Ecology, meaning, and religion

Ecology, Meaning, and Religion

Ecology, Meaning, and Religion

ROY A.

RAPPAPORT

University of Michigan

NORTH ATLANTIC BOOKS RICHMOND,

CALIFORNIA

Ecology, Meaning, and Religion Copyright © 1 9 7 9 by Roy A. Rappaport ISBN 0 - 9 1 3 0 2 8 - 5 4 - 1

Publisher's Current Address: North Atlantic Books 6 3 5 Amador Street Richmond, California 9 4 8 0 5 Distribution for Resale: Book People 2 9 4 0 Seventh Street Berkeley, California 9 4 7 1 0 Ingram Book Company 3 4 7 Reed wood Drive Nashville,Tennessee 3 7 2 1 7 The text is set in ten-point Garamond 3 on Mergenthaler Linocomp equipment Cover: George Mattingly

This book is for Gregory Bateson and Theophile Kahn

Contents Preface

ix A s p e c t s o f M a n ' s I n f l u e n c e o n Island E c o s y s t e m s A l t e r a t i o n and C o n t r o l

Ritual Regulation of Environmental Relations among a N e w Guinea People 27 E c o l o g y , A d a p t a t i o n , and t h e Ills o f F u n c t i o n a l i s m 43 O n Cognized Models 97 A d a p t i v e S t r u c t u r e and Its D i s o r d e r s 145 T h e O b v i o u s A s p e c t s o f Ritual 173 S a n c t i t y and L i e s in E v o l u t i o n 223

Index 247

Preface Like all essays these must speak for themselves, so I shall be brief in sending them on their way. T h e first two were written a good many years ago. T h e second is reprinted unchanged, but for the first I have prepared a "new" final section, based upon an unpublished article also written in 1 9 6 1 . M y reasons for expanding an essay almost two decades old with an equally ancient argument are twofold. First, the constraints of original publica­ tion were such as to require so drastic a condensation of an argument concerning the ecological bases of differences in social stratification in Polynesia that it became almost incomprehensible, but, made clearer in the present expansion, it may still be of interest to some students. Second, the propriety of the distinction between populations and social orders upon which that argument rests remains a matter of debate in anthropology. Because it has been the object of rather sharp criticism within the last several years, it seemed to me useful to present it in the comparative ethnographic context in which it was originally conceived. O f the remaining essays, one—"On Cognized Models"—has been written especially for this collection, and the others are all rather recent. I have felt free to revise them because I do not regard them, in either their original or present forms, to be so much finished works as thoughts in progress. Sections IV, X , and X I of "Ecology, Adaptation, and the Ills of Functionalism" are new, and so are many other passages in that essay and the others. These revisions represent second thoughts and elabora­ tions, but I have also edited extensively to reduce the repetitiveness otherwise inevitable in publishing together articles on related subjects originally appearing separately for different audiences. I have, however, chosen not to eliminate all redundancy. To do so would have made some complex arguments even more difficult to follow and would have im­ posed hardship upon those readers who may want to read some, but not all, of the essays or who, in any event, will not read the volume through at one time. Moreover, reiteration is not devoid of advantages of its own: the appearance of particular points or arguments in more than one essay cannot help but make explicit the themes that articulate them all. Those who read the collection as a whole will surely become aware of the general direction in which it moves. T h e first and second essays could be construed as exercises in a rather strict ecology. The concerns of "The Obvious Aspects of R i t u a l " the penultimate essay—with the under­ standings entailed by ritual's form—could hardly be "less ecological," at

x I Preface least on the face o f it. The intervening essays, however, constitute an attempt to elucidate some of the connections between them. "On Cog­ nized M o d e l s " is centrally concerned with the relationship between the "meaningful," which is culturally constructed, and the "lawful/' which is naturally constituted. "Adaptive Structure and Its Disorders" represents an attempt to elucidate structural features of systems in which meaning­ ful and material processes are ordered, to discuss the relationship of those structural features to adaptation, and to argue that maladaptation can be regarded as structural anomaly, or disorderings of such structures. T h e last essay, "Sanctity and Lies in Evolution," brings themes developed in " T h e Obvious Aspects of Ritual" to bear upon questions of adaptation and evolution raised earlier in the volume. * Although the collection as a whole moves in a certain direction and although this movement is roughly chronological, it should be clear that I have not, in developing the interests expressed in the later essays, disavowed the concerns o f the earlier ones. In my view the incapacities of the ecological approach developed in the first and second essays are not so much a product of flaws as of limitations. There is, simply, a great deal that cannot be explained or interpreted by reference to ecological principles. It was, in fact, a profound sense of the inability of any ecological formulation to account for the meanings inherent in ritual s structure that led me to the mode of formal analysis that operates in " T h e Obvious Aspects of Ritual." B u t limitations, after all, are not themselves errors nor do they produce errors unless they are ignored or overridden, and to say that an approach is limited is not to distinguish it from any other systematic attempt to enlarge understanding, except in particulars. If no particular form of interpretation or explanation can provide all o f the understanding we may hope for, and if the limitations o f each are different, we must consider the possibility that relationships between or among at least some differing modes are complementary rather than alternative or competitive. This issue is approached in the last sections of "Ecology, Adaptation, and the Ills of Functionalism." #

*

#

To acknowledge all those who have influenced these essays or who have in one way or another made it possible for me to write them would include most of the people to whom I have ever spoken. Moreover, to express gratitude to each of those from whom I have learned things reflected in the pages that follow might also seem to inflate claims of significance for what I take to be a modest and tentative work. My appreciation to those from whom I have learned is no less deep and real for remaining general in its expression. It is proper, however, to thank the institutions that have supported

Preface | xi me or extended hospitality to me while I wrote these essays, in either the original o r present versions. They include my own institution, the Uni­ versity of Michigan; the Department of Anthropology of the University of Cambridge; the Wenner-Gren Foundation; the American Council of Learned Societies; the Guggenheim Foundation; and the East-West Center in Honolulu. I also o w e special thanks to Richard Grossinger, the anthropologist and publisher who invited me to gather these essays together, and to several colleagues: Frithjof Bergmann, Ray Kelly, Robert Levy, Ellen Messer, Sherry Ortner, and Aram Yengoyan, each of whom read one or more of the essays rewritten for this volume, offering suggestions for their improvement. I have, in the main, followed their advice, but wish to exonerate them from all responsibility for the collection's flaw's and shortcomings. Karen Shedlowe deciphered my handwriting brilliantly and improved my prose as she, with saintly patience, typed the manu­ script. Ann, Amelia, and Gina Rappaport have, as always, been enor­ mously supportive. Finally, 1 mean the volume as a whole to express my gratitude to the two great teachers to whom it is dedicated. R O Y A. R A P P A P O R T

Aspects of Man's Influence upon Island Ecosystems: Alteration and Control

i This paper will first be concerned with components of prehuman Pacific island ecosystems, and with the cultural and noncultural elements likely to have been introduced by human agency in pre-European times. Then, some of the possible alterations in these ecosystems subsequent to and resulting from human introductions will be discussed and suggestions will be made concerning possible implications for human social organiza­ tion of man's participation in the various kinds of ecosystem. For the sake of convenience, we shall refer to the prehuman eco­ systems as the ''pristine ecosystems." Their reconstruction is no easy task. Many essential data have not yet been provided by paleoecological investigations, and the inferences that may be made from existing island ecosystems are limited. In those ecosystems in which man has had a place, pristine conditions have presumably been obscured by man him­ self as well as by continuing physiographic and climatological processes, and the few islands without permanent populations may, by their nature, have special characteristics and therefore cannot be used uncritically as models for reconstructions of prehuman ecosystems in general. N e v e r ­ theless, some tentative characterizations of the pristine ecosystems can be made. Zimmerman ( 1 9 6 5 ) has outlined for us in some detail the This essay was originally presented at the tenth Pacific Science Congress in Honolulu in 1961 by A. P. Vayda and Roy A . Rappaport. H. E. Maude commented on it. It was revised by Rappaport alone, incorporating some of Maude's comments, and was first published in F. R. Fosberg, ed., Man's Place in the Island Ecosystem (Honolulu: Bishop Museum Press, 1963).

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characteristics of the pristine terrestrial ecosystems of high islands. It would be well to review some of these characteristics briefly. Owing to the difficulty of transportation across open sea, these systems were generally characterized by the presence of few genera. T h e relative number of genera in the various situations was roughly in inverse pro­ portion to the distance from the large land masses of Australia and Mela­ nesia, the points of origin for most of the forms, although some plants and animals did arrive in various islands from other directions. Members of many large taxonomic groupings were able to arrive only rarely if at all; thus, for instance, very few terrestrial vertebrates became established in, and mammals were totally absent from, large portions of the island world. T h e forms which did establish themselves, however, frequently did so in the absence of those biotic and edaphic features which had kept them in check in their earlier habitats, and often found "ecological vac­ uums" in their new homes. These two factors made for rapid, sometimes explosive, population expansion. Indeed, conditions on the high islands, which are characterized by great meteorological and physical variety within restricted space, encouraged rapid and prolific speciation. (Thus, in Hawaii, 1 , 2 0 0 or more species of land snails in nine families have arisen from possibly no more than twenty-four ancestral stocks.) Many of the adaptations associated with this speciation were extreme and nar­ row, however, and were possible only in the absence of forms better able to exploit the same sets of resources. Thus, as new immigrants arrived there was frequent replacement of forms, and it is unlikely that equilibria were ever approached. While the biotic elements in the pristine high islands were taxonomically restricted, those on the low islands were even more so. The indi­ genous vegetation of uninhabited Rose Atoll, for instance, included only three vascular species in as many genera (Sachet 1 9 5 4 : 1 5 ) . While this example is extreme, similar data may be found concerning larger in­ habited islands. Hatheway ( 1 9 5 5 : 2 ) studied the vegetation of Canton Island some twenty years after the arrival of relatively permanent resi­ dents. O f the approximately 1 6 0 vascular plant species present at the time of his study, he regarded only 1 4 species in as many genera to be indigenous. On the same island, Van Zwaluwenberg ( i 9 5 5 ' ) found only 93 species o f insects, not all of which were indigenous (Degener and Gillaspy 1 9 5 $ : 4 8 ) . On Kapingamarangi, an island peopled a rela­ tively long time ago, Niering ( 1 9 5 6 : 4 ) found 98 vascular plant species, 58 o f which had been introduced by man. Several factors combine to make the terrestrial biota of the atoll among the world's most retricted. Fosberg has suggested that in addition to the factor most pertinent in high islands, that of difficulty of transportation across open water, the relatively short period of time during which dry J I

Aspects of Man's Influence upon Island Ecosystems | 3 land has been exposed on coral atolls is of primary importance. H e points also to the lack of topographic or altitudinal diversity which was crucial in the processes of speciation in the high islands, and, finally, to special edaphic conditions such as high salinity and calcareousness prevailing on atolls (Fosberg 1 9 5 3 : 5)It is possible, however, that despite the lack of diversity in the low island biota, equilibria were more closely approximated on atolls than on the high islands, for conditions were so special that the introduction of most new forms was in large measure prohibited. Those floral elements which did become dominant were highly adapted for both water-borne dispersal and for survival under the forbidding conditions offered by the atoll. Consequently they were almost invulnerable to displacement by other forms. It is interesting to note that none of the 1 5 0 floral species recently brought to Canton by man has shown any tendency to invade the still undisturbed areas of the island, which continue to be dominated by indigenous forms (Hatheway 1 9 5 5 : 2 ) . Reef-lagoon biota, found in association with both coral atolls and high islands, may be regarded as belonging to distinct ecosystems which con­ trast strikingly with those of dry land. Considerable stability and great taxonomic variety in reef-lagoon ecosystems is indicated by some recent investigations, such as Hiatt and Strasburg's study ( 1 9 6 0 ) of 2 3 3 of the approximately 6 0 0 species of fish judged to be present in Marshall Islands reef communities. The 2 3 3 species belonged to 127 genera and 56 fami­ lies, and it should not be forgotten that the biota included many organ­ isms in addition to fish. Odum and Odum ( 1 9 5 5 ) , who studied the reef community of Eniwetok Atoll in the Marshall Islands, also discuss the variety and richness of reef-lagoon ecosystems. Moreover, they point out that the Eniwetok reef-lagoon system seemed to sustain itself; the primary producers were members of the community and apparently there was little derived from exotic plankton. To Odum and Odum this seemeci a "true climax community" with little or no variation in living biomass. Similarly, Hiatt and Strasburg ( 1 9 6 0 : 66) refer to reef ecosystems as "steady state equilibria," self-adjusted and apparently fluctuating in com­ position very little, if at all, from year to year. T h e stability of these reeflagoon systems, despite the exploitation to which they have been sub­ jected for considerable time, gives some grounds for supposing that the difference between observed and pristine conditions is probably much less in reef-lagoon than in terrestrial ecosystems. II Pacific island ecosystems were eventually entered by human popula­ tions, together with their associated mutuals, parasites, and commensals.

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Information concerning the biotic associations arriving at the various islands is scanty, but it is clear that a simple reconstruction of an early Pacific cultigen inventory would only mark the range of possible introduc­ tions into any particular island. While the range of Pacific cultigens was limited, it was broad enough to ensure that no human group transported the full inventory, and the range o f organisms associated with either the humans o r the domesticates and cultigens in relationships of commensalism or parasitism was even broader. It must be assumed, therefore, that each island in the Pacific received a set o f organisms that differed to a greater or lesser degree from the sets introduced into other islands. The migrating human populations should be seen as units comparable to other animal populations being introduced into the island ecosystems. A population, human or not, may be defined as an aggregate of organ­ isms that belong to the same species, occupy a common habitat, and have in common certain distinctive means whereby they exploit one or more niches in one or more ecosystems. Needless to say, human populations rely most heavily upon extrabiological (that is, cultural) means in exploit­ ing niches in ecosystems; but there is no advantage, for ecological in­ quiry, in treating cultures as entities to be separated from the culture carriers. Particular means may be regarded as attributes of particular populations, particular cultural means as properties of particular human populations. * Considerable diversity must have obtained among human founding populations in the Pacific islands. Even in such restricted areas of the island world as Polynesia, the circumstances of settlement were such that we cannot assume common human traits, both biological and cultural, to have been brought equally to all islands. A multiplicity of points of em­ barkation is indicated by linguistics and stratigraphic archaeology (Emory 1 9 6 1 ; G o o d e n o u g h 1 9 5 7 ; Grace 1 9 6 1 ; G r e e n 1 9 6 1 ) . Furthermore, im­ migrant groups, which often seem to have comprised only a few people (Vayda 1 9 5 9 ) , no doubt represented chance samples of their ancestral populations. They brought with them neither the whole gene pools nor the entire cultures of those populations (Goodenough 1 9 5 7 ) . Continuing investigations should elucidate some of the variations, par­ ticularly in technology, which pertained among human founding popula­ tions. Questions concerning differences in tool inventories will, to some extent, be answered by stratigraphic archaeology. B u t while it is already evident that there were marked differences among the forms of tools even in the inventories of groups as closely related historically as the Polynesian populations, the functional differences among these forms •For a discussion of the implications of populations as units of analysis in ecological formulations in anthropology, see section IV of the essay "Ecology, Adaptation, and the Ills of Functional ism" in this volume.

Aspects of Man's Influence upon Island Ecosystems | 5 are not clear. While it may be possible to do anything with a tangless adz that can be done with a tanged adz, for example, it is less likely that the variety offish that can be taken on two-piece hooks corresponds exactly to that which can be taken on one-piece hooks. In eastern Polynesia both one- and two-piece hooks are found, whereas in western Polynesia only two-piece hooks are known. Archaeology has yet to decide for us whether these differences are differences in the hook inventories of the immi­ grant groups, or whether they are a result of subsequent differentiation from initially similar bases, a less likely possibility. If the latter is the case, we may have an example o f technological "adaptive differentiation." If the former, we have an initial difference which may have made for slightly different impacts on more or less similar marine ecosystems. It is extremely unlikely that the biological variation among different founding populations can ever be fully known; but studies of differences among contemporary populations may help to illuminate the possible importance of biological variation in the ability of particular populations to participate in particular ecosystems. Maude ( 1 9 6 3 ) tells us . . while I could scarcely drink the well water in many Gilbertese villages, particu­ larly in times of drought, the people of Bangai on Tabiteuea, situated on a remote sandy islet, have apparently become accustomed to drinking water so brackish that even the Gilbertese, when visiting them, are re­ ported to bring their own bottled supplies." It cannot be asserted, of course, that the ability to use resources which others cannot use indicates genetic difference. It is probable that the people of Bangai had, through lifelong use, simply become conditioned to water which others were unable, or preferred not, to tolerate. H o w e v e r , the possible biological basis of this ability, genetic or not, does merit investigation. Answers to this and similar questions, particularly those concerning the dietary re­ quirements of various populations, may demonstrate that interpopulation biological differences may be significant variables in the interaction of men and ecosystems. We should also consider differences between founding populations in those portions of their cultures which comprised the means for ordering elements in the ecosystems into meaningful categories. To be noted here are such questions as: what was immediately recognized as food and what was not; what restrictions, if any, were placed upon the exploitation of various portions of the biota, or on specific practices of exploitation; how close a correspondence there was between what were seen to be the criti­ cal relationships pertaining among biotic elements and the operational relationships which did, in fact, pertain among the same elements. To deal with these questions, it may be useful to make a distinction between the "operational environment" of a population and what could be termed its "cognized environment." The term "operational environ-

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| ECOLOGY, M E A N I N G , A N D RELIGION

meat" was originally proposed by Marston Bates ( 1 9 6 0 : 5 5 4 ) , who quotes a definition o f environment constructed earlier by Mason and Langenheim: The environment of any organism is the class composed of the sum of those phenomena that enter a reaction system of the organism or otherwise directly impinge upon it to affect its mode of life at any time throughout its life cycle as ordered by the demands of the ontogeny of the organism or as ordered by any other condition of the organism that alters its environmental demands. The cognized environment may be seen as the class composed of the sum o f the phenomena ordered into meaningful categories by a population. T h e operational and cognized environments will include many of the same elements, but they may differ extensively in the structuring of rela­ tionships between elements. It is probable that in the case of human populations in small Pacific islands no operational nor cognized environment is, or ever was, co­ terminous with a particular ecosystem. Both the cognized and operational environments of such populations included elements best seen as com­ ponents of several distinct ecosystems; that of the dry land, and those of the sea. On the other hand, it is clear that no cognized environment will ever include all o f the elements in any ecosystem, and it is possible that some elements in an ecosystem will be so remote, functionally, from a population in the same ecosystem that these elements may be considered to be outside that population's operational environment. A s in the case of their biological components, it will never be possible to reconstruct the cognitive systems of founding populations in the Pacific, much less map their cognized environments. However, the analy­ sis of contemporary folk taxonomies in such areas a ethnobotany and ethnozoology, a study already pioneered by Conklin and others, should yield important insights into the roles played by distinctive cognitive capacities and limitations in structuring the interaction of particular popu­ lations with particular ecosystems. Ill A m o n g the numerous and varied elements of the established island eco­ systems and the elements introduced into them an almost infinite number of specific interactions is conceivable. The data are deficient on the inter­ actions that actually took place, but it is evident that not all exotic forms could find a place in the islands to which they were conveyed. Among the forms that might be rejected were human beings themselves. There are islands in the Pacific which were reached by people in pre-European times but seem never to have supported permanent human populations. In some, such as Phoenix Island, it was probably the terrestrial, rather

Aspects of Man's Influence upon Island Ecosystems \ i than the reef-lagoon system which was inhospitable to man. We have no evidence to indicate that the reef-lagoon system of Phoenix Island dif­ fered markedly from those of nearby inhabited atolls, but we do know that Phoenix was considerably smaller than its inhabited neighbors; too small, according to Maude, to provide a home for a sufficient number of humans to form a viable community. Further, and associated with its small size and local atmospheric conditions, there was quite possibly a deficiency of fresh water on Phoenix. Rainfall was slight and irregular, and when, in 1 9 3 7 , Maude dug six wells to a depth of twelve feet, he was unable to find a fresh water lens (Maude 1 9 5 2 : 11). While it is probable that in most uninhabited low islands deficiencies in terrestrial rather than in reef-lagoon systems were crucial, it is clear that not all reef-lagoon systems are equally utilizable by humans. It seems, in fact, that factors in some reef-lagoon systems have severely hindered, or even prevented, human colonization. The recent history of the Gilbertese colony on Sydney Island in the Phoenix group is an example. While the size of the island was sufficient for a viable colony, and while coconut culti­ vation was possible, Maude ( 1 9 6 3 ) writes that "the configuration of the shore-line afforded no adequate lee for the deep sea fisherman, and with many of the reef fish toxic . . . and no fish in the lagoon . . . the colony had to be abandoned after twenty years." T h e sea channel into the lagoon, according to Maude, had dried up, resulting in a level o f salinity in the lagoon too high to maintain marine biota. Maude also suggests that some islands were differentially hospitable to different immigrant populations: . . . there existed many environments so uncongenial to some immigrants that sooner or later they preferred to risk all the perils of the deep rather than remain; whereas on these same islands others more accustomed to making the best use of strictly limited ecosystems were later able to establish comfortable and permanent homes. . . . The more limited the environmental potentialities, the fewer and more specialized the human populations willing to add them­ selves to the establishment. T h e importance of possible interpopulation cognitive and perhaps bio­ logical variation is suggested here. On other islands, conditions permitted the establishment of humans, but excluded certain of the species associated with them. Thus, certain plants such as sweet potatoes and kava, widely cultivated in Polynesia, could not be grown on many atolls. Certain commensals and parasites conveyed inadvertently by man may likewise have failed to become estab­ lished. This may have been especially true of weeds associated with food crops that came to be cultivated in new ways and under new conditions. O f the exotic forms not rejected, some were established less easily and less extensively than others. On coral atolls, for instance, the establish-

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ment of introduced root crops, most commonly taro-like plants, gener­ ally required painstaking modification of the cultivation sites. Also, cer­ tain arboreal forms were not readily established in coral atolls. Whereas the cultivation of breadfruit was possible there, it was limited by calcare­ ous soils (Catala 1 9 5 7 : 1 1 ) and by the sensitivity of the trees to salt water in the form of spray or occasional inundation (Fosberg 1 9 5 3 : 5, 8 ) . That there could be difficulty in establishing and maintaining even that impor­ tant and widely distributed food plant, the coconut, is suggested by its reported near-absence from a number of atolls prior to the advent of the copra trade (Danielsson 1 9 5 5 : 6 4 - 6 $ ) . T h e limiting factor probably was drought. On the other hand, some animals, after being brought by man to cer­ tain islands, apparently became established readily and were by no means confined to areas modified by human activities. Most notable of such animals were rats. C o o k ( 1 7 8 4 : 2 1 7 ) found rats on uninhabited Palmerston in 1 7 7 7 . A n abundance of the animals was noted by Mayor in 1 9 2 0 on R o s e Atoll, which has never been inhabited (Sachet 1 9 5 4 : 2 0 ) , and Sharp ( 1 9 5 6 : 1 3 6 ) states that at least five Polynesian islands had rats but no people at the time of European discovery. Certain insects probably were transported by people. On uninhabited Alone islet in Ant Atoll, Marshall ( 1 9 5 7 - 5) found swarms of cockroaches. The ability o f some animals to establish themselves without much help from man is indicated also by the fact that on some islands, especially the larger ones, domesti­ cated animals have escaped and have maintained themselves in the "wild." In M o o r e a in the Society Islands, "wild" pigs and chickens have become established in the mountainous and more or less inaccessible interior, and have recently been joined by "wild" goats and cattle as well. There are interesting examples from lower and smaller islands too. Maude ( 1 9 5 2 : 7 6 - 7 7 ) found rabbits on uninhabited Phoenix in 1 9 3 7 , and G r e e n ( 1 9 6 1 ) has seen goats on Kamaka, an uninhabited island in the Mangarevan Islands. Man himself as an exotic biotic element in island ecosystems must not be forgotten. Like many other immigrant species populations, humans found ecological vacuums in the ecosystems they entered. Population growth must frequently have been explosive. A model proposed by B i r d sell ( 1 9 5 7 ) suggests that populations in "open" environments are likely to double, at least initially, in each generation. Densities exceeding 1,000 per square mile were eventually reached on some islands. It seems probable that, generally, the flora transported inadvertently and introduced by pre-European human populations did not become dominant. Merrill ( 1 9 5 4 : 2 1 2 ) believes that in 1 7 6 9 , when Banks and Solander made their collections in Tahiti, there were relatively few intro­ duced weeds and that the flora had not been gready altered as to con-

Aspects of Man's Influence upon Island Ecosystems | 9 stituent species. It may be that, in general, the establishment of most introduced floral elements was restricted in pre-European times to sites modified by human activities. This seems so for the important food plants, all of which except pandanus were introduced by man. The same kind of restriction for weeds is suggested by Merrill's interpretation, but the data are deficient. While it is possible, as Maude suggests, that many islands were con­ genial to some human immigrants and not to others, immigrant popula­ tions were rarely confronted with kinds of ecosystems about which they knew nothing. For example, since most high islands have fringing reefs, often with coral islets on them, atolls would not have been entirely strange even to many immigrant high islanders (Goodenough 1957* 1 5 1 - 1 5 2 ) . Nevertheless, no two Pacific islands have ever been alike in all important respects; elements apparently similar in two islands might turn out to differ significantly. Thus, some fish, especially red snappers, groupers, jacks and barracuda, are toxic within rather narrow geographical limits, harmless in nearby areas (Banner 1 9 5 9 : 3 0 - This means that the occur­ rence of toxicity or nontoxicity, even among recognized fish, could not be taken for granted by immigrant groups. The classifications and reclassifications that humans made of both flora and fauna had a bearing upon the interaction between themselves and island ecosystems. Edible plants and such fauna as sharks and sea-slugs might be utilized, depending upon whether they had been classified as edible or otherwise in the islands from which the people came. There might have been some reclassifications. A n emergency food, for example, might have been reclassified as a staple. This was true of Portulaca oleracea (purslane) among Gilbertese settlers of the Phoenix Islands (Turbott 1 9 5 9 ; 1 9 5 4 ) - On occasion, people were confronted by plants that they did not know at all. Cumberland tells us that the principal staple vege­ table food of the Maoris was the starchy root of the Pteridium esculentum. a fern that must have been unknown to the first settlers of N e w Zealand. Occasionally, man's introductions resulted in the complete elimination and replacement of certain pre-existing forms, or, more frequently, the range and numbers of those forms were reduced. Such reductions were not always directly due to man. In Hawaii the rat played an important part in bringing some plants and certain ground-nesting birds to the brink of extinction (Zimmerman 1 9 6 3 ) . B u t human activities in many cases did have a direct influence. Certain plants and animals were elimi­ nated or substantially reduced, not because they were pests, nor because, being useful, they were overexploited, but simply because they were in the way. This must have been true in localities where sedentary horti­ culture was instituted. In most areas of tropical Polynesia and Micronesia where swidden agriculture was being practiced, secondary forest usually

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replaced virgin forest. On Moala Island in Fiji, however, where the lands around long-established villages were deforested as a result of swiddening, replacement was by a thick cover of reed (Sahlins 1 9 5 7 : 4 5 8 : 4 5 9 ) . S o m e plant and animal populations were undoubtedly eliminated or re­ duced through direct overexploitation. This may have been the reason for moa extinction in N e w Zealand, although, as Sharp ( 1 9 5 6 : 1 3 6 ) sug­ gests in a speculative reconstruction, rats and dogs may also have been responsible for the extinction of these birds. Certain shellfish, particu­ larly the more accessible or more visible ones on reefs or close to shore­ lines, may have been brought to near extinction through overexploita­ tion. Pertinent information on this should become available with the publication o f the midden analyses of recent archaeological excavations in Mangareva and in the Society and Hawaiian Islands. Some plants or animals were the victims of human activities directed against other plants or animals. T h e use of fire in connection with the hunting of wild fauna could destroy much natural vegetation, and Cum­ berland indicates that many acres of forests in N e w Zealand may have been eliminated in this manner in Moa-hunter times. A more recent example is available from tropical Polynesia. Some years ago, when Tahitians began to use fire for hunting pigs in the highlands, large portions of Tahitian uplands were burned. These areas are now covered by weeds largely of American origin, rather than by indigenous arboreal vegetation. M a n s activities sometimes provided new opportunities for certain in­ digenous species. Coconut groves planted by man were, for instance, an attractive habitat for a number of indigenous plants. Certain of these, such as morinda and pandanus, may so flourish under coconut trees as to threaten to choke out the plantations (Fosberg 1 9 5 3 : 1 1 ) . Nonliving components of the ecosystems were also significantly af­ fected by man. When sea-birds were frightened away by human settle­ ments on coral atolls, the soils could no longer be replenished with the phosphate and nitrate contents of guano (Fosberg 1 9 5 3 : 3 ; Hatheway 1 9 5 3 : 6 1 ) . In modern times, additional phosphate has been lost from island ecosystems through the export of large quantities of phosphorusrich copra (Fosberg 1 9 5 3 : 1 1 ) . In the Tahitian uplands, where human activities have recently effected a replacement o f arboreal flora, the water-retaining capacity of the soil has been seriously impaired; streams that previously flowed all the time are now dry for part of the year. IV Man's introductions affected levels of productivity and the organization of biotic communities differently in each of the three kinds of Pacific island ecosystems.

Aspects of Mans Influence upon Island Ecosystems | u The terrestrial systems of high islands were probably the most vulner­ able to processes resulting in changed productivity and changed commu­ nity organization. In general, these systems were extremely hospitable to most new organisms; and there was, no doubt, substantial change in the organization of some biotic communities simply concomitant to the in­ troduction of new species. These introductions increased organic diver­ sity, on the genus level at least, but it is improbable that in themselves they had an important effect upon the general productivity of the eco­ systems. Much more important changes, particularly involving processes lowering productivity, could have resulted directly from human activi­ ties. Evidence of such processes in pre-European Polynesia and Micro­ nesia are generally lacking, but in Melanesia such degradation is clear. In the latter area, indeed, Barrau ( 1 9 5 8 : 1 9 ) usually credits the formation of grassland, scrub, savannah, and savannah woodland, at the expense of forest, to human activity: "In most areas, man is responsible for spread­ ing these herbaceous formations, which have developed as a result of damage caused to the original vegetation by shifting agriculture or by burning for hunting purposes. Burning was also used in some places to facilitate foraging... First, the replacement of forest by grassy cover affected the water supply. Barrau suggests ( 1 9 5 8 . 2 5 ) that the development of a definite dry season in large areas of Melanesia was a result of the replacement of arboreal by herbaceous formations. Such replacement of forest over hilly areas too limited in size to affect the rainfall regime might still reduce the effective water supply over larger regions. A recent case observed in Tahiti has been mentioned above, and G o u r o u ( 1 9 6 3 ) notes a similar case in nineteenth-century Mauritius. Second, the replacement of forest by other vegetation on slopes may have brought about soil erosion. It is possible that the replacement of arboreal by herbaceous climaxes was not unknown in pre-European tropical Polynesian and Micronesian high islands. T h e lack of evidence, however, suggests that in those areas in which primary forests were removed, they were usually replaced by secondary forest rather than by nonarboreal covers. T h e productivity rates of these fast growing secondary forest formations were probably not at great variance with those prevailing in the primary forests and, further, the long-range tendency toward re-establishment of the original climax was not destroyed. It would seem that on the high islands of Micronesia and Melanesia serious degradation of the terrestrial eco­ systems was not frequently or widely induced by human populations, despite their size and density, occupancy o f one to three millennia, and removal of primary forest cover from large areas. This is in marked con­ trast to some larger and less densely populated regions in Melanesia. The terrestrial systems of atolls were less vulnerable to change induced

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by pre-European man. While there was possibility of drastic reduction of productivity rates on high islands through the replacement of climax forest by scrub, weed, or grass, the agricultural possibilities presented by atolls precluded such extensive degradation. The cultivation of root crops on atolls was not only restricted to areas under which the water table was relatively low in salinity, but restricted to sites which had been pains­ takingly modified by excavating and composting. T h e areas thus trans­ formed were generally small, relative to total island size. Furthermore, it is probable that primary productivity in taro pits was higher than in any unmodified portion of the ecosystem. Great emphasis on tree cultivation is largely recent; a response to the European demand for copra. N e v e r ­ theless, it can be assumed that on many atolls cultivated trees, particu­ larly coconut and to a lesser extent breadfruit, were significant in preEuropean ecosystems. Tree cultivation necessitated at least partial re­ placement of indigenous arborescent forms, but trees were replaced by trees. Changes in community structures were, therefore, less profound than in those high islands on which trees were replaced by very different vegetations. Furthermore, since coconut groves sometimes sheltered a lower story of indigenous species such as pandanus and morinda, it is doubtful whether pre-European tree cultivation in itself served to lower levels of primary productivity. It must be noted, however, that cultivated trees were more vulnerable to drought than the indigenous varieties, and that during periods of water shortage primary productivity must have decreased more markedly in cultivated groves than in areas of indigenous vegetation. Furthermore, the cultivation and consumption o f coconut has induced depletion of phosphorus in atoll soils, contributing to longrun lowering of productivity. This has become serious on some atolls in recent times, but to what extent it was a problem in pre-European times is uncertain. Atoll water supplies, while more precarious than those of high islands, were less vulnerable to damage by man. Derived mainly from a hydro­ static lens under a relatively flat surface, they were generally unaffected by human activity. Reef-lagoon ecosystems were least affected by human participation. Community structure and productivity rates probably always remained, as they still do, quite constant. There is no clear-cut evidence of either the introduction of new organisms into pristine reef-lagoon systems by man or o f the complete elimination of any of the constituent species populations by man, although both may have occurred.* Quite possible the numbers o f certain species dropped drastically from time to time, 4

A n exception to this may be pointed out in the Palmyra Island lagoon, where the eco­ logical conditions and the biota were completely modified when free circulation of ocean water was cut off (see E. Y. Dawson, Pacific Naturalist 1(2): 1 - 5 1 , 1959)-

Aspects of Man's Influence upon Island Ecosystems | 1 3 and it is even possible that occasionally the total biomass of the faunal components of some communities was reduced significantly because of human activities. Such events, however, must have been of short dura­ tion for the primary producers of the reef-lagoon community, in con­ trast to those of terrestrial systems, could hardly be affected by man. Essentially calcareous algae and zooxanthellae, these primary producers could not be utilized directly as food by man, nor could the space they occupied be turned by man to other uses. Therefore species or whole faunas which had been temporarily reduced could always find the nutri­ ment with which to regenerate their numbers.

The kinds of communities emerging from interactions between pristine ecosystems and introduced elements, including man, may be broadly categorized according to man's place in them. On the reef, in the lagoon, and in the sea there continued to be relatively unmodified communities, composed of generally the same elements in generally the same relation­ ships as those that obtained prior to man's arrival. The ecological niche or niches exploited by human populations belonging to such communi­ ties depended mainly upon the biotic elements present before the advent of man; the presence, location, and quantity of these elements were sub­ ject to little or no control by human beings. Within Pacific island terrestrial ecosystems, there emerged rather dif­ ferent kinds of biotic communities, which may be designated as "anthropocentric." In such communities, both the presence of the main biotic elements, particularly the primary producers, and the decisive relation­ ships among them depended upon the ecological niches that human beings had arranged for themselves according to their criteria of selfinterest. T h e nature and composition of the communities were the result of attempts by human populations to construct and dominate simplified ecosystems consisting of short food chains. These anthropocentric communities were delicate. Because they usu­ ally did not extend over all of a locality in which similar climatic and edaphic conditions prevailed, the territory of anthropocentric commu­ nities might be subject to reconquest by the unmodified biota at com­ munity borders. Within the anthropocentric communities were weeds and animal pests that threatened either to subvert the entire communi­ ties or, at least, to divert substantial organic matter from food chains leading to man. Moreover, the perpetuation of the anthropocentric com­ munities depended upon the continuing presence of a large class of things not within the "cognized" environment of the human population: nitrogen-fixing bacteria and trace elements, for example. T h e functional

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requisites of even known elements were not necessarily clearly under­ stood and might at times fail to be provided by appropriate human action. Thus the disruption of anthropocentric communities might come about through too great a difference between the structures of the cognized and the operational environments. Human intraspecies competition placed anthropocentric communities in jeopardy. During warfare the human population might be unable to burn the bush or to plant cultigens at the proper times, and enemy planta­ tions might be deliberately destroyed. This is said to have been true of the native wars of such Polynesian high islands as Tahiti, Hawaii, Samoa, and Mangaia (Vayda 1 9 5 6 : 2 4 0 ; Williamson 1 9 3 9 : 3 6 - 3 8 ) . Regarding Tuamotuan coral atolls, Lucett ( 1 8 5 1 : 2 6 0 ) wrote in the middle of the nineteenth century that warriors from the island of Anaa "some years a g o . . . overran nearly every island in the g r o u p . . . rooting up and de­ stroying every cocoa-nut tree standing, which accounts for their scarcity at the other islands." VI Factors noted in earlier sections may help to account for the remarkable differences in social stratification prevailing in Polynesian societies when they were first observed by European voyagers. Consideration of the relationship of these factors to aspects of Polynesian social orders is, moreover, pertinent to the continuing discussion within anthropology of the place of ecosystemic processes and ecological principles and methods in accounting for cultural differences, and of the utility and propriety in anthropological formulations of a special cultural ecology on the one hand and of a general biological ecology on the other. As Sahlins noted in his bold pioneering study of adaptive radiation, Social Stratification in Polynesia ( 1 9 5 8 ) , differences in prerogatives, rights and honor were more highly developed on volcanic high islands than on coral atolls. N o t only did structurally complex ranking distinguish three strata of persons in the most highly stratified archipelagos—Hawaii, Tonga, * Samoa, and the Society Islands—but the rights vested in each of these ranks were distinct from those of the others. T h e highest rank usually claimed title to land and lagoons, controlled communal produc­ tion, had call upon the harvests reaped and the fish landed, managed redistributions, possessed confiscatory prerogatives, could mete out pun­ ishments as severe as banishment or death, and were highly sanctified. •Tongan society, very highly stratified by all accounts, seems anomalous. The dominant island, Tongatabu, is neither a high island nor an atoll but a raised coral island. In area, however—about 100 square miles—and in the presence of volcanic soil, it resembles high islands more than atolls.

Aspects of Man's Influence upon Island Ecosystems | 1 5 Other high island societies—Mangareva, Mangaia, Easter, the Marque­ sas Tikopia—seem to have been less stratified than those of Hawaii, Tonga, Samoa, and Tahiti; but the least stratified of all Polynesian socie­ ties occupied coral atolls. There were only two status levels in Puka Puka, O n t o n g j a v a , and Tokelau (Sahlins 1 9 5 8 : 1 2 , ch. 5) and virtually all other atoll societies, and the prerogatives of the upper or chiefly strata were limited. On only a few atolls were any members of the upper stratum freed from physical labor; chiefs were not usually important in distribution and they did not play much of a part in the management of communal lands. They were not highly sanctified and their ability to pun­ ish was slight. Sahlins attempted to account for differences in the degree of social stratification of Polynesian societies by differences in their productivity. In my view differences in productivity, if they existed at all, had no sig­ nificance in this respect, but other ecosystemic differences discussed earlier in this essay were, in fact, salient. Sahlins's argument is an impor­ tant one, however, and it deserves recapitulation. It is founded upon the assumption that greater productivity produced larger surpluses, a por­ tion of which could be used to free chiefs and, in some instances, their retainers as well as "bureaucrats" and craft specialists, from laboring in food production. Freed from horticulture and fishing, the chief could devote himself to the administration of the distribution of that portion of the surplus not required to support him and his establishment. T h e chief's duties or functions in the domain of distribution would have served, Sahlins argued, as a ground for the extension of his prerogatives into other aspects of social life. If there is a separation on the basis of status between producers and regulators of general distribution, certain consequences would follow regarding the sepa­ ration of statuses in many other operations. First there would be a tendency for the regulation of distribution to exert some authority over production.... A degree of control of production implies a degree of control over the utiliza­ tion of resources, or, in other words . . . property rights. In turn, regulation of these economic processes necessitates the exercise of authority in interpersonal affairs. . . . Finally, all these differentials would be validated in ideology and ceremony. Sac redness and ritual superiority become attributes of high rank [1958:4]. Atoll societies were least stratified because least productive in Sahlins's view. Although it is not altogether clear, he may have considered their relatively low productivity to have been a function of their relatively heavy reliance, compared to societies inhabiting high islands, upon the bounties of the reef, the lagoon, and the open sea. H e observes that "in most environments horticultural activities are usually more productive than collecting activities since the reproduction of the energy source is

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directly controlled" (p. 1 0 ) . This general rule served Sahlins, at any rate, as a subsidiary ground for assessing productivities, the comparison of which formed the demonstration o f his thesis. Sahlins denned productivity in two rather different ways. First, "the ability to derive need-serving goods from the external world may be called the productivity of the culture" (p. 1 0 7 ) ; second, productivity is "considered to mean the ability of the wielders of the technology to produce strategic goods beyond their consumption needs*' (p. 1 4 9 ) - T h e second of the two seems to identify productivity with surplus and, in the absence of quantitative data on agricultural yields, fish landings, and con­ sumption, Sahlins approached the problem of assessing differential pro­ ductivity through an attempt to assess and order the surpluses generated in the various societies he considered. H e took "the greatest number of people encompassed in a single redistributive network" to be "a fairly accurate indication of the ability to produce 5 „ or immediate surplus" (p. 1 0 9 ) , which he defined as "the ability of food producers to acquire, in a single exploitative activity, an amount of food beyond their immedi­ ate consumption needs, or an amount greater than would be needed before production is resumed again" (pp. 1 0 8 - 1 0 9 ) . "Cyclical surplus," that which was produced during a complete production cycle in excess o f the needs o f those engaged in subsistence production, was also taken into consideration. "Other things being constant, the greater the [cyclical surplus] the greater the proportion of people in the society divorced from food production, that is, the greater the proportion of specialists" (p. 1 0 9 ) . T h e inferential chain forged by Sahlins to estimate comparative pro­ ductivity and to associate it with comparative degrees of social stratifica­ tion was a long one, and some of its links were weak. T h e identification of surplus with productivity is questionable, for one thing. For another, a procedure that takes the size o f the distributive network to be a criterion of productivity ipso facto prejudices the results in favor of the larger soci­ eties, even when the frequencies of the distributions are taken into ac­ count. Indeed, Sahlins's summary table of comparative productivity (p. 1 3 2 ) reveals what may be a perfect correlation between estimated popu­ lation size and productivity. This would seem to reduce his general for­ mulation to the correlation of social stratification with population size. Such a correlation may, indeed, have prevailed. Most anthropologists would be hesitant, however, to assign an important causal or enabling role in the development of stratification to population size perse, although it may be that some atoll populations were simply too small to maintain stratified relations among their members. Another objection to Sahlins's procedure for estimating immediate surplus was pointed out by Goodenough ( 1 9 5 9 ) . If the scope of the

Aspects of Man's Influence upon Island Ecosystems | 17 distributive prerogative vested in chiefs is to be considered an aspect of stratification and if stratification is to be accounted for by productivity, to read productivity from the size of distributive networks is to come peri­ lously close to circularity. It may also be suggested that Sahlins's attempt to estimate cyclical sur­ plus from reports of the presence of craft specialists is also dubious. For one thing, the relationship of such specialists to subsistence activities is not entirely clear. Moreover, other criteria for estimating cyclical surplus would have yielded different results. For instance, the stone ceremonial structures found throughout Polynesia represent investments of labor which must have been supported from surpluses, either "immediate" or "cyclical." T h e largest stone structures in Polynesia are dance platforms in the Marquesas, an archipelago in which stratification was much less strongly developed than elsewhere, and Emory ( 1 9 4 7 : 4 2 ) found that at least thirteen maraes existed on Nupaka, an atoll in the Tuamotus with a land area of not much more than a square mile. The criteria employed by Sahlins to infer surpluses were, then, ques­ tionable and, moreover, the relationship of surplus to productivity is ambiguous. If the confiscatory prerogatives of a chief are supported by severe physical sanctions, that which he takes into his hands, whether he consumes it or redistributes it, may not be surplus, if by "surplus" is meant the quantity of goods exceeding the consumption needs of those who produced them. If, on the other hand, chiefly redistributions served to provide a population with a portion of its requirements, as they may sometimes have in Hawaii (see Sahlins, 1 9 5 8 , especially pp. 1 7 - 1 8 ) , it would be difficult to argue that what is redistributed represents surplus. Hawaii notwithstanding, however, the p a n played by large-scale chiefly redistributions in the actual provisioning of the populations of high islands is unclear but is, nevertheless, suspect. For one thing they did not occur very often. For another, in all but a few of the very largest islands the full range of plants and animals contributing significantly to subsis­ tence flourished in locations convenient to all residences. These con­ siderations combine to suggest that the importance of large-scale chiefly redistributions in the routine distribution of foodstuffs was slight (although they may have had a more important role during emergencies). If the role of the chiefs in distribution was not, in fact, important in provision­ ing, it could hardly have served as the ground from which their authority could be extended into the realm of production and property rights on the one hand and into interpersonal affairs on the other. To say, however, that the economic and nutritional importance of chiefly redistributions was probably not great on most high islands is not to derogate their significance, which seems to have been largely "sym­ bolic." To respond to the chief's call for provisions, most of which would

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be quickly redistributed to those who had donated them, was not merely to recognize his primary rights in the land, the lagoon, the sea, and the fruits thereof, but to give substance to that recognition. Chiefly collec­ tions and redistributions were material representations—that is to say, substantiations—of social relations. It may be noted in passing that to characterize redistribution as symbol­ izing social relations is inadequate. In Charles Peirce's ( 1 9 6 0 : I 4 3 f f . ) sense they demonstrated, displayed, or indicated the character and state of those relations. There were, possibly, two classes of information trans­ mitted in those demonstrations. First, as we have already noted, the mes­ sage of subordination to the chief was intrinsic to making contributions to redistributions. T h e term "message" may not be sufficiently strong. Subordination was realized in the contribution, which is to say that con­ tributing may not only have been performative in J . L . Austin's ( 1 9 6 2 ) sense (see "On Cognized M o d e l s " and " T h e Obvious Aspects of Ritual" in this v o l u m e ) , but meta-performative, not only establishing the sub­ ordination of the particular participants themselves, but ever re-establish­ ing the conventions of subordination. Second, it may be that fluctuations from one distribution to another in the volume of goods flowing to the chief and back from him indicated to both the chief and others fluctua­ tions in productive success. Such information would, however, have probably been freely available. If, however, chiefs could infer from their redistributive operations whether or not there had been changes in the number of their supporters or in the configuration of the groups over which they presided, then their ceremonial redistributions were provid­ ing them with important information that they otherwise might not have come by. T h e size of such networks could not, however, have told them, or us, much if anything about either surplus or per capita productivity. In sum, Sahlins's criteria for assessing productivity were questionable, resting heavily upon what was probably a misinterpretation of redistribu­ tion, and his conception of productivity was itself rather vague. It is im­ portant to note that, aside from his remark that horticulture is generally more productive than collecting, his criteria for assessing productivity were social. This led him into tautology. If it is to be demonstrated that aspects o f the social order are contingent upon productivity, it is in­ admissible to read productivity from the same or closely related aspects of the social order. It may be suggested that the logical and methodological difficulties that Sahlins encountered derived from the metaphysics of the approach to environmental relations called "cultural ecology" (Steward 1 9 5 5 : 3 o f f . ) . This approach, which took its goal to be a "determination of how culture is affected by its adaptation to the environment" (ibid.: 3 1 ) , as­ sumed that biological and cultural ecology each require their own dis-

Aspects of Man's Influence upon Island Ecosystems | 1 9 tinctive concepts and methods, and therefore distinguished itself from biological ecology. T h e methodological implication of the divorcement of cultural from biological (or general) ecology and, by implication if not entailment, the conceptual divorcement of cultural from biological proc­ esses, may have been that organic criteria became inadmissible in assess­ ing processes such as those associated with productivity, which were, perhaps, regarded as cultural. B e this as it may, if it is to be demonstrated that aspects of the social order are contingent upon productivity, it seems best to avoid social indicators of productivity altogether. That which is produced, whether or not its production is socially guided and whether or not it is put to social ends, it not itself social. Being produced are quantities of material, in the Polynesian case foodstuffs. A s Sahlins puts it, "productivity is best understood, if cross-cultural comparisons are to be made, in terms of the ability to produce food" ( 1 9 5 8 : 1 0 7 ) . The term "ability" is troublesome in this as in other of Sahlins's statements con­ cerning productivity. A t best the term is superfluous, at worst it trans­ forms the straightforwardly and simply material into the vague and am­ biguously cultural, social, or psychological. (What is the nature of abil­ ity?) It therefore seems advisable to drop ability from consideration and simply to compare the food production of the societies under considera­ tion. In the absence of direct harvesting and landing information a cer­ tain organic aspect of Polynesian populations may provide an appropriate and non-tautological criterion for the assessment of production. I refer to their density. T h e equation of comparative population density with comparative pro­ ductivity may require some discussion, noting at the outset that it is in accord with the concept of productivity developed in general ecology, which Eugene Odum ( 1 9 5 9 : 58) has expressed as follows: Basic or primary productivity of an ecological community, or any part thereof, is defined as the rate at which energy is stored by photosynthetic and chemosynthetic organisms (chiefly green plants) in the form of organic substances which can be used as food materials... the rates of energy at consumer and decomposer trophic levels are referred to as secondary productivities. Productivity in this sense may be expressed as biomass or energy generated in an area of specified size during a specified length of time, for instance, grams or calories per square meter per day or kilograms or tons per square kilometer per year. T h e notion of rate is as intrinsic to the concept of productivity as is quantity of biomass or energy, but in instances in which the productivities of closely related populations of the same species operating in different ecosystems are to be compared it may be acceptable to assume that rates (of growth, aging, and metabolism) are similar, and therefore to ignore them. T h e comparison is then made

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between "standing crops," that is, the biomass of populations per unit of area. When dealing with populations as closely related as those of Poly­ nesia, it is reasonable, when approximations are sufficient and data are lacking, to assume that the organisms composing the populations com­ pared are of roughly similar size, and thus to take population densities to indicate standing crops. Population density, this is to say, indicates pro­ ductivity in the ecological sense. It may be argued that ecological productivity differs from productivity in the economic sense implicit in the identification of productivity with surplus or in the extractive sense implicit in its definition as the "ability to derive need-serving goods from the external world." However, for purposes o f comparing societies possessing similar material cultures from which power machinery is absent and in which production (in the extrac­ tive sense) is for use rather than for profit, it is reasonable to consider ecological productivity, indicated by population density, and economic productivity to be one and the same. Population density, this is to say, indicates the amount of "need-serving goods [extracted] from the ex­ ternal world" in such societies. It is fortunate that gross and approximate results are sufficient for our purposes because estimates of Polynesian populations at the time of con­ tact are unreliable, good estimates of the proportions of land cultivable on various islands are unavailable, and the proportions of lagoon, sea, and land in the total area exploited vary between societies. It is, never­ theless, o f considerable interest that some of the highest densities in the Pacific were reached on coral atolls. This is probably related to the com­ munity productivities of coral reefs, which are among the highest of the world's ecosystems (Odum 1 9 5 9 : 3 5 7 ) . A t any rate, the population of Puka Puka, for example, with only two square miles of land, not all o f which could be cultivated, varied between 4 3 5 and 6 3 2 persons during the period 1 9 0 6 to 1 9 2 5 , according to the Beagleholes ( 1 9 3 8 : 2 1 ) , but it may have stood between 1 , 0 0 0 and 2 , 0 0 0 persons before being devas­ tated by a tsunami around A . D . 1 6 0 0 . Densities reckoned against total land area varied, this is to say, between 2 1 7 and, possibly, 1,000 persons per square mile. Economic density, that is, density reckoned against arable area, would, of course, have been much higher. In contrast, West­ ern Samoa, with a total area of 1 1 1 7 square miles and 5 0 5 square miles of arable area (Stace, 1 9 5 6 ) , had a population estimated at 5 0 , 0 0 0 at the time of contact (Burrows's figure, accepted by Sahlins, 1 9 5 8 : 1 3 3 ) , yield­ ing a gross density of 45 persons per square mile and an economic den­ sity of 99 per square mile. Even doubling or tripling these figures, per­ haps to be justified because Samoa may have supported a larger popula­ tion than Burrows estimated, does little more than bring Samoa into the lower portion of the Puka Puka range. Taking marine environments into

Aspects of Man's Influence upon Island Ecosystems | 2 1 deration would only reinforce the comparison, for Puka Puka en° asses a lagoon of only five square miles. Most Samoans had con^derably o r e than five square miles of lagoon available to them and, of course much larger areas of open sea stood in the lee of Samoa than of puka Puka. Other cases may be cited. Ontong Java,with not much more than two square miles of land, may have supported as many as 5 . 5 0 0 people in 1907 (Naval Intelligence 1 9 4 4 : 6 0 3 , 6 6 8 ) . In 1 9 3 5 the population of Kapirigamarangi, with less than one-half square mile of dry land, stood at 399 (Naval Intelligence 1 9 4 5 : 4 i o f f . ) . Tikopia, a high island with a land area of three square miles and no lagoon, had a population of approxi­ mately 1 2 5 0 persons at the rime of Firth's visit in 1 9 2 9 . If 5 0 percent of the land was arable, a generous estimate, the economic population den­ sity stood at 8 3 3 persons per square mile. Tikopia was much less strati­ fied than Hawaii, Tonga, Tahiti, or Samoa, in all of which densities were considerably lower. Four of Mangarevas eleven square miles of dry land may have been arable (my estimate from maps). T h e population at con­ tact probably stood at around 2 , 5 0 0 ( R o g e r Green, personal communi­ cation, estimated from church records), yielding an economic density of 625 per square mile, also higher than densities on the most stratified islands. T h e accuracy of these estimates are, of course, dubious. They are, nevertheless, sufficient to disredit the contention that social stratifi­ cation in Polynesia was even correlated with, let alone was caused, en­ abled, or encouraged by, high productivity, and inversely correlated with, or discouraged or precluded by, low productivity. It may be, however, that the contrasts between the ecological commu­ nity types discussed in section V were significant in this regard. Of par­ ticular importance were differences in the extent to which productive and extractive processes in unmodified systems on the one hand and anthropocentric systems on the other could be controlled. The presence, location, quantity, and periodicity of the species constituting the un­ modified systems o f the reef, lagoon, and sea were largely beyond the control of humans altogether, and fishing and reef-combing are not wellsuited to management by anyone other than the immediate participants. It is seldom even realistic for anyone else to set quotas for fishermen to fulfill. T h e management of fishing, therefore, generally must be left in the hands of the individuals or small groups directly engaged. Although they do not have an important part to play in the productive processes of unmodified marine systems, or in extracting resources from them, more inclusive units may be important in the distribution of marine products once they are landed. Such distribution does not, however, require management by powerful central authorities, at least among populations as small as those inhabiting atolls, or, for that matter, the size C

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of the redistriburive networks on many of the high islands. On coral atolls generally all persons enjoyed full access to a full range of the products they required by vitrue of membership in a range of groups, each based upon kinship co-residence, joint rights in resources, or joint participation in subsistence activities (Sahlins 1 9 3 8 , ch. n ) . Distribution could be effected quickly and efficiently through the networks intrinsic to the membership of all individuals in such pluralities of groups. Central management, particularly by administrators who, being divorced from direct participation in extractive activities, had to be supported in manners befitting their stations, offered few benefits with respect to the exploitation of unmodi­ fied marine ecosystems in Polynesia. If advantages of centralized manage­ ment by superordinate authorities form one of the grounds of social strati­ fication, social stratification was not likely to emerge out of the exploita­ tion of the reef, the lagoon, and the sea by atoll populations. If, on the other hand, control of resources or extractive activities is also prerequisite to the development of social stratification, it is unlikely to develop on coral atolls because marine species are subject to no more than the most limited control, and the same may be said for the activity of fishing. The exploita­ tion of marine resources in the Pacific neither establishes a need for social stratification, nor does it provide opportunity for its development. W e cannot, however, account for differences in stratification between the high islands and the atolls by taking high islanders to be horticulturists and atoll inhabitants marine hunters and gatherers. Cultivated plants were as crucial to the survival of atoll populations as they were to those occupy­ ing high islands. General differences among the anthropocentric commu­ nities of high islands on the one hand and atolls on the other must now be considered. I noted in an earlier section that few plant species could establish themselves in the saline and calcareous soils of coral atolls. Horticulture on such islands was possible only in occasional swamps like that on Puka Puka, or in small, laboriously prepared areas, such as taro pits. Horti­ culture in such an environment does little or no damage to the eco­ system. Primary productivity is probably increased in the areas cultivated and, as experience on Canton Island demonstrates, exotic species flour­ ishing in the cultivated areas usually cannot establish themselves outside of them. Coral atolls are harsh and forbidding environments in which to attempt horticulture but, as we noted in section IV, they are relatively invulnerable to degradation by subsistence cultivation. Atoll crops are, however, especially vulnerable to catastrophic reduction by natural dis­ asters such as typhoons, tsunamis, droughts, and even prolonged periods of hot clear weather following heavy rain. A t such times the water in the taro pits could be heated to temperatures lethal to the growing plants (Beaglehole 1 9 3 8 : 2 0 ) . Atoll populations themselves were also, of course,

Aspects of Man's Influence upon Island Ecosystems > 23 uch greater jeopardy from catastrophe than were high islanders. U "rticulture was much easier in the volcanic soils o f the high islands on coral atolls but, as w e have noted, the terrestrial ecosystems of h d i islands are delicate compared to those of coral atolls. Horticulture undertaken on high islands could easily cause erosion, soil depletion, neral floral change including deforestation, and changes in water reWhereas atoll populations could do little to damage their eco­ systems, but were vulnerable to catastrophe, the converse was the case on high islands. High islands were hardly subject to drought, typhoons struck them only infrequently and were not as devastating as they were on coral atolls, and much of the land on high islands lies at altitudes above the reach o f tsunamis. High island populations were relatively in­ vulnerable to catastrophe, then, but their own activities could seriously damage the terrestrial ecosystems from which they derived the major portion of their sustenance. Such degradation is not widely evidenced in pre-European tropical Polynesia, however, and it may be suggested that the large, stratified, and, in some degree, centralized organizations found on the high islands served to protect inherently unstable ecosystems from the kind of degradation observed in Melanesia, where no such large-scale organizations developed. To be more specific I suggest that the development of large, stratified social units on Polynesian high islands was a managerial response to the need of large and perhaps expanding populations to derive stable or increasing food supplies from the anthropocentric communities of spatially limited ecosystems in which man's activities could easily induce degradation. In contrast, no amount of management could prevent the catastrophically induced fluctuations, not only of harvests but of human populations themselves, that unpredict­ ably afflicted coral atolls. T h e uncontrollable and unpredictable nature of the factors directly threatening human populations as well as their re­ source bases on coral atolls, along with the generally greater reliance of atoll peoples upon foodstuffs taken from unmodified and generally un­ controllable marine ecosystems, may well account for the weak develop­ ment o f social stratification on the low islands. Quite simply, stratification offered few, if any, adaptive advantages in the atoll environment, but it did on high islands. lfl

m

e

REFERENCES

CITED

Austin, J . L. 1962 How to do things with words. Oxford University Press. Banner, A. H. 1959 Fish poisoning reports wanted for University of Hawaii study. South Pacific Commn. Quart. Bull. 9(3):3i.

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Barrau, Jacques 1 9 5 8 Subsistence agriculture in Melanesia. B . P. Bishop Mus. Bull. 2 1 9 . Honolulu. Bates, Mars ton 1 9 6 0 Ecology and evolution. In Evolution after Darwin, vol. 1, ed. Sol Tax, pp. 5 4 7 - 5 6 8 . Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Beaglehole, Ernest and Pearl 1 9 3 8 Ethnology of Puka Puka. B. P. Bishop Mus. Bull. 1 5 0 . Honolulu. Birdsell, Joseph 1 9 5 7 Some population problems involving Pleistocene man. Cold Spring Harbor Symp. Quant. Biol. 2 2 : 4 7 - 6 8 . Catala, Rene L. H. 1 9 5 7 Report on the Gilbert Islands: some aspects of human ecology. Atoll Rsch. Bull. 5 9 . Washington, D.C.: National Research Council. Cook, James 1 7 8 4 A voyage to the Pacific Ocean . . . performed. . .in the years 1116 ... 1 7 8 0 , vol. 1 . London: Nicoll and Cadell. Danielsson, Bengt 1 9 5 5 Work and life on Raroia. Stockholm: Saxon and Lindstroms. Degener, O., and E. Gillaspy 1 9 5 5 Canton Island, South Pacific. Atoll Rsch. Bull. 4 1 . Washington, D.C.: National Research Council. Emory, Kenneth P. 1 9 4 7 Tuamotuan religious structures. B . P. Bishop Mus. Bull. 1 9 1 . Honolulu. 1 9 6 1 Personal communication. Fosberg, F. R. 1 9 5 3 Vegetation of Central Pacific atolls: a brief summary. Atoll Rsch. Bull. 2 3 . Washington, D.C.: National Research Council. Goodenough, Ward 1 9 5 7 Oceania and the problem of controls in the study of cultural and human evolution. J. Polynesian Soc. 6 6 : 1 4 6 - 1 5 5 . 1959 Review of Social stratification in Polynesia. In J. Polynesian Soc. 6 8 ( 3 ) . Gourou, Pierre 1 9 6 3 Pressure on island environment. In Man's place in the island ecosystem, ed. F. D. Fosberg, pp. 2 0 7 - 2 2 5 . Honolulu: Bishop Museum Press. Grace, George W. 1 9 6 1 Austronesian linguistics and culture history. American Anthropologist 63:359-368.

Green, Roger C. 1 9 6 1 Personal communication. Hatheway, William 1 9 5 3 The land vegetation of Amo Atoll, Marshall Islands. Atoll Rsch. Bull. 1 6 . Washington, D.C.: National Research Council. 1 9 5 5 The natural vegetation of Canton Island, an equatorial Pacific atoll. Atoll Rsch. Bull. 4 3 . Washington, D.C.: National Research Council. Hiatt, R. W., and D. W. Strasburg 1 9 6 0 Ecological relationships of the fish fauna on coral reefs of the Mar­ shall Islands. Ecol. Monogr. 3 0 : 6 5 - 1 2 7 . Lucett, Edward 1 8 5 1 Rovings in the Pacific, from 1 8 3 7 to 1 8 4 9 , vol. 1 . London: Longman, Brown, Green, and Longmans.

Aspects of Man's Influence upon Island Ecosystems | 2 5

Marshall, ^ '^ j j j Ji the first year of the Pacific Islands Rat Ecology Proj,rt Atoll Rsch. Bull. 56. Washington, D . C : National Research Counect. Atoll cil. • J-J E. ' The colonization of the Phoenix Islands./. Polynesian Soc. 6 1 : 6 2 - 8 9 . Q6* Discussion in Man's place in the island ecosystem, ed. F. R. Fosberg, pp. 1 7 1 - 1 7 4 - Honolulu: Bishop Museum Press. Merrill, Elmer Drew 1 9 5 4 The botany of Cook's voyages and its unexpected significance in rela­ tion to anthropology, biogeography and history. Chronica Botan tea Q

v s te

ur ng

1 9 3 7

1

i ( /6):i6i-384. 4

5

Naval Intelligence Division [British] 1 9 4 4 The Pacific islands. Vol. 3 , The western Pacific: Tonga to the Solomon Islands. Geographical Handbook Series. 1 9 4 5 The Pacific islands. Vol. 4, The western Pacific: New Guinea and islands northward. Geographical Handbook Series. Niering, William A. 1 9 5 6 Bioecology of Kapingamarangi Atoll Caroline Islands. Terrestrial aspects. Atoll Rsch. bull. 4 9 . Washington, D.C.: National Research Council. Odum, Eugene P. 1 9 5 9 Fundamentals of ecology. 2nd ed. Philadelphia: Saunders. Odum, Howard T., and Eugene P. Odum 1 9 5 5 Trophic structure and productivity of a windward coral reef commu­ nity on Eniwetok Atoll. Ecol. Monogr. 2 5 : 2 9 1 - 3 2 0 . Pierce, Charles 1 9 6 0 Collected papers of Charles Sanders Pierce. Vol. 4 , Elements of logic, ed. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Uni­ versity Press. Sachet, Marie-Helene 1 9 5 4 ^ summary of information on Rose Atoll. Atoll Rsch. Bull. 29. Washing­ ton, D.C.: National Research Council. Sahlins, Marshall 1 9 5 5 Esoteric efflorescence on Easter Island. American Anthropologist 5 7 : t

1045-1052.

1957

Land use and the extended family in Moala, Fiji. American Anthro­ pologist 5 9 : 4 4 9 - 4 6 3 1 9 5 8 Social stratification in Polynesia. American Eth nological Society Mono­ graph. Seattle: University of Washington Press. Sharp, Andrew 1 9 5 6 Ancient voyagers in the Pacific. Polynesian Society, Mem. 3 2 . Wallington, N . Z . Stace, V. D. 1 9 5 6 Western Samoa—an economic survey. South Pacific Technical Paper 9 1 . Noumea. Steward, Julian 1 9 5 5 Theory of culture change. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. Turbott, 1. G . 1949 Diets, Gilbert and Ellice Islands colony. J . Polynesian Soc. 5 8 : 3 6 - 4 6 . 1 9 5 4 Portulaca: a specialty in the diet of the Gilbertese in the Phoenix Islands, Central Pacific. J. Polynesian Soc. 6 3 : 7 7 - 8 5 .

26

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RELIGION

Van Zwaluwenburg, R. H. 1955 The insects and certain arthropods of Canton Island. Atoll Rsch. Bull. 4 2 . Washington, D.C.: National Research Council. Vayda, A. P. 1 9 5 6 Maori warfare. Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, New York. 1 9 5 9 Polynesian cultural distributions in new perspective. American An­ thropologist 6 1 : 8 1 7 - 8 2 8 . Williamson, Robert W. 1 9 3 9 Essays in Polynesian ethnology, ed. Ralph Piddington. Cambridge: Cam­ bridge University Press. Zimmerman, Elwood C. 1 9 6 3 Nature of the land biota. In Man's place in the island ecosystem, ed. F. R. Fosberg, pp. 5 7 - 6 4 . Honolulu: Bishop Museum Press.

Ritual Regulation of Environmental Relations among a N e w Guinea People

Most functional studies of religious behavior in anthropology have as an analytic goal the elucidation of events, processes, or relationships occur­ ring within a social unit of some sort. The social unit is not always well defined, but in some cases it appears to be a church, that is, a group of people who entertain similar beliefs about the universe, or a congrega­ tion, a group of people who participate together in the performance of religious rituals. There have been exceptions. Thus Vayda, Leeds, and Smith ( 1 9 6 1 ) and O. K . Moore ( 1 9 5 7 ) have clearly perceived that the functions of religious ritual are not necessarily confined within the boundaries of a congregation or even a church. B y and large, however, I believe that the following statement by Homans ( 1 9 4 1 : 1 7 2 ) represents fairly the dominant line of anthropological thought concerning the func­ tions of religious ritual: Ritual actions do not produce a practical result on the external world—that is one of the reasons why we call them ritual. But to make this statement is not to say that ritual has no function. Its function is not related to the world external This essay was originally published in Ethnology 6: 1 7 - 3 0 , 1967. The field work upon which it is based was supported by a grant from the National Science Foundation, under which Professor A . P. Vayda was principal investigator. Personal support was received by the author from the National Institutes of Health. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the 1964 annual meeting of the American Anthropological Association in Detroit, and before a Columbia University seminar on Ecological Systems and Cultural Evolution. I have received valuable suggestions from Alexander A Hand, Jacques Barrau, William Clarke, Paul Collins, C Glen King, Marvin Harris, Margaret Mead, M. J . Meggitt, Ann Rappaport, John Street, Marjorie Whiting, Cherry Vayda, A. P. Vayda and many others, but I take full responsibility for the analysis presented herewith.

28

I ECOLOGY, MEANING, A N D RELIGION

to the society but to the internal constitution of the society. It gives the mem­ bers of the society confidence, it dispels their anxieties, it disciplines their social organization. N o argument will be raised here against the sociological and psycho­ logical functions imputed by Homans, and many others before him, to ritual. They seem to me to be plausible. Nevertheless, in some cases at least, ritual does produce, in Homans' terms, "a practical result on the world" external not only to the social unit composed of those who par­ ticipate together in ritual performances but also to the larger unit com­ posed of those who entertain similar beliefs concerning the universe. T h e material presented here will show that the ritual cycles of the Tsem­ baga, and of other local territorial groups o f Maring speakers living in the N e w G u i n e a interior, play an important part in regulating the relation­ ships of these groups with both the nonhuman components of their immediate environments and the human components of their less imme­ diate environments, that is, with other similar territorial groups. To be more specific, this regulation helps to maintain the biotic communities existing within their territories, redistributes land among people and people over land, and limits the frequency of fighting. In the absence of authoritative political statuses or offices, the ritual cycle likewise pro­ vides a means for mobilizing allies when warfare may be undertaken. It also provides a mechanism for redistributing local pig surpluses in the form o f pork throughout a large regional population while helping to assure the local population of a supply of pork when its members are most in need o f high quality protein. Religious ritual may be defined, for the purposes of this paper, as the prescribed performance of conventionalized acts manifestly directed toward the involvement of nonempirical or supernatural agencies in the affairs of the actors. While this definition relies upon the formal charac­ teristics o f the performances and upon the motives for undertaking them, attention will be focused upon the empirical effects of ritual per­ formances and sequences of ritual performances. The religious rituals to be discussed are regarded as neither more nor less than part o f the be­ havioral repertoire employed by an aggregate of organisms in adjusting to its environment. T h e data upon which this paper is based were collected during four­ teen months of field work among the Tsembaga, one of about twenty local groups of Maring speakers living in the Simbai and J i m i Valleys of the Bismarck Range in the Territory of N e w Guinea. T h e size of Maring local groups varies from a little over 1 0 0 to 9 0 0 . The Tsembaga, who in 1 9 6 3 numbered 2 0 4 persons, are located on the south wall of the Simbai Valley. T h e country in which they live differs from the true highlands in being lower, generally more rugged, and more heavily forested. Tsem-

Ritual Regulation of Environmental Relations | 2 9 baga territory rises, within a total surface area of 3.2 square miles, from an elevation of 2 , 2 0 0 feet at the Simbai river to 7 , 2 0 0 feet at the ridge crest. Gardens are cut in the secondary forests up to between 5,000 and 5 4 0 0 feet, above which the area remains in primary forest. Rainfall reaches 1 5 0 inches per year. The Tsembaga have come into contact with the outside world only recently; the first government patrol to penetrate their territory arrived in I954- They were considered uncontrolled by the Australian govern­ ment until 1 9 6 2 , and they remain unmissionized to this day. The 2 0 4 Tsembaga are distributed among five putatively patrilineal clans, which are, in turn, organized into more inclusive groupings on two hierarchical levels below that of the total local group. Internal political structure is highly egalitarian. There are no hereditary or elected chiefs, nor are there even "big men" who can regularly coerce or command the support of their clansmen or co-residents in economic or forceful enter­ prises. It is convenient to regard the Tsembaga as a population in the ecologi­ cal sense, that is, as one of the components of a system of trophic ex­ changes taking place within a bounded area. Tsembaga territory and the biotic community existing upon it may be conveniently viewed as an ecosystem. While it would be permissible arbitrarily to designate the Tsembaga as a population and their territory with its biota as an eco­ system, there are also nonarbitrary reasons for doing so. A n ecosystem is a system of material exchanges, and the Tsembaga maintain against other human groups exclusive access to the resources within their territorial borders. Conversely, it is from this territory alone that the Tsembaga ordinarily derive all of their foodstuffs and most of the other materials they require for survival. Less anthropocentrically, it may be justified to regard Tsembaga territory with its biota as an ecosystem in view of the rather localized nature of cyclical material exchanges in tropical rain­ forests. A s they are involved with the nonhuman biotic community within their territory in a set o f trophic exchanges, so do they participate in other material relationships with other human groups external to their territory. Genetic materials are exchanged with other groups, and certain crucial items, such as stone axes, were in the past obtained from the out­ side. Furthermore, in the area occupied by the Maring speakers, more than one local group is usually involved in any process, either peaceful or warlike, through which people are redistributed over land and land re­ distributed among people. T h e concept of the ecosystem, though it provides a convenient frame for the analysis of interspecific trophic exchanges taking place within lim­ ited geographical areas, does not comfortably accommodate intraspecific

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| ECOLOGY, MEANING, AND

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exchanges taking place over wider geographic areas. Some sort of geo­ graphic population model would be more useful for the analysis of the relationship of the local ecological population to the larger regional population of which it is a part, but we lack even a set of appropriate terms for such a model. Suffice it here to note that the relations of the Tsembaga to the total of other local human populations in their vicinity are similar to the relations of local aggregates of other animals to the totality of their species occupying broader and more or less continuous regions. This larger, more inclusive aggregate may resemble what geneti­ cists mean by the term population, that is, an aggregate of interbreeding organisms persisting through an indefinite number of generations and either living o r capable of living in isolation from similar aggregates of the same species. This is the unit which survives through long periods of time while its local ecological {sensu stricto) subunits, the units more or less independently involved in interspecific trophic exchanges such as the Tsembaga, are ephemeral. Since it has been asserted that the ritual cycles of the Tsembaga regu­ late relationships within what may be regarded as a complex system, it is necessary, before proceeding to the ritual cycle itself, to describe briefly, and where possible in quantitative terms, some aspects of the place of the Tsembaga in this system. T h e Tsembaga are bush-following horticulturalists. Staples include a range of root crops, taro (Colocasia) and sweet potatoes being most im­ portant, yams and manioc less so. In addition, a great variety of greens are raised, some of which are rich in protein. Sugar cane and some tree crops, particularly Pandanus conotdeus, are also important. All gardens are mixed, many of them containing all of the major root crops and many greens. T w o named garden types are, however, distin­ guished by the crops which predominate in them. "Taro-yam gardens" were found to produce, on the basis of daily harvest records kept on entire gardens for close to one year, about 5 , 3 0 0 , 0 0 0 calories* per acre during their harvesting lives of 18 to 24 months; 85 percent of their yield is harvested between 2 4 and 76 weeks after planting. " S u g a r - s w e e t potato gardens" produce about 4 , 6 0 0 , 0 0 0 calories per acre during their harvesting lives, 9 1 percent being taken between 24 and 7 6 weeks after planting. I estimated that approximately 3 1 0 , 0 0 0 calories per acre is ex­ pended on cutting, fencing, planting, maintaining, harvesting, and walk­ ing to and from taro-yam gardens. Sugar-sweet potato gardens required •Because the length of time in the field precluded the possibility of maintaining harvest records on single gardens from planting through abandonment, figures were based, in the case of both "taro-yara" and "sugar-sweet potato" gardens, on three separate gar­ dens planted in successive years. Conversions from the gross weight to the caloric value of the yield were made by reference to the literature. The sources used are listed in Rappaport (1966 : Appendix v m ) .

Ritual Regulation of Environmental Relations | 3 1 nditure o f approximately 2 9 0 , 0 0 0 calories per acre.* These ratios, approximately 1 7 : 1 on taro-yam gardens and 1 6 : 1 on e n e r g y ^ ^ p o t o gardens, compare favorably with figures reported f U f ^ i d d e n cultivation in other regions.t Intake is high in comparison with the reported dietaries of other N e w Guinea populations. On the basis of daily consumption records kept for ten months on four households numbering in total sixteen persons, 1 estimated the average daily intake of adult males to be approximately 2 600 calories, and that of adult females to be around 2 , 2 0 0 calories. It may be mentioned here that the Tsembaga are small and short-statured. Adult males average 1 0 1 pounds in weight and approximately 58.5 inches in height; the corresponding averages for adult females are 85 pounds and 54-5 inches.? Although 99 percent by weight of the food consumed is vegetable, the protein intake is high by N e w Guinea standards. T h e daily protein con­ sumption of adult males from vegetable sources was estimated to be be­ tween 43 and 55 grams, of adult females 36 to 48 grams. Even with an adjustment for vegetable sources, these values are slightly in excess of the recently published W H O / F A O daily requirements (Food and Agricul­ ture Organization of the United Nations 1 9 6 4 ) . The same is true of the younger age categories, although soft and discolored hair, a symptom of protein deficiency, was noted in a few children. The W H O / F A O protein requirements do not include a large "margin for safety" or allowance for stress; and, although no clinical assessments were undertaken, it may be suggested that the Tsembaga achieve nitrogen balance at a low level. In other words, their protein intake is probably marginal. Measurements of all gardens made during 1 9 6 2 and of some gardens made during 1 9 6 3 indicate that, to support the human population, be­ tween . 1 5 and . 1 9 acres are put into cultivation per capita per year. Fal­ lows range from 8 to 4 5 years. T h e area in secondary forest comprises approximately 1 , 0 0 0 acres, only 3 0 to 50 of which are in cultivation at any time. Assuming calories to be the limiting factor, and assuming an unchanging population structure, the territory could support—with no 2 X 1

e

t a

"Rough time and motion studies of each of the casks involved in making, maintaining, harvesting, and walking to and from gardens were undertaken. Conversion to energy expenditure values was accomplished by reference to energy expenditure tables pre­ pared by Hipsley and Kirk ( 1 9 6 5 : 4 3 ) on the basis of gas exchange measurements made during the performance of garden tasks by the Chimbu people of the New Guinea high­ lands. t Marvin Harris, in an unpublished paper, estimates the ratio of energy return to energy input on Dyak (Borneo) rice swiddens at 1 0 : 1 . His estimates of energy ratios on Tepotzlan (Meso-America) swiddens range from 1 3 : 1 on poor land to 2 9 : 1 on the best land, tHeights may be inaccurate. Many men wear their hair in large coiffures hardened with pan dan us grease, and it was necessary in some instances to estimate the location of the top of the skull.

32

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RELIGION

reduction in lengths of fallow and without cutting into the virgin forest from which theTsembaga extract many important items—between 290 and 397 people if the pig population remained minimal. T h e size of the pig herd, however, fluctuates widely. Taking Maring pig husbandry pro­ cedures into consideration, I have estimated the human carrying capacity of the Tsembaga territory at between 2 7 0 and 3 2 0 people. Because the timing of the ritual cycle is bound up with the demog­ raphy o f the pig herd, the place of the pig in Tsembaga adaptation must be examined. First, being omnivorous, pigs keep residential areas free of garbage and human feces. Second, limited numbers of pigs rooting in secondary growth may help to hasten the development of that growth. The Tsem­ baga usually permit pigs to enter their gardens one and a half to two years after planting, by which time second-growth trees are well established there. T h e Tsembaga practice selective weeding; from the time the gar­ den is planted, herbaceous species are removed, but tree species are allowed to remain. B y the time cropping is discontinued and the pigs are let in, some of the trees in the garden are already ten to fifteen feet tall. These well-established trees are relatively impervious to damage by the pigs, which, in rooting for seeds and remaining tubers, eliminate many seeds and seedlings that, if allowed to develop, would provide some competition for the established trees. Moreover, in some Maringspeaking areas swiddens are planted twice, although this is not the case with the Tsembaga. After the first crop is almost exhausted, pigs are penned in the garden, where their rooting eliminates weeds and softens the ground, making the task of planting for a second time easier. T h e pigs, in other words, are used as cultivating machines. Small numbers of pigs are easy to keep. They run free during the day and return home at night to receive their ration of garbage and sub­ standard tubers, particularly sweet potatoes. Supplying the latter re­ quires little extra work, for the substandard tubers are taken from the ground in the course of harvesting the daily ration for humans. Daily consumption records kept over a period of some months show that the ration of tubers received by the pigs approximates in weight that consumed by adult humans, i.e., a little less than three pounds per day per pig. If the pig herd grows large, however, the substandard tubers inci­ dentally obtained in the course of harvesting for human needs become insufficient, and it becomes necessary to harvest especially for the pigs. In other words, people must work for the pigs and perhaps even supply them with food fit for human consumption. Thus, as Vayda, Leeds, and Smith ( 1 9 6 1 : 7 1 ) have pointed out, there can be too many pigs for a given community.

Ritual Regulation of Environmental Relations | 33 . holds true of the sanitary and cultivating services rendered by • A small number of pigs is sufficient to keep residential areas clean, P " superfluous seedlings in abandoned gardens, and to soften *h ^>il in gardens scheduled for second plantings. A larger herd, on the other hand, may be troublesome; the larger the number of pigs, the ° eater the possibility of their invasion of producing gardens, with con­ comitant damage not only to crops and young secondary growth but also to the relations between the pig owners and garden owners. All male pigs are castrated at approximately three months of age, for boars, people say, are dangerous and do not grow as large as barrows. Pregnancies, therefore, are always the result of unions of domestic sows with feral males. Fecundity is thus only a fraction of its potential. During one twelve-month period only fourteen litters resulted out of a potential 99 or more pregnancies. Farrowing generally takes place in the forest, and mortality of the young is high. Only 32 of the offspring of the abovementioned fourteen pregnancies were alive six months after birth. This number is barely sufficient to replace the number of adult animals which would have died or been killed during most years without pig festivals. The Tsembaga almost never kill domestic pigs outside of ritual con­ texts. In ordinary times, when there is no pig festival in progress, these rituals are almost always associated with misfortunes or emergencies, notably warfare, illness, injury, or death. Rules state not only the con­ texts in which pigs are to be ritually slaughtered, but also who may par­ take of the flesh of the sacrificial animals. During warfare it is only the men participating in the fighting who eat the pork. In cases of illness or injury, it is only the victim and certain near relatives, particularly his co­ resident agnates and spouses, who do so. It is reasonable to assume that misfortune and emergency are likely to induce in the organisms experiencing them a complex of physiological changes known collectively as "stress." Physiological stress reactions occur not only in organisms which are infected with disease or trauma­ tized, but also in those experiencing rage or fear (Houssay et al. 1 9 5 5 : 1 0 9 6 ) , or even prolonged anxiety (National Research Council 1 9 6 3 : 53)One important aspect of stress is the increased catabolization of protein (Houssay et al. 1 9 5 5 : 4 5 1 ; National Research Council 1 9 6 3 : 4 9 ) , with a net loss of nitrogen from the tissues (Houssay et al. 1 9 5 5 : 4 5 0 ) . This is a serious matter for organisms with a marginal protein intake. Antibody production is low ( B e r g 1 9 4 8 : 3 1 1 ) , healing is slow (Large and Johnston 9 4 8 : 3 5 2 ) , and a variety of symptoms of a serious nature are likely to develop (Lund and Levenson 1 9 4 8 : 3 4 9 ; Zintel 1 9 6 4 : 1 0 4 3 ) . The status of a protein-depleted animal, however, may be significantly improved in a relatively short period of time by the intake of high quality protein, and high protein diets are therefore routinely prescribed for surgical patients l g S

S

!

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I ECOLOGY, MEANING, AND

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and those suffering from infectious diseases (Burton 1 9 5 9 : 2 3 1 ; Lund and Levenson 1 9 4 8 : 3 5 0 ; Elman 1 9 5 1 : 85ft.; Zintel 1 9 6 4 - 10436°.). It is precisely when they are undergoing physiological stress that the Tsembaga kill and consume their pigs, and it should be noted that they limit the consumption to those likely to be experiencing stress most pro­ foundly. T h e Tsembaga, of course, know nothing of physiological stress. Native theories of the etiology and treatment of disease and injury impli­ cate various categories of spirits to whom sacrifices must be made. Nevertheless, the behavior which is appropriate in terms of native understandings is also appropriate to the actual situation confronting the actors. W e may now outline in the barest of terms the Tsembaga ritual cycle. Space does not permit a description of its ideological correlates. It must suffice to note that the Tsembaga do not necessarily perceive all o f the empirical effects which the anthropologist sees to flow from their ritual behavior. Such empirical consequences as they may perceive, moreover, are not central to their rationalizations of the performances. T h e Tsem­ baga say that they perform the rituals in order to rearrange their rela­ tionships with the supernatural world. We may only reiterate here that behavior undertaken in reference to their "cognized environment"—an environment which includes as very important elements the spirits of ancestors—seems appropriate in their "operational environment," the material environment specified by the anthropologist through operations of observation, including measurement. Since the rituals are arranged in a cycle, description may commence at any point. T h e operation of the cycle becomes clearest if w e begin with the rituals performed during warfare. Opponents in all cases occupy ad­ jacent territories, in almost all cases on the same valley wall. After hos­ tilities have broken out, each side performs certain rituals which place the opposing side in the formal category of "enemy." A number o f taboos prevail while hostilities continue. These include prohibitions on sexual intercourse and on the ingestion of certain things—food prepared by women, food grown on the lower portion of the territory, marsupials, eels, and while actually on the fighting ground, any liquid whatsoever. One ritual practice associated with fighting which may have some physiological consequences deserves mention. Immediately before pro­ ceeding to the fighting ground, the warriors eat heavily salted pig fat. T h e ingestion of salt, coupled with the taboo on drinking, has the effect of shortening the fighting day, particularly since the Maring prefer to fight only on bright sunny days. When everyone gets unbearably thirsty, ac­ cording to informants, fighting is broken off. There may formerly have been other effects if the native salt contained sodium (the production of salt was discontinued some years previous to

Ritual Regulation of Environmental Relations | 3 5 the field work, and no samples were obtained). The Maring diet seems to be deficient in sodium. The ingestion of large amounts of sodium just prior to fighting would have permitted the warriors to sweat normally without a lowering of blood volume and consequent weakness during the course of the fighting. The pork belly ingested with the salt would have provided them with a new burst of energy two hours or so after the com­ mencement of the engagement. After fighting was finished for the day, lean pork was consumed, offsetting, at least to some extent, the nitrogen loss associated with the stressful fighting (personal communications from F. Dunn, W. McFarlane, and J . Sabine, 1 9 6 5 ) . Fighting could continue sporadically for weeks. Occasionally it termi­ nated in the rout of one of the antagonistic groups, whose survivors would take refuge with kinsmen elsewhere. In such instances, the victors would lay waste their opponents' groves and gardens, slaughter their pigs, and burn their houses. They would not, however, immediately an­ nex the territory of the vanquished. The Maring say that they never take over the territory of an enemy for, even if it has been abandoned, the spirits of their ancestors remain to guard it against interlopers. Most fights, however, terminated in truces between the antagonists. With the termination of hostilities a group which has not been driven off its territory performs a ritual called "planting the rumbim." Every man puts his hand on the ritual plant, rumbim {Cordyline fruticosa ( L . ) , A . C h e v ; C. terminalis, Kunth), as it is planted in the ground. The ancestors are addressed, in effect, as follows: We thank you for helping us in the fight and permitting us to remain on our territory. We place our souls in this rumbim as we plant it on our ground. We ask you to care for this rumbim. We will kill pigs for you now, but they are few. In the future, when we have many pigs, we shall again give you pork and uproot the rumbim and stage a kaiko (pig festival). But until there are sufficient pigs to repay you the rumbim will remain in the ground. This ritual is accompanied by the wholesale slaughter of pigs. Only juveniles remain alive. All adult and adolescent animals are killed, cooked, and dedicated to the ancestors. Some are consumed by the local group, but most are distributed to allies who assisted in the fight. Some of the taboos which the group suffered during the time of fight­ ing are abrogated by this ritual. Sexual intercourse is now permitted, liquids may be taken at any time, and food from any part of the territory may be eaten. B u t the group is still in debt to its allies and ancestors. People say it is still the time of the bamp ku, or "fighting stones," which are actual objects used in the rituals associated with warfare. Although the fighting ceases when rumbim is planted, the concomitant obligations, debts to allies and ancestors, remain outstanding; and the fighting stones may not be put away until these obligations are fulfilled. The time of the

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fighting stones is a time of debt and danger which lasts until the rumbim is uprooted and a pig festival {kaiko) is staged. Certain taboos persist during the time of the fighting stones. Marsu­ pials, regarded as the pigs of the ancestors of the high ground, may not be trapped until the debt to their masters has been repaid. Eels, the "pigs of the ancestors of the low ground," may neither be caught nor con­ sumed. Prohibitions on all intercourse with the enemy come into force. O n e may not touch, talk to, or even look at a member o f the enemy group, nor set foot on enemy ground. Even more important, a group may not attack another group while its ritual plant remains in the ground, for it has not yet fully rewarded its ancestors and allies for their assistance in the last fight. Until the debts to them have been paid, further assistance from them will not be forthcoming. A kind of "truce of g o d " thus pre­ vails until the rumbim is uprooted and a kaiko completed. To uproot the rumbim requires sufficient pigs. H o w many pigs are suf­ ficient, and how long does it take to acquire them? The Tsembaga say that, if a place is "good," this can take as little as five years; but if a place is "bad," it may require ten years or longer. A bad place is one in which misfortunes are frequent and where, therefore, ritual demands for the killing of pigs arise frequently. A good place is one where such demands are infrequent. In a good place, the increase of the pig herd exceeds the ongoing ritual demands, and the herd grows rapidly. Sooner or later the substandard tubers incidentally obtained while harvesting become insuf­ ficient to feed the herd, and additional acreage must be put into produc­ tion specifically for the pigs. T h e work involved in caring for a large pig herd can be extremely burdensome. The Tsembaga herd just prior to the pig festival of 1 9 6 2 6 3 , when it numbered 1 6 9 animals, was receiving 54 percent of all the sweet potatoes and 82 percent of all the manioc harvested. These com­ prised 3 5 . 9 percent by weight of all root crops harvested. This figure is consistent with the difference between the amount of land under cultiva­ tion just previous to the pig festival, when the herd was at maximum size, and that immediately afterwards, when the pig herd was at minimum size. T h e former was 3 6 . 1 percent in excess o f the latter. I have estimated, on the basis of acreage yield and energy expenditure figures, that about 4 5 , 0 0 0 calories per year are expended in caring for one pig 1 2 0 - 1 5 0 pounds in size. It is upon women that most of the burden of pig keeping falls. If, from a woman's daily intake of about 2 , 2 0 0 calories, 9 5 0 calories are allowed for basal metabolism, a woman has only 1 , 2 5 0 calories a day available for all her activities, which include gardening for her family, child care, and cooking, as well as tending pigs. It is clear that no woman can feed many pigs; only a few had as many as four in their care at the commencement of the festival; and it is not

Ritual Regulation of Environmental Relations | 37 rising that agitation to uproot the rumbim and stage the kaiko starts with the wives of the owners of large numbers of pigs. A large herd is not only burdensome as far as energy expenditure is concerned; it becomes increasingly a nuisance as it expands. T h e more numerous pigs become, the more frequently are gardens invaded by them. Such events result in serious disturbances of local tranquillity. The garden owner often shoots, or attempts to shoot, the offending pig; and the pig owner commonly retorts by shooting, or attempting to shoot, either the garden owner, his wife, or one of his pigs. A s more and more such events occur, the settlement, nucleated when the herd was small, disperses as people try to put as much distance as possible between their pigs and other p e o p l e s gardens and between their gardens and other people's pigs. Occasionally this reaches its logical conclusion, and people begin to leave the territory, taking up residence with kinsmen in other local populations. The number of pigs sufficient to become intolerable to the Tsembaga was below the capacity of the territory to carry pigs. I have estimated that, if the size and structure of the human population remained constant at the 1 9 6 2 - 1 9 6 3 level, a pig population of 1 4 0 to 2 4 0 animals averaging 100 to 1 5 0 pounds in size could be maintained perpetually by the Tsem­ baga without necessarily inducing environmental degradation. Since the size of the herd fluctuates, even higher cyclical maxima could be achieved. The level of toleration, however, is likely always to be below the carrying capacity, since the destructive capacity o f the pigs is dependent upon the population density of both people and pigs, rather than upon population size. The denser the human population, the fewer pigs will be required to disrupt sc rial life. If the carrying capacity is exceeded, it is likely to be exceeded by people and not by pigs. The kaiko o r pig festival, which commences with the planting of stakes at the boundary and the uprooting of the rumbim, is thus triggered by either the additional work attendant upon feeding pigs or the destructive capacity o f the pigs themselves. It may be said, then, that there are suffi­ cient pigs to stage the kaiko when the relationship of pigs to people changes from one of mutualism to one of parasitism or competition. A short time prior to the uprooting of the rumbim, stakes are planted at the boundary. If the enemy has continued to occupy its territory, the stakes are planted at the boundary which existed before the fight. If, on the other hand, the enemy has abandoned its territory, the victors may plant their stakes at a new boundary which encompasses areas previously occupied by the enemy. T h e Maring say, to be sure, that they never take land belonging to an enemy, but this land is regarded as vacant, since no rumbim was planted on it after the last fight. We may state here a rule of land redistribution in terms of the ritual cycle: / / one of a pair of antagou

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nistic groups is able to uproot its rumbim before its opponents can plant their rumbim, it may occupy the tatter's territory. N o t only have the vanquished abandoned their territory; it is assumed that it has also been abandoned by their ancestors as well. T h e surviving members o f the erstwhile enemy group have by this time resided with other groups for a number o f years, and most if not all of them have already had occasion to sacrific pigs to their ancestors at their new resi­ dences. In so doing they have invited these spirits to settle at the new locations of the living, where they will in the future receive sacrifices. Ancestors of vanquished groups thus relinquish their guardianship over the territory, making it available to victorious groups. Meanwhile, the de facto membership of the living in the groups with which they have taken refuge is converted eventually into de jure membership. Sooner or later the groups with which they have taken up residence will have occasion to plant rumbim, and the refugees, as co-residents, will participate, thus ritually validating their connection to the new territory and the new group. A rule of population redistribution may thus be stated in terms of ritual cycles: A man becomes a member of a territorial group by participating with it in the planting of rumbim. T h e uprooting o f the rumbim follows shortly after the planting of stakes at the boundary. On this particular occasion the Tsembaga killed 3 2 pigs out of their herd of 1 6 9 . Much of the pork was distributed to allies and affines outside of the local group. T h e taboo on trapping marsupials was also terminated at this time. Information is lacking concerning the population dynamics o f the local marsupials, but it may well be that the taboo which had prevailed since the last fight—that against taking them in traps—had conserved a fauna which might otherwise have become extinct. T h e kaiko continues for about a year, during which period friendly groups are entertained from time to time. T h e guests receive presents of vegetable foods, and the hosts and male guests dance together through­ out the night. These events may be regarded as analogous to aspects o f the social behavior of many nonhuman animals. First o f all, they include massed epigamic, or courtship, displays (Wynne-Edwards 1 9 6 2 : 1 7 ) . Y o u n g women are presented with samples of the eligible males of local groups with which they may not otherwise have had the opportunity to become familiar. T h e context, moreover, permits the young women to discrimi­ nate amongst this sample in terms of both endurance (signaled by how vigorously and how long a man dances) and wealth (signaled by the rich­ ness o f a man's shell and feather finery). M o r e importantly, the massed dancing at these events may be regarded as epideictic display, communicating to the participants information

Ritual Regulation of Environmental Relations | 39 .

the size or density of the group (Wynne-Edwards 1 9 6 2 : 1 6 ) . concer j displays take place as a prelude to actions which [ man* ^ density, and such is the case among the Maring. The d dancing of the visitors at a kaiko entertainment communicates to G h o s t s , while the rumbim truce is still in force, information concerning ^ o J n t of support they may expect from the visitors in the bellicose enterprises that they are likely to embark upon soon after the termina­ tion of the pig festival. Among the Maring there are no chiefs or other political authorities capable of commanding the support of a body of followers, and the deci­ sion to assist another group in warfare rests with each individual male. Allies are not recruited by appealing for help to other local groups as such. Rather, each member of the groups primarily involved in the hos­ tilities appeals to his cognatic and affinal kinsmen in other local groups. These men, in turn, urge other of their co-residents and kinsmen to "help them fight." The channels through which invitations to dance are extended are precisely those through which appeals for military support are issued. The invitations go not from group to group, but from kins­ man to kinsman, the recipients of invitations urging their co-residents to "help them dance." Invitations to dance do more than exercise the channels through which allies are recruited; they provide a means for judging their effectiveness. Dancing and righting are regarded as in some sense equivalent. This equivalence is expressed in the similarity of some pre-fight and predance rituals, and the Maring say that those who come to dance come to fight. The size of a visiting dancing contingent is consequently taken as a measure of the size of the contingent of warriors whose assistance may be expected in the next round of warfare. In the morning the dancing ground turns into a trading ground. The items most frequently exchanged include axes, bird plumes, shell orna­ ments, an occasional baby pig, and, in former times, native salt. The kaiko thus facilitates trade by providing a market-like setting in which large numbers of traders can assemble. It likewise facilitates the movement of two critical items, salt and axes, by creating a demand for the bird plumes which may be exchanged for them. The kaiko concludes with major pig sacrifices. On this particular occa­ sion the Tsembaga butchered 1 0 5 adult and adolescent pigs, leaving only 6 0 juveniles and neonates alive. The survival of an additional fifteen adolescents and adults was only temporary, for they were scheduled as imminent victims. The pork yielded by the Tsembaga slaughter was esti­ mated to weigh between 7,000 and 8,500 pounds, of which between 4 . 5 0 0 and 6 , 0 0 0 pounds were distributed to members of other local groups in 1 6 3 separate presentations. An estimated 2 , 0 0 0 to 3 , 0 0 0 c

n

c

e

e s

s

u

c

n

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people in seventeen local groups were the beneficiaries of the redistribu­ tion. T h e presentations, it should be mentioned, were not confined to pork. Sixteen Tsembaga men presented bridewealth or child-wealth, consisting largely of axes and shells, to their affines at this time. T h e kaiko terminates on the day of the pig slaughter with the public presentation of salted pig belly to allies of the last fight. Presentations are made through the window in a high ceremonial fence built specially for the occasion at one end of the dance ground. T h e name of each honored man is announced to the assembled multitude as he charges to the win­ dow to receive his hero's portion. The fence is then ritually torn down, and the fighting stones are put away. T h e pig festival and the ritual cycle have been completed, demonstrating, it may be suggested, the ecological and economic competence of the local population. T h e local population would now be free, if it were not for the presence of the government, to attack its enemy again, secure in the knowledge that the assistance of allies and ancestors would be forthcoming because they have received pork and the obligations to them have been fulfilled. Usually fighting did break out again very soon after the completion of the ritual cycle. If peace still prevailed when the ceremonial fence had rotted completely—a process said to take about three years, a little longer than the length of time required to raise a pig to maximum size— rumbim was planted as if there had been a fight, and all adult and ado­ lescent pigs were killed. When the pig herd was large enough so that the rumbim could be uprooted, peace could be made with former enemies if they were also able to dig out their rumbim. To put this in formal terms: If a pair of antagonistic groups proceeds through two ritual cycles without resumption of hostilities their enmity may be terminated. T h e relations of the Tsembaga with their environment have been ana­ lyzed as a complex system composed of two subsystems. What may be called the "local subsystem" has been derived from the relations of the Tsembaga with the nonhuman components of their immediate or terri­ torial environment. It corresponds to the ecosystem in which the Tsem­ baga participate. A second subsystem, one which corresponds to the larger regional population of which the Tsembaga are one of the consti­ tuent units and which may be designated as the "regional subsystem," has been derived from the relations of the Tsembaga with neighboring local populations similar to themselves. It has been argued that rituals, arranged in repetitive sequences, regu­ late relations both within each of the subsystems and within the larger complex system as a whole. T h e timing of the ritual cycle is largely de­ pendent upon changes in the states of the components of the local sub­ system. B u t the kaiko, which is the culmination of the ritual cycle, does more than reverse changes w hich have taken place within the local subr

Ritual Regulation of Environmental Relations | 4 1 Its occurrence also affects relations among the components of ^eg< ' s k y - During its performance, obligations to other populations are fulfilled, support for future military enterprises is ir d and land from which enemies have earlier been driven is occu. 1 j completion, furthermore, permits the local population to ini­ tiate warfare again. Conversely, warfare is terminated by rituals which edude the reinitiation of warfare until the state of the local subsystem is again such that a kaiko may be staged and completed. Ritual among the Tsembaga and other Maring, in short, operates as both transducer, •translating" changes in the state of one subsystem into information which can effect changes in a second subsystem, and homeostat, main­ taining a number of variables which in sum comprise the total system within ranges of viability. To repeat an earlier assertion, the operation of ritual among the Tsembaga and other Maring helps to maintain an undegraded environment, limits fighting to frequencies which do not en­ danger the existence of the regional population, adjusts man-land ratios, facilitates trade, distributes local surpluses of pig throughout the regional population in the form of pork, and assures people of high quality pro­ tein when they are most in need of it. Religious rituals and the supernatural orders toward which they are directed cannot be assumed a priori to be mere epiphenomena. Ritual may, and doubtless frequently does, do nothing more than validate and intensify the relationships which integrate the social unit, or symbolize the relationships which bind the social unit to its environment. But the interpretation of such presumably sapiens-specific phenomena as reli­ gious ritual within a framework which will also accommodate the behav­ ior of other species shows, I think, that religious ritual may do much more than symbolize, validate, and intensify relationships. Indeed, it would not be improper to refer to the Tsembaga and the other entities with which they share their territory as a "ritually regulated ecosystem," and to the Tsembaga and their human neighbors as a "ritually regulated population." S y S t

o n a

u

s

s t e m

r

t s

REFERENCES CITED Berg, C . 1 9 4 8 Protein deficiency and its relation to nutritional anemia, hypoproteinemia, nutritional edema, and resistance to infection. In Protein and amino acids in nutrition, ed. M. Sahyun, pp. 2 9 0 - 3 1 7 . N e w York: Reinhold. Burton, B . T., ed. 1 9 5 9 The Heinz handbook of nutrition. N e w York: McGraw-Hill. Elm an, R. 1 9 5 1 Surgical care. N e w York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.

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Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 1 9 6 4 Protein: at the heart of the world food problem. World Food Problems 5. Rome: FAO. Hipsley, E., and N . Kirk 1 9 6 5 Studies of the dietary intake and energy expenditure of New Guineans. South Pacific Commission, Technical Paper 1 4 7 . Noumea: South Pacific Commission. Homans, G . C. 1 9 4 1 Anxiety and ritual: the theories of Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown. American Anthropologist 4 3 : 1 6 4 - 1 7 2. Houssay, B . A., et aL 1 9 5 5 Human physiology. 2nd edit. New York: McGraw-Hill. Large, A., and C. G . Johnston 1 9 4 8 Proteins as related to burns. In Proteins and amino acids in nutrition, ed. M. Sahyun, pp. 3 8 6 - 3 9 6 . New York: Reinhold. Lund, C. G., and S. M. Levenson 1 9 4 8 Protein nutrition in surgical patients. In Proteins and amino acids in nutrition, ed. M. Sahyun, pp. 3 4 9 - 3 6 3 . New York: Reinhold. Moore, O. K. 1957 Divination—a new perspective. American Anthropologist 5 9 : 6 9 - 7 4 . National Research Council 1 9 6 3 Evaluation of protein quality. National Academy of Sciences National Research Council Publication 1 1 0 0 . Washington: NAS/NRC. Rappaport, R. A. 1 9 6 6 Ritual in the ecology of a New Guinea people. Unpublished doctoral dissertation. Columbia University. Vayda, A. P., A. Leeds, and D. B. Smith 1 9 6 1 The place of pigs in Melanesian subsistence. In Proceedings of the 1 9 6 1 Annual Spring Meeting of the American Ethnological Society, ed. V. E. Garfield, pp. 6 9 - 7 7 . Seattle: University of Washington Press. Wayne-Edwards, V. C. 1 9 6 2 Animal dispersion in relation to social behaviour. Edinburgh and Lon­ don: Oliver & Boyd. Zintel, Harold A. 1 9 6 4 Nutrition in the care of the surgical patient. In Modem nutrition in health and disease, ed. M. G. Wo hi and R. S. Good hart, pp. 1 0 4 3 1 0 6 4 . 3rd edit. Philadelphia: Lee & Febiger.

Ecology, Adaptation, and the Ills of Functionalism

Several years ago in an essay in Man ( 1 9 7 4 : 4 4 4 - 4 6 9 ) Jonathan Fried­ man characterized as species of vulgar materialism "the ecological anthropology of Vayda, Rappaport and others, and, in a more obvious way, the cultural materialism most recently espoused by Marvin Harris" (p. 4 4 4 ) . H e further associates this ecological anthropology with "the new functionalism" which, he says, "is fundamentally the same as the old functionalism except that the field of application has changed, the inter­ est now being to show the rationality of institutions with respect to their environments rather than to other elements in the society" (p. 4 5 7 ) . H e does, however, seem to modify the harshness of this assessment in some degree: T h e new functional ecology, through its a priori assumptions, i s . . . entrenched in the ideological matrix of vulgar materialism even though its ultimate source and possible salvation is the far more produc­ tive framework of systems theory" (p. 4 4 5 ) . In the course of his argu­ ment he also criticizes my analysis and interpretation of the ritual cycle of the Tsembaga Maring of N e w Guinea for the improper use of a basic systemic concept, namely negative feedback. I am grateful to Friedman for the opportunity he has provided to clarify some matters relating to ecological concepts, functional formula­ tions, and the relationship between them. I must note at the outset, however, that the highly general nature of Friedman's critique presents Sections IV and X of this article have been added, for this publication, to the first half of an essay entitled "Ecology, Adaptation, and the Ills of Functionalism (Being, among Other Things, a Response to Jonathan Friedman)," originally published in Michigan Discussions in Anthropology 2: 1 3 8 - 1 9 0 , 1977. 43

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certain problems for response. H e paints in such broad strokes ("the new functionalism is fundamentally the same as the old") that it becomes necessary to refine or elaborate his arguments before responding to them, a tedious exercise sometimes requiring the recitation of funda­ mentals. M o r e o v e r , he attempts to paint over a very broad canvas ("the ecological anthropology of Vayda, Rappaport and others"). Friedman's critique thus advertises itself as highly inclusive in its applicability, and presumably in its basis. In fact, he attends to only one work of mine ( 1 9 6 8 ) and to a precis of that work published subsequently as an intro­ duction to an argument concerning the relationship of sanctity to certain characteristics of language ( 1 9 7 i a ) . One old work of Vayda s is cited very briefly in a context conflating it with the work of Suttles ( 1 9 6 0 ) and Piddocke ( 1 9 6 5 ) . Harris's interpretation of the place of sacred cows in Indian economic and environmental relations is the only other work clearly associated by Friedman with "the new functional ecology" with which he deals at all. Other works appearing among his references are mentioned only in footnotes (particularly footnote 1 6 : " S e e references for works by Vayda, Collins [ 1 9 6 5 ] , Rappaport, etc."). T h e basis of Friedman's critique of "the new functional ecology," is, thus, much nar­ rower than the scope he claims for it ("the ecological anthropology of Vayda, Rappaport and others," to say nothing of the cultural materialism of H a r r i s ) . Indeed, it is narrower than would reasonably warrant making it stand for " m y " ecological anthropology much less that of Vayda and others. T h e context of my discussion will have to be, in some degree, Pigs for the Ancestors because it is the battleground that Friedman has chosen. M y aim, however, is not so much to defend a work published a decade ago as it is to consider problems of a more general nature, and to correct what I take to be some common misunderstandings. I I shall deal first with the matter of vulgar materialism, which Friedman defines as follows: Vulgar materialism, mechanical materialism, and economism are terms which refer to a simplistic kind of materialism, rejected by Marx, which envisages social forms as mere epiphenomena of technologies and environments, either by direct causation or by some economic rationality which makes institutions the product of social optimisation. This approach has made its appearance in the form of what Sahlins has called the "new materialism" ( 1 9 6 9 : 3 0 ) ; neofunctional ecology and cultural materialism, both of which are embedded in the functionalist-empiricist ideology which has characterised most of American social science. [ 1 9 7 4 : 4 5 6 - 4 5 7 ]

Ecology, Adaptation, and the Ills of Functionalism | 45 1 am not sure that this is an adequate characterization of "vulgar mate­ rialism" but, after all, vulgar materialism is a vague and pejorative notion rather than a precise theoretical concept. What does seem to be implied by "epiphenomena" (an inaccurate term because, in denoting the secon­ dary and the derivative, it may connote insignificance, mere effect which in itself effects nothing, and no one, so far as I know, has argued this of "social forms") is that social forms are caused by, or emerge out of (per­ haps as some sort of by-product), the interactions of environments and technologies. If this is a criterion of vulgar materialism then Pigs for the Ancestors is not vulgarly materialistic because it does not attempt to ac­ count in any way whatsoever for the emergence of the social forms with which it is concerned, except, perhaps, in a few sentences ( 1 9 6 8 : 2 3 1 ) which note that there are strong similarities among the ritual practices of different Highlands peoples, and that the variations among them may be the result of 'differences in the ecological circumstances of various populations." This brief suggestion followed an earlier article by Vayda and me ( 1 9 6 7 ) in which we (also briefly) suggested that cultures gener­ ate (in accordance with their own constraints) ranges of forms from among which environments select in a manner that may be generally similar to the ways in which natural selection operates upon populations of organisms. I grant that this formulation was vague, that it was hardly original and that it does not constitute an adequate account of the rela­ tionship of culture to environment, particularly of the mutually causal and constraining processes that characterize the evolution or "emer­ gence" of human social forms, anthropocentric ecosystems and even humanity itself. I simply assert here that it is an account that does not take social forms to be mere epiphenomena of technologies and environ­ ments. Friedman would have to agree that such a formulation is not vul­ garly materialistic because he himself proposes something very similar ( 1 9 7 4 : 4 $ 1 ) as if it w ere an insight vouchsafed to us for the first time by the conjunction of structuralism and Marxism. I would respectfully sug­ gest that inasmuch as he claimed that his charge of vulgar materialism is applicable to the new ecology generally, it was Friedman's responsibility to take this published proposition into account, and then to remark on the ways it differs from or resembles his proposal that environments, as it were, select from among the range of possible transformations of struc­ tures those that do, in fact, occur. r

I am led here to a second point in Friedman s characterization of vulgar materialism. If I understand him correctly he also considers to vul­ garly materialist a view which would take as causal an economic rational­ ity, which makes institutions the products of social optimization. T h e charge is difficult to deal with because of the vagueness of the terms, a vagueness that may mask fallacy and certainly encourages confusion.

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What, for istance, is meant by "rationality" not only in Friedman's char­ acterization of vulgar materialism but elsewhere in his article? ( S e e his discussion o f the "deadly weakness of functionalism" [ i 9 7 4 - 4 5 9 ] , which I, in turn, will discuss below.) H e seems to be referring to some general property of social systems as wholes. Such a usage seems to me to be improper. It is either a translation of terms like "function" or "adaptiveness" into a different jargon or a vague and facile metaphor confusing two levels of analysis and abstraction (the individual and his decisions on the one hand, society and its structure on the other).* Nothing seems to be gained and considerable clarity is lost by using the term "rational" in such a way, and I would urge that it be reserved to refer to processes inhering in individuals or discrete decision-making agencies. A s far as economic rationality is concerned, then, I understand it to be a process located in the thought of individuals and, derivatively or meta­ phorically, in certain o f the activities of corporations acting more or less as individuals. T h e term "rationality" implies, if it does not entail, con­ sciousness, purpose, and deliberateness. T h e term "economic" when combined with it implies that consciousness and deliberateness are put to the task o f weighing alternatives with respect to differences in the advan­ tages they may be expected to confer upon those who have the opportu­ nity to select among them. T h e goals of economic rationality, it is gener­ ally assumed, are highly specified and it is generally further assumed that the aim o f economic rationality is to maximize these specifics, whatever they may be. Pigs for the Ancestors did, of course, consider behavior that may aptly be described as economic. Individual choices are made with respect to the disposal o f pigs; women, I suppose, assess the degrees to which their backs ache against their goals of their husbands; people must be con­ cerned with trade-offs between the work of pig raising and the trouble following garden invasions on the one hand, and the satisfaction of their allies with the pork they are given on the other, and so on. Whether all of these and other considerations are weighed rationally is not a matter which need concern us. One of the main points of the analysis, however, was that Maring ritual regulation is surely not to be understood as an outcome of the economistic behavior o f individuals but as providing an order such that ( i ) the fulfillment of the goals of individuals is given culturally defined and sanctified meaning, and (2) in the particular case at hand made consonant with the perpetuation of groups as biological and social entities and with the perpetuation of the Maring as a whole. M a ­ ring ritual regulation stands against or constrains the economic (and political) goals of individuals and even of corporate groups. In some * Robert Hefner, personal communication.

Ecology, Adaptation, and the Ills of Functionalism | 47 instances it induces them to behave in ways which do the opposite of maximizing their positions vis-a-vis others. This argument seems to me to be implicit throughout Pigs for the Ancestors, but was made explicit in at least one passage ( 1 9 6 8 : 2 3 9 ) , and has been argued at length elsewhere (Kelly and Rappaport 1 9 7 5 ) I have argued that ritual regulation among the Maring is consonant with ecosystemic imperatives and, were it not for the fallacy inherent in attributing rationality to societies, a charge of ecological rationality might have been more apposite. Ecological rationality, which may be observed in some individuals, is not simply an extension of economizing rationality into the environmental domain. It is a "rationality" which, concerned with the persistence of systems in which the actor participates and upon which his continued existence is contingent, is contradicted by a rational­ ity which is concerned with the maximization of the immediate interests of the actor vis-a-vis that system. It was made clear very early in the book, however, that the conscious purposes of the Maring were not eco­ logical, that is, the ecosystemic regulatory functions of the ritual cycle were mystified by its sacred aspects, although some Maring were surely aware of them. That the consonance of the religious logic of the ritual cycle with eco­ systemic imperatives was not accounted for adequately is a shortcoming of the book, but it seems hardly surprising that social and ecological regulation in an unstratified and undifferentiated society in which pro­ duction is domestic and in which only a simple technology is available is preservative o f the ecosystem. I did not assert that social and cultural forms and the relations among them always and everywhere somehow absorb ecosystematic imperatives and institute ecologically sound prac­ tice. Such is not the case among all tribal peoples, and strip-mining, clear-cutting, offshore oil-drilling and continued use of fluorocarbons, among other things, would make nonsense of such an assertion were it to be extended into the "developed" world. 1 have, in fact, argued in a number of publications (especially 1 9 7 1 b , 1 9 7 1 c , 1 9 7 6 , 1 9 7 7 ) that sociocultural forms and ecosystemic considerations often are, are likely to be, indeed may inevitably come to be, at odds. If cultural forms can be con­ tradictory to ecosystemic processes it is hard to see how they can be mere epiphenomena of technologies interacting with environments. In sum, I think the charge, as made by Friedman, that Pigs for the Ancestors is an instance of a vulgar materialism inherent in ecological formulations generally, fails. Later we shall touch upon a related charge, raised by Marshall Sahlins, that of "ecology fetishism."

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II We may now turn to more substantial matters. Friedman identifies the "new ecology" with the "new functionalism" and the "new functionalism" with the old. T h e r e are difficulties in dealing with this rather com­ plex matter. F o r one thing, I do not wish to defend the ill-defined corpus of doctrines designated by the term "functionalism" from criticisms with which I have agreed in print ( 1 9 6 8 , 1 9 7 1 c ; see also Vayda 1 9 6 8 ; and Vayda and Rappaport 1 9 6 7 ) . Indeed, the fieldwork reported in Pigs for the Ancestors, and the analysis attempted in that book were guided by criticisms of functionalism, and not functional doctrine per se. Moreover, although Friedman identified "ecological anthropology" and "neo-functionalism" with the "old functionalism," he does not spe­ cify very clearly the ways in which he takes them to be similar, and he certainly does not deal adequately with the contentions of Vayda, me (references cited) and others (Collins 1 9 6 5 ) that they are different in important respects. B y ignoring our statements concerning these differ­ ences he merely asserts an identity between us and that which we our­ selves have criticized. Such a tactic sets discussion back rather than ad­ vancing it. If he wished to make the case that the new ecology is funda­ mentally the same as the old functionalism it was his responsibility to take into consideration both our aims and our practice, and to show that either or both are not essentially different from those of the old func­ tionalism. His discussion is deficient in this regard. His case also required a more comprehensive critique o f functionalism than it has in fact pro­ vided. In taking up the problems of functionalism we may, however, begin with points that Friedman has raised. Following Murphy ( 1 9 7 0 ) , Friedman notes two related difficulties associated with the concept of function, and he asserts that they continue to plague the "new ecology." a. In its more modest form, it dissolves into pure description. The function of the stomach is to digest food; the function of ritual pig slaughter is to regu­ late pig populations—i.e. the function of x is to do what it does. The word here is totally superfluous and adds no information unless we assume some meta­ physical notion of purpose implied in rhe following. b. By extension to the teleological meaning, "function" becomes "adaptive function." Here we are still dealing with our first definition, "the function of x is to do what it does," but now the "what it does" is not an observed datum, and we are left with what is basically a description of imaginary relations, where the "function" is assumed rather than demonstrated. [ 1 9 7 4 : 4 5 7 ] I would, of course, agree that the term "function" adds little or noth­ ing to statements that simply describe the output, immediate result, or product o f the operation of some system, structure, or process. In the

Ecology, Adaptation, and the Ills of Functionalism \ 49 analysis of any particular case the term "function" should be reserved for the designation of contributions made by components of defined systems to the unitary character or maintenance of those systems. It was so used in ftp fo tb Ancestors, both explicitly and implicitly. Before discussing function perse, it seems to me that some things need to be said about description perse. Although I agree that functional asser­ tions and simple descriptions should not be confused, I do take descrip­ tion to be in itself worthwhile. T h e first duty of an ethnographer is to report as thoroughly and accurately as he can. If he cannot "explain" everything that he reports, it is no serious matter. Someone else some­ day may be able to do so, perhaps long after our currently fashionable modes of explanation have become quaint. There is more to be said in favor of description, however, than that it reports that which may eventually be explained. First, "what is being done" by an organ or an institution is not always as patent as Friedman's parodied examples might suggest. To follow him in his organic allusion, while men have always had a kind of commonsense awareness of what the stomach, heart, and eyes "do," they have not always had such an awareness of either the outputs of, say, the pancreas, the thyroid, and the vermiform appendix, or of the place of these outputs in the maintenance of the organisms of which they are indubitably parts. Discourse concern­ ing these matters, whether or not it is in some narrow sense explanatory (Hempel [ 1 9 6 8 ] and Nagel [ 1 9 6 1 ] agree that it may b e ) , is not superflu­ ous, and discoveries concerning them are, of course, highly informative. We should beware of confusing explanation with informativeness or understanding (see Bergmann 1 9 7 5 ) . r

e

It is not the case, however, that analyses generally designated "func­ tional" or "systemic" are always actually concerned with "what x does." They may be at least as concerned with how systems work as with what they do, and may even take the latter for granted. M e n "knew" that the stomach digested food long before they knew how, but elucidation of the ways in which various organic structures and substances join together in the complex processes of anabolism and catabolism is, obviously, enor­ mously informative, and important as well. Similarly, to leave Friedman's organic example for a cultural one, we might say, for example, that anthropology has known since Durkheim's time that rituals establish or enhance solidarity among those joining in their performance. Indeed, an awareness o f this has no doubt been part of general common sense since time immemorial. Y e t we have much to learn about just how ritual cre­ ates this solidarity. In sum, whether or not they are "explanatory'' (and if properly formu­ lated and appropriately applied I take them to b e ) , statements of "what it d o e s " and "how it does it" may well be among the most informative,

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important, and interesting that may be made concerning an organ, an institution, o r a convention. To put this a little differently, among the most informative things that can be said about structures or systems, be they organic, social, cultural, or ecological, are statements concerning how they maintain, order, reproduce, and transform themselves. To make such statements concerning structures or systems requires, of course, some elucidation of the parts played by their elements. In the work that Friedman seems to have been attempting to parody in his reference to the ritual regulation of pig populations, I was concerned not merely to note the direct outcome of pig sacrifices, but with the opera­ tion of a protracted ritual cycle of which pig sacrifices are a part, and the place of that cycle in a complex system that included ecosystemic, eco­ nomic, and political relations. Friedman seems contemptuous of pure description, but does not indi­ cate what he means by the term. For instance, a statement to the effect that ritual pig slaughters regulate pig populations could not be counted as "pure description," if we mean to denote by the phrase "pure descrip­ tion" accounts of events. A sentence stating, simply, that a ritual sacrifice has reduced the number of living pigs would be closer. T h e term "regu­ late," however, which predicates the sentence that Friedman offers, also and inescapably refers to phenomena external to the event being de­ scribed and, because regulation is not a directly observable datum, it also implies or even entails some sort of analytic operation. A similar ob­ servation can be made with respect to the term "digest" in Friedman's stomach sentence. When their predicates are spelled out these sentences denote relationships between their subjects and larger structures or sys­ tems. M o r e o v e r , the relationships denoted by the terms "regulate" and "digest" are supportive, and properly designated "functional" in the nar­ rowest sense of the term. Digestion is, after all, necessary to the mainte­ nance o f life in organisms, regulation to the persistence of dynamic sys­ tems of all classes. Thus, even those sentences that Friedman adduces, in virtual parody, as instances of pure description are probably not what he means by pure description, but are better taken as examples of the second class o f functional sentences he identifies, a class he summarily dismisses as descriptive of merely "imaginary relations," in which an adaptive function is assumed rather than demonstrated. Friedman pro­ vides us with no definition of "adaptation" or "adaptive function," and the imaginary nature of the relations under consideration is asserted as a derogation rather than demonstrated or even discussed ( 1 9 7 4 : 4 5 7 ) . T h e question of "imaginary" versus "real" relations is, of course, sticky. I would only note that all analytic constructs are, in a sense, "imaginary." To disregard this is to fall into the error of misplaced concreteness. Analytic models should make "facts" intelligible, but such

Ecology, Adaptation, and the Ills of Functionalism | 5 1 models are not themselves "the facts" nor, for that matter, facts at all except as artifacts of metaphysics and epistemology. ( N . B . : I speak here of elements of analytic models, not components of actors' models.) If analytic models are imaginary, then the relationships among their components cannot be other than imaginary. This is not, however, to claim that no "real" relations exist in the world. The more or less unified entities with which anthropologists, ecologists, and, for that matter, all scientists are concerned are made up of parts. Relations among these parts and the units of which they are parts, be they conceived as proc­ esses or as things, are not imaginary. Whether or not an analyst gets these relations straight—that is, whether or not these relations are accounted for by his imaginary model—is another matter. Friedman's assertions concerning the imaginary nature of "adaptive functions" do not lead me to abandon my belief that analytic terms like "adaptation" and "adaptive function" correspond to processes occurring in the real world. It still seems to me too that the systemic and ecological model applied in Pigs for the Ancestors so far as it went (and it should not be forgotten in this regard that it subsumed a structural account of the oppositions of Maring religious logic and their mediation, in accordance with which regulatory activities were performed), provided a reasonable account of the Maring materials. Others may disagree and are free to offer alternative accounts. If I were doing the analysis now rather than a decade ago, I probably would give more attention to the place of individual strategies in the allocation of pork concomitant to the major sacrifices at the end of the kaiko if only to avoid fruitless argument. The data did not suggest to me when the analysis was undertaken, however, nor do they now, that these considerations accounted for the size of the pig herd deemed sufficient to perform the kaiko. f

Ill Assertions that the concept of function "in its more modest form dis­ solves into pure description," and "by extension to the teleological mean­ ing" becomes "what is basically a description of imaginary relations" ( 1 9 7 4 : 4 5 7 ) , together with attempts to illustrate these assertions, hardly constitute an adequate account of the ills of the "old functionalism," let alone grounds for asserting that the "new ecology" is heir to them. It is with some reluctance that I reopen this old can of worms, but in order to respond usefully to the general charge that "ecological anthropology" is "fundamentally the same as the old functionalism except that the field of application has changed . . . to show the rationality of institutions with re­ spect to their environments" ( 1 9 7 4 : 4 5 7 ) , I am afraid that it is necessary to cite more comprehensive critiques of functionalism than Friedman

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provides. Doing so will allow me to make some of my own views con­ cerning functionalism's limitations explicit, and to indicate some impor­ tant differences between the "old functionalism" and the ecological per­ spective of at least some present-day workers. We may turn here to the critiques of Brown ( 1 9 6 3 ) , Hempel ( 1 9 6 8 ) , and Nagel ( 1 9 6 1 ) , critiques with which, as I indicated in Pigs for the Ancestors (especially chapter 6 ) , I am in general agreement. Although its concerns were primarily substantive, Pigs for the Ancestors was written with these criticisms in mind and it may be regarded as a more or less explicit, although not altogether successful, attempt to take them into account. I should remind readers at the outset that the objections the philoso­ phers I have named, and others as well, have addressed to functionalist thought and practice were parts of attempts to specify the proper limits of functional statements and to purge functional analyses of the faults that may, and often do, vitiate them. They were not attempts to do away with the notion of function, which they took to have a valid place in the social sciences, a position with which Friedman surely must agree inas­ much as he proposes, incorrectly 1 think,* that the elements that make up the hierarchical structures which he calls social formations are simply functional distinctions ( 1 9 7 4 : 4 4 5 ) . Hempel ( 1 9 5 8 ) argues that functional formulations in the social sci­ ences often fail for several reasons (which can only be outlined in their genera] form here). First, they are often untestable because their key terms lack empirical import. The entities to which functional assertions refer are frequently not specified with sufficient precision (to which may be added Brown's [ 1 9 6 3 ] objection that these entities are not always *The social formation in Friedman's scheme is a hierarchy, bifurcated in the first de­ scending level into "infrastructure" and "superstructure." Superstructure subsumes two elements or subsystems, one labeled "juridico-political," the other "ideological." Infra­ structure is bifurcated into "relations of production" and "forces of production," the latter again bifurcated into "means of production" and "organization of production." While a term like "juridico-political" may designate in a vague sort of way activities of a certain sort, it is descriptive rather than functional. The term "ideological" denotes phe­ nomena of a certain oncological nature. It does not, in itself, propose the contribution that ideology makes to systems in general (meta-function) or to any particular system (function). Terms like "infrastructure" and "superstructure" are of an entirely different order. They are analytic rather than descriptive (ontological) or functional terms. The same may be said for "relations of production" and, possibly, the other terms as well. The "model" seems to be composed of a hodgepodge of terms of different order. More­ over, as it is represented diagrammatically its structure shows no clear relation of com­ mand—or dialectic—between the elements of superstructure and infrastructure. It is quite possible that I misunderstand this model, but it seems to me that it betrays a lack of awareness of the distinction between an analytic model which attempts to relate cate­ gories with respect to inclusiveness and a systemic model which attempts to represent operating relationships among parts. The latter sort must be system-specific if they are to be useful. The former may be of use forgathering data and organizing them categorically. "Sahlins (1969) has used this point as a mild criterion of ecological formulations, but it seems to me misplaced as such. The point is well-understood by ecological anthropolo­ gists and, moreover, it is implicit in the use of goal ranges in designated variables to specify acceptable or adaptive states.

Ecology, Adaptation, and the Ills of Functionalism | 5 3 proper objects of functional assertions), and there is often a failure to provide empirical criteria for such terms as "adequate functioning." Second, there is a failure to make explicit the hypotheses of self-regulation that are implicit in functional formulations and to identify the mechanisms of self-regulation precisely. H e also notes certain difficulties in functional logic, and, I might add, there are further confusions with respect to the relationship between universal and system-specific func­ tional formulations. I shall take up these problems later. These criticisms were, of course, justified, and I attempted to meet them in Pigs for the Ancestors. Thus, the units to w hich the b o o k s func­ tional— I would now prefer to use the term adaptive—assertions in the main referred were specific and concrete: organisms, self-defined groups of organisms, such as local populations; and ecosystems. Procedures for identifying these units were made explicit when necessary, and the choice of these rather than other units was argued on the grounds that they are commensurable with ecological (and adaptive) theory. Whether or not they are proper objects of functional statements is a separate issue (although their appearance in ecological theory, which is systemic in its general oudines, would lead us to believe, prima facie, that they are). Brown ( 1 9 6 3 : 1 1 0 ) has asserted that functional statements hold only in systems of a certain type, namely those that are "self-persisting." Within them, B r o w n states, functional statements are, in fact, causal. H e is in agreement in this regard with Nagel ( 1 9 6 1 ) , who states that functional statements are appropriate in connection with systems incorporating "self-persisting mechanisms." Brown notes that a system can be taken to be self-persisting if it includes self-regulatory devices or mechanisms. There is clearly no argument between Friedman and me concerning the propriety of including within the class of "self-persisting," "selfmaintaining," or "self-regulating" systems both organisms and organized social groups, a class of which local populations are members. It may be asked, however, whether ecosystems are to be included among such sys­ tems. Friedman thinks not: r

An eco-system is not organized as such. It is the result of the mutual and usually partial adaptation of populations each of which has laws of functioning that are internally determined. [ 1 9 7 4 : 466] Vayda and M c K a y ( 1 9 7 5 : 2296°.) seem to come close to agreement with Friedman. Citing Colinvaux's ( 1 9 7 3 : 5 4 9 ) r e m a r k , " . . . nowhere can we find discrete ecosystems, let alone ecosystems with the self-organiz­ ing properties implied by the concept of the c l i m a x . . . " they assert that "the ecosystem is an analytic, not a biological, entity." They continue by proposing that ' 'interactions observed in complex ecosystems need not be regarded as expressing self-organizing properties of the systems

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themselves; instead they can be understood as the consequences of the various and variable adaptive strategies of individual organisms living to­ gether in restricted spaces." (While Friedman favors the "social forma­ tion" as an analytic unit, Vayda and M c K a y assign a priority to the indi­ vidual organism because natural selection operates on individuals.) I regard all of this to be rather muddled. T h e distinction that Vayda and M c K a y make between the analytic and biological seems to me to be a mistaken one. It is surely the case that there are few, if any, ecosystems less inclusive than the solar system that are hermetically sealed to flows of matter, energy, and information across their borders. T h e i r bound­ aries must, therefore, be specified analytically, as must those of social formations or, for that matter, social units of any sort. T h e question of the criteria used to discriminate ecosystems from the continuity of natu­ ral phenomena is, of course, strategic. In Pigs for the Ancestors the cri­ terion for establishing the boundaries of local ecosystems in what was a continuous biotic association, it is important to note, was human terri­ toriality. T h e Maring are horticulturalists and, as such, ecological domi­ nants. T h e y set the conditions encouraging or discouraging the presence of other species, and they attempt to construct anthropocentric eco­ systems within areas in which the engagement of humans in interspecies exchanges is conventionally regulated. Maring local groups are regulat­ ing the ecosystems within which they participate or, to put it in the con­ verse, the domain of the regulatory operations of a local group defines an ecosystem. B e c a u s e a Maring local group is a component of the eco­ system which it regulates (and upon the persistence of which its own persistence is contingent) the ecosystem is by definition self-regulating. It might be argued that self-regulatory properties are peculiar to anthropocentric ecosystems. I think this is not the case. Self-regulating mechanisms, 1 believe, inhere in ecosystems qua ecosystems as well as in their constituent populations. That there are self-regulating mechanisms at one level of organization does not mean that there are none at others. E v e r y population in every ecosystem must have "internally determined laws of functioning" of its own, but this does not mean that there are no self-regulating mechanisms emerging out of relations between and among populations—as in the case of the mutual regulation of predator and prey populations. Ecosystemic self-regulation may be a product of dy­ namic interaction among a number of species none of whom exercises central control or is even dominant in a less active way. Such diffuse regulation is not unfamiliar to us; it animates, at least conceptually, the "perfect market" of economic mythology. Ecosystems do seem to be self-regulated, then, and they show other indications of being "organized as such." F o r one thing they possess wellT

Ecology, Adaptation, and the Ills of Functionalism | 55 known structural characteristics. Regardless of what their constituent species may be, ecological systems are roughly cyclical with respect to material flow and pyramidal with respect to the productivity and energy flux of constituent populations, and with respect to population regulation as well. They also seem to possess "self-organizing" properties. T h e y not only transform themselves in response to changes in external conditions, sometimes by replacing all of their constituent species populations with populations of other species, but also through the mutual adaptation o f their constituent species to each other. (I am not sure what Friedman means when he asserts that these adaptations are only "partial." Biologi­ cal adaptation cannot create ex nihilo. It can do no more than transform what is present. A s such, I suppose it can never be more than partial in some sense. Nevertheless, some astounding relationships [e.g., termites and Myxotricha paradoxa] have evolved, relationships of such intricacy and intimacy that the term "co-evolution" should be used to refer to the mutual causal processes through which they have emerged.) Although ecosystems may include species that have come together accidentally and which are, at the outset, only crudely articulated, the constitutions of such systems are likely to become increasingly elaborate and coercive through time. Many ecologists have believed, and continue to believe, that ecosystemic successions, unless they are arrested or de­ flected, exhibit certain holistic tendencies and that these tendencies are similar in systems very different in species composition (see Odum 1 9 6 9 ; Margalef 1 9 6 8 ) . U n d e r more or less stable conditions, it is proposed, the number of species of which ecosystems are composed increases, perhaps to some maximum; the species present become increasingly specialized and an increasing proportion of them is composed o f large, longer-lived, slower-breeding organisms. Systems as wholes require less and less en­ ergy flux per unit of standing biomass to sustain themselves, but produc­ tivity p e r unit of area increases. Material and energy pathways prolifer­ ate, as d o regulatory mechanisms. Systemic redundancy thus offsets the loss of systemic stability that might otherwise be a concomitant of the increasing specialization of the species present. Colinvaux ( 1 9 7 3 , chs. 6 and 4 0 especially) has recently argued that successional properties have been oversimplified and their commonalities exaggerated, but even he does not dismiss them. T h e adjudication of this argument must be left to biological ecologists. Whatever the outcome of their debate may be, however, there are sufficient grounds for taking ecosystems to be organ­ ized as such, to be members of the class of self-persistent systems, and as such they qualify as proper objects of functional formulations. Whether they are appropriate units of such formulations in particular cases is, of course, another matter.

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A statement of Robert Murphy's could possibly be taken to be an argument against using the ecosystem as an object of functional state­ ments even though the organized status of such systems is granted: Higher order phenomena arrange lower order phenomena to their purposes, though they may not change their properties. Correspondingly, human social systems reach out and embrace ecosystems rather than the reverse proposition, and culture reorders nature and makes appendages of the parts of it that are relevant to the human situation. [ 1 9 7 0 : 1 6 9 ] T h e only qualification that I would voice with respect to this statement is that it may not apply to hunting and gathering populations. With food production—or at least with plant cultivation—men become ecological dominants, the populations setting the conditions encouraging or dis­ couraging the presence of populations of other species. T h e burden of regulating anthropocentric ecosystems rests, of course, upon the men dominating them. To say that men put nature to their own purposes (i.e., regulate ecosystems in accordance with what they take to be their own self-interest) is true to the point of truism, but this is hardly the end of the matter. We want to know how this is done; what the purposes and understandings of the actors may b e ; to what degree these purposes are themselves constituted, coerced, or constrained by environmental char­ acteristics; the degree to which they conform to, or are even explicitly concerned with or informed by, an awareness of the requirements of ecosystemic perpetuation; and, of course, w hether actions guided by such purposes are ecologically destructive. M y study of the Tsembaga suggested to me that there was such conformity in this case, and I have argued elsewhere ( 1 9 7 1 c ) that this may not be unusual in small highly self-sufficient preindustrial social groups all of whose full members are actively engaged in gardening. To insist upon the self-regulating, self-organizing characteristics of ecosystems is not to claim that only ecosystems are organized as such and that functional statements properly apply only to them. Well-defined social units and individual organisms are also constituted systems with "laws of functioning that are internally determined." To note that eco­ systems are constituted is not to deny to the organisms and populations of organisms (including human groups) participating in them their rela­ tive autonomy. Conversely, to recognize the relative autonomy of a social unit is not to deny the organization of the ecosystem of which it is a part, any more than to recognize the relative autonomy of individuals is to deny the organization of the social units of which individuals are al­ ways members. To deny the organization of more inclusive systems to protect conceptually the autonomy of the systems they include is not to argue for the relative autonomy of the latter. It is tantamount to arguing r

Ecology, Adaptation, and the Ills of Eunctionalism | 57 for the absolute autonomy of systems at one or another level of inclusiveness (laissez-faire capitalists would, for instance, take the autono­ mous systems to be, properly, individuals or corporations) operating in larger fields which are not systematic or the systemic qualities of which are purely derivative. The complexity of the world does not warrant such a view even for analytic or heuristic purposes. We must recognize that more inclusive entities are indeed organized systems, made up of com­ ponents that are themselves relatively autonomous. Ecosystems, for in­ stance, include populations which are, in turn, composed of individuals. While it may be that generally similar principles organize systems at vari­ ous levels of inclusiveness, as systems theory proposes, we must also recognize that there are important differences in their more specific "laws of functioning." A difference to which little attention has been given, and which is perhaps closely related to relative autonomy, is that of the differential degrees of coherence that systems of different classes both require and can tolerate. B y "relative coherence" I refer to the degree to which changes in one component of a system effect changes in other com­ ponents of the system. A fully coherent system is one in which any change in any component results in an immediate and proportional change in all other components. A s no living system could be totally incoherent, neither could any living system be fully coherent, for disruptions any­ where would immediately spread everywhere. Perhaps because their functining depends upon fine, quick, and continual coordination of their parts, organisms are, and must be, more coherent than social systems. Conversely, the degree of coherence continually required by organisms would probably be intolerable for social systems (which may attain levels of coherence comparable to that of organisms only in extraordinary cir­ cumstances for relatively brief periods). Ecosystems are probably less coherent than social systems, at least human social systems (perhaps be­ cause orderly relations within them depend more on increasing redun­ dancy of food and energy chains than upon coordination). Their low degree of coherence may well be in large part responsible for our fre­ quent failure to recognize their systemic characteristics. It is, of course, obvious that the maintenance of systems and the pur­ poses of their relatively autonomous components do not always coincide. M e n can surely do violence to the structure and function of the eco­ systems that they come to dominate, just as certain subsystems of socie­ ties, such as industries, can do violence to the social entities that they come to dominate. Although such violation is not unexampled among tribal peoples, its likelihood is increased and its effects extended and in­ tensified by increased differentiation of society, alienating or at least separating the economic rationalities of individuals from direct ecologi-

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cal imperatives by production for gain rather than use and by industri­ alization. T h e imperatives of individual existence often bring men into conflict with the social systems o f which they are members; the cultural impera­ tives of social systems may lead to actions at variance with ecological principles. Contradiction between constituted systems.on various levels of indusiveness—between men and societies, between societies and ecosystems—are inevitable. Sahlins ( 1 9 6 9 ) and Friedman err, I think, in taking ecological or adaptive formulations to be "innocent of a concern for contradiction." Elsewhere ( 1 9 6 9 a , 1 9 7 4 , 1 9 7 6 , 1 9 7 7 , and see "Adap­ tive Structure and Its Disorders" in this volume) I have discussed maladaptation in structural terms, proposing that it is to be understood as, or as resulting from, interlevel contradiction. Indeed, it seems to me that it is Friedman's argument, and not adaptive and ecological formulations, that is analytically innocent of a concern for interlevel contradiction. In insisting, as I think he should, upon the relative autonomy of certain social entities, he mistakenly, in my view, denies reality or organization to the systems that include the systems he favors. B u t if reality or organization is denied to ecological systems how is it possible to discover contradictions between them and the social entities participating in them? B y asserting the autonomy of his chosen systems and by banishing to virtual irrelevance others Friedman may not only miss much of ex­ planatory importance but also much of what is problematic or even poignant or tragic in the human condition. The impoverishment of the perspective is increased if relevance is also denied to the relative auton­ omy o f the individuals composing the social entities with which he is concerned. It should not be forgotten that one of the perennial concerns of human thought about the human condition is with the problems congregating in the relationship between individuals and the societies of which they are members, problems which are conceptually summarized in such phrases as "the problem of freedom"—or of happiness, duty, honor, authenticity, ambition, responsibility, obligation, or ethics. IV M o r e needs to be said about populations as referent units in ecological formulations before we proceed to further problems of functional for­ mulations. T h e use o f populations as environed units distinguishes most clearly what others have called the "new ecology" from the "cultural ecology" of Steward ( 1 9 5 5 ) and others (e.g., Sahlins, 1 9 5 8 ) , in which cultures are taken to be the environed units. Friedman has raised no explicit objections to the use of populations (although his own choice would seem to be the "social formation"), but others have. Marshall

Ecology, Adaptation, and the Ills of Functionalism \ 59 Sahibs has argued that in the "translation" of a "social order" into a <« nulation of organisms. . . everything that is distinctively cultural about the object has been allowed to escape" ( 1 9 7 6 a : 2 9 8 ) . Because the propriety of an analytic choice of almost two decades ago remains a matter of discussion and, I believe, a matter of misunderstanding, it may be well, even at this late date, to clarify it and some of the considerations that led to it. First, difficulties are entailed by the uses of cultures or their parts (e.g., Steward's "culture core") as environed units in ecological analyses, and when cultures are combined with an ecosystemic concept of the environ­ ment these difficulties are increased. A n awkward analogy is implicit in the simple formulation of cultures in ecosystems, but before making it explicit I would suggest that such a choice is the result of a rather subtle methodological or even logical confusion, a confusion between an explicandum on the one hand and, on the other, the primary units of analysis, the major components of analytic or descriptive models, the elements seen to stand in relation to each other. This confusion is easy to fall into, and it is understandable that anthro­ pologists interested in the formative effects of environments on cultures would take cultures, or parts of cultures, to be their primary units of analysis. The conception of culture as an order of phenomena distinct from the psychological, biological, and inorganic has been one of anthro­ pology's important contributions to Western thought. Inasmuch as cul­ tural phenomena may be distinguished from other phenomena and inas­ much as culture, however it is understood, is what most cultural anthropologsts wish to elucidate, cultures or their constituents have seemed obvious choices for referent units in ecological as well as other anthropo­ logical formulations. Indeed, it may be that such a choice seems almost inevitable when it is remembered that culture is conceived by many anthropologists to be not only ontologically distinct from biological, psychological, and inorganic phenomena, but processually independent of them as well. Culture, it is said, obeys laws of its own, laws distinct from those governing organic and inorganic processes. A t the same time that cultural ecology took cultures, distinct from the organisms bearing them, to be interacting with environments, it bor­ rowed the concept of ecosystem from general ecology. In the formula­ tion resulting, cultures simply interact with ecosystems. But cultures and ecosystems are not directly commensurable and cannot simply be squeezed together in such fashion. An ecosystem is a system of matter and energy transactions among populations of organisms of various kinds, and between each of them and all of them on the one hand, and non-living substances, things, and processes on the other. Culture is the category of phenomena distinguished from others by its contingency 0

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upon symbols. A culture consists of the cultural phenomena distinguish­ ing a particular group or category of people from others. T h e incom­ mensurability of ecosystems and cultures becomes clear when the anal­ ogy implicit in the notion o f cultures (independent of, or at least con­ ceptually separated from, culture-bearing organisms) interacting with other components of ecological systems is made explicit. C U L T U R E : E C O S Y S T E M :: A N I M A L P O P U L A T I O N : E C O S Y S T E M

It is ironic to note that the choice of cultures as primary units of analysis in "cultural ecological" formulations aimed to protect the uniqueness of culture against the dissolving power of ecological prin­ ciples, but it has the opposite effect, for the processual equivalence of cultures and animal populations is logically entailed by it. This not only implies that they have similar requirements that must be fulfilled in similar ways and are similarly limited by environmental constraints, but also that cultures, far from obeying laws of their own, are directly subject to the same laws as those governing animal populations. N o cultural ecologist has ever taken such a position, of course, and, I am sure, none ever intended to do so. It is nevertheless intrinsic to the eclectic con­ junction o f incommensurable and incongruent terms that characterizes the cultural ecological conception. Eclectic formulations bring together the disparate terms they subsume only by violating some or all o f them. In the case at hand the violence is wreaked upon the notion of culture, for it, or some of its aspects, such as the social order, may be conflated with biological phenomena. This problem is illustrated by difficulties experienced by Marshall Sahlins in Social Stratification in Polynesia. It was his thesis in that work that certain differences in the social orders of Polynesian societies, in particular differences in social stratification, were to be accounted for by differences in productivity. T h e term "produc­ tivity" must refer in societies such as those of Polynesia to the yields of horticulture and fishing. In the absence of direct production data he attempted to estimate the comparative productivity of the societies in question by comparing the size of the largest networks through which garden, grove, and fishing yields were distributed in each society, making the assumption that the larger the network and the more frequently it operated, the greater the surplus and therefore the higher the produc­ tion. T h e relationship between surplus and productivity is problematic, however, and there is no reason to believe, prima facie, that a society of a certain size organized into a single distributive network produces more per capita than a smaller society, or more than one of the same size organized into a number of smaller networks. Moreover, if the scope of the distributive prerogatives vested in chiefs is an aspect o f stratification, and if stratification is to be accounted for by productivity, to read pro-

Ecology, Adaptation, and the Ills of Functionalism I 61 ducrivity from the size of redistributive networks brings the argument perilously close to circularity. The dubiety o f a long inferential chain and the dangers of circularity are avoidable, however. Productivity in an ecological sense is understood as the amount of biomass or energy produced per unit of area per unit of time. T h e horticultural productivity of societies can thus be compared in such terms as tons per acre per year. In the absence of harvest and landing data indices may or must be used, but the size of redistributive networks is not an appropriate one. In relatively undifferentiated nonindustrial societies like those of Polynesia, however, in which production is for use rather than for gain, and in which populations are closely related genetically, it is reasonable to infer comparative productivity, or production, from a comparison of the densities of the populations sup­ ported by that production. Such a comparison indicates that there was probably no correlation between social stratification and productivity in aboriginal Polynesia, but the point I wish to make here is that 1 believe Sahlins's difficulties have followed from a failure to distinguish an aspect of social orders—the size of redistributive networks—from a biological characteristic of populations, namely their densities. Synthetic formulations in contrast to those which are merely eclectic subsume the subject matter of what had previously been separate realms of discourse under terms of sufficient generality to accommodate both without distortion. They do not ignore or deny distinctions but employ terms of sufficiently high logical type to encompass distinct phenomena as separate subclasses. T h e first step in moving toward any synthesis is to find terms expressing commonalities. In the case of the place of humans in ecosystemic processes, instead of attending only to that which distin­ guishes the human species from other species, synthesis begins with what is common to them and then proceeds to whatever may distinguish them. We thus begin with the simple observation that the human species is, after all, a species among species and that, as such, humanity's rela­ tions with its physical and biotic environments are, like those of other animals, continuous, indissoluble, and necessary. It follows that it is not only possible but proper to take populations of the human species to be an environed unit in ecological formulations. A n ecological population is an aggregate of organisms sharing distinc­ tive means for maintaining a common set of material relations with the other components of the ecosystem in which they together participate. A n ecosystem, as we have already noted, is the total of ecological populations and nonliving substances bound together in material ex­ changes in a demarcated portion of the biosphere. The terms "eco­ system" and "human population," taken in the ecological sense (and not, for instance, in the sense of a simple census count in a polity of some

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sort) are fully commensurable and congruent. I have discussed proce­ dures for discriminating ecosystems and populations of various sorts elsewhere ( 1 9 6 8 , 1 9 6 9 b , 1 9 7 1 c ) and need not discuss them further here. But what o f culture ? For purposes of ecological formulations, cultures or their constituents may be regarded as properties of populations. In this view, culture is not analogous to animal populations but is, in part, analogous to the distinctive means by which populations or other species maintain their environmental relations. It is important to emphasize, however, that to say that a population's means for meeting its needs are cultural is surely not to say that cultures are mere instruments in the service o f organic phenomena. Far from being merely instrumental, cultures have, as it were, needs and purposes o f their o w n ; some are material and some may be at odds with the organic needs of the popula­ tions in which they occur. That the cultural properties of human popula­ tions can be inimical to their organic properties is as inherent to this view o f the relationship between cultural and organic phenomena as is the recognition that aspects of culture are properly regarded as instru­ mental. Indeed, the contradiction, perhaps inevitable, between the cul­ tural and biological is, in my view, the most important problem o f an ecologically aware anthropology. It is well to make clear, however, that such an anthropology does not, o r should not, attempt to account for all of culture in ecological terms. It does not constitute a general theory of culture, although it may be that some anthropologists, including me (Rappaport 1 9 7 1 c ; Vayda and Rappaport 1 9 6 7 ) , have come close to trying to make it so from time to time. B e this as it may, no violation of culture or any o f its parts is entailed when cultures are taken to be properties o f populations. Indeed, far from the social order being re­ duced to the status o f a population o f organisms, as Sahlins charges ( 1 9 7 6 : 2 9 8 ) , organisms are more clearly distinguished from the cultural conventions ordering them than they are in the cultural ecology of Steward or the early Sahlins. It may be well to make explicit further epistemological and meta­ physical implications of the population unit. Although anthropologists like to think o f themselves as especially free o f ethnocentrism, they have traditionally been concerned with those aspects of human existence that are unique to the species. Anthropology is, in short, anthropocentric and, o f course, it would be surprising if it weren't. B u t by focusing upon those aspects o f human existence that are unique to humanity w e tend to ignore other aspects o f human existence that, although not unique to human life, are nonetheless parts of it. Such a stance may lead us to separate ourselves from or even oppose ourselves to the rest of nature in our daily lives and public affairs, with the unhappy consequences w e see

Ecology, Adaptation, and the Ills of Functionalism | 63 developing in the environment around us. M o r e o v e r , in our more formal attempts to understand our relation to the rest of the world we are encouraged to seek special explanations, explanations which, founded upon assumptions of uniqueness, can cover only one, o r at best a narrow range, o f cases, and we are dissuaded from attempts to understand cultural phenomena in terms of principles that apply to other species as well. Whether such general principles as those concerning adaptation, homeostasis, and cybernetic operation have much to contribute to our understanding o f culture or the human condition is touched upon later in this essay. H e r e it may be suggested that formulations that illuminate similarities rather than emphasize differences should have a place in our epistemologies. It may even be proposed that the exposure of similarities among a class of phenomena, such as organisms, populations, or even living systems, generally precedes adequate understanding o f the differ­ ences among them. Unless similarities are recognized and understood, the magnitude and significance of differences cannot be comprehended. What to a more general perspective might seem to be variations on a common theme may appear to a narrower perspective to be enormous differences. It seems to me, finally, that the use of the human population in eco­ logical analyses preserves a view o f man as part of nature at the same time that it recognizes the uniqueness conferred upon him by culture. A s such it preserves the terms defining the condition o f a creature that can live only in terms o f meanings, largely culturally constituted, in a world to which law is intrinsic but meaning is not. V Let us now return to the ills, real and putative, of functional formulations per se. That they often seem to identify what Friedman calls the rational­ ity o f elements while ignoring the rationality or irrationality of the system is surely true. Friedman is, however, incorrect in asserting that this is a "deadly weakness of functionalism" if he is proposing ( 1 ) that it is intrinsic to the logic of functional (or systemic) analyses, or (2) that it is peculiar to them. H e is wrong in a more specific way in regard to formulations that include ecological variables. A s far as the general charge is concerned, Vayda has observed that "a concern with how extant systems operate by no means commits the analyst to the proposition that no other systems could operate better" ( 1 9 6 8 : x ) , and Harris ( 1 9 6 6 ) has also been explicit about this. Friedman is, of course, free to demonstrate that the practice of these writers contradicts their explicit statements, but he did not attempt to do so.

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It should be kept in mind that adaptation is not a maximizing, or even an immediately optimizing process. Adaptations need not be the best possible solutions to problems, but only "good enough." (In fact, "good e n o u g h " is, in the long run, often better than "best" because maximiza­ tion, or even optimization, of immediate material returns is likely to require specializations which reduce long-term flexibility [see Bateson 1 9 6 3 ; Slobodkin and Rapoport 1 9 7 4 ; see also "Adaptive Structure and Its D i s o r d e r s " ] . ) T h e weakness of which Friedman speaks is not peculiar to functional­ ism per se. It is, rather, intrinsic to the doctrine of cultural relativism with which functional formulations have often been associated. Obviously required tp obviate the problem are supra-cultural criteria in accordance with which both the operations o f particular systems and the effects of their operations may be assessed. Ecological theory and general systems theory (the latter being concerned, among other things, with the struc­ ture of self-regulating and self-organizing processes) provide such cri­ teria. What Friedman might mean by "the rationality" o f systems, and at least what I mean by the adaptiveness of systems as well as of elements, may b e assessed with respect to ( 1 ) their ecosystemic consequences and ( 2 ) the extent to which their structures are self-regulating and selforganizing. Although ecological theory and the theory of adaptive structure do provide criteria in terms o f which the operation of systems may b e assessed, I do not claim that they alone provide such criteria. Half a century ago, for instance, Sapir suggested that cultures may be judged "genuine" o r "spurious" in terms o f their internal consistency and the opportunities they provide to individuals for personal realization ( 1 9 2 4 ) . T h e application of one such set of criteria does not preclude the simul­ taneous application of others, and 1 raise no objection in principle to the application of standards, such as those that Sapir suggested, to sociocultural systems generally. If they are derived from an explicit theory and if some sort of objective import can be given to their key terms, they are strengthened by claims to empirical testability; but even if their terms cannot be given hard objective meaning they may have a subjective or intuitive validity not to be discounted, even though great caution is required when subjectivity and intuition are at play. A variety o f supra-cultural criteria might be put to the task of assessing sociocultural systems. It may be suggested, however, that ecological (and I may add, biological) and adaptive criteria are indispensable. I d o not wish to press this point, but the following arguments may be adduced in its support. First, and least important, ecological criteria, and biological criteria in general, enjoy a high degree of objectivity. Ecological criteria

Ecology, Adaptation, and the Ills of Functionalism | 65 are material, often amenable to quantification, and viable limits for eco­ logical and biological variables can sometimes be established. Adaptive criteria are structural and quasi-logical. (This point is elaborated in the essay "Adaptive Structure and Its Disorders/') Systems which are charac­ terized by, o r defined by, adaptive processes, a class that includes all living systems (organisms, populations, and ecosystems), seem to be, and probably must be, organized both hierarchically and cybernetically. While much work remains to be done on the conceptualization of the adaptive processes, it does already seem possible to specify some of the structural features requisite to systems if orderly adaptive processes are to continue within them (Bateson 1 9 6 3 ; Pattee 1 9 7 3 ; Piaget 1 9 7 1 ; Simon 1 9 6 9 ; Slobodkin and Rapoport 1 9 7 4 ) - If these structural features can be identified, then violations o f them can be recognized and taken to be maladaptive. Second, and more obvious, relating as they do to matters o f survival, ecological, biological, and adaptive criteria are, in a crucial sense, funda­ mental. Third, and most problematic, ecological, biological, and adaptive theo­ ries, including as they do in their formulations such units as organisms and associations of organisms, are not only commensurable with theories pertaining to all of life, but may also provide a framework within which some criteria drawn from other substantive theories could be organized and related to each other in orderly fashion. Even psychological and humanistic criteria might be accommodated. For instance, adaptive struc­ tures are in their nature self-regulated. Adequate regulation requires, among other things, that the regulation contain informational variety equivalent to the variety manifested in the phenomena to be regulated. Because humans play regulatory roles in sociocultural and ecological systems this argues against their narrow specialization, a matter that troubled Sapir long ago. Let m e reiterate, however, that I do not claim for ecological, biological, and adaptive criteria that they have exclusive rights with respect to the assessment of social systems or that they can order o r dominate all other criteria T h e y surely cannot subsume all of the humanistic concerns that properly reside in humans and that should not be discounted because they are intangible. T o summarize, the procedure adopted in Pigs for the Ancestors met a general criticism of functional analyses, namely that the units to which functional statements refer are usually not adequately specified. Eco­ systems, being themselves self-regulating and self-organizing, qualify as objects o f functional statements, but they are not the only units that do. S o do social groups and individual organisms, and Pigs for the Ancestors gave them an attention equal to that which it gave the ecosystem. T h e

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recognition of the ecosystem as one of the significant units, however, makes it possible to discover contradictions between their imperatives and the internally determined imperatives of the units they include. Far from denying the relative autonomy of the latter, that autonomy is regarded as an inevitable source of real world problems. It is possible that Pigs for the Ancestors did, in fact, fail to illuminate contradictions between social, ecological, and organic levels of organization. N e v e r t h e ­ less, that a particular case may be free, or relatively free, of interlevel contradiction does not suggest that such harmony is usual. Finally, I re­ iterate that the inclusion o f ecological, biological, and adaptive criteria (the latter not emphasized in Pigs for the Ancestors) provides a method for assessing what Friedman calls "the rationality of systems" as well as elements. Friedman, it may be recalled, has asserted that the "new ecology" is "fundamentally the same as the old functionalism except that the field of application has changed, the interest now being to show the rationality of institutions with respect to environments, rather than to other elements in the society" ( 1 9 7 4 : 4 5 7 ) . The implication of the last portion of my argument is that the inclusion of ecosystems in the analysis is more than a m e r e extension of functional analysis to a new domain. It is a more fundamental change, for it exposes interlevel contradiction and provides criteria for systemic assessment. V I turn now to the matter of the failure of functional formulations to provide empirical import for such key terms as "adequate functioning," "survival," "homeostasis," and so on. That this criticism is justified is indubitable, but it is also fair to say that there was a serious attempt to meet it in Pigs for the Ancestors. That attempt was only partially successful, but its shortcomings, I think, had the virtue o f exposing specific difficul­ ties, only partially o f a metrical sort. T h e procedure was patent, but I shall reiterate it here. Having defined the units to be considered, an attempt was made to give "homeostasis," or "adequate functioning," empirical import in variable-specific terms. It was conceived, in accordance with the strictures of H e m p e l ( 1 9 5 8 ) and N a g e l ( 1 9 6 1 ) , as a set of "goal ranges" (i.e., ranges of viability) on variables which, for reasons independent of the mode of operation o f the system under consideration, were taken to be crucial to the persistence of that system. Thus, for ecological reasons, "carrying capacity" and nutritional variables were among those selected. A n attempt was made to assign values to them on the basis of observation, measurements, and

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reference to m o r e o r less g e n e r a l theories. T h e s e attempts at quantifica­ tion w e r e o n l y partially successful. W h i l e u p p e r limits w e r e assigned to the tolerable size o f pig and human populations, l o w e r limits w e r e not. T h e values assigned to u p p e r limits w e r e t h e m s e l v e s suspect. It was not possible, for instance, to ascertain directly just h o w long fallow periods had been, much less h o w long they n e e d e d to have been. A l l that could be d o n e — o r at least was d o n e — w a s to a d d u c e e v i d e n c e indicating that they had b e e n adequate. N o v a l u e was assigned to the frequency o f warfare, much less to viable frequencies o f warfare. Since there remained important lacunae in the quantitative data, the study remained an "exploratory sketch," to use Collins s ( 1 9 6 5 ) term. A n important feature o f the m e t h o d , noted in passing in the last paragraph, d e s e r v e s emphasis. I stipulated that the assignment o f limits to g o a l ranges is to be m a d e by r e f e r e n c e to considerations distinct from the values at w h i c h the relevant variables (e.g., numbers o f pigs) are, in fact, equilibrated. T h i s stipulation is necessary if another c o m m o n failing of functional formulations, namely that they fall into tautology, is to be avoided. ( I c a m e perilously close to this with respect to the length o f fallow p e r i o d s . ) I f the level at which a variable is in fact equilibrated is taken ipso facto to represent an equilibrium o r homeostatic value for that variable, there is, ipso facto, tautology. H o w e v e r , if homeostasis is defined by reference to independent criteria, tautology is avoided. R e f e r e n c e values (the v a l u e s with respect to which equilibration or regulation takes p l a c e ) and goal ranges (the ranges o f values defining "homeostasis," adequate functioning, survival, etc.) must b e established independently. In establishing t h e m independently it is possible to discover instances in which reference values fall outside o f goal ranges. Such a condition may define "dysfunction" under stable conditions. T h e possibility that refer­ ence values may well violate goal ranges is indicated in the last p a g e s o f Pigs for the Ancestors in a discussion o f cognized and operational m o d e l s . T h e r e is a y e t m o r e fundamental difficulty intrinsic t o the p r o c e d u r e I have outlined. In a changing w o r l d e v e n goal ranges may change. T h e introduction o f a n e w c r o p , for instance, may change carrying capacity. T h a t this difficulty was, in fact, recognized in the b o o k d o e s not dissolve it. T h e m e t h o d , as I have outlined it, suffers from the limitations o f the static, a point that Friedman did not raise, but that must b e made explicit. In another essay in this v o l u m e , " A d a p t i v e Structure and Its D i s o r d e r s , " I deal with w a y s in which change may be dealt with in general systemic terms.

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VI I have been using terms more familiarly associated with systemic than with functional analysis, and Hempel, in his critique of functional analy­ sis, in effect called for the replacement of vague functional formulations by more rigorous systemic constructions. That he made no sharp distinc­ tion between the two constituted a tacit recognition on his part that the latter may be regarded as a reform of the former. B e this as it may, Pigs for the Ancestors constituted an attempt at systemic analysis, an analysis in which the units are clearly specified, the goal ranges and reference values o f key variables are given objective import, and the regulatory mecha­ nisms identified. That it failed to meet the rigorous requirements of systemic analysis in all respects must be freely admitted, and it is thus vulnerable to criticism in its own terms. It is important to point out here, however, lest anyone be bemused by Friedman's suggestion that the "ultimate source and possible salvation" of the "new functional ecology" lies in systems theory ( 1 9 7 4 : 4 4 5 ) , that systems analysis, at least (systems theory is another matter), has problems of its own. Systemic analysis makes no prescription concerning the variables to be included in the analytic system. Their selection is a product of hypotheses concerning interrelations among the phenomena under investigation. While the rigorous specification of systems ameliorates the vagueness that often vitiates looser functional formulations, it increases the danger that crucial components or aspects of the natural or cultural system being represented will be omitted. Since systemic analyses, like looser func­ tional formulations, are concerned to elucidate the ways in which order is maintained in systems that naturally tend toward disorder or entropy, it may be—although it is not logically entailed that this should be s o — that there is a tendency to ignore the disorderly and to include only the orderly, even though the notion of self-regulation, virtually intrinsic to the notion of system, implies response to perturbation. Nevertheless, by giving himself the system, so to speak, the maintenance of which he takes it to be his task to elucidate, the analyst may affirm whatever assumptions concerning harmony and orderliness he entertained at the outset without fear of overthrow. The dilemma is, simply, that the abstraction necessary to derive analytically tractable systems from the complexity of nature and culture puts systemic formulations in danger of becoming unreal or unfalsifiable. This, o f course, is not very different from the difficulties besetting all of science. The point here is that this difficulty is exacerbated by increased rigor; more specifically, by increasingly rigorous canons of specification. T h e problem is not hopeless, of course. Systemic analyses do not usually take place in contexts devoid of substantive theories. Such theories usually include references to units that can be taken to be the

Ecology, Adaptation, and the Ills of Functionalism | 69 systems forming the object of investigation, and also are likely to include criteria for establishing the goal ranges of the variables which they specify as crucial to systemic persistence. Ecology provides one such body of theory, discriminating discrete units on several levels of inclusiveness, many of which are directly available to observation (e.g., organisms), and some of which correspond to self-defining and selfbounding entities (e.g., Maring local populations). For the analyst to take such units to be those with which his analysis is concerned is to g o far toward avoiding the problems implicit in "giving himself the system," but this remains an ever-present danger. VII We have continually returned to the matter of regulation, and may now deal with another of the important criticisms of functionalism raised by Hempel, namely that the self-regulatory mechanisms implicit in func­ tional formulations are not made explicit. I claim that Pigs for the Ances­ tors met this criterion adequately. T h e self-regulatory processes inhering in the ritual cycle of the Tsembaga were described in narrative form in the work itself in sufficient detail to make possible its computer model­ ing without, on the part of the modeler, requests for additional data from me (Shantzis and Behrens, 1 9 7 3 ) . In a later work of mine ( 1 9 7 1 c ) , the Tsembaga system, including its regulatory mechanisms, was represented diagrammatically (see "On Cognized Models" in this volume). Friedman, however, takes issue with my analysis of Maring ritual regulation, arguing that I have misused the general concept of negative feedback. His first point is a general one. H e defines negative feedback systems as "systems in which certain variables are kept within certain crucial limits by the operation of other variables which are dependent functions of those limits" ( 1 9 7 4 : 4 5 9 ; italics original), and says that he fails "to see that the environment limit is involved at all [in the Tsembaga case], since . . . the [ritual] cycle is triggered way below carrying capacity, and other groups probably come closer to that limit" ( 1 9 7 4 : 4 6 0 ) . Later he elucidates his argument with the following analogy: " I f a thermostat is set for 7 5 degrees, but the furnace which it regulates breaks down at 6 5 degrees every time, then we cannot speak of negative feedback" ( i 9 7 4 460). A misunderstanding of negative feedback is evident here. Negative feedback is simply a process in which deviations from reference values initiate operations tending to return the state of the deviating variable to its reference value. T h e relationship of reference values to goal ranges (what Friedman probably means by "limits," i.e., the possible range of viable or homeostatic states) is a separate question, and a very important :

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one, which, as I have already pointed out, was considered in italics in the closing pages of the Mating book. In a discussion of the relationship between cognized and operational models I called attention to problems that may develop in cybernetic operation itself. I said the following, italicizing the main point in the original so that its significance would not be missed. (Evidently this strategy was not successful.) First, what is the relationship between signs and the processes they are taken to indicate? Is it the case, for instance, that such processes as environmental degradation are detected (indicated by signs) early, or only when they are well advanced? Second, to what extent do reference values, which are likely to reflect people's wants rather than their needs, correspond to the actual material requirements of the local population, the ecosystem, or the regional popula­ tion? In other words, what is the relationship between the reference value or ranges of values of the cognized model and the goal ranges of the operational model? [1968: 2 4 0 - 2 4 1 ]

1 did not make explicit that the "wants" referred to in this passage are culturally determined, are a product of ideology, ambition, social rela­ tions, or social structure. I simply took that for granted and assumed that anyone who read the book would also take it for granted. It may be that I should have discussed more fully the possible sociocultural factors that entered into the reference value for pig herd size, but as I have already mentioned, I argued that although the slain pigs were put to culturally determined ends, the reference value itself is a reflection of a local population's tolerance for the labor requirements of pigs or the disrup­ tive capacity of pigs. The more important point I wish to reiterate here is that the reference values upon which negative feedback operation is equilibrated may lie outside of independently specified goal ranges. To para­ phrase Friedman's thermostat-furnace analogy, we could set a thermostat at 4 0 and sit around shivering, or at n o ° and collapse from heat prostra­ tion. M o r e to the point, our own society offers a large number of instances of economic reference values, which are of course culturally determined, being maintained outside of environmental and physiologi­ cal goal ranges. I think we can say that this is "dysfunctional" or "mal­ adaptive" even if the economic system is working well for the time being (which, o f course, it isn't). This is to say that negative feedback need not be homeostatic. This leads to an important point raised by Friedman. H e notes that "while it is valid to describe [italics original] the ritual cycle as operating to keep the pig population below a certain level, it is incorrect to claim that it is a bomeostat [italics added] when no relation has been shown to exist between the limit and the triggering of the cycle" ( 1 9 7 4 : 4 6 0 ) . This point must be taken seriously, and it does, I think, rightly point to a deficiency in Pigs for the Ancestors. I showed no intrinsic relationship 0

Ecology, Adaptation, and the Ills of Functionalism | 7 1 between women's labor and carrying capacity, and there may not be any. I did argue, however ( 1 9 6 8 : 1 6 0 f f . ; see also pp. 1 1 6 and 7 0 ) , that in more densely populated areas the depredations of pigs, rather than their labor requirements, may trigger kaikos. I further argued that the frequency of garden invasions by pigs is density-dependent and as such may be re­ lated, in a rough way, to environmental limits. In terms that I was not aware of at the time, what was implied (but in all fairness to Friedman was surely not adequately expressed) was multi-phasic regulation (Vayda 1 9 7 4 ) , in which at low densities women's labor is operative while at high densities environmental considerations predominate. Friedman relegates his discussion of garden invasions by pigs to a footnote in which he seems to dismiss the possible relationship of density dependence to environ­ mental limits and in which he also is guilty of an ethnographic error. ( A more careful reading of the work would have indicated to him that conflicts concerning pigs are not generated in "the nuclear phase of a pulsating settlement pattern," but throughout the dispersal which they in part motivate.) B e this as it may, my argument concerning the densitydependent nature of pig-caused conflict and the relationship of this density-dependence to environmental limits was not supported by suffi­ cient data and, therefore, was no more than hypothetical. Moreover, I did not, in accordance with the strictures of Hempel, specify the range of conditions (e.g., human demographic) under which the regulatory mechanism of the ritual cycle would keep pig herd size within environ­ mental capacity. M y case, then, for asserting that the regulatory opera­ tion of the ritual cycle is homeostatic, was incomplete. It is worth noting, however, as I did in the book ( 1 9 6 8 : 1 6 3 ) , that the problem under discussion here is not altogether one of analysis, but is a reflection of how natural systems operate. It is certainly the case that maximal pig popula­ tion size among the Tsembaga was equilibrated well below limits. This is not unusual. A s Wynne-Edwards ( 1 9 6 2 ) , Birdsell ( 1 9 5 8 ) and others have noted, populations of many species are regulated in the first in­ stance by endogenous mechanisms operating well below carrying capa­ city, and it is not always clear how such regulatory operations relate to environmental limits. It may be that instances of humans who are not maximizing occasion some surprise, but such surprise is surely engen­ dered by economistic preconceptions. Adaptation is not a maximizing process, and the imperatives of Maring social structure do not encourage maximizing. Friedman raises one other problem concerning Maring regulation that remains to be discussed. The principal limit of the system as it is described by Rappaport is the point at which physical strain on women builds up. Since it is they who are burdened with the task of feeding and managing the pigs, they are the first to feel the

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diminishing returns on increased labor. All the evidence he presents indicates that it is this strain in the system which triggers the cycle. Yet his own "explana­ tion" appears to turn the whole thing upside down since he assumes that it is the ritual cycle which regulates labour and not the converse. [ 1 9 7 4 : 4 5 9 - 4 6 0 ] Friedman is certainly correct in his reading o f the ethnography when he notes that it is "the strain" of too many pigs that triggers the kaiko. I tried very hard to argue that very point, and the attempt to use it in criticism of the analysis suggests to me a misunderstanding of cybernetic operation. T h e very same point could be made concerning thermostats, which, I am sure, Friedman will admit to the class of cybernetic regula­ tors. It is a rise in room temperature, an outcome of the furnace's operation, that triggers the regulatory reaction of the thermostat, namely to turn off the furnace. Similarly, it is the increase in pig population to intolerable limits, as indicated by complaints concerning labor and con­ flicts resulting from porcine depredations, that triggers the regulatory reaction of the ritual cycle, namely the kaiko, which "turns off" the pigs. If the ritual cycle is not a regulatory mechanism, neither is the thermostat. W e note in these examples that cybernetic or negative feedback regu­ lation takes the form of a closed loop: it has a circular causal structure. A change in the value of a variable itself initiates a process that either limits further change or returns the value to its former level. T h e basic diffi­ culty in Friedman's argument seems to be that it attempts to impose a notion of linear causality upon a system which is in its nature circular. The linear assumption is implicit in the view that either the kaiko or the labor is causal. Granting the circular structure o f cybernetic systems, it still might be asked why it should be said that the ritual cycle regulates pig demog­ raphy, warfare frequency, etc., and not that they regulate the ritual cycle. The same question may be asked about the regulatory relationship o f the thermostat and the furnace. T h e self-regulatory operations of all systems in which they occur are, of course, contingent upon the dynamic interaction of these systems' components, and in some systems discrete regulators are not to be dis­ tinguished. Nevertheless, there surely are grounds for taking thermo­ stats and ritual cycles to be regulators. I would note first that the Maring ritual cycle contains, so to speak, a set of standard corrective responses to deviations in the values o f variables external to itself; for instance, the labor o f which Friedman speaks. One basis for saying that the ritual cycle regulates labor and not vice versa is the fact that "amount of labor" is not a regulatory response, but rather a variable which may deviate from a reference value or goal range (thus requiring regulation). It is important to make clear, however, that the ritual cycle is not simply a set of correc­ tive responses. It itself constitutes those responses. It is the locus of the

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i n v e n t i o n s in accordance with which the corrective responses are undertaken and conducted. It e m b o d i e s a set o f instructions for a c o m ­ munal c o r r e c t i v e p r o g r a m . T h e r m o s t a t s , analogously, also contain in­ structions, albeit rather simple o n e s (e.g., when the temperature o f the room reaches the value set on the dial, switch off the furnace; w h e n it drops 3 b e l o w that v a l u e , switch on the furnace). T h e regulator is that c o m p o n e n t o f a circular causal system which contains the instructions in accordance with which the system operates. In the sorts o f systems exemplified by the T s e m b a g a and their relations with other species and groups, the regulator is the dominant information processing c o m p o n e n t in systems o f matter and energy transactions. T h e information processed is culturally e n c o d e d , and it g o e s without saying that, as such, it is not only founded upon cultural p e r c e p t i o n s o f natural processes (which per­ ceptions may be " o b j e c t i v e l y ' ' inaccurate), but it is also selected by socially d e t e r m i n e d m o t i v e s and goals, and in accordance with the im­ peratives o f social relations and structures. I shall reiterate, h o w e v e r , that in small undifferentiated societies such as that o f the M a r i n g , in which all adult m e m b e r s are directly and continuously engaged with the natural environment and in which corrective informational feedback from the environment is direct, o b s e r v a b l e , and relatively quick, w e may e x p e c t a close c o r r e s p o n d e n c e b e t w e e n culturally specified motives and goals and the r e q u i r e m e n t s o f ecosystemic processes. It m a y b e possible to add another justification to those already offered for taking the ritual cycle to be regulator rather than regulated, although this m a y be little m o r e than a translation o f the preceding argument into other terms. T h e ritual cycle constitutes, o r at least codifies, the relations of production o f M a r i n g society. T o use Friedman's definition, "relations of production are those social relations which dominate (i.e. determine the e c o n o m i c rationality o f ) the material process o f production in g i v e n techno-ecological c o n d i t i o n s . . . . M o r e specifically they determine . . . the use to b e m a d e o f the e n v i r o n m e n t . . . the division o f productive l a b o u r . . . the forms o f appropriation and distribution" ( 1 9 7 4 : 4 4 6 ) . T h e ritual cycle is a sacred structure within which productive and reproduc­ tive activities (ecological, biological, and social) p r o c e e d and in terms o f which social, political, and ecological relations are defined and g i v e n meaning. It may b e suggested that ritually regulated societies comprise a m o d e o f production c o m m e n s u r a b l e with feudalism, capitalism, and oriental despotism. B e c a u s e the operation o f ritually regulated societies d o e s not entail social stratification o r e v e n ranking, ritual itself may constitute a v e r y old if not the primordial m o d e o f production. 0

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VIII There remains the criticism that systemic as well as functional formula­ tions suffer from the fallacy of affirming their consequents. N o w it surely is invalid to claim, as some functional analyses seem to do, that an "item" or "trait" is present in a system because the system functions adequately if and only if a certain condition is met, and that the item present meets the condition. To say that a particular item meets the condition is not to say that only that item could meet the condition. It might be met equally well by other items. Only in cases in which the item present and only the item present could meet the condition can a functional statement ac­ count for the item's presence in the system, but such functional indispensability is empirically difficult or even logically impossible to demon­ strate. This criticism was presaged before the turn of the century by Durkheim ( 1 9 3 8 : 9 0 ) . It is true that in a brief passage in Pigs for the Ancestors, to which allusion has already been made, it was indeed suggested that the Maring ritual cycle might be a local variation o f a generalized Highland form and that the peculiar characteristics of the local variation might be accounted for by local environmental conditions. This proposal, it may be sug­ gested, is not a simple functional proposal, but an adaptive one, imply­ ing, as it does, a model of adaptive radiation. B e this as it may, the aim of the book was not to account for either the presence or the origin of the ritual cycle, and it was not asserted that the regulatory functions ascribed to the cycle could not be fulfilled by other mechanisms. T h e ritual cycle was taken as a given, and the aim of the book was simply to elucidate its place in the operation of a particular system during a particular period in its history. T h e general criticism, that function does not account for presence or origin, is not relevant to Pigs for the Ancestors, and Friedman did not raise it explicitly. It is nevertheless worth discussing for two reasons. First, Friedman's charge that the "new ecology" is essentially the same as the old functionalism seems to imply that it embodies all of the vices of the old functionalism. Second, and more important, the critique itself is not without difficulties. Taking up the simplest of these difficulties first, it is surely true that functional statements alone cannot account for origin or presence, but they may form indispensable components of more elaborate formula­ tions that can. Although "items" other than those present could con­ ceivably fulfill indispensable functions at a particular time and place, given the limited cultural materials (structural, ideological, technical, social, political, or whatever) usually available, only the item or form present, or a limited range of them, could have emerged. It might be

Ecology, Adaptation, and the Ills of Functionalism | 7 5 supposed, for instance, that a king or a bicameral parliament could have done everything that the Maring ritual cycle was doing, and done it better, but given the cultural materials available, a ritual cycle, and neither kings nor parliaments, did, in fact, emerge. To use Aristotelian terminology, neither final nor efficient nor material cause is alone sufficient to account for presence or origin, but taken together they may be. Environmental changes or perturbation are of the class of processes that can qualify as efficient causes, inducing a system to respond (change its state or structure) within the constraints of its previously existing constitution (material cause) in such a way as to perpetuate itself (final cause, or what is ordinarily meant by "function"). This is all obvicms, but two general comments should be made. First, we are no longer speaking of simple functional formulations, which are no more than final causal, but of adaptive formulations which also include material causal and, of course, efficient causal considerations as w ell. I take ecological and systemic formulations to be, at least im­ plicitly, adaptive rather than merely functional, although I have myself to blame for labeling Pigs for the Ancestors (in the first sentence of the first chapter) a functional study. I did not fully comprehend what I was, in fact, trying to do. I shall return to adaptive formulations later. Second, Aristotle proposed a fourth type of cause, namely formal cause. H e wasn't very clear about it, but I take it to refer to the entailment of operations of particular sons by the formal characteristics of structures. We are led here to the second major difficulty with the general critique of functional formulations presently under discussion. It grows out o f a confusion resulting from a conflation of formal and final causal accounts under the label "functional." Raymond Kelly and I ( i 9 7 5 ) have recently attempted to clarify some of the issues: I shall take this opportunity to elaborate our earlier attempt. In its most common usage the term "function" implies final cause, a functional formulation being one seeking to "explain" or "elucidate" an "item" in a "system" by specifying its "contribution" to the "survival," "persistence," or "adequate functioning" of that system. Although, as I have already noted, they are often improperly constructed, and al­ though their proper limits have often been violated, this concept of function, particularly when expressed in the rigorous terms of an em­ pirically-based systemic analysis and informed by a substantive theory, does have a legitimate place in the social sciences. That it may be impossible to demonstrate the "functional indispensability" of particular items does not vitiate the value of the final causal conception of function. It must be understood, however, that final causal accounts are properly only system-specific For instance, that a ritual cycle regulates the social, political, and ecological relationships of the Maring people such that the r

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frequency of warfare, the intensity o f land use, and the divisive effects of internal quarreling among the members of local groups are all kept within viable limits does not mean that forms or structure that we would recognize as ritual perform similar functions anywhere else in the world. T h e specification of a particular function in a particular system does not entail the specification of the form o f the mechanism the output of which is that function. Conversely, the specification of a "category" or "form" o r " t y p e " of "item" (e.g., ritual) does not entail the specification of its particular contribution to any system in which it appears. This autonomy of form and function with respect to each other is sometimes considered to be lethal to the notion of function as an "explanatory concept." In fact, it simply proposes the limitations of final causal statements. W e may turn now to the other form o f argument which is sometimes labeled "functional," but which differs importantly from final causal formulations. In fact, it is formal causal, and as such virtually the inverse o f the final causal type. Its aim is not to elucidate the contribution that some "item" or "component" or "form" makes to the system of which it is a part, but to elucidate what is entailed by, follows from o r is intrinsic to a particular form or structure. T h e form of a formal causal account is certainly not limited to, but is nicely illustrated by, cybernetic mechanisms. T h e term "cybernetic" denotes a structure o r form of a particular sort, that of the closed causal loop. Intrinsic to, o r entailed by, the operation o f a simple cybernetic structure is "negative feedback," such that deviations of the states of components of the loop from reference values initiate processes tending to return those states to their reference values. ( W e needn't g o into the matter o f "positive feedback" o r "deviation amplification" here.) A number of observations are in order. First, because cybernetic struc­ ture entails regulation, wherever the structure is observed the state of some variable is being equilibrated at or around some reference value. In contrast to simple final causal accounts, which are properly only systemspecific, formal causal accounts are universalist. Second, formal causal accounts are properly applied only to structures. that is, to phenomena that may be formally described in terms of endur­ ing internal relations. Cybernetic structure is a proper object of such formulations, but the class o f such objects is innumerable, certainly including kinship systems, marriage systems, and ritual. Elsewhere, for instance, I have defined ritual as the performance o f more or less in­ variant sequences o f formal acts and utterances not encoded by the performers. This definition, specifying as it does not only a number of features but also relations among them, denotes a structure, and I have argued that this structure entails social contract, morality, a paradigm of

Ecology, Adaptation, and the Ills of Functionalism | 7 7 ncept of the sacred and notion of the divine (see " T h e Obvious Aspects of R i t u a l " ) . Third, if particular entailments are intrinsic to a particular structure and only to that structure (e.g., to the cybernetic structure, or to the tructure which is ritual) it may be argued that those structures are without equivalents. I have so argued for ritual (ibid.),, and a similar argument could be made for cybernetic structure (see Piaget 1 9 7 1 : 1 5 ) . If the unique entailments o f a particular structure are crucial to the persistence or survival of systems in general then it may be said that that structure is not only without equivalent but indispensable. This may account for the ubiquitous occurrence of such structures as the cyber­ netic and ritual forms. Fourth, this argument would seem to contradict the dictum that func­ tion cannot account for presence because of the impossibility of demon­ strating the indispensability o f even those items performing indispens­ able functions. It seems to propose that there is an aspect or class of phenomena, namely structure or structures, for which claims of func­ tional uniqueness and indispensability can, in fact, be made. The contra­ diction, however, is more apparent than real because the entailments of structure are not properly regarded as functions in the final causal sense. What is entailed by a structure does not in itself constitute a specific contribution to the maintenance of any particular system in which it appears. T o recall an earlier argument, the proposition that a cybernetic mechanism equilibrates the state of a variable around some reference range may sound like a final causal statement. It is not, because it alone does not take account of the relationship of the reference value to the persistence o r survival o f any particular system. A s I observed earlier, w e could set our thermostat to maintain temperature at a level that would kill us. Similarly, the proposition that the structure of ritual is such as to invest the contents of ritual with morality does not in itself take into account the relationship o f the particular practices or conceptions in­ vested with morality to the "persistence" or "adequate functioning" of the systems o f which they are parts. T h e assertion, then, that ritual makes its contents moral falls short of adequacy as a final causal statement. Fifth, to recognize that that which is intrinsic to a structure is not ipso facto final causal is not to deny its significance. T o assert that morality and social contract are intrinsic to the structure of ritual is not vacuous. State­ ments concerning entailments are not simple functional statements in the final causal sense, but statements o f another order. It could be said, I suppose, that formal causal formulations are meta-functional, or per­ haps it would be better to say that they are statements concerning metafunctions. T h e y are not properly attempts to stipulate the contribution

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that a form or structure makes to the persistence of any particular system in which it occurs, but what is intrinsic to that form o r structure that makes it suitable to fulfill the range o f specific functions its instances do fulfill in the diversity of systems in which they occur. In summary, I have noted two contrasting types of account, one finalcausal and system-specific, the other formal-causal and universalist. T h e two have not been sufficiently distinguished in anthropological thought (both often being called "functional"), and what Kelly (Kelly and Rappaport 1 9 7 5 ) has called "the fallacy o f crossed explicanda" has sometimes followed from this confusion. This fallacy, w hich might be regarded as an error in logical typing (Bateson 1 9 7 2 ) , occurs when final causal state­ ments are offered in instances in which formal causal statements are apropriate and vice versa. F o r example, to state that it is in the nature of ritual to regulate ecological and political relations in the way that I attempted to demonstrate that it did for the Maring would be to make a final causal assertion where a formal causal statement is appropriate. Such an assertion would tend to trivialize ritual and would also be false on empirical grounds. We can cite innumerable instances in which ritual has nothing whatever to do with political o r ecological relations. Conversely, an attempt to account, let us say, for the division of labor in nineteenth-century France by invoking Durkheim's assertion that organic solidarity is intrinsic to the division o f labor, as a final causal statement ("the division o f labor in nineteenth-century France enhanced the organic solidarity o f French society"), to make, that is, a formal causal assertion where a final causal one might be appropriate, would not be so much wrong as banal, vacuous, and, of course, inadequate (see Bergmann 1 9 7 5 ) . r

IX T i m e and transformation remain to be discussed. Although simple func­ tional formulations may be well-suited to the consideration of changes in the states of systems, they are ill-equipped to deal with structural change, and may impose specious assumptions o f stasis upon dynamic realities. T h e temporal limitations o f fieldwork may exacerbate this difficulty and ecologically informed research has not been exempt. Indeed, the prob­ lem o f carrying capacity to which I earlier alluded exemplifies it with especial clarity. O f course, the problem of static formulation in dynamic context is not exclusive to functional and systemic formulations. Self-consciously struc­ tural accounts face problems that are at least similar. Neither systemic nor structural formulations are, however, intrinsically static. Indeed, the

Ecology, Adaptation, and the Ills of ¥unctionalism | 7 9 theory of evolution by natural selection, a theory concerning structural transformation, is systemic in character. B o t h Friedman and I are concerned with problems in the relationship of the temporal to the atemporal, with possibilities for making hypotheses about "social formations" as wholes, and with the general characteristics of order and ordering. Writing o f the conjunction of Marxist and struc­ turalist thought, Friedman speaks o f "an expanded view of the social field which could render possible hypotheses about social formations as wholes." H e continues as follows: In structuralist terms this would be a framework for handling the as yet un­ approachable problem of 'Tordre des ordres" (Levi-Strauss 1 9 5 8 : 3 4 7 ) or ver­ tical structures which account for societies as entities. Further, it is the only way that one can get at a real theoretical history. For unless we assume that history takes place outside the object of study and according to some meta-social laws of its own, then the problem of diachrony and synchrony must dissolve in the understanding of the dynamic properties of social systems. It is knowledge of the fundamental structural properties of social reproduction which enables us to predict the way society will behave over time. [ 1 9 7 4 : 4 4 5 ] I must demur from what I take to be overstatement (e.g., " . . . the only way to get at a real theoretical history"), and I think that claims o f predic­ tion must be set about with elaborate qualification because the specific outcomes of evolutionary processes are, given the unforeseeable nature of the stresses that any living system experiences, low in predictability. In my view, moreover, Friedman's hierarchical schematization of Marx's social formation into, initially, a bifurcation of infrastructures and super­ structure, both subsuming other "functional" categories, is, as I indicated earlier (see note, p . 5 2 ) , incapable of realizing the goals he sets for himself and for anthropology. I am, however, in general sympathy with the aspirations he expresses in this passage, and I would suggest that the concept o f adaptation may have much to contribute to the realization of the goals that I share with him. T h e term "adaptation" is generally associated—perhaps free-associ­ ated—with environment and thus, perhaps, with ecological formula­ tions. It is certainly the case that adaptive processes are manifested or realized only in particular environments, social, cultural, or physical. Nevertheless, a general theory of adaptation is not so much concerned with the particulars of environment as it is with those structural charac­ teristics of systems that make it possible for them to transform them­ selves in response to environmental fluctuation, change, or opportunity. Adaptive formulations thus have ecological implications, but are not properly subsumed under a category of ecological formulations. It also should be clear that they are neither simple functional formulations

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because they are concerned with structural change, nor are they simple evolutionary formulations because they are as concerned with the per­ sistence o f systems as they are with changes in them. In fact, the distinc­ tion between maintenance and change, "diachrony and synchrony," dis­ solves in the dynamics of adaptive processes. Adaptive formulations, moreover, are formal as well as final causal, emphasizing not only the goals and effects of processes but processual structure as well. Indeed, the concept of adaptation is fundamentally structural (in the sense of struc­ ture expressed, but hardly originated, by Piaget [ 1 9 7 1 ] ) because adaptive operation has certain structural entailments or, to put it differently, orderly adaptive operation is contingent upon the prevalence of certain formal relationships among the components of the systems in which it occurs. This is to say that adaptive systems are characterized by a gener­ ally similar architecture, or that adaptive processes are characterized by a generally similar structure. T h e form of this structure and the conse­ quences of anomalies in it are considered in some detail in the essay "Adaptive Structure and Its Disorders."

X In light of this essay's movement it may seem unnecessary to take up further problems of functional or ecological formulations. We have, after all, left simple functional and ecological accounts behind as we have approached more complex and synthetic adaptive notions. There remain, however, certain important criticisms that may have more general impli­ cations than any of those already discussed, and their discussion, further­ more, will lead us at the end to consider what relationships should prevail among the various modes o f explanation and interpretation prevalent in anthropology. W e may turn first to a criticism not only of functional formulations but of social science in general recently published by the philosopher Frithjof Bergmann ( 1 9 7 5 ) . H e suggests that the often rehearsed objections to functionalism—for instance, that it cannot explain why one rather than some other element fulfills a certain function ( 1 9 7 5 : 6 ) , or that func­ tional analyses play down the irrational features of cultural institutions in their search for hidden utilities ( 1 9 7 5 : 3)—really miss the mark. The shortcoming of functional formulations is at once more simple and more profound. T h e central question is "how much of a given phenomenon the postulated function in the end explains" ( 1 9 7 5 : 3 ; italics his). Bergmann's answer is "very little." H e notes, as an instance, that attempts to explain language in terms of its functions have encountered a "gross disproportionality," for "the biological and social needs that can

Ecology, Adaptation, and the Ills of F unctionalism | 81 postulated as genuine requirements could always be fulfilled by an in­ strument vastly less complex and powerful than any actual language" ( 1 9 7 5 - 3 ) - Similarly, the rather simple set of functions postulated for the Maring ritual cycle in Pigs for the Ancestors could have been achieved with something much simpler, and therefore only a small portion of the phenomena described in the work are accounted for. It is not clear what the prohibition against cooking marita and ma together, or the belief that this taboo is ended by spitting out a mouthful of pandanus seeds in the nearby forest contribute to the achievement of one or any of these ends. And since this is similarly true of coundess other features it may be regarded as the main limitation of the functional approach. [ i 9 7 5 6 ] £ :

Bergmann fits his criticism of functionalism into a larger critique of scientific approaches to the study of social and cultural phenomena generally. Following Monod ( 1 9 7 2 ) he asserts that "the principle of objectivity' represents the one indispensable foundation upon which 'science' rests" ( 1 9 7 5 : 7 ) . This principle prohibits "subjective" principles of explanation to be "exported," that is, applied to natural phenomena. Human activity, however, is precisely the domain of the subjective, and therefore in the investigation of cultures or societies, or perhaps of anything distinctive of man (as opposed to inaminate and animate nature) the use of "subjective" prin­ ciples of explanation clearly does not constitute an [improper] "exportation." . . . Man has motives and purposes and goals and we have ways of knowing what they are. Therefore we confront a choice: we c a n . . . observe the "principle of objectivity" even in these investigations and in effect model them after other sciences. The price exacted would be much that we genuinely know [which would be excluded because both subjective and only subjectively known] Alternatively, we can allow "subjective principles" of explanation and . . . pay the price of no longer working in real "science." The alternatives are thus be­ tween being scientific at the expense of knowledge, and gaining knowledge that will no longer form a science.... If functionalism is placed against the schema of this choice it appears as an unhappy compromise. It suffers the disadvantages of both alternatives without gaining the full benefits of either. [ 1 9 7 5 : 8 - 9 ] In Bergmann's view structuralism suffers from kindred deficiencies, and he calls for a deep change in the nature of social studies generally. . . . at the root lies the erroneous assumption that we need a "science" to know and to understand. What must be disavowed is the epistemology that interpreted the whole of knowledge as analogy to science. Once that epistemology has been discarded the investigation of society can be conceptualized in a new way. The main fact is not that the object of this enterprise is too complex or too resistant to the tools of "science." More important is that we have an entirely different epistemic relationship to this object: that it in essence is so widely known [from our experience as members

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of society] that the highly structured "scientific" forms of knowledge cannot advance us further, but on the contrary become impediments that hold us back. [ 1 9 7 5 : 2 1 ] Anthropology should, in Bergman n s view, quit whoring after the strange gods of physics and openly declare itself a convert to the humanities. Raymond Kelly and I , in a response to Bergmann ( 1 9 7 5 ) have agreed that science is one thing and all of knowledge another, and although science may require obedience to a "principle of objectivity" this is not so for all o f knowledge. W e have also agreed that in the study of anything distinctive of humanity as a cultural species the use of subjective prin­ ciples is proper. W e also indicated that we don't care any more than Bergmann does about whether or not our credentials as scientists are in order. We believe, however, that the choice Bergmann asks of anthro­ p o l o g y — t o be either one of the sciences or one of the humanities— is unnecessary and mistaken. Anthropology is properly a synthesis of the two. This is not a plea for an easy tolerance of what any and every anthropologist does. What constitutes the proper domains of the subjec­ tive on the one hand and the objective on the other is a matter of funda­ mental importance which remains in some degree ambiguous and even confused. It seems to me certain, however, that clarification will not follow from their radical separation. To choose between subjective and objective principles of elucidation is not only to impoverish our under­ standing, but also to force us to make the particular set of principles we favor do work for which it is not suited, work properly belonging to the domain o f the other. A s it is improper to "import" objectivity into the subjective realm, so is it improper to "export" subjectivity into the objective realm. Furthermore, one o f the most profound sets of prob­ lems with wtiich anthropology should be concerned is that of the rela­ tionship o f the "subjective domain (that of goals, motives, purposes, feelings, understandings, misunderstandings, hopes, dreads)" to the "ob­ jective domain (of rocks, water, trees, animals, metabolism, endocrine secretion, nutrition, growth, decay, entropy)." T o choose between objec­ tive and subjective principles is to make it impossible from the start to investigate relationships between the domains to which each properly applies, relationships that approximate those between meaning and law, between the performatively constituted and the naturally constituted (see "On Cognized M o d e l s " ) . This relationship is the most distinctive characteristic of the human condition. It is this relationship with which Pigs for the Ancestors was centrally concerned. Through both distinguishing and relating cognized and operational models it attempted to show purposeful men operating in

Ecology, Adaptation, and the Ills of Functionalism | 83 terms of culturally constituted meanings in a purposeless but lawful natural world. Whereas the strategy of distinguishing a subjective cog­ nized model from an objective operational model and then relating them to each other was, I think, proper, I will freely admit that the attempt was flawed. S o m e of the "objective" data were inadequate and some mean­ ings were missed, misunderstood, or, possibly, infected by what Sahlins (1976a: 2 9 8 ) has called "ecology fetishism," which is associated with a materialism [which] allows itself to ignore the distinctive quality of human action as meaningfully organized—that it may proceed to organize meaning as an instrumental mystification of natural reason. Its "empiricism" then consists in the radical practice of the idea that nothing is in fact what it appears, i.e., culturally, but is translated instead into natural coordinates or consequences. The result is a kind of "ecology fetishism" whereby corn, beans and squash become an unbalanced diet. . . ritual pig slaughter and distribution to affines a mode of remaining within "the limits of carrying capacity," the social order "a population of organisms."... We are well-warned by Sahlins to guard against simplistic equations of meaning with "instrumental mystifications of natural reason." Some of the interpretations of meanings in Pigs for the Ancestors—particularly in matters relating to food consumption—may have been little more than that. I would suggest, however, that Sahlins's discussion, both in the work cited and in Culture and Practical Reason ( 1 9 7 6 b : 878".) is not clarifying. To say, for instance, that corn, beans, and squash form an unbalanced diet is, assuming it to be correct, simply to report an "objec­ tive fact," i.e., one "belonging to" the objective domain. Such a state­ ment surely does, by itself, "ignore the distinctive quality of human life as meaningfully organized" but it does not provide an instance of "mean­ ing as instrumental mystification of natural reason" simply because it doesn't say anything about meaning at all, nor does it entail or even imply any instructions whatever as to how meaning is to be construed. Because it is devoid of any report, description, or interpretation of the meaning of the corn, beans, and squash trinity for those who live on it, the state­ ment is inadequate as a full ethnographic account. Ethnographies are not, however, composed of single statements, and to say that a statement is by itself inadequate is not to say that it is irrelevant. The relevance to the general ethnographic enterprise of the nutritional qualities of the diets of the peoples with whom anthropologists live and work need not be defended, although I will agree that not all ethnographic fieldwork need attend to such matters. T h e account of the Maring ritual cycle's meanings, as provided in Pigs for the Ancestors, was largely concerned, first, with the activation, by the events o f social life, of certain oppositions between spirits and between qualities; second, with the relationships of categories of persons to those

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spirits and qualities; and, third, with the mediation and amelioration of those oppositions and the transformation of those relations through the dynamic o f the cycle. N o w h e r e was it argued that any of those elements of meaning emerged out of environmental relations, nor were they trans­ formed into mere "mystifications of natural reason" because the ritual cycle with which they were associated had attributed to it certain regu­ latory functions—including keeping porcine populations within "the limits o f carrying capacity"—by an objective analysis. T h e meanings remained what those for whom they were meaningful took them to be, regardless o f whatever objective regulatory functions may have inhered in the ritual cycle which they invested, and regardless of the fact that, because the Maring acted in ways that those meanings organized, and not in ways dictated by "practical" or "natural" regulatory factors, they ipso facto masked, mystified, or made subsidiary those practical or natural factors. T h e relationship o f meaning to natural processes is hardly a simple one. Meaning is nowhere monolithic. Much of quotidian understanding everywhere is grounded in observations of naturally constituted proc­ esses and, through acts of distinction, encoded as "fact" in classifications, either implicit or explicit. Some of these facts are, of course, performatively established, but concordance is generally high between natural processes and what I have elsewhere called "low order meaning," mean­ ing founded upon distinction (see "On Cognized Models"). Higher order meanings, the meanings not of distinctions but of similarities underlying distinctions, the meanings of metaphor, symbol, and value, are not grounded directly in observations of nature and are thus rela­ tively free from constraints to conform to it. They are, this is to say, free to organize action in a variety of ways and thus are free to attempt the subordination of natural processes to whatever ends they define—molli­ fying ancestors, repaying affines, making profits. I have already suggested that a high concordance between actions organized in terms of higher order meaning and ecosystemic processes in an unstratified and relatively undifferentiated horticultural society such as that of the Maring should not be surprising. Virtually everyone is directly engaged in activities that not only display to them the circularities of those ecosystemic processes but involve them directly in their maintenance. Ancestors and affines are kept happy, but at levels sufficiently modest to avoid ecosystemic degradation. Such concordance may not pertain in all domains in such societies. For instance, the nutritional soundness o f Maring pig husbandry and con­ sumption is probably more dubious than the general ecological sound­ ness of the ritual cycle and probably more dubious than I cautiously suggested in Pigs for the Ancestors. Different conventions, which could

Ecology. Adaptation, and the Ills of Functionalism | 8 5 , included both agistment and regular slaughter at earlier ages with wide distribution of the pork might have enhanced the Maring diet signific^fjy- H o w e v e r , the conventions governing husbandry and laughter during the period described in the ethnography were crucial to the maintenance and regulation of social and political relations as well as ^ o s y s t e m i c relations and dietary intake. Meaning and the requisites o f the social order were thus being served at what might have been signifi­ cant cost to the health o f the organisms whose actions they organized. To say that meaning is highly valued everywhere borders on the tautologous simply because the concept o f value is subsumed by the concept of meaning. Without meaning there is no value. B e this as it may, humans always and everywhere have been willing to labor, to give treasure, to kill, and even to sacrifice their own lives for such meanings as God, Salvation, Fatherland, and H o n o r . High cost may be prerequisite to deep meaning, and deep meaning may be requisite to the maintenance of social life. It is a vulgar error to consider the costs of meaning—the treasure and labor given to the temple, the bird feathers provided for the chiefs cloak, even the lives given for the sake of honor, glory, or salvation—to be exploitative because those w h o pay them do not neces­ sarily receive material returns. Sometimes, however, too much may be asked o f individuals, and sometimes not only individuals but entire social orders may be led into decline by the meanings they entertain. T h e very survival o f populations may be endangered by the requisites of the social orders which are their properties. T h e concordance existing between higher order meaning and ecosystemic processes among the Maring should not set up a cross-cultural expectation. Contemporary industrial society, for instance, is badly damaging the natural systems upon which it depends in the name o f such ideas as progress, free enterprise, "the health of the economy," the communist threat, the abundant life. O f course some meanings are instruments of the survival of the organ­ isms maintaining them, and of course the actions of the self-same organ­ isms are meaningfully organized in terms of ends that they themselves did not define, that d o not emerge naturally out o f "natural" or utilitarian considerations, and that may, indeed, be inimical to those who strive toward them. B u t neither o f these two statements by itself constitutes an adequate account of the relationship o f the processes of culturally con­ stituted meaning and natural processes, nor, for that matter, do the two together. What they d o delineate is a field for investigation, a set of problems corresponding closely to the characteristics o f a species that not only must live in terms of meanings but must itself construct those meanings although only loosely constrained by nature from fashioning sefl-destructive follies. e

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XI Let us return here to Bergmann's essential point, that the systemic account provided by Pigs for the Ancestors (and other such works) finally fails because much that it describes remains unexplained or uninter­ preted. T h e virtues of description for its own sake could once again be raised in defense, of course, but it seemed to Kelly and me that the account of the ritual cycle in that work did not leave readers as com­ pletely in the dark about pandanus seeds, marsupial tails, fighting stones, eels, raua mat, and other such symbolic phenomena as Bergmann s critique suggested. There was an attempt to indicate, partly through a subsidiary structural analysis made more explicit in later essays ( 1 9 7 1 c , also "On Cognized M o d e l s " ) , at least some of the ways in which such disparate phenomena as conceptual oppositions between spirits and ab­ stract qualities on the one hand and population trends in pig herds were related to each other through a ritual cycle. We argued, furthermore, that the relations thus elucidated were not among the phenomena already "richly known" through ordinary experience as members of society, either the Maring's experience or our own. Our common sense would not lead us to believe that the sow's ear o f ecosystemic regulation would be embroidered by the silken thread of an elaborate succession of rituals, nor would it lead us from the rituals themselves to their regulatory ef­ fects. A s far as the common sense of the Maring is concerned, it was argued in the conclusion o f the work under consideration (and reiterated earlier in this essay), not at all originally, that native understandings must be at some variance from the actual operations of social systems. This is to claim that knowledge not given to us in other ways was gained through the analysis, but it must be agreed that at the end much remained to be accounted for. Surely conceptual approaches other than that which domi­ nated the book could have elucidated aspects of ritual that remained untouched by the analysis. It may be asked, however, whether the failure of this or any other analysis to account for all the detailed descriptive material with which it is associated should be allowed to disqualify, or even demean, what it did accomplish. To say that an analysis does not illuminate everything does not mean that it illuminates nothing. The most that we can ask o f any analysis is that it tell us something that is worth knowing and that we o t h e r w i s e wouldn't k n o w — i n other words, that it add significantly to our understanding. It would be both mistaken and arrogant to claim for the analysis under discussion—or, for that matter, any analysis—that it explained everything "really important" in the phenomena with which it is concerned. Functional or systemic or structural or symbolic or other sorts of analysis impoverish understanding only when their results are

Ecology, Adaptation, and the Ills of Functionalism | 87 . to be alternative to, rather than enlargements of, knowledge gained through other modes of analysis or through general social ex­ perience. j follows that moving on to other modes of description, analysis, or interpretation, even of the same material, does not constitute a rejection f what has already been done but, simply, a recognition of its limita­ tions. I, f ° instance, have been led—or pushed—to more recent con­ cerns with the nature of the sacred and the formal characteristics of ritual (see " T h e Obvious Aspects of Ritual") by the realization that an eco­ logical and systemic analysis of a ritual cycle says nothing about those aspects of rituals that make them rituals, or about the nature and grounds of sanctity. I had, at best, learned something about the functions of ritual and sanctity among the Maring. I had not learned anything at all about ritual or sanctity themselves. It is the business of philosophers to criticize theories, paradigms, methods, to locate their deficiencies, to discover their limitations, to test their soundness, and anthropologists should listen carefully to what they have to say. W e may, however, be too naively sensitive to their strictures, and thus too prone to disparage modes of analysis for what they are not, too reluctant to value them for what they are, too quick to dismiss them because they do not account for everything. B u t there never has been, nor will there ever be, a mode of analysis that will tell us everything worth knowing about anything. To persist in demanding the unattainable is unreasonable, but would be more or less harmless if it merely left us in chronic states o f disappointment. It doesn't. It leaves us either with nothing, as we reject everything, or with an undifferentiated everything as we give ourselves too easily to the saving images of the revitalistic movements that, with some regularity, sweep through the discipline promising, if not the keys to the kindgom, the key to the universe— culture and personality in the thirties, the " N e w Ethnography" and "Cultural Ecology" in the fifties, "Structuralism" and the " N e w Ecol­ ogy" in the sixties. Those swept up in such movements are inclined either to impoverish understanding by defining "everything worth knowing" as that which can be known through the doctrines to which they are devoted, or to distort understanding by asking more of their theories, methods, or perspectives than they can deliver. Failures resulting from the exportation o f sound but limited modes of explanation into unsuit­ able domains are likely to be construed not as the abuses of concepts, which they are, but as the bankruptcy of those concepts, which they are not. To say simply that no mode of explanation illuminates everything and that more comprehensive understanding is grounded in several modes simultaneously applied is to invite a shapeless eclecticism, and as such t

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is not very helpful. A little ecology, let us say, a little Freud, and a f ^ structural embellishments are more likely, when stirred together, increase confusion than understanding. If a plurality of explanatory principles are to be invoked effectively they must be related to each other in ordered ways. Thus, questions concerning the proper place of ecological principles, of the notion of function, of the concept of system in anthropological understanding dissolve into the larger question of a general ecology of explanation. There is a need, I think, to elucidate the relationship both o f modes of explanation and o f explanatory prin­ ciples to each other. I am not competent to deal with the complex issue of the structure of comprehensive explanation, but I must note that w e have been touching on this matter throughout the course of this essay. Earlier in this section, for instance, w e considered the relationship of subjective and objective domains. O u r discussion in a previous section of the relations pertaining among formal, final, efficient, and material accounts, moreover, suggests one obvious way in which ecological explanations fit into a general ecology o f explanation. Environmental perturbations can qualify as effi­ cient causes of events in societies or even of changes in the structures of societies. Systems respond to efficient causes within the constraints of their previously existing orders (i.e., structured contents) which, in this terminology, constitute material cause. T o claim that the specific charac­ teristics of environments or perturbations in them cannot account for the specific nature o f the responses to them—a common complaint—is, first, simply to say that efficient cause is not material cause (the related complaint that functions do not specify how they are fulfilled in like manner criticizes final cause for not being material cause). Second, and perhaps more important, the claim, if radically construed, is exaggerated to the point of being misleading or even erroneous. With the possible exception of genetic responses, the characteristics of environments and changes in them do more than stimulate adapting systems to random activity. Problems constituted by environments have particular proper­ ties that must be accommodated, circumvented, overridden, domesti­ cated, ameliorated, or corrected. Whereas characteristics of the environ­ ment o r changes in them do not determine the specific nature of re­ sponses to them, they may establish the general direction or trajectory of those responses more or less stringently and, of course, it is in terms of them that the appropriateness, adequacy, or success of those responses is minimally assessed. That adaptive formulations can seldom provide "uniquely correct answers," as critics have charged, is, of course, true. Ordered versatility is, after all, the essence of adaptiveness. But to say that the "answers" provided by adaptive formulations are not "uniquely correct" is not to say that they are incorrect or of no account. e

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Ecology, Adaptation, and the Ills of Functionalism | 89 ^ related problem bearing upon comprehensive understanding, ouched upon earlier in this essay, is that of contradiction between the requisites' goals, and effects of the operations of included vs. including stems—organisms, populations of various magnitudes, and ecosystems. Considerations of this general problem, which seems to be one of the most crucial of our time, obviously requires consideration not only of the specific "laws of functioning" of systems at various levels, but of relations between levels. It was suggested at the end of our brief discussion of adaptation in an earlier section that if the relationship of included to including systems is to any degree that of part to whole, these hierarchies of interlevel relations may have to possess certain structural characteris­ tics to remain orderly. In the essay "Adaptive Structure and Its Dis­ orders" the possible structural requisites of adaptive organization will be considered in some detail and so will the possible consequences of anomalies in them. H e r e I will only note, first, that these principles have a logical basis and, second, if the suggestions in that essay are in any way correct they will demonstrate that principles of great generality can increase our understanding of some of the detailed structural character­ istics of human social systems. I will finally note as germane to an ecology of explanation that state­ ments concerning principles of organization generally may be ordered into explanatory hierarchies. Such principles may be associated with classes of organization of greater or lesser generality, for example, Ma­ ring society, human society, single species societies, living systems, in­ formation processing systems, physical systems, all systems. (Such hier­ archies are different from those of included and including systems. H u ­ man society, for instance, subsumes Maring society as a member, but does not include it as a part in the same way that an organism includes a cell.) Certain phenomena are characteristic of each of these "levels" and cer­ tain laws, regularities, or orders prevail within each of them. For in­ stance, all physical systems are subject to the thermodynamic laws, and all information processing systems to the logic of analogic or digital coding. A l l living systems are characterized by adaptiveness, all organ­ isms by metabolism, all animals by sentience, all humanity by cultural processes, all Maring by Maring cultural processes. It seems clear that the laws relating to more inclusive classes limit or bound the subclasses they include. For instance, the operation of metabolism conforms to the thermodynamic laws and may, perhaps, be taken to be special cases of them. It also seems that a relationship of contingency between the proc­ esses applying to less and more general classes of systems prevails. M e ­ tabolism, for example, is a prerequisite of sentience, or, to put it in the converse, sentience is contingent upon metabolism. T h e extent to which functional relations correspond to contingency relations is unclear and

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may have changed in the course of evolution. Whatever sentience is p . sessed by, let us say, an earthworm, is probably fully in the service of metabolism and reproduction, but such a simple relation between sense and metabolism is not true o f humanity nor even, for that matter, of the higher animals. 1 have, in other terms, repeatedly spoken of this ambigu. ity as a source of substantive problems. T h e hierarchies that we are considering here are hierarchies of speci­ ficity and generality. It follows that goals or requisites o f more general categories are given specificity in terms of the specific principles of their individual members. It has, however, been suggested that the more general or inclusive the domain of an explanatory principle the less it is able to account for the particulars of any phenomenon. T h e laws of gravity do not, it is true, tell us much about culture, cultures, or the human condition. We should not, however, permit an oversimplified dictum to constrain us unduly. It does not seem to me that the principles ordering the phenomena characteristic of, or defining, any level should be allowed to monopolize understanding. Various aspects of a particular phenomenon may be illuminated by reference to the principles of vari­ ous levels and the resulting account is "thicker," richer, and thus more meaningful than an account that is limited to the explanatory principles o f a single level. This seems to me to be as true of meaning as it is of adaptation. Consider the meanings inhering in the ritual uprooting of rumbim described in the essay "On Cognized Models." 0 s

First, there are the meanings encoded in the particular representations appearing in the ritual—rumbim, amame, a special form of oven, particu­ lar foodstuffs, the acts of removing the charcoal called ringi from men's bodies, o f sacrificing pigs, of consuming the contents o f the oven, of planting the rumbim and the amame and so on. These multivocalic repre­ sentations simplify, symbolize, and "iconify " meanings peculiar to Maring culture—certain spirits, qualities, and social conditions, relations among them and relations of the Maring to them. These meanings, being pecu­ liar to Maring culture, are, of course, to be understood in the terms of Maring culture. That these Maring meanings are represented in the contxt of a ritual, however, leads us out of the level of the particular culture to meanings of a second and more general sort. I have mentioned in an earlier section that certain meanings—social contract, morality, a paradigm of creation, the concept of the sacred, the notion of the divine—inhere in ritual per se. In " T h e Obvious Aspects of Ritual" I argue that these meanings are entailed by the structure that is definitive of ritual. Ritual, however, is not peculiar to Maring culture. It is a panhuman phenomenon, and it would be a mistake to take its pan-cultural meanings to be specifically Maring meanings. Moreover, the nature of the "meaningfulness" of the specifically Maring meanings is different

Ecology, Adaptation, and the Ills of Functionalism | 91 the meaningfulness of panhuman ritual. T h e matter is too intricate to ^ ^ j ) e i this essay, but is discussed in detail in " T h e Obvious Aspects of Q' ual." Here it must suffice to say that whereas culturally specific repre­ sentations stand in symbolic and iconic relationships to their culturally inx significations, the meanings peculiar to ritual are indexically sig­ ned. Further, the participation (in the ritual) of the sender of ritual messages (who is also their most important receiver) is ipso facto participa­ tion in the messages themselves. I argue in the essay "On Cognized Models" that the meaningfulness of participation is that of identity, unity, or integration, rather than that of reference, which is the form of meaningfulness characterizing culturally particular meanings by themselves. r 0 l X

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There is yet a third level of meaning in ritual: the significance intrinsic to the mere fact of a rituals performance. I have argued elsewhere (197id) that the mere occurrence of a non-calendrical ritual may be a signal. Since any ritual included in the repertoire of a people can, at any particular time, be in only one of two possible states—occurring or not occurring—occurrence can transmit a binary signal. Although the occur­ rence of the ritual transmits a " y e s / n o " signal, it may have been triggered by the achievement or violation of a particular state or range of states of a continuous, "more-less" variable, o r even of a complex state or range of states constellated by relationships among a number of such variables. As such, the occurrence of a ritual may be a simple qualitative representa­ tion of complex quantitative information or, to put it differently, the occurrence of a ritual may summarize complex analogic information and translate it into the simplest possible digital signal, one for which there is only one alternative. It is of great importance to note that the simple binary characteristics are not peculiar to Maring rituals. In fact, they are not peculiar to ritual. We are speaking here of a much broader phenome­ non, a general characteristic of digital information processing, binary characteristics are not only peculiar to Maring rituals. In fact, they are not peculiar to ritual. We are speaking here of a much broader phenomenon, a general characteristic of digital information processing. O u r understanding o f rituals, then, is increased by appeals to three levels of order. It would have been possible to invoke other levels as well, but our illustrative purposes have not demanded it. T h e point here is that valuable insights concerning detailed aspects of ritual have been vouchsafed to us by the principles governing three levels of order. O f course the general characteristics of ritual and the panhuman meanings they entail do not account for all of the symbolic and iconic particulari­ ties of Maring, Catholic, or any other ritual. Conversely, the particulari­ ties of Maring, Catholic, o r any other ritual cannot provide an under­ standing of why they are presented in ritual and not in some other symbolic form. We are led here to a related point. A n appeal to more

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than one level does not simply provide us with several concurrent bu more or less autonomous sets of meanings. These sets o f meanings are related to each other. For instance, the occurrence of culturally specific representations in ritual contexts sanctifies them and invests them with morality. T h e performance of a ritual, moreover, entails an acceptance by the performer of an obligation to abide by whatever that ritual encodes. Further implications of the ritual form for what is represented in it are discussed in " T h e Obvious Aspects of Ritual" and in "Sanctity and Lies in Evolution." Sufficient has been said here to indicate that the ritual form is something like a meta-statement about the culturally specific meanings it encompasses. 1 say "something like a meta-statement" be­ cause rituals possess performative qualities and are not merely state­ ments. I have discussed the meaningfulness of performatives in "On Cognized Models." It is not simply the meaningfulness of description, nor even that of evaluation. It is constitutive. A s such it is a meaningful­ ness very different from that of culturally specific representations by themselves. It is a meaningfulness that is, or comes very close to being, causal. t

In sum, our understanding of ritual is not merely enriched by appeals to more than one level of generality. It is, rather, impoverished, incom­ plete, and inadequate unless we do invoke the meanings o f more than one level. T h e proper citation of the principles of one level does not conflict with the simultaneous citation of those pertaining to other levels. Indeed, to say that the simultaneously invoked principles of the several levels complement each other is inadequate as an expression of the inti­ macy of their relationship. It would be tempting to say that they com­ plete each other if it were not that our understanding of anything as profound, subtle, various, and ubiquitous as ritual can never be com­ plete, for such things forever demand that new questions be asked of them. It should not be forgotten, furthermore, that the scope of that which anthropology seeks to understand is not well or truly represented by any catalogue of the innumerable cultural categories or phenomena, such as ritual or rituals, with which the distinctions of language can provide us. T h e task of anthropology is not even to be understood as the elucidation of cultures as systems. A s Roger Keesing put it a few years ago, we also . . . want to know how human groups organize and sustain their social life; how biology and experience interact... how the nature of that experience shapes personalities; how different—and how similar—are human modes of thought and perception in different times and places; how ways of life change, and what shapes and forms they take in particular settings. [ 1 9 7 4 : 9 0 ] A n d , I would add, we want to know how cultures come to be at odds

Ecology, Adaptation, and the Ills of Functionalism | 93 *irh the creatures who bear them and with the ecological systems in hich they are set; in what specific forms such contradictions between -nature" and "culture" manifest themselves and whether the difficulties hat follow such disorders can be corrected. We also need to understand better how humans may keep from destroying the systems upon which they depend, and themselves along with them, when the complexity of those systems exceeds any hope o f comprehension. In the face o f the world's enormity, demands for "uniquely correct answers," which neither adaptive formulations nor any others can really provide, sound like cries in the dark. Uniquely correct answers may be provided for a relatively small number o f precise questions, of course, but there are np uniquely correct questions. Those that may properly be asked are as innumerable as the species and stars of which they are asked and as unbounded as the imaginations of those who would ask them. w

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CITED

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Keesing, Roger 1974 Theories of culture. Annual Review of Anthropology 3 - 7 3 - 9 8 . Kelly, Raymond, and R. A. Rappaport 1975 Function, generality, and explanatory power: a commentary and re­ sponse to Bergmann's arguments. Michigan Discussions in Anthro­ pology 1 ( 0 : 2 4 - 4 4 . Margatef, Ramon 1968 Perspectives in ecological theory. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Monod, Jacques 1972 Chance and necessity. New York: Random House. Murphy. Robert 1970 Basin ethnography and ecological theory. In Languages and cultures of western North America, ed. Earl Swanson, J r . Pocatello: Idaho State University Press. Nagel, Ernest 1961 The structure of science. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World. Odum, E. P. 1969 The strategy of ecosystem development. Science 1 6 4 : 2 6 2 - 2 7 0 . Pattee, H. H., ed. 1 9 7 3 Hierarchy theory. New York: Braziller, International Library of Sys­ tems Theory and Philosophy. Piaget, Jean 1 9 7 1 Structuralism. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Piddocke, S. 1965 The potlatch system of the southern Kwakiutl: a new perspective. Southwestern Journal of Anthropology 2 1 : 2 4 4 - 2 6 4 . Rappaport, Roy A. 1968 Pigs for the ancestors. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1969a Sanctity and adaptation. lo 7 ( i 9 ? o ) : 4 6 - 7 1 . (Paper prepared for Wenner-Gren Conference on the Moral and Aesthetic Structure of Human Adaptation, 1969.) 1969b Some suggestions concerning concept and method in ecological an­ thropology. In Ecological essays, ed. David Damas. National Museum of Canada Bulletin 230. 1971a Ritual, sanctity, and cybernetics. American Anthropologist 7 3 : 5 9 - 7 6 . 1 9 7 1 b The flow of energy in an agricultural society. Scientific American 225(3)1116-132. 1971 c Nature, culture, and ecological anthropology. In Man, culture and society, rev. ed., ed. H . Shapiro, pp. 2 3 7 - 2 6 8 . New York: Oxford University Press. 1 9 7 i d The sacred in human evolution. Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics 2 : 2 3 - 4 4 . 1974 Energy and the structure of adaptation. Coevolution Quarterly, vol. 1, no. 1. 1976 Adaptation and maladaptarion in social systems. In The ethical basis of economic freedom, ed. Ivan Hill, pp. 3 9 - 8 2 . Chapel Hill, N.C.: Ameri­ can Viewpoint. 1977 Maladaptation in social systems. In Evolution in social systems, ed. J . Friedman and M. Rowlands. London: Duckworth.

Ecology, Adaptation, and the Ills of Functiona/ism | 95 Sahlins, Marshall 1 9 5 8 Social stratification in Polynesia. American Ethnological Society Monograph. Seattle: University of Washington Press. £969 Economic anthropology and anthropological economics. Social Science Information 8 : 1 3 - 3 3 . 1 9 7 6 a CA comment on "Structural and eclectic revisions of Marxist strategy: a cultural materialist critique," by Allen H. Berger. Current Anthro­ pology 1 7 : 2 9 8 - 3 0 0 . 1 9 7 6 b Culture and practical reason. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Sapir, Edward 1 9 2 4 Culture, genuine and spurious. American Journal of Sociology 2 9 : 4 0 1 429.

Shantzis, S. B., and W. W. Behrens 1 9 7 3 Population control mechanisms in a primitive society. In Toward global equilibrium, ed. D. L. Meadows and D. H. Meadows. Cam­ bridge, Mass.: Wright-Allen Press. Simon, Herbert 1 9 6 9 The sciences of the artificial. Cambridge, Mass.: M I T Press. Slobodkin, L., and A. Rapoport 1 9 7 4 An optimal strategy of evolution. Quarterly Review of Biology 4 9 : 181-200.

Steward, Julian 1 9 5 5 Theory of culture change. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. Suttles, Wayne 1 9 6 0 Affinal ties, subsistence, and prestige among the Coast Salish. Ameri­ can Anthropologist 6 2 : 2 9 6 - 3 0 5 . Thomas, Lewis 1 9 7 4 The lives of a cell. New York: Viking Press. Vayda, A. P. 1 9 6 8 Foreword to Pigs for the ancestors by R. A. Rappaport, pp. ix-xiii. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1 9 7 4 Warfare in ecological perspective. Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics 5 : 1 8 3 - 1 9 4 . Vayda, A. P., and B . McKay 1 9 7 5 New directions in ecology and ecological anthropology. Annual Re­ view of Anthropology 4 : 2 9 3 - 3 0 6 . Vayda, A. P., and R. A. Rappaport 1967 Ecology, cultural and non-cultural In Introduction to cultural anthro­ pology, ed. J . Clifton, pp. 4 5 6 - 4 7 9 - Boston: Houghton-Mifflin. Wynne-Edwards, V. C. 1 9 6 2 Animal dispersion in relation to social behavior. Edinburgh and London: Oliver 6c Boyd.

On Cognized Models

i Nature is seen by humans through a screen of beliefs, knowledge, and purposes, and it is in terms of their images of nature, rather than of the actual structure of nature, that they act. Yet, it is upon nature itself that they do act, and it is nature itself that acts upon them, nurturing or destroying them. Disparities between images of nature and the actual structure of ecosystems are inevitable. Humans are gifted learners and may continually enlarge and correct their knowledge of their environ­ ments, but their images of nature are always simpler than nature and in some degree or sense inexact, for ecological systems are complex and subtle beyond full comprehension. The discrepancy between cultural images of nature and the actual organization of nature is a critical problem for mankind and one of the central problems of any ecologically oriented anthropology. To cope with it I have suggested in earlier essays ( 1 9 6 3 , 1 9 6 8 , 1 9 7 1 ) that the ethnographer must prepare two accounts of his subject matter. One, which I have called the "cognized model," is a description of a people's knowledge of their environment and of their beliefs concerning it. The second, the "operational model," describes the same ecological system (including the people and their activities) in accordance with the assump­ tions and methods of the objective sciences, in particular the science of ecology. It is, in another jargon, "etic," whereas the cognized model is "emic" (Harris 1 9 7 6 ) . I have suggested that many components of the physical world are likely to be included in both the cognized and opera­ tional models, but their memberships will seldom, if ever, be identical. The operational model includes those substances, organisms, processes,

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and cultural practices which observations proceeding in accordance with the canons o f natural science suggest to the analyst have an effect upon the organisms, populations, and ecosystems under consideration. It may include elements of which the actors are unaware (such as microorgan­ isms and trace elements) but which affect them in important ways. The cognized model, on the other hand, may well include components, such as supernaturals, whose existence cannot be demonstrated by empirical procedures, but whose putative existence moves the actors to behave in the ways that they do. I have argued that this approach does not imply that cognized models are merely less accurate or more ignorant views of the world than opera­ tional models written in accordance with scientific principles, but should, rather, be regarded as parts of populations' distinctive means for main­ taining themselves in their environments. T h e important question con­ cerning cognized models in this view is not the extent to which they are identical with what the analyst takes to be reality but the extent to which they direct behavior in ways that are appropriate to the biological wellbeing of the actors and of the ecosystems in which they participate. The criterion of adequacy for a cognized model is not its accuracy, but its adaptive effectiveness. Accordingly, the analysis of the ecological eth­ nographer consists o f an integration of the cognized and operational models, an integration that permits him to describe the effects of behav­ ior undertaken with respect to the understanding of the cognized model on both the ecosystem and the population itself as they are represented in the operational model. In this way it becomes possible to assess the adaptiveness not only of overt human behavior, but even of the ideology that informs that behavior. In this view, the place of cognized models in the material relations of populations is analogous to that of the "memories" of computer controls in cybernetically regulated systems of material exchange and transforma­ tions. In such systems reports of current systemic states are continuously or periodically compared to reference values (which may, of course, be continuously adjusted in response to signals from other parts of the system). If discrepancies between states of affairs and the relevant refer­ ence values are detected, programs to return the states of affairs to those reference values may be initiated. Such programs are, ideally, discon­ tinued when the discrepancies are eliminated. In a roughly similar way I have suggested that people compare the states o f the systems in which they participate, as these states are indicated by signs, with their culturally determined notions of what they think they should be (reference or ideal values). Some important general questions follow. First, what is the relationship between signs and the processes they are understood to indicate? Is it the case that such processes as soil

On Cognized Models | 99 Repletion are detected early, or only when they are well advanced ? D o those phenomena that are taken to be signs of particular conditions actually indicate what they are understood to indicate ? O f even greater importance, to what extent do reference or ideal values, which reflect people's culturally defined understandings and wishes, correspond to their actual material requirements, and to the requirements and limita­ tions of the ecosystems in which they participate? I have put these questions in more formal terms in earlier essays. Operational models, as I proposed to conceive them, may—perhaps even should—include specifications of what are sometimes called in systems jargon "goal ranges" for variables that are, on theoretical or empirical grounds, taken to be crucial to the perpetuation of the systems under consideration. T h e goal range of such a variable encompasses the range of states that, if maintained, permits the system to continue. Viola­ tion of a goal range, conversely, threatens the perpetuation of the sys­ tem. The population size of local groups in tribal societies may serve as an example. Below a certain size a local group may not be able to defend itself, but if it becomes too large it may degrade its resource base. The goal range lies between the minimum number required for self-defense and the maximum number that can be supported in perpetuity on the land available. Similarly, a goal range for livestock, such as pigs, may lie between the minimum requisite for nutrition and a maximum beyond which environmental destruction would ensue. It is of great importance that the limits of goal ranges be established by procedures independent of those attempting to discover reference values because reference values, that is, the values around which systems equilibrate themselves, may not correspond to goal ranges, the ranges of states within which systems remain viable. We return here to the formal expression of the question raised in the last paragraph: What is the relationship between a reference value, or range of values, which is a component of a cognized model, and the correspond­ ing goal range, a component of an operational model? In Pigs for the Ancestors, a work dealing with tribal horticulturalists, I argued that among the Maring of N e w Guinea the upper limit of the reference range for pigs was always likely to remain below the upper limit of the goal range defined as the territory's ability to support pigs (see "Ecology, Adaptation, and the Ills of Functionalism" elsewhere in this volume for a discussion of Jonathan Friedman's criticism of this analysis), but it is important to emphasize that such a nice fit between reference values and goal ranges does not always prevail. I have re­ peatedly noted that it is entirely possible for reference values to be set outside of goal ranges. T o say that a system is self-equilibrating or cyber­ netic is not to say that it is, ipso facto, adaptive or functional. Systems may be equilibrated at levels that are self-destructive.

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I have argued that reference values that violate the goal ranges of biological (including demographic and ecological) variables are, prima facie, maladaptive. T h e concept of adaptation, and the related notion of maladaptation, are considered at length in another essay in this volume ("Adaptive Structure and Its Disorders"), but it is well to note here that maladaptive, dysfunctional, or contradictory equilibration may not be at all uncommon. Although instances can surely be found among the state­ less societies traditionally studied by anthropologists, maladaptive equili­ bration may be encouraged by increases in social scale, complexity, and interdependence. Such enlargements increase the likelihood that local social and ecological systems will be regulated in terms of values external to and distinct from themselves. We come here to a problem more profound than that of simple disparity between reference values and their corresponding goal ranges. T h e very terms in which reference values are expressed may be alien to and inappropriate for the systems being regulated. Economic terms, for instance, are incommensurable with ecological terms, and the state of the "developed" world strongly suggests that the regulation of ecosystems in accordance with economic reference values is likely to result in environmental destruction, just as the regulation of social relations and health care in economic terms may degrade social relations and obstruct medical treatment. If the regulation of ecological systems in terms of economics is likely to result in environmental devastation, and is ultimately destructive to the society dependent upon that environment, then it would seem advisable to elevate ecological and other biological principles to positions of ultimacy in cognized models (at the same time demoting economic con­ siderations to the subordinate positions that their short-term, conven­ tional, and contingent nature warrants). I have argued, however, that there may be no simple, direct relationship between the amount of testable empirical knowledge included in a cognized model and the appropriateness of the behavior that it elicits. It is by no means certain that the representations of nature provided us by science are more adaptive than those images of the world, inhabited by spirits whom men respect, that guide the actions of the Maring and other "primitives." To drape nature in supernatural veils may be to provide her with some protection against human folly and extravagance. Indeed, destruction of nature may well be encouraged by a natural view of it. G i v e n the complexity of natural ecosystems it is unlikely that we will ever be able to predict the outcome of all of the actions we undertake in any of them, even if w e do understand the principles of ecosystemic operation gener­ ally. Because knowledge can never replace respect as a guiding principle in our ecosystemic relations, it is adaptive for cognized models to engender respect for that which is unknown, unpredictable, and uncon-

On Cognized Models | 1 0 1 tollable, as well as for them to codify empirical knowledge. It may be that PP P ' cognized models, that is, those from which adapti behavior follows, are not those that simply represent ecosys­ temic relations in objectively "correct" material terms, but those that invest them with significance and value beyond themselves. All cognized models encode values, but all do not value the same things equally, and we may inquire into the adaptiveness of different sets of evaluative understandings. A model dominated by, let us say, the postulates of economic rationality would propose that an ecosystem is composed of elements of three general sorts: those that qualify as •resources," those that are neutrally useless, and those that may be regarded as pests, antagonists, or competitors. In contrast, the Ituri Pygmies take the forest encompassing them to be the body of G o d . These two views of the world obviously suggest radically different ways of living in it. t

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The crude first approach to the systemic relationship of cultural under­ standings to ecological processes just outlined is not devoid of merit but it is surely inadequate, even with respect to its own limited ends. Before discussing its undoubted shortcomings and possible virtues, however, it will be useful to turn, for illustrative purposes, to Maring ethnography. Whereas earlier presentations of this material have emphasized the "ob­ jective" terms of the operational model the emphasis here will be upon Maring understandings, in particular those encoded in their ritual cycle. That their ritual cycle embodies Maring conceptions of the divine, cosmologic?l postulates, and the rules guiding social action at the same time that it regulates political and environmental relations proposes that it is of strategic importance in approaching the problems with which this essay is concerned, and we may reasonably expect ritual cycles of at least some other tribal societies to be comparably important. I shall proceed as follows. After describing the Maring ritual cycle and the understandings that animate it I shall note some of the obvious deficiencies of the earlier formulation of the relationship of the meaning­ ful and material. This will lead to a discussion of the structure of cognized models which, 1 shall propose, are composed of understandings of sev­ eral orders. 1 shall suggest that these understandings are organized, or "put in order," along several dimensions. I shall be particularly con­ cerned with the way in which such ordering is accomplished by ritual, and with the adaptive implications of such orders. This discussion will make clear the need for further changes in the formulation of the rela­ tionship between the meaningful and material reviewed in the opening pages of this essay.

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W e shall proceed from the ordering of understanding to a discussion of the order of meaning and meaningfulness. This will lead to considera­ tion of differences in the meaningfulness of cognized models in tradi­ tional and modern societies. Differences in the ways in which knowledge is organized in traditional and modern societies will, in turn, lead to consideration of the relationship of knowledge and its distribution to power. In the course of this discussion the predicating force of metaphor and its place in domination and subordination will be examined. This discussion will elucidate the general nature of cognized models, propos­ ing that they are quasi-performative or quasi-illocutionary (Austin 1 9 6 2 ) , and not simply descriptive. T h e ''naturalization" of the performatively constituted will then be discussed and, finally, the union of the meaningful and material aspects of living processes will be considered. II The Tsembaga, who at the time of fieldwork in 1 9 6 2 - 1 9 6 3 numbered 2 0 0 people divided among five putatively patrilineal clans, may be con­ sidered an ecological population, and their territory, 3.2 square miles of forested land rising from 2 7 0 0 to 7 2 0 0 feet on the south wall of the Simbai Valley, an ecosystem. About half of their land is arable, and the Tsembaga, who are slash-and-burn horticulturalists, cut new gardens in the secondary forest up to altitudes of 5 4 0 0 feet each year. Harvesting continues for a year to two years or more, after which the site must be allowed to lie fallow until the secondary forest developing upon it has reached a certain stage o f maturity. This takes from seven to forty years, depending upon the site. Staples are root crops. Taro and sweet potatoes are most important, but yams, manioc, bananas, pandanus, and a great variety of greens are also grown. T h e Tsembaga also raise pigs which, although domiciled and fed in the women's houses, wander loose during the day and provide themselves with most of their diet. In addition to the rations of tubers given them (an adult pig is given about as much as a man) they consume garbage and human feces as well as what they can root up in abandoned gardens and secondary forest. Immediately to the east of the Tsembaga, on the same valley wall, lies the territory of the Tuguma, a Maring local group with whom the Tsem­ baga are friendly. T h e land immediately to the west is occupied by the Kundagai, against whom the Tsembaga waged war four times in the halfcentury previous to 1 9 6 2 . T h e Tsembaga, like all other Maring, are egalitarian as far as men are concerned. T h e r e are no chiefs or other authorities who can command or coerce the obedience o f others. But, I have argued, relations between autonomous local populations such as the Tsembaga and the Kundagai,

On Cognized Models | 1 0 3 and between such populations and the other species with which they share their territories, are regulated by protracted ritual cycles. Indeed, fjie operation of these cycles helps to maintain an undegraded biotic and physical environment, distributes local surpluses of pigs throughout a region in the form of pork, and may assure people high quality protein when they are most in need of it. T h e ritual cycles also limit warfare to frequencies that do not endanger the survival of the regional population but allow occasional redispersion of people over land and land among people, thus, perhaps, tending to correct discrepancies between the population densities of different local groups. * While observations informed by general ecological and cybernetic principles indicate the regulatory functions of Maring ritual cycles, they are not so understood by the Tsembaga and other Maring. They perform them, they say, to maintain or transmute their relations with spirits. #

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Two sets of major spirits inhabit the Maring world. O n e dwells in the upper reaches of clan territories, the other in the lower. The spirits of the high ground include R e d Spirits (Raua Mugi) and Smoke Woman (Kun KazeAmbra). T h e R e d Spirits are said to dwell in the high altitude forest, and Smoke Woman is thought to reside at the highest point in the group's territory, sometimes flying off to the summit of Mount Oipor, the highest peak in the general area. Smoke Woman, who was never human, acts as an intermediary be­ tween the living and all other categories of spirits. Shamans communicate with her in seances, conducted in darkened men s houses and often lasting all night, by "pulling smoke." They inhale deeply the smoke of strong native cigars and send their nomane (a term which in some con­ texts means thought, refers here to the conscious aspect of the self that survives death) out of their noses to fly to the houses of the Smoke Woman in the high places and to escort her back to the seance. She enters the shaman's head through his nostrils and, speaking through his mouth, informs the living of the wishes of the dead. Shamans commune with the Smoke Woman before all important rituals and upon many other occasions as well. Although this spirit is female, she has no association with women. Female shamans are virtually nonexistent; the one of whom I know was regarded as preposterous by most men. Smoke Woman has no connec­ tion whatsoever with fertility either, and while not antagonistic to women generally, is perhaps antagonistic to the sexuality of living *See "Ritual Regulation of Environmental Relations among a New Guinea People" earlier in this volume.

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women. A t any rate, when a man is "struck" by her for the first time, he should abstain from intercourse for a while because, it is said, the Smoke Woman might, out of jealousy, do mischief to any women with whom a novice of hers consorted. T h e R e d Spirits are spirits of those who have been killed in warfare. Those species included in the category ma—mostly high altitude ar­ boreal marsupials—are said to be their pigs, but aside from some con­ cern with the hunting and trapping of these animals, the R e d Spirits have no interest in subsistence activities. A s they are associated with the upper portion of the territory, so they are associated with the upper part of the body. They may cause illness of the head and chest, and their help is solicited when such afflictions have other causes. Their most important concerns, however, are with the relations of the local group to other local groups, particularly in warfare. Warfare rituals are largely addressed to them, and they enforce the taboos associated with warfare. Their general qualities are reflected in the terms by which they are addressed in ritual. Often they are called Norum-Kombri and RungeYinye. Kombri are cassowaries, fierce birds living mainly in the high forest. Norum are epiphytic orchids with strong stalks growing high on high-altitude trees. Runge is the sun, yinye is fire. T h e Red Spirits are said to be rombanda, which in other context may mean simply "hot," but in relation to them, as well as in some other contexts, it implies dryness, hardness, strength, and, as seems apparent in some rituals associated with warfare, anger and ferocity as well. T h e two classes of spirits that dwell in the lower portions of the territory are sometimes known collectively as Raua Mai. Mai in this context seems to mean antecedent in a biological sense: a taro corm from which rhizomes have grown is a mai; a woman who has borne children is an ambra mai; old men are yu mai. Included among the Raua Mai is, first, Koipa Mangiang, who, like Smoke Woman, was never human. This spirit is said to be male and to dwell in pools in the streams dissecting the mountainside and, as marsu­ pials are the pigs of the R e d Spirits, eels are said to be his pigs. Living nearby, in the trunks of the largest trees in climax forest rem­ nants, are the Raua Tukump, the spirits of those who have died of illness or accident. T h e term tukump refers both to a supernatural corruption that may pollute places and harm people, and to the mold, sometimes said to be faintly luminescent, that develops on rotting objects and sub­ stances. A s the R e d Spirits are associated with the upper part of the body, so the "Spirits of R o t " are associated with the lower—with the belly, the reproductive organs, and the legs—and they may both afflict those parts and cure afflictions of them. They and Koipa Mangiang have minor pans

On Cognized Models I 1 0 5 D w a r

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to pi*? * ^ rituals ( f ° instance, when the warriors call the R e d Spirits into themselves, they ask the spirits of the low ground to strengthen their legs) but their major concern is, not surprisingly, with fertility generally—with the fruitfulness of women, pigs, and gardens— and rituals concerned with fertility are addressed, in the main, to the spirits of the low ground. Koipa Mangiang has authority in these matters, the Spirits of R o t acting as his intermediaries, but his dominion is not limited to fertility. H e alone among the major spirits actually kills (although other spirits may request that he do so). Koipa Mangiang has, therefore, a fearful as well as a benign aspect. As the spirits of the high ground are said to be "hot," so those of the low ground are said to be kinim, which sometimes means, simply, cold. Here, kinim carries an implication of wetness as well: the juice of sugar cane is kinim. S o is water and all creatures that live in water, and women are said to be so because of their vaginal secretions. Maring observe that cold and wet conditions induce decay, the dissolu­ tion of organic matter and its reabsorption into earth from which it sprang, and decay is seen by them to favor fertility. N e w life grows from the rot of things once living; that which is living will in its turn dissolve, supporting life yet to come. B u t whether or not it is beneficial to growth, that which is decaying is, after all, itself dead or dying. Fertility is, thus, closely related to death in Maring cosmology. This closeness is indicated by their union in the figure of Koipa Mangiang. Both hotness and coldness, both strength and fertility are, in the Maring view, qualities necessary to survival—to the successful defense of the land and to its successful cultivation. But the two sets of qualities are inimical to each other. Therefore, some activities must be segregated from others in time and space, and some objects and persons must be insulated from contact with other objects and persons during certain periods or even permanently. Thus, men at war who have taken into themselves the heat of the R e d Spirits should avoid contact with women because the coldness and wetness of the women will extinguish their fires and soften their strength. Like many other N e w Guinea Highlanders, the Maring have well-developed notions, expressed in a welter of taboos, concerning the polluting qualities of women, and too much contact with women at any time is said to be debilitating (see Buchbinder and Rappaport 1 9 7 6 ) . In sum, the virtues of the two sets of spirits stand in clear contrast to each other, although we could, perhaps, note within the cosmology, as I have outlined it, some mediation between them. The Spirits of R o t and the R e d Spirits were kinsmen in life, and thus, perhaps, stand, in some logical sense, between Smoke Woman and Koipa Mangiang. But of greater interest than this logical mediation is the dynamic mediation of

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the ritual cycle. It is in terms of this mediation among supernatural enti­ ties that the material variables comprising the ecosystem are regulated. *

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It is convenient to begin a description of the ritual cycle with the outbreak of warfare. Hostilities erupt when a member of one local group (such as the Tsembaga) inflicts upon a member of another local group an injury of sufficient seriousness to demand homicidal revenge. A principle of balanced reciprocity prevails with respect to homicide including battle casualties. Injuries requiring vengeance are therefore most often homi­ cides or attempted homicides revenging deaths suffered in previous rounds of warfare but remaining unavenged. That is, because the spirit of every person slain demands to be avenged with the life of a member of the killer s group, more deaths suffered by one side than the other in a round o f warfare serve as grounds for the next round some years later. W e have noted that the Red Spirits are primarily associated with warfare, and that their characteristics stand in opposition to those of the spirits of the low ground. Indeed, the virtues of the latter are thought to be inimical to those of the R e d Spirits, and to the assistance that they might provide during warfare. It is therefore necessary, when warfare is initiated, to segregate the two sets of spirits and everything associated with them as much as possible, and to identify the community, especially the men, more closely with the R e d Spirits. This is accomplished in an elaborate ritual during which certain objects called fighting stones {bamp ku) are hung from the center post of a ritual house. This ritual transforms the relationship o f the antagonists from one of "brotherhood" (nguingui: 'brother-brother') into one of formal and sanctified enmity (cenang yu: 'ax men') if it had not already been so transformed in earlier rounds of warfare. T h e territories of enemies may not be entered except to despoil them, and enemies may not be touched or addressed except in anger. In the course of this ritual, in which only men participate, the R e d Spirits are taken by the warriors into their heads, where they are said to burn like fire. Sexual intercourse is henceforth tabooed, of course, because contact with the cold, wet, soft women would put out the fires burning in the hot, hard, dry men's heads, and conversely, women would be burned by contact with the men. For similar reasons food cooked by women, moist foods, soft foods, and foods identified with the lower altitudes become tabooed to the warriors, who also suffer a taboo on drinking any fluids while actually on the battle ground. T h e segregation of that associated with the high from that associated with the low, a segregation which is at its most extreme when warfare is initiated, is indicated by these and other taboos. It is perhaps most clearly repre-

On Cognized Models | 1 0 7 ented by the prohibition against consuming marsupials, the pigs of the jied Spirits, together with the fruit o f the marita pandanus, which is associated with the Spirits of R o t (parts of whose mortal remains are buried in pandanus groves). Marsupials and pandanus each may be cooked and consumed, but not in mixture or even at the same meal. Not only are the two sets of supernaturals segregated from each other, but the living are separated from both by heavy obligations. These are owed even to the spirits of the low ground who are asked, when the stones are hung, to strengthen the warriors' legs. Because of these debts a taboo on the trapping of marsupials goes into effect, although they may be eaten if shot. Eels may neither be trapped nor eaten. Men cannot eat them because eels, being cold and wet, would be inimical to their strength. B u t they cannot be trapped even for consumption by women because they are the pigs of Koipa Mangiang, and while a debt to him remains his pigs may not be taken. Warfare, in sum, tears the universe asunder, for it requires the radical separation of the hot from the cold, the high from the low, the strong from the fertile, male from female. When war is "declared" (by hanging the righting stones) a great range of taboos prohibiting certain objects, substances, foods, classes of persons, and activities from coming into contact with each other are therefore activated, and heavy debts in favor of the dead are assumed by the living, for the dead must be repaid for their assistance in the fighting. Fighting could go on for weeks. Oral histories report the occasional rout of one of the parties, and in such cases the victors despoiled the territory of their opponents, then retired to their own ground. Maring say they never seize the land of enemies because, even if they have driven off the living, their ancestral spirits remain to guard it. Usually, however, warfare terminates by agreement between the antagonists that there has been enough fighting and injury and death for the time being. With the termination of warfare reintegration of the universe com­ mences. Indeed, from the Maring point of view the remainder of the ritual cycle, which began when the fighting stones were hung, is a procedure for mending the world that warfare has broken. Each of the cycle's steps absolves those participating from certain taboos, and thus allows objects, persons, and activities that hostilities have segregated to come together once again. Planting rumbim is the first of these rituals. Indeed, the very act of planting rumbim by a local group, or, as is usually the case, by its constituent units simultaneously (antagonists plant rumhim separately), signifies that it has committed itself to a truce. It is after planting rumbim that men and women can once again become intimate, and taboos on certain foodstuffs are also abrogated at this time. s

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T h e importance of the rumbim planting ritual, which represents or even constitutes the fundamental terms of Maring cosmology and society at the same time that it establishes a sanctified truce, is sufficient to warrant a more or less detailed account. Buchbinder and I have provided such a description elsewhere ( 1 9 7 6 ) , but I shall repeat it here. W h e n it is agreed by the antagonists that warfare is to be discontinued, everyone in the local group—women, children, warriors, and allies—assembles for the events preceding the planting. In preparation, all possible varieties o f edible wild animals are taken: marsupials, snakes, lizards, frogs, rats, insects, grubs, birds; and wild greens, chiefly edible ferns, are gathered. These wild foods, along with a little fat from the belly of a female pig, are cooked in a special oven (pubit) said to be about three feet square and made of bark. While the food is steaming in the oven, the warriors ritually remove the "hot" charcoal called ringi that they had applied to themselves when the fighting stones were hung. When the oven is opened, they, as well as their womenfolk and children, partake of its contents, although mixed throughout it are meats at all other times forbidden to men who have participated in warfare rituals. What seems to be represented by the oven are both the fruitfulness of nature, and a natural precultural state in which men, like animals, knew no taboos and would eat anything that nature offered them. Perhaps also significant with respect to the lack of distinctions in the state of nature is the very position of the oven—it rests directly upon the ground. In contrast, ovens in which pigs dedicated to the R e d Spirits (sometimes called "head pigs") are cooked are raised above the ground, while those in which pigs are offered to the spirits of the low ground ("leg pigs"), as well as those in which non-ritual meals are prepared, are dug into the ground. It may further be suggested for reasons that will become ap­ parent, that the fruitfulness of nature represented in the feast of wild foods and the oven itself are associated with procreation. T h e feasting finished, the women are sent away and a young tondoko, a red-leafed variety of rumbim {Cordyline fruticosa), is planted in the middle o f the emptied oven. It is called the yu min rumbim (7*/man, w/w/shadow, life stuff). Each man clasps the rumbim as it is planted, and some men say that by laying hold of it their min flows into the plant where it remains for safekeeping. A t any rate, although the rumbim may be planted primarily for the well-being o f those planting it (women may not even touch it), it is not planted for their benefit only. It is said that after they plant rumbim, the children begotten by the participants will quickly become "hard" (anc); that is to say they will grow quickly, become strong and remain well. B y joining in the planting of rumbim, a man who was previously an outsider is attached to a territory and assimilated to the group occupying

On Cognized Models | 1 0 9 chat territory. Thus, rumbim seems not only to be associated with indi­ vidual men, and with the quality of hardness or strength, but also with |aims to territoriality. Claims to territory reside in corporations of men who ar » ideally, agnatically related, but by grasping the rumbim an outsider mingles his mih with theirs, taking the first step toward the ^similation of his descendants into the agnatic clan claiming the terri­ tory. Although the several patrilineal clans that form a local population coordinate the planting of rumbim (in fact, such coordination defines them as a local population), they usually plant it separately, each clan on its own ground. Rumbim is, thus, associated with patrilineality as well as with territoriality and with men's well-being and strength. B y grasping the yu min rumbim, not only does an outsider seemingly mingle his mih with those of the clansmen, thereby taking the first step toward assimila­ tion, but he incidentally resettles his ancestors at his new home, for he accompanies his participation in this ritual with the sacrifice of pigs, and he calls out to his dead to come to the new place to partake of it. Although it is with their mih that men invest the rumbim, it may be that the association of mih with agnatic corporations imbues the commingled mih that infuses the rumbim with, if not immortality, a perdurance beyond that of individual lives. B y clasping rumbim, a man participates in, as it were, a corporate life whose span is greater than his own. Such a view of clan mih is suggested by a standard phrase in the speech of heroes in accounts o f how brave men have faced death. "It does not matter if I die. There are more Merkai (or Kamungagai, or Kwibigai, etc.) to hold the land and father the children." The clan is not immortal, but it is subject to extinction rather than death, and thus its mortal span is prolonged beyond that of the individual. In a sense, it evades death, and rumbim is associated with this extended life span as well as, or as a function of, its association with both individuals and territorial corpora­ tions. T h e spiritual qualities of rumbim are yet more encompassing, however, for it is also associated with the R e d Spirits. Tondoko has red leaves, and the R e d Spirits are addressed when it is planted. They are thanked for their help in warfare, promised offerings of pork in the future, and asked to guard the rumbim so that the men will remain well and the children begotten by them healthy. Spirituality, strength, health, agnation, territoriality, continuity, and something like immortality are thus represented in the planting of rumbim. (We may be reminded here of the Mudyi tree of the N d e m b u people of Zambia whose many significations have been masterfully analyzed by Victor Turner [ 1 9 6 7 a ] ) . When the men unclasp the rumbim, they plant amame around the oven. The belly fat of pig cooked with the wild foods has been reserved and is buried among the amame, which is called, in fact, the tone kump amame (pig belly amame). While it is being planted, the spirits of the low ground c

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are entreated to care well for it, that the pigs will be fertile and grow fat that the gardens flourish, and that the women be healthy and bear children. A s the oven rots, the amame overruns it. When it has, cuttings are taken from it to plant at the women's houses for the sake of the human and porcine residents. T h e sexual symbolism of the rumbim and the oven seems obvious, but the planting of rumbim in the oven probably does not represent the procreative act in any simple sense. It seems to employ a relationship between objects similar to that of male and female organs in intercourse to represent metaphorically a more abstract union which will be de­ scribed below. The spatial relationship of these objects does suggest, however, that the oven is in some sense a vaginal representation. This identification receives some support from the oven's bounty: as human children emerge from vaginas, so the fruits of the earth emerge from the oven. Although neither Buchbinder nor I got corroborating exegeses from Maring informants, and would not have expected them, this inter­ pretation does not rest entirely on exogenous theories of symbolism. There is a theme in Maring stories o f an apparently pregnant woman from whom bursts forth not a child, but a great flood of wild vegetables and animals. T h e story of such a miracle reached one of us in the field as the report of a current event in a distant community. To say that the oven represents a vagina through which the fruits of the earth come forth is to assimilate the earth to other entities possessing vaginas, notably women. T h e earth and women, this is to say, are mem­ bers o f a class sharing certain qualities o r attributes. Both are fruitful, and as we observed earlier, the fruitfulness of both soil and women is related to their "coldness." This coldness, however, is dangerous as well as fertile. In the light of this, it may now be suggested that the spatial relationship of amame and rumbim to each other produced by their planting and by the subsequent growth of the amame over the area occupied by the oven recalls the spatial relationship of these two plants on burial sites. This is to say that as rumbim and amame are spatially related to the oven, so are they related to graves. It is further to suggest, if the oven is a vaginal representation, that vaginas and graves are conflated. A s the earth possesses a vagina in the oven, so women possess, in their vaginas, graves. In the symbolism of ritual, then, we find cor­ roboration of the identification o f fertility and death implicit in avoid­ ance behavior and almost explicit in cosmology, and we gain some insight into the nature o f men s pollution fears. A s that which emerges from the earth is eventually reabsorbed by the earth, so re-entry by men into that from which men emerge, although necessary for procreation and pleas­ urable as well, is dangerous. A s the earth dissolves the creatures sprung from it, so can those sprung from vaginas be dissolved by entry into

On Cognized Models I 1 1 1 aginas. It is of interest that pollution by women is said to cause a severe outrescence, a condition of deterioration resembling that of corpses (a process with which the Maring are familiar because they expose cadavers n raised platforms, where they are attended by widows or close female agnates until reduced to skeletons). In light of this it may be suggested that Maring men's fear of pollution by women's sexuality on the one hand and by the association of women with corpses on the other, are one and the same. The process of the natural world is the cycle of fertility, growth, and death, and the planting of rumbim and amame seems to represent an attempt by men to impose their own cultural order upon the bounties and dangers of the nature by which they are both sustained and threat­ ened. If the oven is a representation of a vagina, it may signify not only that the bountifulness of the wild is an aspect of the wild's fecundity, but that fecundity itself is an aspect of the wild. This is to say that the planting of amame, itself a cultigen, around the oven which it eventually overruns is an attempt to capture for the cultivated the fecundity of the wild. Since the amame is explicidy planted for the benefit of women, domestic pigs, and gardens, to plant it is to lash sociocultural ends onto natural processes, or to assimilate the processes of nature into those of society. It is of importance to note here that the opposition of wild to culti­ vated is not foreign to the Maring. T h e distinction between fp wombi and t'p demi, approximating that between things domestic and things wild, is important in Maring thought. It is in accordance with our general discus­ sion, however, that demi may carry the meaning of dangerous as well as wild, and that some creatures or entities not in a meaningful sense either cultivated or uncultivated, such as enemies and the ghosts of those who have not been given proper mortuary rites, are said to be demi. Whereas the planting of amame may be interpreted as the imposition of cultural purposes upon the fruitful but dangerous and purposeless processes o f nature, the planting of rumbim, a plant that men clasp and invest but women may not even touch, makes clear that insofar as the cultural order is in the hands of mortals, it is literally in the hands o f men. Moreover, since R e d Spirits are associated with the rumbim as well as with the living men who plant it, since the amame is associated with the spirits o f the low ground, and since seances with the Smoke Woman always precede the planting of rumbim, the cultural order that men dominate is a spiritual order as well. T h e planting of rumbim in the oven does not represent a procreative act in any simple sense but, rather, the union of nature, associated with death and fertility, with spirituality, associated by the Maring with the cultural order. It is of interest in this respect that the word nomane, which v

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means in some contexts thought or "soul," can in other contexts be glossed as custom or culture. This union implies, we may note, ordering of living and nonliving beings. Smoke Woman, associated with words, thought, and breath, as insubstantial and ethereal as the hot vapors through which men commune with her, flies high above the world. Koipa Mangiang, who is concerned with fertility, decay, and death, swims in its depths. If Smoke Woman, who is above jjie world and who provides to the world the words by which it is ordered, is super­ natural, Koipa Mangiang, who swims beneath the world, is infranatural for the world rests upon the processes over which he presides. Between them and the living, dwelling in trees in the low ground and burning on the high ground, are the spirits of those who once lived, the Spirits of R o t , and the R e d Spirits. "Primitive society," says Douglas ( 1 9 6 6 : 4 ) , "is an energized structure at the center of its universe." A t the center of the Maring universe, in the world of life, these two sets come together in the relationship between men and women. Society is possible only in their union, a union represented in the planting of rumbim and amame in and around the oven. Avoidance and taboo facilitate their union, for they are not only mutually dependent, but also in some degree inimical. A t least the spiritual and cultural order, embodied in men particularly, is in danger of being engulfed by the natural processes necessary to its per­ petuation. In this view, Maring beliefs concerning female pollution are not simply an outcome or aspect of an opposition between nature and culture, an opposition that is virtually explicit in the dichotomy Maring make between t'p wombi and t'p demi. It is an aspect of their union as well. a i l

*

#

#

Absolution from the taboos assumed when the fighting stones were hung requires reductions in the debt owed by the living to the dead, and all adult and adolescent animals owned by members of a group are offered to spirits when the rumbim is planted. Only juveniles escape the slaughter. The dead are said to devour the spirits of the pigs, while the flesh of the animals is consumed by the living. It is of interest that although the R e d Spirits are more important in warfare, most of the sacrificed pigs are offered to the spirits of the low ground because the flesh o f pigs dedi­ cated to them can be presented to allies, and allies as well as spirits must be repaid for their assistance. Only agnates may consume the flesh of pigs offered to the R e d Spirits. T h e pork presented to ancestors and allies with the planting of rumbim constitutes no more than a first payment to them. A large debt remains outstanding, and therefore many taboos, including those on marsupials and eels and those dealing with the enemy and forbidding trespass upon enemy territory, remain. Since the Maring believe that warfare can be

On Cognized Models | 1 1 3 f u l only with the assistance of spirits, and since the aid of spirits ^ill not be forthcoming if debts to them remain outstanding, a group cannot initiate a new round of warfare until it has fully repaid its debts from the last. A sanctified truce thus comes into effect with the planting {rumbim. This prevails until there are sufficient pigs to repay the spirits. The question of how many pigs are sufficient and how long it may take to acquire them has been dealt with in detail elsewhere (Rappaport 1 9 6 8 ) . H e r e I would only note that whereas the goal or motive for raising pigs is to repay debts owed to spirits and to allies, the number of pigs required to discharge those debts is not specified. H o n o r sets a lower limit: to give prestations that seem stingy shames the donor (and may lose him the support of the beneficiary). In complement, the attrac­ tions of prestige urge donors to give as lavishly as possible. Nevertheless, the fact o f debts to ancestors and allies and the size of those debts are to be distinguished or, to put it differently, the social obligations them­ selves do not establish what is required to discharge them. To gain an insight into the number of animals required we must consider some objective aspects of Tsembaga pig husbandry. Aside from the rituals associated with warfare and festivals, the Tsem­ baga usually kill and consume pigs only during rituals associated with illness and injury.* It may be nutritionally sound to reserve the limited quantity of pigs for consumption when their masters are experiencing physiological stress and thus are in need o f high quality protein, but whether or not this is the case, the rate of increase of the pig population is obviously related to the health of the human population. It might also be noted that since all male pigs are castrated (to increase their size and decrease their fierceness), sows can be impregnated only by feral boars, and the herd grows more slowly than it would if domestic boars were kept. When the pig population is of moderate size it can be fed upon sub­ standard tubers obtained while harvesting for humans. H o w e v e r , when the pig herd grows it becomes necessary to plant gardens especially for them. T h e amount of acreage and w ork can be substantial. When the Tsembaga herd was at maximum ( 1 7 0 animals), 3 6 percent of the gardens were devoted to the support of pigs. T h e additional labor entailed by these gardens falls mainly upon women, who eventually begin to com­ plain of overwork. Moreover, as they become more numerous, pigs e S S

0

r

*There is some evidence that there was some variation in this respect, even prior to contact by agents of the Australian government. Jimi Valley Maring seem to have kept more pigs than Simbai Valley Maring, possibly because they relied more heavily upon sweet potato and less upon taro, in turn a possible consequence of the conversion of a substantial portion of their forests to grassland. With more pigs there may have been more occasions for killing and consuming them. Jimi Valley Maring seem to have made prestations of pork to afnnes outside of festival contexts. The Tsembaga did not.

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become nuisances, often invading gardens, and garden invasions cause trouble between pig owners and garden owners. In short, a large number of pigs becomes either a burden or a nuisance, and when the pigs have become intolerable to a sufficient number of people to affect the con­ sensus, there are sufficient pigs to repay the ancestors. It takes anywhere from six or seven to twenty years to accumulate this number. When there are sufficient pigs, stakes marking the boundaries of the local population's territory are ritually planted. If the enemy remains on his territory, they are planted at the old border. If the enemy was driven out, however, the taboo on entering his land is abrogated and the stakes may be planted at new locations incorporating some or all of his land. It is assumed that by this time even the spirits of the enemy's ancestors have departed to take up residence with their living descendants, who, after they were routed, sought refuge with kinsmen living elsewhere. Erstwhile enemy land is thus considered unoccupied, and as such may be annexed. Also abrogated at this time is the taboo on trapping marsupials, and a ritual trapping period, lasting for one or two months (until a certain variety o f pandanus fruit ripens) commences. This culminates in an important ritual in which the rumbim planted after the last fight is uprooted. During this ritual there is further debt reduction and impor­ tant reintegration of the cosmos. T h e beneficiaries of the slaughter of pigs at this time are mainly the R e d Spirits. T h e pigs offered them are, in part, payment for their past assistance and in part in exchange for the marsupials (their pigs) that have recently been trapped and smoked and are now consumed. A relationship of equality with the R e d Spirits, replacing the former indebtedness, is now being approached by the living. Correlated with this, the communion entered into years before by men when they took the R e d Spirits into their heads is now concluded. The R e d Spirits are asked to take the pig being offered them and leave. It has already been mentioned that the cassowary is associated with the spirits o f the high ground, the pandanus with the low, and from the point o f view of reintegration perhaps the most interesting act in this elaborate ritual is the piercing, by a man dancing on hot stones, of a pandanus fruit with a cassowary bone. Then the pandanus is cooked with marsupials, and the mixture consumed. The spirits of the high and the low, long separated, are being drawn closer together, and the congregation, gradu­ ally absolving its debts, is drawing closer to both. With the uprooting of the rumbim the taboo on beating drums is abro­ gated, and a kaiko, a year-long festival, culminating the entire ritual cycle, commences. During this festival other local populations are entertained from time to time at elaborate dances, and about six months after the uprooting of the rumbim, when the taro has begun to open in the 1

On Cognized Models | 1 1 5 gardens, the fighting stones are finally lowered during a ritual called kaiko nde. With the lowering of the fighting stones, it becomes possible to trap e l s , and one to three months later eel traps are placed in special places in various streams. In the meantime friendly groups continue to be entertained, but taro is now the focus of the food presentations to the visitors. Taro is to the Maring the most important of foods; even sacri­ ficial pig is called "taro" in addresses to spirits, and ritual presentations of taro to guests symbolize the ability of the hosts to maintain gardens on the one hand and social relations on the other. Among the Maring food sharing is synonymous with friendship; people will not eat food grown by enemies, and to eat a man's taro is to say that he is your friend. The festival.concludes in a series of rituals occurring on successive days. On the first day a few pigs are slaughtered and dedicated to the R e d Spirits in ritual abrogating some residual taboos on relations with other groups arising out of warfare in earlier generations. A t this time, too, inter-dining taboos among members of the local population assumed with respect to each other in moments of anger are abrogated. The renunciation of these taboos permits the locals to conduct, usually on the next day, the rituals that are the climax of the entire ritual climax. Performed at sacred places in the middle altitudes, and accompanied by the slaughter of great numbers of pigs, these rituals suggest a cosmic procreative act. T h e trapped eels, kept in cages in nearby streams, are carried by young men to the sacred sacrificial places (raku) up newly cut pathways, through frond-bedecked arches, where they are joined by the women and young girls. The young men, women, and girls proceed together to the center of the raku where the eels are removed from their cages and, grasped by their tails, flailed to death on the flank of a female pig, just slaughtered. T h e eel and the pig are then cooked together in the tmbi ying, a small circular house with a pole projecting through its roof. It is a house, moreover, into which on the previous night both Koipa Mangiang and S m o k e Woman had been called and in which both had been present at the same time. Penetration, ejaculation, and gestation—or processes formally similar to them—seem to be represented, and the universe is finally reintegrated by them. T h e next day on the dance ground there is a massive distribution of pork to members of friendly groups through a window in a ceremonial fence {pake) especially constructed for the occasion. When the pork has been distributed, the hosts, who have assembled behind the fence, crash through to join the throng dancing on the dance ground. Yesterday they reunited the high with the low and themselves with both in what might appear to the observer to have been a great procreative act. Today, in what may be a rebirth, they have broken through the restrictions e

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separating them from their neighbors. Their debts to both the living and the dead have been repaid, and if the central government had not recently pacified the area they would have been again free to initiate warfare, for the sanctified truce had ended.

Ill This account of the Maring ritual cycle points to certain of the inade­ quacies o f the formulation of the relationship between cognized and operational models reviewed at the beginning of this essay. For one thing, few if any societies break the world into the more o r less distinct systems distinguished by Western science. N o t all of them, surely, dis­ tinguish environmental from social relations. Among the Maring, it is clear, ecological, political, and social relations (most notably the relations between the sexes) are not separately conceived and their regulation proceeds in terms of an integrated set of understandings and principles. M o r e o v e r , these understandings and principles, which, in the Maring view , both account for the structure and state of the world and invest the world and actions in it with meaning, are not confined to the particular material and social relations regulated. They include as well metaphysical abstractions of great generality. If representations of cognized models in accordance with which ecosystems are regulated were to be confined to folk accounts o f ecosystemic elements and processes per se little more than sets of folk taxonomies and gardening and hunting lore would be included in them. I do not wish to denigrate the ethnoscientific enter­ prise, nor the taxonomies and "cultural grammars" that it is capable of discovering or constructing. I would simply suggest that these and other representations of both the material elements of which ecosystems are composed and the processes relating these elements to each other should be conceptualized in the larger metaphysical and epistemological con­ texts which, as far as the actors are concerned, give them value and significance. T h e y should not be alienated from other processes, social, political, o r spiritual, from which they are not separated in the actors' understandings. r

Another point follows. Although the Maring ritual cycle surely does regulate social, political, and ecosystemic relations, regulatory operations just as surely cannot account for the entire cycle in all its aspects and with all o f the understanding it embodies. Maring liturgical order, and liturgi­ cal orders generally, seem far richer in understanding and meaning than social, political, or ecological regulation obviously requires. A n examina­ tion of the structure of these understandings and meanings will reinforce such an impression.

On Cognized Models \ 1 1 7 Our description of the Maring ritual cycle surely has indicated that the cognized models expressed in liturgy are not mere heaps of disparate understandings. Liturgical orders impose structure upon understanding or perhaps it is better to say, provide the structure without which understanding can only be fragmented and contradictory. I have argued elsewhere (see " T h e Obvious Aspects of Ritual" in this volume) that liturgical orders possess several dimensions, and it is in terms of these dimensions that the concepts and notions represented in ritual are organ­ ized. The most apparent is the sequential dimension. O n e representation follows another, usually in fixed order, in the enactment of a ritual, and one ritual follows another in the progress of a ritual cycle or series. Each representation in such sequences may, however, signify many things at one and the same time, binding its varied significata together in chordlike fashion. This second aspect of ritual may be called its "simultaneous dimension." Less immediately apparent and more difficult to grasp is liturgy's hierarchical dimension. It is sufficient to observe here that some rituals seem fundamental or constitutive (e.g., the Mass) whereas others seem to be contingent upon the fundamental rituals (e.g, crowning a king in the name of G o d ) , or instrumental (e.g., a marriage service). The fundamental components of liturgical orders, or even of particular rituals, moreover, seem to be more sacred, enduring, invariant, and authoritative than those which are contingent or instrumental. We may compare here the creeds and the eucharist to the substance of sermons. A concomitant of the hierarchical structure of liturgical orders is the hierarchical organization of the understandings encoded in those orders. 1 shall treat this dimension of Maring understanding first. At the apex, so to speak, of the conceptual structure embodied in the Maring liturgical order are understandings, formal expression of which is largely confined to ritual, concerning the existence of spirits and the relations prevailing among them. These understandings, the significa­ tions of which are not material and are beyond the reach of logical refutation, are neither verifiable nor falsifiable, but are nevertheless taken to be unquestionable. They are of the class that elsewhere 1 have called "ultimate sacred propositions," but which might better be called "ultimate sacred postulates" (see " T h e Obvious Aspects of Ritual"). This class includes, for example, the Jewish declaration of faith called the Shema ("Hear, O Israel, the Lord our G o d , the Lord is One") and the creeds of Christians. N o such creed or declaration is made explicit by the Maring, but postulates concerning the existence of sentient and puissant spirits are surely implicit in the highly stylized addresses to those spirits which occur in all Maring rituals. A second class of understandings, a class composed of cosmological axioms, is closely associated with ultimate sacred postulates. I include in

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this category Maring notions of the world as constituted by a set f oppositions between certain qualities which are, on the one hand, associ ated with the two general classes of spirits and, on the other hand manifested in the social and physical world. Thus, the hot, hard, dry strong, cultural, spiritual, and immortal are associated with the R j Spirits on the one hand and substantiated in men, patrilineages, terri­ toriality, warfare, and high land on the other. In opposition, the low, soft cold, moist, fecund, natural, and mortal are associated with the Spirits of the L o w Ground on the one hand and substantiated in women, garden­ ing, pig husbandry, and the lower portion of the body on the other, \ further include among Maring cosmological axioms their conceptions concerning the mediation of these oppositions through ritual. Whereas the oppositions per se are irreducible the relationship of the opposed terms is transformed, through the course of the cycle, from inimical to complementary. Whereas cosmological axioms concerning fundamental oppositions and their mediation are explicit in Maring exegeses of their liturgical cycle, other cosmological axioms are implicit in its formal actions, in the transformations achieved by these actions, and in their order and prog­ ress (to which I shall return). First among these implicit principles is that of reciprocity. All assistance must be reciprocated, all trespasses com­ pensated or avenged. A second assumption concerns the relationship of humans to spirits. All important human understandings require the acquiescence of spirits and for many activities, particularly warfare, their active assistance is crucial. Like the principle of reciprocity, this under­ standing is seldom, if ever, explicitly articulated, but is implicit in virtu­ ally all invocations of spirits. A corollary of both of these axioms taken together is that spirits must be repaid for their help in past warfare if they are to provide the help needed for success in the future. It should be clear that I have been using the term "cosmological axioms" to refer to assumptions concerning the fundamental structure of the universe or, to put it differently, to refer to the paradigmatic relation­ ships in accordance with which the cosmos is constructed. I do not include within this class what are generally called "values." Some values may, however, be implicit in them, be entailed by them, or even be derived as theorems from them. For instance, the high value that Maring place upon unity o r integrity is at least implicit in the progress in the ritual cycle from a condition of maximum segregation of parts of the universe from each other to one in which segregation is radically re­ duced. T h e negative value placed upon the failure to fulfill reciprocal obligations f o l k w s from the assumption that reciprocity is fundamental to cosmic structure. G i v e n this assumption, lapses in reciprocity are violations of the order constituting the world. 0

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On Cognized Models | 1 1 9 1 have distinguished cosmological axioms as a class from ultimate d postulates on several grounds. First and most obviously, ultimate ed postulates are typically devoid of material significata, whereas cmological axioms are concerned with relationships among qualities rfiat may themselves be sensible (e.g., hot and cold) and that are mani­ fested in physical and social phenomena (e.g., the relationship between men and women). It follows, second, that if cosmological axioms are manifested in social and physical phenomena the occasions for their expression are more general and varied than those in which it is appro­ priate to express ultimate sacred postulates. The proprietous expression of the latter is largely confined to ritual whereas the expression of the former is implicit in much of daily life. Third, and related to the first and second, whereas ultimate sacred postulates, by themselves, are either devoid of explicit social content or very vague in this regard, cosmological axioms are more specific and often do have direct, explicit, and substantial political, social, and ecological import. Fourth, cosmological axioms serve as the logical basis from which both specific rules of conduct and the proprieties of social life can be derived. Ultimate sacred postulates are more remote from social life. They do not themselves provide a logical foundation for it, nor even for cosmological structure (which, I have asserted, is axiomatic). But they are not otiose. They sanctify, which is to say certify, the entire system of understandings in accordance with which people conduct their lives. Without sanctification the axioms of cosmology would remain arbitrary, constituting nothing more than speculative conceptual structures, amounting to nothing more than at­ tempts at explanation. When a cosmology is sanctified it is no longer merely conceptual nor simply explanatory nor even speculative. It be­ comes something like an assertion, statement, description, or report of the way the world in fact is. To invert the hierarchical metaphor, whereas ultimate sacred postulates do not themselves provide the logical ground upon which the usages and rules of social life are established, they provide the ground, deeper than logic and beyond logic's reach, upon which cosmological structure can be founded. It follows that cosmo­ logical structures can change—expand, contract, or even be radically altered structurally—in response to changes in environmental or histori­ cal conditions without changes in, or even challenge to, ultimate sacred postulates. Being devoid of material terms, ultimate sacred postulates are not fully of this mortal world and can be regarded as eternal verities. Being devoid of explicit social content they can sanctify everything, including change, while remaining irrevocably committed to nothing. A third and yet "lower" level in hierarchies of understanding is com­ posed of the yet more specific rules (to which I have already alluded in discussing cosmological axioms) governing the conduct of relations e

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among the persons, qualities, conditions, and states of affairs w h o oppositions are decreed by cosmological axioms (e.g., between men anj women, men and cold foods, etc.). These rules are, of course, expressed in the performance of rituals, a matter to which 1 shall return, but they also govern the behavior of everyday life. A m o n g the Maring taboos of all sorts are prominent among such rules. T h e oppositions of the cosmological level, including as they do terms that may be materially manifested, are more concrete and have more direct social import than do the ultimate sacred postulates sanctifying them. S o , in turn, are the rules o f conduct more concrete than the cosmological oppositions they express. They are, therefore, able both to "realize" or substantiate those oppositions and to provide them with a specific social import that they, by themselves, do not clearly and un­ ambiguously possess. It is one thing to establish cosmologically men and women as members o f opposing sets. It is quite another to exclude women on such grounds from participating in ritual. T h e rules of the third level, then, transform cosmology into conduct. It is important to note that as the cosmological structure of the second level can be modified without challenge to ultimate sacred postulates so can these rules be changed without affecting the oppositions they make material. I shall later cite an instance of such a change in discussing the sequential dimension of liturgical order and its understandings. O u r account so far may seem to suggest that liturgical orders somehow create understandings that are then exported to the world outside of ritual (although I have indicated in passing that cosmological axioms and the rules that make them concrete may change in response to historical or environmental change). It is important to make clear, however, that this is not the whole of the matter. Liturgical orders also import informa­ tion from the external world in the form of formal indications o f cur­ rently prevailing conditions. These importations form a fourth level in hierarchies of understandings. A m o n g the Maring indications of the states of ecological relations are prominent among the understandings imported. The uprooting of rum­ bim, for instance, indicates that relations among such phenomena ex­ ternal to ritual as the size and rate of increase of the pig population, the amount o f land in cultivation, the intensity of women's labor, the patience and health o f women, the frequency of garden invasions by pigs and other factors as well, have reached a certain complex composite state which, in material terms, can be described as "all the pigs the group can maintain or tolerate." When imported into the liturgical order, however, this description of a material condition is invested with cosmological meaning and transformed into "sufficient pigs to repay the ancestors." T h e Maring ritual cycle provides opportunities for signifying states of Se

On Cognized Models | 1 2 1 a rs other than ecological, o f course. For a resident alien to join in hinting rumbim indicates his naturalization into the local group, the size *f a visiting contingent o f dancers at a kaiko indicates to the hosts the ^nount of military support they may expect to receive from that group in future rounds of warfare (see Pigs for the Ancestors). Liturgical orders differ in conditions prevailing in the external world their per­ formance, or aspects of their performance, may signify, but intrinsic to all rituals is indication of some aspect of the contemporary social, psychic, or physical state of the performers and, possibly, of aspects of their environmental relations as well (Leach 1 9 6 5 : n ) . I shall only note what I shall call a fifth level o f understandings, more or less completely external to the liturgical order but investing domains over which the liturgical order ultimately presides. I refer here to secular understandings of the everyday world, its people, its animals, its plants, its places, its activities. It is on this "level" (surely more complex than the notion of a single level suggests) that classification seems to be most highly elaborated. A hierarchy of understandings is, then, represented in the Maring liturgical order. A t the apogee stand postulates concerning spirits. Ulti­ mately sacred, these understandings are not open to material refutation, for their significata are not material, nor are they vulnerable to logical refutation. Y e t they are taken to be unquestionable, immutable, and eternal. Cosmological structure is elaborated in a second class, a class of axioms by or through which the spirits postulated are associated with elements and relations o f the material and social world in a set of abstract structural oppositions that apply to both: as the R e d Spirits are hot, hard, dry, and strong, so are men; as the Spirits of the L o w Ground are cold, soft, wet, and fertile, so are women. T h e s e relations are given concreteness and specificity in yet a third level o f understandings constituted of rules and taboos concerning action appropriate or inappropriate in terms of the understandings o f the cosmological structure that informs them. Indications o f material and social conditions immediately prevailing in the everyday world are imported into ritual, where they constitute a fourth level o f understandings, and are translated there into the terms o f cosmology. Secular knowledge of the everyday world constitutes a fifth level o f understanding that, for the most part, remains external to ritual. T h e hierarchy of understanding organized by ritual is, thus, one of sanctity, mutability, concreteness, specificity, and immediacy. Further aspects o f such hierarchies and how their features may be related to adaptive processes are discussed in "Adaptive Structure and Its Dis­ orders" and "Sanctity and Lies in Evolution." w

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T h e second dimension of liturgical order is the sequential. The sue cession of elements in ritual is usually fixed and so are the successions of rituals composing liturgical calendars and cycles of other sorts. It should be kept in mind, however, that all components of ritual are likely to have their places in the liturgical order defined by all dimensions simultane­ ously. Thus, the sanctified succession that proceeds from the maximal segregation of categories of spirits, persons, foods, and lands from each other when the fighting stones are hung to their maximal integration at the end of the kaiko has sacred, cosmic, social, and ecological signifi­ cance. It is a rule-governed succession through the actions of which the oppositions explicit in cosmological structure are transformed from an antagonistic to complementary state in response to indications of eco­ systemic conditions and changes in them. The actions transforming cos­ mic relations also transform social and ecological relations in the Maring case. It is important to note that the specific rules in accordance with which these transformations are effected—those stipulating how and when to repay spirits and what it takes to repay them—are flexible. T h e quantity of pigs required is not a specific number but is the function of relations among a number o f variables, and the length of intervals between rituals is elastic. Furthermore, the rules are not only flexible, but mutable as well. For example, in 1 9 5 5 envoys from the Kauwassi, the largest of the Maring groups, invited the Tukmenga to join them in a concerted attack upon the Monamban, whose lands lay between their territories. The Tukmenga at first refused, protesting that their rumbim remained in the ground, for they had not yet fully repaid the spirits for their help in the last war. After prolonged discussion they were persuaded that the spirits could be satisfied by a different procedure requiring fewer pigs and no delay. A few pigs were, accordingly, immediately killed and laid on the roofs o f ringi ying, no doubt as offerings to R e d Spirits, and the Tuk­ menga stormed off to join the Kauwassi in the rout of the Monamban. Informants told Vayda that this procedure had always been acceptable, but could not, or at least would not, cite any precedents, although pressed to d o so (Rappaport 1 9 6 8 : 1 5 2 ) . W e may note here than in our accounts of the hierarchical and sequen­ tial dimensions o f liturgical orders we have touched upon their adaptive characteristics. T h e sequential dimension o f non-calendrical liturgical orders are able to expand and contract, as it were, in response to fluctua­ tions in indications of material conditions. T h e flexibility and elasticity inherent in the Maring ritual cycle as constituted by its rules is further enhanced by the mutability of the rules themselves. If pressure is great enough they may be changed. It is of interest that when the Kauwassi were persuading the Tukmenga to change their rules concerning the

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rep*y °^ P* ' ^ largest of the Maring local groups in their own right, their numbers were further swollen by refugees, and heir l a ^ degraded in Maringdom. It may be suggested that the elasticity of sequence in response to fluctuations in indications of material conditions and the flexibility and mutability of rules for realizing cosmological transformations not only maintains cosmological and sacred understandings unchanged in the face of perturbation, but also tends to do so within environmental limits. This is to say that the fit between the cognized and operational models among the Maring is to be accounted for, at least in part, by formal character­ istics of the liturgical order in which the cognized model is encoded; in particular, those characteristics that make it flexible. To speak o f the sequential dimension of ritual and its ordering of understandings, it should be clear from this account, is not to speak of elements distinct or separate from those encompassed in hierarchies of understanding. It is, rather, to consider the temporal relations of the same postulates, axiomatic oppositions, rules, and indications. T h e sequential dimension of liturgical order adds understandings of trans­ formation, process, and possibly even of cause and time, to the hierarchy of understanding. It is not the concern of this essay to pursue the causal and temporal significance of liturgical orders per se. Suffice it to note that to effect a transformation must be, in some sense, to cause it. A s far as time is concerned I will only mention that rituals ability to distinguish before from after with perfect clarity permits it to impose upon nature disconti­ nuities much sharper than nature's own. N o t only may it distinguish one period from the next unambiguously, but it may thereby fashion rime itself out o f mere duration. In distinguishing one period from the next, furthermore, it distinguishes both before and after, as periods, from the non-periodic times between them—the times between times occupied by ritual itself—and thus it separates mundane time from sacred time which, being time out of time, may be associated in ritual with the eternal (see Turner 1967 b ) . n

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Finally, I may mention briefly the simultaneous or chordlike dimen­ sion o f liturgical order. T h e representations o f ritual follow one another, but each may have multiple significations (Campbell 1 9 5 9 : 4 6 i f f . ; Ortner * 9 7 3 ; Turner 1 9 6 7 a ) . Thus, rumbim and its planting signify at one and the same time R e d Spirits, spirituality', immortality, maleness, patrilineality, patrilocality, territoriality, particular patricians, membership in par­ ticular patricians, hotness, hardness, ferocity, strength, the domination of nature by culture and women by men. It is, in Ortner s terms, a key symbol representing at one and the same time all, or virtually all, of the terms making up one o f the two sets party to the oppositions stipulated

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by Maring cosmological axioms. A s such, it binds together the different realms in which the qualities composing the set are manifested—gender relations, political relations, ecological processes. They are not only regulated by the same rules sequentially applied but become icons of each other and of relations among spirits. I shall touch upon these matters in another context later. #

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Several general points are to be made in concluding this discussion of the structure of the understandings encoded in the Maring liturgical order. First, the analytic framework sketched here may help to relate the insights of some other more particular approaches to understanding to each other. T h e notion of structure as organized sets of oppositions and their mediation (Levi-Strauss, 1 9 5 5 ) is manifest in what I have called "cosmological axioms" and in the transformation of the nature of the oppositions they specify through the progress of the ritual cycle. Such a conception of structure also invests the taboos and other rules of "the third level" that realize the oppositions of the second. T h e comprehen­ sion of signs indicating material and social conditions, an area of under­ standing emphasized in systemic and ecological analyses, is accommo­ dated on "the fourth level," and folk taxonomies, the domain of lin­ guistic-cognitive anthropologists, dominate "the fifth," and "lower" secu­ lar levels, although they are not confined to them. T h e multivocalic and bipolar symbolic meanings (Campbell 1 9 5 9 ; Turner 1 9 6 7 a ) infusing the symbols appearing in ritual are manifested in what I have called the "simultaneous dimension" of liturgical order. Second, it is important to emphasize that the temporal entailments of the structure I have sketched are not limited to its sequential dimension but are intrinsic to its hierarchical dimension as well. We may consider differences in the longevity of the understandings assigned to the several levels of such hierarchies. Ultimate sacred postulates are taken to be eternal verities and seem, in fact, to persist for long periods. The Sbema of the J e w s has endured for at least three thousand years. Cosmological axioms may be taken by those accepting them to be as enduring as ultimate sacred postulates, but are probably less so, and the specific rules that realize those axioms and govern social behavior are likely to be yet shorter-lived. Signs indicating contemporary states in an ever-fluctuating world are ephemeral. Differences in the longevity of understandings may or may not be recognized by those entertaining them, but whether or not they are, w e can observe in the ascent from the understandings of everyday life to those o f ultimate sacred postulates a progression from the quick to the eternal. Systematic disparities in the longevity of understandings imply a

On Cognized Models | 1 2 5 dynamic beyond the invariant series of transformations effected by rit­ uals and sequences of rituals. T h e relationship between the quick and the eternal is also a relationship between the ever-changing and the neverchanging. It is o f importance that the most labile of values are both the most specific and the most concrete. For example, the number of pigs sufficient to repay spirits varies from one festival to the next in response to changes in demographic, social, political, and ecological circum­ stances. Such variation is, of course, in accordance with highly flexible rules, rules that are maintained unchanged through changes in the magni­ tudes o f the reference values which they set. But, as we have seen, such rules can themselves change while higher-order cosmological under­ standings remain unchanged, and, similarly, these cosmological under­ standings can change without affecting ultimate sacred postulates. These, taken to be immutable, can remain unchanged as all understandings of "lower order" change. Indeed, they are likely to be changed only in response to, or as an effect of, fundamental social or political change. In "Adaptive Structure and Its Disorders" the adaptive significance of con­ cordance between temporal qualities and transmutative capacity will be considered at some length. It is necessary here only to emphasize that it is change in concrete material values (e.g., the number of pigs that is "sufficient") that maintains high-order understandings unchanged. This relationship of the concrete to the conceptual leads to a third general point o f great importance. A s the understandings of the Maring ritual cycle guide and regulate the social, political, and ecological proc­ esses in which the Maring participate, so do these material and social processes support or maintain the understandings that guide them. This view accords with the nature of cybernetic and other forms of selfregulation generally and, for that matter, with our account of them as an aspect of cognized and operational models. Cybernetic and other selfregulating processes equilibrate systems around reference values which stipulate or define the satisfactory, if not ideal. To put this in Bateson's ( 1 9 7 2 ) terms, they operate to preserve the truth value of propositions about the systems in which they occur in the face of continuous threats to falsify them. It is, thus, value and meaning that define the teleology of such systems; it is value and meaning, and not biological and ecological integrity, that they tend, in the first instance, to preserve. Recognition of this characteristic of the cybernetic operation of sociocultural systems, it should be made clear, does not in and of itself invalidate the proposal reviewed at the beginning of this essay—that cognized models may be assessed in terms of the ecological and biological effects of the behavior they elicit. We shall return to this matter. Although our concern is not so much w ith ritual as it is with the understandings that, in the Maring case as in the cases of many tribal r

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peoples, are expressed, embodied, or encoded in ritual, it is nevertheless worth noting that to encompass in a single liturgical order understand* ings that include ultimate sacred postulates, cosmological axioms con. cerning relations among spirits, qualities, persons, things and processes rules for transforming these relations, and indications o f prevailing states of society and nature, is to establish a unity or integrity of understanding that may seem highly meaningful to those grasping it and that may be tenuous or lacking in societies poor in ritual. It is well to make clear, however, that I do not propose that the sanctified liturgical ordering of understandings into more of less consistent structures guarantees that everyone's view of the world will duplicate the views of everyone else. T h e understandings of which 1 have spoken, and the relations among them, not only leave room for some individual interpretation, but de­ mand it. T h e liturgical representation of a public order o f understandings does, however, ensure the persistence of a common corpus for inter­ pretation and sets limits upon the private interpretations possible. I would suggest, finally, that the understandings embodied by a liturgi­ cal order may seem particularly meaningful not only because of their relatively high degree of coherence, consistency, and integrity, but also because rituals are constituted of acts as well as concepts. B y participating in a liturgical o r d e r — b y becoming part o f it—an actor radically reduces or even annihilates disparities between his conduct and his understand­ ing o f what is true and correct. Ritual action thus has a special signifi­ cance for the actors, for it realizes conceptions of the moral in the very postures and movements o f the body (see "The Obvious Aspects of Ritual" for a discussion of the entailments of ritual participation). IV To say that understandings may be more or less meaningful is to dis­ tinguish meaning and meaningfulness from understanding. M y use of the term 'understanding" has, I think, been dear, but what I mean by the terms "meaning" and "meaningful" may be obscure. I suggest that three types or levels of meaning may be distinguished. First, there is the notion of meaning in its simple, everyday semantic sense. T h e meaning of the word "dog" is dog, dog being distinct from cat, which is signified by the distinct term "cat." Meaning in this low-order sense is closely related to what information theorists mean by "informa­ tion." In this technical sense information is that which reduces uncer­ tainty. T h e minimal unit is the "bit," which can be understood as a binary distinction, or as that which eliminates the uncertainty between the two alternatives in a binary choice, or, to put it slightly differently, as the answer to a yes/no question when " y e s " and "no" are equally probable.

On Cognized Models | 1 2 7 Taxonomies are the typical but, of course, not the only forms within which low-order meaning is organized. When, however, we begin to consider not only simple meaning but fneaningfulness, w e become concerned not only with rationally drawn distinctions, but with emotionally charged values as well. Low-order meaning is founded upon distinction, but higher-order meaning is of another sort. The sense of meaning to which the question "What does it all mean?" points when asked by one confronted by a complex mass of information is surely not that of simple distinction. In answering such a question w e do not attempt to increase distinction but, on the contrary, to decrease it by discovering similarities among apparently disparate phe­ nomena, namely, that which we seek to understand on the one hand, and that which we already know, or at least think we know, on the other. In higher-order meaning these similarities among obviously distinctive phenomena become more significant than the distinctions themselves. The paradigmatic vehicle of higher-order meaning is metaphor. Meta­ phor, we may note, enriches the world's meaning, for the significance of every term that participates in a metaphor is transformed into more than itself, that is, into an icon of other things as well. It is significant that art and poetry rely heavily upon metaphor, a mode of representation that, because of its connotative resonance, is affectively more powerful than straightforward didactic forms. Whereas low-order meaning is based upon distinction and higherorder meaning is based on similarity, highest-order meaning is grounded in identity or unity, the radical identification of self with other. It is not so much intellectual as experiential and is perhaps most often grasped in ritual and other religions devotions. TTiose who have known it in its highest form may refer to it by such obscure phrases as the "Experience of Being," or " B e i n g Itself," or "Pure Being." They report that, although it is nonreferential, it seems enormously or even ultimately meaningful. It signifies only itself, but it itself seems comprehensive. All distinctions seem to disappear into an immediate and undeniable sense of union with others or even with the cosmos as a whole. Highest-order meaning, it is of interest to note, not only stands beyond language—it is non-discur­ sive—but, being devoid, of distinction, is also devoid of information. T h e meaning of informationlessness is discussed further in " T h e Obvious Aspects of Ritual" later in this volume. W e note, then, three bases o f meaningfulness: distinction, similarity, and identity. Each of these stipulates a different relationship of significata to those for whom they are meaningful. T h e semantic distinctions that constitute low-order meaning are properties of the messages or texts themselves and as such are distinct from those for whom they are meaningful. Higher-order meaning is based upon the structural similarity

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of a text to the experience of those for whom it is meaningful. Persons and significata are, as it were, drawn closer together than they are by loworder meaning. In highest-order meaning the distance between significata and those for whom they are significant is annihilated, for the latter participates in, or becomes united or identified with, the former. Mean­ ing becomes a state of being. It is worth remarking that each level of meaning seems to be roughlyassociated with a different class of Peirce's tripartite classification of signs ( 1 9 6 0 : I 4 3 f f . ) . There is an approximate correlation of low-order mean­ ing, which relies most heavily upon the semantic distinctions of language, with symbols in Peirce's sense, that is, with signs "associated by law," as he put it, with their significata. Higher-order meanings are conveyed iconically, and highest-order meaning, founded upon identity, seems close to indexical representation, in which signs are either effects of, or aspects of, what they signify. It is of interest that it is low-order meaning, which is elaborated by language, that is the sine qua non of humanity. The ultimately meaningful, being largely non-discursive and almost free of language altogether, may triumph, at least from time to time, over the experiences of fragmentation and alienation that are, possibly, the con­ comitants of language's objectifying powers (Van Baal 1 9 7 1 ) . To distinguish three levels of meaning is not, of course, to separate them. It is unfortunate that the students of each tend to be different people, for surely these levels must be related to each other in systematic w ays. It would seem that association with, or subsumption by, higherorder meaning invests meanings of lower order with significance and value; that is, makes mere information "meaningful." Conversely, loworder meanings provide the distinctions upon which those of higher order operate. It is not possible to illuminate similarities among distinct phenomena through metaphor until the distinctions among those phe­ nomena have been drawn. Similarly, it would not be possible to dissolve all distinctions into a transcendent unity if there were no distinctions to dissolve. r

V Cognized models may differ in meaningfulness. Some may be rich in low-order meaning but poor in meaningfulness because higher-order meanings, those of similarity, integration, and unity, remain undeveloped or, more likely, because they have been damaged or become diluted. A long line o f theologians, philosophers, and social scientists precedes me in proposing that modern society is rather worse off with respect to meaningfulness than traditional society. It is nevertheless worth con­ sidering this matter briefly, noting particularly that destruction of

On Cognized Models | 1 2 9 meaning may be intrinsic to developments we have taken to be advances in epistemology, computation, and social structure. We are led here to consider differences in the ways in which knowl­ edge—the medium of meaning—is conceived and organized in tradi­ tional and modern societies. Generalizations concerning such matters can be no more than approximate, but our discussion has suggested that among tribal peoples and in archaic civilizations, sacred knowledge was ultimate. I have already indicated that by "sacred knowledge" I refer to postulates in their nature neither verifiable nor falsifiable but neverthe­ less taken to be unquestionable because mystically known or because ritually accepted (Rappaport 1 9 7 1 b ; and "The Obvious Aspects of Ritual"). Concerned with gods and the like, they are typically devoid of terms having material signification and are thus without sociological specificity. Such postulates do, however, sanctify, which is to say certify, other sentences. A s we have seen, these include axioms concerning the structure of the cosmos, rules for behavior, and values entailed by these axioms and rules. If, as I have suggested, high-order meaning is derived from the perception of deep similarities underlying apparent distinc­ tions, the result of such an ordering of knowledge is a world laden with high-order meaning. If, further, highest-order meaning is an outcome of identification with the meaningful by those for whom it is meaningful, the ritual representation of such an ordering of knowledge also invests the world with highest-order meaning, for to perform a ritual is to par­ ticipate in it. Finally, there is knowledge of ordinary material facts, the facts of farming, hunting, cooking. T h e Maring are as aware as any other cultivators of, for instance, the special characteristics of particular plants (in which soils they will grow, how long they take to mature, the special treatment they require), but they consider such knowledge to be ob­ vious, transient, and hardly fundamental. Of "greater meaning" to them is the subsumption of material facts by cosmological oppositions and the elaboration o f taboos and other rules on the foundation those opposi­ tions provide. T h e coherence, orderliness, and meaningfulness of the conceptual structures liturgy organizes stand in striking contrast to those of modern society, for it would seem that the order of knowledge has been inverted in the course of history. Ultimate knowledge has become knowledge of fact. To be sure, facts are ordered within limited domains by subsump­ tion under more or less specific scientific taxonomies and laws, but these are perpetually subject to modification, or even overthrow, by the dis­ covery of further facts. Attempts to apply general ordering principles to disparate domains are often regarded as improper, and thus "respect­ able" generalizations are of limited scope. Those that apply to physical or organic phenomena, for instance, are said not to apply to the social

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domain. Indeed, attempts to subsume substantively distinctive phenom­ ena under common generalizations are likely to be dismissed as "merely analogic" or even "reductionistic." Thus, as we come to know more and more about ever more limited domains, the domains themselves become ever more isolated, and ever less meaningful to whatever lies outside of them. Nothing is any longer an icon of anything else, and if higher-order meaning lies in the perception of deep similarities underlying apparent distinctions, then, paradoxically, meaning has been diminished as knowl­ edge of fact—empirical knowledge—has increased. T h e position of that which in earlier times was taken to be ultimate knowledge—the unques­ tionable religious postulate—becomes anomalous in a world subordi­ nated to the fact, and so do the values it sanctifies. The empirical and logical rationality that not only discovers and ascertains facts but that defines knowledge as knowledge of fact is not hospitable to the authority of either sanctity or value. Ultimate sacred postulates are no longer even counted as knowledge but are mere beliefs, if not superstitions. Values are defined by preference and as such become no more than matters of taste or of the arithmetic of economizing. If high-order meanings are not destroyed they are demeaned and their influence upon human affairs minimized by "serious" and "practical" men who give to rationality itself an ever-narrower construction. It is a rationality reduced to the syl­ logism, the experiment, and those self-serving mental processes denoted by the economists' use of the term. It is a rationality that has no room for the insights of art, religion, fantasy, or dream. The evaluational capacities of such a dispassionate but impoverished reason are limited, to say the least, and hardly trustworthy. It is of considerable interest that money is an important component of evaluational procedures in societies in which facts have been apotheo­ sized. If meaning is fragmented by fact it is dissolved by money. It may seem that money, which makes it possible to assign commensurable "values" to things that are radically distinctive, represents similarities underlying apparent disparities with unparalleled precision and facility. A s such money would seem to enrich meaning. In fact it does not. Rather than finding or emphasizing similarities among the distinctive phenom­ ena to which it is applied, it renders the distinctions among them irrele­ vant, which is to say meaningless, from the beginning. The application of a common monetary metric to dissimilar things reduces their qualitative distinctiveness to the status of mere quantitative difference. T h e most appropriate answer to questions of the type "What is the difference between a forest and a parking l o t ? " becomes so many dollars per acre. Evaluation becomes nothing more than what is called "the bottom line," the result of the operations of addition and subtraction. Right and wrong, correct and erroneous, perhaps even true and false, are reduced to, or

On Cognized Models | 1 3 1 displaced by, more and less. Low-order meaning is demeaned as distinc­ tions are dissolved into differences and, of course, higher- and highestorder meanings are debilitated by the dissolution of significant distinc­ tions underneath which similarities are to be discovered or in the tran­ scendence of which unity is to be experienced. Money degrades meaning, but not only meaning. It also, and by the same token, degrades the objective world. It is obvious that the nature upon which the simple metric of money is imposed is not as simple as that metric. It is perhaps less obvious that it must not be. Living systems require a great variety of distinct and incommensurable substances to remain viable. Monetization, however, forces the great range of things and processes to which it is applied into a specious commensurability. A s such, at the same time that it impoverishes the meaningfulness of experi­ ence, it threatens life itself. Decisions made in terms of simple-minded monetary considerations, freed from the surveillance of higher-order meanings, are in their very nature unmindful of the uniqueness and incommensurability of elements in the objective world upon which life depends, and the deployment of large amounts of mindless energy under the guidance of money is almost bound to be brutal and destructive. M o r e generally, it may be suggested that the meaningful and material aspects of living processes are systematically related. That which dam­ ages one damages the other, and it may be further suggested that danger to them is greater in societies in which technological development, monetization, and the dissolution of high-order meaning have proceeded furthest. VI Concern with the coherence of cognized models, with their fragmenta­ tion, their meaningfulness, and adaptiveness, cannot be limited to con­ siderations of the structure of understanding per se. T h e differing ways in which societies distribute knowledge among their members must also be taken into account. T h e subject is a complex one, and has not been well studied. It does, nevertheless, seem safe enough to say that some gross differences among societies are related to equally gross differences in social complexity. That, in tribal societies, substantially similar knowl­ edge is available to persons of similar age and sex, and that the members of a category generally entertain similar if not identical values, may follow from the common circumstances of their lives and from joint participation in ritual. High redundancy in the distribution of knowl­ edge, a general feature of societies characterized by mechanical solidarity (Durkheim 1 9 3 3 [ 1 8 9 3 ] ) confers a high degree of autonomy upon individuals and small local groups, enhancing their ability to survive in

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isolation, reducing the degree to which they are perturbed by events abroad, increasing their ability to settle new and distant lands. Polynesia, for example, seems to have been explored and settled by small groups of voyagers who, isolated from their homelands, were able to reproduce the general forms o f the societies from which they had emigrated. T h e redundancy of knowledge associated with the segmentary organ­ ization o f tribal societies is sharply reduced in contemporary nationstates. A s social organization has become increasingly differentiated and solidarity "organic," so have the understandings of individuals become increasingly specialized. A s redundancy has its adaptive virtues so does differentiation and specialization. The society in which specialized knowledge is differentially distributed among its membership can, in its entirety, "know m o r e " than a society in which redundancy is high. But, as societies as wholes become able to gain, process, and store ever larger amounts o f knowledge, each individual and the specialized groups into which they are organized may come to know less, to become ever more narrow in their orientation, to lose awareness of the whole and their place in it. Specialization of knowledge entails loss of autonomy and the increasingly obligatory nature of interdependence may reach dangerous proportions. This problem is exacerbated by the attenuation of generally accepted higher-order meanings, itself a concomitant of specialization, for such meanings stand opposed to the parochialism of specialized understandings and interests. We touch here upon aspects of the social malaise discussed in recent years by "Death of G o d " theologians (see B u b e r 1 9 5 2 ; Alitzer and Hamilton 1 9 6 6 ; Murchland 1 9 6 7 ) and in de­ bates concerning "the end of ideology." T h e redundancy of knowledge in tribal societies suggests that they are not only like to be dominated by one more or less integrated set of under­ standings, but to be pervaded by one. We may, therefore, speak with some degree o f confidence of "the cognized model" of a tribal society. In contrast, the differentiated condition of modern society may be so ex­ treme as to make it bootless to search for pervasive and integrated sets of understandings. But to say that a society is not pervaded by any coher­ ent set o f understandings is not to say that it is not dominated by such a set. W e are led here to questions concerning the relationship of knowl­ edge and meaning to power. A t least three classes of questions are to be considered. T h e first, and most obvious, is concerned with the degree to which sets of understandings are differentially influential as a function of relations of domination and subordination among those who hold them. It is obvious that not all of the knowledge and understandings possessed by all of the members of any contemporary society enter into the conduct of that society's affairs in degrees commensurate with relevance, accuracy.

On Cognized Models | 1 3 3 wisdom. A great deal of knowledge concerning the effects of various modes of intervention upon ecosystems is diffused throughout contem­ porary society, but analyses based upon this information usually fail to prevail over economic considerations in plans for using what are called "natural resources" (itself an economic term) because, among other things, those avowing economic interests are politically more powerful than those articulating ecological concerns. I do not claim that there is anything mysterious about this aspect of the politics of understanding, but would nevertheless suggest that the elucidation of the ways in which economic understandings have come to prevail over ecological and humanistic understandings in particular instances would not only be theoretically rewarding but could contribute to attempts to correct those symptoms of systemic disorder and of the disorder of meaning that we label "ecological problems" and, for that matter, a host of other social, political, and economic "problems" as well. That some understandings prevail over others because they are held by the powerful may be obvious, but hardly sufficient to account for the power of some ideas. We are led here to a second class of questions and considerations. Some understandings may be inherently more coercive than others. It may be, for instance, that the individual living in a con­ temporary capitalist society is virtually forced to act in a manner con­ forming in considerable degree to the model of Homo econamicus, regard­ less of his own convictions concerning the nature o f humanity and its proper goals and purposes. In a w orld in which "nice guys finish last," he probably had better not be a nice guy. Other alternative sets of under­ standings, because less punitive, may be less coercive and as such they may not be acted upon even by those w ho "believe in" them. Questions of a third class concerning the relationship of knowledge and meaning to power are the inverse of those of the first. Whereas questions of the first class are concerned with relationships among sets of understandings as consequences of the social and political relations of those holding them, questions of the third class are concerned with relations of domination and subordination among persons as a conse­ quence of the distribution of knowledge and the control of meaning. We may return here to the matter of redundancy. Redundancy of knowledge implies equivalence and the egalitarian nature of tribal soci­ eties is surely related to high redundancy. It must not be imagined, however, that the understandings of all members of any tribal society are uniform. That some variation within common frameworks is usual, even among people of similar age and sex, is demonstrated by variations in the folk taxonomies commonly provided by different informants in the same community (see, for example, Messer 1 9 7 8 , especially chapter 4 ) . Dis­ tinctions of much greater magnitude are likely to distinguish different o r

r

r

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categories of persons. Such distinctions do not necessarily imply inequal­ ity. A m o n g Australian aborigines sacred knowledge is typically distrib­ uted among men according to their section, subsection, moiety, an<j totemic affiliations, and sometimes by locality as well. The Gadjari cycle of the Walbiri, for instance, re-enacts or celebrates the dream-time journey of the Mamandabari M e n along a path meandering for fifteen hundred miles across the desert (Meggitt 1 9 6 5 ) . N o one knows the myth in its entirety, let alone all of trie Gadjari songs and rituals, but in each of the four major Walbiri "counlries" there are men who know the portion of the cycle pertaining to their own region. The Gadjari thus creates a set of understandings that no individual fully possesses but in which many individuals participate. Interdependence is intrinsic to the ways in which sacred knowledge is distributed among Australian abori­ gines, and it may be that the dependence of local groups upon each other for the performance of the rituals understood to be necessary to maintain the world counteracts the social fragmentation likely to attend hunting and gathering in vast deserts (Yengoyan 1 9 7 2 , 1 9 7 6 ) . Each group's knowledge is sacred, and it is also deemed to be as necessary to others as it is to those possessing it. The Gadjari thus seems to establish equiva­ lence, and thus equality, as it establishes interdependence among those whom it differentiates. We are, however, led here to the relationship of knowledge to subordination. T h e "distinctive equals'' related to each other by the Gadjari are men. The Walbiri, like many other tribal peoples, deny detailed sacred knowl­ edge to women. Women are excluded from their rituals; indeed, that a woman has laid eyes on certain religious objects provides grounds for her execution. Inasmuch as the domain of the sacred is a domain of highorder meaning, to exclude women from ritual is to deny them full and direct access to higher-order meaning. Such meanings are given to them, or rather imposed upon them, by men. Whether or not the men consciously manipulate these meanings to their own advantage, they are, among the Walbiri, organized in ways that favor men over women, and other tribal societies generally resemble the Walbiri in this respect. For example, among the Maring we have seen that a series of abstract oppositions—hot/cold, high/low, hard/soft, dry/wet, strong/fecund—pervade the world. T h e term "male" is associ­ ated with the series high-hot-hard-dry-strong, "female" with the oppos­ ing series, low-cold-soft-wet-fecund. The qualities composing each of these series are considered to be inimical to those they oppose under certain circumstances, and when those circumstances prevail objects and persons in which they are manifest must be insulated from each other. (Most Maring taboos can be understood in this light. See Douglas 1 9 6 6 . ) It is important to note, however, that although the sets associated with

On Cognized Models | 1 3 5 ..jjjaJe'' on the one hand and "female" on the other are opposed, and although their opposition implies that things in which their qualities are manifest may be dangerous to each other, inequality is not intrinsic to the logic of their relations. That which is "cold" may be inimical to that which is "hot/* but neither hot nor cold is necessarily superior. And yet, although some Maring do say that under certain circumstances contact with men may "burn" women, it is pollution of the pure men by impure women that is feared, and it is to the well-being of men that Maring taboos are dedicated. Moreover, two further oppositions identify the spiritual and immortal with male and the mortal and natural with female. It is possible that whatever is spiritual and immortal is inherently supe­ rior to whatever is natural and mortal, but the association of the superior terms with male and the inferior with female is not logically entailed by either the opposition of the two sets or the nature of the other members composing each of them. It would, rather, seem to be grounded in the simple fact that women are excluded from the rituals in which men, through their participation, partake of the sacred. Whether or not Maring men manipulate the meanings intrinsic to these oppositions, they accept them and act in accordance with them. Their women may, from time to time, flout them, but in the main they too accept both them and the radical inequality that they entail. A s Buchbinder and I ( 1 9 7 6 : 3 1 ) , following Read ( 1 9 5 2 : 1 6 ) , have observed, sanctified pollution beliefs elaborated among the Maring (and other N e w Guinea Highlanders) raise the justification of male dominance from that of arbitrary material advantage to that of inexorable spiritual principle. The subordinated as well as the subordinating can accept spiritual prin­ ciple with resignation if not with equanimity. The subordination of women in the N e w Guinea Highlands, the Australian desert, and elsewhere indicates that even in the absence of material grounds for stratification, differential control of meaning may serve as a basis for social inequality. Indeed, differential control of meaning may have constituted the primordial ground for the subordina­ tion of some persons by others—probably women by men. It has, of course, remained crucial to the maintenance of stable relations of sub­ ordination throughout history.

VII To observe that the subordinated acquiesce to, or even participate in, their own oppression because of the meanings provided them by those who are the masters of meaning does not, perhaps, adequately convey the nature of this meaningfulness. Discussion of it will elucidate the

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capacity of cognized models not merely to describe a cosmos, but to constitute it. It should be clear that we are not primarily concerned here with loworder meaning, or the meaningfulness that informs adequate explana­ tion. Acceptance of subordination does not follow from the situation being well explained. We are concerned, rather, with meaning o f a very high order—not the meaning of explanation but of identification. The matter may be illustrated by continuing our consideration of the sub­ ordination of Maring women to men. T h e male/female distinction is universal, simple, obvious, and, if any­ thing at all is, it is naturally significant as well. A s such, it is "easy to think," and as such it has been invoked by many societies to order other phenomena. Buchbinder and I have argued that among the Maring it is not simply another opposition in the set of oppositions with which it is associated but that set's living summary and representation. It stands, in other words, in a metaphoric relationship to the sum of distinctions that the opposition of the two sets include. Male : female :: high-hot-harddry-strong-spiritual-immortal : low-cold-soft-wet-fecund-natural-mortal. It is important to note that, unlike some oppositions, male/female is not simply a figure o f speech. It is not merely a verbal metaphor but a material one, and thus it substantiates or realizes the abstract or even abstruse qualities and concepts with which it is associated. Y e t even the recognition that male/female is not simply a metaphor but a material metaphor does not do full justice to its peculiar properties of significa­ tion, for it is not simply a material metaphor either. After all, contrasting objects manipulated in ritual—let us say rumbim and amame—can also substantiate or realize the opposition of the same abstractions. Amame and rumbim, however, and the distinction between them, differ in an important way from male, female, and the distinction between them. Whereas amame and rumbim are separate from those who make distinc­ tions by manipulating them, "male" and "female" are not. T h e terms of this opposition are inseparable aspects of those who use it metaphorically to make other distinctions. T h e actors themselves become terms in their own logic of the concrete. T h e use in metaphor of one's person and the persons of others from whom one is distinguished by gender is surely a powerful aid to under­ standing. T h e remote, abstract, ethereal, and unfamiliar is thereby brought into the grasp of the immediate, material, concrete, and appar­ ently absolutely unknown. B u t the consequences may be grave. Brief reference to the role of metaphor in predication will be useful here. T h e predication of nominals is one of language's fundamental proc­ esses. Perception is organized into comprehension when we say that a subject either is, or has, or does something. Subjects, that is, are defined,

On Cognized Models | 1 3 7 ecified, identified, or invested with the qualities of predicates. Predica? n be either literal or metaphoric (Thomas 1969: 5 9 ) , and Fer­ nandez has even argued that "the elementary definition of the meta­ phor . . - is the predication of a sign-image upon an inchoate subject. The fast mission of metaphor is to provide identity for such subjects" (1974: 120). Subjects, this is to say, by employing metaphors that include selfreferential or subjective terms, are open to predication by those meta­ phors. Thus the Maring, in taking the gender distinction to be a meta­ phor for the conventional oppositions they impose upon the world, not only make those oppositions comprehensible but establish them in thenown bodies and in whatever distinguishes the bodies of men from those of women. T h e conceptual cleavages dividing or fragmenting the world are not only made substantial but, being established in the flesh, become as apparently natural as the sexual difference itself. A s such they become inescapable, unchallengeable, and ever-present, and so, of course, do the dangers and antagonisms they entail. It may be that male/female is "easy to think" and "likely to be thought," providing as it does an intuitively comprehensible metaphor in terms of which many aspects of the world may be ordered. B u t to say that it is "easy to think" is not to say that it is "good to think," and its cost may be high. Metaphors may work in both directions: as the proximal terms and the relations between them illuminate the distal terms and the relations between them, so may the distal terms predicate the proximal. The Maring use of male/female to order obscure or abstract oppositions may illuminate those oppositions but it also permits the horrors attend­ ing them to storm back across the metaphoric bridge, so to speak, to invade the bodies of those who thought them into being. Thus we can see that the concept of female pollution among the Maring does not derive from the properties of substances, such as menstrual blood, nor from the metaphoric imposition of any of women's other physical charac­ teristics upon the world. Women are polluting because they are predi­ cated by the abstractions they have come to embody, and because these abstractions are opposed to, and therefore dangerous to, the abstractions embodied by men. Qfl

c a

VIII M o r e germane to the concerns of this essay than a theory of female pollution perse is the light cast by this instance of predication on the force of cognized models generally. It may be that those whose actions are guided by any cognized model assume, if they think about the matter at all, that it is composed of descriptive, evaluative, and metaphysical state­ ments concerning orders existing independently of those statements.

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If, however, cognized models can predicate those who are guided by them, they are not simply complex statements. They are in effect, al­ though not by conscious intention, at least partly performative in character. "Performatives," or "illocutionary acts," are conventional acts or utter­ ances through which conventional effects are achieved (Austin 1 9 6 2 ) . Verbal performatives—and all performatives are either fully or partially verbal or at least have been provided meaning by words—may be lexically and grammatically indistinguishable from reports or descrip­ tions, but the relationship of a performative to the states of affairs with which it is concerned is very different from that of a statement. For instance, when a priest pronounces the couple standing before him to be man and wife he is not reporting or describing the act of marriage to them. H e is making them man and wife. The utterance itself is part of the act of marriage and the conventional state of marriage is not only sub­ sequent to but contingent upon the utterance because the utterance brings it into being. This is the inverse of the relationship prevailing between reports or descriptions and states of affairs. For a report or description to be a report or description, and not a lie, myth, or fiction, the state of affairs to which it supposedly corresponds must exist inde­ pendent of and prior to the report or description. T h e importance of performatives in human affairs is obviously enor­ mous. Conventional states of affairs are achieved and conventions them­ selves are established performatively and perhaps only performatively (see " T h e Obvious Aspects of Ritual"), and thus human social life is, in considerable degree, performatively constituted. A s the myths of many peoples have told us, our conventional worlds have been uttered into being. Performative creation is, however, almost always mystified. Public affairs in contemporary Western society, for instance, are guided more by the assumptions of formal economics than by those of any other discipline. Indeed, the institutions dominating our society are founded upon its understandings, central to which is that of man as Homo economi­ sts. This conception is an invention of market economics and formal economics, but it is presented to us by formal economics as that disci­ pline's discovery o f quintessential human nature. This is to say that formal economics and the cognized models that it dominates are not, as economists would have us believe, descriptions of processes constituted by a precultural and quintessential human nature (see Sahlins 1 9 7 2 : 1 3 passim). They are not maps but, as it were, blueprints and operating instructions for establishing and maintaining conditions that will repro­ duce Homo economicus. That cognized models dominated by formal economics are covertly

On Cognized Models | 1 3 9 performative while advertised as descriptive does not distinguish them from other cognized models, of course. It would be a mistake, moreover, to consider this form of masquerade to be nothing more than epistemological error or exploitative lie, for such mystification is an inevitable cultural process. "Models for" become "models of" instantaneously (Geertz 1 9 6 5 : 3 4 ) . That which ha* been established performatively can subsequently be described, often in words identical to those of the performative and, in being described, may come to seem as real as trees or rocks, as natural as respiration or photosynthesis or digestion. Having become natural it may seem to be necessary and inevitable, and as such less vulnerable to subversion, dissolution, or rebellion than that which is nakedly conventional (see "The Obvious Aspects of Ritual"). It may well be that the continuity of all cultures requires the natural­ ization o f their fundamental conventions, but as necessary as such natu­ ralization might be, problems are likely to be generated in its course. Whereas the conventions of the worlds inhabited by humans are per­ formatively established these worlds are, of course, not entirely con­ ventional. Some of their componeats are constituted by what are called "the laws of nature." The lawful and the meaningful are never coextensive, and they are differently known. If the laws of nature are to be known they must be discovered. In contrast, the understandings and meanings of humankind must be constructed. Natural processes are described by laws; con­ ventions are performatively established through understandings and meanings. Discovered laws may provide some of the material out of which understandings and meanings are constructed, but they do not in and of themselves provide, constitute, or maintain meaning or meaning­ fulness. Indeed, by apotheosizing fact, I earlier argued, the search for natural law may violate the structure of meaning. Such searches may also abet the subversion of nature, for to know nature starkly and coldly may be to encourage attempts to subordinate it to narrow, short-run, and short-sighted purposes. Discovered law does not constitute meaning, nor can it do meaning's work. If the natural processes that statements of law describe are to be preserved they must be comprehended by understandings more encom­ passing than those laws. They must, this is to say, be "made meaningful." A s law cannot do the work of meaning neither can meaning do the work of law. The lawful operation of natural processes is neither con­ stituted nor transformed by understanding, and the laws of nature prevail in their domains whether or not they are understood or meaningful. Relations between that which is performatively established and that which has been naturally constituted through the workings of the sun, the wind, the waves, the motions of continents, and the coevolution of

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organisms, are both intimate and complicated. It is surely not the case, as some recent writers would perhaps have us believe, that the natural merely provides material to the convention which then shapes the world to its will as if it were clay in the hand of G o d . Nature is not simply the source of the human world's substance but, with culture, a source of its form as well. Indeed, the formative effects of nature and culture are inseparable. N o r is the relationship one of simple limitation, as the old possibilists proposed. T h e briefest glance at the present condition of the world must indicate that the establishment of convention is not con­ strained by ecosystemic characteristics, that it is possible to establish systems of conventions that persistently violate and continually degrade naturally constituted ecosystemic processes. Ecosystemic limitations of conventional processes might operate, finally, only apocalyptically. We return here to the matter of contingency. Whereas it is surely the case that no conventional system can long persist if it destroys the natural processes sustaining it, it is equally the case that the persistence of humanity, albeit a species constituted by natural evolutionary processes, is itself contingent upon conventions. To say, however, that human society is contingent upon conventions is not to say that it is contingent upon any particular set of them, and sets of conventions may differ in their appropriateness to particular sets of circumstances. W e are concerned with a species that must construct the understand­ ings and meanings by which it lives in a world whose laws it can neither change nor fully comprehend. In contradiction of the doctrine of cultural relativism it may be asserted that some of the understandings that socie­ ties may construct for themselves are false because they lead those for whom they are meaningful to act in ways that are so at variance with the natural constitution of the world as to make damage to it and to them­ selves inevitable. The lawful order of nature—through which the proc­ esses o f understanding and convention emerged—continues to provide criteria in terms of which the appropriateness of understandings and conventions can be assessed. Such criteria suggest to us that, for instance, the conventional orders o f industrialized capitalism, which must expand to remain stable, have become, if they were not always, inappropriate, infelicitous, and maladaptive, because they must sooner or later degrade or violate the finite ecosystemic processes over which they exercise domi­ nation but upon which they depend. It should be clear that I do not propose here the sovereignty of the material. Earlier in this essay a systemic relationship between the meaningful and material aspects of the living processes constituting humanity was explicitly recognized in a discussion of the material consequences of the impoverished under­ standings of monetary semantics. It was suggested then that that which damages meaning damages the world as a whole.

On Cognized Models | 1 4 1 But, as the impoverishment of meaning deadens life and threatens its continuity, so may the richness of life be enhanced and its continuity abetted by cognized models that permit distinctions to multiply, meta­ phors to prosper, and the experience of unity to flourish. A cognized model that is "true," or in Austin's ( 1 9 6 2 ) usage "felicitous," is not one that simply corresponds to natural laws, but one that provides an order of understandings that leads those for whom it is meaningful to act in ways that are in harmony with natural processes. Such models always recog­ nize, more or less crudely o r precisely, some natural laws—at least some empirical generalizations from experience. But they are never exhausted by such laws, for the relevance of natural law to human experience is always a matter of meaning and understanding, and not itself a matter of law. It may seem that, at the end, we come to a simple and straightforward reiteration of the formulation that, at the beginning, was said to be inadequate. In fact, we have not. T h e earlier formulation proposed that material desiderata should, as it were, sit in judgment of meanings and understandings. Meanings and understandings were, in that view, mere instruments in the service of material ends. In the course of the essay it has been demonstrated that this view of meanings and understandings not only will not account for them but does not even do justice to their role in the adaptations of human societies. It now may be added that serious problems beset the use of biological criteria themselves. First, despite their apparent materiality, ecological and other biological criteria (the invocation of which, it was hoped, would permit us to assess objec­ tively the "truth" of cognized models) are ambiguous. Slobodkin and Rapoport ( 1 9 7 4 ) have observed, for one thing, that it may not be possible to specify any particular feature of biological structure or opera­ tion that will always and everywhere abet the persistence of all of the systems in which it occurs. Whether or not this is the case, it is indubi­ table that the complexity of living systems is of such an order that their responses to particular perturbations may be counter-intuitive. It is often, therefore, difficult to predict even the more or less immediate out­ comes, biological or otherwise, of actions undertaken in them, let alone effects which may be distant in time or space. This difficulty does not call into question the validity of a concern with the biological and ecological consequences of actions proposed by cognized models. It does, however, call into question the validity of invoking specific biological or ecological standards as ultimate criteria of the adequacy of cognized models. T h e rejection of specific biological criteria might seem to leave the notion of the "truth" or "falsity" of cognized models so vague as to be meaningless, but reference to discussions of the structure of understand­ ing and meaning appearing earlier in this essay save us from exchanging

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specious precision for pious vacuity. O u r observations concerning the dissolution o f qualitative distinctions into quantitative differences as an entailment of the monetization of evaluation points in this direction E v e n m o r e fundamentally, in the accounts of the structure of under­ standing and meaning offered in this essay, and in subsequent proposals concerning the mutual dependence of meaningful and material proc­ esses, it has been implicitly assumed that it is possible to stipulate the formal characteristics of orders of understanding that preserve meaning and meaningfulness and, in preserving them, preserve other living proc­ esses as well. This proposal is less mysterious than it may seem at first, and is elaborated in essays appearing later in this volume. It is well, however, to recall there the discussion earlier in this essay of the hier­ archical structure o f orders o f understanding. It was proposed that the understandings o f which cognized models are made are not simply heaps, but are organized hierarchically with respect to sanctity, mutability, temporality, specificity, and concreteness. Thus, ultimate sacred postu­ lates, the most sacred of concepts, are also, typically, understood to be immutable and eternal. They do not have concrete or material referents and are devoid o f social specificity. In contrast, rules o f conduct, which are high in specificity, are much less sacred than ultimate sacred postu­ lates, are not taken to be eternal verities, and are regarded as mutable. I also suggested that it may be in the very nature of the ritual form to preserve hierarchical order among the ultimate sacred postulates, cosmo­ logical axioms, rules of conduct, and social and environmental states of affairs represented in them. This would suggest that the degradation and abandonment o f ritual, widespread in the contemporary world, is con­ tributing significantly to social and environmental problems, as well as to failures of meaning. B e this as it may, to make explicit a proposal that has been implicit throughout much of this essay, disordering? of hierarchical relations among understandings differing in the qualities of sanctity, muta­ bility, temporality, specificity, and concreteness (for instance, the investment o f highly specific rules o f conduct with a degree of sanctity appropriate to a cosmological axiom or even an ultimate sacred postulate) lead not only to the destruction of meaning but of the material world as well. T h e formal characteristics of adaptive systems, of which both meaning­ ful and material processes are inextricably interrelated components or aspects, are explored in "Adaptive Structure and Its Disorders,'' where it is further argued that anomalies in, o r disorderings of, such structures are to be regarded as maladaptive. Like "Adaptive Structure and Its Dis­ orders," the other essays that follow were written earlier than this one and d o have themes of their own, but in developing their own themes they develop and elaborate discussions broached here. " T h e Obvious Aspects

On Cognized Models | 1 4 3 of Ritual" discusses neither adaptation nor maladaptations but is, rather, attempt to elucidate the construction of meaning and convention in and by liturgy. It is concerned, in particular, with the concepts and notions intrinsic to the very form, structure, o r order that is definitive of ritual. T h e s e include not only social contract, morality, creation, and those which ultimate sacred postulates express, but the very concept of the sacred. "Sanctity and Lies in Evolution" returns to problems of the falsification o f meaning, understandings, and ultimately, o f sanctity itself. REFERENCES

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Thomas, Owen 1 9 6 9 Metaphor and related subjects. New York: Random House. Turner, Victor 1 9 6 7 a Symbols in Ndembu ritual. In The forest of symbols. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1 9 6 7 b Betwixt and between: the liminal period in rites de passage. In The forest of symbols. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Van Baal, J . 1 9 7 1 Symbols for communication: an introduction to the anthropological study of religion. Assen: Van Goracum. Yengoyan, Aram 1 9 7 2 Ritual and exchange in aboriginal Australia: an adaptive interpreta­ tion of male initiation rites. In Social exchange and interaction, ed. E. N. Wilmsen. Anthropological Papers No. 4 6 , University of Michi­ gan Museum of Anthropology. 1 9 7 6 Structure, event, and ecology in aboriginal Australia: a comparative viewpoint. In Tribes and boundaries in Australia, ed. N. Peterson. Canberra: Australian Institute of Aboriginal Studies.

Adaptive Structure and Its Disorders

I shall be concerned in this essay with the structure of adaptation and with its maladaptive disordering. The concept of adaptation is central to much of biological and anthropological thought but, like most central concepts, it is not entirely clear. Perhaps it shouldn't be. In remaining vague it itself remains adaptive. B e that as it may, because usage and understanding vary it is necessary for me to make my understanding of adaptation explicit at the beginning, even at the risk of rehearsing elementary matters. I I take the term "adaptation" to refer to the processes through which living systems maintain homeostasis in the face of both short-term envi­ ronmental fluctuations and, by transformations in their own structures, through long-term nonreversing changes in their environments as well. It would be well to comment upon certain features of this characteriza­ tion before exploring its implications. First, I include with the class "living systems" both organisms and associations of organisms. T h e latter may include such social groups as families, clans, tribes, states, and even societies and ecosystems—any association that can be shown to have inhering in it as a unit distinct processes initiated in response to and as response to perturbation. This essay is an expansion of the second half of the essay "Ecology, Adaptation, and the Ills of Functionalism (Being, among Other Things, a Response to Jonathan Fried­ man)" originally published in Michigan Discussions in Anthropology 2 : 1 3 9 - 1 9 0 , 1977-

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T h e application o f a common set of concepts to organisms and to associations of organisms, some o f which are culturally governed, i likely to attract charges o f organic analogizing. Such charges would be, i my view, misplaced. To say that organisms and associations of organisms are loci of adaptive processes is to recognize that they are both subclasses o f a larger class, namely living or adaptive systems, and not to propose that social systems are detailed icons of organisms (or vice versa). To recognize general similarities among systems differing in obvious re­ spects is not to deny their differences or the significance of their differ­ ences, but to contextualize them. We shall return to certain of these differences shortly. It may be noted in passing, however, that the organic analogy doesn't even apply very w ell to organisms, which turn out to be more like ecosystems than is generally thought (Thomas 1 9 7 4 ) . Adaptation is a process, or category of processes, universal to life. It is to be observed in simple animals and elaborate empires, and its applica­ tion to human affairs may provide supracultural criteria in terms of which the operations of particular societies may be assessed. Although it may be acceptable to speak of adaptive processes "inhering in" living systems, it is more accurate and therefore preferable to propose the converse: that adaptive processes define (and bound) living systems. The scope of an adaptive process distinguishes a living system (which may, of course, include others and be included by others of greater scope) from its environment. Relatively autonomous adaptive systems are what have sometimes been called "general purpose systems." T h e term is ugly but it does convey the notion that such systems to not have special goals. They cannot be defined, as can the special-purpose systems which they in­ clude, by the production of some special product, like petroleum or pituitrin, of by some special activity, as can hearts, lungs, or fire depart­ ments. Their ultimate goal is so low in specificity as to seem a virtual nongoal. It is simply to persist. A s Slobodkin ( 1 9 6 8 ) has put it in a discussion of the difficulties of applying game theory to evolution, general purpose systems are players of the existential game, a game that is peculiar in that the only reward for successful play is to be allowed to continue to play, a game in which the phrase "cashing in your chips" is a euphemism for losing. Individual humans and societies may, of course, mystify such goals (or non-goals) while maintaining their low specificity (e.g., "It is the goal of society to serve G o d . " ) , but for them to set for themselves enduring goals as specific as those appropriate for their subsystems is likely to reduce their chances of staying in the existential game by reducing their flexibility. Central to adaptation is the maintenance of systemic flexibility, the maintenance of an ability to keep responding homeostatically to perturbations the magnitude and nature of which s

n

r

Adaptive Structure and Us Disorders \ usually cannot be predicted, given the complexity of the universe. fi second feature of our definition of adaptation bearing brief com­ ment is its inclusion of the term "environment." "Environment" and 'ecosystem" are not synonymous, and "environment" here is meant to embrace cultural and social as well as physical and biotic phenomena Whereas both individuals and ecosystems are to be included within the class "living systems," social and cultural anthropologists may be ex­ pected to take human social units or formations to be the adaptive systems with w hich they are primarily concerned. Third, the term "homeostasis" appears in the definition. Systemic homeostasis may be given specific, if not always precise, meaning if it is conceived as a set of ranges of viability on a corresponding set of variables abstracted from what, for independently established empirical or theoretical reasons, are taken to be conditions vital to the persistence of the system. This is to say that any process, physiological, behavioral, cultural, or genetic, that tends to keep the states of crucial variables (e.g., body temperature, population size, protein intake, energy flux) within ranges of viability or tends to return them to such ranges should they depart from them may be taken, other things being equal, to be adaptive. Later it will be necessary to consider difficulties in the association of adaptiveness with particular variables, but this preliminary formulation may stand for the present, because it underlines certain features of adaptive process and structure. Fourth, it is important to note that the terms "homeostasis" and "dynamic equilibrium" do not imply changelessness. Indeed, the oppo­ site is the case. In an ever-changing world the maintenance of homeo­ stasis requires constant change of state and, for most systems at least, occasional change in structure. We shall return to this. r

*

•

*

The definition of adaptation offered here implies, or even entails, selfregulation. Self-regulation depends upon a limited family of mecha­ nisms. These include, first, immutability, in which some aspect or com­ ponent of the system is held in what seems to be an absolutely invariant state. T h e clearest cases are probably religious propositions, such as creeds, taken by those adhering to them to be eternally true. These have considerable importance in the self-regulation of human societies. Second, there are what Piaget ( 1 9 7 1 : 1 4 ) calls operations. These are perfectly reversible processes, best exemplified by mathematical and logical formulations. A s such they are of considerable importance in thought. Although they do not apply directly to matter and energy transactions, within which inexactitude prevails and entropy is ubiqui­ tous, they may be important in the regulation of such transactions. In

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the essay "On Cognized Models" elsewhere in this volume Maring ritual procedures for reversing damage done to the cosmos are described. Time-dependent regulation, exemplified by circadian rhythms, traffic lights, and some seasonal festivals form a third class of regulatory mechanisms of considerable importance in social and physical processes, but perhaps most important is the variable-dependent or cybernetic mode. It is, perhaps, obvious that the various regulatory modes may be embodied or, in social systems, institutionalized in a variety of ways. Discrete regulators (e.g., chiefs, big men, kings) are important in some systems, but regulation may be the outcome of unmediated interactions among components, as in hypothetical "perfect markets" and in dynamic interactions among distinct species populations. Regulation in human societies and ecological systems dominated by humans may also reside in tradition, in ritual cycles, or in the entailments of social structure. Self-regulation entails corrective responses, and corrective responses may have several effects. In some instances the stressing factor is elimi­ nated. In others, compensatory adjustments are made within the existing structure of the system. In yet others, however, changes—genetic, con­ stitutional, structural—in the very organization of the responding sys­ tems themselves are, and must be, made. T h e self-regulating processes through which living systems maintain themselves thus entail or sub­ sume the self-organizing processes through which they transform them­ selves. These two classes of processes, self-regulation and self-organization, have generally been distinguished in the social sciences, forming the foci of two distinct modes of analysis, "functional" on the one hand and "evolutionary" on the other. The distinction has been overdrawn be­ cause the maintenance ("persistence," "adequate functioning," "sur­ vival") of systems in a changing world requires constant change. The connecting generalization is what Hockett and Ascher ( 1 9 6 4 ) have called "Romer's Rule," after Alfred S. Romer, the zoologist who first enunci­ ated it in a discussion of the emergence o f the amphibia ( 1 9 5 4 ; originally published 1 9 3 3 ) . T h e lobe-finned fish, R o m e r argues, did not come onto dry land to take advantage o f its previously unexploited opportunities. Rather, relatively minor modification of their fins and other subsystems made it possible for these creatures to migrate from one drying-up stream or pond to another still containing water during the intermittent droughts presumed to have been frequent during the Devonian period. Such structural changes thus made it possible for them to maintain their general aquatic organization during a period of marked environmental change. In slightly different terms, self-organizing or evolutionary changes in components of systems are functions in the self-regulatory process of the more inclusive and enduring systems of which they are parts. Structural or evolu-

Adaptive Structure and Its Disorders | 1 4 9 tionary changes, such as fin to leg, may be distinguished from "func­ tional changes or "systemic adjustments" on some grounds, but they ^ not separated from them in the larger more inclusive scheme of Captive process. Together they form ordered series of responses to per­ turbations. Several comments are in order before discussing adaptive response sequence. First, it is worth reiteration, because there seems to be considerable confusion surrounding this matter, that the view of adaptation proposed here suggests that there is no contradiction between the maintenance of homeostasis and evolutionary change. Indeed, Romer's parable—it may be no more than that—suggests that the most salient question to ask concerning any structural change is "What does this change maintain unchanged?" Second, earlier I proposed that the goal of an adaptive system, as a player of Slobodkin's existential game, is simply to persist. Our account suggests that that which persists is not necessarily any particular feature or component of the adapting system, but simply an organized set of adaptive processes. Even structure may change. It follows that the fre­ quently asked question, "When does a system stop being what it has been and become something e l s e ? " a question that is generally deemed impossible to answer and thus devastating to systemic approaches to evolutionary transformation, is close to nonsensical. There has been, for instance, an unbroken continuity in English society from the days of the heptarchy until today despite enormous changes in both structure and cultural content. In the course of their unbroken successions ecosystems may replace all, or almost all, of their constituent species several times. That we distinguish and name the phases following each other in these successions, just as we may distinguish and name and periods following each other in the history of societies, or, for that matter, in the ontogeny of individuals, and that these phases and period differ in important ways, does not mean that they are discontinuous. Slobodkin and Rapoport ( 1 9 7 4 ) have noted two distinct ways in which distinctive associations of conspecifics can cease to exist, and they have admonished us not to confuse them. On the one hand, there can come a time when no descen­ dants of that association remain alive. A t such time we can say that the adaptive processes that it embodied have come to an end. We can further say in such cases that the evolutionary process has ended in failure. On the other hand, such an association may apparently cease to exist because its descendants have been so transformed as to warrant being called by a new species name. In this instance the adaptive processes continue and the evolutionary process continues to be successful. A third major point is that insofar as adaptive processes are cybernetic they are possessed of a characteristic structure, because cybernetic

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systems have a characteristic structure, namely that of the closed causal loop: in a cybernetic system a deviation from a reference value itself initiates the process that attempts to correct it. Fourth, although adaptive processes may have cybernetic character­ istics, all that is cybernetic is not adaptive in the sense outlined in the first paragraphs of this essay. In the most general terms, cybernetic systems attempt to maintain the truth value of propositions about themselves in the face of perturbations tending to falsify them (Bateson 1 9 7 2 ) . In systems dominated by humans, at least, the propositions so maintained (and the physical states represented by such propositions) may not cor­ respond to, or may even contradict, homeostasis biologically or even socially defined. II Adaptation is not constituted of a class of isolated responses. Orderly adaptive processes are, rather, organized into ordered sequences of responses, and these sequences as sequences have certain interesting struc­ tural properties (Bateson 1 9 6 3 ; Frisancho 1 9 7 $ ; Rappaport 1 9 7 6 a ; Slobodkin and Rapoport 1 9 7 4 ; Vayda and McKay 1 9 7 5 ) . T h e responses most quickly mobilized are likely to be energetically and behaviorally expensive, but easily and quickly reversible following the cessation of stress. Should a perturbation or stress continue, however, the earlier responses are eventually relieved by slower-acting, less energetically expensive, less easily reversible changes. Responses earlier in the se­ quence are likely to be gross behavioral and physiological state changes. Changes later in the sequence are likely to be structural (constitutional in social systems, irreversible somatic change, and ultimately genetic change, in organisms and populations of organisms; formally similar sequences can possibly be observed in various psychological processes). While the earlier responses operate, the system may well be deprived of some behavioral flexibility, but while these earlier easily reversible re­ sponses continue, the structure of the system in which they occur re­ mains unchanged. Later responses, although they may be more efficient energetically than the earlier, and although they do restore some im­ mediate behavioral flexibility to the system, are less easily reversible or even irreversible. This is to say that later responses may entail structural change. B o t h Bateson, and Slobodkin and Rapoport, have suggested that the probable effect of structural change in response to specific problems is the reduction of long-term flexibility. There is likely to be trade-off, then, in adaptive response sequences, of long-term systemic flexibility for immediate efficiency (or other advantage). In an unpredictably changing universe it is good evolutionary strategy, they say, to give up

Adaptive Structure and Its Disorders | 1 5 1 ^5 little flexibility as possible, to change no more than is necessary. (To die matter in more familiar terms, structural change in response to particular stresses is likely to lead to increased specialization, and in­ creased specialization to earlier loss in the existential game, a game in which even the rules change from rime to time.) This argument was presaged in Evolution and Culture, edited by Sahlins and Service in 1 9 6 0 . u t

Evolutionary wisdom seems to be intrinsic to the graduated structure of the adaptive response sequences o f organisms, but may not be as well founded in social systems. In human social systems, at least, adaptive response sequences can, and do, become disordered, a matter to which I shall return in the next section. First, however, we must consider the structure of adaptive systems, to consider, that is, how systems must be constructed if they are to maintain continuing homeostatis through the mobilization of orderly sequences of responses to perturbation. We have already noted that adaptive systems are self-regulating, and that self-regulating processes have characteristic structures. T h e causal structure of the cybernetic mode, probably the most important, takes the form of a closed circuit. Adaptive processes are not only cybernetic, sequential, and graduated, however. The adaptive structure of any living system is not merely a collection of more or less distinct feedback loops. Particular or specific adaptations must be related to each other in struc­ tured ways, and general adaptations, human or otherwise, biological or cultural, must take the form of enormously complex sets of interlocking corrective loops, roughly and generally hierarchically arranged, and in­ cluding not only mechanisms regulating material variables, but regu­ lators regulating relations between regulators and so on (Kalmus 1 9 6 6 ; Miller 1 9 6 5 a , 1 9 6 5 b ; Pattee 1973* Rappaport 1 9 6 9 , 1 9 7 1 a ; Simon 1 9 6 9 ) . Adaptive structures are structured sets of processes, and regulatory hierarchies, whether or not they are embodied in particular organs or institutions, are found in all biological and social systems. It is important, however, to issue a caveat here: to say that regulatory structure is hierarchical is not to say that it is centralized, nor that it entails social stratification. For instance, among some egalitarian societies, compo­ nents of regulatory hierarchies are embedded in ritual cycles; in others in segmentary kinship organization (Brookfield and B r o w n 1 9 6 3 ; Meggitt S>65, 1 9 7 2 ; Ortiz 1 9 6 9 ; Rappaport 1 9 6 8 ; Sahlins 1 9 6 1 ) . r

The hierarchical organization of adaptive processes is manifested not only in the relationship of regulators to each other but also in the relationships of parts to the systems in which they are included. This relationship is, of course, implicit in the parable of the emerging am­ phibia. Transformations in one or several subsystems made it possible for

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the general structure of those organisms to remain unchanged during the initial stage of the terrestrial adaptation. It may be possible to dis­ tinguish transformations of differing degrees of profundity. "Low order" transformations, transformations of the internal structure of specific subsystems, may be occurring more or less continuously, but because complex living systems are, to use S i m o n s ( 1 9 6 9 ) phrase, "loosely coupled," their effects may be confined to the subsystems in which they occur. High-order transformations, transformations in the structures of more inclusive systems, are rarer, and, of course, their effects are more profound. To speak, simply, of structural transformation is not sufficient, but there are possibilities for identifying transformations o f different order and to consider relations—temporal, causal, and formal—among these transformations. Whereas the adaptive structure of all living systems must share certain fundamental features—hierarchical organization and both self-regulat­ ing and self-transforming properties (see Piaget 1 9 7 1 ) , those of different classes surely differ in important respects that may be most significantly related to differences in their characteristic coherence and in the relative autonomy o f their subsystems. There are also, and perhaps related, differences among hierarchies in the extent to which they are organized in accordance with segmentary or sectorial principles (in the former, subsystems at each level are similar, in the latter differentiated). T h e increasing differentiation, in the course of evolution, of discrete special-purpose subsystems in organisms, societies, and ecosystems has been called "progressive segregation," and it is often accompanied in organisms and social systems, but not ecosystems, by increasing central­ ization of regulatory operation, or "progressive centralization." In organ­ isms w e note the elaboration of central nervous systems, in societies the development of administrative structures. This contrast between the development of ecological and other systems may rest upon their con­ trasting bases for order maintenance. The basis of orderliness in eco­ systems seems to shift, in the course of their development from "pio­ neer" to "mature" stages, from a reliance upon the resilience of indi­ vidual organisms to a reliance upon the increasing redundance of matter and energy pathways resulting from increasing species diversity. These contrasting bases of order maintenance may, in turn, reflect differences in the degrees o f coherence that different classes of systems require and can tolerate. Whereas anthropologists traditionally have been concerned with the ways in which the various components of sociocultural systems are bound together—the jargon is "integrated"—they have generally ignored the ways in which the parts and processes of such systems are buffered from each other and each others disruptions. I further suggest that organisms are, and in their nature must be, more coherent than

Adaptive Structure and Its Disorders | 1 5 3 social systems, and social systems more coherent than ecosystems. A s a pjle of thumb, the more inclusive the system, the less coherent it is and jnust be. The less inclusive the system, the more its internal orderliness and the effectiveness of its activities depends upon the fine coordination of its parts. An organism requires and can tolerate closer coordination of the activities of its parts than societies, and societies more (at least from time to time) than ecosystems. Coordination depends upon central­ ization, hence progressive centralization in organisms and societies, but not ecosystems. The relative autonomy of a system is a function of the degree to which the regulatory mechanisms upon which its persistence depends are in­ trinsic to itself. To put it a little differently, "relative autonomy" refers to the extent to which systems are themselves more or less distinct adaptive units. Organs, for instance, have very little autonomy, for they cannot function in the absence of the organisms of which they are parts. Whole organisms have a much higher degree of relative autonomy; they are distinct adaptive units. It should be kept in mind, however, that no system less inclusive than the solar system is absolutely autonomous. To repeat, whereas the adaptive structures of all living systems share certain fundamental features, they also differ in certain ways, probably related most importantly to differences in their coherence and in the relative autonomy of their subsystems.

Ill Much conceptual and empirical work remains to be done, but it may be tentatively suggested that in orderly adaptive systems, relations between subsystems and regulators at different levels should be hierarchical along a number of dimensions. T h e simplest of these, entailed by the charac­ teristics of response sequences, to which reference has already been made, include: specificity of goals (highly specific at lowest levels to highly general at highest levels), response time (very fast and continu­ ously operating at low levels, slower and tending toward sporadic opera­ tion at higher levels), and reversibility (easily and quickly reversible at lowest levels to irreversible only at the highest levels). It follows from the ordering of the simple dimensions that higherorder regulators are not so much engaged in the regulation of specific material and behavioral processes as they are in the regulation of rela­ tions among these processes. T h e y become involved in the details of the systems subordinate to them only when lower-order regulation experiences difficulty. In contrast to regulators of low order, each of which may respond to fluctuations in a number of distinct and specific processes, higher-order regulators operate in terms of simplified and

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highly aggregated variables, like monetary values. This implies that higher-order regulators do not "know" or need to know all that is known by their subordinates; that they needn't be any more complex, and may be simpler, than those of lower order; that they may operate less con­ tinuously than those of lower order; and that they include within their repertoires programs for changing structurally, or even replacing, lowerorder regulators or subsystems. In sum, there is an ordering in adaptive hierarchies from a range of highly specific concerns at lowest levels to increasingly more aggregated and general concerns at higher levels, and characteristic relationships of reversibility and time are associated with this order. The temporal di­ mension requires further brief discussion, for it is rather complex and we have considered only one of its aspects, the speed of response. There is also the matter o f duration. First, the concerns of lower-order systems are likely to be transitory, while those of higher order systems are enduring. This is reflected in differences in the temporal qualities of the sentences typically concerned with regulation of lower and higher order. Low-order directives are typically commands, and as such are situationspecific and therefore ephemeral. Rules, which are more or less en­ during, being category- rather than situation-specific, are typical of middle-range regulation. Principles, characteristic of yet higher order regulators, may be taken by those accepting them to reflect enduring or even timeless aspects o f morality or nature, and highest o r d e r regulation is likely to be associated with propositions concerning gods conceived to be altogether outside o f time and man's reach. We move from the quick to the eternal. Adaptive structures include processes, experienced by those participating in them as continuously changing in the flux of time, and components, understood as immutable and thus not subject to times vicissitudes. Adaptive structures not only include both temporal and atemporal features; they are constituted by relationships among these features; and, it may be suggested, evolution and history are to be understood in terms of the dynamic relationship between the everchanging and what is understood as never-changing. T h e correlation o f the dimensions of time, specificity, and reversi­ bility, a correlation that may be intrinsic to adaptive systems of all classes, leads to, or perhaps even entails, other dimensions of hierarchy that may be unique to human social systems. These dimensions may be related both to the low degree to which patterns of behavior are specified genetically among humans and to the relative autonomy o f higher-order regulatory goals and conventions from environmental constraint. In pro­ ceeding from lower, more goal-specific regulation to regulation of higher order, the degree to which operation is determined or limited by en­ vironmental and other factors decreases. Regulation of increasingly

Adaptive Structure and Its Disorders | 1 5 5 higher order is increasingly informed by conventional rather than mate­ rial considerations. To put this into a different terminology, relations of production are less determined by environmental factors than are means of production. Environments place tighter constraints upon the way crops are grown than they do upon claims to the product. Possibly associated with the increasing arbitrariness of higher-order regulation is increase in the value-laden terms employed in regulatory discourse. For instance, discourse concerning wheat farming is highly concrete, and the fundamental agricultural assumptions of Soviet and American wheat farmers are probably close. But when economics is discussed, phrases like "free enterprise" and "from each what he can give, to each what he needs" begin to appear. The difference between what is connoted by these phrases is not technical, but ideological. Both are taken by those subscribing to them to be highly moral. Yet higherorder regulation is bolstered by such notions as honor, freedom, righ­ teousness, and patriotism. Moreover, highest-order regulation may be explicitly concerned with the preservation of notions taken to be natu­ rally or self-evidently moral, like "Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness." These are explicitly stated to be principles or values for the preservation of which governments and other institutions are mere in­ struments. Regulatory hierarchies are always hierarchies of values, and even of sanctity. At the highest levels of regulation, divinity is often invoked. Pharaoh was the living Horus; Elizabeth is by Grace of G o d Queen; and even the United States is One Nation under a G o d in whom we trust* and by whom our highest principles, Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness, are said to be given. The hierarchical arrangement of values in adaptive structures is worth emphasizing. In well-ordered adaptive systems values are ordered such that they proceed from instrumental values at the lower levels to what may be called "ultimate" or "basic" values at the highest levels. Whereas instrumental values are highly specific, ultimate values are not only very general, they are also very vague. What, after all, is "Liberty," and what is "Happiness"? And who or what is the G o d endorsing them? Vagueness is not a flaw but an adaptive characteristic of the ultimate. Propositions about G o d typically are devoid of material terms and there­ fore in themselves specify no particular social arrangements or institu­ tions. Being devoid of, or at least low in, social specificity, they are well suited to be associated with the general goals of societies, namely their own perpetuation, for they can sanctify changing social arrangements while they themselves, remaining unchanged, provide continuity and meaning through those changes. Their typically cryptic nature is also important, for if they are vague the association of the ultimate and *I refer doubters co our currency.

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eternal with the immediate realities o f history' requires continual inter­ pretation. Interpretation and reinterpretation do not challenge ultimate sacred postulates, but only previous interpretations of them. If postu­ lates are to be taken to be unquestionable, it is important that they be incomprehensible. T h e very qualities of such propositions that lead positivists to take them to be without sense, or even nonsensical, are those that make them adaptively valid. To summarize, I have argued so far that the persistence of living systems is founded upon ordered sequences of responses to perturba­ tions. If such sequences are to remain orderly the systems in which they occur must possess certain structural characteristics. M o r e specifically, they must be both cybernetic and hierarchical, with their hierarchical dimensions including specificity, concreteness, reversibility, arbitrari­ ness, response time, duration, value, sanctity, and authority. IV A hierarchy of values is, ipso facto, a hierarchy of meaning, for values are a category of meaning. In ascending hierarchies of values we proceed, as I have already noted, from highly specific and often precise instrumental values to more general, vague, and even cryptic ultimate values. There are corresponding changes in the nature of their meanings and in mean­ ing in general. Low-order meanings, in particular the meanings of words per se, are those of definition and distinction, and as such are virtually synonymous with information in the technical sense. Low-order instru­ mental values can be specified adequately in words and numbers. Higher-order meaning is of a different sort. The sense of meaning to which the question "What does it all mean?" points is really no longer that of simple distinction or definition when asked by one confronted by a complex mass of information. Indeed, in answering such a question, information is radically reduced: "It all means that the world is good," or that "the world is evil," or that "Life is like a fountain." But as informa­ tion is decreased, meaningfulness is increased; for similarities, substan­ tive o r structural, between that which we seek to understand and that which we already "know," are made explicit. Metaphors are constructed. The application of a rule, principle, or classificatory device to a wide range of phenomena (such as the application of the hot/cold dichotomy to gender, other social relations, plants, and conditions of the body) invests the world with meaning, for everything is not only itself but also an icon of other things. Higher-order meaning is, then, not information in the digital sense but, rather, metaphoric. Although the discursive content of higher-order meanings may be less than that of lower-order meanings, higher-order

Adaptive Structure and Its Disorders | 1 5 7 meanings may well be affectively more powerful, which is to say more meaningful. It is significant that representations of art, poetry, and ritual rely heavily upon metaphor, and that primary process thought is largely metaphoric. The meaningfulness of highest-order meaning, that which lies around —and beyond—ultimate sacred postulates, is again different. T h e dis­ cursive content of ultimate sacred postulates is low, and beyond such sentences the meanings of language may evaporate completely. Even metaphors grasp is exceeded. Just as meaningfulness does not vanish with information, neither is it limited to that which metaphor may reach. Meaning may be nondiscursive. All distinction and all likeness may dissolve into a sense of no-distinction, or unity. Ultimate meaning is without reference, signifying only itself. It is a state of being, and is sometimes called by such names as "pure being" and "Being-Itself." It is of interest that the meanings that seem peculiar to humans, those we associate with what we are wont to call their "highest faculties," pre­ dominate at lowest levels. The meanings prevailing at higher and highest levels are diminishingly discursive, increasingly affective, and, perhaps, increasingly archaic and decreasingly distinctive of humanity. B e this as it may, the objectincation of self and the world, and the concomitant alienation of self from the self and the world that is intrinsic to the use of language, may be overcome for the nonce by the sense of identity with self and the world (see Van Baal 1 9 7 1 ) that constitutes highest-level meaning. This is mystical. It should not be forgotten, however, that mystical experiences (in a broad sense) do occur, particularly in religious rituals, the characteristics of which tend to encourage them. Elsewhere ( 1 9 6 7 b ; "Sanctity and Lies in Evolution" in this volume) I have argued that such experience may provide deeper and more compelling under­ standings of perfectly natural and extremely important aspects of the physical and social world than can be provided by discursive reason alone. They may make palpable to us the reality of the larger systems of which we are parts, but which are ordinarily hidden from us by the evidence of our senses, which inform us of our autonomy and separation. Highest-order meaning has an important place in the adaptive structure of humanity, and so does the order of meaning in general. I commenced with adaptation, a notion derived from biological disci­ plines, but find myself discussing meaning and meaningfulness, notions more obviously associated with the disciplines of mind. Two enterprises have proceeded in anthropology since its earliest days. One, objective in its aspirations and inspired by biological disciplines, seeks explanation and is concerned to discover laws and causes. The other, subjective in its orientation and influenced by philosophy, linguistics, and the humanities, attempts interpretation and seeks to elucidate meanings. I take any

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radical separation of the two to be misguided, for the relationship tween them, with all of its difficulty, ambiguity, and tension, is a refle . tion of, or metaphor for, the condition of a species that lives in terms of meanings in a physical world devoid of intrinsic meaning but subject to causal law. T h e concept of adaptation when applied to human society must take account of meaning as well as cause and o f the complex dynamic of their relationship. It could, perhaps, be argued that all organisms behave in terms of meanings, but it is obvious that meaning must be implicated in unique ways in the adaptive organization of a species whose constituent groups not only conduct themselves in accordance with meanings, but must themselves construct those meanings. M y earlier attempts ( 1 9 6 3 , 1968, 1 9 7 1 b ) to deal with the place of meaning in adaptive structure by proposing that 'cognized" as well as "operational" models are requisite to analyses of the ecological relations of human groups were inadequate on several grounds. In a more recent essay ("On Cognized Models," in this volume) I have tried to rectify some of the earlier problems, among which was too great a readiness to take the relationship of meaning to biology to be, simply, instrumental and contingent, instrumental in that understandings could be taken to be parts of the survival mechanisms of organisms and populations of organisms, and not themselves the objects of homeostatic processes. Relations o f contingency take a little more spelling out in this context. I have suggested that the proper goal o f adaptive systems is merely to persist, but have said nothing about what persistence entails. We may be reminded here that the term "adaptation" is biological in origin and that the cultural systems with which we are concerned are founded upon living organisms. Cultural systems are living systems, and it is obvious that no living system (cultural or otherwise) could persist if the popula­ tion of organisms realizing it did not persist. N o particular convention is indispensable to the persistence of any human social system, but human organisms, in contrast, are obviously indispensable to the persistence of all such systems and, of course, the maintenance of ecosystemic function is indispensable to the survival and well-being of humans. We note here that contingency may be regarded as another dimension of the hierarchical structure o f adaptive systems. T h e cultural is ulti­ mately contingent upon the organic, but consideration of relations of contingency leads beyond dimensions of hierarchy to consideration of the shape, as it were, of hierarchy itself; "the organic" is, of course, realized in individuals, and, in the end, contingency turns the adaptive hierarchies o f human societies back upon themselves. They become circular. That is, although humans are subordinate to the regulatory structures of the societies in which they participate, their persistence is c

Adaptive Structure and Its Disorders | 1 5 9 the sine qua non of the persistence of those societies. The highest and lowest levels of the hierarchy thus meet in the individual. To say, however, that persistence is nothing if not biological is not to say that it is only biological. We have already noted that in the most general terms, cybernetic and other self-regulating mechanisms can be understood to operate in a manner that preserves the truth value of propositions concerning the systems in which they occur in the face of perturbations tending to falsify them (Bateson 1 9 7 2 ) . Although the effect of such mechanisms may be, and often is, the regulation of matter and energy processes, they operate in terms of information in a broad sense, including meanings. Whether or not we wish to argue that mean­ ings are guiding for all creatures, there are special problems for humans. The "truths" maintained in organic processes are, in large measure, genetically established, and no doubt correspond closely to organic requisites. T h e same may be asserted, to a greater or lesser degree, for the behavioral and social processes of infrahuman species. Humans, however, must construct the meanings they maintain, and considerable disparity may develop between those meanings on the one hand and, on the other, the organic requisites of individuals and the requirements of the ecosystems in which they participate. W e shall discuss such dispari­ ties later in the course o f discussing maladaptive forms. H e r e I shall merely reiterate two obvious points. First, adaptive systems must main­ tain meanings as well as organic function because the self-regulatory processes upon which organic function depends (and is in some degree ordered) operate in terms o f information and meaning. T h e relationship, in fact, between meaning and information on the one hand, and matter and energy on the other, is so intimate and interdependent that it is an error to take either to be ultimate. And just as the organic is realized in individuals, so are the processes of meaning and information. Although symbols and other forms of collective representation may be the vehicles of meaning, meaningfulness is experienced, and experience has its locus in individuals. T h e hierarchical structure of adaptive systems turns back upon itself, or is circular with respect to meaning as well as, and partially as corollary of, the circularity following from contingency relations. In the conjunction of the highest and lowest levels of the hierarchy in the individual, I have argued elsewhere (see "Sanctity and Lies in Evolution" in this v o l u m e ) , the ambitions of separate men may be subordinated to common interest while, at the same time, the operations of societies are reviewed and tempered by the psychic and physical needs of the humans constituting them. Second, and also obvious, disagreements between the meanings main­ tained by a society and the requisites, organic, populational, and ecosystemic, of its persistence may be likely to develop in all human

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societies not only because of the opportunity and need to invent mean­ ings but also because the increased information processing capacity provided by language increases opportunities for error. The likelihood of such disparities may, furthermore, increase in the course of cultural evolution because, among other things, cultural evolution produces, as a concomitant of social differentiation, what are called "special interests." In orderly adaptive structures, however, the meanings maintained are not in conflict with the persistence of organic and ecosystemic processes. This does not mean that biological variables are explicitly denominated as ultimate. They never seem to be in the religious systems of living societies, and it would probably be adaptively ineffective for them to be thus elevated. I have already argued that sacred postulates, themselves specifiying nothing, appropriately occupy the status of ultimate. The implication of my argument is that the maintenance of organic and ecosystemic function is intrinsic to orderly adaptive structure, to a cer­ tain ordering of processual and systemic components with respect to time, specificity, reversibility, sanctity, value, contingency, and meaning. A t the beginning of this essay I associated systemic homeostasis with the maintenance of sets of vital variables within ranges of viability, but immediately noted that difficulties attend such a conception. A s far as biological variables are concerned, given the counter-intuitive nature of complex systems, it is difficult or impossible to assess the long-run effects of any aspect of culture on particular biological variables. For a second, it does not seem possible to specify any particular feature of biological structure or function that will always contribute to survival chances (Slobodkin and Rapoport 1 9 7 4 ) . Although particular variables are, and must be, maintained within ranges of viability at particular times, these ranges, and even the systemic components of which they are states, may be changed by evolution. A s there may be no particular biological variables that under all circumstances must be maintained, neither are there specific meanings that must always and everywhere be taken as true. Adaptiveness, therefore, is not to be identified with specific vari­ ables, but with a general, or systemic, homeostasis that is structural in nature. // orderly adaptive structure is maintained, organic function, meaning, and meaningfulness will be maintained. This is to propose that the formal or structural characteristics of adaptive processes have substantive implica­ tions. This proposal will become clearer in the course of a discussion of maladaptive forms, particularly that called "usurpation." V If adaptive processes are those tending to maintain homeostasis in the face of perturbation, maladaptations are factors internal to systems

Adaptive Structure and Its Disorders | 1 6 1 interfering with their homeostatic responses. They reduce the likelihood of a system's persistence, not so much by subjecting the system to stress as by impeding its ability to respond effectively to stress. Maladaptations are not to be confused with exogenous stressors or perturbing factors, although they themselves can, of course, produce stress. This view of maladapcation is similar to the concept of disease (dis-ease) proposed by Young and Rowley ( 1 9 6 7 ) . If the maintenance of homeostasis depends upon hierarchically ordered sequences of responses, and the mobilization and ordering o f such re­ sponses depends upon a structure of a characteristic sort, then it should be possible to describe or define maladaptation, or maladaptations, struc­ turally. Maladaptations may be conceived as anomalies in the hierarchical and self-regulatory features we have taken to be characteristic of orderly adaptive structure. That is, relations along the several dimensions of adaptive order—response time, duration, reversibility, specificity, sanc­ tity, meaning, value—can become disordered, producing interlevel con­ tradictions o r conflicts. These disorders are what I mean the term 'mal­ adaptation" to designate. Although maladaptation may be conceived in structural terms, these structural anomalies have material consequences that we recognize as substantive problems—the ecological problem, the energy problem, the problems of oppression and imperialism. We may now turn briefly to a few of the many possible maladaptive forms. T h e simplest of these forms are such cybernetic difficulties as im­ pedances to the detection of changes in the states of variables; the delay, loss, or distortion of information transmitted to system regulators; and the inability of regulators to interpret the signals they receive. These structural problems may produce inappropriate responses, or errors in scale of response, like "too little, too late." These difficulties are exacer­ bated by increased size. For instance, the more nodes through which information must pass, the more subject it is to distortion or loss. Thus, the higher the administrator, the less accurate and adequate his informa­ tion is likely to be, and the more likely the production of an erroneous or inappropriate regulatory response. T h e likelihood of hierarchical anomaly also increases with scale. For instance, the deeper the regulatory hierarchy, the more likely are time aberrations. Whereas excessive lag may be a problem, so may be pre­ mature responses of high-order regulators, for if they constantly override those of lower order they will destroy them, throwing additional burdens on themselves, perhaps to the point of overload and breakdown. More­ over, premature responses o f higher-order regulators may well be overresponses— "too much too soon," resulting in more or less irreversible changes when less drastic adjustments would not only have been suffi­ cient but conservative of long-term flexibility. The contribution of

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high-energy technology' to premature override and over-response i patent. We may note that premature override is facilitated by high-speed communication, a product of high-energy technology, and magnitude of response is freed by high-energy technology from the limitations set by the energy available from local and contemporary biological processes. Several other related trends seem to flow from the increased scale of social and economic organization. First, there is what may be called oversegregation. Whole regions or even countries come to specialize in one crop or product. But increasing regional specialization is usually, if not always, accompanied by decreased ecological stability. High-yield varie­ ties of staples planted in monocrop fields are in themselves delicate; moreover, their successful growth depends upon fuel, machinery, and chemicals delivered from great distances through extensive and compli­ cated networks. Remote as well as nearby difficulties can thus disrupt agriculture anywhere. With the loss of local self-sufficiency that follows from geographical specialization, there is also loss of local regulatory autonomy. T h e homeostatic capacity lost from local systems is not ade­ quately replaced by increasingly remote centralized regulators respond­ ing to increasingly aggregated and simplified variables, like monetary values, through operations increasingly subject to cybernetic impedances and time aberrations. Moreover, the responses of distant regulators are often to factors extraneous to some of the local systems affected by them. F o r instance, changes in oil prices threaten to cause increased starvation in India by reducing the production of Japanese fertilizer upon which Indian agriculture in some degree depends. We recognize here yet an­ other maladaptive form which has elsewhere been called hyper-coherence (Flannery 1 9 7 2 ; Rappaport 1 9 6 9 , 1967a, 1 9 7 7 a ) . T h e coherence of the world system increases to dangerous levels as the self-sufficiency of local systems is reduced and their autonomy destroyed and replaced by more centralized agencies whose operations are inadequate to the regulation of the complex systems over which they preside. Oversegregation and overctntralization taken together are complemen­ tary aspects of a more general structural anomaly which may be called the hierarchical maldistribution of organization. A n increasingly complex world organization is based upon decreasingly organized local, regional, and even national social and ecological systems. It seems doubtful that a worldwide human organization can elaborate itself indefinitely at the expense of its local infrastructures, and it may be suggested that the ability of the world system to withstand perturbation would be increased by returning to its local subsystems some of the autonomy and diversity they have lost, as China seems to be doing. This is not to advocate fracturing the world into smaller, autonomous self-sufficient systems, as undesirable as impossible, but to suggest that redistribution of organs

Adaptive Structure and Us Disorders | 1 6 3 ization among the levels of the world system would serve well the world system as a whole. Another class of maladaptations combines with those discussed so far. The basic form has elsewhere been called usurpation, escalation, and overspecification (Flannery 1 9 7 2 ; Rappaport 1 9 6 9 , 1976a, 1 9 7 7 a ) . I speak here of special-purpose subsystems coming to dominate the larger, general-purpose systems of which they are parts. When particular indi­ viduals become identified with special-purpose systems they tend to identify the special purposes of those subsystems with their own general purposes; that is, with their own survival and betterment. Their own general purposes become highly specialized, and they attempt to pro­ mote these purposes to positions of predominance in the larger systems of which they are parts. A s they become increasingly powerful, they are increasingly able to succeed. Needless to say, power is not equally distributed among the various components of highly differentiated "de­ veloped" societies such as our own, but is, rather, concentrated in their industrial and financial sectors. These sectors are frequently able to dominate the agencies charged with regulating them, and the logical end is for the interests of groups of industrial firms, financial institutions, and related military establishments to come to dominate the societies of which they are merely specialized parts. This eventuality is nicely summed up in the phrase "W^hat's good for General Motors is good for America." B u t no matter how public-spirited or benign General Motors might be, what is good for it cannot in the long run be good for A m e r i c a For a society like the United States to commit itself to what may be good for one of its special-purpose subsystems, such as General Motors, or even the entire set of industries devoted to the manufacture, mainte­ nance, and operation of automobiles, is for it to overspecify or narrow the range of conditions under which it can persist—that is, it reduces its evolutionary flexibility. Loss of evolutionary flexibility is disguised by what seem to be the characteristics of progress, and is therefore difficult to discern. Other more obvious concomitants of the elevation of low-order goals and values to positions of predominance in higher-order systems may be related to loss of flexibility, but have other implications as well. First, as industrial subsystems become increasingly large and powerful, the qual­ ity o r utility of their products, or both, are likely to deteriorate, for the subsystem's contribution to the society becomes less its product and more its mere operation, providing wages to some, profits to others, and a market for yet others. Arms, which are both expensive and immedi­ ately obsolete, and automobiles into which obsolescence is built, are ideal products, and there is nothing wrong with products that serve no useful purpose whatsoever. The product tends to become a by- or even

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waste-product of what might be called the "industrial metabolism" which is, ultimately, simply the operation o f machines. Neither competition nor an independently established demand serves to regulate or limit "industrial metabolism" effectively because large industries are usually not very competitive and they can exercise considerable control over the demand to which they are supposed to be subject. Second and more serious, with the escalation of low-order goals to dominating positions in society, it becomes increasingly possible for ancient and complex systems, particularly ecological systems, to be dis­ rupted by ever smaller groups with ever more narrowly denned interests. For instance, there is some evidence to support the contention that certain fluorocarbons used in propellants in spray cans dispensing shav­ ing cream, deodorants, and the like are destroying atmospheric ozone that shields life from lethal intensities of ultraviolet radiation. Y e t these aerosols are still manufactured and sold. That the putative effects of these chemicals upon the atmosphere have not yet been "proven" hardly justifies their continued use, given the trivial nature of their advantages and the catastrophic nature o f the risks their use may entail. We note in this and many other instances—the clear-cutting of forests in areas in which they are unlikely to regenerate, offshore oil drilling in unstable geological zones, the dumping of undegradable poisons into fresh waters—the violation of orderly time relations, relations of contingency, and relations between the instrumental and the fundamental. Short-run, narrow, and instrumental interests have usurped the places of, or sub­ ordinated, long-run, general, and fundamental needs and values. These instances suggest that the facilitation of disruption for the sake of nar­ rowly defined special interests is not the whole of the ecological or indeed human problem following from the promotion of the low-order goals of industrialized subsystems to predominant positions in societies. T h e ultimate consequence is not merely that the short-run interests of a few powerful men or institutions come to prevail, but that the "interests" of machines—which even powerful men serve—become dominant. Needless to say, the interests of machines and organisms do not coincide. They do not have the same needs for pure air or water, and being blind and deaf, machines have no need for quiet or for landscapes that refresh the eye. Whereas organisms have need of uncounted numbers of subtle compounds, the needs of machines are few , simple, and voracious. It is in accordance with the logic o f a world dominated by machines to rip the tops off complex systems like West Virginia and Colorado to extract a single substance, coal. Usurpation is, in formal terms, to be regarded as an anomaly in the structure of values. It is an error of logical typing: short-term instru­ mental goals of high specificity are elevated to the status of enduring f

Adaptive Structure and Its Disorders | 165 fundamental principles. Their predominance becomes more encompass­ ing * specificity warrants and, as a consequence, regulation comes to maintain the trivial at the possible expense of the necessary. That is, under such circumstances it is likely that reference values—the values around which the system equilibrates itself or, to put it differently, the values the truth of which is cybernetically maintained—will be set outside of goal ranges, the ranges of conditions under which the system remains viable. 1 have been emphasizing the material effects of this logical-moraladaptive aberration, having discussed elsewhere (in slightly different terms) the dissolution of meaning and meaningfulness entailed by it (see "On Cognized M o d e l s " ) . Two points should be made here in this regard, how ever, First, to observe that as a consequence of this anomaly the trivial is maintained at the expense of the necessary or fundamental is not only to point to the preservation of spray cans at the expense of atmo­ spheric ozone, but to the preservation of interests at the expense of principles. It is as much a statement about the processes of meaning as it is about the state of the biosphere. Finally, there is the degradation of sanctity itself. As the material goals of lower-order systems usurp the places properly belonging to values of greater generality, they may lay claim to their sanctity. What is highly sanctified is resistant to change, and to oversanctify the specific and material is to reduce adaptive flexibility. It is of interest that the theolo­ gian Paul Tillich ( 1 9 5 7 : 1 1 ) called the absolutizing of the relative and the relativizing of the absolute "idolatry" and took it to be an evil. I am proosing that it is maladaptive, but it may be that in this instance, at least, the two coin-ide. The social effects of what we, following Tillich, may call "idolatry" are, of course, not limited to the reduction of adaptive flexi­ bility. At least as serious is the degradation of basic values, not usually through their explicit replacement by those of lower order, but by their conflation with them. The pursuit of "happiness," a term which in the eighteenth century seems to have denoted felicity, becomes the pursuit of pleasure and the accumulation of goods. Liberty becomes little more than the right to serve oneself. Materialism and selfishness become honored as highest ideals. We hardly need dwell upon the unacceptable demands that the sanctification of these values makes upon undeveloped countries and upon ecosystems, for they are obvious. t

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VI Earlier I suggested that what we take to be substantive problems— ecological problems, problems of poverty, oppression, imperialism, and others that we might name—are social and material consequences of

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structural anomaly. It may now be suggested, however, that structural anomaly and material problems stand in relationships of mutual causa­ tion. M o r e o v e r , the brief account I have offered of maladaptive forms and o f some of the substantive difficulties associated with them implies that maladaptive trends are nourished by, or may even inhere in, cultural evolution itself. In the world o f events cause is seldom simple, and I can d o no more, at the end, than to discuss, briefly and tentatively, a few of the evolutionary advances that seem to have contributed both to the structural deformities I have called maladaptations and to the material problems associated with them. S o m e suggestions have already been made about increases in the amounts of energy captured. It is important to keep in mind, however, that energy capture has sometimes been taken to be the metric of cultural evolution. O v e r a quarter o f a century ago, Leslie White, follow­ ing Ostwald, proclaimed what he called " T h e Basic Law of Cultural Evolution" as follows: Other factors remaining constant, culture evolves as the amount of energy harnessed per capita per year is increased, or as the efficiency of the instru­ mental means of putting energy to work is increased. [1949: 368-369] T h e r e can be no denying the first clause of this formulation. Large technologically developed states appearing late in history surely do har­ ness more energy per capita per day or year than do the small "primitive* societies which appeared earlier. One recent estimate would place daily energy consumption in the contemporary United States at 2 3 0 , 0 0 0 kilocalories, and in hunting and gathering societies as 2 , 0 0 0 - 3 , 0 0 0 (Cook 1 9 7 1 ) . T h e contemporary United States has a population of 2 0 0 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 people; the bushman bands seldom include more than a score or two of p e o p l e ; and increases in energy capture have made possible much larger and more sedentary social systems. B u t some, if not all, of the mal­ adaptive trends I have suggested here are related to increased scale. M o r e o v e r , high-energy technology itself frees those operating in local ecosystems from the limits imposed upon them by the need to derive energy from the contemporary biological processes of those systems. Gasoline, pipelines, bulldozers, high-voltage electrical transmission per­ mit virtually unlimited amounts of energy to be focused upon very small systems, and the ecological disruption of those systems can be toler­ ated—at least for a time—because of the increased specialization of other local systems. I have argued, however, that in the long run the increasing specialization of larger and larger regions—itself made pos­ sible by a technology that provides means for moving even bulky com-

Adaptive Structure and Its Disorders | 167 jnodities long distances inexpensively, and for transmitting information long distances instantaneously—is unstable. 'fne increasing specialization o f increasingly large geographical regions is simply one aspect of increasing internal differentiation of social sys­ tems. Progressive segregation and progressive centralization w e r e , of course, encouraged by the emergence of plant and animal cultivation ten thousand o r so years ago, for plant and animal cultivation provided sig­ nificant opportunities for full-time division of labor. B y 4 0 0 0 B . C . , if not earlier, subsistence, craft, religious, and administrative specialization was well developed. B u t the emergence of high-energy technology based upon fossil fuels has accelerated and exaggerated this trend and the maladaptations associated with it. These include not only oversegregation and overcentralization, with their concomitants of ecological in­ stability and hypercoherence; high-energy technology is differentially distributed among the subsystems of societies and it permits or en­ courages the promotion of the special purposes o f the more powerful to positions of greater dominance in systems of higher order than their degree of specialization warrants. High-energy technology is, of course, not alone in impelling mal­ adaptive trends. All-purpose money has also played a part. In addition to its obvious contribution to the concentration of real wealth and regula­ tory prerogative, it flows through virtually all barriers, increasing the coherence of the world system enormously. Its ability to penetrate whatever barriers may have protected previously autonomous systems against outside disruption rests upon its most peculiar and interesting property: it annihilates distinctions. It tends to dissolve the differences between all things by providing a simple metric against which virtually all things can be assessed, and in terms of which decisions concerning them can be made. B u t the world upon which this metric is imposed is not as simple as this metric. Living systems—plants, animals, societies, eco­ systems—are very diverse and each requires a great variety o f particular materials to remain healthy. Monetization, however, forces the great ranges o f unique and distinct materials and processes that together sustain or e v e n constitute life into an arbitrary and specious equivalence and decisions informed by these terms are likely to simplify, that is, to degrade and to disrupt the ecological systems in which they are effective. N e e d l e s s to say the application of large amounts o f mindless energy under the guidance o f the simplified or even simple-minded and often selfish considerations that all-purpose money makes virtually omni­ potent and, when united with a capitalist ideology, even sacred, is in its nature stupid, brutal, and almost bound to be destructive. With increases in the amounts o f energy harnessed, with increases in

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the internal differentiation of social systems, with the monetization of even larger portions of life, the contradiction between the direction of cultural evolution on the one hand and the maintenance of living proc­ esses, both meaningful and material, has become increasingly profound. We are led to ask whether civilization, the elaborate stage o f culture with which are associated money and banking, high-energy technology, and social stratification and specialization, is not maladaptive. It is, after all, in civilized societies that w e can observe most clearly oversegregation, overcentralization, oversanctification, hypercoherence, the domination o f higher- by lower-order systems, and the destruction of ecosystems. Civilization has emerged only recently—in the past six thousand or so years—and it may yet prove to be an unsuccessful experiment. What are taken to be evolutionary advances institutionalize new con­ tradictions and set new problems as they solve or resolve older problems or overcome earlier limitations, and social systems may eventually be­ come paralyzed by accumulating structural anomalies at the same time that they are increasingly perturbed by mounting substantive difficulties. It may be recalled that both Bateson and Slobodkin have argued that it is good evolutionary strategy for evolving systems to change no more than persistence requires, but increasing systemic deformity may require radical correction. Revolution has historically been an ultimate correc­ tive response of systems so afflicted by maladaptation as to be unable to respond homeostatically to the events continually perturbing them. Flannery has argued that the radical correction o f structural anomaly has been an important factor in the evolution of civilization ( 1 9 7 2 ) , and inquiry into the dynamic relationship among structural anomaly, substantive problem, and profound corrective processes is, in other terms, central to the thought of Marx. Bateson ( 1 9 7 2 ) , however, has located the problem at a level that may be beyond the reach of revolutionary correction—in the characteristics of human intelligence. H e argues that purposefulness is the dominant characteristic o f human reason, a plausible suggestion, for purposeful­ ness, encompassing both foresight and concentration, must have been strongly selected for during m a n s two or three million years on earth (and even earlier among man's prehuman forebears and other animals). But, located in the conscious minds of individuals and serving in the first instance their separate survivals, purposefulness must incline toward self-interest o r even selfishness. (Indeed the philosopher Bergson in recognizing this problem took religion to be society's defense against the "dissolving p o w e r " of the human mind.) That some human purposes are selfish cannot be gainsaid. B u t Bateson suggests that the problem of purposefulness is more profound. Purpose­ fulness, he argues, has a linear structure. A man at point A with goal D

Adaptive Structure and Its Disorders | 169 takes actions B and C, and with the achievement of D considers the process to be completed. Thus, the structure of purposeful action is linear: A —> B —• C —• D . B u t the world is not constructed in linear fashion. W e have already discussed the circular structure o f cybernetic, that is, self-correcting, systems, and it is well known that ecosystems are roughly circular in plan, with materials being cycled and recycled through the soil, the air, and organisms of many species. Moreover, the circularity of both cybernetic and ecosystemic structure blurs the distinction be­ tween cause and effect, or rather suggests to us that simple linear notions of causality, which lead us to think of actors, objects upon which they act, and the transformation of such objects, are inadequate, for purposeful behavior seldom affects only a single object, here designated D , but usually many other objects as well, often in complex and ramifying ways. Among those being affected in unforeseen and possibly unpleasant ways may be the actor himself. It may be suggested, however, that linear, purposeful thought is adequate to the needs of simple hunters and gatherers, and not very destructive to the ecological systems in which they live, because both the scope and power of their activities are limited. It is when linear thought comes to guide the operations of an increasingly powerful technology over domains of ever increasing scope that disruption may become inevitable. Bateson argues that the problem is not only to make men aware of the ramifying and circular structure of the universe, but to make the impera­ tives of this structure more compelling than their own linearly defined goals. H e believes that this requires that more of their minds than their conscious reason be engaged. It is also necessary to engage the nondiscursive aspects of their processes of comprehension, and he suggests that this is achieved through art and religion. I would agree, and else­ where in this volume ("Sanctity and Lies in Evolution") I discuss the place of religious experience in adaptive structure. To argue that more than reason may be required to maintain adaptive structure in human social systems, or to restore adapti% eness to systems beset by maladaptations, is not to argue for the banishment of reason nor for its replacement by blind commitment or mystic insight. Conscious reason has entered into the evolutionary process, cannot be ignored, and should, obviously, be put to the task of rectifying adaptive difficulties. A n apparent paradox may be that attempts to solve problems of adapta­ tion are likely to cause further problems, perhaps because "problem solving" is in its nature linear. Moreover, the systems in which men participate are so complex that w e cannot now, and probably never shall be able to, analyze them in sufficient detail to predict with precision the outcome of many of our own actions within them. We must, therefore, f

I ? 0 | ECOLOGY, M E A N I N G , A N D RELIGION investigate the possibilities for developing theories o f action that, al­ though based upon incomplete knowledge, will permit us to participate in systems without destroying them and ourselves along with them. This task is not hopeless. To say that the complexity o f living systems is so great as to confound prediction is not to say that w e cannot apprehend the salient characteristics o f their structures. T h e account o f adaptive structure and o f maladaptation offered here is abbreviated, tentative, and, I am certain, erroneous in many respects. It d o e s , h o w e v e r , represent an attempt to relate structure and process, the historical and the changeless, meaning and cause within an "ordre des ordres" in a manner permitting the identification o f disorder as well as of order. I offer it for discussion, but it would b e well to make explicit, although it is probably obvious, that it has not been m y intention to d e v e l o p a descriptive model the verisimilitude of which might be sub­ stantiated by e v e n a single case. It has been, rather, to propose a norma­ tive m o d e l no instances of which exist, but in terms o f which historical systems may be assessed and their difficulties comprehended (Rappaport i977b). T h e r e has recendy been much concern, and rightly so, about the rela­ tionship o f anthropology to the peoples traditionally constituting its most immediate and obvious subject matter. A w a r e n e s s o f the services anthropology, or anthropologists, have rendered to colonialism is grow­ ing and so is sophistication concerning the dangers o f applied anthro­ pology. L e s s thought has been given to the relationship o f anthropology to the society that has spawned it and may constitute its less apparent but ultimate subject matter. It may be suggested, h o w e v e r , that in its very existence anthropology constitutes a tacit critique of that society. Criti­ cism implies correction, but o u r culture is without an adequate theory o f correction. What is called "problem-solving" is problematic, making as many p r o b l e m s as it solves, and revolutions are destructive, often insti­ tutionalizing conventions as maladaptive as those they overthrow. T h e suggestions concerning adaptive structure offered here may, perhaps, m a k e a contribution to a theory o f correction, a theory, that is, for restoring adaptiveness to systems v e x e d by maladaptation. W h e t h e r o r not these suggestions have such a value, anthropology, I think, has much to offer to the development of such a theory and, possibly, to its applica­ tion to public affairs. If this seems presumptuous and dangerous w e should k e e p in mind that social policy is, at present, frequently informed by v i e w s o f the world, its ills, and ways to cure its ills provided by other, narrower disciplines no better founded and considerably less humane than o u r own.

Adaptive Structure and Its Disorders | 1 7 1 REFERENCES

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Bateson, Gregory 1963 The role of somatic change in evolution. Evolution 1 7 : 5 2 9 - 5 3 9 . 1972 Effects of conscious purpose on human adaptation. In Steps to an ecology of mind. New York: Ballantine. Brook field, H., and P. Brown 1963 Struggle for land: agriculture and group territories among the Cbimbu of the New Guinea Highlands. Melbourne: Oxford University Press. Cook, Earl 1971 The flow of energy in an industrial society. Scientific American, Sept. Flannery, Kent 1972 The cultural evolution of civilizations. Annual Review of Ecology and Systernatics 3:399-426. Frisancho, Roberto 1975 Functional adaptation to high altitude hypoxia. Science 1 8 7 : 3 1 3 - 3 1 9 . Hockett, C. F., and R. Ascher 1964 The human revolution. Current Anthropology 5 : 1 3 5 - 1 6 8 . Kalmus, Hans 1966 Control hierarchies, in Regulation and control of living systems, ed. H. Kalmus. New York: Wiley. Meggitt, Mervyn 1965 The lineage system of the Mae-Enga of New Guinea. Edinburgh: Oliver & Boyd. Miller, James 1965a Living systems: basic concepts. Behavioral Science 1 0 : 1 9 3 - 2 5 7 . 1965b Living systems: structure and process. Behavioral Science 1 0 : 3 3 7 - 3 7 9 . Ortiz, Alphonso 1969 The Tewa World: space, time, being and becoming in a Pueblo society. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Pattee, H. H., ed. 1973 Hierarchy theory. New York: Braziller, International Library of Sys­ tems Theory and Philosophy. Piaget, Jean 1971 Structuralism. London: Rourledge and Kegan Paul. Rappaport, R. A. 1963 Aspects of man's influence upon island ecosystems: alteration and control. In Man's place in the island ecosystem, ed. F. R. Fosberg, pp. 1 5 5 - 1 7 4 . Honolulu: Bishop Museum Press. 1968 Pigs for the ancestors. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1969 Sanctity and adaptation. /# 7(i97o):46-7i. (Paper prepared for Wenner-Gren Conference on the Moral and Aesthetic Structure of Human Adaptation, 1969). 1971a The sacred in human evolution. Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics 2 : 2 3 - 4 4 . 1971b Nature, culture, and ecological anthropology. In Man, culture, and society, rev. ed., ed. H. Shapiro, pp. 2 3 7 - 2 6 8 . New York: Oxford University Press. 1976a Adaptation and maladaptation in social systems. In The ethical basis of economic freedom, ed. Ivan Hill, pp. 3 9 - 8 2 . Chapel Hill, N . C . : Ameri­ can Viewpoint.

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(Rappaport, R. A.) 1 9 7 6 b Liturgies and lies. International Yearbook for the Sociology of Knowledge and Religion 1 0 : 7 5 - 1 0 4 . 1 9 7 7 a Maladaptation in social systems. In Evolution in social systems, ed. J , Friedman and M. Rowlands. London: Duckworth. 1 9 7 7 b Normative models of adaptive process: a response to Anne Whyte. In Evolution in social systems, ed. J . Friedman and M. Rowlands. London: Duckworth. Romer, Alfred S. 1 9 5 4 Man and the vertebrates. London: Penguin. First published 1 9 3 3 . Sahlins, Marshall 1 9 6 1 The segmentary lineage: an organization of predatory expansion. American Anthropologist 6 3 : 3 2 2 - 3 4 5 . 1969 Economic anthropology and anthropological economics. Social Science Information 8 : 1 3 - 3 3 . Sahlins, Marshall, and E. Service 1 9 6 0 Evolution and culture. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Simon, Herbert 1 9 6 9 The Sciences of the artificial. Cambridge: MIT Press. Slobodkin, L. 1 9 6 8 Toward a predictive theory of evolution. In Population biology and evolution, ed. R. Lewontin. Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press. Slobodkin, L., and A. Rapoport 1974 An optimal strategy of evolution. Quarterly Review of Biology 4 9 : 1 8 1 200.

Thomas, Lewis 1 9 7 4 The lives of a cell. New York: Viking Press. Tillich, Paul 1 9 5 7 The dynamics 0}faith. New York: Harper & Row. Van Baal, J . 1 9 7 1 Symbols for communication. Assen: Van Goracum 6c Co. Vayda, A. P. and B. McKay 1 9 7 5 New directions in ecology and ecological anthropology. Annual Re­ view of Anthropology 4 : 2 9 3 - 3 0 6 . White, Leslie 1 9 4 9 The science of culture. New York: Grove Press. Young, 1. J . , and W. F. Rowley 1 9 6 7 The logic of disease. InternationalJournal of Neuropsychiatry.

The Obvious Aspects of Ritual

i This essay is not about the symbols of which human rituals are made, nor yet about the entities, ideas, or processes—physical, psychic, social, natural, or cosmic—that these symbols may represent. It is concerned with the obvious rather than the hidden aspects of ritual, those of its features that, being most apparent, lead us to identify events as instances of ritual. Some difficulties beset presentation. For one thing, it is necessary to state the obvious—that which is immediately apparent and generally accepted—before discussing it, and it will be necessary, for the sake of clarity and continuity, to connect what I take to be non-obvious observa­ tions about the obvious with remarks that may themselves be obvious. Moreover, the argument is in part concerned with what seems to be logically necessary. When arguments are based upon logical necessity rather than empirical demonstration social scientists are inclined to take them to be trivial or tautologous. One of the points that 1 shall try to make, however, is that there is at the heart of ritual a relationship that has certain logically necessary entailments. Certain meanings and effects are intrinsic to the very structure of ritual, and ritual thus may impose, or seem to impose, logical necessity upon the vagrant affairs of the world. This may sound like a functional observation. In fact it is not, and it may be well to make clear at the outset that the argument developed in this This essay expands an earlier version, published in Cambridge Anthropology 2 ( 1 ) : 3 -69, 1974

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essay is formal- rather than final-causal in nature. Because I have dis­ cussed this distinction in some detail in "Ecology, Adaptation, and the Ills o f Functionalism" (in this volume), it will suffice to note here that functional formulations, which are properly system-specific, account for "items" in respect of the contributions they make to the systems of which they are elements. H e r e , however, I shall not be concerned with specific contributions rituals make to the systems in which they occur but with entailments of the ritual form wherever it appears. If an expedition into the obvious calls for justification, it may be suggested that in their eagerness to plumb ritual's dark symbolic or functional depths, to find in ritual more than meets the eye, anthro­ pologists have, perhaps increasingly, tended to overlook ritual's surface, that which does meet the eye. Y e t it is on its surfaces, in its form, that we may discern whatever may be peculiar to ritual. It is in its depths that ritual meets other symbolic forms—myth, poetry, graphic art, architec­ ture. Indeed, it is in respect to its symbolic content that ritual is least distinctive. It is in respect to its symbolism that myth and ritual are "one and the same," to recall Leach's famous dictum o f a quarter-century ago ( 1 9 5 4 : 13fF.), an identity more recently expressed by La Fontaine in the introduction to a volume of essays on the interpretation o f ritual. "In this book ritual actions are seen as exemplifying in another medium the cultural values that find expression in . . . statements which we call beliefs and which are elaborated in narratives or myths" ( 1 9 7 2 : xvii). It would be well to make clear that I am raising no objections what­ soever to symbolic analyses of rituals as a class or to functional and adaptive analyses of ritual as a class. Both surely may increase our understanding of the world. I am only asserting that to view ritual as simply a way to fulfill certain functions that may as well or better be fulfilled by other means, or as an alternative symbolic medium for expressing what may just as w e l l — o r perhaps better—be expressed in other ways is, obviously, to ignore that which is distinctive of ritual itself. Moreover, it becomes apparent through consideration of ritual's form that ritual is not simply an alternative way to express certain things, but that certain things can be expressed only in ritual. This is to reiterate that certain meanings and effects are intrinsic to the ritual form, which is further to suggest that ritual is without equivalents or even alternatives. This would account for its widespread occurrence and remarkable per­ sistence. I do not wish to press this point and will only assert that that which can be expressed only in ritual is not trivial. It is, I think, crucial, and because of it I take ritual to be the basic social act. I will argue, in fact, that social contract, morality, the concept of the sacred, the notion of the divine, and even a paradigm of creation are intrinsic to ritual's structure. It should be clear that the phrase "the structure of ritual" refers here

The Obvious Aspects of Ritual j 1 7 5 to relations among ritual's general features or components and not to relations among the symbols that may appear in rituals, for I have contrasted the depth of ritual with ritual's surfaces, those of its obvious, distinctive features that ae immediately available to the senses. In con­ trast to its depths, in which mutually dependent symbols propitiate the obscure understanding of the faithful or await the exegesis of holy man or anthropologist, the surfaces o f ritual are not symbolic, or at least not entirely so. Indeed, that ritual is not entirely symbolic seems to m e to be one of its most interesting and important characteristics, for through ritual some of the embarrassments and difficulties of symbolic communi­ cation are overcome. T h e r e is more to be said about the structure of ritual than that social contract and morality are intrinsic to it, and that it is not altogether symbolic, of course, and I shall proceed as follows: First, 1 must make explicit what 1 take to be ritual's obvious features. This will lead to a discussion o f the two classes of message expressed in ritual and of the nonsymbolic way in which one of these classes may be transmitted. Next, the representation of analogical processes by digital signals will be noted, and then w e shall approach what J . L. Austin ( 1 9 6 2 ) would call the "performativeness" of ritual. This will lead to what I take to be distinc­ tive of ritual, namely the social contract and morality intrinsic to its structure. T h e fact that rituals generally include physical acts as well as words will be considered, and I shall suggest that in including both word and act ritual may hold within itself a paradigm of creation. Some sugges­ tions concerning liturgical orders will then be advanced, and it will be further suggested that the concept of the sacred may emerge from ritual's structure. Finally, the numinous emotions generated in some rituals will be discussed briefly, and some suggestions will be offered concerning possible grounds in ritual for the notion of the divine.

II I take ritual to be a form or structure, denning it as the performance of more or less invariant sequences of formal acts and utterances not encoded by the performers. I shall be concerned to unpack the implica­ tions of this definition, noting first that no single feature of ritual is peculiar to it. It is in the conjunction of its features that it is unique. It is, nevertheless, convenient to consider its simple features at the beginning. T h e unique implications o f their concatenation will emerge later. First there is formality. Formality is an obvious aspect of all rituals: both observers and actors identify acts as ritual in part by their formality. Rituals tend to be stylized, repetitive, stereotyped, often but not always

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decorous, and they also tend to occur at special places and at times fixed by the clock, calendar, o r specified circumstances. T h e r e are problems in distinguishing some events from others by the criterion of formality because events are not easily discriminated into those that are formal and those that are not. T h e r e is, as R o g e r Abrahams ( 1 9 7 3 ) has pointed out, a continuum o f behavioral formality from (a) the formal w o r d s and gestures that intersperse ordinary conversation and acts, through (/?) that of the "everyday ceremoniousness" of greeting behavior and formal expressions o f deference and demeanor, through (c) the rather invariant procedures of, say, the courtroom within which the variant substance o f litigation is contained, and through which it is presented in orderly fashion, through, next, (d) such events as corona­ tions, in which the invariant aspects o f the event begin to predominate o v e r the variant, to, finally, (e) highly invariant events, like those of certain religious liturgies in which almost all of the performance is specified, and opportunities for variation are both few and narrowly defined. T w o points are to be noted. First, invariance emerges out of, or is an aspect of, increasing formality. Second, it may be useful to make a distinction between ritual, the formal, stereotyped aspect of all events, and rituals, relatively invariant events dominated by formality. B e this as it may, there is little value in separating rituals from other events by imposing an arbitrary' discontinuity upon the continuum of formality at any particular point. I will simply note that the phenomena with which this essay is largely concerned lie toward the more formal, less variant end o f the continuum. W e shall be mainly concerned with rituals suffi­ ciently elaborate to include what may be called "liturgical orders," more o r less invariant sequences of formal acts and utterances repeated in specified contexts. T h e term "liturgical order" will, however, be ex­ tended here to include not only the fixed sequences of words and acts providing form to individual ritual events, but also, following Van G e n n e p ( 1 9 0 9 ) , to the fixed sequences of rituals that lead men around circles of seasons, along the straight paths that depart from birth and arrive at death, through the alterations o f war and peace or along the dream tracks that cross Australian deserts. While ritual is characterized by its formality, all that is formal, stereo­ typed, repetitive, o r decorous is not ritual. Certain decorative art is similarly formal, and so are many buildings. It is of importance to recog­ nize, although it seems banal, that performance as well as formality is necessary to ritual. Performance is the second sine qua non of ritual, for if there is no performance there is no ritual. This is not simply to say that a ritual is not a book or myth o r television set, but to emphasize that

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performance is not merely a way to express something, but is itself an aspect of that which it is expressing. O f course, not all formal performance is ritual. Ordinary usage would not so have it, and there is no analytic advantage here in violating ordinary usage. For instance, although they bear some resemblance to each other, ritual and drama, at least in their polar forms, are best distinguished. F o r one thing, dramas have audiences, rituals have con­ gregations. A n audience watches a drama, a congregation participates in a ritual. This participation often if not always requires more than the entertainment o f a certain attitude. Participation is frequently active, and is likely to require o f the members o f a congregation that they sing, dance, stand, kneel, o r respond in litanies at particular times. For another thing, those w h o act in drama are "only acting," which is precisely to say that they are not acting in earnest, and it is perhaps significant that drama's synonym in English is "play." Ritual in contrast, is in earnest, even when it is playful, entertaining, blasphemous, humorous, or ludicrous. To say that ritual is in earnest is not to say that the formal action of ritual is instrumental in any ordinary physical sense. Indeed, another of ritual's criterial attributes—at least one proposed by many p e o p l e — i s that it is not. T h e r e seem to be two main lines of thought concerning this. T h e first, clearly enunciated by Leach long ago ( i 9 5 4 - i 2 f f . ) , implies the distinction already made between ritual and rituals. Ritual in this view is the non-instrumental aspect o r component o f events that may also include an instrumental component, "technique." Ritual is that frill o r decoration that communicates something about the performance or the performer. T h e other general view, which initially appears to be more different from the first than it actually is, would hold that ritual not only communi­ cates something but is taken by those performing it to be "doing some­ thing" as w ell. T h e r e would seem to be support for this position from some o f the words designating ritual in various languages. T h e G r e e k "dromenon" means "thing done," "liturgy" comes from the G r e e k for "public work," the English term "service" connotes more than talk; the Tew a Indians (Ortiz 1 9 6 9 : 98ff.), as well as the Tikopians (Firth 1 9 4 0 ) refer to some rituals as "spirit work." H o w v e r , that which is done by ritual is not done by operating with matter and energy on matter and energy in accordance with the laws of physics, chemistry, or biology. T h e efficacy of ritual derives, to use a term that Fortes ( 1 9 6 6 ) favors in a rather general way, from "the occult." T h e occult differs from "the patent" in that the patent can be known in the last resort by sensory experience, and it conforms to the regularities o f material cause. T h e r

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occult cannot be so known and does not so conform. G o o d y ( 1 9 6 1 ) similarly characterizes ritual as "a category of standardized behaviour (custom) in which the relationship between means and ends is not intrinsic.'' We have neither the time nor the need to examine in any detail either what anthropologists claim to be folk theories of the basis of occult efficacy, or what they claim to be the occult's foundation "in reality." Suffice it to say that one large and heterogeneous set of analytic theories would derive the occult from the affective force and persuasiveness of ritual performance, and we may note in passing that some students would take some sort o f systematic relationship to the emotions to be an aspect of virtually all ritual. Other analytic theories would see the occult to be founded upon certain characteristics of language, a view that accords with the widespread, almost universal belief in the magical power of words (Tambiah 1 9 6 8 ) . The two views are neither mutually exclusive nor exhaustive. T h e point that is of importance here is that if the efficacy of liturgical rituals rests in whole or in p a n upon words (both in native theory and in the theory of the anthropologist) then the distinction between ritual as communication and as efficacious action breaks down. This is not to claim that all rituals, even those for which efficacy is claimed, are deemed to possess occult efficacy, but simply to take effica­ cious ritual to be a subclass o f the larger class, ritual, itself one of many modes of communication. Leach stated—or perhaps overstated—this or a similar point when he asserted that the distinction between commu­ nication behavior and behavior potent in terms of cultural convention is trivial ( 1 9 6 6 ) . It may be objected that a view of ritual as communication comes up against the fact that many rituals are conducted in solitude. B u t the subjective experience of, say, private prayer, is one of communication. Moreover, given the extent to which in solitary rituals various parts of the psyche may be brought in touch with each other it is reasonable to take ritual to be auto-communicative as well as allo-communicative (Wallace 1 9 6 6 : 2 3 7 6 * . ) . Auto-communication is important even in public rituals. In fact, the transmitters o f ritual messages are often, if not always, their most significant receivers. Although w e may recognize that ritual, even efficacious ritual, is a mode of communication, we must also sympathize with the concern that Fortes expressed when he observed that "it is but a short step from the notion of ritual as communication to the non-existence of ritual per se" ( 1 9 6 6 ) . It is simply not enough to say that ritual is a mode of communi­ cation. B u t to say that ritual is a mode o f communication is surely not to say that it is interchangeable with other modes of communication nor, necessarily, to denigrate its uniqueness. It is, rather, to accept an

The Obvious Aspects of Ritual | 1 7 9 e x p a n d e d n o t i o n o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n , o n e that includes the achievement o f effects t h r o u g h the transmission o f i n f o r m a t i o n rather than t h r o u g h t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f m a t t e r and energy. C o m m u n i c a t i o n , this is t o say, n o t o n l y includes "saying," b u t certain sorts o f " d o i n g " as w e l l , sorts o f d o i n g i n w h i c h t h e efficacious p r i n c i p l e is i n f o r m a t i v e rather than p o w e r f u l . Ill T h e r e seem t o be t w o b r o a d classes o f messages t r a n s m i t t e d i n ritual. First, w h a t e v e r else may happen i n some h u m a n rituals, i n all rituals, b o t h h u m a n and a n i m a l , t h e participants transmit i n f o r m a t i o n c o n c e r n ­ i n g t h e i r o w n c u r r e n t physical, psychic, o r sometimes social states t o themselves a n d t o o t h e r participants. A s Leach p u t it, r i t u a l "serves t o express t h e individual's status i n the structural system i n w h i c h h e finds h i m s e l f f o r t h e t i m e b e i n g " ( 1 9 5 4 : r i ) . I shall, w i t h some m i s g i v i n g , f o l l o w L y o n s ( 1 9 7 0 : 7 3 ) and refer t o these transmissions as " i n d e x i c a l " transmissions, and t o this i n f o r m a t i o n as " i n d e x i c a l / ' I n perhaps all animal rituals, and i n some h u m a n rituals t o o , this is all t h e r e is. W h e n o n e b a b o o n presents his r u m p t o another he is signaling s u b m i s s i o n ; w h e n the o t h e r m o u n t s he signals dominance. T h e i n f o r m a ­ t i o n c o n t e n t o f t h e r i t u a l is exhausted b y t h e messages c o n c e r n i n g their c u r r e n t states b e i n g t r a n s m i t t e d by the participants. T h e r i t u a l is o n l y indexical. B u t s o m e h u m a n rituals are d i f f e r e n t , f o r i n t h e m t h e s u m o f t h e messages o r i g i n a t i n g a m o n g and t r a n s m i t t e d a m o n g the participants c o n ­ c e r n i n g t h e i r o w n c o n t e m p o r a r y states is n o t coextensive w i t h the i n ­ f o r m a t i o n c o n t e n t (using t h e t e r m i n f o r m a t i o n i n a b r o a d sense) o f t h e r i t u a l . A d d i t i o n a l messages, although t r a n s m i t t e d by the participants, are n o t e n c o d e d b y t h e m . T h e y are f o u n d b y participants already e n c o d e d i n t h e l i t u r g y . Since these messages are m o r e o r less invariant o b v i o u s l y they cannot i n themselves reflect t h e transmitter's c o n t e m p o r a r y state. F o r instance, t h e o r d e r o f t h e R o m a n mass does n o t , i n itself, express a n y t h i n g a b o u t t h e c u r r e n t states o f those p e r f o r m i n g it. I n r e c o g n i t i o n o f t h e r e g u l a r i t y , p r o p r i e t y , and apparent d u r a b i l i t y and i m m u t a b i l i t y o f these messages I shall r e f e r t o t h e m as "canonical." Whereas that w h i c h is signified by t h e indexical is confined t o t h e here and n o w , t h e referents o f t h e canonical are n o t . T h e y always m a k e references t o processes o r entities, m a t e r i a l o r p u t a t i v e , outside t h e r i t u a l , i n w o r d s and acts that have, b y d e f i n i t i o n , b e e n s p o k e n o r p e r f o r m e d before. Whereas the indexical is c o n c e r n e d w i t h t h e i m m e d i a t e t h e canonical is concerned w i t h t h e e n d u r i n g . I n d e e d , its q u a l i t y o f perdurance is perhaps signi­ fied— its sense is surely c o n v e y e d — b y the apparent invariance o f the l i t u r g y i n w h i c h i t is expressed.

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Earlier I claimed that o n e o f ritual's most salient characteristics is that i t is n o t e n t i r e l y symbolic. Since t h e t e r m " s y m b o l " is used i n several ways i n t h e l i t e r a t u r e i t is i m p o r t a n t that I m a k e clear that 1 a m c o n f o r m ­ i n g t o P e i r c e s ( 1 9 6 0 : 1436°.) t r i p a r t i t e classification o f signs i n t o symbols, icons, a n d indices. I n this usage a s y m b o l is m e r e l y "associated b y l a w " o r c o n v e n t i o n w i t h that w h i c h i t signifies. T h e w o r d " d o g " is a s y m b o l designating a certain sort o r class o f creatures. W o r d s are t h e funda­ m e n t a l , b u t n o t t h e o n l y , s y m b o l s ; f o r o b j e c t s , m a r k s , n o n v e r b a l sounds, gestures, m o v e m e n t s m a y b e assigned s y m b o l i c m e a n i n g b y w o r d s . T h e v i r t u e s o f s y m b o l i c c o m m u n i c a t i o n are patent. W i t h symbols discourse can escape f r o m t h e here a n d n o w t o d w e l l u p o n t h e past, f u t u r e , distant, h y p o t h e t i c a l , a n d imaginary, a n d w i t h a c o m p l e x s y m b o l i c system, such as a natural language, an u n l i m i t e d variety o f messages may b e encoded t h r o u g h t h e o r d e r l y r e c o m b i n a t i o n o f a small n u m b e r o f basic units. A l t h o u g h a f e w o t h e r species m a y m a k e very l i m i t e d use o f symbols, s y m b o l i c c o m m u n i c a t i o n is characteristic o f t h e h u m a n species, and has m a d e possible f o r m e n a w a y o f life so d i f f e r e n t f r o m that o f o t h e r animals that some anthropologists w o u l d c o m p a r e t h e emergence o f the s y m b o l i n i m p o r t a n c e a n d n o v e l t y o n l y t o t h e emergence o f life itself. I n contrast t o symbols, icons by d e f i n i t i o n share sensible f o r m a l charac­ teristics w i t h that w h i c h they signify. A m a p is an i c o n o f t h e area t o w h i c h i t c o r r e s p o n d s , a n d m a n y o f what are called symbols i n o t h e r usages are, i n this t e r m i n o l o g y , iconic. A " p h a l l i c s y m b o l , " f o r instance, is an i c o n . I n contrast t o b o t h symbols and icons, indices are, t o use Peirce's phrase, " r e a l l y affected b y " that w h i c h they signify. A rash is a n i n d e x o f measles, a d a r k c l o u d o f r a i n . A n index is caused b y , o r is p a r t o f , that w h i c h i t indicates; i n t h e e x t r e m e case i t is identical w i t h it. C a n o n i c a l messages, w h i c h are c o n c e r n e d w i t h things n o t present and o f t e n n o t e v e n m a t e r i a l , a r e , a n d can only be, f o u n d e d u p o n symbols, a l t h o u g h t h e y can e m p l o y , secondarily, icons a n d m a y even m a k e l i m i t e d use o f indices. O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , i n f o r m a t i o n c o n c e r n i n g t h e c u r r e n t state o f t h e t r a n s m i t t e r may transcend m e r e symbolic designation a n d be signified indexically. I t is f o r this reason that I refer t o such i n f o r m a t i o n as " i n d e x i c a l . " T o say that indexical transmission m a y " t r a n s c e n d " " m e r e " symbolic transmission is t o suggest that i t m a y o v e r c o m e a certain p r o b l e m , t o w h i c h I have called a t t e n t i o n elsewhere ( 1 9 6 9 , 1 9 7 1 a , 1 9 7 1 b ) , that is intrinsic t o t h e s y m b o l i c relationship. W h e n a sign is o n l y arbitrarily o r c o n v e n t i o n a l l y related t o t h e signified i t is possible f o r it t o occur i n t h e absence o f t h e signified a n d f o r i t n o t t o occur i n the presence o f t h e signified. T h u s , t h e v e r y f r e e d o m o f sign f r o m signified that p e r m i t s discourse t o transcend t h e here and n o w , i f i t does n o t actually m a k e l y i n g possible, facilitates i t e n o r m o u s l y and m a y encourage i t as w e l l .

The Obvious Aspects of Ritual | 1 8 1 T h e indexical s i t u a t i o n does o f f e r some o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r d e c e p t i o n (see 'Sanctity and Lies i n E v o l u t i o n " i n this v o l u m e ) , b u t such o p p o r t u n i t i e s are m u l t i p l i e d b y magnitudes b y the s y m b o l . T h e reliability o f i n f o r m a ­ t i o n becomes a p r o b l e m f o r s y m b o l - u s i n g m a n : i f the c o m m u n i c a t i o n system u p o n w h i c h a social o r d e r depends accommodates lies, h o w m a y the recipients o f i n f o r m a t i o n be assured that t h e i n f o r m a t i o n t r a n s m i t t e d to t h e m is sufficiently reliable f o r t h e m t o act u p o n ? I n r i t u a l this p r o b l e m is in s o m e degree o v e r c o m e by eschewing the use o f t h e s y m b o l and t r a n s m i t t i n g i n f o r m a t i o n c o n c e r n i n g t h e c u r r e n t states o f the p e r ­ f o r m e r s indexically. I a m n o t sure that a l l messages c o n c e r n i n g the c u r r e n t states o f the p e r f o r m e r s t r a n s m i t t e d i n r i t u a l are indexical i n Peirce's sense, hence m y misgivings i n using t h e t e r m " i n d e x i c a l " t o refer t o t h e m . T h a t such signals are indexical is clear i n some cases, however. F o r instance, w h e n a G o o d e n o u g h Islander ( Y o u n g 1971) o r a Siuai ( O l i v e r 1955) transmits the message that h e is a m a n o f i m p o r t a n c e , influence, o r prestige b y g i v i n g away large n u m b e r s o f yams and substantial n u m b e r s o f pigs he is n o t s i m p l y c l a i m i n g t o be a b i g m a n . H e is displaying the fact that he is. T h e a m o u n t that he gives away is an index o f his " b i g n e s s " because i t is " r e a l l y affected b y " that w h i c h i t s i g n i f i e s — h i s influence, prestige, au­ thority, o r whatever. I t m a y b e n o t e d that i n this example t h e r e has b e e n an i n v e r s i o n o f t h e m o r e familiar qualities o f the sign and t h e signified. W e are m o r e accustomed t o the sign b e i n g insubstantial, and the signified substantial, as, f o r instance, i n t h e relationship i n w h i c h t h e w o r d " d o g " stands t o the a n i m a l that i t designates. I t may be that i n cases i n w h i c h claims are made c o n c e r n i n g states that are themselves w i t h o u t physical p r o p e r t i e s (e.g., prestige, w o r t h , v a l o r ) , the sign m u s t be substantial i f i t is t o be heeded. I f t h e sign w e r e insubstantial i t w o u l d b e m e r e w o r d s , vaporous, " h o t air." B e this as i t may, r i t u a l signs are f r e q u e n t l y substantial, a m a t t e r t o w h i c h w e shall r e t u r n . T h e indexicality o f o t h e r cases is less p a t e n t b u t m o r e interesting. L e t us consider the M a r i n g m a n w h o , by dancing at the festival o f another g r o u p , signifies t o his hosts that he w i l l help t h e m i n warfare ( R a p p a p o r t 1 9 6 8 ) . T h e r e is surely n o intrinsic o r causal relationship b e t w e e n d a n c i n g and fighting, p a r t i c u l a r l y b e t w e e n fighting i n the future and d a n c i n g i n t h e present. H o w e v e r , t h e contemporary state t h t the transmitter is signaling i n this instance is a conventional state o r act, namely o n e o f p r o m i s i n g o r u n d e r t a k i n g o b l i g a t i o n . T h e c o n v e n t i o n a l signal, dancing, is taken t o b e intrinsic t o that c o n v e n t i o n a l state, w h i c h is t o say that t o dance is t o p r o m i s e . T h e c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n dancing and p r o m i s i n g is, o f course, c o n v e n t i o n a l . B u t p r o m i s i n g is itself a c o n v e n t i o n and conventions can

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o n l y b e s i g n i f i e d c o n v e n t i o n a l l y . I a m c l a i m i n g , h o w e v e r , that t h e rela­ t i o n b e t w e e n t w o c o n v e n t i o n s , h e r e d a n c i n g and p r o m i s i n g , can b e , and i n t h i s instance is, i n d e x i c a l because t h e y are i d e n t i c a l . D a n c i n g at a kaiko a n d p l e d g i n g s u p p o r t i n f u t u r e r o u n d s o f w a r f a r e are o n e a n d t h e same. T h e case o f t h e M a r i n g d a n c e r n o t o n l y illustrates i n d e x i c a l i t y b u t also suggests i n d e x i c a l i t y ' s l i m i t a t i o n s . W h i l e i t m a y b e that t o dance is t o p l e d g e s u p p o r t , t o p l e d g e s u p p o r t does n o t i n i t s e l f h o n o r that pledge. T h e u n d e r t a k i n g o f t h e p l e d g e is i n t h e p r e s e n t , a n d can b e signaled i n d e x i c a l l y , b u t t h e f u l f i l l m e n t o f t h e p l e d g e is i n t h e f u t u r e , and that w h i c h d o e s n o t y e t exist c a n n o t b e signified indexically. W h a t may m a k e t h e hosts c o n f i d e n t that t h e i r guests w i l l h o n o r i n t h e f u t u r e t h e pledges t h e y a r e u n d e r t a k i n g i n t h e p r e s e n t is a n o t h e r m a t t e r r e l a t i n g t o o t h e r aspects o f t h e r i t u a l . W e shall r e t u r n t o this q u e s t i o n later, n o t i n g n o w o n l y t h a t this c o n f i d e n c e — s u c h as i t i s — i s c o n t i n g e n t u p o n t h e associa­ t i o n o f t h e i n d e x i c a l l y t r a n s m i t t e d p l e d g e w i t h t h e canonical messages borne by the liturgy. #

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T w o classes o f i n f o r m a t i o n , t h e n , are t r a n s m i t t e d i n r i t u a l . A l l rituals, b o t h a n i m a l a n d h u m a n , carry i n d e x i c a l i n f o r m a t i o n , i n f o r m a t i o n c o n ­ c e r n i n g t h e c u r r e n t states o f t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s , o f t e n i f n o t always trans­ m i t t e d i n d e x i c a l l y r a t h e r t h a n s y m b o l i c a l l y . T h e second class, t h e c a n o n i ­ cal, is c o n c e r n e d w i t h e n d u r i n g aspects o f n a t u r e , society, o r cosmos, and is e n c o d e d i n a p p a r e n t l y invariant aspects o f l i t u r g i c a l o r d e r s . T h e i n variance o f a l i t u r g y m a y b e an i c o n o f the s e e m i n g changelessness o f the canonical i n f o r m a t i o n that i t i n c o r p o r a t e s , o r e v e n an i n d e x o f its actual changelessness, b u t canonical i n f o r m a t i o n i t s e l f rests u l t i m a t e l y u p o n symbols. W h i l e t h e r e is a n i n d e x i c a l c o m p o n e n t i n a l l rituals i t m i g h t seem that i n s o m e r i t u a l s t h e significance o f t h e i n d e x i c a l is so f a r o u w e i g h e d b y t h e canonical t h a t i t appears t r i v i a l , as, f o r instance, i n t h e Mass. C o n ­ s i d e r a t i o n o f this m a t t e r m u s t b e d e l a y e d u n t i l later b u t i t m a y b e w e l l t o a s s e r t — o r r e a s s e r t — n o w t h a t i n all l i t u r g i c a l r i t u a l s , and m o s t clearly i n all r e l i g i o u s r i t u a l s , t h e r e is t r a n s m i t t e d an i n d e x i c a l message t h a t cannot b e t r a n s m i t t e d i n any o t h e r w a y a n d , f a r f r o m b e i n g t r i v i a l , i t is o n e w i t h o u t w h i c h canonical messages are w i t h o u t f o r c e , o r m a y e v e n seem nonsensical. T o say, as i t w a s said at t h e e n d o f t h e last subsection, that s o m e i n d e x i c a l messages are d e p e n d e n t f o r t h e i r acceptability o n t h e i r associa­ t i o n w i t h t h e c a n o n i c a l , a n d t o say t h a t canonical messages are w i t h o u t f o r c e , o r e v e n sense, unless a c c o m p a n i e d b y c e r t a i n i n d e x i c a l messages is t o say t h a t r i t u a l is n o t m e r e l y a m o d e o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n i n w h i c h t w o

The Obvious Aspects of Ritual | 1 8 3 sorts o f i n f o r m a t i o n m a y b e t r a n s m i t t e d , b u t a v e r y c o m p l e x f o r m i n w h i c h t h e t w o sorts o f i n f o r m a t i o n are d e p e n d e n t u p o n each o t h e r . IV C e r t a i n f u r t h e r aspects o f i n d e x i c a l t r a n s m i s s i o n i t s e l f s h o u l d b e dis­ cussed b e f o r e w e t u r n t o t h e i n t e r r e l a t i o n o f t h e i n d e x i c a l and canonical. C o n s i d e r a t i o n o f these aspects o f t h e i n d e x i c a l w i l l , i n fact, lead naturally to t h e c a n o n i c a l , b u t t h e y can c l a i m some i n t e r e s t i n t h e i r o w n r i g h t . C a n o n i c a l messages, i t has b e e n e m p h a s i z e d , are c a r r i e d b y that w h i c h is i n v a r i a n t i n t h e l i t u r g y . I n contrast, indexical transmission m u s t rely u p o n w h a t e v e r o p p o r t u n i t i e s m o r e o r less i n v a r i a n t l i t u r g y offers f o r v a r i a t i o n . T h e r e are always some. First o f a l l , t h e r e is, i n t h e case o f noncalendrical rituals, variation i n occurrence, i n whether o r n o t to c o n d u c t t h e r i t u a l at a p a r t i c u l a r t i m e . S e c o n d , t h e r e is, f o r t h e i n d i ­ v i d u a l , t h e m a t t e r o f w h e t h e r o r n o t t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n a ritual that is o c c u r r i n g . T h e r e is, at least t h e o r e t i c a l l y , always t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f choice. T h i s is a m a t t e r o f great i m p o r t a n c e t o w h i c h w e shall r e t u r n later. T h i r d , t h e r e are m a n y o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r v a r i a t i o n i n t h e c o n t e n t o f ritual. I shall m e n t i o n one k i n d o f possibility very briefly before m o v i n g o n t o occur­ r e n c e , a b o u t w h i c h I shall also b e b r i e f , since I have w r i t t e n a b o u t b o t h c o n t e n t and o c c u r r e n c e e l s e w h e r e ( 1 9 7 1 a , 1 9 7 1 b ) , j u s t i f y i n g t h e i r r e ­ iteration here o n grounds o f coherence. *

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A s f a r as c o n t e n t s are c o n c e r n e d , t h e r e are, a m o n g o t h e r t h i n g s , usually p o s s i b i l i t i e s i n e v e n t h e m o s t i n v a r i a n t o f l i t u r g i c a l o r d e r s f o r variations o f a n u m e r i c a l sort, e i t h e r c a r d i n a l o r o r d i n a l . F o r instance, a m o n g t h e M a r i n g t h e r e is a w e l l - s p e c i f i e d p r o c e d u r e b y w h i c h p r i n c i p a l antagonists h o n o r m e n f r o m o t h e r g r o u p s w h o assisted t h e m i n t h e i r last r o u n d o f w a r f a r e . A t a p u b l i c occasion at t h e e n d o f t h e i r festival t h e p r i n c i p a l s call o u t t h e names o f t h e i r allies, w h o c o m e f o r w a r d t o receive b o t h p l a u d i t s and salted p o r k . W h a t is n o t specified b y l i t u r g y , b u t is o f g r e a t i m p o r ­ tance t o a l l c o n c e r n e d , is t h e o r d e r i n w h i c h t h e names o f t h e allies are called o u t . H e w h o is called first is m o s t h o n o r e d . H e w h o is called last may w e l l feel dishonored. Q u a n t i t y is also i m p o r t a n t — t h i s is o b v i o u s i n events l i k e M a r i n g haiko e n t e r t a i n m e n t s , d u r i n g w h i c h hosts assess t h e size o f f u t u r e allied m i l i ­ tary d e t a c h m e n t s b y t h e size o f d a n c i n g c o n t i n g e n t s , and i n potlatches a n d p i g feasts messages c o n c e r n i n g w o r t h i n e s s a n d p r e s t i g e a r e c o m ­ m u n i c a t e d b y n u m b e r s o f p i g s , pearlshells, b l a n k e t s , c o p p e r s , and similar valuables.

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Such rituals are obviously operating as public counting and ordering devices. B u t i t is i m p o r t a n t t o note that their o p e r a t i o n includes more than simple c o u n t i n g o r o r d e r i n g . I n c o r p o r e a l qualities that are i n their nature o n l y vaguely quantitative and certainly n o n - m e t r i c a l , like honor and w o r t h , are b e i n g g i v e n a form that is n o t only material, b u t clearly m e t r i c a l , l i k e numbers o f pigs o r coppers. I n c o m m u n i c a t i o n terms qualities that w o u l d seem t o vary analogically, l i k e prestige, are n o t only b e i n g substantiated, b u t are being represented digitally. T h e t e r m "analogic" refers t o entities and processes i n w h i c h values can change t h r o u g h continuous imperceptible g r a d a t i o n s — f o r instance t e m p e r a t u r e , distance, velocity, influence, m a t u r a t i o n , m o o d , prestige, and worthiness. Signals, l i k e o t h e r p h e n o m e n a , may be analogic. Cries o f p a i n , f o r instance, can p r o c e e d t h r o u g h continua o f imperceptibly i n ­ creasing intensity that m a y indicate t h e intensity o f the suffering they signify. T h e t e r m " d i g i t a l , " i n contrast, refers t o entities o r processes w h o s e values change n o t t h r o u g h continuous infinitesimal gradations but by discontinuous leaps. Examples o f discontinuous p h e m o n e n a that lead themselves " n a t u ­ r a l l y " t o digital representation are the beating o f the heart, and changes i n the size o f populations. Some objects include b o t h digital and analogic elements. T h u s , a thermostat contains b o t h an analogic element, a ther­ m o m e t e r , a n d a digital element, a w i t c h that fluctuates back and f o r t h b e t w e e n t w o discontinuous positions, " o n and off." A s there are analogic signals, so may there be digital signals e m p l o y i n g discontinuous terms o r scales, l i k e n u m b e r s o f pigs o r blankets. T h e r e may sometimes be some loss o f accuracy i n the representation o f analogic processes o r entities digitally, b u t the advantage o f digitalization is that it increases clarity. F o r instance, t h e representation o f influence, prestige, o r w o r t h i n numbers o f discrete units, such as pigs, reduces the vagueness o f a social and p o l i t i ­ cal situation b y facilitating comparison. This reduction i n vagueness is i n part a f u n c t i o n o f substantiation, i n p a n o f digitalization. T h i r t y - t w o pigs t h r o w n i n t o a feasting c o m p e t i t i o n are, simply and obviously, m o r e than t w e n t y - f i v e . ( T o claim that digitalization increases clarity and facilitates c o m p a r i s o n is n o t , o f course, t o claim that the clear is always t o be p r e ­ f e r r e d t o t h e vague.) #

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Whereas vagueness is reduced by the digitalization o f some aspects o f ritual's contents, ambiguity concerning t h e current state o f t h e per­ f o r m e r s may be reduced o r even eliminated b y ritual's occurrence. O c c u r r e n c e carries t h e digital t o the e x t r e m e — o r , rather, t o o n e step away f r o m the e x t r e m e . T h a t is, i t brings i t t o the binary, t o the r e d u c t i o n o f discrete units o r states t o t w o only. A n y ritual included i n t h e reper­ t o i r e o f a society can at any t i m e only b e o c c u r r i n g o r not o c c u r r i n g . T h i s

The Obvious Aspects of Ritual | 185 is to say that the occurrence o f a noncalendrical ritual can transmit a significant binary, o r " y e s - n o " ( o r " 0 / 1 " o r " o n - o f i f " ) signal. B u t al­ though occurrence transmits only a " y e s - n o " signal it may have been triggered by the achievement or violation o f a particular state i n some continuous ( o r " m o r e - l e s s " ) variable, o r even a c o m p l e x state i n a constellation o f interrelated variables. For instance, a certain ritual per­ formed b y a M a r i n g local g r o u p signifies its transition f r o m spiritually sanctioned peacefulness to a potential belligerence that also enjoys spiri­ tual support. T h e message concerning transition is entirely free o f a m b i ­ g u i t y : a g r o u p has either u p r o o t e d its rumbim plant or it has not. B u t when this ritual w i l l occur depends u p o n a complex concatenation a m o n g the states o f a large n u m b e r o f ecological, demographic, and social variables, i n c l u d i n g the rates o f increase i n the p i g p o p u l a t i o n , f r e q u e n ­ cies o f h u m a n m i s f o r t u n e , the frequency and seriousness o f arguments a m o n g co-residents, the n u m b e r and health o f a group's w o m e n , the ratio o f taro to sweet potatoes in local gardens. T h e occurrence o f the ritual, this is to say, summarizes a great mass o f constantly fluctuating heterogeneous " m o r e - l e s s " i n f o r m a t i o n and transmits its summary as a simple binary signal w h i c h is i n its nature unambiguous. R e d u c t i o n o f the continuous and complex to the binary t h r o u g h ritual occurrence is also i m p o r t a n t in the transition o f individuals f r o m one state o r c o n d i t i o n to another. F o r instance a Tahitian lad decides some­ t i m e a r o u n d the age o f twelve to have h i m s e l f supercised, thus m a k i n g clear his transition f r o m the status o f child t o that o f T'aure'area (Levy 1 9 7 3 : i i 7 f f , 3 6 8 f f ) . H e thereby summarizes all o f the obscure, con­ tinuous physical and psychic processes that in concert constitute his m a t u r a t i o n , and transmits i n f o r m a t i o n concerning his decision as a simple yes-no signal. T h e r e may appear to be a rather clumsy b i t o f sleight-of-hand i n this abbreviated account. O n the one hand I have claimed that the signal indicates a certain stage in the b o y s maturational process, o n the other that it represents a decision o n his part to impose a change o f status u p o n those processes. T h i s duality is, I t h i n k , i n the nature o f the case. F o r one t h i n g , the process o f deciding to change status—a process that is t e r m i ­ nated by the actual d e c i s i o n — i s itself part o f the c o m p l e x maturational process. M o r e i m p o r t a n t , the boy himself is the most significant receiver o f the message he h i m s e l f has transmitted by having himself supercised. H e has, so t o speak, signaled to h i m s e l f that he has imposed a simple yesno decision u p o n whatever ambivalence, fear, and d o u b t he may have b e e n experiencing. T h e r e is n o t h i n g f o r h i m to d o n o w b u t t o b r i n g his private processes i n t o accord w i t h the new public status that f o l l o w s f r o m his ritual act. T w o general points are to be made here. T h e first concerns distinction, the second the articulation o f the u n l i k e . I t is obvious that the simple

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" y e s - n o " o f ritual o c c u r r e n c e , w h i c h separates t h e b e f o r e f r o m the after w i t h absolute clarity, is a d m i r a b l y suited t o impose u p o n t h e continua o f n a t u r e distinctions that are m u c h sharper than nature's o w n . I t may, that is, i m p o s e unambiguous distinctions u p o n ambiguous differences (see W i l . d e n 1 9 7 2 : 1 7 7 ) . T h e binary characteristic o f occurrence does n o t , o f course, l i m i t its application t o single distinctions, f o r rituals are often arranged i n series: t h e rites o f passage stretching f r o m b i r t h t o death, the festivals separating t h e years i n t o seasons, those leading f r o m war to h u s b a n d r y a n d back again. A l t h o u g h w e are m a i n l y concerned i n this section w i t h t h e i n d e x i c a l c o n t e n t o f r i t u a l w e also note here that t h e ability t o m a k e u n a m b i g u o u s distinctions, w h i c h is intrinsic t o t h e occur­ rence o f rituals, is n o t l i m i t e d i n its application t o t h e indexical. A n n u a l r o u n d s o f festivals surely distinguish t h e seasons f r o m each o t h e r m o r e clearly t h a n t h e weather, and reference t o t h e m m a y o r d e r t h e lives o f m e n m o r e effectively than t h e g r o w t h o f plants o r changes i n tempera­ t u r e . T h e clarity o f r i t u a l o c c u r r e n c e c o m b i n e d w i t h its general f o r m a l i t y and n o n u t i l i t y suit r i t u a l ideally f o r service i n w h a t Bateson calls " c o n t e x t m a r k i n g " ( 1 9 7 2 : 289fT.) generally. I t is o f considerable interest that r i t u a l occurrence resembles digital c o m p u t i n g machines w i t h respect t o its m a n n e r o f o p e r a t i o n as w e l l as i n its effects u p o n c o n t i n u o u s processes. I n an i n t r o d u c t o r y t e x t b o o k c o n ­ c e r n e d w i t h t h e logical design o f digital circuits C . M . Reeves writes, " T h e successful o p e r a t i o n o f a real machine depends u p o n b e i n g able t o separate t h e t i m e intervals at w h i c h variables have their desired values f r o m those i n w h i c h they are changing. Logically, t h e r e f o r e , the passage o f t i m e is discrete w h e r e physically i t is c o n t i n u o u s " (1972: 7 ) . M o d e r n machines usually confine t h e t i m e intervals i n w h i c h t h e values o f vari­ ables are changing t o microseconds w h i c h , taken t o b e instantaneous, are i g n o r e d . I n some rituals, similarly, t h e values o f some variables are changed d u r i n g the course o f a r i t u a l o r seris o f rituals ( V a n G e n n e p 1909; T u r n e r 1 9 6 9 ) . B e t w e e n a n act o f separation and an act o f r e aggregation t h e r e is a l i m i n a l p e r i o d d u r i n g w h i c h some aspect o f the c o n d i t i o n o r state o f some o r all o f t h e actors is t r a n s f o r m e d . A s i n t h e case o f t h e d i g i t a l m a c h i n e , t h e t i m e d u r i n g w h i c h the values o f variables are c h a n g i n g is o u t o f o r d i n a r y t i m e , as Eliade (1959) and others have o b s e r v e d . I n contrast t o t h e m a c h i n e , i n w h i c h t h e " t i m e b e t w e e n t i m e s " is o f t e n v i r t u a l l y i n f i n i t e s i m a l , t h e l i m i n a l o r marginal p e r i o d s demar­ cated r i t u a l l y m a y last f o r h o u r s , days, o r even m o n t h s o r years. M o r e ­ o v e r , w e k n o w that that w h i c h occurs d u r i n g rituals and is i n s t r u m e n t a l i n t r a n s f o r m i n g some aspect o f t h e actors' states, is n o t always entirely discursive o r digital. I n t h e interstices o f t i m e , i n t h e times o u t o f t i m e that l i e b e t w e e n the befores a n d afters that rituals distinguish so clearly, t h e r e m a y b e a t i m e o f c o n t i n u o u s , h i g h l y affective p e r f o r m a n c e i n w h i c h

The Obvious Aspects of Ritual | 187 boundaries a n d distinctions are o b l i t e r a t e d , rather than clarified. T o emphasize, as 1 have i n this section, ritual's digital aspects is not t o deny its analogic aspects. A t t h e e n d o f this essay w e shall r e t u r n t o the analogic heart h e l d b o t h safe and harmless w i t h i n the digital brackets o f ritual's o c c u r r e n c e . T h e o c c u r r e n c e o f rituals makes distinctions, b u t o f course does n o t necessarily separate. W h i l e i t may be that festivals distinguish the seasons one f r o m a n o t h e r i t is also the case that they j o i n t h e m i n t o the circle o f t h e year. T h e intervals b e t w e e n t h e rituals i n p r o t r a c t e d liturgical orders b e c o m e , i n p a r t because they are set apart b y rituals, n o t simply dura­ tions d u r i n g w h i c h t h e r e has b e e n m o r e g r o w t h o r the w e a t h e r has g r o w n w a r m e r , b u t distinctive p e r i o d s : c h i l d h o o d , m a n h o o d , spring, s u m m e r , a u t u m n , w a r , peace. B o u n d together by t h e rituals d i s t i n g u i s h i n g t h e m , they f o r m significant w h o l e s : lives and histories, and the years that set lives i n t o histories and histories i n t o the cosmos. #

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T h e o c c u r r e n c e o f r i t u a l n o t o n l y articulates w h a t i t itself distinguishes, as the seasons b y festival o r sacrifice, o r w h a t i t itself separates, as war f r o m peace b y r i t u a l declaration. I t also aids i n t h e t r a n s d u c t i o n o f i n f o r m a t i o n b e t w e e n u n l i k e systems. F o r instance, i n t h e case o f the u p r o o t i n g o f rumbim b y M a r i n g local g r o u p s , signifying, as w e have n o t e d , a passage f r o m spiritually e n f o r c e d peacefulness t o p o t e n t i a l belligerence, information concerning environmental, demographic, physical, and social variables is s u m m a r i z e d and t r a n s m i t t e d f r o m a local ecological system i n t o a regional political system (see R a p p a p o r t 1 9 6 8 ) . I n the case o f Tahitian supercision and o t h e r p u b e r t y rites, the r i t u a l articu­ lates a n i n d i v i d u a l psychophysical system o n the o n e hand and a social system o n the o t h e r . D e s p i t e the fact that they share c o m p o n e n t s , local ecological systems and regional political systems are " u n l i k e , " and t h e same may b e said o f i n d i v i d u a l psychophysical systems o n the o n e hand a n d social systems o n the o t h e r . Local ecological systems are " a b o u t " t r o p h i c exchanges, energy flows, soil d e p l e t i o n and replenishment. R e ­ g i o n a l p o l i t i c a l systems are " a b o u t " war, w o m e n , land, and the exchange o f g o o d s . S i m i l a r l y , b o t h psychophysical and social systems are charac­ t e r i z e d b y c o n t i n u o u s q u a n t i t a t i v e processes and c o n t i n u o u s change i n such variables as e m o t i o n a l , cognitive, and physical states o n the o n e h a n d and changes i n status, r o l e , g r o u p affiliation, and e c o n o m i c status, a m o n g o t h e r things, o n t h e o t h e r . A l t h o u g h they are related t o each o t h e r and affect each o t h e r , and a l t h o u g h any i n d i v i d u a l is a locus o f b o t h , psychophysical processes and social processes are quasi-autono­ m o u s w i t h respect t o each o t h e r . N e i t h e r is a d i r e c t f u n c t i o n o r o u t c o m e o f t h e o t h e r , and i n f o r m a t i o n c o n c e r n i n g the t w o sets is n o t altogether

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c o m m e n s u r a b l e . T h e same may b e said o f t h e relations b e t w e e n local ecological systems a n d r e g i o n a l p o l i t i c a l systems. Since social a n d psychophysical processes are n o t altogether c o m m e n s u r a b l e , n o r are ecological a n d regional p o l i t i c a l processes, con­ t i n u o u s l y fluctuating quantitative i n f o r m a t i o n c o n c e r n i n g any o f these systems is n o t d i r e c t l y m e a n i n g f u l i n t h e system t o w h i c h i t is articulated. B y " n o t d i r e c t l y m e a n i n g f u l " I m e a n that i t cannot affect systematic n o n r a n d o m p r o p o r t i o n a l changes i n t h e o t h e r w i t h o u t first b e i n g inter­ p r e t e d o r translated. T h e occurrence o f r i t u a l as a binary transducer summarizes this q u a n t i t a t i v e i n f o r m a t i o n i n t o a simple statement that not o n l y is n o n a m b i g u o u s b u t is m e a n i n g f u l i n t h e system i n t o w h i c h it is t r a n s m i t t e d , e.g., " t h i s b o y is p r e p a r e d t o b e c o m e , o r has b e c o m e , a m a n . " I t is significant that c o n t r o l transduction b e t w e e n u n l i k e c o m ­ p o n e n t s o f organic systems also relies heavily u p o n binary mechanisms because o f t h e d i f f i c u l t y o f translating c o n t i n u o u s and o f t e n fluctuating q u a n t i t a t i v e i n f o r m a t i o n d i r e c t l y b e t w e e n i n c o m m e n s u r a b l e systems (Goldman 1960; Wilden 1972). I n s o m e rituals local ecological systems m a y b e articulated t o regional p o l i t i c a l systems, and i n m a n y o t h e r s social units o f d i f f e r e n t magnitude o r t y p e may b e b r o u g h t together. I t may b e asserted, h o w e v e r , that i n all rituals p r i v a t e psychophysical processes are articulated w i t h public o r d e r s . T h i s was clear i n t h e case o f the Tahitian y o u t h . I n having h i m s e l f supercised t h e b o y reaches o u t , so t o speak, f r o m his private processes— t h o s e o f physical a n d psychic m a t u r a t i o n — i n t o a p u b l i c liturgical o r d e r t o grasp t h e category that he t h e n imposes u p o n his p r i v a t e processes. I t is n o less so i n t h e case o f p l a n t i n g o r u p r o o t i n g rumbim a m o n g the M a r i n g . I n p e r f o r m i n g such a r i t u a l each p a r t i c i p a n t imposes u p o n his o w n p r i v a t e self a t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f his p u b l i c state: b y u p r o o t i n g rum­ bim h e t r a n s f o r m s h i m s e l f f r o m husbandman i n t o w a r r i o r , b y p l a n t i n g rumbim f r o m w a r r i o r t o husbandman. V I n discussing the l i t u r g i c a l variations that may carry indexical i n f o r m a t i o n w e have approached t h e canonical, f o r i t is f r o m t h e canonical c o n t e n t o f l i t u r g y that a r e d r a w n t h e categories that give m e a n i n g t o whatever indexical messages are t r a n s m i t t e d . W e c o m e , this is t o say, t o t h e relationship o f t h e indexical t o t h e canonical. I t is a c o m p l e x relationship that I w i s h t o address at first b y r e t u r n i n g , w i t h a somewhat d i f f e r e n t emphasis, t o a n indexical message considered earlier. B y dancing at a kaiko a M a r i n g m a n signals his pledge t o help his hosts i n warfare. D a n c i n g signals a pledge because i t is itself a p l e d g i n g . A s such, i t was earlier argued, i t indicates rather than m e r e l y symbolizes r

The Obvious Aspects of Ritual | 189 the p l e d g e w i t h w h i c h i t is " i d e n t i f i e d , " i.e., made identical. N o w I w i s h to emphasize that " t o p l e d g e " is n o t m e r e l y t o say s o m e t h i n g b u t t o d o s o m e t h i n g . A p l e d g e is an act. R i t u a l is f u l l o f c o n v e n t i o n a l utterances w h i c h achieve c o n v e n t i o n a l effects. " I name this ship t h e Q u e e n Elizabeth." " W e declare w a r . " " I dub thee t o k n i g h t h o o d . " " I swear t o tell the t r u t h . " " I p r o m i s e t o sup­ p o r t y o u . " " W e find t h e d e f e n d a n t g u i l t y . " ' I apologize." I n all o f these instances, w e w o u l d agree, t h e speaker is n o t simply saying s o m e t h i n g b u t d o i n g s o m e t h i n g , a n d w h a t he is d o i n g — a c h i e v i n g a c o n v e n t i o n a l effect t h r o u g h some sort o f c o n v e n t i o n a l p r o c e d u r e — c a n n o t be d o n e b y the application o f m a t t e r and energy t o some o b j e c t i n accordance w i t h the laws o f physics, chemistry, o r biology. T h e i m p o r t a n c e o f such utterances i n t h e c o n d u c t o f h u m a n affairs is so p a t e n t as t o obviate any need f o r c o m m e n t , b u t philosophers have, i n the last t w o decades especially, g i v e n considerable a t t e n t i o n t o their peculiar characteristics. J . F. A u s t i n ( 1 9 6 2 ) has called t h e m " p e r f o r m a ­ tive utterances" a n d " i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts"; J . R. Searle (1969) includes t h e m a m o n g w h a t he calls " s p e e c h acts"; F. O ' D o h e r r y ( 1 9 7 3 a ) refers t o an i m p o r t a n t subclass as " f a c t i t i v e " acts o r utterances; J . S k o r u p s k i ( 1 9 7 6 ) uses t h e t e r m " o p e r a t i v e acts" f o r a class r e s e m b l i n g t h e m closely. I t is i m p o r t a n t t o note that t h e efficacy o f w h a t I shall, f o l l o w i n g A u s t i n ' s earlier a n d simpler t e r m i n o l o g y , call " p e r f o r m a t i v e s " is n o t i n the persuasive effect o f these utterances u p o n others. I f a u t h o r i z e d persons declare peace i n a p r o p e r m a n n e r peace is declared, w h e t h e r o r n o t t h e antagonists are persuaded t o act accordingly. T h i s is n o t t o saythat p e r f o r m a t i v e utterances may n o t b e persuasive. T h e y o f t e n have, t o use A u s t i n ' s t e r m s , " p e r l o c u t i o n a r y " as w e l l as " i l l o c u t i o n a r y " force. B u t an action o f some sort ( b e y o n d t h e o b v i o u s act o f p r o d u c i n g sounds, o r even m e a n i n g f u l sounds) is c o m p l e t e d i n t h e p e r f o r m a t i v e gesture o r utterance itself. P e r f o r m a t i v e s o f course differ i n t h e scope o f t h e action they c o m p l e t e . T h u s , i f I a m authorized t o d o so and name this ship the Q u e e n E l i z a b e t h , this ship is so n a m e d , and that is really all there is t o it. Y o u m a y call i t " H o r t e n s e " i f y o u l i k e , b u t its name happens t o be Q u e e n Elizabeth ( A u s t i n 1 9 6 2 : 9 9 passim). O n t h e o t h e r hand, i f I have danced at y o u r kaiko, t h e r e b y p r o m i s i n g t o h e l p y o u i n warfare, that is n o t a l l t h e r e is t o i t , f o r i t remains f o r m e t o f u l f i l l m y p r o m i s e , and I m a y fail t o d o so. F o l l o w i n g O ' D o h e r t y , w e may say that t h e n a m i n g , w h i c h n o t o n l y constitutes a n action b u t actually brings i n t o b e i n g t h e state o f affairs w i t h w h i c h i t is c o n c e r n e d , is n o t simply p e r f o r m a t i v e , b u t " f a c t i t i v e " as w e l l . W h e r e a s m a n y actions c o m p l e t e d i n r i t u a l — d u b b i n g s , declarations o f peace, marriages, p u r i f i c a t i o n — a r e factitive, i t is o b v i o u s that all are not. S o m e — a m o n g t h e m are those A u s t i n called " c o m m i s s i v e s ' ( 1 9 6 2 : i 5 o f f . ) — d o n o t b r i n g i n t o b e i n g t h e states o f affairs w i t h w h i c h they 1

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are c o n c e r n e d , b u t m e r e l y c o m m i t those p e r f o r m i n g t h e m to do sometime in the future. W h i l e m a n y liturgies are p e r f o r m a t i v e , w h i l e some sort o f p e r f o r m t i v e act is t h e m a i n p o i n t o f t h e p e r f o r m a n c e , t r a n s f o r m i n g war i peace, r e s t o r i n g p u r i t y t o that w h i c h has b e e n p o l l u t e d , j o i n i n g m e n and w o m e n i n w e d l o c k , performativeness is n o t c o n f i n e d t o ritual. T h e r e is n o advantage t o b e g a i n e d , f o r instance, i n t a k i n g t o be ritual the publican's utterance " T h e b a r is closed." B u t w h e n h e says " t h e bar is c l o s e d " i t is t h e r e b y closed, and w e may as w e l l g o h o m e . Performatives are n o t c o n f i n e d t o r i t u a l , b u t i t may b e suggested that there is a special r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n r i t u a l and performativeness. First, t h e f o r m a l characteristics o f r i t u a l enhance the chances o f success o f t h e p e r f o r m a t i v e s t h e y i n c l u d e . L i k e any o t h e r acts performatives can fail. I f , f o r instance, I w e r e t o d u b o n e o f m y j u n i o r colleagues k n i g h t o f t h e g a r t e r he w o u l d n o t thereby b e c o m e a k n i g h t o f t h e garter, even if t h e c o n d u c t o f t h e r i t u a l w e r e l e t t e r - p e r f e c t . Conversely, i f Q u e e n Elizabeth d u b b e d Princess A n n e ' s horse t o k n i g h t h o o d it probably w o u l d n ' t m a k e h i m a k n i g h t . A n d i f a b e f u d d l e d cleric recited t h e service f o r t h e dead rather t h a n t h e marriage l i t u r g y i t is d o u b t f u l i f the couple standing b e f o r e h i m w o u l d thereby b e m a r r i e d o r b e c o m e objects o f m o u r n i n g ( A u s t i n 1 9 6 2 : p a s s i m ) . A l l o f these instances o f faulty per­ f o r m a t i v e s are o f r i t u a l p e r f o r m a t i v e s , and r i t u a l p e r f o r m a t i v e s can fail, b u t t h e l u d i c r o u s nature o f these instances suggests that they are less l i k e l y t o fail t h a n o t h e r p e r f o r m a t i v e s . T h e f o r m a l i t y o f liturgical orders helps t o ensure that w h a t e v e r p e r f o r m a t i v e s they m a y i n c o r p o r a t e are p e r f o r m e d b y a u t h o r i z e d p e o p l e w i t h respect t o eligible persons o r entities u n d e r p r o p e r circumstances i n accordance w i t h p r o p e r proce­ dures. M o r e o v e r , t h e f o r m a l i t y o f r i t u a l makes very clear a n d explicit w h a t i t is that is b e i n g d o n e . F o r instance, i f o n e M a r i n g casually said to a n o t h e r w h o m h e happened t o b e v i s i t i n g , " I ' l l help y o u w h e n n e x t y o u g o t o w a r , " i t w o u l d n o t be clear w h e t h e r this was t o b e taken as a vague statement o f i n t e n t , as a p r e d i c t i o n o f w h a t he w o u l d be l i k e l y t o d o , o r as a p r o m i s e , n o r w o u l d i t necessarily b e clear w hat m i g h t b e m e a n t by " h e l p . " T o dance this message i n a r i t u a l , h o w e v e r , makes i t clear t o all c o n c e r n e d that a p l e d g e t o h e l p is u n d e r t a k e n , and that that h e l p entails fighting. R i t u a l , this is t o say, n o t o n l y ensures t h e correctness o f t h e p e r f o r m a t i v e e n a c t m e n t ; i t also makes t h e p e r f o r m a t i v e s i t carries ex­ p l i c i t , a n d it generally makes t h e m w e i g h t y as w e l l . I f a message is c o m m u n i c a t e d b y p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n r i t u a l i t is i n its nature n o t vague. M o r e o v e r , t h e r e is n o p o i n t i n m o b i l i z i n g t h e f o r m a l i t y , d e c o r u m , and s o l e m n i t y o f r i t u a l t o c o m m u n i c a t e messages that are o f n o i m p o r t a n c e o r gravity. Promises are o f t e n c o m m u n i c a t e d i n r i t u a l , b u t vague state­ m e n t s o f i n t e n t s e l d o m i f ever are. 5 0

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The Obvious Aspects of Ritual I 1 9 1 I shall o n l y m e n t i o n t w o o t h e r closely related reasons f o r c o n s i d e r i n g the performativeness o f r i t u a l here. First, the association o f the sacred o r occult ( I d o n o t take t h e m t o b e s y n o n y m o u s ) w i t h p e r f o r m a t i v e s i n A p i c a l and religious rituals may h i d e t h e i r c o n v e n t i o n a l nature f r o m t h e actors, and this o b v i o u s l y may enhance t h e i r chances o f success. T o take the state o f affairs established b y a king's e n t h r o n e m e n t t o d e r i v e f r o m the sacramental v i r t u e o f c r o w n and c h r i s m is perhaps m o r e effective w i t h respect t o the maintenance o f the o r d e r o f w h i c h the k i n g is a p a r t than w o u l d be t h e r e c o g n i t i o n o f e n t h r o n e m e n t as a naked p e r f o r m a t i v e . Second, as R u t h F i n n i g a n ( 1 9 6 9 : $ 5 0 ) has suggested, albeit rather u n specifically, t h e ' t r u t h l y i n g b e h i n d " assumptions c o n c e r n i n g w h a t is o f t e n called " t h e magical p o w e r o f w o r d s " m a y b e related t o t h e i r i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e o r p e r f o r m a t i v e n e s s . I t may be p r o p o s e d , rather m o r e specifically, that t h e magical p o w e r o f some o f t h e w o r d s a n d acts f o r m i n g p a r t o f liturgies derives f r o m the factitive relationship b e t w e e n t h e m a n d t h e c o n v e n t i o n a l states o f affairs w i t h w h i c h they are c o n ­ cerned. M a g i c a l p o w e r may b e a t t r i b u t e d t o y e t o t h e r w o r d s b y e x t e n ­ sion o f the p r i n c i p l e o f factitiveness b e y o n d the d o m a i n o f the c o n v e n ­ t i o n a l i n w h i c h i t is effective i n t o t h e d o m a i n o f t h e physical, i n w h i c h i t is not. B u t i t b e h o o v e s us t o b e w a r y about stipulating the l i m i t s o f w h a t may i n fact b e effected b y r i t u a l acts. T h e efficacy o f factitiveness may, after a l l , b e a u g m e n t e d b y the p e r l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e o f t h e acts i n w h i c h the factitiveness inheres, and n o o n e y e t k n o w s h o w far i n t o physical processes p e r l o c u t i o n a r y force m a y penetrate. I t does seem safe t o say, h o w e v e r , that the efficacy o f r i t u a l m a y e x t e n d b e y o n d the p u r e l y c o n ­ v e n t i o n a l and i n t o the organic, f o r p e o p l e d o occasionally die o f w i t c h ­ craft o r e n s o r c e l l e m e n t , a n d t h e y are sometimes healed b y f a i t h . T h e magical efficacy o f w o r d s may rest u p o n their p e r l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e o r persuasiveness as w e l l as u p o n t h e i r factitiveness.

VI Perhaps t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t reason f o r c o n s i d e r i n g the performativeness o f rituals is, paradoxically, that certain rituals are n o t themselves o b v i ­ ously p e r f o r m a t i v e b u t may m a k e p e r f o r m a t i v e s possible. T h e r e seems t o b e m o r e t o some o r even a l l liturgies t h a n t h e per­ f o r m a t i v e s t h e y i n c o r p o r a t e , and some liturgies may n o t seem t o i n c l u d e p e r f o r m a t i v e s i n any s i m p l e sense at all. M a n y religious rituals d o n o t seem t o be d i r e c t e d t o w a r d achieving simple c o n v e n t i o n a l effects t h r o u g h c o n v e n t i o n a l p r o c e d u r e s . A l t h o u g h simple performativeness is n o t c r i ­ t e r i a ! o f r i t u a l , s o m e t h i n g l i k e i t , b u t o f h i g h e r o r d e r , is. W e approach here the c o n j u n c t i o n o f f o r m a l i t y and p e r f o r m a n c e that was emphasized

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i n the i n t r o d u c t i o n . W e c o m e , this is t o say, t o w h a t is i m p l i c i t i n the act o f p e r f o r m i n g a liturgical o r d e r . T h e t e r m " l i t u r g i c a l o r d e r , " w e may be r e m i n d e d here, refers b o t h to t h e m o r e o r less invariant sequences o f f o r m a l acts and utterances that c o m p r i s e single rituals, and t o the sequences o f rituals and make u p ritual cycles a n d series. " O r d e r " is a n especially a p p r o p r i a t e t e r m because these series o f events constitute o r d e r s i n several senses b e y o n d the o b v i o u s o n e o f sequence. T h e y are also orders i n the sense o f organiza­ t i o n , f o r m , o r regularity ( s y n o n y m o u s w i t h the m e a n i n g o f " o r d e r " i n such phrases as " t h e social o r d e r " ) . A s such they constitute order, or m a i n t a i n orderliness, i n contrast to disorder, e n t r o p y , o r chaos. T h e y are, f u r t h e r , o r d e r s i n that they are i n some sense imperatives o r directives. L i t u r g i c a l o r d e r s , i t was asserted i n t h e first section, must b e per­ f o r m e d . W i t h o u t p e r f o r m a n c e there is n o r i t u a l , n o liturgical order. T h e r e are still extant i n b o o k s outlines o f liturgies p e r f o r m e d i n U r and L u x o r , b u t they are dead, f o r they are n o l o n g e r g i v e n voice b y m e n s breaths n o r energy' b y t h e i r bodies. A liturgical o r d e r is an o r d e r i n g o f acts o r utterances, and as such i t is e n l i v e n d , realized, o r established only when those acts are p e r f o r m e d and those utterances voiced. W e shall r e t u r n t o this shortly. T h e p o i n t t o be m a d e here is that this relationship o f t h e act o f p e r f o r m a n c e t o that w h i c h is b e i n g p e r f o r m e d — t h a t it brings i t i n t o b e i n g — c a n n o t h e l p b u t specify as w e l l the relationship o f t h e p e r f o r m e r t o that w h i c h h e is p e r f o r m i n g . H e is n o t m e r e l y trans­ m i t t i n g messages he finds e n c o d e d i n the liturgy. H e is p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n — b e c o m i n g p a r t o f — t h e o r d e r t o w h i c h his o w n b o d y and breath g i v e life. Since t o p e r f o r m a liturgical o r d e r , w h i c h is b y d e f i n i t i o n a relatively invariant sequence o f acts and utterances encoded by someone other t h a n the p e r f o r m e r himself, is t o conform t o it, a u t h o r i t y o r directive is intrinsic to l i t u r g i c a l o r d e r . H o w e v e r , the account just o f f e r e d suggests s o m e t h i n g m o r e i n t i m a t e , and perhaps even m o r e b i n d i n g than w h a t e v e r is con­ n o t e d b y terms l i k e " a u t h o r i t y " and " c o n f o r m i t y . " T h e n o t i o n o f c o m ­ m u n i c a t i o n i m p l i e s , m i n i m a l l y , transmitters, receivers, messages, and channels t h r o u g h w h i c h messages are carried f r o m transmitters t o r e ­ ceivers. S o m e t i m e s , m o r e o v e r , as i n t h e case o f canonical messages, the senders o r encoders o f messages are separate f r o m t h e transmitters. W e earlier n o t e d a peculiarity o f r i t u a l c o m m u n i c a t i o n , namely that i n r i t u a l t h e transmitters and receivers are o f t e n o n e and t h e same. A t least the t r a n s m i t t e r is always a m o n g the receivers. N o w w e have n o t e d another o f ritual's peculiarities. I n r i t u a l the transmitter-receiver becomes fused w i t h t h e message he is t r a n s m i t t i n g and receiving. I n c o n f o r m i n g t o that w h i c h his p e r f o r m a n c e brings i n t o b e i n g , and w h i c h comes alive i n its p e r f o r m a n c e , h e becomes indistinguishable f r o m it, a part o f it, f o r the t i m e b e i n g . Since this is t h e case, f o r a p e r f o r m e r t o reject t h e canonical

The Obvious Aspects of Ritual | 1 9 3 message e n c o d e d i n a l i t u r g i c a l o r d e r that is b e i n g realized b y his p e r ­ formance as he is p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n i t seems t o m e t o be a c o n t r a d i c t i o n i n terms, and thus impossible. T h i s is t o say that by performing a liturgical order the performer accepts, and indicates to himself and to others that he accepts, whatever is encoded in the canons of the liturgical order in which he is participating. T h i s message o f acceptance is t h e indexical message that is intrinsic t o all l i t u r g i c a l p e r f o r m a n c e s , t h e indexical message w i t h o u t w h i c h l i t u r g i c a l o r d e r s a n d t h e canonical messages they encode are nonexistent o r vacuous. I t is n o t a trivial message because m e n are n o t b o u n d t o acceptance b y their genotypes. T h e y are o f t e n free n o t t o participate i n rituals i f they d o n o t care t o , and refusal t o participate is always a p o s s i b i l i t y , at least logically, conceivable b y p o t e n t i a l actors. Participation always rests i n some degree u p o n choice. W e see here, incidentally, h o w m y t h and r i t u a l differ i n an i m p o r t a n t w a y : r i t u a l specifies t h e relationship o f t h e p e r f o r m e r t o w h a t h e is p e r f o r m i n g w h i l e m y t h does not. A m y t h can be r e c o u n t e d as an enter­ t a i n m e n t by a b a r d , as an e d i f y i n g lesson f o r his c h i l d r e n by a father, o r as a set o f o p p o s i t i o n s b y a structuralist, a l t h o u g h i t m a y b e recited as d o c t r i n e b y a priest t o a novice. T o recite a m y t h is n o t necessarily t o accept i t , and a m y t h survives as w e l l o n t h e p r i n t e d page as i t does o n t h e tongues o f l i v i n g m e n . #

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W e are l e d h e r e back t o t h e m a t t e r o f p e r f o r m a t i v e s and t o the assertion that w h i l e all r i t u a l m a y n o t b e p e r f o r m a t i v e , rituals m a k e p e r f o r m a t i v e s possible. A u s t i n ( 1 9 6 2 : 2 6 f f . ) listed six c o n d i t i o n s that m u s t b e f u l f i l l e d i f p e r f o r m a t i v e s are t o c o m e off. T h e s e i n c l u d e such o b v i o u s stipulations as that t h e y be p e r f o r m e d b y p r o p e r persons u n d e r p r o p e r circumstances. N o w his first a n d m o s t basic c o n d i t i o n is that f o r c o n v e n t i o n a l states o f affairs t o b e achieved t h e r e m u s t exist accepted c o n v e n t i o n a l procedures f o r achieving t h e m . T h e y cannot be achieved w i t h o u t such conventions. I f y o u n g m e n are t o b e t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o k n i g h t s there m u s t b e a p r o c e d u r e f o r d o i n g so, and this p r o c e d u r e m u s t b e acceptable t o t h e r e l e v a n t p u b l i c . T h e acceptance o f a p r o c e d u r e f o r d u b b i n g k n i g h t s also o b v i o u s l y presupposes t h e existence o f an accepted c o n v e n t i o n o f k n i g h t ­ h o o d . T h i s s t i p u l a t i o n is n o t vacuous, f o r i t can b e v i o l a t e d . F o r instance, it is u n l i k e l y that i n t h e c o n t e m p o r a r y U n i t e d States a slap o f t h e g l o v e across t h e cheek w o u l d ever result i n a d u e l . T h e c o n v e n t i o n s o f h o n o r , o f w h i c h this r i t u a l action was a part, are n o longer accepted. T h e y n o l o n g e r exist except i n m e m o r y o r history. A l t h o u g h A u s t i n stipulated as requisite t o t h e effectiveness o f per­ f o r m a t i v e s that t h e relevant conventions exist a n d b e accepted, h e gave n o a t t e n t i o n t o t h e m a t t e r o f h o w this p r e r e q u i s i t e is f u l f i l l e d . I a m a r g u i n g here that i t is f u l f i l l e d b y ritual. T h e p e r f o r m a n c e o f ritual

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establishes t h e existence o f c o n v e n t i o n s a n d accepts t h e m simultane­ ously a n d inextricably. R i t u a l p e r f o r m a n c e is n o t i n itself merely, n o r e v e n necessarily, factitive. I t is n o t always p e r f o r m a t i v e i n a simple way, m e r e l y b r i n g i n g i n t o b e i n g c o n v e n t i o n a l states o f affairs t h r o u g h con­ v e n t i o n a l actions. I t is, rather, meta-performative and a ^ t a - f a c t i t i v e , f o r it establishes, that is, i t stipulates and accepts, t h e conventions i n respect t o w h i c h c o n v e n t i o n a l states o f affairs are d e f i n e d and realized. T h e canons accepted i n t h e i r p e r f o r m a n c e m a y , o f course, represent c o n v e n t i o n a l understandings c o n c e r n i n g nature a n d t h e cosmos, o r social a n d m o r a l rules as w e l l as s i m p l e p e r f o r m a t i v e s , b u t i n any case t h e p e r f o r m a n c e o f a l i t u r g i c a l o r d e r realizes o r establishes t h e c o n v e n t i o n s that the liturgical o r d e r e m b o d i e s . I t may b e suggested that as the reality l y i n g b e h i n d n o t i o n s o f t h e magical p o w e r o f w o r d s is simple performativeness m y s t i ­ fied, so m a y t h e reality l y i n g b e h i n d t h e creative p o w e r o f T h e W o r d — the E t e r n a l W o r d — b e m e t a - p e r f o r m a t i v e n e s s m y s t i f i e d — t h e establish­ m e n t o f c o n v e n t i o n s t h r o u g h p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n invariant liturgical orders. VII T h e assertion that acceptance is intrinsic t o p e r f o r m a n c e is o n t h e face o f it e i t h e r d u b i o u s o r i n d u b i t a b l e , and t h e r e f o r e requires some c o m m e n t and clarification. First, t o say that t h e p e r f o r m e r accepts t h e a u t h o r i t y o f a liturgical o r d e r i n p e r f o r m i n g i t is n o t t o say that h e is necessarily d o i n g a n y t h i n g very grave. T h e g r a v i t y o f t h e act o f acceptance is c o n t i n g e n t u p o n w h a t e v e r t h e liturgical o r d e r represents. T h i s , o f course, varies. S e c o n d , a n d m o r e i m p o r t a n t , "acceptance" is n o t s y n o n y m o u s w i t h belief. B e l i e f I take t o b e some sort o f i n w a r d state k n o w a b l e subjec­ tively, i f at all. Acceptance, i n contrast, is n o t a private state b u t a public act. v i s i b l e t o b o t h t h e witnesses a n d t h e p e r f o r m e r himself. T h i s is t o reiterate i n a d i f f e r e n t w a y a p o i n t m a d e i n section III, namely that p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n r i t u a l m a r k s a b o u n d a r y , so t o speak, b e t w e e n p u b l i c and p r i v a t e processes. L i t u r g i c a l o r d e r s are p u b l i c , and p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h e m constitutes a p u b l i c acceptance o f a p u b l i c o r d e r , regardless o f the p r i v a t e state o f belief. Acceptance is, thus, a f u n d a m e n t a l social act, and i t f o r m s a basis f o r p u b l i c o r d e r s , w h i c h u n k n o w a b l e a n d volatile b e l i e f o r convic­ t i o n cannot. A c c e p t a n c e n o t o n l y is n o t belief. I t does n o t even i m p l y belief. T h e p r i v a t e processes o f individuals m a y o f t e n b e persuaded b y t h e i r r i t u a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n t o c o m e i n t o c o n f o r m i t y w i t h t h e i r p u b l i c acts, b u t this is n o t always t h e case. T h i s suggests that w h i l e p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n l i t u r g i c a l p e r f o r m a n c e may b e h i g h l y visible, i t is n o t v e r y p r o f o u n d , f o r i t n e i t h e r indicates n o r does i t necessarily p r o d u c e an i n w a r d state c o n f o r m i n g

The Obvious Aspects of Ritual | 1 9 5 i t directly. B u t f o r this v e r y reason i t is i n some sense v e r y p r o f o u n d , f o r i t makes i t possible f o r the p e r f o r m e r t o transcend his o w n d o u b t by accepting i n defiance o f it. Acceptance i n this sense has m u c h i n c o m m o n w i t h some theological n o t i o n s o f faith ( O ' D o h e r t y 1 9 7 3 b : 8ff.; T i l l i c h 1 9 5 7 : i 6 f f . ) . N e v e r t h e l e s s , i t must be recognized that w h e n t h e p u b l i c and t h e p r i v a t e are so loosely related, a range o f what A u s t i n ( 1 9 6 2 : 95ff.) called " i n f e l i c i t i e s " — i n s i n c e r i t i e s and t h e l i k e — b e c o m e possible, and they i n c l u d e possibilities f o r deceit. B u t t h e alternative t o t h e possibility o f deceit m i g h t w e l l b e t h e certainty o f n o n - o r d e r o r disorder i f p u b l i c o r d e r w e r e r e q u i r e d t o d e p e n d u p o n t h e c o n t i n u i n g acquies­ cence o f the p r i v a t e processes o f those subject t o i t — u p o n their belief, sincerity, g o o d w i l l , c o n v i c t i o n , f o r these surely m u s t fluctuate c o n t i n u ­ ously. W h i l e i t is perhaps o b v i o u s i t is w o r t h r e i t e r a t i n g that insincerity and the possibility o f deceit are intrinsic t o t h e very acts that m a k e social life possible f o r organisms that relate t o each o t h e r i n acccordance w i t h v o l u n t a r i l y accepted c o n v e n t i o n rather than i n ways m o r e n a r r o w l y defined b y t h e i r genotypes. O u r a r g u m e n t here suggests, h o w e v e r , that although liturgical p e r f o r m a n c e does n o t eliminate infelicities, i t does i n some degree offset o r ameliorate their effects by r e n d e r i n g t h e m i r r e l e ­ vant. I t is t h e visible, explicit, p u b l i c act o f acceptance, and n o t t h e i n v i s i b l e , a m b i g u o u s , p r i v a t e sentiment that is socially a n d m o r a l l y binding. T o say, t h e n , that a liturgical o r d e r is i n its nature authoritative, o r that the canons i t encodes are accepted i n its p e r f o r m a n c e , is n o t t o say that the p e r f o r m e r w i l l " b e l i e v e " t h e cosmic o r d e r i t may p r o j e c t o r approve o f t h e rules o r n o r m s i t may i n c o r p o r a t e . I t is n o t even t o claim that he w i l l abide b y these rules o r n o r m s . W e all k n o w that a m a n may p a r t i c i ­ pate i n a l i t u r g y i n w h i c h c o m m a n d m e n t s against adultery and t h i e v i n g are p r o n o u n c e d , t h e n p i l f e r f r o m the p o o r b o x o n his way o u t o f c h u r c h , o r depart f r o m c o m m u n i o n t o tryst w i t h his neighbor's w i f e . B u t such b e h a v i o r does n o t r e n d e r his acceptance meaningless o r e m p t y . I t is an e n t a i l m e n t o f l i t u r g i c a l performances t o establish c o n v e n t i o n a l u n d e r ­ standings, rules, and n o r m s i n accordance w i t h w h i c h everyday behavior is supposed t o p r o c e e d , n o t t o c o n t r o l that behavior directly. Participa­ t i o n i n a r i t u a l i n w h i c h a p r o h i b i t i o n against adultery is enunciated by, a m o n g o t h e r s , h i m s e l f may n o t p r e v e n t a m a n f r o m c o m m i t t i n g adultery, b u t i t does establish f o r h i m t h e p r o h i b i t i o n o f adultery as a r u l e that he h i m s e l f has accepted as he e n l i v e n e d it. W h e t h e r o r n o t h e abides b y the r u l e h e has obligated h i m s e l f t o d o so. I f he does n o t he has violated an o b l i g a t i o n that he himselj has a v o w e d . T h e assertion here is similar t o that o f t h e p h i l o s o p h e r J o h n Searle, w h o has argued that: t o

r

W h e n one enters an institutional activity by invoking the rules of that institu­ tion one necessarily commits oneself in such and such ways, regardless of

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whether one approves or disapproves of the institution. In the case o f lingu ti institutions like promising and accepting the serious utterance o f words com­ mits one in ways which are determined by the meaning o f the words. In certain first person utterances the utterance is the undertaking o f an obligation. [ 1 9 6 9 189] lS

c

Searle later notes that t h e n o t i o n o f o b l i g a t i o n is closely related to those o f accepting, r e c o g n i z i n g , a c k n o w l e d g i n g . T h i s suggests that there is n o o b l i g a t i o n w i t h o u t acceptance, a n d perhaps that m o r a l i t y begins w i t h acceptance. W h i l e t h e acceptance o f c o n v e n t i o n a l undertakings, rules, and p r o c e d u r e s is possible o u t s i d e o f r i t u a l , the f o r m a l and public n a t u r e o f l i t u r g i c a l p e r f o r m a n c e makes i t very clear that a n act o f accep­ tance is t a k i n g place, that t h e acceptance is serious, and w h a t i t is that is b e i n g accepted. I n A u s t i n ' s terms ( 1 9 6 2 : passim) i t is " e x p l i c i t l y per­ f o r m a t i v e . " B u t m u c h m o r e is i m p l i c i t i n r i t u a l acceptance than simply m a k i n g clear and w e i g h t y w h a t is b e i n g d o n e and i n respect t o w h a t i t is b e i n g d o n e . M o r e o v e r , that t h e obligations clearly a n d explicitly ac­ cepted i n liturgical p e r f o r m a n c e are nullified neither b y disbelief n o r v i o l a t i o n has a significance transcending t h e p r o b l e m s o f insincerity and deceitfulness. I t m a y b e that some c o n v e n t i o n s , particularly those o f a m o r e o r less n e u t r a l sort, such as linguistic c o n v e n t i o n s , can emerge o u t o f o r d i n a r y usage a n d b e m a i n t a i n e d by o r d i n a r y usage i n sufficient stability t o allow m e a n i n g f u l a n d o r d e r l y social i n t e r a c t i o n . I n such cases " t h e n o r m is i d e n t i c a l w i t h t h e statistical average" (Leach 1 9 7 2 : 3 2 0 ) . V a r i a t i o n w i t h respect t o some c o n v e n t i o n s can b e c o m f o r t a b l y tolerated and usage may be a l l o w e d t o establish, m a i n t a i n , o r change t h e m . B u t statistical averages arising o u t o f usage are n o t able t o establish c o n v e n t i o n a l understand­ ings, rules, o r p r o c e e d i n g s , c o n c e r n i n g some aspects o f social l i f e . F o r instance, o r d i n a r y usage m i g h t have difficulty c o n c e r n i n g t h e establish­ m e n t o f c o n v e n t i o n a l understandings about things w i t h o u t material o r b e h a v i o r a l referents and t h e r e f o r e w i t h o u t any o r d i n a r y u s a g e — c o n v e n ­ tions c o n c e r n i n g gods and the l i k e . I t may also have difficulty establishing c o n v e n t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g aspects o f social l i f e that are n o t o n l y arbitrary, b u t h i g h l y charged e m o t i o n a l l y , o r that are dangerous, o r r e q u i r e c o ­ o r d i n a t i o n — those c o n c e r n i n g , f o r instance, sex, leadership, service t o the social g r o u p . B e h a v i o r a l variations may b e less tolerable w i t h respect t o these matters than w i t h respect t o linguistic usage, and v a r i a t i o n o r u n ­ certainty as t o the precise nature o f the c o n v e n t i o n , a somewhat d i f f e r e n t m a t t e r , m a y b e e v e n less tolerable than variations i n t h e behavior i t p r e s u m a b l y directs. O r d i n a r y usage always varies, and i n o r d i n a r y usage rules a n d c o n v e n t i o n s are f r e q u e n t l y v i o l a t e d . Leach was generally cor­ rect b u t d i d n o t p u t t h e m a t t e r strongly e n o u g h w h e n he suggested that " i f anarchy is t o be a v o i d e d , t h e individuals w h o make u p a society m u s t

The Obvious Aspects of Ritual | 1 9 7 f r o m t i m e t o t i m e be r e m i n d e d o f the u n d e r l y i n g o r d e r that is supposed g u i d e t h e i r social activities. R i t u a l performances have this f u n c t i o n f o r the g r o u p as a w h o l e ; they m o m e n t a r i l y m a k e explicit what is o t h e r w i s e f i c t i o n " ( 1 9 5 4 : 1 6 ) . A l t h o u g h usage may n o t be f a i t h f u l t o it, that w h i c h is represented i n l i t u r g y is n o t a f i c t i o n , and t h e p e r f o r m a n c e does m o r e than remind individuals o f an u n d e r l y i n g o r d e r . I t establishes that o r d e r . Usage erodes o r d e r and i t is t h e r e f o r e necessary t o establish at least some c o n v e n t i o n s i n a way that protects t h e m f r o m d i s s o l u t i o n i n t h e variations o f o r d i n a r y usage and f r o m o v e r t h r o w b y the violations i n w h i c h usage abounds. L i t u r g y preserves t h e c o n v e n t i o n s i t encodes i n v i o l a t e i n the face o f t h e vagaries o f usage, and i n this respect i t may be w i t h o u t f u n c t i o n a l equivalents. C o n v e n t i o n s p r o m u l g a t e d by decree and m a i n t a i n e d b y f o r c e may also be insulated f r o m dissolution i n usage. B u t the acceptance by those w h o m they a i m to subordinate is n o t intrinsic t o decrees. I t m a y also be suggested i n passing that the c o n d i t i o n s p e r m i t ­ t i n g some m e n t o establish c o n v e n t i o n s b y issuing directives t o w h i c h o t h e r m e n m u s t c o n f o r m m a y b e relatively recent, f o r they may rest u p o n d i f f e r e n t i a l c o n t r o l o f strategic resources, and there was p r o b a b l y l i t t l e o p p o r t u n i t y f o r such d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n t o d e v e l o p b e f o r e the appear­ ance o f p l a n t and animal c u l t i v a t i o n t e n thousand o r so years ago. M o r e o v e r , e v e n after social stratification based u p o n resource c o n t r o l became w e l l d e v e l o p e d , authorities c o n t i n u e d — a s some still d o — t o stand u p o n t h e i r sanctity, and sanctity itself may e m e r g e o u t o f r i t u a l . W e shall r e t u r n t o this later, n o t i n g here that t h e p e r f o r m a n c e o f r i t u a l does n o t r e q u i r e s u p e r o r d i n a t e h u m a n authorities, and m u s t have antedated f o r m s f o r p r o m u l g a t i n g c o n v e n t i o n s that d o . I t is plausible t o suggest, t h e r e f o r e , that r i t u a l , i n t h e v e r y structure o f w h i c h a u t h o r i t y and acqui­ escence are i m p l i c i t , was the p r i m o r d i a l means by w h i c h m e n , divested o f genetically d e t e r m i n e d o r d e r , established the conventions by w h i c h they o r d e r themselves. I n s u m , r i t u a l is u n i q u e i n at once establishing c o n v e n t i o n s , that is t o say e n u n c i a t i n g and accepting t h e m , and i n insulating t h e m f r o m usage. I n b o t h e n u n c i a t i n g c o n v e n t i o n s and accepting t h e m , i t contains w i t h i n itself n o t simply a symbolic representation o f social contract, b u t a c o n s u m m a t i o n o f social contract. A s such, r i t u a l , w h i c h also establishes a b o u n d a r y b e t w e e n p r i v a t e and p u b l i c processes, thereby insulating p u b l i c o r d e r s f r o m private vagaries (and vice v e r s a ) ' * is the basic social act. t o

*Ervin GorTman, in "The Nature of Deference and Demeanor" (1956) and later works, has argued that the rituals of deference and demeanor protect the psyche from lacera­ tions that would inevitably result from naked encounters.

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VIII T o say that r i t u a l is t h e basic social act must b e t o say that i t is i n some sense m o r a l , f o r t h e social subsumes t h e m o r a l . N o t a l l rituals are e x p l i c i t l y m o r a l , b u t i t is w o r t h m a k i n g e x p l i c i t that m o r a l i t y , l i k e social contract, is i m p l i c i t i n ritual's v e r y s t r u c t u r e . M o r a l d i c t a m a y , o f course, f o r m part o f t h e canon that a l i t u r g y carries, a n d w e have already n o t e d that i t is also i m p l i e d b y o b l i g a t i o n , w h i c h some p h i l o s o p h e r s , at least, w o u l d take t o b e entailed b y the acceptance i n t r i n s i c t o p e r f o r m a n c e . Failure t o abide b y t h e terms o f an o b l i g a t i o n that o n e has accepted is generally, perhaps even universally, categorized as i m m o r a l , u n e t h i c a l , o r w r o n g . I t m i g h t even b e argued that t h e v i o l a t i o n o f o b l i g a t i o n is t h e f u n d a m e n t a l i m m o r a l act. T h i s is n o t o u r c o n c e r n h e r e , h o w e v e r , and m o r a l i t y is intrinsic t o ritual's struc­ t u r e i n a y e t m o r e subtle way. W h i l e n o t c o n f i n e d t o t h e m , the matter may b e illustrated most clearly b y reference t o specifically factitive rituals l i k e o r d i n a t i o n s , d u b b i n g s , and peace declarations. I t is o f t h e essence t o contrast such p e r f o r m a t i v e acts o r utterances w i t h o r d i n a r y descriptive statements. A u s t i n i n i t i a l l y t r i e d t o say that p e r f o r m a t i v e s are neither t r u e n o r false ( 1 9 7 0 - 233ff.) whereas statement are. Later h e f o u n d this n o t always t o b e t h e case. H o w e v e r , they d o d i f f e r f r o m statements i n a related w a y w h i c h he d i d n o t n o t e b u t w h i c h does have t o d o w i t h t r u t h , and w i t h t h e f o u n d a t i o n s o f m o r a l i t y . T h e adequacy o f a d e s c r i p t i v e statement is assessed b y t h e degree t o w h i c h i t c o n f o r m s t o t h e state o f affairs that i t p u r p o r t s t o describe. I f it is i n sufficient c o n f o r m i t y w e say that i t is t r u e , accurate, o r correct. I f i t is n o t w e say that i t is false, e r r o n e o u s , inaccurate, l y i n g . T h e state o f affairs is t h e c r i t e r i o n b y w h i c h t h e statement is assessed. T h e relationship o f p e r f o r m a t i v e s — p a r t i c u l a r l y factitives and c o m m i s s i v e s — t o t h e states o f affairs w i t h w h i c h they are c o n c e r n e d is exactly t h e inverse. I f , f o r instance, a m a n is p r o p e r l y d u b b e d t o k n i g h t h o o d and t h e n proceeds t o v i o l a t e all o f t h e canons o f chivalry, o r i f peace is declared i n a p r o p e r l y c o n d u c t e d r i t u a l b u t soon after o n e o f t h e parties t o t h e declaration attacks t h e o t h e r , w e w o u l d n o t say that t h e d u b b i n g o r t h e peace d e c l a r a t i o n w e r e faulty, b u t that t h e states o f affairs w e r e faulty. We judge the state of affairs by the degree to which it conforms to the stipulations of the performative ritual. T h u s , liturgical orders p r o v i d e c r i t e r i a i n terms o f w h i c h e v e n t s — u s a g e a n d h i s t o r y — m a y b e j u d g e d . A s such, liturgical o r d e r s a r e intrinsically c o r r e c t o r m o r a l . M o r a l i t y is i n h e r e n t i n t h e structure o f l i t u r g i c a l p e r f o r m a n c e prior t o w h a t e v e r its canons assert a b o u t m o r a l i t y i t s e l f o r a b o u t w h a t e v e r i n particular is m o r a l . T h i s m o r a l i t y is n o t l i m i t e d t o the structure o f simple factitive and commissive rituals, w hich seek t o establish particular c o n v e n t i o n a l states o f affairs, f

The Obvious Aspects of Ritual | 1 9 9 b u t is intrinsic as w e l l t o rituals that seek t o establish c o n v e n t i o n a l orders. I t is o f interest h e r e than ancient Persians and Indians r e f e r r e d t o states o f affairs that d e p a r t e d f r o m the p r o p e r o r d e r , w h i c h was estab­ lished liturgically, b y a t e r m , anrta, that also seems t o have meant " l i e " ( D u c h e s n e - G u i U e m i n 1 9 6 6 : 26ff.; B r o w n 1 9 7 2 : 252ff.). IX T h a t v i r t u a l l y all rituals i n c l u d e acts as w e l l as w o r d s , and o f t e n objects and substances as w e l l , suggests that n o t all messages are c o m m u n i c a t e d equally w e l l b y a l l media. W e t o u c h e d u p o n this q u e s t i o n earlier i n n o t i n g that t h e indexical messages t r a n s m i t t e d b y t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f o b j e c t s — p i g s , pearlshells, blankets, and copper p l a q u e s — i n c o m p e t i ­ tive feasting c o u l d n o t have b e e n t r a n s m i t t e d as w e l l — o r even at a l l — b y w o r d s , and physical acts may also have distinct c o m m u n i c a t i v e virtues. F o r m a l postures and gestures may c o m m u n i c a t e s o m e t h i n g m o r e , o r c o m m u n i c a t e i t b e t t e r , than d o t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g w o r d s . F o r instance, t o k n e e l s u b o r d i n a t i o n , it is plausible t o suggest, is n o t s i m p l y t o state s u b o r d i n a t i o n , b u t t o display i t , and h o w may i n f o r m a t i o n c o n c e r n i n g some state o f a t r a n s m i t t e r b e t t e r be signaled than by displaying that state itself? W e have r e t u r n e d h e r e t o the indexical status o f messages con­ c e r n i n g t h e state o f transmitters, a d d i n g t o o u r earlier discussion t h e suggestion that a l t h o u g h w o r d s may serve as indices, and may even b e necessary' t o stipulate t h e indexicality o f physical acts (dancing w o u l d not be p r o m i s i n g unless i t w e r e s o m e t i m e so stipulated i n w o r d s ) , physical acts carry i n d e x i c a l messages m o r e c o n v i n c i n g l y than does language. " A c t i o n s , " as t h e saying goes, "speak l o u d e r than w o r d s , " even w h e n the actions are r i t u a l a c t i o n s — o r perhaps especially w h e n they are r i t u a l actions, f o r t h e acceptance o f a particular o r d e r is intrinsic t o a r i t u a l act. L i t u r g y ' s acts may also speak m o r e clearly than w o r d s . T h e very l i m i t a ­ tions o f display may enhance its clarity. T h e subtlety o f o r d i n a r y language is such that i t can suggest, c o n n o t e , h i n t at, o r i m p l y such delicately g r a d e d degrees o f , say, s u b o r d i n a t i o n , respect, o r c o n t e m p t that i t can s h r o u d all social relations i n a m b i g u i t y , vagueness, and uncertainty. B u t o n e kneels o r o n e does n o t , and w e may recall here the clarity that is intrinsic t o binary signals. I t m a y b e o b j e c t e d , h o w e v e r , that t h e language o f l i t u r g y is n o t o r d i n a r y language, b u t stylized and invariant. A s o n e kneels o r o n e does n o t , so o n e does o r does n o t recite a r i t u a l f o r m u l a , and so ritual w o r d s as w e l l as acts c a n — a n d u n d o u b t e d l y d o — t r a n s m i t indexical messages. A c t s , h o w e v e r , have a related v i r t u e n o t possessed by e i t h e r w o r d s o r the o b j e c t s and substances that rituals may e m p l o y . Earlier I suggested that i n r i t u a l , t r a n s m i t t e r , receiver, and canonical message are fused i n t h e

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p a r t i c i p a n t , b u t n o t h i n g was said about w h a t it is that constitutes the p a r t i c i p a n t . G i v e n t h e possibility, o r even p r o b a b i l i t y , o f discontinuity o r e v e n conflict, b e t w e e n p u b l i c and p r i v a t e processes this is n o t a trivial q u e s t i o n . I n d e e d , i t is h i g h l y p r o b l e m a t i c . I w o u l d n o w p r o p o s e that t h e use o f t h e b o d y defines t h e self o f the p e r f o r m e r f o r h i m s e l f and f o r others. I n k n e e l i n g , f o r instance, he is not m e r e l y sending a message t o t h e effect that he submits i n ephemeral w o r d s that flutter away f r o m his m o u t h . H e identifies his inseparable, indispensable, a n d e n d u r i n g b o d y w i t h his s u b o r d i n a t i o n . T h e subordi­ nated self is n e i t h e r a creature o f insubstantial w o r d s f r o m w h i c h he may separate h i m s e l f w i t h o u t loss o f b l o o d , n o r some insubstantial essence or s o u l that cannot b e located i n space o r c o n f i n e d i n t i m e . I t is his visible, p r e s e n t , l i v i n g substance that he p u t s o n t h e l i n e , " that "stands up ( o r kneels d o w n ) t o b e c o u n t e d . " A s " s a y i n g " m a y b e " d o i n g , " " d o i n g " may also b e an especially p o w e r f u l — o r s u b s t a n t i a l — w a y o f "saying." A s r i t u a l acts and objects have special c o m m u n i c a t i o n qualities so, o f c o u r s e , d o w o r d s have o t h e r s , as T a m b i a h ( 1 9 6 8 ) has argued. Whereas acts a n d substances represent substantially that w h i c h is o f t h e here and n o w , t h e w o r d s o f l i t u r g y can connect t h e h e r e a n d n o w t o t h e past, o r e v e n t o t h e b e g i n n i n g o f t i m e , and t o t h e f u t u r e , o r even t o time's end. I n t h e i r v e r y invariance t h e w o r d s o f l i t u r g y i m p l i c i t l y assimilate t h e current e v e n t i n t o a n ancient o r ageless category o f events, s o m e t h i n g that speechless gesture, m o r t a l substance, o r expendable objects alone can­ n o t . Because o f t h e i r symbolic quality, this is t o say, invariant words easily escape f r o m t h e h e r e a n d n o w and thus can represent felicitously t h e canonical, w h i c h is never confined t o t h e here a n d now. O b j e c t s like t h e cross can have symbolic value, i t is t r u e , a n d thus m a k e reference to that w h i c h is p r e s e n t i n n e i t h e r t i m e n o r space, b u t such objects m u s t be assigned s y m b o l i c value by w o r d s , a n d w o r d s are u l t i m a t e l y necessary t o representations o f t h e canonical. T h e i n f o r m a t i v e v i r t u e s o f t h e physical and v e r b a l aspects o f l i t u r g y thus seem t o c o m p l e m e n t o r even c o m p l e t e each o t h e r . B u t terms l i k e " c o m p l e m e n t " o r even " c o m p l e t e " d o n o t express adequately t h e i n t i ­ macy o f t h e relationship b e t w e e n liturgical w o r d s a n d acts. B y d r a w i n g h i m s e l f i n t o a p o s t u r e t o w h i c h canonical w o r d s g i v e s y m b o l i c value, the p e r f o r m e r incarnates a s y m b o l . H e gives substance t o t h e s y m b o l as that s y m b o l gives h i m f o r m . T h e canonical and t h e indexical c o m e together i n t h e substance o f t h e formal p o s t u r e o r gesture. 4

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I n i n c l u d i n g w i t h i n itself b o t h w o r d and substance, r i t u a l m a y contain w i t h i n itself a p a r a d i g m o f creation. M a n y m y t h s o f c r e a t i o n , as Bateson ( 1 9 7 2 : x x i i i ff.) has recently emphasized, d o n o t take creation t o b e ,

The Obvious Aspects of Ritual \ 2 0 1 simply* o r e v e n at all, the p r o d u c t i o n o f m a t t e r ex nihilo, b u t o f g i v i n g form t o inchoate m a t t e r already i n existence. C r e a t i o n , this is t o say, is conceived as t h e i n f o r m i n g o f substance and the substantiation o f f o r m , a u n i o n o f f o r m and substance. F o r m — t h e o r d e r i n g p r i n c i p l e o r a g e n t — i s o f t e n e x p l i c i t l y associated w i t h w o r d . T h e M a m a n d a b a r i m e n , w h o ap­ pear i n t h e m y t h s o f the W a l b i r i p e o p l e o f C e n t r a l A u s t r a l i a , e m e r g e f r o m t h e y e t featureless earth. First, t h e y give themselves b e i n g b y singing t h e i r o w n names, and t h e n they w a l k across t h e land singing its places a n d species i n t o b e i n g ( M e g g i t t 1 9 6 5 ) . T h e W a w i l a k sisters o f the M u r n g i n p e o p l e o f A r n h e m L a n d also created places and species b y n a m i n g t h e m ( W a r n e r 1 9 3 7 : i 5 o f f . ) . I n Genesis the w o r l d was f o r m e d o u t o f waste b y t h e utterances o f G o d , and earth was t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o m a n b y t h e b r e a t h o f G o d . B r e a t h and w o r d are surely c o n n e c t e d . T h e second A d a m was, o f course, the W o r d b e c o m e Flesh. C r e a t i o n , t h e n , i n some m y t h s at least, is conceived as the p r i m o r d i a l u n i o n o f t w o p r i m i t i v e and i r r e d u c i b l e categories, f o r m and substance, and i n r i t u a l t h e r e seems t o be a r e u n i o n o f this p r i m o r d i a l u n i o n . W h a t better w a y t o represent f o r m than b y the invariant w o r d s o f a l i t u r g i c a l o r d e r , o r substance than b y d r a w i n g t h e b o d y i n t o a r i t u a l p o s t u r e o r using s o m e o b j e c t o r substance sacramentally ? A similar t h e o r y c o n ­ c e r n i n g t h e sacraments was first p r o p o u n d e d b y W i l l i a m o f A u x e r r e i n the t h i r t e e n t h c e n t u r y . " T h e sensible act o r t h i n g used i n a sacrament was l i k e n e d t o formless m a t t e r , b e i n g i n d e t e r m i n a t e i n use and adaptable t o m a n y p u r p o s e s ; i t was d e t e r m i n e d t o a spiritual significance by t h e use o f w o r d s , w h i c h t h e n p l a y e d the part o f t h e metaphysical forma essentialis (Lacey 1 9 1 8 : 9 0 7 ) . B u t as substance is formless w i t h o u t w o r d , so f o r m alone c o u l d n o t exist i n this w o r l d o f m a t t e r and energy i n d e p e n d e n t o f substance. C o n s e q u e n t l y , all C a t h o l i c sacraments r e q u i r e their p r o p e r materia as w e l l as t h e i r p r o p e r i n v o c a t i o n , a n d so d o those o f t h e O r t h o d o x c h u r c h . I t s h o u l d b e n o t e d that w h e n W i l l i a m o f A u x e r r e sought t o account f o r t h e fact that t h e sacraments i n c l u d e d b o t h w o r d and m a t t e r t h e t e r m " s a c r a m e n t " was used m u c h m o r e generally than i t has b e e n since t h e C o u n c i l o f T r e n t , w h i c h stipulated just seven sacra­ m e n t s " p r o p e r l y so-called." H i s p r o p o s a l , that is, was advanced as a m o r e o r less general t h e o r y o f C a t h o l i c r i t u a l . ft

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T o o b s e r v e that r i t u a l i n i n c l u d i n g b o t h verbal and physical c o m p o n e n t s may i n some sense r e p r e s e n t — r e - p r e s e n t — a p r i m o r d i a l u n i o n o f f o r m and substance does n o t account f o r w h y i t is that m e n should take this u n i o n t o be p r o b l e m a t i c , m u c h less f o r w h y f o r m should so o f t e n b e asso­ ciated w i t h w o r d s . T h e d i s t i n c t i o n does not arise d i r e c d y f r o m e x p e r i ­ ence, f o r , a f t e r a l l , n o o n e has e v e r experienced e i t h e r matterless f o r m o r

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formless matter. N a t u r e is precisely as f u l l o f o n e as o f t h e o t h e r . A n d yet, a l t h o u g h n o o n e has experienced chaos, everyone has experienced w h a t h e takes t o b e disorder. M o r e o v e r , a l t h o u g h the natural w o r l d is f u l l o f f o r m , t h e f o r m s o f the c o n v e n t i o n s pressing u p o n humans are not o b v i o u s l y g i v e n b y t h e f o r m s o f nature. I t is c o n v e n t i o n a l , n o t natural f o r m , that is p r o b l e m a t i c . I f the d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n f o r m and substance is t o b e m a d e at all t h e association o f f o r m w i t h w o r d s m a y be o b v i o u s , f o r c o n v e n t i o n a l f o r m s must u l t i m a t e l y b e specified i n w o r d s . T h i s is to say that c o n v e n t i o n a l f o r m s a r e , i n a sense, naturally associated w i t h w ords. B a t e s o n ( 1 9 7 2 : x x v ) has cautiously suggested that the d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n f o r m a n d substance m a y b e i m p l i c i t i n the subject-predicate r e l a t i o n s h i p i n o r d i n a r y language. A l m o s t all subjects can be predicated i n a n u m b e r o f ways and almost all predicates can apply t o a n u m b e r o f subjects. T h e subject-predicate relationship forces u p o n the m i n d alter­ natives, i n c l u d i n g alternative orders and disorders, and i n m a k i n g t h e m conceivable i t makes at least some o f t h e m possible. T h e very charac­ teristics o f language that p r o v i d e the basis f o r m a n s astounding adaptive flexibility also g i v e b i r t h t o c o n f u s i o n , and threaten w i t h chaos and babel the o r d e r s that g r o u p s o f m e n d o establish. T h u s , i f there are g o i n g t o be any w o r d s at all i t may b e necessary t o establish The Word. T h e W o r d is i m p l i c i t i n the invariant w o r d s o f liturgical orders, o f course, a n d i n c o s m o g o n i c m y t h s W o r d is established by the assertion that /'/ has estab­ lished t h e natural w o r l d . I n the p r i m o r d i a l u n i o n o f f o r m and substance expressed i n m y t h and o f w h i c h r i t u a l m a y be a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , the natural o r d e r is apparently f o r m e d b y , and thus absorbed i n t o , a c o n v e n ­ t i o n a l o r d e r . B u t t h e p o i n t o f t h e exercise is n o t so m u c h , I t h i n k , t o m a k e nature c o n v e n t i o n a l as the reverse. B y accounting f o r t h e palpable w o r l d o f trees and beasts and places t h e c o n v e n t i o n a l is t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o the apparently natural a n d , i n b e c o m i n g natural partakes o f t h e r e g u ­ larity, necessity, and solidity o f natural objects and processes that appar­ e n t l y present themselves directly t o t h e senses. T o conventionalize t h e natural is at t h e same t i m e t o naturalize t h e c o n v e n t i o n a l . I n t h e r i t u a l u n i o n o f f o r m a n d substance there is a r e u n i o n o f c o n v e n t i o n w i t h t h e n a t u r e f r o m w h i c h w o r d s have alienated, b u t never freed i t . r

X W o r d a n d w o r d s are c o m p o n e n t s o f language, and liturgical o r d e r s l i k e language have regular structures that may b e i n some respects analogous t o g r a m m a r s . B o t h r i t u a l and language are modes o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n , and it is n o t s u r p r i s i n g that some anthropologists s h o u l d take r i t u a l t o be a k i n d o f language. T h i s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o r analogy can be i l l u m i n a t i n g b u t ,

The Obvious Aspects of Ritual | 2 0 3 as those w h o p r o p o s e i t themselves hasten t o p o i n t o u t (e.g., Leach 1 9 6 6 ) , i t is very r o u g h , f o r l i t u r g y and language differ i n i n t e r e s t i n g ways, some o f w h i c h it is w e l l t o make explicit here. O n e i m p o r t a n t difference is i m p l i e d i n t h e o p p o s i t i o n o f W o r d t o w o r d s . A l l natural languages consist o f w o r d s and sets o f rules f o r c o m ­ b i n i n g t h e m i n t o m e a n i n g f u l utterances. W h i l e these rules restrict h o w things m a y be said they d o n o t themselves restrict w hat things may be said, and i t is possible i n any language t o say whatever there is vocabulary available t o say. I n contrast, t o t h e degree that a liturgical o r d e r is invariant t h e r e are o b v i o u s l y restrictions b e i n g placed u p o n w hat it can c o m m u n i c a t e . I n t h e e x t r e m e case w h a t it can c o m m u n i c a t e is reduced t o u n i t y . B o t h language and l i t u r g y may m a k e use o f t h e same w o r d s , o f t e n w i t h t h e same designata, b u t the ways i n w h i c h they may be related t o each o t h e r semantically i n t h e utterances o f o r d i n a r y language are n o t f o r m a l l y specified i n language, whereas they are i n liturgy. A s M a u r i c e B l o c h ( 1 9 7 3 ) has p u t i t , " t h e features o f j u n c t u r e " are fixed i n l i t u r g y , b u t o p e n i n language. T h e r e f o r e , o r d i n a r y language easily accommodates a r g u m e n t , nuance, g r a d a t i o n , and m o d i f i c a t i o n , b u t liturgical language does n o t . A l i t u r g y does n o t argue, b u t it may assert. T h e flexibility o f o r d i n a r y discourse is such that it can be responsive t o t h e ever-changing p r e s e n t , and w h e n a speakers utterances d o n o t take account o f changes i n w h a t is b e i n g said t o h i m w e take i t t o b e a sign o f p a t h o l o g y : he is o b t u s e , fanatical, insane o r possibly deaf. T h e r i g i d i t y o f l i t u r g i c a l dis­ course, i n contrast, is such that it can represent w h a t e v e r is conceived to be n e v e r - c h a n g i n g , and changes i n it m a y be taken t o be p a t h o l o g i c a l : e r r o n e o u s , u n o r t h o d o x , inefficacious, u n h a l l o w e d , heretical, o r blasphe­ m o u s . I n short, natural languages are o p e n codes; liturgies, a l t h o u g h they m u s t use t h e w o r d s o f language, are m o r e o r less c o n s t r i c t i n g orders. I t may b e suggested that t h e very act o f c o n f i n i n g w o r d s that m a y also appear i n t h e f r e e and loose usage o f o r d i n a r y discourse to t h e places assigned t o t h e m i n l i t u r g y emphasizes that liturgies are restrictive o r d e r s standing against the possibility o f unrestricted disorder. T

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W h i l e some w ords m a y have places i n b o t h o r d i n a r y and liturgical language, t h e r e are i m p o r t a n t differences b e t w e e n liturgical signs, even w h e n they are w o r d s , and t h e w o r d s o f o r d i n a r y discourse. A s V i c t o r T u r n e r ( 1 9 6 7 , 1 9 7 3 ) especially has emphasized, liturgical symbols are l i k e l y t o b e " m u l t i v o c a l i c , " that is, t h e y have a n u m b e r o f significata a n d , as b o t h he a n d Joseph C a m p b e l l ( 1 9 5 9 : passim) have argued, these significata are l i k e l y t o have a b i p o l a r d i s t r i b u t i o n . " A t o n e p o l e o f m e a n i n g . . . significata t e n d t o refer t o t h e m o r a l and social o r d e r s . . . at the o t h e r , t h e sensory . . . , are concentrated r e f e r e n c e s . . . that m a y b e

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e x p e c t e d t o stimulate desires and feelings" ( T u r n e r 1 9 7 3 : 1 1 0 0 ) , t i c u l a r l y references t o organic structures, substances, and processes. I t i$ p e r h a p s i m p o r t a n t i n this regard that liturgical signs are o f t e n substantial and at once iconic and indexical as w e l l as symbolic. I n contrast, the w o r d s o f o r d i n a r y language also d o f r e q u e n t l y have m o r e than one m e a n i n g b u t a n i m p o r t a n t difference distinguishes the way i n w h i c h they usually signify f r o m s y m b o l i z a t i o n i n ritual. I n everyday discourse the c o n t e x t usually tells us t o w h i c h o f a w o r d ' s several significata it presently refers. I f i t fails t o e l i m i n a t e all b u t o n e o f the possibilities w e say that the utterance is a m b i g u o u s , and u n d e r m o s t circumstances take ambiguity t o be a fault. O r d i n a r y discursive language is linear: o n e meaning follows another. I n contrast, t h e signification o f l i t u r g y has a simultaneous d i m e n s i o n . A - r i t u a l sign m a y refer t o a l l o f its significata at o n c e , a n d i t does n o t d e r i v e its meanings f r o m each o f t h e m separately so m u c h as i t derives its m e a n i n g f r o m t h e union o f these several significata T h i s is t o say that that w h i c h is noise i n o r d i n a r y language is m e a n i n g i n liturgy. O f course t h e m e a n i n g that m a y d e r i v e f r o m a concatenation o f significata among w h i c h m i g h t w e l l b e i n c l u d e d organic and psychic, as w e l l as social, e n v i r o n m e n t a l , a n d spiritual references, may finally be so abstract, c o m ­ p l e x , a n d e m o t i o n a l l y charged as t o b e ineffable. P a u l T i l l i c h l o n g ago distinguished w h a t he called symbols ( b y w h i c h h e m e a n t l i t u r g i c a l signs p a r t i c u l a r l y ) f r o m o t h e r elements o f c o m m u n i ­ c a t i o n i n n o t i n g that they "participate i n that t o w h i c h they p o i n t " ( 1 9 5 7 ) . A vague n o t i o n o f i d e n t i f i c a t i o n i f n o t indexicality m a y be i m p l i c i t i n this suggestion. B e a t t i e i m p l i e d t h e iconicity, o r s o m e t h i n g l i k e i t , o f l i t u r g i c a l c o m p o n e n t s i n arguing that t h e relationship b e t w e e n w h a t he ( i n agreement w i t h m a n y o t h e r s ) called symbols and t h e i r sig­ nificata is n o t m e r e l y arbitrary. T h e y are j o i n e d by an " u n d e r l y i n g r a t i o n a l e " o r appropriateness: t h e serpent b i t i n g its tail symbolizes eter­ n i t y , t h e large-headed and inscrutable o w l w i s d o m , whiteness p u r i t y and v i r t u e ( 1 9 6 4 : 6 9 f f . ) . F i r t h f o l l o w s a usage that has considerable currency w h e n h e says that symbols have " a c o m p l e x series o f associations, o f t e n o f an e m o t i o n a l k i n d , and [are] difficult (some w o u l d say impossible) t o describe i n t e r m s o t h e r t h a n partial r e p r e s e n t a t i o n " ( 1 9 7 3 : 7 5 ) - These and o t h e r understandings o f t h e s y m b o l a n d s y m b o l i z a t i o n o b v i o u s l y d i f f e r radically f r o m t h e c o n c e p t o f symbols as, simply, signs o n l y c o n ­ v e n t i o n a l l y related t o that w h i c h they signify. J o h n S k o r u p s k i ( 1 9 7 6 : H9ff.) has recently p o i n t e d o u t that designa­ t o r s are o f t w o types, those that name o r d e n o t e , a n d those that r e p r e ­ sent. T h u s " F i d o " names o r denotes F i d o , it does n o t represent h i m ; o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , a serpent b i t i n g its tail represents e t e r n i t y — i t does n o t n a m e o r d e n o t e i t ; equally whiteness represents p u r i t y rather than

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n a m i n g o r d e n o t i n g it. T h e t e r m " s y m b o l " has b e e n used t o refer t o b o t h d e n o t a t i v e and representational designators, and since the d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n d e n o t a t i o n and representation has s e l d o m been made e x p l i c i t some c o n f u s i o n has b e e n e n g e n d e r e d . S k o r u p s k i w o u l d reserve " s y m b o l " f o r representational designators, e x c l u d i n g f r o m its coverage those that simply d e n o t e o r name. H i s justification f o r this usage lies i n the i m p o r t a n c e o f representations i n ritual action: Thus the symbol substitutes for the thing symbolised. W e are sometimes said to think in words—certainly we communicate with each other in words. In words about things T h e symbol is itself made the object of thought. It stands for, or re-presents, the thing symbolised. In other words, it makes it present to the senses, and is treated for the purposes o f symbolic action as being what is sym­ bolised. O n this picture the logic of a symbolic action is clear: it represents or enacts an action, event or state o f affairs in which the thing represented by the symbol plays a part analogous to that which the symbol plays in the symbolic action itself. [1976: 123]

T h i s account suggests additional g r o u n d s f o r the substantial nature o f liturgical signs. I t accords c o m f o r t a b l y w i t h b o t h t h e contagious and sympathetic p r i n c i p l e s o f " m a g i c a l " efficacy, and i t is also c o m p a t i b l e w i t h a p e r f o r m a t i v e theory o f r i t u a l efficacy. S k o r u p s k i ' s d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n denotative and representational desig­ nators is i m p o r t a n t and useful b u t i t seems t o m e that n o t h i n g is t o b e gained and s o m e t h i n g is to be lost by reserving " s y m b o l " f o r representa­ t i o n a l designators exclusively. M o r e i m p o r t a n t , t o call signs that r e p r e ­ sent " s y m b o l s " and those that d e n o t e by a n o t h e r t e r m may be t o d i s t i n ­ g u i s h t h e m t o o radically. O n the o t h e r h a n d , t o distinguish i n a r o u g h way b e t w e e n representational symbols and denotative symbols is t o recognize t h e i r similarities as w e l l as t h e i r differences. I t also encourages r e c o g n i t i o n o f certain aspects o f the relationship o f representation t o d e n o t a t i o n . First, representation is c o n t i n g e n t u p o n d e n o t a t i o n . T h e W o r m O u r o b o u r o s c o u l d n o t represent e t e r n i t y u n t i l denotative w o r d s had p o i n t e d t o e t e r n i t y ; similarly, w h i t e c o u l d n o t represent p u r i t y o r v i r t u e u n t i l a n u m b e r o f d e n o t a t i v e operations had taken place. S e c o n d , representational symbols may b e fused o u t o f associations o f simpler significations, i n c l u d i n g d e n o t a t i v e symbols, i n liturgical p e r f o r m a n c e . T h a t is, i n t h e l i t u r g i c a l sign, w h i c h is m u l t i v o c a l i c and b i p o l a r , w h i c h m a y be at o n c e i c o n i c , i n d e x i c a l , and denotative, and w h i c h is e m b o d i e d i n s o m e t h i n g s u b s t a n t i a l — a cross, a flag, a p o s t u r e — t h e r e seems t o be u n i o n o f a concatenated mass o f simple significations i n t o a single b u t c o m p l e x r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . O n c e such a representation is b r o u g h t i n t o b e ­ i n g i t may be " t r e a t e d . . . as being w h a t is symbolised." W h e n that w h i c h is s y m b o l i z e d is abstract o r ineffable but the s y m b o l itself is substantial

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i t is t h e s y m b o l t h a t p r o v i d e s r e a l i t y t o t h e s y m b o l i z e d . M o r e o v e r , i t i e a s i e r t o o p e r a t e u p o n s u b s t a n t i a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s t h a n i n s u b s t a n t i a l sig­ n i f i c a t i o n s . T h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n d e n o t a t i o n a n d r e p r e s e n t a t i o n is n o t a b s o l u t e , a n d i n l i t u r g i e s d e n o t a t i o n s , j o i n e d w i t h i c o n s a n d i n d i c e s , are t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o representations. W e m a y recall here Bateson's observa­ t i o n ( 1 9 7 2 : 1 8 3 ) t h a t " i n t h e d i m area w h e r e a r t , m a g i c a n d r e l i g i o n o v e r l a p " t h e r e is s o m e t i m e s " a n a t t e m p t t o d e n y t h e difference b e t w e e n m a p a n d t e r r i t o r y " characteristic o f denotative symbols a n d t o r e t u r n t o a more innocent mode o f communication. T w o related points f o l l o w f r o m t h e complexity o f liturgical representa­ t i o n . F i r s t , a l t h o u g h i t is w e l l - k n o w n t h a t a m o n g s o m e p e o p l e l i t u r g i c a l o r d e r s are i m p o r t a n t i n t h e regulation o f social, political, o r ecological r e l a t i o n s , l i t u r g i c a l o r d e r s c a n n o t b e said t o " r e f l e c t , " " i n t e r p r e t , " o r " r e p r e s e n t " t h e m i n a n y s i m p l e w a y . T h e y a r e n o t s i m p l y social o r psychic orders played o u t a n d mystified i n public symbols. A s w e all k n o w , s o m e l i t u r g i e s m a k e n o r e f e r e n c e t o e x i s t i n g social a r r a n g e m e n t s o r i f t h e y d o , a t o n e a n d t h e same t i m e , e v e n i n t h e s e l f - s a m e s y m b o l , t h e y m a y r e f e r b o t h t o p u t a t i v e e n t i t i e s t r a n s c e n d i n g t h e e x i s t i n g social o r d e r s a n d t o t h e p r i v a t e processes o f individuals. I n their wholeness (a w h o l e n e s s i m p l i c i t i n t h e t e r m " o r d e r " as o r g a n i z a t i o n ) l i t u r g i c a l o r d e r s are n o t s i m p l y r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s o f t h e s o c i a l , p h y s i c a l , p s y c h i c , o r i m a g ­ ined. T h e y represent, that is, re-present, themselves (see B a b c o c k Abrahams 1973). W e note here another w a y i n w h i c h liturgical representations differ f r o m ordinary' language. T h e distinctions o f language c u t t h e w o r l d into b i t s — i n t o c a t e g o r i e s , classes, o p p o s i t i o n s , a n d c o n t r a s t s . I t is i n t h e n a t u r e o f l a n g u a g e t o search o u t a l l d i f f e r e n c e s a n d t o t u r n t h e m i n t o d i s t i n c t i o n s w h i c h t h e n p r o v i d e bases f o r b o u n d a r i e s a n d b a r r i e r s . I t i s , o n t h e other hand, i n t h e nature o f liturgical orders to unite, o r reunite, t h e p s y c h i c , s o c i a l , n a t u r a l , a n d c o s m i c o r d e r s w h i c h language a n d t h e e x i g e n c i e s o f l i f e p u l l a p a r t . I t is o f i m p o r t a n c e i n t h i s r e g a r d t h a t r e p r e ­ s e n t a t i o n s i n ritual a r e o f t e n m u l t i - m o d a l , e m p l o y i n g at o n e a n d t h e s a m e t i m e w o r d s , m u s i c , n o i s e , o d o r s , o b j e c t s , a n d substances. L i t u r g i c a l o r d e r s b i n d together disparate entities and processes, a n d it is t h i s b i n d i n g t o g e t h e r r a t h e r t h a n w h a t is b o u n d t o g e t h e r t h a t is p e c u l i a r t o t h e m . L i t u r g i c a l o r d e r s are m e t a - o r d e r s , o r o r d e r s o f o r d e r s , a n d i f w e w e r e t o c h a r a c t e r i z e i n a p h r a s e t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p t o w h a t lies o u t s i d e o f t h e m w e m i g h t say t h a t t h e y m e n d e v e r again w o r l d s f o r e v e r b r e a k i n g a p a r t u n d e r t h e b l o w s o f usage a n d t h e slashing d i s t i n c t i o n s o f language. s

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XI T h e r e is, o f course, considerable range i n the canonical c o n t e n t o f l i t u r g i ­ cal representations. N o t all liturgies give equal w e i g h t to all possible classes. T h e Mass, f o r instance, seems t o be largely t a k e n u p w i t h cosmic and spiritual references and it also includes p r o f o u n d b o d y s y m b o l i s m , b u t o t h e r rituals give m o r e p r o m i n e n t place t o representations, either m y s t i f i e d , i m p l i c i t o r e x p l i c i t , o f aspects o f c o n t e m p o r a r y social l i f e . R u l e s c o n c e r n i n g social behavior are e n u n c i a t e d i n s o m e , and o t h e r s i n c o r p o r a t e c o n v e n t i o n a l procedures f o r achieving c o n v e n t i o n a l ef­ f e c t s — t r a n s f o r m i n g princes i n t o kings, war i n t o peace, dances i n t o c o m m i t m e n t s . S o m e t i m e s a f u l l range o f messages are e n c o d e d i n a single r i t u a l . A m o n g the M a r i n g o f N e w G u i n e a , f o r e x a m p l e , t h e r i t u a l that establishes truces i n accordance w i t h c o n v e n t i o n a l p r o c e d u r e s also establishes deceased ancestors as sentient and p o w e r f u l beings. I n c o n ­ trast, t h e Mass and J e w i s h sabbath services hardly refer t o the existing social o r d e r . T h e y d o , h o w e v e r , establish the existence o f cosmic entities u p o n w h i c h o t h e r rituals m o r e d i r e c t l y concerned w i t h social particulars are c o n t i n g e n t . I f a k i n g is t o be c r o w n e d i n the name o f G o d i n a c o r o n a t i o n r i t u a l , o r i f m e n are t o swear i n the name o f G o d i n a c o u r t r o o m , it is necessary f o r the existence o f that G o d t o have already b e e n established. T h i s may be d o n e , i n fact is perhaps best d o n e , i n rituals r e m o v e d f r o m c r o w n i n g s o f c o u r t r o o m s . W e have seen i n p r e v i o u s sections that liturgical o r d e r s have b o t h sequential and simultaneous dimensions. A s acts and utterances f o l l o w each o t h e r , so meanings w h i c h are c h o r d l i k e i n their signification f o l l o w each o t h e r . N o w w e see that l i t u r g y also has a hierarchal d i m e n s i o n w h i c h may be manifested either i n single rituals o r i n related rituals, s o m e c o n t i n g e n t u p o n others. T h e r e are surely i m p o r t a n t differences i n t h e hierarchical d e v e l o p m e n t o f liturgical o r d e r s , and i t may be that such differences c o r r e s p o n d t o differences a m o n g societies i n the degree t o w h i c h they are stratified o r r a n k e d . I t is generally i f n o t always the case, h o w e v e r , that t h e " u l t i m a t e " o r " a b s o l u t e " c o m p o n e n t s o f l i t u r g i c a l o r d e r s are t h e cosmic o r s p i r i t u a l entities t o w h i c h they m a k e references, w h i l e t h e c o n t i n g e n t elements are t h e i r social referents and the liturgical p e r f o r m a n c e s associated w i t h t h e m . T h e r e c o u l d be n o d i v i n e kingship w i t h o u t d i v i n i t y ; coronations i n C a t h o l i c countries are c o n t i n g e n t u p o n t h e Mass, w h i c h establishes as a social fact the d i v i n i t y o f t h e G o d i n w h o s e n a m e , o r t h r o u g h w h o s e grace, m e n are t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o kings. T h e hierarchy o f c o n t i n g e n c y seems, obviously, t o b e hierarchy o f au­ t h o r i t y and efficacy as w e l l . M o r e o v e r , since t h e sacred, w h i c h I have n o t y e t d e f i n e d , is generally u n d e r s t o o d t o have its purest expression i n representations o f spiritual o r cosmic entities i n the u l t i m a t e o r absolute

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c o m p o n e n t s o f l i t u r g i c a l o r d e r s , liturgy's hierarchical d i m e n s i o n o r d e r s relations o f sanctity as w e l l as o f a u t h o r i t y , efficacy, a n d contingency. I n d e e d , these aspects o f l i t u r g y ' s hierarchical structure are virtually indistinguishable. I have s p o k e n o f l i t u r g i c a l o r d e r s as " m o r e o r less" invariant, m e a n i n g t o r e c o g n i z e b y this language n o t o n l y t h e sloppiness intrinsic t o practice b u t also that some aspects o f l i t u r g y are m o r e variable than others. I t is o f i m p o r t a n c e that as a r u l e t h e spiritual aspects o f l i t u r g y — b o t h significata and r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s — a r e less variable and m o r e d u r a b l e than those c o n ­ c e r n e d w i t h c o n t e m p o r a r y social arrangements. T h e l i t u r g y o f t h e Mass has persisted f o r close t o t w o m i l l e n n i a , d u r i n g w h i c h i t has changed b u t slowly. T h e creeds r e c i t e d i n t h e Mass are i n their present f o r m v e r y ancient. I n contrast, certain c o n t i n g e n t rituals concerned w i t h social effects, such as homage a n d fealty, have v i r t u a l l y d r o p p e d o u t o f use altogether. A l t h o u g h o t h e r aspects o f t h e i r liturgies vary considerably, possibly r e f l e c t i n g differences i n t h e i r social c o n d i t i o n s a n d historical circumstances, t h e rituals o f t h e Ashkenazic Jews o f n o r t h e r n E u r o p e , t h e Sephardic o f t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n , t h e Falacha o f E t h i o p i a (Leslau 1 9 5 1 : 1 2 4 ) , t h e B e n i o f I n d i a ( S t r i t z o w e r 1 9 7 1 : 1 4 ) , and t h e Karaites o f t h e C r i m e a ( I d e l s o n 1 9 3 2 : 3 1 0 ) all r e t a i n t h e d e d i c a t i o n o f faith called t h e Shema i n a central p o s i t i o n . I t is i m p o r t a n t t o note that t h e self-same s p i r i t u a l representations are l i k e l y t o b e t h e m o s t invariant o f ritual's e l e m e n t s n o t o n l y i n t h e sense o f m o s t e n d u r i n g b u t also i n the sense that they are those expressed w i t h greatest p u n c t i l i o . Relations o f relative i n variance, ideally at least, c o r r e s p o n d t o t h e hierarchical o r d e r i n g o f c o n t i n g e n c y , a u t h o r i t y , efficacy, a n d sanctity. XII I n v a r i a n c e , as I stated at t h e b e g i n n i n g , is characteristic o f all rituals, b o t h h u m a n a n d n o n h u m a n , a n d i t m a y b e that b o t h t h e sacred a n d t h e s u p e r n a t u r a l arose o u t o f t h e u n i o n o f w o r d s w i t h t h e invariance o f the speechless rituals o f t h e beasts f r o m w h o m w e are descended. B e this as it m a y , b o t h t h e sacred a n d t h e supernatural are, I b e l i e v e , i m p l i e d b y l i t u r g y ' s invariance. B e f o r e d e v e l o p i n g this p o i n t m o r e must b e said a b o u t t h e sacred. E l s e w h e r e (1971a, 1971b) I have argued that w e take liturgies t o be r e l i g i o u s i f t h e y i n c l u d e postulates o f a c e r t a i n sort. T h e Shema, " H e a r , O Israel, t h e L o r d o u r G o d , t h e L o r d is O n e , " is an e x a m p l e . So is " D e c e a s e d Ancestors persist as sentient Beings," w h i c h is i m p l i c i t i n t h e rituals i n w h i c h M a r i n g m e n pledge their m i l i t a r y s u p p o r t t o their hosts. S u c h sentences have p e c u l i a r qualities. H a v i n g n o material reference t h e y a r e n e i t h e r verifiable n o r falsifiable, a n d y e t they are regarded as

The Obvious Aspects of Ritual | 209 u n q u e s t i o n a b l e . I take sanctity to be the quality of unquestionabless imputed by a congregation to postulates in their nature neither verifiable nor falsifiable. T h i s is t o say that sanctity is u l t i m a t e l y a q u a l i t y o f discourse and n o t o f t h e o b j e c t s w i t h w h i c h that discourse is c o n c e r n e d . I t is o f interest i n this r e g a r d , h o w e v e r , that t h e o b j e c t s w i t h w h i c h sacred discourse is c o n ­ c e r n e d are o f t e n themselves elements o f discourse: instances o f t h e C r e a t i v e W o r d . T h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n sacred discourse and the objects o f sacred discourse may thus b e masked o r , t o p u t i t differently, sacred discourse a n d its o b j e c t s m a y be conflated. L e t us t u r n n o w t o t h e relationship o f sanctity t o invariance. I t was A n t h o n y F. C . Wallace ( 1 9 6 6 : 234) w h o first p o i n t e d o u t that i n terms o f i n f o r m a t i o n t h e o r y r i t u a l is a peculiar f o r m o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n . I n f o r m a ­ t i o n is f o r m a l l y d e f i n e d as that w h i c h reduces uncertainty, t h e m i n i m a l u n i t being the "bit," the amount o f information required to eliminate the u n c e r t a i n t y b e t w e e n t w o equally l i k e l y alternatives. I t is, r o u g h l y , t h e answer t o a y e s - n o q u e s t i o n . W e t o u c h e d u p o n this matter i n discussing i n d e x i c a l .messages, all o f w h i c h , because they d e p e n d u p o n t h e possi­ b i l i t y o f v a r i a t i o n , d o contain i n f o r m a t i o n i n t h e technical sense. B u t , Wallace o b s e r v e d , t o the e x t e n t that a l i t u r g y is invariant i t contains n o i n f o r m a t i o n because i t eliminates n o uncertainty. H e f u r t h e r argued, h o w e v e r , that m e a n i n g and i n f o r m a t i o n are n o t t h e same t h i n g , a n d that t h e m e a n i n g o f this informationlessness is certainty. T o p u t this a l i t t l e d i f f e r e n t l y , that w h i c h is stated i n t h e invariant canon is thereby r e p r e ­ sented as certain because invariance implies certainty. C e r t a i n t y a n d unquestionabless a r e closely related, and one o f t h e g r o u n d s o f t h e unquestionableness o f these postulates w h i c h w e may call " u l t i m a t e l y sacred," is t h e certainty o f t h e i r expression. I t is n o t , h o w e v e r , t h e o n l y ground. C e r t a i n t y is a p r o p e r t y o f i n f o r m a t i o n o r messages. I t is o n e t h i n g t o say that a message is certain a n d another t o say that i t goes u n q u e s t i o n e d . W h e t h e r o r n o t a statement w i l l b e challenged does n o t rest o n l y o r finally u p o n t h e p r o p e r t i e s o f t h e statement itself, b u t u p o n t h e disposi­ t i o n t o w a r d i t o f t h e persons t o w h o m i t is p r e s e n t e d . W e have already seen, h o w e v e r , that t o participate i n a r i t u a l is t o accept that w h i c h i t encodes. T h i s acceptance is entailed b y p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n an invariant o r d e r that t h e participants themselves d i d n o t encode. L i t u r g i c a l invariance, at t h e same t i m e that i t invests w h a t i t encodes w i t h certainty, secures t h e acceptance o f its p e r f o r m e r s . T h i s account distinguishes t h e sacred f r o m t h e d i v i n e o r supernatural, b u t i t m a y b e that the invariance o f sacred utterances m a y i m p l y t h e o b j e c t s o f these utterances. Bloch's recent ( 1 9 7 3 ) arguments suggest that the n o t i o n o f t h e supernatural as w e l l as t h e idea o f t h e sacred m a y e m e r g e o u t o f t h e invariance o f liturgical p e r f o r m a n c e . T h e w o r d s

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s p o k e n b y a p e r f o r m e r are n o t his w o r d s . T h e y are e x t r a o r d i n a r y and o f t e n i m m e m o r i a l w o r d s , and as such they i m p l y e x t r a o r d i n a r y speakers w h o first u t t e r e d t h e m i n a n t i q u i t y , o r perhaps b e y o n d a n t i q u i t y , at the b e g i n n i n g o f t i m e . G o d s and spirits as w e l l as social contract and m o r a l i t y may b e intrinsic t o t h e s t r u c t u r e o f liturgical o r d e r . W h i l e sanctity has its apparent source i n u l t i m a t e sacred postulates w h i c h , b e i n g expressions c o n c e r n i n g G o d s and t h e l i k e , are typically w i t h o u t material significata, i t flows t o o t h e r sentences w h i c h d o include m a t e r i a l terms and w h i c h are directly c o n c e r n e d w i t h t h e o p e r a t i o n o f society: " H e n r y is b y G r a c e o f G o d K i n g . " " I t is m o r e blessed t o give t h a n t o receive." " T h o u shalt n o t bear false witness." " I swear i n t h e n a m e o f G o d t o t e l l t h e t r u t h . " T h u s i t is that association w i t h u l t i m a t e sacred p r o p o s i t i o n s certifies t h e correctness a n d naturalness o f c o n v e n ­ tions, t h e legitimacy o f a u t h o r i t i e s , t h e truthfulness o f t e s t i m o n y and the r e l i a b i l i t y o f commissives. T o r e t u r n t o a question raised m u c h earlier: that M a r i n g m e n w i l l h o n o r the pledges t o give m i l i t a r y s u p p o r t that they u n d e r t a k e and display b y dancing is certified by association w i t h an u l t i m a t e sacred postulate. I t is i m p o r t a n t t o observe here that the greater invariance o f the sacred o r spiritual than t h e social c o m p o n e n t s o f liturgical o r d e r s p r o v i d e s t h e m w i t h a certainty b e y o n d t h e certainties o f social orders c u r r e n t l y existing. A s t h e social c o n t e n t o f canon is m o r e o r less e n d u r i n g , p r o v i d i n g an o r d e r w i t h i n w h i c h t h e states represented i n indexical messages m a y fluctuate, so the e v e n less variable, m o r e e n d u r i n g references t o gods and spirits p r o v i d e an apparently eternal m e t a - o r d e r w i t h i n w h i c h social o r d e r s themselves may b e t r a n s f o r m e d . T h e adaptive implications o f the g r e a t e r invariance o f t h e n o n m a t e r i a l than t h e material are i m p o r t a n t , b u t are discussed elsewhere (see t h e essay " A d a p t i v e Structure and its D i s o r d e r s " i n this v o l u m e ) . H e r e I w o u l d l i k e t o suggest that a l t h o u g h the concept o f the sacred and t h e n o t i o n o f t h e d i v i n e w o u l d b e literally u n t h i n k a b l e w i t h o u t language i t m a y also be that language and social o r d e r s f o u n d e d u p o n language c o u l d n o t have e m e r g e d w i t h o u t the s u p p o r t o f sanctity. Earlier w e n o t e d o n e o f t h e p r o b l e m s i n h e r e n t i n l a n g u a g e — i t s e x t r a o r d i n a r y talent f o r deceit, and later a n o t h e r — t h e i n ­ nate a b i l i t y o f language users t o c o m p r e h e n d t h e arbitrary nature o f t h e c o n v e n t i o n s t o w h i c h t h e y are s u b o r d i n a t e d and t h e i r ability, also i n ­ trinsic t o language, t o conceive o f alternatives. L i e a n d alternative, i n ­ h e r e n t i n language, i t is interesting t o note, are t a k e n b y B u b e r ( 1 9 5 2 ) t o be t h e g r o u n d o f all e v i l . A t the very least they pose p r o b l e m s t o any society w hose structure is f o u n d e d u p o n language, w h i c h is t o say all h u m a n societies. I have t h e r e f o r e argued that i f there are t o be w o r d s at all i t is necessary t o establish The Word, and that T h e W o r d is established b y t h e invariance o f liturgy. I t m a y be at least suggested, f u r t h e r m o r e , r

r

The Obvious Aspects of Ritual \ 2 1 1 that i t e m e r g e d p h y l o g e n e t i c a l l y as some expressions d r a w n f r o m the b u r g e o n i n g language o f earlier h o m i n i d s w e r e absorbed i n t o , and sub­ o r d i n a t e d t o , t h e invariance o f already existing n o n v e r b a l rituals w h i c h seem t o b e c o m m o n i n the animal w o r l d . W e m a y n o w n o t e that l i t u r g y ameliorates some o f the p r o b l e m s intrinsic t o s y m b o l i c c o m m u n i c a t i o n , particularly l y i n g , b y m o v i n g i n t w o o p p o s i t e directions. O n t h e o n e h a n d , as w e observed i n an early section o f this p a p e r , it eschews symbolization i n favor o f indexicality i n at least some o f its representations o f t h e here and n o w . O n t h e o t h e r hand i t sanctifies references t o that w h i c h is n o t confined i n the here and n o w . L i k e t h e lies t o w h i c h they are a partial a n t i d o t e , u l t i m a t e sacred p o s t u ­ lates are made possible by denotative symbols, f o r denotative symbols free signs f r o m that w h i c h t h e y signify. T o summarize, truthfulness, reliability, correctness, naturalness, and legitimacy are vested i n c o n v e n t i o n s and c o n v e n t i o n a l acts by their association w i t h u l t i m a t e sacred postulates. T h e notions o f truthfulness, r e l i a b i l i t y , correctness, naturalness, and legitimacy are closely related t o that o f unquestionabless, w h i c h I have i d e n t i f i e d w i t h the sacred. U n questionableness i n t u r n is closely related t o certainty and acceptance, c e r t a i n t y and acceptance t o invariance. T h e invariance o f r i t u a l , w h i c h antedates the d e v e l o p m e n t o f language, is t h e f o u n d a t i o n o f c o n v e n t i o n , f o r t h r o u g h i t c o n v e n t i o n s are n o t o n l y e n u n c i a t e d , accepted, invested w i t h m o r a l i t y , and naturalized, b u t also sanctified. I n d e e d , t h e concept o f t h e sacred itself emerges o u t o f liturgical invariance. XIII Y e t , as i m p o r t a n t as liturgical invariance may b e , surely language and t h e h u m a n way o f l i f e m u s t b e f o u n d e d u p o n m o r e than a t r i c k i n i n f o r m a ­ t i o n t h e o r y . So far I have s p o k e n o n l y o f t h e sacred, w h i c h is i n language a n d w h i c h faces language and the p u b l i c orders b u i l t u p o n language. B u t t h e sacred is o n l y o n e c o m p o n e n t o r aspect o f a m o r e inclusive p h e ­ n o m e n o n w h i c h I call t h e H o l y . T h e o t h e r aspect o f t h e H o l y , w h i c h , f o l l o w i n g R u d o l p h O t t o ( 1 9 2 6 ) , may be called the " n u m i n o u s , " is its n o n d i s c u r s i v e , ineffable, o r e m o t i o n a l a s p e c t — w h a t is called " r e l i g i o u s e x p e r i e n c e " (James 1 9 0 3 ) i n t h e broadest sense. W e k n o w that this, as w e l l as the sacred, is i n v o k e d i n at least some rituals. " C o m m u n i t a s " ( T u r n e r 1969) o r " e f f e r v e s c e n c e " ( D u r k h e i m 1 9 6 1 [ 1 9 1 5 ] ) is o n e o f its manifestations. Scholars d i f f e r w i t h respect t o t h e nature o f religious e x p e r i e n c e . S o m e w o u l d apply t h e t e r m t o any e m o t i o n a l state t a k e n b y t h e i n d i v i d u a l t o b e a response t o w h a t is construed t o be a divine o b j e c t . O t h e r s , l i k e R u d o l p h O t t o ( 1 9 2 6 ) , w o u l d take i t t o b e a general u n d i f ­ f e r e n t i a t e d " u r - e m o t i o n " encompassing l o v e , fear, dependence, fascina-

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t i o n , u n w o r t h i n e s s , majesty, c o n n e c t i o n . Witnesses agree that it is p o w e r f u l , indescribable, and u t t e r l y c o n v i n c i n g . I d o n o t m e a n t o m a k e t o o m u c h o f this, b u t E r i k s o n (1966) suggests that t h e n u m i n o u s e m o t i o n has its o n t o g e n e t i c basis i n t h e relationship o f t h e p r e v e r b a l i n f a n t t o its m o t h e r . T h e child's experience o f its m o t h e r has characteristics similar t o those that O t t o attributes t o t h e w o r s h i p e r ' s e x p e r i e n c e o f his G o d : she is m y s t e r i o u s , t r e m e n d o u s , o v e r p o w e r i n g , l o v i n g , a n d f r i g h t e n i n g . I t is l e a r n i n g t o trust h e r u p o n w h o m h e depends u t t e r l y that makes subsequent language l e a r n i n g a n d , f o r that matter, c o n t i n u i n g socialization possible. T h i s trust is learned i n w h a t E r i k s o n calls ' d a i l y rituals o f n u r t u r a n c e and g r e e t i n g ' ' ( 1 9 6 6 ) , stereotyped inter­ actions b e t w e e n m o t h e r a n d c h i l d t a k i n g place d e p e n d a b l y at regular intervals, o r at times specified b y t h e child's needs. T h r o u g h t h e course o f o n t o g e n y t h e n u m i n o u s e m o t i o n s initially associated w i t h m o t h e r are displaced t o o t h e r objects. O f i m p o r t a n c e here is t h e bipolar reference o f r i t u a l symbols n o t e d b y T u r n e r ( 1 9 7 3 ) and C a m p b e l l ( 1 9 5 9 : 4 6 1 f f . ) . A t o n e and t h e same t i m e they p o i n t t o cosmic and social conceptions o n the o n e h a n d and psychic and physiological experience o n t h e o t h e r . T h r o u g h t h e m e d i a t i o n o f such representations t h e conceptual is g i v e n t h e p o w e r o f t h e e x p e r i e n t i a l and t h e e x p e r i e n t i a l t h e guidance o f t h e conceptual. A g a i n , w e n o t e a r e l a t i o n s h i p h e r e b e t w e e n conceptual f o r m a n d e x p e r i ­ e n t i a l substance. E r i k s o n ' s o n t o g e n e t i c suggestion has p h y l o g e n e t i c implications. I f o n t o g e n y has a p h y l o g e n y and i f t h e m o t h e r - c h i l d relationship a m o n g h u m a n s is b u t a variant o f t h e p r i m a t e o r e v e n m a m m a l i a n p a t t e r n , i t may be that t h e basis o f t h e n u m i n o u s is archaic, antedating h u m a n i t y , and i t may f u r t h e r be that r e l i g i o n came i n t o b e i n g w h e n t h e e m e r g i n g , discur­ sive, c o n v e n t i o n a l sacred was lashed t o t h e p r i m o r d i a l , non-discursive, m a m m a l i a n e m o t i o n a l processes that i n t h e i r later f o r m w e call " n u m i ­ nous." B e t h e o n t o g e n e t i c and p h y l o g e n e t i c bases o f n u m i n o u s experience as t h e y may, such experience is o f t e n i n v o k e d i n r i t u a l . I n an earlier section I emphasized t h e digital aspects o f liturgical o r d e r s , b u t n o t e d that t h e b i n a r y nature o f r i t u a l o c c u r r e n c e , that makes i t possible f o r rituals t o d i s t i n g u i s h b e f o r e f r o m after w i t h p e r f e c t clarity, obliterates n e i t h e r r i t u a l s analogic v i r t u e s n o r its affective p o w e r . B e t w e e n t h e b e f o r e and the after m a r k e d b y the occurrence o f r i t u a l , t h e r e is a " l i m i n a l p e r i o d " ( V a n G e n n e p 1909). T o recall Reeves remarks a b o u t digital machines, it is a t i m e w h e n variables, i n r i t u a l t h e states o f p e r f o r m e r s , d o n o t have t h e i r u n a m b i g u o u s b e f o r e o r after values, b u t are, rather, changing. I t is a t i m e o u t o f o r d i n a r y t i m e and is m a r k e d as such b y t h e p r o m i n e n t place g i v e n t o representations that connect t h e m o m e n t t o t h e eternal, a n d t h e r e b y disconnect i t f r o m t h e everyday and o r d i n a r y .

The Obvious Aspects of Ritual | 2 1 3 I n s o m e r i t u a l s t h e c o n t r a s t w i t h t h e e v e r y d a y is radical and t h e canons o f reality w h i c h guide everyday behavior seem inappropriate and are d i s c a r d e d . D u r i n g such r i t u a l l y m a r k e d t i m e s o u t o f t i m e , e m o t i o n s — o f t e n v e r y s t r o n g a n d p e r s u a s i v e — a r e g e n e r a t e d , a n d these e m o t i o n s m a y o b l i t e r a t e t h e b o u n d a r y that l i t u r g i c a l p e r f o r m a n c e i t s e l f establishes b e t w e e n p u b l i c acts a n d p r i v a t e states. I n t h e f e r v o r o f r e l i g i o u s e m o t i o n t h e p r i v a t e states o f t h e p e r f o r m e r s s o m e t i m e s c o m e i n t o a c c o r d w i t h t h e i r p u b l i c p e r f o r m a n c e s . A s W i l l i a m James p u t i t , t h e i r acceptance is " e n t h u s i a s t i c . " T h e p e r f o r m e r " r u n s o u t t o accept t h e d i v i n e d e c r e e s " ( 1 9 0 3 : 2 8 9 ) . B a t e s o n ( 1 9 7 2 ) , f o l l o w i n g H u x l e y , agrees w i t h J a m e s i n r e f e r r i n g t o such states o f p s y c h i c r e u n i o n b y t h e t e r m " g r a c e . " T h i s s e l f - u n i f i c a t i o n m u s t b e e n c o u r a g e d , i n s o m e cases at least, b y p e r f o r m i n g a n i n v a r i a n t l i t u r g y , b u t c o n f o r m i t y t o such a n o r d e r is n o t s i m p l y t o u n i t e o r r e u n i t e alienated o r w a r r i n g p a r t s o f t h e self. I t is t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n — t h a t is, t o b e c o m e p a r t o f — s o m e t h i n g larger t h a n w h a t is o r d i n a r i l y e x p e r i e n c e d as t h e self. I t is o f i n t e r e s t that t h e e x p e r i e n c e o f w h i c h I speak n e e d n o t b e , i n d e e d , is p e r h a p s n o t o f t e n , i n d i v i d u a l . I n t h e u n i o n o r r e u n i o n o f t h e i r p r i v a t e and p u b l i c selves t h e p e r f o r m e r s m a y a c h i e v e a c o r p o r a t e state o f c o m m u n i t a s ( T u r n e r 1 9 6 9 ) , a n " e f f e r ­ v e s c e n t " state ( D u r k h e i m 1 9 6 1 ) i n w h i c h t h e sense o f i n d i v i d u a l self that o r d i n a r y consciousness i m p o s e s u p o n m e n b e c o m e s less sharp, o r is e v e n l o s t i n t h e sense o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h e larger w h o l e that t h e p e r f o r m a n c e m a k e s p a l p a b l e . I t is, p e r h a p s , i m p o r t a n t i n this r e g a r d that t h e c o o r d i n a ­ t i o n o f p e r s o n s i n r i t u a l p e r f o r m a n c e s is o f t e n m u c h t i g h t e r t h a n usual ( R a d c l i f f e - B r o w n 1 9 6 4 : c h a p t e r 2 ) . I n d e e d , t h e levels o f c o h e r e n c e (see " E c o l o g y , A d a p t a t i o n , a n d t h e Ills o f F u n c t i o n a l i s m " o r " A d a p t i v e S t r u c ­ t u r e a n d I t s D i s o r d e r s " f o r discussions o f c o h e r e n c e ) o f t e n a c h i e v e d i n r i t u a l is m o r e t y p i c a l o f o r g a n i s m s t h a n o f social g r o u p s . I t is i m p o r t a n t t h a t u n i s o n is a c o m m o n f e a t u r e o f r i t u a l , a n d i t m a y b e m a d e c o m p r e ­ h e n s i v e b y e n g a g i n g several sense m o d a l i t i e s a n d m o d e s o f e x p r e s s i o n simultaneously. I n s u m , I e a r l i e r a r g u e d that l i t u r g y ' s i n v a r i a n c e gives rise t o t h e s a c r e d , m e a n i n g b y t h e t e r m " s a c r e d " t o designate o n l y t h e discursive aspect o f a m o r e e n c o m p a s s i n g category w h i c h m a y b e called t h e H o l y . T h e sacred, t h e u l t i m a t e c o n s t i t u e n t s o f w h i c h are i n language, is that aspect o f t h e H o l y w h i c h faces language, reason, t h e p u b l i c o r d e r , a n d t h e i r p r o b l e m s . B u t t h e H o l y also has a n o n d i s c u r s i v e , affective a n d e x p e r i e n t i a l aspect w h i c h w e m a y , f o l l o w i n g O t t o , call " t h e n u m i n o u s . " A s t h e sacred m a y e m e r g e o u t o f t h e invariance o f l i t u r g i c a l o r d e r s , so m a y t h e n u m i n o u s b e i n v o k e d b y ritual's u n i s o n . #

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T h e canons o f liturgy, i n w h i c h are encoded b o t h postulates concerning t h a t w h i c h is u l t i m a t e l y sacred a n d sentences c o n c e r n i n g t e m p o r a l social o r d e r s m a y , t h e n , r e c e i v e i n t h e rituals i n w h i c h t h e y are e n u n c i a t e d t h e s u p p o r t o f n u m i n o u s e m o t i o n s . N u m i n o u s c o m m u n i t a s , p e r h a p s sub­ s t a n t i a t e d i n acts o f u n i s o n , m a y a d d a d i m e n s i o n — o r a m a g n i t u d e — t o t h e o r d e r l i n e s s o f t h e sacred c a n o n i c a l . B u t u n i s o n is n o t a l l that is t o b e f o u n d at r i t u a l ' s h e a r t , n o r is t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n c a n o n i c a l o r d e r a n d n u m i n o u s e m o t i o n always c o m p l e m e n t a r y . A t t h e h e a r t o f s o m e r i t u a l s t h e r e is n o t always h e i g h t e n e d o r d e r b u t h i l a r i t y , c o n f u s i o n , a g g r e s s i o n , a n d chaos, e x p r e s s e d i n c l o w n i n g , trans­ v e s t i s m , attacks u p o n i n i t i a t e s , s e l f - m o r t i f i c a t i o n , sexual license, blas­ p h e m y , a n d o t h e r w i s e i n d e c o r o u s actions. S u c h b e h a v i o r m a y c h a l l e n g e , t a c i t l y o r e x p l i c i t l y , t h e v e r y canons t h a t o r d a i n i t , a n d A b r a h a m s ( 1 9 7 3 ) suggests t h a t t h e " v i t a l i t y " o f r i t u a l springs f r o m t h e c o n f r o n t a t i o n s o f o r d e r a n d d i s o r d e r f o r w h i c h i t p r o v i d e s a n arena. T h i s is t o say that l i t u r g i c a l o r d e r s m a y i n c l u d e n o t o n l y canons o f o r d e r b u t t h e i r antitheses as w e l l . A s A b r a h a m s p u t s i t " t h e r e is a s i m u l t a n e o u s p r o c l a m a t i o n o f the o r d e r o f t h e w o r l d as seen b y t h e g r o u p a n d its ( a l m o s t ) a b s o l u t e d e n i a l (1973: 15).

T h e orders o f liturgy d o generally manage t o contain, and even t o s u b l i m a t e , t h e e m o t i o n s t h a t t h e y t h e m s e l v e s g e n e r a t e , a n d t h e y surely may be vitalized o r invigorated by confrontations w i t h their anti-orders. B u t these c o n f r o n t a t i o n s m a y b e m o r e t h a n i n v i g o r a t i n g . T h e y m a y b e l i m i t i n g a n d c o r r e c t i v e as w e l l . T h e denials o f o r d e r i n r i t u a l are s e l d o m i f e v e r a b s o l u t e , a n d w h i l e t h e y m a y b e denials o f this w o r l d ' s o r d e r , l i t u r g i c a l o r d e r s a r e usually c o n c e r n e d w i t h m o r e t h a n t h e o r d e r o f t h e w o r l d o f h e r e a n d n o w . T h e y also p r o c l a i m an o r d e r t h a t transcends t i m e , a n u l t i m a t e o r a b s o l u t e o r d e r o f w h i c h t h e t e m p o r a l o r d e r is m e r e l y a c o n t i n g e n t p a r t . I t is t h e t e m p o r a l , a n d n o t t h e u l t i m a t e , aspects o f o r d e r t h a t are m o s t o p e n t o c h a l l e n g e , a n d that are m o s t l i k e l y t o b e c h a l l e n g e d b y w h a t appears t o b e a n t i - o r d e r . A n d i t is t h e t e m p o r a l a n d c o n t i n g e n t n a t u r e o f c o n v e n t i o n s t h a t is e x p o s e d b y r i d i c u l i n g a n d v i o l a t i n g t h e m . I n b e i n g e x p o s e d f o r w h a t t h e y are, t h e y a r e p r e v e n t e d f r o m t h e m s e l v e s b e c o m i n g u l t i m a t e . T h e k i n g w h o is o r d a i n e d b y G o d is t o l d — a n d so is e v e r y o n e e l s e — t h a t h e is n o m o r e t h a n a m a n w h e n h e is d e m e a n e d i n t h e n a m e o f G o d . L i t u r g y ' s challenges t o t h e t e m p o r a l are i n t h e service o f t h e u l t i m a t e , f o r t h e y k e e p t h e c o n v e n t i o n s o f t i m e a n d place i n t h e i r places b y d e m o n s t r a t i n g t h a t t h e y a r e n o t u l t i m a t e l y sacred, b u t o n l y s a n c t i f i e d b y t h e u l t i m a t e l y sacred. T h e y are also t h e r e b y i n t h e service o f e v o l u t i o n , f o r t h e y m a k e i t easier t o discard t e m p o r a l c o n v e n t i o n s w h e n t i m e s a n d places change.

The Obvious Aspects of Ritual | 2 1 5 XIV T h e u n i o n i n r i t u a l o f the n u m i n o u s , a p r o d u c t o f e m o t i o n , w i t h the sacred, a p r o d u c t o f language, suggests possible g r o u n d s f o r the n o t i o n o f t h e d i v i n e g o i n g somewhat b e y o n d Bloch's ingenious b u t perhaps t o o s i m p l e suggestion. Because t h e n o t i o n o f the d i v i n e is a h u m a n universal w e m u s t search f o r its g r o u n d i n a universal experience o r c o n d i t i o n . I w o u l d hesitantly suggest that t h e n o t i o n o f the d i v i n e has at least f o u r features. First, w h i l e d i v i n e objects may be incarnated, the quality o f the d i v i n e i t s e l f is n o t material i n any o r d i n a r y sense. Second, the d i v i n e exists, o r , rather, has b e i n g . I t is n o t d e e m e d to b e , simply, a law, l i k e the laws o f t h e r m o d y n a m i c s , o r an abstraction, l i k e t r u t h , b u t a b e i n g , l i k e Z e u s . T h i r d , it is p o w e r f u l , o r efficacious. I t has t h e ability t o cause effects. Finally, i t is s o m e t h i n g l i k e alive. I t possesses s o m e t h i n g l i k e vitality. T o use R u d o l p h O t t o ' s t e r m , it is " u r g e n t . " I w o u l d hesitantly suggest that the first three o f these qualities are s u p p l i e d by f u n d a m e n t a l linguistic processes as they are expressed in ritual's utterances, the last b y the e m o t i o n s generated i n r i t u a l . First, t h e existence o f the n o n m a t e r i a l is made conceptually possible b y t h e s y m b o l i c relationship b e t w e e n sign and signified. W h e r e a s c o n ­ cept is i n t r i n s i c t o the symbolic relationship, material reference is n o t i n t r i n s i c to concept. I f the sign is not b o u n d t o the signified there is n o t h i n g t o h o l d t h e signified to materiality at all, and it can easily escape i n t o t h e abstract, imaginary, o r o t h e r w i s e p u r e l y conceptual. T h e existence o f the conceptual may be m a d e conceivable b y the f u n d a m e n t a l linguistic process o f p r e d i c a t i o n . T o say that " X is an aspect o f Y " is to e n d o w Y w i t h t h e a t t r i b u t e X . T h e c o p u l a " i s " i n this sentence has, s i m p l y , a logical f u n c t i o n , w h i c h is to invest Y w i t h X , b u t this logical f u n c t i o n has an existential i m p l i c a t i o n . M o r e o v e r , this i m p l i ­ c a t i o n may b e unavoidable. T o say that " X is an aspect o f Y " m i g h t be t o say, o r to seem t o say, that b o t h X and Y i n some sense exist. Y e t t h e existence entailed by p r e d i c a t i o n may be n o m o r e than conceptual exis­ tence, l i k e the way i n w h i c h h o n o r o r t h e axioms o f g e o m e t r y exist. B u t G o d s are beings. T h e p r o b l e m is, t h e n , to t r a n s f o r m the c o n c e p t u a l — that w h i c h exists m e r e l y as c o n c e p t — i n t o that w h i c h seems to have being. T h e c o n c e p t i o n o f the n o n m a t e r i a l as efficacious, i.e., as capable o f causing effects, may c o n t r i b u t e t o such a t r a n s f o r m a t i o n , f o r humans g e n e r a l l y realize that effects are n o t directly caused by concepts alone (any m o r e t h a n , l e t us say, houses are b u i l t by plans a l o n e ) . T h e efficacy o f t h e n o n m a t e r i a l , this is t o say, implies the b e i n g o f the n o n m a t e r i a l . T h e n o t i o n o f t h e efficacy o f d i v i n e beings, i n t u r n , m i g h t w e l l be f o u n d e d u p o n the performativeness and meta-performativeness o f l a n -

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guage as expressed i n r i t u a l . T h e very invariance o f ritual proposes, as B l o c h has suggested, an agent t o w h o m t h e efficacy o f performativeness intrinsic t o ritual's language can be a t t r i b u t e d . D i v i n e beings b y t h e account so far o f f e r e d r e m a i n n o t h i n g m o r e than i n d u c t i o n s f r o m m y s t i f i e d performativeness. T h i s , h o w e v e r , seems n e i t h e r satisfactory n o r correct, f o r w e k n o w that p e o p l e are o f t e n c o n v i n c e d o f the existence o f d i v i n e beings i n the absence o f effects f r o m w h i c h t h e y c o u l d i n d u c e , h o w e v e r c o r r e c t l y o r incorrectly, such beliefs. W e m u s t consider n o t o n l y t h e capacities o f the p r o p o s i t i o n s and p e r f o r m a t i v e s that language may present t o t h e w o r s h i p e r b u t also the w o r s h i p e r ' s experience o f those utterances and acts, and the relationship b e t w e e n t h e i r qualities a n d his experience. A m e d i a t i n g o r connecting t e r m m a y be n o t e d . A t least i n languages i n w h i c h i t is an i n d e p e n d e n t lexical e l e m e n t , a n d perhaps i n all language, t h e verb " t o b e " may give rise t o t h e n o t i o n o f b e i n g i n d e p e n d e n t o f instances o f b e i n g . I t is o f interest i n this respect that the m o s t sacred name o f G o d i n H e b r e w , the t e t r a g r a m m a t o n , is said t o b e a f o r m o f the v e r b " t o b e " ( B r a n d o n 1 9 7 0 : 6 5 5 ) . T i l l i c h ( 1 9 5 7 , etc.) refers t o G o d as " T h e G r o u n d - o f - A l l - B e i n g " and " B e i n g - I t s e l f . " I t is o f f u r t h e r interest here that t h e p r o f o u n d l y altered states o f consciousness characteristic o f religious experience are s o m e t i m e s described as states o f " p u r e b e i n g , " t h e w o r d f o r trance i n Java is " b e i n g " ( G e e r t z 1 9 6 5 : 3 2 ) , and B u s h m e n refer t o t h e states they achieve i n trance dancing as "really b e i n g " ( K a t z 1 9 7 4 ) . T h e p r e d i c a t i o n o f that w h i c h is represented i n an u l t i m a t e sacred p r o p o s i t i o n m a y b e c o m e conflated i n r i t u a l w i t h t h e n u m i n o u s state o f " p u r e b e i n g " o f the p e r f o r m e r . N u m i n o u s experiences, even those that are m u c h less intense than may b e suggested b y references t o Javanese and B u s h m a n trance, are w i d e l y described as ones i n w h i c h the presence o f t h e d i v i n e b e i n g is " e x p e r i e n c e d . " Sometimes, i n d e e d , w i t h loss o f d i s t i n c t i o n , t h e w o r s h i p e r senses that he is participating i n , o r b e c o m i n g o n e w i t h , the d i v i n e b e i n g . I w o u l d suggest that d i v i n e objects, w h i c h are r e p r e s e n t e d b y u l t i m a t e sacred postulates, are predicated as l i v i n g , o r e v e n s u p p l i e d t h e predicate o f b e i n g , b y t h e n u m i n o u s experiences o f w o r s h i p e r s . T h e % itality that t h e w o r s h i p e r feels i n the d i v i n e o b j e c t is his o w n p r o j e c t e d u p o n w h a t he takes t o be o t h e r o r "encompassing." R i t u a l , t h e n , is possibly t h e furnace w i t h i n w h i c h t h e image o f G o d is f o r g e d o u t o f the p o w e r o f language and o f e m o t i o n . r

r

XV Earlier I spoke o f the acceptance o f c o n v e n t i o n entailed b y p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n l i t u r g y . I insisted that r i t u a l acceptance is a p u b l i c act and that i t is n o t necessarily associated w i t h an i n w a r d state c o n f o r m i n g t o i t . Acceptance

The Obvious Aspects of Ritual | 2 1 7 does n o t entail b e l i e f b u t , I p r o p o s e d , it is sufficient t o establish t h e o b l i g a t i o n s u p o n w h i c h h u m a n societies stand. I w o u l d n o w suggest that f o r m a l acceptance i n t h e absence o f s o m e t h i n g m o r e p r o f o u n d may b e fragile and that t h e n u m i n o u s , w h e n i t is e x p e r i e n c e d , supports accep­ tance w i t h c o n v i c t i o n o r belief. T h o s e w h o have reached those p r o f o u n d states called mystical r e p o r t a loss o f d i s t i n c t i o n , an experience o f unifica­ t i o n w i t h w h a t they take t o be the d i v i n e o b j e c t and perhaps the cosmos. T h e e x p e r i e n c e , they say, is u l t i m a t e l y m e a n i n g f u l , b u t b e i n g d e v o i d o f d i s t i n c t i o n is d e v o i d o f reference. I t p o i n t s t o n o t h i n g b u t itself. U l t i m a t e m e a n i n g is n o t r e f e r e n t i a l b u t is, rather, a state o f b e i n g o r even o f p u r e , seemingly u n p r e d i c a t e d b e i n g . 1 cannot discuss the v a l i d i t y o f the i l l u m i ­ nations vouchsafed i n those states in w hich m e a n i n g and b e i n g b e c o m e o n e , b u t w i l l o n l y n o t e that to say such m e a n i n g is c o n v i n c i n g is inade­ q u a t e , f o r , b e i n g d i r e c t l y e x p e r i e n c e d , it simply is. A s such i t is u n d e n i ­ able, and so, i n d e e d , may b e n u m i n o u s experiences f a l l i n g short o f the mystical. I t is o f interest that sacred p r o p o s i t i o n s and n u m i n o u s experiences are the inverse o f each o t h e r . U l t i m a t e sacred postulates are discursive b u t t h e i r significata are n o t material. N u m i n o u s experiences are i m m e d i a t e l y m a t e r i a l ( t h e y are actual physical and psychic states) b u t they are n o t discursive. U l t i m a t e sacred postulates a r e unfalsifiable; n u m i n o u s e x ­ periences are u n d e n i a b l e . I n ritual's u n i o n u l t i m a t e sacred p r o p o s i t i o n s t h u s seem t o p a r t a k e o f the i m m e d i a t e l y k n o w n and undeniable quality o f t h e n u m i n o u s . T h a t this is logically unsound s h o u l d n o t t r o u b l e us f o r , a l t h o u g h i t may m a k e p r o b l e m s f o r logicians, i t does n o t t r o u b l e t h e f a i t h f u l . I n t h e u n i o n o f the sacred and the n u m i n o u s t h e m o s t abstract and distant o f c o n c e p t i o n s are b o u n d t o the m o s t i m m e d i a t e and sub­ stantial o f experiences. W e are c o n f r o n t e d , finally, w i t h a r e m a r k a b l e spectacle. T h e unfalsifiable s u p p o r t e d b y the undeniable yields the u n ­ q u e s t i o n a b l e , w h i c h transforms the d u b i o u s , the arbitrary, and the c o n ­ v e n t i o n a l i n t o the c o r r e c t , the necessary, and the natural. T h i s structure is, I w o u l d suggest, t h e f o u n d a t i o n u p o n w h i c h the h u m a n way o f life stands, and it is realized i n r i t u a l . A t the heart o f r i t u a l — i t s " a t o m , " so t o s p e a k — i s the relationship o f p e r f o r m e r s t o t h e i r o w n p e r f o r m a n c e s o f i n v a r i a n t sequences o f acts and utterances w h i c h they d i d n o t encode. V i r t u a l l y e v e r y t h i n g I have argued is i m p l i e d o r entailed b y that f o r m . r

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Roger Ritual for fun and profit. Paper prepared for Burg-Wartenstein C o n fere nee-5 9 on Ritual and Reconciliation. Austin, J . L 1962 How to do things with words. Oxford University Press. 1973

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( A u s t i n , J. L.) 1 9 7 0 Performative utterance. In Philosophical papers, 2d ed., ed. J. O . U r m son and G . J. Warneck. O x f o r d . Babcock-Abrahams, Barbara 1 9 7 3 T h e carnivalization o f the novel and the high spirituality o f dressing up. Paper prepared for Burg-Wartenstein Conference-59 o n Ritual and Reconciliation. Bateson, Gregory 1 9 7 2 Steps to an ecology of mind. N e w Y o r k : Ballantine Books. Beattie, J o h n 1 9 6 4 Other cultures. L o n d o n : Routledge & Kegan Paul. B l o c h , Maurice * 9 7 3 Symbols, song, and dance, and features o f articulation. European Journal of Sociology 1 5 : 5 5 - 8 1 . Brandon, S. G . F. 1 9 7 0 A dictionary of comparative religion. N e w Y o r k : Charles Scribner's Sons. B r o w n , W. N o r m a n 1 9 7 2 D u t y as truth in ancient India. Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 1 1 6 : 2 5 2 - 2 6 8 . Buber, M a r t i n 1 9 5 2 The eclipse of God. N e w Y o r k : Harper & Bros. Campbell, Joseph 1 9 5 9 The masks of God. V o l . 1, Primitive mythology. N e w Y o r k : V i k i n g . Duchesne-Guillemin, Jacques 1966 Symbols and values in Zoroastrianism. N e w Y o r k : Harper & Row. D u r k h e i m , Emile 1 9 6 1 The elementary forms of the religious life. Joseph Ward Swan, translator. N e w Y o r k : Collier. Eliade, Mircea 1 9 5 9 The sacred and the profane: the nature of religion. N e w Y o r k : Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. Erikson, Eric 1 9 6 6 T h e ritualization o f ontogeny. I n A discussion of ritualisation of be­ haviour in animals and man, Julian Huxley, organizer. L o n d o n : Philo­ sophical Transactions o f the Royal Society o f London, Series B, B i o ­ logical Sciences, v o l . 2 5 1 , no. 7 7 2 . Finnegan, Ruth 1 9 6 9 H o w to do things with words: performative utterances among the Limba o f Sierra Leone. Man 4 : 5 3 7 - 5 5 1 . Firth, Raymond 1 9 4 0 The work of the gods in Tikopia. London. 973 Symbols, public and private. L o n d o n : George Allen & U n w i n . Fortes, Meyer 1 9 6 6 Religious premises and logical technique in divinatory ritual. I n A dis­ cussion of ritualisatin of behaviour in animals and man, Julian Huxley, organizer. London: Philosophical Transactions o f the Royal Society o f L o n d o n , Series B, Biological Sciences, vol. 2 5 1 , no. 7 7 2 . Freud, Sigmund 1 9 0 7 Obsessive actions and religious practice. Zeitschrift fur Religionspsychologie 1 : 4 - 1 2 . x

The Obvious Aspects of Ritual | 2 1 9 Geertz, Clifford 1 9 6 5 Religion as a cultural system. I n Anthropological approaches to religion, ed. Michael Banton. ASA Monograph no. 3. London: Tavistock. G l u c k m a n , Max 1 9 5 4 Rituals o f rebellion in South-east Africa. The Frazer Lecture, 1 9 5 0 . Manchester University Press. G o f f m a n , Ervin 1 9 5 6 T h e nature o f deference and demeanor. American Anthropologist 5 8 : 473-503.

G o l d m a n , Stanford 1 9 6 0 Further consideration o f the cybernetic aspects o f homeostasis. I n Self organising systems, ed. M . C. Yovitz and Scott Cameron. N e w Y o r k : Pergamon Press. Goody, Jack 1 9 6 1 Religion and ritual: the definitional problem. British Journal of Soci­ ology 1 2 : 1 4 2 - 1 6 4 . Idelson, A . Z . 1 9 3 2 Jewish liturgy and its development. N e w Y o r k : Schocken paperbacks (1967)

James, William 1903 The varieties of religious experience. N e w Y o r k : Collier Books ( 1 9 6 1 ) . Katz, Richard 1 9 6 4 Education for transcendence: lessons f r o m the !Kung Zhu/Twasi. Journal of Transcultural Psychology 2 : 1 3 6 - 1 5 5 . La Fontaine 1 9 7 2 The interpretation of ritual: essays in honor of A. A. Richards. London: Tavistock. Lacey, T. 1 9 1 8 Sacraments, Christian, Western. I n Encyclopedia of religion and ethics, ed. James Hastings, v o l . 1 0 , pp. 9 0 3 - 9 0 8 . Leach, E. R. 1 9 5 4 The political systems of Highland Burma. Boston: Beacon Press. 1 9 6 6 Ritualisarion in man i n relation to conceptual and social develop­ ment. I n A discussion of ritualisation of behaviour in animals and man, Julian H u x l e y , organizer. London: Philosophical Transactions o f the Royal Society o f London, Series B, Biological Sciences, vol. 2 5 1 , no. 772.

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T h e influence o f cultural context on non-verbal communication in man. I n Non-verbal communication, ed. R. A . H i n d e . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Leslau, T. 1 9 5 1 Falas ha anthology: the black Jews of Ethiopia. N e w Y o r k : Schocken. Levy, Robert 1 9 7 3 The Tahitians: mind and experience in the Society Islands. Chicago: University o f Chicago Press. Lyons, John 1 9 7 0 H u m a n language. I n Non-verbal communication, ed. R. A . H i n d e . Cambridge. Cambridge University Press. Meggitt, M . J . 1 9 6 5 Gadjari among the Walbiri aborigines of Central Australia. Oceania monographs.

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O ' D o h e r t y , F. 1 9 7 3 a Ritual as a second order language. Paper prepared for Burg-Wane nstein Conference-59 o n Ritual and Reconciliation. 1 9 7 3 b Nature, grace, and faith, ms. O l i v e r , D. 1 9 5 5 A Solomon Island society. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Ortiz, A. 1 9 6 9 The Tewa world. Chicago: University o f Chicago Press. O t t o , Rudolph 1 9 2 6 T h e idea o f the holy. London: O x f o r d University Press. J. W. Harvey, translator. Peirce, Charles 1 9 6 0 Collected papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, Vol. 2 , Elements of logic, ed. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard U n i ­ versity Press. Radcliffe-Brown, A . R. 1 9 6 4 The Andaman Islanders. Rappaport, Roy A . 1 9 6 8 Pigs for the ancestors. N e w Haven: Yale University Press. 1 9 6 9 Sanctity and adaptation. Paper prepared for Wenner-Gren Confer­ ence o n the M o r a l and Aesthetic Structure o f Adaptation. Reprinted in lo 7 ( i 9 7 o ) . ' 4 6 - 7 i .

Ritual, sanctity, and cybernetics. American Anthropologist 7 3 : 5 9 - 7 6 . 1 9 7 1 b The sacred in human evolution. Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics 2 : 2 3 - 4 4 . Reeves, C. M . 1 9 7 2 The logical design of digital circuits. N e w York, de Rougement, Denis 1 9 4 4 La part du diable. N e w Y o r k : Brentan. Searle, J . R. 1 9 6 9 Speech acts. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Skorupski, J. 1 9 7 6 Symbol and theory: a philosophical study of theories of religion in social anthropology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Stritzower, Schifira 1 9 7 1 The Children of Israel: the Bent Israel of Bombay. O x f o r d : Basil Blackwell. Tambiah, S. J. 1957 T h e magical power o f words. Man 3 : 1 7 5 - 2 0 8 . Tillich, P. 1 9 5 7 The dynamics of faith. N e w Y o r k : Harper. Turner, Victor 1 9 6 7 The forest of symbols. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. 1 9 6 9 The ritual process. Chicago: Aldine. 1973 Symbols in African ritual. Science 1 7 9 - 1 1 0 0 - 1 1 0 5 . Van Gennep, A. 1 9 0 9 The rites of passage. M . Vizedom and G . F. Caflfee, translators, w i t h introduction by Solon Kimball. Chicago: Phoenix Books, University o f Chicago Press, 1 9 6 0 . Wallace, Anthony F. C. 1 9 6 6 Religion: an anthropological vieu>. N e w Y o r k : Random House. 1971a

The Obvious Aspects of Ritual Warner, W. F. 1 9 3 7 A black civilization. New York: Harper & Bros. Wilden, A. 1 9 7 2 Systems and structure. London: Tavistock. Young, Michael 1971

Fighting with food. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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Sanctity and Lies in Evolution

I shall be concerned i n this essay w i t h the place o f the holy i n adaptive processes and, further, w i t h the disordering o f the holy i n the course o f e v o l u t i o n . I shall examine the holy and its constituents, the sacred and the numinous, i n light o f problems o f language, namely those o f false­ h o o d , and shall, therefore, also explore the evolutionary significance o f lies. I n the course o f the essay 1 shall attempt to identify, i n addition t o the ordinary lie, a n u m b e r o f forms bearing a family resemblance t o it. I shall call t h e m vedic lies, lies o f oppression, diabolical lies, and idolatry, and I shall consider their roles i n degrading the sacred, deluding the n u m i n o u s , and breaking the holy. A t the e n d 1 shall discuss the mal­ adaptive consequences o f such desecration. I I n another essay, " T h e O b v i o u s Aspects o f Ritual," I have argued that the sacred, t h e numinous, the holy, and perhaps even the divine, are products o f ritual, b u t I have observed that they always escape f r o m ritual's confines. Sanctity, I proposed, emerges o u t o f canonical invariance and its performance, first investing certain sentences expressed i n ritual b u t flowing f r o m those "ultimate sacred postulates" t o others that are directly implicated i n the affairs o f society. H a v i n g escaped f r o m An earlier version of this essay, "Liturgies and Lies," was published in the International Yearbook for the Sociology of Knowledge and Religion 1 0 : 7 5 - 1 0 4 , 1 9 7 6 . In the revision much that would have repeated arguments presented more fully in "The Obvious Aspects of Ritual" was excised and other discussions were expanded to increase their clarity. 223

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r i t u a l , sanctity, sometimes w i t h the support o f the n u m i n o u s , becomes a p a r t i a l a n t i d o t e t o certain p r o b l e m s intrinsic to the very virtues o f language. T h e s e w e r e n o t e d i n T h e O b v i o u s Aspects o f R i t u a l , " b u t may be treated at greater l e n g t h here. T h e first o f these p r o b l e m s is that o f the lie. T h e r e is a f a m i l y o f f o r m s that m a y be designated " l i e , " b u t at the b e g i n n i n g I shall consider o n l y o r d i n a r y lies. 1 use the t e r m " o r d i n a r y l i e " t o refer t o the w i l l f u l trans­ m i s s i o n o f i n f o r m a t i o n t h o u g h t o r k n o w n by senders t o be false. L y i n g is o f t e n associated w i t h deceit, b u t deceit seems t o be m o r e general in scope. T h e t e r m " d e c e i t " implies, I t h i n k , an i n t e n t i o n t o mislead to the disadvantage o f those w h o are misled. B o t h terms i m p l y i n t e n t i o n , b u t the d e f i n i n g i n t e n t i o n o f lie is related t o the signal t r a n s m i t t e d , that o f deceit t o t h e effect u p o n , o r m o r e specifically t o the response of, the receiver. I t may be that lies are usually d e c e i t f u l and that deceit o f t e n e m p l o y s lies, b u t some lies, l i k e t e l l i n g a d y i n g m a n that he w i l l be w e l l , may n o t be d e c e i t f u l , and d e c e i t f u l acts may be o t h e r than lies i n a strict sense. T h e horse that the G r e e k s left f o r the Trojans was not a l i e , b u t it was t h e central e l e m e n t i n w h a t seems a rather implausible deceit. T h e r e are p r o b l e m s w i t h these simple d e f i n i t i o n s , o r rather characterizations, o f lie and d e c e i t , b u t they are sufficient f o r o u r purpose. L y i n g seems largely a h u m a n p r o b l e m , b u t deceit may be m o r e w i d e ­ spread. A t least there are p h e n o m e n a o f considerable i m p o r t a n c e t h r o u g h o u t the animal w o r l d that d o share characteristics w i t h d e c e i t f u l ness: m i m i c r y , bluff, camouflage, b r o k e n - w i n g behavior, p l a y i n g p o s s u m . B u t i n t e n t i o n a l i t y is l a c k i n g f r o m some o f these p h e n o m e n a , and b e ­ sides, e v e n the i n t e n t i o n t o mislead may not be sufficient to i d e n t i f y deceitfulness. T h e r e are contexts i n w h i c h it is acceptable to mislead. N o reasonable p e r s o n w o u l d consider a f e i n t i n b o x i n g , o r a trap i n chess, to be d e c e i t f u l . T h e n o t i o n o f deceit may suppose the existence o f a rela­ t i o n s h i p o f trust w h i c h deceit t h e n violates, and it may be significant that aside f r o m b l u f f i n g , the sorts o f instances that I have n o t e d a m o n g animals are generally e m p l o y e d b y m e m b e r s o f one species to mislead m e m b e r s o f others w i t h w h o m they d o not share a c o m m u n i c a t i o n code and w i t h w h o m they certainly d o n ' t stand i n a relationship o f trust. W e may, nevertheless, be confident that even i f deceit is m o r e widespread than l y i n g , and e v e n i f l y i n g is n o t always d e c e i t f u l , l y i n g expands the possibilities f o r deceit e n o r m o u s l y . T h e c o n t e n t i o n that l y i n g is largely a h u m a n p r o b l e m is n o t n o v e l . H o b b e s ( 1 9 3 0 : 3 i f f . , i64fT.) said as m u c h , and so i n this c e n t u r y has B u b e r ( 1 9 5 2 : 7 ) . M o r e recently, H o c k e t t and A l t m a n n ( 1 9 6 8 ) have added t h e ability t o prevaricate t o H o c k e t t ' s earlier list o f the " d e s i g n f e a t u r e s " o f h u m a n language. T h o r p e , an ethnologist, i n a discussion o f H o c k e t t and A l t m a n n , observes that this ability is " h i g h l y characteristic

Sanctity and Lies in Evolution | 2 2 5 o f t h e h u m a n species and is h a r d l y f o u n d at a l l i n animals'' ( 1 9 7 2 : 3 3 ) . T h o r p e ' s q u a l i f i c a t i o n s h o u l d b e n o t e d , f o r t h e r e d o seem t o b e s o m e w e l l - a t t e s t e d cases o f animals l y i n g o r d o i n g s o m e t h i n g v e r y m u c h l i k e i t . A n o n d o m e s t i c a t e d adolescent m a l e c h i m p a n z e e called Figans b y t h e researchers at t h e G o m b e research s t a t i o n i n Tanzania was o b s e r v e d t o d o s o m e t h i n g t h a t m i g h t w e l l q u a l i f y . I t was t h e practice o f t h e e t h o l o gists t o leave bananas i n a c e r t a i n c l e a r i n g t o attract t h e animals f o r o b ­ s e r v a t i o n . E x p e c t a b l y , h i g h - r a n k i n g a d u l t males d o m i n a t e d t h e assem­ blages a n d a p p r o p r i a t e d m o s t o f t h e f r u i t f o r themselves. N O W w h e n c h i m p a n z e e s have b e e n at rest, i f o n e gets u p a n d leaves b r i s k l y o t h e r s are l i k e l y t o f o l l o w h i m , p e r h a p s because h e is assumed t o have seen o r h e a r d s o m e t h i n g . O n a n u m b e r o f occasions Figans l e d t h e g r o u p away f r o m t h e f e e d i n g area i n such a m a n n e r , c o m i n g b a c k q u i e t l y and alone a s h o r t w h i l e l a t e r t o g o r g e h i m s e l f i n s o l i t u d e . V a n L a w i c k - G o o d a l l states t h a t " q u i t e o b v i o u s l y h e was d o i n g i t d e l i b e r a t e l y " ( 1 9 7 1 . 9 6 ) . M a r g a r i t h a T h u r n d a h l ( p e r s o n a l c o m m u n i c a t i o n ) , w h o w a t c h e d Figans o n o t h e r occasions, suggests t h a t h i s g u i l e was e v e n m o r e e l a b o r a t e . H e w o u l d act as i f h e had heard s o m e t h i n g a n d dash o f f v o c a l i z i n g , s t i m u l a t ­ i n g o t h e r s t o vocalize as w e l l , r e t u r n i n g t h e n u n d e r t h e c o v e r o f t h e general c o m m o t i o n . W e c a n a d m i r e Figans's i n g e n u i t y , b u t o u r v e r y a d m i r a t i o n is a r e c o g ­ n i t i o n o f h o w a w k w a r d a n d d i f f i c u l t is l y i n g that relies u p o n gross p h y s i c a l a c t i o n , a n d h o w f e w m u s t b e t h e occasions i n w h i c h i t is p o s s i b l e . I t is n o t s u r p r i s i n g that e v e n f o r apes f o r w h o m l y i n g is e v i ­ d e n t l y p o s s i b l e i t is p r o b a b l y u n c o m m o n . B u t f o r m a n y , i f n o t i n d e e d m o s t , o t h e r species, l y i n g m a y n o t o c c u r because o f a c e r t a i n f a m i l i a r f e a t u r e o f a n i m a l signaling r e c e n t l y characterized b y J . C . M a r s h a l l , a l i n g u i s t , as f o l l o w s : t

T h e most striking differences between animal signs and language behaviour are to be f o u n d , then, i n the rigid, stereotyped nature o f the former and i n the fact that they are under the control o f independently specifiable external stimuli and internal motivational states. [1970: 234] I n o t h e r w o r d s , g i v e n a p a r t i c u l a r state o f affairs, i n t e r n a l o r e x t e r n a l , a p a r t i c u l a r signal w i l l b e t r a n s m i t t e d because t h e signal is r e l a t e d t o t h e e v e n t i n r o u g h l y t h e same w a y that a n i m b u s o n t h e h o r i z o n is r e l a t e d t o f o r t h c o m i n g r a i n . T h e r u s t l i n g o f t h e peacock's f a n , this is t o say, is as i n t r i n s i c t o his sexual arousal as his t u m e s c e n c e . I t is a p e r c e p t i b l e aspect o f an event indicating t o t h e observer the occurrence o f other n o n p e r c e p t i b l e aspects o f t h e same event. I t is a s i m p l e sign ( i n Peirce's t e r m s " i n d e x , " 1 9 6 0 : i 4 3 f f . ) , o f t h a t event. I n c o n t r a s t , linguistic signals are n o t i n t r i n s i c , b u t o n l y c o n v e n t i o n a l l y r e l a t e d , t o t h e i r significata.

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T h e y a r e , t o f o l l o w b o t h Peirce a n d a usage widespread i n A m e r i c a n a n t h r o p o l o g y , symbolic. T h e advantages o f symbolic c o m m u n i c a t i o n are so e n o r m o u s that some a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s ( W h i t e 1949: 2 2 f T . ) have claimed that its e m e r ­ gence i n e v o l u t i o n can b e c o m p a r e d i n i m p o r t a n c e a n d n o v e l t y o n l y t o the appearance o f life. S y m b o l i c signals can b e t r a n s m i t t e d i n the absence o f t h e i r r e f e r e n t s , and t h e r e f o r e discourse can escape f r o m t h e here and n o w i n t o t h e past, t h e f u t u r e , t h e distant, a n d t h e h y p o t h e t i c a l . T h e scope o f t h o u g h t and action is increased b y magnitudes and dimensions b y t h e use o f the s y m b o l , b u t t h e p r o b l e m w i t h w h i c h w e are c o n c e r n e d is i n t r i n s i c t o its v e r y virtues. W h e n a signal can b e t r a n s m i t t e d i n t h e absence o f its r e f e r e n t , o r w h e n , conversely, an e v e n t can o c c u r w i t h o u t ineluctably signaling itself, l y i n g becomes possible. I t may b e n o t e d that t h e c r i t e r i o n o f i n t e n t i o n a l i t y is i m p l i c i t here. W h e n c o m m u n i c a t i o n is s y m b o l i c , i t is n o l o n g e r " u n d e r t h e c o n t r o l o f external s t i m u l i a n d i n ­ t e r n a l state," n o l o n g e r u n d e r t h e c o n t r o l o f that w h i c h i t signifies. I t is, r a t h e r , subject t o a h i g h e r - o r d e r c o n t r o l t o w h i c h choices are available, and choice i m p l i e s i n t e n t i o n . I t is n o d o u b t t h e case that M a r s h a l l (as others b e f o r e h i m have d o n e ) o v e r d r a w s t h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e c o m m u n i c a t i o n o f animals and o f m e n i f " a n i m a l signs" are t a k e n t o b e t r a n s m i t t e d o n l y by animals a n d " s y m b o l i c c o m m u n i c a t i o n " o n l y b y humans. M e n c o n t i n u e t o c o m m u n i ­ cate t h r o u g h " a n i m a l signs" (Bateson 1972a: ijyff.), and t h e r e seems t o be some s y m b o l use b y animals o t h e r than m a n , even some animals n o t t a u g h t symbols b y m e n , a n d , as w e have n o t e d , some instances o f w h a t m i g h t b e l y i n g have b e e n o b s e r v e d a m o n g t h e m . T h e p o i n t is that lies are the bastard o f f s p r i n g o f symbols. W h i l e there m a y b e some use o f s y m b o l s b y n o n h u m a n animals, t h e reliance o f humans u p o n symbols surpasses b y m a g n i t u d e s any rudimentary use o f symbols b y o t h e r species, and t h e r e f o r e l y i n g is essentially a h u m a n p r o b l e m . I take this p r o b l e m t o b e f u n d a m e n t a l . T h e survival o f any p o p u l a t i o n o f animals depends u p o n social interactions characterized b y some m i n i ­ m u m degree o f orderliness, b u t orderliness depends u p o n reliable c o m ­ m u n i c a t i o n . I f t h e recipients o f messages are n o t w i l l i n g t o accept t h e messages they receive as sufficiently reliable t o i n f o r m t h e i r actions, t h e i r responses are l i k e l y t o t e n d towards randomness, b e c o m i n g increasingly less p r e d i c t a b l e , leading t o yet m o r e r a n d o m responses, r e d u c i n g o r d e r l i ­ ness y e t f u r t h e r . W h e n t h e c o m m u n i c a t i o n system can a c c o m m o d a t e lies it becomes a p r o b l e m t o assure t h e recipients o f messages that t h e i n f o r m a t i o n they receive is sufficiently reliable t o act u p o n (see W a d dington 1961). N o t all symbolically encoded messages are p r o b l e m a t i c , o r course. T h o s e c o m m u n i c a t i n g necessary t r u t h s o r w e l l - k n o w n a n d i m m u t a b l e

Sanctity and Lies in Evolution | 227 facts o r e m p i r i c a l laws m a y n o t present difficulties. T h e message that 1 + 1 = 2 does n o t t r o u b l e a n o r m a l receiver. G i v e n the meanings assigned t o t h e t e r m s i t w o u l d b e self-contradictory t o d e n y this statement. S i m i ­ larly, t h e assertion that t h e application o f sufficient heat t o ice produces l i q u i d water is n o t l i k e l y t o excite d o u b t . B u t m o s t socially i m p o r t a n t i n f o r m a t i o n is n o t o f these kinds. A law c o n c e r n i n g heat, w a t e r , m e l t i n g p o i n t s , b o i l i n g p o i n t s , and so o n does n o t tell w h a t t h e t e m p e r a t u r e o f a distant lake is at this t i m e , o r w h e t h e r the fish are n o w b i t i n g . T h a t 1 + 1 = 2 does n o t tell us h o w many m e n are c o m i n g t o help us o r h o w m a n y dollars r e m a i n i n t h e treasury. T h e i n f o r m a t i o n u p o n w h i c h h u m a n s m u s t act is s e l d o m c o n c e r n e d d i r e c t l y w i t h t h e general laws i n accordance w i t h w h i c h s y s t e m s — p s y c h o l o g i c a l , b i o l o g i c a l , social, eco­ logical, p h y s i c a l — o p e r a t e , b u t rather w i t h t h e c o n t e m p o r a r y o r f u t u r e states o f those systems. F r e q u e n t l y it is n o t feasible f o r the receiver t o v e r i f y such i n f o r m a t i o n t r a n s m i t t e d t o h i m ; o f t e n , i n d e e d , t h e r e is n o possible way f o r h i m to d o so. F o r instance, a m o n g t h e M a r i n g , a p e o p l e a m o n g w h o m I l i v e d f o r a w h i l e i n N e w G u i n e a , m e n c o m m u n i c a t e their p l e d g e t o g i v e m i l i t a r y assistance t o groups o f w h i c h they are n o t m e m ­ bers b y d a n c i n g at those g r o u p s ' religious festivals ( R a p p a p o r t 1 9 6 8 ) . T h e r e is n o way f o r t h e i r hosts t o verify o r validate t h e sincerity o r steadfastness o f t h e i r pledges. H o w t h e n can they rely u p o n t h e m ? II W i t h s y m b o l i c c o m m u n i c a t i o n t h e r e emerges n o t o n l y the possibility o f l y i n g , b u t also o f sanctification. Sanctity seems t o e m e r g e o u t o f r i t u a l , o r at least it is c o n t i n u a l l y re-established i n religious r i t u a l , b u t r i t u a l is m o r e widespread than religious belief. I n d e e d , t h e t e r m " r i t u a l " has b e e n used to r e f e r t o f o r m a l l y similar c o n d u c t observed n o t o n l y a m o n g m e m b e r s o f o t h e r species b u t even o f o t h e r phyla. A m o n g the obvious shared characteristics o f all that is called r i t u a l are stereotypy, material n o n - i n s t r u m e n t a l i t y , p e r f o r m a n c e , a n d , possibly, e m o t i o n a l force. I t is also generally accepted that a m o n g b o t h m e n and animals r i t u a l is a m o d e o f communication. I n all r i t u a l , b o t h animal and h u m a n , there is t r a n s m i t t e d w h a t L y o n s ( 1 9 7 2 : 7 i f f . ) , f o l l o w i n g A b e r c r o m b i e ( 1 9 6 7 ) and Laver ( 1 9 6 8 ) , calls " i n d e x i c a l i n f o r m a t i o n , " that is, i n f o r m a t i o n c o n c e r n i n g the c u r r e n t p h y s i o l o g i c a l , psychological, o r social state o f t h e transmitter. T h i s is p r o b a b l y all that is t r a n s m i t t e d i n m o s t o r all animal rituals. F o r instance, w h e n o n e b a b o o n presents his r u m p t o a n o t h e r h e is c o m m u n i c a t i n g his s u b m i s s i o n ; w h e n t h e o t h e r m o u n t s he is c o m m u n i c a t i n g his dominance. N o t h i n g else seems t o b e c o m m u n i c a t e d , w h i c h is t o say that t h e mes­ sage c o n t e n t o f t h e r i t u a l is exhausted b y t h e indexical messages trans-

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m i t t e d i n t h e r i t u a l . B u t some h u m a n rituals are different. A l t h o u g h all h u m a n rituals have a n indexical c o m p o n e n t , a n d a l t h o u g h this c o m ­ p o n e n t is always o f great i m p o r t a n c e — a m a t t e r t o w h i c h w e shall re­ t u r n — t h e message c o n t e n t o f some h u m a n rituals is n o t exhausted by t h e indexical messages t r a n s m i t t e d i n t h e m . A d d i t i o n a l messages are e m b o d i e d i n t h e c a n o n , t h e fixed sequence o f f o r m a l acts and utterances not encoded by the performers but merely transmitted by them. T h e o r i g i n a t o r s o r encoders are l i k e l y t o b e taken t o b e creators, o r ancestors, o r spirits, o r ancient heroes. T h e messages e n c o d e d i n liturgies vary, b u t i n some o f t h e m rather c u r i o u s postulates, typically w i t h o u t material referents, are l i k e l y t o be f o u n d . I n c l u d e d here are such sentences as t h e Sbema o f t h e Jews and those i n c l u d e d i n t h e C h r i s t i a n creeds. I n t h e rituals i n w h i c h M a r i n g m e n p l e d g e t h e i r f u t u r e m i l i t a r y s u p p o r t there are addresses t o ances­ tors, a n d it is reasonable t o posit as an analogous postulate "Deceased ancestors persist as sentient and p o w e r f u l beings." Such postulates, b e i n g w i t h o u t material referents, are n o t i n their nature falsifiable, n o r can they b e v e r i f i e d , a n d yet they are taken t o b e u n q u e s t i o n a b l e . I take sanctity t o b e t h e quality o f unquestionableness i m p u t e d by t h e f a i t h f u l t o such unfalsifiable postulates. T h a t the u n q u e s tionableness o f u l t i m a t e sacred postulates is a consequence o f t h e i n variance o f t h e canons i n w h i c h they are expressed has b e e n argued at l e n g t h i n " T h e O b v i o u s Aspects o f R i t u a l " and need n o t b e discussed f u r t h e r here. T h i s use o f t h e t e r m " s a c r e d " is, o f course, m o r e restricted t h a n is usual. I use i t t o refer t o o n e aspect o f a m o r e inclusive category, " t h e h o l y , " t h a t includes n o t o n l y the discursive sacred, b u t also t h e n o n discursive o r e m o t i o n a l aspect o f religious p h e n o m e n a , w h i c h I call t h e " n u m i n o u s . " I n m y usage, " s a n c t i t y " is that p a r t o f the holy that can be expressed i n language a n d that, as it w e r e , faces conscious reason a n d discourse. I n d e e d , i t accords w i t h this usage t o say that sanctity is a characteristic o r quality o f discourse rather t h a n o f t h e objects, real o r p u t a t i v e , w i t h w h i c h t h e discourse is c o n c e r n e d . W h i l e sanctity m a y have its source, so t o speak, i n " u l t i m a t e sacred postulates," i t flows t o o t h e r sentences w h i c h , u n l i k e t h e m , d o include references t o material objects a n d activities, sentences d i r e c t l y c o n ­ c e r n e d w i t h t h e affairs o f society. I n literate societies theological e x p o s i ­ t i o n m a y s o m e t i m e s b e t h e vehicle f o r t r a n s p o r t i n g sanctity f r o m u l t i ­ m a t e sacred postulates t o sentences i n c l u d i n g material terms. B u t ritual association, w h i c h does n o t d e p e n d u p o n w r i t i n g , is surely m o r e ancient and remains m o r e w i d e s p r e a d , and i t is also m o r e persuasive and b i n d i n g (see " T h e O b v i o u s Aspects o f R i t u a l " ) . T h e message " W e shall help y o u i n w a r f a r e " t r a n s m i t t e d b y M a r i n g m e n b y dancing at t h e festivals o f t h e i r f r i e n d s , seemingly partakes o f t h e truthfulness that is a p r o p e r t y

Sanctity and Lies in Evolution | 229 o f t h e u l t i m a t e sacred postulates w i t h w h i c h it is associated. T o sanctify messages is t o certify t h e m . T h i s f u n c t i o n o f sanctity remains i m p o r t a n t i n t h e swearing o f oaths. I a m n o t a r g u i n g that sanctity eliminates falsehood, although i t may decrease its prevalence. I d o argue that sanctification increases t h e w i l l ­ ingness o f recipients o f symbolically encoded messages t o accept t h e messages they receive as sufficiently reliable t o act u p o n . T h e p r o b l e m o f falsehood is n o t m e r e l y that o f falsehood itself, n o r even o f its direct effects, as devastating as they m a y b e , b u t o f the corrosive distrust b r e d by f a l s e h o o d s m e r e possibility. T o t h e e x t e n t that t h e recipients o f messages accept t h e m as t r u s t w o r t h y , t h e i r actions w i l l t e n d t o be n o n r a n d o m a n d t h e r e f o r e p r e d i c t a b l e . M o r e o v e r , t h e regularity o f t h e i r responses m a y b r i n g a b o u t t h e states o f affairs that they assume. T o p u t it a l i t t l e d i f f e r e n t l y , t h e v a l i d i t y o f some messages is a f u n c t i o n o f their acceptance ( B a t e s o n 1 9 5 1 : 2 i 2 f f . ) , and t h e i r acceptance is a f u n c t i o n o f t h e i r sanctification. A s far as i n f o r m i n g b e h a v i o r is c o n c e r n e d , sanctified t r u t h is a t h i r d m e m b e r o f the set that also includes t h e necessary t r u t h o f logic a n d t h e e m p i r i c a l t r u t h o f experience. I a m also n o t a r g u i n g that all t h e messages o f any society have ever b e e n d i r e c t l y sanctified i n r i t u a l . I a m p r o p o s i n g that t h e sanctification o f strategic messages m u s t have b e e n i m p o r t a n t i n the e v o l u t i o n o f m a n ­ k i n d , a n d whereas t h e sacred w o u l d be literally u n t h i n k a b l e w i t h o u t s y m b o l s , so t h e e m e r g e n c e o f s y m b o l i c c o m m u n i c a t i o n m i g h t n o t have b e e n possible w i t h o u t t h e sacred, because, a m o n g o t h e r things, o f t h e subversive possibilities i n h e r e n t i n t h e capacity t o l i e . L i k e lies, t h e u l t i m a t e sacred postulates f r o m w h i c h sanctity flows are m a d e possible b y s y m b o l i c c o m m u n i c a t i o n , b y f r e e i n g t h e signal f r o m that w h i c h i t signifies. T h u s , t h e q u a l i t y o f language o u t o f w h i c h t h e p r o b l e m o f falsehood arose also p r o p o s e d its s o l u t i o n t h r o u g h a m o v e o f a s t o n i s h i n g — y e t i n e v i t a b l e — s i m p l i c i t y and p r o f u n d i t y . W h e r e a s lies are m a d e possible b y t h e f r e e i n g o f signals f r o m m a t e r i a l significata, u l t i ­ m a t e sacred postulates are m a d e possible b y t h e f r e e i n g o f significata f r o m m a t e r i a l e m b o d i m e n t altogether. I t m a y be n o t e d , i n passing, that i f l y i n g is t h e i n t e n t i o n a l transmission o f i n f o r m a t i o n t h o u g h t o r k n o w n b y t h e t r a n s m i t t e r t o be false, t h e n u l t i m a t e sacred postulates, w h i c h i n t h e i r n a t u r e are unfalsifiable, c a n n o t b e lies i n an o r d i n a r y sense. T h e y can, h o w ­ e v e r , b e f a u l t y i n ways related t o l y i n g . W e shall r e t u r n t o t h e m later. Ill T h e e m e r g e n c e o f sanctity may be an example o f t h e e v o l u t i o n a r y p r i n c i p l e that H o c k e t t and A s c h e r ( 1 9 6 4 : 1 3 7 ) have called " R o m e r ' s R u l e , " w h i c h proposes that t h e i n i t i a l effect o f an e v o l u t i o n a r y change is

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conservative i n that i t makes i t possible f o r a p r e v i o u s l y existing way o f life t o persist i n t h e face o f changed conditions. F o r e x a m p l e , i n the passage that i n s p i r e d H o c k e t t and A s c h e r , t h e zoologist A l f r e d R o m e r ( 1 9 5 4 : v o l . 1,43fT.) argued that t h r o u g h t h e e n l a r g e m e n t o f t h e i r fins and o t h e r relatively m i n o r organizational modifications o f certain o f their organs, t h e l o b e - f i n n e d fish, w h o w e r e ancestral t o t h e a m p h i b i a , became able t o m i g r a t e o v e r l a n d f r o m o n e d r y i n g - u p b o d y o f w a t e r t o another, and thus w e r e able t o m a i n t a i n t h e i r general aquatic way o f life i n t h e face o f t h e i n t e r m i t t e n t dessication p r e s u m e d t o have characterized t h e D e v o n i a n p e r i o d . S i m i l a r l y , sanctity m a y have p e r m i t t e d t h e persistence o f s o m e p r e v i o u s l y e x i s t i n g m o d e o f social organization, o r e v e n the s u r v i v a l o f t h e associations o f organisms t e r m e d "societies," i n the face o f t h e threat p o s e d t o o r d e r l y social life b y an increasing ability t o l i e . T h e c e r t i f i c a t i o n o f questionable i n f o r m a t i o n is o n l y o n e o f sanctity's offices. A l l sorts o f sentences m a y b e sanctified, i n c l u d i n g directives s p e c i f y i n g p a r t i c u l a r rules, such as " t h o u shalt n o t k i l l , " and h o m i l i e s l i k e " i t is m o r e blessed t o give than t o receive," and they m a y also include sentences c e r t i f y i n g authorities, l i k e " E l i z a b e t h is b y grace o f G o d q u e e n . " Sanctification may, finally, b e extended t o , o r invest, all o f the sentences t h r o u g h w h i c h society is regulated. T h e s e are l i k e l y t o include those i n terms o f w h i c h t h o u g h t and a t t i t u d e are o r g a n i z e d : t h e truisms o f c h i l d - r e a r i n g a n d k i n s h i p o b l i g a t i o n , a n d all o f t h e m y t h i c discourse i n w hich pangolins u n i t e ( D o u g l a s 1 9 6 6 : i7off.), snakes c o r r u p t , and casso­ waries are related t o y o u r b r o t h e r - i n - l a w ( B u l m e r 1 9 6 7 ) — a l l o f t h e m y t h a n d classification i n terms o f w h i c h t h e w o r l d is o r d e r e d . T h i s is a m a t t e r o f great i m p o r t a n c e g i v e n another e v o l u t i o n a r y t r e n d that was surely associated w i t h t h e emergence o f language. I refer t o t h e decrease i n t h e degree t o w h i c h b e h a v i o r and patterns f o r b e h a v i o r are genetically specified. T h e replacement o f genetic d e t e r m i n a t i o n by c u l ­ t u r a l s t i p u l a t i o n o f patterns o f b e h a v i o r has p e r m i t t e d m e n t o e n t e r a n d eventually t o d o m i n a t e t h e great range o f e n v i r o n m e n t s t h e w o r l d p r e ­ sents t o t h e m . B u t intrinsic t o increasing flexibility is t h e c o n c o m i t a n t p r o b l e m that m e n are n o l o n g e r genetically constrained t o abide b y the c o n v e n t i o n s o f t h e societies i n w h i c h they d o happen t o l i v e . Sanctity i n t h e absence o f genetic specification o f b e h a v i o r stabilizes t h e c o n v e n ­ tions o f p a r t i c u l a r societies b y c e r t i f y i n g directives, authorities w h o m a y issue d i r e c t i v e s , and all o f t h e m y t h i c discourse that connects the present t o t h e b e g i n n i n g , establishing f o r m e n particular meanings f r o m a m o n g t h e g r e a t range o f meanings available t o t h e i r genetically u n b o u n d e d imaginations. T o p u t this a l i t t l e d i f f e r e n t l y , t h e second p r o b l e m intrinsic t o t h e p o w e r s o f language is alternative. W i t h an increasing range o f c u l t u r a l o r d e r s b e c o m i n g genetically possible f o r any h u m a n o r g a n i s m , t h e r

Sanctity and Lies in Evolution | 2 3 1 adaptive capacities o f t h e species are enhanced and its adaptive processes accelerated. B u t possibilities f o r d i s o r d e r are also magnified. I f c u l t u r a l o r d e r s are b u i l t u p o n w o r d s , there is n o t o n l y the possibility o f false w o r d s , b u t o f many w o r d s , n o t o n l y o f lie, b u t o f babel, o f o v e r w h e l m ­ i n g alternative. T h e c o n c e p t i o n o f alternative orders is an inevitable c o n ­ c o m i t a n t o f l e x i c o n and syntax. I f i t is possible t o say " C h r i s t is G o d and J o v e is n o t , " i t is possible t o say o r imagine "Jove is G o d and C h r i s t is n o t . " I f i t is possible t o say " M o n a r c h y is g o o d and democracy is n o t , " i t is possible t o say o r imagine t h e converse. T h e c o n c e p t i o n o f alternative may b e t h e first step t o w a r d t h e d i s r u p t i o n o f t h e existent i f n o t t o w a r d the realization o f t h e alternative, and any c o n v e n t i o n a l o r d e r m u s t p r o ­ tect i t s e l f agaipst t h e d i s o r d e r i n g p o w e r s o f t h e linguistically i n f o r m e d i m a g i n a t i o n . I f t h e r e are any w o r d s i t thus m a y be necessary t o establish The Word. O n c e again R o m e r ' s R u l e may b e cited. A l t h o u g h the i n i t i a l effect o f an i n n o v a t i o n is conservative its subsequent effects m i g h t n o t be. A s t h e terrestrial vertebrates e m e r g e d o u t o f the genetic changes i n i t i a l l y m a k i n g i t possible f o r the l o b e - f i n n e d fish t o m a i n t a i n an aquatic way o f l i f e , so sanctity, o n c e e m e r g e d , p r o v i d e d a p r i n c i p l e u p o n w h i c h the great range o f n o v e l h u m a n social organizations made possible b y language c o u l d rest. L i e and alternative, i n s u m , are t w o f u n d a m e n t a l p r o b l e m s — p e r h a p s the t w o f u n d a m e n t a l p r o b l e m s — b e s e t t i n g language. I t is o f interest that B u b e r ( 1 9 5 2 ) takes t h e m t o be t h e t w o g r o u n d s o f e v i l . I have a r g u e d , h o w e v e r , that s a n c t i t y — a l s o a precipitate o f language, b u t o f language s u b o r d i n a t e d t o p r o p r i e t y - g e n e r a t i n g canonical i n v a r i a n c e — a m e l i o r a t e s those evils b y c e r t i f y i n g t h e truthfulness o f p u t a t i v e l y factual i n f o r m a t i o n and t h e correctness o f c o n v e n t i o n . T r u t h f u l n e s s a n d correctness are, o f course, related notions. I t is o f interest here that, a c c o r d i n g t o some scholars, i n t h e Z o r o a s t r i a n i s m o f t h e ancient Persian e m p i r e ( D u c h e s n e - G u i l l e m i n 1 9 6 6 : ?6ff.) as w e l l as i n V e d i c I n d i a ( B r o w n 1 9 7 2 : 252ff.) t h e t e r m rta meant b o t h t r u t h and o r d e r a n d t h e w o r d anrta m a y have b e e n used f o r b o t h lie and v i o l a t i o n o f c o r r e c t o r d e r . W e m a y note a second m e m b e r o f t h e family o f lies. W h e r e a s an o r d i n a r y lie is o f the class o f incorrect statements, statements that d o n o t c o r r e s p o n d t o t h e states o f affairs they p u r p o r t t o describe o r r e p o r t , w h a t w e m a y call vedic lies are i n c o r r e c t states o f affairs, states o f affairs, that is, that d o n o t c o n f o r m t o t h e specifications t h e y p u r p o r t , o r are s u p p o s e d , t o m e e t . IV U l t i m a t e sacred postulates, w h i c h are o f t e n expressed o n l y i n r i t u a l , may sanctify sentences c o n c e r n i n g ethics, authorities, categories o f t h o u g h t ,

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t h e m a x i m s o f socialization and t h e rules o f social i n t e r a c t i o n , e c o n o m i c o r g a n i z a t i o n a n d ecological r e l a t i o n s — s e n t e n c e s , this is t o say, having d i r e c t l y t o d o w i t h t h e r e g u l a t i o n o f society. T o p u t this i n t o terms p r o p o s e d b y V i c t o r T u r n e r ( 1 9 6 9 ) , u l t i m a t e sacred postulates, perhaps supported by " communitas,"* the "destructured" and often numinous state o f society p r e v a i l i n g i n r i t u a l , m a y sanctify w h a t h e means b y " s t r u c t u r e , " t h e d i f f e r e n t i a t e d , rational organization t h r o u g h w h i c h soci­ eties c o n d u c t t h e i r d a y - t o - d a y affairs and m e e t t h e i r m a t e r i a l needs. T h a t sanctity s u p p o r t s social o r d e r is o n e o f a n t h r o p o l o g y ' s m o s t ancient t r u i s m s . T h a t i t may increase the adaptiveness o f social systems is n o t , f o r f l e x i b i l i t y is central t o adaptiveness, a n d t o m a i n t a i n t h e p r e ­ d o m i n a n c e o f some c o n v e n t i o n s against t h e challenge o f alternatives seems h a r d l y t o b e t o m a i n t a i n flexibility. T h e ability t o m o d i f y o r replace c o n v e n t i o n s is central t o h u m a n adaptiveness, and t h e suggestion that that w h i c h constrains change preserves such an ability seems, at first, t o b e v i r t u a l l y paradoxical. F l e x i b i l i t y , h o w e v e r , is n o t m e r e versatility b u t , r a t h e r , a p r o d u c t o f versatility and orderliness. T h e i n n u m e r a b l e possibilities i n h e r e n t i n w o r d s a n d their c o m b i n a t i o n are n o t all e l i m i ­ nated b y t h e u n q u e s t i o n a b l e W o r d enunciated i n ritual's apparently invariant c a n o n b u t are r e d u c e d , constrained, and o r d e r e d b y i t . T h e c o n v e n t i o n s t h r o u g h w h i c h societies are regulated, i t s h o u l d b e e m p h a ­ sized, are sanctified, b u t they themselves are n o t sacred. T h e u l t i m a t e l y sacred, a n d thus absolutely unquestionable, is, i n an o r d e r l y adaptive s y s t e m , c o n f i n e d t o certain postulates expressed i n t h e m o s t invariant p o r t i o n s o f liturgies. A feature typical o f u l t i m a t e sacred postulates is o f great significance h e r e . I r e f e r t o t h e i r material and social vacuity. I n " T h e O b v i o u s Aspects o f R i t u a l " I observed that this feature places t h e m b e y o n d falsification. N o w i t m a y b e suggested that this self-same charac­ teristic is o f i m p o r t a n c e t o t h e flexibility o f adaptive systems as w h o l e s . I have discussed t h e nature o f these systems i n " A d a p t i v e S t r u c t u r e and Its D i s o r d e r s " and c a n b e b r i e f here. Such systems, i n c l u d i n g social systems, d o n o t have special goals o r o u t p u t s , t h e i r p r o p e r l y adaptive g o a l b e i n g n o t h i n g m o r e specific t h a n t o persist, w h i c h is t o say t o c o n t i n u e t o b e able t o t r a n s f o r m themselves i n response t o t h e vicissi­ tudes o f h i s t o r y a n d e n v i r o n m e n t . A s Lawrence S l o b o d k i n ( 1 9 6 8 ) has p u t i t , such systems are "players o f the existential game," a game i n w h i c h t h e r e are n o payoffs h a v i n g value e x t e r n a l t o t h e g a m e because t h e " p l a y e r " can't "leave t h e table," a game i n w h i c h , t h e r e f o r e , t h e o n l y r e w a r d f o r successful play is t o be a l l o w e d t o c o n t i n u e t o play. Since t h e c o n d i t i o n s a n d e v e n t h e rules o f play are l i k e l y t o change, flexibility— t h e capacity f o r o r d e r l y s e l f - t r a n s f o r m a t i o n — i s advantageous, r i g i d 4

I am using the term in a slightly more restricted sense than does Turner.

Sanctity and Lies in Evolution | 2 3 3 c o m m i t m e n t t o particular modes o f p l a y — p a r t i c u l a r c o n v e n t i o n s o r i n s t i t u t i o n s — i s disadvantageous, o r even lethal. N o w u l t i m a t e sacred postulates, w h i c h c o n t a i n n o material t e r m s , d o not i n themselves specify p a r t i c u l a r m a t e r i a l goals o r institutions. T h e y can, t h e r e f o r e , n o t o n l y sanctify any i n s t i t u t i o n w h i l e b e i n g b o u n d t o none b u t can also sanctify changes i n i n s t i t u t i o n s . C o n t i n u i t y can b e m a i n t a i n e d w h i l e a l l o w i n g change t o t a k e place, f o r the association o f particular institutions o r c o n v e n t i o n s w i t h u l t i m a t e sacred postulates is a m a t t e r o f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , and that w h i c h m u s t b e i n t e r p r e t e d can always be r e i n t e r p r e t e d w i t h o u t b e i n g challenged. So, g o d s may r e m a i n unchanged w h i l e the c o n v e n t i o n s they sanctify are t r a n s f o r m e d t h r o u g h r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i n response t o c h a n g i n g c o n d i t i o n s . Usage is not sufficient t o establish c o n v e n t i o n s b u t t h e c o n v e n t i o n s established i n l i t u r g y may be m o d i f i e d , t h r o u g h r e i n t e r ­ p r e t a t i o n , i n response t o changing usage arising o u t o f changed historical c o n d i t i o n s . I t m a y b e suggested h e r e that r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n is facilitated b y t h e c r y p t i c as w e l l as t h e n o n m a t e r i a l nature o f u l t i m a t e sacred postulates. I t is i m p o r t a n t , i f a p r o p o s i t i o n is t o be t a k e n t o be unques­ t i o n a b l y t r u e , that n o o n e understand i t , and i t is n o t s u r p r i s i n g that u l t i m a t e sacred postulates are o f t e n " m y s t e r i e s . " * T h i s b r i e f account suggests a n encompassing c o r r e c t i v e o p e r a t i o n t h r o u g h w h i c h r e g u l a t o r y structures that have b e c o m e oppressive o r maladaptive are divested o f t h e i r sanctity. M a t e r i a l and social c o n d i t i o n s are i n some considerable degree a f u n c t i o n o f t h e o p e r a t i o n o f regulatory structures w h i c h , i n t u r n , are sanctified by postulates the u l t i m a t e sacred status o f w h i c h is c o n t i n g e n t u p o n t h e i r f o r m a l o r n u m i n o u s acceptance b y congregations o f the very persons w h o s e lives they o r d e r . I f material and social c o n d i t i o n s r e m a i n oppressive o r unsatisfactory, the willingness o r a b i l i t y o f congregations t o sanctify the structures responsible f o r t h e i r m i s e r y w i l l , s o o n e r o r later, be adversely affected a n d , i f c o n d i t i o n s d o n o t i m p r o v e , those structures, o r those m a n n i n g t h e m , w i l l sooner o r later be s t r i p p e d o f sanctity. T h e phrase " s o o n e r o r l a t e r " is i m p o r t a n t here. T h e w i t h d r a w a l o f sanctification is l i k e l y t o b e a m o r e o r less d i r e c t f u n c t i o n o f u n d e r ­ s t a n d i n g , and t h e o p e r a t i o n s o f some societies may be so m y s t i f i e d o r so c o m p l e x that t h e sources o f distress are grasped only slowly. M o r e o v e r , e v e n w h e n t h e nature o f the difficulties becomes m o r e o r less apparent p e o p l e are o f t e n w i l l i n g t o p u t u p w i t h a g o o d deal i n t h e name o f G o d . I t is p r o b a b l y w e l l that they are, f o r u n h a p p y c o n d i t i o n s are l i k e l y t o be as r e v e r s i b l e as they are ineluctable, and f o r t i t u d e is o f t e n a b e t t e r response *A Catholic Dictionary defines a "mystery properly so called" as a "truth which, though it is not against reason, so far transcends it that no created intelligence could ever discover it, and which, even when it is revealed, is impenetrable by any created intelli­ gence" (Artwater 1961: 3 3 6 ) .

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t o t h e m than d e l i b e r a t e c o r r e c t i v e action. P r e m a t u r e structural responses t o adversity m a y cause l o n g - r u n difficulties as they alleviate s h o r t - r u n stresses (see " A d a p t i v e S t r u c t u r e and I t s D i s o r d e r s " ) . T h e restraint and fortitude that sanctification encourages m a y p r o v i d e t i m e f o r less p r o ­ f o u n d , m o r e easily reversible c o r r e c t i v e responses t o operate first, sanctified s t r u c t u r a l changes f o l l o w i n g o n l y i f less radical corrective measures fail. I n short, sanctity maintains o r d e r i n adaptive response sequences. T h i s s i m p l i f i e d account o f sanctification and desanctification describes a c y b e r n e t i c s t r u c t u r e , f o r those w h o are subordinate t o sanctified regula­ t o r y hierarchies are those w h o invest t h e m w i t h , and may divest t h e m o f , sanctity. T h e r e f o r e , i f authorities w i s h t o m a i n t a i n t h e i r sanctity they m u s t k e e p t h e o p e r a t i o n s o f t h e regulatory structures they administer i n reasonable w o r k i n g o r d e r . I f they d o n o t they may find themselves d e p r i v e d o f sanctity, either passively as p e o p l e w i t h d r a w f r o m participa­ t i o n i n rituals s u p p o r t i n g e x i s t i n g hierarchies (possibly because they n o l o n g e r experience n u m i n o u s e m o t i o n s w h i l e p e r f o r m i n g t h e m ) o r ac­ t i v e l y b y b e i n g d e p o s e d t h r o u g h sanctified p r o c e d u r e s (e.g., Frazer 1 9 6 3 : 3o8ff.) o r , possibly, t h r o u g h t h e instigation o f p r o p h e t s w h o challenge t h e i r c o n n e c t i o n t o t h e sources o f sanctity, o r e v e n declare new u l t i m a t e sacred postulates. T h i s u l t i m a t e c o r r e c t i v e o p e r a t i o n inheres i n systems as w h o l e s . I t is i n t e r e s t i n g i n this regard that the e t y m o l o g y o f the w o r d " h o l y " is shared w i t h t h e w o r d s " w h o l e " a n d " h e a l t h . " I n this l i g h t t h e use o f the t e r m " h o l y " f o r t h e larger category that includes b o t h t h e discursive sacred and t h e nondiscursive n u m i n o u s seems t o m e t o b e especially a p p r o p r i ­ ate. T h e sacred a n d t h e n u m i n o u s , t h e rational and t h e affective, t h e everyday f o r m a l s t r u c t u r e o f society a n d its occasional r i t u a l o r festive state o f c o m m u n i t a s , f o r m w h o l e s t h r o u g h the m o b i l i z a t i o n o f w h i c h t h e a m b i t i o n s o f separate m e n m a y b e s u b o r d i n a t e d t o c o m m o n interest w h i l e at t h e same t i m e t h e operations o f society are c o n t i n u a l l y r e v i e w e d and t e m p e r e d b y t h e needs o f those c o m p o s i n g i t . W h o l e n e s s , holiness, and adaptiveness are closely related i f n o t , i n d e e d , o n e and t h e same.

V I t may b e that l i t u r g i c a l o r d e r , sacred u n d e r s t a n d i n g , a n d t h e sanctifica­ t i o n o f c o n v e n t i o n t o g e t h e r c o n s t i t u t e d an e v o l u t i o n a r y response t o t h e increasing possibilities f o r l i e a n d alternative that d e v e l o p e d as c o n ­ c o m i t a n t s o f s y m b o l i c c o m m u n i c a t i o n and that c o n t i n u e t o threaten t h e social o r d e r s b u i l t u p o n symbolic c o m m u n i c a t i o n . Can i t n o t b e a r g u e d , h o w e v e r , that l i t u r g i c a l operations and t h e sacred and supernatural e n t i -

Sanctity and Lies in Evolution | 2 3 5 ties at once c o n c e i v e d t h r o u g h t h e m and rationalized b y t h e m are as false as the lies f o r w h i c h t h e y are antidotes? I t is o b v i o u s , first, that u l t i m a t e sacred postulates cannot be lies i n any s i m p l e sense because, as w e have already n o t e d , t o the e x t e n t that t h e i r t e r m s are n o n m a t e r i a l , they are nonfalsifiable. M o r e o v e r , e v e n i f they c o u l d b e s h o w n t o be i n some sense false, t h e r e may n o t be o n the p a r t o f those t r a n s m i t t i n g t h e m any i n t e n t i o n t o transmit false i n f o r m a t i o n . M o r e i m p o r t a n t , i t is possible t o argue that u l t i m a t e sacred postulates, w h i c h are w i t h o u t m a t e r i a l referents, are m e m b e r s o f the class o f state­ m e n t s t h e v a l i d i t y o f w h i c h is a f u n c t i o n o f their acceptance (Bateson 1 9 5 1 ) , and t h e same may be said o f the regulatory sentences they sanctify. T h e process o f naturalization that occurs i n some liturgies is l i k e w i s e s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d , and the states o f affairs that c o m e i n t o b e i n g t h r o u g h liturgical actions are, finally, as m u c h o f nature as those that c o m e o u t o f tectonic activity. " B r u t e " and " i n s t i t u t i o n a l " facts (Searle 1 9 6 9 : 5off.) are inseparable i n nature. O t h e r possible flaws w h i c h are n o t encompassed by any n a r r o w d e f i n i ­ t i o n o f lie b u t w h i c h are, nevertheless, related to lie may b e intrinsic to l i t u r g i c a l o r d e r s , and t o the c o n c e p t i o n s e m e r g i n g o u t o f t h e m o f forces o r s e n t i e n t beings transcending m o r t a l i t y and society, o r e v e n space and t i m e . I n o t e first, m a i n l y t o disagree w i t h it, t h e charge that religious c o n c e p t i o n s are i n h e r e n t l y d e c e i t f u l simply because they are illusory. I n the n e x t section w e shall t u r n to m o r e substantial difficulties that maybeset l i t u r g y and sanctity. I t is w e l l k n o w n that F r e u d ( 1 9 2 7 ) t o o k religious c o n c e p t i o n s t o be i l l u s i o n s , a n d f o r m u c h t h e same reason that D u r k h e i m t o o k all r e l i g i o n t o b e i n some sense t r u e , M a r x ( 1 8 4 2 , 1844) t o o k i t t o b e false ( S k o r u p s k i 1 9 7 6 : 3 2 f f . ) . D u r k h e i m , w h o rested his case largely u p o n A u s t r a l i a n a b o r i g i n a l m a t e r i a l , t o o k such conceptions t o be symbolic representa­ t i o n s o f society, veils o f m y s t i f i c a t i o n b e i n g perhaps necessary because m e n are l i k e l y t o find the necessity o f the apparently n a t u r a l , and the a u t h o r i t y o f t h e n a t u r a l i z i n g supernaturals, t o be m o r e c o m p e l l i n g t h a n m e r e r a t i o n a l c o n v e n t i o n s as bases f o r l i v i n g i n some degree o f c o n c o r d w i t h o t h e r m e n and nature. M a r x , i n contrast, w h o was c o n c e r n e d largely w i t h state societies, t o o k religious conceptions n o t t o b e m o r e o r less u s e f u l o r necessary mystifications b u t deceptions facilitating the m a n i p u ­ l a t i o n o f t h e m a n y by t h e few. F r e u d and M a r x w e r e i n considerable agreement i n seeing religious c o n c e p t i o n s n o t o n l y t o be illusions, b u t because illusory d e p l o r a b l e , f o r i l l u s i o n denies t o m a n t h e i l l u m i n a t i o n s w h i c h his u n c l o u d e d reason c o u l d p r o v i d e h i m , and p r e v e n t s h i m f r o m establishing social orders f o u n d e d u p o n reason. B u t the t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y has perhaps taught us that t h e f a i t h o f t h e n i n e t e e n t h i n reason may have b e e n t o o sanguine.

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I t h i n k w e k n o w n o w that conscious reason has n o t b e e n a n i m p r i s o n e d angel that w o u l d save us i f o n l y i t w e r e f r e e d f r o m its b o n d a g e t o t h e i r r a t i o n a l . T o t h e e x t e n t that i t has b e e n possible t o f r e e reason i t has b e e n f r e e d , p e r h a p s as n e v e r b e f o r e , i n t h e t i m e o f o u r fathers, o u r g r a n d f a t h e r s , a n d o u r s e l v e s , a n d i t has d i s c o v e r e d e v o l u t i o n a n d rela­ t i v i t y a n d t h e d o u b l e h e l i x . I t has also s p a w n e d m o n s t e r s o f such p o w e r that t h e y t h r e a t e n t h e existence o f t h e species that reasoned t h e m i n t o b e i n g . B u t w e d o n o t n e e d h i s t o r y t o t e l l us that n o b l e c o n c e p t i o n s are n o t a l o n e i n b e i n g b o r n o f conscious reason. I t is i n consciousness that m e n scheme a n d c o n s p i r e against t h e i r f e l l o w s , a n d i f reason is n o t always d o w n r i g h t t r e a c h e r o u s , i t is o f t e n n a r r o w l y s e l f - s e r v i n g . I n d e e d , t h e w o r d " r a t i o n a l " i n e c o n o m i c s , t h e d i s c i p l i n e that p r o b a b l y m o r e t h a n any o t h e r g u i d e s t h e affairs o f m o d e r n societies, has c o m e t o r e f e r t o a class o f activities t h a t pits m e n against t h e i r f e l l o w s and that m u s t b e , i n s o m e sense, a n t i s o c i a l : t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f scarce means t o d i f f e r e n t i a l l y g r a d e d ends t o m a x i m i z e t h e p o s i t i o n o f t h e actor vis-a-vis o t h e r s . I f r a t i o n a l i t y i n t h e e c o n o m i c sense is w h a t conscious reason can c o m e t o i t m a y b e suggested that reason a l o n e c o u l d n o t p r o v i d e a secure and s o u n d basis f o r social l i f e e v e n i f i t c o u l d b e f r e e d f r o m t h e n o n r a t i o n a l . F o r ­ t u n a t e l y i t c a n t b e , f o r t h e n o n r a t i o n a l is n o t o n l y t h e h o m e o f rage a n d fear, b u t also o f art, p o e t r y , and w h a t e v e r i t is that p e o p l e m e a n b y t h e w o r d " l o v e . " M o r e o v e r , t h e understandings that e v e n t u a l l y lead t o f o r m a l t h e o r i e s c o n c e r n i n g space, t i m e , m a t t e r and e n e r g y are as l i k e l y t o b e g r a s p e d i n i t i a l l y b y t h e l e f t h a n d o f t h e n o n r a t i o n a l as b y t h e r i g h t h a n d o f conscious reason ( B r u n e r 1 9 7 0 ) . C o n s c i o u s reason is i n c o m p l e t e , and so are its u n a i d e d u n d e r s t a n d i n g s . T h e c o m m o n sense o f conscious r e a s o n , w h i c h has its l o c i i n i n d i v i d u a l o r g a n i s m s , p r o p o s e s a sense o f separation. Consciousness separates h u ­ mans f r o m each o t h e r , each i n s o l i t u d e b e h i n d his o w n eyes, each i m p r i s o n e d b y his o w n s k i n , each enclosed alone b e t w e e n t h e dates o f b i r t h and d e a t h . T h e c o m m o n sense o f separation endorses t h e c o m m o n sense o f self-sufficiency a n d a u t o n o m y , n o t i o n s that are sanctified v i r t u ­ ally t o t h e p o i n t o f apotheosis i n W e s t e r n capitalist society. B u t o f c o u r s e t h e y are i l l u s i o n s . A l t h o u g h h u m a n s are m e t a b o l i c a l l y separate f r o m o n e a n o t h e r , a n d a l t h o u g h consciousness is i n d i v i d u a l , h u m a n s are n o t selfsufficient a n d t h e i r a u t o n o m y is relative a n d slight. T h e y are parts o f larger systems u p o n w h i c h t h e i r c o n t i n u e d existence is c o n t i n g e n t . B u t t h e w h o l e n e s s , i f n o t i n d e e d t h e v e r y existence, o f those systems, m a y b e b e y o n d t h e grasp o f t h e i r o r d i n a r y consciousness. A l t h o u g h conscious reason is i n c o m p l e t e , t h e m o d e o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g e n c o u r a g e d b y l i t u r g y m a y m a k e u p f o r s o m e o f i t s deficiencies. P a r t i c i p a t i o n i n rituals m a y e n l a r g e t h e awareness o f those p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n t h e m , p r o v i d i n g t h e m

Sanctity and hies in Evolution | 2 3 7 w i t h u n d e r s t a n d i n g s o f p e r f e c t l y natural aspects o f t h e social and physical w o r l d that m a y e l u d e u n a i d e d reason. G r e g o r y Bateson's r e c e n t ( 1 9 7 2 : 4 4 8 f f . ) discussion o f m i n d casts l i g h t o n those aspects o f n a t u r e that m a y b e grasped b y ritual's insight. B a t e s o n suggests that t h e m i n i m u m u n i t o f idea is a " d i f f e r e n c e w h i c h m a k e s a d i f f e r e n c e , " a bit i n i n f o r m a t i o n t h e o r y . T h e e l e m e n t a r y cyber­ netic c i r c u i t s a r o u n d w h i c h such u n i t s o f i n f o r m a t i o n flow a r e t h e s i m p l e s t u n i t s o f m i n d . M i n d , that is t o say, is i m m a n e n t i n c y b e r n e t i c systems. W h i l e i t is surely t h e case that some such circuits are c o n t a i n e d e n t i r e w i t h i n i n d i v i d u a l consciousness, t h e m i n d o f the i n d i v i d u a l is m o r e c o m p r e h e n s i v e t h a n his consciousness a l o n e , as F r e u d l o n g ago s h o w e d us. W e also k n o w d i r e c t l y f r o m e x p e r i e n c e that o u r i n f o r m a t i o n - p r o c e s s ­ i n g c i r c u i t s i n c l u d e m o r e t h a n o u r brains, because i n response t o some messages w e e x p e r i e n c e changes i n o u r visceral states, a n d these changes e n t e r i n t o t h e c o m p u t a t i o n s that p r o d u c e o u r t o t a l reactions t o t h e i n f o r m a t i o n r e c e i v e d . W e f u r t h e r i m p l y h e r e that t h e i n f o r m a t i o n cir­ c u i t s that are significant t o us i n c l u d e n o t o n l y m o r e t h a n o u r brains b u t m o r e t h a n t h e selves o u r skins b o u n d . W e are d e p e n d e n t u p o n circuits t h a t i n c l u d e p o r t i o n s o f e n v i r o n m e n t s ; some o f t h e m i n c l u d e many i n d i v i d u a l s , o f t e n i n d i v i d u a l s o f a n u m b e r o f species. W h e r e a s animals are, as a r u l e , q u i t e separate f r o m each o t h e r as far as m e t a b o l i s m is c o n c e r n e d , they are less a u t o n o m o u s w i t h respect t o i n f o r m a t i o n p r o c ­ essing. T h i s is t o say that m a t t e r - e n e r g y processing systems a n d i n f o r m a ­ t i o n p r o c e s s i n g systems are n o t coextensive. B u t t h e adequate f u n c t i o n ­ i n g , i n d e e d t h e v e r y s u r v i v a l , o f m e t a b o l i c a l l y a u t o n o m o u s i n d i v i d u a l s as w e l l as societies is c o n t i n g e n t u p o n s u p r a - i n d i v i d u a l i n f o r m a t i o n p r o c ­ essing c i r c u i t r y i m m a n e n t i n social a n d ecological systems, and d i s r u p ­ t i o n s o f such circuits are l i k e l y t o lead t o results n o t f o r m a l l y dissimilar f r o m t h e effects o f b r a i n lesions o r neuroses. I n t h e absence o f reliable i n f o r m a t i o n , t o t a l systems o r t h e i r parts cease t o b e s e l f - c o r r e c t i n g . T h e d o c t r i n e o f I - T h o u w h i c h B u b e r ( 1 9 7 0 ) proposes as an ethical d i c t u m is i n fact a n a d a p t i v e i m p e r a t i v e , a n d i t does n o t d e n i g r a t e T i l l i c h ' s c o n c e p t o f t h e " G r o u n d o f B e i n g " o r " B e i n g I t s e l f " ( M c K e l w a y 1 9 6 4 : i23ff.) t o suggest that t h e s t r u c t u r e o f i n f o r m a t i o n processing i n n a t u r e accords w i t h i t . B a t e s o n has r e c o g n i z e d these s i m i l a r i t i e s : . . . there is a larger M i n d o f which the individual m i n d is only a subsystem. This larger M i n d is comparable t o G o d and is perhaps what some people mean by " G o d " b u t i t is still immanent i n the total interconnected social system and planetary ecology. [ 1 9 7 2 b : 4 6 1 ] C o n s c i o u s reason m a y o f course p r o v i d e us w i t h k n o w l e d g e a b o u t t h e s t r u c t u r e a n d f u n c t i o n o f ecological and social systems and present t o us

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reasonable arguments f o r c o m p l y i n g w i t h t h e i r imperatives. B u t such k n o w l e d g e a n d reasons are l i k e l y t o b e o v e r c o m e by w h a t economists call " r a t i o n a l i t y . " T o ask conscious reason t o lead unaided t h e separate i n d i v i d u a l s i n w h i c h i t resides t o favor t h e l o n g - t e r m interests o f eco­ systems a n d societies o v e r t h e i r o w n i m m e d i a t e interests may b e t o ask t o o m u c h o f i t . Sustained compliance w i t h t h e imperatives o f larger systems n o t o n l y m a y r e q u i r e m o r e than o r d i n a r y reason, b u t m a y have t o b e m a i n t a i n e d i n defiance o f a consciousness that in its nature i n f o r m s m e n o f t h e i r separateness. I t m a y , i n d e e d , r e q u i r e that t h e c o m m o n sense o f separation b e transcended and replaced f r o m t i m e t o t i m e b y an e x t r a o r d i n a r y sense o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n , o f b e i n g j o i n e d together w i t h e n t i ­ ties, f r o m w h i c h o n e is separated b y t h e evidence o f t h e senses and by c o m p e t i t i v e rationality, i n t o w h o l e s — s o c i e t i e s and e c o s y s t e m s — t h a t are n a t u r a l , b u t n o t i n t h e i r nature directly perceptible. T o p e r f o r m a l i t u r g i c a l o r d e r is t o participate i n it, act as part o f i t ; and w h e r e t h e r i t u a l is p u b l i c , i t is t o j o i n w i t h o t h e r s i n this p a r t i c i p a t i o n . I n m a n y rituals s t r o n g e m o t i o n s are e n g e n d e r e d and consciousness altered. N o t i n f r e q u e n t l y there is a f e e l i n g o f "loss o f s e l f " — t h a t is, a loss o f the sense o f s e p a r a t i o n — a n d a f e e l i n g o f u n i o n w i t h t h e o t h e r m e m b e r s o f t h e c o n g r e g a t i o n a n d e v e n m o r e e m b r a c i n g entities. I t is o b v i o u s l y i m p o r t a n t that s i n g i n g , d a n c i n g , a n d speaking i n u n i s o n are c o m m o n features o f p u b l i c rituals. T o sing o r dance i n c o n c e r t o r i n u n i s o n w i t h o t h e r s , t o m o v e as they m o v e a n d speak as they speak is, literally, t o act as p a r t o f a larger e n t i t y , t o participate i n i t ; and as t h e radical separation o f t h e everyday self dissolves i n t h e c o m m u n i t a s ( T u r n e r 1 9 6 9 ) o f p a r ­ t i c i p a t i o n — a s i t sometimes d o e s — t h e larger e n t i t y becomes palpable. Such e x t r a o r d i n a r y o r e v e n mystical experiences seem to be p r o f o u n d l y satisfying b u t , m o r e i m p o r t a n t h e r e , they also m a y p r o v i d e d e e p e r and m o r e c o m p e l l i n g understandings o f p e r f e c t l y natural and e x t r e m e l y i m ­ p o r t a n t aspects o f the physical and social w o r l d than can b e p r o v i d e d b y reason alone. I n s u m , l i t u r g i c a l o r d e r does n o t always hide t h e w o r l d f r o m conscious reason b e h i n d a v e i l o f supernatural illusions. R a t h e r , i t may p i e r c e t h e v e i l o f illusions b e h i n d w h i c h unaided reason hides t h e w o r l d f r o m comprehensive human understanding. VI B u t a d m i r a t i o n f o r l i t u r g y and sanctity m u s t , at t h e e n d , b e t e m p e r e d , f o r they are b o t h subject t o real and malignant disorders o f t h e i r o w n . First, i t is o b v i o u s that i f liturgical orders " n a t u r a l i z e " some c o n v e n ­ tions they m u s t stipulate, at least tacitly, that o t h e r s are u n n a t u r a l . A s a c o n s e q u e n c e , t h e c o n v e n t i o n s o f o t h e r c u l t u r a l groups are l i k e l y t o be t h o u g h t n o t t o b e s i m p l y d i f f e r e n t f r o m those o f one's o w n , n o r e v e n

Sanctity and Lies in Evolution | 239 m e r e l y i m m o r a l , b u t a b o m i n a b l e . T h o s e p r a c t i c i n g t h e m may, conse­ q u e n t l y , b e t a k e n t o b e o t h e r t h a n , o r less t h a n , h u m a n , and treated accordingly. T o use E r i k E r i k s o n s ( 1 9 6 6 ) t e r m , c u l t u r a l g r o u p s b e c o m e pseudo-species. Sanctity and l i t u r g y may magnify m i n o r c u l t u r a l d i f f e r ­ ences i n t o seemingly m a j o r natural differences. T h e y may n o t o n l y e n v e n o m e n m i t i e s f o r w h i c h they themselves w e r e n o t initially r e s p o n ­ sible, b u t are themselves capable o f s e t t i n g m e n against each o t h e r . Less o b v i o u s difficulties m a y beset t h e s t r u c t u r e o f sanctification. I f adaptive systems are t o r e m a i n f l e x i b l e the degree o f sanctity accorded to d i r e c t i v e s s h o u l d b e inversely c o r r e l a t e d w i t h t h e i r material specificity. A p r o b l e m that m a y b e intrinsic t o sanctification becomes apparent h e r e , f o r dissonance may d e v e l o p b e t w e e n sanctity and specificity. H i g h l y spe­ cific directives may b e c o m e oversanctified. A case i n p o i n t m i g h t b e b i r t h c o n t r o l p r o h i b i t i o n i n C a t h o l i c i s m . T o an o u t s i d e r it w o u l d seem that b i r t h c o n t r o l devices c o u l d b e m a d e acceptable t h r o u g h r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n w i t h o u t challenge t o d o g m a . B u t highly specific l o w - o r d e r directives c o n c e r n i n g t h e m are b e i n g accorded a degree o f sanctity greater t h a n t h e i r specificity warrants, a degree o f sanctity a p p r o a c h i n g that o f u l t i ­ m a t e sacred postulates, o r d o g m a , and t h e c h u r c h seems t o b e suffering w i d e s p r e a d d e f e c t i o n as a result. O v e r s a n c t i f i c a t i o n o f t h e specific, a d i s o r d e r a k i n to mistakes i n logical t y p i n g (see B a t e s o n 1 9 7 2 c ) and o n e that stifles social change, is a possi­ b i l i t y i n t r i n s i c t o sanctification. I t m a y b e , h o w e v e r , that i t becomes especially l i k e l y , and thus especially serious, i n state-organized societies, f o r i n such societies specialized clergies, o f t e n i n possession o f p o w e r f u l means o f c o e r c i o n , m a y be i n positions a l l o w i n g t h e m t o adjudicate questions o f orthodoxy. B u t oversanctification o f t h e specific may d e v e l o p f o r reasons o t h e r t h a n an i n f l e x i b l e o r t h o d o x y ' s c o n f u s i o n o f specific rules w i t h general p r i n c i p l e s . I have argued i n " A d a p t i v e S t r u c t u r e and Its D i s o r d e r s " that as t h e subsystems o f societies b e c o m e increasingly d i f f e r e n t i a t e d and d i f f e r e n t i a l l y p o w e r f u l , t h e m o r e p o w e r f u l are ever m o r e able t o elevate t h e i r o w n special goals and interests t o positions o f p r e d o m i n a n c e i n t h e systems o f w h i c h they are o n l y c o m p o n e n t s . A s t h e i r special goals and interests are elevated t h e y are invested w i t h t h e sanctity o f t h e m o r e g e n e r a l postulates t h e y replace o r define. I f , as President C o o l i d g e said, " T h e business o f A m e r i c a is business," and i f A m e r i c a is " O n e N a t i o n u n d e r G o d , " as t h e pledge o f allegiance stipulates, t h e n business and all that is related t o i t — p r o f i t , p r i v a t e e n t e r p r i s e , h i g h c o n s u m p t i o n — b e c o m e conflated w i t h " l i f e , l i b e r t y , and t h e p u r s u i t o f happiness." T h e t h e o l o g i a n Paul T i l l i c h ( 1 9 5 7 : n f f . ) characterized t h e " a b s o l u t i z i n g o f t h e r e l a t i v e and t h e r e l a t i v i z i n g o f t h e absolute," w h i c h identifies t h e u l t i m a t e w i t h t h e m a t e r i a l and w i t h t h e status q u o , as " i d o l a t r y , " and he

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t o o k i t t o be e v i l . I w i l l o n l y add that t o accord a higher degree o f sanctity t o p r o p o s i t i o n s o r goals than t h e i r specificity warrants is t o n a r r o w t h e range o f c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h t h e society can persist. E v i l a n d m a l adaptiveness, i t may b e suggested, intersect i n w h a t T i l l i c h called " i d o l ­ atry," and I i n c l u d e i d o l a t r y i n t h e f a m i l y o f falsehoods. I f w e can take t o b e "adaptively t r u e " postulates t h e acceptance o f w hich enhances chances o f persistence, w e can, I t h i n k , take idolatrous postulates t o b e adaptively false, f o r t h e apotheosizing o f the m a t e r i a l , i t is i r o n i c t o o b s e r v e , defeats t h e material goal o f survival. I take idolatrous postulates t o b e false, b e i t n o t i c e d , regardless o f the degree o f accep­ tance accorded t h e m . T h i s is t o say that consent and consensus are n o t i n themselves sufficient t o establish a l l c o n v e n t i o n a l truths. T h e o n l y u l t i ­ mate sacred postulates that can b e adaptively t r u e are those that, having n o m a t e r i a l t e r m s , d o n o t irrevocably c o m m i t t h e societies accepting t h e m t o particular institutions o r conventions. " T h e l i e , " said M a r t i n B u b e r , " i s f r o m t i m e and w i l l b e swallowed u p by t i m e ; t h e t r u t h , t h e d i v i n e t r u t h , is f r o m e t e r n i t y a n d i n eternity, and i n d e v o t i o n t o t h e t r u t h . . . partakes o f e t e r n i t y " ( 1 9 5 2 : i 3 f ) . T h e v e r y q u a l i t y o f n o n i d o l a t r o u s u l t i m a t e sacred postulates that seems t o r e n d e r t h e m rationally illusory, that they are n e i t h e r verifiable n o r falsifiable, makes t h e m adaptively t r u e . N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e possibility o f i d o l a t r y , w h i c h bears a f a m i l y resemblance t o l i e , is intrinsic t o sanctity. Its l i k e l i h o o d , h o w e v e r , is perhaps increased w i t h increasing social dif­ f e r e n t i a t i o n a n d technological d e v e l o p m e n t , b o t h o f w h i c h tend t o i n ­ crease disparities i n t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f p o w e r a m o n g t h e subsystems o f societies. Social d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n a n d technological advance, b o t h aspects o f c u l t u r a l e v o l u t i o n , place at the disposal o f authorities coercive i n s t r u ­ m e n t s at o n c e increasingly p o w e r f u l and decreasingly available t o t h e i r subjects. T h e possession o f such means o f c o e r c i o n diminishes t h e d e p e n d e n c e o f t h e a u t h o r i t y u p o n his sanctity. A s h e become increas­ ingly p o w e r f u l h e can stand m o r e u p o n p o w e r (a f u n c t i o n o f m e n , resources, a n d o r g a n i z a t i o n ; see Bierstadt 1 9 5 0 : 7 3 0 f f . ) a n d less u p o n sanctity. T h i s is n o t t o say that p o w e r f u l authorities necessarily dispense w i t h sanctity. I t is t o say that as p o w e r accumulates t h e relationship b e t w e e n sanctity a n d a u t h o r i t y is l i k e l y t o b e i n v e r t e d . Whereas i n t h e t e c h n o ­ logically s i m p l e society t h e a u t h o r i t y is c o n t i n g e n t u p o n its sanctity, i n the technically advanced society sanctity may be degraded t o the status o f authority's instrument. A n aspect o f this degradation may be a change i n t h e basis o f t h e u n q u e s t i o n a b l e status o f u l t i m a t e sacred postulates. Whereas they o n c e rested u p o n t h e u n c o e r c e d acceptance o f the f a i t h f u l , perhaps s u p p o r t e d by n u m i n o u s experiences, they later c o m e t o rest u p o n f o r c e — h e r e t i c s T

Sanctity and Lies in Evolution | 2 4 1 are b u r n e d , infidels p u t to t h e s w o r d . W h e n acceptance is coerced i t becomes a l i e , b u t i t is n o t t h e lie o f he w h o accepts. I t is t h e lie o f t h e coercer. W e m a y refer t o these lies as "lies o f oppression." I n lies o f o p p r e s s i o n t h e coercer is n o t o n l y t h e liar b u t also the u l t i m a t e v i c t i m o f his o w n l i e , f o r if, as I have argued, b o t h acceptance and its w a n i n g i n f o r m t h e r e g u l a t i o n o f society, t h e n f o r an a u t h o r i t y t o coerce accep­ tance is f o r it i t s e l f t o d i s t o r t t h e i n f o r m a t i o n by w h i c h i t is g u i d e d . P o w e r threatens t r u t h and threatens t h e cybernetics o f adaptive systems, f o r a d a p t a t i o n relies u p o n i n f o r m a t i o n c o n c e r n i n g c u r r e n t c o n d i t i o n s that is i n s o m e degree accurate. T h i s is t o suggest that o p p r e s s i o n is n o t o n l y i n h u m a n e b u t maladaptive a n d , finally, self-defeating. I d o n o t argue that w i t h degradation o f sanctity b y p o w e r religious experiences n o l o n g e r o c c u r , n o r that acceptance is never freely g i v e n . B u t , i n v o k e d i n t h e churches o f state-organized societies b y visions o f u l t i m a t e o r o t h e r - w o r l d l y salvation, they may b e disconnected, so t o speak, f r o m c o r r e c t i v e effect u p o n t h e here and n o w . T h e y n o l o n g e r f o r m p a r t o f an encompassing adaptive structure. I n d e e d , to t h e e x t e n t that t h e experience o f r i t u a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n alleviates t h e anxieties o f t h e f a i t h f u l w i t h o u t alleviating t h e causes o f their anxieties it bears f o r m a l resemblance t o neurosis, as F r e u d ( 1 9 0 7 ) c l a i m e d , a n d t o opiates, as M a r x ( 1 8 4 4 ) c l a i m e d , and rituals are parts o f deceits i f they lead the f a i t h f u l i n t o b o n d a g e w h i l e p r o m i s i n g salvation. Sanctity, itself t h e f o u n d a t i o n o f t r u t h a n d correctness, and t h e n u m i n o u s s u p p o r t i n g i t , w h e n s u b o r d i n a t e d t o t h e p o w e r f u l and material b e c o m e false, f o r they falsify consciousness. B u t t h e cost is great even f o r those w h o are n o t d e l u d e d . F o r t h e m r i t u a l becomes e m p t y and meaningless, i n d e e d t h e v e r y t e r m " r i t u a l " comes t o d e n o t e e m p t y f o r m ( D o u g l a s 1 9 7 0 : 1 9 ) . T h e act o f r i t u a l acceptance, once m o r e p r o f o u n d than belief, becomes a p r o v e r b i a l f o r m o f hypocrisy. B u t i n refusing t o participate hypocritically n o less than i n h y p o c r i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n , the conscious m i n d s o f m e n and w o m e n b e c o m e d i v o r c e d f r o m those deep and h i d d e n p o r t i o n s o f t h e m ­ selves t o w h i c h r i t u a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t r o d u c e d and b o u n d t h e m . T h e self b e c o m e s f r a g m e n t e d and some o f t h e fragments m a y b e lost. T h e c o n ­ sciousness that remains is l i k e l y t o r e m a i n trapped i n its radical separa­ t i o n . F o r those n o t d e l u d e d t h e r e is alienation. So t h e sacred and t h e n u m i n o u s m a y g e t detached f r o m each o t h e r and f r o m t h e i r cybernetic o r c o r r e c t i v e f u n c t i o n s . G i v e n t h e association I have m a d e b e t w e e n wholeness and holiness it is n o t i n a p p r o p r i a t e t o say that they b e c o m e u n h o l y . A s holiness stands t o wholeness, adaptiveness, and s u r v i v a l , so does unholiness stand t o f r a g m e n t a t i o n , maladaptation, and a n n i h i l a t i o n . I t is o f interest that i n t h e K a b b a l a h o f Isaac L u r i a ( S c h o l e m 1 9 6 9 : n o f f . ) t h e o r i g i n o f e v i l is n o t ascribed t o the appear­ ance o f any particular substance o r b e i n g , b u t t o the f r a g m e n t a t i o n o f a

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p r i m o r d i a l u n i t y . T h e d i s r u p t i o n o f the cybernetics o f holiness is such a f r a g m e n t a t i o n . W e m a y recall o n c e again t h e V e d i c a n d Z o r o a s t r i a n n o t i o n o f l i e as v i o l a t i o n o f sacred o r d e r , b u t n o w t h e o r d e r itself becomes d i s o r d e r l y , d i s r u p t i n g ecosystems, oppressing m e n and w o m e n , leading societies i n t o decline. M a n y years ago d e R o u g e m o n t (1944) m a d e a d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n o r d i n a r y lies and w h a t he called " d i a b o l i c a l lies," i n r e c o g n i t i o n o f the putative p r o c l i v i t y o f " T h e Father o f L i e s " f o r appearing as his o w n o p p o s i t e . D i a b o l i c a l lies are n o t simply false trans­ missions b u t lies that t a m p e r w i t h t h e very canons o f t r u t h . I t h i n k i t n o t w r o n g t o assign t o this category assertions o f sanctity f o r discourse t h e unquestionable status o f w h i c h rests u l t i m a t e l y u p o n f o r c e , w h i c h is subject rather t h a n s u p e r i o r t o t h e authorities i t sanctifies, w h i c h m i s ­ leads r i t u a l acceptance a n d n u m i n o u s experience away f r o m c o r r e c t i v e effect u p o n t h e here a n d n o w , w h i c h encourages f r a g m e n t a t i o n and maladaptation w h i l e p r o m i s i n g wholeness and heaven. D i a b o l i c a l lies are n o t n e w t o this w o r l d , as Buber's ( 1 9 5 2 : 7 f f . ) analysis o f the 12 t h Psalm i n f o r m s us. T h e psalmist, according t o B u b e r , no longer suffers merely from liars but from a generation of the lie,. . . the lie in this generation has reached the highest level of perfection as an ingeniously controlled means of supremacy . . . [removing] c o m p l e t e l y . . . the basis of men's common life . . . those the psalmist has in mind speak "delusion" . . . they breed "delusion" in their hearers, they spin illusions for t h e m . . . . Instead of complet­ ing their fellow-men's experience and insight with the help of their own, as required by men's common thinking and knowing, they introduce falsified ma­ terial into his knowledge of the world and of life, and thus falsify the relations of his soul to his b e i n g . . . . In order that the lie may bear the stamp of truth, the liars as it w e r e manufacture a special heart, an apparatus which functions with the greatest appearance of naturalness, from which lies well up to the "smooth lips" like spontaneous utterances of experience and i n s i g h t . . . all this is the work o f the mighty in order to render tractable by deceits those whom they have oppressed, [pp. 8 - 1 0 ]

D i a b o l i c a l lies, l i k e lies o f oppression and idolatrous lies, are the p r o d ­ ucts o f p o w e r , and i f they are n o t n e w t o this w o r l d , n e w and increasing possibilities f o r diabolical l y i n g are offered b y t h e increasing ability o f ever smaller g r o u p s o f m e n a n d ever m o r e specialized institutions t o c o n t r o l t h e flow o f ever greater v o l u m e s o f i n f o r m a t i o n m o r e c o m p r e ­ hensively a n d t h e d i s p o s i t i o n o f increasing concentrations o f energy m o r e totally. T h i s ability has b e e n enhanced by advances i n technology, w h i c h is t o say that i t is correlated w i t h w h a t seems t o have b e e n t h e central factor i n c u l t u r a l e v o l u t i o n . I t thus m a y b e that humanity's fall is o n e w i t h its e v o l u t i o n : as its e v o l u t i o n has b e e n f o u n d e d u p o n its possession o f w o r d s , so m a y its possession b y w o r d s have sealed its fate. O f w o r d s are inevitably b o r n n o t o n l y o r d i n a r y lies and vedic lies, w h i c h may be b e n i g n , b u t also lies

Sanctity and Lies in Evolution | 243 o f o p p r e s s i o n , i d o l a t r o u s lies, diabolical lies, and n o d o u b t o t h e r f o r m s , that j o i n t o g e t h e r i n t o t h e encompassing and w o r l d - d i s s o l v i n g genera­ t i o n o f the l i e that seems t o vex o u r times e v e n m o r e t h a n the times o f t h e psalmist. B e this as i t may, ancient divines u n d e r s t o o d as w e l l as w e d o , o r b e t t e r , t h e paradoxes o f the h u m a n c o n d i t i o n , and t h e r e is an early m e d i e v a l J e w i s h legend o f c r e a t i o n ( S c h o l e m 1 9 6 9 : 179ft".) that also seems t o i d e n t i f y t h e f a l l w i t h the w o r d . B e f o r e H e b r e a t h e d sense i n t o t h e e a r t h that was t o b e m a n , G o d p u t his seal u p o n H i s c r e a t i o n s f o r e h e a d . T h e t h r e e letters aleph, mem, and tot, o f w h i c h t h e seal was c o m p o s e d , encompass all speech, f o r they are the first, m i d d l e , and last l e t t e r s o f t h e alphabet. B u t i n t h e mystical t r a d i t i o n o f w h i c h this legend is a p a r t , w o r d s themselves are creative and e v e n i d e n t i f i e d w i t h G o d h i m s e l f ( i b i d . : 1676°.). T h u s , t h e t h r e e letters i n encompassing all l a n ­ guage encompass all t h i n g s : t h e y are the b e g i n n i n g , e n d , and c o n t i n u i t y . T h e y also spell t h e w o r d emet, w h i c h means " t r u t h . " W h e n t h e sense t h a t G o d had b r e a t h e d i n t o h i m l e d m a n , as i t i n e v i t a b l y d i d , i n t o l i e , and v e d i c l i e — v i o l a t i o n o f t h e o r d e r p r o t e c t e d b y t h e p r i m o r d i a l p r o ­ h i b i t i o n against m a k i n g d i s t i n c t i o n s — G o d erased f r o m his f o r e h e a d the l e t t e r aleph, w h i c h , s i g n i f y i n g the b e g i n n i n g o f all things, was associated m o s t closely and u n a m b i g u o u s l y w i t h H i m s e l f . T h i s l e f t o n man's f o r e ­ h e a d t h e w o r d met, m e a n i n g " d e a t h . " B u t i n a t t e n d i n g t o ancient w o r d s w e s h o u l d r e m e m b e r that w h e n they w e r e e x p e l l e d f r o m E d e n ( " b l i s s " ) , t h e H e b r e w name that m a n b e ­ s t o w e d u p o n t h e w o m a n w h o w as t o b e " t h e m o t h e r o f all the l i v i n g " was C h a w w a , m e a n i n g " l i f e . " I t is n o t o n l y h u m a n d e a t h that the fall invents, b u t also h u m a n l i f e , a m o d e o f existence characterized b y discourse, and b y t h e reason and c h o i c e discourse makes possible. F o r h u m a n l i f e t o persist i t was necessary f o r the o n e c o m m a n d m e n t that had f o r a w h i l e p r e s e r v e d E d e n t o b e replaced b y the 6 1 3 d e r i v e d f r o m the T o r a h , f o r , b e i n g f o u n d e d u p o n w o r d s f o r whose lies t h e r e is n o sure c u r e , t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f h u m a n life are tenuous. B u t i f discursive reason and speech are u n i q u e o n this e a r t h t o h u m a n l i f e , h u m a n l i f e remains m o r e t h a n reason a n d speech, and the g e n e r a t i o n o f the l i e is c o n t i n u o u s l y chal­ l e n g e d b y t h e l i v i n g — b y p r o p h e t s , mystics, y o u t h , r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s , and r e f o r m e r s — w h o , i n t h e i r search f o r w h o l e n e s s , restore holiness ever again t o t h e b r e a k i n g w o r l d b y re-establishing t h e adaptive c o n n e c t i o n o f t h e timeless sacred and the i m m e d i a t e n u m i n o u s t o t h e c o n t i n u i n g here and n o w . r

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Atrwater, Donald, ed. 1 9 6 1 A Catholic Dictionary (The Catholic Encyclopaedic Dictionary), 3 d . ed. New York: Macmillan Bateson, Gregory 1 9 5 1 Conventions of communication: where validity depends upon belief. In Communication: the social matrix ofpsychiatry, ed. J . Ruesch and G. Bateson, pp. 2 1 7 - 2 2 7 . New York: Norton. 1 9 7 2 a A theory of play and fantasy. In Steps to an ecology of mind, pp. 1 7 7 1 9 3 . New York: Ballantine. 1 9 7 2 b Form, substance, and difference. In Steps to an ecology of mind, pp. 4 4 8 - 4 6 8 . New York: Ballantine. 1 9 7 2 c The logical categories of learning and communication. In Steps to an ecology of mind. New York: Ballantine. Bierstadt, Richard 1950 An analysis of social power. American Sociological Review 1 5 : 7 3 0 - 7 3 8 . Brown, Norman W. 1 9 7 2 Duty as truth in ancient India. Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 1 1 6 ( 3 ) : 2 5 2 - 2 6 8 . Bruner, James 1 9 7 0 On knowing: essays for the left hand. New York: Atheneum. (Harvard University' Press, 1 9 6 2 ) . Buber, Martin 1 9 5 2 Good and evil: two interpretations. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. Bulmer, Ralph 1 9 6 7 Why is the cassowary not a bird? Man, N.S. 2 : 5 - 2 5 . Douglas, Mary 1 9 6 6 Purity and danger. New York: Praeger. 1 9 7 0 Natural symbols. Harmondsworth: Penguin. Duchesne-Guillemin, Jacques 1 9 6 6 Symbols and values in Zoroastrianism: their survival and renewal New York: Harper & Row. Durkheim, Emile 1 9 6 1 The elementary forms of the religious life. Joseph Ward Swain, trans­ lator. New York: Collier. (First published 1 9 1 2 ) . Erikson, E. 1 9 6 6 The ritualization of ontogeny. In A discussion of ritualisation of be­ haviour in animals and man, ed. J . S. Huxley, pp. 2 4 9 - 2 7 2 ; Philo­ sophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London, Series B, Biological Sciences 7 7 2 , vol. 2 5 1 . Frazer, Sir James 1 9 6 3 The golden bough: a study in magic and religion. One volume, abridged edition. New York: Macmillan. (First published 1 9 2 2 ) . Freud, Sigmund 1 9 0 7 Obsessive actions and religious practices. Zeitschrift fur Religionspsychologie 1 : 4 - 1 2 . (Translated 1 9 5 9 in the standard edition of The complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud, ed. J . Strachey, vol. 9. London: Hogarth.) 1 9 2 7 The future of an illusion. (Translated by W. D. Robson-Scott, revised and newly edited by James Strachey, 1 9 6 4 . First published as Die Zukunft einer Illusion, Vienna.)

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Thorpe, W. M . 1968 T h e comparison o f vocal communication i n animal and man. I n Non­ verbal communication, e d . R. A . H i n d e , pp. 2 7 - 4 8 . Cambridge: Cam­ bridge University Press. T i l l i c h , Paul 1951 Systematic Theology. V o l . 1 . Chicago: University o f Chicago Press. 1957 Dynamics of Faith. N e w Y o r k : Hayner. Turner, V i c t o r 1969 The ritual process. Chicago: A l d i n e . V a n L a w i c k - G o o d a l l , J. 1 9 7 1 In the shadow of man. L o n d o n : Collins. Waddington 1961 The ethical animal. N e w Y o r k : Atheneurn. W h i t e , Leslie 1949 The science of culture. N e w Y o r k : Farrar Strauss.

Index Abercrombie, D., 227 Abrahams, Roger, 176, 214 Acceptance. See also Ritual, acceptance and force, 240f. validity as a function of, 229, 235 Acclimation. See Adaptation Adaptation, 5, 2 1 , 2 3 , 43*95, 98ff, i22f, 1 4 1 , 1 4 5 - 1 7 3 . See also Adaptive structure, adaptive formulations, 7 5ff, 79f, 88 adaptive goals, 146, 153 adaptive radiation, 74 and cybernetic equilibration, 150 defined, 145 meaning in 1 5 6 - 1 6 0 sacred in, 232 Adaptive structure, 65, i22f., i24f., 14 5 - 1 7 2. 5** also Adaptation

adaptive falsity, 240 adaptive truth, 240 anomalies of, 1 6 1 - 1 6 5 , 168 conventional and material constraints, 1 5 5 cybernetic aspect of, i49f. disorders in, 142, 1 5 1 , 161-165.S** also Hierarchies, anomalies in hierarchical aspect of, 1 5 1 , 153-156 holy in, 223, 243 meaning in, 156-160 order of adaptive responses, i5of. religious experience in, 169 restoration of, i69f. reversibility in, 154 specificity in, 154 temporal aspects of, 150, 154 vagueness in, 155 values in, 1 5 5 - 1 6 0 Alienation, 157, 241 Alitzer, Thomas, 132 Alternative, 202, 210, 23of., 234 and disorder, 23of. and sanctifkation, 2 3of. Alt man, S., 224 Amame, 90, io9ff, 1 1 2

Ambiguity, reduction of, i84f. Anaa, 14. See also Tuamotus Analogic processes and signals, 175 characterized, 184 digital representation of, 184 Ant Atoll, 8 Anthropocentrism, 62 Ascher, Robert, 148, 2 29f. Atoll social organization, i5ff. Attwater, Donald, 233 Austin, J . L , 18, 102, 138, 175, 189, 190, 193, 195. 196, i98f. Autonomy, relative, 56f, 146, 153 Axioms, cosmological, ii7ff., 123, 129

Babcock-Abrahams, Barbara, 206 Banana, 30, 102 Banner, A. H., 9 Barrau, Jacques, 11 Bates, Marston, 6 Bateson, Gregory, 64, 65, 78, 150, 159, i65ff., 186, 2ooff., 206, 213, 226, 229. 235, 237f Beaglehole, E., 20, 22 Beaglehole, P., 20, 22 Beattie, John, 204 Behrens, W. W., 69 Being, 127^, 157 Being-Itself, 216, 237 and divinity, 216 Ground-of-All-Being, 216, 237 and meaning, 217 and trance, 2 1 6 Belief, i94f. and acceptance, 194 and doubt, 195 and numinous experience, 217 as private state, 194 Berg, C , 33 Bergmann, Frithjof, 49, 78, 80-87 Bergson, Henri, 168 Bierstadt, Richard, 240 Binary signals, i84f. and continuous and complex information, 185

248 I E C O L O G Y , M E A N I N G , A N D R E L I G I O N

Birds, 9 Birdsell, Joseph, 8 . 7 1 Bloch, Maurice, 2 0 3 , 2 0 9 , 2 1 6 Boundaries obliterating in ritual, 1 8 7 territorial, 3 7 Brandon, S. G. F., 2 1 6 Breadfruit, 8, 1 2 Brookfield, Harold, 1 5 1 Brown, Paula, 1 5 1 Brown, Robert, 52f. Brown, W. Norman, 199, 2 3 1 Buber, Martin, 1 3 2 , 2 1 0 , 2 2 4 , 2 3 1 , 237,

240, 242

Buchbinder, Georgeda, 1 0 5 , 1 0 8 , no, 1 3 5 , 1 3 6 Bulmer, Ralph, 2 3 0 Burning, n Burton, B. T., 3 4 Bushmen, 2 1 6 Campbell, Joseph, 1 2 3 , 1 2 4 , 2 0 3 , 2 1 2 Canton Island, 2 , 3 , 2 2 Carrying capacity Tsembaga human, 3 1 , 6 6 Tsembaga pigs, 3 7 , 7 1 Catala, Rene, 8 Catastrophe, 2 0 , 2 2 Cause in cybernetic systems, 72f., 1 5 1 efficient, 7 5 , 8 8 final, 7 5 f f , 8 0 , 8 8 , 1 7 3 f

formal, 7 5 ^ . , 8 0 , 8 8 , 1 7 3 f material, 7 5 , 8 8 , 1 7 7 Centralization, progressive, 1 5 2 Certainty, 209rf.

Change and changelessness, 80, 1 4 7 degrees of, 1 5 2 Code, 2 0 3 Co-evolution, 5 5 Cognized environment. See Cognized model Cognized model, 5f., i3f., 3 4 . 7 6 , 8 2 , 9 7 - 1 4 3 . See also Understanding appropriateness, criteria of, 9 8 assessment of, 9 8 , 1 2 5 , 1 4 0 and constitution of cosmos, 1 3 5f. domain of, 8 2 inadequacy of earlier formulations, 116

meaningfulness of, 1 2 6 - 1 3 1

and operational model disparities between, 9 7 fit between, 1 2 3 and regulation, 1 1 6 rhetorical force of, 1 3 7 - 1 4 0 Coherence, 5 7 , 1 5 2 of living systems, 1 5 3 and redundancy, 1 5 2 Cold (supernatural), i05ff., uoff. Colinvaux, P., 5 3 , 5 5 Collins, Paul, 4 4 , 4 8 , 6 7 Colocasia. See Taro Communication, animal, 224ff. Communitas, 2 1 1 , 2 3 2 and unison, 2 1 3 Community, biotic, n anthropocentric, 1 3 , 2 1 boundaries of, 5 4 differences among, 22f., 5 4 unmodified, 1 3 , 2 1 Conklin, Harold, 6 Context marking, 1 8 6 Contingency, i58f.

Contradiction between cultural and organic, 6 2 , 168

and equilibration, 1 0 0 and evolution, 1 6 8 interlevel, 5 7 f , 8 9 , 1 6 1 - 1 6 5

Convention establishment of, 1 3 9 , 1 9 4 performative nature of, 1 3 9 preservation by ritual, 1 9 7 and statistical averages, 1 9 6 and variable usage, 1 9 6 Cook, Earl, 1 6 6 Cook, Captain James, 8 Cordyline. See Rumbim Cosmological axioms. See Axioms, cosmological Creation paradigm of, 1 7 4 , 2oof. and word, 2 4 3 Creeds. See Ultimate sacred postulates Cultural relativism, 6 4 , 1 4 0 Culture core, 5 9 Cultures genuine and spurious, 6 4 as properties of populations, 6 2 as referent units in ecology, 5 9 Cybernetics, 6 3 , 1 2 5 , 148. See also Adaptation; Adaptive structure;

Index I 249 Negative feedback; Selfregulation; Systems, selfregulating and adaptation, 7 0 , 99, 1 5 0 and desanctincation, 2 3 4 disorders of. i6if., 2 3 4

entailments of, 7 6 of the holy, 2 3 4 disruption of, 2 4 2 and homeostasis, 7 0 , 9 9 . 5 o memories of cybernetic mechanisms, 9 8 and mind, 2 3 7 reference values in, 9 8 , 1 2 5 structure of cybernetic systems, 7 2 , x

149

Dancing as display, 38f. Maring, 38f., 1 8 1 f. as performative, 1 8 9 and pledging among Maring, 3 9 , i88f.

Danielsson, Bengt, 8 Death, 11 of. and fertility, 1 1 1 of God, 1 3 2 Deceit. See Lie Deforestation, 1 0 Degener, O., 2 Density-dependent process, 7 1 Desanctification of authorities, 2 3 3 f . Description, 49ff.

Desecration, 2 2 3 Diet Maring, 3 1 protein in, 3 3 Digital processes and signals, 1 7 5 characterized, 1 8 4 reduction to binary, i84f. representation of analogic phenomena, 1 8 4 Dioscorea. See Yam Directives. See also Rules; Ultimate sacred postulates. commands, 1 5 4 principles, 1 5 4 ritual, authority of, 1 9 2 rules, 1 5 4 Disease. See Disorder; Maladaptation; Stress

Disorder of adaptive systems, 1 4 5 - 1 7 3 and alternative, 23of.

in hierarchical structure, 1 6 1 - 1 6 5 of the holy, 2 2 3 Display, 1 8 1 . See also Ritual epigamic, 3 8 epideictic, 3 8 Distinction and articulation, 1 8 7 and difference, i3of., 1 8 6 and meaning, i26ff.

and money, 13of. obliteration of, i3of., 1 8 7

and separation, 1 8 7 transcendence of, i 2 7 f . Distribution, i6ff., 2if., 38f. Distrust, 226f., 2 2 9

Divinity and aspects of language, 2 1 5 basis of, 209f., 2 i 5 f .

features of, 2 1 5 and kingship, 2 0 7 notion of, 2 0 7 numinous predication of, 2 1 6 unification with, 2 1 6 Douglas, Mary, 1 1 2 , 1 3 4 , 2 3 0 , 2 4 1 Drama, 1 7 7 Drought, 1 2 , 22f. Duchesne -Guillemin, Jacques, 1 9 9 , 231

Dunn, F., 3 5 Durkheim, Emile, 4 9 , 74* 7 8 , 1 3 1 . 2ii,

213,235

Dysfunction, 6 7 , 1 0 0 Easter Island, 1 5 Eclecticism, 6 0 , 87f. Ecological anthropology, 4 3 - 9 5 Ecology, 4 3 - 9 5 , 9 7 - 1 4 4 .

145-172

Ecology fetishism, 4 7 , 8 3 - 8 5 Ecosystems as adaptive systems, 1 4 5 alteration of, 1 - 2 6 anthropocentric, 1 3 , 2 1 boundaries, 5 4 climax, 3 coherence of, 5 7 control of, 1 , 2 1 defined, 2 9 , 5 4 , 6 1 degradation, 1 0 , 1 1 , 1 2 , 1 4 , 22f., 1 oof.,

1401T.

250

I ECOLOGY,

MEANING, A N D RELIGION

Ecosystems (continued) and high-energy technology, i66f.

and money, 164, 167 diversity, 2, 11 island, 1 - 2 6 isolation, 2 pristine, i f f . reef-lagoon, 3, 7, i2f. regulation of, 2 7 - 4 2 by ritual, 2 7 - 4 2 size, 7 stability, 2 self-organizing properties of, 55ff. self-regulatory properties of, 53ff. structure, 5 5 successions i n , 5 5 Eliade, M . , 186 Ernies, 97 Emory, K., 4. 17 Energy and evolution, 166 expenditure in Maring gardens, 3of. expenditure i n Maring pig husbandry, 36f. high-energy technology, 162, i63f., i66f.

and maladaptation, 166-167 returns f r o m Maring gardens, 3of. Eniwetok, 3 Enmity, Maring, 34 sanct in cation of, 106 termination of, 40 Entailment, 76ff. o f cybernetic structure, 76 o f ritual, 76f., 1 7 3 - 2 2 1 Environment. See also Ecosystem and ecosystem, 147 Equilibrium. See Homeostasis Erikson, Erik, 2 1 2 , 239 Error, 160 Ethnoscience, 6, 116 Etics, 97 Eve, 243 Evil, 2 3 1 origin of, 241 Evolution. See also Adaptation; Change co-evolution, 5 5 and conventional specification o f behavior, 230 and energy, 1 6 6

evolutionary advance and contradiction, 168 evolutionary success, 149 and fall, 242 and function, i48ff. and genetic specification o f behavior, 230 the holy i n , 223 and homeostasis, 149 lies i n , 2 2 3 - 2 4 3 and maladaptation, 1 6 5 - 1 7 0 sanctity i n , 223, 229 Explanation comprehensive, 74* 86-93 ecology of, 88 formal causal, 76ff. functional, 75f. impoverishment of, 8off., 86f. subjective principles i n , 8iff. system specific, 75ff uniquely correct explanations, 88, 93

universalist, 76ff. Extinction, 9, 10, 149 Fact, 129 brute and institutional, 235 Factitive acts. See Performatives Faith, 19$ Fallacy affirming the consequent, 74 o f crossed explicanda, 78 Falsity, 141 Fernandez, James, 137 Fighting stones (bamp ku), 35, 86, io6f, 1 1 5 , 122

Fiji Islands, 10 Finnigan, R u t h , 191 Firth, Raymond, 2 1 , 177. 204 Fishing, 7 Fish poisoning, 9 Flannery, Kent, i62f., 168 Flexibility, 122, 146, 150 increase of, 23of. loss of, 163 and orderliness, 232f. and sanctity, 232 Forest, secondary, 9. 3* Fortes, Meyer, 177fFosberg, F. M . , 2f. 8, 10 Fragmentation, 241 and evil, 241 f. f

Index | 2 5 1 disorders in, 1 6 1 - 1 6 5

Frazer, James. 2 3 4 Freud. Sigmund, 2 3 5 , 2 4 1 Friedman, Jonathan, 4 3 - 7 3 . 9 9 Frisancho, Roberto, 1 5 0 Function concepts of, 48f. confusions, 7 5ff.

embedded, 1 5 1 explanatory* 8 9 of inclusion, 8 9 interlevel relations in, 8 9 f f , i24f.

of invariance, 2 0 8 , 2 1 0

and evolution, I48ff.

of meaning, 9off., i26ff. regulatory, 1 5 1 . 1 5 3 - 1 6 0

and formal and final cause, 75ff>

of sanctity, 2 1 0 of specificity, 8 9 f f

I73f.

of subsumption, 8 9 temporal aspects of, i 2 4 f

meta-function, i48ff. Functionalism, 2 7 , 4 3 - 9 5

of values, 1 5 6 - 1 6 0

Bergmann's critique, 8 0 - 8 5 critique, general, 5 2 - 8 5 "deadly weakness of," 4 6 , 6 3 limitations of, 8 6 - 9 3

"New Gadjari,

Functionalism," 4 3 134 2

Game, existential, 1 4 6 , 149* 1 5 1 . 3 2 Geertz, Clifford, 1 3 9 , 2 1 6 Genesis, 201, 242f.

Gilbert Islands, 5 Gillespy, E., 2 Goal range, 66, 69, 99 Goffman, Ervin, 197 Goldman, Stanford, 1 8 8 Good enough Island, 1 8 1 Goodenough, Ward, 4 , 9, 1 6 Goody, Jack, 1 7 8 Gouroo, P., 1 1 Grace, 2 1 3 Grace, George, 4 Graves, nof. Green, Roger, 4, 8, 2 1 Guano, 1 0 , passim Hamilton, William, 1 3 2 Harris, Marvin, 4 3 , 4 4 . 6 3 , 9 7 Hatheway, William, 2, 3 , 1 0 Hawaii, 10, 1 4 , 1 7 , 2 1 Hemple, Carl, 4 9 , 5 2 f , 6 6 Hiatt, R W„ 3 Hierarchy, 89ffadaptive, 1 2 2 f , 1 5 3 - 1 6 0 anomalies in, 1 6 1 - 1 6 5

material consequences of, 1 6 3 f of authority, 207 and circularity, I 5 8 f dimension of liturgical order, 1 1 7 - 12 I, 2 0 7 f

Hipsley, E., 3 1 Hobbes, Thomas, 2 2 4 Hockett, Charles, 1 4 8 , 2 2 4 , 229f. Holy 2 1 1 , 2 1 3 , 2 2 8 and adaptation, 2 2 3 , 2 4 3 cybernetics of, 2 3 4 disruption of, 2 4 2 etymology of, 2 3 4 fragmentation of, 2 2 3 , 24if. restoration of, 2 4 3 and unholy, 24if. and wholeness, 2 4 3 Homans, George, 27f. Homeostasis, 3 , 6 3 , 66f., 7 0 , i 4 5 f f > 150

and evolution, 1 4 9 general or systemic, 1 6 0 interference with, 1 6 1 operational meaning of, 1 4 7 structural, 1 6 0 Homeostats, 4 1 * ?o Homo economicus, 1 3 3 , 1 3 8 Horticulture, 9, 1 1 , 29, 3 0 , 3 2 , 1 0 2 atoll, 1 2 , 2 2 energy inputs, Maring, 3 0 energy yields, Maring, 3 0 garden types> 3 0 Hot (supernatural), io5ff., 1 0 8

Houssay, B. A., 3 3 Hunting, 1 0 Huxley, Aldous, 2 1 3 Icons, 9of., 1 8 0 , 1 8 2 , 204f.

Idelson, A. Z . , 2 0 8 Idolatry. See Lie, family of Illocutionary acts. See Performatives Illusion, 235f. Imaginary relations, 48ff. Immortality, 1 0 9

252

| ECOLOGY, MEANING, A N D RELIGION

Indexical communication and signs, 1 8 , 9 1 , i2of., 1 7 9 - 1 8 3 , 2 2 5

index defined, 1 8 0 indexical relationship between conventions, 1 8 if. in ritual, 1 7 9 - 1 8 3 , 2 0 4 , 227 f.

Insincerity, 1 9 5 Interpretation, i56f. In variance, 1 9 2 , 2 0 8 - 2 1 1 and certainty, 209f. and divinity, 209f., 2 1 6 and sanctity, 209f.

and unquestionableness, 2 0 9 and The Word, 2 1 0 James, William, 2 1 1 , 2 1 3 Johnston, C. G., 3 3 Kabbalah, 2 4 1 Kaiko, 36f., 38f., 5 1 , 1 8 9 indexical transmission in, i82f. kaiko nde, 1 1 5 termination of, 4 0 , 1 1 5 , 1 2 2 triggering of, 3 7 , 7 iff. Kalmus, Hans, 1 5 1 Kapingamarangi, 2 , 2 1 Katz, Richard, 2 1 6 Keesing, Roger, 9 2 Kelly, Raymond, 7 5 , 7 8 , 8 2 , 8 6 Kirk, Nancy, 3 1 Knowledge distribution of, 1 3 1 - 1 3 5 fragmentation of, i 2 9 f .

and interdependence, 1 3 4 inversion of order of, 1 2 9 and meaning, 1 3 0 organization of, 1 0 0 , 1 0 2 , 1 2 9 - 1 3 1 and power, 1 3 2 - 1 3 5 redundancy in, 1 3 2 - 1 3 5

specialization of, 1 3 2

Law, natural, and meaning, 1 3 9 - 1 4 3 Leach, Edmund, 1 7 4 , i?7ff., i96f.

Leeds, Anthony, 3 2 Leslau, Wolf, 2 0 8 Levels of organization, 53f., 56f., 66, 69. See also Hierarchy interlevel relations, 8 9 Levenson, S. M., 3 3 Levi-Strauss, Claude, 7 9 , 1 2 4 Levy, Robert, 1 8 5 Lie, i8of., 1 9 9 , 2 1 0 , 2 2 3 - 2 4 3

among animals, 2 2 4 - 2 2 6 and distrust, 226f., 2 2 9 evolutionary significance of, 2 2 3 , 2 4 2 f. family of diabolical lies, 2 2 3 , 242f. generation of the lie, 242f. idolatry, 1 6 5 , 2 2 3 , 239f.

adaptive falsity of, 2 4 0 and sanctity, 2 4 0 , 2 4 3 oppression, lies of, 2 2 3 , 24of., 243 ordinary lie, 2 2 3 , 2 2 4 - 2 2 7 , 2 4 2 vedic lie, 1 9 9 , 2 2 3 , 2 3 1 , 2 4 2 f .

and symbol, 2 2 6 and time, 2 4 0 Liturgical order, 1 1 7 , 175f., 1 9 2 , 2 3 4 . See also Order; Ritual and codes, 2 0 3 and conventions, 1 9 7 dimensions of, 1 1 7 hierarchical, 1 1 7 - 1 2 1 , 2 0 7 f.

sequential, 1 1 7 , 1 2 3 simultaneous, 1 1 7 . 1 2 3 , 2 0 4 as meta-orders, 2 0 6 and the numinous, 2 i 2 f f .

and order transcendent, 2 1 4 underlying, 1 9 7 problems of,

234-243

representation of itself, 2 0 6 Lacey, T , 2 0 1 La Fontaine, J . , 1 7 4 Language, 202f. See also Ritual; Symbols; Word contingency upon sanctity, 2 1 0 contrasted with liturgy, 202ff. problems of, 2 2 3 - 2 4 3 . See also Alternative; Lie Lange, A., 3 3 Laver, J . D. M., 2 2 7

structure of, 1 1 7 , 2 1 7

unifying nature of, 2 0 6 unison in, 2 1 3 unity of, 1 2 6 Logical necessity, 1 7 3 Logical typing, errors of, 7 8 , i64f. Lucett, E., 1 4 Lund, C. G., 3 3 Luria, Isaac, 2 4 1 Lyons, J . , 1 7 9 . 2 2 7

Index | 2 5 3 McKay, Bonnie, 53f., 150 McFarlane, W., 35 McKelway, Alexander, 237 Maladaptation, 100, 1 4 5 - 1 7 3 correction of, 169f. denned, i6of. and evolution, 100, 1 6 5 - 1 7 0 forms of cybernetic disorders, 161 escalation, 162, 167 hierarchical maldistribution of organization, 162 hypercoherence, 162, 167 idolatry, 165 overcentralization, 162 over-response, 161 oversegregation, 162, 167 overs pecincation, 162 premature override, 162 premature response, 161 and oppression, 241 structural nature of, 161 substantive consequences of, 163f., i66f. Management. See Regulation Mangaia, i4f. Mangareva, 8, 10, 15, 21 Manioc, 30, 102 Maoris, 9 Margalef, Ramon, 55 Maring, 2 7 - 4 2 , 43, 51, 6 9 - 7 3 , 75i 90, 1 0 1 - 1 2 6 , 1 8 1 - 1 8 3 , 185, 227 Marquesas, 15, 17 Marshall Islands, 2 Marshall, J . C , 225f. Marshall, J. T., Jr., 8 Marx, Karl, 44f., 79. 168, 235, 241 Materialism cultural, 44 vulgar, 43, 44fT. Maude, Harry, 5, 7. 8 Mauritius, 11 Meaning, 8 3 - 8 5 . See also Meaningfulness; Understanding and Being, I27f., 157. 217

control of, 133 costs of, 85 destruction of, 129 disordering of, 1 3 3 , 142 disparities between meaning and need, 141, 159 false meanings, 141,160. See also Lie

hierarchies of, 90, i26ff., 142, 156-160 and icons, 128 and indices, 128 and instrumentality, 85 and money, i3of., 142, 167 and natural law, 1 3 9 - 1 4 3 non-discursive, 157 orders of low order, 84, i26f., 156 dissolution of, 131 and distinction, 126 and information, 127 high order, 84, 127, 129 demeaning of, i3off. and metaphor, 127 and similarity, 127 highest order, 127, 129, 157 in adaptive structure, 1 5 7 degradation of, i3of. and identity, 127 and power, 1 3 2 - 1 3 5 structure of, i26ff., 142 and adaptive structure, 142 f. anomalies in, 165 and subordination, 135 and symbols, 128 Meaningfulness, 102, i27f. of cognized models, 102, 1 2 6 - 1 3 1 and identity, 127, 157 and liturgical order, 124, 126 locus in individuals, 159 and material processes, 85, 1 3 1 , 140-143 Meggitt, M. J . , 134, 1 5 1 , 2 0 1 Melanesia, n , 23 Merrill, E., 8 Messer, Ellen, 13 3 Metaphor, 127 material, i36f. and predication, i36f. Micronesia, 9 Miller, James, 151 Mind, 237f. Moala, 10 Models analytic, 5of. "for" and "of," 139 Money, i3of., 142 and ecological degradation, 167 and meaning, 13of., 142, 167 Monod, J . , 81

254

| ECOLOGY, MEANING, A N D RELIGION

Moorea, 8 Moore, Omar Khayyam, 2 7 Morality, 1 7 4 , i95f-

and performatives, 1 9 8 Murchland, Bernard, 1 3 2 Murngin, 2 0 1 Murphy, Robert, 4 8 , 5 6 Mutability, 1 2 2 Mystery, 2 3 3 Mystical experience, 1 5 7 Myth, 1 7 4 , 1 9 3 Nagel, E . , 4 9 , 52f., 66

National Research Council, 3 3 Naturalization of convention, 1 3 9 , 238f.

Negative feedback, 4 o f , 4 3 , 6 9 - 7 3 . 98f. See also Cybernetics; Homeostasis; Systems, selfregulating

Ontong Java, 1 5 , 2 1 Operational environment. See Operational model Operational model, 5f., 3 4 , 7 0 , 8 2 f , 97ff., 1 0 1

Operative acts. See Performatives Order. See also Adaptive structure; Liturgical order of adaptive response sequences, 150

bases of, 1 5 2 and code, 2 0 3 establishment of, 197 of invariance, 2 1 0 of orders, 7 9 . i?o, 1 9 2 and redundancy, 1 5 2 Organic analogy, 1 4 6 Ortiz, Alphonso, 1 5 1 , 1 7 7 Ortner, Sherry, 1 2 3 Otto, Rudolph, 2 1 1 , 2 1 3 , 2 1 5

New Guinea, 2 7 - 4 2

New Zealand, 9 Nietling, W., 2 Non-discursive, i68ff., 2 1 1 - 2 1 4 , 2 1 6 , 236ff.

Numinous, 1 7 5 , 2 1 1 - 2 1 6 , 2 2 3 , 2 2 8 . 232, 243

and belief, 2 1 7 and communitas, 2 i 3 f .

delusion of, 2 2 3 , 2 4 1 and disorder, 2 1 4 and grace, 2 1 3 invocation in ritual, 2 1 2 as neurosis, 2 4 1 ontogeny of, 2 1 2 as opiate, 2 4 1 phylogeny of, 2 i 2 f .

and self-unification, 2 1 3 and unison, 2 1 3 , 2 3 8 Nupaka, 1 7 Nutrition, 3 1 - 3 4 . 8 3 Objectivity, 8iff., 1 0 1 , 1 5 7 Obligation, i95fand acceptance, i95ff., 2 1 7 Occult, I 7 7 f .

and performatives, 1 9 1 O'Doherty, F., 1 8 9 . 1 9 5 Odum, Eugene, 3 , 1 9 . 2 0 , 5 5 Odum, Howard, 3 Oliver, Douglas, 1 8 1

Palmers ton Island, 8 Palmyra Island, 1 2 Pandanus, 1 0 , 3 0 , 1 0 2 Pattee, H. H., 6 5 , 1 5 1 Peirce, Charles, 1 8 , 1 2 8 , i8of., 2 2 5 f . Performatives, 1 8 , 1 0 2 , i38ff.

and divinity, 2 1 5 explicit, 1 9 6 infelicities, 1 9 5 and magical power of words, 1 9 1 meta-performatives, 1 8 , 1 9 4 and morality, i98f.

mystification of, 1 3 8 , 1 9 1 , 1 9 4 performative success requisites for, 1 9 3 and ritual form, 1 9 0 quasi-performatives, 1 0 2 , 1386°. in ritual, 1 7 5 , 1 8 8 - 1 9 7

types of commissives, 1 8 9 , 2 1 0 factitives, 1 8 9 , 1 9 1 , 1 9 4 Perlocutionary force. 1 8 9 , 1 9 1 Persistence, i58f.

and meaning, 1 5 9 and truth-value, 1 5 9 Perturbation, 6 8 , 1 4 5 ^ responses to, 1 4 5 - 1 7 3

Phoenix Island, 6ff. Piaget,Jean.65, 7 7 , 1 5 2 Piddocke, D., 4 4

Index | 2 5 5 Pigs hunting of, 10 Maring diet of, 32, 36 in diet, 33, 39f, ^ 3 garden invasions by, 3 7 . 1 1 herd size, 3 2 - 3 8 , 51 husbandry, 32ff., 102 prestations of pork , 3 5 , 3 8ff. . 1 1 2 sacrifice of, 33, 35, 1 0 8 , 1 1 2 - 1 1 5 sufficiency of, 36f., 113^. wild, 8 Pollution female, 1 1 1 , 1 3 4 - 1 3 7 and metaphor, i36f. and predication, i36f. Polynesia, 4 - 2 3 Populations, 3 defined,4 densities of, 8, 19ft". ecological defined, 29, 6if. as referent units, 58-63 founding, 4, 5 growth of, 8 human, 3ff. migrations of, 4 regional, 29f., 103 Portulaca, 9

Power, 163 Predication, 1366°., 202 and the divine, 215 metaphoric, 136 numinous, 216 Production, relations of, 73 Productivity, 1 1 , 12, i5fF., 22, 6of. criteria of, i8f. defined, 19 Promising, 182, 188, 190, 227 as performative, 189 Protein, 3of., 33f. Psalms, 242 Pseudo-species, 239 Pteridium esculentum, 9 Pubit, 108 Puka Puka, 15, 2off. Purposefulness, i68ff. Queen Elizabeth, 155 passim Radcliffe-Brown, A. R., 213 Rapoport, Anatole, 64f., 1 4 1 , i49f.

Rationality conscious rationality deficiencies of, 2 37f. ills of, i68ff, 236ff. incompleteness of, 170, 23off. ecological, 47 economic, 45f, 101, i3of., 133, 138, i63ff., 236, 238 empirical and logical, 130 illusions of, 238 narrowing of, 130 Read, Kenneth, 135 Reciprocity, 106, 118 Redistribution, i6f, 21 Reeves, C. M., 186, 212 Reference value, 67, 69, 98f. and goal range, 7of., 99 inappropriate, 100 Refugees, Maring, 38 Regulation, 2 8 - 4 2 , 47, 50, 68, 6 9 - 7 3 , 76, I47ff- See also Cybernetics; Negative feedback; Systems and self-organization, i48ff. self-regulation, 5 3 f., 69 - 7 3 of ecosystems, 54ff. self-regulatory modes, 69, 147 dynamic interaction, 54 immutability, 147 multi-phasic, 7 1 operations, 147 time-dependent, 148 variable-dependent, 148. See also Cybernetics density-dependent, 71 Representations. See also Ritual, representations complex, 205 material, 18, 183f, 200f., 204 the body in, 201 re-presentation, 201, 205 Ringi, 108 Ritual, 2 7 - 4 2 , 76f., 9 0 - 9 3 , 1 7 3 - 2 2 1 . See also Liturgical order acceptance, 193 and belief, 194 binding nature of, i95f. clarity of, 196 entailments of, 194-197 and establishment of convention, i95f. and faith, 195

256

I ECOLOGY, MEANING, A N D RELIGION

Ritual {continued) and force, 2 4 1 fragility of, 2 1 7 indexicality of, 1 9 3 and obligation, I 9 5 f f

as performative, 1 9 3 as public act, 194, 2 i6f. violation of, I95f. acts, 1 9 9 - 2 0 2

performative virtues of, 1 9 9 and selves of performers, 2 0 0 , 238

as substance, 2 0 1 animal, 1 7 9 "atom of," 2 1 7 authority of, 1 9 2 autocommunication in, 1 7 8 -as basic social act, 1 9 7 consciousness. See Numinous; Ritual, participation in; Ritual, unison in cycles of, 2 7 - 4 2 , 7 0 - 7 3 . 75> 101-116, 124, 151

mediation by, 1 0 6 mending the world, 107 - 1 1 6 denned, 7 6 , 1 7 5 and drama, 1 7 7 as empty form, 2 4 1 form, i6£. 9 2 , 1 7 3 - 2 2 1 . See also Liturgical order levels of meaning in, 9off. meanings intrinsic to, 1 7 3 - 2 2 1 messages t

indexical, 1 7 9 - 1 8 3 , 1 9 3

non-symbolic nature of, 1 7 5 , 180 canonical, 1 7 9 - 1 8 3 , i88ff., 2 2 8

symbolic nature of, 1 8 0 mode of production, 7 3 obvious features of, 1 7 3 - 2 2 1 formality, i 7 5 f .

invariance. See Invariance non-instrumentality, 1 7 7 performance, i76f.

occurrence, 1 8 3 and ambiguity, i84ff.

and articulation, 1 8 7 and digital computation, 186 and distinction, 186 and transduction, 4 1 , i87f.

2i6f., 2 3 8

numinous aspects of, 2 1 1 - 2 1 7 . See also Numinous; Ritual, unison and union performatives in. See Performatives as public counting device, 1 8 4 regulation, 2 7 - 4 2 , 4 7 , 7off., 1 5 1 .

See also Regulation representations. See also Representations fusions of complex out of simple, 205

material representations, 1 8 4 , 200, 2 0 1 , 204

non-symbolic, 1 7 5 , 1 8 0 rites of passage, 1 8 5 liminal phase, 186, 2 1 2 ritual and rituals, 1 7 6 and sanctity, 2 0 8 - 2 1 1 structure. See Liturgical Order; Ritual, form surfaces of, 1 7 4 and technique, 1 7 7 transduction in, 4 1 , i87f.

transmission indexical transmission in, 183-188, 204

variation in occurrence. See Ritual, occurrence variation in order, 1 8 3 variation in quantity, i83f. sender-receiver fusion, 1 7 8 with message, 1 9 2 unison and union, 2 1 3 , 2 3 8 words, 1 9 9 - 204- See also Language; Word and form, 2 0 1 as work, 1 7 7 Romer, Alfred S., 1 4 8 , 2 3 0 Romers Rule, 1 4 8 , 229ff. Rose Atoll, 2 , 8 de Rougemont, Denis, 2 4 2 Rowley, W. F., 1 6 1 Rules, 1 i9f., 1 2 9 , 1 5 4 changes in, 1 2 2 violations of, 1 9 5 Rumbim, 3 5 , 9 0 , 1 8 5 , i87f. planting, 3 5 , 3 7 , 1 0 7 - 1 1 5 significations of, io8ff.

uprooting, 3 6 , 3 7

participation in, 1 7 7 , 1 9 2 , 2 0 4 and consciousness, 2 1 1 - 2 1 4 ,

Sabine, J . , 3 5

Index | 2 5 7 Sachet, Marie-Helene, 2 , 8 Sacrament, 2 0 1 Sacred. See also Sanctity and

sanctification; Ultimate sacred postulates concept of, 1 7 4 , 2 1 1 , 2 2 3 , 2 2 8 , 2 4 3 and evolution, 2 1 4 , 2 2 3 - 2 4 3 . See also Evolution and numinous, 2 1 3 , 2 1 7 . $ * * also

Numinous and performatives, 1 9 1 . See also

Performatives contrasted with sanctified, 2 1 4 Sacrifice, 33ff-> 3?fSahlins,Marshall, io, i4ff., 4 4 , 4 7 , 581T, 8 3 , 1 3 8 , 1 5 1

Samoa, 1 4 , 2of., 2 1 Sanctity and sanctifkation, 1 4 , 1 2 9 , 1 5 5 . * 9 7 . 2 2 8 , 2 3 iff. See also

Sacred; Ultimate sacred postulates as antidote to alternative, 2 3of. as antidote to lie, 227 ft., and authority, I 5 5 f . , 2 0 7 , 24of. and certainty, 209f.

of convention, 2 3of. denned, 2 0 9 degradation of, 1 6 5 , 2 2 3 , 24of. and divinity, 209f.

evolution of, 2 2 9 in evolution, 2 1 4 , 2 2 3 , 2 2 9 and idolatry, 2 4 0 ills of, 2 3 4 - 2 4 3 of information, 2 3 o f . and invariance, 209f.

as quality of discourse, 2 0 9 and specificity, 1 6 5 , 2 3 9 and unquestionableness, 2 0 9 Sapir, Edward, 6 4 Scholem, Gershon, 2 4 1 , 2 4 3 Science, criticisms of, 8 0 - 8 4 Searle, J . M., 1 8 9 , i 9 5 f , 2 3 5

Sectorial organization, 1 5 2 Segmentary'organization, 1 3 2 , 1 5 2 Segregation, progressive, 1 5 2 Selection of cultural traits, 4 5 natural, 7 9 Self-destruction, 7 0 , 7 9 Self-organization, 5 5 , 148ft"., 232f.Se* also Systems relation to self-regulation, i48ff.

Service, Elman, 1 5 1 Shamans, 1 0 3 Shantzis, S. B., 6 9 Sharp, A., 1 0 Shema, 1 1 7 , 2 0 8 , 2 2 8 . See also

Ultimate sacred postulates Shifting cultivation. See Horticulture Simon, Herbert, 6 5 , 15if. Siuai,i8i Skorupski, John, 1 8 9 , 2046°. Slobodkin, L., 6 4 , 6 5 , 1 4 1 , 1 4 6 , i49f., 168, 2 3 2

Smith, David, 3 2 Social contract, 1 7 4 , 1 9 7 Social formation, 5 2 , 54, 7 9 , 1 4 7 Social stratification, 1 4 - 2 3 and meaning, 1 3 1 - 1 3 7 and ritual, 1 3 1 - 1 3 7 , 1 9 7

Society Islands, 8, iof, i4f., 2 1 , 1 8 5 , i87f-

Speech acts. See Performatives Spirits, Maring, 3 3 , 3 8 , 86, 103ff., 108, 1 1 2 , ii4f.

Stace, V. D., 2 0 Steward, Julian, 1 8 , 58f., 6 2 Strasberg, D. W., 3 Stress, 3 3 , 1 5 0 , 1 6 1 Stritzower, Schifira, 2 0 8 Structuralism, 4 5 , 8 1 Structures change in, 78ff.

and formal cause, 7 6 processual, 8 0 structural analysis, 8 6 Surplus, i6f., 6 0 Suttles, Wayne, 4 4 Sweet potatoes, 7 , 3 0 , 1 0 2 Swidden. See Horticulture Sydney Island, 7 Symbols Beattie's usage, 2 0 4 bipolar signification, 2 0 3 f .

denned, 1 8 0 denotative, 204ft*. and divinity, 2 1 5 . See also Divinity

Firth's usage, 2 0 4 genres, 1 7 4 icons and indices, 17f., 1 8 0 , 2 2 6 . See also Icon; Indexical

communication and signs key, i 2 3 f .

multivocalic, 1 2 3 6 , 2 0 3

258

| ECOLOGY, MEANING, A N D RELIGION

Symbols {continued) Peirce's usage, 1 8 0 problems of, i 8 o f , 1 9 9 , 2 1 0 , 2 2 6 .

See also Alternative; Lie representational, 204ff.

in ritual, i?9f. See also Ritual Skorupski's usage, 2040°. Tillich's usage, 2 0 4 Synthetic formulations, 6if. Systemic analysis, 68f., 7 5 Systems adaptive, 1 4 5 - 1 7 2

assessment of, 6 6 general purpose, 1 4 6 irrationality of, 63f. limits, 6 9 - 7 3 Jiving, 1 4 5 - 1 7 2

loosely coupled, 1 5 2 self-organizing, 5 5 self-persisting, 5 3 self-regulating, 5 3 , 6 9 - 7 3 . 99

special purpose, 1 4 6 subsystems, 1 4 6 local and regional, 4 0 systems theory, 4 3 , 5 7 , 6 8

Tokelau, 1 5 Tonga, 1 4 , 2 1 Trance, 2 1 6 Transduction, in ritual, 4 1 , 1 8 7 f. Transformation, 78ff. See also Change; Evolution Tree cultivation, 1 2 Trent, Council of, 2 0 1 Truce, Maring, 3 5 Truth, 1 4 1 , 1 5 9 , 226ff. See also Lie as function of acceptance, 2 2 9 , 2 3 5 adaptive, 2 4 0 and correctness, 2 3 1 and death, 2 4 3 empirical, 2 2 7 and eternity, 2 4 0 falsification of the basis of truth, 241

as God's seal, 2 4 3 necessary, 226f.

and power, 2 4 1 preservation of truth of propositions, 1 2 5 , 1 5 0 . See also Cybernetics; Reference value and unquestionableness, 2 0 9 , 2 1 1 Tsembaga, 2 7 - 4 2 , 4 3 , 6 9 - 7 3 , 100-116

Tabiteuea, 5 Taboo, Maring, 34ff., 3 8 , 1 0 5 - 1 0 8 , 1 1 2 - 1 1 5 , 134

Tahiti. See Society Islands Tambiah, S., 1 7 8 , 2 0 0 Taro, 8, 2 2 , 3 0 , 1 0 2 , i i 4 f .

Tewa, 1 7 7 Thomas, Lewis, 1 4 6 Thomas, Owen, 1 3 7 Thorpe, W. M., 224f.

Thurndahl, Margaritha, 2 2 5 Tikopia, 1 5 , 2 1 , 1 7 7 Tillich, Paul, 1 6 5 , 1 9 5 , 2 0 4 , 2 1 6 , 2 3 7 , 239f

Time, 78ff.

construction of, 1 2 3 logical and physical, 1 8 6 mundane, 1 2 3 and mutability, 1 2 5 sacred, 1 2 3 , 1 8 6 relation of temporal to atemporal, 7

8ff.

temporal aspects of adaptive structure, 1 5 0 , 233f. of hierarchy, i 2 4 f .

Tuamotus, 1 4 , 1 7 Turbott, I. G., 9 Turner, Victor, 1 0 9 , i23f., 1 8 6 , 2 0 3 f . , 2 1 iff., 2 3 2 , 2 3 8

Ultimate sacred postulates, ii7.ff., I29f., 1 5 4 , 2 1 6 , 2 2 8 , 2 3 i f f . See

also Sacred adaptive characteristics of, 1 5 5 ^ , 232ff.

adaptive truth of, 2 4 0 cryptic nature of, 1 5 5 ^ , 2 3 3 and force, 24of. ills of, 2 3 4 - 2 4 3 and invariance, 2 0 8 - 2 1 1

meaning and meaningfulness of, 157

and numinous, 2 1 7 vacuity of, 2 3 2 vagueness of, 1 5 5 Understanding, 97 - 1 7 2 . See also Cognized models; Meaning; Meaningfulness dominant, 1 3 2 ecological, 1 3 3

Index | 2 5 9 economic. See Rationality, economic

and lies, 2 2 3 - 2 4 3 . See also Lie

false, i4of.

magical power of, 1 7 8 , 1 9 1

hierarchies of, 1 2 1 , 1 2 4 . See also

in ritual, 1 9 9 - 2 0 4

Hierarchy disordering of, 1 4 2 inversion of, 1 2 9 temporal aspects of, i24f. secular, 1 2 1 structure of, 1 2 1 , 1 2 4 Unholy, 24if. Unquestionableness, 2 0 9 ^ , 2 1 7 . See also Sanctity and sanctincation Vagueness reduction of, 1 8 4 o f ultimate sacred postulates, 15 5 Values, 1 1 8 , i29f.

in adaptive structure, 1 5 5 - 1 6 0 anomalies in value structure, 155-160

basic, I 5 5 f

cryptic nature of, i 5 5 f vagueness of, i 5 5 f .

and cybernetics, 1 2 5 degradation of, 1 6 5 hierarchies of, 1 5 5 - 1 6 0

instrumental, 1 5 5 Van Baal, J . , 1 2 8 , 1 5 7 Van Gennep, Arnold, 1 7 6 , 1 8 6 , 2 1 2 Van Lawick-Goodall, Jane, 2 2 5 Van Zwaluwenberg, R. H., 2 Vayda, A. P., 1 , 1 4 , 3 2 , 4 3 f . 4 5 , 4 8 , 53f, 63, 7 i , 150

Vengeance, 1 0 6 Waddington, C. H., 2 2 6 Walbiri, 1 3 4 , 2 0 1 Wallace, Anthony F. C , 1 7 8 , 2 0 9 Warfare, Maring, 28ff., 34ff-» 4i» 1 0 4 , 106-no

Warner, W. Lloyd, 2 0 1 Water, 1 0 , 1 2 Weeds, 8, 1 0 , 3 2 White, Leslie, 1 6 6 , 2 2 6 Wilden, Anthony, 1 8 8 William of Auxerre, 2 0 1 Williamson, R. W., 1 4 Women, 1 0 6 - 1 1 2 , 1 3 4 - 1 3 7

Word creative power of, 1 9 4 and fall, 2 4 3

and form, 20if.

word, words and alternative, 2 0 2 , 210,231

Wynne-Edwards, V. C , 3 8 , 7 1 Yams, 3 0 , 1 0 2 , 1 8 1 Yengoyan, Aram, 1 3 4 Young, I. J . , 1 6 1 Young, Michael. 1 8 1 Zimmerman, E., if., 9 Zintel, Harold, 3 3

$7.95 / A N T H R O P O L O G Y / N O R T H A T L A N T I C BOOKS / ISBN 0-913208-54-1

'Two

enterprises have proceeded in a n t h r o p o l o g y

since its

earliest d a y s . O n e , objective in its aspirations and inspired by biological

disciplines, seeks explanation and is c o n c e r n e d to

discover laws and causes. T h e other, subjective in its orienta­ tion and influenced

by philosophy, linguistics, and the h u ­

manities, a t t e m p t s interpretation and seeks to elucidate m e a n ­ ings. I take a n y radical separation of the t w o to be misguided, for the relationship

b e t w e e n t h e m , w i t h all of its d i f f i c u l t y ,

ambiguity, and tension, is a reflection

of, o r m e t a p h o r

for,

the c o n d i t i o n o f a species that lives in terms o f meanings in a physical w o r l d

devoid of

intrinsic meaning but subject

to

causal law. T h e c o n c e p t of a d a p t a t i o n w h e n applied to h u m a n society must take a c c o u n t of meaning as well as cause, and of the c o m p l e x d y n a m i c of their relationship." Roy

A . R a p p a p o r t was born in 1926. A f t e r a career in inn-

keeping in Massachusetts, he returned to school at C o l u m b i a U n i v e r s i t y and received his P r u D . in a n t h r o p o l o g y

in 1966.

He has d o n e archaeological f i e l d w o r k in the S o c i e t y Islands, and

ethnological f i e l d w o r k in N e w G u i n e a . H e is co-author of

Archaeology for

in

the Ancestors

Mo'orea,

/French

Polynesia

and a u t h o r of Pigs

and n u m e r o u s scholarly papers. H e is cur­

rently a professor o f a n t h r o p o l o g y at I he University of M i c h i ­ gan

in A n n A r b o r , and A n t h r o p o l o g y

Department Chairman.