Encyclopedia of Global Justice

Encyclopedia of Global Justice

Deen K. Chatterjee (Ed.)

Encyclopedia of Global Justice With 10 Figures and 4 Tables

Editor Deen K. Chatterjee Department of Philosophy University of Utah Salt Lake City, UT USA

ISBN 978-1-4020-9159-9 e-ISBN 978-1-4020-9160-5 Print and electronic bundle under ISBN 978-1-4020-9161-2 DOI 10.1007/978-1-4020-9160-5 Springer Dordrecht Heidelberg London New York Library of Congress Control Number: 2011932691 © Springer ScienceþBusiness Media B.V. 2011 No part of this work may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, microfilming, recording or otherwise, without written permission from the Publisher, with the exception of any material supplied specifically for the purpose of being entered and executed on a computer system, for exclusive use by the purchaser of the work. Printed on acid-free paper Springer is part of Springer ScienceþBusiness Media (www.springer.com)

Preface The two-volume Encyclopedia of Global Justice is a major publication venture toward a comprehensive coverage of this timely topic. The Encyclopedia is an international, interdisciplinary, and collaborative project, spanning all the relevant areas of scholarship related to issues of global justice, and edited and advised by leading scholars from around the world. The wide-ranging entries present the latest ideas on this complex subject by authors who are at the cutting edge of inquiry. The goal of this timely and comprehensive encyclopedia is to provide a premier reference guide for students, scholars, policy makers, and others interested in assessing the moral consequences of global interdependence and understanding the concepts and arguments that shed light on the myriad aspects of global justice. The Encyclopedia will set the tone and direction of this increasingly important area of scholarship for years to come. The question of justice across national boundaries, recently the focus of intense debate due to the ethical challenges of modern globalization, spans the range from extreme global egalitarianism to various kinds of extended nationalism and limited globalism. The topic covers several disciplines and raises both theoretical and applied issues in such areas as relations among nations, world poverty, human rights, global development, environmental concerns, and the justifiability of military conflicts, among others. The Encyclopedia reflects this reality and provides an interdisciplinary approach that combines empirical research with theoretical arguments, drawing terms and concepts from political philosophy and theory, ethics, international law and legal theory, development economics, public policy, and applied ethics, including legal, business, medical, military, religious, environmental, and feminist ethics as they relate to all aspects of global justice. Because the term “global justice” is itself a matter of contention, prompting questions regarding how it relates to and differs from “international justice,” an important part of the project is to clarify such definitional issues and include entries that seek to address the related methodological concerns. The Encyclopedia will serve as a complete reference for all key terms and concepts of global justice, broadly conceived. It is organized in A-to-Z format with cross-referencing of entries around a series of topics under four broad categories, making it convenient for students, scholars, and general readers to access the relevant entries on a specific theme or topic. The four broad categories are: ● ● ● ●

Concepts/Theories Persons/Thinkers Institutions/Organizations Trends/Movements/Policies/Treaties

All entry topics fall under one or more of these broad categories. The entries number around 500 and consist of essays of 300 to 5,000 words. The inclusion and length of entries are based on their significance to the topic of global justice, regardless of their importance in other areas. The Encyclopedia consists of entries written by scholars drawn from a variety of fields and disciplines. Based on their painstaking preparation of the chapters and their diligence through the process of revisions and editing, they made amply evident their high level of care for and commitment to the project and their dedication to the growth and development of their own fields. It was a delight and a privilege to work with them and see how they brought together their scholarship and their respective style and orientation into a coherent focus to make this ambitious project possible. Naturally, our greatest thanks go to these contributors for their collaboration and good will. Their belief in the importance of the project sustained our efforts. Special thanks are due to the members of the distinguished editorial board for their support and encouragement. Most of them reviewed the drafts and gave their advice whenever needed, and some of them also wrote several key entries. I would especially like to thank Lynette Sieger of New York University, a member of the editorial board and contributor of several key chapters, for her able assistance, advice, and support.

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Special gratitude goes to Christine Hausmann at the Reference Editorial Office of Springer’s Reference and Database Publishing for her patience and unfailing support that made the project possible. Special thanks are also due to Neil Olivier, Publishing Editor of Philosophy of Law and Ethics in the Humanities Department at Springer and to Susanne Friedrichsen, Associate Editor at Springer’s Reference & Database Publishing, for their valuable help and guidance. Finally, my greatest gratitude and appreciation goes to my beloved wife Donna Dinsdale for all her loving support, kindness, and sacrifice during the entire duration of this long project. I cannot thank her enough. Deen K. Chatterjee Editor-in-Chief

Topical Table of Contents Concepts/Theories Absolute Poverty Act-Consequentialism Adaptive Preferences ►Capabilities Approach ►Preference-Satisfaction Advocacy Organizations ►International Organizations Agency, Collective Agency, Individual Agent-Centered Prerogative Aggression Ahimsa Aid to Burdened Societies Altruism Anarchy Armed Conflict: Effect on Women Associative Duties Basic Needs Basic Rights Beneficence, Principle of Biodiversity Bioprospecting and Biopiracy Borders Capabilities Approach Capitalism Care Ethics Charity Chronic Poverty ►Absolute Poverty ►Poverty Citizenship Citizenship Practices Civil Disobedience, International Civil Disobedience, Transnational Civil Rights Class and Status Climate Justice Co-National Partiality ►Compatriot Partiality Thesis Coercion Collective Choice

Collective Decision Problem Collective Identity Collective Responsibility Colonialism Common Good Communitarianism Communities Compatriot Partiality Thesis Complex Emergency Complex Equality Composition, Fallacy of Consensus/Justification Consent Conspiracy Theory Constructivism Consumerism Contractarianism Corporate Social Responsibility Correlative Obligations Corruption Cosmopolitan Democracy Cosmopolitan Justice Cosmopolitan Republicanism Cosmopolitanism Crimes Against Humanity Crimes Against Peace Cultural Relativism Cultural Rights ►Globalization ►Health and Health Care ►Human Rights: African Perspectives ►International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights ►Multiculturalism Death Penalty ►Capital Punishment Decent Society Democracy, Constitutional Democracy, Deliberative Democracy, Transnational Democratic Citizenship Democratic Equality

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Democratic Legitimacy Democratic Peace Theory Development Accountability Development as Freedom ►Capabilities Approach ►Sen, Amartya Development Assistance Development Ethics Difference Principle Diffused Responsibility Hypothesis Disabled People Disagreement, Reasonable Dispersed Groups ►Immigration ►Refugees Dispute Resolution Domination Double Effect, Doctrine of Duties of Assistance Duties to Non-Compatriots Duties to the Distant Needy Duties, Determinate and Indeterminate Duties, Perfect and Imperfect Duties, Positive and Negative Duties, Remedial ►Duties, Determinate and Indeterminate ►Duties, Perfect and Imperfect ►Duties, Positive and Negative Earth Democracy ►Brundtland Commission ►Political Ecology ►Rio Declaration ►Stockholm Conference, 1972 Economic Rights Egalitarianism ►Fair Equality of Opportunity ►Global Egalitarianism ►Global Equality of Opportunity End of Life Care Environmental Justice Environmental Racism Environmental Sustainability Equality Essential Medicines, Access to Ethical Foreign Policy ►Foreign Policy Eurocentrism Exploitation Fair Equality of Opportunity

Fairness Feminist Ethics Feminization of Poverty Food Sovereignty Friendship Functioning, Well-Being and ►Capabilities Approach ►Nussbaum, Martha C. ►Quality of Life ►Sen, Amartya Gender-Based Violence ►Violence Gender Justice Genetic Engineering Genocide Georgism Global Basic Structure Global Citizenship Global Civil Society Global Contractarian Justice Global Democracy Global Difference Principle Global Distributive Justice Global Egalitarianism Global Equality of Opportunity Global Ethic Global Federalism Global Governance Global Impartiality Thesis Global Justice Global Justice, Subjects of Global Market ►Capitalism ►Free Trade ►Globalization Global Organizations ►Capitalism ►Global Democracy ►Global Poverty ►Global Public Sphere ►Globalization ►International Monetary Fund (IMF) ►World Bank (WB) Global Poverty Global Public Global Public Goods Global Public Health Global Public Reason Global Resource Distribution

Topical Table of Contents

Global Resources Dividend ►Pogge, Thomas Global Taxation Global Tragedy of the Commons ►Global Public ►Global Warming ►Pareto Optimality Group Rights Harm Principle Health and Health Care Human Development ►Capabilities Approach ►Crocker, David ►Development Ethics ►Human Development and Capability Association (HDCA) ►International Development Ethics Association (IDEA) ►Nussbaum, Martha C. ►Sen, Amartya Human Genome Human Right to Democracy Human Rights Human Security Humanitarian Aid Humanitarian Intervention, Non-Military Humanitarian Military Intervention Ideal Moral Theory Illegitimate States Immigration Impartiality ►Global Impartiality Thesis Imperialism Indigenous Peoples Indigenous Rights to Land Inequality ►Global Democracy ►Global Egalitarianism ►Global Justice Intergenerational Justice International Due Process ►International Criminal Court (ICC) ►International Criminal Justice ►International Law International Health Partnership ►Development Ethics ►Global Public Health ►Health and Health Care ►Pandemics International Humanitarian Assistance

International Institutional Legitimacy International Justice ►Fairness ►Foreign Policy ►Globalization ►Hague Conventions ►International Law ►Law of Peoples ►Liberal Nationalism ►Moral Equality ►Nagel, Thomas ►Nationalism ►Rawls, John ►Realistic Utopia ►Sen, Amartya ►Tamir, Yael ►Transitional Justice in Africa ►Treaty of Westphalia International Law International Law, Normative Foundations of International Organizations International Political Economy ►Global Justice ►International Monetary Fund (IMF) ►World Bank (WB) Intrastate Autonomy ►Secession Intuitionism Jus ad Bellum Jus ad Pacem Jus Gentium Jus in Bello Just Peace ►Peace Versus Justice ►Perpetual Peace: Abbe´ de Saint-Pierre ►Perpetual Peace: Kant ►Preventive Non-Intervention Just War Theory ►Just War Theory: Invasion of Iraq ►War, Just and Unjust Justice and Reciprocity: Local and Global Justice and Religion: Buddhism Justice and Religion: Christianity Justice and Religion: Confucianism Justice and Religion: Daoism Justice and Religion: Hinduism Justice and Religion: Islam Justice and Religion: Judaism Killing and Letting Die

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Labor Land Ethic Language and Politics Law of Peoples Legal Rights Liberal Democracy Liberal Nationalism Liberal Pluralism Liberalism Libertarianism Liberties Lifeboat Ethics Local Communities ►Communitarianism ►Quality of Life ►Relativity of Well-Being ►Thin Universalism and Thick Localism Luck Egalitarianism Majoritarianism Maldevelopment ►Development Ethics Marxism Medical Justice ►Global Public Health ►Health and Health Care ►Pharmaceutical Justice ►Pogge, Thomas Migration ►Immigration Minority Groups ►Multiculturalism Modus Vivendi Moral Authority Moral Community Moral Cosmopolitanism Moral Distance Moral Equality Moral Innocence and Harm ►Non-Combatant Immunity Moral Legitimacy Moral Luck ►Luck Egalitarianism Moral Reasoning Multiculturalism National Interest Thesis ►Compatriot Partiality Thesis ►Liberal Nationalism ►Nationalism ►Social Contract National Self-Determination

Nationalism Nationalism, Explanatory Nationalism, Extended Natural Rights Needs ►Basic Needs Negative Duties ►Duties, Positive and Negative ►Killing and Letting Die Negative Rights Neoliberalism Non-Combatant Immunity Non-Ideal Moral Theory Obligation to Future Generations Odious Debts Original Position Owning Life Pacifism Pareto Optimality Partiality Paternalism Patriarchy Patriotism Peace Education Perfect Justice ►Rawls, John ►Sen, Amartya Perpetual Peace Perpetual Peace: Abbe´ de Saint-Pierre Perpetual Peace: Kant Persecution ►Amnesty International ►Gay Rights ►Human Rights ►Human Rights Watch ►Torture Pharmaceutical Justice Pluralism Political Allegiance Political Authority Political Autonomy Political Constructivism Political Cosmopolitanism Political Ecology Political Economy Political Forgiveness Political Freedom ►Falk, Richard ►Liberal Pluralism ►Political Autonomy

Topical Table of Contents

►Political Representation ►Politics of Recognition Political Idealism Political Leadership ►Gandhi, Mahatma ►Political Authority Political Legitimacy Political Liberalism Political Obligation Political Realism ►Compatriot Partiality Thesis ►Liberal Nationalism ►Lifeboat Ethics ►Political Liberalism Political Reconciliation ►Political Forgiveness ►Truth Commissions Political Representation Positive Duties ►Duties, Positive and Negative Positive Rights Poverty Preemptive War Preference-Satisfaction Preventive Diplomacy ►Dispute Resolution ►Preventive Non-Intervention ►Soft Power ►War, Just and Unjust Preventive Non-Intervention Preventive War Prima Facie Duties Primary Goods Prisoner’s Dilemma Prisoners of War ►Geneva Conventions ►Punishment ►War Against Terrorism ►War, Just and Unjust Proceduralism Propaganda Property Rights Public Good ►Common Good Public Interest Public Reason Punishment Quality of Life Racism Realistic Utopia

Reciprocity Recognition, the Politics of Recognitional Legitimacy Rectificatory Justice Relative Poverty Relativism Relativity of Well-Being Remedial Rights ►Secession ►Truth Commissions Reparations Reproductive Rights ►Population Politics ►Poverty ►Quality of Life Resource Curse Responsibility, Individual Restorative Justice ►Truth Commissions Retribution Retributive Justice Revolution Rights Rule-Consequentialism Sanctions Second Original Position Self-Determination Separation of Church and State Slavery Social Contract Socialism Solidarity Sovereignty Special Obligations Special Rights Standard of Living ►Development Ethics ►Feminization of Poverty ►Quality of Life ►Relativity of Well-Being State Terrorism Subsidiarity Principle Subsidies Subsistence Resources ►Absolute Poverty ►Basic Needs ►Basic Rights ►Food Sovereignty ►Poverty ►Quality of Life

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Subsistence Rights Surrogacy, Transnational Sustainable Development Territorial Rights Thin Universalism and Thick Localism Toleration/Tolerance, Liberal Principle of Transitional Justice Transitional Justice in Africa Transnational Citizenship ►Citizenship ►World Citizenship ►World Government Tyranny Ubuntu Unequal Exchange Theory ►Exploitation ►Fair Trade ►Imperialism ►Pogge, Thomas Unilateral Rights Universal Hospitality Utilitarianism Violence Virtue Ethics War Crimes War, Just and Unjust Wealth Gap ►Equality ►Global Democracy ►Global Difference Principle ►Global Distributive Justice ►Global Egalitarianism ►Global Poverty ►Moral Cosmopolitanism Wide Reflective Equilibrium Women’s Rights ►Armed Conflict: Effect on Women ►Ecofeminism ►Feminist Ethics ►Gender Justice ►Feminization of Poverty ►Okin, Susan ►Shiva, Vandana Working Poor ►Labor ►Labor Laws ►Poverty World Citizenship World Government

World Ownership ►Global Public Goods ►Global Public Sphere ►World Government

Institutions/Organizations African Development Bank Amnesty International Bretton Woods Institutions Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) Democratic Institutions ►Global Democracy Development Institutions ►Development Assistance ►Basic Needs ►United Nations: Right to Development Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) ►Land Grab European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) ►Basic Needs ►Development Assistance European Union (EU) Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM) ►Refugees Grameen Bank Greenpeace High Road for Human Rights Human Development and Capability Association (HDCA) Human Rights Watch Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change ►Climate Change ►Global Warming International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) International Court of Justice (ICJ) ►International Criminal Court (ICC) ►International Criminal Justice ►International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) ►International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights International Criminal Court (ICC) International Development Ethics Association (IDEA) International Finance Cooperation (IFC) ►Free Trade ►International Monetary Fund (IMF)

Topical Table of Contents

International Forum Against Globalization ►Globalization ►Third World Resistance International Labour Organization (ILO) ►Labor Laws International Law Commission ►International Law International Monetary Fund (IMF) League of Nations Multinational Corporations National Alliance for Tribal Self Rule (NATSR), India ►Indigenous Peoples Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) ►Amnesty International ►Global Governance ►Global Public ►Global Public Reason ►High Road for Human Rights ►Human Rights Watch ►Illegitimate States ►International Organizations ►O’Neill, Onora ►Owning Life ►Pax Natura ►Sen, Amartya ►Shiva, Vandana ►Treaty of Westphalia ►World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) ►World Social Forum North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) ►International Organizations Organization for African Unity (OAU) ►African Development Bank ►Health and Health Care ►Human Rights: African Perspectives ►International Organizations Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) ►Development Assistance ►Fair Trade ►Global Taxation Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) ►European Convention on Human Rights ►Human Trafficking ►International Organizations ►Subsidiarity Principle ►Terrorism

Organization of American States (OAS) ►Development Assistance ►Fair Trade ►International Organizations Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) Oxfam International Pax Natura Foundation Regional Human Rights Courts and Commissions ►Human Rights ►International Institutional Legitimacy ►International Law United Nations (UN) ►Global Governance ►Global Human Rights Culture ►Global Public Reason ►International Organizations ►Self-Determination ►United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea ►United Nations: Peacekeeping and Peace Building ►United Nations: Reform ►United Nations: Right to Development ►Universal Declaration of Human Rights United Nations Agenda for Democratization ►Global Democracy United Nations Charter on Economic Rights and Duties of States ►Basic Rights ►Human Rights ►Positive Rights United Nations Democracy Fund ►Global Democracy United Nations Development Program (UNDP) ►Capabilities Approach ►Crocker, David ►Development Ethics ►Health and Health Care ►Human Development and Capability Association (HDCA) ►Human Security ►International Development Ethics Association (IDEA) ►Poverty ►Sen, Amartya United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) ►Capabilities Approach ►Development Ethics ►Peace Education

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United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) ►Food ►Food Sovereignty ►Land Grab United Nations Human Rights Commission ►Ethical Globalization Initiative (EGI) ►Human Rights ►Human Rights: African Perspectives United Nations Security Council ►United Nations: Peacekeeping and Peace Building ►United Nations: Reform United Nations: Peacekeeping and Peace Building United Nations: Reform United Nations: Right to Development Working Women’s Forum (WWF), India ►Post-Colonialism World Bank (WB) World Commission on Environment and Development ►Brundtland Commission World Health Organization (WHO) ►Development Ethics ►Global Public Health ►Health and Health Care ►Pandemics World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) World Social Forum World Trade Organization (WTO) ►Alterglobalization ►Bandung Conference ►Doha Declaration ►General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) ►Global Basic Structure ►International Organizations ►Stiglitz, Joseph Eugene ►Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property

Persons/Thinkers Agarwal, Bina Ake, Claude Appiah, Kwame Anthony Arendt, Hannah Augustine Barber, Benjamin Barry, Brian Bauman, Zygmunt Beitz, Charles Benhabib, Seyla Berger, John Bohman, James

Bonhoeffer, Dietrich Boylan, Michael Brock, Gillian Buchanan, Allen Cabrera, Luis Caney, Simon Chodosh, Hiram Chomsky, Noam Chumakov, Alexander N. Chwaszcza, Christine Cicero Condorcet, N. Marquis de Crocker, David Dante Derrida, Jacques Dower, Nigel Dryzek, John Falk, Richard Fanon, Frantz ►Human Rights: African Perspectives ►Imperialism ►Liberation Theology ►Violence Foucault, Michel Gandhi, Mahatma George, Henry ►Georgism Goldhagen, Daniel Jonah Gould, Carol Goulet, Denis Grotius, Hugo Habermas, Ju¨rgen Hardin, Garrett Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Held, David Held, Virginia Herodotus Hobbes, Thomas Honneth, Axel Huntington, Samuel Jefferson, Thomas Kant, Immanuel Kant, Immanuel: Contemporary Kantian Responses to King, Martin Luther, Jr. Kukathas, Chandran Ku¨ng, Hans ►Global Ethic ►World Citizenship Laozi Locke, John

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Luther, Martin Mallat, Chibli Mamdani, Mahmoud ►Human Rights: African Perspectives Mao, Zedong Marx, Karl May, Larry McBride, William McMahan, Jeff Mill, John Stuart Miller, David Miller, Richard Moellendorf, Darrel Nagel, Thomas Narveson, Jan Nickel, James Nozick, Robert Nussbaum, Martha C. O’Neill, Onora Okin, Susan Pogge, Thomas Rawls, John Roosevelt, Eleanor Rosenbaum, Thane Rosenthal, Joel H. Rousseau, Jean-Jacques Russell, Bertrand Sellers, Mortimer Sen, Amartya Seneca Shiva, Vandana Shue, Henry Singer, Peter Spinoza, Baruch Stiglitz, Joseph Eugene Tagore, Rabindranath Talbott, William J. Tamir, Yael Tan, Kok-Chor Teso´n, Fernando Thucydides Vitoria, Francisco de Walzer, Michael Wenar, Leif Xunzi Young, Iris Marion

Trends/Movements/Policies/Treaties Advocacy Organizations ►International Organizations

Afghanistan and Iraq Wars al Qaeda ►Afghanistan and Iraq Wars ►Punishment ►Terrorism ►War Against Terrorism Alterglobalization Animal Rights Anti-Globalization Movements ►Alterglobalization ►Ecofeminism ►Shiva, Vandana Arms Race ►Afghanistan and Iraq Wars ►Chomsky, Noam ►Corporate Social Responsibility ►Corruption ►Dispute Resolution ►Foreign Policy ►Peace Education ►Pogge, Thomas ►Preventive Non-Intervention ►Preventive War Asian Values Debate Bandung Conference Beijing Platform on Women ►Falk, Richard ►Gender Justice ►Okin, Susan Bhopal Tragedy Bilateral Aid ►Development Assistance ►Basic Needs Bribery ►Corruption ►Foreign Policy ►Pogge, Thomas ►Poverty Brundtland Commission Cairo Declaration of Human Rights Capital Punishment Carbon Tax Child Labor Child Soldiers Climate Change Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) ►Okin, Susan Cyber Privacy ►Privacy

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Cyberwar Debt Relief Deforestation ►Pax Natura Foundation ►Sustainable Development Democratic Nation Building ►Doha Declaration ►Global Democracy ►Humanitarian Military Intervention ►Humanitarian Intervention, Non-Military ►Human Right to Democracy ►Preventive Non-Intervention Doha Declaration Drug Research and Human Experimentation ►Bioprospecting and Biopiracy ►Essential Medicines, Access to ►Organ Trafficking ►Owning Life Duty to Prosecute East Asian Economic Crisis ►International Monetary Fund (IMF) ►World Bank (WB) Ecofeminism Embargoes ►Foreign Policy ►Poverty Empire Enemy Combatant Environmental Protection Environmental Regulations ►Environmental Protection Ethical Globalization Initiative (EGI) European Convention on Human Rights Failed States ►Development Assistance ►Development Ethics ►Duties of Assistance Fair Trade Female Genital Mutilation Food Foreign Aid Foreign Policy Free Trade Gay Rights General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) General Agreement on Trade and Services (GATS) ►Free Trade Geneva Conventions Global Democracy Deficit ►Consensus/Justification ►Global Democracy

Global Human Rights Culture Global Justice Project: Iraq Global Public Sphere Global Trafficking ►Human Trafficking Global Warming Globalization Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA) ►Land Grab Guantanamo Bay Prisoners ►Afghanistan and Iraq Wars ►Just War Theory: Invasion of Iraq ►Punishment ►Terrorism ►War Against Terrorism Hague Conventions Human Rights: African Perspectives Human Trafficking Inept States ►Poverty ►Rawls, John Intellectual Property Rights International Borrowing Privilege ►Debt Relief International Criminal Justice International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) International Environmental Standards ►Climate Change ►Climate Justice ►Global Warming International Labor Standards International Legal Reform ►Chodosh, Hiram ►Global Democracy ►Global Justice International Solidarity ►Global Public Reason ►Solidarity Intervention, Non-Military ►Humanitarian Intervention, Non-Military Just War Theory: Invasion of Iraq Kyoto Protocol ►Climate Change ►Climate Justice ►Global Warming Labor Laws Land Grab Liberal Internationalism Liberation Theology

Topical Table of Contents

Mediation ►Chodosh, Hiram ►Dispute Resolution Mega-Cities Moral Imperialism Movement for the Emancipation of the Nile Delta (MEND) Nation Building ►Development Ethics ►Human Right to Democracy ►Humanitarian Aid ►Humanitarian Intervention, Non-Military ►Humanitarian Military Intervention ►United Nations: Peacekeeping and Peace Building New International Economic Order ►Globalization Non-Aligned Movement ►Bandung Conference North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) ►Alterglobalization ►Fair Trade ►Free Trade North-South Division ►Alterglobalization ►Ecofeminism ►Global Egalitarianism ►Global Justice ►Global Poverty ►Globalization ►Shiva, Vandana Nuclear Proliferation ►Falk, Richard ►Russell, Bertrand ►State Terrorism Nuremberg Trials Oil Organ Trafficking Outsourcing ►Corporate Social Responsibility ►Globalization Pandemics Paris Peace Conference Peace Versus Justice Population Politics Post-Colonial Feminism ►Colonialism ►Gender Justice ►Post-Colonialism Post-Colonialism Privacy

Protectionist Policies ►Free Trade ►International Organizations ►Third World Resistance Refugees Rendition, Extraordinary ►War Against Terrorism Rio Declaration Rogue States ►Humanitarian Military Intervention ►Rawls, John ►Tyranny Rome Statute of 1998 Rwanda Secession Singularity Soft Power Stockholm Conference, 1972 Technology Terrorism Third World Resistance Tobin Tax Torture Trade Agreements ►Bandung Conference ►Doha Declaration ►Fair Trade ►Foreign Policy ►Free Trade ►Intellectual Property Rights ►Stiglitz, Joseph Eugene ►Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Transhumanism Treaty of Westphalia Truth Commissions UDHR ►Universal Declaration of Human Rights ►United Nations: Rights and Duties United Nations Conference on Trade and Development ►Development Ethics ►Free Trade United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea United Nations Millennium Development Goals ►Health and Health Care ►Poverty ►Pogge, Thomas United Nations: Rights and Duties Universal Declaration of Human Rights Vegetarianism Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties

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Vienna Declaration on Human Rights War Against Terrorism Water Weapons of Mass Destruction ►Afghanistan and Iraq Wars ►Just War Theory: Invasion of Iraq ►War Against Terrorism

►War, Just and Unjust Women’s Movement ►Ecofeminism ►Feminist Ethics ►Solidarity Zapatistas

Editor-in-Chief

Deen K. Chatterjee Department of Philosophy University of Utah Salt Lake City, UT USA Deen K. Chatterjee teaches philosophy at the University of Utah and is the series editor of Studies in Global Justice (Springer), with nine volumes published in the series. His areas of specialization are political philosophy, applied ethics, and philosophy of religion and culture. Chatterjee’s publications include, most recently, Ethics of Preventive War (Cambridge University Press); Democracy in a Global World: Human Rights and Political Participation in the 21st Century (Rowman and Littlefield); Ethics of Assistance: Morality and the Distant Needy (Cambridge University Press); and Ethics and Foreign Intervention, with Don E. Scheid (Cambridge University Press). Currently he is completing two monographs, one on the ethics of war and peace and the other on cosmopolitan justice. In addition, he is editing two volumes, one with Martha Nussbaum on Tagore’s philosophy of education and the other on feminism and multiculturalism. Besides contributing chapters in several anthologies and encyclopedias, he has published articles and reviews in The Monist, Metaphilosophy, Ethics and International Affairs, Ethics, The Journal of Moral Philosophy, Social Philosophy Today, and The Good Society. Chatterjee has been a member of the American Philosophical Association’s Advisory Committee on Applied Ethics (Eastern Division) and has been a two-term member of the Association’s Committee on International Cooperation.

Editorial Board Associate Editors NKIRUKA AHIAUZU University of Wales UK ELIZABETH ASHFORD University of St. Andrews UK CHRISTIAN BARRY Australian National University Australia CHANDRA KALA BHADRA Tribhuvan University Nepal MICHAEL BLAKE University of Washington USA GILLIAN BROCK University of Auckland New Zealand CHRISTINE CHWASZCZA Philosophisches Seminar der Uni Koeln Germany SHANNON FRENCH US Naval Academy USA CHRISTOPHER KILBY Villanova University USA RAHUL KUMAR Queen’s University Canada

MONICA MOOKHERJEE Keele University UK JEREMY MOSS University of Melbourne Australia COLLEEN MURPHY Texas A & M University USA REECE NEWMAN Forum for Questioning Minds USA JUHA RAIKKA University of Turku Finland SALLY SCHOLZ Villanova University USA ASUNCION LERA ST. CLAIR University of Bergen Norway HELEN STACY Stanford Law School USA RONALD TINNEVELT Radboud University Nijmegen The Netherlands

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Editorial Advisors BINA AGARWAL University of Delhi India

MICHAEL DOYLE Columbia University USA

KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH Princeton University USA

MYRTO DRAGONA-MONACHOU University of Athens Greece

CHARLES BEITZ Princeton University USA

RICHARD FALK University of California, Santa Barbara USA

SEYLA BENHABIB Yale University USA

TOM FARER University of Denver USA

ALLEN BUCHANAN Duke University USA

DESMOND GASPER Institute of Social Studies The Netherlands

LUIS CAMACHO University of Costa Rica Costa Rica

SAAD EDDIN IBRAHIM American University of Cairo Egypt

HIRAM CHODOSH University of Utah USA

TAKASHI INOGUCHI Chuo University Japan

ALEXANDER CHUMAKOV Moscow Academy of Law Russia

IOANNA KUC¸URADI Hacetteppe University Turkey

TONY COADY University of Melbourne Australia

CHANDRAN KUKATHAS London School of Economics UK

JOSHUA COHEN Stanford University USA

HANS KU¨NG Global Ethic Foundation Germany

ADELA CORTINA University of Valencia Spain

WILL KYMLICKA Queen’s University Canada

DAVID CROCKER University of Maryland USA

STEPHEN MACEDO Princeton University USA

Editorial Board

LARRY MAY Vanderbilt University USA and Charles Sturt and Australian National Universities Australia

SAMANTHA POWER Harvard University USA

ALISTAIR MACLEOD Queen’s University Canada

JOEL H. ROSENTHAL Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs USA

WILLIAM MCBRIDE Purdue University USA JEFF MCMAHAN Rutgers University USA DAVID MILLER Oxford University UK RICHARD MILLER Cornell University USA ROBERT NEWMAN University of Utah USA MARTHA NUSSBAUM University of Chicago USA ONORA O’NEILL Cambridge University UK

{

Deceased

MARY ROBINSON Ethical Globalization Initiative USA

AMARTYA SEN Harvard University USA ARJUN SENGUPTA{ Centre for Development and Human Rights India HENRY SHUE Oxford University UK PETER SINGER Princeton University USA and University of Melbourne Australia GU SU Nanjing University China JEREMY WALDRON New York University USA MICHAEL WALZER Institute for Advanced Study USA

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Editorial Assistants KATHY GLASS Redway, CA USA

SUMMER OSBURN Salt Lake City, UT USA

LYNETTE E. SIEGER New York University USA

List of Contributors DAVID A´LVAREZ Yale Global Justice Program Department of Sociology, Political Science and Philosophy University of Vigo Vigo Spain ROBERT P. ABELE Department of Humanities and Philosophy Diablo Valley College Pleasant Hill, CA USA JACOB AFFOLTER Department of Philosophy University of Kentucky Lexington, KY USA NKIRUKA AHIAUZU Department of Law & Criminology University of Wales Aberystwyth Ceredigion UK MICHAEL ALLEN Department of Philosophy East Tennessee State University Johnson City, TN USA ANDY AMATO School of Arts & Humanities University of Texas at Dallas Richardson, TX USA SHARON ANDERSON-GOLD Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (RPI) Troy, NY USA

ROSS C. ANDERSON High Road for Human Rights Salt Lake City, UT USA

CHRIS ARMSTRONG School of Social Sciences University of Southampton Southampton UK

YUBRAJ ARYAL Philosophy and Literature Program Purdue University West Lafayette, IN USA

HARRIET E. BABER Department of Philosophy University of San Diego San Diego, CA USA

GORDON A. BABST Department of Political Science Wilkinson College Chapman University Orange, CA USA

AMRITA BANERJEE Department of Philosophy University of Oregon Eugene, OR USA

ALYSSA R. BERNSTEIN Department of Philosophy Ohio University Athens, OH USA

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ERIC BLUMENSON Suffolk University Law School Boston, MA USA DAVID BOERSEMA Department of Philosophy Pacific University Forest Grove, OR USA MICHAEL BOYLAN Department of Philosophy Marymount University Arlington, VA USA AVI BRISMAN Department of Anthropology Emory University Atlanta, GA USA GILLIAN BROCK Department of Philosophy University of Auckland Auckland New Zealand MICHAEL BUCKLEY Department of Philosophy Lehman College City University of New York Bronx, NY USA

HENRY F. CHIP CAREY Department of Political Science Georgia State University Atlanta, GA USA DEEN K. CHATTERJEE Department of Philosophy University of Utah Salt Lake City, UT USA HIRAM CHODOSH S.J. Quinney College of Law University of Utah Salt Lake City, UT USA RYOA CHUNG Department of Philosophy University of Montreal Montreal, QC Canada ROBERT PAUL CHURCHILL Department of Philosophy Columbian College of Arts & Sciences George Washington University Washington, DC USA WILLIAM W. CLOHESY Department of Philosophy and World Religions University of Northern Iowa Cedar Falls, IA USA

LUIS CABRERA Department of Political Science and International Studies University of Birmingham Edgbaston, Birmingham UK

JULIAN CULP Justitia Amplificata–Centre for Advanced Studies Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universita¨t Frankfurt Frankfurt am Main Germany

STEPHEN F. CAPONE, JR. Department of Philosophy University of Utah Salt Lake City, UT USA

RANDALL CURREN Department of Philosophy University of Rochester Rochester, NY USA

List of Contributors

ALEX CURRIT Department of Sociology Brigham Young University Provo, UT USA YOSSI DAHAN The Academic Center of Law and Business Ramat Gan Israel OMAR DAHBOUR Department of Philosophy Hunter College City University of New York New York, NY USA RAMON DAS School of History, Philosophy Political Science and International Relations Victoria University Wellington New Zealand HELDER DE SCHUTTER Centre for Ethics, Social and Political Philosophy Katholieke Universiteit Leuven Leuven Belgium MATT DEATON Department of Philosophy University of Tennessee Knoxville, TN USA JUDITH WAGNER DECEW Department of Philosophy Clark University Worcester, MA USA CRISTIAN DIMITRIU Department of Philosophy University of Toronto Toronto, ON Canada

JOHN J. DONOHUE CEMAM, Centre d’Etudes pour le Monde Arabe Moderne St. Joseph’s University Beirut Lebanon JAY DRYDYK Department of Philosophy Carleton University Ottawa, ON Canada DAVID A. DUQUETTE St. Norbert College De Pere, WI USA TEPPO ESKELINEN Department of Social Sciences and Philosophy University of Jyva¨skyla¨ Jyva¨skyla¨ Finland STEPHEN L. ESQUITH Residential College in Arts and Humanities Michigan State University East Lansing, MI USA JEFF EWING Department of Sociology University of Oregon Eugene, OR USA ARNOLD L. FARR Department of Philosophy University of Kentucky Lexington, KY USA CHRISTOPHER J. FINLAY Department of Political Science and International Studies University of Birmingham Edgbaston, Birmingham UK

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MILTON FISK Indiana University Bloomington, IN USA FRED E. FOLDVARY Civil Society Institute Santa Clara University Santa Clara, CA USA HELEN FROWE University of Kent School of European Culture and Languages Canterbury UK DES GASPER Public Policy and Management/Staff Group on States, Societies and World Development International Institute of Social Studies (of Erasmus University Rotterdam) The Hague The Netherlands WILLIAM C. GAY Department of Philosophy University of North Carolina at Charlotte Charlotte, NC USA GU¨NTHER GEBHARDT Global Ethic Foundation Tu¨bingen Germany

WENDY C. HAMBLET Department of Liberal Studies North Carolina Agricultural and Technical State University Greensboro, NC USA WAYNE B. HANEWICZ Department of Humanities/Philosophy Utah Valley University Orem, UT USA JAMIE HARDY Department of Philosophy University of Utah Salt Lake City, UT USA TRISTIN S. HASSELL Department of Philosophy Oakland University Rochester, MI USA NICOLE HASSOUN Department of Philosophy Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh, PA USA HAYE HAZENBERG Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies Katholieke Universiteit Leuven Leuven Belgium

ALEXANDRA E. GEORGE Faculty of Law University of New South Wales Sydney, NSW Australia

SIRKKU K. HELLSTEN Department of Political and Economic Studies/Social and Moral Philosophy University of Helsinki Helsinki Finland

KEVIN M. GRAHAM Department of Philosophy Creighton University Omaha, NE USA

KENNETH HENLEY Department of Philosophy Florida International University Miami, FL USA

List of Contributors

HARRISON HIBBERT Department of Philosophy Purdue University West Lafayette, IN USA

JOSHUA J. KASSNER Division of Legal, Ethical, and Historical Studies University of Baltimore Baltimore, MD USA

ROBERT W. HOAG Department of Philosophy and Religion Berea College Berea, KY USA

FREDERIK KAUFMAN Department of Philosophy and Religion Ithaca College Ithaca, NY USA

CINDY HOLDER Department of Philosophy University of Victoria Victoria, BC Canada

KAI ANA MAKANOE KAIKAULAOKAWEILAHA KAULULAAU Department of Philosophy California State University Los Angeles, CA USA

ZACHARY HOSKINS Department of Philosophy Washington University St. Louis, MO USA

PAULINE M. KAURIN Department of Philosophy Pacific Lutheran University Tacoma, WA USA

PAUL M. HUGHES Department of Literature, Philosophy, and the Arts University of Michigan – Dearborn Dearborn, MI USA

LORI KELEHER Department of Philosophy New Mexico State University Las Cruces, NM USA

DAVID MICHAEL JACKSON Department of Philosophy University of Utah Salt Lake City, UT USA

DAVID R. KELLER Department of Philosophy Utah Valley University Orem, UT USA

ANA JELNIKAR Science and Research Centre of Koper University of Primorska Ljubljana Slovenia

CHRISTOPHER KILBY Department of Economics Villanova University Villanova, PA USA

RYAN JENKINS Department of Philosophy University of Colorado at Boulder Boulder, CO USA

MEGAN KIME Department of Philosophy The University of Sheffield Sheffield UK

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ZENIA KISH Department of Social and Cultural Analysis New York University New York, NY USA

HANNA LERNER Department of Political Science Tel Aviv University Tel Aviv Israel

AVERY KOLERS Department of Philosophy University of Louisville Louisville, KY USA

COURTLAND LEWIS Department of Philosophy University of Tennessee Pellissippi State Technical Community College Knoxville, TN USA

KOSTAS KOUKOUZELIS Department of Philosophy & Social Studies University of Crete Rethymno Crete Greece

JOHANNA LUTTRELL Department of Philosophy University of Oregon Eugene, OR USA

HE´LE`NE LANDEMORE Department of Political Science Yale University New Haven, CT USA BRUCE M. LANDESMAN Department of Philosophy University of Utah Salt Lake City, UT USA ANTHONY J. LANGLOIS School of International Studies Flinders University Adelaide Australia

ANNA MALAVISI Department of Philosophy Michigan State University East Lansing, MI USA CHIBLI MALLAT S.J. Quinney College of Law University of Utah Salt Lake City, UT USA RAFFAELE MARCHETTI Department of History and Political Science Luiss University Rome Italy

KENNETH LASSON School of Law University of Baltimore Baltimore, MD USA

JAMES R. MAXEINER School of Law Center for International and Comparative Law University of Baltimore Baltimore, MD USA

WIN-CHIAT LEE Department of Philosophy Wake Forest University Winston-Salem, NC USA

JAMIE MAYERFELD Department of Political Science University of Washington Seattle, WA USA

List of Contributors

DAVID MCCABE Department of Philosophy Colgate University Hamilton, NY USA

ANASTASIA V. MITROFANOVA Diplomatic Academy of the Russian Ministry for Foreign Affairs Moscow Russia

COREY MCCALL Department of Philosophy and Religion Elmira College Elmira, NY USA

KAREN MIZELL Department of Philosophy and Humanities Utah Valley University Orem, UT USA

PATRICIA L. MCCARNEY Political Science and Global City Indicators Facility John H. Daniels Faculty of Architecture, Landscape and Design University of Toronto Toronto, ON Canada

WILLIAM B. T. MOCK The John Marshall Law School Chicago, IL USA

U. EDWARD MCDOUGALL Department of Philosophy University of Durham Durham UK MARGARET A. MCLAREN Department of Philosophy Rollins College Winter Park, FL USA THADDEUS METZ Department of Philosophy University of Johannesburg Auckland Park Republic of South Africa

DIMITRIOS (JIM) MOLOS Department of Philosophy Faculty of Law Queen’s University Kingston, ON Canada ANNA MOLTCHANOVA Department of Philosophy Carleton College Northfield, MN USA MONICA MOOKHERJEE SPIRE (Politics, International Relations and Philosophy) Keele University Keele, Staffordshire UK

FAINA MILMAN-SIVAN Haifa University Haifa Israel

MARY LEE MORRISON Pax Educare, Inc. Central Connecticut State University Hartford, CT USA

MICHAEL MINCH Department of Philosophy/Humanities Utah Valley University Orem, UT USA

MATTHEW MOSDELL Department of Philosophy University of Utah Salt Lake City, UT USA

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GREG MOSES Department of Philosophy St. Edwards University Austin, TX USA

MARK C. NAVIN Department of Philosophy Oakland University Rochester, MI USA

SUSAN P. MURPHY School of Politics and International Relations University College Dublin Dublin Ireland

BLAIN NEUFELD Department of Philosophy College of Letters and Science University of Wisconsin – Milwaukee Milwaukee, WI USA

COLLEEN MURPHY Department of Philosophy Texas A & M University College Station, TX USA PETER MURRAY Department of Philosophy University at Albany, State University of New York Albany, NY USA MALCOLM MURRAY Department of Philosophy University of Prince Edward Island Charlottetown, PEI Canada TODD ERIC MYERS Center for Asian and Pacific Studies San Diego State University San Diego, CA USA

TRACEY NICHOLLS Department of Philosophy Lewis University Romeoville, IL USA DOUGLAS PALETTA Department of Philosophy University of Pennsylvania Philadelphia, PA USA JEFFREY PARIS Department of Philosophy College of Arts and Sciences University of San Francisco San Francisco, CA USA ASHWANI PEETUSH Department of Philosophy Wilfrid Laurier University Waterloo, ON Canada

ROSLYN MYERS Department of Criminal Justice John Jay College of Criminal Justice and Fordham Law School New York, NY USA

CHRISTOPHER PENFIELD Department of Philosophy Purdue University West Lafayette, IN USA

STEPHEN NATHANSON Department of Philosophy Northeastern University Boston, MA USA

PETER PENZ Centre for Refugee Studies York University Toronto, ON Canada

List of Contributors

CAROLINA PEREIRA-SA´EZ School of Law University of La Corun˜a La Corun˜a Spain

KEISHA RAY Department of Philosophy University of Utah Salt Lake City, UT USA

MONIKA PIOTROWSKA Department of Philosophy Florida International University Miami, FL USA

HENRY S. RICHARDSON Department of Philosophy Georgetown University Washington, DC USA

ARUN KUMAR POKHREL Department of English University of Florida Gainesville, FL USA

WALTER J. RIKER Department of Philosophy University of West Georgia Carrollton, GA USA

MICHAEL K. POTTER Centre for Teaching and Learning University of Windsor Windsor, ON Canada

LISA RIVERA Department of Philosophy University of Massachusetts – Boston Boston, MA USA

RAPHAEL PRAIS Government Legal Service London UK

RODNEY C. ROBERTS Department of Philosophy East Carolina University Greenville, NC USA

ANURADHA PRAKASH Crean School of Health & Life Sciences Chapman University Orange, CA USA

KIRK ROBINSON Western Wildlife Conservancy Salt Lake City, UT USA

GAIL M. PRESBEY College of Liberal Arts and Education University of Detroit Mercy Detroit, MI USA

WADE L. ROBISON Department of Philosophy Rochester Institute of Technology Rochester, NY USA

JUHA RA¨IKKA¨ Department of Behavioural Sciences and Philosophy University of Turku Turku Finland

JORDY ROCHELEAU Department of History and Philosophy Austin Peay State University Clarksville, TN USA

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KENNETH A. RODMAN Department of Government Colby College Waterville, ME USA JAMES E. ROPER Department of Philosophy Michigan State University East Lansing, MI USA CHARLES ROSENBERG Milwaukee, WI USA ALEXANDER SAGER Department of Philosophy Portland State University Portland, OR USA YAZID SAID Centre for Research on Religion McGill University Montreal, QC Canada EDWARD SANKOWSKI Department of Philosophy University of Oklahoma Norman, OK USA DON E. SCHEID Department of Philosophy Winona State University Winona, MN USA SALLY J. SCHOLZ Department of Philosophy Villanova University Villanova, PA USA JUSTIN SCHWARTZ The John Marshall Law School Chicago, IL USA

JANET A. SEIZ Department of Economics Grinnell College Grinnell, IA USA BONGRAE SEOK Department of Humanities/Philosophy Alvernia University Reading, PA USA LYNETTE E. SIEGER Gallatin School New York University New York, NY USA GARY M. SIMPSON Department of Theology Luther Seminary St. Paul, MN USA ERIC SMAW Department of Philosophy and Religion Rollins College Winter Park, FL USA NANCY E. SNOW Department of Philosophy Marquette University Milwaukee, WI USA RICHARD STITH School of Law Valparaiso University Valparaiso, IN USA SOPHIA A. STONE Department of Philosophy Purdue University West Lafayette, IN USA

List of Contributors

CHRISTINE STRAEHLE Graduate School of Public and International Affairs University of Ottawa Ottawa, ON Canada

CASSIE ANN STRIBLEN Department of Philosophy West Chester University West Chester, PA USA

LAWRENCE TORCELLO Department of Philosophy Rochester Institute of Technology Rochester, NY USA LEE TREPANIER Department of Political Science Saginaw Valley State University University Center, MI USA

JEFFREY SWINDLE Department of Sociology Brigham Young University Provo, UT USA

PETER SHIU-HWA TSU Philosophy Program Research School of Social Sciences Australian National University Canberra, ACT Australia

JENNIFER SZENDE Department of Philosophy Queen’s University Kingston, ON Canada

ERICKA TUCKER Department of Philosophy Cal Poly Pomona Pomona, CA USA

HERVE´ TCHUMKAM Department of Foreign Languages and Literatures Southern Methodist University Dallas, TX USA

NICOLAUS TIDEMAN Department of Economics Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University Blacksburg, VA USA

RONALD TINNEVELT Department of Philosophy of Law Radboud University Nijmegen Nijmegen The Netherlands

RANDALL TOLPINRUD Pax Natura Foundation Salt Lake City, UT USA

DORIS UNGER SoCuM Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz Mainz Germany SUSANNE UUSITALO Department of Behavioural Sciences and Philosophy University of Turku Turku Finland CHRISTIEN VAN DEN ANKER Department of Politics, Philosophy and International Relations University of the West of England Bristol UK STEVE VANDERHEIDEN Department of Political Science University of Colorado at Boulder Boulder, CO USA

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HELGA VARDEN Department of Philosophy University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Urbana, IL USA SANDRA WACHHOLZ Department of Criminology University of Southern Maine Portland, ME USA PAUL WARREN Department of Philosophy Florida International University Miami, FL USA MELISSA A. WATERS School of Law Washington University in St. Louis St. Louis, MO USA TIMOTHY A. WEIDEL Department of Philosophy Loyola University Chicago Chicago, IL USA CHRIS WEIGEL Department of Philosophy Utah Valley University Orem, UT USA ALEX WELLINGTON Department of Philosophy Ryerson University Toronto, ON Canada

CHRISTOPHER HEATH WELLMAN Department of Philosophy Washington University in St. Louis St. Louis, MO USA and CAPPE, Charles Sturt University Australia KATHLEEN J. WININGER Department of Philosophy & Women and Gender Studies University of Southern Maine Portland, ME USA MORTON WINSTON Department of Philosophy and Religion The College of New Jersey Ewing, NJ USA RAFAŁ WONICKI Department of Philosophy and Sociology University of Warsaw Warsaw Poland SHAUN PATRICK YOUNG McLaughlin College and York Centre for Practical Ethics York University Toronto, ON Canada NOAM ZION Hartman Institute Jerusalem Israel

A Absolute Poverty TEPPO ESKELINEN Department of Social Sciences and Philosophy, University of Jyva¨skyla¨, Jyva¨skyla¨, Finland

Absolute poverty means poverty defined using a universal baseline with no reference to other people’s income or access to goods. The failure of meeting this baseline thus means that the individual is poor. Absolute poverty is typically discussed in the context of extreme poverty in developing countries, although absolute and extreme poverty are not synonymous concepts. Absolute poverty can be defined as the state in which a subject lacks the means to meet his or her basic needs. Such basic needs are often listed in international poverty reduction programs, and usually include food, water, shelter, basic education, and basic medical care. Extreme poverty is typically defined as a state in which a person lacks access to all, or several, of the goods needed for meeting these basic needs. Definitions of absolute poverty often derive from the idea that the basic needs which need to be satisfied in order not to be poor in the absolute sense are common to all human beings and thus in some sense objective. Yet which needs count as basic needs and what is a sufficient level of meeting these needs are philosophical problems in their own right, as not all of the needs typically listed as basic derive directly from human biology. Education serves as an example. In a narrow sense, basic needs can be defined as only biological needs, but this definition can be criticized for excluding vital needs from the definition. Practically, the attempts to measure the number of people living in absolute poverty have been based on economic measurements. In such cases, a poverty line is defined, and persons falling under this line are classified as poor. There are both domestically used and international poverty lines. Poverty lines can also vary between different social contexts, such as rural and urban areas. The most used poverty lines are $1.08 a day for extreme poverty and $2.16 a day for poverty. These lines

have been defined by the World Bank, which also produces statistics on the number of the people in the world living below these poverty lines. The dollar figures do not refer to actual dollars but purchasing power. Therefore, $1.08 means the amount of money with which one can buy the equivalent of goods $1.08 buys in the USA. Practically, in developing countries, the actual amount of money needed for meeting the poverty line is significantly less than $1.08. The World Bank argues that the $1.08 PPP (purchasing power parity) poverty line corresponds with the amount of money needed to meet one’s most basic needs. Several critics have claimed that the poverty line is set at a too low level or at an arbitrary level. Practically, current international poverty reduction efforts focus on poverty in the absolute sense. Thus the task of poverty reduction is seen as to lift the people living in poverty above a poverty line, rather than making income distribution more equal or increasing the overall living standards in poor countries. This policy is supported by the ethical argument that absolute extreme poverty generates duties for wealthier individuals and countries to act to alleviate poverty, while less severe forms of poverty do not generate the same level of responsibilities. Absolute poverty in its extreme form is thus understood as a state which is dehumanizing to the extent that global justice can be seen to require abolishing such poverty regardless of what else is required.

Related Topics ▶ Basic Needs ▶ Global Justice ▶ Global Poverty ▶ Relative Poverty

References Mack E, Schramm M, Klasen S (eds) (2009) Absolute poverty and global justice. Empirical data – moral theories – initiatives. Ashgate, Aldershot Pogge T, Reddy S (2010) How not to count the poor. In: Anand S, Segal P, Stiglitz J (eds) Debates in the measurement of global poverty. Oxford University Press, Oxford Ravallion M (1998) Poverty lines in theory and practice. Living standards measurement study working papers no 133. World Bank, Washington, DC

Deen K. Chatterjee (ed.), Encyclopedia of Global Justice, DOI 10.1007/978-1-4020-9160-5, # Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

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Act-Consequentialism

Act-Consequentialism MATTHEW MOSDELL Department of Philosophy, University of Utah, Salt Lake City, UT, USA

Act-consequentialism is the view that an action is right if and only if it maximizes the good for the greatest number of people. As with any consequentialist theory of morality, act-consequentialism must specify what features of an action’s consequences are morally valuable. Is it happiness, pleasure, welfare, wealth distribution, access to primary goods, or something else? Furthermore, as a consequentialist theory of morality, it must specify the calculative method for determining the overall moral value for a particular state of affairs. Only in this manner will it be possible for a comparison across states of affairs to be obtained. Though these difficulties are not unique to act-consequentialism, they are problems that need to be addressed if the position is to be plausibly maintained. As a distinctive position, act-consequentialism is often mistakenly thought of as a decision procedure for determining what one ought to do: act in an effort to maximize the greatest good for the greatest number. Because of the difficulties associated with such a decision procedure, however, it is unfair to saddle act-consequentialists with such a commitment, and virtually no one endorses the position as a decision procedure in contemporary philosophy. What, then, is peculiar to act-consequentialism as a philosophical position? Minimally, it is the view that moral properties of an action are wholly determined by the action’s consequences. This is in contrast to ruleconsequentialism: the view that moral properties are determined by the consequences of rules. The difference is apparent when considering the moral wrongness of an action. For an act-consequentialist, an action is morally wrong if it results in less good than some possible and available alternative. Rule-consequentialists reject this position in favor of one according to which an action’s moral wrongness is determined by a rule justified in terms of its consequences. In this manner, an action may have consequences that fail to maximize the good on a particular occasion and be morally justified for a ruleconsequentialist (because following the rule will have better effect overall) but not for an act-consequentialist. As with other forms of consequentialism, actconsequentialism has a significant role to play when thinking about questions of global justice. However, since the position does not have a viable role to play as a method for

determining what ought to be done, that is, it cannot be used as a tool for making decisions, it seems that its primary role must be in thinking about judging the moral rightness of actions and, subsequently, thinking about moral culpability in terms of an action’s consequences. For example, on an act-consequentialist rendering of actions during war, the moral rightness of certain actions are determined by their effects. It is frequently the case that innocent civilians are killed during bombing attacks, yet the action is judged morally blameless in virtue of a net increase in perceived good as a result of the action, for example, the value of killing, dismantling, or destroying certain targets may justify the loss of some civilian life. Whether such actions can be justified or not, it is clear that such act-consequentialist thinking plays prominently in our intuitive moral judgments, and, consequently, we should expect the view to have influence in considerations of this kind.

Related Topics

▶ Common Good ▶ Double Effect, Doctrine of ▶ Moral Reasoning ▶ Rule-Consequentialism ▶ Utilitarianism

References Hooker B (2007) Rule-consequentialism and internal consistency: a reply to card. Utilitas 19:514–519 Lyons D (1965) Forms and limits of utilitarianism. Oxford University Press, Oxford Mill JS (1861) Utilitarianism Moore GE (1903) Principia ethica. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Rawls J (1951) Outline for a decision procedure in ethics. Philos Rev 60:177–197 Sen A, Williams B (eds) (1982) Utilitarianism and beyond. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Singer P (1972) Is act-utilitarianism self-defeating? Philos Rev 81:94–104 Smart JJC (1956) Extreme and restricted utilitarianism. Philos Q 6:344–354

Adaptive Preferences ▶ Capabilities Approach ▶ Preference-Satisfaction

Advocacy Organizations ▶ International Organizations

Afghanistan and Iraq Wars

Afghanistan and Iraq Wars GAIL M. PRESBEY College of Liberal Arts and Education, University of Detroit Mercy, Detroit, MI, USA

This chapter focuses on the “war against terrorism” as it has been fought by the United States and its allies in Afghanistan and Iraq. After the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon in Virginia, USA, widely believed to have been orchestrated by al-Qaeda, whose mastermind was Osama bin Ladin, there became a question of how the United States government should respond to the attacks. On September 12, 2001, Cardinal Theodore McCarrick, the Catholic Archbishop of Washington, presided over a mass during which he asked congregants to seek the guilty but refrain from striking out against the innocent. The USA invaded Afghanistan on October 7, 2001. The rationale was that the Taliban, rulers of Afghanistan, were harboring Osama bin Ladin and other al-Qaeda members and not cooperating with US requests to hand them over. The Taliban, for their part, complained that the US officials had not shown them the evidence linking bin Ladin and the September 11 attacks. While some saw the US-led actions in Afghanistan as a just and measured response to the attacks, other thinkers like Noam Chomsky (2001, 2003) and Tomis Kapitan (2003) pointed out flagrant double-standards in who was called a terrorist, and what response to terrorism was considered legitimate. Usually, the application of standards to judge terrorism, or for that matter, the war on terrorism, lacks evenhandedness. Noam Chomsky pointed out the asymmetry of the United States’ declaration that it could legitimately attack Afghanistan because it harbored terrorists who had attacked the United States. If this attack were justified, then on the same grounds, Nicaragua would have been justified in attacking the United States, because it had mined Nicaragua’s harbors and armed an insurgent group (the “contras”) who had attacked schools, hospitals, and farms in Nicaragua (thus targeting and harming noncombatants), in violation of international law. Haiti would be justified in bombing the United States because it had failed to extradite Emmanuel Constant, a man responsible for thousands of deaths in Haiti. Sudan would be justified in bombing the United States because it had bombed a pharmaceutical plant, shown later to be a nonmilitary target – several thousand had died. Yet Americans would not think that other countries were justified in attacking

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them for such reasons, even if the other countries had thereby suffered as many civilian deaths as did the United States on September 11, 2001. The asymmetry involved in US decisions to invade other countries militarily in situations where others would not have been allowed to, or would not have been considered legitimate in so doing, points to the degree of power that the USA has in the world. Such power disparities, according to some thinkers, undermine the possibility of global justice. There is also the question of whether engaging in war in Afghanistan was the best or most efficient way to attack America’s al-Qaeda enemies. A recent documentary, Rethink Afghanistan, suggests that going to war with and then occupying all of Afghanistan is like going after a hotelier and trying to occupy a hotel in order to ensure that the bad guest does not decide to stay there again. It is a costly and inefficient procedure. Developing this kind of argument philosophically, Karsten Struhl argues that the US war in Afghanistan goes against just war principles (Struhl 2005). In addition to academics, family members of those who died on September 11 called themselves “September Eleventh Families for Peaceful Tomorrows,” as they publicly witnessed that they did not want the loss of their loved ones to be construed as a justification for Afghani families to lose their loved ones as well. Members of this group traveled to Afghanistan in 2002, raising and distributing funds to try to rebuild war-torn Afghanistan. On October 26, 2001, US Congress passed the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act, popularly known as the USA PATRIOT Act. This gave the US government authorization to hold immigrants in indefinite detention without charges, and gave the Federal Bureau of Investigations power to search phone, email, medical, and financial records without court orders. Set to expire in 2005, it was amended and passed by Congress and signed into law on March 9 and 10, 2006. These surveillance and detention measures have caused controversy and have been the subject of litigation. The US “war on terrorism” expanded to include military action against Iraq in 2003. It is also important to note that US aggression against Iraq preceded September 11, 2001. While Hussein had been an ally of the USA during the Iran–Iraq war of the 1980s, he later fell out of favor. The United Nations Security Council imposed sanctions on Iraq on August 6, 1990, four days after Iraq invaded Kuwait. In January 15, 1991, the US-led air strikes against Iraq. Trade embargoes against Iraq continued, despite statements and official reports from high-ranking U.N. officials that a war-damaged power grid, water

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supply, and communications network would have to be rebuilt or else high civilian deaths would result. UNICEF reported on high infant mortality rates as well as high rates of death of children under the age of 5 years. This led some people to claim that civilian deaths, particularly those of children, were not unexpected collateral effects of attempts to remove Hussein, but were instead foreseen and predictable results of the sanctions. Joy Gordon highlights how the USA used concepts like “dual use” to claim that items as benign as water pipes and child vaccines could be used to create weapons, thereby denying Iraq necessary items and leading to a “humanitarian catastrophe.” Despite US and UK attempts to the contrary, the sanctions were later modified to allow some oil sales for food and medical supplies. The U.N. was supposed to monitor Iraq’s dismantling of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). This decade of sanctions also included many missile attacks, notably January 17 (42 cruise missiles) and June 26 (23 cruise missiles) during 1993 and September 3–4, 1996, when 44 cruise missiles were used during Operation Desert Strike. In 1998, the US Congress passed H.R. 4655, the Iraq Liberation Act which stated that the USA would support efforts to remove Saddam Hussein from office so as to support a transition to democracy. It designated certain groups to receive funds so as to help oust Hussein. This bill was signed into law by the then US President Bill Clinton on October 31, 1998. This was followed by Operation Desert Fox, on December 16–19, 1998, when hundreds of cruise missiles were used. After September 11, 2001, the Bush Administration tried to link Hussein’s Iraq with the September 11 plotters and al-Qaeda so as to draw it into the war against terrorism, to help to justify a military invasion to oust Hussein. The topic of the evidence allegedly supporting the decision to go to war with Iraq is long and convoluted. The Senate Intelligence Committee Report, released on July 9, 2004, argued that the CIA and other agencies made many misjudgments of evidence due to an “assumption train” which colored how they interpreted the often-sketchy evidence they had gathered. Meanwhile, Bush and Cheney used rhetoric to link Saddam Hussein (ruler of Iraq) and al-Qaeda in the minds of many people. Mentioning “9/11” in the same sentence as “Iraq” encouraged listeners to draw the inference that Saddam Hussein had something to do with the attacks, even if a close analysis of the particular sentence would reveal that there was not a literal claim that Hussein was responsible for September 11 attacks. Cheney also often referred to a presumed meeting between Mohammad Atta and Ahmed al-Ani, an Iraqi Intelligence officer, which occurred five months before

September 11, 2001. The CIA repeatedly attempted to convince Cheney that no evidence of such a collaborative relationship existed. Cheney continued to repeat the story of the meeting. Finally on June 16, 2004, the September 11 Commission claimed to have evidence that the meeting never took place. In the meantime, talk aimed at creating the impression was influential. As early as October 2002, a PEW Research Center poll reported that two thirds of Americans thought that Saddam Hussein had a role in the September 11 attacks on the United States. In October 2002, a large bipartisan majority of Congress passed the “Authorization for the Use of Military Force Against Iraq,” which said that the President could use force if necessary in Iraq to “prosecute the war on terrorism.” The bill explained in Section 3.b.2 that the US government was permitted to take military action against countries who aided the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks by helping terrorist organizations in some way. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1441 (November 8, 2002) told Iraq that it must comply with weapons inspections and a program of disarmament or face “serious consequences,” although military force was not mentioned as a possible action. Nevertheless, the USA threatened military force against Hussein. Pope John Paul II and the current Pope Benedict XVI (as Cardinal Ratzinger back then) spoke out before the US-led incursion into Iraq in 2003, saying that such a war would be unjust, and would strain Christian–Muslim relations. Hundreds of thousands of people in the USA and worldwide also protested the announced invasion, but their protests were not heeded. Without obtaining explicit U.N. permission to use military force (since the USA could not overcome opposition from France, Russia, and China on the U.N. Security Council), the USA invaded Iraq on March 20, 2003. Due to lack of explicit permission, U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan called the war illegal. The invasion has led to many debates about the morality of preemptive war. In Bush’s National Security Strategy, released in September 2002, he declared that due to the new nature of terrorist enemies, preemptive war would now be used. In speeches earlier that year and in subsequent government documents, Bush insisted on this right to engage in preemptive action. Other authors have clarified that in fact the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 was a preventive war (attacking enemies before they have declared hostilities), not a preemptive war (anticipatory self-defense when an attack is already underway), and preventive war cannot have the level of moral justification that preemptive war can sometimes have. The problem with preventive war undertaken by either one country or a coalition, even a UN-backed coalition, according to

Afghanistan and Iraq Wars

Harry van der Linden (2007), is that criteria for preventive war are so vague that they could disguise an aggressive war as a preventive war. For these reasons, the precedent of preventive war would make the world a more dangerous place. On September 23, 2003, Bush had gone to the United Nations to present his speech to the Assembly justifying nations using preemptive force, and Annan spoke afterward, with a moral condemnation of the idea of unilateral preemptive war. While Bush stated that major combat operations ended in Iraq on May 1, 2003, US troops remained there, engaged for many years fighting insurgencies while the US government engaged in active influencing and shaping of the new Iraqi “democratic” government. Facts are the bedrock upon which political action can build. But the basic facts about the Iraq war and the “war on terrorism” are not yet known by the American people. In an insightful argument by Robert F. Kennedy, Jr. on the topic of manipulation of citizens by the media, Kennedy claimed that there is not a split in the USA (along the lines of “red” and “blue” states) regarding values. Rather, there is a split regarding facts. A survey undertaken by the Program on International Policy Attitudes (University of Maryland) right after the 2004 elections said that most Bush supporters were convinced that Iraq played a role in the al-Qaeda attacks of 9/11, and therefore they supported the US-led war in Iraq. Most respondents who held this view listened to Fox News. Most Kerry supporters did not think that Iraq played a role in the al-Qaeda attacks of 9/11, and so they were against the plan to invade Iraq. Those who thought so got their news from sources other than Fox News. Kennedy therefore argues that the debate in the USA is really over the facts, and not the differing conclusions people may come to over the same set of facts. As proof of his distinction, he says the same pollsters followed up with another poll of the people who say they support the US invasion of Iraq whether their position would change if they were to find out, in the future, that Iraq did not play a role in the 9/11 attacks. Eighty percent of the Bush supporters interviewed agreed that under such circumstances, they would withdraw their support for the war (Democracy in Crisis 2007). Fox News had even played video footage of US troops finding the WMDs in Iraq. They showed some tubes being pulled up out of the ground. They said they were rockets to propel WMDs. The other news stations later reported that the weapons found were not WMDs. But those who watched Fox News continue to believe that they saw the WMDs with their own eyes. Fear of terrorists has made many US citizens, lawmakers, and military personnel willingly complicit in

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eroding moral prohibitions against the use of torture. Many claimed that an unscrupulous adversary called for drastic measures. Hundreds of Afghanis and others were detained at Guantanamo Bay as “enemy combatants” with few rights. Some were tortured. Known more fully in hindsight, the Senate Armed Services Committee report, “Inquiry into the Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody” (November 20, 2008) charts how decisions to use inhumane treatment of prisoners at Guantanamo Bay as well as in Afghanistan and Iraq (Abu Ghraib prison) were made at top levels of administration. Justice department memos (October 23, 2001 and March 14, 2003) authored by John Yoo of their Office of Legal Counsel greatly expanded the President’s powers during wartime and created a legal foundation for aggressive interrogation practices. The Bybee memo of August 1, 2002, set standards for torture so high that only pain that compared to organ failure or death would be considered torture. The Senate report also explains that the Department of Defense agency called Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA), whose job was to train US military in skills needed to survive torture and maltreatment they might suffer at the hands of US enemies (based on techniques used by Chinese Communists on US POW’s during the Korean War), a training referred to as Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape (or SERE) training, was used in a new context. Techniques such as sleep deprivation, nakedness, hooding, sensory deprivation, and even waterboarding, originally used by Chinese Communists to extract false confessions (not real actionable intelligence), during the US War on Terrorism suddenly became methods deployed by SERE trainers (who had not previously been used as interrogators) to supposedly gain information from prisoners. The report charges that Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld’s authorization of aggressive interrogation techniques at Guantanamo Bay was a direct cause of detainee abuse there. While Rumsfeld had rescinded the authority to use aggressive techniques on January 15, 2003, his earlier approval of the techniques continued to influence treatment of prisoners in Iraq and Afghanistan, since the order to rescind was not widely known. Standard Operating Procedure in Afghanistan included light control, environmental manipulation, sleep deprivation, stress positions, 20 hour long investigations, and controlled fear such as using dogs, hooding prisoners, etc. Despite Jack Goldsmith (the new Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal Counsel at the Justice Department) having rescinded both the Bybee 2002 and Yoo 2003 memos, JPRA continued its use of the interrogation techniques. The Senate report notes that harsh techniques are counter-productive, in that they

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reinforce detainees’ beliefs that the USA is out to destroy Islam; such techniques decrease cooperation with US forces and create new enemies. Yet many Americans, influenced by a popular television show, “24,” in which the main character routinely saves the day by torturing a suspect who then reveals life-saving information, have a mistaken impression that harsh techniques are a help to US security. While the new US President Barack Obama had promised, just 2 days after his inaugural address on January 22, 2009, to close Guantanamo Bay prison within a year, lingering fears of dangerous “terrorists” held there led the US senate to block funds needed to close the prison in May of 2009. As of one year later, January 2010, there were still 193 prisoners held there, although they are no longer called “enemy combatants.” Part of Obama’s emphasis on closing the prison has to do not only with the issue of detainee treatment, but also the rights of prisoners to challenge their detention in civilian courts – a right upheld by the US Supreme Court’s decision in Boumediene vs. Bush (June 12, 2008). A combination of factors has led not only to pessimism about the future of Iraq but a looking backward to search out the beginnings of grave errors. US forces have been unable to improve security in Iraq. The new Iraqi government has been unable to heal divisions of religion and geography that threaten to tear the country apart. Deployment of National Guard troops and redeployment of those who have already served in Iraq, along with neglect of troops returning with signs of posttraumatic stress disorder and physical disabilities, has undermined troops’ confidence in government decision making. This negatively affects the spirit of willing self-sacrifice among the troops. They begin to feel betrayed, and feel that they are being used. Unscrupulous methods of recruitment also make recruits feel like they have been sold a bill of goods. A tremendous price continues to be paid by troops while Americans at home continue to shop (Weaver and McGovern 2007; Rockwell 2007). The current Pope has given sermons denouncing war. In his 2007 Easter message he “denounced the continual slaughter in Iraq and said that nothing positive is happening,” and he voiced his concerns to President Bush when they met in June of 2007. A growing number of people, including military personnel, are questioning the war. A New York Times/CBS news poll in May 2007 showed that less than half of US military and their immediate family believed that the United States did the right thing in invading Iraq. When Obama assumed the presidency, he promised to end combat operations in Iraq. The United Kingdom under Prime Minister Gordon Brown pulled out their troops by May 2009. The United States declared its combat operations

in Iraq over in August 2010 (with many troops redeployed to the growing combat operations in Afghanistan). While Obama found 144,000 US troops in Iraq at the beginning of his presidency, he reduced the number to 50,000, ostensibly remaining behind to help Iraqi security forces in an “advisory capacity” under a military campaign called Operation New Dawn. These lingering forces are supposed to depart by the end of 2011. But observers seeing the huge US investments in Baghdad’s Green Zone predict that substantial US presence and influence will continue. While the US war and occupation of Afghanistan continues, it is no longer described as part of the “war against terrorism,” but is instead found under the umbrella of the new term “Overseas Contingency Operations.”

Related Topics

▶ Preemptive War ▶ Preventive War ▶ War Against Terrorism ▶ War, Just and Unjust

References Chomsky N (2001) The new war against terror. Counterpunch 24 Oct 2001 Chomsky N (2003) Terror and just response. In: Sterba JP (ed) Terrorism and international justice. Oxford University Press, New York, pp 69–87 Democracy in Crisis – interview with Robert F. Kennedy, Jr. Truthout. Retrieved July 17, 2007, from http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nsct/ 2006/ Gordon J (2010) Invisible war: United States and the Iraq sanctions. Harvard University Press, Cambridge Hunt T (2003) Bush: no proof of Saddam role in 9/11. Associated Press, September 17 Jehl D (2004) Central Intelligence Agency director again disputes hijacker’s Iraqi contact. New York Times, 9 July 2004 Kapitan T (2003) The terrorism of ‘terrorism’. In: Sterba JP (ed) Terrorism and international justice. Oxford University Press, New York, pp 47–66 Presbey GM (2005) Challenges of founding a new government in Iraq. Constellations 12(4):521–541 Presbey GM (2007) Is the United States-Led occupation of Iraq part of the ‘war on terror’? In: Presbey GM (ed) Philosophical perspectives on the ‘war on terrorism’. Rodopi, Amsterdam, pp 161–197 Rockwell P (2007) Truth has consequences for soldier of conscience. The Baltimore Sun 1 Feb 2007 Shanker T (2004) Iraqis, seeking foes of Saudis, contacted bin Laden, file says. New York Times, 25 June 2004 Struhl K (2005) Is war a morally legitimate response to terrorism? Philos Forum 36(1):129–137 Van der Linden H (2007) Would the United States doctrine of preventive war be justified as a United Nations doctrine? In: Presbey GM (ed) Philosophical perspectives on the “war on terrorism.” Value Inquiry Book Series vol. 188. Rodopi Publishers, New York, pp 141–160 Weaver A, McGovern R (2007) Troops return to painful wait for needed help. The Baltimore Sun 4 Feb 2007

African Development Bank

African Development Bank ZENIA KISH Department of Social and Cultural Analysis, New York University, New York, NY, USA

The African Development Bank Group is a regional development bank currently based in Tunis, Tunisia. Established in 1964, the Bank’s objectives are to promote sustainable economic growth and social development in its regional member countries in Africa with the ultimate goal of overall poverty reduction. The Bank provides grants, loans, and technical assistance and is made up of three main lending organizations. The African Development Bank (AfDB) is the Group’s parent organisation, comprising 77 member countries (including 53 independent African countries and 24 non-African countries), and provides non-concessional loans to Regional Member Countries (RMCs) at market rates, as well as grants and debt relief. The African Development Fund (ADF; established 1972), which includes donor and recipient countries, offers concessional interest-free loans (with a service charge of 0.75% per annum and a 50-year repayment period, including a 10-year grace period) and technical assistance to lower-income RMCs. Finally, the Nigeria Trust Fund (NTF; established 1976) is a special AfDB fund created through an agreement between the Bank Group and the Nigerian government for the purpose of extending concessional, low-interest assistance to the Bank’s low-income members (in 2003, the Fund’s interest rate on loans was reduced from 4% to a 2–4% range, with a 25-year repayment period, including a 5-year grace period). Over 70% of countries on the continent fall under the low-income category. Other special funds under the Bank Group include the Arab Oil Fund, the Special Emergency Assistance Fund for Drought and Famine in Africa, and the Special Relief Fund. The Bank has grown significantly in capitalization and areas of activity since its inception, and finances projects and studies in infrastructure, agriculture, health, all levels of education, public utilities, environment, gender, telecommunications, industry, and the private sector. Despite administering a small proportion of overall development funds on the continent, the Bank is highly visible and influential in Africa. It continues to face challenges maintaining credibility and effectiveness through periodic crises and restructurings, including the introduction of non-regional members in 1973 and a credit crisis in the mid-1990s.

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History Following widespread decolonization across Africa in the aftermath of World War II, newly independent states recognized the need for greater unity on the continent as well as for a regional lending institution to fund and facilitate development. Draft charters emerged for the Organisation of African Unity, which was established in 1963 (and later replaced by the African Union in 2002), as well as for a regional development bank. Proposals for the bank first circulated at the All-African People’s Conference in Tunis in January, 1960, and the Bank was officially promulgated on August 4, 1964, in Khartoum, Sudan, initially composed of 23 newly independent African countries. Headquartered in Abidjan, Coˆte d’Ivoire, the bank took shape following the general model of other existing multilateral lending institutions such as the World Bank (1944) and the InterAmerican Bank (1959) – the Asian Development Bank was established in 1966 – but the AfDB was unique in its initial mandate to remain independent of extra-regional influence and financial backing. Whereas the InterAmerican Bank’s largest single shareholder has always been the United States (with 30% of the total number of votes) and decision making at the Asian Development Bank is dominated by both Japan and the United States (its largest shareholders, each with 12.76% of the total vote), the African Development Bank remained an exclusively African institution for the first 9 years of its operation. Founded with great optimism but low capitalization – the Bank’s initial capital fund was US$250 million – the AfDB has remained the smallest, and initially at least, most independent of the three major regional development banks. Because non-regional powers were denied any formal or decision-making power, foreign donors proved unwilling to contribute substantial funds to a Bank where they had minimal input, and the Bank had difficulty securing loans on international markets. Early observers charged that the lack of international confidence in the Bank and its limited financial resources demonstrated the global structural limits reproducing underdevelopment in Africa, and the Third World more broadly. From its initial authorized capital of US$250 million, the Bank’s resources increased to US$2.9 billion by 1982. It remained a small player relative to other states and organizations contributing to the continent’s development. Internal debate about how to strengthen the Bank’s access to resources concluded with the decision to invite a number of non-regional members to join the African Development Fund beginning in 1973, where they could contribute capital but only had representation at the level of the Fund. Internal and external pressure continued to mount and, by 1982, non-regional countries were

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permitted to join the Development Bank and were given voting power on the institution’s Board of Governors commensurate with their capital input. These transformations led to a rise in the Bank’s capital inflow and international credibility, and it saw its lending power jump from US$2.9 billion in 1982 to US$6.3 billion in 1983. Five years later, its funds grew to US$22.3 billion, and capital increases from both regional and non-regional shareholders continued. By the mid-1990s, doubts about the Bank Group’s lending policies, lack of transparency and access for donor members, and management practices led to a crisis in confidence in the Bank. Many of the Group’s regional members had been experiencing severe economic and budgetary problems for some time, owing both to ineffective policy and international economic conditions that included high oil prices and low prices on commodity exports. The AfDB continued to extend non-concessional loans to member countries that were deemed uncreditworthy and, by 1994, AfDB arrears had doubled from their 1992 levels to $700 million; in 1994, the Bank was left without sufficient resources to make loans. In 1995, the U.S. General Accounting Office issued a report criticizing the Bank’s governance system for giving borrowers control over decision making, and the United States virtually ceased contributions to the Group between 1993 and 1999, calling for sweeping structural reforms in the Bank. Omar Kabbaj was elected President of the Bank in 1995 and immediately undertook management and fiscal reforms at the Bank. By 1998, the Board of Governors approved his restructuring with a vote confirming the fifth general capital increase of the AfDB, raising the Bank’s resources by 35% and increasing the non-regional (non-African) share in the Bank’s capital from 33% to 40%. In the first decade of the new millennium, the Bank has restructured its operations and begun to rebuild its capital base, which reached close to US$12.2 billion in 2009. The Group has maintained some of its traditional programmatic emphases, such as heavy investment in large infrastructure projects, while also charting new priorities. For example, the Bank has focused attention on the role of women in African society, education and structural reforms, HIV/AIDS programs, and successfully rallied to support debt alleviation for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs). The Bank has been designated the main agency to facilitate the infrastructure initiatives of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), an economic development program ratified by the African Union in July 2001. In the last decade, the Bank has also strived to position itself as a central knowledge base and

leader in good governance for Africa. The Bank publishes several academic journals, including the African Development Review and the African Bank Law for Development Review, which aim to increase and disseminate research on development-related issues with the goal of positively impacting policy.

Structure and Governance The Bank seeks to spur economic and social development and reduce poverty by mobilizing and allocating investment resources in its member countries, and by providing policy advice and technical assistance to support development. To achieve these goals, the institution makes loans and equity investments in its member countries, provides technical assistance, promotes the further investment of private and public capital for development programs, and helps coordinate the development policies and regional integration of its members. The AfDB primarily channels its resources through specific projects, although it also assists national economic management through program, sector, and policy-based loans. The Bank Group, comprising three main lending facilities, is owned by its 77 member states, which include regional (African) and non-regional countries. The Bank derives its funds from Regional Member Country (RMC) subscriptions, raised funds from borrowing on the basis of its members’ callable subscriptions, and loan repayments, as well as from periodic capital increases by member countries. While the African Development Bank (AfDB) provides loans at non-concessional rates, grants, and technical assistance to RMCs, the African Development Fund (ADF) was established specifically as a concessional lender to low-income RMCs. The Nigerian Trust Fund provides financing on terms intermediate between those of the AfDB and ADF. In 2009, the AfDB administered US$8.29 billion for its members’ projects, and the ADF approved US$3.6 billion through its concessionary window. The Bank’s funds are maintained through intermittent replenishments, usually every 3 years, primarily by non-regional member countries. Under Kabbaj’s leadership, the AfDB recovered its AAA credit ratings based on its strong support by regional and non-regional members within a context of growing international assistance to Africa, as well as its solid financial structure, capital base, liquidity, and financial management. The Bank’s highest decision-making body is the Board of Governors, where each member state is typically represented by its finance minister. The Board is responsible for loans, grants, policies, programs, capital increases, and electing the President, who sits for a 5-year term, renewable once. The day-to-day operations

African Development Bank

and decision making at the Bank are handled by the Board of Directors, also known as the Executive Board, which is made up of 18 Executive Directors. Twelve of these directors are elected by the Governors of regional countries, and six by the Governors of non-regional member countries; directors sit for 3-year terms. The African Development Fund is run independently by a Board of Directors composed of twelve Executive Directors, six of whom are selected by regional and six by non-regional member countries. Thus, while non-African countries hold a minority – 6 of 18 – votes on the AfDB Board, they hold half of the votes on the ADF Board. In its recent move to increase effectiveness and focus on promoting regional integration, the Bank Group has expanded its regional offices to 25 member countries.

Controversies While the AfDB is widely recognized as the leading financial development institution exclusive to Africa, it still only contributes a relatively small share of total development financing in Africa – in 2004, the Bank’s contributions totaled 6% of all development aid to the continent, the majority of which comes from the World Bank, the United Nations, the European Union, and other multilateral organizations – and its effectiveness, funding priorities, and susceptibility to foreign influence are subjects of debate. Because the Bank’s ability to raise capital hinges on the confidence of the international community, it is situated between the competing development agendas of regional and international interests, and has steadily fought to retain its “African character.” Some members argue that the institution’s development priorities and programs should be decided by Africans and are critical of the voting power retained by non-regional donors. RMCs have majority voting power on the AfDB Board of Directors but share decision-making power equally on the ADF. This is significant because the AfDB’s concessional fund is currently overcapacity relative to the needs of the 15 member countries that qualify for AfDB financing; borrowers at the concessional ADF, however, are underfinanced and most in need, especially in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis. Development decisions regarding the distribution of funds and programs in lower-income member countries thus have the greatest potential to impact the Bank’s goals of poverty reduction and social and economic development, and it is in these decisions that competing perspectives are negotiated regarding regionalism vs. continental integration; the relative prioritization of infrastructure, health, education, good governance, and so forth; and the rearticulation of African economic unity in the aftermath of the crisis.

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Some in the Bank and elsewhere argue that the exportfocused development agenda historically promoted by the World Bank, IMF, and other bilateral organizations offer little promise for African countries to escape their longstanding structural marginalization in the world economy. Postcolonial and Cold War legacies of uneven development and decades of declining terms of trade for Africa’s nonpetroleum-based international trade have left African markets underinvested and with low influence on export and import pricing – all factors that have been key in the ongoing exclusion of African economies from the global expansion of trade and finance. Because of a history of competing shareholder interests and the difficulties of coordinating a large and somewhat fragmented region of 53 mostly small economies – as well as its near collapse in the credit crisis of 1995 – the Bank is under increased international scrutiny to become more transparent, accountable, and cohesive in its mandate and programming. AfDB President Donald Kaberuka called a special High-Level Panel to assess the current state of the African Development Bank and its role in Africa’s future growth. The Panel issued a report in 2007 that recommends four main sectors of intervention for the Bank: massive investments in infrastructure; building effective and accountable states, and especially improving institutions in post-conflict states and those deemed fragile; promoting the private sector, which is seen as the driver of growth in Africa; and developing skills in the sectors not already seeing significant investment from other development agencies. How to achieve reform and improve effectiveness while addressing economic circumstances resulting from both chronic underdevelopment and the effects of 2008 world financial crisis remains unclear. The Bank’s dedication to social and environmental justice while pursuing economic improvement is also inconsistent, despite its policies committing it to collaboration with civil society organizations, environmentally sustainable projects, responsibility to populations involuntarily resettled, gender equity, and the improvement of livelihoods of local communities. At the level of national economy building and debt reduction, the AfDB joined the G7-backed Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) in 2005, agreeing jointly to abolish up to $60 billion in heavily indebted poor countries (HIPCs) debt over time and institute a new debt sustainability framework. However, the Bank, along with other International Financial Institutions (IFIs), continues a high volume of lending to HIPCs and logs overly optimistic growth projections for many of these regions, and as such has come under criticism for setting up conditions to reduplicate massive and unsustainable indebtedness, thus stunting recovery from the financial crisis and

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hindering development. Some observers are pressuring the Bank to decrease its loans and increase its grants to low-income countries. Additionally, the Bank’s emphasis on funding large infrastructural projects – in 2007, infrastructure operations accounted for approximately 60% of the bank’s portfolio – is seen as a controversial development strategy, especially as they can have significant and negative environmental and social effects. According to former employees, civil society groups, and watchdogs, the Bank tends to provide little public access to officials and documents. The lack of transparency is coupled with a limited complaint review process whereby the Bank’s Independent Review Mechanism (IRM) only allows individuals or groups to file a complaint in cases where they can demonstrate adverse effects on their well-being due to the Bank’s failure to comply with its own policies – this process, therefore, does not allow the public to question the legitimacy of project decisions or the policies that guide their implementation. Additionally, the Bank’s enforcement of its social responsibility and environmental policies is seen as weak. In a publicized example, the Bank’s pledge to support construction of the Gilgel Gibe III hydroelectric project in Ethiopia was widely criticized for the Bank’s cooperation with the Ethiopian government after it illegally awarded the project to an Italian contractor without any open bidding procedure for which the World Bank, the Italian government, J.P. Morgan Chase, and others withdrew their funding. Organizations in Ethiopia and downstream in Kenya lodged complaints regarding the project’s potentially devastating effects on the ecosystem of Lake Turkana and on the livelihoods of indigenous groups who rely on Lake Turkana in northwestern Kenya. Prompted by the backlash, the Bank chartered an independent review of the potential effects of the project in 2009 and finally withdrew its consideration of funding for the project after multiple studies and negative press testified to the destructive potential of the project on the regional environment, as well as the dam’s potential to intensify existing tribal conflicts. Social and environmental advocates thus call for greater transparency and accountability at the AfDB, as well as for greater opportunities for civil society actors to participate in and influence the institution’s policies and projects.

Related Topics

▶ Development Assistance ▶ United Nations: Right to Development ▶ World Bank (WB)

References Chissano J, Martin P (2007) Investing in Africa’s future: the ADB in the 21st century. Report of the High Level Panel for the African Development Bank English EP, Mule H (eds) (1995) The African Development Bank. The multilateral development banks, vol 1. L. Rienner, Boulder Krasner SD (1981) Power structures and regional development banks. Int Organ 35(2):303–328 Mingst KA (1990) Politics and the African Development Bank. The University Press of Kentucky, Lexington Weiss MA (2009) The African Development Bank Group. Congressional Research Service, report number RS22690

Agarwal, Bina JANET A. SEIZ Department of Economics, Grinnell College, Grinnell, IA, USA

Bina Agarwal is an economist and director of the Institute of Economic Growth at the University of Delhi. She has done pioneering work in many aspects of gender analysis, with a particular focus on gender justice and the lives of the most disadvantaged. She is best known for her seminal work on gender and land rights, but many of her papers on environmental change have also broken new ground and are widely cited. Her most recent book, Gender and Green Governance (2010b), which examines the impact on equity and conservation of women’s inclusion in the management of forests, parallels in scope, scale, and importance of her earlier book A Field of One’s Own (1994b) which focused on the importance of women’s rights in agricultural land. While the context of Agarwal’s research is developing countries, especially South Asia, her conceptual and theoretical contributions are applicable far more widely and have influenced thinking globally. Her writings attract an unusually large audience of researchers, teachers, students, policymakers, and activists. Agarwal grew up in India and was educated at the Universities of Cambridge and Delhi. She has been Professor of Economics at Delhi’s Institute of Economic Growth since 1988 and is now its Director. She has written or edited/co-edited nine books and more than 70 academic articles. Issues of equity and justice are the running thread in her work which addresses, in diverse ways, the processes that underlie the persistence of economic and social deprivation, and the legal, economic, and institutional mechanisms which can help overcome such deprivations. Among the hallmarks of her writings

Agarwal, Bina

are rigor of analysis, clarity of exposition, and a seamless weaving across disciplines and across quantitative and qualitative dimensions. She has frequently challenged mainstream arguments by economists and sometimes even by feminist scholars to chart new directions, both in the questions asked and the answers arrived at. Here we can discuss only a few of her many contributions; readers are encouraged to consult the references provided and her website www.binaagarwal.com for a more complete listing. We turn now to some of the central themes explored in Agarwal’s work.

Gender, Property, and Land Agarwal’s most influential work thus far has been that on women’s command over property, especially land. Her writings on this subject in the late 1980s and early 1990s culminated in the path-breaking and award-winning book A Field of One’s Own: Gender and Land Rights in South Asia (1994b). This focused on the central importance of women’s rights in immovable property, especially land, and opened up an entirely new understanding of the pathways to women’s empowerment. This book, recognized widely as a tour de force, is magisterial in scope. It spans five countries in South Asia (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Nepal). It engages with a wide range of disciplines, including economics, law, history, and anthropology. It makes a strong argument for gender equality in landed property, not only for justice and welfare but also for enhancing food security and productivity, and for empowering women. It maps crossregional patterns in women’s property rights historically, the factors underlying the gaps between law and practice, and between land ownership and its effective control. Most importantly, it engages with policy to indicate how these gaps can be overcome. It is this holistic approach, the traversing of theory and empirical evidence, and serious concern with policy that explains the wide influence of Agarwal’s work globally – beyond academics to grassroots practitioners, international agencies, and policy makers. Even groups without a specific gender focus, but dealing with land, poverty, and livelihood questions have been motivated to take up women’s land rights as a key initiative. Agarwal’s pioneering research united and helped to transform the debates both on land and on gender. Some central arguments of the book are especially worth highlighting. For women, Agarwal argues, land access is key to reducing poverty and enhancing their and their children’s welfare. It is also key to increasing productivity and empowering women. Land is a crucial asset in times of economic stress, and serves as a collateral

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for loans. Owning land can also enhance women’s bargaining power, winning them better treatment within families, better prospects in the labor market, and higher status and more voice in their communities. Most importantly, Agarwal provides early evidence which shows that gender equality in land access would increase agricultural output, especially given the tendency toward a feminization of agriculture, with more men than women moving to non-farm occupations. Women workers remain much more dependent on agriculture in many countries: in India, three fourths of women workers and only half of men workers are based in agriculture. South Asian women, however, have owned and controlled a very small share of the region’s land, which remains largely in male hands due to male bias in access through the family, the state, and markets. Much of agricultural land in the region is privately owned. Inheritance laws and their implementation have favored men, as have government land reform programs which tend to give titles mainly to male household heads. And few women have finances to individually lease or buy land. Agarwal’s book also examines women’s covert and overt resistance to gender inequality, especially in the context of land struggles. And she outlines actions that could be taken by governments, NGOs, and activists to strengthen women’s land rights, such as making laws gender equal and increasing legal awareness and legal aid; giving land titles to women, or at least to both spouses in government programs for land reform and resettlement schemes; and supporting the formation of women’s agricultural cooperatives and ensuring women farmers’ access to credit, information, and technical assistance. Revisiting the land issue in later articles (2003, 2010a), Agarwal takes her recommendations further. She argues that individual women have few resources to access land on their own or to cultivate it effectively. An answer, she argues, lies in encouraging women to pool their resources in small groups of say 10–15 women, to lease in land or purchase land and cultivate it jointly. Such “agricultural production collectivities,” as she terms them, would help women to better access not only land but also credit, inputs, and markets. She is careful to distinguish this from early socialist collectivization which was typically coercive and enormous in scale. She emphasizes the importance of the groups being small sized, voluntarily formed, and egalitarian and participative in functioning. What makes her argument especially strong is the evidence she provides of hundreds of successful women’s groups undertaking joint farming in South India and Bangladesh. She also gives examples of voluntarily formed family

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cooperatives in the transition economies of Eastern Europe after de-collectivization, which are found to be more productive than individual family farms. Agarwal’s research and advocacy have had a powerful influence on policy: in India, she helped to catalyze a momentous reform of Hindu Inheritance law in 2005 that removed gender inequalities in inheritance of agricultural land for Hindu women, who constitute over 80% of women in India. Over the years, she has also provided substantial support to NGOs in India, Bangladesh, and even South Africa, through workshops and written inputs, as well as advice to the Indian government on how to promote women’s rights in land and property. Agarwal’s related and again insightful empirical work with Pradeep Panda, on the security against domestic violence that owning land or a house provides to women, has further strengthened the case for women’s land claims. This can prove to be an important new pathway for global justice groups working on violence against women.

Gender and the Environment Environmental justice constitutes a second major contribution of Agarwal’s work and predates that on land rights. She began writing on environmental issues long before many had woken up to the challenge. Her 1980s monograph and subsequent book Cold Hearths and Barren Slopes: The Woodfuel Crises in the Third World (1986) noted how the effects of environmental degradation differ for women and men. Agarwal drew on evidence from Asia, Africa, and Latin America to highlight the crises of cooking energy which was affecting millions of poor households, and particularly women, who bear the main burden of gathering firewood for cooking and heating. Even today, fuelwood remains the main source of cooking energy in much of the developing world. Using a political economy approach, Agarwal noted that the causes of the crises lay in the exploitation of forests for commercial use with little attention paid to local livelihood needs. She provided a powerful critique of the top-down planning and implementation of social forestry programs launched by governments and international agencies as solutions to the crises. Few programs benefited rural poor women who were the principal sufferers. The book made a strong case for involving the rural poor and especially women in the design and implementation of afforestation schemes. Her work also questioned whether truly effective solutions to the crisis were possible without measures to reduce existing socioeconomic (especially land-based) inequalities; and without economic policies oriented to a more energy-efficient and ecologically sustainable form of development.

Agarwal’s subsequent writings were a significant contribution to the conceptual debate on the relationship between women and the environment. In a much cited 1992 paper “The Gender and Environment Debate: Lessons from India,” she argued that women’s relationship with the natural world should not be seen as an outgrowth of gender ideology or biology, as some ecofeminists had suggested. She propounded an alternative theoretical framework, which she termed “feminist environmentalism,” under which women and men’s relationship with nature depends on the gender division of labor and of resources. The first affects the type of relationship men and women have with the natural environment in their daily lives. Since women usually are the ones who gather firewood and collect water, the growing scarcity and deterioration of forests and water has serious consequences for women’s workloads and health. At the same time, women’s limited access to private property resources- such as land-also increases women’s dependence on forests and the commons. Agarwal presented substantial evidence about the severity of problems women faced with the degradation of these resources. She also discussed emerging environmental activism such as the Chipko movement in India, and suggested future directions for policy. In the late 1990s Agarwal began research on community forestry, leading to a much cited World Development paper on “Participatory Exclusions” and culminating in her book Gender and Green Governance (2010b). This work followed naturally from Cold Hearths and Barren Slopes, wherein she had emphasized the importance of participatory approaches to forest management by communities. In the early 1990s many governments launched programs transferring parts of government forests to local communities to manage them. In 1998–1999 Agarwal traveled across India and parts of Nepal to examine how well this was working on the ground and found that women were seriously underrepresented in community forestry institutions, often making up 10% or less of the active membership. To capture this phenomenon she coined the term “participatory exclusions” to indicate how local institutions with formal democratic structures could effectively exclude significant sections. In Gender and Green Governance, however, Agarwal made a leap by reversing the idea of women’s absence from governance to examine what difference women’s presence would make. She asked: would women’s better representation in community forestry increase their voice in such institutions? Would it lead to different rules of forest use? Most importantly, would it improve conservation and

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reduce women’s problems of domestic energy? Also how large a presence of women would have an impact – for instance, was there an identifiable critical mass? To answer these and other questions, she painstakingly collected her own data with the help of a research team, spending several years interviewing community management groups, male and female villagers, foresters, guards and NGOs in the villages of India and Nepal. She also traced women’s history of exclusion from public institutions, what restricts them from participating, and how they could overcome those barriers. Some of her findings based on rigorous testing of many hypotheses are especially striking: ● In the community forestry institutions which have 25–33% women in their executive committee (EC) – the main decision making body – women are significantly more likely to attend meetings, speak up at them, and be inducted into leadership positions. This constitutes a “critical mass,” a figure which is often lobbied for by groups seeking women’s quotas in local bodies or Parliaments, but seldom empirically verified. Also, women’s participation in forest governance is found to be especially high among groups with a high proportion of landless women. ● Groups with a larger proportion of EC women have a significantly greater likelihood of improving forest condition, in terms of canopy cover and regeneration. All-women groups in Nepal perform especially well in relation to groups with men. This is despite the fact that all-women groups started with a disadvantage, since they received smaller and more degraded forests than other groups. Agarwal argues that including women brings benefits to conservation for several reasons: it substantially improves protection by involving all members of the community and not only men in protection. Women’s involvement in rule making also increases their incentive to comply with the rules themselves and persuade others to do the same. Moreover, women have substantial knowledge (different from men’s) about forest products and how to use and extract them. Taking this knowledge into account by including women improves forest condition notably. It also adds to biodiversity since men and women have knowledge about different forest products: women often know more about firewood, fodder, herbs, and food items which they collect, and men tend to know more about timber species. ● Including women leads to less shortage of firewood and fodder, since women are able to persuade men to allow extraction of these essential items of daily use. At

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the same time Agarwal emphasizes that effective solutions to domestic energy shortages lie in substituting alternative clean fuels, such as biogas, for firewood. For this women need to have a voice not only in local institutions but also in the upper echelons of government where energy policy is framed. ● Women-inclusive institutions tend to better fulfill the conditions which Elinor Ostrom, 2009 Nobel Laureate in Economics, has emphasized as necessary for building enduring institutions for governing the commons. Agarwal’s work on gender and green governance has lessons not only for local institutions of environmental governance in many parts of the world, but also for other institutions of governance. For instance, is one third the threshold (“critical mass”) that must be achieved to ensure women’s effective voice in all types of institutions? Is Agarwal’s finding that including poor landless women in governance improves outcomes applicable to women in other institutions? Will women legislators differ in the decisions they take depending on their economic backgrounds, race or caste? Agarwal’s work also suggests that it is important not only to examine whether women and men have different policy priorities, but whether women’s presence will improve policy implementation. Two additional questions that Agarwal addresses are also noteworthy. First, how can we enhance women’s effective presence in local governance, and second, how can we elicit government accountability in addressing poor rural women’s needs, such as for clean domestic energy and better access to the commons? On the first count, she emphasizes constituting “a web of strategic alliances” between women in forest management groups and other women’s groups in the villages, to strengthen rural women’s bargaining power with the community and the local government. On the second count, she poses a general challenge on how deliberative democracy can be broadened both locally and nationally. This has implications for political theory. Agarwal’s work on environmental governance breaks new ground in both environmental economics and gender studies. Gender has been rather little studied by environmental economists while feminist analysis in other disciplines has focused more on women’s absence than on the impact of their presence. Agarwal’s agnostic approach to gender questions, and her strong emphasis on evidencebased conclusions, provides a powerful and effective tool of persuasion for policy. Like her work on land rights, her recommendations on gender and green governance are already beginning to influence policy makers in India. In

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this, her statistically rigorous analysis, which demonstrates that women’s inclusion matters not only for gender justice, but also for better conservation and biodiversity, is an important persuader. This suggests that global justice arguments could have higher impact if they were complemented with evidence of higher productivity.

Feminist Theory: The “Bargaining” Framework An important theoretical framework that underlies Agarwal’s work on property as well as on environmental governance is that of “bargaining,” which she initially developed in A Field of One’s Own and subsequently elaborated in a widely cited article “Bargaining and Gender Relations” (1997). This made significant theoretical contributions to feminist economics and is the most downloaded article of the journal Feminist Economics. The concept of “bargaining,” Agarwal argued, could be used to analyze gender inequality in a variety of settings: the home, the community, the market, and the state. In common with other feminist economists, Agarwal rejected the “unitary household” model, which assumed that all family members’ interests were in harmony and benevolent household heads could be counted on to ensure fair outcomes. In her view, while cooperation in the household yields gains that make household members better off than they would be on their own, there are also conflicts of interest about the division of tasks and consumption. “Bargaining power” is a person’s ability to shape the outcome, and its determination is complex. One important element is each person’s “fallback position,” which depends on the assets, earning power, and external support that she or he could rely upon if cooperation fails. The person with worse outside options has less bargaining power. Also, Agarwal recognizes the central importance of social norms which define the distribution of tasks and resources within the home and outside, and social perceptions about people’s contributions and needs in determining bargaining power. She provides a major insight by outlining how social norms can themselves be bargained over. Analyzing bargaining power within the household is helpful for understanding how women’s disadvantage is perpetuated and how it can be changed. The bargaining framework is also relevant to other arenas. In labor markets, for example, what factors can enable workers to receive higher wages and better working conditions? In the political arena, what determines the influence a rights based group can exercise in interactions with the state? Most importantly, Agarwal shows how bargaining power

in one arena can influence women’s bargaining power in other arenas. Hence a government that frames womensupportive policies and laws can simultaneously enhance their bargaining power within the home and in the community. Thinking in terms of bargaining power can also help practitioners and researchers identify the key elements that stand in the way of achieving justice and devise effective strategies for promoting change.

Food Security and Human Capabilities A key facet of Agarwal’s intellectual engagement is not only its range but its contemporary relevance in issues of justice. One such issue is food security. Many argue that the right to food is a basic human right. Agarwal’s work on land rights and on the environment impinges in significant ways on food security. But, in addition, she has written on gender and food security during droughts and famines (2000), and provided a gender perspective on the global food crises and potential differential effects of climate change on women and men. A volume coedited with Jane Humphries and Ingrid Robeyns also deserves special mention: Capabilities, Freedom and Equality (2006) brings together several perceptive essays on Amartya Sen’s work and ideas from a gender perspective, and extends the work of Sen, a major writer on the idea of justice.

Concluding Comments The audience for Bina Agarwal’s work is unusually broad. Her research, often based on extensive fieldwork, is deep and very thorough. It addresses vitally important questions related to global justice, and engages with other disciplines. Her writing is outstandingly clear and accessible, and she often incorporates the voices of the women and men she is writing about, giving us the human face behind the statistics. Professor Agarwal has received professional recognition in many forms and across the globe. She was president of the International Association for Feminist Economics and vice-president of the International Economic Association. She is currently president-elect of the International Society for Ecological Economics. Apart from many book prizes, she has received several awards for a body of work, including the Malcolm Adiseshiah Award for distinguished contributions to Development Studies, the Ramesh Chandra Award for outstanding contributions to Agricultural Economics, and the Wassily Leontief Prize for “advancing the frontiers of economic thought.” In 2008 she was awarded the Padma Sri, one of India’s highest civilian honors. She also holds

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honorary doctorates from the Institute for Social Studies, the Hague, and the University of Antwerp. Typically, Agarwal is the first woman, or the first Indian, or the first South-based economist to receive a particular prize or office. Agarwal has held distinguished visiting positions at many universities, including Harvard, Michigan (Ann Arbor), Minnesota (where she held the Winton Chair), and the New York University School of Law. And she has served on many significant commissions and committees of the United Nations. Given her international and national recognition, hers is a strong and highly respected voice on issues of economic and social justice among academics and policymakers. This is a great asset for movements working for global justice and concerned with poverty, inequality, and the environment.

Related Topics

▶ Ecofeminism ▶ Feminist Ethics ▶ Gender Justice ▶ Indigenous Rights to Land ▶ Sen, Amartya ▶ Solidarity

References Agarwal B (1986) Cold hearths and barren slopes: the woodfuel crisis in the third world. Zed Books, London Agarwal B (1992) The gender and environment debate: lessons from India. Feminist Stud 18(1):119–158 Agarwal B (1994a) Gender and command over property: a critical gap in economic analysis and policy in South Asia. World Dev 22(10):1455–1476 Agarwal B (1994b) A field of one’s own: gender and land rights in South Asia. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Agarwal B (1997) Bargaining and gender relations: within and beyond the household. Feminist Econ 3(1):1–51 Agarwal B (2000) Conceptualizing environmental collective action: why gender matters. Camb J Econ 24(3):283–310 Agarwal B (2003) Gender and land rights revisited: exploring new prospects via the state, family and market. J Agrarian Change 3(1–2): 184–224 Agarwal B (2010a) Rethinking agricultural production collectivities. Econ Polit Wkly Bombay 55(9):64–78 (27 February) Agarwal B (2010b) Gender and green governance: the political economy of women’s presence within and beyond community forestry. Oxford University Press, Oxford Agarwal B, Panda P (2007) Toward freedom from domestic violence: the neglected obvious. J Hum Dev 8(3):359–388 Agarwal B, Humphries J, Robeyns I (2006) Capabilities, freedom and equality: Amartya Sen’s work from a gender perspective. Oxford University Press, Delhi

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Agency, Collective ANNA MOLTCHANOVA Department of Philosophy, Carleton College, Northfield, MN, USA

Are groups of individuals agents? We can say that nations go to war, companies implement their plans, teams lose or win games, and so on. But do groups really act? Or is it that only individuals do, and that their aggregate actions are attributed to groups only figuratively? That is, when we say that such and such football team won a game, what we really mean is that certain individuals coordinated their actions to follow a plan each of them agreed upon. A different understanding of group agency points out that individuals perform actions as members of a group only because they stand in a certain relation to one another by virtue of their membership; hence, in some sense, the existence of the group transcends the aggregate existence of its members. To choose between the two views of group agency, one needs to determine whether groups can be said to exist in relative independence from their members. An issue related to this inquiry is whether groups can be moral agents – agents capable of making choices and exercising freedom and thus capable of being held accountable for their actions. Group agency is subject to a lively academic debate with important practical implications crucial for global justice. In order to identify the norms of moral order that underlie global justice and assign rights and duties correctly, we need to know which among various collectives present in the international arena, such as religious, ethnic and national groups, states, militant organizations, parties, NGOs, corporations, and others, can be recognized as moral agents in their own right with rights and responsibilities. For example, states in which governments do not express the will of the people certainly act as group agents, but their political power is not legitimate. Or, the official expression of group interests of an oppressive cultural group may not represent the true interests of all group members. To see what the group may be entitled to, we need to investigate its mode of existence. A theory of group agency provides a much needed background for this inquiry. Thus, the relevance of the notion of group agency to global justice lies in the notion’s potential to provide a substantive basis for correctly identifying subjects for normative treatment, in particular, moral group rights.

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There are different accounts of what sets of individuals constitute collective agents and of what evidence can be given in support of their existence. The presence of an institutional organization and a decision procedure makes a collective capable of purposeful action over time and gives it identity over time independent of particular membership, as Peter French would point out. For example, corporations can be full moral persons with rights and responsibilities; because individuals within the corporation act according to the status within the group’s power structure, the structure incorporates individual intentions by subordinating and synthesizing them into a corporate decision (French 1979). A less formal structure may suffice for a group agent to come into existence. One may say, with Christopher McMachon, that a group of cooperatively disposed people that lacks an institutional structure but has made the choice of a cooperative scheme becomes a group agent (McMachon 2001). The least demanding view of group agency requires neither formal institutional nor procedural organization to say that a group is an agent. Groups that lack explicit decision-making structures but have enough cohesion to engage in collective action can be held responsible as groups. For example, family members are motivated to act for the good of other members of their group (Feinberg 1968). Hence, we may say that a group exists when its members partake in a cooperative relation that extends through time and influences their actions. The presence of some or all the following features creates a group agent: a formal institutional organization; an established decision-making procedure or cooperative scheme; and a certain relation that enables individuals to engage in group actions based on a common interest. Those who admit that groups exist in relative independence from their members take a realist stance with respect to group agency, and can be called “non-reductionists” – that is, what a group is cannot be reduced to the sum of characteristics of its individual members (note that on this account members standing in a certain relation to one another are more than just a sum of individuals, they are individuals plus the relation). Those who object to realism concerning groups can be called “reductionists” – they claim that a group can be reduced to the aggregate of its individual members. Hence, realists need to offer some proof of the existence of group agency. Philip Pettit provides evidence that collective reasoning yields results different from the summation of the results of individual reasoning: when individuals decide as a group, the outcome is often different from the one obtained by majority vote based on the outcomes of individual decisions (Pettit 2001). This proves that collective agents are discontinuous with the individuals

who compose them. David Copp offers a normative argument for the existence of group agents: in certain situations the actions of individuals in their official capacity on behalf of collectives can be rational and morally innocent while the outcome of their actions is morally faulty. Since moral fault has to be assigned and individuals are blameless, the fault resides at the collective level. The collective is at fault and thus must have acted; therefore, it is an agent (Copp 2006). Reductionists can object that groups cannot be agents because they do not have self-awareness as individuals do. One may reply that although individuals have first-person phenomenological access that collectives lack, this access does not need to be required for agency. Carol Rovane argues that persons, individual or collective, endure over time only insofar as they have commitments to unifying projects that give them renewed reasons for action at different moments of their lives (Rovane 1998). A group person is constituted by interpersonal affairs and a single person is constituted by intrapersonal affairs that pertain to a unifying project. Group members cannot control one another’s actions directly, but neither can they do it in their relations to their future selves (Rovane 1998: 146). To act today on an intention one had yesterday, one has to first remember that she had this intention. By recognizing the existence of the intention, she recognizes that she participates in a certain continuous project. A similar action of recognition occurs in interpersonal affairs in which individual interactions contribute to the execution of the unifying project. Hence, that the collectives do not have a self as individuals do doesn’t preclude them from being agents. Consequently, collectives can be held morally responsible based on the kinds of projects they engage in and can have rights. Overall, at present the question of group agency offers more questions than definitive answers, but it is of crucial importance for global justice to continue developing theories of group agency.

Related Topics

▶ Agency, Individual ▶ Global Justice, Subjects of ▶ Group Rights ▶ Rights

References Copp D (2006) On the agency of certain collective entities: an argument from “normative autonomy.” Midwest Stud Philos 30:194–221 Erskine T (ed) (2003) Can institutions have responsibilities? Collective moral agency and international relations. Palgrave MacMillan, New York

Agency, Individual Feinberg J (1968) Collective responsibility. J Philos 65(21):674–687 French PA (1979) The corporation as a moral person. Am Philos Quart 16(3):207–215 French PA, Wettstein HK (eds) (2006) Shared intentions and collective responsibility. Midwest Stud Philos vol XXX. Blackwell, Boston/ Oxford McMahon C (2001) Collective rationality and collective reasoning. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Pettit P (2001) A theory of freedom: from the psychology to the politics of agency. Oxford University Press, Oxford Rovane C (1998) The bounds of agency. Princeton University Press, Princeton Sistare C, May L, Francis L (eds) (2001) Groups and group rights. University Press of Kansas, Lawrence

Agency, Individual JUHA RA¨IKKA¨, SUSANNE UUSITALO Department of Behavioural Sciences and Philosophy, University of Turku, Turku, Finland

In global ethics, one important question concerns the responsibilities of different agents. One may ask, for instance, who is responsible for extreme poverty. Some authors argue that the structures of international order are unjust and that they are not produced on purpose. According to those authors, the question about responsible agents is, therefore, misleading. Extreme poverty is comparable to unavoidable natural disasters such as earthquakes and tsunamis. However, if we reject this view and accept that extreme poverty should be distinguished from natural disasters, then the question about responsible agents arises. We should ask which agents have contributed to the extreme poverty or which agents have not contributed to the eradication of extreme poverty even if they could have done so. Many authors have suggested that the responsible agents are multinational corporations and industrial states. This claim, however, has been contested. Some scholars claim that problems of global poverty are primarily due to individual persons in affluent countries. The individuals in question fail to fulfil their duties in such a way that contributes to global poverty. Charitable giving is too rare, and more importantly, people in the affluent countries do not force their politicians to fight against severe poverty in the developing world. This brings us to the problems of individual agency and intentional action. It is customary to distinguish between actions and other events. Human events can be divided into actions and mere happenings, but it is

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important to notice that, arguably, activities fall short of actions but are more than mere happenings. When my arm goes up it may be a mere happening, but it can also be an action. If I raise my hand in order to say hello, it is an action. However, if I scratch my head while reading a book, we could say that my scratching is an activity, not an action. Breathing is something everyone does, but we do not say that breathing is an action. In ordinary language, “action” often refers to an “act,” but these concepts seem to have different meanings. Acts are things people do and hence they are, in this sense, act-types. One person can do the same thing as another person. For instance, both you and I can vote politicians who promise to fight against severe poverty. However, the action of my voting a politician is not the same action as your voting the same candidate. Obviously, they are separate actions. Acts are usually done by doing some other acts. An individual citizen may fight against severe poverty by voting for politicians who promise to try to break the status quo of unjust international order. However, not every act someone does could be done by doing something else. If this were the case, then, arguably, nothing would ever get done. Therefore, it is customary to think that there are some basic acts, acts that are not done by doing something else. There are many theories that aim to explain what happens when someone acts. Intuitively, it seems that when a person acts, there is something that the person wants and then there is an action that he or she believes is effective in reaching the goal. The person’s desire and belief together make him or her to form an intention to perform an action, and the intention causes corresponding bodily movements. The person’s reasons for action are constituted by his or her desire and belief. This story, however, raises plenty of questions, and philosophy of action is the field of philosophy that aims to answer them. A plausible theory of action has to be able to explain deviant action springing from, say, weakness of the will or addiction, and it also provides an account of notions such as self-control, free will, and agency on the whole. When a person’s culpability is considered, it is not enough to consider those desires and beliefs that constitute the person’s reason for doing what he or she does and connect with what he or she does intentionally. We may also want to know whether some effect that was not intended by the person was foreseen by him or her. In order to be morally accountable, an agent does not necessarily have to know what the moral requirements are. The capacity to find out such things may be enough. For instance, the citizens of affluent countries may think that

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they are doing the right thing when they do not require changes to the international order. Suppose, however, that it is wrong not to oppose the status quo and that it is relatively easy for people to see that this is so if they think the things through. In this case, they could plausibly be held responsible for moral negligence. It is not uncommon to blame collective entities such as corporations, states, or nations. Often people say things like “it is the Americans’ fault” or “the Monsanto Company is guilty of exploitation.” When “Americans” are morally blamed, it is not always clear what the target of the criticism is. Sometimes the target of the criticism of the “Americans” is a multifaceted entity, the United States or American people. When a person blames “Americans” in this sense, often the idea is not that the Americans are collectively responsible in such a way that this attribution of responsibility can be expressed exhaustively by speaking merely of individual responsibilities. An extreme view is that “Americans” can be responsible even though every individual American is innocent. Another strong thesis is that when the “Americans” should be blamed, all individual Americans should be blamed. However, relatively often the claim that “Americans are responsible” merely means that a person or persons who happen to be Americans are responsible. When the President of the United States of America is believed to be responsible, one way to express this is to say that the Americans are responsible. Seemingly collective attributions of responsibility are often in fact individual responsibility attributions. Therefore, questions of individual agency are not irrelevant to the ethical issues in global affairs. Questions of different types of agency and responsibility tie in with the concept of global justice. It is important to determine and analyze the kind of entities and collectives that can have duties and play a role in global justice. Furthermore, questions of what kinds of agency and action are called for when we face the challenges of the unjust world are central to the discussion of global justice.

Related Topics ▶ Agency, Collective ▶ Human Rights ▶ Poverty

References Davidson D (1980) Actions and events. Oxford University Press, Oxford Haksar V (1998) Moral agents. In: Craig E (ed) Routledge encyclopedia of philosophy, vol 6. Routledge, London, pp 499–504 Henden E (2008) What is self-control? Philos Psychol 21:69–90 Hornsby J (1998) Action. In: Craig E (ed) Routledge encyclopedia of philosophy, vol 1. Routledge, London, pp 37–41

Koistinen O (2001) Action and agent. Acta Philosophica Fennica, Helsinki Mele RA (ed) (1997) The philosophy of action. Oxford University Press, Oxford Ra¨ikka¨ J (2006) Pogge on global poverty. J Glob Ethics 2:111–118 Velleman JD (2000) The possibility of practical reason. Clarendon, Oxford Watson G (2004) Agency and answerability: selected essays. Oxford University Press, Oxford

Agent-Centered Prerogative PETER SHIU-HWA TSU Philosophy Program, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, Canberra, ACT, Australia

The idea of an agent-centered prerogative is, roughly, the idea that a moral agent can have a prerogative not to do the act that produces the best consequences, all things considered from an impartial perspective. This idea does not come out of the blue. Rather, it was firstly introduced into the ethics literature to moderate the demands of act-consequentialism (Scheffler 2003). It also has deep implications for global justice issues, especially for the issue of fighting world poverty. Before we get to what these implications are, we need to get clear about what the idea of agent-centered prerogatives stands for. This idea can be best illustrated against the backdrop of act-consequentialism. So, we will introduce the idea of agent-centered prerogatives by way of introducing act-consequentialism.

Demands of Act-Consequentialism Act-consequentialism, on a standard construal, requires a moral agent to always perform the act that produces the best overall consequences, as judged from an impartial perspective. Although this might seem intuitively harmless and plausible, it is actually excessively demanding. Imagine for instance the following scenario. Suppose that you have some spare money of 1,000 US dollars. You can spend it on a family travel during holidays. Alternatively, you can donate the money to Oxfam, which will in turn use the money to save the lives of starving children in Africa. Judged from an impartial perspective, the pleasures you and your family can get from the travel are insignificant compared to the lives you can save. So, in this scenario, the act that will produce the best consequences is clearly donating your money. And this is

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exactly what act-consequentialism asks you to do. If you choose to take your family on a travel instead, then, according to act-consequentialism, your action is morally wrong. This is a harsh verdict. Few of us believe it. The demands of act-consequentialism are apparently too high. It is hard to imagine how an act as innocent as spending one’s spare money on family travel can be immoral! Here is what most of us believe instead. Most of us believe that while it is morally meritorious to donate the money, it is okay or morally permitted not to do so. We do not have a general moral obligation to always perform the act that produces the best consequences, as dictated by act-consequentialism. We are morally allowed to indulge ourselves in movies and spend time with our loved ones although arguably the money spent on movies and time spent with our loved ones can always be put to better uses, such as contributing to famine relief or visiting the elderly and the sick. In commonsense morality, we believe that we have agent-centered prerogatives – the prerogatives not to perform the act that will produce the best consequences, all things considered. Agent-centered prerogatives set up a limit to the unlimited requirement of act-consequentialism (Kagan 2002). They give the moral agent some elbow room to devote time, energy, and money to the things they find meaningful from their own personal point of view. By depriving a moral agent such elbow room, act-consequentialism seems excessively demanding.

Agent-Centered Prerogative in Global Justice Context Equipped with a better idea of what “agent-centered prerogatives” means, we can now proceed to explore their implications for issues of global justice, especially for the issue of fighting world poverty. In the context of fighting world poverty, having an agent-centered prerogative would mean, roughly, that people in the affluent countries could choose to donate to charities to fight world poverty if they want to; however, they have prerogatives not to do so. While it is very charitable to donate money, we certainly do not seem to be doing anything immoral if we keep our money to ourselves and spend it on things we find to be deeply meaningful from our own personal perspective – such as travels, arts, or hanging out with friends. Although this line of reasoning might sound reasonable for most of us, some find it unacceptable, given the dire situation of the world we are currently living in. After all, we are now living in a world where approximately 27,000 children die every day of preventable causes, such as malnutrition or diarrhea. These evils generated by

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poverty can be lessened, if not entirely eradicated, if all of us contribute more. Insisting on agent-centered prerogatives in this sort of context seems to make mockery of the claim that each human life has equal value. Is it not ironic that when we are having a fun ride on a Ferris wheel, those kids in the poorest countries are struggling to survive? Along a similar line of reasoning, Peter Singer (1972, 2009) famously contends that we are not entitled to have agent-centered prerogatives. We could perhaps have a claim to them only if we were living in a world oozing with milk and honey, where no one suffers from hunger. However, we are not living in such a world. The world we live in still has many people who die of hunger. Thus, Singer urges that people in the affluent countries should donate their money until one cent more would do as much good to themselves as to the poor. Anything less than this is a violation of our moral duty. As can be expected, many find this duty overly heavy. Singer’s line of reasoning has been strongly contested by many. John Kekes (2002), for instance, endorses the idea of agent-centered prerogatives. In fact, he contends that there are some areas of life which should be kept free of the interventions of morality. It simply cannot be the case that when I sit back in a cinema, enjoying a movie with my family, I immediately become susceptible to the moral criticism that I could have used the time and the money to fight world poverty. This is way too much! To think otherwise is to start moralizing, taking morality out of its legitimate bounds. There is no space for us to settle the dispute between Singer and Kekes here. However, as we can reasonably expect, as long as there are still people in our world dying of hunger, and as long as we still feel we ought to be left with some personal space to pursue things we find meaningful from our own perspective, the dispute about whether we have agent-centered prerogatives will continue.

Related Topics

▶ Act-Consequentialism ▶ Duties of Assistance ▶ Duties to the Distant Needy ▶ Duties, Positive and Negative ▶ Foreign Aid ▶ Global Distributive Justice ▶ Global Poverty ▶ Moral Equality ▶ Partiality ▶ Singer, Peter ▶ Special Obligations

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References Kagan S (2002) The limits of morality. Oxford University Press, Oxford Kekes J (2002) On the supposed obligation to relieve famine. Philos Public Aff 77:503–517 Scheffler S (2003) The rejection of consequentialism. Oxford University Press, Oxford Singer P (1972) Famine, affluence, and morality. Philos Public Aff 1(1):229–243 Singer P (2009) The life you can save: acting now to end world poverty. Text Publishing, Melbourne

Aggression DON E. SCHEID Department of Philosophy, Winona State University, Winona, MN, USA

A great part of global justice must concern itself with the use of force, especially the aggressive use of force. In the quest for global justice and international governance, one strategy is to impose legal constraints on the use of force by outlawing acts and wars of aggression. Unfortunately, a workable definition of “aggression” for this purpose in international law has proven problematic. At the beginning of the twentieth century, there was no globally accepted norm prohibiting the resort to war. As the century progressed, there began a process of limiting the conditions under which States could legitimately resort to warfare. Thus, the 1907 Hague Convention (II) completely prohibited resort to war to enforce recovery of contract debts, while Hague Convention (III) required that States give explicit warning before commencing armed hostilities. The Versailles Treaty (1919) recognized the obligation of States to refrain from resort to war, and to pursue open, just, and honorable relations between nations by the commitment to international law as the actual rule of conduct among governments. In the Covenant of the League of Nations (1919), members undertook to respect and preserve the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all members against external aggression. In 1928, a number of States took a more dramatic step with the General Treaty for the Renunciation of War (Kellogg-Briand Pact or Pact of Paris). They condemned recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and they renounced war as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another. Thereafter, the idea that war, other than a defensive one, is prohibited in international law has been continually restated in various international resolutions and agreements.

Defining “Aggression” and the United Nations While a primary purpose of the United Nations (UN) is to prevent acts of aggression, not even Chapter VII of the UN Charter (Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression) defines “aggression” as a significant term in international law. Since World War II, there have been a number of efforts to define “aggression.” The definition most widely (though not universally) agreed upon is the 1974 General Assembly Consensus Resolution on the Definition of Aggression (Resolution 3314) (1974 GA Definition). Authority to determine acts of aggression lies with the UN Security Council under Article 39 of the UN Charter. Although given this authority, the Security Council was not initially given any normative guidance on what constituted aggression. The purpose of the GA Definition was to provide a guide for the Security Council when it was required to determine the existence of aggression. The GA Definition has been heavily relied upon as a reference point in subsequent efforts to draft criminal provisions on “aggression.” The 1974 GA Definition begins with a general, definitional statement and then provides a non-exhaustive list of features. Aggression is the “most serious and dangerous form of the illegal use of force.” According to Article I of the Definition: “Aggression is the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations, . . .” It is to be noted that “use of armed force” is not the same as a “threat of armed force.” The Nuremberg definitional statement of Crimes Against Peace (initial version of the crime of aggression) prohibited the “planning” or “preparation” of a war of aggression. In the 1949 Ministries case, the Nuremberg Tribunal held that the “invasions” of Austria in February 1939 and of Czechoslovakia in March 1939 were wholly aggressive and, accordingly, entailed Crimes Against Peace – even though they were bloodless conquests without a “shooting war,” consisting only in the threat of military might. Under the 1974 GA Definition and later versions, however, the threat of force alone does not constitute “aggression.” Article 2 provides that the first use of armed force by a State shall constitute prima facie evidence of an act of aggression. But it further provides that the Security Council may conclude that a determination of an “act of aggression” is not warranted if the acts involved or their consequences are not of sufficient gravity. Thus, for example, minor border incidents might not count as acts of aggression.

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The GA Definition goes on (Article 3) to provide a non-exhaustive list of typical acts of aggression: (1) The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory of another State, or any military occupation, or any annexation; (2) Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the territory of another State; (3) The blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed forces of another State; (4) An attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea, or air forces, or marine and air fleets of another State. Also included are situations in which one State permits another State to use its own territory to undertake acts of aggression against a third State. The State-sponsored employment of armed irregulars or mercenaries to carry out acts of aggression is also covered. These listed acts of aggression may be suggestive; some might even be regarded as “acts of war” by definition; but they cannot properly be regarded as defining conditions for “aggression” or “act of aggression.” In the present context, “aggression” is both a descriptive and normative term. The normative import of the term implies serious wrongfulness. Hence, the crucial issue in defining “aggression” is not descriptions of the military means involved, but the criteria by which armed aggressions are to be distinguished normatively from justifiable uses of force, including acts of war (e.g., a war of self-defense). This issue is very partially addressed by Article 5 of the GA Definition, which states: “No considerations of whatever nature, whether political, economic, military or otherwise, may serve as a justification.” But then Article 7 introduces a major proviso: that the Definition is not to prejudice “the right of self-determination, freedom, and independence, . . . , of peoples forcibly deprived of that right . . . , particularly people under colonial and racist regimes or other forms of alien domination; nor the right of these peoples to struggle to that end and to seek and receive support, . . .” In the end, the Definition provides some normative considerations, but nothing like a systematic account of justifiable and unjustifiable uses of force. The 1974 GA Definition is only a recommended guide and is not binding on the Security Council, so the Council may apply or disregard this guidance, as it sees fit. Moreover, the GA Definition is entirely open-ended, allowing the Council wide discretion. It says the Security Council can conclude that other actions amount to aggression besides those indicated by the Definition (Article 4). At the same time, even if the conditions in the Definition are met, the Security Council may conclude that there was not an aggression after all. Commentators have suggested that, consequently, the GA Definition has had little effect on deliberations of the Security Council.

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From 1946 to the present, there have not been any national or international trials for the crime of aggression (formerly, Crimes Against Peace); thus, no greater content or specificity of “aggression” has been achieved through judicial rulings. On the other hand, there have been clear instances of States engaged in acts of aggression. The Security Council has condemned these various military actions and, on a few rare occasions, labeled particular military incursions as “acts of aggression.” For instance, in 1985, the Security Council condemned South Africa for military incursions into Angola, calling them “hostile and unprovoked acts of aggression” (UN Security Council Resolution 577, 6 December 1985). Possibly, a legally binding definition of “act of aggression” could be pieced together from a close study of such individual cases; but, to date, this prospect remains elusive.

UN Prohibition on Use of Force and Indirect Definition The United Nations Charter was the first international treaty in history to decisively prohibit the threat or use of force in international relations. The primary purpose of the United Nations is to maintain international peace and security by taking “effective . . . measures . . . for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, . . .” (Article 1 [1]). To this end, the resort to armed force is strictly forbidden. All member States are to settle their disputes peacefully (Article 2 [3]). The only two exceptions to the prohibition on the use of force are: (1) the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense against an armed attack (Article 51), and (2) collective security measures authorized by the Security Council (Article 42). Given the context of the UN Charter’s prohibition on the use of force, the strategy suggests itself of defining “act of aggression” by stipulating what it is not – a kind of “negative” definition. For instance, one might propose that if a State engages in a use of force that is neither justified as individual or collective self-defense nor authorized by the UN Security Council, then it is, by definition, an act of aggression. An important problem with this approach is that one cannot be sure that all justifiable uses of force will be contained as exceptions in the definition. As international law evolves, other justifications for the use of force besides individual self-defense, collective self-defense, and collective security authorized by the Security Council might become acceptable. What about wars to recover territory illegally seized, or revolutions against a colonial power or a tyrannical government? What about cross-border uses of force to combat terrorism or insurgency? What about

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armed rescue of nationals, or humanitarian military interventions? What about preemptive, or even preventive, use of force? Will all these kinds of military campaigns, and possibly others, always be considered unjustified under all circumstances?

Aggression as First Strike The first use of armed force (“first strike”) has seemed to many to be a clear indication of aggression. Why not simply treat the State that starts the fight as the aggressor? In the domestic analogy of the barroom brawl, the question is: “Who started it? Who threw the first punch?” And whoever threw the first punch is considered the aggressor. Unfortunately, this is too simple. In some cases, it is impossible to determine who “threw the first punch.” It is hopeless to try to determine who started the quarrel and who is most in the wrong when considering long-standing belligerencies between peoples. It is impossible, for example, to sort out who engaged in the first overt military use of force in long-simmering border disputes. Even where there is a clear first use of military force, it does not necessarily constitute aggression. One example is the case of anticipatory self-defense wherein a preemptive attack is justifiable as a defensive measure. For instance, commentators have pointed to the Israeli first strike against Egyptian forces in the Six Day War (1967) as a justified case of a defensive, preemptive attack. On that occasion, Egypt had peremptorily ejected the UN Emergency Force from the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula and closed the Straits of Tiran. It had also undertaken an unprecedented buildup of its forces along Israel’s borders and issued constant belligerent statements about the impending fight. Taken together, these events seemed to clearly indicate that an attack by Egypt was imminent. Hence, with Israeli forces being smaller than Egypt’s, attacking first with the element of surprise seemed Israel’s best defense strategy. Long-range missiles have presented unique problems for assessing acts of aggression. Once operational, longrange missiles can deliver their bombs in a matter of minutes; consequently, the distinction between an imminent attack and an actual attack is also reduced to minutes. In these circumstances, preventing the installation of such missiles in the first place may be the most reasonable defense. For instance, the US naval blockade of Soviet Union ships attempting to deliver nuclear missiles to Cuba, during the Cuban Missile Crisis (October 1962), was regarded by many as a defensive use of force and not an act of aggression. Nuclear weapons also present particular problems for assessing acts of aggression. In 1981, Israeli aircraft made a surprise attack on Osirak, a nuclear testing reactor in

Iraq. This attack was intended to prevent Iraq from using the reactor to create nuclear weapons. At the time, many foreign governments, including the United States, roundly condemned Israel’s attack on Osirak as an act of aggression. The United Nations Security Council also strongly condemned the attack (Security Council Resolution 487). Yet the argument that the attack was defensive in nature is that once nuclear weapons are operational, there is no effective defense and their use may not be survivable. Much more controversial was the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, beginning with its “Shock and Awe” air attack on Baghdad (March 19–20), which was clearly a “first strike.” The Bush Administration initially justified the military campaign largely as an attempt to secure threatening weapons of mass destruction being developed by the Saddam Hussein regime. The action was justified under a rationale of preventive war. Under the so-called Bush Doctrine, preventive war is sometimes justified as a defensive strategy. The key idea is that if we wait for threats to materialize (especially nuclear threats), we will have waited too long and it will be too late to defend ourselves against them. Much of the preventive-war rationale was set out in a National Security Council text, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, published on September 17, 2002, and updated in March 2006. Further complications for the idea of first strike arise in cases of provocation. Sometimes States purposely provoke their adversary into striking first, so they may then claim that their own use of force is defensive. In such cases, the provoker is better thought of as the aggressor, as the one who “picked the fight.” Aside from provocation, and the possible rationales for anticipatory self-defense and preventive war, there also may be other cases, such as humanitarian military intervention, in which the first use of armed force is sometimes justified. The problem is similar to that noted above, that is, the problem of regarding all cases not specified as exceptions in a negative definition as always being cases of unjustified use of force. Clearly, a first use of military force cannot automatically count as an act of aggression. At best, a first strike may create a rebuttable presumption of aggression, as suggested in Article 2 of the GA Definition (discussed above).

Related Topics

▶ Crimes Against Peace ▶ Humanitarian Military Intervention ▶ Nuremberg Trials ▶ Preemptive War ▶ Preventive War

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References Documents Charter of the United Nations. http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/ index.shtml. Accessed Aug 2010 The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 17 Sept 2002 The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 16 March 2006 UN General Assembly Resolution 3314 (Definition of Aggression). http:// www.undemocracy.com/A-RES-3314(XXIX)/. Accessed Aug 2010 Books Detter I (2000) The law of war, 2nd edn. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Dinstein Y (2005) War, aggression, and self-defence, vol 4. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Gray C (2000) International law and the use of force. Oxford University Press, Oxford May L (2008) Aggression and crimes against peace. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

Ahimsa ASHWANI PEETUSH Department of Philosophy, Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, ON, Canada

The principle of ahimsa, or nonviolence, has had an enormous impact as a means to confront social and political injustice. Mohandas Gandhi successfully employed nonviolent civil disobedience to free India from British imperialism; Martin Luther King used nonviolent resistance in the civil rights movement against discriminatory laws in the United States. The principle of nonviolence was also crucial in ending Apartheid in South Africa. Globally, nonviolent resistance is regularly employed as a peaceful means of protest to enact social and political change and an alternative to brutal confrontation. This chapter explores the Indian origins and philosophical sources of the principle of ahimsa, tracing its history from an ethical ideal that is thought necessary to attain personal enlightenment or moksha or nirvana to its development as a form of social and political action used in the struggle against oppression and injustice.

Philosophical Origins Ahimsa means non-harm or nonviolence; it originates from within Indian philosophical and religious traditions of Jainism, Hinduism, and Buddhism. The philosophical

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origins of ahimsa are rooted in the idea that all life is precious, and thus, to take life is a serious matter; all creatures, whether human or not, avoid pain and strive toward their well-being. However, these traditions recognize that the act of living is impossible without causing harm of some kind; the simple act of breathing, cooking, farming, all involve destruction of some forms of life. As such, this ethical virtue is articulated in negative terms; ahimsa is the opposite of himsa, which is to harm or injure. Since harm is an unavoidable part of life, the idea is to minimize the amount for which one is responsible or alpadroha. Ultimately, in the Indian context, to harm another is to harm the self at some level. Although the three traditions conceptualize this idea differently, it is agreed that to intentionally cause unnecessary injury results in negative karma or negative consequences which hinder one’s progress toward enlightenment and for which one must atone at a later time. It should be noted that animals too are an explicit part of the focus of ethical consideration, which is not limited to human beings (Tahtinen 1976). As an ideal, ahimsa requires not simply refraining from harmful action, but also refraining from the thought, intention, or desire to injure in the first place; as, it is these from which action takes birth. Moreover, harm is not limited to physical injury; it includes psychological, emotional and other forms of injury, such as humiliation, intimidation, and depriving persons of their livelihood. Ahimsa must thus be practiced in thought, speech, and action. One engages in harm not simply by committing it oneself, but also by aiding in it, or witnessing it without attempting to stop it, or benefiting from it (Parekh 1988). Ahimsa is originally formulated as an individual ethical practice to perfect the self and free it from unending selfcentered desire, which is conceived as the root cause of human suffering in the Indian tradition.

The Sanctity of Life: Jainism Some of the oldest texts extolling the virtue of ahimsa are from the Jain community. Although a small community in India, Jains have had a great influence on both the Hindu and Buddhist traditions in the practice of nonviolence. Jain ontology and metaphysics holds that there are two kinds of substances in the universe, jiva and ajiva, or, consciousness or sentience and matter. The true nature of the jiva is bliss and omniscience, yet it is entangled in matter (as gold in ore). The purpose of existence is to free oneself of this bondage, which is enmeshed in relentless desire and resultant suffering. The greatest hindrance to freeing oneself and experiencing bliss is actions that cause harm either intentionally or out of carelessness and neglect. All forms

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of such action need to be avoided, as far as possible. Along with the pursuit of knowledge, moral perfection, of which the practice of ahimsa is the highest form, is the critical ingredient of the good life (Jaini 1979). Jains practice ahimsa in numerous ways. They are strict vegetarians, as animals too are jivas. Most Jains live only on vegetables and milk products, even honey and certain types of figs are prohibited since they may contain many forms of life. The requirements for monks are far stricter than for laity, but these set the ideal. Monks (and some laity) often have small mouth-coverings to avoid ingesting bugs, lightly sweep the road in front before taking a step, and are scrupulous that their movements to not unnecessarily harm other life-forms (Chapple 1993). Interestingly, respect for life and the principle of ahimsa develop into a respect for other views, or the epistemological theory of anekantavada, or theory of manifoldness. The idea is that reality is complex, manifold, and multifaceted. The truth claims that attempt to describe this reality are inherently limited by one’s viewpoint; and, as such, they may be only partially true, as they are dependent on one’s perspective. Thus, differences in doctrine may not necessarily be opposed or wrong, but simply be describing reality from a differing angle or facet. As such, one ought not to immediately condemn other views as wrong, but explore these for what they may have to offer. A similar approach also exists in Hinduism and Buddhism, which gives rise to a particularly Indian form of respect and tolerance for diversity based on the principle of ahimsa as applied to doctrinal differences. This attitude accounts for the degree of tolerance that India has shown various religious groups that came to reside on the subcontinent.

Hinduism and the Unity of Existence Classical Hinduism similarly came to regard ahimsa as “the highest truth,” “the highest dharma [moral duty],” and “the highest self-control” (Mahabharata XIII: 116: 37–41, Chapple 1993: 17). However, this principle is justified from within a different ontology and metaphysics. According to the Upanisads, the concern for the well-being of others is premised on the basis that one’s atman or real self is, at an ontological level, no different than that of another. That is, although one may perceive the world as a multiplicity of selves, this multiplicity is pervaded by an underlying unity or brahman. Individuals, with regard to their real selves or atman, are isolated by a veil of maya or illusion; they become free with the realization of their ultimate identity as brahman. This is the purpose of existence and is attained when one experiences the unity of being or brahman or the self as the other and the other as

the self, which is defined as enlightenment or moksha. As such, one incurs negative karma by inflicting harm on another because to harm the other is to harm the self. This is the reason that ahimsa is an integral moral duty: it helps one to realize the self as the other and to reach one step closer to enlightenment. One must note that the Hindu interpretation of the principle of ahimsa is not absolute; as is often the case with most moral or political values, ahimsa is prioritized and balanced in light of other values. As such, Hinduism does not prohibit all forms of harm, and, indeed, even sanctions killing under certain extreme circumstances. In the Bhagavada Gita for example, Krishna tells Arjuna that in the context of a just war, as a warrior, his dharma or ethical duty is to fight and kill the enemy, as defending one’s country is the ethical obligation of a warrior. Indeed, in the Mahabharata, killing a violent criminal to protect the community is not considered an act of violence and thus does not infringe on the principle of ahimsa (Parekh 1988). Furthermore, in severe circumstances, ahimsa actually may require himsa: in order to uphold the principle of nonviolence, one may actually have to inflict harm to defend the safety of the innocent, as in the case of killing a murderer to protect the community or killing to defend one’s country. Jains and Buddhists, at least in practice, accept that certain forms of harm may be necessary.

Buddhist Interconnectedness Buddhism shares with Hinduism and Jainism the emphasis on ahimsa, yet grounds this importance in the doctrine of pritityasmutapada or interconnectedness and anataman or the doctrine of no-self. Buddhists agree with Jains and Hindus that suffering is a result of insatiable desire and ignorance, but define this differently. On both Hindu and Buddhist accounts, the source of suffering is an overattachment to the self of everyday life as being ultimately real; the reason for unending desire is due to a clinging to one’s bodily identity, wealth, status, and the like, as constituting one’s true, separate, and permanent identity. On the Hindu account, this self is an illusion, one’s real self is the atman. On the Buddhist account, the self of ordinary existence too is unreal, but there is nothing which underlies this everyday self; there is no atman; there is no self. Ultimately, the self of ordinary existence is simply an aggregation of physical, mental, perceptual, and volitional processes and the processes of consciousness. There is nothing over and above these that we can call a self, as there is no river over and above the flowing of water. Indeed, existence is a continual process of change that is the result of the interaction of various such processes; this is the doctrine of pratityasmutpada.

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Whatever exists, or arises, does so because it is causally dependent on various other conditions, which are themselves dependent on other conditions. That is, nothing exists in and of itself, everything is interconnected. The reason for violence and harm is because one thinks of oneself as a separate and permanent individual, clinging to one’s ego in order to gain advantage over the other. Virtues such as ahimsa help one to realize that there is no separate or permanent self; what one does to the other, one does to oneself, as all are interconnected in the web of life. The principle of ahimsa in the Buddhist context is also interpreted as refraining from harm in all its variances, ranging from the practice of not killing animals, to right speech (not engaging in slander), and right livelihood (not making weapons, poisons, slavery, or prostitution, among others).

Ahimsa as a Social and Political Value Ahimsa developed from being a personal and individual practice to a social and political value with the Indian emperor Ashoka (274–232 BCE). After having engaged in many wars and conquests, Ashoka is said to have realized the futility of violence and converted to Buddhism. But far from using the practice of ahimsa as simply a personal means to seek enlightenment, Ashoka enacted government laws to establish a nonviolent social order. For example, many of Ashoka’s edicts, carved on rock pillars throughout various parts of India (which are still standing), decree laws for the protection and kind treatment of animals. These laws restrict meat eating and hunting; Ashoka went as far as to establish hospitals for animals. Interestingly, Akbar (1542–1605), the Muslim ruler of India, was influenced by Jainism and also enacted several laws for the protection of animals on a societal level.

Gandhi and the Politics of Ahimsa The modern interpretation of ahimsa as nonviolent civil disobedience originates from Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi (1869–1948). Gandhi’s struggle for swaraj or self-rule for India was grounded in the idea of satyagraha or truth force, which Gandhi equated with nonviolent non-cooperation in the context of oppressive and unjust laws. Indeed, Gandhi successfully used mass nonviolent civil disobedience campaigns to free India from the yoke of British imperialism. Gandhi did not accept the individualistic interpretation of ahimsa sometimes offered in the Indian tradition; to the objection that nonviolence has no place in politics, he argued that he had “no use” for the concept as simply “a means to individual salvation,” but rather, saw it as an active form of protest against social injustice

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(UNESCO, 1948). As such, Gandhi argued that ahimsa was intimately related to the social, economic, and political domain (Collected Works, XXI, 290). He argued that ahimsa required that each have proper shelter, a balanced diet, and clothing. Furthermore, Gandhi contended that “true economics” could not be separated from ahimsa and stood for social justice and promoted “the good of all equally, including the weakest” (Tahtinen 1976). Moreover, Gandhi criticized practices such as untouchability and the caste system, and the oppression of women, on the basis of ahimsa and the Hindu idea that each has the same atman as any other, thus providing an internal justification to Hinduism for social and political equality. Although Gandhi’s interpretation of ahimsa was rooted in the Indian tradition, his conception was also influenced by Christianity and thinkers such as Tolstoy and Thoreau. Gandhi interpreted ahimsa positively and urged that the essence of ahimsa was “compassion” and “love in action.” Without compassion, there could be no real concern for the other, which is the reason to not harm in the first place. Compassion and love require identification with the other; they require an understanding that the other’s suffering is like one’s own. Rather than seeing the other as a separate and isolated individual whose interests are in potential conflict with one’s own, compassion requires seeing the other as kith and kin. For Gandhi, this teaching was universal and apparent in all great spiritual and religious traditions of the world. He thus argued that it was only in the narrow or passive sense that ahimsa meant to refrain from harming others; in the broad and active sense, it meant a positive duty to help those in need (Collected works, XIII, 295; see also Parekh 1988). Along these lines, Gandhi identified the purpose of nonviolent disobedience with transformation of the self and one’s oppressor. It transforms the self because it requires one to exercise compassion and patience to suffer possible violence at the hands of the oppressor for the justice of one’s cause. It requires courage because the ideal is to actively confront one’s oppressor and never to yield to injustice. Nonviolent non-cooperation attempted to transform both the heart and mind of the oppressor. Although nonviolence was the highest form of dharma for Gandhi, he believed that violent resistance could be used, if necessary, as a last resort. Gandhi directly influenced Martin Luther King and the American civil rights movement. King first used nonviolent disobedience in the 1955–56 Montgomery bus boycott, and successfully initiated change against discriminatory laws in the United States. It was also employed against the USSR by Poland, and the abolishment of Apartheid in South Africa, in Yugoslavia, and various

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current ecological movements around the globe. Ahimsa as a political tool employed in solidarity within a country or across the world to fight against injustice and oppression has changed the trajectory of global justice.

Related Topics

▶ Animal Rights ▶ Civil Rights ▶ Colonialism ▶ Dispute Resolution ▶ Environmental Justice ▶ Gandhi, Mahatma ▶ Global Ethic ▶ Justice and Religion: Buddhism ▶ Justice and Religion: Christianity ▶ Justice and Religion: Hinduism ▶ King, Martin Luther, Jr. ▶ Violence

References Chapple ChK (1993) Nonviolence to animals, earth, and self in Asian traditions. State University of New York Press, New York Ghandi M (1969a) Collected works of Mahatma Gandhi, vol XXXV. Government of India, New Delhi Ghandi M (1969b) Collected works of Mahatma Gandhi, vol XIII. Government of India, New Delhi Gandhi MK (1927) An autobiography or the story of my experiments with the truth (trans: Desai M). Penguin Books, New York Gandhi MK, Kripalani K (1958) All men are brothers: life and thoughts of Mahatma Gandhi as told in his own words. UNESCO, New York Jaini P (1979) The Jaina path of purification. University of California Press, Berkeley Parekh B (1988) Gandhi’s concept of ahimsa. Alternatives XIII 13:95–217 Radhakrishnan S (trans) (1953/2000) The principal Upanisads. Harper Collins, New Delhi Sargeant W (trans) (1994) The Bhagavad Gita. State University of New York Press, New York Tahtinen U (1976) Ahimsa: non-violence in Indian tradition. Rider, London

Aid to Burdened Societies BLAIN NEUFELD Department of Philosophy, College of Letters and Science, University of Wisconsin – Milwaukee, Milwaukee, WI, USA

The existence of societies that lack regimes capable of meeting the basic needs of their citizens (often called “failed states”) is a tragic feature of the contemporary world. A fundamental question that any account of global

justice must answer is: what duties, if any, do functioning, reasonably affluent political societies have with respect to such societies? This is one of the questions addressed by John Rawls in his theory of global justice, as presented in The Law of Peoples (1999). Rawls proposes that “wellordered societies” have a duty to aid “burdened societies” so that the latter may become capable of meeting their citizens’ basic needs over time.

Burdened Societies In outlining his account of global justice, Rawls identifies five different kinds of societies: liberal peoples, non-liberal but “decent peoples,” “benevolent absolutisms,” “outlaw states,” and “burdened societies” (“societies burdened by unfavorable conditions”). The first two kinds of societies, liberal and decent peoples, are “well-ordered societies.” This means, roughly, that they each possess a domestic “basic structure” (system of political and economic institutions) that (a) protects basic human rights and (b) is organized by a liberal or decent conception of justice. Liberal and decent peoples are also peaceful in their relations with other societies. “Benevolent absolutisms” respect basic human rights and are nonaggressive in their foreign relations; however, because such regimes do not grant their members any meaningful role in their main political decision-making processes, they are not wellordered societies. “Outlaw states” fail to respect the basic human rights of their members and/or are aggressive in their foreign relations. “Burdened societies” are societies that either are incapable of satisfying their members’ basic human rights or otherwise are incapable of becoming well-ordered liberal or decent peoples. The burdens that afflict such societies can include, inter alia, insufficient material and technological resources, a lack of human capital and knowledge, and an absence of a political culture capable of protecting basic human rights and/or supporting liberal or decent political institutions and practices.

Duty of Aid to Burdened Societies The eighth principle of Rawls’s Law of Peoples asserts that liberal and decent peoples have a duty to assist burdened societies to become capable of being well-ordered societies. Once the society in question is no longer burdened, the duty of assistance has been fulfilled. Thus, the duty of assistance – unlike many proposed principles of international distributive justice, including a globalized version of Rawls’s “difference principle” – has a “target” and a “cut-off point.” Formerly burdened societies, once they become liberal or decent peoples, can be considered equal members in the “Society of Peoples.”

Aid to Burdened Societies

The duty of assistance does not require simply the direct provision of funds to burdened societies. Instead, aid typically will involve the provision of advice and technical support – including, importantly, education and training – in order to assist the recipient society in institution building. Members of a burdened society are to be assisted in acquiring the political culture (skills, practices, virtues, and so forth) and institutions (political, legal, and economic) necessary for them to be capable of governing themselves as a well-ordered society. In addition to the duty of assistance, well-ordered societies also have a duty to aid burdened societies in satisfying the human right to subsistence. Satisfying this duty involves, inter alia, helping burdened societies ensure that their members have access to potable water and adequate nutrition.

Debate over Rawls’s Account of Aid to Burdened Societies Thomas Pogge has advanced a number of criticisms of Rawls’s account of burdened societies and associated duty of assistance. One criticism is that the duty of assistance cannot be justified via the two international “original positions” that Rawls employs in The Law of Peoples. In the first international original position, only liberal peoples are represented, and they select the eight principles of the Law of Peoples. Decent peoples are included in a second international original position in order to ensure that the Law of Peoples is acceptable to them, which Rawls thinks is required by liberalism’s principle of toleration. Since the parties in the international original positions are purely “rational” (i.e., concerned exclusively with protecting the interests of the peoples whom they represent; the “veil of ignorance” models the fairness or “reasonableness” of peoples), Pogge argues that they have no reason to select a duty to aid societies that are not represented, including burdened societies. Thus, the duty of assistance lacks justification. This failure reflects a deeper problem with Rawls’s Law of Peoples, Pogge maintains, namely, its use of peoples as the primary subjects of principles of global justice rather than individuals. According to Pogge, a satisfactory account of global justice must take individuals to be its primary subjects. Some defenders of Rawls’s duty of assistance have proposed that the parties in the international original positions would select the duty of assistance for prudential reasons. Burdened societies can impose great costs on other societies: They can became havens for criminal or terrorist organizations, they are prone to becoming “outlaw states,” and their members frequently become refugees

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that try to enter well-ordered societies. Thus, the duty of assistance can be understood as justified on prudential grounds: It helps protect well-ordered societies against these problems. Other justifications for the duty of assistance have been advanced, including justifications that appeal to moral, as opposed to prudential, considerations. Nonetheless, Rawls’s account of the duty of assistance seems to lack a clear justification. Rawls concedes in The Law of Peoples that its basis is less firm than the other seven principles of his account of global justice. Another criticism of Rawls’s account of burdened societies and the duty of assistance that has been pressed by Pogge is that the duty presupposes what Pogge calls “explanatory nationalism” (also referred to by Pogge as the “Purely Domestic Poverty Thesis”). Explanatory nationalism, roughly, is the view that a society’s level of wealth is to be explained by internal or domestic factors, such as a society’s political culture and/or institutions. Pogge maintains that explanatory nationalism neglects the important role that external factors – including especially features of the international economic order – play in determining whether a society is burdened. Among the features of the existing international order that Pogge claims are especially deleterious in their effects on the economic and political health of developing countries are the various “privileges” that it extends to whatever group exercises effective power in a country, irrespective of how it came to power. One such privilege is what Pogge calls the “international resource privilege.” (Other “international privileges” discussed by Pogge include the borrowing and treaty privileges.) Existing international practice confers upon any group that exercises effective power in a country the right to sell that country’s resources and to dispose of the proceeds of such sales as they see fit. The international resource privilege thus gives rise to what is known as the “resource curse”: Countries blessed with abundant natural resources are more likely to be cursed with a lack of economic and political development. One reason for this is that the international resource privilege enables authoritarian regimes to maintain power (as they can sell their country’s natural resources to pay for arms, mercenaries, and so forth). The international resource privilege also can give rise to political instability by encouraging coup attempts and civil wars (as the prospect of controlling a country’s natural resources serves as an incentive for different groups to attempt to seize power). Many resource-rich countries consequently are plagued by political oppression, corruption, civil conflict, and poor economic performance. Pogge concludes that the international resource privilege, which is a feature of the international economic order, helps show that explanatory

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nationalism is incorrect – nondomestic factors often significantly influence or determine the political and economic fate of a country. A satisfactory account of global justice, according to Pogge, must take into account such features of the international economic order. Pogge’s argument, however, focuses on the current international system, not Rawls’s “realistic utopia” of a just Society of Peoples. The practices discussed by Pogge clearly seem to violate the Law of Peoples. If existing wealthy societies actually were well-ordered peoples, they would respect the eight principles of the Law of Peoples, including the first principle (the duty to respect the freedom and independence of other peoples) and the eighth principle (the duty of assistance). Insofar as the international resource privilege undermines the freedom and independence of many societies, and in fact prevents some societies from becoming capable of being wellordered societies (by facilitating authoritarianism, civil conflict, and so forth), then the international resource privilege, as it exists today, is incompatible with the Law of Peoples. (Similar arguments can be made, mutatis mutandis, with respect to many, if not all, of the other aspects of the existing international economic order discussed by Pogge.) Moreover, Rawls notes (albeit only briefly) that peoples would agree to implement “fair standards of trade” in their relations with each other. Despite these replies (which Pogge acknowledges, but finds ultimately inadequate or incomplete), Pogge argues that the Law of Peoples, by providing “interactional” instead of “institutional” principles, cannot adequately address issues of injustice that invariably emerge in the larger international institutional context in which societies exist and interact, including inevitable power disparities between societies. In contrast, Pogge emphasizes that Rawls’s domestic theory of justice, by providing “institutional” principles to regulate the domestic basic structure of a society, prevents any member of that society from being vulnerable to the decisions of other particular members of that society. According to Pogge, then, a plausible account of global justice must similarly be institutional, not interactional, in nature. Matthias Risse has defended Rawls’s account of burdened societies and the duty of assistance by defending what he calls the “institutional view” (or “institutional stance”). According to this view, a country’s level of prosperity depends primarily on the quality of its institutions. Other factors, such as a country’s level of integration into the global economy, have an impact on a country’s prosperity primarily through their impact on that country’s institutions. According to the institutional view, the existence of a stable property rights regime, the

rule of law, independent courts, and regulatory structures to minimize corruption is important in facilitating economic growth. Also important are less formal features of a society’s institutional structure, such as the existence of social trust and cooperation, and the health of civil society in general. Risse argues that the institutional view helps justify Rawls’s duty of assistance, and in particular, its focus on helping burdened societies become capable of being well-ordered societies. Moreover, according to Risse, this justification for the duty of assistance is not vulnerable to Pogge’s criticisms of explanatory nationalism. The institutional view asserts that a country’s institutions are the primary determinants of that country’s economic condition; this claim is compatible with acknowledging the role played by the international economic order in affecting or shaping the institutional structure of that country. Thus to the extent that the international economic order helps cause bad institutions (authoritarian regimes, civil war, and so forth), this must be taken into account when determining the content of the duty of assistance in particular cases. Other defenses of the duty of assistance as the appropriate distributive principle of global justice have been advanced. For instance, Rawls and some sympathetic commentators have claimed that more demanding principles of global distributive justice would be incompatible with the ideal of national self-determination. In contrast, the duty of assistance simply ensures that all peoples are capable of being genuinely self-determining. Another line of defense emphasizes that Rawls’s project in The Law of Peoples is to outline principles of global justice for a “realistic utopia.” Any principle of global distributive justice more demanding than the duty of assistance simply is unrealistic. This is especially the case given the existing global public political culture. Because Rawls’s Law of Peoples is a “political” conception of justice, it is constructed in terms of political ideas found within the global public political culture. A political conception of global justice therefore faces a justificatory constraint that precludes a principle of global distributive justice more demanding than the duty of assistance. These defenses of Rawls’s account of burdened societies and the duty of assistance have been challenged. It may be the case, for instance, that not all principles of global distributive justice more demanding than the duty of assistance are incompatible with the ideal of national self-determination. The claim that the duty of assistance is more feasible than all rival principles of global distributive justice also has been disputed. Given that Rawls himself concedes that the basis of the duty of assistance is not

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especially firm, in light of the global public political culture, it is not clear that all alternative principles fare worse. Other important criticisms and defenses of Rawls’s account of burdened societies and the duty to aid such societies have been advanced in recent years. Many of these debates reflect the broader and more fundamental debate between advocates of “cosmopolitan” theories of global justice and defenders of Rawls’s Law of Peoples.

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Rawls J (1999) The law of peoples. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA Reidy D (2007) A just global economy: in defense of Rawls. J Ethics 11:193–236 Risse M (2005) What we owe to the global poor. J Ethics 9:81–117 Tasioulas J (2005) Global justice without end? In: Barry C, Pogge T (eds) Global institutions and responsibilities. Blackwell, Oxford, pp 3–28 Wenar L (2006) Why Rawls is not a cosmopolitan egalitarian. In: Martin R, Reidy D (eds) Rawls’s law of peoples: a realistic utopia? Blackwell, Oxford, pp 95–113

Conclusion Although among prominent contemporary theories of global justice the duty of assistance is widely judged to be a comparatively “modest” principle, even critics acknowledge that realizing it would require existing wealthy societies to do far more than they presently do in order to aid burdened societies. A world in which wealthy societies fulfilled their duties of aid to burdened societies would be a radically different one from the world in which we live today. Critics and defenders of Rawls’s Law of Peoples disagree, however, over whether the universal realization of the duty of assistance would be sufficient for a distributively just world.

Related Topics

▶ Duties of Assistance ▶ Law of Peoples ▶ Nationalism, Explanatory ▶ Original Position ▶ Pogge, Thomas ▶ Political Liberalism ▶ Rawls, John ▶ Realistic Utopia ▶ Resource Curse ▶ Second Original Position

References Armstrong C (2009) Defending the duty of assistance? Soc Theory Pract 35:461–482 Freeman S (2007) The law of peoples, social cooperation, human rights, and distributive justice. In: Freeman S (ed) Justice and the social contract: essays on Rawlsian political philosophy. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 259–295 Heath J (2007) Rawls on global distributive justice: a defence. In: Weinstock D (ed) Global justice, global institutions, vol 31, Canadian Journal of Philosophy. University of Calgary Press, Lethbridge, pp 193–226 Pogge T (2004) “Assisting” the global poor. In: Chatterjee DK (ed) The ethics of assistance. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 260–288 Pogge T (2006) Do Rawls’s two theories of justice fit together? In: Martin R, Reidy D (eds) Rawls’s law of peoples: a realistic utopia? Blackwell, Oxford, pp 206–225

Ake, Claude NKIRUKA AHIAUZU Department of Law & Criminology, University of Wales, Aberystwyth, Ceredigion, UK

Claude Ake was a leading African political scientist and activist born in Nigeria whose highly significant and influential work on African political economy spanned over twenty years. His views on democracy, development, and rights widely influenced the development of social science in Africa as it is today. Ake critiqued the theory of development arguing that oppressed persons require a social science that fosters self-determination. He saw Western conceptions of social science as bearing capitalist structures which are themselves developmentally restrictive. This ushered several critiques on Eurocentric foundations of Western social science in favor of more African conceptions that, as Ake’s work did, emphasized a focus on the welfare of the average African, interpreting development from this standpoint. He suggested a dialectical materialist method as a more adequate approach for evaluating African political economy, identifying disarticulation and monetization as critical concepts of analysis both of which he saw as vestiges of colonization that should be addressed for any significant development to occur. Ake outlined necessary attributes of an adequate conception of democracy for Africa as being one in which persons possess influential decision-making power, fosters practical sociopolitical and economic rights, one where collective as opposed to individual rights are the basis of policies and programs, and which possesses the feature of incorporation. He also had an active political and activist life, being significantly involved in the formation of a political party (the Peoples Solidarity Party) that along with other parties was abolished by the military regime at the time. This represented much of the nature of his engagement with the regimes, an instance of

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which was his highly publicized resignation from a Shell oil-related commission (the Steering Committee of the Niger Delta Environmental Survey) which he had been reluctant to be involved with, but did so on the persuasion of environmental activist and friend Ken Saro-Wiwa whose execution by the Sani Abacha military regime led to his resignation in protest. Ake was part of a second generation of thinkers along with Walter Rodney, Samora Machel, and Amilcar Cabral that emerged in the 1970s, similar to those referred to as the “philosopher-kings” such as Nyerere, Nkrumah, and Senghor whose thinking not only shaped African thought but inspired significant sociopolitical waves. Ake however saw independence leaders such as Kenyatta and Nkrumah as erring in their employment of the western development model of focusing on national wealth and not the welfare of the people. His controversial but widely received views and criticism of the role of the elite class and government in what he referred to as the “democratization of the disempowerment” of lower classes imported a useful radical and critical consciousness in the assessment of issues of African development which, though partly drawing from Marxist thinking, deviated from it to the extent of the existence of inadequate Eurocentric teleological elements of analysis. Ake held several reputable positions in Nigeria, across Africa and internationally and at the time of his death was visiting professor at Yale. He also founded the Centre for Advanced Social Science in Port Harcourt (Nigeria) that continues to be a think tank for African political economy. His death in 1996 in a plane crash in Nigeria sparked off some suspicions of its link with his activism. Ake’s work continues to influence thinking on African development and political economy generally both within Africa and internationally, providing a valuable perspective to the discourse on development ethics and global justice.

Related Topics

▶ African Development Bank ▶ Human Rights: African Perspectives ▶ Political Economy ▶ Sustainable Development

References Ahiauzu N (2008) Naming struggles: African ideologies and the law. Afr J Leg Theory 1:24 Ake C (1967) A theory of political integration. Dorsey, Homewood Ake C (1978) Revolutionary pressures in Africa. Zed Books, London Ake C (1979) Social science as imperialism: a theory of political development. Ibadan University Press, Ibadan Ake C (1981) A political economy of Africa. Longman, London Ake C (1985) A political economy of Nigeria. Longman, London

Ake C (1989) The political economy of crisis and underdevelopment in Africa: selected works of Claude Ake. Jad, Lagos Ake C (1992) The new world order: a view from the south. Malthouse, Lagos Ake C (1994) Democratization of disempowerment in Africa. Malthouse, Lagos Ake C (1996a) The marginalization of Africa: notes on a productive confusion. Malthouse, Lagos Ake C (1996b) Democracy and development in Africa. Brookings Institution Press, Washington, DC Ake C (1996c) The marginalisation of Africa: notes on a productive confusion. Malthouse, Lagos Ake C (1996d) Is Africa democratizing? Malthouse, Lagos Ake C (1996e) The social sciences in Africa: trends, tasks and challenges. Malthouse, Lagos Ake C (2005) The feasibility of democracy in Africa. Codesria, Dakar Kelly H (2005) Still relevant: Claude Ake’s challenge to mainstream discourse on African politics and development. J Third World Stud 22(2):73–88 Mwalilino W (2000) An interview with Claude Ake. West Afr Rev 2(1):3

al Qaeda ▶ Afghanistan and Iraq Wars ▶ Punishment ▶ Terrorism ▶ War Against Terrorism

Alterglobalization ARUN KUMAR POKHREL Department of English, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL, USA

Alterglobalization (also known as “alternative globalization,” alter-mundialization – from the French “altermondialisme” – or the global justice movement) refers to various social movements that seek global cooperation and interaction to resist the negative social, political, economic, and environmental impacts of the contemporary neoliberal globalization. Globalization, as a late stage of capitalism, has brought many profound social changes, but at the same time, it is believed to bring many negative impacts to a society, such as a broadening gap between the rich and the poor, environmental destruction, and the escalation of civil and international conflicts. While trying to contest, interrogate, and reverse the destructive aspects of neoliberal globalization, the alterglobalization movement advocates alternative forms of globalization based

Alterglobalization

on values of democracy, global and social justice, environmental protection, and human rights rather than purely economic concerns. Hence, social struggles from different parts of the world forge an alliance to provide a workable global alternative (“Another world is possible”) to the Washington Consensus, urging various governments and peoples to implement a participatory governance system and to promote a global public sphere via social networks. Since alterglobalization is an offshoot of globalization, it is closely interlinked with various aspects of globalization, encompassing social, cultural, political, technological, and economic issues (Jameson 2000). Globalization, in the past few decades, has become a common cultural grammar in Western academia, so there is a huge body of literature written about globalization and antiglobalization processes in general (Hardt and Negri 2000; Held and McGrew 2007; Hirst and Thompson 1996; Robertson 1992; Scholte 2005). In it, the antiglobalization movement is often seen as completely opposed to globalization, rejecting any form of globalization, although most antiglobalists argue that they oppose corporate globalization, imposed by the industrialized countries and large multinational corporations. This is why many within this movement started to call themselves “alterglobalists”. They saw themselves as “reformists” or “transformists,” thus advocating new forms of globalization (Scholte 2005). In spite of the fact that there are some disagreements between them, the major concern of both antiglobalists and alterglobalists is the advocacy of global justice at multiple levels – social, political, environmental, human rights, and economic, to mention only a few. Hence, both of them aim at achieving justice in different ways, but it would be misleading to say that all alterglobalists agree on the same issues, including the issue of global justice. There are subtle differences among themselves as well. Unlike proponents of antiglobalization, alterglobalists have begun to formulate a language to theorize not just negative impacts but also the ways in which neoliberal globalization might be resisted and transformed. Alterglobalization seeks to harness possibilities of globalization, bringing positive changes to a society while acknowledging challenges the process of globalization entails. Such possibilities, according to Jan Aart Scholte, include: technological and organizational developments, critical public awareness of global problems, and global solidarities among people, among other things. While some alterglobalists are in favor of social reforms, others insist on the need for a complete structural change. Most alterglobalists, nonetheless, perceive neoliberalism as a root problem, which, in their view, fosters unbridled corporate capitalism and consolidates the power of the

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privileged few. Hence, they point out the need of rearticulation of the social, political, and economic dynamics of globalization in more democratic ways, which may lead to new developments, such as “democracy from below” (Dallmayr 1999), “grassroots globalization” or “globalization from below” (Appadurai 2000), “global civil society” (Germain and Kenny 2005; Holton 2005), “cosmopolitanism” (Robbins 1999; Beck and Sznaider 2006), and “global governance” (Held 2007). And it is this rearticulation of various global dynamics which may help empower the poor and powerless. Also described as the “movement of movements,” al[t] erglobalization is a multiplicative form of resistance – social, political, ecological – against neoliberal globalization and is believed to have gained momentum with the first World Social Forum (WSF) in Porto Alegre in 2001. The WSF came into being as a reaction to the meeting of the World Economic Forum (WEF) in Davos, Switzerland, where business leaders, economists, experts, and political leaders from the developed countries met annually since its establishment in 1971. The dissidents of the annual WEF meeting in Davos started preparing for an antiDavos summit and launched the WSF in June 2000 at the Alternative Social Summit in Geneva, coinciding with the United Nations Assembly on Social Development. Designed to bring together diverse social movements, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and civil societies opposed to neoliberalism, the WSF was conceived as an open international forum with a decentralized power structure in which different organizations would coordinate and network with each other in taking concrete actions toward building another world. However, many alterglobalists today argue that resistances to global capitalism have taken on a radically new form since the 1999 Battle of Seattle. In this Battle, more than 30,000 protestors from around the world, representing numerous NGOs, labor unions, student groups, media, and religious groups, hit the streets in Seattle. Seattle thus became the locus of an informal global nexus of diverse people and groups to protest neoliberal economic policies, such as structural adjustments, of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB), and the World Trade Organization (WTO). On the heels of Seattle came the WSF in 2001 in Porto Alegre in Brazil with the slogan “Another World Is Possible!” Other important institutions of alterglobalization include the Independent Media Center (also known as Indymedia), a collectively run online global news network for grassroots coverage, and the Association for the Taxation of financial Transactions and Aid to Citizens (ATTAC), an international organization and network

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in the global justice movement. Like the WSF, these organizations resist neoliberal globalization and work toward social, environmental, and democratic alternatives in the globalization process. But these organizations of alterglobalization did not appear out of thin air: Many critics see them as an outcome of different social movements that emerged in the 1990s and even before, especially since economic restructuring of the early 1970s. In the 1990s, there was a wave of social struggles against neoliberalism as most countries in the global South opened their national economies to world markets and privatized their public enterprises under neoliberal dictates. Intellectuals on the Left thought those struggles represented a wave of new futures for social and global justice, democracy, and emancipation; however, they were made ineffective by the insuperable forces of global capitalism. Hence, the WSF was born as a new social collective arising from the need to re-imagine those social struggles in new global contexts. On the other hand, some theorists like C. Aguiton and Immanuel Wallerstein compare the alterglobalization movement to the “New Left” of 1968 in terms of its origin, principles, and scope. They argue that it would be impossible to imagine this movement in the absence of “old” forms of trade unions and Left parties, or large scale protests such as those in Seattle, Geneva, and many other places. Notwithstanding the residual structures of the “old” forms, they still consider the alterglobalization movement a new movement that demands a dialectic study examining its objective preconditions, genesis, evolution, and its qualitatively new features in their contradictory nature. Yet some alterglobalists view the emergence of the alterglobalization movement in relation to other social movements and to Raymond Williams’ identification of different modes of historicity such as dominant, residual, and emergent cultural practices. The first period – from the nineteenth century to the 1960s – was marked by the emergence and prominence of the workers’ movement. The second phase was shaped by post-WWII economic transformations, which eventually led to the prominence of new social movements that covered a wide range of issues from civil rights to feminism, human rights, and ecology. Finally, the late 1990s marked the emergence of a new phase of global social movements: alterglobalization (de Jong et al. 2005; McDonald 2006). The new shift in historicity, especially the pervasiveness of neoliberal globalization, has thus given rise to a new form of global social movement. In this sense, alterglobalization is relatively a new cultural phenomenon that tries to counter neoliberal globalization.

But what is neoliberalism, anyway? In his book A Brief History of Neoliberalism, David Harvey defines neoliberalism as a theory of political-economic practices, which has been considered a panacea since the 1970s, promoting the individual entrepreneurial freedoms and corporatism characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade. Propounded by economists Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman, neoliberalism defends freemarket capitalism based on the principles of deregulation, privatization, and minimization of the state’s role in areas of public importance. Like Harvey, Pierre Bourdieu, in Acts of Resistance (1989), defines neoliberalism as a kind of conservative revolution that reifies and glorifies the reign of the financial markets, promoting unbridled capitalism with no other law than that of maximum profit and introducing modern forms of domination. The main mantra of neoliberalism is thus to maximize profit and accumulate capital, what Harvey calls “accumulation by dispossession.” This process of “accumulation by dispossession” occurs in a numerous ways, but mainly through privatization and corporatization of public properties and institutions. Public services such as health, education, communications, and transportation are privatized under neoliberal dictates. So much so that common property resources, such as water needed daily for the human livelihood is even privatized and made inaccessible to common people. Thus neoliberalism is seen as a new form of domination that has impacted almost every sphere of human life – cultures, economies, politics, education, the media, and business – in contemporary times and prevents people from living a socially just and dignified life. Critics of neoliberal globalization, or what has been alternatively called the Washington Consensus, hold that the governments of developed countries or corporations from those countries make progress at the expense of less-developed countries’ impoverishment. The phrase “Washington Consensus,” originally coined by John Williamson in 1990, in reference to the economic policy advice given by Washington-based international financial institutions such as the IMF and the WB to Latin American countries as of 1989, is now seen as synonymous with neoliberal globalization. So the big international institutions like the IMF, the WB, and the WTO, that regulate global finance and trade, are thought to function not only as engines of exploitation via structural adjustment programs, but also as agents of Western capitalist imperialism, mainly promoting the interests of the United States and Europe. For instance, the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement of the WTO allows multinational corporations to patent life-forms or seeds developed by peasants as their private

Alterglobalization

property through slight modification or genetic engineering. The corporations can also patent indigenous knowledge about the beneficial uses of different plants as their private property, which is dubbed “biopiracy.” Hence, neoliberal globalization has created new forms of enclosures and made common people’s lives difficult. Many scholars think that neoliberal globalization resembles earlier forms of colonialism and empire. Naomi Klein coins the term “disaster capitalism” to describe such colonial and imperial forms of global capitalism. Mike Davis explores the geography and culture of the “planet of slums” generated by the economics of global involution. In a similar vein, Arundhati Roy documents the plight of rural people in India who are dispossessed and exploited by successive neoliberal Indian governments. Other scholars, such as Vandana Shiva, Maria Mies, David Harvey, Arturo Escobar, Henry A. Giroux, Arif Dirlik, and others have written extensively on the current neoliberal practices of expropriation of land, life, or natural resources in the global South, which dispossess local people from their lands and resources. According to these alterglobalists, the processes of expropriation have been intensified over the past few decades, whereas Earth’s resources were used cooperatively and sustainably for the most part of human history. Powerful individuals, groups, or corporations have monopolized and expropriated Earth’s land, life, or resources, declaring themselves to be the sole owners of those common properties. In recent times, neoliberal global capitalism, for example, has found a new territory for exploitation, i.e., the environment of the global South. The construction of dams, the rampant use of natural resources, the sale of common land for commercial purposes, and overfishing of the oceans, among other things, have not only deprived the local people’s control over their traditional lands and resources but also led to a massive environmental destruction. As a consequence, there has been an explosion of local resistances throughout the world in the forms of civil wars, insurrection, ethnic rivalries, and religious fundamentalism against global capitalism despite the neoliberal governments’ developmental narratives of modernization and their imperatives of progress to “catch up” with the Western countries. Through these movements, people reclaim and defend their local culture, history, and identity, as well as their rights for autonomy. Such movements, for example, include a wide variety of movements – both nonviolent and violent rebellions – such as the Zapatista Movement (Mexico), Narmada Bachao Andolan (India), the Chipko Movement (India), the Assembly of the Poor (Thailand), Ekta Parishad (India), the Landless Rural

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Workers’ Movement (Brazil), Proceso de Comunidades Negras (PCN, Colombia), the Niger Delta movements (Nigeria), and the Green Belt Movement (Kenya), to mention only a few. Although neoliberalism functions differently in different places, the overall implications of these social movements are for promoting grassroots democracy, sustainable development, cultural identity, dignity, equality, and global social justice. One of the noted examples of social struggles resisting neoliberalism that began in the 1990s and that also had a huge influence in the formation of the WSF, Indymedia, ATTAC, and more importantly, the alterglobalization movement itself, is the Zapatista movement. Launched on January 1, 1994 when the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) came into effect, the Zapatista movement is a local rebellion against neoliberal globalization that has its locus in Chiapas in Southern Mexico. The local struggle for identity and social justice, originating in the local geography and culture of Chiapas, has now become a global dissent representing the subaltern voice. Strongly resisting the systemic social exclusion and exploitation caused by neoliberal policies of successive Mexican governments, the Zapatistas have launched different social campaigns, as well as organized a series of international meetings and public debates on the neoliberal agendas of globalization. The impact of this movement was starkly visible during the 1999 Seattle protest. Interestingly, the Zapatistas have made an exemplary use of cyberspace to mobilize the grassroots movements for social justice in Mexico and around the world. Alterglobalists like Alain Touraine argue that neoliberal globalization has not “dissolved our capacity for political action.” They believe that it is only through collective political action that social justice can be restored. From Seattle to Davos, people engage in popular resistances – the peace movement, the anticorporate globalization movement, the human rights movement, the environmental justice movement – within and across national boundaries, thereby forging new global collectivities against hegemonic forces of neoliberalism. Mobilizing against the destructive aspects of globalization from the perspectives of what they have been and what they are at present, local people from different parts of the world engage in the defense of their particular localities from the perspective of the economic, ecological, and cultural difference that their landscapes, cultures, and economies embody in relation to those of more dominant sectors of society (Escobar 2008). They are collectively taking up the challenge of neoliberalism and reviving both the meaning of resistance and the places where it comes about (Giroux 2008). This is why local movements, more

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generally linked to local identity, environment, culture, and economy in all of their diversity, are now global and are often linked to the various social movements of global justice in some way. In this respect, it is believed that the WSF has played a significant role in turning different social movements into a truly global movement that gathers a wide spectrum of people – citizens, intellectuals, indigenous peoples, farmers, dalits, and NGOs – against neoliberal policies in street demonstrations all over the world, from Bangalore to Seattle and from Porto Alegre to Nairobi. However, the WSF is not free from criticism, ranging from accusations of vague idealism devoid of real-world application, racism, Eurocentrism, and its ineffective decision-making structure (seen by some as too centralized while, ironically, seen by others as too diffuse) (Curran 2007). Such accusations notwithstanding, the WSF remains one of the few established nonhierarchical entities explicitly committed to resistance against social exclusion and other problems brought out by neoliberal globalization (Grzybowski 2006; de Sousa Santos 2006). To conclude, while the processes of neoliberal globalization (enclosures of the commons, industrialization, development, modernity, and modernization) have denied common people’s access to local resources and their autonomy in decision-making processes, the alterglobalization movement advocates “another world” premised on an alternative social logic: social justice, global peace, economic justice, legal equality, individual freedom, mutual respect, environmental sustainability, and democracy. This alternative social logic is essential not only to respect cultural difference but also to help maintain a sense of unity and solidarity among the peoples of marginalized cultures and societies.

Related Topics

▶ Cosmopolitanism ▶ Environmental Justice ▶ Eurocentrism ▶ Global Citizenship ▶ Global Justice ▶ Globalization ▶ Human Rights ▶ International Monetary Fund (IMF) ▶ Neoliberalism ▶ Solidarity ▶ World Bank (WB) ▶ World Social Forum ▶ World Trade Organization (WTO) ▶ Zapatistas

References Alexander MJ (2005) Pedagogies of crossing. Duke University Press, Durham Appadurai A (2000) Grassroots globalization and the research imagination. Public Culture 12(1):1–19 Beck U, Sznaider N (2006) Unpacking cosmopolitanism for the social sciences: A research agenda. The British Journal of Sociology 57(1):1–23 Callinicos A (2003) The anti-capitalist movement after Genoa and New York. In: Aronowitz S, Gautney H (eds) Implicating empire: globalization & resistance in the 21st century world order. Basic Books, New York Curran G (2007) Making another world possible? The politics of the World Social Forum. Social Alternative 26(1):7–12 Dallmayr FR (1999) Globalization from below. International Politics 36:321–334 de Jong W, Shaw M, Stammers N (eds) (2005) Global activism, global media. Pluto, Ann Arbor, MI Dirlik A (2006) Introduction: our ways of knowing – and what to do about them. In: Dirlik A (ed) Pedagogies of the global: knowledge in the human interest. Paradigm, Boulder Escobar A (2008) Territories of difference: place, movements, life, redes. Duke University Press, Durham Gautney H (2009) Alterglobalization: protest and organization in the alternative globalization era: NGOs, social movements, and political parties. Palgrave Macmillan, London Germain RD, Kenny M (eds) (2005) The idea of global civil society. Routledge, London Giroux HA (2008) Against the terror of neoliberalism: politics beyond the age of greed. Paradigm, Boulder Grzybowski C (2006) The World Social Forum: reinventing global politics. Global Governance 12(1):7–13 Hardt M, Negri A (2000) Empire. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA Harvey D (2005) A brief history of neoliberalism. Oxford University Press, Oxford Held D (2007) Reframing global governance: Apocalypse soon or reform. In: McGrew A, Held D (eds) Globalization theory: approaches and controversies. Polity, Cambridge Held D, McGrew A (2007) Globalization/anti-globalization: beyond the great divide, 2nd ed. Polity, Cambridge Hirst P, Thompson G (1996) Globalization in question: the international economy and the possibilities of governance, 2nd ed. Polity, Cambridge Holton R (2005) Making globalization. Palgrave Macmillan, New York, Basingstoke Jameson F (2000) Globalization and political strategy. New Left Review 11(4):49–68 Lindholm C, Zuquete JP (2010) The struggle for the world: liberation movements for the 21st century. Stanford University Press, Stanford McDonald K (2006) Global movements: action and culture. Blackwell, Malden Pleyers G (2010) Alter-globalization: becoming actors in a global age. Polity, Cambridge Robbins B (1999) Feeling global: internationalism in distress. New York University Press, New York Robertson R (1992) Globalisation: social theory and global culture. Sage, London Scholte JA (2005) Globalization: a critical introduction (2nd ed.). Palgrave Macmillan, New York

Altruism World Economic Forum. http://www.weforum.org/en/index.htm. Accessed May 2010 World Social Forum http://www.forumsocialmundial.org. Accessed June 2010

Altruism ROBERT PAUL CHURCHILL Department of Philosophy, Columbian College of Arts & Sciences, George Washington University, Washington, DC, USA

The term “altruism” was coined by Auguste Comte in his Syste`me de Politique in 1851 by combining the Latin alter with ui to mean “to this other.” Altruism continues to be widely used in this general sense to refer to promoting the interests of others. Extensive studies have been made of persons who have behaved altruistically, such as rescuers of Jews during the Holocaust. Scientists also have made efforts to study altruism, or pro-social behavior, experimentally and have theorized about the evolutionary adaptation of altruistic traits in group members. The implications and associations of altruism for the morality of individual and group behavior appear to be complex. For this reason, further studies of altruism could have important implications for global justice.

Definitions When investigated by social and behavioral scientists, altruism is generally regarded as synonymous with any type of pro-social or other regarding behavior. However, Auguste Comte and popularizers of his work, such as George H. Lewis who introduced the term into English, intended the term to designate a moral concept. In addition, viewing altruism as synonymous with pro-social behavior renders the concept too elastic to be helpful, as behavior described as “altruistic” can easily become confused with self-interested or egoistically motivated behaviors. For instance, we need a term that designates helping behavior motivated by concern for others in contrast to situations in which one is motivated to help others because of an expectation of a reward or benefit. Thus, the term is most accurately used to refer to helping behavior that usually has two additional characteristics: (1) helping the other supplies the primary motive, rather than self-interest and (2) empathy, sympathy, or compassion is often involved so that the altruist takes the interest of the other as his or her own.

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Studies of Altruism In addition to ethicists and philosophers, research on altruism has been conducted by anthropologists, economists, evolutionary biologists, political scientists, psychologists, and sociologists. Niall Scott and Jonathan Seglow (2007) provide a helpful overview and evaluation of the relative contributions of several fields. Many investigators in the behavioral and social sciences have assumed a selfinterested basis for altruism or have attempted to reduce altruism to adaptive advantages such as kin selection. Many economists have attempted to analyze altruism in terms of the dominant rational choice model of individual behavior, and consequently, focus on exchange and reciprocity as did the early anthropological studies of Malinowski and Mauss rather than altruism itself. Theorists working on the biological evolution of altruistic behavior have developed sophisticated explanatory models. One notable attempt by Sober and Wilson (1998) purports to offer a descriptive ethics including altruism. The authors argue for the adaptive advantage of a certain plasticity of motivational factors they describe as “motivational pluralism.” So far, however, biological explanations have very limited explanatory power. They are most persuasive for simple interactions such as those modeled in game theory, but they fail to illuminate the cognitions and emotions that seem to underlie motivations to help others in emergency situations or in other complex social settings. Descriptive, scientific accounts of the origins of altruism and of its actual presence or absence in social settings, no matter how detailed, cannot instruct us on what we ought to do, or as to what kinds of persons we should aspire to be. These questions remain subjects for rational debate in ethics, philosophy, religion, and the humanities. However, inasmuch as increased beneficence, care, and empathy for the plight of others seem necessary for a genuinely human future, it is encouraging that research on a construct known as the altruistic personality suggests that we have the option of cultivating altruism, even if the role of altruism in social life, at least for the near future, remains relatively modest.

The Altruistic Personality A more promising approach to a descriptive, or scientific, understanding of altruism comes from the efforts of psychologists and sociologists in studying the personalities of persons who have acted altruistically, most notably, rescuers of Jews during the Nazi domination of much of Europe. These studies generally analyze personality in terms of “traits,” and examine those circumstances,

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or “states,” in which these altruists acted. The most notable studies of this kind have been conducted by Kristen Monroe (1996), Samuel Oliner and Pearl Oliner (1988), and Pearl Oliner et al. (1992). Such studies strongly suggest that there is an identifiable altruistic personality. Persons with such personalities have a distinctive view of human life and morality, and often are effective in assisting others because reasoning is highly integrated in their motivational responses with emotional identification with the plight of others. Individuals selected for the study of personality traits must be known to have acted in ways observers can agree to have been altruistic. For this reason, it is very difficult to undertake comparative and developmental studies controlling for factors relevant for facilitating or inhibiting motivation. It is far from clear, therefore, whether the incidence of altruistic behavior is likely to remain relatively constant despite social change from peace to war, for example, or whether altruistic behavior might increase or be inhibited or repressed when there are massive violations of human rights or crimes against humanity.

Titmuss’ Classic Study Is it possible that altruistic motivation to act charitably is inversely related in complex ways with market mechanisms? The recent republication of Richard Titmuss’ classic work The Gift Relationship ([1970] 1997) has revived debate over the significance of altruism for public policy and especially cosmopolitanism. In this work, Titmuss offers a powerful defense of the welfare state in which altruistic “gifts” such as blood donations enhance the quality of life. Given Titmuss’ argument some observers have argued that appeals to supposedly more altruistic, or charitable, motives for assisting the distant needy should replace appeals to duties or obligations. Titmuss examined gift relationships, particularly donations of blood to strangers, and found that monetary incentives for blood resulted in a decrease in giving along with a decline in available blood. Titmuss argues from such studies that gift relationships are being driven out by market incentives with a corresponding decrease in the quality of life. Yet, after a careful examination of Titmuss’ argument, Scott and Seglow (2007) expose the ambiguities in Titmuss’ argument between giving behaviors, which are paradigmatically altruistic, and behaviors more properly described as exchanges. Whatever the situation with blood donations, most relationships characterized by Titmuss as giving are actually exchanges based on different motivational grounds. As exchanges imply the potential realization of the agent’s own interest, they may exacerbate

attempts to take advantage of others while excusing one’s behavior as public spirited.

Altruism and Global Justice Philosophers, cosmopolitans, and others concerned with global justice need to give greater attention to altruism. First, the relationships between altruism and moral sentiments such as benevolence, sympathy, care, and generosity require further study. Second, insofar as studies of the altruistic personality suggest the possibility of cultivating altruistic proclivities, philosophers ought to investigate these moral options. It is important to consider which child-rearing practices and social influences might develop proclivities for altruistic behavior in the young, and whether or not these practices are morally defensible (e.g., Churchill 1999). Third, concerns such as those raised by Titmuss about the possible incompatibility between altruism and economic incentives or between altruism and obligation need further investigation. Some altruistic behavior may raise moral complexities. As Scott and Seglow note, in-group altruism, such as the tendency of Americans to assist victims of Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans while not bestowing similar help on victims of genocide in Darfur might be morally suspect because of its prima facie incompatibility with the impartiality demanded by morality. The relationship between altruism and justice, like that between justice and reconciliation, appears complex and not without some tension. Finally, cross-disciplinary research is needed to determine whether altruistic dispositions and behaviors make various types of violence less likely, as in having a preventative or prophylactic effect, or on the contrary, whether altruistic behavior remains relatively dormant until altruists find themselves in unstable and violent or oppressive situations in which their actions can reduce others’ sufferings. As noted in connection with studies of the altruistic personality, so far we have little data indicating how much psychological mechanisms or so-called situational factors such as obedience to authority (e.g., Milgram 1974) or the bystander effect (e.g., Latane´ and Darley 1970), or the spectrum of dehumanizing effects (e.g., Zimbardo 2008) might inhibit motivation and induce obedience or indifference in persons with more altruistic personalities as in other persons more generally. Research on group processes (e.g., Volkan 1998, 2006) suggests that ethnic collectivities may inhibit proclivities to be altruistic. At the same time, however, available evidence strongly suggests that altruistic persons with the vision of “a common humanity,” as identified by Monroe (1996), are likely to be more resilient than most in resisting malevolent or destructive influences.

Amnesty International

Related Topics

▶ Ahimsa ▶ Aid to Burdened Societies ▶ Beneficence, Principle of ▶ Charity ▶ Cosmopolitanism ▶ Global Impartiality Thesis ▶ Humanitarian Aid ▶ Reciprocity

References Churchill RP (1999) The obligation of parents to raise their children as altruists. In: Houlgate LD (ed) Morals, marriage, and parenthood: an introduction to family ethics. Wadsworth/International Thomson, Belmont/New York Latane´ B, Darley JM (1970) The unresponsive bystander: why doesn’t he help? Appleton-century Crofts, New York Milgram S (1974) Obedience to authority: an experimental view. Harper & Row, New York Monroe KN (1996) The heart of altruism: perceptions of a common humanity. Princeton University Press, Princeton Oliner SP, Oliner PM (1988) The altruistic personality: rescuers of Jews in Nazi Germany. Free Press, New York Oliner PM et al (eds) (1992) Embracing the other: philosophical, psychological, and historical perspectives on altruism. New York University Press, New York Scott N, Seglow J (2007) Altruism. Open University Press, Maidenhead Seglow J (ed) (2004) Altruism and justice. Frank Cass, London Sober E, Wilson DS (1998) Unto others: the evolution and psychology of unselfish behavior. Harvard University Press, Cambridge Titmuss R, Ashton J, Oakley A (1997) The gift relationship: from human blood to social policy. London School of Economics Books, London, 1970 Volkan VD (1998) Bloodlines: from ethnic pride to ethnic terrorism. Basic Books, New York Volkan VD (2006) Killing in the name of identity: a study of bloody conflicts. Pitchstone, Charlottesville Zimbardo P (2008) The Lucifer effect: understanding how good people turn evil. Random House Books, New York

Amnesty International MICHAEL MINCH Department of Philosophy/Humanities, Utah Valley University, Orem, UT, USA

Amnesty International is known throughout the world for its relentless education about, and work to secure, human rights for all persons. Amnesty undertakes research and action focused on preventing and ending grave human rights abuses, and works for freedom

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of conscience, expression, and from discrimination. Amnesty International (also known as “AI”) has fulfilled this mission, on a global scale, without peer. Amnesty is an independent, global movement, primarily funded by membership dues and private donations, with more than three million supporters, more than 2.2 million members, and activists in more than 150 countries. It conducts research and generates action to prevent grave abuses of human rights, and demands justice for those whose rights have been violated. AI works to end violence against women, abolish the death penalty, stop torture, free prisoners of conscience, and protect the rights of refugees and migrants. Amnesty International was founded by a British Lawyer, Peter Benenson, in 1961, the year its first international meeting was held, and the decision was made to start “a permanent international movement in defence of freedom of opinion and religion.” AI began publishing annual reports of human rights abuses and its work to combat such abuse, in 1962. In 1964, the United Nations gave Amnesty consultative status. By 1967, AI had 550 groups working in 18 countries, was working on behalf of nearly 2,000 prisoners in 63 countries, and had secured the release of 293 prisoners. In 1969, UNESCO granted AI consultative status, and 2,000 prisoners had been released. In 1972, Amnesty launched its first worldwide campaign for the abolition of torture; and in 1974 AI’s Sean McBride, Chair of the International Executive Committee, was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. In 1975, the U.N. unanimously adopted a Declaration Against Torture, and brought the International Bill of Rights into being. In 1977, Amnesty International itself was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for “having contributed to securing the ground for freedom, for justice, and thereby also for peace in the world.” Just a year later, AI won the United Nations Human Rights prize for “outstanding contributions in the field of human rights.” In 1985, AI published its first educational material and made the decision to work for refugees. In 1987, AI published a report claiming that the death penalty was exercised in the USA in a racially biased way, and that it violated treaties such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. In 1996, AI launched the campaign for a Permanent International Criminal Court (which came into effect in 2002). In 2001, Amnesty changed its statute of incorporation to include work for “economic, social and cultural rights.” In short, the history of Amnesty International is one of pursuing justice; pushing the United Nations to adopt positions, conventions, and actions toward justice; and pressuring and shaming governments to end injustice. While much remains to be done, it is clear that

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Amnesty has been successful time and again. AI has been, perhaps, the world leader in the recognition of human rights. Because Amnesty’s goal is to apply pressure where it accomplishes the most, primarily through mobilizing public opinion; AI does not publish reports of human rights abuses in careful correspondence to the locations where they occur. For this reason, it is of note that AI issues reports disproportionately about governments in comparatively democratic and open countries. Moreover, because “large countries influence small countries,” and greater concern about human rights in the global north creates credibility (the impression of evenhandedness) for reports of abuses in the south, such disproportionality is strategic and warranted. Whereas global justice will always need states and international cooperation among them; insofar as nonstate actors are concerned, Amnesty International has proven to be of inestimable value, has saved thousands of lives; and changed the knowledge, perspective, and expectation of millions around the world – such that it is now a common view that human rights exist, and that the violation of them should end.

Related Topics

▶ Cairo Declaration of Human Rights ▶ Cosmopolitan Justice ▶ Global Justice, Subjects of ▶ High Road for Human Rights ▶ Human Rights ▶ Human Rights Watch ▶ Human Rights: African Perspectives ▶ Moral Equality ▶ Natural Rights ▶ Rights

References Amnesty International (2009) Freedom: stories celebrating the universal declaration of human rights. Broadway, New York Amnesty International (2010a) Amnesty International report: the state of the world’s human rights. Amnesty International Publications, London Amnesty International (2010b) Free?: stories about human rights. Candlewick Press, Somerville Clarke A (2001) Diplomacy of conscience: Amnesty International and changing human rights norms. Princeton University Press, Princeton Hopgood S (2006) Keepers of the flame: understanding Amnesty International. Cornell University Press, Ithaca Power J (2001) Like water on stone: the story of Amnesty International. Northeastern University Press, Boston Ronand J et al (2005) Transnational information politics: NGO human rights reporting, 1986–2000. Int Stud Q 49:557–587

Anarchy MICHAEL MINCH Department of Philosophy/Humanities, Utah Valley University, Orem, UT, USA

Anarchy means without rule, authority, or sovereignty (from the Greek anarwος, anarchos). Some international relations theorists, generally known as “realists,” claim that the world is “anarchic,” meaning it is disorderly. This term is thus used in a technical but not literal sense, because, of course, the world is not literally without (any) order. Philosophically and historically, political anarchy, or anarchism, is a broad umbrella term containing many conceptions, forms, schools, and movements, some of which are compatible with others, some which stand in contradiction to others. The one unifying principle of anarchism is the view that there should be no coercive state, nor other coercive forms of authority. Anarchism can be seen to have a long genealogy, stretching back to antiquity in the east and west (for whenever anyone speaks against collective coercive authority, he or she has spoken the anarchist doctrine). Anarchism began to be theorized and argued, however, in modernity, although its “founder” is a matter of dispute. William Godwin’s An Enquiry Concerning Political Justice (1793) is the earliest developed theory of anarchism. He argued that governments keep power through misleading and manipulative means, and as people progress in rationality, governments will diminish and ultimately disappear, as they will be unable to have power over the people. Max Stirner’s The Ego and Its Own (1844) argued for a most radical individualism (sometimes called “ego anarchism”). He argued that society does not exist and that individuals should have no limitations placed upon them. This view was later echoed by Ayn Rand and Margaret Thatcher’s infamous claim that “There is no such thing as society.” Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (1809–1865) split with Marx, fearing the latter’s plans would lead to authoritarianism. He theorized the idea of spontaneous order and the voluntary association and cooperation of individuals (sometimes known as “mutualism”). Mikail (or Michael) Bakunin (1814–1876) was a follower of Proudhon who argued that all private means of ownership should be abolished and that instead property should be collectivized. He too opposed Marx, whom he saw as desiring the transformation, rather than the elimination, of the state. This view is sometimes called “collectivist anarchism.” Bakunin thought such anarchist society would be brought about, in part, through violence, or “propaganda by the deed” (this is

Anarchy

sometimes called “revolutionary socialism”). In his Mutual Aid (1897), Peter Kropotkin sought to provide a scientific foundation for anarchism based on Darwin’s work. He argued that evolutionary progress entailed the development of societies based on self-managing and cooperative communities, where people helped one another in ways that trumped their own self-interests (this is sometimes called “anarchist communism”). The early twentieth century gave rise to “anarcho-syndicalism,” a movement (beginning in France) that held that trade unions (French, syndicates) should replace the state. Anarchism is, almost by definition, fecund, syncretic, and lends itself to multiple expressions, yet there are two basic types. Some anarchists are individualists, and some, extremely so (e.g., Stirner). This kind of anarchism is sometimes called, and is certainly close to, libertarianism. But most anarchists emphasize collective and cooperative association (“social anarchism” is sometimes used to name this wide and varied view). Whereas some anarchists who emphasize individual autonomy may want to be left alone, and hope that others are generally left alone; most anarchists hold convictions about the need to change society, and international institutions and systems for the better. Most anarchists want more equality, freedom, justice, power, and opportunity for all than the status quo allows; and many anarchists and anarchist organizations have worked courageously for such change. Some anarchists have theorized, and/or participated in, violence for the sake of change, but most eschew violence, especially after World War I and the October Revolution of 1917. The violence espoused by Bakunin and others; the assassinations of some heads of state between 1881 and 1914 by those who were, or mistakenly thought to be, anarchists; the May 1886 Haymarket Affair in Chicago, where an unknown person threw a bomb near the end of an anarchist rally, and in the ensuing panic, several people were killed; and the conduct of some as brick-throwing protestors (as in the protests against the World Trade Organization in Seattle in 1999) have contributed to an unfair characterization of anarchists as typically violent. Because anarchism is quite diverse, and because the great majority seek radical change away from the power of the state (which is seen as a necessary evil at best), and other forms of collective coercive power (e.g., the power of multilateral organizations and multinational corporations), the means anarchists have chosen to pursue global justice have been varied. One instrument is trade unionism and the building of labor’s political power, as in Spain’s Confederacio´n Nacional del Trabojo (National Federation of Labor), the International Workers Association, the Workers Solidarity Alliance in the United States, and

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the UK Solidarity Federation. Anarchists generally form partnerships with, and support progressive movements, including civil rights, women’s, indigenous peoples’, environmental, post-colonial, and culture-critical movements. Anarchists are, perhaps increasingly, involved in active protests against institutions and organizations of global capital and globalization, and against war. Anarchists have also been at the forefront of the twentieth century “un-schooling,” “de-schooling,” and “free school” movements in Europe, the United States, and Latin America. Whereas organizations such as the International of Anarchist Federations, the International Worker’s Association, and the International Libertarian Society exist, it seems that anarchists mostly collaborate with one another and with non-anarchists on much smaller and local scales, and in a more ad hoc manner than the existence of such organizations would indicate. Anarchism is diverse and eclectic, containing many “schools” or varieties, including Christian, green, feminist, labor, socialist, collectivist, individualist, violent revolutionary, and pacifist manifestations. Anarchists have been as diverse as Leo Tolstoy, Emma Goldman, Jacque Ellul, Paul Goodman, Murray Bookchin, Noam Chomsky, Lawrence Jarach, and John Zerzan. Whereas one, minor, form of anarchism runs close to libertarianism and the radical individualism this implies (a kind of “anarchism for rich people”), most anarchists are moral and political progressives who undertake various means to make global justice a reality. To oppose the coercive power of the state and other large institutions is to invoke and promote the concomitant project of empowering people.

Related Topics

▶ Alterglobalization ▶ Citizenship ▶ Civil Disobedience, International ▶ Civil Disobedience, Transnational ▶ Coercion ▶ Collective Responsibility ▶ Democratic Citizenship ▶ Global Civil Society ▶ Globalization ▶ Libertarianism ▶ Responsibility, Individual ▶ Self-Determination

References Amster R et al (eds) (2009) Contemporary anarchist studies: an introductory anthology of anarchy in the academy. Routledge, New York Bakunin M (2002) Statism and anarchy. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Berkman A (2003) What is anarchism? Phoenix, London

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Graham R (ed) (2005) Anarchism: a documentary history of libertarian ideas. Volume one: from anarchy to anarchism (300 CE to 1939). Black Rose, Montreal Graham R (ed) (2009a) Anarchism: a documentary history of libertarian ideas. Volume two: the emergence of the new anarchism (1939–1977). Black Rose, Montreal Graham R (ed) (2009b) Anarchism: a documentary history of libertarian ideas. Volume three: the new anarchism (1974–2008). Black Rose, Montreal Marshall P (2010) Demanding the impossible: a history of anarchism. PM Press, Oakland Miller D (1984) Anarchism. Dent, London Nozick R (1974) Anarchy, state and utopia. Blackwell, Oxford Purkis J, Bowen J (eds) (2005) Changing anarchism: anarchist theory and practice in a global age. Manchester University Press, Manchester Russell B (2009) Proposed roads to freedom: socialism, anarchism and syndicalism. Red and Black, St. Petersburg Wolf R (1998) In defense of anarchism. University of California Press, Berkeley

Animal Rights LAWRENCE TORCELLO Department of Philosophy, Rochester Institute of Technology, Rochester, NY, USA

Issues of egalitarianism, sustainable agriculture, ecology, and biomedical research all meet at the nexus of animal welfare concerns. Therefore, with regard to global justice, issues of animal rights and animal welfare are of growing magnitude. The fact that animal welfare overlaps broadly with many other issues of consequence for global justice should be of no surprise given human culture’s longstanding ties to, and preoccupation with, nonhuman animals. Traditionally, the human relationship to nonhuman animals has been informed by religious doctrine, and typically, with some exceptions, religious milieus have endorsed a human-oriented hierarchy with regard to nonhuman animals. Philosophy, especially in the West, has tended to enforce such systems. Aristotle argued that animals lack rational souls and therefore are outside of the sphere of justice. Rene Descartes famously likened nonhuman animals on the whole to sophisticated automata. Immanuel Kant believed that human beings ought to avoid cruelty to animals, but only as an indirect duty to other human beings, believing that cruelty to nonhuman animals tended to encourage violence against human beings. A notable exception to this trend is JeanJacques Rousseau, who argued that nonhuman animals are subject to natural law by virtue of sentience. In the nineteenth century, some philosophers began to recognize

the more substantial ethical significance of nonhuman animals. Among them, Arthur Schopenhauer recognized animals as fellow sufferers and acknowledged the duty to treat them compassionately. In nineteenth-century philosophy, the most considered defense of animal welfare begins with the rise of Jeremy Bentham’s utilitarianism. Bentham held that what was morally relevant among human beings was shared by the wider animal kingdom, and specifically that human beings and nonhuman animals alike are driven by nature to seek pleasure and to flee pain. Bentham denied that one could meaningfully distinguish levels of worth between pleasures, with the consequence that the pleasures of human beings and the pleasures of animals must be considered equally relevant in human moral considerations. Bentham famously argued that it is not whether a being can think that makes it worthy of our moral concern, but whether a being can suffer. In so doing, Bentham began the utilitarian tradition of animal welfare. Several attempts were made in England during the nineteenth century to introduce animal welfare legislation in parliament. Most attempts were unsuccessful, with the notable exception of the “Act to Prevent the Cruel and Improper Treatment of Cattle” initially proposed by Colonel Richard Martin and passed in 1822. The legislation, often referred to as “Martin’s Act,” made it a punishable offense to misuse animals defined as cattle under the act. The act was replaced with more expansive acts against animal cruelty in the later part of the nineteenth century. In 1986, the Animal Scientific Procedures Act was passed in the UK, ushering in an age of regulation of animal experimentation and replacing previous animal cruelty legislation.

The Modern Animal Rights Movement The modern animal rights movement is supported by philosophers, legal scholars, and activists around the globe. In its most general sense, the “animal rights” or “animal liberation” movement advocates for the egalitarian moral recognition of nonhuman animals. Members of the animal rights movement differ philosophically, but tend to agree on the following points: ● Nonhuman animals have an important moral status independent of human beings. ● The common tendency among human beings to view nonhuman animals as mere tools for exploitation is morally untenable and rooted in speciesism. ● A change in human practices regarding the use of nonhuman animals in research, food production, clothing, and entertainment is necessary for the achievement of a just world.

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The animal rights movement is notable for its roots in serious philosophical debate and its component parts of legal scholarship and civil activism.

Modern Intellectual Foundations of the Animal Rights Movement The first rumblings of the modern animal rights movement began in Britain during the late 1960s and early 1970s. In 1967, the animal welfare organization Compassion in World Farming was founded by English dairy farmer Peter Roberts. The organization was created to counteract the 1960s rise and spread of factory farming practices, which entail the rearing and slaughter of large numbers of animals under cruel and inhumane conditions. In 1971, the book Animals, Men, and Morals was published. The book was edited by Stanley and Roslind Godlovitch and John Harris. The work brought together a number of writers who explored the maltreatment of nonhuman animals. One of the contributors to the text was the psychologist Richard Ryder; Ryder is responsible for coining the term “speciesism.” Speciesism can be understood as the attitude or assumption that human beings are innately superior to other sentient species and thus are owed moral considerations not owed to other species. In 1975, Ryder’s book Victims of Science was published. In that book, Ryder identifies and attacks moral abuses associated with animal experimentation.

Animal Liberation and “Rights-Based” Concerns for Animal Welfare As a preference utilitarian, the philosopher Peter Singer posits that all things being equal, morality demands equal consideration of the preferential interests of others, including nonhuman animals. This view grows out of classical utilitarianism, though as Singer suggests, most approaches to morality allow that suffering is crucially significant. In 1975, Singer’s Animal Liberation was published; the work is often referred to as the “bible” of the animal rights movement. Singer argues that in order to ground an egalitarian morality, moral relevance ought to be associated with a being’s capacity to suffer. The capacity to suffer or “sentience” broadly construed is the minimum characteristic necessary to endow living beings with interests. Insofar as Singer suggests that most ethical views hold the capacity to suffer to be morally significant, Animal Liberation is not argued from an explicitly utilitarian point of view, though it is consistent with utilitarianism. Singer argues that meat eating is unjustifiable, morally speaking. Singer is especially critical of animal husbandry practices that create pain and suffering in animal

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populations and that end with traumatic forms of slaughter. Thus, Singer is a harsh and vigorous critic of modern factory farming. Singer is also critical of animal research as an institution. In Animal Liberation, Singer suggests that researchers should consider whether or not any particular experiment could be justified if it were performed on human beings with the mental capacity of a typical nonhuman, but sentient, test subject. Singer suggests this thought experiment as a test for speciesism, and therefore the failure to take into account equal consideration of interests among all sentient beings. As a consistent utilitarian, Singer does not make use of “rights” as a moral concept, nor does he categorically rule out the possibility that some forms of experimentation on nonhuman animals may be permissible under specific conditions and given particular consequences. Because of Singer’s utilitarian refusal to categorically condemn all forms of nonhuman animal experimentation, he has been criticized by “rights-based” nonhuman animal advocates. Nevertheless, Singer has been among the most successful of animal rights advocates in his efforts to change attitudes and practices impacting animal welfare. In his book The Case for Animal Rights (1985), Tom Regan argues that nonhuman animals live lives of inherent moral value. Regan argues that human beings ascribe rights to each other, as experiencing subjects of life, regardless of mental capacity. While it is true that nonhuman animals are incapable of abstract intellectual feats of rationality, it is also the case that many human beings are incapable of acts of high cognitive ability. Yet we do not consider the life of human beings who lack high levels of rational functioning to be less worthy of moral rights. So too, Regan argues, we ought to recognize that nonhuman animals have moral rights implicitly as subjects of a lived experience. Thus, according to Regan, human beings and nonhuman animals have an equal claim to moral rights, by virtue of their status as subjects-of-a-life. Based on these arguments, Regan calls for the complete cessation of nonhuman animal experimentation, the total abolition of commercial animal agriculture, and the categorical abolition of hunting and trapping. There have been many other philosophical contributions to animal rights literature. Notable recent works include James Rachels’ Created from Animals: The Moral Implications of Darwinism (1999) and David DeGrazia’s Taking Animals Seriously: Mental Life and Moral Status (1996). Also of interest is the work of Martha Nussbaum regarding animal rights and the capabilities approach, as argued in her Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership (2006).

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Legal Abolitionism Approach The American legal scholar Gary L. Francione argues that nonhuman animals deserve a singular right based on their sentient status; this is the right not to be made into the property of human beings. In Animals, Property, and the Law (1995), Francione argues that as long as nonhuman animals are considered the property or potential property of human beings, “humane” animal welfare laws will carry no significant protection of nonhuman animals. In his book Rain Without Thunder: the Ideology of the Animal Rights Movement (1996), Francione further argues that a distinction must be recognized between “animal rights,” which he associates with an end to the claim that animals are property, and “animal welfare.” According to Francione, animal welfare entails support of more “humane” treatment for nonhuman animals, but because it is sought within the legal and ideological framework that views nonhuman animals as human property, it fails to achieve meaningful change. Francione argues that veganism is the most important vehicle for change regarding animal rights, and that any true animal rights approach is an extension of the global peace movement.

Modern Activism and Advocacy on Behalf of “Nonhuman Persons” The modern animal rights movement has seen the rise of numerous organizations promoting animal welfare and liberation through activism aimed at legislative change and the reform of abusive commercial practices. Notable in terms of activism is the late Henry Spira, who sought to shame institutions responsible for animal cruelty into changing their practices. In 1974, after attending a course at New York University taught by Peter Singer, Spira founded the animal rights advocacy organization, Animal Rights International. In 1976, Spira and his organization were successful in convincing the Museum of Natural History in New York to end experiments being conducted on cats. Most famously, in 1980, Spira influenced the cosmetic company Revlon to discontinue using the Draize test, which involves dripping cosmetic ingredients into an animal’s eye in order to determine toxicity. Spira’s form of activism has been extremely influential on the practices of other animal rights groups such as People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals. The campaigns of animal rights organizations and advocates have resulted in meaningful reform especially under European Union legislation. Such reforms include the following: in 1999, the European Union passed legislation banning the use of battery cages for hens; in 2007, a European Union law banning the use of veal crates came

into effect; a law banning sow stalls will become effective 2013 across the European Union. In the USA, the state of California passed a ballot proposition (Proposition 2) in 2008, which is officially known as the “Standards for Confining Farm Animals Initiative.” The proposition, effective 2015, requires that veal calves, egg-laying hens, and pregnant sows be confined in a way that allows for an increased range of movement. Such animals, according to the bill, must have space to lie down, stand up, stretch their legs fully, and freely turn around. In 2008, Spain passed a rights resolution to extend certain rights (or personhood) to nonhuman great apes. Specifically, the Spanish resolution named the right of nonhuman great apes not to be killed, used in circuses, or experimented upon; Spain’s resolution stems from the efforts of the Great Ape Project (GAP). The Great Ape Project is an advocacy movement consisting of scientists, legal scholars, and philosophers, which campaigns for a United Nations Declaration of Rights for all Great Apes, consistent with the rights currently recognized for homo sapiens. Prominent thinkers involved in the Great Ape Project include Peter Singer, Jane Goodall, and Richard Dawkins. The movement developed out of an anthology of the same name, edited by Paola Cavalieri and Peter Singer. Philosophers have also called for a similar reconsideration of the treatment of dolphins. Notably, Thomas White, in his book In Defense of Dolphins: The New Moral Frontier (2007) explores the ethical implications of scientific findings regarding a level of intelligence in dolphins exceeding that of nonhuman primates.

Related Topics

▶ Capabilities Approach ▶ Climate Change ▶ Ecofeminism ▶ Environmental Protection ▶ Environmental Sustainability ▶ Food ▶ Global Warming ▶ Justice and Religion: Buddhism ▶ Justice and Religion: Hinduism ▶ Kant, Immanuel ▶ Nussbaum, Martha C. ▶ Pax Natura Foundation ▶ Rousseau, Jean-Jacques ▶ Singer, Peter ▶ Sustainable Development ▶ Utilitarianism ▶ Vegetarianism

Appiah, Kwame Anthony

References Cavalieri P, Singer P (eds) (1993) The great ape project: equality beyond humanity. Fourth Estate, London DeGrazia D (1996) Taking animals seriously: mental life and moral status. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge DeGrazia D (2002) Animal rights: a very short introduction. Oxford University Press, Oxford Francione G (1995) Animals, property and the law. Temple University Press, Philadelphia Nussbaum M (2006) Frontiers of justice: disability, nationality, species membership. The Belknap Press, Cambridge Rachels J (1999) Created from animals: the moral implications of Darwinism. Oxford University Press, Oxford Regan T (1985) The case for animal rights. University of California Press, Berkley Regan T, Singer P (1976) Animal rights and human obligations. Prentice Hall, New Jersey Singer P (1975) Animal liberation. Random House, New York Singer P (1999) Ethics into action: Henry Spira and the animal rights movement. Rowman and Littlefield, Maryland Singer P, Mason J (1993) The way we eat: why are food choices matter. Rodale, New York

Anti-Globalization Movements ▶ Alterglobalization ▶ Ecofeminism ▶ Shiva, Vandana

Appiah, Kwame Anthony COREY MCCALL Department of Philosophy and Religion, Elmira College, Elmira, NY, USA

In his wide-ranging writings, Kwame Anthony Appiah has tackled a variety of philosophical topics in issues such as the philosophy of language and logic, experimental philosophy, and ethics and political philosophy. With respect to ethics and political philosophy, Appiah begins to articulate a view of embedded cosmopolitanism in his 2005 book The Ethics of Identity and proceeds to fully develop this concept in Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers (2007). In developing this concept of rooted cosmopolitanism, Appiah begins from his own personal experience. In other words, Appiah’s cosmopolitanism begins with ethical concerns rather than political ones. Raised in Ghana by a Ghanaian father and an English mother, his experience

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could not but be cosmopolitan. He introduces his chapter “Rooted Cosmopolitanism” with an account of his father’s admonition that, no matter where they should choose to live they “should endeavor to leave that place ‘better than you found it.’ ‘Deep inside of me,’ [his father] went on, ‘is a great love for mankind and an abiding desire to see mankind, under God, fulfill its highest destiny’” (Appiah 2005). Appiah’s father does more than voice an admirable sentiment, for the context of his advice to him raises the apparent contradiction inherent in all cosmopolitan claims, i.e., in all claims that one ought to be a citizen of the world. Individuals are not citizens of the world – they are from a particular place and they are rooted in that place. Each individual has certain obligations made by those closest to her, family and dear friends. The universalistic impulse that forms the basis of cosmopolitanism would seem to deny or at least undermine the connections represented by these obligations. Certainly any notion of embedded or rooted cosmopolitanism would seem contradictory. Appiah begins with this apparent contradiction. While individuals may object to cosmopolitanism due to its denial of tribalism and particular group identities, a closely related objection sees the cosmopolitan claim as masking an imperialist agenda that mistakes universalism for Western norms, seen either as an unattainable ideal or as an attainable but objectionable one (Appiah 2005). Appiah hopes that his conception of rooted cosmopolitanism will address both of these concerns. To the first, he would argue that his is manifestly not a political cosmopolitanism, for it is first and foremost an ethical cosmopolitanism. Perhaps the demands of political cosmopolitanism are too stringent, and, even if they are not, we need to begin by cultivating the individual connections we have in common: conversations rather than political institutions and legal strictures – we must begin from where we are. His partial cosmopolitanism seeks a middle way between the Scylla of nationalism (and the xenophobia and rejection of the other this position often entails) and the Charybdis of the sort of political cosmopolitanism that seeks to reject the nation and its particularism in favor of a world state or its equivalent. The rooted cosmopolitan operates under the assumption that every individual matters regardless of his or her relationship to any other, an assumption that certainly does not forsake the obligations we have to those near and dear to us in favor of claims of strangers. But things become difficult when we begin to analyze these obligations to strangers we will never know. Do we have an obligation, as philosophers Peter Singer and Peter Unger argue, to give all our disposable income to insure

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adequate food and clothing to needy children? Appiah takes up this question in the concluding chapter of Cosmopolitanism, “Kindness to Strangers.” Rather than advocating Singer’s radical position that urges those of means in the West to help others financially by contributing all their disposable income to reputable charities that will assist those in need, Appiah takes a more moderate position that states that those with the means to help others ought to do so provided it won’t cost one unduly, a position he dubs the “emergency principle” (Appiah 2007). Similar to his attempt to mediate between nationalism and cosmopolitanism, Appiah seeks a moderate position between Singer’s position and one that would deny our obligations to strangers. The emergency principle acknowledges the dignity that ought to be afforded each individual and the basic rights that accrue to her as a result, but then poses a much more difficult question: how are we to best ensure that these basic rights are acknowledged and enforced? More specifically, how are we to ensure that beyond bare needs (for food, shelter, education), people can opt for things that will enhance their lives, such as expressing ideas, exercising imagination and choosing to have children? (Appiah 2007: 163). Singer and Unger focus on meeting basic needs through financial obligations, but the past 30 years have shown us that simply meeting financial obligations often is insufficient: throwing money at the problem does not make it go away (Appiah points out that during this period, per capita income in the poorest nations has in fact decreased). Cosmopolitans need to focus more on creative solutions to the difficult problems we face when it comes to global poverty and inequality, solutions tailored to specific problems and situations. The nation-state will thus remain the locus for these solutions, rather than a global state (cf. Appiah 2007: 163). Each of us has an obligation to do our fair share to help our fellow humans in need, but to simply define fairness in terms of financial obligations neglects other possibilities that will ensure that individuals not only have their basic needs met but have the option to live fulfilling lives of their own. Furthermore, a world in which individuals simply sought to “alleviate diarrhea in the Third World and never on a ticket to the opera (or a donation to a local theater company, gallery, symphony orchestra, library, or what have you)” would likely be a “drab and dreary place” (Appiah 2007: 166). Appiah’s rooted cosmopolitanism does an excellent job of reminding readers of the ethical and cultural dimensions of cosmopolitanism that are equally as difficult as the political questions raised by other theorists of cosmopolitanism such as Ju¨rgen Habermas, Seyla Benhabib, and Thomas Pogge.

Related Topics

▶ Communities ▶ Cosmopolitan Justice ▶ Cosmopolitanism ▶ Global Ethic ▶ Global Justice ▶ Habermas, Ju¨rgen ▶ Pogge, Thomas ▶ Singer, Peter

References Appiah KA (2005) The ethics of identity. Princeton University Press, Princeton Appiah KA (2007) Cosmopolitanism: ethics in a world of strangers. W.W. Norton, New York Benhabib S (2006) Another cosmopolitanism (Berkeley Tanner Lectures). Oxford University Press, New York Habermas J (2001) The postnational constellation: political essays. MIT Press, Cambridge Pogge Th (2002) World poverty and human rights: cosmopolitan responsibilities and reforms. Polity, Cambridge Singer P (1972) Famine, affluence and morality. Philos Public Aff 1(spring):229–243

Arendt, Hannah WILLIAM W. CLOHESY Department of Philosophy and World Religions, University of Northern Iowa, Cedar Falls, IA, USA

Hannah Arendt describes the plight of refugees displaced by ethnic tensions after World War I in her examination of totalitarianism’s origins. Her discussion of refugees remains a timely problem of global justice today. By definition, refugees have fled from or been expelled by their own governments; so, homeless, they seek protection due to their human rights from whatever states are willing, however reluctantly, to admit them. Refugees’ plight is an international problem of justice, for their home states refuse, and their host states are willing or able to give them only limited justice and protection. This is a global problem as well for it arises repeatedly, painfully throughout the world. The first loss refugees suffer is to have no state to protect them. Their plea for upholding their human rights is only rhetorical. For rights to be realized, there must be a state that accepts the duty to listen to peoples’ pleas and to act upon them. Without a state accepting this duty, refugees lack the standing to plead for their human rights. They lack “the right to have rights.”

Arendt, Hannah

At best, refugees have the potential for human rights should some authoritative entity accept that duty toward them. Beyond this loss, Arendt warns, refugees lose the opportunity to speak and act as citizens addressing their common future. A theme throughout Arendt (1968) is the increase in modern times of “superfluous people,” unwanted, unneeded, and especially reviled ethnic, racial, or religious minorities. Colonies in Africa and Asia offered Europe’s excess population opportunities in mines, plantations, and colonial bureaus that kept order between ambitious colonial intruders and the native peoples they displaced. Moreover, racism proved a useful concept for rationalizing cruelty and exploitation in colonies and discrimination at home. The ultimate achievements of racism were, of course, the massacres and genocide intended to remove whole peoples from the earth. The problem of superfluous people continues and even increases today as many are displaced and forced to seek refuge in reluctant host states. Arendt tells of the nation-states formed from the defeated empires after World War I forming homelands for ethnic majorities with minorities nominally protected by declarations of human rights in the nationstates’ constitutions, echoing the American Declaration of Independence and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen. These new nation-states, however, succeeded as nations in advancing their ethnic majorities, but failed as states to uphold a rule of law for all their citizens. Europe was awash with refugees fleeing nationstates in which minorities suffered greatly despite avowals of respect for their rights (see Arendt 1968: 267–302). During the Enlightenment, a profound change occurred in Western peoples’ understanding of the grounding of governments and citizens’ voice. Governments’ legitimacy was recognized to rest upon the consent of the governed. No external power, historical tradition, or religious sanction grants a people authority to found a state. Assertions were made about humans’ “inalienable” rights to life and liberty and their common good as the “pursuit of happiness” and the “possession of property.” Rights belonged to all simply because of their humanity and were recognized by all who understood and accepted the regulative idea of humanity as a unifying ideal. Rights are not granted by states, for then they would be revocable privileges. States recognize rights by acknowledging them as belonging to their citizens. When people recognize their authority collectively to found a state, they recognize powers, goods, and practices as theirs due to their humanity. States acknowledge these goods as human rights belonging to their people and, beyond them, to humans generally. States are obligated to protect their

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citizens’ rights, but whether they have a duty to protect others’ human rights is not clear. Citizens receive the best protection when their human rights are integrated into law and practice as civil rights and liberties rooted in the state’s everyday functioning. Human rights connected to no political entity with the obligation to protect them are an anomaly: A right without a corresponding duty is only a potential right, a plea for assistance made to others recognizing the plight of those denied their rights. As soon as stateless persons make a claim for aid based upon their universal human rights, the rights’ abstract character becomes evident: aggrieved stateless persons can plead to no one, for no juridical body is responsible for protecting their rights. Human rights have been proclaimed by specific governments; so, despite their universality, these rights’ fulfillment requires a state to agree to act on claimants’ behalf. Refugees, of course, have no government of their own. Further, there are no unsettled places left in the world to which refugees could repair to begin their lives anew. The world has become one network of states and their possessions joined together by mutual recognition of boundaries and internal sovereignty. When citizens leave their homes and enter another state, their proper treatment is assured by agreements among the states. If persons leave due to the animosity of their government and fellow citizens, they enter another state as outcasts, former citizens who can only invoke human rights as the moral basis for their request. Refugees can neither escape the worldwide network of states, nor can they use it for their protection. The abstract character of universal human rights renders them useless for those with no state that acknowledges their plea. Without a government to heed their claim, refugees have no “right to have rights;” for only a state can accept the obligation to respond to the pleas of its citizens to protect their human rights (Arendt 1968: 296–298). The refugees Arendt discusses were forced from their homes due to ethnic hostility, economic distress, confiscation of property, and violence. Neighboring states took in the refugees fleeing their former home, but they were accepted on sufferance although the host states might refer to human rights as their reason for giving shelter. The refugees most often remained aliens in the sheltering states, however; naturalization was uncommon due to ethnic strains, the sheer number of aliens, and the limited economic opportunities. As their numbers rose, moreover, refugees were best contained and cared for in internment camps. Suffering the loss of a polity to speak for them, refugees lost a home, a place in the world and its protection. Arendt observes, however, that the greatest loss suffered by

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Armed Conflict: Effect on Women

refugees touches their human nature more profoundly: They lost a public space where their opinions mattered and their actions could be effective (Arendt 1968: 296). The absence of opinion and action, two components essential to political life, emphasizes that refugees’ plight in the loss of a polity is not merely the loss of protection provided by the state nor of a home for themselves and their families, but, foremost, the loss of participation in their world as citizens. To clarify her meaning, Arendt turns to Aristotle’s twofold definition of humans as “animals with speech” and, thereby, “political animals” who live in ways determined by discourse and persuasion by which agreement for action is reached and, with the power generated by citizens’ agreement, action is taken. Through action a beginning occurs in the world that, as human intervention, redirects the on-flow of events. Modern political thought emphasizes the state’s duty to protect the private lives of its citizens. Arendt recognizes that refugees, in being unable to speak and act publicly as citizens, suffer an even greater loss than the material loss of a home or the security outlined in their human rights. Politically, humans display “plurality” in that each is unlike all others due to their unique perspectives, expressed in opinions, enabling them to comprehend their common world. Citizens also show initiative by proposing novel courses of action that they can undertake together. Arendt introduces Aristotle into her discussion because in the ancients’ politics she sees something crucial to political life that the moderns have forgotten: the exchange of opinions by citizens seeking agreements so that together they generate the power to act effectively. The loss Arendt discovered is not limited to refugees. In her subsequent political thought, Arendt returns to the Greeks, neither from nostalgia nor from the grandeur of their political accomplishments, of which she is skeptical, but because Athens presents a culture in which politics is central to a good life and the elements of politics are clearly displayed. Athens serves as her guide in examining and redeeming political life, for our age is too given to private rather than public life to comprehend easily either political concepts such as participation or conundrums such as the global demands of justice for refugees.

Related Topics

▶ Amnesty International ▶ Basic Rights ▶ Benhabib, Seyla ▶ Citizenship ▶ Civil Rights ▶ Duties of Assistance ▶ Duties, Perfect and Imperfect

▶ Hobbes, Thomas ▶ Human Right to Democracy ▶ Human Rights ▶ Human Rights Watch ▶ Humanitarian Aid ▶ Immigration ▶ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ▶ International Humanitarian Assistance ▶ Kant, Immanuel ▶ Nationalism ▶ Nationalism, Extended ▶ Natural Rights ▶ O’Neill, Onora ▶ Rawls, John ▶ Refugees ▶ Sen, Amartya ▶ Shue, Henry ▶ Universal Declaration of Human Rights ▶ Vienna Declaration on Human Rights

References Arendt H (1958) The human condition. University of Chicago Press, Chicago/London Arendt H (1968) The origins of totalitarianism, 3rd edn. Harcourt, New York Arendt H (1994) Essays in understanding 1930–1954, ed. Kohn J. Harcourt Brace, New York Bernstein RJ (1996) Hannah Arendt and the Jewish question. MIT Press, Cambridge Birmingham P (2006) Hannah Arendt and human rights: the predicament of common responsibility. Indiana University Press, Bloomington Indianapolis

Armed Conflict: Effect on Women LISA RIVERA Department of Philosophy, University of Massachusetts – Boston, Boston, MA, USA

War affects women and girls by killing, displacing, and impoverishing them, and subjecting them to sexual violence and enslavement. In modern wars, civilians are killed at far higher rates than combatants; women and children are the majority of civilians killed. As war disrupts social, economic, and gender hierarchies, women also take on economic and political responsibility as heads of households and communities, and as leaders in peace and reconciliation projects. Global justice frames concern about women in multinational conflicts as refugees and as targets

Armed Conflict: Effect on Women

of violence that is punishable under international humanitarian law and the laws of war. Although women in conflict and post-conflict situations often lack institutional resources to address their concerns, international treaties have brought some measure of global justice to them. A traditional image is that women stand outside armed conflicts, and men protect them. Rather, women generally provide for their own survival and that of their families. Although women are combatants much less frequently than men, they do participate in wars, willingly or unwillingly, by fighting and/or providing material support. However, even combatant women rarely play significant decision-making roles. And women’s lower social status and caretaking responsibilities make them more vulnerable to harm in conflicts. Women and girls are intentionally targeted for sexual violence during conflict. They may experience rape, sexual torture, abduction for the purposes of sexual slavery, and sexual mutilation, and be forced into prostitution, marriage, pregnancy, maternity, abortion, or sterilization. Widespread sexual violence and coercion are not an incidental or inevitable effect of war but are used as weapons of war, and serve specific political and military objectives. The perception of women as producers of the next generation means that rape and forced pregnancy can be used to symbolically defile a rival ethnic or national group. Sexual terror causes civilians to flee, and facilitates ethnic cleansing. Instances of rape against civilian women can be minimal when it damages military objectives, as during guerilla warfare where fighters depend on the voluntary support of locals. In the aftermath of a conflict, women and girls who experienced sexual violence and coercion, and children born of wartime rape, may be ostracized or punished by their own community. When displaced by war, women must still care for children and elders. This limits their mobility and capacity to support themselves, and can make them long-term refugees. As refugees, dislocation and poverty leave them vulnerable to sexual trafficking and assault. Their plight as refugees is a global justice issue. Yet, an international response does not necessarily guarantee human rights protections to women. For example, UN peacekeepers and members of international organizations overseeing refugee camps were sexual traffickers and assailants in the aftermath of conflicts in Cambodia, Mozambique, and Somalia. Although camps are often not safe places for refugee women and girls, some do benefit through literacy, vocational and political skills acquired in their time there. Violence targeting women violates longstanding international laws that exempt noncombatants from direct attack and guarantee humane treatment to combatants. Because postwar processes have ignored war’s particular impact on

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women however, full global justice for women during armed conflict and its aftermath requires specific international agreements targeted to their issues. Through extensive political work, international women’s groups have established several of these. In 1998, Article 7 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) codified certain types of rape and sexual violence as crimes against humanity. Rapes were prosecuted as crimes against humanity for the first time by the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). The United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325, passed in October 2000, affirmed the role of women in peace negotiations and post-conflict processes and incorporated gender mainstreaming into UN peace and security efforts. Certain acts of sexual violence were distinguished as crimes of war, crimes against humanity, or constitutive acts of genocide by UNSCR 1820 in 2008.

Related Topics

▶ Feminist Ethics ▶ Feminization of Poverty ▶ Gender Justice ▶ Genocide ▶ Human Rights ▶ Human Rights: African Perspectives ▶ Humanitarian Military Intervention ▶ International Criminal Court (ICC) ▶ International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) ▶ International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) ▶ Jus in Bello ▶ Refugees ▶ Rome Statute of 1998 ▶ Rwanda ▶ Torture ▶ Violence

References Cockburn C (1999) The space between us: negotiating gender and national identities in conflict. Zed Books, London Dombrowski N (2004) Women and war in the twentieth century: enlisted with or without consent. Routledge, New York Enloe C (2000) Maneuvers: the international politics of militarizing women’s lives. University of California Press, Berkeley Lindsey-Curtet C (2001) Women facing war: ICRC study of the impact of armed conflict on women. International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva Lorentzen L, Turpin J (eds) (1998) The women and war reader. New York University Press, New York Mazaruna D, Raven-Roberts A, Parpart J (2005) Gender, conflict and peacekeeping. Rowman and Littlefield, Latham Meintjes S, Turshen M, Pillay A (eds) (2002) The aftermath: women in post-conflict transformation. Zed Books, London

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Arms Race ▶ Afghanistan and Iraq Wars ▶ Chomsky, Noam ▶ Corporate Social Responsibility ▶ Corruption ▶ Dispute Resolution ▶ Foreign Policy ▶ Peace Education ▶ Pogge, Thomas ▶ Preventive Non-Intervention ▶ Preventive War

Asian Values Debate TODD ERIC MYERS Center for Asian and Pacific Studies, San Diego State University, San Diego, CA, USA

In 1993, the Bangkok Declaration on Human Rights affirmed the commitment of various Asian states to the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights while calling for greater emphasis to be given to economic, social, and cultural rights in comparison to civil and political rights. The Singaporean political leader, Lee Kuan Yew, became a strong advocate for this position, arguing that Asian societies had different values from Western societies and that these values were in important respects superior. Lee pointed to social pathologies such as high instances of crime, drug abuse, and family breakdown present in modern Western liberal democracies and argued that what he termed Asian values such as respect for authority and consideration of the community’s interests above the individual’s interests could allow for economic growth and promote social harmony while avoiding the social pathologies prevalent in the West. He emphasized the Confucian tradition as a source of these values but also found them present in other Asian traditions including Buddhism, Hinduism, and Islam. In practice, Lee became a defender of authoritarian politics against liberal democratic values and began the Asian values debate. The Bangkok charter did not challenge the universality of political and civic norms adopted by the international community but brought into question the application of those norms in societies facing different developmental challenges. Lee brought into question the actual value of

civic and political rights by affirming traditions that he understood to curtail certain human rights to bring about flourishing communities. From a global justice perspective, Lee created a divide within the world community challenging liberal conceptions of individual dignity with his own communitarian understanding of the human good. Pragmatically, Lee may have been intending a local solution to creating political order within his ethnically diverse state around a conception of “Asian values,” but his forceful articulation of this position opened the door to a clash of civilizations based upon universalistic claims. In the end, if Lee was correct in his assessment of liberalism and its consequences, Western societies would need to abandon their commitment to the rights that led to decadence and disharmony or alter the values of their societies so that they could enjoy prosperous and harmonious societies like Lee’s Singapore. Lee’s affirmation of Asian values and attacks against liberal values did not go unanswered. His formulation of an authoritarian capitalism incensed those committed to a conception of the human good requiring democratic political participation. Kim Dae Jung, then a democracy activist and later to be president of the Republic of Korea, criticized Lee for confusing pathologies associated with industrialization with democracy. Kim contended that wealth and democracy go hand in hand and argued that the natural course of economic development leads to democracy. He also focused on the hypocrisy of Lee’s reliance on the symbolism of a minimalist state and a culture of family values as the source of political legitimacy when that order was in reality maintained by a virtual police state. He went on to note how democratic values are present in Confucian and other Asian traditions and that commitment to democracy is essential for earning the legitimacy necessary for meeting the political challenges of the future. Kim embraced a vision of global democracy as the foundation for any legitimate attempt to address problems such as poverty and ecological deterioration. His compass for this better world was the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Amartya Sen, Nobel Prize winning economist, tackled Lee’s Asian values hypothesis on both empirical consequentialist grounds as well as on the qualitative nature of Asian thought. Sen observed that though many East Asian states with authoritarian governments have experienced higher rates of economic growth than certain democratic states, it is not clear that authoritarian government is the key variable in promoting that growth. In fact, the statistical studies conducted to determine the relationship between political rights and economic development varied widely and therefore cannot determine whether political

Asian Values Debate

freedom contributes or inhibits growth. It is much clearer that openness to competition, the use of international markets, a high level of literacy and access to education, successful land reforms, and public incentives provided for investment, exporting, and industrialization have been more important variables for economic development than political structure. The strongest defenses for a preference for democratic government over an authoritarian government emerges insofar democratic regimes are better at preventing famine and other disasters. Political and civil rights appear to prevent economic and social disasters and therefore a government that dismisses these rights may be eliminating an important protection against such disasters. Further, Sen disputed the qualitative nature of Asian thought as being essentially authoritarian and respect for liberty and autonomy essentially Western. Sen finds a commitment to liberation and equality in Buddhism, religious tolerance in the thought of Mughal rulers, freedom of speech in India’s tradition of religious disputation, and consideration for liberty at least for the elite in the meditations of Kautilya, India’s own Machiavelli. He also questioned whether Western thinkers such as Plato or Augustine were any more committed to human freedom than Eastern thinkers such as Buddha and Confucius. He instead argued that freedom is an essential human good and that the simplistic interpretation of history embedded in the concept of the dichotomy of Asian and Western values contributes to the divisiveness of the world and adds nothing of consequence to ethical dialogue. The Asian Financial Crisis of 1997–1998 and the deterioration of the economies asserting their cultural superiority appeared to bring the Asian values debate to a close. The relationship between family values and crony capitalism that partially caused the crises brought negative attention to Asian values and even Lee Kuan Yew distanced himself from the Asian values framework by emphasizing how Singapore was protected from the crisis by its adherence to the rule of law and recognized how family values, an Asian value, contributed to the crisis through mechanism of crony capitalism. The political scientist and public intellectual Francis Fukuyama observed the passing of the economic basis of Asian values as a confirmation of his thesis of liberal democracy becoming the universal paradigm for political order and global justice. Those who are less sanguine about the values embedded in liberal democracy still search Asian cultures of authority for the communitarian values that give greater weight to consideration of economic, social, and cultural rights that they find down played by the liberal tradition. Peter Hershock and Roger Ames, philosophers

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associated with the East West Center at the University Hawaii, have been particularly active along this line as they examine the creativity and virtuosity embedded in Asian cultures of authority even as they clearly reject authoritarianism. Finally, it seems that the People’s Republic of China’s rehabilitation of Confucius has set the foundation for a revival of an authoritarian articulation of the Asian value theme as the Chinese regime affirms party authority and rejects political and civic rights as essential to promoting political stability. In this crude form, this affirmation of authority is essentially Hobbesian and has little to do with any conception of justice save the old maxim “might makes right.” The study of culture as a variable determining the relative justness of societies is very dangerous since claims of cultural superiority lend themselves to chauvinism and may encourage the neglect of problem areas of legitimate ethical concern in name of cultural uniqueness. Nevertheless, dismissing culture as an area of ethical inquiry risks dismissing tangible ethical achievements that have been made possible by certain historical and physical environments. It also denies the validity of the lenses through which most individuals view the ethical world. It is likely that an unfolding dialogue on global justice will need to take into careful consideration cultural claims of ethical superiority and/or difference as it attempts to develop global norms of right and wrong.

Related Topics

▶ Communitarianism ▶ Cultural Relativism ▶ Global Democracy ▶ Global Human Rights Culture ▶ Hobbes, Thomas ▶ Justice and Religion: Buddhism ▶ Justice and Religion: Confucianism ▶ Justice and Religion: Daoism ▶ Justice and Religion: Hinduism ▶ Justice and Religion: Islam ▶ Liberal Democracy ▶ Liberalism ▶ Sen, Amartya ▶ Universal Declaration of Human Rights

References Ames R, Hershock P (eds) (2006) Confucian cultures of authority. State University Press of New York, Albany Avonius L, Kingsbury D (2008) Human rights in Asia: a reassessment of the Asian values debate. Palgrave Macmillan, New York Barr M (2000) Lee Kuan Yew: the beliefs behind the man. Georgetown University Press, Washington, DC Barr M (2004) Cultural politics and Asian values. Routledge, New York

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Bell D (2006) Beyond liberal democracy: political thinking for an East Asian context. Princeton University Press, Princeton De Bary WT (2000) Asian values and human rights: a Confucian communitarian perspective. Harvard University Press, Cambridge Sen A (2000) Freedom and development. Anchor, New York

Associative Duties MEGAN KIME Department of Philosophy, The University of Sheffield, Sheffield, UK

Associative duties refer to the special set of duties that we owe to people with whom we stand in certain types of relationship, or have interacted in certain ways. They are to be distinguished from general duties, which we owe to all persons qua persons. They are strongly supported by common-sense morality, which recognizes a broad range of duties of varying strength associated with diverse kinds of relationship and interaction, including, but not limited to, family, friends, colleagues and team members, neighbors, and fellow members of one’s nation, state, religious or ethnic community. Associative duties vary in terms of content, but they generally involve giving special weight to the interests of one’s associates over the interests of other people. They have been justified either intrinsically – with reference to the special value of the relationship or association in question, or derivatively – with reference to the instrumental value that they help to realize. Associative duties, as identified by Samuel Scheffler, have been subject to two main objections: one from the point of view of participants and the other from the point of view of outsiders. The “voluntarist” objection views associative duties as impositions on the holders who may not have voluntarily entered into the relationship which gives rise to the duty. The “distributive” objection, in contrast, views associative duties as advantageous for participants, and so in conflict with an ideal of equality, since nonparticipants are unfairly excluded. In terms of global justice, it is the distributive objection that is most relevant, since it points to how associative duties may conflict with general global duties. Nationalists such as David Miller have defended associative duties to compatriots in order to block attempts by cosmopolitans to universalize our duties of social justice. These defenses of associative duties to compatriots often appeal to a similarity between one’s family and one’s nation. It remains a matter for debate whether we have such associative duties to our compatriots, and if we do, whether they outweigh our general global duties.

Many moderate cosmopolitans allow that we have associative duties to our compatriots (as well as to family, friends, etc.), but insist that they can only add to our general duties, rather than outweigh them (Pogge). However, critics of cosmopolitanism have argued that it cannot, as a universalist moral theory, make room for our intuitively important associative obligations, and should therefore be rejected. “Associative” or “relational” cosmopolitan theorists, such as Charles Beitz, have attempted to justify global duties by viewing them as a kind of associative duty, arguing that global interdependence places us all in a relevant relationship at the global level. However, statists and nationalists have responded to these claims by arguing that the relevant kinds of interactions that give rise to associative duties only take place within nation-states. Associative duties are alternatively labeled as “associative obligations” (Dworkin), “special responsibilities” (Scheffler), and “special obligations” (Jeske), although they are properly understood as a subset of the broader category of special obligations, which also includes role obligations and contractual obligations.

Related Topics

▶ Compatriot Partiality Thesis ▶ Duties to Non-Compatriots ▶ Partiality ▶ Patriotism ▶ Special Obligations

References Jeske D (1996) Associative obligations, voluntarism, and equality. Pac Philos Q 77:289–309 Kolodny N (2002) Do associative duties matter? J Polit Philos 10:250–266 Oldenquist A (1982) Loyalties. J Philos 79:173–193 Scheffler S (2001) Boundaries and allegiances. Oxford University Press, Oxford Simmons AJ (1996) Associative political obligations. Ethics 106:247–273

Augustine MICHAEL MINCH Department of Philosophy/Humanities, Utah Valley University, Orem, UT, USA

St. Augustine is more than imposing. He is, perhaps, history’s most intimidating figure. From his conversion to Christianity in 386 to his death in 430, he wrote on the

Augustine

order of 117 books. Outside of the New Testament, no writer has had nearly the influence upon Christian thought than has the Bishop of Hippo. There is no doubt that Augustine had much to say about justice, even though he wrote no one text devoted to justice alone. To understand his thought about justice, we shall have to consider his thought about politics, love, and violence. We would also need to consider his thought about God, the church, and so much more, to give Augustinian justice its due, but this entry can be nothing other than a humbling exercise in restraint. For Augustine, human beings are social, or political in the Aristotelian sense, in our essence; for we are, after all, created in the image of the Triune God. Because God is an ontological community of Love (“God is love,” proclaims 1 John 4:16), sharing love between Father, Son, and Spirit (to keep to traditional terms) – we too are social and communal, and made for love, and to love. This is our human ontology, because it is our Creator’s. As creatures made to love, the question becomes one of how our love is ordered. Who, what, why, and how we love gives light to the meaning of justice. Because we are made by Love, individualism, disharmony, violence, and injustice have no necessary or inevitable claim upon us. Politics, then, is not doomed to be nothing more than managing power, conflict, and violence. The City of God and the earthly city compete for our allegiance, and contend with one another, to be sure. But at the same time, for Augustine, the public, or civil order, is a space for natural goods proper to human beings. Justice and peace of a kind can be found in the earthly city, and these are not to be despised. Temporal goods are valuable and reflect our social natures, our being built for relationships. Chief among these goods is peace. Nonetheless, only incomplete justice and peace can be found apart from the City of God. Against Aristotle and others, we do not find our completion in the state, but only in God. For Augustine, the Roman Empire was not completely public or political; it was not a true res publica (“public thing”) because a true republic is based on justice, which is giving each his or her due. This claim implies that God too, would receive that which is owed to God, namely, proper love and worship; and that God as the fountain and foundation of justice would be recognized. But such recognition is not made in earthly political orders (City of God. XIX.21). The Roman Empire (crumbling as Augustine wrote) was based on libido dominandi, this was the highest civic virtue, because it controlled all other lusts (City of God, I.30; V.12). This desire for domination is a considerable distance from love and justice. For Cicero, a republic is an association based on common agreement concerning the right and shared

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interests. For Augustine, however, this cannot be sufficient because a republic is a people united by a common love of the same things. Only the church is united in this way, only it can be a true republic. The world is filled with goodness, and political goods are among them. In the earthly city, we are called to do no harm and help whomever we can whenever we can. But the public life of this world will never be sufficiently public, only a politics of love is sufficiently political. It is the case that “if we are to discover the character of any people, we have only to examine what it loves” (City of God, 19, 24). Only a just peace is truly peace, and we cannot find true justice in the earthly city. Augustine’s City of God is, among other things, a political theology and a claim of ontological peace rather than ontological conflict (Milbank). He notes that the two cities are created by two loves. The earthly city from love of self, extending even to contempt for God; and the heavenly city by love of God, extending even to contempt for self (City of God, 14, 28). We are called to live truly public and political, just and peaceable lives, promoting the well-being of all, and to do so, we must love God and love others. The properly ordered love that enables this way of being in the world comes only from the One true and triune Love. For Augustine, justice is a species of love. Justice “is love serving alone that which is loved and thus ruling rightly” and “justice is love serving God alone,” and therefore, “ruling well all else” (On the Manichean Heresy, 1.15.25). Love is the ground of our being and the means to true knowledge, so it follows that we cannot know or do justice apart from its grounding and orientation in love. Indeed, for Augustine, love determines all virtue. Rightly ordered love creates a life of virtue, including justice. “True justice,” then, can only be found in “that republic whose founder and ruler is Christ,” who is Love incarnate and the one perfect human being (City of God, 2.21; 11.29; 19.24). The just person is one who has ordered his or her loves properly, knowing what and who to love, and how to love (On Christian Doctrine, 1.59). Yet we are to love all equally, displaying in our love both difference and equality; again as an echo of the Triune God who is Love. Because Augustine addressed the problem of war in the City of God, he has become known as an important contributor to the “just war tradition,” it remains to address the relationship between justice and war in his thought. Over against the Manicheans (among whom he once belonged), who thought of evil as embedded in creation itself, Augustine can see evil only as a distortion of the good that alone emerged from creation. There is an ontological love and peace (harmony and justice) at creation, meant to become the geography of our lives. War can

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never be truly just, only sometimes tragically necessary – when in the defense of the innocent under the shadow of lethal harm. His oft-quoted and repeated remark, first stated by a captured pirate answering Alexander the Great, speaks to his view of politics, war, and justice. Accused of infesting the sea, the pirate replied, “. . .because I do it with a tiny craft, I’m called a pirate: because you have a mighty navy, you’re called a commander” (City of God, IV.4). Augustine notes that even justifiable wars properly give rise to lament and sorrow rather than pride or patriotism, let alone celebration. To fail to grieve about necessary wars is to be pitiable and contemptible. “Peace” achieved even by just war cannot be true peace. Real peace, shared by those in harmony and common love, realizes justice for all. In respect to lethal violence, Augustine must be read against himself, as his willingness to endorse violence against the heretic Donatists, makes clear. Even violence against others, he thought, must be an embodiment of love. Tragically, all too easy recourse to platitudes about love – and justice – have also made our violence all too easy to wage. Violence waged, even when, in motivation from love and for peace, too easily becomes unjust, sundered from love, and contrary to peace. If follows that true salvation must be liberation from political, economic, and psychic sin; for true salvation, justice, and peace come ultimately and only from infinite and ontological Love. As to global justice, Augustine, we will recall, argued that we must love all equally, while “proportionally.” He knows that we have special obligations of love, most clearly to our spouses and children; yet he thinks that the meaning of God as love, and our human purposes in life as agents of love, can only mean that our lives must be lived so that all others will receive no harm, and all good we can do for them, we must do. It is precisely here where his doctrine of sin is, perhaps, most liberating. For Augustine knew deeply of the complexities, sophistications, subtleties, evasions, and sweet justifications of human sin. Our political, social, economic, and cultural traditions, systems, and structures are sinful. Global justice, for him, is taken seriously only as we work for the transformation of human institutions from those that enslave us to those which help liberate us. Of course, institutions in themselves do not liberate or save; but God’s good world, created for love and justice to be

known, allows for the transformation of institutions into agencies of justice, just as it allows for the transformation of persons themselves. We are made to reflect God’s love among one another, act with justice and walk humbly with God (Micah 6:8).

Related Topics

▶ Charity ▶ Just War Theory: Invasion of Iraq ▶ Justice and Religion: Christianity ▶ Liberation Theology ▶ Moral Equality ▶ Pax Natura Foundation ▶ Violence ▶ War, Just and Unjust

References Augustine (1961) The confessions. Penguin, New York Augustine (1972) The city of god (trans: McKenna S). Catholic University Press of America, Washington, DC Elshtian J (1995) Augustine and the limits of politics. Notre Dame University Press, Notre Dame Gregory E (2008) Politics and the order of love: an Augustinian ethic of democratic citizenship. University of Chicago Press, Chicago Heyking J (2001) Augustine and politics as longing in the world. University of Missouri Press, Columbia Markus R (1970) Saeculum: history and society in the theology of St. Augustine. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Milbank J (1990) Theololgy and social theory: beyond secular reason. Blackwell, Oxford Niebuhr R (1986) Augustine’s political realism. In: Brown R (ed) The essential Reinhold Niebuhr. Yale University Press, New Haven, pp 123–141 Paolucci H (ed) (1967) The political writings of St. Augustine. Henry Regnery, Chicago Ruokanen M (1993) Theology of social life in Augustine’s “De civiate Dei”. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Go¨ttingen Santurri E (1997) Rawlsian liberalism, moral truth, and Augustinian politics. J Peace Justice Stud 8(2):1–36 Schlabach G (2001) For the joy set before us: Augustine and self-denying love. University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame Tkacz M, Kries D (trans) (1994) Augustine, political writings. Hackett, Indianapolis Weithman P (2001) Augustine’s political philosophy. In: Stump E, Kretzmann N (eds) The Cambridge companion to Augustine. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 234–252 Williams R (1987) Politics and the soul: a reading of the city of god. Milltown Stud 19(20):55–72 Wills G (1999) Saint Augustine. Viking, New York

B Bandung Conference CHARLES ROSENBERG Milwaukee, WI, USA

The Asian-African Conference convened in Bandung, Indonesia, April 17–24, 1955, bringing together representatives from 29 newly independent nations, which had either been formally colonized or subjected to unequal treaties by European nations. This conference laid the foundation for the Movement of Nonaligned Countries, which convened in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, in 1961 – nations declining to take sides between the United States and the Soviet Union. Participants at the conference, and in the Nonaligned Movement, included some nations ruled by communist parties, or experimenting with other forms of socialism, as well as nations with some sort of capitalist economy. The sponsors of the conference were Burma, India, Indonesia, Ceylon, and Pakistan. Indonesia’s President Sukarno, who hosted the conference, viewed his country as a leading antiimperialist force, in a world where former colonial powers still held overwhelming economic power, and substantial ability to intervene militarily. A final communique´ from the conference promoted mutual cooperation for economic development in Asia and Africa, called for economic development funds under United Nations auspices, stabilized commodity trade, developing means to process raw materials locally to diversify exports, and encouraged formation of national and regional financial institutions. At a time when many colonial possessions were not yet independent, the conference firmly denounced colonialism as a denial of the fundamental rights of man, and a means of cultural suppression. The next half century did not deliver the era of cooperation and peaceful development envisioned nor establish a just international order. Participating nations fought wars with each other, or suffered genocidal civil wars and bloody military coups. Economic development remained uneven, although some participants emerged as global economic powers in the early twenty-first century. Adam Clayton Powell, an African American member of the

US congress, pointed out even in 1955 the many forms of racial discrimination practiced within Asia and Africa. Powell, present as an observer, sharply denounced the US state department for deliberately ignoring the landmark importance of the conference, while vigorously defending his country’s record against communist critiques. The conference was a landmark, but did not construct a firm foundation for the future toward building a sustained cooperation among the participating countries for peace and justice.

Related Topics

▶ Alterglobalization ▶ Class and Status ▶ Colonialism ▶ Eurocentrism ▶ National Self-Determination ▶ Nationalism ▶ Post-Colonialism

References Borthwick M (1998) Pacific century: the emergence of modern Pacific Asia. Westview Press, Boulder En-Lai C (1981) China and the Asian-African conference. Foreign Languages Press, Beijing Powell AC (2002) Adam by Adam: the autobiography of Adam Clayton Powell. Dafina, New York Rist G (2004) The history of development from western origins to global faith. Zed Books, London Tan SS, Amitav A (eds) (2008) Bandung revisited: the legacy of the 1955 Asian-African conference for international order. NUS Press, Singapore Wright R (1994) The color curtain: a report on the Bandung conference. Banner Books, Jackson

Barber, Benjamin GORDON A. BABST Department of Political Science, Wilkinson College, Chapman University, Orange, CA, USA

The focus of political theorist Benjamin Barber’s scholarship has been democratic civic engagement both in the USA and globally, and threats to meaningful

Deen K. Chatterjee (ed.), Encyclopedia of Global Justice, DOI 10.1007/978-1-4020-9160-5, # Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

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participation by citizens in self-governance. In addition to his scholarship, Barber has been a public voice for democratic ideals and served as an informal consultant to President Bill Clinton, with his experiences and reflections providing the basis for his most recent book The Truth of Power: Intellectual Affairs in the Clinton White House (2008). Barber’s interests are both academic and practical, which is reflected in his writings which range from democratic theory at the more conceptual and theoretical level, to issues of implementation at the level of democratic practice. In his earlier published work Barber advocated “strong democracy,” a democratic governance resting on the civic engagement of an active, informed citizenry who realize the good of participatory politics. This conception of a liberal democratic industrialized society provided a counterpoise to a liberalism overly focused on the individual’s rights and the representation of interests. Barber’s first work that tackled issues of globalization, Jihad vs. McWorld, first published in 1995, gained him both fame and notoriety, with the second edition including his reflections on 9/11, which seemed to embody Jihad’s war against McWorld and to suggest that McWorld’s global triumph was premature (2001). Barber uses “jihad” to refer not only to Islamic jihad, but more so to refer to reactionary, militant religious fundamentalism in general, which he views as tribalism’s most potent response to global integration and modernization. “McWorld” refers to the unbridled march of globalization without benefit of an effective political envelope and in the form of an aggressive economic and cultural integration that principally reflects the corporate interests of the industrialized West. Jihad reflects a cultural fundamentalism, of which religion is an important arena and advancing the cause is an all-or-nothing gambit, while McWorld reflects a cultural monism or flattening of the world’s pluralism across all spheres facilitated by the advance of Western-style capitalism and related phenomena such as privatization of a common public sphere, neoliberalism, and consumerism, which are unconcerned with cultural diversity except for the business opportunities it may provide. Both of these opposing forces have significant political consequences on their own and together, Barber argues, they can be resisted only through the resurgence of democracy. More democratic self-governance, especially at the local level, is what is needed even were the threat posed by militant terrorism to fade owing to the global asymmetry already fashioned by McWorld between the global North and South, the latter lacking the economic

might or political stability to resist except through a return to tribalism and jihad. Jihad vs. McWorld ranks with Samuel Huntington’s The Clash of Civilizations as an early, popular overview of the emerging organization of the world at the global level. Barber’s work, however, was not intended to attribute civilizational significance to the division of the world he elaborated in terms of a normative ranking of the two sides; rather, his animating concern is the fundamentalism at the heart of both sides, a religious vs. market fundamentalism that are both inimical to democratic governance, to control by citizens of the world around them. Barber’s book Consumed (2007) sharpens the focus of attention to the contemporary state of the democratic citizenry, who, in the face of the globalization of what he earlier termed “McWorld,” have become more adept at being consumers than citizens. Barber traces an evolution from earlier production-oriented capitalism to contemporary consumption-oriented capitalism, and is highly critical of the values and habits of mind engendered by consumerism and the harms to democracy and the exercise of freedom that he sees corroding the fabric of civil society. He argues that the contemporary practice of free market capitalism “infantilizes” adults who substitute their wants for their needs, and have been rendered unable to distinguish a public interest from the pursuit of their private preferences. The ultimate victim here is the public-spirited citizen who has been conditioned to realize his or her freedom mostly as a consumer making generally trivial choices in the marketplace, a highly shrunken understanding and practice of freedom that bodes badly for the future of liberal democracy. Barber’s solution to this entrenched, debilitating state of affairs throughout most of the world is a reinvigorated civic life, the democratization of globalization from the ground up to redirect it toward meeting people’s genuine needs including, importantly, a need to participate meaningfully in selfgovernance and together achieve a value that transcends the proximate satisfactions of consumer society.

Related Topics

▶ Capitalism ▶ Citizenship ▶ Consumerism ▶ Democratic Citizenship ▶ Global Citizenship ▶ Global Civil Society ▶ Global Democracy ▶ Globalization ▶ Huntington, Samuel

Barry, Brian

▶ War Against Terrorism ▶ World Citizenship

References Barber B (2001) Jihad vs. McWorld: terrorism’s challenge to democracy, 2nd edn. Ballantine Books, New York Barber B (2004) Strong democracy: participatory politics for a new age, Deluxe edition. University of California Press, Berkeley Barber B (2007) Consumed: how markets corrupt children, infantilize adults, and swallow citizens whole. W.W. Norton, New York Barber B (2008) The truth to power: intellectual affairs in the Clinton White House. Columbia University Press, New York Perusek D (ed) (2010) Between Jihad and McWorld: voices of social justice. Papers presented at a conference with Benjamin Barber. Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Newcastle upon Tyne Ritzer G (ed) (2009) McDonaldization: the reader, 3rd edn. Pine Forge Press, Newbury Park

Barry, Brian GORDON A. BABST Department of Political Science, Wilkinson College Chapman University, Orange, CA, USA

Brian Barry (1936–2009) last taught philosophy and political science at Columbia University from 1998 until 2005, and had taught at and was honored by several notable academic institutions such as the London School of Economics before that. The focus of political theorist Brian Barry’s scholarship was social justice in contemporary liberal-democratic societies, a topic he pursued while simultaneously demonstrating the power of Enlightenment reason. Besides his significant scholarship, he was known for his leadership of the influential journal Ethics, his sharp wit, and his straightforward, formidable criticisms of sloppy or muddled thinking. Nonetheless, he was beloved by many colleagues and students, several of whom dedicated Justice & Democracy to him. Barry made his mark with Political Argument, which helped both to revitalize Anglo-American political philosophy and to establish important terms for subsequent political argument and theorizing, such as the notion of the public interest, which he deployed quite differently than social choice theorists, whom he thought fundamentally misguided in their approach. He was a steadfast social democrat, an egalitarian who found unregulated capitalism to be detrimental of the public good and a chief cause of social injustice.

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Barry was both a critic of John Rawls and a defender of his vision of liberal egalitarianism, arguing that Rawls’ difference principle provides for a more just distribution of goods, and defending equality of opportunity, not the realization of equality, as a desideratum of a just society. His critical focus of attention was on those who would defend burdens on the poorest in the name of overall prosperity, which for him always meant occluding from view the responsibility of the well-off for situations under which others suffer. Barry was very concerned to defend the pluralism of modern society without conceding ground to relativistic attempts to sanction any and all practices even where they are incompatible with liberal-democratic norms, or to communitarian impulses to guide people by the light of community beliefs, however traditional or wellnested they may be. Culture and Equality offers a sustained critique of multiculturalism to the extent the latter offends the basic equality of all citizens or impedes the realization of universalistic principles of justice, which he held for inviolable even though they need not manifest themselves in the same way in each society. In Why Social Justice Matters Barry focuses attention on the need to address inequalities in wealth and income so that the most vulnerable citizens benefit from the wealth a society produces and justifiably redistributes through a scheme of taxation that provides for the health care and education of everyone. Barry’s own view of justice was elaborated at length in Justice as Impartiality, in which among other things he addressed head-on the challenge religious pluralism poses in contemporary societies; chiefly, how to moderate conflicts among believers and power struggles among religious groups. His suggestion of justice as impartiality appeals to fairness rather than to goodness, and is grounded in reasoned argument’s ability to proffer premises that are open to everyone and will suggest voluntary restraint when pursuing a conception of the good. Barry’s approach to political theory, his views of justice in the contemporary plural setting, and his trenching criticism of any policies that ignore society’s vulnerable in favor of some good generally more important to the better off may together inform a theory of global justice. On Barry’s take, we arrive at just outcomes when we reason together, are impartial with respect to varying views of the good, intend to do right by the worst-off in society, and are committed to using governance mechanisms to counterbalance the tendency of wealth and privilege to crowd out claims to a fair share of goods such as equal opportunity, health care, and education. Barry, then, would aver

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that social justice is primary and that its chief impediments are economic inequality and any unreasonable pursuit of goodness over fairness. A globe structured by grave inequalities between North and South owing to a capitalist mentality that puts profit above people’s interests in survival or a modicum of meaningful opportunity would not meet with Barry’s favor, and has veered far from social justice as Barry understood it.

Related Topics

▶ Equality ▶ Fair Equality of Opportunity ▶ Fairness ▶ Liberal Democracy ▶ Liberalism ▶ Multiculturalism ▶ Rawls, John

References Barry B (1965, reissued 1990 and 2010) Political argument. Routledge & Kegan Paul, New York Barry B (1995) Justice as impartiality. Oxford University Press, Oxford Barry B (2002) Culture and equality: an egalitarian critique of multiculturalism. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA Barry B (2005) Why social justice matters. Polity Press, Cambridge Dowding K, Goodin R, Pateman C (eds) (2004) Justice & democracy. Essays for Brian Barry. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

Basic Needs GILLIAN BROCK Department of Philosophy, University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand

According to many accounts of global distributive justice, our basic needs are salient in determining what we owe one another. When people are unable to meet their basic needs, global justice has not yet been realized. In this entry, we examine, first, accounts of basic needs available to play this important role in developing our global responsibilities. Discussing such accounts also enables us to address some central questions often raised in connection with needs, namely: Why are needs morally and politically salient? What kinds of responsibilities, if any, can they generate? Are there any needs which are universal, or are they always culturally relative? Are needs importantly distinct from several other neighboring concepts, such as preferences or desires?

Two recent accounts of basic needs are influential, can help us address these questions, and so deserve some detailed discussion, namely the philosophical account offered by David Braybrooke (1987) and that of Len Doyal and Ian Gough (1991), which aims to connect theoretical and more empirical domains. These two accounts focus on different aspects of why meeting needs is important, and the methods they use for arriving at our needs are interestingly different. Yet, there is also convergence between them. David Braybrooke’s account is one of the most developed and influential in the philosophical literature. He develops his account of basic needs in terms of what is necessary for social functioning. Something is a need if, without its satisfaction, one would be unable to carry out four basic social roles, those of citizen, parent, householder, and worker. By examining several lists proposed by the United Nations and others, he extracts their common elements and offers a systematic account of the needs one would have over the course of a life. The list consists of needs for a life-supporting relation to the environment; for whatever is indispensable to preserving the body intact in important respects (including food, water, exercise, and periodic rest); for companionship; for education; for social acceptance and recognition; for sexual activity; for recreation; and for freedom from harassment, including not being continually frightened. Focusing on what humans typically do (through consideration of roles) provides Braybrooke with a good reference point for compiling this list. Someone might claim that not all these needs apply to everyone (e.g., the need for sexual activity for a nun or the need for companionship for a hermit), but recall that Braybrooke is interested in deriving a list of items that are plausibly needed in order to carry out the four roles he identifies. In order to have the genuine choice to perform the role, one typically needs items on the list. Len Doyal and Ian Gough’s view is that needs are universalizable preconditions that enable non-impaired participation in any form of life. Chief among these preconditions will be physical health and the mental competence to deliberate and choose, or autonomy. They recognize a class of “intermediate needs,” which aim to connect the two basic needs with knowledge available about basic needs in the social sciences. These are: nutritional food and clean water, protective housing, a nonhazardous work environment, a non-hazardous physical environment, appropriate health care, security in childhood, significant primary relationships, physical security, economic security, appropriate education, safe birth control, and safe child-bearing. Their account provides

Basic Rights

important connections between the philosophical literature and the social and natural sciences, which could facilitate measuring progress with respect to meeting needs in the world. Braybrooke’s and Doyal and Gough’s accounts highlight important features of recent accounts of basic needs: the importance of social (not just physical) functioning in particular communities; the relevance of information about human needs collected by the natural and social sciences; and the importance of cross-cultural comparison. More generally, there are several common elements to these and other recent accounts of normatively salient needs. The needs that matter morally are those that are necessary, indispensable, or inescapable, at least with respect to human functioning in social groups. Moreover, if such needs are not met, we are unable to do anything much at all, let alone to lead a recognizably human life. Meeting needs is essential to our ability to function as human agents. Another common strategy deployed in arguing for the importance of needs is to highlight just how vulnerable people are to coercion or oppression when their needs are not met. While one dominant approach in the needs literature is to emphasize the link between needs and human agency, other approaches can be discerned, such as linking our basic needs to what is required for human flourishing. This kind of more expansive account is sometimes more vulnerable to skeptical concerns about basic needs, such as that they cannot be adequately distinguished from people’s wants, preferences, or desires. Another common concern about needs is that they are so culturally, societally, or historically relative that they can play no useful role in public policy. However, as both the accounts featured above illustrate, there is some core area of convergence, and importantly, there are some clear criteria by which we can determine which needs are to be granted moral and political importance in matters of public policy. The concern about relativity does not necessarily undermine the important role needs do and should play in matters of distributive justice. Basic needs have played an important role in global public policy matters, for instance, in the so-called basic needs approach, introduced by Paul Streeten in the 1970s. The idea was to identify universal basic needs and then to provide the means to meet these to communities in an attempt to address global poverty. However, the implementation of this program suffered from several avoidable problems, such as excessive paternalism and commodity-focus, with the result that the capabilities approach is often thought to be superior, especially in its ability to avoid these dangers. Whether or not the basic

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needs and capabilities approaches are necessarily distinct is also subject to debate, as is the matter of whether the dangers often associated with the basic needs approach must always accompany it.

Related Topics

▶ Absolute Poverty ▶ Basic Rights ▶ Capabilities Approach ▶ Development Assistance ▶ Duties of Assistance ▶ Duties to the Distant Needy ▶ Global Poverty ▶ Poverty ▶ Relative Poverty

References Braybrooke D (1987) Meeting needs. Princeton University Press, Princeton Brock G (ed) (1998) Necessary goods: our responsibilities to meet others’ needs. Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham Brock G (2009) Global justice: a cosmopolitan account. Oxford University Press, Oxford Doyal L, Gough I (1991) A theory of human need. MacMillan, Houndsmills Frankfurt H (1998) Necessity and desire. In: Brock G (ed) Necessary goods: our responsibilities to meet others’ needs. Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, pp 19–23 Miller D (2007) National responsibility and global justice. Oxford University Press, Oxford Reader S (ed) (2005) The philosophy of need. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Streeten P et al (1982) First things first. Oxford University Press, World Bank Research Publication, Oxford Thomson G (1987) Needs. Routledge, London Wiggins D (1987) Claims of need. In: Wiggins D (ed) Needs, values, truth. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 1–57

Basic Rights MICHAEL BOYLAN Department of Philosophy, Marymount University, Arlington, VA, USA

Introduction Basic rights are a category within human rights that cover the strongest rights claims. A list of basic rights might include: food, water, sanitation, clothing, protection from unwarranted bodily harm, basic health care, primary

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and secondary education, liberty rights, and the autonomy (and opportunity) to do with one’s life as she likes. This is a large list. Which of these rights are most basic? Which stand out before the others? In order to answer this question, we must examine first the definition of a claim right and then how it is justified.

What Is a Claim Right? Claims rights are legitimate claims that an agent may make to some other agent or community for particular goods. Since rights claims are always against some responding party, it is important to distinguish two different conceptions about who might have the correlative duties that correspond to the legitimate basic rights claims. On the one hand are those supporting a nationalist perspective (such as John Rawls (1971)). In this case, the claim is against fellow citizens of a nation. On the other hand are those supporting a cosmopolitan perspective (such as Pogge (2008)). In this case, the claim is against all those on earth in a position to satisfy the claim (according to the ought implies can standard).

How Are Claim Rights Justified? There are three principal justifications for human rights: legal, interest-based, and agency-based. Let us address these in order. First, there are legal-based justifications for human rights. This approach depends upon either contractarianism (via some international body such as the United Nations) or intuitionism. Under these paradigms, we have documents that are agreed upon by certain representative individuals because of mutual interest or because they are intuited to be valid claims. Two key examples of a contractarian basis are (a) the Universal Declaration of Human rights (agreed to by representatives of the member nations) and (b) the United States Bill of Rights (agreed to by representatives of the first United States Congress). To answer our generating question, the list of human rights would be pared to basic rights by general agreement. However, a downside to this approach is that these legal regulations require a measure of specificity. This means a level of interpretation. When one enters the international sphere, the force of the legalistic approach can be compromised because the various nation states that sign some particular agreement (contractarianism) often represent a particular constituency at a particular moment in history. The time span of the human signers is short. When a new head of state comes into power, he or she does not necessarily feel bound by the personal acts of

a predecessor. Because there is no World Government with executive or judicial power of enforcement, the signatories to international treaties are really subject to an honor system. In practice, this often means that weak countries must comply while rich and powerful countries comply at their pleasure. When there is no one with the power to enforce contracts (including binding penalties), then the only reason any nation would comply would be self-interest on a changeable basis. This reality leaves the legal tact with a significant gap. The second approach to human rights seeks a moral justification via the interest-based approach. Jonathan Mann suggests that the implicit question the modern human rights movement should ask is about the societal, especially the governmental, roles and responsibilities in promoting individual and collective well-being (Mann 1996). If human rights is fundamentally concerned with well-being, then following Raz, one has a right if and only if one can have rights, and, other things being equal, an aspect of one’s well-being (that is, one’s interest) is a sufficient reason for holding some other person(s) to be under a duty (Raz 1986). The key point here is how we are to assess one’s well-being. Turning to our generating question the list provided would be pared in accordance with the conditions of well-being. Much like Sen’s capabilities approach (Sen 2000), the focus is upon some end state. Whatever it takes to achieve well-being (in some minimal way) within a society, then that constitutes a ground for a legitimate rights claim. Advocates for this approach say that over and against the legalistic approach, the interest-based grounding of human rights in well-being gives a more theoretical foundation so that hard cases will be solved by theoretical principles and not by hair-splitting legal decisions. Detractors will say that well-being is too far down the food chain to be effective. They would assert that well-being is the responsibility of the agent. This leads us to the third justification for human rights, agency-based arguments. Those who take the aforementioned objection to the well-being position (including this author) will say that policy is best served by outlining specific goods (the most fundamental for action are biologically based: food, water, clothing, sanitation, protection from unwarranted bodily harm including basic health care). Once one knows what these goods are, then the generating question is answered about what constitutes basic rights – it is the claim to these fundamental goods of human action. The force of the agency basis of human rights rests upon the conditions necessary for humans to commit purposive action. On the agency account, desiring

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to commit purposive action amounts to something close to human nature. Under the agency account, the correlative duty of others is to give her what she needs to be a minimally effective actor in the world. The rest is up to her. There are certainly some overlaps between the interestbased and agency accounts. They each approach the problem with a different foundational aim. The interest-based account looks at an end product of well-being and tries to figure out what is needed to get there. The agency account looks at an end product of committing purposive action and tries to figure out what is necessary to allow voluntary, purposive action to take place. Each theory describes a primitive level that would stand as a justificatory basis of basic rights from the standpoint of that theory: legal, interest-based, or agency-based.

Basic Rights in the World Those goods that allow a person to stay alive are the most important to protect. I parse these as: food, water, sanitation, clothing, protection from unwarranted bodily harm, and basic health care. These goods are woefully lacking around the world. There are 1.02 billion hungry people who live undernourished on less than 500 cal a day (FAO). These are people who cannot act except in the most minimal way. The worst off are in Asia, the Pacific, and Africa. The WHO also reports that over one billion people in 149 countries are stricken with tropical diseases (many of which are fatal). Some of these are due to poor sanitation and dirty water and others due to other vectors such as mosquitoes and unprotected sex. Treatments for these exist among the G-8 nations (the wealthiest eight nations in the world). Much of the rest of the planet fends for itself with some small relief from various organizations (see below). The most common cause for homelessness is to become a refugee (internal or external). Refugees arise from political violence, natural disaster, and epidemic disease. In some countries in the world, such as Iraq and Sudan, there are estimated to be almost half of the population that has been displaced and forced to live in temporary situation. Sometimes temporary situations can extend for decades. One example of protection from unwarranted bodily harm is in female sex trafficking. Sadly, this is a growing problem and not a diminishing one. Young girls are sold by parents, kidnapped, or are the spoils of war and internal conflict. Because of the second-class status of women in most of the world, there is little outcry.

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Too many in the world lack the basic rights to claim basic goods that might enable them to live even minimally decent lives.

Agents of Change At the writing of this entry, the primary agents to protect basic rights are: (1) wealthy governments around the world, (2) nongovernmental organizations, (3) The United Nations, and (4) private citizens through wealth or personal volunteer action. Each of these agencies operates differently (Boylan 2011).

Related Topics

▶ Basic Needs ▶ Capabilities Approach ▶ Cosmopolitan Justice ▶ Duties of Assistance ▶ Duties, Positive and Negative ▶ Global Justice ▶ Global Poverty ▶ Human Rights ▶ Natural Rights ▶ Primary Goods ▶ Rights

References Boylan M (2004) A just society. Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham/Oxford Boylan M (2011a) Morality and global justice. Westview, Boulder Boylan M (2011b) The morality and global justice reader. Westview, Boulder Churchill RP (2006) Human rights and global diversity. Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River Gewirth A (1978) Reason and morality. University of Chicago Press, Chicago Griffin J (2008) On human rights. Oxford University Press, Oxford Mann J (1996) Health and human rights. Br Med J 312:924–925 Mann J (1997) Medicine and public health: ethics and human rights. Hastings Center Report 27.3: 6–13 Pogge TW (2008) World poverty and human rights, 2nd edn. Polity, Oxford Rawls J (1971) A theory of justice. Harvard University Press, Cambridge Rawls J (1999) The law of peoples. Harvard University Press, Cambridge Raz J (1986) The morality of freedom. Clarendon Press, Oxford Scanlon TM (1998) What we owe each other. Harvard University Press, Cambridge Sen A (2000) Development as freedom. Anchor, New York Shue H (1996) Basic rights, 2nd edn. Princeton University Press, Princeton Singer B (1993) Operative rights. SUNY, Albany Internet Sites www.Fao.org/hunger.org www.who.int/research.en www.refugeesinternational.org www.humantrafficking.org www.globalwater.org www.amnesty.org

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Bauman, Zygmunt ALEX CURRIT Department of Sociology, Brigham Young University, Provo, UT, USA

Zygmunt Bauman was born into a non-practicing Jewish family in Poland on November 19, 1925. In 1970, he became a Professor of Sociology at the University of Leeds, where, since 1990, he has been a Professor Emeritus. Bauman is a prolific writer, producing approximately a book a year well into his 80s. He has frequently engaged some of the most significant current social and political questions, such as war, mass violence (terrorism, and the Holocaust), consumerism, democracy, ethics, and globalization. His works particularly addressing these issues include: Postmodernity and Its Discontents (1997), Modernity and the Holocaust (2001), and Globalization: The Human Consequences (1998). One of Bauman’s primary themes is that modernity makes universal global justice essentially impossible because modern bureaucracy severs decision makers from the consequences of their decisions (for instance, shareholders of a company in America need never have any direct interaction with their overseas factory workers). Furthermore, a “free” global market destroys peoples’ ability to locally legislate because decision-making centers of global mega-companies are free from the territorial restraints of locality, thus nationstates are functionally rendered into security agencies for global mega-companies. With labor abundantly available and policed by nation-states, labor can be factored out of the economic equations of investors, thereby making investors globally mobile and labor (meaning those dependant on global investors for their livelihood) locally immobile. In this case, true “freedom” becomes restricted to those with physical mobility – a mobility which can only be purchased. In this world environment, competition between individual nation-states is quickly being replaced by competition between groups of states, making the distinction between internal and global markets even more unclear. This, in turn, makes territory and population policing initiatives almost impossible – meaning that essentially local governments are restricted to handling micro affairs, while the global community handles macro ones. Bauman further argues that this leads to companies having a vested interest in states strong enough to protect their production processes but too weak to impose trade or labor restrictions. Thus, the interdependent relationship between political fragmentation and economic

globalization renders the reconstruction of pressing social problems into effectual community-level collective solutions nearly impossible. For Bauman, modernity has been characterized by secularization, with the lives of individuals becoming increasingly fragmented to the degree that no central religious authority is able to produce a dissonance-free ideology applicable in every area of an individual’s life. With this increased fragmentation, Bauman believes the ethical quality of actions should likewise be fragmented into three categories: economics, esthetics, and morality; meaning, for example, that an action could be economically correct, but ethically wrong in regard to morality. Bauman argues however that this does not mean anything goes and every action or belief should be accepted. Instead he believes that to act morally is to assume moral responsibility – responsibility based on the idea that morality is defined as setting aside our own self-interests, and acting purely in the interest of others. This modern morality creates problems for states seeking global justice as the fragmentation of morality leads to human behavior becoming increasingly unpredictable and thereby becoming a source of potential instability. States thus seek to legitimate control over human behavior by constructing and legislating a universal moral dogma. However, Bauman believes that the ambivalence of the postmodern individual renders such pursuits impossible, and therefore endeavors to legislate global justice fundamentally cannot result in a universal code of ethics and thus should be limited to empowering free individuals with the rights that are imperative to securing and perpetuating the conditions of their freedom.

Related Topics

▶ Alterglobalization ▶ Barber, Benjamin ▶ Capitalism ▶ Citizenship ▶ Corruption ▶ Human Right to Democracy ▶ Poverty ▶ Sovereignty ▶ Territorial Rights ▶ World Government

References Bauman Z (1989) Modernity and the holocaust. Cornell University Press, Ithaca Bauman Z (1996) Assimilation into exile: the Jew as a Polish writer. Poetics Today 17(4):569–597. Duke University Press, Durham Bauman Z (1997) Postmodernity and its discontents. New York University Press, New York Bauman Z (1998) Globalization: the human consequences. Columbia University Press, New York

Beitz, Charles Bauman Z (2001) Community: seeking safety in an insecure world. Polity, Cambridge Best S (1998) Review: Zygmunt Bauman: personal reflections within the mainstream of modernity. Br J Sociol 49:331–320. Blackwell, Boston Gardiner M (2006) Review: Bauman before postmodernity: invitation, conversations, and annotated bibliography, 1953–1989. Acta Sociol 49:228–230. Sage Publications, Beverly Hills Isaac J (1996) A new guarantee on Earth: Hannah Arendt on human dignity and the politics of human rights. Am Polit Sci Rev 90:61–73. American Political Science Association Scott JC (1976) The moral economy of the peasant. Yale University Press, New Haven

Beijing Platform on Women ▶ Falk, Richard ▶ Gender Justice ▶ Okin, Susan

Beitz, Charles ROBERT PAUL CHURCHILL Department of Philosophy, Columbian College of Arts & Sciences, George Washington University, Washington, DC, USA

Charles Beitz is an American philosopher and political theorist whose classic Political Theory and International Relations (1979, 1999), probably more than any other text, demonstrated the importance of ethics and political theory for twentieth-century international relations and international law. In this work, Beitz also offered what is widely believed to be the first persuasive argument for global principles of justice. Beitz’s Political Theory and International Relations (PTIR) together with Henry Shue’s Basic Rights (1980, 1996) are seen as foundational texts for the field of international political theory. Beitz also has made major contributions to the literatures on cosmopolitanism and human rights. Beitz has joined with James Nickel (1987, 2007) in holding that the human rights tradition is not continuous with the tradition of natural rights developed by philosophers. In The Idea of Human Rights (2009), Beitz argues that human rights ought to be understood and justified as part of a complex practice that has emerged following the settlement of World War II.

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Beitz on Rawls and Global Justice PTIR is divided into three parts. In the first part, Beitz repudiates the realist and neo-realist theories of international relations as a Hobbesian state of nature in which moral judgments cannot be applied. Beitz demonstrates that the realists’ Hobbesian view is empirically false and theoretically untenable. In the second part, Beitz argues against a widely held view he characterizes as the “autonomy of states.” This is a view maintained by Michael Walzer (1977, 1992), among others, to the effect that states have rights of autonomy that insulate them from external moral assessment and political interference from other states. Beitz argues instead that a theory of international relations should include a revised principle of state autonomy based on the justice of states’ domestic institutions. In the third part of the book, Beitz makes a strikingly daring application of the logic of John Rawls’ contractarian arguments in A Theory of Justice (1971). Applying the logic of Rawls’ original position and veil of ignorance to the international sphere, Beitz generates a cosmopolitan transformation of Rawls’ theory. Beitz argues that a correct application of Rawls’ reasoning justifies a resource distribution principle and a global difference principle to establish a fair division of resources and wealth among persons situated in diverse national societies. In PTIR, Beitz criticizes Rawls by arguing that, even if we are to assume with Rawls that states are separate selfcontained societies, their representatives meeting in a second original position would not accept the principles Rawls envisages. In particular, Beitz argues contra Rawls that representatives of states would not agree to a principle confirming that natural resources belong to the states whose territories encompass them. The existing distribution of natural resources is morally arbitrary so that no state deserves its resource endowment. Thus, not knowing whether their own states were resource-rich or not, riskaverse representatives would insist on a principle that distributed resources equally by means of some kind of global wealth tax. However, Beitz goes on to argue in PTIR that, because of interdependence, states cannot be treated as selfcontained societies as Rawls had assumed. There is no need for a second contract between state representatives as Rawls had suggested in A Theory of Justice. Instead, the logic of Rawls’ theory of justice should be applied worldwide. In addition to the equal liberty principle, parties in an international original position would select a global difference principle. No separate principle governing resources would be needed, as the global difference principle makes it superfluous. The global difference principle

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would apply in international society as Rawls’ difference principle applies in domestic society. It is the globally least advantaged represented group whose position must be improved if significant inequalities are to be allowed among societies. With the publication of The Laws of Peoples (1999), Rawls continued to insist that societies must be seen for the purposes of theory as self-contained cooperative schemes for mutual advantage. For over a decade, the efforts of Beitz, Rawls, and others (e.g., Pogge 1989, 2002; Caney 2002; Buchanan 2004) to establish foundations for global justice were among the most widely debated topics in political theory and philosophy. Although interdependence throughout the globe has greatly increased since the 1970s when Beitz wrote, it is still argued by some critics of Beitz that relations between affluent and poor countries cannot be seen in terms of the mutual cooperation and reciprocity necessary to think of global society in a way appropriate for application of a contractarian theory of justice. However, in his 1983 paper “Cosmopolitan Ideals and National Sovereignty,” Beitz already had moved away from a contractarian approach and was grounding cosmopolitanism on a Kantian account of the moral equality of persons and following the movement of Rawls’ later thought in Rawls’ Dewey Lectures. (Beitz addresses this change in perspective in the Afterword of the 1999 edition of PTIR.)

Open-Ended Cosmopolitanism In the third part of PTIR, Beitz had been agnostic about what ideally just global institutions might be like. Then, in “Cosmopolitan Liberalism and the States System” (1994), Beitz drew an important distinction between moral cosmopolitanism and institutional cosmopolitanism that he reinforced in the Afterword to the 1999 edition of PTIR as well as an important 2005 paper. Beitz claims that, unlike institutional cosmopolitanism, moral cosmopolitanism does not entail any ambitious claims about the best structure for international affairs. Moral cosmopolitanism, which Beitz endorses, simply insists on the global application of a single moral maxim: questions about policies to select and institutions to establish should be based on an impartial consideration of the claims of each and every person who will be affected. Thus, by 2005, Beitz concluded that the bare idea of moral cosmopolitanism is too protean to settle most issues. Beitz adds that while in PTIR he pictured the responsibilities of affluent states to the less advantaged on the model of foreign development assistance, in 2005 he concedes that this view, if taken on its own, is oversimplified and might lead one to confuse the part with the whole.

Not only are the requirements of justice grounded in interests of different degrees of urgency that exert claims of different weights, it is not unreasonable to expect the requirements of social justice, at the level of institutions, laws, and policies, to vary across societies in ways that respond to differences in the economic, social, and cultural background and that are too diverse to be easily comprehended within a single normative framework. Thus, justice cannot be applied directly to the relations among individuals in a manner not mediated by membership in political and institutional structures including states themselves. Thus, in The Idea of Human Rights (2009), Beitz rejects the view, increasingly popular in the human rights movement, that human rights ought to be regarded as the standards for international social justice. Beitz argues that, whereas human rights are matters of international concern, it is not plausible that the international community can take responsibility for all of the issues of justice arising within its component societies. For Beitz, the diversity of interests and problems in the international arena generates equally diverse reasons for action. We face the continual possibility of conflict between cosmopolitan claims and sectional values as well as a plurality of incompatible ethical responses to global problems such as global poverty. Moreover, as for a theory of global justice per se, Beitz holds that there is as yet no subject for such a theory to be about, nor do we know how to proceed in constructing such a theory. A just scheme needs to be designed so that, as far as possible, distributions accepted as just would result from the normal operations of global institutions. The only models of distributive justice presently available come from domestic contexts and they do not apply globally in any straightforward manner. And as we acquire more specific and accurate knowledge of economic globalization, transnational networks of officials, and global governance functions, as well as regional and local conditions, we may find the integration of practical knowledge with ethics and political theory results in something we had not previously anticipated.

Beitz on Human Rights By the time The Idea of Human Rights (IHR) was published, Beitz had rejected his earlier view (e.g., 1979) that human rights are derivative from social justice. In IHR, Beitz argues that human rights are a distinct normative system constructed in the post–World War II era to play a special role in global political life. International human rights consist of a normative practice that developed more or less sui generis and we need to investigate

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how the idea of human rights functions within the practice. Because human rights have a discursive function as triggers of international concern and action, human rights must be open to endorsement from a variety of reasonable points of view in order to be suitable for contemporary international life. Thus, Beitz rejects both the view that human rights are derived from the philosophical logic of natural rights and claims that human rights can be justified on the basis of the natural features of persons such as normative agency or central human capabilities. Human rights are the constitutive norms of an emergent global practice with its own characteristic purposes. The practice itself is constituted by acceptance of a distinctive class of norms as reasons for action rather than agreement over the content of the human rights set forth in declarations, covenants, and treaties. Thus, in IHR Beitz believes he has derived a practical model of human rights that describes an existing discursive practice. It is faithful to a substantial portion of human rights discourse developed by examining the historical origins and purposes of human rights doctrines and analyzing the roles the idea plays within discursive practices in which competent practitioners, lawyers, and experts engage. This model has two levels to represent a division of labor between states as bearers of the primary responsibilities to protect human rights and those who act as agents of the international community and guarantors of these rights. Thus, the model has three elements altogether: (1) the accepted understanding that human rights are requirements whose object is to protect urgent individual interests against standard threats, (2) at a first level, the requirements of human rights apply to the political institutions of states, and (3) human rights are matters of international concern such that a government’s failure to carry out its first-level responsibilities may give rise to reasons for action by appropriately placed and capable second-level agents outside the state. While human rights are constituted within an international discursive practice, that is, in terms of the reasons for action competent participants will find decisive, Beitz concedes that there is considerable controversy over the specific content of many human rights. Beitz also rejects the view that international acceptance implies some agreement on a deeper level of moral justification, such as agreement on a common core, an overlapping consensus, or a progressive convergence. Beitz stresses that the practice is emergent and ongoing, and subject to critical review among members of the practice itself. Thus, it cannot be agreement over the content of specific rights that provides human rights norms with their moral authority as such agreement would deprive human rights of their role in

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criticizing existing institutions, states, and conventions, including the practice itself. Moreover, because human rights is a problem-solving practice that must come to grips with complex realities of the world, there is continual relativity of human rights on contingent but important and varying circumstances. Beitz presents three major conditions for the justification of human rights norms. First, the interests to be protected by rights, when regarded from the perspective of the vulnerable, must be sufficiently urgent to be reasonably regarded political priorities. Second, it is advantageous to protect the underlying interests by means of legal or policy instruments available to the state. Third, typical or general failures of states to protect these interests are suitable grounds for international concern. This third condition imposes a requirement of feasibility. Unless there is some permissible and constructive form of international action that agents could have reason to carry out, there is no practical point to counting a protection as an international human right. In Beitz’s view, these conditions are jointly necessary and sufficient for the justification of human rights. Among the notable features of Beitz’s justificatory schema, one is its appeal to a plurality of normative considerations, including consequentialism as indicated by the second condition. The schema also allows for normative open-endedness insofar as the urgency of interests, the vulnerability of these interests to likely threats, and their amenability to political and legal protection, while based on public reasons, are nevertheless subject to considerable variation. The justification of human rights, as with institutional rights, depends to some extent on historical and social contingencies. Additionally, when a state fails to respect human rights, agents outside the state have pro tanto, or prima facie, reasons to act that are not necessarily conclusive. In Beitz’s view, whatever its importance from the perspective of potential beneficiaries and however appropriate it would be as a requirement for domestic institutions, an interest needing protection cannot count as a human right if it fails to satisfy a feasibility requirement of this kind. There are a number of significant consequences of Beitz’s schematic justification of human rights. First, Beitz rejects the approach often taken in philosophical discussions about the human rights of distant others. For instance, Henry Shue (1980, 1996) demonstrated that we must be cautious about claiming that a group (e.g., the human rights to security of persons in Darfur) lack human rights simply because it is not immediately apparent who bears the correlative obligations vis-a`-vis rights-holders. However, while Beitz’s tripartite model of human rights

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distinguishes reasons for protecting urgent interests from the reasons why distinct and diverse agents might be obligated to act, his justificatory schema has the consequence of collapsing the more traditional distinction between questions about the existence of human rights and questions about correlative obligations. It is a consequence of Beitz’s efforts to locate the justification of human rights within ongoing discursive practices which are constitutive of human rights, that the existence of a right depends, in the last analysis on the possibility of its justification. And due to the feasibility condition in Beitz’s justificatory schema, and the absence of any mechanism for assigning second-level obligations to specific agents, Beitz’s account of normativity complicates the number of reasons for action requiring careful consideration. Contrary to philosophers such as O’Neill (2005), Beitz rejects the view that so-called manifesto or aspirational rights are “normatively inert” (2009, 165). IHR is certain to be controversial for other reasons as well. For instance, given Beitz’s justificatory scheme, all human rights can be derogated, many, if not all, very considerably. This view is inconsistent with positions David Luban (2009) and Henry Shue (1978) have taken with respect to torture, for example. Yet, it hardly seems plausible for Beitz to say that a right not to be tortured is a different kind of right, perhaps a natural right, given its central role in what Beitz characterizes as the practice of human rights. Other critics might object to the inferences that if a persuasive case cannot be made for intervention or action on the part of relevant agents, then there is no actionable rights claim and therefore no human right after all. It might be asked whether this analysis eliminates the critical element of moral tragedy that results when a people have a moral right but others cannot effectively provide relief. Will Beitz’s analysis reignite the philosophical tradition he seeks to end? If critics believe greater relative weight should be given to urgent interests human rights are taken to protect than Beitz is willing to grant, then so-called naturalists are likely to continue to tie the urgency of human rights to the central capacities of human beings, or the necessary features of agency. Finally, is Beitz’s description of the practice flawed? Surely, some will claim that the practice itself distinguishes a category of offenses against human rights, including genocide and mass atrocity crimes, in which the responsibility to protect justifies coercive intervention. In such cases, there are two sorts of questions: whether infringement of human rights generates reasons for outside agents to act, and what forms of action by which agents might be likely to succeed. Given this distinction, human rights are not themselves constituted within the practice, or at least not within the same

practice in which issues of humanitarian intervention are raised and settled.

Beitz’s Influence The influence of PTIR on political scientists, philosophers, lawyers, and a wide range of practitioners helps explain why cosmopolitanism and theories of global justice advanced as rapidly and densely since the 1970s. Today, entire university courses and conferences are devoted to global justice, and almost invariably include a study of PTIR or other works by Beitz. In addition, Beitz had farreaching influence as editor for more than a decade of Philosophy & Public Affairs, one of the first and most influential journals to publish articles on global justice and international ethics. Beitz’s renunciation of moral skepticism has, in the view of many, consigned realism – the orthodox view when PTIR was published – to diminishing significance while Beitz’s criticism of the autonomy of states model reinvigorated debate over the moral judgment of states’ behaviors. Today, the general principle accepted by scholars and increasingly among those who make international policy is the principle advocated by Beitz, namely, that a state’s freedom from external criticism and intervention ought to depend on the justice of its institutions and actions. One measure of Beitz’s continuing influence is the 2005 symposium on his work in the journal Review of International Studies (2005).

Related Topics

▶ Buchanan, Allen ▶ Caney, Simon ▶ Contractarianism ▶ Cosmopolitanism ▶ Global Difference Principle ▶ Global Distributive Justice ▶ Global Justice ▶ Global Resource Distribution ▶ Human Rights ▶ Moral Cosmopolitanism ▶ Natural Rights ▶ Pogge, Thomas ▶ Political Liberalism ▶ Rawls, John ▶ Second Original Position

References Beitz CR (1979a) Human rights and social justice. In: Brown PG, MacLean D (eds) Human rights and US foreign policy. Lexington Books, Lexington/Toronto, pp 45–63 Beitz CR (1979b) Political theory and international relations, 1st and 2nd edn. Princeton University Press, Princeton

Beneficence, Principle of Beitz CR (1983) Cosmopolitan ideals and national sovereignty. J Philos 80:591–600 Beitz CR (1994) Cosmopolitan liberalism and the states system. In: Brown C (ed) Political restructuring in Europe: ethical perspectives. Routledge, London/New York, pp 123–136 Beitz CR (2000) Rawls’s law of peoples. Ethics 110:669–696 Beitz CR (2001) Human rights as a common concern. Am Polit Sci Rev 95:269–282 Beitz CR (2003) What human rights mean. Daedalus 132:36–46 Beitz CR (2004) Human rights and the law of peoples. In: Chatterjee DK (ed) The ethics of assistance, morality and the distant needy. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Beitz CR (2005) Cosmopolitanism and global justice. Ethics 9:11–27 Beitz CR (2009) The idea of human rights. Oxford University Press, Oxford Beitz CR, Goodin RE (eds) (2009) Global human rights. Oxford University Press, New York Buchanan A (2004) Justice, legitimacy, and self-determination: moral foundations for international law. Oxford University Press, Oxford Caney S (2002) Justice beyond borders: a global political theory. Oxford University Press, Oxford Luban D (2009) Unthinking the ticking bomb. In: Beitz CR, Goodin RE (eds) Global human rights. Oxford University Press, New York Nickel JW (1987, 2007) Making sense of human rights, 1st and 2nd edn. University of California Press, Los Angeles and Berkeley and Blackwell Publishing, Malden O’Neill O (2005) The dark side of human rights. Int Aff 81:427–439 Pogge T (1989) Realizing Rawls. Cornell University Press, Ithaca Pogge T (2002, 2008) World poverty and human rights, 1st and 2nd edn. Polity, Cambridge Rawls J (1971, 1999) A theory of justice, 1st and 2nd (revised) edn. Harvard University Press, Cambridge Rawls J (1999a) Kantian constructivism in moral theory (The Dewey lectures). In: Freeman S (ed) John Rawls: collected papers. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, pp 303–358 Rawls J (1999b) The law of peoples. Harvard University Press, Cambridge Rengger N et al (2005) Reading Charles Beitz: twenty-five years of political theory and international affairs. Rev Int Stud 31:361–423 Shue H (1978) Torture. Philos Public Aff 7:124–143 Shue H (1980, 1996) Basic rights: subsistence, affluence and U.S. foreign policy, 1st and 2nd edn. Princeton University Press, Princeton Walzer M (1977, 1992) Just and unjust wars, 1st and 2nd edn. Basic Books, New York

Beneficence, Principle of SUSAN P. MURPHY School of Politics and International Relations, University College Dublin, Dublin, Ireland

The principle of beneficence forms a part of almost all major moral and ethical theories. The principle gives rise to a normative agent-based claim that one (an agent) should act for the benefit of, or for the good of, another

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(or others). The term benevolence refers to the character trait of an agent acting for the good of another. The basic concept of beneficence, as an action performed by one person for the benefit of another, is broadly accepted as a rational, cultural, or religious imperative. The source of this moral claim differs across moral, religious, ethical, and cultural traditions. Also, there is little consensus across these traditions on the scope and content of the duties that can be derived from this claim. The following will firstly provide an overview of the nature of the principle of beneficence; secondly, it will outline the source, scope, and content of this principle in the two dominant moral theories of the Western secular philosophical tradition – consequentialism and Kantianism. There has been increasing interest in recent years in the philosophical foundations of the principle of beneficence and the duties this gives rise to. The modern conditions of increasing globalization, transnational economic interaction, and interdependence, the changing role and face of the state, combined with the existence and persistence of radical deprivation have generated much debate among philosophers contributing to the discourse on Global Justice. Much of the discourse focuses on the principle of beneficence as giving rise to an agent-based claim upon individuals, as opposed to a claim upon the actions and behavior of states. More specifically, the discourse on Global Justice is concerned with the source, scope, and content of this principle as it applies to strangers or those beyond state borders and outside our immediate domain of special relationships.

The Source of the Principle The principle of beneficence refers to actions we ought to do for the good of another (others). That is, it can be understood as giving rise to a moral claim on individual agents from which specific duties can be derived. Consequentialist moral theory encompasses a broad family of philosophical perspectives that largely converge on the moral significance and importance of outcomes, goals, or interests in determining the moral value of actions and reasons to act. Within this tradition there is broad consensus on the role of the principle of beneficence. Broadly speaking, this principle gives rise to a normative claim on every agent to promote the good by performing actions that will produce the best outcomes or maximize the interests or utility of the greatest number of people. Utilitarian moral theory is one representative of this family. In the work of David Hume and John S. Mill, the principle of beneficence is the supreme principle of morality and an original feature of human nature. Beneficence arises from the principle of utility from which all duties

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and actions can be derived and judged. The motive of the principle of beneficence is to maximize happiness or wellbeing for the greatest number. For philosophers within the Kantian tradition, the source of this principle is the individual moral agent with the capacity to act rationally and autonomously. Beneficence is not the supreme principle of morality but a principle of duty. Kant’s account of beneficence is grounded on a principle of duty, that is, that agents have duties to perform certain actions because it is right to do your duty. The motive of duty is duty itself rather than securing good outcomes or maximizing happiness. The principle of beneficence and the moral claim this gives rise to – that an agent should act for the good of another – are connected to one specific end for all agents that Kant takes to be obligatory. This is to promote the happiness and interests of others according to one’s means and without demanding anything in return.

The Nature of Duties The constitutive characteristics of the duties derived from the principle of beneficence can be broadly described as follows. Firstly, duties can be either positive or negative in nature. That is, they can require an agent to perform certain actions for specific others. Such positive duties of beneficence are selective in nature. As it is not possible to act for the good of all others all of the time, agents must select the specific actions they can undertake and for whom. Secondly, duties can also be negative in nature, such as a duty not to harm or not to interfere. Negative duties of beneficence can be universally applied. Thirdly, duties of beneficence are imperfect in nature. That is, they are incomplete and indeterminate. There is an indefinite variety of acts that one can undertake to promote the good of another – care, friendship, love, emotional support, financial support, technical support, training, education, knowledge sharing, and so on. Fourthly, selection of the most appropriate action to be performed will depend on a number of factors including: the circumstance of the other person(s); recognition of the other person as a human being with interests, goals, and needs; the skills and capacity of the agent performing the action; the cost of the action; and often a belief on behalf of the agent and the beneficiary in the value of the actions to be performed. Finally, the scope of ethical concern for principles of beneficence can be either universal or special. It is widely accepted that special relationships such as family, employer/employee contracts, community members, and membership of a nation are the context of certain types of duties that can be derived from the principle of

beneficence. The critical question with which philosophers writing on Global Justice are concerned is whether duties of beneficence extend to those outside such special relationships. There is no analytical constraint within the concept of beneficence or the nature of the principle to restrict its reach to special relationships. However, the practice of beneficence does entail the process of selection. If it is impossible to perform acts for the benefit of all others all of the time, it is necessary for an agent to identify to whom they should give consideration and which acts to perform. The question of scope and potential sources of constraint on the principle of beneficence are considered in greater detail below. Beneficent actions can be distinguished from supererogatory actions that it is permissible but not obligatory for an agent to perform. Supererogatory actions are widely understood as beyond the call of duty. Whereas the principle of beneficence governs all every day actions and interactions with others, supererogation refers to acts of kindness, mercy, or charity that are not obligatory. Supererogatory actions can range from small acts of kindness and generosity to those that involve great sacrifices by the agent, entailing a significant reduction of the agent’s wellbeing or involving significant risk to an agent’s life.

The Principle of Beneficence and Consequentialist Moral Theory Within the discourse on Global Justice, the work of Peter Singer has perhaps been most influential and controversial on the subject of beneficence. Singer’s article “Famine, Affluence, and Morality” (1972) acted as the catalyst for the renewed philosophical exploration of the principle of beneficence and the normative claim upon agents that this gives rise to. Under the modern conditions of increased globalization, the changing role and face of the state, unprecedented levels of wealth in affluent or developed states coupled with mass poverty, harm, and extreme levels of human suffering in less affluent states, Singer builds a universalist, consequentialist account of the principle of beneficence that he takes to hold upon all agents, regardless of state boundaries or special ties. Starting from ordinary moral thinking and reasoning, Singer begins with the relatively uncontroversial premise that suffering caused by poverty is bad. He then extrapolates from this that one should prevent this bad from occurring if it is in one’s power to do so without sacrificing anything of comparable value. The physical proximity of the person experiencing harm is not a morally relevant factor. In an effort to move from an abstract principle to the specific practical question of who ought to do what for

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whom, Singer introduces a third empirical premise: That donations to aid agencies prevent suffering and harm caused by poverty and do not sacrifice anything of comparable value. Therefore it is wrong not to donate to aid agencies (2009). The amount of aid we should donate should be the maximum amount we can give without sacrificing anything of equal moral worth. Thus, those who spend money on luxury items instead of giving to aid agencies are wrong and their actions morally blameworthy. Singer’s account is representative of a radical consequentialist school of thought that holds that there exist equally strong duties toward all persons, regardless of location or special commitments. To this account, there are two dominant objections raised in the literature. Firstly, on the question of scope, many argue that, although consequentialist moral theory can support the universal reach of Singer’s normative claim, the strength of the duties can change depending on other morally relevant factors such as special relationships and proximity. An account of beneficence must support an agent in balancing the demands of special ties with the demand for universal concern. In response to Singer’s claim, Richard Miller, David Miller, and others have argued that proximity and special ties are morally relevant factors and priority ought to be afforded to those closer and those with whom we share special commitments. Richard Miller takes Singer’s first premise to hold true and develops a more moderate account of the principle of general beneficence based on a principle of sympathy as the regulating factor. Miller’s account is based upon an assumption of equal moral worth of all persons. We have beneficent duties of concern for those with whom we share special relationships and those who are nearby, but duties of equal respect for others. For Miller, the normative claim of the principle of beneficence gives priority to special relationships and those nearby. An agent is morally wrong or blameworthy if they fail to display sympathy and demonstrate concern to those with whom they share special ties, and to those close by. Agents should give donations to aid agencies for the good of others when the demands generated by these special ties have been met; however an agent is not morally blameworthy or wrong if they fail to do this. The second and related objection relates to the content of Singer’s claim, which many take to be overdemanding. Richard Miller, for example, argues that Singer’s account is based on an extensive principle of sacrifice that is beyond ordinary moral thinking and demands acts that are supererogatory rather than beneficent in nature. Miller develops an alternative account of the content of the duties of

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beneficence that provides for a graduated reduction in the strength of duties as the distance between the agent and “the other” in need increases. Liam Murphy takes an alternative approach to the objection of overdemandingness to which Singer’s claim gives rise. Murphy (1993) develops an alternative consequentialist account of the principle of beneficence as a “cooperative” conception. Rather than starting from the claim that every agent should do as much as they possibly can without sacrificing anything of comparable value, Murphy examines the collective duties that the principle of beneficence gives rise to and the most “fair” way to distribute the burdens of these duties across all agents equally. Introducing a “compliance condition,” Murphy argues that each agent should be required to give only the level of donations/perform only the acts that would be adequate to solve the problem of poverty if everyone gave an equal share. Anything beyond this, say for example additional acts or giving to compensate for the failure of others to act or to give would be considered supererogatory, that is morally optional and beyond the call of duty.

The Principle of Beneficence and Kantian Moral Theory In Towards Justice and Virtue (1996), Onora O’Neill has developed a Kantian account of the principle of beneficence as the source of morally required duties of virtue, universal in scope, imperfect, and indeterminate in content. For O’Neill, the modern conditions of deep pluralism, continuous and widening networks of connection, and mutual interdependence demand the reintegration of duties of virtue, including beneficence, into moral theorizing, judgment, and evaluation. For O’Neill, duties of beneficence are derived from a general agent-based duty to reject indifference and neglect. Rather than focusing on the source, O’Neill focuses instead on justification of principles of virtue. For O’Neill, the criteria for justification are relatively meager, yet demanding – duties must be adoptable, followable, and intelligible by those who fall into the domain of ethical consideration. One of the primary objections to O’Neill’s account of beneficence as a duty of virtue relates to the imperfect and indeterminate nature of this duty. A number of philosophers writing on Global Justice, including Simon Caney (2005, 2007) and Elizabeth Ashford (2007) have argued that the conditions of the modern age demand the enforcement of certain duties of beneficence. They argue that certain duties such as the duty of assistance should be specified and enforced through a legal institutional framework. While sharing the concerns of Global Justice, Onora

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O’Neill defends the Kantian position. For O’Neill, duties of beneficence are universal and imperfect, held by all persons equally, but owed to no one specifically unless an institutional framework can be established to link recipient to agent and determine the content of the duty. However, even then only specifiable duties can be prescribed. Beneficence is a broad and context-dependent concept. It is not possible to determine in advance the full content of duties of beneficence. These will depend on the context of the agent and the person who’s good is to be protected or promoted. Also, although institutions can enforce specified duties and promote beneficent actions, it is not possible to force a person to have a benevolent character. The duties of beneficence remain a matter of moral virtue. Although the two traditions examined here may appear to be pulling in opposite directions, the literature on Global Justice includes a large body of work that seeks to reconcile the tensions and conflicts between these traditions. A critical point of consensus between the traditions is that the principle of beneficence and the duties that can be derived from this are broadly accepted as universal imperatives, that is, they are duties to which all are obligated. The key points of conflict surround the source of the principle and the motive for action. Within and between both traditions, there is a rich body of research exploring and debating the nature and extent of this principle and its derivative duties.

Related Topics

▶ Charity ▶ Cosmopolitan Justice ▶ Cosmopolitanism ▶ Decent Society ▶ Duties of Assistance ▶ Duties to Non-Compatriots ▶ Duties to the Distant Needy ▶ Duties, Determinate and Indeterminate ▶ Duties, Perfect and Imperfect ▶ Duties, Positive and Negative ▶ Friendship ▶ International Humanitarian Assistance ▶ Solidarity ▶ Ubuntu ▶ Virtue Ethics

References Arneson R (2004) Moral limits on the demands of beneficence. In: Chatterjee D (ed) The ethics of assistance: morality and the distant needy. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 33–58 Ashford E (2007) The duties imposed by the human right to basic necessities. In: Pogge T (ed) Freedom from poverty as a human

right: who owes what to the very poor? Oxford University Press, New York, pp 183–218 Beauchamp T (2008) The principle of beneficence in applied ethics. In: Stanford encyclopaedia of philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/ entries/principle-beneficence/ Caney S (2005) Justice beyond borders. Oxford University Press, New York Caney S (2007) Global poverty and human rights: the case for positive duties. In: Pogge T (ed) Freedom from poverty as a human right: who owes what to the very poor? Oxford University Press, New York, pp 275–302 Chatterjee D (ed) (2004) The ethics of assistance: morality and the distant needy. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Metz T (2007) Toward an African moral theory. J Polit Philos 15(3): 321–341 Miller R (2004a) Beneficence, duty, and distance. Philos Public Aff 32(4):357–383 Miller R (2004b) Moral closeness and world community. In: Chatterjee D (ed) The ethics of assistance: morality and the distant needy. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 101–122 Miller D (2007) National responsibility and global justice. Oxford University Press, Oxford Murphy L (1993) The demands of beneficence. Philos Public Aff 22(4): 267–292 O’Neill O (1996) Towards justice and virtue. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge O’Neill O (2004) Global justice: whose obligations? In: Chatterjee D (ed) The ethics of assistance: morality and the distant needy. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Pogge T (ed) (2001) Global justice. Blackwell, Oxford Pogge T (2004) Assisting the global poor. In: Chatterjee D (ed) The ethics of assistance: morality and the distant needy. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Pogge T (2007) Severe poverty as a human rights violation. In: Pogge T (ed) Freedom from poverty as a human right: who owes what to the very poor? Oxford University Press, New York, pp 11–54 Singer P (1972) Famine, affluence, and morality. Philos Public Aff 1(1):229–243 Singer P (2004) Outsiders: our obligations to those beyond our borders. In: Chatterjee D (ed) The ethics of assistance: morality and the distant needy. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 11–32 Singer P (2009) The life you can save. Picador, London

Benhabib, Seyla DAVID A´LVAREZ Yale Global Justice Program, Department of Sociology, Political Science and Philosophy, University of Vigo, Vigo, Spain

Seyla Benhabib is the Eugene Meyer Professor of Political Science and Philosophy at Yale University. Her work on global justice is mostly concerned with the conditions for just membership in a global order and with the consequent transformations of citizenship in a

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post-Westphalian conception of sovereignty. Benhabib’s work responds to the challenge of defending an articulate balance between unity and diversity in the political organization of human coexistence, and faces this task through a cosmopolitan approach that intends to go beyond interventionism and indifference. The resulting proposal defends a cosmopolitan federation of self-governing polities with porous borders, articulated through an increasingly dense net of global institutions. This cosmopolitan horizon requires the reconceptualization of some central elements of the international system: It entails a workable conception of human rights, a post-Wesphalian conception of sovereignty, the reformulation of democratic legitimacy, membership and admission policies, and a new role for global civil society in the institutionalization of these reformulations. These aspects will be examined in closer detail in the following sections.

Methodological Presuppositions: Interactive Universalism and Democratic Iterations Benhabib’s work is a path-breaking contribution to a subject that only recently has received the attention it deserves in the global justice debate. Questions of membership, immigration, and admission had been relatively absent in political philosophy. Benhabib’s own conception of the “right to have rights” inherits the Arendtian reflections upon the tragic fate of minorities in twentiethcentury Europe during successive patterns of persecution, denationalization, expulsion, and extermination. These convulsions that accompanied the World Wars and led to the creation of the League of Nations, the United Nations, and the 1948 UDHR reflected the vulnerability of those individuals entitled to universal human rights but deprived of a state that would actually enact these protections. Benhabib’s work takes this rich Arendtian legacy and develops a conception of just membership for a world in which the relations of interdependency and the possibilities of interaction help to configure a more ambitious cosmopolitan horizon. These same historical conditions of inescapable coexistence and enhanced interactions support a reinterpretation of the Kantian cosmopolitan right of hospitality and the obligation to enter into a global juridical community. Benhabib’s conception of the “right to have rights” reconciles the immanent criticism of the Critical Theory tradition with a normative standard for transcending the Westphalian system through the emergence of cosmopolitan norms. Benhabib’s early proposal of an Interactive Universalism addresses some of the main criticisms directed to the Habermasian paradigm of Discourse Ethics by feminist,

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communitarian, and postmodern thinkers. Her alternative account supplements the idealized conditions of equal respect that take the interlocutor as a “generalized other” with a conception of a “concrete other” that is sensitive to the contingent, embodied, and contextual elements that frame the singular perspective of the other. This reformulation of the deliberative conditions relaxes the pressure to reach a consensus and emphasizes the need to conceive deliberative practices as open processes oriented to enable an enlarged mentality. Such a practice of reason-giving depends on the ability to approach the other’s concrete perspective and on the reflexive reformulation of the subject’s own identity. This conception of Interactive Universalism is further elaborated and politically fleshed out as Democratic Iterations, stressing the ability to adopt and adapt right claims. This practice also enables the legal concretization of abstract universal standards, like core human rights, by self-governing peoples. The aforementioned iterations provide a way to defend the universality of human rights without advocating a unified juridical culture. Following the thread of Interactive Universalism, the practice of claiming rights across borders and boundaries is consistent with a conception of human rights that relies on a deliberative process about what we can accept as valid claims for rights. One can encapsulate the underlying theoretical presuppositions in the following way: Any political justification of human rights (juridical universalism) presupposes strong beliefs about the normative content of human reason (justificatory universalism), and such belief rests on the recognition of the other’s right to accept as valid only those rules that can be expressed with convincing reasons through practices of equal respect and communicative freedom (moral universalism). The account of human agency that is at the base of this communicative justification of rights can be expressed in terms of “generalized” and “concrete” other. It does not depend on any controversial and essentialist description of human nature (no essentialist universalism).

The Right to Have Rights and Global Justice The “right to have rights” is a non-state-centric conception of just membership that affirms that every human being has the right to be a member of a political community in which his or her basic interests are given due respect. This formulation expresses the “principle of right” of a legal cosmopolitan position whose core concept would also include some minimal conditions present in the documents of the human rights regime, such as the rights to life, liberty (including protections against the

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various forms of slavery and serfdom), personal property, equal freedom of thought and religion, expression, association, representation and, crucially, the right of self-government. The “schedule of rights,” that is, the legitimate variation in a core list of rights that is institutionalized in a political community, represents the expression of collective self-government, limited by binding cosmopolitan norms. However, the practice of Democratic Iteration, as an empirical activity of a self-governing demos, represents a delicate balance between the expression of democratic legitimacy and cosmopolitan justification. Nothing in this delicate equilibrium precludes that a demos could reach undesirable exclusionary agreements that are inconsistent with the fair representation of the interests of all affected participants and thus generate norms that fail to express universal moral respect or egalitarian reciprocity. The “right to have rights” differs from other conceptions of human rights in that it does not aim to reduce human rights to a membership right, and in that it conceives the right of self-government as a fundamental determinant of the range of legitimate variation in the content of basic human rights. In this sense, Benhabib distinguishes between “mere membership rights,” which simply take into account one’s interests in nondemocratic societies, and “just membership rights” that give one’s interests proper consideration through adequate participatory channels.

Global Political Structure: A Cosmopolitan Federation Seyla Benhabib advocates a cosmopolitan federation of self-governing polities. This project can be articulated through a global dispersion of sovereignty that does not require the constitution of a global state. However, Benhabib’s emphasis is not on the specific questions of global institutional design but on the paradox of democratic legitimacy implicit in this articulation of cosmopolitan norms and democratic self-government. We can parse two dimensions implicit in this paradox at the core of a republican community, depending on whether we accentuate the “self ” (the limits of the polity) or the “government” (the autonomy of its will) part of the concept. The first question involves who is entitled to decide about who is entitled to decide (full-membership) in a democratic process. Any demos requires a level of closure. Otherwise it is not possible to guarantee that identity of the co-legislators is coextensive with those that are subjected to the law. This identity is key in the promotion of the civic engagement required to develop a common political project over time. Benhabib considers that this

goal is incompatible with an ideal policy of open borders, but it is also incompatible with republican and nationalist conceptions of unrestricted control over admissions. As full membership in a political community implies the access to goods, services, positions, and resources, we could say that a cosmopolitan conception of just admission policies is also a theory of global redistribution. Although there is a link between poverty and migration, and between admission policies and resources, Benhabib states specifically that these are different concerns and that migration flows should not be interpreted as the solution to global poverty. Benhabib explicitly denies that international resource transfers like Rawls’s Duty of Assistance can automatically legitimate border closure by donor peoples and holds that the moral and legal duties toward migrant and asylum seekers must be discussed separately from distributive norms. In the case of just membership in a non-state-centric global order, first admissions to residency should be regulated through selection criteria not based on ascriptive grounds like gender, race, or ethnicity. The transition to full membership should be made according to clear, public, and transparent procedures for which authorities can be held accountable. The second question points to the precommitment to cosmopolitan standards like human rights, whose validity is conceived as independent from the democratic will that they constrain. This familiar tension between constitutional liberalism and democratic politics becomes significant for global justice in that it points to the necessity of justifying the structure of authority responsible for the enforcement of these cosmopolitan standards. Benhabib’s approach to these complex questions consists of admitting that the intrinsically paradoxical nature of these problems defies any a priori analytical solution and, consequently, adopting an “in media res” perspective. This means assuming the existence of “de facto” historical communities as a starting point, and developing, through democratic iterations, imperfect approximations to the regulative ideal. The final result of this vertical dispersion of sovereignty in a cosmopolitan federation is a disaggregated conception of citizenship through multiples spaces of self-government that would approximate conditions of egalitarian respect in a global scope.

The Emergence of Cosmopolitan Norms and Global Civil Society How is the transition from international to cosmopolitan norms of justice possible? One of the key questions of a cosmopolitan theory is an explanation of how states would agree to implement, through voluntary treaties

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and conventions, self-binding norms that recognize the ultimate moral and legal status of basic individual entitlements when these norms are not backed by a higher, binding legal authority for their enforcement. Benhabib develops a dual-track approach that combines the analysis of the formal policies of legal institutions with the informal and less-structured practices of global civil society. These two poles do not, however, occupy symmetrical positions. Her conception of the emergence of cosmopolitan norms gives a privileged role to the movements within civil society for its key contributions in articulating these new moral facts in an emerging global conscience. Characteristically, Benhabib’s main contribution to the debates about political and legal globalization is to point out the risks of decoupling the institutional process from the political will formation. Benhabib’s position is critical about technocratic approaches backed by systemic theories that heavily rely on the activities of professional and bureaucratic elites, and also skeptical about projects of global constitutionalism that could generate a legal framework that no demos would identify with. The nature of this supra-state dynamics constitutes a challenge for the institutionalization of cosmopolitan norms. Humanity is not a unified political collective, and the individuals that cosmopolitan norms would protect develop their loyalties and identifications through national institutions. In Benhabib’s work, global civil society has a key role in mediating between these two levels. Civil society has the potential to represent a plurality of interests, including the claims of justice of those collectives that do not have an effective institutional channel to voice their arguments. It also has the ability to generate a global conscience about new moral and political facts that transcends the national perspective and that reconciles the democratic will formation with the allegiance to emerging cosmopolitan norms. The most relevant reference for these cosmopolitan norms is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Benhabib emphasizes the moral and legal nature of human rights and their inherent aim toward legal positivization and even constitutionalization through democratic iterations. The most salient areas that Benhabib highlights are: crimes against humanity, genocide and war crimes; humanitarian interventions; and transnational migrations. Benhabib’s approach to matters like global poverty and distributive justice also reflects her dual-track perspective. Her focus is the reform of existing institutions of global capitalism (lex mercatoria) that have a great impact in determining the realization of basic human

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rights. Here her contribution has been to point to the legitimacy of spaces of resistance and contestation where social movements, unions, activists, and NGOs could bring to bear their claims and interpretations of the standards that should be implemented and institutionalized in an emerging global configuration. Consequently, Benhabib privileges the “soft” power of global civil society to bring about these cosmopolitan transformations over more drastic and interventionist measures.

Related Topics

▶ Crimes Against Humanity ▶ Democracy, Deliberative ▶ Global Civil Society ▶ Global Federalism ▶ Global Public Reason ▶ Habermas, Ju¨rgen ▶ Human Right to Democracy ▶ Moral Cosmopolitanism ▶ Refugees ▶ Transitional Justice

References Benhabib S (2002) The claims of culture. Equality and diversity in the global era. Princeton University Press, Princeton Benhabib S (2004a) The law of peoples, distributive justice and migrations. Fordham Law Rev LXXII(5):1761–1787 Benhabib S (2004b) The rights of others: aliens, residents and citizens: the John Seeley memorial lectures. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Benhabib S (2006) Another cosmopolitanism. The Berkeley Tanner lectures, edited and introduced by Robert Post and with commentaries by Jeremy Waldron, Bonnie Honig and William Kymlicka. Oxford University Press, Oxford Benhabib S (2007a) Twilight of sovereignty or the emergence of cosmopolitan norms? Rethinking citizenship in volatile times. Citiz Stud 11(1):19–36 Benhabib S (2007b) Is there a human right to democracy? Beyond interventionism and indifference: the Lindley lecture. The University of Kansas, Kansas Benhabib S (2009a) Hannah Arendt and Ralph Lemkin: international law in the shadow of totalitarianism. Constellations Int J Crit Democratic Theor 16(2):331–350 Benhabib S (2009b) Claiming rights across borders. International human rights and democratic sovereignty. Am Polit Sci Rev 103:691–704 Carens J (1995) Aliens and citizens: the case for open borders. In: Beiner R (ed) Theorizing citizenship. State University of New York Press, Albany Cohen J (2006) Is there a human right to democracy? In: Sypnowich Ch (ed) The egalitarian conscience. Essays in honor of G. A. Cohen. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 226–248 Habermas J (2008) The constitutionalization of international law and the legitimacy problems of a constitution for a world society. Constellations Int J Crit Democratic Theor 15(4):444–455 Pogge T (2009) World poverty and human rights. Polity Press, Cambridge

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Berger, John

Berger, John JOHANNA LUTTRELL Department of Philosophy, University of Oregon, Eugene, OR, USA

John Berger is a novelist, short-story writer, essayist, poet, painter, filmmaker, philosopher, art critic, and political activist. Coming of age in the 1950s and 1960s in England, he was most widely known for his works in art criticism, his BBC series, and collections of essays, “Ways of Seeing.” Due in part to the reception of these works, he was penned as a Marxist radical and cultural critic. In recent decades, his guiding concerns have widened from the arena of art criticism proper to the lived experiences of the economically and socially marginalized. His method for describing these concerns, though, remains a distinctly artistic one; he portrays the condition of the world’s poor by using visual landmarks and poetic narration. Thus, he is never far from art, in either his subject or his method. About Berger, one would not merely want to say that his politics are artistic. Rather, he urges his readers to see the world in an artistic way, in a manner that is wholly commensurate with, and not divorced from, politics. His contributions to the arena of global justice include his concern with international migration, his diagnostic of history, and his articulation of the shape of resistances in the present era.

Global Migration Berger’s topics are distinctly international, and he writes often of traveling, homesickness, and exile. Perhaps these themes have been prevalent in his writing because he himself relocated from England to rural France halfway through his career. However, few writers are more viscerally aware of the great migrations taking place under the current world’s economic structure, shaped by the forces of neoliberalism and consumerism. Thus, the themes of homelessness and exile are part of Berger’s effort to reconcile his inner life with the realities of this world on the move. In the early 1970s, Berger insisted that the experience of the migrant worker in Europe was not peripheral, but absolutely central, to European history. Now, as ideologies of consumerism and the policies of neoliberalism find global footing, the world sees migration on an unprecedented scale. Berger posits the political and economic exiles of neoliberalism as central to our shared history as well. His writing details the shape of the experiences of people who travel to find work leaving

homelands that have been systematically underdeveloped and can no longer provide basic subsistence. Characteristically interested in place, Berger is also interested in describing places of transit: the refugee camp, the factory, the slums outside of industrial cities. In the tradition of participatory polemic, Berger urges his readers to ask, along with him, why must these people be on the move? He considers the task of answering this question to be one of the crucial endeavors of our time, and one of the central questions of global justice.

Diagnosing History In the tradition of Walter Benjamin, Berger calls on his readers to “take in” the realities of history, which in this era he names as globalization and neoliberalism, from the perspectives of those who are not benefiting from these economic ideologies. Taken together, globalization and neoliberalism constitute the primary obstacles to global justice, because Berger envisions global justice as, in part, economic justice for the very poor. Further, to “take in” reality means to lessen the distance between the consequences of the macrodevelopments on the poor and a person’s inner life. This effort, for Berger, is the life of the mind. He contends that one of the characteristics of the ideologies of globalization and consumerism is that they pretend the world cannot be otherwise, that no other alternative is possible, and that they have no social history, only a natural one. This pretension is the marker, for Berger, of a fanaticism. In reaction to these ideologies, ones that lessen the political voice of the poor by way of absolute economic depravation, everyone must, Berger urges, engage in diagnosing history. To diagnose history means to give a social history to globalization, neoliberalism, and consumerism, to show that the vast inequality of the present era has no natural basis, and to work toward global justice. In his essay, “Meanwhile” which, along with The Seventh Man, are the works by which Berger has said he would most like to be remembered, he holds up the figure of the prison to a visual landmark by which we can understand our present age. Such a landmark, he explains, is not a fully formed systematic critique. A visual landmark offers, instead, a shared reference point for thinking. This age’s reference point is the prison, Berger thinks, because of its overwhelming sense of inevitability. In this era, well-paid workers can hold no other value above absolute profit, while the poor are condemned to suffer in precipitous intensity. It seems inevitable, too, that market forces will and should always be stronger than any nation-state, and so individual governments feel their powers are out of their own hands. The single priority of

Berger, John

this age, for the state and everyone else, is to create favorable conditions for investors. The character of the present era, is marked, as a prison, by an ostensible lack of alternatives to present conditions. Berger’s aim is, in some sense, to undermine this sense of inevitability of failures in imagination.

Articulations of Resistance: A New Political Vocabulary Berger is interested in articulating the shapes of resistance to globalization and its accompanying militancy. A crucial element to global justice, and one method of resistance, is reclaiming and giving new meaning to visionary political vocabularies that have lost their historical and experienced senses. Freedom, for example, needs to mean more than “freedom from your headscarves”; hope must mean more than shallow optimism, and despair more than a lonely person’s a-political alienation. After the era of monadic nation-states, with their accompanying rhetoric of national fraternity, the world has changed. The democratic impulses of nation-states are at the mercy of the new economic world order, and the visionary political vocabulary of three centuries have been reduced to their most banal, consumerist senses. Yet with the disenfranchisement of the state structure, replaced by a globalized economy of multinational corporations beyond any one government’s control, new kinds of resistance arise, along with a new vocabulary. These resistances, Berger asserts, are based in desire. That is, the kinds of resistance that are coming to the fore today in Palestine and Afghanistan are ones founded in the desire of the people. These resistances do not rely on the programmatic structure of the state; they are spontaneous and include the experiences of freedom in action. For Berger, freedom in our age of capitaldriven violence is one in which people’s desires are acknowledged, chosen, and pursued, now and not in some indiscriminate time in the future. Berger’s formulation of political desire is not a wholesale and naı¨ve glorification of all desire. Not all desires evidence our freedom. He admits desires are compulsive and can, at times, limit one’s freedom. But it does not follow from the compulsive character of desires that they are antithetical to freedom, either. That error is the historical mistake of philosophers and economists. Berger gives us the alternative in the form of a remarkably adept definition of freedom: “freedom is the experience of a desire being acknowledged, chosen, and pursued.” One could interpret the statement thusly – freedom is not to be discovered or achieved in the repression of desires, but neither is it in the uncritical, unreflective, or unconscious uptake of desires. If freedom is to come about, desires are

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chosen and pursued, that is, they are to be taken up by reasonable and thinking people. Freedom does not constitute the satisfaction of desire, but the space and time and resources to take it up. There is both activity and passivity in the discovery and achievement of a freedom is responsive to, and responsible for, desire. Desire is a force acting upon us, and while freedom does not consist in our mere acquiescence to this force, we acknowledge its power while choosing which part of it we are going to act upon. These desires are future-oriented, but they speak to the present. This future which Berger envisions can be said to be the “now future”; he does not speak from certain versions of prophetic traditions which, like in a Beckett play, we are endlessly waiting for an external intervention that supersedes upon human behavior. Since Berger is describing the freedom of human action in a world characterized by a system divorced from such action, we do not push off our desires as according to sometime in the future. We are the actors enacting our own desires. Also, insofar as it is connected to human action and not necessarily some definite end, freedom does not consist in the mere and static possession of something. Often, thinkers lament the fact that desire is a dynamic force, that it cannot be satiated in the possession of something. On this basis, desire is to be repudiated because it is insatiable and eschews “contentment.” But this lamentation is a misunderstanding of the possibilities of desire, a misunderstanding that stems from the specific historical context of late-capitalist globalization. One assumes contentment means something like making peace with what we have accumulated, but the aim of human desire is not, like the capitalist’s, accumulation. Desire’s aim, as a motivator for human action, is change. In enriching the meaning of visionary vocabulary in the service of global justice, Berger also writes on what it means to see the world from the perspective of despair. He notes that it is hard to imagine what the despair of the very poor is because those living in the First World are continually diverted from their inner lives by distractions. The despair of those who have no distractions, of those who cannot escape from, say, a refugee camp, cannot divert their attention away from their present conditions. Despair is also, Berger considers, what makes a terrorist or martyr. To allay or alleviate despair of the people who are forced to be “single-minded” is in part to respect their desires. Respect for desires is one meaning of, or perhaps beginning to, solidarity between people. Despair may mean, then, in some contexts, the sense that your life and the lives of those around you do not count for anything. A robust hope must be the antidote to despair; but

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the meaning of hope, too, must change as well. Hope, Berger writes, is “something to bite on.” One hopes even in the worst of moments, when there is no external confirmation that change is coming. For Berger, hope is very different from a confidence, promise, or, especially, a contract. As a measure of resistance, hope does not accommodate the patterns of present, unjust conditions; hope overturns them. Holding on to hope, even in the face of despair, can be called desiring justice. The desire for justice includes all the things that normally come to mind when we think about desire: romantic desire, impassioned yearning, outward orientation, and, more encompassingly, human flourishing. Berger places desire at the heart of his humanism, and its acknowledgment, choice, and pursuit an essential part of human dignity and global justice, especially in our time and place. Berger’s vision of global justice is, then, one in which visionary political vocabulary regains a sense of potency that corresponds to the lived experiences of those living on the underside of neoliberalism and globalization. Further, a just world would be one in which the “first” world lives in solidarity with the “third” world, by sharing a knowledge of material hardship, and fundamentally altering the causes of global migration.

Related Topics

▶ Capitalism ▶ Class and Status ▶ Free Trade ▶ Global Poverty ▶ Globalization ▶ Immigration ▶ Marxism ▶ Neoliberalism ▶ Poverty ▶ Refugees ▶ Solidarity ▶ Terrorism ▶ Third World Resistance

References Berger J (2001) The shape of a pocket. Vintage, New York Berger, J (2003) Selected essays of John Berger, ed. Dyer G. Vintage, New York Berger J (2007) Hold everything dear: dispatches on survival and resistance. Vintage, New York Berger J (2008) Meanwhile. Drawbridge Books, London Berger J, Mohr J (2010) A seventh man. Verso, New York and London Carlin P (2001) The spectre of hope: with Sebastia˜o Salgado and John Berger. Icarus Films, New York

Bhopal Tragedy TEPPO ESKELINEN Department of Social Sciences and Philosophy, University of Jyva¨skyla¨, Jyva¨skyla¨, Finland

Bhopal tragedy was the world’s deadliest industrial disaster, which took place in Bhopal, state of Maharashtra, India, on December 3, 1984. Estimates of the number of victims vary, but the immediate death toll of the accident was between 8,000 and 30,000 people. Thousands of people have died prematurely at a later point for reasons related to the accident, and even today thousands of survivors continue to suffer from diseases, such as respiratory problems, fatigue, and joint pains. The accident took place in the factory owned by Union Carbide company, producing a pesticide called Sevin, which was sold mainly to the Indian market. The use of this pesticide was thought to be an important part of the green revolution strategy in India, and generally in fighting hunger and malnutrition of small peasants. Indeed the use of the pesticide was very successful in terminating insects which destroy food crops. Yet after the recession in India in the early 1980s, the company, frustrated with its low sales record, decided to close the factory and relocate production. In this process, a fatal mistake was made to store large amounts of a chemical called MIC (Methyl isocyanate), needed in the production of Sevin, at the factory site. As the factory was not practically operational, safety measures related to MIC storaging were inadequate. Thus, an overheating of one of the MIC tanks led to its explosion, spreading lethal hydrocyanide gas to surrounding residential areas. The wind spread the gas especially to nearby slums. Union Carbide paid a lump sum in compensation for victims right after the accident. The sum of $47 million was paid to the Indian government, which used the money only partially to help Bhopal victims. The company has later referred to its negotiations with the government, arguing that it has made an honorable deal with large compensation payments, and any further payments to the disaster victims ought to be paid by the Indian central government or the state government of Maharashtra. While the compensation was at the time largest in history, the stock exchange’s reaction to the compensation deal was a sharp increase in Union Carbide’s stock value. The social movement calling for justice for Bhopal victims has continued to be strong and vocal even today. The campaigners argue that the victims were never

Biodiversity

adequately compensated, and that Union Carbide inc. had foreknowledge about the risks related to the storaging of MIC. They also call for the company to reveal the full composition of the chemical, which it has declared a business secret, along with the cleanup of the factory site, in which the soil is still heavily polluted, affecting, for example, local groundwater. Regular protests related to the tragedy still occur. Bhopal has become a symbol for many global justice advocates, who see the company having paid inadequate compensations since the victims were poor Indians instead of wealthy Americans or Europeans. This is seen as a sign of global inequality. The situation has yet been complicated by the fact that Union Carbide has been sold to Dow Chemicals, which does not see itself responsible for the liabilities of the company it has purchased. Further, it is highly difficult to divide compensational responsibilities between the company, the central government, and the local government, who all contributed in some way to the accident.

Related Topics

▶ Corporate Social Responsibility ▶ Reparations

References Eckerman I (2005) The Bhopal saga. Causes and consequences of world’s largest industrial disaster. Universities Press India, Delhi Fortun K (2001) Advocacy after Bhopal. Environmentalism, disaster, new global orders. University of Chicago Press, Chicago Lapierre D, Moro J (2002) Five past midnight in Bhopal. The epic story of the world’s deadliest industrial disaster. Grand Central, New York

Bilateral Aid ▶ Basic Needs ▶ Development Assistance

Biodiversity WILLIAM B. T. MOCK The John Marshall Law School, Chicago, IL, USA

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biodiversity is often used as an approximation of an ecosystem’s health. Biodiversity varies widely among regions and countries, and is closely tied to issues in international development and global justice. Species diversity is the most common form of measurement of biodiversity, and measures the range of different species within a given ecosystem, including the global ecosystem. Estimates suggest that approximately 5–15% of all species extant have actually been cataloged with the vast majority of these being plant and vertebrates. It is likely that fewer than 5% of all viruses, fungi, bacteria, and nematodes have been identified. Species diversity also suffers from debates over shifting definitions of what constitutes a species. Genetic diversity measures the variation in genetic material within a given ecosystem, which includes genetic variations within species as well as between species. Potentially a more rigorous and useful measure than species diversity, genetic diversity currently suffers from the same issues of weak access to relevant information. Habitat diversity refers to two distinct concepts. One is the biodiversity within a given habitat and, as such, is essentially a geographically delimited use of species or genetic diversity. Alternatively, habitat diversity refers to the range of different habitats that are present within a given country or region, or the world as a whole. Thus, for example, tundra would be distinguished from forest, which itself could be divided into tropical, temperate, and northern forests and classified by rainfall and seasonal temperature variations. Habitat diversity is a particularly useful tool in conservation efforts, since a major cause of loss of species and genetic diversity is loss of habitat. Global biodiversity is very unevenly distributed, with moist tropical regions and islands generally holding the greatest variety of species and numbers of endemic species. Thus, there is often a negative correlation between national biodiversity and national development – effectively a biological version of the resource curse. According to the United Nations’ World Conservation Monitoring Center, 17 megadiverse countries hold roughly 70% of the world’s biological resources. Of these, only Australia and the USA are considered developed countries, with the great majority of megadiverse countries being in tropical Latin America, central Africa, southern Asia, and the Indian and Pacific Oceans.

Biodiversity Loss Biodiversity refers to any of the several measures of the global or local diversity of life, and is important in identifying and addressing environmental change. As such,

It is estimated that species loss due to human involvement is between 1,000 and 10,000 times what it would have been without human involvement. Most of that species loss has occurred since the onset of the industrial revolution, and

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the pace of extinction has been accelerating rapidly. Although there have been significant instances of mass extinction, such as when the dinosaurs died out at the end of the Cretaceous Period 65 million years ago, scientists estimate that extinctions in the modern era are proceeding at a pace of at least 100 times the usual extinction rate between cataclysmic events. The ongoing “Holocene extinction” is thus approaching past cataclysmic events, and is the only one known to be associated with human activity. The International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) has generated a widely used “Red List” of threatened and endangered species, which has assessed roughly 2–3% of the world’s estimated 5–30 million species. According to the Red List, species that are recently extinct or threatened with extinction constitute 22% of the world’s mammals, 31% of amphibians, 14% of birds, 27% of corals, and similar numbers for most other forms of life. It is widely recognized that biodiversity concerns must be addressed on an international level. The 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development (the Rio “Earth Summit”) proclaimed a set of 27 principles relating to issues of environmentally sustainable development. At that same international conference, the Convention on Biological Diversity was opened for signature, becoming effective in December 1993. At last count, 193 countries were members of this Convention, with only the USA and a handful of microstates not participating. A key element of the Convention is that it establishes biodiversity target goals for 2010, which was designated by the UN as the International Year of Biodiversity. Few, if any, of those targets have been met, though modest progress was made in slowing the rates of some measures of biodiversity decline. There are many causes of biodiversity decline. Poverty and underdevelopment leads to resource pressures when rainforests are cleared for ranching or fuel. Deforestation, in turn, leads to diminished carbon sequestration, with a consequent increase in global warming. Global warming leads to habitat change that can eliminate ecological niches for vulnerable species. Agricultural practices destroy habitats, as fertilizer run-offs can lead to “dead zones” in downstream rivers and deltas, and development of monocultures leads to a narrowing of genetic diversity even in domesticated crops and animals. Ocean acidification and overfishing destroys coral reefs, eliminate marine habitats, and eliminate top-level species from the marine environment. Intentional and accidental human introduction of nonnative species into endemic populations in isolated ecosystems, including many islands, and draining

and development of liminal zones such as swamps and marshes eliminate fertile habitats and destroy necessary resting or breeding grounds for migratory species. Unsustainable levels of consumption of resources, including energy, are a key factor in environmental pressures that lead to loss of ecosystems and biodiversity. A common thread in these causes of decline in biodiversity is human population pressure and the Tragedy of the Commons. Only a small portion of the world’s species have been identified, cataloged, and tracked for population change, and large quantities of biological and genetic resources remain undiscovered. Given the potentially significant losses to future generations that would be involved in continuing major losses in global biodiversity, this argues for widespread application of the Precautionary Principle to human activity.

Significance of Biodiversity Loss Biodiversity losses have deeply significant impacts, both in themselves and in terms of human well-being. Some environmental advocates argue for recognition of the inherent value of Earth’s biosphere, without regard for human interests. Similarly, animal rights advocates point out the injustice of human-originated destruction of entire sentient species. In addition, healthy biomes are key to production of a breathable atmosphere, fertile land, and most of the world’s fresh water. Human beings also lose as biodiversity declines, with the greatest impact falling upon future generations. Culturally, biodiversity, including habitat diversity, is of great import, from the preservation of sacred locations and culturally significant wildlife to preservation of traditional sources of folk medicine and the emotional benefits of familiar, scenic, and historic sites. Economically, it is estimated that more than one-third of the world’s economic activity derives from biological resources. In addition to agriculture and commercial fishing, biological diversity is key to the daily survival of the world’s poorest billions of people who often find themselves caught in cycles of poverty and environmental degradation. Eco-tourism, which forms a vital part of many countries’ development plans, depends upon biodiversity. The development of new pharmaceuticals relies heavily upon identifying new genetic resources, often through bio-prospecting. Efforts to assign economic values to biodiversity’s multiple functions, which fall under the rubric of “green accounting,” are still rudimentary but, with great uniformity, reveal that actions to maintain biodiversity provide far greater economic value to society at large than any alternate utilization of resources. In recognition of the importance of biodiversity and habitat preservation, in

Bioprospecting and Biopiracy

both economic and non-economic terms, roughly one eighth of the world’s land areas and a significantly smaller portion of the world’s marine areas have been set aside as protected conservation areas. This figure has roughly doubled from 1980 to 2010, and represents one of the most positive trends in the effort to maintain the world’s biodiversity.

Related Topics

▶ Environmental Sustainability ▶ Global Resource Distribution ▶ Global Warming ▶ Obligation to Future Generations ▶ Resource Curse ▶ Rio Declaration

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Where bioprospecting involves unauthorized access to information, the obtaining of information through deception, otherwise exploitative behaviour by researchers, or the use of a community’s traditional knowledge for reasons different from those for which it was provided, the practice is known as “bio-piracy.” As bio-piracy typically involves scientists from wealthier, developed nations conducting research in communities of indigenous people in poorer, developing nations – many of which are former colonies that were previously “discovered” and conquered by imperial powers wishing to profit from their natural resources – the practice is sometimes dubbed “biocolonialism.” It has drawn criticism from human rights activists, influential academics, nongovernmental organizations, and some governments for being contrary to fundamental principles of global justice.

References Heywood VH, Dowdeswell E (1995) Global biodiversity assessment. UNEP/Cambridge University Press, New York International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (“IUCN”) IUCN Red List of Threatened Species. IUCN. http://www.iucnredlist.org/ Magurran AE (2004) Measuring biological diversity. Blackwell, Malden, MA Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity (2010) Global biodiversity outlook 3. United Nations, Montreal United Nations General Assembly (1992) Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (A/CONF.151/26 vol 1). UN. http://www.un.org/documents/ga/conf151/aconf15126-1 annex1.htm

Bioprospecting and Biopiracy ALEXANDRA E. GEORGE Faculty of Law, University of New South Wales, Sydney, NSW, Australia

The collection and use of the biological knowledge of a particular community by researchers from outside that community is a contentious issue. The search for such traditional knowledge with a view to developing commercial products is commonly referred to as “bioprospecting.” Subsequent analysis of the information that is gathered through bioprospecting activities is called “bio-discovery,” and the aim of bioprospecting and bio-discovery is to identify natural products that can be used for medicines and to achieve other beneficial outcomes. It has been estimated that, of the top 150 prescription medicines marketed in the United States (US), around 57% were derived from products found in nature.

The Global Injustice of Biopiracy While all people, including those from the communities that have been traditional custodians of the biological knowledge in question, can benefit from the advances in scientific and medical research that can emerge from bioprospecting activities, the reality has often been unjust outcomes. In particular, bio-pirates have been criticized for exploiting traditional communities by taking their knowledge and know-how without rewarding them with a share of the resulting profits. In some circumstances, the traditional custodians of the knowledge have ended up worse off after the effects of patents affected local access to the plants on which the bio-pirated “inventions” were based. Thus, while bioprospecting would ideally improve global distributive justice through profit-sharing arrangements, bio-piracy can undermine global justice. Several well-known examples of bioprospecting that gave rise to foreign patents and were then criticized as examples of bio-piracy involved the Neem Plant and Basmati Rice from India, the Enola Bean from Mexico, and the taking of genetic material from the Hagahai people of Papua New Guinea. In summary: ● Neem plant: The Neem Tree, Azadirachta indica, has been used in India since time immemorial to provide natural medicines, antifungal oil, soaps, cosmetics, dental remedies, contraceptives, and pesticides. In the early 1990s, several Neem tree patents were registered by W.R. Grace and the US Department of Agriculture at the European Patent Office (EPO). These included a method of controlling fungi in crops using Neem oil (EPO Patent No. 436257). In light of the patents, the price of Neem seed soared, with most of it being purchased by W.R. Grace, putting it out of reach

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of the majority of ordinary Indian villagers. Following condemnation and a campaign involving the Indian government, the Green grouping in the European Parliament, and other organizations, the EPO revoked the fungicide patent in 2000. This was challenged by W.R. Grace, but upheld by the EPO in 2006. ● Basmati Rice: In 1997, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) awarded a patent over “basmati rice lines and grains” (US Patent No. 5,663,484) to a United States company, Ricetec, owned by Prince Hans-Adam of Liechtenstein. The patent application included a claim to property rights over characteristics similar to Indian basmati rice characteristics. Following protests by the Indian government and other activists, in 2000 Ricetec amended its patent by withdrawing the parts specifying the contentious claim. ● Enola Bean: In 1999, John Proctor obtained a US patent over the Enola Bean, also known as the “yellow bean” (US Patent No. 5,894,079). He then sued US importers of Mexican yellow beans, with the result that exports of the beans fell by 90% for Mexican farmers whose livelihood had involved selling yellow beans. This reportedly caused economic harm to over 20,000 Mexican farmers. The farmers sued, and in 2005 they won their initial case, with the USPTO ruling in their favor. Following an appeal, the Enola bean patent was revoked in 2008, and this was confirmed on further appeal in 2009. ● Hagahai Cells: In 1995, a US patent was granted over a human T-cell line known as “pNG-1” and a viral preparation comprising a variant in the cell line (US Patent No. 5,397,696). These inventions were derived from the genetic material of an unidentified 21-yearold man that had been gathered – apparently without informed consent – by researchers treating people from Papua New Guinea’s Hagahai tribe for diseases. Scientists noticed that the blood of many Hagahai people contained the T-cell leukaemia virus, yet the carriers were not afflicted with leukaemia. The T-cell line invention that they patented enabled screening of Melanesian people (such as the indigenous people of Papua New Guinea) for the cell line and, potentially more lucratively, had prospects for use in vaccines to protect humans against infection with diseases such as leukaemia. The patent was awarded to five researchers, and owned by the US Department of Health, with the Hagahai people and the individual donor of the genetic material receiving no direct benefits. Following outcries about the injustice of this situation, the US government filed paperwork with the USPTO

forfeiting its rights in the patent and relinquishing control over the invention. The Hagahai example differs from the plant patent examples given above, in that the knowledge patented was not given directly to researchers by the indigenous people but was instead derived from human biological material gathered from those people. As such, it is sometimes cited as an even more intrusive version of bio-piracy because it involves taking material from the bodies of indigenous people, rather than taking biological knowledge from their communities. A fundamental tenet of patent law worldwide is that patents should be awarded only over inventions, not mere discoveries. Thus, it is arguable that none of the plant examples outlined here should ever have given rise to the patents that were registered, as each involved patented claims (i.e., the novel parts of the invention that become the property of the patent holder for a 20-year term) that were mere discoveries, not inventions. They therefore represented failures of the patent system to operate properly in these cases rather than underlying flaws with patentability criteria. The malfunctions were typically the result of US and European patent examiners being unaware that local communities overseas had traditional knowledge of the plant properties that were being patented. Each of these high-profile examples served to increase global awareness and concern about bio-piracy. Each attracted intense media coverage and helped to focus attention on the need to create laws, treaties, and processes to curtail the harmful effects of bio-piracy, while simultaneously avoiding stifling the potentially beneficial effects of bioprospecting.

Efforts to Regulate Bioprospecting and End Biopiracy Efforts to promote and regulate bioprospecting while ending bio-piracy have occurred at national and international levels.

International Measures At a global level, the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People acknowledges that indigenous people have the right to “maintain, control, protect and develop” their cultural heritage and traditional knowledge. This is defined as including human and genetic resources, seeds, medicines, oral traditions, and knowledge about the properties of plants and animals. In practice, opinions about how this can be achieved are contested.

Bioprospecting and Biopiracy

The World Trade Organization’s Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 1994 (TRIPS Agreement) is an international treaty that governs and has standardized many aspects of patent law globally. It allows nations to exclude plants and animals per se from patentability, leaving decisions about whether or not to allow such patents to the lawmakers of individual signatory states. Likewise, it is silent on bioprospecting and the patentability of human genetic material. Taking a different approach, the Convention on Biodiversity 1992 (CBD) was signed at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. It came into force in 1994 and addresses issues that are not covered by the TRIPS Agreement. The CBD establishes principles for benefit sharing between researchers and donor communities for inventions arising from bioprospecting activities. Bioprospectors are required to obtain informed consent before accessing traditional knowledge, and they must share the benefits of their research on mutually agreed terms. However, only certain types of research are included (e.g., human genetic resources are not covered by the CBD). Although almost all countries in the world have ratified the CBD, its success is dependent on signatory governments passing domestic legislation to implement its provisions. The voluntary Bonn Guidelines (2002) were intended to assist CBD parties in implementing fair access to biological resources. However, some smaller, poor countries lack the legal infrastructure and resources to establish and enact appropriate laws. The failure of some countries to pass domestic legislation is perceived as a serious weakness in the ability of the CBD to prevent the global injustice that can arise from bio-piracy.

National Measures Many jurisdictions have responded to the problem of biopiracy by introducing legal frameworks for regulating and managing bioprospecting within their territories. For example, Canada, Brazil, South Africa, and several South Pacific island nations have introduced laws or regulations requiring researchers to apply for permission or licenses before conducting bioprospecting activities, and some countries have introduced benefit-sharing requirements. Some groups of countries have joined together to implement common regional approaches to the regulation of bioprospecting and bio-piracy. For example, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Peru, Surinam, and Venezuela concluded the Rio Declaration of 2005, laying out a system of common intellectual property laws and

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information sharing. Several of these countries had previously agreed to common regulations and standards requiring bioprospectors to obtain informed consent before engaging in their research, and to share benefits with both the governments and local communities on whose lands the research is conducted. By contrast, the governments of Norway, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, and Sweden developed a common Strategy for Conservation of Genetic Resources in the Nordic Region (2001–2004) that did not require benefit sharing with local communities in which bioprospecting was conducted. The Nordic governments concluded that the benefits of unregulated research would be likely to outweigh those brought about by regulation. Taking a different and more practical approach, several governments have also established local databases of indigenous biological material in an attempt to help prevent unjustified patents from being awarded over their nations’ traditional knowledge. For example, the government of India has established the Traditional Knowledge Digital Library, containing over 200,000 traditional Indian remedies from local plants and animals, and available in a variety of European and Asian languages. Meanwhile, the State Intellectual Property Office of China has established the Traditional Chinese Medicine Patent Database, containing more than 19,000 bibliographic records and 40,000 formulae known to practitioners of traditional Chinese medicine. These databases may include information about traditional medicines and remedies (e.g., the Indian database includes a catalogue of traditional yoga positions), as well as other customary uses for plants (e.g., pesticidal uses). They have been made available to patent offices in overseas jurisdictions in an attempt to give foreign patent examiners additional published sources in which searches for “prior art” (i.e., existing publications or uses of the alleged invention that could prevent it from being patented) can be conducted. As not all jurisdictions recognize foreign prior art unless it is patented or documented in a publicly accessible publication, the establishment of such databases is a practical and potentially important step toward thwarting patent registrations covering previously undocumented or inaccessibly documented traditional knowledge. The Indian government had supported successful legal challenges against the Neem plant patent in the EPO, and also against a US patent over “use of turmeric in wound healing” (US Patent No. 5,401,504). It reasoned that commissioning the Traditional Knowledge Digital Library could help to preempt other problematic patents over traditional knowledge materials from being granted by foreign patent registries in the future. In practice, the

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ability of patent offices worldwide to search such databases may also act as a disincentive against potential bio-pirates lodging applications to patent such dubious “inventions.” Practical measures like this may therefore play a key role in improving global justice by forestalling the activities of potential bio-pirates.

The Future The practice of bio-piracy is condemned as unjust and unacceptable by many people and governments around the globe. Yet bioprospecting has the potential to be mutually beneficial to all, helping to distribute wealth more equally and enhance global justice. A major challenge for lawmakers – both nationally and internationally – is therefore to create policies and regulations that successfully end bio-piracy without limiting bioprospecting. An equally difficult challenge may be to overcome the distrust and resentment in indigenous communities and their governments that has resulted from bio-piracy and exploitation of the past. Indigenous people whose communities experienced imperialism could be forgiven for interpreting bio-piracy as a form of neocolonialism, and this is indeed a claim often made by local activists and nongovernmental organizations that represent them in negotiations. These fears may be heightened by attitudes that display ignorance of, or arrogance toward, other cultures and their traditions during negotiations for either local agreements or international treaties. Such conduct is likely also to have provoked the allegations by some that bioprospecting is merely bio-piracy that is legitimated by Western legal systems and concepts (including patent law), which do not align well with the noncommercial customs and ways of regulating access to and use of knowledge that are typical of many traditional societies. The existence of such perceptions complicates the ability of researchers to negotiate access to and use of traditional knowledge, especially as indigenous people within a community may have differing opinions about whether proposed research is likely to involve beneficial bioprospecting or nefarious bio-piracy. Sadly, even the most honest and best-intentioned researchers may now face mistrust and obstruction from members of local communities that suffered “theft” and exploitation at the hands of bio-pirates (and other outsiders) before this issue became the subject of concern, condemnation, and regulation. Overcoming such suspicion and wariness – and ensuring that scope for future bio-piracy is negated – will be a difficult but important step toward finding ways in which people globally can benefit from the research emanating from bioprospecting.

In a world in which cultures are being lost and scientists routinely express concern that global biological diversity is under growing great threat from pressures such as population growth, deforestation, and climate change, recording traditional knowledge (and preserving the plants and animals it relates to) becomes a matter of greater urgency. Unprincipled bio-piracy by some has harmed the ability of conservationists and other scientists to conduct such work. It is to be hoped that the biological resources of our planet can be preserved in the interests of global justice. Ethical bioprospecting may well have a role to play in achieving this goal.

Related Topics

▶ Globalization ▶ Human Genome ▶ Intellectual Property Rights ▶ Owning Life ▶ Shiva, Vandana ▶ Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property ▶ World Trade Organization (WTO)

References Abo´s J (2000) Biopiracy: patenting the developing countries’ resources and knowledge. Copenhagen Business School/Department of English, Copenhagen DeGeer ME (2002) Biopiracy: the appropriation of indigenous peoples’ cultural knowledge. New Eng J Int’ & Comp L 9(1):180–208 Dutfield G (2011) A critical analysis of the debate on traditional knowledge, drug discovery and patent-based biopiracy. Eur Intellect Prop Rev 33(4):238–244 Hamilton C (2006) Biodiversity, biopiracy and benefits: what allegations of biopiracy tell us about intellectual property. Dev World Bioeth 6(3):158–173 Hawthorne S (2006) Land, bodies, and knowledge: biocolonialism of plants, indigenous peoples, women, and people with disabilities. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago Isaac GE, Kerr WA (2004) Bioprospecting or biopiracy? J World Intellect Prop 7(1):35–52 Kam SK (2006) Biopiracy in paradise? Fulfilling the legal duty to regulate bioprospecting in Hawaii. Univ Hawaii Law Rev 28(2):387 Mgbeoji I (2006) Global biopiracy: patents, plants and indigenous knowledge. UBC Press, Vancouver Mushita A, Thompson CB (2007) Biopiracy of biodiversity: global exchange as enclosure. Africa World Press, Trenton Rimmer M (2003) Blame it on Rio: biodiscovery, native title, and traditional knowledge. The Berkeley Electronic Press, Berkeley Robinson DF (2010) Confronting biopiracy: challenges, cases and international debates. Earthscan, London/Washington, DC Shiva V (1997) Biopiracy: the plunder of nature and knowledge. South End Press, Cambridge, MA Shiva V (2006) Bioprospecting as sophisticated biopiracy. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago

Bonhoeffer, Dietrich

Bohman, James MICHAEL ALLEN Department of Philosophy, East Tennessee State University, Johnson City, TN, USA

James Bohman’s contribution to global justice debates consists in a remarkable reinterpretation of Kant’s idea of a federal republic of humanity. This reinterpretation not only strongly emphasizes the neo-Roman ideal of freedom from domination under the rule of law. It also stresses the capacities of republican citizens to shape their ongoing terms of cooperation, in flexible processes of deliberation. Here Bohman argues for the realignment of the ideal of non-domination with a nearly forgotten form of federal republicanism once endorsed by Enlightenment republican thinkers such as Diderot and Turgot. These thinkers looked to the dispersal of powers in federalism to develop an alternative to the antiquated form of centralized empire. The advantage to this approach is that it dispenses entirely with the idea often associated with the republican ideal of non-domination that it was the common sentiment of a unitary people, along with the size of the polity, which was the decisive consideration in securing the freedom of all. Indeed, in addressing the problem of the domination of the colonies by the imperial center, antiimperialist republicans sought to integrate the normative powers of spatially dispersed participants into multiple political units, each with its own interacting publics. According to Bohman, this anti-imperial federalist approach to securing non-domination lays the basis for a contemporary republican cosmopolitan version of transnational democracy. Such republicanism does not presuppose a maximal conception of national democracy grounded in community identifications and sovereign law. Instead, it presupposes only a minimum set of powers and conditions. This democratic minimum of powers makes it possible for diverse participants in deliberation across borders to avoid domination by more powerful, larger, or more central units in a polyarchical scheme of transnational governance. From Bohman’s point of view, the key claim as adapted from the anti-imperial republicans is that non-domination is a function of cross-border deliberations that are large and dispersed, encompassing interactions across multiple overlapping political units or “demoi.” Translated into the contemporary context of transnational governance, this model of a democratic minimum of creative powers to initiate deliberation at

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multiple different sites and levels of participation offers a more appropriate model of non-domination. Perhaps the most remarkable feature of Bohman’s conception is the strong emphasis he gives the advantages of deliberation attendant upon size and complexity of the republican cosmopolitan polity. Indeed, the dispersal of power is not just a condition of freedom from domination, but also the epistemic improvement of agendasetting and policy-making. Such improvement is a function of rigorous processes of “multiperspectival” testing, which takes full advantage of large and numerous units of public participation. To this extent, Bohman’s program may be said to offer a powerful corrective to more pessimistic Kantian cosmopolitans, like Ju¨rgen Habermas. In his own influential interpretation of Kant, Habermas contends that the epistemic quality of deliberation remains at its most intense only within the confines of the nation state. Contrary to Habermas, Bohman optimistically holds out the prospect of a concomitant growth in the powers of freedom and production of new social knowledge in cross-border deliberations.

Related Topics

▶ Cosmopolitanism ▶ Democracy, Transnational ▶ Dryzek, John ▶ Habermas, Ju¨rgen

References Bohman J (1996) Public deliberation. MIT Press, Cambridge Bohman J (2001) Cosmopolitan republicanism. Monist 84(1):3–22 Bohman J (2006) Deliberative democracy and the epistemic benefits of diversity. Episteme 3:3 Bohman J (2007) Democracy across borders: from demos to demoi. MIT Press, Cambridge Bohman J (2008) Non-domination and transnational democracy. In: Laborde C, Maynor J (eds) Republicanism and political theory. Blackwell, Malden

Bonhoeffer, Dietrich GARY M. SIMPSON Department of Theology, Luther Seminary, St. Paul, MN, USA

Dietrich Bonhoeffer (1906–1945) was a German Lutheran pastor, theologian, and martyr who lived his adult life under the reign of Adolf Hitler’s Third Reich. Hitler ordered his execution just 2 weeks before the Allied Forces

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entered Berlin. Bonhoeffer’s tie to the theme of justice came primarily through his categorical resistance to Nazi totalitarianism and tyranny. He was raised in an aristocratic and intellectual family and studied theology at the University of Berlin, where his father was a professor of psychiatry. At the age of 21, he finished his first dissertation and, 3 years later, he finished his second dissertation, which was a German requirement for future professors. In 1930, he went to New York City for a year, where he studied with Reinhold Niebuhr, the most famous American-Christian social ethicist of the time. During that year, he regularly attended Abyssinian Baptist Church in Harlem, where he gained firsthand knowledge of the systematic discrimination of African Americans, of the spirituality of African Americans, and of the Harlem Renaissance. Bonhoeffer had come to the United States with the common German-Lutheran conviction that Christian faith and theology had little interest in concrete political life. After returning to Germany, he soon became a young leader within the growing Ecumenical Movement of the day making numerous friends in other parts of Europe and especially establishing close ties with influential church leaders in England. He also, quickly, became a young leader within the Confessing Church movement that opposed the Nazi takeover of the Protestant churches. He immediately and openly denounced Hitler’s April 1933 Aryan Civil Service law that banned Jews from being German civil servants. Bonhoeffer’s theological ethics of war, peace, and resistance went through four basic stages of development. First, until 1932, he harbored rather traditional just-war convictions and the German penchant for obedience to political authority. Second, from 1932 at least through 1934, if not later, he developed and voiced a kind of “Christian pacifism,” whereby followers of Christ, the Prince of Peace, could not participate in coercive violence or in any kind of war activity. Neither should the Protestant Church sanction war. The pursuit of peace should be the Church’s default position, so to speak. Because Bonhoeffer considered Christian ethics to be a concrete affair of obeying God’s commands in particular situations, he opposed the notion of timeless principles. His Christian pacifism was, therefore, always of a provisional sort and not a principled or absolute pacifism, as pacifism is often thought to be. In a third period up until 1939, he developed a position that closely resembled selective conscientious objection, whereby a Christian could refuse to participate in a particular war if it was unjust. Finally, from 1939 until his death, he developed a type of “agonized participation” in violence as a necessary last resort to sanction tyrannicide (Rasmussen 1972/2005: 107, 122).

Bonhoeffer’s shifts from Christian pacifism and selective conscientious objection to agonized participation represent a turn in emphasis from passive resistance to active resistance to Nazi totalitarian tyranny. In 1939, he joined one of the numerous loosely organized conspiracy groups that sought to assassinate Hitler. He became a double agent for the Abwehr, the counterintelligence agency of the Nazi armed forces which harbored key conspirators. His conspiracy assignment was to inform his confidants in the British Parliament of the resistance and to seek a conditional surrender for Germany, whereby those who resisted Hitler would be recognized as the legitimate postwar political leadership. The Allied Forces accepted only unconditional surrender, which left the resistance movement with no postwar power. Bonhoeffer’s theological ethic and active life of resistance to injustice under Nazi totalitarian cruelty was based in his Christian understanding of Jesus Christ’s solidarity with those who suffer. His German word for Christ’s solidarity was Stellvertretung, a difficult notion to put into English. The standard translation is “vicarious representative action.” Literally, Stellvertretung means “placing taking or sharing” for and with another, particularly those who suffer. Such solidarity leads to “an experience of incomparable value . . . to see the great events of world history from below, from the perspective of the outcast, the suspects, the maltreated, the powerless, the oppressed, the reviled – in short, from the perspective of those who suffer” (Bonhoeffer 1997: 3). For Bonhoeffer, this view from below then impels to “what is braved in the bold deeds of justice” (Kelly and Nelson 1990: 515).

Related Topics

▶ Civil Disobedience, International ▶ Civil Disobedience, Transnational ▶ Conspiracy Theory ▶ Crimes Against Humanity ▶ Just War Theory: Invasion of Iraq ▶ Luther, Martin ▶ Pacifism ▶ Solidarity ▶ Tyranny

References Bethge E (2000) Dietrich Bonhoeffer: a biography, revised edn. Fortress, Minneapolis Bonhoeffer D (1995–2011) Dietrich Bonhoeffer works, 16 volumes. Fortress, Minneapolis Bonhoeffer D (1997) Letters and papers from prison. Simon & Schuster, New York

Borders de Gruchy J (1999) The Cambridge companion to Dietrich Bonhoeffer. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Green C (1999) Bonhoeffer: a theology of sociality. Eerdmans, Grand Rapids Haynes S (2004) The Bonhoeffer phenomenon. Fortress, Minneapolis Kelly G, Nelson F (1990) Testament to freedom: the essential writings of Dietrich Bonhoeffer. HarperCollins, New York Rasmussen L (1972/2005) Dietrich Bonhoeffer: reality and resistance. Westminster JohnKnox, Louisville

Borders MICHAEL MINCH Department of Philosophy/Humanities, Utah Valley University, Orem, UT, USA

Human history has long known borders, but in the last two decades of the twentieth century there has been a reappraisal of their moral and political legitimacy. This reassessment can be traced, conceptually, to two sources: first, to moral cosmopolitanism, the idea that all persons have equal dignity and worth, and therefore deserve equal consideration and treatment; second, to political cosmopolitanism, the idea that because we all share equal moral consideration, we have an ethical obligation to build political regimes, institutions, and policies that promote and protect individuals and their basic interests or human rights. If human rights exist, then it follows that borders which, by definition, warrant the treatment of citizens and noncitizens differently are called into question. In addition to the conceptual sources that endorse the interrogation of interstate borders, there is the practical matter of an increasingly “globalized” planet. Institutions and regimes that are evermore interrelated and interdependent also call the value and legitimacy of borders into question. The European Union stands out as an example of the institutionalizing of state cooperation that transcends the idea of state sovereignty that became conventional at, and after, the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. This idea of robust, if not near-absolute, state sovereignty that has held sway for over three centuries is weakened, according to many theorists, by moral and (therefore) political cosmopolitanism, and by the very interdependencies of a “shrinking” world in which various cultural, economic, and political activities simply make borders less important, if not altogether frustrating, to many pursuits. The question of the legitimacy and value of interstate borders touches on several matters of concern among

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moral philosophers, international relations specialists, and those concerned about democracy, political economy, peace, and global justice. Questions concerning the nature and meaning of citizenship, nationality, membership, democracy, the freedom to migrate, to labor, and to live are among the important issues related to borders. Immanuel Kant provides a touchstone for the interrogation of the justification of borders. In his essay Perpetual Peace (1795), Kant offers three “definitive articles for the perpetual peace among states.” The third article is given this cumbersome title, “The Law of World Citizenship Shall be Limited to Conditions of Universal Hospitality.” The heart of Kant’s argument is that all peoples and their governments have the duty to extend “hospitality” to noncitizens as a matter of right. Welcoming persons to one’s country is not necessarily an act of charity. This article can be seen as an extension or manifestation of Kant’s first formulation of the categorical imperative (the “universal law formulation”), whereby he argues for the universality of moral principles, and anchors the idea of moral and political cosmopolitanism. Kant writes: "

Hospitality means the right of a stranger not to be treated as an enemy when he arrives in the land of another. One may refuse to receive him when this can be done without causing his destruction; but, so long as he peacefully occupies his place, one may not treat him with hostility. It is not the right to be a permanent visitor that one may demand.

Kant does not call for a world without borders, but his argument qualifies the Westphalian notion of state sovereignty and its implicit warrant for nonporous borders. Whereas the idea of strong borders correlates to an idea of citizenship that belongs strictly to members of a state, insofar as citizenship is reconceived, borders may be seen to have a qualified purpose. Relatedly, insofar as borders are reconceived, citizenship may be seen to have a broader basis. What is clear is that borders and citizenship bear an important, if not essential, relationship to one another. Again, the European Union is a location where the reconceptualization of both borders and citizenship can be observed. Perhaps there is no reason, in principle, that one may not hold citizenship in any number of states. Just how flexible and polyvalent citizenship may be is of great interest to those who think about borders. In similar fashion, the reconceptualization of borders corresponds to new appraisals of nationality. The modern connection of nation (the constitution of a people) and state (the constitution of sovereignty and territory) need not be fixed. Because, conventionally and theoretically, one’s membership is attached to both people (or peoples)

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and to a state (or states), it is clear that borders have often been used to demarcate national, as well as political, boundaries. The interrogation of borders has developed alongside the renewal of citizenship theory and democratic theory. Just as national and political membership has been, until recently, conceived in Westphalian terms, so too has democracy. That is, democracy has been understood as something that occurs (when it occurs) inside of states. But the last three decades have seen a vital discussion about democracy across borders. Insofar as democracy’s logic is seen to transcend states, it follows that there are democratic reasons to question the nature of borders. How porous and nonporous borders should be is a democratic question as well as one of citizenship and nationality. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights stipulates that everyone “has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country” (Article 13). No concomitant right to enter a country not one’s own is given in the Declaration. By 2000, there were 175 million migrants in the world and migrations had increased sixfold over the previous 90 years. There are approximately 20 million refugees, asylum seekers, and “internally displaced persons” in the world (Benhabib, Rights of Others, 5). Borders are transgressed with greater frequency, and more complication, than ever before. Millions cross borders in order to work and/or in order to live. Crossings for both reasons take place legally and illegally. Questions of human rights and justice bring to light the complex legal, economic, political, and ethical dimensions of borders’ proper functions. From the standpoint of global justice, it is clear that the existence of interstate borders presents a significant challenge if moral and political cosmopolitanism are true accounts of what people owe to other people. It is not clear that there can be room for nonporous borders if all people matter equally. Should borders be eliminated? Should some be strong and others weak? The question of how open or closed borders should be will remain with us for quite some time.

Related Topics

▶ Benhabib, Seyla ▶ Citizenship ▶ Cosmopolitan Democracy ▶ Cosmopolitanism ▶ Democratic Peace Theory ▶ Global Democracy ▶ Human Rights ▶ Immigration ▶ Kant, Immanuel

▶ Liberal Nationalism ▶ Moral Equality ▶ Nationalism ▶ Treaty of Westphalia ▶ Universal Declaration of Human Rights

References Benhabib S (2005) Another cosmopolitanism with Jeremy Waldron, Bonnie Honig, and Will Kymlicka. Oxford University Press, Oxford Benhabib S (2007) The rights of others: aliens, residents and citizens. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Bohman J (2007) Democracy across borders: from Demos to Demoi. Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, Cambridge, MA Brotherton D, Kretsedemas P (eds) (2008) Keeping out the other: a critical introduction to immigration enforcement today. Columbia University Press, New York Brown W (2010) Walled states waning sovereignty. Zone Books, New York Carens J (1987) Aliens and citizens: the case for open borders. Rev Polit 49(2):251–273 Honig B (1999) Democracy and the foreigner. Princeton University Press, Princeton Jacobson D (1997) Rights across borders: immigration and the decline of citizenship. Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore Jean-Marie G (1995) The end of the nation-state (trans: Elliot V). University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis Kant I (2001) Perpetual peace. In: Reiss H (ed) Kant: political writings. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Linklater A (1998) The transformation of political community: ethical foundations of the post-Westphalian era. Polity Press, Cambridge Martens T (1996) Cosmopolitanism and citizenship: Kant Against Habermas. Eur J Philos 4(3):328–347 Ong A (1999) Flexible citizenship: the cultural logic of transnationality. Duke University Press, Durham

Boylan, Michael ROBERT PAUL CHURCHILL Department of Philosophy, Columbian College of Arts & Sciences, George Washington University, Washington, DC, USA

Michael Boylan is an American philosopher, poet, and novelist. He has written extensively on ethical theory, social justice, and a range of issues in applied and professional ethics as well as a philosophical novel The Extinction of Desire (2007). The significance of Boylan’s philosophy for global justice stems primarily from his original worldview theories. In his Basic Ethics (2000, 2008), Boylan sought to develop an inclusive and holistic way of thinking about ethics and public problems that offers a way to close the gap, noted by Aristotle, between theory and practice.

Boylan, Michael

Boylan’s insight was to conceive of metaethics as a subject that investigates the ways in which persons come to acquire ethical beliefs and motives as well as the ways beliefs are reshaped or changed. Of special importance are two imperatives that Boylan calls the “personal worldview imperative” and the “shared-community worldview imperative.” The arguments for these imperatives are refined and applied in A Just Society (2004). In Morality and Global Justice (2011), Boylan articulates an “extended-community worldview imperative” in connection with which he examines moral arguments offered for different responses to a number of global issues.

The Personal Worldview Imperative To understand Boylan’s worldview theories, it is helpful to begin with a brief description of Boylan’s project in a philosophy book written for the general public, namely, The Good, the True, and the Beautiful (2008). Beginning with the premise that all individuals seek what they believe to be good, Boylan leads readers – by way of thought experiments and detailed arguments – through many of the main questions of philosophy, addressing what it means to be good, how we struggle to discover truth, and how we decide what is beautiful. While Boylan does provide his own answers to these questions, his primary objective is to demonstrate that our own answers are deeply embedded in the personal and shared-community worldviews that we embrace, whether or not we were initially aware of this. Because we are purposive beings who must act, and who act, when rational, on the basis of judgments about the way that actions advance our values, Boylan believes we each maintain a more or less coherent web of beliefs. Thus, if we do adopt claims about the good, the true, or the beautiful as our own, that is, as principles we are sincerely willing to apply in our lives, then they must be meaningful for us within the context of frames of reference we use in our ongoing activities. And this requires, in turn, that they are already part of or can be coherently added to our operational worldviews. Personal worldviews implicate values concerning the critical concerns of life, including ethics, politics, religion, and aesthetics. Insofar as our search for the good leads us to encounter novel ethical norms we then adopt, we do so through a dialectical interaction Boylan calls “worldview overlap and modification.” In both Basic Ethics and A Just Society, Boylan argues that although worldviews may be fairly fragmentary or inchoate, it is possible not only to critically reflect about one’s worldview and life plan in a holistic manner but also to apply evaluative criteria to worldviews, despite the fact

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that they are subjective in nature. Boylan argues that we morally ought to apply such criteria to our worldviews and grounds this moral imperative in three of the strongest impulses directing human life: rationality, autonomy, and the search for integrity and wholeness. Thus, the moral force behind applying evaluative criteria to our personal worldviews is the necessity to live with rational consistency, genuine responsibility for our actions, and integrity, or to suffer the psychological (and probable) social consequences of our failure. Boylan prescribes what he calls the Personal Worldview Imperative (PWI). In effect, it requires that we each develop a single comprehensive and internally coherent worldview that satisfies moral criteria and that we strive to act out in our daily lives. It is important to emphasize the procedural, or formal, character of the PWI. Although it refers to morality, the PWI is neutral between conflicting ethical theories. The PWI thus functions as a metaethical principle that allows any ethical content consistent with the conditions of completeness, coherence, and practical applicability. Likewise, particular content – that is, the beliefs, values, and practices to which persons commit themselves – comes from elsewhere. It cannot be complained by persons of any social or cultural group that the PWI imports valueladen content from external sources.

The Shared-Community Worldview Imperative In addition to making our personal worldviews ethically robust, in A Just Society, Boylan emphasizes that our worldviews must be practical; because they must guide us amidst the complexities of the world we inhabit, we must continually refine them. Our worldviews must become more comprehensive as we come to learn more about the realities of the world we share with others. We also must respond to different, often competing worldviews, but potentially containing elements we might seek to integrate into our worldview. As Boylan notes, however, we are already immersed within shared-community worldviews that can be described as some set of shared social and cultural attitudes, values, and beliefs that affect life within the communities to which we belong. The question, “should we develop a shared-community worldview?” is thus not really an open option. The real questions to ask at the community level thus concern the inclusivity of the community and the quality – in terms of completeness, coherence, morality, and practicality of the shared-community worldview. It is incumbent on us to recognize that insofar as sharedcommunity worldviews affect attitudes and behaviors,

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they have a normative character, and therefore false, misleading, and ethically questionable elements ought to be subjected to scrutiny. Moreover, if one is already sincere and authentic (i.e., one proceeds with both a rational good will and an affective good will) in questioning one’s personal worldview, then as questioning carries over into the community’s web of beliefs, it gives rise to what Boylan characterizes as a shared-community worldview imperative (SCWI). The SCWI differs from the PWI primarily in two respects. First, each agent must contribute to a common body of knowledge that supports the sharedcommunity worldview. In this connection, individuals are responsible for bringing to others’ attention information critical to the truth or falsity of core beliefs and for questioning assumptions that may affect attitudes. Second, the practicality of the SCWI includes the support of social institutions and their policies given the constraints of the community’s “essential core” of commonly held values. In a manner consistent with his imperative to provide knowledge to support a shared-community worldview, in A Just Society Boylan advocates a theory of justice based primarily on deonotological ethical considerations. While not proposing a rights-based theory per se, Boylan grounds justice on the moral agency of persons. On Boylan’s view, types of goods are differently “embedded” depending on how critical they are for the agency of persons. The most deeply embedded of goods are basic for they are absolutely necessary for human action, or, at a second level, necessary for effective action. Secondary goods include those that are life enhancing, those that are useful, and finally, those that are luxurious. Boylan argues that this classification ought to guide distributive decisions such that no persons must sacrifice basic goods so that others gain secondary goods but some secondary goods can be sacrificed justifiably to ensure that no one is deprived of basic goods. Whether or not readers accept Boylan’s own substantive theory in A Just Society or his arguments in Morality and Global Justice, if they take the PWI and SCWI seriously, then they ought to concede the necessity for concern with more than the logical or formal justification of a theory of justice. An acceptable theory must be one that – as John Dewey might have emphasized – can be put into practice. But of course, no theory will be practicable unless it commends itself to moral agents as a sensible and valuable guide to action. Whether or not a general theory such as universal human rights attains this accepted status is a matter not just of its justificatory integrity, as it were, but also of the protocol, or the procedural acuteness with which it is advanced.

The Extended-Community Worldview Imperative In Morality and Global Justice, Boylan recommends an extension of shared-community worldviews to the greatest possible macro level, namely, the globe. What Boylan calls the “extended-community worldview imperative” (ECWl) suggests the possibility that an integration of worldviews can lead the vastly diverse peoples of the globe to someday accept shared norms for a just global order despite preserving a great plurality of beliefs, values, and life plans. In seeing oneself as potentially a global citizen, each citizen must seek to be as educated as possible about the access of differently situated peoples to the basic goods of agency, their essential and commonly held cultural values, and their governmental and institutional structures. Unless such knowledge is acquired, it will not be possible for individuals and collectives to accept duties that ensue from other peoples’ legitimate rights claims and then “act accordingly within what is aspirationally possible” (2007: 3). How do new elements become integrated in worldviews such that the latter can be more comprehensive and potentially global? While we do correct flaws within personal worldviews and may even abandon a worldview we find almost wholly out of harmony with experience, for the most part our worldviews overlap, become layered, and eventually transform through a dialectical process. There are three stages to these responses. (1) Overview and Justification: at this stage we gather further information and assess the justification for the theory or the probable truth of a belief. (2) Dialectical Understanding: one’s reflections move back and forth between the present worldview and the new elements. As a result of the process at this stage a person will have one of three reactions: (a) coincidence and amplification in which the new elements support and strengthen the existing worldview; (b) dissonance and rejection, which will result if the new elements cannot be reconciled with the worldview, at least at present, and are rejected; and (c) overlap and modification, which occurs if the new elements are felt to be intriguing and to warrant further consideration. (3) Dialectical Interaction: this stage of worldview transformation occurs when overlap and modification have been successful. At this third stage, a person is able to “conceptually try out” a newly enlarged or transformed worldview and to implement it in action at least for a “test drive.”

Worldview Theory and Global Justice Boylan’s reliance on the neutrality of ethical content in worldviews is intriguingly similar to reliance in liberal democracies on the principle of neutrality. The principle

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of neutrality accords equal respect to different visions of the good life. In both cases, there is a shift from emphases on “the good” to “the right” in which “the right” is understood as procedurally just in democratic theory and metaethically right in worldview theory. Just as individuals cannot be neutral about the pursuit of the good, a liberal democracy cannot be indifferent to the needs of humans as moral agents and to human well-being, despite its commitment to neutrality. Thus, in liberal democracies, the good – the objectives of justice – must be attained as the outcome of fair or right procedures. In both democracy and worldview integration, we must proceed dialectically, through discourse and participation. That is, without shirking real, often strong, differences, all sides ought to adopt the objective of attaining an agreement or synthesis that will be as satisfactory as possible for everyone concerned. Suppose in developing an extendedcommunity worldview, we believe we ought to work for a just global order founded on respect for universal human rights, but that we collide head to head with traditionalists whose worldviews inform them that human rights norms are incompatible with religious duties or cultural values. In such a case, Boylan’s worldview theories might be adapted as a helpful strategy of cross-cultural negotiation (Churchill 2006). Much of the critical interest in Boylan’s work (e.g., Gordon 2009) results from its originality, including the sharp contrast with more traditional approaches. By and large, philosophers concerned with a just society or a just global order proceed in the manner made famous by John Rawls in ATheory of Justice (1971). Rawls’ emphasis was on the justification of the principles that would be chosen for the design of social and political institutions. This pattern has been followed, for example, by Allen Buchanan in his Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination (2004). It is a distinctive feature of such approaches that they focus primarily on the theoretical justification of basic principles. Thus, Buchanan also follows Rawls in distinguishing between “ideal theory” and “nonideal theory” with the expectation that nonideal contingencies require significant qualifications of ideal theory. For Boylan, the “ideal” and “nonideal” distinction is an academic but artificial bifurcation of the more holistic way we experience the world in which we must act. Thus, Boylan requires that “nonideal” issues, that is, applicability, be addressed as part of the evaluation of any theoretical orientation. Moreover, theoretical “topdown” approaches that emphasize the logic of theory often result in detaching justification and motivation. When their own worldviews remain unengaged by a theory, individuals may fully appreciate the logic of an

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argument for justice, yet remain unmoved even despite a desire to feel enthused. This coming apart, or divorce, of reason and motivation is far less likely to happen in Boylan’s worldview approach. Boylan can accept that while motivation comes into worldviews from the bottom-up, theoretical elements must be worked in to form a coherent whole. In other words, a worldview approach to justice must start with personal worldviews and the PWI. This project will therefore address the reasons, beliefs, affects, and motives of the individuals who must implement and who must live with the changes brought about by the grand designs of academic philosophers.

Related Topics

▶ Buchanan, Allen ▶ Cosmopolitanism ▶ Democracy, Deliberative ▶ Global Civil Society ▶ Global Human Rights Culture ▶ Global Justice ▶ Human Rights ▶ Liberal Democracy ▶ Rawls, John

References Boylan M (2000, 2008) Basic ethics. Pearson Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River Boylan M (2004) A just society. Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham/London Boylan M (2007) The extinction of desire. A tale of enlightenment. Blackwell, Malden Boylan M (2008) The good, the true, and the beautiful. Continuum, London/New York Boylan M (2011a) Morality and global justice. Westview, Boulder Boylan M (ed) (2011b) The morality and justice reader. Westview, Boulder Buchanan A (2004) Justice, legitimacy, and self-determination: moral foundations for international law. Oxford University Press, Oxford Churchill RP (2006) Human rights and global diversity. Pearson Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River Gordon J-S (2009) Morality and justice: reading Boylan’s a just society. Lexington Books, Plymouth Rawls J (1971) A theory of justice. Harvard University Press, Cambridge

Bretton Woods Institutions SHARON ANDERSON-GOLD Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (RPI), Troy, NY, USA

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD),

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commonly known as the World Bank, were created in 1944 at a meeting of 44 nations (the Allies) at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire to rebuild devastated economies after the war and to promote economic stability and economic development on a global scale. The founders wished to protect future generations against a repeat of a worldwide economic crisis like the one experienced during the Great Depression which was believed to have partially caused the subsequent rise of fascism and the outbreak of World War II. It was thought that if economic cooperation could be arranged on a permanent institutional basis, the world would be better protected against economic depression, and war and humanity could achieve economic prosperity on a global scale. The mission of the International Monetary Fund was to create the conditions for stability in exchange rates and to protect nations against the disruptions in trade and devaluations of their currency that would occur when balance of payments were out of order. To provide for issuance of credit when balances are out of order, member nations of the IMF created a type of insurance pool where each member contributes funds that are made available on a basis of need. The original mission of the IMF was not development per se but the more narrow objective of providing the type of co-ordination in economic policy that was perceived to be a precondition of development in an economically interdependent world. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, better known as the World Bank, was given the broader mission of financing development projects. Because the IMF was concerned to correct imbalances in balance of payments, the IMF was from the beginning involved in setting “conditions” for the economic policies of its members. The objective was not redistribution of wealth from the rich to the poor but a form of integration that would pull the less developed countries up through their participation in a global economy. The new context of development, an international financing system, tied national economies to a global market system. Nations were expected to borrow primarily from the resources that they had contributed to the fund. Loans were expected to be repaid within 3–5 years and no nation was expected to seek successive cycles of grants. However, the oil crises of the 1970s severely impacted economic growth throughout the world and radically transformed the ability of the IMF to continue its previous policies. Energy-dependent nations found themselves involved in extended cycles of debt with severe consequences for the newly industrializing nations who because of the growing percentage of debt service could no longer foresee the

possibility of growing themselves out of debt. In the following decade, the IMF looked to international money markets to insure the supply of available capital and began to broker loans that less developed countries ultimately could not repay. This triggered the international debt crisis of the 1980s. Since debt reduction strategies were essential to future international monetary stability the IMF began offering special terms for nations that agreed to abide by economic policies that the fund believed would increase the flow in international investment. The debt crisis was viewed as an opportunity to further open debtor economies to international investment. International aide increased with far reaching conditions that required the liberalization of macroeconomic policies to encourage the privatization of economies and the influx of foreign investments. These new loan conditions have led developing nations to reduce state investments in social sectors and have led to the adoption of neoliberal models of economic development to facilitate the globalization of capital investment transfers. New capital investments have brought greater social and political dependence on multinational corporations, banks, and foreign institutions, transforming traditional notions of sovereign control over national economies. Because less developed countries have increasingly requested grants from international financial institutions to enable their transition into the global market place, the two objectives of economic development and state control over the economy have not always proven compatible. Because the terms of competing in the global market place have generally required considerable influxes of foreign investment these terms have seriously compromised the ability of debtor nations to retain control of their own economic policies and in some cases have seriously constrained a nation’s ability to provide for social services. The mission of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) has been to reduce poverty in “credit-worthy” countries through the provision of loans and financial services to governments and public enterprises. It is structured like a cooperative, owned and operated for the benefit of its 186 member countries. It raises most of its 12–15 billion dollar a year budget through the issuance of bonds on the global financial market. Because its bonds are backed by the share capital of its member states, IBRD bonds receive the highest triple A rating. Because of its credit rating the IBRD is able to lend to member countries at attractive low rates of interest. Although originally focused on large-scale infrastructure projects for the reconstruction

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of post-war Europe and Japan, as these countries became economically capable, the IBRD has shifted its focus to the economic growth of developing countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. While the IBRD has had a history of interest in poverty reduction, the neoliberal theory of development that caught hold of the IMF in the 1980s also shaped the bank’s attitudes and policies. In the 1980s, the bank began adding its own “structural adjustment” conditions to its loan processes adding a double whammy to the financial situation of underdeveloped countries. Both the IMF and the IBRD have been criticized for their failure to effectively reduce poverty. Throughout the 1980s the gap between the rich and poor both within and between countries grew significantly. Critics maintain that the growth and development they have promoted has been that of markets but not necessarily that of the human potential of poorer nations. This had led to public protests and much criticism of the internal structure of these organizations that are dominated by US and European interests. The Bretton Woods Institutions were the first instance of an attempt to establish international monetary cooperation on a permanent institutional basis. As such they are instances of global governance and thus because of their scope and impact raise questions concerning their accountability to those whose lives they affect through their policies.

Related Topics

▶ Global Governance ▶ International Monetary Fund (IMF) ▶ World Bank (WB)

References Bandow D, Vasquez I (eds) (1994) Perpetuating poverty: the World Bank, the IMF and the developing world. Cato Institute, Washington, DC Goode R (1985) Economic assistance to developing countries through the IMF. The Brookings Institute, Washington, DC Harper R (1998) Inside the IMF: an ethnography of documents, technology and organizational action. Academic, New York Kenen P (1986) Financing, adjustment and the International Monetary Fund. The Brookings Institute, Washington, DC McQuillan L, Montgomery P (eds) (1999) The International Monetary Fund: financial medic to the world? Hoover Institution Press, Stanford Mosley P, Harrigan J, Toye J (eds) (1991) Aid and power: the World Bank and policy-based lending. Routledge, London Vreeland J (2007) International Monetary Fund: politics of conditional lending. Routledge, London Woods N (2007) The globalizers: the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and their borrowers. Cornell University Press, Cornell

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Bribery ▶ Corruption ▶ Foreign Policy ▶ Pogge, Thomas ▶ Poverty

Brock, Gillian NICOLE HASSOUN Department of Philosophy, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, USA Gillian Brock is one of the most important scholars working on global justice today. Her seminal contribution to debates in global justices is, perhaps, her book Global Justice: A Cosmopolitan Account (2009a). The book carefully lays out an account of global justice that takes individuals’ equal moral worth seriously while leaving room for defensible forms of nationalism and group affiliation. It addresses two kinds of skeptic about the possibility of global justice. The first kind of skeptic believes cosmopolitanism is wildly impracticable. The second kind of skeptic thinks cosmopolitanism does not leave space for important kinds of identification and group affiliation like nationalism. The book has three parts. In the first, Brock sets out her cosmopolitan account of global justice. In the second, Brock suggests some concrete ways of improving public policy and making it more just. Finally, Brock considers how this account of what good practice requires can inform theory. More precisely, Brock starts by making some useful distinctions between different kinds of cosmopolitanism and links between cosmopolitanism, global justice, and globalization. She explains how those who accept nationalist theories like that articulated in Rawls’ Law of Peoples often believe cosmopolitanism does not leave enough room for nationalist and other forms of legitimate group affiliation and identification. She argues that all people must be able to enjoy the prospect of a decent life. According to Brock, everyone should be able to meet their basic needs, secure important liberties, and interact with others on fair terms. She discusses the implications of this view for accounts of sovereignty and good governance. Good governance, for instance, must be accountable and effective and support democratic self-determination for nations.

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Next, Brock argues that we might address global poverty (helping people meet their basic needs) with an innovative proposal for reforming international tax and accounting law. She suggests that cosmopolitan forms of democracy that support national self-determination will protect basic liberties. She argues that both national and international institutions can promote democracy by encouraging freedom of the press and supporting organizations like the International Criminal Court and Reporters Without Borders. This section of the book concludes by discussing the conditions under which international intervention can be justified, when immigration reforms are required, and ways of reforming international trade law to achieve global justice. Brock suggests that intervention can sometimes be justified to protect basic needs and freedoms but that this does not have to undermine sovereignty conceived of as a certain kind of responsibility. Here she says there is reason to believe the prospects for effective intervention are good as the United Nations’ General Assembly is embracing the responsibility to protect the vulnerable. Brock does not think several recent proposals for immigration reform are likely to provide an effective way of securing global justice. Though, she believes that immigration with strict term limits that bring net benefits to both host and home countries may be justifiable. Nevertheless, Brock believes that trade is likely to bring greater benefits to the poor than immigration reform. She argues that free trade is justifiable if it promotes global justice, though she thinks that there may be reason to link trade agreements to improvements in labor conditions, for instance. Brock also advocates special and differential treatment for poor countries and reforming the process of trade negotiation. Next, Brock turns her attention to the debate between nationalists and cosmopolitans. She considers different accounts of what we owe to compatriots vs. outsiders, critiquing several proposals by liberal nationalists. Brock argues that her account of global justice leaves room for a legitimate form of nationalism and illustrates her thesis by appeal to some of her conclusions about public policy arrived at in the previous section of her book. She suggests that as long as everyone can interact with others on fair terms and their basic needs and freedoms are protected, there is room within her account for nationalistic policies (as well as to pursue other commitments). She argues that her account adequately protects the basic equality of all, in part, because it supports democratic institutions. Brock does not believe we have to compromise sovereignty or cosmopolitanism, for we can reconceptualize sovereignty as responsibility and rely upon the institutional reforms she advocates.

Brock concludes by reviewing how her book addresses the feasibility skeptic. She argues that her account answers the four questions this skeptic is most likely to ask. “What are the goals of global justice?” “How can we make progress on these?” “How can we track our progress?” And “How will we create the motivation to pursue global justice or otherwise deal with the issue of global authority (or lack thereof)?” (p. 326). She explains how her theoretical and concrete policy suggestions help answer these questions while providing a general strategy for reconciling cosmopolitanism with other commitments like nationalism. Besides Global Justice: A Cosmopolitan Account, Brock has edited (or coedited) three other books. The first, Necessary Goods: Our Responsibility to Meet Others’ Needs (1998a), contains a collection of important articles on this topic, including contributions by David Wiggins, David Copp, Harry Frankfurt, Martha Nussbaum, James Sterba, David Braybrooke, Robert Goodin, and Onora O’Neill. The authors consider whose and which needs matter, what obligations they generate, and who has responsibility for meeting needs. The anthology includes Kantian, Aristotelian, contractarian, rights-based, liberal, libertarian, and egalitarian perspectives on meeting needs. In the introduction to this book, Brock suggests a new autonomy-based account of needs. Brock’s second edited volume, Current Debates in Global Justice (2005), includes great work on both theoretical and applied topics by many of the big names in global justice, including Charles Beitz, Thomas Pogge, Mathias Risse, Dale Jamieson, and Gopal Sreenivasan. The volume covers everything from cosmopolitanism, patriotism, and environmental issues, to Just War theory and issues in global health. It provides readers with a broad introduction to canonical and emerging topics in global justice. Brock’s final volume, The Political Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism (2005), coedited with Harry Brighouse, is one of the best known anthologies on global justice. It includes articles by David Held, Hillel Steiner, David Copp, Christine Sypnowich, Chris Bertram, Thomas Pogge, Allen Buchanan, Richard Miller, Darrel Moellendorf, Kok-Chor Tan, Kai Nielsen, Martha Nussbaum, Jocelyn Couture, Jon Mandle, and Catriona McKinnon. Together, these authors address the question of whether national boundaries have fundamental moral significance in a world of increasing interdependence, articulating and defending different versions of cosmopolitanism. Finally, Brock has many other important articles on global justice in leading journals. In these articles, she addresses many of the topics that appear in her book, sometimes in (even) more depth. Brock’s contributions

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to the debate over cosmopolitanism, for instance, are formidable. In her particularly interesting article “Egalitarianism, Ideals, and Cosmopolitan Justice” (2005c), she defends a principle of global equality of opportunity and a minimum floor principle (as opposed to a global difference principle). In other articles on cosmopolitanism, she considers the case for global democracy, redistribution to help the needy, and the new nationalisms. In her Monist article “The New Nationalisms” (1999), for instance, she offers extended criticism of liberal nationalism. In her Philosophy article, “Needs and Global Justice” (2005a), she argues that, in an appropriately specified original position, people would only agree to principles of justice on which they are well placed to meet their needs. She also has a series of articles critiquing some competing accounts of needs and considering the relationship between needs, justice, desert, and moral theory more generally. One of the noteworthy features about Brock’s recent work is the fact that she engages well with interdisciplinary literature. Her work on taxation, for instance, is notable not only for its quality but for the way that it engages with relevant interdisciplinary literature.

Related Topics

▶ Cosmopolitanism ▶ Free Trade ▶ Global Egalitarianism ▶ Global Poverty ▶ Immigration ▶ International Criminal Court (ICC) ▶ Liberal Nationalism ▶ Rawls, John ▶ Sovereignty

References Brock G (ed) (1998a) Necessary goods: our responsibilities to meet others’ needs. Rowman & Littlefield, Oxford/Lanham, p. 239 Brock G (1998b) Future generations, natural resources, and property rights. Ethics Environ 3:119–130 Brock G (1999) The new nationalisms. Monist 82:367–386 Brock G (2005a) Needs and global justice. Philosophy 57:51–72 Brock G (2005b) The difference principle, equality of opportunity, and cosmopolitan justice. J Moral Philos 8:333–351 Brock G (2005c) Egalitarianism, ideals, and cosmopolitan justice. Philos Forum XXXVI:1–30 Brock G (2005d) Needs and global justice. In: Reader S (ed) The philosophy of need. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 51–72 Brock G (2008) Taxation and global justice: closing the gap between theory and practice. J Soc Philos 39(2):161–184 Brock G (2009a) Global justice: a cosmopolitan account. Oxford University Press, Oxford, p. 384 Brock G (2009b) Health in developing countries and our global responsibilities. In: Dawson A (ed) The philosophy of public health. Ashgate, Aldershot

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Brock G (2009c) Reforming our taxation arrangements to promote global gender justice. J Soc Philos 39(2):161–184 Brock G, Brighouse H (eds) (2005) The political philosophy of cosmopolitanism. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p. 262 Brock G, Moellendorf D (eds) (2005) Current debates in global justice. Kluwer/Springer/Academic, Dordrecht/Boston/Norwell, p. 312 Brock G, Reader S (2004) Needs, moral demands and moral theory. Utilitas 16:251–266

Brundtland Commission AVI BRISMAN Department of Anthropology, Emory University, Atlanta, GA, USA

The “Brundtland Commission,” formally the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED), is known by the name of its chair, Norwegian Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland. It was established in 1983 by the U.N. General Assembly (1983), and was charged with reexamining environment and development, as well as formulating proposals to address their integration. In the years after World War II, the model of development that was pursued focused primarily on the goal of economic growth. This model was initially pursued by fading European colonial powers and then (through the 1960s and beyond) by newly empowered national and international development agencies (that were frequently operating under Cold War rivalries). It was thought that improving the global standard of living – with growth in the national gross domestic product (GDP) and personal income as indicia of success – would achieve the social goals of development, such as alleviating poverty and reducing inequality. Measured against these criteria – growth in GDP and in personal income – this model of development was quite successful in the 1950–1970s. But by the 1980s, as this model came to be regarded as a “surrogate for neo-colonial Westernization” and as critics pointed out the inadequacy of using GDP as a measure of progress, support for the model began to wane. Against this backdrop – and with growing recognition that post–World War II international development had placed inordinate stresses on the world’s ecosystems – the Brundtland Commission was established and charged with the task of reconceptualizing notions of progress and development. In creating the commission, the U.N.

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General Assembly suggested that it should focus on the following terms of reference for its work: (a) To propose long-term environmental strategies for achieving sustainable development to the year 2000 and beyond (b) To recommend ways in which concern for the environment may be translated into greater cooperation among developing countries and between countries at different stages of economic and social development and lead to the achievement of common and mutually supportive objectives which take account of the interrelationships between people, resources, environment, and development (c) To consider ways and means by which the international community can deal more effectively with environmental concerns, in the light of the other recommendations in its report (d) To help to define shared perceptions of long-term environmental issues and of the appropriate efforts needed to deal successfully with the problems of protecting and enhancing the environment, a long-term agenda for action during the coming decades, and aspirational goals for the world community In 1987, the commission issued its report, Our Common Future, which contained what has since become the most widely quoted and definitive statement of “sustainable development”: “Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.” The Brundtland Commission’s work also led to the U.N. Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) or “Earth Summit” in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992. While the concept of “sustainable development” has drawn criticism (e.g., for the vagueness of the term, for its unknown consequences and effects, for its inattention to power structures, for its anthropomorphism, and for its marginalization of the poorest), it has also helped illuminate the interrelatedness of environmental, economic, and social dimensions of global change, and has drawn attention to the responsibilities of the present generation for the well-being of future generations – phenomena important to questions regarding the scope of justice, the institutions responsible for justice, and distributive (in) equality.

Related Topics

▶ Sustainable Development

References Dernbach JC (2002) Sustainable development: now more than ever. In: Dernbach JC (ed) Stumbling toward sustainability. Environmental Law Institute, Washington, DC, pp 45–61 Hulme M (2009) Why we disagree about climate change: understanding controversy, inaction and opportunity. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Hunter D, Salzman J, Zaelke D (2002) International environmental law and policy 2/e. Foundation Press, New York Speth JG (2004) Red sky at morning: America and the crisis of the global environment. Yale University Press, New Haven/London U.N. General Assembly (1983) Process of preparation of the environmental perspective to the year 2000 and beyond. A/RES/38/161, 19 Dec 1983 Victor DG, Raustiala K, Skolnikoff EB (eds) (1998) The implementation and effectiveness of international environmental commitments: theory and practice. MIT Press, Cambridge World Commission on Environment and Development (1987) Our common future. Oxford University Press, Oxford

Buchanan, Allen CHRISTOPHER HEATH WELLMAN Department of Philosophy, Washington University in St. Louis, St. Louis, MO, USA CAPPE, Charles Sturt University, Australia

In addition to being among the most important political philosophers working today, Allen Buchanan is a leading bioethicist. Buchanan’s work in bioethics is worth noting here not because his stature in these two separate fields is impressive (though it is), but because Buchanan’s important and distinctive contributions to our understanding of global justice were likely made possible only because his approach to political philosophy has been shaped by his work in bioethics. Let me explain. Bioethics is widely regarded as more successful than analogous sub-fields, like business ethics, because it has been much more interdisciplinary. Although there are clear exceptions, there appears to be precious little meaningful dialogue between those who write on business ethics and actual businesspeople. In bioethics, on the other hand, philosophers and medical practitioners routinely collaborate. As a consequence, bioethicists tend not to concern themselves solely with whatever abstract questions are antecedently deemed to be of greatest philosophical importance; they grapple instead with the ethical quandaries that medical practitioners actually face in their daily routines. Thus, Buchanan’s publications in bioethics have been so influential not just because he is

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such a good philosopher, but because he has for decades collaborated with (and learned from) a diverse range of people who work in and around medicine. As a consequence, his efforts in this area tend to be a model of applied ethics: without sacrificing rigor or avoiding philosophical depth, he has repeatedly shed light on the ethics of existing medical institutions and the moral responsibilities of those who work within them. Against this backdrop, it is easy to see why Buchanan’s work in global justice has been so groundbreaking: The key is not (just) that he offers better answers; it is that he asks different questions. When everyone else was content to offer competing theories as to when and why political states are legitimate, for instance, Buchanan was the first major philosopher to systematically attend to the related but distinct question as to when the international community should recognize a state as legitimate. Buchanan was drawn to this slightly different issue not merely because actual political agents must make these judgments, but because where we place the bar for public recognition will have real effects upon how justly actual states are governed. Thus, whereas most theorists would have (understandably) presumed that we should merely recognize all and only legitimate states as legitimate, Buchanan appreciated that we might have weighty moral reasons to design and implement a policy which recognizes some illegitimate states as legitimate because doing so is likely to make the world a more just place. Buchanan has published a striking number of influential articles and books on a remarkably diverse range of issues, but his most systematic and important contribution to international political philosophy is Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination: Moral Foundations for International Law (2004). The first thing to notice about this book is what it does not do: it does not attempt to offer a theory of global justice. Rather, as its subtitle indicates, it provides the moral foundations for international law. But why would Buchanan concern himself with this particular question when there is so much controversy about other, arguably more basic, questions concerning international justice? Why not tackle head-on a more fashionable question, such as whether justice demands that the principle of fair equality of opportunity should be applied globally? Part of the reason Buchanan does not offer a theory of global distributive justice is because (1) there is a great deal of uncertainty about what global distributive justice requires (i.e., we are at a primitive stage of theorizing and nobody has the answers) and (2) international institutions are not in a good position to do much by

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way of implementing principles of global distributive justice head-on, mainly because they are not currently capable of achieving direct, explicit redistribution. (Of course, Buchanan does not deny that there is a lot of room for international institutions to have an impact on distributive justice.) But this is only part of the story. Another reason Buchanan is reluctant to focus principally on constructing a theory of global distributive justice one might speculate (and this is only speculation) is because his work in bioethics has led him to find these types of questions too abstract. He does not deny that many of the popular questions are philosophically challenging, but he worries that even the best answers to these ideal, non-institutional questions are too far removed from what is currently necessary to make the world a better place. Thus, while most who work in international political philosophy are consumed with questions such as whether Rawls’s theory of justice can be applied globally, Buchanan takes a decidedly different tack. Motivated by the general thought that institutions are needed to secure justice and the more particular corollary that (for the time being, at least) an effective system of international law provides us with the best prospects for remedying the most egregious elements of global injustice, Buchanan seeks to answer two related questions: (1) Can a system of international law be justified? And, if so, (2) how should we design such an institution for the world as it actually exists? It is important to recognize that, in setting out to address issues of greater practical urgency, Buchanan does not give himself a free pass on the basic philosophical questions. Indeed, as the three-pronged title of Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination indicates, Buchanan begins by grappling with basic question of justice, the responses to which enable him to answer crucial questions about how international law might be justified, which in turn shed light on what forms international law should take. Consider each of these three steps. Against the traditional view that the exclusive aim of international law is to secure peace, Buchanan invokes Moral Equality along with a Natural Duty of Justice to argue that it must also seek to secure justice. At its core, the argument is that it would be absurd to deny that all humans are equal, and respecting this equality requires more than that one merely refrain from actively violating another’s rights, it demands that one also help ensure that no one is vulnerable to having these rights violated by others. In the real world, this means that we all have a responsibility to ensure that no one is without adequate institutional protections of their most basic human interests. In short, we all have a (robust) natural duty to construct and support institutions that protect everyone’s

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basic human rights, where such rights are understood in terms of one’s capacity to live a minimally decent human life. These views on justice have clear implications for the legitimacy of particular states as well as international law. Against the prevailing view that states are merely groups of individuals who voluntarily collaborate for mutual advantage, Buchanan insists that the natural duty of justice reveals that we must abandon both the voluntarist notion that states cannot be legitimate in the absence of consent and the mutual benefit idea that states should aim solely to promote the interests of their constituents. In place of these common (mis)conceptions, Buchanan postulates that a state’s legitimate function is to protect the rights of insiders and outsiders alike. In other words, because states are a central vehicle through which individuals fulfill their natural duties of justice, they are legitimate only to the extent that they do in fact make the world a more just place. Buchanan’s account of the legitimacy of the international legal system as a whole parallels his analysis of individual states; he contends that this larger system is also legitimate insofar as it actually protects basic human rights. Given that we already have states to perform this function, one might worry that an international legal system would be redundant and/or illegitimate unless unanimously accepted by each individual state. As the horrible track record of actual states unfortunately reveals, though, an international legal system is anything but redundant. And given that we need such a system to make the world a more just place, consent by the states is no more required to justify international law than the consent of citizens is necessary for the legitimacy of individual states. With this account of the international legal system in place, Buchanan is now in a position to comment on the ideal content of international law on various matters, including group self-determination. Regarding secession, for instance, he dismisses the notion that the value of political self-determination shows that international law must allow qualified groups to secede whenever their political divorce will render neither the separatists nor the rump state unable to protect the basic human rights of their citizens. Against this, Buchanan suggests that international law’s twin aims of promoting peace and securing basic human rights necessitate that there should be an international ban on unilateral secession in the absence of injustice. At the heart of Buchanan’s argument are concerns about the types of incentives that international laws can create. He argues in favor of remedial rights to secede because of the beneficial incentives that institutionally protecting these rights will

have, and he argues against allowing any so-called primary rights to secede because of the perverse incentives that would be created by international laws designed to protect them. In particular, if international law recognizes rights to secede only in cases of injustice, then political leaders will be motivated to govern justly because they know both that (1) doing so will lead the international community to support this state in any potential secessionist conflict and that (2) substantial injustices could lead the international community to support the secessionists. The incentive structure would be altogether different, however, if the international legal system also respected primary rights to secede. Not only would leaders lose some of their incentive to govern justly (because being a just state would no longer insulate it from the threat of secession), institutionally protecting primary rights to secede would discourage decentralization, open immigration, and freedom of migration, because each of these policies potentially nurtures separatism. In sum, there seems ample reason to think that institutionally protecting only remedial rights to secede would create positive incentives, whereas protecting primary rights would both eliminate those helpful incentives and create additional detrimental ones. Thus, because the justifying aim of international law is to secure peace and promote justice, and because legalizing primary rights to secede threatens to lead to a world in which basic human rights are considerably less secure, the international legal system should adopt a decidedly conservative stance on unilateral statebreaking in the absence of injustice. To emphasize: Buchanan is not alleging that there could be no grounds for positing more permissive rights to secede in an ideal world; his claim more specifically is only that once one understands the legitimating function of international law, one can see why in the current world the international legal system ought not to protect rights to secede in the absence of injustice. As this terribly brief summary of Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination shows, Buchanan’s work is distinctive (and distinctively valuable) insofar as it offers concrete proposals for feasible reforms of our most important existing institutions, and it does so without shying away from the foundational questions. Buchanan begins with the most basic building blocks of justice, on which he constructs a novel (and systematic) defense of those institutions which give us the best chance of actually reducing the horrible levels of existing injustice, and then concludes by providing clear prescriptions that can actually help contemporary actors who seek to reform our international legal system so that it better achieves its vital two-pronged function of securing peace and

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protecting basic human rights. Like so much that Buchanan writes, this book is not merely the product of an insightful and rigorous political philosopher, it is the work of someone who insists on making the fruits of his thinking accessible and maximally useful to those currently charged with designing the institutions which determine how peaceful and just our world will be.

Related Topics

▶ Global Distributive Justice ▶ Global Justice

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▶ Human Rights ▶ Sovereignty

References Buchanan A (1982) Marx and justice: the radical critique of liberalism. Rowman & Allanheld, Totowa Buchanan A (1991) Secession: the morality of political divorce from Fort Sumter to Lithuania and Quebec. Westvew Press, Boulder Buchanan A (2004) Justice, legitimacy, and self-determination: moral foundations for international law. Oxford University Press, Oxford Buchanan A (2010) Human rights, legitimacy, and the use of force. Oxford University Press, Oxford

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C Cabrera, Luis CHRISTOPHER J. FINLAY Department of Political Science and International Studies, University of Birmingham, Edgbaston, Birmingham, UK

Luis Cabrera is one of the firmest advocates of institutional cosmopolitanism among contemporary theorists of global justice. Institutional cosmopolitanism is generally defined in contrast to moral cosmopolitanism, understood as the assessment of the justice of global institutions according to how individuals, rather than states, fare under them. Institutional cosmopolitanism is seen as more prescriptive, advocating the creation of institutions above the state that are able to secure just outcomes. Limited forms of institutional cosmopolitanism prescribe the creation of institutions narrowly focused on international law, distributive justice, or the environment, while stronger versions advocate full global political integration. Cabrera argues in Political Theory of Global Justice: A Cosmopolitan Case for the World State (2004) that a specific form of world government would in fact be an appropriate political ideal. He focuses on the obstacles in the way of securing distributive justice in a global system composed of sovereign states. A states system, he argues, naturally reinforces three central biases against trans-state distributions of resources and opportunities. The first is a foundational bias, stemming from the normative structure of the Westphalian system, where states are viewed as the stewards of their own citizens’ interests. To distribute resources across borders consistent with some global application of the Rawlsian difference principle (Beitz 1999; Pogge 2008), or a similar distributive principle, could be to subvert a state’s presumed stewardship role and weaken its claims to noninterference and other prerogatives of sovereignty. A second, electoral, bias stems from the strong interest leaders in democratic states have in giving overwhelming attention to their own constituents’ interests. Something

similar may also be true of some hierarchical states as well where stakeholders could be expected to object strenuously to those overseas transfers necessary for a full realization of cosmopolitan attempts to address the poverty and vulnerability of those in less-affluent states. A final “own-case” bias is Lockean in inspiration. Where Locke argued that conflict over resources would tend to spiral upward in a state of nature because of the lack of a neutral judge, Cabrera argues that individuals within affluent states may simply be permitted to underestimate their own distributive obligations in the absence of any formal adjudication of claims at the suprastate level. Each bias, he argues, points to a likely need for deeper political integration between states, roughly on the model of the European Union. Such integration would involve the creation of suprastate governing bodies with global scope, including ultimately a global parliamentary body, executive, etc. Cabrera does not, however, argue for the straightforward creation of a sovereign state at the global level. That is, he does not argue for global bodies with either a monopoly on the legitimate means of organized violence or an unchallengeable final authority. Nor does he place significant emphasis in the short term on the control of nuclear weapons. Thus, his approach is distinct in emphasis from the many “one world or none” arguments offered in the heyday of world-state debate in the aftermath of World War II (see Einstein 2007[1946]), as well as from some recent world-government accounts that place greater emphasis on interstate security (Wendt 2003; Deudney 2007). Long-standing objections to world government on grounds that it is likely to become tyrannous give good reason to avoid concentration in control of the global coercive apparatus, Cabrera argues. Overall, he advocates an incremental approach to suprastate integration, with emphasis on promoting democratic accountability in the processes of integration already underway at the regional and global levels. Even if some fully integrated, democratic global political system might not be achievable even in the very long term, he argues, lesser forms of accountable integration could lead to significant improvements for those within less-affluent states.

Deen K. Chatterjee (ed.), Encyclopedia of Global Justice, DOI 10.1007/978-1-4020-9160-5, # Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

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Cabrera extends the argument in The Practice of Global Citizenship (2010). Here his concern is not primarily with the macro-level case for world government, but with the individual duties that would apply in a frame of institutional cosmopolitanism. He argues that to elaborate comprehensively the duties that correspond to universal human rights, it is necessary to consider ways in which the current global system tends to impede rights fulfillment. Again he argues for a strong variant of institutional cosmopolitanism, and here for individual duties to promote democratically accountable integration between states. Specifically, he identifies three types of duties that are said to be incumbent on all individuals in the current system: duties of contribution, accommodation, and institutional advocacy. Duties in the first two categories are informed by those in the third, to promote the reform and expansion of suprastate institutions, with the ultimate aim being a set of global institutions – again a world government – capable of protecting the core rights of all persons. Thus, where representative individuals within affluent states, for example, are seen as having duties to contribute to poverty alleviation efforts, they are expected to give emphasis to efforts that could build institutional capacity to address poverty in impoverished states. Where they are said to have duties to accommodate the deeper distributive demands that are likely to be made on them in an integrating global system, they would also have duties to accommodate newcomers under more liberalized immigration regimes. The European Union again serves as a partial model for the more integrated system. Cabrera, who began his career as a journalist for The Associated Press in Seattle, draws on his early training in Practice. He illustrates his argument with findings from several years’ worth of interviews and field observations among unauthorized immigrants, immigrant-rights activists, and the restrictionist “Minutemen” civilian border patrollers. Findings are presented from similar fieldwork in Western Europe. Immigrant-rights activists and immigrants themselves are offered as exemplars of some aspects of global citizenship practice. Cabrera argues that unauthorized immigrants are, in fact, practicing a form of global “civil” disobedience by violating entry laws to better secure economic rights for themselves and their family members. Near-term institutional changes that individuals could promote are said to include the expansion of the European Union to Turkey and some other middle- or lower-income states, the deepening of North American integration, and

the deepening of parliamentarian involvement in the governance of the World Trade Organization and like bodies. Cabrera also emphasizes duties that those in less-affluent states could assume, or already have. The latter are illustrated with findings from fieldwork in Veracruz, Mexico, among communities where local parishioners provide food and temporary shelter to Central Americans riding on top of freight trains to the US border. Finally, Cabrera has been centrally involved in the recent resurgence of systematic thought on possibilities for global government. He organized roundtable discussions involving world-government thinkers at major US political science meetings from 2006 to 2009, and solicited contributions by prominent global government advocates and critics in an edited volume, Global Governance, Global Government: Institutional Visions for an Evolving World System (2011).

Related Topics

▶ Associative Duties ▶ Cosmopolitan Democracy ▶ Cosmopolitanism ▶ Duties to Non-Compatriots ▶ Global Civil Society ▶ Global Difference Principle ▶ Global Federalism ▶ Global Justice ▶ Immigration ▶ Patriotism ▶ World Citizenship

References Beitz C (1999) Political theory and international relations, revised edn. Princeton University Press, Princeton Cabrera L (2004) Political theory of global justice: a cosmopolitan case for the world state. Routledge, London Cabrera L (2010) The practice of global citizenship. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Cabrera L (2011) Global governance, global government: institutional visions for an evolving world system. State University of New York Press, Albany Deudney DH (2007) Bounding power: republican security theory from the Polis to the global village. Princeton University Press, Princeton Einstein A (2007/1946) The way out. In: Masters D, Way K (eds) One world or none: a report to the public on the full meaning of the atomic bomb. The New Press, New York, pp 209–214 Pogge T (2008) World poverty and human rights: cosmopolitan responsibilities and reforms, 2nd edn. Polity Press, Cambridge Wendt A (2003) Why a world state is inevitable. Eur J Int Relat 9(4):491–542

Cairo Declaration of Human Rights

Cairo Declaration of Human Rights DAVID BOERSEMA Department of Philosophy, Pacific University, Forest Grove, OR, USA

The Cairo Declaration of Human Rights in Islam (CDHRI) was drafted by the majority of the member states of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) in 1990. It was, in part, a response to previous international rights declarations and accords that were seen by these OIC states as being too secular in tone and content, particularly the landmark Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). The CDHRI was also an attempt to acknowledge and codify the importance of human rights as they relate to fundamental principles of Islam. The CDHRI is based on the foundation of Shari’ah Law, that is, divine commandments that are revealed in holy scripture, especially in the Qur’an. Because of its divine nature, Shari’ah Law takes precedence over any civil laws and the latter can have legitimate authority only to the extent that they do not contradict it. Shari’ah Law provides a guide for human conduct, and the CDHRI is intended to spell out rights and freedoms as an integral part of Islam. The CDHRI consists of a preamble and 25 articles, enunciating general and specific rights enjoyed under Shari’ah Law, as well as corresponding duties and responsibilities. Some of the rights that are enunciated are negative rights, that is, rights of immunity against interference by others. Among these rights are the right to life, bodily security, freedom from torture, freedom of religion, selfdetermination, property, privacy (in one’s home), political participation, presumption of innocence, freedom of movement, and free expression. Other rights that are enunciated are positive rights, that is, rights that obligate others (The State) to provide something in order for those rights to be enjoyed. Among these rights are the right to work (including fair wages, holidays, and deserved promotions) and cultural benefits. Familial rights are also explicitly noted, including the right to marriage, parental rights in the rearing of children, and children’s rights to appropriate care and upbringing. Among the enunciated duties and responsibilities are the duty not to kill nonbelligerents (such as old men, women, and children) even in the context of armed conflict, not to take hostages, to

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exchange prisoners of war and arrange visits and reunions of families separated by the circumstances of war, not to destroy property, and parents’ responsibilities for appropriate care (physical and moral) of their children. Many people have claimed that the CDHRI is complementary to the UDHR, not an alternative to it. Indeed, many OIC countries are signatories of the UDHR. Others, however, claim that some specific language in the CDHRI is inconsistent with the articles in the UDHR. For example, Article 22 of the CDHRI states “Everyone shall have the right to express his opinion freely in such manner as would not be contrary to the principles of Shari’ah.” Likewise, Article 12 states “Every man shall have the right, within the framework of Shari’ah, to free movement.” Such language, say critics, limits and undercuts genuine freedom of expression or movement. Supporters of the CDHRI disagree, claiming that human actions must be understood always and only in the context of divine guidance. In addition, they say, even in secular countries freedom of expression and movement often is limited on grounds of social good. As hinted above, the CDHRI relates to concerns about global justice from at least two perspectives. For the supporters of the CDHRI, the document is a response to the actual or perceived sense of (western) cultural hegemony, especially cultural values that are framed in the language of rights. Global justice, say these supporters, requires that rights be generated, understood, appraised, and justified in local and cultural contexts. Critics of the CDHRI, of course, argue that matters of justice, including the issue of rights, cannot be defined or determined merely on the grounds of cultural traditions or practices, which themselves might very well be unjust. This can play out in specific cases such as how to interpret a prohibition against cruel and degrading punishment in the context of Shari’ah Law. For instance, does the stoning to death of an adulterer (a punishment that many claim has Qur’anic backing) constitute a violation of justice? This forces the question: whose justice? Clearly, as a broad normative document that is intended not only for the interpretation of practices, but also for the instruction of future practices, the CDHRI raises the issue of how to understand the global aspects of global justice, that is, global as universal, as international, as multiethnic, or in yet some other manner.

Related Topics ▶ Basic Rights ▶ Decent Society ▶ Eurocentrism

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Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA)

▶ Global Human Rights Culture ▶ Globalization ▶ Human Rights ▶ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ▶ International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights ▶ Justice and Religion: Islam ▶ Multiculturalism ▶ Rights ▶ Universal Declaration of Human Rights

References Baderin Ma (2005) International human rights and Islamic law. Oxford University Press, Oxford Brownlie I, Goodwin-Gill GS (eds) (2006) Basic documents on human rights, 5th edn. Oxford University Press, Oxford Churchill RP (2005) Human rights and global diversity. Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs Mayer A (2006) Islam and human rights: tradition and politics, 4th edn. Westview Press, Boulder Sachedina AA (2009) Islam and the challenge of human rights. Oxford University Press, Oxford

The agency has been the subject of controversy. In 2007, the Canadian Senate released a damning report asserting that CIDA was overly bureaucratic, inefficient, and costly and cited the fact that 80% of CIDA staff are based in Ottawa. It assessed that the $12.4 billion Canada had spent on bilateral assistance to sub-Saharan Africa since 1968 had produced little if any results. CIDA has been embroiled in various scandals involving the disappearance of aid funds through embezzlement and corruption in partner countries, including in Zambia, Afghanistan, and the Tsunami recovery effort. The effectiveness of CIDA’s gender equality programming has been low despite the large allocation of resources. CIDA was also controversially central to rewriting Colombian mining regulations in 2000–2001, significantly lowering extraction royalties foreign firms pay the Colombian government as well as reducing environmental, labor, and indigenous property protections. The agency’s credibility also suffers from a lack of transparency and the disproportionately high allocation of funds to administrative overhead.

Related Topics

Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) ZENIA KISH Department of Social and Cultural Analysis, New York University, New York, NY, USA

▶ Basic Needs ▶ Development Accountability ▶ Development Assistance ▶ Foreign Aid ▶ Global Poverty ▶ Humanitarian Aid

References The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) is Canada’s bilateral governmental organization charged with planning, funding, and implementing approximately 80% of the federal aid budget. Established in 1968, the agency administers development programs intended to reduce poverty, increase security and equality, and foster independence in over 100 developing countries and countries in transition. CIDA works in partnership with public and private sector partners (both for-profit and nonprofit organizations are eligible) to provide goods, services, financial contributions, humanitarian aid, and the transfer of knowledge and skills. In order to increase the effectiveness of its aid budget, CIDA has recently reorganized its operations to focus efforts on 20 countries and has established three priority themes to guide the organization’s work: increasing food security, improving opportunities for children and youth, and stimulating economic growth. CIDA commits approximately 25% of its resources to supporting basic human needs.

Gillies DW (1987) Commerce over conscience? Aid-trade links in canada’s foreign aid programme. McGill University, Montreal Morrison D (1998) Aid and ebb tide: a history of CIDA and Canadian assistance. North-South Institute, Ottawa Pratt C (1996) Canadian international development assistance policies: an appraisal. McGill-Queen’s University Press, Montreal-Kingston

Caney, Simon ALYSSA R. BERNSTEIN Department of Philosophy, Ohio University, Athens, OH, USA

Simon Caney is Professor in Political Theory and University Lecturer as well as Tutorial Fellow in Politics at Magdalen College, Oxford, UK. He is the author of Justice Beyond Borders: A Global Political Theory (2005), and has

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coedited Climate Ethics: Essential Readings (2010). He is also the author of more than a dozen articles on climate change, a report for the World Bank (“Ethics and Climate Change”), a report for the International Council on Human Rights Policy (“Climate Technology Transfer: A Derivation of Rights- and Duty-Bearers from Fundamental Human Rights”), and numerous articles on topics in contemporary political philosophy including global distributive justice, human rights, sovereignty, global governance, self-determination, humanitarian intervention, and intergenerational justice. Since 2005 he has focused mainly on climate change, human rights, justice, and cosmopolitanism. For discussions of some of his writings on cosmopolitanism, global distributive justice, and human rights, see the entries ▶ Moral Cosmopolitanism and ▶ Political Cosmopolitanism in this encyclopedia. Below are summaries of several of his most recently published articles on climate change. Needless to say, normative and policy issues of climate change centrally relate to the pressing issues of global justice. In “Climate Change, Human Rights, and Moral Thresholds” (2010a), Caney distinguishes several different normative frameworks that have been used by theorists about climate change. These include cost–benefit and security-focused analyses, where security is understood in the traditional way, as contrasted with the more recently formulated idea of human security. Caney claims that a human rights–centered analysis of the impacts of climate change yields insights that are not yielded by other approaches, in particular cost–benefit and security-based analyses. Using what he regards as the most modest and least contentious formulations of the fundamental human rights to life, health, and subsistence, which can enjoy ecumenical support from a wide variety of different ethical perspectives, Caney argues that anthropogenic climate change jeopardizes, undermines, or violates these rights. He emphasizes several implications of such a human rights–centered analysis: (1) that policymakers should take into account only the human rights–relevant effects of climate change; (2) that mitigation and adaptation costs should be assessed in light of the impermissibility of violating human rights: such violations must cease, regardless how high the economic costs of cessation; (3) that compensation is due to those whose rights have been violated; (4) that it is unacceptable to violate a human right with a view to paying compensation afterward; and (5) that respect for human rights must guide the design of international and national policies for combatting climate change, including distribution of the burdens of mitigation and adaptation. Caney contends that those whose human rights are most vulnerable should

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not be required to bear the burden of combatting climate change. In “Human Rights and Global Climate Change” (2010b), Caney argues that climate change jeopardizes a number of fundamental human rights. The current consumption of fossil fuels is, he contends, “unjust because it generates outcomes in which people’s fundamental interests are unprotected,” thus undermining human rights. This is unjust from a “minimal” cosmopolitan perspective, he says, whether the people whose interests are unprotected are fellow citizens or foreigners and whether they are currently alive or will be born in the future. After some methodological preliminaries, Caney considers whether the human rights approach can adequately deal with the inter-temporal character of climate change, and discusses the fact that climate change creates risks and uncertainties (rather than known outcomes). He then addresses the question of the level of protection from climate harms that persons should be able to claim as a matter of right. Caney contends that the human rights jeopardized by climate change should not be subject to “a positive pure time discount rate”: the appropriate pure time discount rate is zero because temporal location in itself has no deep moral significance and the reasoning that grounds human rights accords no moral relevance to time. Caney discusses this topic further in “Climate Change and the Future: Discounting for Time, Wealth, and Risk” (2009). In “Climate Change and the Duties of the Advantaged” (2010c), Caney argues that the burdens of combatting dangerous climate change should be distributed according to a revised form of the Polluter Pays principle, supplemented by a modified version of the Ability to Pay principle. The burdens in question are costly or difficult mitigation and adaptation efforts. The unrevised Polluter Pays principle says that those who caused the problem should pay, and the unmodified Ability to Pay principle says that those who have the greatest ability to pay should pay. Caney rebuts two objections to the Polluter Pays principle, one concerning practicality and the other concerning excusable ignorance. Three more serious objections to this principle shape Caney’s argument to the conclusion that the (backward-looking) Polluter Pays principle must be supplemented by a (forward-looking) Ability to Pay principle in order to address “the Remainder,” i.e., harmful changes stemming from (a) non-anthropogenic climate change, (b) the emissions of (dead) earlier generations, and (c) the emissions needed by the disadvantaged for survival. Caney concludes that persons should bear the burden of climate change that they have caused, so long as doing so does

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not push them below a decent standard of living, and that the duties associated with the Remainder should be borne by the wealthy, with more responsibility carried by those whose wealth came about in unjust ways. As Caney points out, one significant feature of his “hybrid” view is that these duties fall not only on states but also on substate political authorities, international financial institutions, corporations, and individuals; a second significant feature is that it implies that the least advantaged, too, have climate change–related duties. Further, as Caney emphasizes, although an Ability to Pay principle may seem to justify postponing mitigation efforts and allowing future generations to pay the costs of both mitigation and adaptation (on the basis of the assumption that people in the future will be wealthier), his own view has no such implication. It does, however, have policy implications for systems of emissions quotas and carbon trading, as well as systems of carbon taxes: it rules out some, but not all, forms of such systems. It also has policy implications for the financing of research, development, and international transfer of clean technology, as well as for the funding of adaptation efforts. In “Markets, Morality and Climate Change: What, if Anything, Is Wrong with Emissions Trading?” (2010d), Caney argues that existing emissions trading schemes should be radically redesigned, or new ones introduced, since the current schemes are unjust. A justifiable scheme would both distribute the costs of emissions trading equitably and make an appropriate contribution to climate mitigation, which current schemes fail to do, he contends. Caney sets out five moral criteria for assessing mitigation policies such as emissions trading: a just mitigation policy will (1) make an appropriate contribution to lowering greenhouse gas emissions to a safe level, in order to protect the human rights to life, health, and subsistence; (2) distribute burdens fairly among duty-bearers, and impose no unreasonably demanding burdens; (3) impose no intolerable restrictions on liberty; (4) result from a fair, inclusive decision-making process; and in addition, a fully justifiable mitigation policy will (5) violate no ethical obligations to other persons or in relation to the natural world. Focusing on (1), (2), and (5), Caney argues in this article that although utilizing market instruments to combat climate change is not inherently objectionable, current emissions trading schemes are objectionable, for they fail to meet criteria (1) and (2). These schemes do not clearly succeed in lowering emissions, and they distribute the burdens of mitigation unfairly by “handing out large benefits to energy companies” and failing to meet the needs of the poor. Caney emphasizes that when designing or evaluating public policies, one must assess each policy

in comparison with the others that are possible, and must also consider whether the policy being evaluated might undercut the efficacy of any other policies. The other possible climate change mitigation policies that he highlights (referring to relevant publications by others) are: (a) carbon taxes; (b) regulations; (c) carbon disclosure initiatives; and (d) educational initiatives. Noting that moral values rarely specify any particular policy package, and that political as well as stability and efficiency considerations must be taken into account, Caney explains that moral values can inform public policy by specifying goals that should be pursued as well as parameters, e.g., rights that must be honored.

Related Topics

▶ Climate Change ▶ Climate Justice ▶ Global Warming ▶ Moral Cosmopolitanism ▶ Political Cosmopolitanism

References Caney S (2005) Justice beyond borders: a global political theory. Oxford University Press, Oxford Caney S (2009) Climate change and the future: discounting for time, wealth, and risk. J Soc Philos 40(2):163–186 Caney S (2010a) Climate change, human rights, and moral thresholds. In: Gardiner S, Caney S, Jamieson D, Shue H (eds) Climate ethics: essential readings. Oxford University Press, Oxford Caney S (2010b) Human rights and global climate change. In: Pierik R, Wouter W (eds) Cosmopolitanism in context: perspectives from international law and political theory. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Caney S (2010c) Climate change and the duties of the advantaged. Crit Rev Int Soc Polit Philos 13(1):203–228 Caney S (2010d) Markets, morality and climate change: what, if anything, is wrong with emissions trading? New Polit Econ 15(2):197–224 Gardiner S, Caney S, Jamieson D, Shue H (eds) (2010) Climate ethics: essential readings. Oxford University Press, Oxford http://www.politics.ox.ac.uk/index.php/profile/simon-caney.html

Capabilities Approach JAY DRYDYK Department of Philosophy, Carleton University, Ottawa, ON, Canada

The capability approach uses concepts of capability and functioning to address a wide range of issues – theoretical and practical, normative and empirical – concerning wellbeing and inequality. Initially devised to address

Capabilities Approach

theoretical problems in welfare economics, these concepts were found to have an important bearing on theories of justice by giving arguably superior answers to questions about which inequalities should matter. The approach has gained considerable influence in public policy, especially concerning international aid, poverty, and development. Most recently, it has also given rise to vigorous criticism of social contract theory as an approach to social and global justice.

Capability Concepts The terms “capability” and “functioning” can be used specifically in relation to well-being, but they can also be used more generically. In the generic usage, “functioning” refers to anything that a person might be or might do. These “beings and doings” might be quite heterogeneous, for instance: staying healthy, smoking tobacco, playing piano, being a concert pianist, making philosophical arguments, working, fishing, or kayaking. It may be that certain people could manage to achieve some functionings but not others, as I, for instance, can make philosophical arguments but cannot be a concert pianist. Between other functionings, there are trade-offs for a person, for instance, between being a good professional actress and being a good professional philosopher, or between smoking and staying healthy. Given any specified set of functionings, we can, in principle, identify which functionings and combinations of functionings a given person could likely manage to achieve. So, for instance, I could manage to stay healthy, and to smoke tobacco, but not likely both; I am highly unlikely to become a concert pianist or an actress of any kind; I can manage to be a good professional philosopher, but only as long as I give more attention to working at making philosophical arguments than playing the piano, fishing, or kayaking. This can be called my “capability set” with regard to these particular functionings. Using the same set of functionings, we can also determine whether my overall capability expands or contracts over time and whether my overall capability is greater or smaller than that of any other person. Interpersonal comparisons of well-being and advantage are central both to welfare economics and theories of justice. If capabilities are to be relevant to these comparisons, they must be defined in terms of functionings that are relevant to the well-being of the people being compared. The capability approach seeks an analysis of “living better” (or worse) in terms functioning better (or worse) in specific dimensions. For instance, remaining healthy is certainly an important constituent of living well. Acquiring and expanding knowledge is arguably another, as is forming emotionally rewarding personal

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relationships. For each specific functioning, a given person has a specific capability, which may expand or contract over time, and which may be greater or lesser than another person’s capability of that same kind. Capabilities can be diminished by lack of resources: The capability to remain healthy may be reduced for an entire community that lacks access to health care or clean potable water. But capabilities also differ because of human diversity: people have different capacities for converting resources to functionings, as for instance, some people may need wheelchairs along with accessible buildings and social environments in order to equal others in capability for mobility. Which functionings are to be selected for making interpersonal comparisons of well-being and advantage? Most capability theorists would agree that these should be grounded in rational choice, or, to use Amartya Sen’s phrase, the relevant capabilities and functionings are those that people ‘have reason to value’. Martha Nussbaum agrees that the salient capabilities are those that would emerge from rational reflection and discussion. However, she specifies this more narrowly as political deliberation over the capabilities that must be protected for all persons to at least threshold levels, in view of their equal dignity. She goes farther than Sen in proposing that such deliberation will result in an overlapping consensus supporting ten specific capabilities: life; bodily health; bodily integrity; senses, imagination, and thought; emotions; practical reason; affiliation; concern for other species; play; and control over one’s environment. Sen, Nussbaum, and other capability theorists have developed these basic capability concepts in somewhat different directions. If we can identify a set of capabilities to function in ways that people have reason to value, then, for each person, this set determines the extent of what in Sen’s parlance is that person’s “well-being freedom.” Poverty can be regarded as a shortfall in well-being freedom, and development must include expansion of well-being freedom, requiring some balancing between the value of equality (removing “substantive unfreedoms”) and efficiency (expanding everyone’s well-being freedom, short of merely robbing from that of others). Well-being freedom can be contrasted with agency freedom, the extent of which is determined by the set of valued goals that a person is capable of achieving – goals that may have little or nothing to do with that person’s own well-being. Other capability theorists have preferred a more enriched conception of agency that focuses on the extent to which one’s activities result from one’s own choices and values. While Sen acknowledges that well-being freedoms are “refined” and more valuable if they are produced and

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enacted through one’s own choice, Nussbaum has abandoned the distinction between well-being and agency freedom in favor of recognizing practical reasoning (which involves choosing what to do for one’s own reasons) as being, in its own right, one of the ten central capabilities. Taking a leaf from the early writings of Karl Marx, she adds that when capabilities are built and functionings achieved by means of practical reasoning (and, she adds, affinity), human life is distinguished as truly human and befitting of human dignity.

Implications Capability concepts were used first in debates over central assumptions of welfare economics. Though these debates, in their technical forms, are beyond the scope of this article, similar but less formal arguments apply to utilitarianism (or any consequentialist moral theory that aggregates over individual well-being) and to “inequality of what?” debates concerning social and global justice. Consider the welfare questions first. If we are to judge the merits of actions and policies by their effects on aggregate well-being, then this must in turn be based on adequate estimations of individual well-being. To simplify, we may think of the latter either as a function of the individual’s preference-satisfaction or as a function of psychological states such as pleasure and pain. In either case, two people can be judged equal in well-being, even though one is functioning much more poorly in some important dimension. Suppose that one is in poor health but has become so inured to sickness that she either ceases to suffer or ceases to care. By the standard of preferencesatisfaction, her well-being equals that of the healthy person because she has ceased to care (the adaptive preference problem), and by hedonic standards we also find equal well-being because she has ceased to suffer from her ill health. But it would be unreasonable to consider the sick and the healthy to be equal in well-being, and this line of reasoning supports the capability approach, which conceives of well-being in terms of capabilities to function in ways that people have reason to value. Though many theories of justice agree superficially that inequalities are unjust, the important question is which inequalities are unjust, and on this they disagree. Capability theorists agree that inequality of capability is central to injustice. They do not consider all inequalities in functioning to be unjust, since, for instance, while unrelieved famines do an injustice to the victims, fasting does not. What matters is not that everyone does eat equally well, but that everyone is equally capable of eating well. This approach opposes theories of justice that focus on inequality of income or other resources. Here again, the

human diversity argument applies. People with the same resources may not be equally able to convert them to wellbeing. Hence, a disabled person with the same income as one who is not disabled might lack sufficient resources to function as well. Inequalities between the able and disabled can therefore be overlooked by resource-based theories of justice. They can also get the direction of inequality wrong. To use one of Sen’s illustrations: African-American males have higher incomes, but lower life expectancies than men from the state of Kerala in southern India. By income standards, the AfricanAmericans would have to be judged better off, though they do not live as long. This, however, places too little value on their lives. By the capability standard, it is the Keralans who are better off, despite having lower incomes. A great deal of empirical research has been devoted to the measurement of capability inequalities, and some of the measures, such as the Human Development Index, now provide benchmarks for policies and programs of governments, aid agencies, development banks, and nongovernmental organizations, not only as indices of inequality but as indices of progress in social and economic development. Capability concepts have also been used as the basis for novel contributions to a variety of policy issues including human security, economic development policy, human rights, gender inequality, cultural freedom and social exclusion, globalization, environment and climate change, disability, democracy, and empowerment. Many of these have been published along with Human Development Index results in the annual Human Development Reports.

Global Justice and the Social Contract Tradition Because the capability approach relies on reasoning and an information base that are not limited by national boundaries, and because it denies that the capabilities of any individual person are less important than the capabilities of any other, the demands of justice are likewise not limited by national boundaries or grounded in social membership. Nevertheless, this universalism is balanced by cultural pluralism and respect for self-determination by and within nation-states. Pluralism is achievable first because the same capabilities can be realized in different ways (some people being nourished by bagels, others by chapatis), and, second, because persons are valued for their dignity, not for their specific conceptions of the good. Though Nussbaum argues that everyone should be constitutionally entitled to social support maintaining their central capabilities above threshold levels, how to implement this is a task for democratic politics and

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deliberation. At the same time, self-determination is not just for states: capability theorists typically support participatory democracy, expanded agency, and empowerment at grassroots levels, both in governance and in development activities. Several challenges to the social contract tradition have emerged from the capability approach. Sen has criticized the conception of justice as a property of ideal social institutions; what is needed is rather to estimate how justly or unjustly actual institutions are functioning, and for this purpose a comparative idea of justice is more useful than an ideal. Nussbaum identifies four common assumptions of liberal social contract theory that have blocked its progress at the “frontiers of justice,” namely, that just arrangements are those that result from rational agreement (a) based on mutual advantage and (b) excluding altruism or benevolence (c) for free, equal, and independent persons in (d) circumstances of justice that make such cooperation both possible and necessary. With these assumptions, she argues, social contract theory can have little to say about the just treatment of disabled people, of people in other countries, or of other species. Instead of proposing an end-state for global justice, the capability approach identifies types of change that must be harmonized in order to move in the direction of greater justice, both local and global. (a) Removing shortfalls in central capabilities and well-being freedom remains a focal point, balanced against (b) expanding the capabilities of all. Similarly, (c) entitlements must prevent people from falling below basic capability thresholds and thus being excluded from social participation, but at the same time (d) giving priority to the worst-off is often the first step in moving them up to those thresholds. These changes should be brought about in ways that are (e) empowering for the people whose capabilities are to expand, achieved through processes to which these stakeholders can actively contribute, both as individuals and as members of groups, reflecting their own choices and thinking. Finally, they should be brought about (f) in ways that respect other normative values, including accepted conceptions of fair and legitimate process. The capability approach, in short, is less interested in looking at global justice than in leading towards it.

Related Topics

▶ Contractarianism ▶ Crocker, David ▶ Development Ethics ▶ Economic Rights ▶ Equality ▶ Global Poverty

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▶ Human Development and Capability Association (HDCA) ▶ Ideal Moral Theory ▶ Nussbaum, Martha C. ▶ Preference-Satisfaction ▶ Quality of Life ▶ Sen, Amartya ▶ Utilitarianism

References Alkire S (2002) Valuing freedoms: Sen’s capability approach and poverty reduction. Oxford University Press, Oxford Crocker D (2008) Ethics of global development; agency, capability, and deliberative democracy. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Deneulin S, Shahani L (eds) (2009) An introduction to the human development and capability approach. Earthscan/International Development Research Centre, London/Ottawa Nussbaum M (2000) Women and human development: the capabilities approach. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Nussbaum M (2006) Frontiers of justice: disability, nationality, species membership. Harvard University Press, Cambridge Nussbaum M, Sen A (eds) (1993) The quality of life. Oxford University Press, Oxford Robeyns I (2005) The capability approach: a theoretical survey. J Hum Dev 6:93–114 Sen A (1992) Inequality reexamined. Harvard University Press, Cambridge Sen A (1999) Development as freedom. Knopf, New York Sen A (2009) The idea of justice. Harvard University Press, Cambridge United Nations Development Programme (1990-) Human development reports. Available online at http://hdr.undp.org/en/

Capital Punishment ROBERT P. ABELE Department of Humanities and Philosophy, Diablo Valley College, Pleasant Hill, CA, USA

Capital punishment may be defined as the judicial sentence and carrying-out of the sentence of death as the punishment for a crime committed. As such, it is a penalty performed by a socially recognized agency, usually the state. We will use the term “death penalty” as synonymous with “capital punishment” in the exposition and analysis here. In this reflection, the following aspects of capital punishment will be examined: its current state in the world, its role in the overall notion of legal punishment and its justification, the arguments for and against capital punishment, and the relation of global justice concerns to the practice of capital punishment.

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Statistics on Capital Punishment How do the nations of the world stand on the issue of capital punishment? According to Amnesty International, 139 countries in the world have abolished the death penalty, while less than 50 nations currently engage in it. More telling, on December 21, 2010, a resolution calling for a universal moratorium on the use of the death penalty at the United Nations General Assembly received 109 votes (of nations) in favor of the resolution, 41 votes against, 35 abstentions, and 7 nations were absent. This demonstrates a trend toward international abolition, since an additional three states voted in favor of the 2010 resolution, and five fewer states voted against it, than they did with an almost identical resolution in 2008 (Amnesty International). Furthermore, popular opinion in the world is demonstrably opposed to capital punishment. The practice has little to no support from the populations of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Latin America, and Europe (Death Penalty Information Center 2010). European Union member states all prohibit capital punishment as a condition of their membership, as exemplified in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Article 2. However, there are exceptions to this trend against the death penalty in world opinion. For instance, the four most populous countries in the world engage in the death penalty, thus affecting over 60% of the world’s population. These countries are China, India, the United States, and Indonesia. All of these countries voted against the U.N. General Assembly Resolution on a Moratorium on the Use of the Death Penalty, in 2008. In the United States, a 2010 survey by the Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life found that 62% of Americans support the death penalty in murder cases, and only 30% oppose it (Falsani 2010).

The Notion of Legal Punishment and Its Justification In order to discuss capital punishment effectively, one must take into account the fact that this practice theoretically is an articulation of one understanding of the more general philosophy of legal punishment and its justification. This general topic is defined as the judicial infliction of some kind of suffering on someone who has committed a legal transgression – or, as John Rawls puts it, attaching legal penalties to the violation of legal rules (Rawls 1955). The general theories of punishment are usually divided into three traditions: deterrent/consequentialist, retributivist/deontological, and abolitionist. Utilitarian theory holds that punishment is justifiable only by reference to the probable consequences of maintaining it as one of the devices of the social order

(Rawls 1955). Since it appeals to a social good(s) for justification of the overall practice of punishment, it provides the philosophical grounding of a deterrent approach to punishment, as well as an argument for detaining wrongdoers. There are a few problems inherent in such an approach to punishment, however. Frequently raised objections to this view include the fact that deterrence cannot work when it comes to crimes of passion or where people assess the risk and determine that the action and its outcome is worth the risk. Further, consequentialist justifications of punishment tend to ignore proportional punishment (i.e., making the punishment fit the crime), and making sure that only the guilty are punished for their crimes. The retributive view of punishment is that punishment is justified simply on the grounds that wrongdoing merits punishment, and that a person who does wrong should suffer in proportion to his or her wrongdoing (Rawls 1955). It is a deontological view in that it maintains the priority of normative assessment: The justification of punishment here appeals to rules or principles of the institution that have been violated by a particular act. Thus, punishment is a matter of justice, not a matter of the social benefits that accrue from punishment. This viewpoint is not without its own problems of course. Included in the traditional challenges to it are: the problem of determining the unfair advantage attained by a lawbreaker, the problem that any punishment does not really compensate the victim for the crime, and the fact that it coerces people into obeying the laws instead of treating them as rational agents responsible for acting appropriately toward others. Michel Foucault responds to this debate by denying that punishment can be justified at all, since it is essentially based on the ideology of the sociopolitical power-system in place in a given society. As such, it cannot be rationally justified nor philosophically discussed (Foucault 1977). The abolitionist view takes up Foucault’s challenge and presses it further by arguing that no justification of punishment is possible at all. According to abolitionists such as Christie, the notion of “crime” itself is problematic, and should be replaced with notions of “conflicts” instead (Christie 1977).

The Three Main Positions on Capital Punishment As legal punishment is generally analyzed from three primary philosophical perspectives, so also is the analysis of the death penalty. The problems we noted for each of these justification positions likewise make their appearance when it comes to justifying capital punishment.

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Continuing with the abolitionist position, perhaps the most well-known and outspoken contemporary opponent of the death penalty in philosophy is Hugo Adam Bedau. Bedau is primarily concerned to dismantle the deterrence justification for capital punishment. He argues that deterrence must be consistently and promptly employed in order to work as its defenders claim. However, when it comes to capital punishment, deterrence does not work in this way. One reason for this is that the numbers of murderers sentenced to death are very small – 1 in 50 – and of this number, even fewer are actually executed. So deterrence is not an issue with capital punishment. Additionally, considerable delays and costs are unavoidable due to procedural safeguards intended to protect the innocent. We can reduce delay and costs only by removing these safeguards, which would then increase the likelihood of the innocent being executed (Bedau 1997). Second, Bedau presents the three main cases in which murders occur, and finds each of them problematic with regard to deterrence. First, premeditated murders will not be reduced by the threat of the death penalty, since the perpetrators have calculated the risks and concluded that they can escape the penalty. Second are so-called crimes of passion. These are not planned, and therefore deterrence is not applicable. Finally, drug trafficking murderers are already betting their lives with their competitors and in their expected battles with the police (Bedau 1997). Bedau also finds the death penalty intrinsically problematic on the grounds of its inherent unfairness. Race, sex, and socioeconomic class are all significant factors in determining who is sentenced to die. Finally, the inevitability of error and the financial costs to prosecute and appeal capital crime cases argue against the death penalty’s effectiveness (more on these issues below). Jeffrey H. Reiman, for his part, finds several problems with the abolitionist view. First, the abolitionist view that it is wrong to kill the offender by doing the same wrong to them must be set aside, since we do allow this to happen in times of self-defense or war. If this is correct, then the wrongfulness of murder cannot be that it is killing per se, but rather that it is the killing of an innocent person. But if this is so, then if the state kills the murderer, it does not do the wrong that the murderer did, since the state is not killing an innocent person (Reiman 1985). Also, the rejection of capital punishment on the grounds of the potential for killing the innocent must be annulled as well, since we do tolerate the deaths of innocents in work and in wars. If the abolitionist view has its problems, does the utilitarian/consequentialist justification for capital punishment fare any better? This perspective (as well as the deontological/retributivist argument) follows the same

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line of argumentation as we have seen under legal punishment. In this philosophy, the notion of deterrence plays a significant role. One of the most famous utilitarians, John Stuart Mill, was a staunch defender of capital punishment in cases of murder. Mill held that his was a humanity-based deterrence principle, since the punishment of hard labor for life was a less humane punishment than killing a murderer: It is “the least cruel mode in which it is possible adequately to deter from the crime” (Mill 1868). Mill appeals to the (allegedly) countless numbers of cases in which the deterrence factor saved lives, and additionally that the deterrent effect comes from its use only with the crime of murder. He concludes that the killing of innocents that comes with the use of the death penalty is so small in number that its use is justified by the greater good for society. The deterrence argument became more detailed and nuanced in the late twentieth century. Gone now are defenses and rejections of deterrence based on the rational psychology of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Now deterrence is said to depend on the likelihood and on the regularity (not the rationality) of human responses to danger. This response mechanism is seen in human behavior in nonjudicial settings; for example, no one who is not suicidal jumps off of high mountain cliffs. Risks and rewards are now seen as “felt,” not reasoned. Added to this shift is a sociological assumption that people refrain from committing offenses because they feel an obligation to behave lawfully. But this obligation in turn results from the deterrent effect of punishment, and nothing more. This means that, regarding actions whose punishment is light, violating a law will be the result. Given these considerations, the question is not whether or not the death penalty deters, but whether it deters more than the alternatives. For defenders of the deterrence argument, supporting capital punishment requires only that the severity of the penalty may influence some potential criminals, and that the added severity of death adds to the deterrence. Even the irrevocability of the death penalty is not a demand for further proof of deterrence. It is only a demand for a reason to expect more deterrence than revocable penalties might produce (van den Haag 1983). Aside from the Hobbesian overtones in such arguments as van den Haag’s, there are surely some problems within deterrence justifications. First of all, does it logically follow from the fact that one penalty is more feared than another that it thereby deters better? Also, it has been pointed out that violent criminals realize that in the commission of their violence, when they encounter the police, their chances of being killed are quite high.

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Additionally, there is an arbitrariness that seems to occur in the use of the death penalty that the deterrent justification leaves untouched – for example, racial, social, and/or economic factors. Some death penalty advocates, such as van den Haag, dismiss such arbitrariness as present throughout the judicial system, and thus of little merit, since nothing can be done without abolishing all punishment (van den Haag 1983). But surely in cases where the penalty is so severe (death), and where protection of citizens is necessary but the death penalty itself is not necessary for doing so, arbitrariness must remain an important concern. As Reiman argues, what would happen if we abolished all capital punishment? His answer: nothing new. But if all punishments themselves were abolished, there would be a Hobbesian war of all against all. Thus, the argument from arbitrariness retains its special force against capital punishment (Reiman 1985). A deontological/retributivist justification of capital punishment has as its focus one of two concerns. The first justification is lex talionis, which maintains that the offender should be paid back with the same type of suffering he has caused another (i.e., “an eye for an eye”). The second is proportional retributivism, which maintains only that the criminal be punished in degree to his crime, not in kind. The death penalty might be, but is not necessitated as a proportional response to a capital crime, under this justification. These two positions might be called the “strict equivalency” position and the “proportional equivalency” position. As might be expected, each of these positions has its problems as well. Strict equivalency must answer questions concerning how this is conceivable in all cases. For example, cases of torturing someone before murdering them, rape before murder, or multiple murders cannot use strict equivalency as a justification. Proportional equivalency likewise has problems, including the difficulty of preparing a hierarchical listing of proportional punishments and crimes, and the fact that rational distinctions like this are difficult, if not impossible. Further, punishing the perpetrator does not undo the wrong suffered by the victim, nor does it compensate the victim for her suffering (MacKinnon 2004). Two defenders of the lex talionis view are G.W. Hegel and Immanuel Kant. For Hegel, in The Philosophy of Right, crime is an injury willed by the perpetrator that upsets the equality between persons. Hence, to penalize this particular will is to annul the crime and to restore right (i.e., the equality violated). In this way, Hegel argues, the retributive justification is in fact revenge, “which is just in its content insofar as it is retributive” (Hegel 1821).

Kant, in his Metaphysical Elements of Justice, argues that any undeserved evil that one inflicts upon another is one that one does to oneself. So if one kills another, one kills oneself. On this ground, Kant maintains that one who kills also wills to be killed, and thus it is not really the state that punishes him. Rather, through his own judgment, the murderer produces a resolution to take his own life. Even more drastically, Kant states that even if a civil society were to dissolve itself by agreement of all its members, the last murderer remaining in prison must first be executed, so that everyone will duly receive what his actions are worth (Kant 1797). There are questions regarding this Kantian argument as well. First, if the duty to punish is based on what people have done to others because of the respect owed to rational beings, then we would have a duty to do to all other things – good, bad, or indifferent – that they do to others. So this claim must be nuanced to one that states that a rational being, by his actions, authorizes others to do the same things to him. It does not compel them to do so. But this argument leads to a right, not a duty to exact lex talionis. Kant ultimately does not settle the question of the extent to which a victim or a state should exercise the right. Do we torture a torturer, or nearly kill a multiple murderer, revive him, and nearly kill him again? These questions remain unanswered in Kant’s defense of capital punishment (Reiman 1985). Modern versions of proportional retributivism are defended by Jeffrey H. Reiman and Robert Nozick, among many others. Nozick argues that people deserve punishment for their wrongful acts, independently of the deterrent effect of such punishment. That this is not revenge is explained by the fact that retribution is done for a wrong only, and not for a personal injury. In addition, revenge is personal and emotional, whereas retribution is neither of those. After delineating nine conditions for retributive punishment to be justified, he ultimately comes to defend retributive punishment on a nonteleological model, so that it is seen as right or good in itself, apart from its consequences. The point of this is that the wrongdoer has become disconnected from correct values, and the purpose of punishment is to reconnect him, so that the value qua value has as significant an effect on his life as the magnitude of his flouting of those correct values. For the most serious flouting (e.g., murder), capital punishment is the response of equal magnitude. One would think that from there it would be a short step for Nozick to advocate the death penalty. However, he does not. He adds a third connection between punishment and value, and that is the connection between the punisher and the value of the person being punished. The punisher is not simply intending to act on

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the perpetrator in disregard of his value, but as a person who is capable of acknowledging the correct values. This tension results in Nozick’s being unable to reach a definitive conclusion regarding the justification of capital punishment (Nozick 1981).

Capital Punishment and Global Justice There are numerous questions that need to be addressed regarding capital punishment from a global justice perspective. We will examine five important ones here. First, there are difficulties squaring the practice of capital punishment with any normative justification, whether global or local. One of them is racism. Given the ongoing presence of racism in societies worldwide, and the fact that the race of the victim, the perpetrator, and the jurors all matter in obtaining a conviction that would result in the death penalty, one must question the ethical justifications of the use of the death penalty. Since the United States is one of the few remaining modern countries that still uses the death penalty, a specific study concerning its use and racism is appropriate to note here. According to the US General Accounting Office (GAO), and nonpartisan agency, in 82% of the cases studied, the race of the victim was found to have influenced the likelihood of being charged with a capital murder or receiving the death sentence. This conclusion was consistent across data sets, states, data collection methods, and analytic techniques (The Death Penalty Information Center 2010). A second serious issue that recommends ethical skepticism regarding the practice of capital punishment concerns mistaken convictions. In the United States alone, there have been 267 post-conviction DNA-based exonerations from the death penalty in the last 30 years. The sources of mistakes for death penalty conviction include: DNA inclusions at time of trial, other forensic inclusions, false confessions, false witness testimony, microscopic hair comparison matches, bad lawyering, defective or fraudulent science, prosecutorial misconduct, police misconduct, serology inclusion, and mistaken I.D. (The Innocence Project 2010). While supporters of the death penalty generally argue that such numbers are fairly low, a defender of the notion of inalienable human rights would want a more substantive defense of a practice in which this risk of wrongful conviction is undertaken more freely than one which directly belittled the lives of those wrongfully convicted by defending numbers instead of lives. Third, the incidences of higher death penalty rates due to racism, poverty, bias, power abuse, etc., demonstrate that it affects others disproportionately, and thus raises

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ethical questions for a proponent. Even on a retributivist view, the fact that punishment is internally related to a crime (i.e., punishment is necessary for justice to be done) does not imply that the death penalty should be one of those punishments. Fourth is the issue of human rights. Thomas Pogge states that “a human right to X entails the demand that, insofar as reasonably possible, any coercive social institutions be so designed that all human beings affected by them have secure access to X.” The right to life is clearly one of those moral claims on any coercive social institution (Pogge 2008: 52–3). For two examples of this, the United States refers to it in the Declaration of Independence as the “unalienable rights . . . [of] life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness,” and Germany has it in its Constitution that “Everyone shall have the right to life and to inviolability of his person.” It is the same with all other developed countries, which have long since abolished the death penalty as being inconsistent with its claims to uphold human rights. The fifth issue concerns the fact that there is an unmistakable and strong trend in the world community banning the use of capital punishment. By way of example, we may highlight the following charters and treaties: ● European Convention on Human Rights, Protocol 6, bans the use of capital punishment in peacetime, but allows states to use it during war. Further, the Thirteenth Protocol, Article 1, states: “The death penalty shall be abolished. No one shall be condemned to such penalty or executed.” ● American Convention on Human Rights, Second Protocol – adopted in 1990 by the General Assembly of the Organization of American States, and signed and ratified by 11 of the (North and South) American nations, it abolishes the death penalty in times of peace, but allows nations to opt for its use during wartime. The United States and Canada did not vote in favor of this and have not ratified it. ● Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Article 2, Section 2: “No one shall be condemned to the death penalty, or executed.” ● Council of Europe. The Council of Europe’s 47 member states form a death-penalty-free zone. Since 1985, the abolition of the death penalty has been a requirement for membership of the Council of Europe. ● Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1989, it abolishes

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the death penalty in times of peace, but allows states to exercise it during times of war. Seventy-three nations signed and ratified this Protocol. The United States did not vote for it and has not ratified it. These examples clearly indicate that the trend of world opinion and law is strongly in the direction of opposing, if not outright banning the use of capital punishment as inherently unjust and a grave violation of human rights. It is also clear that Europe is leading the way in this movement.

Conclusion The concept of global justice that nations are beginning to embrace clearly includes a notion of the fundamental right to life of persons that is not expunged by the commission of a crime. The movement toward abolishing the death penalty worldwide on this global conception of justice is indubitable. As our conception of humanity becomes more universal, our conception of justice becomes more inclusive, and less prone to abusing those who have harmed others in serious and significant ways. We might summarize this by saying that we are starting to affirm the teaching of Mahatma Gandhi: “An eye for an eye makes the whole world blind.”

Related Topics

▶ Basic Rights ▶ Global Human Rights Culture ▶ International Criminal Justice ▶ Natural Rights ▶ Punishment ▶ Retributive Justice

References Amnesty International (2010) USA: death penalty, still part of the ‘American experiment,’ still wrong. September 22, 2010 Bedau HA (1997) The case against the death penalty. ACLU pamphlet, December 31, 1997 Bentham J (1781/1988) An introduction to the principles of morals and legislation (Chapter 13). Prometheus Books, New York (1988; published in 1781) Christie N (1977) Conflicts as property. Br J Criminol 17(1):1–15 Falsani C (2011) Shepherds lead, but flocks diverge on morality of death penalty. Religion News Service, March 17, 2011 Foucault M (1977) Discipline and punish. Pantheon, New York Hegel GW (1821/1962) The philosophy of right (trans: Knox TM). Clarendon Press, Oxford (1962; published in 1821) Kant I (1797/1965) Metaphysical elements of justice (trans: Ladd J). Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapolis (1965; published in 1797) MacKinnon B (2004) Ethics: theory and contemporary issues. ThomsonWadsworth, New York Mill, JS (1868) Speech in favor of capital punishment. A speech before parliament on April 21, 1868

Nozick R (1981) Philosophical explanations. Harvard University Press, Cambridge Pogge TH (2008) World poverty and human rights. Polity, Cambridge Rawls J (1955) Two concepts of rules. Philos Rev 64:3–13 Reiman JH (1985) Justice, civilization, and the death penalty: answering van den Haag. Philos Public Aff 14(2):115–148 The Innocence Project, quoted from Hinman LM (2010) The death penalty: an overview of the ethical issues. Ethics Matters, November 29, 2010 van den Haag E (1969) On deterrence and the death penalty. J Crim Law Criminol Polit Sci 60(2):141–147 van den Haag E (1982) The collapse of the case against capital punishment. In: Bedau HA (ed) The death penalty in America. Oxford University Press, New York van den Haag E, Conrad J (1983) The death penalty: a debate. Plenum, New York

Capitalism FRED E. FOLDVARY Civil Society Institute, Santa Clara University, Santa Clara, CA, USA

The term “capitalism” has been applied to (1) the concept of a free market, (2) actual mixed economies, and (3) the concept of economic class conflicts. The relationship of “capitalism” to global justice depends on how the term is used and defined. Unless explained, it is unclear what kind of “capital” is being applied in “capitalism.” Classical economics categorized the inputs of production into three basic categories or “factors”: land, labor, and capital goods. Capital goods are goods that have been produced but not yet consumed. They are also referred to as the “produced means of production.” Examples of capital goods include machines, buildings, and inventory. The term “capital” is also applied to financial assets such as money and bonds. Funds are not an input into production, but are used to hire or purchase inputs; hence, financial capital is conceptually different from capital goods. The term “real capital” is applied to capital goods, in contrast to financial capital. A third meaning of “capital” is “human capital,” the skills and education that make labor more productive. Human capital is part of the labor factor, and thus is distinct from capital goods. The term “natural capital” refers to natural resources, especially materials in the ground. With respect to capitalism, the relevant “capitals” are capital goods and financial capital.

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Historical Usage The term “capital” derives from the Latin word “capitalis,” from “caput,” head. The meaning “head” was then applied to describe what is the first or the chief or bigger item, such as the capital of a country or capital letters. When cattle were a principle form of wealth, the heads of cattle provided a measure of the wealth. From “capitalis” came the Latin term “capitale” meaning “stock” or “property,” which was subsequently also applied to financial capital as well as to capital goods. The term “capitalist” referring to an owner of “capital” came into use during the 1600s. During the French Revolution, the term “capitalist” came into use to label those who owned substantial assets. A.R.J. Turgot used “capitaliste” in his 1769 essay, “Reflection on the Formation and Distribution of Wealth.” The term was similarly used by classical economists such as David Ricardo and then by socialists such as Karl Marx, as in “the capitalist mode of production.” But Marx only used “capitalism” once in Volume I of Das Kapital (1867). The first known use of “capitalism” in English was in 1854 by William Thackeray in his novel The Newcomes, referring to the ownership of financial capital. The term had come into economic discourse in France in the mid1800s to refer to a system that privileges the owners of capital. Jean Charles Leonard Simonde de Sismondi (1819), a socialist critic of market economies in the early 1800s, used the term “capitalist” for the economic system as well as for owners of wealth. The term “capitalism” became widely used in the early 1900s by followers of Karl Marx as a contrast to socialism and for the system that historically followed feudalism. The term was popularized by Werner Sombart’s book Der Moderne Kapitalismus in 1902 and by Max Weber’s book The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism in 1904.

Meanings of “Capitalism” 1. The first meaning of “capitalism” is the free market and private enterprise. In its purity, the market aspect of an economy consists of voluntary human action. In a pure market, production, exchange, and consumption are free of any arbitrary governmental restriction or imposed cost. Those who favor markets and private property, believing that markets function well and provide global justice, sometimes use “capitalism” to mean not the actual economic system but a hypothetical system in which private enterprise plays the major role, with minimal governmental intervention. But they also, ambiguously, use “capitalism” to refer to the market aspect of the actual economy.

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2. “Capitalism,” as applied to actual economies, is used as a label for a mixed economy. The economies of almost all countries today are a mixture of markets and governmental intervention and provision. Intervention implies not just inefficiency but also a reduction of global justice, since the purpose of restrictions is often to provide and protect the privileges of a few beneficiaries, at the expense of the public. Governmental intervention alters what people would otherwise voluntarily do. A tax on production of goods reduces the quantity produced and consumed, while a subsidy increases it. Interventions include price and quantity controls. Governments also redistribute wealth and provide much of the output of the economy, including the military, education, infrastructure, and much of the medical services. If most of the production is done by government, then the term “state socialism” is more apt. Thus “capitalism” as a label for an economy presumes that most of the production is done by private enterprise, even though the government is involved by taxation, subsidy, and regulation. When production is nominally in private hands, but government controls it, making the main production decisions, then the term “fascism,” used in its historic sense, is more apt. Thus “capitalism” applies when the decisions of what to produce and what price at which to sell are made by the private entrepreneur and the consumer, with the state interventions altering these decisions but not usually originating them. 3. A third meaning of “capitalism” is the division of society into the class of owners, the capitalists, and the class of workers, or “proletariat,” which has the majority of the population. In this conception, the capitalist class appropriates value that properly belongs to the workers. This meaning uses the theory of surplus value as developed by Sismondi and then Karl Marx, in which the value of goods is greater than the wages paid to workers, and thus the capitalists obtain this surplus, which makes them rich at the expense of the workers. This definition encompasses the labor theory of value and the view that private enterprise exploits labor. Some theorists labeled the economic system of the Soviet Union as “state capitalism.” True socialism, they say, involves the ownership of the means of production, that is, capital goods and land, by the workers. In the USSR, the state acted as the employer, with the workers as employees without control over their tools; hence, they were in a similar situation as the proletariat in private enterprise who own nothing but their labor.

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Problems with the Term “Capitalism”

What Is the Free Market?

Since an economy has three factors of production, calling the system “capitalism” implies a primacy for the owners of capital goods, relative to land and labor. It also gives primacy to financial capital. Yet most of national income goes to labor, and much of the economic gains go to land rent. “Capitalism” thus implies the global injustice of the owners of capital and land dominating labor. Even when what is meant is a label for the actual economy, the connotation is that the owners of real and financial capital are in charge, masking the influence of landowners as well as of labor unions and other interests. Both critics and defenders of markets often do not clearly define which meaning of “capitalism” they are using, and they often use more than one meaning, switching between meanings without telling the reader that they are doing this. For example, critics of markets typically make the following basic argument.

The meaning of capitalism as free market and private enterprise has two quite different applications. The ethical foundation of freedom was analyzed by the philosopher John Locke (1690), especially in his Second Treatise of Government. One of Locke’s premises is the moral equality of human beings, which endows each person with selfownership. In a pure free market, each person owns his labor, the wages from labor, and the products of labor. The free market, consisting of voluntary human action, leaves each person free to produce, trade, and consume as one wishes so long as one does not coercively harm others. However, self-ownership does not apply to what human beings did not produce, namely, natural resources, or land. There are two different viewpoints regarding the morally proper ownership of land: homesteading versus equal benefits. In the homesteading principle, the first person to occupy and use unclaimed land creates a just claim to own that land from then on. Once a claim is established, the owner need not personally use the land, but may rent it out and still own it. The homesteading rule creates allodial land ownership, meaning that the title holder has complete rights to the land, including all its rent. Indeed, the homesteading principle is often used to claim space. When there is a line to buy something or enter a place, the sequence is according to who got there first, as each person goes to the end of the line and homesteads that position. When one enters a theater, one may occupy any unused seat. One homesteads a parking place by claiming a space not used. But such examples consist of temporary possession of space. After the performance is finished, one’s claim to the seat expires. After one leaves the parking place, it is abandoned, and another person may then claim it. In contrast, the homesteading rule for owning land makes its ownership permanent. Also, the rules for homesteading are arbitrary, since it is unclear how long a time is needed to establish a claim, and how much land one may claim, and what kinds of activities constitute a use of the land. Another problem for the homesteading rule is that, contrary to global justice, the current possession of almost all land derives from conquest rather than the first comers to unclaimed land. Those who espouse homesteading say that if the original occupants cannot be determined, then the current occupant in effect is the first claimer, and has a just claim. But that proposition would justify the status quo for most of the world, and the moral basis for such claims is problematic. John Locke proposed a homesteading rule, but with a qualification or proviso. He wrote that one may claim

1. The economic system of the world today is capitalism. 2. The economy of the world today has social problems and injustice such as poverty. 3. Therefore, capitalism causes these social problems. The problem in such an argument is that it shifts among two meanings of “capitalism.” In the first statement, “capitalism” is used as a label for the actual economy. In the third statement, “capitalism” uses the meaning of private enterprise and the market. The third statement would be meaningless if “capitalism” is being used there to label the mixed economy, since it does not tell us what it is about the economy that is causing the problems. Critics of market economies typically use “capitalism” to mean private enterprise when they accuse the system of being unjust as well as unstable and not even efficient. But they also apply the term to the actual economy, as though the government side were nonexistent or has little effect. An analysis of social problems needs to examine whether it is the market or the government or some perverse synthesis that causes social woes. Because of its ambiguity, the word “capitalism” is well suited for political propaganda, as a negative view of “capitalism” seems stronger than an attack on “free markets,” which would possibly imply an attack on freedom. Because of its frequent use by critics of markets, the defenders of markets tend to also use the term, indeed to rebut its negative connotations. But discourse would, in many cases, be clearer if the object of consideration were not called “capitalism” but more specifically the market, the mixed economy, or the class struggle.

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unused land so long as there is land of equal quality freely available for others. Locke did not examine the case of there not being such land. Henry George, in his 1879 book Progress and Poverty and other works, did analyze this case, and his conclusion was that it is sufficient for global justice that the benefit of land be shared equally, while possession could be retained by the current title holders. The benefit of land is manifested by the market rent that it yields. Thus, by the equal benefit rule, global justice can be achieved when the title holders pay the rent to the members of the relevant community, or to government as their agent. This rent can serve to pay for the services of government, instead of taxing labor, enterprise, and produced goods. Thus, when referring to capitalism as the market and private enterprise, it is important to clarify which system one is analyzing, whether the allodial system based on homesteading, or the Georgist equal-benefit system that collects the land rent either for government revenue to distribute in equal shares to the people.

The Efficiency of the Market “Capitalism” meaning the market has been criticized as being inefficient in several ways. Markets are said to create unemployment, poverty, pollution, inadequate public goods, and boom-bust cycles. These problems are called “market failures.” Given the premise that human desires are unlimited, advocates of free markets believe that there is no economic reason for unemployment other than the “frictional” unemployment of those in between jobs or those about to be hired. So long as one can do something useful, one can be hired at a wage based on one’s productivity. During recessions and depressions, there is “cyclical unemployment” as workers get laid off, but during times of prosperity, at some wage, everyone should be able to either become self-employed or be hired. Advocates of markets blame the legal minimum wage for unemployment, since a worker will not be hired if his productivity is less than the required wage. The employer must also pay payroll taxes, including social security, the tax that finances unemployment payments, and accident insurance, along with the employee overhead costs. Like other economic problems, poverty needs to be analyzed to determine whether the cause is the market or government actions. Defenders of markets say that there are government policies that increase poverty by imposing deadweight losses on production and consumption. A sales tax, for example, raises the price paid by the buyer, which reduces the quantity bought, thus also reducing production and employment. By reducing profits and

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making goods more expensive, taxes on labor, profits, and goods reduce wages and employment, increasing poverty. Taxation then takes wealth from the poor who pay taxes on goods if not on their wages. Government welfare programs to help the poor then can trap the poor in poverty, as moving from welfare to working involves a loss of benefits plus costs of employment such as transportation, child care, and taxes. While some advocates for global justice argue for greater government welfare programs, a deeper justice would be accomplished by eliminating the source of poverty. Moreover, in a market that applies the equal benefit principle for land, the land rent is ideally equally shared by all, removing a major source of inequality that exists in allodial economies, since the ownership of the most valuable lands are usually concentrated in a few hands. Thus, it is not evident that such a rent-sharing economy would have significant poverty, since the absence of taxation plus the equal benefit from land would go a long way to reduce poverty. Global justice for the environment requires the prevention of significant negative externalities such as pollution. Such negative externalities have been labeled a market failure, but that depends on how “market” is being defined. Defined as a voluntary economy, significant negative externalities would not exist, since pollution would be regarded as an invasion and trespass into other’s property, requiring compensation for damages. The compensation internalizes the cost, and there is no externality. The payment also reduces pollution, since the polluter has an incentive to avoid the charge either by reducing production or by installing equipment to reduce the pollution. Markets are also said to fail in the adequate provision of public goods, since, for example, if there is a public park with unrestricted access, it is not feasible to charge people for using it. But this market-failure argument overlooks the possibility of private communities such as residential associations providing the park. Indeed, private communities provide streets, transit, security, and many of the services that local government provides. The market economy includes contractual governance for communities such as condominiums, homeowner associations, and cooperatives. Governments engage in stabilization policies to pull economies out of recessions and depressions, but again, one needs to analyze why boom-bust cycles exist. There is no single consensus on the business cycle, but it is evident that the government’s monetary and fiscal policies have a major impact on economies. An expansion of money provides cheap credit, which can fuel investment and

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speculation in real estate. Fiscal policy also induces a real estate boom, as property owners receive tax reductions while the provision of public goods raises land rent and land values, which then gives rise to unsustainable speculation. Moreover, the secondary market in mortgages in the USA was promoted by the government-sponsored enterprises, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Thus the boom-bust cycles have had significant governmental causes.

The Global Justice of “Capitalism” Even if the market economy is substantially efficient, “capitalism” meaning the private sector has been accused of lacking in equity, and of generating an excessive inequality of wealth and income. Inequalities have persisted in mixed economies such as that of the USA in spite of substantial redistribution. One reason for rising inequality is that the wealthy get much of their tax payments back as subsidies. The greatest subsidy is implicit: the generation of land rent and land value by the public goods provided by government, as the tax revenues are mostly on labor and capital. If the land rent is collected and used for public revenue, then that implicit subsidy and a major source of inequality are eliminated. There remains an inequality of wages, but much of that can be justified by the extra productivity that results from investment in human capital. Thus whether “capitalism,” meaning the pure market, is compatible with global justice depends on the initial endowments, particularly of natural resources.

Conclusion The term “capitalism” is ambiguous, as it has been applied to private enterprise, mixed economies, and to class conflict. Discourse on economics is clearer if one either clearly distinguishes among these meanings, or else avoids the term and instead uses terms such as “mixed economy” or “market economy.” An analysis of the global justice of outcomes of mixed economies needs to examine the effects of government policies as well as of the dynamics of markets.

Related Topics ▶ Georgism ▶ Marxism ▶ Political Economy ▶ Socialism

References Braudel F (1979) Civilization and capitalism, 15th–18th century. Harper and Row, New York Friedman M (1962) Capitalism and freedom. University of Chicago Press, Chicago

George H (1879) Progress and poverty. Robert Schalkenbach Foundation, New York. http://schalkenbach.org/library/henry-george/p+p/ ppcont.html Locke J (1690 [1947]) Two treatises of government, ed. Cook ThI. Hafner, New York Marx K (1867 [1990]) Capital (trans: Fowkes B), vol I. Penguin, London Rand A (1966) Capitalism: the unknown ideal. Signet, New York Schumpeter JA (1942 [1976]) Capitalism, socialism, and democracy, 5th edn. Harper and Brothers, New York. George Allen and Unwin, London Simonde de Sismondi JCL (1819 [1991]) New principles of political economy. Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, NJ Sombart W (1915) The quintessence of capitalism: a study of the history and psychology of the modern business man, ed. and trans. Epstein M. E.P. Dutton, New York Tormey S (2004) Anti-capitalism: a beginner’s guide. Oneworld, Oxford Weber M (1904 [1958]) The protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism. Scribner, New York

Carbon Tax WILLIAM B. T. MOCK The John Marshall Law School, Chicago, IL, USA

Carbon dioxide (CO2), a major greenhouse gas, is released when people burn fossil fuels, but not when they use alternatives like solar, wind, hydroelectric, and nuclear energies. Such releases are environmental externalities, typically not captured as costs for either the generator or consumer of power. As with most unregulated externalities, cost-free carbon emissions tend to result in artificially low costs for fossil fuels, excessive release of greenhouse gases, and a competitive disadvantage for energy sources that do not release such emissions. Although there are several models, carbon taxes are indirect, or transactionbased, taxes upon the use of fossil fuels, imposed in amounts proportionate to the fuels’ carbon content, and calibrated to offset the negative externalities of CO2 release. By imposing additional costs on the use of fossil fuels, carbon taxes shift market forces away from such fuels and toward alternative energy technologies that do not release carbon during their use. Carbon taxes are distinct from cap-and-trade approaches to greenhouse gas emissions, as promoted by the Kyoto Protocol, in that the latter offer market-based opportunities for users of fossil fuels to purchase the pollution allocations of other users, thereby shifting the burdens of adopting new technologies to those with the lowest marginal costs. Many commentators prefer carbon taxes over cap-and-trade programs because of

Care Ethics

the former’s greater simplicity and transparency, more comprehensive scope, and relative absence of opportunity for regulatory lobbying. Carbon taxes aim to provide pricing certainty, whereas cap-and-trade systems aim to provide certainty in emissions quantities. Environmentally based carbon taxes are also distinct from general revenue fuel taxes, which have been in place in many countries for decades, in that the latter are typically imposed not in proportion to calculated externalities, but to influence public behavior and generate government revenue. Since the 1990s, many jurisdictions, primarily in northern Europe, have implemented carbon taxes of one form or another. The relevance of carbon tax in promoting global justice is obvious. Carbon tax makes carbon emission countries justly accountable for their disproportionate share of global pollution, without placing undue burden on the poor countries whose well-being is adversely affected by global effects of carbon emissions in the developed, industrialized countries.

Related Topics

▶ Climate Justice ▶ Environmental Justice ▶ Environmental Protection ▶ Environmental Sustainability

References Andersen MS, Ekins P (eds) (2010) Carbon-energy taxation: lessons from Europe. Oxford University Press, New York Gore A (1992) Earth in the balance: ecology and the human spirit. Plume/ Penguin Books, New York Houser T et al (2008) Leveling the carbon playing field: international competition and US climate policy design. Peterson Institute for International Economics, Washington DC

Care Ethics MARGARET A. MCLAREN Department of Philosophy, Rollins College, Winter Park, FL, USA

Care ethics focuses on maintaining relationships, responsibility to others, and avoiding harm; it also takes into account contextual features of the moral situation and acknowledges the impact of identity on moral reasoning.

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Care ethics emerged in the early 1980s after the publication of psychologist Carol Gilligan’s In A Different Voice (1982). Gilligan’s research challenged the standard paradigm for moral reasoning at the time, the deontological view associated with philosopher Immanuel Kant. In general terms, the deontological view privileges rationality, requires impartiality, and emphasizes justice and rights. In the 1960s, Lawrence Kohlberg adopted this Kantian model for moral reasoning to pursue in his empirical psychological studies. Asking subjects to respond to hypothetical situations, Kohlberg then categorized the answers, creating a scale for moral development. Kohlberg’s scale consists of three levels with two stages at each level – Preconventional: (1) avoid punishment and (2) seek rewards; Conventional: (3) seek approval/avoid disapproval and (4) conformity to society’s rules; Postconventional: (5) follow the rules of the community and (6) follow the dictates of individualized conscience grounded in universal moral principles. Unfortunately, women consistently scored lower on Kohlberg’s scale of moral development, usually reaching only stage 3 or 4. Refusing to believe that the problem was women’s lack of moral maturity, Gilligan set out to test Kohlberg’s scale of moral development. One significant problem with Kohlberg’s research was that his original pool of subjects were not diverse, they were mainly male and European or of European descent. Thus, it is in some ways not surprising that a normative scale derived from a skewed sample continues to reflect this original bias favoring the population from whom the scale was derived. Moreover, Gilligan’s research found that girls and women are more likely to ask questions about the situation to provide a greater degree of context and detail. In Kohlberg’s scale, clear-cut answers were preferred, resulting in a higher score on the scale of moral development. Because she found such a significant difference in the ways that males and females answered questions about how they would respond to various moral situations, Gilligan created an alternative scale that reflected the voice of women and girls. Her scale consists of three levels and two transitions – Level 1. Individual survival; Transition: from selfishness to responsibility; Level 2. Goodness equated with self-sacrifice; Transition: to include self in the circle of care; Level 3. Caring for both self and others. Not surprisingly, women and girls scored significantly higher on this new scale of moral development than on Kohlberg’s. Gilligan discovered significant differences in the ways that men and women think about and discuss moral problems. Women emphasized responsibilities to others, rather than individual rights favored by men, women were more concerned with maintaining

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relationships than with executing justice impartially, and women used a language of care that focused on not hurting others, rather than the rights and justice language associated with an impartial moral point of view. Gilligan’s work played a significant role in correcting the male bias of mainstream moral theory and moral development in psychology. Although she found gender differences in moral reasoning, Gilligan and colleagues also found that both women and men engage in both care and justice reasoning. She urges us to acknowledge these different types of moral reasoning and argues that the ideal is to be able to employ both types regardless of gender. Gilligan’s work has had a profound impact on a wide variety of disciplines outside of her own field of psychology. Her work has been influential in philosophy, religious studies, law, political theory, sociology, anthropology, and literature. There are several anthologies that discuss and extend her work, as well as many books that apply care ethics to contemporary issues. Care ethics is viewed as a vital subset of a range of contemporary approaches associated with feminist ethics. However, there is some debate about whether or not care ethics is actually a feminist approach. Gilligan’s work corrected male bias in applied moral theory by highlighting the voices of women and revaluing some of the traits typicallyassociated with women such as emotions, nurturing, and care. Yet, emphasizing these feminine qualities can help to perpetuate stereotypical views of women as emotional rather than rational, as naturally maternal and as too connected to/dependent on others. So, some choose to classify care ethics as a feminine ethics rather than a feminist ethics. Regardless of how one decides to classify care ethics, it provides an important framework for thinking about and discussing moral issues. It recognizes and values the emotional work that many women do; it allows for the context of a moral situation to be taken into account; and it places importance on the identity of the moral agent. The first issue has been discussed above, and here I will elaborate on the second two points. According to a deontological approach, universal principles can be applied to the situation at hand, regardless of the individual situation. For instance, according to Kant (the deontological approach, the mainstay of moral theory), lying is always wrong. While truthfulness is undoubtedly a good moral rule of thumb, there are situations when it may be morally justified to lie, such as when it would save a person’s life. Attention to context allows us to take into account the details of the situation and to adapt our solution to the moral problem at hand. A further aspect of allowing for the significance of context

is the role that a moral agent’s identity may play in her or his decision making. Typically, mainstream moral approaches ask us to “leave our identity at the door,” again the application of universal principles in an impartial manner requires that we apply moral principles in the same way no matter the situation and no matter who we are. Yet, Gilligan’s work and the work of many other theorists show that aspects of our identity, such as gender, class, race, ethnicity, sexual identity, and physical ability often deeply influence our values, perspectives, and choices. Clearly, identity may also play a role in our moral reasoning and ethical choices. Universalizable, abstract principles play an important role in moral theory, providing a moral minimum or a minimal standard of ethical treatment, such as the recognition of civil and political rights. Adhering to a moral minimum may be especially important when addressing issues of global justice because it is often argued that we need transcultural moral standards in order to justify universal concepts, such as human rights. One major criticism of care ethics has been that because of its focus on maintaining relationships, and not harming others, its use is restricted to situations where there is a face-to-face interaction, and is thus not applicable to larger moral or political concerns. However, Joan Tronto develops the political aspect of care in Moral Boundaries: A Political Argument for An Ethic of Care (1993). She argues that care and justice frameworks are not only compatible, but are both necessary to confront questions of autonomy, agency, distribution, and democracy. Questions about care highlight the fact of human interdependency and reveal that “care work” is essential labor performed by the underclass, not only women but also racial and ethnic minorities, as well as the working class and working poor. Tronto’s insight that care is not only gendered, but also raced, and classed is borne out in current research on women and globalization; care is a transnational commodity. Women from the Global South migrate to the Global North to take up work as domestics, nannies, and elder care workers, filling the care deficit in the First World at the expense of themselves and their families. Care as both a practice and a moral approach is essential to any complete analysis of what counts as global justice. Just as global justice may be a moral and political ideal to strive for, so, too, is global care.

Related Topics ▶ Feminist Ethics ▶ Gender Justice

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References Cole EB, Coultrap-McQuin S (eds) (1992) Explorations in feminist ethics: theory and practice. Indiana University Press, Bloomington Gilligan C (1982) In a different voice: psychological theory and women’s development. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA Held V (1993) Feminist morality: transforming culture, society, and politics. University of Chicago Press, Chicago Held V (ed) (1995) Justice and care: essential readings in feminist ethics. Westview Press, Boulder Held V (2006) The ethics of care: personal, political, and global. Oxford University Press, Oxford Kittay EF, Meyers DT (eds) (1987) Women and moral theory. Rowman and Littlefield, Totowa Larrabee MJ (ed) (1993) An ethic of care: feminist and interdisciplinary perspectives. Routledge, New York Noddings N (1984) Caring: a feminine approach to ethics and moral education. University of California Press, Berkeley Tong R (1993) Feminine and feminist ethics. Wadsworth Publishing, Belmont Tronto J (1993) Moral boundaries: a political argument for an ethic of care. Routledge, New York

Charity HELGA VARDEN Department of Philosophy, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, IL, USA

From the point of view of justice, there are two main questions concerning charity. Is charity an enforceable duty and should all redistribution in response to need and poverty be characterized as “charity”? To better appreciate the contemporary treatment of these philosophical issues with respect to global justice, it is helpful to look back to discussions of justice and charity in John Locke and Immanuel Kant. Locke appears to affirm two opposing views on the enforceability of charity in his different writings. In both the First Treatise on Government and in “Venditio,” Locke appears to affirm an enforceable right and duty to charity in response to extreme need. Here Locke clearly seems to argue that charity gives those in extreme need a title to resourceful persons’ private property insofar as this is necessary for the poor persons’ subsistence. But such a right and duty to charity is not without problems for Locke, since in the Second Treatise on Government also argues that justice gives persons private property claims in the products obtained by means of their labor on a fair share of natural resources. Yet if Locke argues that the charity-right is enforceable, then private property rights appear to be undercut. For an enforceable right to charity

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implies that some people have nonconsensual access to the values created by other persons’ labor. Locke acknowledges and addresses these consequences in A Letter Concerning Toleration. Here Locke argues that charity belongs to a large group of moral virtues, which the state cannot legally enforce, because doing so is incompatible with the natural right to the values created by one’s own labor. The sticking point with this view is that Locke then cannot allow that charity will do the work of providing for those in extreme need. Hence, unless Locke’s theory includes some special rights protecting the poverty stricken, their preservation is left to the arbitrary choices of others. Kant also argues that charity or beneficence is not an enforceable right or duty of justice, and instead considers it an imperfect duty of virtue. To be charitable or beneficent we must help others because it is the right thing to do, which Kant describes as acting on a maxim of assistance from a moral motivation (from duty). Hence, charity or beneficence is an unenforceable duty of virtue and not an enforceable duty of justice. In addition, Kant argues that we have a certain latitude when it comes to fulfilling duties of beneficence or charity. When and how we should be charitable depends on our current economic situation and other obligations we have. Both Locke’s and Kant’s philosophical arguments inform much of the contemporary discussions of justice and charity both with regard to domestic and global justice. Some affirm the view expressed by Locke in the First Treatise and in “Venditio” that extreme need as such gives rise to enforceable duties. Positions that affirm an enforceable duty to assist those in dire need are often described as adhering to a “positive duties” conception of justice. The most prominent Lockean scholar in this camp is A. John Simmons. Simmons argues that although people cannot be forced to be moral, namely to perform the right actions based on the right motivations, they can be forced to act charitably. Charity is considered enforceable when a lack of charity entails that some are deprived of their fundamental rights to self-preservation (having subsistence means) and self-government (having some means with which to set ends of one’s own). The strictness of any instance of fulfilling the general duty of charity is seen as proportional to the proximity of the people in need as well as to the “risk, cost, or inconvenience” incurred by helping them. Other prominent non-Lockean scholars join Simmons and other left-wing Lockeans in holding a “positive duties” approach to charity. These include, most notably, utilitarians such as Peter Singer, thinkers in the capabilities tradition such as Martha C. Nussbaum and Amartya Sen, Marxist thinkers such as G. A. Cohen, and care theorists such as Virginia Held. All these scholars

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are unified in thinking that at least minimal equality with regard to some good, whether the satisfaction of basic needs, material resources, capabilities, or care, can justify coercive redistribution of resources from rich to poor domestically and globally. Other Lockeans, however, are more convinced by the kinds of arguments Locke pursues in A Letter On Toleration, namely arguments according to which an enforceable duty of charity is denied. These Lockeans are often described as affirming a “negative duties” conception of justice. Robert Nozick is probably the most influential of this group. Nozick argues that charity cannot be enforceable, since it would entail the enslavement of property owners. That is, an enforceable right to charity violates individuals’ rights to freedom – to set and pursue ends of their own with their resources. Other, prominent rightwing libertarians such as F. A. Hayek and Jan Narveson affirm this basic conception of economic justice, even if they are more radical than Nozick with regard to the issue of an original fair share. Nozick views his conception also as consistent with the position offered by Kant. Some Kant interpreters, such as John Rawls (1999a) and Thomas Pogge (1988), agree with Nozick that Kant affirms a right-wing conception of economic justice. But in contrast to Nozick, they consider this a drawback of his view and so try to overcome it by finding ways to protect the rights of the poor. Others, most notably Onora O’Neill, agree that it is right to see Kant as having a right-wing libertarian (“negative duties”) conception of economic justice in the Doctrine of Right. Nevertheless, Kant’s account of charity in the “Doctrine of Virtue,” she argues, can yield a supplemental, institutional argument to justify redistribution of resources to the needy and vulnerable. Yet others, such as Sarah Holtman, Arthur Ripstein, and Helga Varden, challenge these readings by arguing that Kant neither held a right-wing libertarian conception of economic justice nor did or can he (for the reasons outlined above) deem duties of virtue as in principle enforceable. Instead, they argue that Kant understands the right to poverty relief as a claim citizens hold against their public institutions. It is for this reason, they conclude, that liberal states’ provisions of poverty relief are a matter of justice and not a matter of charity for Kant. Variations on the above “negative duties” and institutional arguments about justice are found in much liberal thought on global justice. Consequently, much liberal thought on global economic justice distinguishes between humanitarian aid and poverty relief since they require different justifications. Providing humanitarian aid to victims of natural disasters and other uncontrollable environmental factors is often justified by several prudential

and “negative duty” arguments. For example, a prudential argument sometimes given for humanitarian aid points to the likely positive correlation between peace and the absence of starvation, whereas related moral arguments include appeals to the natural disaster victims’ fundamental right to a fair share of natural resources. In contrast to humanitarian aid, poverty relief is seen primarily as a problem related to systemic dependency and inequality. When a set of (coercive) institutions both sets the framework within which people interact and results in poverty, then, it is argued, the resulting problems are seen as problems of systemic justice – and not charity. It seems fair to say that these prominent liberal thinkers on global justice, Charles R. Beitz, Michael Blake, Thomas Nagel, John Rawls (1999b), Mathias Risse, and Thomas Pogge (2008), are concerned to analyze and justify exactly what constitutes a fair share of the globe’s natural resources as well as the role and responsibilities of global institutions. In fact, one of their most important disagreements concerns the question of whether or not there is a basic, possibly coercive, system of global institutions that justifies and requires global, coercive redistributive efforts in the name of justice rather than charity.

Related Topics

▶ Absolute Poverty ▶ Beitz, Charles ▶ Capabilities Approach ▶ Care Ethics ▶ Cosmopolitanism ▶ Duties, Perfect and Imperfect ▶ Duties, Positive and Negative ▶ Held, Virginia ▶ Humanitarian Aid ▶ Kant, Immanuel ▶ Kant, Immanuel: Contemporary Kantian Responses to ▶ Killing and Letting Die ▶ Marxism ▶ Nagel, Thomas ▶ Nussbaum, Martha C. ▶ Pogge, Thomas ▶ Rawls, John ▶ Sen, Amartya ▶ Singer, Peter ▶ Utilitarianism

References Beitz Ch (1979) Political theory and international relations. Princeton University Press, Princeton Blake M (2001) Distributive justice, state coercion, and autonomy. Philos Public Aff 30(3):257–296

Child Labor Cohen GA (2008) Rescuing justice and equality. Harvard University Press, Cambridge Hayek FA (2007) The road to serfdom. In: Caldwell B (ed) The collected works of F. A. Hayek, vol 2. University of Chicago Press, Chicago Held V (2006) The ethics of care: personal, political, and global. Oxford University Press, New York Holtman SW (2004) Kantian justice and poverty relief. Kant-Stud 95(1):86–106 Kant I (2006) Immanuel Kant: practical philosophy, ed. and trans. Gregor MJ. Cambridge University Press, New York Locke J (1667/1997) An essay on toleration. In: Goldie M (ed) Locke: political essays. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 134–160 Locke J (1695) Venditio. In: Goldie M (ed) Locke: political essays. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 339–343 Locke J, Laslett P (eds) (1690/1998) Two treatises of government. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Nagel Th (2005) The problem of global justice. Philos Public Aff 33(2):113–148 Narveson J (2001) The libertarian idea. Broadview Press, Peterborough Nozick R (1974) Anarchy, state, and utopia. Basic Books, New York Nussbaum MC (2007) Frontiers of justice: disability, nationality, species membership. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge O’Neill O (1996) Towards justice and virtue. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Pogge TW (1988) Kant’s theory of justice. Kant-Stud 79(1988):407–433 Pogge TW (2008) World poverty and human rights, 2nd edn. Polity Press, Cambridge Rawls J (1999a) A theory of justice, revised edn. Harvard University Press, Cambridge Rawls J (1999b) The laws of peoples. Harvard University Press, Cambridge Ripstein A (2009) Force and freedom: Kant’s legal and political philosophy. Harvard University Press, Cambridge Risse M (2005) What we owe to the global poor. J Ethics 9(1–2):81–117 Sen A (2009) The idea of justice. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge Simmons AJ (1992) The Lockean theory of rights. Princeton University Press, Princeton Singer P (1979) Practical ethics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Varden H (2006) Kant and dependency relations: Kant on the state’s right to redistribute resources to protect the rights of dependents. Dialogue Can Philos Rev XLV:257–285

Child Labor KAREN MIZELL Department of Philosophy and Humanities, Utah Valley University, Orem, UT, USA

Work contributed by children runs along a continuum that ranges from the destructive and exploitive to the beneficial. Many children help with family businesses and farms, sometimes without pay, and in paying

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part-time jobs when they reach a certain age. Some scholars use the term “child work” to designate work by children that does not detract from other activities of childhood such as play and education and offers a positive contribution to a child’s development. The term “child labor”, on the other hand, implies serious human rights abuses and (a) is conditional upon the age of the child, (b) includes activity that impedes the natural physical, emotional, and mental development of the child, (c) denies educational opportunities, (d) endangers the child, (e) impairs a child’s health, and/ or (f) denies freedom of movement to the child. Exploitive employment of children under 18 in factories, mines, the sex trades, food services, entertainment, domestic labor outside the home, textile manufacturing, farms, and military service is generally characterized as child labor. The International Labour Organization and UNICEF (United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund) estimate approximately 250 million children between 2 and 17 qualify as child laborers. Instances of child labor include 4-year-olds who are tied to rug looms for long hours each day, 10-year-olds who work in marble quarries, where it is so hot that film melts in cameras, and 8-year-olds who disappear into offshore fishing operations. Some children, taken from their homes and transported across the world, work in the dangerous sport of camel racing in the Gulf States. Other children are put to work in hazardous workplaces such as explosives factories, coal and diamond mines, pesticide-laced coffee plantations, commercial farms, and brick yards. The domestic and sex trades engage the service of many children worldwide. Social reformers recognized the abuses systemic in the use of child labor at the beginning of the Industrial Revolution in Europe, when countless children were irrevocably harmed by working conditions in factories and sweatshops. Karl Marx was one of the first to call for the abolition of child labor in the factories of Great Britain. Economist Milton Friedman defends the use of children in the general workforce with his claim that children’s work is a necessary requirement in poor and developing countries. He theorizes that as net wages increase, reliance on working children declines. Other theorists contend that while one might expect a reduction in child labor as developing states become more prosperous, the opposite is happening as child labor is reemerging even in the affluent developed world, where it is largely invisible and unacknowledged. Consumers, unwittingly, may exacerbate the situation as they avoid moral complicity by boycotting the products of child labor. UNICEF has determined that such boycotts often deny gainful

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employment to working children and drive them to engage in hazardous and illicit activities. For example, when Nepalese carpet exports were banned by the USA because of child labor, UNICEF workers discovered that 5,000–7,000 children entered prostitution subsequent to loss of employment at carpet factories. Similarly, around 50,000 children in Bangladesh turned to occupations such as stone-crushing, begging, and prostitution when the USA adopted the Child Labor Deterrence Act, effectively banning the import of textiles made by children. At the end of the twentieth century, human rights organizations began to focus attention on bonded and forced child labor as the most egregious forms of child exploitation. Worldwide, millions of poor families in dire circumstances accept small loans from employers who take children from the families to work off the debts. Typically, these debts compound as the children are charged for room, board, living expenses, interest, and fined for committing mistakes in the work. In most cases, families are unable to raise sufficient money to pay off the debts and the children never return to their families. Other forms of bonded child labor are the result of family obligations in which children of succeeding generations are promised to an employer, commitments which may have commenced with the child’s greatgrandparents. Evidence from transnational studies indicates child labor is largely the product of poverty. When a society experiences technological and economic development, children tend to go to school instead of the workplace. In 1998, UNICEF workers determined that when a country’s per capita income is below US$1500, about 30% of its children worked outside the home. In countries where per capita income rose above US$7,000, working children become increasingly uncommon. Per capita income and working children appear to be inversely proportional. The impact of twenty-first century globalization on child labor is yet to be determined. Some scholars predict that augmented employment opportunities in developing nations will contribute to increased parental wages, allowing children to attend school instead of work. Others predict that increased foreign competition will depress earnings, forcing more children into the workplace. From the vantage point of the twenty-first century, the issue of child labor figures into any overarching theory of global justice. Child labor contravenes two fundamental normative demands of justice for the world’s youngest citizens: safeguarding basic liberties and providing for their basic needs. Intricately entangled with other

concerns of global justice, such as the configuration of global economic and monetary policies, fair distribution of goods, including education, the challenges of global poverty, the right to individual self-determination, and entitlement to an open future, the continuation of child labor is a serious impediment to the practical realization of universal justice. Efforts to eliminate exploitive child labor are addressed in Article 32 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted in 1989, and Convention 182 (Convention Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour), adopted by the International Labour Organization (ILO) in 1999. The World Bank has also deployed economic initiatives to alleviate the persistent poverty which generates the worst forms of child labor with uneven success. UNICEF, The World Bank, and The International Labour Organization codified their joint effort to alleviate child labor through the Oslo Agenda, adopted in 1997. The Children’s Rights Division at Human Rights Watch cooperates with representatives of UNICEF, the ILO, the World Bank, and other human rights organizations in order to discover and report abuses in an effort to advocate effective policy change.

Related Topics

▶ Absolute Poverty ▶ Basic Rights ▶ Exploitation ▶ Global Poverty ▶ Human Trafficking ▶ Labor ▶ Labor Laws ▶ Poverty ▶ Slavery

References Fyfe A (1989) Child labour. Cambridge Polity Press, Cambridge International Labour Organization (1998) Child labor: targeting the intolerable. International Labour Organization, Geneva Parker D, Engfer L, Conrow R (1997) Stolen dreams: portraits of working children. Lerner, Minneapolis Schmitz C, Traver E, Larson D (2004) Child labor: a global view. Greenwood Press, Westport Seebrook J (2001) Children of other worlds: exploitation in the global market. Pluto Press, London Upchurch A (2002) Modern child slavery: the coercion and exploitation of youth worldwide. Youth Advocate Program International, Washington, DC Weston B (2005) Child labor and human rights: making children matter. Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder

Child Soldiers

Child Soldiers KAREN MIZELL Department of Philosophy and Humanities, Utah Valley University, Orem, UT, USA

The state of global childhood in the twenty-first century worsens as children become armed pawns in conflicts around the world. The result of political and socioeconomic instabilities and moral degradation, the greatest price is exacted from those who are most vulnerable to coercion and brutality. The use of child soldiers indicates a profound transformation in attitudes toward warfare and to children. A symptom of violence and insecurity, the issue of child soldiers is a pressing issue in the drive to establish a global justice, yet has only recently been recognized as a violation of international human rights law. The global community recognizes its clear responsibility and legitimate interest in terminating the use of children as armed combatants. As an expression of the global determination to sanction just and adequate protection for children who are drawn into hostilities, the practice is newly criminalized under international law as a war crime. Universally accepted definitions of such terms as “child,” “soldier,” and “armed conflict” figure into the challenge of addressing the militarization of children. Since the concept “child,” for example, is a social construction that reflects the values of various cultures and traditions, it is often difficult to determine who counts as a child, deserving of special social and legal protections. Fourteen-year-old males in some African traditions are recognized as adults after they have successfully undergone established rites of passage. In order to institute a uniform conception of childhood, the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) introduced a universal recruitment age for the military of 15 years of age, with most countries adopting the additional protocol that boosts the minimum age for recruitment to eighteen. As a result, a child soldier is generally defined as any person under the age of 18 who is a member of, or attached to, any armed force, whether governmental, opposition, guerilla, or political, and whether or not an armed conflict exists. Most child soldiers are victims of abduction or press gangs, although some children voluntarily enlist in military forces for a variety of motives, including poverty,

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abuse, psychological factors, political reasons, and, paradoxically, a desire for security and affiliation with a structured organization, a traumatized bonding driven by abuse and privation. In some regions, children are recruited as part of armed youth movements and schools devoted to military training and indoctrination. Child soldiers are commonly targeted with brutal dehumanizing treatment and are often killed for desertion, disobedience, or attempting to escape. Few restraints are imposed on what trainers can do to young soldiers, almost always treating them brutally with expectations that they engage in the most hazardous of activities. Historically, children were often present during combat, but only in minor support roles. So, boys functioned as drummers or musicians in eighteenth and nineteenth century armies and young male pages supported medieval knights. Children, however, were rarely targets or active participants in combat. The few recorded times children engaged in combat were occasions when a state was existentially threatened and facing utter destruction. Virginia Military Institute cadets were ordered to support Confederate positions in the US Civil War Battle of New Market in 1864, Hitlers Jugend (Nazi Youth Organization) confronted Allied armies in 1945, and children fought alongside the Viet Cong at the close of the Vietnam War. With ongoing wars on every continent, except Australia and Antarctica, armed organizations – governmental, guerilla, and opposition – increasingly rely on child conscripts. Experts estimate that 10% of all combatants are children, a number that was close to 0% in the post World War II decade. Ambiguity in numerical estimates rests on the fact that some states and military organizations use children in paramilitary forces and support roles. Worldwide, it is thought that around 80% of children involved in armed forces are under the age of 15. In Asia, the average recruitment age of child soldiers is around 14, with estimates that 34% of those are under the age of 12. Among child soldiers in Africa, estimations are that 60,000 are 14 and under, with the average age of children bearing arms in the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda around 12.9 years. International aid workers have discovered that many child combatants do not know their age because they were so young when separated from their families. Considered as malleable and expendable assets, child soldiers are devalued and dehumanized through psychological manipulation and the use of drugs to heighten their sense of fearlessness and invulnerability. When joined with the proliferation of operationally simple, inexpensive, and easily accessible lightweight automatic weapons, child soldiers have become exceptionally lethal participants in

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combat. Children as young as 5 years old can be taught to use the Russian-designed Kalashnikov AK-47 in 30 min. Militarized children typically exhibit an appalling lack of moral insulation against violence and internalized concepts of moral duties and prohibitions. Moreover, such children demonstrate an impaired capacity for basic and socially essential moral emotions such as empathy. Regional conflicts quickly expand into global confrontations when child soldiers are a factor. So many child soldiers remain in unstable situations after the cessation of one conflict that they are ripe for recruitment into other violent organizations. Young displaced soldiers without homes, education, and marketable skills are often trafficked across borders to serve in militarized forces in more armed conflicts, which destabilizes additional governments and nation-states. In addition, the presence of child soldiers in an armed conflict increases the likelihood of recurrent conflicts. Despite the growing phenomenon of child soldiers on the battlefield, the problem is largely invisible. Recognizing the violation of international laws and the potential for war crimes charges, most governments and opposition groups deny conscripting child soldiers and, in some cases, UN field workers have gone along with the deception. Even when recognized by organizations such as World Vision, UNICEF, and the Office of the UN Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict, formal demobilization and rehabilitative programs are grossly underfunded and marked by a lack of expertise, experience, or will in reintegrating former child combatants. Complicating the issue is the lack of resources most nation-states can commit to such a project, even when they express the determination to do so. Prevention, then, is a necessary and critical first step to preventing the horrors faced by weaponized children. A further complication involves legally accountability and prosecution of child combatants for their participation in atrocities against civilians. Some view it as a violation of justice to allow them to go unpunished, although the moral and legal consensus of most authorities is to regard children as a special category, protected from prosecution, and considered instead as coerced victims of adult crimes against them. The UN High Commission for Refugees estimated in 2001 that there were around 25 million child refugees in the world. Poverty, displacement, illiteracy, and living in combat zones constitute a toxic brew for children, any one condition constituting a grim violation of the exigencies of global justice. Orphan and refugee children who come from such conditions are at greatest risk of

becoming militarized. Most child soldiers are male, but recent estimates indicate a significant increase in female soldiers under the age of 18. As one might expect, sexual abuse of girl soldiers is widespread. Besides being required to engage in the same combat and paramilitary activities as boy soldiers, they are often required to become soldiers’ wives. Witnesses recount seeing girls in battles with babies strapped to their backs. Human rights organizations report high levels of STDs and HIV among child soldiers and their victims, with figures as high as 80% among repatriated girl soldiers in several African conflicts. Civilian victims of the conflict in Angola, who had been brutally attacked by child soldiers, registered a 90% HIV infection rate. Recognizing the militarization of children as a fundamental human rights violation, numerous treaties prohibit the use of child soldiers: 1. 2. 3. 4.

1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights Geneva Conventions of 1949 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) May 2000 optional protocol added to the 1989 Convention on the Rights of Child that formally raises recruitment ages to 18 (the original convention age limit was 15), adopted by the UN General Assembly, with over 100 nation signatories

The use of underaged soldiers has been condemned by the UN Security Council, the UN General Assembly, the UN Commission on Human Rights, the International Labor Organization, Amnesty International, and Human Rights Watch. As an expression of global outrage over such violations of children’s justice, grassroots organizations, such as the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, are active in over 40 countries. In addition, the Organization of African Unity, the Economic Community of West African States, the Organization of American States, the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the European Parliament have criticized the use of child soldiers. In 2007, the International Criminal Court established a legal precedent by recognizing and prosecuting the exploitation of child soldiers as a war crime. The reality of global politics, however, systematically undermines the human rights of children and implementation of the CRC by tolerating global arms deals, global trade networks, international politics that directs intervention and/or nonintervention in localized conflicts, national crises, and failed policies. The moral upshot is that responsibility for this horror rests squarely on the world community as it tolerates political, moral, social, and legal agendas that imperil the world’s children in armed conflicts.

Chodosh, Hiram

Related Topics

▶ Aggression ▶ Armed Conflict: Effect on Women ▶ Child Labor ▶ Crimes Against Humanity ▶ Enemy Combatant ▶ Failed States ▶ Global Poverty ▶ Human Rights ▶ Human Security ▶ War Crimes

References Brett R, McCallin M (1996) Children: the invisible soldiers. Radda Barnen, Stockholm Machal, G (1996) Study on the impact of armed conflict on children. UNICEF. Full text of the report can be found at: http://www.unicef. org/graca. Accessed 21 Sept 2010 Otunnu O (1999) Protection of children affected by armed conflict: report of the special representative of the secretary-general for children and armed conflict A/54/30, paragraph 173. United Nations General Assembly, New York Singer P (2001–2002) Caution: children at war. Parameters 31(4):40–56 Singer P (2005) Children at war. Pantheon Books, New York van Boven Th (1982) People matter: view on international human rights policy. Meulenhoff, Amsterdam Wessells M (1997) Child soldiers. Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 53(6): 32–39

Chodosh, Hiram MELISSA A. WATERS School of Law, Washington University in St. Louis, St. Louis, MO, USA

Hiram Chodosh is the Dean at the S.J. Quinney College of Law at the University of Utah. One of the world’s foremost experts on global justice reform (and in particular on the role of comparative methodology in reform efforts), Dean Hiram Chodosh’s career has been marked by his profound commitment to furthering global justice in three discrete but overlapping arenas. First, his scholarship on global justice reform has upended long-held assumptions regarding donor-driven reform projects, transforming the way in which both scholars and reformers think about reform methodology and the role of comparative law in justice reform efforts. Second, his on-the-ground justice reform work around the globe has resulted in the creation of unprecedented international legal frameworks for university, nonprofit, and government partnerships. Finally, his pioneering

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work on global legal education has served as a model for law schools around the country, helping to transform the way in which American legal educators prepare their students to meet the challenges of working in a globalizing legal world.

Scholarship on Justice Reform Dean Chodosh’s groundbreaking scholarship on global justice reform offers two powerful sets of contributions. First, he takes on reform of the reformers themselves, offering both a critical and reconstructive critique of reform methodology. Drawing in particular upon his extensive practical experience with justice reform in India, Indonesia, and Iraq, Dean Chodosh has elucidated the major types of predicaments that face justice reform efforts: questions of design (e.g., independence or accountability), questions of method (incremental or systemic, top-down or bottom-up), and the competing interests of the individual and the collective. He critiques donor-driven reform projects for their common lack of familiarity with local conditions, their imposition of inappropriate models and values, their lack of workable theoretical frameworks for reform, and their absence of accountability. To solve the problem of global justice reform, he argues that reformers need a better theoretical understanding of the enterprise, with an emphasis on improved comparative methodologies, attention to empirical studies, open inquiry frameworks, and local control of decision-making. Second, Dean Chodosh’s scholarship has transformed the way in which scholars view the role of comparative methodology in judicial reform. His seminal book, Global Justice Reform: A Comparative Methodology (2005), builds upon and deepens his earlier work by offering both a critical and reconstructive examination of the discipline of comparative methodology as applied to justice reform efforts. He asserts that most comparative legal scholarship fails to offer a conceptual framework for metacomparison – that is, the “ability to compare comparisons” and to distinguish superior from inferior comparisons. He emphasizes, for example, justice reform’s reliance on shaky comparative theories about which features of a judicial system cause (or alleviate) problems, and where justice reform should accordingly be focused. Illustrating his arguments with examples from his extensive practical experience, Dean Chodosh points out that most reform projects are comparative in two respects: They are inspired by foreign models, and they are informed by a theory that a particular change in the status quo will produce a better system or outcome. He convincingly argues that successful justice reform is in part dependent

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on the quality of our comparative methodologies, and he offers numerous constructive methodological suggestions to help those engaged in justice reform overcome the overwhelming challenges that they face.

Justice Reform In addition to his groundbreaking scholarship, Dean Chodosh has pioneered new approaches to practical, onthe-ground justice reform work. In India, he served as senior reporter on a first-of-its-kind study of the use of mediation in the courts. In his capacity as Fulbright Senior Scholar, he convened multiple workshops and conferences on mediation in India, and continues to serve as a key adviser to the several newly implemented mediation centers (from Ahmedabad to New Delhi) and NGOs dedicated to the dissemination and Indianization of mediation processes. In Indonesia, Dean Chodosh has served as a consultant to the International Monetary Fund on judicial reform. In that capacity, he has worked closely with the Supreme Court, the National Law Commission, the Commercial Court, and other institutions on anti-corruption and judicial independence efforts. Perhaps most significant is Dean Chodosh’s pathbreaking work in Iraq, as founder and director of the Global Justice Project. The Global Justice Project: Iraq (GJPI) is an unprecedented international legal setup resulting from two US State Department grants to the University of Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law. Over a period of nearly two years, GJPI’s work ranged from the review of the Iraqi constitution to reform of the criminal code to review of Iraqi election law. Over a hundred experts were involved in the work, with some twenty people deployed in Baghdad, dozens of law professors and legal scholars from twenty different nationalities, and students involved with specific issues or larger undertakings. GJPI experts sat on both the constitutional review committee and the elections committee, and worked closely with the Higher Judicial Council and with senior judges and law professors in Baghdad. Putting his scholarly ideals into practice, throughout the Global Justice Project, Dean Chodosh emphasized the need to keep Iraqis at the forefront of the project’s work. Iraqi legislators, ministers, and judges effectively set the agenda, building partnerships with representatives from the US government and American civil society in both Iraq and the USA, and with the leaders of the UN mission in Baghdad. The project produced a full revamping of the Criminal Procedure Code, as well as revision of the constitution and the electoral law. A website, kept up to date with legal

developments in Iraq, provided a model for portals in other legally underexposed jurisdictions. Finally, a series of some 15 books on Iraqi classical and modern law will be published with Oxford University Press, so that both Arabic and English language scholars can study and learn from the work of the project.

Global Legal Education Dean Chodosh’s numerous projects in global legal education have a common purpose: to prepare today’s students to confront pressing transnational legal problems. As director of the Frederick K. Cox International Law Center at Case Western Law School, then-Professor Chodosh developed several multi-year symposia to expose students to a host of comparative, transnational, and international law issues. He also created and taught a first-of-its-kind “global perspectives” course for first-year law students, which has since been replicated at several other top law schools. Dean Chodosh is the creator of Law Across Borders, a book series with Aspen Publishers that is designed to globalize the existing law school curriculum by helping professors to incorporate comparative, transnational, and international law into their courses. The series currently has eight books under contract and another dozen in development. At the University of Utah S.J. Quinney School of Law, Dean Chodosh created the Global Justice Project and Global Initiative to engage faculty and students on justice reform projects on global security, democracy and religion, family law, human rights, judicial independence, mediation, philanthropy, water law, climate change, Middle East peace, criminal justice reform, and many other topical issues. He launched the pioneering Global Justice Think Tank, a student-sponsored research organization engaged in service learning research partnerships with governmental and nongovernmental organizations, including the House Committee on Homeland Security, the UN Development Program, and the US Department of State. Under his leadership, the law school was selected as the lead training center by the Public Private Partnership on Afghanistan Justice Reform, and developed an Afghan prosecutor training program under State Department funding. He also developed a two-year global J.D. program for foreign lawyers; created new internships for students in several countries around the world; and developed new clinics in international humanitarian law, global rule of law, and international environmental law (including a New York-based international human rights clinic in partnership with Human Rights Watch).

Chomsky, Noam

Related Topics

▶ Development Accountability ▶ Development Assistance ▶ Global Democracy ▶ Global Justice ▶ Global Justice Project: Iraq ▶ International Law

References Chodosh HE (1999) Comparing comparisons: in search of methodology. Iowa Law Rev 84:1025 Chodosh HE (2004) Globalizing the US legal curriculum: the Saja paradigm. UC Davis Law Rev 37:843 Chodosh HE (2005) Global justice reform: a comparative methodology. New York University Press, New York Chodosh HE (ed) (2009) Law across borders. Aspen Chodosh HE, Mallat Ch (eds) (forthcoming) Global justice project: Iraq. Oxford University Press, Oxford Chodosh HE, Shetreet S (forthcoming) The uniform civil code. Sweet & Maxwell Chodosh HE, Bhatt N, Kassam F (2004) Mediation in India: a toolkit. United States Education Foundation in India, New Delhi

Chomsky, Noam ROBERT P. ABELE Department of Humanities and Philosophy, Diablo Valley College, Pleasant Hill, CA, USA

Although Noam Chomsky (1928–present) is most renowned in academia for his linguistic theory, it is his political writings that have made him most revered with both activist and public readers. This is in part due to the fact that Chomsky does not theorize in the traditional sense of the word. In other words, he does not seek universal, a priori principles or superstructures of thought or action as part of his critical analysis. Rather, his political analyses come directly from empirical observations conjoined with a comparative method contrasting “elementary moral truisms” with government proclamations and both of those with government actions (Chomsky 2004a, b, passim). Part of the reason Chomsky disdains theorizing about issues such as justice comes from his intense opposition to what he calls “the intelligentsia” or “the liberal intelligentsia.” By this term, he refers to academics and even reporters, placing them under the umbrella of “propagandists” “for the state.” Whether or not this charge holds up under critical scrutiny, it deeply influences how Chomsky

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approaches political analysis: in a word, un-theoretically. In using this approach, Chomsky openly acknowledges the influences of socialist thinkers from Karl Marx to Mikhail Bakunin; from Wilhelm von Humboldt to Daniel Guerin and Rudolf Rocker (Chomsky 2005: 118–132, 101–117, 212–220). Consequently, when it comes to Chomsky’s philosophy of global justice, it is most effectively understood as being innate in his political writings. His overt concern has consistently been quite specific: US government moral hypocrisy regarding its stated values compared with its foreign (and in many cases, domestic) policy. Rather than base his political positions on the classical liberal values of liberty and equality, Chomsky founds his political ideas on his understanding of human nature, the essence of which is free, creative self-expression, and voluntary association with others. This leads him to embrace what he refers to as anarcho-syndicalism (sometimes called “libertariansocialism”). Thus, for Chomsky, the value of freedom, while primary in his understanding of justice, is itself functional: It is the means by which humans are able to fulfill their nature, not an end in itself (Chomsky 2003: 51–54, 119–144, 211–216; 2004a: 253–258, 277–286). Thus, “justice,” although a term Chomsky rarely uses due to his avoidance of abstract theorizing, would be engaged when social structures are in place to allow the “full flowering of human freedom.” This entails dissolving all illegitimate authority in all institutional structures, in particular the existence of the state and the capitalist economic system, in that each of these structures prevents human nature from reaching its full creative potential. In its place, Chomsky advocates an anarcho-syndicalist social structure, whereby the workers control the means of production and directly control their representatives (Chomsky 2004a: 203–220; 2005: 101–117, 118–132, 153–177, 212–220). In historical fact, the state and the capitalist system, particularly in the USA, have combined to concentrate power for the benefit of those who have it – i.e., the wealthy. The method Chomsky uses to demonstrate the abuses of state and capitalist power is to delineate numerous single acts of brutality and oppression that issue from the corporate state. Because he is an American citizen, he focuses on the abuses of power and the oppression of people done by the US government. He compares such acts against the “elementary moral truism” that what one nation does it must condone all others doing. When this maxim is violated and/or undermined, injustice reigns (Chomsky 2003: 51–54; 2005: 118–132, 212–220, 153–177).

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When it comes to global justice then, Chomsky would maintain that there can be no justice as long as the inherently oppressive state continues to exist, which acts solely in the interest of corporations while denying other nations and peoples the ability to act for their own perceived good. The USA in particular judges states “unstable” when they do not allow US corporations to have open access to their resources and markets (e.g., US position during the Cold War regarding the Soviet Union), and uses terms such as the “national interest” to disguise the interests of the economic elite in dictating foreign policy and the choices of those states against whom they wish to war. With his unrelenting attack on the contradictions of US government policies when compared with their stated values, it is unsurprising that Chomsky has drawn many critics. These critics charge him variously with onesidedness (highlighting only US immoralities), not defining significant terms (in fact, he does not define most of his terms; e.g., he never defines a “state” while attacking its crimes), being too utopian, using assertion as proof, and even falsifying evidence. While some of these charges are themselves one-sided and poorly supported, some of them do carry weight. For example, Chomsky could stand to define his terms and support both his method and his assumptions better, instead of side-stepping the “liberal intelligentsia” when they demand a bit more structure in his political analyses. Part of what draws such attacks is by Chomsky’s own making, in that he engages in stinging vocabulary and cynical remarks to make points that could be made in a less inflammatory manner (The AntiChomsky Reader, various chapters). Furthermore, he does frequently make sweeping statements and engage in somewhat sloppy reasoning. To name but an example or two from many possibilities, in Language and Politics, he casually dismisses those intellectuals who maintain the doctrine of Realpolitik as “a form of idiocy.” Additionally, he makes frequent claims to “overwhelming” evidence for his position without offering it. In conclusion, it is more appropriate to say that one may construct a Chomskian theory of global justice from elements present in his critique of the state, than to discuss his notion of global justice per se. That Chomsky would have it no other way may be easily seen by his position concerning theories: “social and political issues in general seem to me fairly simple; the effort to obfuscate them in esoteric and generally vacuous theory is one of the contributions of the intelligentsia to enhancing their own power and the power of those they serve” (Chomsky 2004a: 345).

Related Topics

▶ Habermas, Ju¨rgen ▶ International Law ▶ Just War Theory: Invasion of Iraq ▶ Language and Politics ▶ Marx, Karl ▶ Propaganda ▶ State Terrorism ▶ Torture ▶ War Against Terrorism

References Chomsky N, Peck J (eds) (1987) The Chomsky reader. Pantheon Books, New York Chomsky N (2003) Radical priorities. AK Press, Oakland Chomsky N (2004a) Language and politics, ed. Otero CP. AK Press, Oakland Chomsky N (2004b) On terrorism: Noam Chomsky interviewed by John Bolender. Jump Arts Journal Chomsky N (2005) Chomsky on anarchism. AK Press, Oakland Chomsky N (2006) Failed states. Metropolitan Books, New York Collier P, Horowitz D (eds) (2004) The anti-Chomsky reader. Encounter Books, Lanham Edgley A (2000) The social and political thought of Noam Chomsky. Routledge, London

Chronic Poverty ▶ Absolute Poverty ▶ Poverty

Chumakov, Alexander N. WILLIAM C. GAY1, ANASTASIA V. MITROFANOVA2 1 Department of Philosophy, University of North Carolina at Charlotte, Charlotte, NC, USA 2 Diplomatic Academy of the Russian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Moscow, Russia

The philosophical research of Alexander N. Chumakov is interdisciplinary in nature. His research embraces a broad range of problems related to the formation of Global Studies as a special area of academic research directed toward resolving theoretically and practically the acute issues of modernity. He has developed several new ideas concerning the cultural and civilizational foundations of globalization, emphasizing axiology, environmental

Chumakov, Alexander N.

enlightenment, global justice, human rights, and the formation of global consciousness. Chumakov has put forward a concept that the civilizational connections that emerged as a result of developments and enhancements of culture were engendered by separate domains of civilization. Civilizational development led to globalization that, in turn, gave rise to the global problems of modernity in the second half of the twentieth century. Based on a systemic approach to understanding social processes, Chumakov concludes that a multidimensional world has replaced a linear and flat world. He designates mutual relations between culture, civilization, and globalization as a research problem and tries to find solutions. Chumakov formulates the basic categories (“globalization,” “global problem,” “global equality,” “anti-globalism,” etc.) and fundamental propositions composing the philosophical basis for Global Studies as a specific branch of philosophical knowledge (genesis of globalization, categories of globality, classification of global problems, their influence on human sociopolitical activity, etc.). He ties Global Studies closely to issues of human rights and a global democratic social and political order. Reflecting on how morality and common law can become the main social regulators, Chumakov has concluded that human rights are values of primary importance. However, according to him, in the face of global interdependence, human rights should be defined more precisely and complemented by specification of adequate responsibilities. Chumakov argues that every nation, keeping its own traditions, beliefs and values, should, for the sake of the future, put universal human interests as a top priority. These arguments are the most important contribution by Chumakov to the concept of global democratic governance and global justice. Chumakov’s recent works focus on the development of a general globalization theory. This work is reflected in his Globalization: the Contours of the Holistic Society (2005) and Metaphysics of Globalization: Cultural and Civilizational Context (2006), both in Russian. He tries to restore the holistic picture of the world, understanding globalization as both a natural historical process and a sphere of relations and confrontations of various forces and interests. History is interpreted by Chumakov as a single process, temporally developing and passing through several stages. Transitions between the stages are the main turning points of social development producing metamorphoses of epochal significance. Chumakov demonstrates how the logic of development of objective events engenders globalization at the level of three spheres: geological, biological, and social (united under a term

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“triosphere”). As a result, his focus is on culture, civilization, and globalization analyzed as tightly connected and related to fundamental characteristics of various sociocultural systems and of the world community as a whole. This approach provides a distinctively new vision of multidimensional globalization, now embracing all cultural and civilizational systems representing the modern humanity. Within this framework, the protection of human rights and the quest for a global democratic order are paramount. In addition to well over 200 research works, Chumakov has published seven books. Beyond his foundational contributions to Global Studies, he has addressed issues of democratization in general and in relation to Russia in particular. He also has shown special concern for issues of “global dependency” and “ecological crisis.” However, his most significant contribution to Global Studies has been the creation of a language for interdisciplinary communication acceptable for different sciences and the development and upgrading of fundamental key concepts and categories. Beyond terms already noted, other new and important ones include “demographic explosion,” “world community,” and “the new humanism.” These much needed concepts and vocabulary have emerged through his pioneering work in the interdisciplinary field of Global Studies which stresses global democratic order and human rights. Currently Alexander N. Chumakov is the Head and Chair of Philosophy at the Financial Academy of the Government of the Russian Federation. He is also the first vice president of the Russian Philosophical Society (since 1991), and the Russian Philosophical Society is an important element of Russian civil society and currently has more than 6,000 members and branches around the world that operate in the spirit of his theory of global civil society. Furthermore, he is the Editor-in-Chief of the journals Vestnik RFO and The Age of Globalization (Russian-English). His most extensive work in English is the seminal Global Studies Encyclopedia, edited by I. Mazour, A. Chumakov, and W. Gay and with numerous articles by Chumakov. Taken together, his works make him the leading figure in Russian and a key figure internationally in the fields of human rights, global studies, global justice, and global democracy.

Related Topics

▶ Democratic Citizenship ▶ Global Civil Society ▶ Global Governance ▶ Global Justice ▶ Human Rights

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References Chumakov A (1994) Filosofiya Globalnykh Problem. Znanie, Moscow Chumakov A (2005) Globalizatziya. Kontury Tzelostnogo Mira. Prospekt, Moscow Chumakov A (2006) Metafizika Globalizatzii. Kulturno-Tzivilizatzionnyi Kontekst. Kanon+, Moscow Chumakov A (2008) On the subject and boundaries of global studies. Age of globalization. Studies in Contemporary Global Processes 1:6–14 Chumakov A (2009) An anthropological dimension of globalization. In: Omelchenko N (ed) The human being in contemporary philosophical conceptions. Cambridge Scholars, Cambridge, pp 237–244 Chumakov A (2010) Philosophy of globalization: selected articles. MAKS Press, Moscow Mazour I, Chumakov A, Gay W (eds) (2003) Global studies encyclopedia. Raduga, Moscow

Chwaszcza, Christine DORIS UNGER SoCuM, Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz, Mainz, Germany

Christine Chwaszcza develops in Moral Responsibility and Global Justice (MRGJ) (2007) and Beyond Cosmopolitanism (2008) a normative non-ideal theory of international relations that is based on human rights as standards of legitimacy for institutions.

Human Rights as Standards of Legitimacy Human rights, Chwaszcza argues, are not to be misunderstood as a specific catalog of individual legal rights, but should be regarded as moral standards. The normative core of human rights standards is that the central moral concern should be the respect of individual physical and psychological integrity (“principle of individualism”), the equal – moral and legal – status of individuals (“principle of moral equality”), and the liberty of individuals to live according to freely chosen values and beliefs (“principle of ethical individualism”). The relevant institutions of transnational justice are sociopolitical and legal institutions which comprise states and international organizations as well as “generally rule-guided social practices.” These institutions are morally justifiable to the extent they satisfy human rights standards. Existing institutions should be changed and new institutions established if the status quo violates human rights. Chwaszcza’s theory of transnational justice is a “contextualist account” that argues in favor of judging

domestic and international issues in accordance with empirical facts rather than formulating an ideal theory. By contrast with domestic systems, the international order is not structured hierarchically and, therefore, lacks effective mechanisms of law enforcement and functional differentiation. Domestic political theory cannot merely be applied to the international context because states, and not individuals, are the most significant actors in international relations and international law. It follows that states as “legal actors” have moral rights and must take moral responsibilities toward other states and individuals who are not citizens of their own state. Contrary to the cosmopolitan claim, Chwaszcza argues that these rights and responsibilities of states cannot be solely derived from the rights and responsibilities of individual citizens.

Political Contexts Chwaszcza applies her context-dependent account to a number of specific topics, e.g., peace ethics, humanitarian intervention, secession, global distributive justice, and transnational migration. In MRGJ and Die normative Bedeutung politischer Grenzen (2006), she asserts that distributive justice requires democratic decision-making procedures by which appropriate regulations of (re) distribution can be selected. Since the international sphere lacks those procedures, global distributive justice has to be limited to a “right to subsistence.” States are morally responsible to combat poverty that endangers subsistence across borders and to establish international institutions that promote a fair international trade system. Thus, in accordance with institutional realities, Chwaszcza differentiates between human rights requirements and requirements of political justice. MRGJ and a number of articles, e.g., Secession, Humanitarian Intervention, and the Normative Significance of Political Boundaries (2003), discuss the legitimacy of humanitarian military intervention. Chwaszcza argues that states are not to be treated as black boxes whose internal affairs do not matter internationally. In cases of massive human rights violations, other states do not just have the right, but even an imperfect duty, to intervene. Nevertheless, the probability of improving the circumstances must be weighed carefully against the consequences of intervention.

Related Topics

▶ Cosmopolitanism ▶ Global Distributive Justice ▶ Global Justice ▶ Human Rights ▶ Humanitarian Military Intervention

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▶ International Institutional Legitimacy ▶ Moral Legitimacy

References Chwaszcza C (2003) Secession, humanitarian intervention, and the normative significance of political boundaries. In: Chatterjee D, Scheid D (eds) Ethics and foreign intervention. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 168–188 Chwaszcza C (2006) Die normative Bedeutung politischer Grenzen: Zur Abgrenzung politischer und allgemein moralischer Bereiche der Gerechtigkeit. In: Koller P (ed) The normative significance of political boundaries: enclosing political and general moral spheres of justice. Die globale Frage. Passagen, Wien, pp 349–376 Chwaszcza C (2007) Moral responsibility and global justice: a human rights approach. Nomos, Baden-Baden Chwaszcza C (2008) Beyond cosmopolitanism: towards a non-ideal account of transnational justice. Ethics Glob Politics 1(3):115–138 Chwaszcza C (2009) The unity of the people, and immigration in liberal theory. Citizenship Stud 13(5):451–473

Cicero LEE TREPANIER Department of Political Science, Saginaw Valley State University, University Center, MI, USA

Marcus Tullius Cicero (106–43 BC) was the Roman philosopher who erected the basic conceptual framework of the “law of nations” which has influenced subsequent international law, theory, and ethics. During Cicero’s time, the need for a universal code of ethics had become pressing, as Roman conquest had created a polyglot empire with an elite suffused with a wide variety of foreign philosophies and religions. Furthermore, the subjects of this new empire were neither Roman citizens who could partake in civic life nor were they the conquered slaves of despotism. Confronted by this challenge, Cicero revived Roman republican traditions under the guise of a statesman who would be limited to and accountable for his power by following a code of universal ethics embodied in the Stoic notion of natural law. However, Cicero was not a Stoic but a skeptic: he believed that humans cannot be certain about their knowledge of the world and therefore no philosophy can ever claim to be true. Although skeptics did not offer constructive arguments of their own, they were able to see all sides of an issue and accept beliefs until a better argument presents itself. This is the path Cicero took as a lawyer and a philosopher but not as a politician, a role in which he turned to Stoicism and Peripatetic philosophies for

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guidance. Since as a skeptic he was free to accept any argument that he had found convincing, Cicero put forth Stoic doctrines to be followed provisionally by the Roman elite in order to improve both individual and collective life. Cicero’s Stoicism postulated that the gods existed, loved human beings, and rewarded or punished them according to their conduct in life. But most importantly was the gods’ gift of reason to humans. Since humans have this in common with the gods, the most virtuous and divine life was to live a life according to reason. It was reason that enabled humans to discover and follow the natural law: the source of all properly made laws for both individuals and communities. Because all humans shared reason and therefore could discover natural law, humanity could be conceived as a single community which followed this universal law. Thus, natural law created not only a singular community of humanity but it also provided a singular ethics. Cicero made some of his most important pronouncements on this universal code of ethics in On Duties where he established the principle of war as the last resort to maintain peace. For Cicero, a state must first exhaust all options before choosing war in defense of itself. War should never be considered as a first option or for retributive justice. In fact, when a state was victorious, Cicero recommended that the state be generous in the sparing of lives of the defeated in order to promote peace and friendship among enemies. The promotion of peace without injustice was the underlying principle of Cicero’s thoughts on war and thereby defined not only the just causes of war but also placed limits on the conduct of war itself. In peacetime, Cicero also made significant contributions to global ethics with his ideas of hospitality and friendship, concepts that would be later adopted by thinkers like Derrida and Levinas. According to Cicero in On Duties, strangers were to be treated with hospitality, with nobody being injured for the sake of the betterment of somebody else. Such acts were contrary to nature, for, as members of a universal community, every human required equal respect and dignity. And since all humans demanded the same treatment, friendships that transcended region or race became possible. In On Friendship Cicero described the nature of true friendship as one between good and virtuous people who followed natural law. He offered advice of winning the glory of friendship through good will, honor, and liberality, the last virtue being particularly important as a form of aristocratic largesse to particular groups of the citizenry. Friendship therefore was not only the bond among the most virtuous but it was also the cement between classes in society (albeit

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this latter form of friendship was inferior to the most virtuous kind). Cicero’s notions of hospitality and friendship therefore could serve as the basis for a universal, cosmopolitan community. However, the pressures of local attachments and the adversities of political life threaten the fabric of this cosmopolitan community. Recognizing that humans were more closely bounded and therefore obliged to their families and local communities rather than nonfamilial members and cosmopolitan citizens, Cicero proposed patriotism to overcome these familial and local attachments. Philosophy itself was an inadequate basis for a universal community because only a few could live the life of reason, whereas many preferred the pursuit of pleasure. Thus, it was the task of the statesman to discover truth and convey this truth to a particular political community through suitable rhetoric in order to persuade people about the authority of the law. But this rhetoric also required philosophy, as Cicero argued in On the Republic and On the Laws; otherwise, the statesman would become tyrannical. It is important to note that the cosmopolitan community did not abolish the attachment to particular communities for Cicero. Humans were attached to what specifically belonged to them as well to the universal good itself. Particular political communities were members of a universal cosmic order in the sense that its dictates – the precepts of practical reason – became law. The fact that a universal political community did not pragmatically exist was not a problem for Cicero, because every community to some extent followed the natural law in their human-made laws. Since individuals were part of a group of humans that shared human laws, each one was part of a political community and therefore had a duty to that community. This obligation was informed by the natural law that called for individuals to partake in politics, so far as it is possible, in order to improve the communities in which they live. That is, politics was informed by a universal code of ethics but was practiced in a particular community. Cicero’s contribution to global justice were not only limited to his understanding of natural law but also included critical concepts like friendship and hospitality, limitations to the causes and conduct of war, and the institutionalization of these ideas into local and universal communities. Although the scope of justice for Cicero was universal, the application of it ultimately was local. Cicero’s Stoic vision of an eternal and immutable law for all nations, the virtues of friendship and hospitality, the principles of warfare, and the duty to serve one’s local community formed the conceptual framework for global

issues that would subsequently affect international theory, politics, and justice.

Related Topics

▶ Cosmopolitanism ▶ Friendship ▶ Global Citizenship ▶ Global Ethic ▶ Just War Theory: Invasion of Iraq ▶ Political Obligation ▶ War, Just and Unjust

References Cicero MT (1913–2010) Works: Loeb Editions. Harvard University Press, Cambridge Dyck R (1997) A commentary on Cicero, De Officiis (On duty). University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor MacKendrick P (1989) The philosophical books of Cicero. St. Martin’s Press, New York Nussbaum M (1994) The therapy of desire theory and practice in Hellenistic ethics. Princeton University Press, Princeton Pangle T (1999) Justice among nations. University of Press Kansas, Lawrence Powell J (1999) Cicero the philosopher: twelve papers. Oxford University Press, Oxford Wood N (1988) Cicero’s social and political thought. University of California Press, Berkeley

Citizenship RONALD TINNEVELT Department of Philosophy of Law, Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, The Netherlands

The nature of citizenship is, as Aristotle already observed, an often disputed question. A citizen in a democracy may not count as one in an oligarchy (Aristotle 1995: 1275a21). Controversy persists regarding the content, scope, and depth of citizenship (Faulks 2000). Should citizenship primarily be determined in terms of rights or also in that of duties? What is the extent of citizenship? Who should be excluded and who included? And how thick should our identity as citizen be? Does it demand a strong form of fellow feeling or specific competences? What does it mean to be a good citizen? Despite disagreement, two “classical” ideals of citizenship can be distinguished that greatly influenced our main traditions of political thought: the ideal of Roman law with its emphasis on equality under law, and the Athenian ideal with its stress on the importance of political activity.

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A citizen, according to the second ideal, is one who “both rules and is ruled” (Pocock 1998: 32). A similar distinction can be found regarding theories of liberty. Benjamin Constant is famous for comparing the liberty of the ancients with that of the moderns. Whereas the liberal tradition adheres to the Roman view of citizenship, the republican tradition of political thought revives the Greek view. The liberal model of citizenship as rights and the republican model of political self-rule, however, are not the only approaches to citizenship that can be distinguished within the contemporary debate. Other models are based on the views of communitarians, deliberative democrats, and agonists. The debate between communitarians and deliberative democrats centers, among other things, on the nature of civic integration. From these different approaches at least four dimensions of the idea of citizenship can be inferred. Citizenship is first of all a specific status. A citizen is a member of a political community. The Latin civis – from which the word citizen derives – is closely linked to the word civitas (city or state). A parallel connection can be found between the Greek polites and polis. Because of this status citizens have a certain standing that noncitizens do not have (Weinstock 2002). Aristotle connects this status to a second dimension of citizenship, that of participation or self-rule. Citizenship is a political status. It is neither determined on the basis of residence nor on being subject to the laws of the city. Unlike a subject a citizen “shares in the administration of justice” (Aristotle 1995: 1275a21). Citizens, from a more general perspective, participate either directly or indirectly – through their representatives – in the process of law-making. Within our modern understanding citizenship changed from a political notion to a formal-juridical one. Citizenship is a legal status that establishes rights and duties. Citizens should be protected from unlawful coercion and free to pursue their own conception of the good. T. H. Marshall’s “Citizenship and Social Class” presents the most influential formulation of what these rights are: civil rights to protect individual freedom, political rights to secure access to self-government, and social rights to guarantee a minimum level of economic welfare for all (Marshall 1965: 78). The last component of citizenship is that of political identity (Cohen 1999). Citizens have a special tie to their fellows and identify with the specific culture of their particular political community. By conferring a higher social status on fellow citizens, citizenship functions – both within and between states – as a “powerful instrument of

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social closure” (Brubaker 1992: x). Political communities are always bounded communities that distinguish between insiders and outsiders. Like theories of justice, modern theories of citizenship have long been constructed almost exclusively against the background of territorial nation-states. In A Theory of Justice (1971) Rawls, for example, famously limits his case to that of a closed society, “a self-contained national community” (p. 457). The meanings, conditions, and practices of citizenship, however, have transformed as a consequence of the impact of growing cultural diversity and globalization. Several important debates have resulted from these challenges. Two will be mentioned here. The first is related to the idea of cultural and social pluralism. Although the enjoyment of a set of common rights is an important aspect of citizenship, critics of the ideal of universal citizenship – with its emphasis on inclusion and abstraction from particularity and difference – argue that greater attention should be paid to the importance of group-differentiated rights. Equal treatment for all can sometimes be better realized on the basis of differentiated citizenship (Young 1989) or multicultural citizenship (Kymlicka 1995). A second debate concerns the relevance of citizenship in an age of globalization. Can citizenship still be a meaningful status outside the territorial borders of sovereign states? Proponents of transnational citizenship – like David Held or Richard Falk – think there can be multiple arenas of citizenship, at the local, transnational, and global levels. Citizenship, then, need not denote the relationship between an individual and a state. Liberal nationalists – like David Miller and Will Kymlicka – argue against the feasibility of transnational forms of citizenship. Global democrats, according to them, ignore the empirical conditions of genuine citizenship: a high level of trust, responsibility, and common understanding. These conditions exist currently only within national communities. Although these debates are mainly related to the idea of citizenship as membership in a political community, citizenship can also be used in a wider sense to indicate a specific kind of cultural or moral attitude. World citizenship – being a citizen of the world – is a case in point. The idea of world citizenship, however, has different meanings. Consonant with the distinction between moral and institutional cosmopolitanism, different forms can be discerned (Heater 2002). They range from an ethical identification with humanity (moral status) and the establishment of a system of cosmopolitan right (legal status) to the need for some form of supranational political authority (political status).

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From the perspective of moral cosmopolitanism – the idea that human beings are the ultimate units of moral concern – the specific liberties, rights, and opportunities attached to citizenship status pose an interesting problem. Looking at Western liberal democracies the argument can be made that citizenship “is the modern equivalent of feudal privilege – an inherited status that greatly enhances one’s life chances” (Carens 1987: 252) Can these differences in life prospects be justified? If a person’s gender, race, and wealth are considered “arbitrary from a moral point of view” (Rawls 1971: 15), should not the same apply to his or her citizenship or nationality? After all, the country in which one is born seems just a matter of brute luck. On a more general level, these questions can also be posed in terms of the distinction between general duties and special obligations. Do citizens have special obligations toward fellow citizens that outweigh their more general duties? Whereas general duties are owed to everyone, special obligations arise out of special transactions or special relationships (Hart 1955: 183). Citizenship, however, need not only refer to a specific status of persons. More broadly speaking, “citizenship” is sometimes also used to indicate standards of proper conduct – like environmental citizenship or corporate citizenship – or membership in other kinds of human association (Smith 2002).

Related Topics

▶ Civil Rights ▶ Collective Identity ▶ Compatriot Partiality Thesis ▶ Global Citizenship ▶ Liberal Nationalism ▶ World Citizenship

References Aristotle (1995) Politics. Oxford University Press, Oxford Brubaker R (1992) Citizenship and nationhood in France and Germany. Harvard University Press, Cambridge Carens J (1987) Aliens and citizens: the case for open borders. Rev Polit 49(2):251–273 Cohen J (1999) Changing paradigms of citizenship and the exclusiveness of the demos. Int Sociol 14(3):245–268 Faulks K (2000) Citizenship. Routledge, London/New York Hart HLA (1955) Are there any natural rights? Philos Rev 64(2):175–191 Heater D (2002) World citizenship: cosmopolitan thinking and its opponents. Continuum, London Kymlicka W (1995) Multicultural citizenship: a liberal theory of minority rights. Oxford University Press, Oxford Marshall TH (1965) Class, citizenship, and social development. Anchor Books, Garden City

Pocock JGA (1998) The ideal of citizenship since classical times. In: Shafir G (ed) Citizenship debates: a reader. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, pp 31–42 Rawls J (1971) A theory of justice. Harvard University Press, Cambridge Smith RM (2002) Modern citizenship. In: Isin EF, Turner BS (eds) Handbook of citizenship studies. Sage, London, pp 105–116 Weinstock D (2002) Citizenship and pluralism. In: Simon RL (ed) The Blackwell guide to social and political philosophy. Blackwell, Malden, pp 239–270 Young IM (1989) Polity and group difference: a critique of the ideal of universal citizenship. Ethics 99(2):250–274

Citizenship Practices SOPHIA A. STONE Department of Philosophy, Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN, USA

Citizenship practices fall under two conceptions of citizenship: state and global. A person is a citizen by virtue of the rights and duties through membership of a nation state. Or a person is a citizen of the world in virtue of being a member of the human race. If citizenship is restricted to rights and duties granted by a governing body, then global citizenship is impossible. Yet contemporary scholars such as Nigel Dower (Dower 2000) and Andrew Linklater (Linklater 1999) posit global citizenship as a natural and necessary relation an individual has with the human race. State and Global conceptions differ in whether rights imply duties. State citizenship practices are activities that follow from the rights and duties granted to the citizen by the state. Richard Falk explains that when we vote, we give consent to be governed (Falk 2009). A citizen pays taxes for the services and infrastructure provided by the state. State citizenship practices include obeying laws. Where laws overstep basic rights to other citizens, the citizen should work toward changing the laws. For example, the Montgomery Alabama bus boycotts in 1955 challenged segregation laws. State citizenship practices are often on the local level, directly affecting the community, such as volunteer work. State citizenship practices are a necessary part of the reciprocal relation between the citizen and the nation. Global citizenship practices work toward ending global problems: regional conflicts, hunger, human rights violations, and threats to the environment and natural disasters. While global citizenship practices do not hold an obligatory reciprocal relation between an individual

Civil Disobedience, International

and a global government, global citizenship practices are necessary, given the immediacy of transnational threats to security, economic stability, and food resources. Global citizenship practices work toward equality and justice among all people, regardless of status or statehood. Arguably, then, global citizenship practices are an integral component of global justice.

Related Topics

▶ Citizenship ▶ Common Good ▶ Communitarianism ▶ Correlative Obligations ▶ Cosmopolitanism ▶ Democratic Citizenship ▶ Dower, Nigel ▶ Duties of Assistance ▶ Duties to the Distant Needy ▶ Duties, Positive and Negative ▶ Falk, Richard ▶ Global Citizenship ▶ Locke, John ▶ Reciprocity ▶ Rousseau, Jean-Jacques ▶ World Citizenship

References Dower N (2000) The idea of global citizenship – a sympathetic assessment. Glob Soc 14:4 Falk R (2009) Achieving human rights. Routledge, New York, p 72 Linklater A (1999) Cosmopolitan citizenship. In: Hutchings K, Dannreuther R (eds) Cosmopolitan citizenship. St. Martin’s Press, New York, pp 35–59 Miller D (1999) Bounded citizenship. In: Hutchings K, Dannreuther R (eds) Cosmopolitan citizenship. St. Martin’s Press, New York, pp 60–80 Raz J (1996) Liberty and trust. In: George R (ed) Natural law, liberalism and morality. Clarendon, Oxford, pp 114–129

Civil Disobedience, International MICHAEL ALLEN Department of Philosophy, East Tennessee State University, Johnson City, TN, USA

Civil disobedience is typically conceived as a nonviolent, symbolic, and illegal form of protest that takes place within the constitutional democratic nation state. This equation of civil disobedience with the state paradigm is,

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however, challenged by some political philosophers who argue that the model of civilly disobedient protest may be translated into the international domain of politics. Here it is contended that in the case of international civil disobedience, states may play a role in protesting global injustices analogous to that of citizens protesting injustices within the borders of their own state in the case of domestic civil disobedience. In what follows, I shall briefly sketch the core features of civilly disobedient protest in the domestic case of constitutional democratic nation states before considering the analogy between the citizens of such states and states themselves as civilly disobedient actors in the international domain. I then conclude with some remarks on the viability of the concept of international civil disobedience and the extent to which it might be said adequately to challenge the state paradigm in an age of globalization.

The Domestic Case of Civil Disobedience In the domestic case, nonviolent, symbolic, illegal protest is undertaken by civil disobedients as the citizens of constitutional democratic states. When undertaking such protest, citizen civil disobedients appeal, on the one hand, to the formal institutions of the state and, on the other hand, to the sense of justice of their fellow citizens. In doing so, their intention is to publicize some fundamental injustice within the borders of the state and gain popular support and legitimacy for an appropriate legal reform to redress this injustice. Such protest is controversial in that it immediately encounters two objections: that it undermines the stabilizing function of law in democratic societies and that it violates the majority principle. The first objection, however, is typically met by an argument to the effect that an objection to civil disobedience purely on grounds of its illegality is to collapse the vital distinction between the legitimacy of law and its stabilizing function. The second objection can then be met by appealing to this same distinction and arguing to the effect that the majority principle is simply not a definitive test for the legitimacy of law. Instead, the legitimacy of law in a constitutional democracy is conditional upon public deliberation and respect for basic rights. To the extent it may be said to promote public deliberation over basic rights violations such as the denial of civil and political rights to ethnic or religious minorities, civilly disobedient protest should be regarded as justifiable within the context of such a society. Indeed, respect for the constitutional rule of law in general may be demonstrated by the willingness of citizen civil disobedients to accept the legal penalties for their disobedience.

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The Analogy Between Citizens and States Extrapolating from the domestic case, political philosophers, such as Robert Goodin (2005) and Nancy Kokaz (2005), argue that states may be morally justified in breaking international law with a view to reforming it when such law may be shown to be fundamentally unjust. Indeed, reasoning analogically, they claim that just as citizens may be morally justified in breaking the domestic law of their own state when it is fundamentally unjust, states may be morally justified in breaking international law for precisely the same reason. For his part, Goodin contends that in the international arena, the analogue of the domestic principle of the “rule of law, and not men” should be the “rule of law, and not states.” Abiding by the principle of fidelity to international law, states may nonetheless be justified in breaking unjust international laws. But he emphasizes that such international law breaking would be justified only to the extent civilly disobedient states are willing to accept the legal consequences for doing so, in ways analogous to the ordinary standards of civil disobedience. Along the similar lines, Nancy Kokaz argues that the decision of Brazil, for instance, to produce and export generic HIV medications in defiance of intellectual property rights should be viewed appropriately as instance of international civil disobedience. Her rationale for this claim is that Brazil was willing to give publicly justifiable reasons suitable to a plural world; thus satisfying standards of reason-giving broadly analogous to the publicity standards familiar to cases of domestic civil disobedience. Indeed, for both theorists, the state becomes the agent of civilly disobedient protest, and it is officials of the disobedient state who give public reasons to the officials of other states for breaking international law, while holding the state and its national public open to the possibility of suffering legal penalties imposed by the larger international community. Public reasons of civilly disobedient states may be given in international tribunals empowered to hear relevant cases and impose penalties under a treaty to which all parties are signatories. According to this conception of the civilly disobedient state as sketched by Goodin and Kokaz, the role played by the citizens of an internationally disobedient state is thus rendered indirect from the perspective of international law. To be sure, citizens may play a direct role in domestically protesting the state’s compliance with unjust international law, and so prompt the state to engage in acts of international law breaking. This might be the case, for instance, of citizens who illegally protest the fidelity of their own state to intellectual property rights laid down in international

law that restrict the export of generic medications for HIV, contrary to the example set by Brazil. But here the role of civilly disobedient citizens remains decidedly within the state paradigm. Citizens, at most, play an indirect role in protesting unjust international law insofar as their protest is directed only against their own state. In the international context of international relations, it is the state and not its citizens that takes on the role of directly protesting unjust international law.

Implications for Global Justice The concept of international civil disobedience clearly makes an important contribution to global justice debates. Indeed, by extrapolating from citizens to states as the proper agents of civilly disobedient protest, its theorists bring to the international arena a critical resource for testing the legitimacy of international law. Moreover, it does so at a time when the thickening web of international law has become increasingly intrusive into the lives of the citizens of national publics, in addition to being the target of growing public criticism across borders for failing to secure the basic rights of individuals globally. To be sure, international civil disobedience may encounter the objection that it threatens to destabilize the international rule of law, especially given that international law is already generally acknowledged to be less stable than the domestic law of well-established constitutional democratic states. But this objection can surely be answered, in much the same way as in the domestic case, by emphasizing that an appropriate distinction has to be maintained between the legitimacy of international law and its stabilizing function. Again, it may well be argued that stability is in large part itself a function of legitimacy, and that the civilly disobedient protests of states are a vital resource for increasing the legitimacy of international law through publicizing injustices and facilitating legal reform. Nonetheless, it is less than clear that the idea of international civil disobedience is an effective conceptual tool for testing the legitimacy of international law. Indeed, this concept poses a particular challenge to any notion that civilly disobedient protest should be viewed as being applicable only within the borders of constitutional democratic states. But it does not otherwise go very far in challenging the state paradigm itself. Indeed, it sticks resolutely to the model of international, or interstate, relations and the representation by state officials of the reasons and opinions of national publics. That is, it does so at a time when the adequacy of this model of global politics is seen by many other theorists as having been undermined in some significant ways by the emergence

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with globalization of a variety of new trans-state or suprastate actors. Such actors include not only global financial institutions and global corporations, but also global publics and global civil society movements. The latter are remarkable in that they consist in networks of citizens who organize protests across state borders with the intention of directly contesting injustices brought about by the former, often bypassing those states of which they are members as the medium for representing their reasons and opinions to other states in international tribunals. This distinct phenomenon of transnational civil disobedience is, however, eludes the conceptual framework of international civil disobedience. A more satisfactory account of the possibilities and prospects of civil disobedience beyond the state would need to address both its international and transnational manifestations.

Related Topics

▶ Civil Disobedience, Transnational ▶ Global Human Rights Culture ▶ Globalization

References Buchanan A (2004) Justice, legitimacy, and self-determination: moral foundations for international law. Oxford University Press, Oxford Dworkin R (1985) A matter of principle. Harvard University Press, Cambridge Goodin RE (2005) Towards an international rule of law: distinguishing international law-breakers from would-be law-makers. J Ethics 9:1–2 Kokaz N (2005) Theorizing international fairness. Metaphilosophy 36: 68–92 Rawls J (1971) A theory of justice. Harvard University Press, Cambridge

Civil Disobedience, Transnational MICHAEL ALLEN Department of Philosophy, East Tennessee State University, Johnson City, TN, USA

Transnational civil disobedience is a form of nonviolent, symbolic, and illegal protest that specifically engages the concepts of global citizens and a global public. It is a model of civil disobedience that takes global citizens to be the agents of civilly disobedient protest who address a global public with a global sense of justice. Here the targets of such protest may well include the formal institutions of either national or international law. More often than not, however, the favored targets of protest are

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powerful and influential actors ranging from global financial institutions to multinational corporations able to shape the pluralism of informal regulatory “regimes” more characteristic of coordination processes under globalization. Such processes are informal in that they amount to little more than fluid and incompletely defined agreements that are responses to the increasing pace of global interactions, and which lack the backing of formal and codified law. In these respects, transnational civil disobedience may be said to mark a fairly radical departure from the more standard models of domestic and international civil disobedience. Indeed, neither of these latter models fully engages the concepts of global citizens and a global public. Instead, they cleave to the state paradigm of national publics and the representation of such publics by the officials of the state. In what follows, I first briefly discuss the domestic and international models of civil disobedience. Here I stress their shared analytical assumptions derived from the state paradigm about law and legal reform, as the primary means of achieving a just social order, whether nationally or internationally. I then turn to the transnational model of civil disobedience, emphasizing instead its contrasting analytical assumptions based on the theory of globalization about the frequency with which discourse and network communication often effectively supplant the formal structures of national and international law. The chapter concludes with a remark concerning the conceptual risks of overstating this equation of transnational civil disobedience with informal discursive ordering without recourse to fundamental legal reform.

Domestic and International Civil Disobedience: Reforming the Formal Institutions of National and International Law While they differ significantly in their conceptions of the appropriate agent of civil disobedience, the domestic and international models are otherwise remarkably similar in their basic assumptions concerning the efficacy of illegal protest in facilitating legal reforms that redress fundamental social injustices. This may be seen first in the domestic model in which the agents of civilly disobedient protest are the citizens of the national public of an imperfectly just constitutional democratic state. Here the definitive case of domestic civil disobedience is surely the nonviolent protests undertaken by the American Civil Rights Movement, contesting segregation laws entrenched in the legal order that discriminated against Black American citizens. The

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purpose of these protests, such as Blacks sitting at “Whites Only” counters in segregated restaurants, was symbolically to publicize the injustice of segregation and appeal to the sense of justice of the entire citizen body in order to motivate a basic reform of the legal order. Clearly underlying such protests was the assumption that the United States was a society ordered by law, and that the law could justifiably be broken on moral grounds when it was demonstrably unjust in terms of the fundamental principle of equality under the law. This same emphasis on the idea of a community ordered by law and the ideal of equality reappears in the international model of civil disobedience, even though the appropriate agent of disobedience in this model is shifted from the citizens of a national public to the state itself. Indeed, the assumption of this model is that the international community consists of a society of societies ordered by law. Here a state may be morally justified in breaking an unjust international law in order to facilitate its reform. A relevant example of such disobedience may be found in the decision of Brazil to produce and export generic HIV medications in defiance of intellectual property rights, as protected under existing international law. In doing so, the officials of the Brazilian state represented to the international community the moral conviction of its own national public that placing intellectual property rights over the right to receive affordable treatment of the victims of a global AIDS pandemic is fundamentally unjust. Again a fundamental injustice pertaining to inequalities in the basic rights and opportunities of persons is to be overcome through reform of the formal legal order, in this case the formal order of international law.

Transnational Civil Disobedience: Illegal Protest as Influencing the Balance of Globally Consequential Discourses By contrast with the emphasis on illegal protest as facilitating formal legal reform in the domestic and international models of civil disobedience, transnational civil disobedience focuses on the prospects for achieving justice through illegal action without directly engaging the formal institutions of law. The origin of the model lies in theorizing about globalization and a novel kind of politics made possible by the increasing pace of global interactions and communication, in addition to growing awareness among the citizens of diverse national publics of global interconnectivity and shared risks. This new form of politics variously called world civic politics and deliberative global politics emphasizes the ability of citizens to employ a network form of organization across national borders to

publicize common risks to all of humanity, such as irreversible ecological damage to the planet. The most sophisticated version of this approach if offered by John Dryzek (2006) who argues that global politics today are best understood in terms of discursive rather than legal ordering. Dryzek contends that global interactions are ordered informally according to the guiding terms and assumptions of a variety of globally consequential discourses, such as the “the free market,” “unlimited growth,” or “sustainable development.” Indeed, global citizens as participants in rival discourses enter into informal contests with one another to influence the balance of such discourses, and so continuously shape fluid and informal agreements concerning legitimate global interactions. Here a much favored example of a transnational civil disobedient is the environmentalist group Greenpeace. Although willing to engage the state or agencies of international law when this promises to yield the outcomes they want, Greenpeace is often more concerned with exerting influence and pressure to achieve these outcomes in ways that bypass the formal structures of legal ordering. This approach may be seen, for instance, in the case of its illegal occupation of the Brent Spar oil storage platform in British territorial waters. The occupation was intended to prevent the deep-water dumping of the platform as obsolete industrial waste by the Shell Corporation. Greenpeace did not, however, attempt to reform British law, or international law, to prevent deep-water dumping, as a fundamental violation of the environmental rights of all humanity to enjoy clean oceans. Instead, it used the illegal protest as a way to pressure Shell into towing the platform to dry land, where it could be dismantled and its parts recycled. The effect of the protest then was to influence the balance of globally consequential discourses so as to favor the terms and assumptions of sustainable development over those of free-market efficiency and industrialism. Acting as global citizens, Greenpeace thus sought to publicize the global risks of environmental dumping to a global public, resolving the issue of dumping not by changing laws but reshaping the common terms and assumptions that may be said to constitute the sense of justice of this public.

Conclusion Transnational civil disobedience has emerged as a distinctive kind of nonviolent, symbolic, illegal protest by contrast with the domestic and international models due to its commitment to an analysis of globalization according to which global interactions are increasingly ordered in discursive as opposed to legal terms.

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Undoubtedly, the informal discursive ordering of global affairs is a genuine phenomenon of globalization that opens up new possibilities for activist politics. But there is also risk involved in such a strong emphasis on informal resolutions to injustices, such as causing irreversible environmental harms, which potentially affect all persons globally for generations to come. In particular, bypassing formal institutions of law is to bypass the opportunity to entrench the ideal of the equal consideration of all persons through fundamental reform of international law that is concerned with securing guarantees of the equal human rights of global citizens. Indeed, it would surely have been inadequate for the American Civil Rights movement to have concerned itself only with reaching informal agreements with particular restaurant owners to desegregate the seating arrangements for their customers. This would have left Black Americans entirely vulnerable to the open possibility of these arrangements being changed for the worse in an ongoing contest between the rival discourses of civil rights and “state rights” to reshape basic assumptions about appropriate norms of interaction. Precisely the same point about the vulnerability of gains due to the fluid character of such a contest could be made regarding the environmental human rights of global citizens. In light of this sort of concern, the case may well be made for global citizens to give equal emphasis to immediate informal gains resulting from illegal protests and the long-term protection of these gains through international legal reforms grounded in human rights.

Related Topics

▶ Ahimsa ▶ Civil Disobedience, International ▶ Democracy, Transnational ▶ Dryzek, John ▶ Global Citizenship ▶ Global Public ▶ Globalization ▶ Greenpeace ▶ Human Rights ▶ Humanitarian Intervention, Non-Military

References Dryzek JS (2006) Deliberative global politics. Polity, Cambridge Dworkin R (1985) A matter of principle. Harvard University Press, Cambridge Goodin RE (2005) Towards an international rule of law: distinguishing international law-breakers from would-be law-makers. J Ethics 9:1–2 Kokaz N (2005) Theorizing international fairness. Metaphilosophy 36:68–92 Rawls J (1971) A theory of justice. Harvard University Press, Cambridge

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Civil Rights LYNETTE E. SIEGER Gallatin School, New York University, New York, NY, USA

Civil rights belong to a class of rights known as first generation rights. First generation rights are concerned with political and civil claims of citizens within a political community to the rights of freedom of expression, association, access to meaningful political participation, and equal protection of the law. The primary struggle in civil rights movements worldwide has been over whom counts as citizen and who – if anyone – within civil society can legitimately be excluded from civil rights protections and guarantees. Though civil rights battles are usually addressed within the state, liberalism has evolved on the global sphere to recognize that equality of all persons subject to the state should not be denied on the arbitrary basis of characteristics such as sex, skin color, belonging to a minority group, or religion. Equality is recognized as paramount to securing civil rights in the arena of global justice through the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). The ICCPR binds signatory states to uphold the principle of equality – as fundamental to securing peace, justice, and freedom – in administering the articles of the covenant. Equality is necessary to the underlying goal of civil rights, which is to protect and secure what Ju¨rgen Habermas refers to as the private and the civil/public autonomy of citizens. In the case of private autonomy, liberalism upholds the right of persons to decide, with minimal interference from the state, their own life plan and how best to pursue it. Civil autonomy is an extension of private autonomy allowing persons to participate in the processes that determine the shape and direction of their social political lives. This collective identity is an extension of the personal identity and is a necessary means to securing the rights of personal autonomy. This entry will first explore the practical and normative dimensions of securing and promoting civil rights within states through international agreements in global society. Second, it will address the rising concerns over global governance institutions in accountability to international civil rights norms. Third and last, it will introduce emerging protections for minority groups and how these third generation rights conflict or compliment liberal civil rights.

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Practical and Normative Dimensions of Securing and Promoting Civil Rights Though International Organizations (IOs) such as the World Trade Organization, the United Nations, and the International Monetary Fund directly impact the lives of persons, they are structured so as to be concerned with states via representatives and not persons directly as such. Currently there are no citizens subject to global governance in the traditional sense as citizens are subject to the state. Given this nature of IOs, the question arises over what role global governance agencies have in relation to the satisfaction of civil rights. The proliferation of IOs, International Financial Institutions (IFIs), Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs), Multinational Corporations (MNCs), and International treaties and covenants contribute to the creation of global society where spheres that may have once been more easily relegated to the boundaries of the state now overlap. This newly emerging global society has been constructing rules for cooperation and engagement between states. Though – as will be discussed in section Emerging Protections for Minority Groups – pluralism and self-determination are valued in the global order, there are moral limits to how the state may exercise power over its citizens. Thus the ICCPR was created as an international means to promote civil rights within states. The ICCPR bound signatory states to ensure that all subjects to a state and individuals within the jurisdiction of the state – without bias predicated on distinctions such as sex, color, or national origin – have guaranteed access to civil rights. These include equal recognition before the law, freedom of religious and political beliefs and the exercise of those beliefs, and the equal opportunity to participate in civil society. A primary concern with international treaties such as the ICCPR is that without the enforcement mechanisms of the state, it is questionable as to whether or not they are useful in securing rights – in this case civil rights. Carol Gould rightly suggests that international rights documents gain effect when they are instituted at the state level which is what treaties require – namely, state compliance. Beyond the traditional interpretation of implementation and enforcement through the state, treaties such as the ICCPR can be argued to be an effective normative tool toward practical implementation. Civil rights treaties carry the force of universal or near universal status of an accepted set of standards. This can then be used as a means of persuasion for IOs, NGOs, and the like to affect adoption of civil rights within the state. Eric Neumayer adds that where rights violations occur, treaties can be used as a tool to name and shame aggressors while

stripping them of their stated justification that civil rights are a sovereign matter internal to the state. To conclude this section, though the primary matter of civil rights is to secure the proper rights of the citizen in relation to the state, the global order plays a significant secondary role. For instance, UN peace operations involve practices that promote the introduction and implementation of robust civil rights within states where the UN has a peace building presence. Additionally IOs, IFIs, NGOs, and MNCs can create norms, establish uniform international guidelines for civil law, and promote through incentive of good global standing the adherence of the state to promoting and securing civil rights.

Rising Concerns over Global Governance Institutions Though states are conventionally the primary units of concern at the international level, evolving global justice norms strive for accountability of IOs when their policies have an effect on the civil rights of persons. The difficulty is justifying claims against IOs that have violated civil rights because the ICCPR – the leading international treaty on civil rights – applies to states. It can be argued that states and not organizations can sign onto treaties and thus only states can be bound to the articles of the ICCPR. The relevant question then becomes how, under the statist structure of international relations, to make IOs accountable to civil rights satisfaction. UN Security Council measures to combat terrorism have emerged as a global civil rights concern that addresses precisely this conundrum. Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter – providing the Security Council with the authority to undertake measures to identify and address threats to the peace – the Security Council has created a series of resolutions imposing sanctions that freeze funds and financial assets of persons and organizations associated with terrorists or terrorist groups. Under the Sanctions Committee – which maintains the sanctions list – Member States and Regional Organizations propose names to include on the list. Though an individual or entity is not informed that they are being considered for the list, a measure that satisfies the element of surprise to thwart potential terrorists from using assets to commit terrorist acts, once on the list targeted persons and entities may apply for delisting through their state. The civil rights concerns for persons and entities included on the sanctions list is that listing results in the violation of fundamental civil rights to property without due process that includes rights to self-defense and effective judicial review. In these cases, states can claim that they are acting in accordance with overriding Security

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Council Resolutions to secure the peace. Further, the claim against states that they are depriving persons of fundamental rights without due process have been countered with the argument that the list is not a criminal indictment and as such states are not subject to the rules of civil procedures. In 2008, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) made a groundbreaking ruling (in the joint case of Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities) that it had the jurisdiction to review whether Security Council resolutions were enacted in a lawful manner. In the cases reviewed, the ECJ ruled that the manner in which the sanctions were imposed deprived the listed of their fundamental rights to property and due process for delisting in violation of European law and treaty obligations. This ruling indicates an important transformation in the realm of global justice. By reviewing the legal status of UN Security Council resolutions, the ECJ asserted the authority to limit the powers of the Security Council. It remains to be worked out whether legally valid claims may be made that IOs are subject to the covenants that their Member States are subject to and whether customary international law might be a basis to enforce civil rights obligations on IOs. Though there are many paths to creating more accountability of IOs from interfering with civil rights, it is high on the agenda of global justice issues to work this out in our increasingly interconnected world.

Emerging Protections for Minority Groups As mentioned in the introduction to this entry, civil rights belong to the class of first generation rights. Second generation rights refer to rights to food, shelter, and health and in important ways are connected to the capability of satisfying first generation rights. For instance, it is argued that the satisfaction of access to the goods necessary to subsist – or some would argue, to flourish – is necessary in order for first generation rights to be effectively exercised. Bracketing the debate between first and second generation rights in this final section, we will explore civil rights in relation to third generation rights. Third generation rights promote the protection of groups. In the realm of global justice, the emphasis has been particularly on minority groups and indigenous peoples to maintain traditional language, cultural practices, and the exercise of some group political autonomy. The ICCPR reflects an attempt to balance respect for both individual and group rights. In article 27, ethnic, religious, and linguistic minorities are guaranteed

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protection to continue culturally distinctive practices of religion and language without interference. The challenge to this guarantee is how to promote both group and individual civil rights when they conflict. For example, the claims of a religious group to deny access of girls and women to education or public political participation as an important religious norm would be a violation of the principle of equality that the ICCPR stresses, and yet a plain reading of article 27 would permit this exclusion. Ronald Dworkin argues that in liberal society individual rights ought to trump collective or group rights. This is an important point because if group members are not guaranteed access to the means that make meaningful consent to the perpetuation of the tradition that they find themselves in possible, then the authenticity of the group’s claim to protected status is shallow. The goal then is to strike a balance between the preservation of individual autonomy with civil autonomy. One way toward achieving this goal is to promote the equal protection of minority and majority groups to coexist within the constraints of adherence to fundamental principles such as the principle of equality. In conclusion, the accelerated growth toward global political and economic communities requires the development and extension of civil rights protections beyond the domain of the citizen and the state. Though the state is the primary locus for claims to civil rights guarantees, the global community and new civil actors such as NGOs have the power to directly and indirectly impact respect for and implementation of civil rights. Mechanisms for enhancing the accountability of global governance institutions to adhere to civil rights are and ought to continue evolving. Finally, third generation rights to the protection of groups, if qualified, can coexist with first generation civil rights.

Related Topics

▶ Collective Identity ▶ Equality ▶ Indigenous Peoples ▶ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ▶ International Law ▶ Terrorism ▶ United Nations: Peacekeeping and Peace Building ▶ United Nations: Reform

References C-402/05 P and C-415/05 (Joined Cases) Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities, Judgment of the European Court of Justice, Grand Chamber (2008)

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Crocker D (2008) Development ethics, democracy and globalization. In: Chatterjee D (ed) Democracy in a global world: human rights and political participation in the 21st century. Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, pp 27–70 Dworkin R (1977) Taking rights seriously. Harvard University Press, Cambridge Gould C (2008) Negotiating the global and the local: situating transnational democracy and human rights. In: Chatterjee D (ed) Democracy in a global world: human rights and political participation in the 21st century. Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, pp 71–87 Habermas J (1995) Address multiculturalism and the liberal state. Stanford Law Rev 47:849–885 Habermas J (1996) Citizenship and national identity. Between facts and norms. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, pp 491–515 Neumayer E (2005) Do international human rights treaties improve respect for human rights? J Confl Resolut 49:925–953 Nickel J, Reidy D (2008) Relativism, self-determination, and human rights. In: Chatterjee D (ed) Democracy in a global world: human rights and political participation in the 21st century. Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, pp 91–109 Nussbaum M (2008) Constitutions and capabilities. In: Chatterjee D (ed) Democracy in a global world: human rights and political participation in the 21st century. Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, pp 187–199

Class and Status JEFF EWING Department of Sociology, University of Oregon, Eugene, OR, USA

“Global justice” as a topic of normative analysis has become increasingly prominent in the last decade. While the justness of relations between nations has been a major focus of political philosophy since its beginnings, the shift to discussion in terms of “global justice” marks the realization of a new stage in our world history. The national borders which mark the independence of nations from each other which characterizes “international justice” are far from absent or irrelevant, but they are becoming increasingly porous and weak in significance. It is now possible to talk about global citizens and global issues (e.g., climate change) in meaningful ways. Global communication renders instantaneous conversations possible between nearly any two points on the planet. More importantly, there are two features of the contemporary world order that bear directly on the process of globalization which drives this increasing global awareness and porousness between borders: global political bodies, and global economic bodies and corporations. The central questions of global justice – the relation between international bodies and state sovereignty/national

self-determination or between the more powerful global players and the less powerful (the USA or the WTO in relation to, say, a developing nation), the effects of the globalizing economy on global peoples and local cultures and resources, etc., – have increasing impact on the lives of even the formerly most isolated peoples. Perhaps the most influential, and most controversial, driving forces behind the processes of globalization are the global economic bodies (the World Bank, IMF, and WTO) and free trade agreements, backed by powerful nations (most notably the USA), and the wealthy and increasingly powerful global corporations and banks. With the spread of economic globalization and the cultural influences that trail behind it, traditional economies, class relationships, and status groups are directly impacted. Every known society with greater complexity than immediate return hunter-gatherer societies has some forms of hierarchy, along which individuals are divided into groups, with some having greater wealth, power, and privilege than others (and while some sexual division of labor may have been present in those earliest societies, whether such de facto differences themselves constituted a hierarchy or variations in social power is contestable). Of the structural categories hierarchically dividing more complex societies, one of the historically most important is the category of class. While usage of the term “class” may vary somewhat between theorists, class broadly references one’s position within the hierarchy of the economy – the system of production, and consequentially exchange, distribution, and consumption. Karl Marx (1818–1883), the German philosopher, economist, sociologist, and revolutionary developed a wide-ranging theory of historical structure and change (historical materialism), as well as a complex theory of the processes and tendencies of the capitalist economic system (including the labor theory of value). History, Marx argued, is the process of mankind’s interaction with each other and nature, grounded first and foremost in material needs – the needs to survive, produce the means of survival, and reproduce. Mankind organizes collective resources and labor to meet human needs through the process of production (resulting in the economic system – mode of production in Marxian terms). As modes of production changed over time, mankind’s collective labor began to produce goods beyond what was needed for immediate survival, surplus goods, which over time began to be privately acquired – the origin of inequality and the first-class societies. For Marx, all societies past our collective classless past were often divided into a number of classes, each defined by their ownership relations to various means of

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production. Each mode of production has, however, two primary classes, the ruling class and the working class, determined by their relation to the dominant form of production (thus dividing into slaveholders and slaves, feudal lords and serfs, and capitalists and laborers in slavery, feudalism, and capitalism, respectively). While each economic system has two primary classes, however, each society simultaneously produces other, comparably minor, classes (such as the petty bourgeois and the lumpenproletariat under capitalism) and classes from prior modes of production can exist alongside the rising mode of production for some time (such as the maintenance of smallholding peasants in France for quite some time after the emergence of capitalism, or the longstanding power of the European feudal aristocracy). In each class society, with the ruling class living from the labor of the working class, both classes are in a necessarily antagonistic relation to each other, resulting in class conflict. The interests of the ruling and working classes are fundamentally opposed (most simply, the ruling class wants as much labor as possible from the working class, and the working class wants such labor minimized), and this tension (as well as other derivative tensions) develop until the ruling class’s property ownership inhibits the potential of the mature mode of production to meet the needs of the working class. This tension builds over time until no further intersystematic solutions are possible, and society reaches a point where it either transcends the ruling class constraints over social and economic development (in a revolution) or society collapses. Max Weber (1864–1920) developed a theory of social stratification with three primary dimensions of potential inequality – social classes, status groups, and parties. Social classes in the Weberian sense share various “life chances” regarding their potential attainment of income, education, etc., as specifically organized around their relationship to the ownership of property within the context of a commodity or labor market. Classes owning property which gives them greater control over important markets are more dominant and classes owning less important property or no property at all are less dominant classes. Individuals in similar situations under this criteria share common class situations, and commonly share more than class position – attitudes, preferences, etc. Like Marx, Weber holds class membership to be determined by objective ownership, irrespective of one’s conceptions of one’s position or that ownership. Unlike Marx, Weber argued that class situations do not directly impact human ideals – though there are often patterns between social classes and ideals, the relationship is not strictly causal – and thus Weber developed the notion of a status group, a group

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associated and hierarchically organized based on the prestige attributed to the group by its characteristics. While social class membership has, in the long run, some regularity in affecting status groups, they have a fairly large degree of independence, and can themselves impact social classes through intentional impositions on market mechanisms. Other theorists built upon the framework of Marx and/or Weber in important ways. Weber’s ideas regarding class and status were deconstructed into a set of variables that included education, occupation, and income, and this focused class analysis (especially in America) onto subjective relations between families, communities, etc., rather than the traditional focus on the economic system as a whole – in effect dissolving “class” into “status.” Another development is in the work of Pierre Bourdieu (1930–2002), for example, who argues that social institutions together constitute a field, composed of varied hierarchies (among factors such as prestige, wealth, education, etc.), and individuals have varied amounts and types of capital, which determines their hierarchical place within the field. Those at the top of the hierarchy – most notably those of the upper class(es) – determine to a greater degree the social standards of “good taste,” and thus influence the hierarchical evaluations that determine one’s status. The exact definitions, causal relationships, and hierarchical positioning of class and status within social phenomena is still a topic for debate, but all debates aside, their impact on the social world, and thus on our daily lives, is readily visible. One of the most important ways in which class is relevant to questions of global justice is through the increasing social, economic, and consequentially political power gained by the owners of the wealthiest corporations under the context of increasing economic globalization, wherein the ownership of resources, opportunities for labor, and consequentially distribution of income, goods, and services displace traditional means of survival and relations to nature, and the terms of loans create significant debt relations between the underdeveloped nations and the advanced capitalist nations. In this way, the spread of advanced capitalist class relationships to new territories and its effects becomes an important topic for global distributive justice. Moreover, the material distribution of goods, services, and income affect the resources available to traditional status groups, which, combined with the accompanying cultural globalization, serve to replace elements of culture in the underdeveloped nations with elements of culture from developed nations. Whether or not this, too, is a “just” process, i.e., whether regions or nations have a right to self-determination in the absence

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of the expansion of culture contemporaneously with increased economic globalization, is an important topic. The forces globalizing the world, driven primarily by an expansion of the capitalist mode of production, its markets, and its associated distribution of income, goods, services, compatible cultural artifacts, and relation to resources (with political globalization lagging behind in terms of successes), increasingly constrain the autonomy of underdeveloped nations and their citizens, and these processes have thus far resulted in increasing disparities between rich and poor both within and between countries. As such, an effectual analysis of global distributive justice, i.e., one that responds to the material reality of life and, moreover, is capable of meaningful implementation, involves not only a critique of the distribution of income, goods, and services, but a critique of their determinants, i.e., effectual global distributive justice involves a critique of class relationships. Given the concrete effects that disparities of class power have on an increasingly global scale, questions of global justice substantially involve analyses of class and status.

Related Topics

▶ Bretton Woods Institutions ▶ Global Distributive Justice ▶ Globalization ▶ Marx, Karl

References Bourdieu P (1984) Distinction: a social critique of the judgement of taste. Harvard University Press, Cambridge Giddens A (1992) Capitalism and modern social theory: an analysis of the writings of Marx, Durkheim and Max Weber. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Marx K, Engels F, Tucker RC (1978) The Marx-Engels reader. Norton, New York Weber M, Gerth HH, Mills CW (2007) From Max Weber: essays in sociology. International Library of Sociology. Routledge, New York Wright EO (2005) Approaches to class analysis. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

Climate Change STEVE VANDERHEIDEN Department of Political Science, University of Colorado at Boulder, Boulder, CO, USA

Anthropogenic climate change is primarily caused by fossil fuel combustion and deforestation, with the former releasing carbon dioxide into the atmosphere and the

latter degrading sinks capable of naturally sequestering that carbon. Along with the increasing atmospheric concentrations of other heat-trapping greenhouse gases, scientists now expect that carbon-intensive patterns of industrialization and consumption will continue to contribute toward a range of adverse environmental consequences, with further impacts on the social, economic, and political systems in which affected societies are embedded. Since the early 1990s, policymakers have attempted to address climate change through the policy process that yielded the 1997 Kyoto Protocol and which now looks toward a post-Kyoto framework to replace that treaty upon its 2012 expiration. Significantly, concerns for international equity and intergenerational justice have been officially declared as key objectives throughout this global process and continue to animate debates about how to achieve climate justice, which is widely viewed as a necessary component of any effective global climate change policy regime. Climate change is an issue for global justice for two main reasons: (1) its predicted harms have been primarily caused by the world’s affluent nations and peoples but are expected to be disproportionately borne by the world’s poor, and (2) policy efforts to mitigate or compensate for these harms involve distributive and restorative justice. Its distributive aspect is seen in the aim of justly allocating the finite resource of atmospheric absorptive capacity among present and future claimants, and its restorative aspect in imperatives to simultaneously ensure that harm suffered by those not responsible for causing climate change is justly remedied, whether through assistance in adapting to a changing climate or through compensation payments to its victims. Scholars and activists alike have explored both of these aspects of climate justice, taking the former as a reason to act now to avoid further injustice and the latter as the normative framework within which a policy acceptable to all the world’s peoples must be developed. Various philosophical problems related to climate justice have been identified and several distinct responses defended, based on the two core policy imperatives of climate change mitigation and adaptation. Since greenhouse gasses accumulate in the atmosphere and continue to cause various climate-related disruptions for over a century after first emitted, the distributive problem of failed mitigation efforts amounts to an intergenerational and an international injustice, as the actions of earlier generations cause avoidable harm to later ones through the former’s excessive de facto claims on the planet’s atmospheric absorptive capacity. Successful mitigation must therefore limit such claims within

Climate Change

each generation for reasons of intergenerational justice, and allocate those fairly among nations and peoples for reasons of international or global justice. One might also view problems of mitigation through the moral lens of a harm principle, enjoining all persons, nations, and generations against causing avoidable climate-related harm to others. Such an approach may yield similar mitigation obligations as those grounded in distributive justice, but the latter approach offers a clearer account of how the burdens of mitigation may be assigned among relevant parties. This is because the moral problem lies not just in the consequence of either allowed or avoided harm, which a harm principle-based account recognizes, but also in the fair allocation of mitigation costs (as through investments in more efficient technology and infrastructure upgrades, decreases in consumption, or the offset of existing emissions with carbon sequestration projects like reforestation), which it does not. An approach based purely in harm avoidance might also be less able to justify strong mitigation efforts, preferring instead to allow avoidable harm and then funding adaptation efforts or paying compensation to victims, particularly if compensation and adaptation are less expensive than mitigation. By asking not only whether or not the good of atmospheric absorptive capacity and the burden of greenhouse gas mitigation are fairly distributed within and across generations, a distributive justice approach captures the injustice of uncompensated harm as well as that of unjustified claims on a common resource and shirked contributions toward the maintenance of a common resource. Likewise, climate change adaptation has a distributive component, but it looks backward at past emissions in assessing burdens rather than forward at what might constitute a justified claim upon atmospheric absorptive capacity. The two problems are linked in that unmitigated environmental disruption must either be rendered benign through the sort of assistance that is described under the rubric of adaptation (including minor remedial measures like technological assistance and food aid or major ones like relocation of groups whose territories are rendered uninhabitable) or compensated when harm is allowed. Ideally, adaptation would avoid causing those living in areas affected by climate change any decline in welfare opportunity, technically avoiding the same sort of harm that is also the subject of mitigation approaches. Where this is not possible, the victims of climate change would be entitled to compensation for their losses, likewise providing a remedy to the harm that they were unjustly caused to suffer by responsible parties, but an inferior

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remedy to which mitigation and adaptation are clearly preferred. Since adaptation and compensation entail assessment of liability on responsible parties as well as the allocation of resources to victims, theories of moral responsibility offer one promising approach to the fair assignment of such costs. Fault-based liability would hold those most responsible for contributing to the problem most responsible for contributing toward its solution, provided that their causal contributions could also be faulted. Such an approach raises questions about the roles of knowledge and uncertainty in assessing fault for some party’s past and present greenhouse gas emissions, as knowledge about the likely effects of one’s acts is often taken to be an epistemic prerequisite for assessing moral fault and assigning liability. Other controversies within the climate justice literature include debates over whether individuals or states constitute relevant levels of analysis and agency in remedial climate policy, how much historical emissions should count in current assignments of liability, and whether developing countries should be assigned binding emissions caps in current or future rounds of international actions.

Related Topics

▶ Basic Rights ▶ Climate Justice ▶ Cosmopolitanism ▶ Duties to Non-Compatriots ▶ Environmental Justice ▶ Global Distributive Justice ▶ Global Warming ▶ Human Rights ▶ Solidarity

References Athanasiou T, Baer P (2002) Dead heat: global justice and global warming. Seven Stories Press, New York Caney S (2005) Cosmopolitan justice, responsibility, and global climate change. Leiden J Int Law 18:747–775 Gardiner S (2005) Ethics and global climate change. Ethics 114:55–600 Garvey J (2008) The ethics of climate change: right and wrong in a warming world. Athlone Press, London Humphreys S (ed) (2009) Climate change and human rights. Cambridge University Press, New York Page E (2007) Climate change, justice, and future generations. Edward Elgar, London Shue H (1999) Global environment and international inequality. Int Aff 75:531–545 Vanderheiden S (2008) Atmospheric justice: a political theory of climate change. Oxford University Press, New York

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Climate Justice ALYSSA R. BERNSTEIN Department of Philosophy, Ohio University, Athens, OH, USA

The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) of 1992 declares that countries should address the climate crisis “on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities.” These topics have been addressed in publications by academic researchers in philosophy, political science, public policy, and economics, among other disciplines, as well as in publications by nonacademic researchers or nonuniversity organizations. However, nonphilosophers who have written influential reports on climate change (including Nicholas Stern and Ross Garnaut, both professors of economics) have generally paid little attention to philosophical work on the topics of equity, justice, and responsibility. This entry briefly discusses recent publications by several cosmopolitan and quasi-cosmopolitan philosophers writing about climate justice, summarizes some of their arguments, and provides on this basis a partial critique of certain arguments about equity and justice presented in Post-Kyoto International Climate Policy (2010) and in Climate Change Justice (2010). Post-Kyoto International Climate Policy (PKICP) is a volume edited by Joseph E. Aldy and Robert N. Stavins that presents the main findings of the Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements. The editors describe the Project as a global, multiyear, multidisciplinary effort intended to help identify the key design elements of a scientifically sound, economically rational, and politically pragmatic post-2012 international policy architecture for addressing the threat of climate change. In this nearly 1,000-page volume, the topics of equity, justice, and responsibility are addressed only to a limited extent and only by economists, lawyers, and public policy experts, not moral or political philosophers. The index of PKICP refers to none of the moral or political philosophers or political theorists who have written most extensively, influentially, and/or discerningly about questions of justice raised by climate change, any list of whom must include Simon Caney, Stephen Gardiner, Robert Goodin, Dale Jamieson, Richard W. Miller, Darrel Moellendorf, Edward Page, Henry Shue, Peter Singer, and Steve Vanderheiden. Of the ten articles in PKICP that mention or (rarely) discuss “justice,” “fairness,” or “equity,” only one refers to any of

those ten philosophers or political theorists (Posner and Sunstein refer to Singer). Similarly, the lists of references and the index in Climate Ethics: Essential Readings (2010), a volume edited by Gardiner, Caney, Jamieson, and Shue, like the indexes and lists of references in the books by Vanderheiden (2008), Moellendorf (2009a), and Miller (2010), make no mention of either of the editors of PKICP, and mention almost none of its fifty-plus authors (exceptions are Robert Keohane and David Victor). Paul Baer is cited both in PKICP and by philosophers or political theorists. PKICP chapter author Ramgopal Agarwala offers a proposal to reconcile the significant disagreements between the G8 (the largest industrialized economies) and the G5 (major emerging economies: Brazil, China, India, Mexico, South Africa) about how to manage climate change. Noting that developed countries are responsible for more than 50% of the current stock of greenhouse gases (GHGs) in the atmosphere, he asserts that they have a “carbon debt” to the people of present and future generations, most of whom will reside in developing countries. He criticizes present discussions of climate change impacts for focusing disproportionately on consequences in terms of global GDP in the very long term, and calls for more research in developing countries on all significant consequences for their economies as well as for publicizing the devastating consequences. He also argues that the middle class in developing countries, which is rapidly growing in size and largely trying to replicate Western lifestyle norms, must reduce its carbon emissions and live more sustainably, which it is unlikely to do unless the West itself is doing so. Agarwala contends that a credible global compact must include all major sources of emissions, and must be effective, efficient, realistic, and equitable. In his view, equity requires equal per capita emission rights. Agarwala thinks it is unrealistic to expect developing countries to reduce their per capita emissions from 2003 levels by 40%, and developed countries to reduce their per capita emissions by 90%, in order to achieve a target of 50% reduction by 2050, as proposed by the G8 in 2008. One of his reasons for thinking it is unrealistic is that if India and China were to replicate the relationship between carbon emissions and per capita incomes that is now typical in developed countries, then by 2050 their per capita emissions could be similar to those of developed countries today. It would be better, he argues, to stabilize CO2 emissions at 2003 levels by 2050. If both developed and developing countries reduce carbon intensity (CO2 emissions per unit of GDP) by 5% per year between 2003 and 2050, then developed countries with economic

Climate Justice

growth rates of 2% per year would have to reduce emissions by about 3% per year, while developing countries with economic growth rates of 6% per year could increase CO2 emissions by about 1% per year, Agarwala explains. If reducing global CO2 emissions by 50% by 2050 is not realistic, then it may be impossible to avoid global warming of more than 2 C, the consequences of which would include greater requirements for adaptation. PKICP chapter authors Eric Posner and Cass Sunstein argue against per capita allocations of emission rights (thus disagreeing with Agarwala and also with Singer, whom they cite). One reason why they oppose an international cap-and-trade system in which emission permits tradable for cash would be allocated to states on a per capita basis is, they say, that it would not be feasible. If emission rights were allocated on a per capita basis, China and India would be “significant net gainers,” while the nations that now have high per capita emissions would be “the principal losers,” and the “biggest loser” of all would be the USA. Given that nations are unlikely to sign an international agreement if they will be significant net losers, and given that powerful nations may well veto a treaty even if it is defensible “in principle” (by which they mean, defensible in terms of a normative ethical theory), insistence on the per capita approach would, say Posner and Sunstein, “endanger and very possibly doom” an international effort to reduce the risks associated with climate change. According to them, it is becoming increasingly likely that some other approach will be used, for example, a cap-and-trade system among countries in the northern hemisphere along with technical and financial assistance and general targets for the south. Henry Shue (1999) argues that three commonsense principles of equity (compensation for harm or imposed costs, contributions according to ability to pay, and the right to an adequate minimum standard of living) all lead to the conclusion that the industrialized countries have the primary responsibility to pay for climate change mitigation. (For a discussion of Shue’s argument that is both sympathetic and critical, see Caney 2009). Peter Singer (2002) similarly argues that four principles of fairness (the imperative to aid the least well off, the utilitarian imperative to maximize happiness, equal claims to shares of a common resource, and responsibility to compensate for harm or imposed costs) all lead to the conclusion that the rich countries should bear most of the burden for mitigation. To Singer, it seems self-evidently fair to recognize the equality of every person’s claim to part of the global atmosphere’s capacity to absorb GHGs without harmful consequences, and he advocates tying emission entitlements to the UN projection of population growth

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per country in 2050. Like Jamieson (2001), Singer advocates the principle of equal per capita emission rights partly on the practical ground of its suitability as a political compromise. Vanderheiden (2008) argues that if a climate regime is to be effective it must be fair to all, since effectiveness requires universal participation under a system of emissions caps. He advocates that roughly equal per capita emission shares be initially allocated to countries, which would be allowed to engage in trading as well as other means of achieving the emission targets. However, he insists (citing Shue 1993) that permissible trading must not be unlimited: governments of poor nations must not be allowed to sell their “unused” survival emission permits in GHG markets to affluent nations seeking more luxury emissions, regardless of the price offered in return. Vanderheiden supports the widely claimed right to develop, which is implied but not guaranteed by the equal shares approach, but he emphasizes that the right to develop cannot trump the right to survival emissions. Global justice and climate change must, Vanderheiden asserts, be addressed simultaneously and as manifestations of the same set of problems. Darrel Moellendorf (2009a) critically examines a number of candidate principles for assigning emissions reductions so as to reach the goal of 2 (a global average temperature increase at equilibrium of no more than 2 C above the preindustrial level by year 2050). He quickly dismisses principles requiring all countries to reduce their GHG emissions by the same amount or by the same percentage, as making utterly unreasonable demands on the world’s poor. Against the Equal Burdens principle, which requires each state to reduce its emissions by a share of the burden of the overall emissions reductions that is equal to the burden of every other state, Moellendorf raises three objections: (a) It uses as benchmark the present unjust international distribution of holdings. (b) It does not ensure respect for the right to development. (c) Equalizing marginal losses to well-being, no matter how measured, is incompatible with allowing any countries to increase their emissions; but the right to development must be interpreted as allowing the least developed countries to do so. The principle Polluter Pays requires each state to reduce its emissions in proportion to its historic contribution to the global excess in emissions; a modified Polluter Pays principle says that each state that is required to reduce its emissions must reduce them in proportion to its historic contribution to the global excess in emissions, and that the overall reduction required of each of these states must be sufficient to offset emission increases by poorer states. Moellendorf objects to Polluter Pays for the reason

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that it does not allow emission increases and cannot be modified to do so satisfactorily. The most defensible candidate principles, Moellendorf argues, are Equal Shares and Greenhouse Development Rights. According to Equal Shares, each state is required to reduce, or permitted to increase, its emissions to the level that is attained by multiplying its year 2050 forecasted population by the average per capita emission permissible given the global reduction required. Moellendorf regards this “contract-and-converge” principle as satisfying the norms of the UNFCCC, and as plausibly interpreting the requirement of equality with respect to the use of a common resource to which no one can claim a natural or preexisting individual entitlement. The same advantages, he thinks, characterize Greenhouse Development Rights, according to which each state is assigned an emission entitlement that is a function of both its responsibility (taken to be its total emissions minus the total of emissions due to productive activity under a development threshold) and its capacity (understood as its aggregate income minus the aggregate income of people below a development threshold). Moellendorf favors this principle partly because, unlike Equal Shares, it can achieve the goal of 2 even if this requires global emissions reductions of more than 50%, by making heavier demands on rich, industrialized states. Moellendorf (2009b) argues in favor of Greenhouse Development Rights on the basis of UNFCCC norms. Three of the norms are equity and the requirements to recognize differentiated responsibilities and capabilities. These three together place heavier burdens on developed countries. A fourth norm is the right to development, which limits the range of acceptable treaties to those that do not prohibit or obstruct macroeconomic policies directed toward rapid economic growth. Moellendorf notes that although both Greenhouse Development Rights and Equal Shares require steep GHG emission reductions by rich industrialized countries, and although Equal Shares is acceptable on the assumption that a 50% reduction in global GHG emissions from 2000 levels by 2050 is sufficient to meet the goal of 2 , it is unlikely that the reductions required by Equal Shares will satisfy the right to development if a 50% reduction is insufficient to meet that goal. Moellendorf asserts that at least some developing countries, especially those with large and fast-growing economies and high CO2 emissions, have bargaining power as long as the developed countries see the value of reaching an effective mitigation agreement. However, members of distant future generations are not present at the negotiations, unlike representatives of the states that

would have to carry heavy mitigation burdens; therefore, Moellendorf cautions, there is a danger that negotiators will pursue the interests of their populations within a time horizon that is too limited, focusing on the present and near future at the expense of people who will live in the further future. Acknowledging that rich, industrialized states would be reluctant to join a treaty satisfying the Greenhouse Development Rights principle, Moellendorf (2009a) argues that accommodating these states by raising the warming limit would pose serious risks of human development setbacks. He hopes that the negotiators will come to regard themselves as obligated also to serve the interests of future generations worldwide. They may do so, he says, if pressured by citizens of countries where the popular will can be given voice. Unlike Moellendorf, Richard Miller (2010) argues that widespread industrial shutdowns in developed countries should be avoided, not only due to the consequences for other countries, but also because serious human costs from significant economic losses or disruption should be taken into account whether the people suffering from them are in developing countries or developed countries. However, like Moellendorf, Miller argues that people in developed countries have political duties to choose climate policies that help needy people in developing countries both by reducing the climatic harms to which the latter are especially liable and by minimizing obstacles to the development they need. Miller argues that impartial acceptability of burdens is the criterion of greenhouse justice, regarding both the adequacy of the emissionsreduction goal and the equity of the allocation of the necessary tasks. An appropriate standard of adequacy is, says Miller, a shared goal to which responsible people throughout the world would hold themselves and others. The goal should be such that the costs of a lower temperature-increase target would not be worth the gains. Like Moellendorf, Miller thinks that the most appropriate goal is 2 . Not only have international groups such as the EU and the UNEP repeatedly affirmed this standard of adequacy, but also, Miller contends, it is equitable, in the sense that impartial concern about human burdens, both climatic and economic, supports climate-harm mitigation policies that would not only avert the direct climate consequences but also avoid imposing economic losses resulting in severe, widespread human costs. Miller argues that fair global teamwork in pursuit of this daunting goal requires that burdens be divided fairly: the decision making about who is to sacrifice what must be impartial, as would be a choice among alternative loss sets

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made by someone behind a veil of ignorance who was seeking to advance her interests but ignorant of which loss would be hers. (Regarding veil of ignorance, see the entry ▶ Original Position in this encyclopedia.) An equitable 2 regime would require developed countries to make a significant economic sacrifice in order to avoid, as far as possible, thwarting efforts by the global poor to escape destitution. Although it would require developing countries to slow the growth of their emissions, it would require developed countries to cut emissions sooner and more steeply. Such a regime would aim for contraction and convergence (C&C), as required, Miller argues, by mutual respect among members of the climate-control team. Baer et al. (2010) observe a “fairly broad” consensus, among both the philosophers who write about climate change and the majority of the climate-policy community, that efforts to reduce greenhouse-gas emissions should not harm the ability of poor countries to grow economically in order to reduce as rapidly as possible the widespread poverty their citizens suffer. They note substantial though not universal support for equal per capita emission rights as a simple, practical, and (sufficiently) fair way to operationalize the consensus that, in view of the moral considerations of need, equality, responsibility, and capacity, the wealthy countries should pay for climate mitigation, at least initially. However, they criticize the assumption that equal per capita emission rights, especially the C&C variant in which equal rights are phased in over time, would adequately protect the interests of poor countries. They doubt that equal per capita allocations can adequately protect the right to development under very steep emission-reduction targets, and argue that even under moderately stringent mitigation targets, poor countries may not have enough permits to avoid incurring significant mitigation costs in addition to adaptation costs. Noting that some policy analysts have attempted to modify the C&C formula to allow per capita emissions in poor countries to grow for a longer time, the authors contend that the fundamental problem is that the allocation of emission permits to countries based on equal emissions today or at some point in the future ignores the fact that there is a much lower per capita budget available going forward than was used by the rich countries during the course of their development, which means, they argue, that developing countries are at a disadvantage as long as low-carbon or no-carbon energy is more expensive than fossil energy. Baer et al. (2010) propose a Greenhouse Development Rights framework that is designed to allocate the costs of extremely rapid reductions in GHG emissions, as well as of

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adaptation, in a way that protects a right to development, by linking obligations to both responsibility (prior emissions) and capacity (ability to pay). This proposal is new both in its definition of a “development threshold” relative to the income of individuals, not the per capita income of countries, and in its inclusion of the distribution of income within countries. Thus, the authors say, their proposal eliminates the need for an arbitrary dividing line between developed and developing countries, and can straightforwardly identify a continuum along which each country’s obligations are demonstrably proportional to the responsibility and capacity of its population. However, they call for further consideration of the complex relationship between causal responsibility and moral responsibility, and for an examination of the ways in which the allocation of emission rights to countries translates into impacts on individuals, as well as for an inquiry into how to define capacity, which would take the form of an exploration of the moral significance of the sacrifices in consumption that would be required of various parties under different burden-sharing arrangements. The authors of Climate Change Justice, Eric Posner and David Weisbach (2010), argue that, contrary to the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol, and the opinions of some scholars, rich nations are not ethically obligated to sign a climate change agreement that is not in their self-interest, in order to help the poor. Like Moellendorf and Miller, they affirm that the moral worth of individuals transcends spatial and temporal boundaries, and that the wealthy have an obligation to help the poor. However, Posner and Weisbach contend that although the rich should help the poor, and although distributive justice requires reducing poverty and giving priority to the poorest and most desperately needy, it is a mistake to tie valid concerns about redistribution to the problem of mitigating climate harm. According to them, the most important obligation with respect to climate change is to develop a “broad, deep, and enforceable treaty that achieves appropriate climate goals.” Posner and Weisbach regard both rich and poor nations as ethically obligated to cooperate, i.e., to join a treaty and not to free-ride; however, they insist, if nations are to agree to a treaty, it must satisfy the International Paretianism condition: all states must believe they are better off with it than without it. This is a pragmatic constraint, not an ethical one, they explain: in the states system, treaties require state consent, and states agree only to treaties that serve their own perceived interests. States that believe they will be harmed relatively less by climate change (richer nations such as the USA, perhaps also China and Brazil) are likely to hold out, either insisting

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that only limited abatement requirements apply to themselves, or else agreeing to more demanding requirements only on condition that they receive “side payments.” Thus, argue Posner and Weisbach, there is a conflict between the requirements of distributive justice and what is necessary in order to get a treaty ratified, given how states actually behave. They emphasize that there is a real possibility of tragedy, since those who care about distributive justice could subvert a climate treaty by insisting that the wealth of a state should determine its burdens. Posner and Weisbach claim that a climate treaty that does not significantly redistribute wealth from rich to poor, and that requires poor states to “bear their share” of the costs of abatement, would still be in the interest of the poor states since they will enjoy the benefits of the abatements; thus such a treaty would serve global welfare, and welfarists should support it. An optimal climate treaty would, they say, be based on aggregated benefits and costs across countries. If distributive justice is the goal, it is necessary to recognize that pursuing this goal through a climate treaty may not be the best way of redistributing wealth from rich countries to poor ones; but if climate harm mitigation is the goal, the best way to pursue it, they argue, is by agreeing to a treaty that both stipulates the “globally optimal” abatement and can get ratified and survive pressures to cheat. Given the practical realities of the state system, such a treaty must, they insist, be one that serves the interests of states; it should stipulate the globally optimal abatement “even though that is not what is optimal for poor states.” Both Moellendorf (2009a, GIM) and Miller (2010) hold that respect for human dignity requires that institutions be justifiable in terms of principles that can be reasonably accepted by those who live under them, and their writings provide the elements for the following reply to Posner and Weisbach. If the goal is a climate treaty such that all parties will regard it as meriting not only ratification but also voluntary compliance despite pressures to cheat, then the treaty must be justifiable to all parties as making them all better off, but not in the sense of serving the (narrowly construed) self-interest of the most powerful states and making the less-powerful states merely better off than they would be without it: the treaty must propose terms of cooperation that all parties can willingly accept because these terms are duly based on impartial concern for the fundamental interests of all human beings. If no treaty satisfying those requirements is proposed and ratified, then the harm that results from failure adequately to constrain global warming will generate a moral debt of repair, which will be larger for countries that diverge more

gravely from climate justice and have the capacity to provide compensation. Page (2011) notes that a number of scholars within the cosmopolitan tradition have critiqued emissions trading, but he argues that international emissions trading can be legitimate and consistent with cosmopolitan norms of global and intergenerational justice, if the trading schemes are properly constructed, implemented, and regulated. In particular, he contends, the schemes must help reduce poverty and must distribute equitably the benefits above and beyond climate mitigation that are created by the scheme. There must also be adequate procedural protections, efforts to ensure the continued flourishing of intrinsic environmental values, and public information campaigns as well as other efforts to ensure social responsibility and support for sustainable development. Caney, too, finds no necessary injustice in global emissions trading, but he argues that existing emissions trading schemes are unjust.

Related Topics

▶ Caney, Simon ▶ Carbon Tax ▶ Climate Change ▶ Development Assistance ▶ Environmental Justice ▶ Environmental Sustainability ▶ Global Warming ▶ Human Rights ▶ Intergenerational Justice ▶ Miller, Richard ▶ Moellendorf, Darrel ▶ Moral Cosmopolitanism ▶ Pareto Optimality ▶ Political Cosmopolitanism ▶ Shue, Henry ▶ Singer, Peter

References Agarwala R (2010) Towards a global compact for managing climate change. In: Aldy J, Stavins R (eds) Post-Kyoto international climate policy: implementing architectures for agreement. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Aldy J, Stavins R (eds) (2010) Post-Kyoto international climate policy: summary for policymakers. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Baer P, Athanasiou T, Kartha S, Kemp-Benedict E (2010) Greenhouse development rights: a framework for climate protection that is more “fair” than equal per capita emissions rights. In: Gardiner S, Caney S, Jamieson D, Shue H (eds) Climate ethics: essential readings. Oxford University Press, Oxford Caney S (2009) Human rights, responsibilities, and climate change. In: Beitz C, Goodin R (eds) Global basic rights. Oxford University Press, Oxford

Coercion Jamieson D (2001) Climate change and global environmental justice. In: Miller C, Edwards P (eds) Changing the atmosphere: expert knowledge and environmental governance. MIT Press, Cambridge Miller R (2010) Globalizing justice: the ethics of poverty and power. Oxford University Press, Oxford Moellendorf D (2009a) Global inequality matters. Palgrave Macmillan, New York Moellendorf D (2009b) Treaty norms and climate change mitigation. Ethics Int Aff 23(3):247–265 Page E (2011) Cosmopolitanism, climate change, and greenhouse emissions trading. Int Theory 3(1):37–69 Posner E, Sunstein C (2010) Justice and climate change: the unpersuasive case for per capita allocations of emissions rights. In: Aldy J, Stavins R (eds) Post-Kyoto international climate policy: implementing architectures for agreement. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Posner E, Weisbach D (2010) Climate change justice. Princeton University Press, Princeton Shue H (1993) Subsistence emissions and luxury emissions. Law Policy 15(1):39–59 Shue H (1999) Global environment and international inequality. Int Aff 75(3):531–545 Singer P (2002/2004) One world: the ethics of globalization. Yale University Press, New Haven Vanderheiden S (2008) Atmospheric justice. Oxford University Press, Oxford

Coercion JAMES E. ROPER Department of Philosophy, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI, USA

Common to many uses of “coercion” is the use of threats, intimidation, and/or force to make someone so fearful as to act against his/her will. Historically, states have often been considered justified in applying coercion in the prosecution of their laws in order to make it possible for people to live together peacefully. Beyond this rather vague consensus, however, there has been relatively little specific attention to this concept until the publication of a seminal essay by Robert Nozick in 1969. In order for there to be coercion, there must be a coercer and a coercee. Viewed from the perspective of the coercer, the focus is on the methods that are used to get the coercee to act as the coercer wishes. Looked at through the eyes of the coercee, the focus is on the kinds of reasons the coercee might have for acting as the coercer wants. While most accounts of coercion have stressed the role of the coercer, Nozick reconceived the question as being about the perspective of the coercee. Nozick’s idea is (very

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roughly) that a person X coerces person Y to refrain from doing something A if and only if Y decides not to do A because X makes a proposal to Y (and Y believes that proposal) that doing A would be worse for Y than not doing A specifically because doing A would lead X to do something Y wants very much to avoid; and Y’s choice not to do A is at least partly the result of Y’s wanting to reduce the probability of that eventuality (Nozick 1969: 41–45; Anderson 2006: 11). Unlike earlier characterizations, Nozick’s analysis excludes any overt use of force. Instead, Nozick’s focus is on the psychology of the coercee – especially his/her determination of how to act in light of the coercer’s conditional threat. Coercion does not occur if the coercee (Y) does A – that is, if the attempt at coercion fails. Nozick’s account changed the discussion about coercion, but it raised a host of new questions. For example, Nozick speaks of proposals that embody “conditional threats.” Theoretically, however, proposals could involve either threats or offers. A conditional offer would focus on the coercer’s making the coercee’s situation better – not on some possible harm the coercer would visit on the individual should s/he fail to act in a certain way. Taking conditional offers into account, Nozick’s account might be modified to allow for the coercer to make an offer the coercee believed. This would lead to the following variant of Nozick’s idea: X coerces Y to refrain from doing something A if and only if Ydecides not to do A because X makes a proposal to Y (and Y believes it) that not doing A would be better for Y than doing A specifically because not doing A would lead X to do something Y wants very much to come about; and Y’s choice not to do A is at least partly the result of Y’s wanting to increase the probability of that happening. Separating conditional threats from conditional offers might be facilitated by a “baseline” relative to which proposals can be evaluated. For example, Nozick speaks of the usual course of things as a standard for separating threats from offers (Nozick 1969: 447). Proposals to elevate Y’s prospects above the baseline are conditional offers; proposals to lower his/her prospects to a point below the baseline are conditional threats. This approach raises the question of whether to focus on what will actually transpire or on what (ethically) should happen. Wertheimer, for example, argues for a moralized baseline that stresses what ought to happen in a given case. While this may be identical with the predicted outcome, it often will not be. In such cases, the moralized baseline must be used (Wertheimer 1987). Why should we be concerned with the notion of coercion? Philosophers and other theorists have pointed to

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a number of issues where this concept is central. While these issues are substantially intertwined, several key areas emerge where the theory of coercion is critical. First, coercion is intimately linked to liberty. At the outset of his groundbreaking article, Nozick tells us that his analysis of coercion is a prelude to a much longer work on the concept of liberty. He makes clear that his focus in that longer study will be on how we justify restricting someone’s freedom to act in a particular way. He will also be concerned with the question of why we need to justify such restriction (Nozick 1969: 440). Closely related to this is the issue of consent, for example in sexual relations. Should we question the validity of consent where the individuals in question have significantly different amounts of power and injustice is the basis of this power differential? Wertheimer argues that, in general, we should not. He claims that a legitimate theory of consent should be appropriate to people’s various situations (Wertheimer 2004: 191–192). Others will disagree. Second, coercion is critically linked to a number of different policy issues that regularly arise. Conditional threats in areas such as war, terrorism, domestic relations, and globalization can all turn on how we understand coercion – as can how we assign moral responsibility for dealing with such issues. Finally, third, when and under what circumstances is coercion justified? This is clearly related to questions in social and political philosophy, as well as issues of economic, legal, and interpersonal justice. It is also directly related to questions of global justice, to which we now turn. Nozick reframes the debate about coercion in terms of individuals coercing other individuals. The issue of what counts as an individual in this connection is somewhat fuzzy. If artificial “persons” are counted as individuals, as Nozick seems to intend, this raises the question of “structural coercion” – coercion of individuals or groups by larger entities such as governments, major corporations, or the dispersed “individuals” that make up economic and political systems – in virtue of the power differentials that exist between such entities and natural persons (McGregor 1988–1989: 24). Terrence Ball goes so far as to say that, although both Marxists and liberals use the word “coercion,” the concepts they have in mind are different (Ball 1978: 97). Such approaches are consistent with work suggesting Nozick’s emphasis on the coercee is misplaced: that we should focus, as in earlier discussions, on the coercer and the supposed immorality of using greater power to coerce an individual or group. This is consistent with the approach suggested by Philippe Diaz’ film “The End of Poverty.” Through the

medium of his film, Diaz strongly suggests that the incredible disparities of wealth between former colonial powers and the so-called industrial nations are the direct result of what amounted to the structural coercion of colonialism. He further implies that such structural coercion has continued long after former colonies have gained political independence from the coercing nations who controlled these colonies. In particular, he implicates the policies of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in this process, which has kept poor countries in a state of constant debt and forced them to “privatize” much of their wealth, which has then been purchased by multinational corporations based in the industrialized northern hemisphere. These issues are, of course, very controversial; but they suggest that Nozick’s reframing of the coercion debate, critical though it has been to work on the topic since 1969, may have framed that debate in a way that is detrimental to addressing issues of global justice.

Related Topics ▶ Consent ▶ Global Justice ▶ Globalization ▶ Nozick, Robert ▶ Terrorism

References Anderson S (February, 2006) Coercion. Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (on line), pp 1–46 Ball Terence (January, 1978) Two concepts of coercion. Theory Soc 5(1):97–112 Diaz P [Director] (2010) The end of poverty. Cinema Libre Studio McGregor J (1988–1989) Bargaining advantages and coercion in the market. Philos Res Arch 14:23–50 Robert N (1969) Coercion. In: Morgenbesser S, Suppes P, White M (eds) Philosophy, science, and method: essays in honor of Ernest Nagel. St. Martin’s Press, New York, pp 440–472 Wertheimer A (1987) Coercion. Princeton University Press, Princeton Wertheimer A (2004) Consent to sexual relations. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

Collective Choice JUSTIN SCHWARTZ The John Marshall Law School, Chicago, IL, USA

Collective choice involves the aggregation of individual preferences by some method such as voting to produce a social outcome. Analysis shows that it involves surprisingly intransigent paradoxes that seem to challenge the

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possibility of fair democratic decision-making. Among the most important of these is the Arrow Impossibility Theorem, the inspiration for the now vast field of social choice theory. That the theorem is valid cannot be disputed. The main objective of this informal, nontechnical discussion is to explicate its content and evaluate its significance. The less than happy conclusion is that it states a deep problem for the theory of democratic politics that 60 years of intensive discussion has failed to dissipate. The theorem was discovered by Kenneth J. Arrow, a Nobel Memorial Prize-winning economist. He showed that four minimal and obvious constraints seemingly necessary for a fair, democratic, and rational outcome cannot be satisfied by any method for aggregating preferences, such as majority rule, that generates a single ranking of preferences with a highest-ranked preference as the collective or social choice. The constraints can be stated as: (D) Nondictatorship: no individual’s preferences unilaterally determine the outcome; (P) the Weak Pareto Principle: if any outcome is unanimously preferred by all to another outcome, the more preferred outcome must be higher ranked; (I) the Indifference of Irrelevant Alternatives: the social ranking of any set of preferences depends only on the actors’ rankings of those preferences or “preference profiles,” as they are termed in the literature. Finally, there is (U) Unrestricted Domain: the method will give a unique social choice among any logically coherent set of actors’ preference profiles, however large, given that no choices or rankings are excluded from the start. Moreover, the actors’ preferences and aggregate social outcomes are (C) Collectively Rational: they respect transitivity, so that if choice A is preferred to B, and B to C, then A is preferred to C; and the outcomes are also “connected,” so for any pair of alternatives, one is either preferred or the ranking is indifferent between them. In Arrow’s presentation, (C) is part of (U). The Impossibility Theorem states that no social choice method involving at least three choices and a finite number of at least three individuals can satisfy all four constraints. It may produce no clear winner or rational outcome, generating paradox. To make the point vivid, a social choice method that satisfies (P), (I), and (U) [including (C)] can violate (D), that is, be a dictatorship. This startling result has teeth for at least three reasons. First, these are, plausibly, minimum, weak, and uncontroversial requirements for making collective choices in a fair and democratic way, so it is disturbing that they are mutually incompatible. Second, the Theorem is robust. It holds whether the actors are individuals or collective entities such as nations or organizations, and regardless of the specific method of aggregation, for

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example, simple majority rule, super-majoritarianism, Australian balloting, etc. The result holds regardless of the content of the preferences. Egoism is not required; it infects aggregation of altruistic preferences. The preferences need not be consequentialist, nor based on a common scale of values. They may incorporate incommensurable values as long as they can be ranked. Third, the theorem suggests that there is no such thing as the “common good,” the “will of the people,” or even the judgment of the majority. The paradoxes hold for any aggregation of individual preferences with more than three actors, be it national, subnational, or global. The theorem therefore raises the specter that no method of aggregating preferences can be rational, fair, and democratic. Simple majority rule, for example, can be shown to violate (C) by generating “Condorcet cycling,” named for the eighteenth century French mathematician who anticipated Arrow by discovering this special case of the theorem. Say the UN, dealing with a Failed State, can vote to Negotiate (N), Sanction (S), or Occupy (O). Rationally, the outcome should be transitive: If the UN prefers N to S and S to O, it should prefer N to O. But the outcome might be that each alternative will win against the other by a majority of a different composition, so that there is no clear winner. Furthermore, applying majority rule to the individual orderings here may lead to intransitivity or cycling: N is preferred to S, and S to O, but O wins over N. This is irrational as well as inconclusive. The theorem shows that this result is general given the premises. Responses are of three broad sorts. One is to try to relax at least one of the premises. A second is to urge that the results are of limited import because they do not arise much as a matter of fact in real politics. The third is to argue that the theorem is misleading or irrelevant because Arrow’s framework fails to capture what democratic decision-making is about and how it works. Attempts to evade Arrovian problems by relaxing the requirements have focused on (I), Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives, (U), Unrestricted Domain, as well as (C), Collective Rationality, technically part of (U). The other two conditions face little if any challenge. Nondictatorship, (D), is as constitutive of fairness and democracy as anything could be. The Weak Pareto Principle, (P), insists no more than that unanimity be honored. What choice could count as collective and depart from that is hard to conceive. The least intuitive condition is (I), that social choice among some set of preferences depend only on individuals’ aggregated ranking of those preferences and on nothing else. If the irrelevant alternatives that go into another

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social choice are genuinely irrelevant to the one at hand, they should not affect the ranking among preferences under consideration. But (I) also imposes a less obvious condition, the rejection of interpersonal comparisons about how much individuals prefer a given alternative. If p is both of our second choices, it does not matter under (I) that for me p is abhorrent while for you it is merely distasteful. The social ranking depends on the ranking that each individual gives the outcomes and not on the relative intensity of preferences about those outcomes across individuals. The outcome turns wholly on ordinal rather than cardinal factors. This does not seem particularly minimal. Cardinal ranking requiring interpersonal comparison of this sort is necessary for classical utilitarianism. Such comparisons are fundamental to welfare and development economics – life expectancy and GDP per capita, for example, are cardinal (comparative) measures of welfare, and interpersonal comparison underlies the concept of diminishing marginal utility, for example, that a marginal increase of wealth means less to the rich than the poor, crucial to all these theories. Taking a major ethical theory and important collective choice method as well as several fundamental approaches to economics off the table ab initio seems like a strong rather than a weak starting point. Three reasons are widely offered for the ordinal, noncomparative approach. First, there is doubt whether interpersonal comparisons are possible or meaningful in the absence of any generally accepted tests for determining whether, for example, I care twice as much about an additional year of expected life or an extra dollar than you do. Some of this skepticism is based on a discredited empiricist view of scientific method as merely a way of testing factual hypotheses about observations. Much work has been done, notably by economist Amartya Sen, a Harvard Nobel Memorial Laureate, and others, to show that such comparisons or proxies for them are technically possible. Some major American philosophers and decision theorists like Allen Gibbard and Donald Davidson contend that such comparisons might or must be made on the basis of personal experience and selfevaluation of our own preferences. Neither, however, offers a metric or avoids contentious normative hypotheses. Even if the interpersonal information exists and such comparisons could be made in principle, how it could be practicably ascertained in a reliable way among many individuals and alternatives is not known. And social choice situations may create strategic incentives to misrepresent actual preferences and their intensities to obtain preferred outcomes. So Arrow’s (I) may indeed be the

weak, minimal, and best approach that it is claimed to be. John Rawls’ and Robert Nozick’s theories of justice are designed to respect it. More deeply, even if reliable information about comparative intensity were available, it is not clear that it should matter in social choice. If, for instance, I rank more expected income higher than a longer expected life, and you vice versa, it seems worse than irrelevant for social choice if I care a lot about the additional money and you only a bit about the additional time. Counting intensity of preference would allow passionate minorities to dominate decision-making without winning votes or changing minds in the many cases when a majority choice is possible but less intensely favored. Arguably, what should count in a vote is which choice is ranked higher, regardless of how intensely individuals care about lower-ranked choices. Interpersonal comparative information, if available, could certainly be used in ethical or economic analysis, but such considerations can only be persuasive, not decisive, in democratic social choice. The second “relaxation” target is (U), Unrestricted Domain, that no possible set of preferences should be excluded as long as they satisfy (C), Collective Rationality. Much effort has gone into domain restrictions. One, explored by Arrow, is illustrative of the ingenuity and barrenness of this sort of approach. It can be proven that majority decision will always be transitive if the range of allowed preference profiles is restricted to cases that are “single peaked,” that is, if some alternative cannot be anyone’s lowest choice, and the number of individuals is odd rather than even. This might arise in the Failed Nation problem posed above to the UN. Suppose that “hawks” who support occupation (O) and “conciliators” who support negotiation (N) cannot adopt the other’s position as their second choice. If the number of UN members is odd, then, sanctions (S), advocated by “pragmatists,” cannot be at the bottom of anyone’s ranking. The artificiality of this sort of result (and there are many more complicated results of this kind) is twofold. The single-peakedness solution works, mathematically, only with an odd number of individuals, and, politically, where consensus about alternatives is high. Such clever but ad hoc domain restrictions are impracticable, illiberal, and unmotivated. Merely avoiding Arrow Impossibility is no basis for excluding certain sets of preference profiles if people have them. Curiously, the philosopher Alfred MacKay, author of a major study of the theorem, advocates imposing single-peakedness on the grounds that the paradoxes are instances of an independently philosophically objectionable infinite regress and not merely as an

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unmotivated ad hoc way of avoiding paradox. But MacKay does not explain why it is democratically acceptable to impose a limited preference structure to avoid a philosophical problem that matters even less in real life than Arrow’s paradoxes themselves, nor does he explain how to implement such a limitation. A stronger rationale for domain restriction, one that people do care about, is that certain sets of preferences – for genocide or tyranny, say – are morally unworthy of consideration. The answer from a liberal democratic perspective is that there is no non-dictatorial way of saying which preferences are not to count and so should be excluded from any domain of choice. It is important to see that choice under Arrovian conditions does not require preferences be taken as given (“exogenously”) without critique or alteration, pace, for example, despite widespread claims to the contrary, like that of political scientist Jon Elster. Whether and how preferences may be subject to revision is different from whether aggregation should exclude any preferences ex ante because of their objectionable content. As long as we remain in Arrow’s democratic world rather than Clausewitz’s realm of armed conflict or even the world of a benevolent (or otherwise) dictator, the range of acceptable alternatives must be decided ex post and politically. A second sort of response to the Impossibility Theorem is that it is practically irrelevant as an empirical matter because divergence on outcomes is not, in the real world, great enough to generate Arrovian paradoxes. For example, Arrow notes that in a country like the USA with only two viable political parties, there may be only two choices. Or perhaps many of the proliferating profiles are marginal, such as a preference for a socialist party in the USA, or “mainstream” preferences are highly similar and relatively consensual. This says, in effect, that the world conveniently provides domain restrictions without anyone’s having to undemocratically eliminate alternatives in an ad hoc way. Where that is true, Arrow problems do not arise, but the assumption that the world is happily arranged to render them generally irrelevant is Panglossian. If the importance of Arrow’s results turns on the probability of paradox in fact transpiring, that unhappy outcome is greater than empirical optimists suppose. From a merely mathematical perspective, Professor Robert Abrams has shown that the probability of a paradoxical result, which is 6% among 216 possible preference profiles for the three-individual, threealternatives case, does not rise above 10% regardless of the number of individuals involved if there are only three

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choices, but it fairly slowly approaches 100% as the number of choices approaches infinity. But 6–10% is a nontrivial probability of paradox – even a statistically significant one. Further, even if the world does restrict the domain de facto, one concern is whether it restricts them in a way that provides the requisite limitations. As singlepeakedness illustrates, these can be quite peculiar, and that may be the simplest instance. More deeply, systematic, widespread, and irreconcilable disagreement is a feature of any complex society, and more so in a world of diverse societies. Rich and poor nations differ about bearing the cost of externalities like pollution and the unequal distribution of wealth generated by capitalism. The world community disagrees about how to handle challenges posed by Failed States, and who belongs in that category. Religious, racial, gender, and not least, class divisions are pervasive within and among nations. Points of consensus, even when expressed through democratic politics, often turn on bases of conflict with other groups. (“We can agree that fundamentalists/infidels/extremists are to be defeated.”) These facts suggest that frequency of cycling and paradoxes may be greater than the cold mathematics suggest. The final sort of reply is that the Impossibility Theorem misses the point of democratic politics. Since there is little agreement on what that is, the objection comes in many flavors. Consider three. An austere version is that our expectations about politics are lower than Arrow requires. Perhaps we do not need a complete social ranking of all alternatives. What matters is that we have a method that reliably produces a winner. However, here the bite of the theorem is that, if such a method exists, it would require us to relax one of the four seemingly unavoidable conditions on social choice, which nonetheless remain compelling. It is not that just that the conclusion of the theorem is troublesome, but that its premises are more attractive than any alternative. A richer objection of this kind is Elster’s criticism that Arrow misconceives democracy by treating politics merely as a market like mechanism for aggregating exogenously given preferences. Inspired by the philosophers Hannah Arendt and Ju¨rgen Habermas, Elster, like Harvard Law Professor Cass Sunstein, advocates a deliberative democracy in which decision-making should be directed to making fair policy decisions by means of public debate that improves our preferences. Perhaps so. It might be noted that it is trivially obvious and not in the least paternalistic to suggest that public discussion might change our preferences. Still, the appeal to deliberative democracy in this

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context misses the mark in two ways. First, as noted, nothing in Arrow excludes revision of preferences by public critique. Exogeneity of preference is not a premise in the Impossibility Theorem. Second, aggregation of the revised preferences is still required to reach a social choice. Since Elster does not challenge Arrow’s premises, his deliberative democracy will face Arrow’s paradoxes when it comes time for a vote. A more radical critique in a similar spirit, offered by the philosopher Elizabeth Andersen and legal academic Richard Pildes, does challenge the premises, specifically Collective Rationality. They maintain that politics expresses an understanding of vital choices based on incommensurable values. Inconsistencies are not “irrational” as long as the ultimate choice among incommensurable values is “not clearly inferior” to the alternatives. Cycling may serve important democratic ends by affirming the independent worth of incommensurable values that cannot all be realized at once. Inconsistent rankings may rationally reflect conflicting values generated by different norms governing multiple social roles that individuals occupy. The inability to attain a single complete consistent social choice ranking by a method that aggregates individual preferences is a virtue, not a paradoxical vice. This thick description of a messy but vital political world is a refreshing contrast to the arid mathematical simplification of social choice theory. Nonetheless, this strategy seems to have subtly changed the subject in making a virtue of necessity. The “rationality” of inconsistent choices involves a comparative judgment of relative worth (“not clearly inferior”) that presupposes the existence of some common evaluative scale or at least a ranking that undermines a claim of radical incommensurability. The cycling Anderson and Pildes defend as functional derives from the very Arrovian assumptions they purport to reject. Moreover, while cycling may be functional for democracy when conflicting interests and demands preclude a determinate choice that does not mean that it is rational. To explain individual inconsistencies in preference due to competing demands of conflicting social roles is not to demonstrate their rationality, but to show how they arise. In the end, this approach offers a less than fully compelling persuasive redefinition of Arrow’s paradoxes as “rational” because they may be the best that can be attained in the circumstances. Collective choice, then, is still haunted by the specter of the Impossibility Theorem and similar social choice theoretic results, like Sen’s Impossibility of a Paretan Liberal. Decades of attempts to circumvent, minimize, or dismiss these results have failed. The prospects for

overcoming them seem dim. If the viability of democracy depended on showing that it could in principle always produce stable and rational results, it would be in trouble. Fortunately democracy, at least in the developed countries, is less debatable and more firmly rooted than any critique of it. No one is going to give it up because of the Arrow theorem. But the irrefrangibility of Arrovian paradox discourages complacency insofar as we wish to defend and understand it.

Related Topics

▶ Arendt, Hannah ▶ Collective Decision Problem ▶ Common Good ▶ Condorcet, N. Marquis de ▶ Consensus/Justification ▶ Democracy, Deliberative ▶ Development Assistance ▶ Genocide ▶ Global Democracy ▶ Habermas, Ju¨rgen ▶ Liberalism ▶ Nozick, Robert ▶ Pareto Optimality ▶ Rawls, John

References Abrams R (1980) Foundations of political analysis: an introduction to the theory of collective choice. Columbia University Press, New York Arrow KJ (1963) Social choice and individual values, 2nd edn. Yale University Press, New Haven (1st ed. 1951. Wiley, New York) Bonner J (1986) Politics, economics, and welfare: an elementary introduction to social choice. Wheatsheaf, Brighton Copp D, Hampton J, Roemer JE (eds) (1993) The idea of democracy. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (contains, inter alia, contributions by C. Sunstein) Elster J, Hylland A (eds) (1986) Foundations of social choice theory. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (contains contributions by J. Elster, D. Davidson, and A. Gibbard) MacKay AF (1980) Arrow’s theorem: the paradox of social choice. A case study in the philosophy of economics. Yale University Press, New Haven Mill JS (1962) On liberty. In: Warnock M (ed) Utilitarianism (On liberty, essay on Bentham, together with selected writings of Jeremy Bentham and John Austin). Meridian, New York Pildes RH, Anderson ES (1990) Slinging arrows at democracy: social choice theory, value pluralism, and democratic politics. Colum L Rev 90:2121–2214 Sen AK (1970a) Collective choice and individual welfare. North-Holland, Amsterdam Sen AK (1970b) The impossibility of a paretian liberal. J Polit Econ 78:152–157 Sen AK (1977) Social choice theory: a re-examination. Econometrica 45:53–89

Collective Decision Problem

Collective Decision Problem BONGRAE SEOK Department of Humanities/Philosophy, Alvernia University, Reading, PA, USA

A collective decision is the decision made by a group of individuals to regulate their group activities. Usually collective actions are not formed by the simple summation of individual actions. Several psychologists report that people work more effectively when they work together than when they worked alone (social facilitation), but collective interaction does not always generate positive outcomes. In many group activities, participants usually perform poorly if they are not observed or not individually evaluated by others (social loafing). Specifically, when a group of individuals participate in a decision-making process, they tend to exhibit peculiar behavioral patterns that negatively affect the future success of their decisions. For example, the individual members of a group tend to develop more extreme, riskier, bolder, or more conservative views when they make decisions as a group than they decide individually (group polarization). They tend to favor or support the opinions of their close friends and discount the beliefs of strangers (ingroup bias), and to ignore or downgrade the difference of views presented by less known members (outgroup homogeneity or stereotype). They also develop, consciously or unconsciously, a group atmosphere that suppresses rational problem solving processes. Irving Janis (1972/1982) called this degrading tendency “groupthink.” Groupthink occurs when a group of individuals make faulty decisions under various pressures that encourage hasty, limited, and biased thoughts. Typical symptoms of groupthink are: illusion of vulnerability (the excessive optimism about the future success based on the blind trust of their status quo), collective rationalization (the ignorance of reasonable warnings and negative feedbacks), belief in inherent morality (the extreme self-righteousness that disregards negative consequences and alternative viewpoints), stereotyped views of outgroups (the creation of unrealistic or overly negative images of enemy), direct pressure on dissenters (the discouragement of criticisms and dissenting views), self-censorship (the pressure against any argument that challenges the perceived group consensus), self-appointed mindguards (the guard against any possible threat to group’s cohesiveness). Not every group becomes a victim of groupthink. Groups that are highly cohesive, isolated from outside

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opinions, under considerable pressure to make important decisions, and have more homogeneous membership tend to engage in groupthink. Under these conditions, a group seeks to make unanimous decisions, to maintain the unity and cohesiveness, and to protect the members from possible challenges and, at the same time, to discourage the considerations of alternative viewpoints and negative consequences of their decisions. The result is careless, myopic, and irrational decisions that are less likely to succeed. In the context of corrective justice and legal decision making, groupthink poses a formidable challenge. Even though groupthink is preventable, lawyers and jurors are constantly pressured by various conditions of groupthink. In the context of distributive justice, faulty collective decisions affect the fair and equal distribution and the optimal use of social resources. In their decisions, policy makers and political leaders are influenced by ingroup biases and outgroup stereotypes. To avoid these pitfalls of collective decision making, specifically to prevent the persistent pressure of group think, several recommendations are proposed. For a rational and successful decision, it is very important for a group to avoid any type of isolation from outside opinions, comments, and criticisms. Maintaining open group atmosphere and inviting alternative viewpoints are the essential preventive measures. In addition to these, each member of a group needs to play the roles of critical evaluator and devil’s advocate to develop critical and alternative views to given issues. If possible, outside experts can be invited to comment on group decision process to reconsider the decision from different angles. Some justice theorists claim that the pitfalls of groupthink are more likely visible in the narrow and confined domains of nationalism than in the open impartiality of cosmopolitanism. To rectify the limitations of a theory of distributive justice that may favor compatriot partiality based on nationalistic considerations, one may need to bring in the global perspective and open and reciprocal viewpoints.

Related Topics

▶ Collective Choice ▶ Collective Identity ▶ Collective Responsibility ▶ Composition, Fallacy of ▶ Partiality

References Ahlfinger NR, Esser JK (2001) Testing the groupthink model: effects of promotional leadership and conformity predisposition. Soc Behav Pers Int J 29:31–42 Harkins S (1987) Social loafing and social facilitation. J Exp Psychol 23:1–18

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Janis IL (1972/1982) Victims of groupthink: a psychological study of foreign policy decisions and fiascoes. Houghton Mifflin, Boston Judd CM, Park B (1988) Out-group homogeneity. J Pers Soc Psychol 54:778–788 Linville PW, Fisher GW, Salovey P (1989) Perceived distribution of the characteristics of in-group and out-group members. J Pers Soc Psychol 57:165–188 Moorhead G, Neck CP, West MS (1998) The tendency toward defective decision making within self-managing teams: the relevance of groupthink for the 21st century. Organ Behav Hum Decis Process 73:327–351 Olson ML Jr (1965/1971) The logic of collective action: public goods and the theory of groups. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA t’Hart P (1994) Groupthink in government: a study of small groups and policy failure. Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore Turner ME, Pratkanis AR (1998) Twenty-five years of groupthink theory and research: lessons from the evaluation of a theory. Organ Behav Hum Decis Process 73:105–115

Collective Identity MARGARET A. MCLAREN Department of Philosophy, Rollins College, Winter Park, FL, USA

Collective identity refers to an individual identifying with a group in such a way that the group identification is significant for the person’s individual identity. Identity is usually attributed to individuals, either in terms of personal identity, which in Anglo-American philosophical debates has often boiled down to continuity over time, or in terms of particular identity, which in philosophy, and in particular in moral psychology, has usually been discussed as those features that make a person unique, that is, what differentiates one person from another, such as character traits. These two types of individual identity differ from social identity, which refers to one’s membership in a social group. Collective or group identity recognizes an interconnection between individual and social identity. In fact, collective identity often is viewed as in conflict with individualism, and therefore with the ideas of individual autonomy that follow from it. This conflict stems from differing assumptions about the ontological priority of the individual vs. the ontological priority of the group. In the former case, the assumption is that individuals are separate from and prior to the groups and social contexts of which they are a part. In the latter case, individuals are seen to arise from the social context, including the social groups to which they belong. The social groups with which individuals identify are often cultural or

religious, but can also be ethnic, racial, sex, gender, or sexuality based. The idea of collective identity is predicated upon the importance of the group or collective. Collective identity has affinities with multiculturalism, group rights, identity politics, relational identity, and communal identity. It might be helpful to distinguish at least three senses of collective identity: an idea of the self as connected to immediate others in one’s family or community (relational identity); the idea of one’s self as a member of a social group where others in the social group share particular features, histories, and ways of life (group identity); and, finally, the self as a member of a social group that shares particular interests or common goals, such as a labor union (associational/interest group identity). In each case, individuals recognize themselves as part of a larger group and derive their identity, at least in part, from their association with that group. These senses of collective identity are not mutually exclusive; some sense of relational identity is implicit in group identity because group identity requires that one think of one’s relationships to others as significant for their own identity, that is, each person views their membership in a group as constitutive of who they are, and are linked to others in the group because of this. In terms of relational identity, collective identity may mean having an enlarged conception of the self that includes immediate and extended family members. For instance, in Bali, extended family lives together and the rituals of daily life include offerings to ancestors. One is first and foremost a member of a family, not an individual; both physical space (the family compound) and spiritual and social life are organized around the family, rather than the individual. Similarly, communal identity involves a conception of self significantly connected to the larger community. Communities may be neighborhoods, tribes, ethnic groups, religious groups, social membership in oppressed groups, interest groups, or nation-states. In each case, what connects the group may differ – mere locality in the case of neighborhoods; shared language, history, culture, and spiritual beliefs in the case of tribes; shared language, culture, and history in the case of ethnic groups; shared beliefs and or practices in the case of religious groups; a similar relationship to the dominant culture in the case of members of oppressed groups; shared interests in the case of interest groups; and a shared history and political culture in the case of nation-states. Collective identity in most of these cases (with the exception of neighborhoods) is predicated upon the recognition of the importance of group membership to an individual. Group membership plays a role in the ways of life one may find meaningful and acceptable, and provides a sense of shared identity with other group members.

Collective Identity

Political philosopher Iris Marion Young defines a social group as follows: “A social group is a collective of persons differentiated from at least one other group by cultural forms, practices or way of life. Members of a group have a specific affinity with one another because of their similar experience or way of life which prompts them to associate with one another more than with those identified with the group, or in a different way.” (Young 1990) Group membership may also limit one’s access to opportunities, especially if those opportunities are structured in such a way as to privilege majority or dominant groups. Thus, in contemporary political and social theory, discussions of collective identity and group membership often lead to discussions of group rights. Collective identity can be politically neutral, for example, an Australian aboriginal’s connection to the land and to her community. But when the land is threatened those with similar connections to the land may be mobilized to take action, engaging in political solidarity to influence legislative or policy decisions. In general, laws favor an individualist conception of the self, rather than a collective one, and often favor the majority, rather than the minority. Take the case of Francophone Quebec: the issue of preserving Francophone culture and language became so contested that Quebec attempted to secede from Canada in order not to be assimilated into the dominant English-speaking society. When collective identity revolves around language and cultural practices, one’s individual sense of self is intimately tied to the perpetuation of social, cultural, and linguistic practices. For instance, one’s identity as a Navajo depends partly on participating in the cultural practices linked to this identity, including speaking the language. However, maintaining a language is a social, not an individual practice. So, an individual can only realize her/his identity as, e.g., Navajo by participating in social practices; cultural meanings inform individual meanings. However, critics argue that this inextricable link between the collective/group and individual may constrain the freedom of individuals to choose to leave a culture or social group. While others argue that supporting group rights to preserve or maintain culture amounts to supporting the status quo by conserving current social norms and practices, and errs by holding an unrealistically static view of culture. However, acknowledging collective identity can be significant for social justice. Collective identity or group identification coalesces around difference. Group members identify with one another because of their shared language, culture, religion, or oppressive situation, in contrast to the dominant or majority group. The dominant majority group

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exercises political control either explicitly through laws and policies that disadvantage minorities or implicitly through the expectation of cultural assimilation, or representation of the dominant culture as hegemonic. Members of underrepresented social groups may make claims on the dominant culture for laws, policies, and practices that treat them fairly and recognize and honor them. The mobilization of collective identity for political goals is known as identity politics. Identity politics refers to members of oppressed groups aligning with other members of that group in political solidarity. Oppressed social groups may make various types of claims: groups that have been subject to conquest or colonized (such as Native Americans or Australian Aboriginals) may argue for self- government, land rights, autonomy in public institutions in order to maintain their culture and language; immigrant ethnic groups may promote bilingual education, and celebration of multiculturalism; oppressed groups such as racial minorities, women, and gays and lesbians may advocate for non-discriminatory (non-racist, nonsexist, non-heterosexist) laws and policies. Furthermore, all of these groups may also press for representation in the public domain, both political representation and positive images in media. Identity politics mobilizes group members around their identity as a member of a particular social group in order to receive fair treatment; often fairness requires that group identity be affirmed and recognized, and that past injustices be redressed. In a globalized, multicultural, multiethnic world, collective identity is important for global justice.

Related Topics ▶ Agency, Collective ▶ Group Rights ▶ Multiculturalism

References Kymlicka W (1995) Multicultural citizenship. Oxford University Press, Oxford Kymlicka W (2001) Politics in the vernacular: nationalism, multiculturalism and citizenship. Oxford University Press, Oxford Kymlicka W (2009) Categorizing groups? Categorizing states: theorizing minority rights in a world of deep diversity. Ethics Int Aff 23:371–389 May S (2008) Language and minority rights: ethnicity, nationalism and the politics of language. Routledge, New York McDonough K, Feinberg W (eds) (2003) Citizenship and education in liberal-democratic societies: teaching for cosmopolitan values and collective identities. Oxford University Press, Oxford Shapiro I, Kymlicka W (eds) (1997) Ethnicity and group rights, NOMOS 39. New York University Press, New York Taylor C (1992) The politics of recognition. In: Gutmann A (ed) Multiculturalism and the ‘politics of recognition’. Princeton University Press, Princeton, pp 25–73

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Young IM (1990) Justice and the politics of difference. Princeton University Press, Princeton Young IM (2000) Inclusion and democracy. Oxford University Press, Oxford

Collective Responsibility STEPHEN L. ESQUITH Residential College in Arts and Humanities, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI, USA

New Problems and New Questions Beginning in the mid-twentieth century, debates over the coherence and usefulness of the concept of collective responsibility for the Nazi Holocaust, slavery, and legalized racial discrimination in the United States, and apartheid in South Africa focused on three closely related issues. Critics argued that holding citizens collectively responsible for the unjust actions of their government, their political parties, their employers, their trading partners, or their ancestors presupposes a dubious conception of group identity and agency. Groups do not act intentionally in the same way that individuals do, and therefore they cannot be held responsible in the same way that individuals can be. Furthermore, from a moral point of view, some critics contended that collective responsibility is incompatible with the basic relationship between responsibility and individual freedom. If responsibility depends upon individual freedom, then it is hard to make sense of a form of responsibility that does not presuppose voluntary action and individual intention. Thirdly, it still may be necessary to distribute moral responsibility among members of responsible collectivities, and the concept of collective responsibility makes it extremely difficult to do this fairly. As globalization has accelerated, as public interest in global justice has grown, and as the idea of human rights has gained greater currency among philosophers and development practitioners, these controversies have shifted and the concept of collective responsibility has become more complex and arguably more defensible. Normative and metaphysical questions remain. However, the questions have become less skeptical, and the arguments for applying the concept of collective responsibility (and its cognates, shared and institutional responsibility) to concrete problems of global injustice such as immigration, child labor and prostitution, genocide, poverty, health care, climate change, and global warming have become more plausible.

Among the new metaphysical questions that have arisen, one is whether a nation or a state is the most appropriate collectivity to which responsibility for global injustice can and ought to be attributed. On its face, a state appears to have a more tangible and discrete identity than a nation. On the other hand, if collective responsibility depends upon collective identity, then national cultural identity may be a stronger bond than legal membership within a state. Alternatively, collective responsibility for global injustice may belong to corporations, multilateral organizations, or other institutions that are neither states nor nations. The issue is not whether collective responsibility is consistent with our assumptions about agency and identity, but rather which collectivity can and ought to be held responsible for problems such as these? Alongside this debate over the nature of the collectivity is the question of how responsibility for global injustice differs from liability and guilt. This question has been explored from various legal, moral, and political perspectives, each one yielding somewhat different results. There are two ways of interpreting this question. If responsibility is interpreted in a backward-looking sense (i.e., Who or what caused or otherwise contributed to global injustice?), then some answers are more plausible than others. If it is interpreted in a forward-looking sense (i.e., Who or what can and should remedy global injustice?), then other answers are more appropriate. From a backward-looking perspective, we are interested in whether there was a collectivity that was implicated in causing the harm and should have foreseen the injustice. From a forward-looking perspective, we are interested in whether there is a collectivity that has the resources and capacity to ameliorate the harm done without creating an equal or greater injustice at the same time.

Which Collectivities? Which collective entities can and should be held responsible for global injustice? Some have argued that nations and states are the prime suspects. They contribute, by omission and commission, to global injustices through the wars they wage at home and abroad, the import duties they impose, and the domestic crop subsidies they provide. They often, although not always, have the capacity to remedy the resulting and foreseeable unjust situations. These arguments appear to be easier to make about states that typically have a monopoly over military force and political power, but a counterargument can be made that nations, whether they control state power or not, are more culturally distinct and persist longer over time than political regimes. National identity is a much stronger form of allegiance than state citizenship, and it is this cultural

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identity that enables nations to act and thereby implicate themselves as collectivities from one generation to the next than states. In contrast, others believe that corporations, nongovernmental organizations, and multilateral institutions are the primary causal agents who skew the terms of international cooperation and trade, and who undermine legitimate governments in poorer countries. According to this view, to the extent that richer states and their citizens support these organizations and institutions, they share in the responsibility for the injustices that result. These organizations and institutions may be more collectively responsible because they have often benefited more tangibly than states, although not always. Which of these collective entities is primarily responsible for global injustice? In part, it depends on whether one is using responsibility in a backward-looking or forward-looking sense, and it depends upon the particular case at hand. From a backward-looking perspective, sometimes transnational corporations who have been involved in extracting natural resources from poor countries have damaged the traditional culture of a poor country and made it even more difficult for that country to provide for itself and for its government to operate without corruption. They and those who have profited from their policies ought to be held responsible. Sometimes in the name of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, states and coalitions of states have caused similar harm. They and those who have empowered them ought to be held responsible. In addition to these actions, international rules of trade and regulatory practices, with the complicity of states and non-state institutions, can have similar long-term cumulative effects. On the other hand, from a forward-looking perspective, it may be wiser and more effective to hold responsible those states and non-state institutions who have the capacity to remedy past and continuing wrongs such as these, even if they are not the sole or even the most directly connected parties to the injustice.

What Responsibilities? Collective responsibility for global injustice falls into three overlapping general categories. The first is moral collective responsibility. This is both backward- and forwardlooking, and it can apply to historical injustices as well as contemporary injustices. For example, one local community group has benefited unjustly from the appropriation of land and property from another group. The appropriating community may be morally blameworthy for not compensating the heirs of the original victims of the injustice. As a moral responsibility, the duty to compensate the rightful heirs may be a perfect duty that entails

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legal obligations or, because of the circumstances, it may be an imperfect moral duty that does not entail any legally binding obligation. It depends on the particular case. There are two types of legal collective responsibilities for global injustice. One is liability, and the case of historical injustice described in the preceding paragraph is an example. Collective liability in this sense presupposes that a collectivity could have foreseen the harm done, acted freely, and failed to avoid harming the other group. This type of legal collective responsibility is modeled on individual tort liability, and cost-effectiveness may be the best test of legal liability. A second type of legal collective responsibility is more like individual guilt or culpability. In this case the harm is closer to intentional wrongdoing than unintentional but still foreseeable harm. The collective responsibility of states for crimes of war and crimes against humanity, even crimes perpetrated by former regimes, falls into this second category. This type of legal culpability also can extend to non-state organizations and institutions who have been accomplices to the original crimes and whose members have continued to benefit by not admitting guilt or rectifying the damage done. The legal responses to these global injustices include capital punishment, imprisonment, lustration, deportation, fines, and community service. The third category of collective responsibility is political. What are the political responsibilities of collectivities and their members for global injustice? That is to say, what obligations do they have to organize and participate in political processes designed to achieve reconciliation and compromise rather than compensation or punishment? Truth and reconciliation commissions are the most familiar alternative methods for meeting this political collective responsibility, and they are typically driven by the state which offers incentives such as amnesty or reduced punishment for participation. Other less common local practices that bring survivors together with perpetrators for extended discussions are facilitated by the state but have a less formal structure.

Which Global Injustices? The meaning of collective responsibility depends upon how we construe global injustice as well as which collectivities we have in mind and what responsibilities are most pertinent to the actions or inactions of these collectivities. What counts as a global injustice as opposed to undeserved tragic suffering depends upon several considerations. One is that global injustices are violations of basic human rights, and basic human rights are the universal claims that individuals have to the fulfillment of basic human needs, where one draws the line between

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basic needs, other needs, and mere preferences is a matter of some disagreement. Which human rights are global and which ones are rights are more appropriately claimed against domestic authorities, and entities may depend upon the kind of right in question but also the institutions that are capable of responding to claims of justice. Against this complex background of established and contested basic human rights, several particular problems stand out as possible cases of global injustice: the mistreatment of immigrants, the commission of genocide and similar international human rights violations, the desperate plight of impoverished workers, women, and children, and the pollution and degradation of the natural environment. It is in response to these three problems that many of the arguments for collective responsibility for global injustice have been made. The unjust treatment of immigrants can be divided into two parts. The first is injustice in the process of immigration. That is, who is permitted into the immigrant-receiving country and how they are treated in the process of immigration. Given the basic human rights to freedom of movement and freedom of association, an argument can be made for the prima facie right to enter whichever country one chooses. Denials of this right to enter, then, would be forms of global injustice for which the denying state would be responsible. The second part of this global injustice would consist of unjust treatment once inside the immigrant-receiving country. Here, injustice can take the form of the denial of basic political and social rights, including access to public services, education, and health care. It can also take the form of the violation of basic civil rights to a fair trial and legal representation. Genocide and other crimes against humanity are probably the least contested violations of basic human rights in principle. Women and children are particularly vulnerable to these global injustices in the form of genocidal rape and abuse, and the abduction of children as soldiers and prostitutes. In practice, legally convicting those accused of these global injustices through international tribunals, whether injustices are perpetrated against fellow citizens or others, remains a challenging task. Sometimes the sheer number of defendants can be an obstacle, and then alternative political methods of reconciliation and compromise can be created. Poverty in general, like famine in particular, is not purely an act of nature. Both are also functions of social decisions and institutions that leave individuals unable to secure the available resources that are available. Just as famine is not the result of the absence of food but rather the inability of the poor to purchase the available food,

poverty is partly a function of the poor being unable to afford basic goods and services at the existing prices. When impoverished children and adults (mainly women) cannot raise, make, or purchase what they need to live a minimally decent life, others who can provide assistance to them arguably have a collective responsibility to provide it. For some who view freedom from poverty as a basic human right, those who fail to meet the correlative collective responsibility to provide adequate resources to the poor violate a perfect moral duty and also a legal duty under international humanitarian law. Others see this as a moral failing, but not a matter of legal liability or culpability because it is not feasible to hold anyone accountable who fails to meet this collective responsibility. Grave health disparities and environmental problems are closely associated with poverty. For example, obesity and malnutrition disproportionately affect poorer populations within more developed countries who live in “food deserts” as well as poorer countries as a whole. While some arguments have been made for distributing collective responsibilities for conditions such as these to principles of fairness (e.g., auctioning permits to emit greenhouse gases), others prefer a very different ethics of care. This alternative ethic of care views health and a healthy sustainable environment as constitutive parts of human wellbeing, not as means to some other end. Since everyone depends upon others to care for them during some periods of their life and they depend upon the environment as a global commons, the responsibilities for care should not be divided contractually. They define non-reciprocal and future-oriented shared responsibilities.

Other Problems and Questions Not all collective responsibilities for global injustices can be attributed to perpetrators and their willing or unwitting accomplices. There are many who stand outside the causal chain of events, no matter how far back we go or how extensive we take this chain to be. Nonetheless, these bystanders still may benefit from global injustice. For example, they may benefit indirectly from a dam and irrigation system that has flooded the traditional grazing lands of others because of the new access they have to electricity. To what extent are bystanders with limited knowledge of the harm that has been done and limited opportunities to foresee it share responsibility for the hardships and losses of those who have been displaced? Are they innocent bystanders, or should some of the benefits that they receive from development projects such as these go to those who have been displaced? Harm done through displacement may be serious enough to

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warrant a collective response from this large class of bystanders, not just from those who knew full well what was going to happen to the displaced poor and benefited handsomely. Another question involves the problem of motivating collectivities, especially bystanders, to meet their responsibilities when there are no mechanisms for enforcement. In cases of legal liability and culpability, the incentives are fairly clear, which is not to say that they are always adequate from a motivational perspective. However, in cases of imperfect moral duties and political collective responsibility, a different strategy is needed to encourage responsible collective action. One possibility is to appeal to the value of impartiality. Just as there is an imperfect logic of collective action, there may also be a logic of collective responsibility. If we do not take collective responsibility for global injustices, others also may not when a similar responsibility falls to them. This uncertainty may prompt us to be more collectively responsible. This logic is more likely where parties know and trust each other. The motivational challenge for a concept of collective responsibility for global injustice is to look beyond those we are most connected to and imagine what outsiders might think. How does one teach this more inclusive impartiality? One approach is to expand on the allegories of rescue such as the passerby and the drowning child that philosophers have used to prompt individual action. Narratives of collective shared responsibility directed at bystanders who have benefited from global injustices that occur beyond their territorial borders may prompt greater recognition of their roles in the displacement and disenfranchisement of the poor.

Related Topics

▶ Agency, Collective ▶ Basic Needs ▶ Basic Rights ▶ Corporate Social Responsibility ▶ Environmental Justice ▶ Genocide ▶ Global Justice ▶ Human Rights ▶ Miller, David ▶ Miller, Richard ▶ O’Neill, Onora ▶ Pogge, Thomas ▶ Sen, Amartya ▶ Shue, Henry ▶ Truth Commissions ▶ War Crimes

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References Barry C, Pogge TW (eds) (2005) Global institutions and responsibilities. Blackwell, Cambridge Bose P, Drydyk J, Penz P (2010) Displacement and development: ethics and responsibilities. Cambridge University Press, New York Carens JH (2000) Culture, citizenship, and community: a contextual exploration of justice as evenhandedness. Oxford University Press, New York Cobban H (2007) Amnesty after atrocity? Healing nations after genocide and war crimes. Paradigm, Boulder Erskine T (ed) (2003) Can institutions have responsibilities? Palgrave MacMillan, New York Esquith SL (2010) The political responsibilities of everyday bystanders. Pennsylvania State University Press, University Park Evans G (2008) The responsibility to protect: ending mass atrocity crimes once and for all. Brookings Institution Press, Washington, DC Goodin RE (1992) Motivating political morality. Blackwell, Cambridge Jamieson D (2008) Ethics and the environment: an introduction. Cambridge University Press, New York Kuper A (ed) (2005) Global responsibilities: who must deliver on human rights? Routledge, New York Miller D (2007) National responsibility and global justice. Oxford University Press, New York O’Neill O (2000) The bounds of justice. Cambridge University Press, New York Pogge TW (ed) (2007) Freedom from poverty as a human right. Oxford University Press, New York Sen A (2009) The idea of justice. Harvard University Press, Cambridge Shue H (1996) Basic rights, 2nd edn. Princeton University Press, Princeton Smiley M (2005) Collective responsibility. In: Zalta EN (ed) Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/collective-responsibility/

Colonialism TRACEY NICHOLLS Department of Philosophy, Lewis University, Romeoville, IL, USA

Colonialism is a project of territorial expansion by powerful states that typically involves resettlement into the newly claimed lands of the colonizing state’s people and the displacement, if not eradication, of the people who had previously lived there. It is not the only basis of justice claims made by and to states, but colonial displacement and eradication remain a very real source of lingering sentiments of injustice. Colonialism is sometimes distinguished into two types: the settler colonialism defined above, and resource colonialism, in which the dominating nation foregoes settlement in favor of extraction of the colony’s wealth. Alternatively, this control over a subordinated nation’s wealth-accumulation capacities – also referred to as indirect colonialism – may be

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presented as the set of relations distinguishing imperialism from colonialism. While colonialism has existed throughout recorded history, it is the particular histories of European colonialism that pose the challenges with which contemporary global justice debates are concerned. Even within the rubric of European colonialism, however, it is important to recognize the different colonizing processes and outcomes each European nation instituted in different parts of the world. Colonial projects proceeded differently depending on such contingencies as the wealth and technological development of the colonizing nation in question (in postcolonial scholarship, “the metropolis”), the political commitments it embraced in the course of its transition out of empire, and the particular geographical realities of the colony in question. Britain, for instance, colonized in quite different ways than did Belgium. And the liberal democratic commitments of the northern European nations – Britain, the Netherlands, and to some extent, France – tended to encourage a more progressive, cooperative set of responses to decolonization demands than those offered by southern European nations like Spain and Portugal. Finally, colonialism’s enduring effects manifest themselves differently in Africa, the socalled Orient, the Caribbean and the Americas, the South Pacific, and the “near colonies” that English conquest transformed into the United Kingdom. From the moment of Norman Conquest of England in the eleventh century, at a time when the borders of European states were still in flux, Britain was already constituting itself through colonization of its nearest neighbors: Wales, Scotland, and Ireland. For the most part, these assertions of control were not accompanied by significant resettlement of the English population into the conquered territories – although the English did manage to complicate subsequent Irish struggles for national sovereignty through a forced settlement of Scots into Northern Ireland – so one might argue that this expansion is better classified as occupation. Colonial expansion as both a settlement of English subjects and a process of resource extraction did not begin in earnest until the early seventeenth century, when Britain gained footholds in North America and the Caribbean. Expansion of the British Empire continued into the South Pacific, India, China, and South Africa, but only in Australia and New Zealand did it result in significant settler populations. British advocates of empire justified its aggressive and repressive exploitation of conquered, colonized territories as a civilizing mission, the duty to instruct and enlighten “barbarians” that is communicated in Rudyard Kipling’s 1899 poem “The White Man’s Burden.”

Despite its historic failure to maintain control over its American colony and its persistent inability to suppress Irish revolutionary movements, Britain succeeded in keeping most of its disparate elements of empire together until the end of World War I. From that point on, however, various colonial possessions began to use Britain’s stated liberal commitments – equality, human dignity, self-determination – as the basis for their demands for independence. For India and Ireland, these sovereignty movements were bloody conflicts, but in most cases, Britain’s relinquishing of control over its colonial possessions has been marked by peaceful negotiations, conducted with an attitude of paternalistic generosity and in a context of diminishing British influence in the world, as was the case when Hong Kong was finally “handed back” to China. In such cases – imperial occupation without a significant resettlement of Britons and concomitant displacement of indigenous peoples – justice was seen to be done in the act of granting, or conceding, independence (or Chinese sovereignty, in the case of Hong Kong), although residual claims that Britain owes its former colonies a special compensatory obligation of, say, development aid or right of immigration have also been made. The more docile “settler” colonies – Australia, Canada, and New Zealand – benefitted from a slow process of greater legislative autonomy granted in increments to their domestic governing institutions and are now independent nations in most senses, even as they retain the notion of the British Queen as nominal head of state. In these former colonies, the demands for justice articulated by colonized indigenous communities have essentially been transferred to the local, putatively postcolonial, governments. The remaining near colonies, Wales and Scotland, on the other hand, have nurtured sovereignty movements whose justice claims take the form of demands for greater respect of their cultural distinctiveness and greater latitude in legislating for themselves, while still remaining part of Britain. The other great colonizing power of Europe, France, asserted control over territories in many of the same parts of the world and profited from its colonial adventures to a similar extent, but found that confronting its colonies’ demands for justice was much more a matter of revolutionary violence than bureaucratic negotiation. Its earliest settlements in the Americas were a mixed success: the Canadian colony of New France was lost to Britain as spoils of war, thereby cutting off its lucrative trade in animal pelts, but the Caribbean colony of Saint Domingue provided adequate compensation to the revenue-hungry empire in the form of sugar wealth. Unfortunately for France’s imperial ambitions, the ideals of the French

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Revolution – liberte´, egalite´, et fraternite´ – were taken far more seriously by the slaves of Saint Domingue than the French had anticipated. The “rights of man” declared to be in force throughout France proved to be a rallying cry during the 13-year long colonial uprising that led to the formation in 1804 of Haiti, the first independent black republic in the Americas. Loss of sugar revenues and the cost of unsuccessful attempts to suppress the Haitian Revolution forced the sale of Louisiana to the United States. While the French retained control over their Caribbean colonies of Martinique and Guadeloupe, they never provided the ostentatious wealth that Saint Domingue had poured into French coffers. Turning to Africa and South East Asia after the Napoleonic interruption, France began again to build a colonial presence marked by both settlement and the exploitation of resources. Again, the republican sentiments it articulated for domestic consumption were taken to heart by its colonies, most notably and bloodily in the Algerian War for independence that marked the 1950s. At the same time France was brutally repressing early Algerian demands for autonomy, it was retreating from its colonial role in Indochina (Vietnam) by relinquishing the mediating role between pro-Western and revolutionary communist factions to the United States. Although decolonizing was a bloodier process for France than for Britain, in both cases, demands for justice from the colonized states led to a decline in the ability of both nations to influence world affairs. Today, France has normalized its remaining possessions – among them the Caribbean islands of Martinique and Guadeloupe – as overseas de´partements (provinces) in an arrangement similar to Britain’s continuing inclusion of Wales and Scotland in its union. Additionally, both nations direct associations of their former colonies, the British Commonwealth and la Francophonie, that coordinate matters of trade and diplomacy, and feature sports competitions and other cultural events. Spain and Portugal, the other two nations that played a major role in the colonization of the Americas, shaped the colonial legacy of Central and South America. As the nation that discovered and claimed the “new world” at the end of the fifteenth century, Spain had the wider reach, from what is now the Southwest of the United States to the southern-most point of the continent. Both Spain and Portugal experienced a decline in their status as European powers much earlier than Britain and France, and consequently lost the ability to keep their American colonies under control. Spain’s control began to erode with the liberation of South America, in the name of the indigenous and enslaved people, by Sı´mon Bolı´var and Jose´ de San Martı´n in the 1820s, and the granting of formal

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independence to Mexico and Central America through peace negotiations that occurred at roughly the same time. However, it held Cuba, Guam, and the Philippines until the end of the nineteenth century when they were ceded to the United States as spoils of the SpanishAmerican War. Although Portugal lost control over Brazil during the 1820s, it held its African colonies until the postWorld War II wave of decolonization that saw Caribbean, African, and Asian nations emancipate themselves from their colonial masters and reconstitute themselves as “nonaligned nations” (now more commonly known as the Third World) who aspired to play the ambitions of the First World off against the Second World (the Soviet Bloc) as a way to consolidate their demands for postcolonial economic justice and political influence. In South Asia and South East Asia Portugal asserted a colonial right to Goa until the territory was annexed by India in 1961, and only relinquished Macau to China in 1976. Other European nations also participated in the project of building wealth through colonialism: most notably Belgium in the Congo; Italy in Ethiopia and Eritrea; and the Netherlands in Indonesia (the Dutch East Indies), the Caribbean (the Dutch West Indies), and South Africa. Of these adventures, only the Dutch engaged in settlement of territory, and then only in South Africa (until Britain took control in 1902 after the Boer War). Typically, the lower profile of these nations as colonizers translates into diminished attention to the economic and cultural injustices that still plague their former colonies. Chief among the injustices that continue to cast long shadows, especially in the Americas, was the widespread practice of African slavery. Colonial wealth-building relied on low-wage (or no-wage) labor so, although European nations sent their own people to their colonial possessions as administrators and landowners, their greatest resettlement programs involved the shipment, sale, and bondage of African people. This has produced syncretic, creole populations in many former colonies, where surviving indigenous beliefs and values have blended with elements of African culture and European traditions imposed by the slaveholders – an outcome most evident in practices like Haitian vodou and Cuban Santerı´a. Another concept closely related to colonialism and imperialism is occupation. This is a set of relations in which one nation claims a right to control another’s territory during or following a war, or for reasons of national security or military advantage. Eliding or disputing the distinction between colonialism and occupation allows some cultural observers to charge that the United States (and previously, the Soviet Union) is engaged in modern

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colonialism. Such charges are resisted because both America’s rhetoric of respect for liberty and its proclaimed desire to be a force for peace and good in the world are contradicted by the notion of it as a colonizer, just as the Soviet Union’s Marxist-inspired commitment to the proletariat would have been undercut by identification of Soviet territorial control practices as colonial – and just as the British and French empires were frequently discomforted by the juxtaposition of their liberal and republican philosophies with their own colonial practices. The most compelling and forceful opposition to colonialism was offered 50 years ago by Frantz Fanon from his vantage point as a black Martinican whose work as a psychiatrist assisting the French Army in Algeria drove him to change sides and fight with the Algerian revolutionary forces. Witnessing French colonial relations from the inside, Fanon diagnosed colonialism as an inherently violent phenomenon. The imposition of settler culture on native populations dehumanizes the colonized natives. They suffer not only the material deprivation associated with the transfer of wealth back to the colonizing metropolis but also from a psychological deprivation. All of the institutions produced by colonialism are for the settler and are embedded within the cultural context that the settler is trying to transplant. Consequently, the natives cannot see themselves reflected in these institutions and cultural artifacts; they are no longer persons within a functioning society. Fanon devotes The Wretched of the Earth, in particular, to exploring the pathologies produced by colonial societies, especially within the colonized native. Deprived of their sense of personal agency, the natives internalize the violence that colonization imposes on them and deploy it only against themselves, their family members, and other natives, because they fear confronting the source of violence, the settler. For Fanon, decolonization has to be a violent process, a revolution rather than a diplomatic negotiation. If liberation does not involve violence against the colonizers, the circuit of violence that travels through the colonized population can never be broken. And if power is transferred through negotiations, the colonizers will obviously choose to negotiate with that segment of the native population which most resembles the settler culture, the native e´lites. Colonial power will not be ended; it will simply continue with a homegrown (but typically settler-educated) ruling class in the positions of power previously occupied by the colonizers. Inspired by, and in conversation with, Fanon, Paulo Freire offers his own critique of pathological colonial societies, drawn from his experience of the impact of colonization on poor Brazilian communities. He too speaks of the colonized as having internalized the voice

of the colonizer, explaining their lack of agency as due to a psychological division that pits the values of the colonized group against the colonizer values. In essence, both Freire and Fanon see a highly efficient injustice at work in colonial contexts; once the colonizing relations have been put in place, the colonized effectively dominate themselves by internally reproducing the authoritative voice of colonial power. For Freire, however, true liberation does not necessarily require violence. What the colonized need are networks of explicitly antiauthoritarian education and political resistance in which they can learn, through dialogue among themselves and with progressive-minded members of the privileged dominating class, how to reconceive their worlds as liberatory spaces in which their desire to live fully human, self-actualized lives becomes possible. Colonialism is unjust, in Freire’s view, for the reasons that Fanon identifies: Colonies that are controlled by a foreign metropolis lack the power to make decisions that are genuinely responsive to the needs of all of their people, and are therefore experienced by these disenfranchised groups as alienating, disempowering, and ultimately dehumanizing. Critiques of colonialism that depict psychological harms as central are important contributions to the project of constructing theories of global justice. It is easier to see, and understand as harms, the economic effects, but emphasizing the impact colonialism has had on people’s self-esteem, their familial and social relations, and their spiritual lives helps us to see the material well-being with which distributive justice is concerned as inadequate. While economic justice and reparations for colonialism are important concerns, they are, on their own, simply not enough. Examining colonial injustice through the question of psychological legacies can bring to light demands of groups who may be motivated by values unfamiliar to Western-trained and Western-socialized theorists. Andrew Robinson and Simon Tormey, for instance, make this point when they speak of global justice theories as limited by an insistence on the state as the guarantor and provider of justice and society as the beneficiary. This, they argue, betrays a “colonial logic” which reproduces metropolis-indigenous power relations through its inability to conceive of alternatives to its own instrumental rationality. Other anticolonial theorists – Gayatri Spivak, Stuart Hall, bell hooks, and Ngu˜gı˜ wa Thiong’o, among them – stress the need for residual decolonization projects that interrogate ways in which colonialism uses representation to consolidate the domination of the colonized other. Spivak’s work on the “subaltern” (the devalued other) identifies as “epistemic violence” the very project of constructing colonized people as “other”. British transplants to India who sent home narratives condemning

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the practice of sati – the supposedly traditional Hindu widow’s self-immolation on her husband’s funeral pyre – mystified and misrepresented this practice through, among other things, rendering these women as voiceless, incapable of speaking for themselves, and therefore presumably incapable of thinking for themselves. Both Hall and hooks take up similar themes of marginalization through misrepresentation, arguing that visual images of colonized peoples have been used against them, to convince them that they are indeed something other than the colonizers who are portrayed, in contrast, as the essence of a fully realized humanity. Reclaiming subjecthood, then, requires the colonized to fight for images that represent them and their communities as equally human and capable of agency. Ngu˜gı˜ likewise analyzes the capacity of language to colonize; language is not just a means of communication but also a carrier of culture. Speaking the colonizer’s language reproduces the colonizer’s values, he charges – a point not lost on communities like the Que´be´cois in Canada and the Maori of New Zealand, who have made language rights a hallmark of their sovereignty movements. The power and complexity of how one is represented means that even a sensitive recognition of diversity can be inadequate to the question of anticolonial justice. Diversity that sees some subjects as “other” – marked by race, gender, national origins, or other contingent attributes of identity – and some subjects as unmarked by these same kinds of contingent features is arguably doing nothing more than reproducing the same taxonomy of people that colonialism constructed: the civilized white men at the center and in charge, and the various others arrayed in concentric circles according to their distance from whiteness, maleness, and Western-ness. Anticolonial struggles against domination through representation must, at least in part, insist that we understand difference as an attribute of the relation one subject has to another, rather than seeing that difference as a characteristic inhering in some subjects (and not in others). In revealing to us – or, more to the point, having shaped – the existence of people whose voices, values, and aspirations are alien to the Western centers of power from which we theorize, colonialism poses to global justice theorists the perennial question of how we open up our theories to make them truly as inclusive and universally relevant as they aspire to be.

Related Topics

▶ Agency, Individual ▶ Economic Rights ▶ Eurocentrism

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▶ Exploitation ▶ Human Rights: African Perspectives ▶ Imperialism ▶ Indigenous Peoples ▶ Liberalism ▶ National Self-Determination ▶ Paternalism ▶ Post-Colonialism ▶ Reparations ▶ Slavery ▶ Violence

References Fanon F (1963) The wretched of the earth (trans: Farrington C). Grove Press, New York Fanon F (1965) A dying colonialism (trans: Chevalier H). Grove Press, New York Fanon F (1967) Toward the African revolution (trans: Chevalier H). Grove Press, New York Farmer P (2003) The uses of Haiti. Common Courage Press, Monroe Freire P (2000) Pedagogy of the oppressed (trans: Bergman Ramos M). Continuum, New York Hall S (1990) Cultural identity and diaspora. In: Rutherford J (ed) Identity: community, culture, difference. Lawrence & Wishart, London hooks b (1995) Art on my mind: visual politics. New Press, New York Ngu˜gı˜ wa Thiong’o (1986) Decolonizing the mind: the politics of language in African literature. James Currey/Heinemann, Oxford, UK Pitts J (2005) A turn to empire: the rise of imperial liberalism in Britain and France. Princeton University Press, Princeton Robinson A, Tormey S (2009) Resisting ‘global justice’: disrupting the colonial ‘emancipatory’ logic of the West. Third World Quarterly 30(8):1395–1409 Said E (1979) Orientalism. Vintage, New York Said E (1993) Culture and imperialism. Vintage, New York Spivak G (1994) Can the subaltern speak? In: Williams P, Chrisman L (eds) Colonial discourse and post-colonial theory: a reader. Columbia University Press, New York Stasiulis D, Yuval-Davis N (eds) (1995) Unsettling settler societies: articulations of gender, race, ethnicity and class. Sage Publications, London

Common Good ANNA MOLTCHANOVA Department of Philosophy, Carleton College, Northfield, MN, USA

The common good includes everything that benefits all members of a community. It is “common” because it is based on the likeness of group members in view of the specific nature of their membership and it is “good” because it defines the conditions of their flourishing.

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These conditions can be very general and universally necessary for a good life, and thus shared by all communities, like clean air and water, or specific, like the freedom to practice a certain culture or religion. In a political context, the common good is the object of justice because it defines the terms of the members’ interactions in a community. The common good changes depending on the context in which we consider it: the common good for the members of a nuclear family is different from that shared by the members of an extended family, or from the common good family members may share with their coworkers, neighbors, or fellow-citizens. The common good is the good of each that includes the good of others; this is why the common good is determined by the bounds of a community and the individual understanding of the conditions of existence of the community. The common good of a community can be based on the notion of individual well-being all of its members share. When individual notions of well-being diverge, but these individuals, nevertheless, consider themselves to form parts of a community, the common good has to do with the common conditions of flourishing that individuals gain by being members of their community while pursuing their own notions of well-being in their personal life. More specifically, members of a political community can agree that their community pursues the common good without achieving consensus on what constitutes individual well-being (Kraut 2002: 398). These citizens can share a notion of what it is to be a good citizen, for example, which would be the basis for their idea of the common good for their community. In the rest of this entry, I will concentrate on the common good of a political community. The idea of the common good is foundational in understanding the conditions for political legitimacy: if the common good is the goal of the government, citizens are ruled on the basis of reasons that apply to them because, in the end, the government promotes their well-being. Political power is presently always exercised over a territory. This is why, in light of the goal of the legitimacy of political power, the common good of a political community cannot be defined in utilitarian terms, as the greatest good for the greatest number of people within a territory; for, if it were, the common good would become the good of the majority within the territory, and could not be said to benefit all. Of course, if the greatest good of the greatest number is the notion of the common good everyone shares and individuals do not mind sacrificing their well-being to promote the well-being of others, the situations in which this occurs are legitimate in light of the

notion of the common good that governs them. Nevertheless, the common good cannot be straightforwardly defined through a summation, by a third party, of the majority’s preferences without trying to discern whether there is, within the territory that the community occupies, a consensus of opinion among members on the idea of the common good. One can also consider, as an alternative, whether all members would reasonably consent to such a summation. This is precisely the point of the notion of the common good when it is applied to the discussion of political legitimacy: that the common good can be reasonably accepted by all and that it benefits all in the territory governed by the political authority. The main challenge to the grounding of politics in the notion of the common good is the diversity of the conceptions of the common good among different group members. The notion of the common good of a society has to reconcile and include all of these views if it is to be a ground for the legitimacy of political power. An important account of the manner in which the common good might be discerned in a political community is articulated by Jean-Jacques Rousseau. His approach is to examine how individual attitudes to public decisionmaking ground the legitimacy of decisions. When participating in voting, each citizen should determine what is good for all, and they should do so impartially and freely (Rousseau 1987: 156). Rousseau distinguishes between the will of all, which considers private interest and which is the sum of private interests, and the general will, which considers only the general interest. The general will is not merely what is left after opposite wills cancel one another in a one person, one vote process, but what is common to all individual wills. “. . .What makes the will general is not so much the number of votes as the common interest that unites them. . .” (Rousseau 1987: 158). When the general will guides political decision-making, it represents the common good. It is often said that that the common good as defined by Rousseau can be articulated only in small homogenous communities in which the public-minded thinking of all members is facilitated by their knowledge of the community and their shared common interests. This concern suggests an important condition for the articulation of the common good in a political community: associates should not be driven by partial interest and they should sincerely consider what is good for all. The common good links the well-being of a community and the individual well-being of its members, because one’s realization of the preferences for the good life cannot be separated from the proper functioning of one’s society, whether the common good is merely

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a particular way of life everyone agrees to share or a more general condition of coexistence of multiple ways of life. Some, like Aristotle, would say that it is not even possible to consider individual well-being in isolation from a wellorganized community, from which it follows that promoting the common good is to everyone’s advantage. The notion of common good can be useful for the articulation of norms of global justice in at least three ways. First, given global migrations, it could help shape norms for the inclusion of immigrants, especially those coming from cultures dramatically different from the accepting community; it can help with the articulation of basic norms governing group rights within multicultural states; and it can provide a background to the justification of international norms that govern the diverse members of international community. When a group is perceived by the rest of society to deviate from the norms of membership, the common good excludes the perspective of these outsiders. While immigrants may be asked to assimilate in the name of preserving national values of their new country, the circumstances under which this demand is made and the way in which this immigrant group was included in the formulation of the requirements imposed on its members affect the legitimacy of the demand. If immigrants were not consulted and the requirements were based on what others, influenced by “national values,” believe to be the immigrants’ conception of the good, it is unlikely that conditions for a genuine articulation of the common good will be established. The demands and justifications for assimilation made under these circumstances are partial and cannot be legitimate because the notion of the common good was not generated by all members. The same reasoning applies to cultural, ethnic, and religious minorities that happen to live in the territory of a state. The majority cannot legitimately rule the minority if the rule is based exclusively on the majority’s view of what is good for all. In order to be truly publicly minded, members of the majority ought to avoid a narrow understanding of membership and inform themselves about the interests of others, familiarizing themselves with their views and preferences and engaging them in the political sphere of the state. A government/state can avoid being guided by a notion of the common good shared only by a part of its population by carrying out periodic reassessments of the general good. The common good for a pluralist or multicultural society should be defined so as to include everyone. All citizens have the minimal common interest of maintaining the conditions of individual and group inclusion that give everyone the opportunity to flourish.

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Publicly minded individuals want everyone to be governed by conditions acceptable to them. As long as citizens agree that their political community should govern itself based on reasons that apply to all, there is a shared conception of the common good; disagreements can be worked out because of their general commitment to public-mindedness. Since there is no world government with the powers equivalent to that of a state government, the voluntary compliance of members with the norms of international law offers the best prospect for the continuous well-being of the international community. In complying, each member implicitly assumes that others will also comply. This coordination game can be played best if participants are governed by rules based on the notion of the common good: in this case, limitations on individual actors’ behavior preserve some of every actor’s freedom. When governed on the basis of the common good, individual actors are governed by rules that apply to them because these rules take into consideration the interests shared by all members. The notion of the common good allows one to be outvoted and still be governed legitimately, but only when all those who are affected by the legislation were public-minded, and thus oriented toward the common good, when voting. One lesson that the notion of the common good teaches the international community is that there ought to be a periodic reassessment of international institutions to evaluate whether they promote the common interest of all participants. Individual actors, if they care about legitimacy, care about the ideal of the common good. The notion of the common good is a suitable background against which we can judge whether there is room for the international participants to responsibly question their views. Can a common good be found for the international community in spite of the fact that its members hold diverse values? The difficulty arises when the notion of the good life shared by the members of a group conflicts with political values that underlie the common good as it is articulated by the rest of the international community. In such situations, what are the grounds upon which the legitimacy of the international community’s interactions with the group can be preserved? Can those who do not comply with the majority view of the common good be coerced to comply? For the coercion to be legitimate, the affected party must have been given a fair chance to participate in the formulation of the notion of the common good. Moreover, the coercion has to be a last resort to be used only when a group’s behaviors threaten international peace, like when a group belligerently affirms its

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preferences regardless of the preferences of others. Suchactions of the group undermine not only international peace but also the continuing existence of international institutions. This group cannot ground its claim that the international community’s intervention in its affairs is not legitimate in the fact that the group does not accept the international conception of the common good as reasonable. Because the group’s actions threaten the very existence of the international order, the legitimacy of its disagreement with the international understanding of the common good is undermined.

Related Topics

▶ Basic Needs ▶ Citizenship ▶ Coercion ▶ Democratic Citizenship ▶ Democratic Legitimacy ▶ Equality ▶ Global Civil Society ▶ Multiculturalism ▶ Solidarity

References Finnis J (1998) Aquinas: moral, political and legal theory. Oxford University Press, Oxford Kraut R (2002) Aristotle: political philosophy. Oxford University Press, Oxford Murphy M (2006) Natural law in jurisprudence and politics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Parekh B (2000) Rethinking multiculturalism: cultural diversity and political theory. Harvard University Press, Cambridge Rawls J (1999) The law of peoples. Harvard University Press, Cambridge Rousseau JJ (1987) The basic political writings. Hackett, Indianapolis Rubio-Marin R (2000) Immigration as a democratic challenge: citizenship and inclusion in Germany and the United States. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Sistaire C (ed) (2004) Civility and its discontents: civic virtue, toleration, and cultural fragmentation. University of Kansas Press, Lawrence

Communitarianism MICHAEL MINCH Department of Philosophy/Humanities, Utah Valley University, Orem, UT, USA

Communitarianism names a late-twentieth century movement that understands itself to strike a balance between excessive individualism and collectivism, and between the rights that are associated with the former

and the responsibilities associated with the latter. Communitarians understand themselves to offer a “third way” between extremes that are polarizing in their philosophical, ideological, and policy-oriented forms. Communitarianism has philosophical roots and manifestations, as well as policy concerns and directives. It is at once an intellectual, and a practical and political movement. The contrast between individualism and thicker ties of affiliation draws from Ferdinand To¨nnies (1855–1936) in his 1957 text Community and Society (Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft, 1887). Communitarianism also draws from Durkheim (1858–1917) and his work on the integrating force of values and the relationship between individuals and society. Other sources include Hegel, T.H. Green, the Hebrew Bible, the New Testament, aspects of Christian theology, and socialist thought. But the single most important figure behind communitarianism is Amitai Etzioni (b. Werner Falk, 1929–), a sociologist and the primary founder of the movement. As a scholar, Etzioni is the author of 24 books and the primary force behind the Institute for Communitarian Policy Studies, at The George Washington University in Washington, D.C., where he is the Institute’s director. As a policy analyst and advocate, he served as Senior Advisor to the White House (1979–1980), and founded the Communitarian Network, a think-tank based in Washington, D.C., which publishes a quarterly journal, The Responsive Community. Just as Etzioni’s career as scholar, analyst, and advocate is one whole, so too communitarianism itself cannot be neatly divided between its theoretical/philosophical and practical/political components. Philosophically, communitarianism echoes republican thought, with its concern for the values, rights, and responsibilities of the relevant group(s) or societies(s) under consideration. Yet, against charges made by some liberals, the response, in the words of the “Communitarian Platform” published by the Communitarian Network, is “Communitarians do not exalt the group as such, nor do they hold that any set of group values is ipso facto good merely because such values originate in a community . . . communal values must be judged by external and overriding criteria, based on shared human experience.” Communitarians hope for “restoration” of “moral voice,” in “responsive communities” where moral standards “reflect the basic needs of all its members.” Communitarianism has been defined by its relationship to liberalism. Some liberals and communitarians have been insufficiently careful in their characterizations of each other’s ideology. Yet much liberal-communitarian tension, at the philosophical level, has been overcome

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due to a more robust dialogue than that which took place in the earlier years of communitarianism’s rise. Nonetheless, distinctions remain. Whereas liberalism focuses on the autonomy of the individual, communitarians see this autonomy as overdetermined, in fact, and overreaching in its universalizing claims. Communitarians claim that one cannot define oneself prior to one’s ends (Sandel 1887), and that our values are socially and culturally embedded. Communitarians claim that the liberal self has too often been presented as “unencumbered” (Sandel 1887) and “atomistic” (Taylor 1997). Another communitarian charge against liberalism is that the focus on rights eclipses what should be an equal emphasis on responsibilities. It is also claimed that there are no objective primary goods, as they are all community based (Walzer 1984; MacIntyre 1981). Those philosophers thought to represent communitarianism most importantly are, Alasdair MacIntyre, Charles Taylor, Michael Walzer, Michael Sandel, and Daniel Bell. As noted above, the dichotomization summarized here is under review and negotiation as liberal and communitarian thinkers seek greater understanding of, and articulation for, their respective views. As a matter of policy and politics, communitarians seek significant, if not radical, adjustments in policies pertaining to the family, public education, public safety and public health, and a host of other areas of concern. They hope to see “seedbeds of public virtue” planted and nurtured that are rooted in small and local contexts, as well as national and international institutions. Indeed, the contemporary communitarian movement was born out of a sense of moral breakdown engendered by, among other factors, excessive individualism. Etzioni, joined by William Galston, began to organize meetings to design communitarian approaches to key public policy issues. They were joined by, among others, Mary Ann Glendon, Jean Bethke Elshtain, as well as political figures and policy analysts. These efforts led to the Network, Platform, and journal cited above. The communitarian goal is to attend to social and political institutions, creating and changing them so as to meet the moral and material needs of all citizens. From the standpoint of global justice, communitarianism seems both a promising movement, and one about which two concerns are legitimately held. As to its promise, the rather considerable literature that has emerged from communitarian philosophers and analysts calls quite strongly for greater justice, equality, freedom, health, opportunity, rights, and power being made available to all persons through structural and institutional means. The Communitarian Platform notes:

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At the heart of the communitarian understanding of social justice is the idea of reciprocity: each member of the community owes something to all the rest, and the community owes something to each of its members. Justice requires responsible individuals in a responsive community . . . individuals have a responsibility for the material and moral well-being of others . . . the community is responsible for ensuring the basic needs of all....

Another aspect of communitarianism’s promise for global justice is its commitment to “strong democracy.” Communitarians are not majoritarians, but seek government that is more representative and citizenship that is more participatory. Communitarians believe that in the “multiplication of strongly democratic communities around the world lies our best hope for the emergence of a global community that can deal concertedly with matters of general concern to our species as a whole. . .” (Platform). Those interested in global justice think of democracy as a necessary means to such justice. The first concern is that communitarian thought remains insufficiently developed as to the needs and content of global justice. One may find inadequate evaluation of global capitalism, for example, in communitarian literature. While communitarian philosophers push against conservatism, many analysts and policy advisors in the communitarian camp may be seen to huddle too close to conservative ideas, institutions, and policies. The second concern is that communitarian thought is far too oriented to culture and politics within the United States and that nearly all of its contributors are US citizens. Yet, because the United States is arguably the world’s most liberal and individual-oriented society, one can understand the development of communitarianism as a perceived corrective to just this aspect of American culture and politics.

Related Topics

▶ Agency, Collective ▶ Agency, Individual ▶ Citizenship ▶ Citizenship Practices ▶ Collective Identity ▶ Collective Responsibility ▶ Common Good ▶ Communities ▶ Decent Society ▶ Democratic Citizenship ▶ Global Civil Society ▶ Moral Community ▶ Political Liberalism ▶ Responsibility, Individual

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▶ Rights ▶ Walzer, Michael

References Amitai E (2003) Communitarianism. In: Karen C, Levison D (eds) Encyclopedia of community: from the village to the virtual world, vol 1. Sage, Thousand Oaks, pp 224–228 Avineri S, De-Shalit A (eds) (1992) Communitarianism and individualism. Oxford University Press, Oxford Bell D (ed) (1993) Communitarianism and its critics. Clarendon, Oxford Bellah R et al (1885) Habits of the heart: individualism and commitment in American life. University of California Press, Berkeley Etzioni A (1994) The spirit of community: the reinvention of American society. Touchstone, New York Etzioni A (ed) (1995) New communitarian thinking: persons, virtues, institutions, and communities. University Press of Virginia, Charlottesville Etzioni A (ed) (1998) The essential communitarian reader. Rowman and Littlefield, New York MacIntyre A (1981) After virtue, 2nd edn. University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame Mulhall S, Swift A (1994) Liberals and communitarians. Blackwell, Oxford Phillips D (1993) Looking backward: a critical appraisal of communitarian thought. Princeton University Press, Princeton Putnam R (2000) Bowling alone: the collapse and revival of community in America. Simon & Schuster, New York Sandel M (1887) Liberalism and its critics. New York University Press, New York Sandel M (1982) Liberalism and the limits of justice. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Selznick P (2002) The communitarian persuasion. Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington, DC Taylor C (1997) Cross-purposes: the liberal-communitarian debate. In: Taylor C (ed) Philosophical arguments. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, pp 181–203 Taylor C (1985) Atomism, and what’s wrong with negative liberty. In: Taylor C (ed) Philosophy and the human sciences: philosophical papers 2. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 211–229, 187–210 Walzer M (1984) Spheres of justice. Basic Books, New York

Communities FRED E. FOLDVARY Civil Society Institute, Santa Clara University, Santa Clara, CA, USA

A community is a group of interacting persons with a common associative characteristic. The characteristic of the association can be geographic, pertaining to a particular territory, or it can be an interest such as a profession, hobby, or religion. An adult community can be

regarded as consistent with justice if its membership is voluntary, and if those such as children and prison inmates, who are held involuntarily, are treated by the principles of global justice. A geographic community can be based on a governmental jurisdiction such as a city, or it can be privately organized, with a contractual association. Communities with a common interest are not necessarily organized. For example, the stamp-collecting community includes members of philatelic societies as well as stamp collectors who are not members. Club communities have an organizational structure with members, dues payments, and services. A geographic community organized to implement a theme or particular rules is referred to as an “intentional community,” in contrast to a city in which there was no ideological purpose, or a condominium with no purpose other than to provide dwellings. Many clubs are non-geographic, tied together by publications and communications, and possibly with periodic conventions and conferences. Clubs include professional and hobby associations, religious congregations, schools, businesses, and political parties. A marriage is a community of the two spouses, and is in part a voluntary and contractual, hence a private community, but it is also governmentally established under the marriage and family laws of the state. The controversy over same-sex marriage illustrates how government is involved in establishing the institution of marriage and providing it with legal rights and privileges. The family is a loose community of parents, children, and other relatives, who may or may not live in one residence. Some people even include pets as members of their family community.

Private Communities Private sector communities are voluntary and contractual. Private residential communities include condominiums, residential or homeowner associations, cooperatives, land trusts, communes, residents of apartment buildings, co-owners of a house, and transient communities such as hotels, camp grounds, and ships. There are also commercial communities such as shopping centers, office buildings, factories, farms, and marinas. A condominium is an association of co-owners in which each residential unit has an owner, and each owner also has a fractional interest in the common elements. The condominium association itself owns nothing, as the common elements such as parking places, landscaping, and the roofs and outer walls are owned by the members, similar to a partnership. The fraction or percentage of the common interest held by a member is also

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its share of the association assessment payments, and the member’s share of the vote for the board of directors. A residential association is more like a corporation, since the association owns the common elements in its own name. The election of the board of directors can take various forms, including voting by tenants. The assessments paid by the members can also be based on various methods, including an equal payment and assessment based on the land or property value. In contrast, in a housing cooperative, the members do not individually own the units, but rather as a shareholder, a member owns the right to occupy a unit. In cooperatives, each member has one vote. In housing cooperatives,s new member-residents need to be approved by the board. In a land trust, the residents own leaseholds since the land is owned by the trust. The residents pay rent to the trust, which typically pays the property tax and provides community services such as parks and security. Residents of an apartment building typically form a community based on their common buildings and their tenant relationship with the landlord. The co-ownership of a house can take several forms, including tenants in common, joint tenancy, and community property for married couples. Joint tenants have equal ownership shares, while tenants in common can have whatever ownership shares they wish. In the USA, state legislatures may also enact community property, a form of ownership inherited from Spanish law. In community property jurisdictions, the property obtained during a marriage, other than by inheritance or gift, belong jointly to both spouses. In Spain, the community-property regimen de gananciales is the default if there is no prenuptial agreement. Transient communities have an association similar to that of tenants in apartments, except that the tenancies are for very short durations. The hotel community has functions similar to those of city communities. Hotels provide collective goods such as security, public transit (as elevators and escalators), pathways, parks (the hotel lobby), recreation, and facilities for conferences. Communities include those in transit, such as ships, airplanes, trains, and busses. A proprietary community is a private community with a single owner. The owner can itself be a collective such as a corporation, but the corporation has a single decisionmaking unit. In contrast, a civic association has more than one co-owner. A residential association, for example, elects a board of directors, but they represent all the owners rather than one voice. A single ownership provides for more control over a change in the use of the property, such as the replacement of an apartment house with an

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office building. With a typical homeowner’s association, the master deed requires unanimous consent to terminate the community.

Justice in Community Global justice applies the concept of equality as well as of moral constraints such as the avoidance of harm to others. In a private community, adult membership is voluntary, and the members have an equal legal standing as well as an explicit contract that provides knowledge of what is expected and what is provided. There are two levels of decision making in clubs. The constitutional level of an organization is the highest level of rules, and a constitutional decision of a member is the choice of joining or leaving a community. When one joins, one agrees to abide by the constitution of the club. Private communities enable the members to be more restrictive than the rules of governmental communities, such as abiding by religious laws or residential covenants, or less restrictive, such as in a clothing-optional resort. The operational decisions are those authorized by the constitution. For example, when one gets married, one makes a constitutional choice. The marriage is a voluntary union in which each party ideally and presumably understands that afterward, there will be shared responsibilities as well as constraints on future choices. A spouse may not agree with operational decisions during the marriage, but one agreed to the marriage constitution under which there are operational compromises. The voluntary aspect of a club, and thus its implementation of justice, is at the constitutional level, which should include an exit option. If one may not exit, then one becomes a slave to the club. Thus, justice for the marriage community requires that there be the possibility of exit, for example, divorce. In communities organized under a government, global justice requires equal treatment for similar circumstances as well as the protection of the individual right to one’s peaceful and honest free will. That implies freedom of association, the right to form voluntary communities.

Related Topics

▶ Communitarianism ▶ Contractarianism ▶ Moral Community ▶ Territorial Rights

References Barzilai G (2003) Communities and law: politics and cultures of legal identities. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor Christensen K et al (2003) Encyclopedia of community, vol 4. Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA

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Fellowship for Intentional Community and Communities Publications Cooperative (1990) Intentional communities. Fellowship for Intentional Community, Evansville Communities Publications Cooperative, Stelle. http://www.ic.org/ Foldvary F (1994) Public goods and private communities. Edward Elgar, Aldershot, UK MacCallum S (1970) The art of community. Institute for Humane Studies, Menlo Park

Compatriot Partiality Thesis WALTER J. RIKER Department of Philosophy, University of West Georgia, Carrollton, GA, USA

The compatriot partiality thesis holds that individuals have special duties to their fellow citizens that they do not have to non-compatriots (see, e.g., Miller 1995, 2005; Tamir 1993). Proponents of this thesis hold, for example, that the interests of needy fellow citizens are morally distinct from, and take precedence over, the similar interests of needy non-compatriots. Thus, the compatriot partiality thesis is often contrasted with the cosmopolitan ideal of impartial egalitarianism, the idea that all individuals are entitled to equal consideration, regardless of nationality (see, e.g., Tan 2004; van Hooft 2009). Of course, proponents of the compatriot partiality thesis do recognize that the interests of non-compatriots have moral significance (Miller 2005: 63–64; Jones 1999: 128). There are some general duties that are owed to everyone simply on the basis of their status as persons. For this reason, proponents of the thesis need to explain how general and special duties are distinct and how they fit together, or, as Miller (2005) puts it, they must explain their “split-level” view of morality (see also Scheffler 2001). They also need to explain what we ought to do when our general and special duties conflict. Though the compatriot partiality thesis is controversial, the idea of special duties is not. For example, it is commonly held that we have special duties to members of our own families that we do not have to people generally. Parents have moral permission, or even a moral obligation, to give priority to the needs of their own children over similar needs of others. In fact, parents may even have moral permission to satisfy relatively insignificant needs of their own children before seeking to satisfy more pressing needs of other children. In a similar way, the sibling we have not spoken to for 3 years may nevertheless ask things

of us that strangers may not. This does not mean that such requests always are or must be granted. The point is that the asking itself, when done by a family member, typically has a certain character that is lacking in the case of strangers. Generally speaking, the partial treatment associated with special duties is justified in terms of the value or meaning that some special projects or relationships give to our lives. For example, for many people, the family gives life much of its meaning. It is the reason why many people do many of the things they do every day. This gives the family a special place in our lives, and justifies partial treatment in favor of our families. Of course, nations are different from families in many respects, so it is not clear that this example tells us much about the compatriot partiality thesis. (For discussion of this analogy, see, e.g., Wellman [2001], and McMahan’s and Hurka’s contributions to McKim and McMahan [1997].) In any case, even if there is an analogy between the family and the nation, considerations like those mentioned above cannot justify just any sort of unequal treatment. Just what special duties require, and where they run out, is still to be settled. Shue (1996) illustrates this point by identifying several ways to construct the compatriot partiality thesis, and pointing out that different variants need different rationales and are open to different objections. For example, does the thesis hold that compatriots have priority over non-compatriots always or only sometimes? Does the thesis morally require that compatriots be given priority or does it only make it morally permissible to act in this way? Is shared nationality necessary, sufficient, or both for invoking the duty, or is it some sort of less definitive but still weighty consideration? Finally, is shared nationality the source of the duty, the limit of the duty (i.e., to conationals), or both? Obviously, different answers to these questions produce different versions of the thesis. There is also a question about the content of the special duty to compatriots. For example, the compatriot partiality thesis is typically taken to include a duty to care for needy conationals. Does it also morally require (at least some of) us to take up arms against others in defense of our nations and fellow citizens in times of war (Shue 1996)? These differences matter, because they generate different versions of the compatriot partiality thesis, each of which may require its own sort of justification, and be open to different sorts of objections. Lazar (2010) argues, for instance, that a special duty to support and improve shared liberal social and political institutions can be defended, but that duties of justice cannot be limited to conationals.

Compatriot Partiality Thesis

There are two general strategies for justifying the compatriot partiality thesis. One strategy grounds the special duty in intrinsic considerations (e.g., Miller 2005), while the other grounds it in extrinsic ones (e.g., Goodin 1988). Miller (2005) argues that shared nationality creates an intrinsically valuable relationship that ought to be given priority over some other relationships for this reason. Generally speaking, special duties arise from relationships that are (a) intrinsically valuable, (b) essentially dutyladen, and (c) not unjust or otherwise immoral. For example, friendship gives rise to special duties. That is, a friendship creates an open-ended special duty – owed only to friends – to support the friend and to keep the relationship alive. Why? First, friendships are intrinsically valuable. There are, of course, instrumental goods associated with friendship, but Miller correctly points out that these goods do not exhaust the value of this relationship. Friendship itself has value, over and above anything else it produces. Second, friendship necessarily involves reciprocal duties. Special duties to friends are integral to the relationship, in the sense that friendships are not possible in the absence of some shared understanding that the relationship brings with it certain special responsibilities for each party involved in the friendship. Third, friendships are not inherently unjust. Friends can, of course, commit unjust acts together, but the friend relationship itself is not morally troubling. According to Miller, shared nationality also meets these three conditions. The relationship between or among conationals is intrinsically valuable, is essentially duty-laden, and is not inherently unjust. Thus, the conational relationship comes with special duties attached. One common objection to this sort of intrinsic justification takes issue with the claim that the conational relationship is valued or valuable. As a matter of empirical fact, it seems that many people simply do not value the conational relationship. Miller (2005) responds that this is beside the point, because people could get value from it, if they wanted to. Further, he says, people who are indifferent to the inherent value of national identity are simply missing something important from their lives. But this is a controversial assertion. While Miller may be able to justify the claim that people could get value from this relationship, the stronger suggestion that those who forgo this source of value will have (somewhat) impoverished lives as a result seems much less compelling. It is just not obvious to many that people need this sort of value to achieve fulfilling lives. And it may be that this is the real source of this complaint. This is a problem for the proponent of compatriot partiality, because if it is true that people do not need the value associated with

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conationality, then the special duty to compatriots must lose some of its weight against general duties. For it seems somewhat selfish to insist on gaining yet another kind of value in our lives, and to insist that conationals do the same, when the resulting good is not necessary for human fulfillment, and when attaining it prevents us from helping others attain some good they need more. The other general strategy for justifying compatriot partiality grounds the duty in extrinsic considerations. For example, Goodin (1988) argues that general duties to all persons are what matter, but that the most effective way to ensure that these general duties are fulfilled is through the state. When general duties are not assigned to particular agents, they are ineffectively executed at best. Thus, we do best to assign general duties to specific agents, and to hold them responsible for performance of these duties. Compatriot partiality is justified, in these terms, because national boundaries are “useful devices for ‘matching’ one person to one protector” (Goodin 1988, p. 686). Nevertheless, the nation is not inherently valuable. Unfortunately, as Vernon (2007) and others have pointed out, and as Goodin acknowledges, the present world order does not assign such responsibilities very well. As Vernon puts it, this position suffers from a “poorness of fit between argument and reality” (2007: 455). For instance, at present, rich states have responsibility for rich populations, and poor states for poor ones, despite the fact that a rich state’s resources have much higher marginal utility for poor populations than for rich ones. Thus, the present order does not effectively assign general duties. Further, it can make things worse by suggesting that rich states have done all that is morally required of them once they have fulfilled their duties to the rich populations they are assigned to. However, Vernon points out that this sort of extrinsic argument may give cosmopolitans something they ultimately want, i.e., a means for assigning greater responsibility for the poor to wealthier nations that does not require the end of social and political institutions like the state. In the end, though, Vernon does not have much confidence in this argument. According to Tan (2005), it is important for cosmopolitans to make room for compatriot partiality. Some cosmopolitans are uneasy with special duties to compatriots, because these duties seem to run counter to the cosmopolitan commitment to impartial egalitarianism. However, as Tan argues, it would be something of an embarrassment for cosmopolitans if they had to deny the deeply and widely held belief that we are obliged to give priority to the claims of compatriots over non-compatriots. Tan holds that cosmopolitan approaches to global

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justice that reject compatriot partiality “fail to take the complexity and richness of human relations and associations seriously” (2005: 167). For this reason, Tan thinks it is important to find a way to make cosmopolitan impartiality fit together with compatriot partiality. With this in mind, he defends “limited patriotism,” a form of compatriot partiality that is limited by the cosmopolitan commitment to impartiality. Cosmopolitan justice “serves to establish the parameters for the practices of patriotism” (2005: 184). Cosmopolitan impartiality is the ultimate principle of justice when it comes to identifying a just global institutional arrangement. But once this basic demand of justice is met, people are free to pursue any and all patriotic interests that fit within the now just (cosmopolitan) global institutional order. Thus, for Tan, cosmopolitan impartiality is a second-order concern – a concern about fundamental global arrangements and institutions – and not a first-order concern about the day-to-day choices individuals make at home. In this way, cosmopolitan impartiality does not conflict with compatriot partiality. In the end, even if compatriot partiality is defensible, Goodin (1988: 667–668) points out that we must often treat non-compatriots better than compatriots. For example, we may take property from our fellow citizens for public purposes, as long as compensation is provided, but we cannot take property from foreigners in the same way, especially if that property is outside of our borders. We can tax our fellow citizens and force them to serve in the armed forces, but we cannot do the same to foreigners. For these and similar reasons, Goodin says, our situation is often more complex than philosophical consideration of special duties may reveal. It pays to keep this in mind.

Related Topics

▶ Associative Duties ▶ Cosmopolitanism ▶ Duties to Non-Compatriots ▶ Global Egalitarianism ▶ Global Impartiality Thesis ▶ Patriotism ▶ Special Obligations

References Goodin R (1988) What is so special about our fellow countrymen? Ethics 98:663–686 Jones C (1999) Global justice: defending cosmopolitanism. Oxford University Press, Oxford Lazar S (2010) A liberal defence of (some) duties to compatriots. J Appl Phil 27:246–257 McKim R, McMahan J (1997) The morality of nationalism. Oxford University Press, Oxford

Miller D (1995) On nationality. Oxford University Press, Oxford Miller D (2005) Reasonable partiality toward compatriots. Ethicl Theory Moral Pract 8:63–81 Scheffler S (2001) Boundaries and allegiances: problems of justice and responsibility in liberal thought. Oxford University Press, Oxford Shue H (1996) Basic rights: subsistence, affluence, and U.S. foreign policy, 2nd edn. Princeton University Press, Princeton Tamir Y (1993) Liberal nationalism. Princeton University Press, Princeton Tan K-C (2004) Justice without borders: cosmopolitanism, nationalism and patriotism. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Tan K-C (2005) Cosmopolitan impartiality and patriotic partiality. In: Weinstock D (ed) Global justice. Global institutions. University of Calgary Press, Calgary, Alberta, pp 165–191 Van Hooft S (2009) Cosmopolitanism: a philosophy for global ethics. McGill-Queen’s University Press, Montreal Vernon R (2007) States of risk: should cosmopolitans favor their compatriots? Ethics Int Affairs 21:451–469 Wellman C (2001) Friends, compatriots, and special political obligations. Polit Theory 29:217–236

Complex Emergency SUSAN P. MURPHY School of Politics and International Relations, University College Dublin, Dublin, Ireland

The term “Complex Humanitarian Emergency,” or “Complex Emergency” as it has been abbreviated in recent research, first emerged to characterize crises in a number of African states in the late 1980s (Duffield 1994) and became integrated into mainstream use by the United Nations from the early 1990s, referring to crises in Rwanda and Bosnia (Bok 1994; Klugman and UN/WIDER 1999). However, the idea of an emergency with complex causes and effects was central to Sen’s work on famine as early as 1981. An “emergency,” by definition, refers to a sudden condition of danger that requires an immediate response or reaction (see, e.g., Oxford Dictionary definition). A “complex” event is one that has several parts or dimensions linked together in a manner that cannot be easily or immediately understood or separated. Numerous definitions of the term “Complex Emergency” are in use in the discourse on development, disaster, and Global Justice. Perhaps the broadest conceptualization is the UNU/ WIDER’s account of social disasters or crises as events that place the survival of large numbers of people at risk from war, displacement, disease, and starvation (For a narrower definition see Albala-Bertrand 2000). It has become increasingly recognized that a critical constituent feature of complex emergencies is that they are human-

Complex Emergency

made events in which political, social, and economic dimensions combine to generate significant threats to the security and survival of large numbers of people. As human-made events, they are seen as perhaps more predictable and preventable than purely natural events may be. The subject has received much attention over the last 2 decades for at least four reasons. Firstly, there has been a significant increase in the number of complex emergencies since the end of the cold war. Secondly, this has been marked by a changing pattern in the nature of conflict from war between states to civil war and intrastate conflict. Such conflicts do not directly involve other states but can cause significant risks to neighboring states as refugees, displaced persons, conflict, and disease move across borders. Thirdly, the international institutional framework traditionally gave separate treatment to issues of peacekeeping, human rights, humanitarian affairs, and development. The complex nature of emergencies experienced over the last 2 decades has required interaction and coordination across all of these areas (Donini 2002). Finally, the consensus across both theory and practice that complex emergencies are human-made events that are preventable and predictable gives rise to ethical questions regarding responsibility for prevention and obligations to assist. The existence and persistence of complex emergencies raises two distinct sets of problems: one practical and the other philosophical. There is a growing political economy discourse that uses the most advanced quantitative and qualitative research methods to examine causal links and relationships between the multiple endogenous and exogenous variables within complex emergencies. This discourse addresses the practical question of how to prevent such events from occurring in the first instance as well as examining the causes of specific events and the measures required to address such emergencies (see, e.g., Collier 2007; Nafziger and Wayne 2002). The discourse on Global Justice directly addresses philosophical questions concerning how to respond to widespread and overt human rights violations such as: which principles should guide action in situations where emergencies occur (Ashford 2007; Bok 1994; Campbell 2007); who ought to do what for whom in these situations (Sen 1981, 2000; Wenar 2007); do those outside the event have duties to aid, and if so, how strong are these duties and what is the justification (Rawls 1999; Miller 2007); do those inside a complex emergency have a right to assistance (Ashford 2007; Caney 2007)? Many political philosophers within the literature on Global Justice have sought to address the practical and

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philosophical problems raised by complex emergencies in recent years (Pogge 2010; Wenar 2008). This research raises critical questions regarding responsibility, accountability, the limits and extent of duties of assistance, the limits of state sovereignty, and considerations surrounding who ought to do what for whom in the face of grave human rights violations. According to the UNDP Annual report for 2008, there are currently 34.9 million human beings including refugees, internally displaced persons, and others directly impacted by complex emergencies that have erupted in more than 40 countries since 2000. Such population movement results in significant economic, social, and political challenges for home states, neighboring states, and host states. This type of emergency has inter- and intrastate affects. The moral urgency of this situation is a central concern for philosophers within the discourse on Global Justice. Normative theorizing and moral deliberation are critical to unpacking the moral and practical problems such situations give rise to. A clear account of the problem is a necessary step in moving toward remedy and resolution.

Related Topics

▶ Absolute Poverty ▶ Genocide ▶ Human Security ▶ International Humanitarian Assistance ▶ Poverty

References Albala-Bertrand J (2000) Responses to complex humanitarian emergencies and natural disasters: an analytical comparison. Third World Quart 21(2):215–227 Ashford E (2007) The duties imposed by the human right to basic necessities. In: Pogge T (ed) Freedom from poverty as a human right: who owes what to the very poor? Oxford University Press, New York, pp 183–219 Bok S (1994) Complex humanitarian emergencies: moral quandaries. Med Global Survival 1:220–228 Campbell T (2007) Poverty as a violation of human rights: inhumanity or injustice. In: Pogge T (ed) Freedom from poverty as a human right: who owes what to the very poor? Oxford University Press, New York, pp 55–74 Caney S (2007) Global poverty and human rights: the case for positive duties. In: Pogge T (ed) Freedom from poverty as a human right: who owes what to the very poor? Oxford University Press, New York, pp 275–302 Collier P (2007) The bottom billion. Oxford University Press, New York Donini A (2002) The geopolitics of mercy: humanitarianism in an age of globalisation. In: Nafziger EW, Va¨yrynen R (eds) The prevention of humanitarian emergencies. Palgrave in association with the United Nations University/World Institute for Development Economics Research, New York, pp 253–268

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Duffield M (1994) The political economy of internal war: asset transfer, complex emergencies and international aid. In: Macrae J, Zwi A (eds) War and hunger. Zed Books, London Klugman J (1999) Social and economic policies to prevent complex humanitarian emergencies, policy brief no. 2. UNU/WIDER, Helsinki Middleton N (1998) Disaster and development. Pluto Press, London Miller D (2007) National responsibility and global justice. Oxford University Press, Oxford Nafziger EW, Va¨yrynen R (2002) The prevention of humanitarian emergencies. Palgrave in association with the United Nations University/ World Institute for Development Economics Research, New York Nafziger EW, Auvinen J (2003) Economic development, inequality, and war: humanitarian emergencies in developing countries. Palgrave, Macmillan, New York Pogge T (2010) Politics as usual: what lies behind the pro-poor rhetoric. Polity Press, Cambridge Rawls J (1999) The law of peoples. Harvard University Press, Cambridge Sen A (1981) Poverty and famines. Oxford University Press, Oxford Sen A (2000) Development as freedom. Anchor Books, New York UNDP Annual Report (2008) Available at: http://www.undp.org/ publications/annualreport2008/pdf/IAR2008_ENG_low.pdf Vayrynen R (1996) Research for action 25: the age of humanitarian emergencies. UNU/WIDER, Helsinki Wenar L (2007) Responsibility and severe poverty. In: Pogge T (ed) Freedom from poverty as a human right: who owes what to the very poor? Oxford University Press, New York, pp 255–274 Wenar L (2008) Property rights and the resource curse. Philos Public Aff 36(1):2–32

Complex Equality WIN-CHIAT LEE Department of Philosophy, Wake Forest University, Winston-Salem, NC, USA

Complex equality is the theory of distributive justice proposed by Michael Walzer in Spheres of Justice (1983). As an account of justice based on social practices and institutions, the theory is communitarian in its approach and poses obstacles for thinking of distributive justice in global terms. Such a communitarian approach, however, would be open to thinking of global distributive justice if, as a matter of fact, the relevant social practices and institutions have themselves become more globalized. The theory begins with an account of goods. The basic idea is that goods do not have an “essential nature.” In Walzer’s view, almost all goods, with very few exceptions, are social goods in the sense that they are goods only due to their social meanings. It is these social goods that concern distributive justice in any case. For a good to have a social meaning means that the reason

why it is valued is based in some ways on a particular set of social practices or institutions embedded in particular cultures. What this amounts to is the claim that without the particular social context from which it derives its social meaning, the good in question would be either not a good at all or, if put under a different social context, a different kind of good. Even health and longevity, for example, would not be the same good in different societies in Walzer’s view. The social meaning of a particular good determines a particular principle of proper distribution of the good inherent in that social meaning, according to Walzer. To have a just distribution of a good g is to have a distribution of g in accordance with the principle inherent in the social meaning of g. If the principle of distributive justice of g can be put in the form, to each according to dimension d, then d varies depending on which g we are talking about or more specifically, what the social meaning of g is. Call this “the Principle of Autonomy.” The Principle of Autonomy implies that in a particular society where there are two goods, F and G, that have different social meanings, it would be wrong for that society to distribute the two goods by the same principle, that is, along the same dimension, say D, because it would involve the misapplication of at least the principle of distribution for one kind of good to another. Not only is this violation of the autonomy of goods itself wrong or unjust, in Walzer’s view, it also promotes dominance in society. Suppose D is the appropriate dimension for distributing F, but not for G. By using the same dimension D to distribute both F and G, that society has made F a more dominant good than G and would give the group favored in the distribution of F an unfair benefit or advantage in the distribution of G as well. This kind of “boundary-crossing,” if wide-spread and consistent, would give one group in a given society dominance over all the others. Suppose D stands for wealth. The society we are discussing would then be a society dominated by the wealthy where they will have more of a great variety of goods such as political power, offices, honor, and health than the others. However, to prevent dominance by one group or a few groups over others in a society, it may not be enough that there be no illegitimate “boundary-crossing” across categories of goods. It would also be important that in that society there be a variety of goods with a variety of social meanings. Call this “the Principle of Plurality.” By having a variety of goods with a variety of social meanings, the goods are to be distributed along a variety of dimensions. In this way, one would be “spreading the

Complex Equality

bets” so that it will not be the same group of people who are consistently advantaged or disadvantaged by the distribution of goods. It is unlikely that it is the same group of people in a society who are diligent, well-born, smart, wealthy, healthy, charming, and skilled if those are the dimensions along which the different goods are to be distributed in that society. This is where pluralism meets egalitarianism in Walzer’s theory and gives rise to the notion of complex equality. By “complex equality,” Walzer means the state of affairs in a society whereby there are a variety of goods and the goods are distributed in accordance with the appropriate principles of distribution inherent in their social meanings. The equality in such a state of affairs is complex because each individual good may be distributed unequally, but it is the resulting multiple inequalities that do not favor any group consistently that act as the equalizer. Complex equality also satisfies both the Principle of Autonomy and the Principle of Plurality and the general concept of justice as giving each person what is due to him or her. It should therefore serve as the criterion for distributive justice. Simple equality, by contrast, is the state of affairs in a society whereby a dominant good, such as political power or wealth, is distributed widely and equally. For Walzer, however, it would require the violation of the Principle of Autonomy to have a dominant good. Furthermore, it is of paramount importance to continue to keep the distribution of the dominant good as equal and as wide as possible within a society because whoever monopolizes the dominant good would then be able to have monopoly over everything else in that society. But it may be difficult to do so without employing coercive means. Distributive justice for Walzer is primarily a local and not a global affair. This is because of his belief that almost all goods and certainly the ones that concern distributive justice are social goods and their value depends on their social meanings. Although goods do get distributed across national boundaries for one reason or another, Walzer believes the political community remains the primary depository of language, history, and culture and therefore the primary site where social meanings come about. Consistent with the Principle of Autonomy, Walzer is also against global “boundary-crossing” applications of distributive principles. As mentioned earlier, the same good, such as health, could have very different social meanings in different societies. (Strictly speaking, it would not really be the same good.) It would therefore need to be distributed according to different principles in different societies. In addition, there is also no reason to think that similar things will appear on the list of every

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society to be considered to be good, albeit for different social meanings. Taking all this in account, it would seem to be the case in a world where distributive justice, that is, complex equality, is achieved in each and every society, there need not be much similarity among these societies in terms of the pattern of their distribution of goods. This kind of diversity or pluralism, for Walzer, would also be a good thing. This no doubt presents serious obstacles to making moral judgments about distributive justice in global terms – judgments that either involve comparison across national boundaries or concern the global or international distribution of goods. It is what leads to the charge of relativism in Walzer’s theory of distributive justice. It is important to note, however, that it is not the notion of complex equality per se, but rather the conventionalist view of goods that is the source of Walzer’s relativism and the obstacles it poses for thinking about justice in global terms. It remains a viable option to adopt Walzer’s notion of complex equality as an account of distributive justice while rejecting or moderating Walzer’s conventionalist view about goods. Alternatively, while staying within Walzer’s conventionalist framework about goods and their distributive principles, there is no reason to expect that all social meanings will remain local given the increase in human interaction and migration across national boundaries and the emergence of regional and global institutions and practices. In either case, complex equality need not remain only a local concern. What in part motivates Walzer’s theory of complex equality in the first place is the worry that if too many goods are distributed along the same dimension, say wealth, then those who fare well in that dimension, that is, those who are wealthy, will also accrue advantages in the distribution of all the other goods as well and acquire dominance as a result. This could also happen globally if, for one reason or another, either distributive principles are applied globally or the distributive practices of different societies happen to converge. Without the mitigating pluralism of the diverse distributive practices of different societies, given Walzer’s concern about dominance, it would be all the more important that globally there be a plurality of goods that are distributed in accordance with diverse principles.

Related Topics

▶ Global Democracy ▶ Pluralism ▶ Primary Goods ▶ Relativity of Well-Being ▶ Walzer, Michael

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References Dworkin R (1985) A matter of principle. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, pp 214–220 Scanlon TM (1985) Local justice. Lond Rev Books 7(15):17–18 Walzer M (1983) Sphere of justice: a defense of pluralism and equality. Basic Books, New York Walzer M (1994) Thick and thin: moral argument at home and abroad. Notre Dame University Press, Notre Dame

Composition, Fallacy of BONGRAE SEOK Department of Humanities/Philosophy, Alvernia University, Reading, PA, USA

In logic, an argument (generally defined as a group of statements, called premises organized to support another statement, called conclusion) is fallacious if its conclusion is not supported deductively or inductively by its premises. Among these fallacious arguments, there are arguments whose fallacies are not detected by inspecting the formal (i.e., syntactic) structures of the statements. Fallacies committed by these arguments are called informal fallacies. The fallacy of composition is an informal fallacy that is committed when a conclusion about an attribute of the whole is fallaciously drawn from the same attribute of its components. Consider an argument: This football stadium is made of atoms. Atoms are small. Therefore this football stadium is small. This argument is fallacious because the whole (a football stadium) does not necessarily share the same attribute (being small) with its components (atoms). In other words, what is true of the part (atoms) is not necessarily true of the whole (a football stadium). There is, however, another form of composition fallacy. In this form of the fallacy, the relationship between members and their groups, not the relationship between part and whole, is considered. For example, when we infer an attribute of a team based on the same attribute of its members, we often commit this fallacy. For example, good football players do not always make a good football team because teamwork (group interaction and dynamics) is also considered in assessing the quality of a team. That is, an attribute of a group or a collective action does not necessarily derive from the same quality or attribute of its members. In sociology, economics, and social psychology, composition fallacy is regarded not only as a pattern of fallacious reasoning but also as a peculiar feature of human rationality and group behavior. The ordinary understanding of human rationality is that if members of

a group are rational, then the group must be collectively rational. It turned out, however, that this intuitive understanding is not always true. In economics, as demonstrated in the examples such as the tragedy of the commons, the individual pursuit of rational interest does not necessarily result in the increased group interest. In psychology, patterns of group behavior such as social loafing or free riding on group activities demonstrate that people behave differently (often inefficiently and selfishly) when they work together. Furthermore, cultural and social norms influence group interactions and add the complexity to the collective human behavior by modulating the degree of the emergent group attributes. It is observed that members of a certain culture, due to the influence of their cultural norms, tend to exhibit less (or more) degree of social loafing. From the perspective of justice, the fallacy of composition is regarded as a fallacious pattern of reasoning that derives from the misunderstanding of the relation between individual interest and group interest. Since the attributes of individuals are not necessarily the same or parallel to the attributes of their groups, there is always a chance of conflict between the two. If this difference and the conflict are not fully understood, the fallacy of composition is committed and invalid justifications of certain social policies are developed. Particularly, in utilitarian theory of justice, this type of conflict tends to be overlooked or ignored. The assumption that each member of a group works for his or her happiness does not necessarily justify the utilitarian doctrine that maximizing the total sum of group utility is the best way to achieve the happiness of all. If individual and group interests are incompatible, is it justifiable to maximize the utility of a whole group while ignoring or sacrificing the interest of an individual or a group of individuals? Probably, right-based or contract-based theories of justice that emphasize individual rights and their special interests and needs look more realistic and resilient to the conflict and the balance between individual interest and group interest.

Related Topics

▶ Common Good ▶ Majoritarianism ▶ Mill, John Stuart ▶ Prisoner’s Dilemma ▶ Utilitarianism

References Engle SM (1980) Analyzing informal fallacies. Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs Gula R (1979/2002) Non-sense: a handbook of logical fallacies. Axios Press, Mount Jackson

Condorcet, N. Marquis de Hardin G (1968) The tragedy of the commons. Science 162:1243–1248 Hardin R (1982) Collective action. RFF Press, Baltimore Mill JS (1957) Utilitarianism. Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapolis Olson ML Jr (1965/1971) The logic of collective action: public goods and the theory of groups. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA

Co-National Partiality ▶ Compatriot Partiality Thesis

Condorcet, N. Marquis de ROSLYN MYERS Department of Criminal Justice, John Jay College of Criminal Justice and Fordham Law School, New York, NY, USA

A descendant of the Caritats, whose title was adopted from their homelands of Condorcet, near Nyons in southeast France, Marie-Jean-Antoine-Nicolas de Caritat Marquis de Condorcet (b. September 17, 1743; Ribemont-surAisne, France) was a French mathematician and Enlightenment philosopher, whose contribution to social justice in France both before and after the French Revolution was manifold. Although his early academic successes were in mathematics – writing a calculus treatise at age 22 (“Essai sur le calcul integral” 1765) and, at 34, becoming permanent secretary of the Academy of Sciences (see “E´loges des Acade´miciens de l’Acade´mie Royale des Sciences morts depuis 1666 jusqu’en 1699” 1773) – he is most notable as a public servant and champion of social causes (“le bien public”), reflected in his polemical political career as an advocate for human rights (“De l’influence de la Re´volution sur l’Europe” 1786); women’s rights (“Sur l’admission des femmes au droits de la cite” 1790); religious freedom; the abolition of slavery (“Reflexions sur l’esclavage des Negres” 1781); secular hospital care (“Memoire sur les hoˆpitaux” 1786); criminal law reform; commerce (“Re´fiexions sur le Commerce des ble´s” 1776); voting procedures (“Essai sur l’Application de l’Analyse aux Probabilite´s des Decisions prises a` la Pluralite´ des Voix” 1785); broad educational access (“Sur l’instruction publique” 1791); jury decision-making (“E´lements du Calcul des Probabilite´s et son Application aux Jeux de Hazard, a` la Loterie, et aux Jugements des Hommes, etc.” 1804); and, at the height of his fervent efforts,

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constitutional democracy during the French Revolution. In all of these areas, he propounded the application of “social arithmetic” to human crises, hoping to establish a polity based on calculated, rational but liberal, approaches to societal problems that strive for justice, morality, and virtue. Condorcet is perhaps best known for his theorem, which posits that the aggregate judgment of many minds holding dispersed knowledge will represent the most accurate determination, is an early model of information aggregation. More precisely, the theorem states that a majority decision among a group of individuals who are more likely to be right than wrong will achieve greater accuracy as the group’s size increases, as individual accuracy exceeds random, and as the correlation of biases within the group decreases. Although the theorem was applied initially to a choice between two alternatives of which only one is correct, it has been extended to situations in which there are numerous options, such that the option receiving plurality support is most likely to be the correct one, assuming that each individual has better than 0.5 knowledge. The breadth of his work showed a restless multifaceted intellect that was as well suited to equations as the literary thought for which he was appointed to the French Academy in 1777. In 1792, he joined the new French Republic’s first National Convention, serving as chair of the Committee on a Constitution, and in that position, lobbying for “a republican constitution based upon equality. . .in accordance with nature, reason and justice: the only one that can protect the liberty of citizens and the dignity of the human race.” Despite or perhaps because of his outspoken and often impolitic criticisms of the growing Jacobin faction, among others, his version of the constitution was not adopted, and indeed he was eventually silenced by an order of proscription, declaring him and outlaw (“hors la loi”), issued by the National Convention in 1793. Although he is credited as a major voice during the French Revolution, he was also one of its tragic casualties, dying in custody on March 29, 1794, at Bourg-la-Reine, of undetermined causes. He is buried in the Panthe´on, Paris, France. His voice as a social theorist is best expressed in his posthumously published final work “Esquisse d’un tableau historique de l’esprit humain” (1794), in which he enumerated the stages of human progress. He was a man not only reacting to the crises of his era, but also a man who influenced the direction of history. Condorcet’s world was not infused with the kind of technology that permitted immediate global distribution of his ideas and ideals, and his effect on global peace is an indirect one. However, had he not had a “global” reach on

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matters related to peace, justice, and human dignity, he would have faded into the shadows of history as a merely minor character in this area.

Related Topics

▶ Common Good ▶ Decent Society ▶ Democratic Citizenship ▶ Equality ▶ Gender Justice ▶ Human Rights ▶ Legal Rights ▶ Liberties ▶ Natural Rights ▶ Political Representation ▶ Rights ▶ Slavery

References Badinter E (ed) (1988) Correspondance ine´dite de Condorcet et Madame Suard, M. Suard et Garat (1771–1791), ed. E´lisabeth. Fayard, Paris Baker KM (1975) Condorcet: from natural philosophy to social mathematics. University of Chicago Press, Chicago Burlingame AE (1930) Condorcet: the torch bearer of the French Revolution. Stratford, Boston Jolibert B (1993) Condorcet (1743–1794) (available online in PDF), in Perspectives: revuew trimestrielle d’e´ducation compare´e. Bureau international d’e´ducation XXIII(1–2):210–213 McLean I, Hewitt F (eds) (1994) Condorcet: foundations of social choice and political theory. Edward Elgar, Aldershot/Brookfield Robinet JFE (1968) Condorcet, sa vie, son oeuvre, 1743–1794. Slatkine Reprints, Geneva, orig. 1893 Rosenfield LC (ed) (1984) Condorcet studies I. Humanities Press, Atlantic Highlands Schandeler J-P (2000) Les Interpre´tations de Condorcet. Symboles et concepts (1794–1894), SVEC 2000:03. Voltaire Foundation, Oxford Williams D (ed) (1987) Condorcet studies II. Peter Lang, New York Williams D (2004) Condorcet and modernity. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

Consensus/Justification LYNETTE E. SIEGER Gallatin School, New York University, New York City, NY, USA

Political philosophers in the liberal tradition regard the coercive nature of political institutions as legitimate on the condition that those subject to such institutions consent to the governing principles and practices by which authority over them is exercised. Motivated to locate the source

of legitimate authority, Jean-Jacques Rousseau posited that the submission of individual freedom to the power of the state should be justified in terms of consent. According to Rousseau, legitimacy is authentic if every generation is able to accept or reject the form of government under which they live, with the end goal of securing the common good with reasonable minimal restriction on individual freedom. From this principle, democratic forms of government have emerged as the ideal form of government in the contemporary world because they facilitate achieving the aim of legitimacy via the principle of consent of the governed. In the global political realm decision makers often decide coercive measures absent of actual or non-coerced consent from affected parties and persons. International Organizations often legislate through state representatives, who often hold diminished or corrupted capacity to negotiate in the best interests of their citizens due to great power differentials between wealthy and poor states. Instances of acts of global governance without consent through democratic participation include global governance of trade, labor standards, lending practices, peacekeeping missions, and wars. Given the scope of affected persons, democracy, in the traditional sense of public discourse and elections, seems implausible for the global political order and is at this time impossible. The questions which then arise are how coercion of persons by global political institutions can be justified and how can global actors justifiably act. Contemporary political theorists have continued the tradition of consensus as a favored normative mechanism on which political principles can be justified and by which legitimate arrangements ought to be made. Ju¨rgen Habermas contends that it is only through the public use of reason that citizens maintain their political autonomy, acting as both author and subject to the laws by which they live. In an effort to reconcile the exercise of coercive demands of justice with respect for a pluralistic society of free and equal citizens, John Rawls developed the idea of overlapping consensus. Rawls argues that political justification ought to rest on a purely political conception of justice. Distinguished from comprehensive religious, moral, or philosophical doctrines, Rawls’s political conception serves as a deliberative guide that can be accepted solely on agreement of political values. Thus, a wide range of reasonable comprehensive views can peacefully coexist, each respecting the overriding power of political values on the terms that they are fundamental to the promotion of fair social cooperation and equal respect. Liberal ideas of pluralism and equal civil and political rights, as well as some degree of economic justice, are political principles

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that can be agreed upon from within various competing comprehensive traditions. Where comprehensive systems intersect is the point where we find the possibility for political consensus. Rawls regards democratic constitutional social stability as a necessary condition for overlapping consensus to develop. As such, Rawls argues that overlapping consensus can be particular only to liberal constitutional democracies and considers such societies as closed and self-contained. Global justice theorists, notably Martha Nussbaum, have expanded the boundaries of Rawls’s notion of overlapping consensus to include nonwestern societies – both democratic and nondemocratic – as well as transnational arrangements and agreements. Observing that there is nothing uniquely Western relating to ideas of mutual respect and toleration Nussbaum argues that the emerging human rights culture in the global sphere makes overlapping consensus a reasonable possibility in both the national and the international case. Political arrangements are malleable and apt to change as power and values may shift across a wide spectrum. No society is immune from the threat of change. Thus, it is commitment to the ideas of free and equal consent rather than actual social institutions which make overlapping consensus an open possibility. Though global organizations, such as the United Nations (UN) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) among others, are predicated on conceptual norms of fairness, equality, and consensus, the actual structure and practices of such institutions are tainted by asymmetrical power between wealthy and poor countries. Emerging as a result of this condition is the issue of coerced consensus. Economist Joseph Stiglitz alludes to the problem of coerced consensus, identifying that lacking access to and control over the vast economic and intellectual resources that wealthy nations enjoy, poor nations are compelled to accept whatever terms wealthy nations may impose as a condition for membership into the world’s most influential political and economic institutions. Where attempts to insist on fair rules may be made, poor countries lack the bargaining power to bear significant influence. This imbalance results in superficial consensus and structural violence. To remedy the defects of coerced consensus, Thomas Pogge argues that global institutions and their memberstate representatives should act in ways that never violate the principle of “do no harm.” Thus, the interests of one political community cannot be pursued at the expense of the interests of people of other communities regarding their basic rights such as life and life-preserving goods. This principle acts as a self-restraining guide for legislators

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legislating in the global sphere through a principle of what is morally justifiable. It overcomes the need for actual direct consent, which is not currently structured into systems of international or global governance, or consent via state representatives, which is often coerced and corrupted. Where a political act cannot be justified to all affected parties, it is illegitimate irrespective of consent. Thus, global justice is cosmopolitan. It is attached to individual persons and not states because all state representatives must take the interests of persons inside and outside of the state into equal account. Amartya Sen offers another approach to overcoming the problem of coerced consent, which is to broaden our conception of democracy as a process that goes beyond ballots and elections. Though ballots and elections are important institutional mechanisms to negotiate and legitimize political power, public discourse is a key element in negotiating global social cooperation. Global governance ought to be horizontal rather than hierarchical, integrating the needs and desires of persons that come to light through discursive processes. Certain ideals that enable individuals to participate in the political and social community and carve out a life that they find valuable should be promoted but always through engagement in the wide sense. Thus, consensus is garnered through a process of dialogue, interaction, and integration beyond the narrow engagement with states or their representatives or the narrow construal of interests represented by the state or interstate structure. It also preserves both the idea of consent and justification by extending how the concepts ought to be construed. In conclusion, global political institutions, as they evolve toward greater power and reach into the day to day lives of persons, must negotiate the terms for justified coercive governance. The liberal tradition of political legitimacy through the principle of consent must be conceived of in ways that are applicable to a system that is beyond the electoral process, without undermining the value of practicing coercion within the confines of the engaged interests of affected persons. The complication is that what is justified in the political realm is inextricably linked to what is consented to. In order to overcome the problem of coerced consensus and global inequality, consent will sometimes rely on judgments of what would be morally justifiable. The further development of consensus and justification is necessary in political philosophy to legitimize and guide political interactions in the global terrain.

Related Topics ▶ Civil Rights ▶ Contractarianism

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▶ Cosmopolitan Democracy ▶ Democratic Equality ▶ Global Contractarian Justice ▶ Global Public Reason ▶ Habermas, Ju¨rgen ▶ Law of Peoples ▶ Liberalism ▶ Nussbaum, Martha C. ▶ Pogge, Thomas ▶ Rawls, John ▶ Rousseau, Jean-Jacques ▶ Sen, Amartya

References Habermas J (1995) Reconciliation through the public use of reason: remark’s on John Rawls’s political liberalism. J Philos 92:109–131 Nussbaum M (2006) Frontiers of justice disability, nationality, species membership. Harvard University Press, Cambridge Pogge T (2008) World poverty and human rights, 2nd edn. Polity, Cambridge Rawls J (1972) Theory of justice. Harvard University Press Rawls J (1993) Political liberalism. Columbia University Press Rawls J (1999) The law of peoples. Harvard University Press Rawls J (2001) Justice as fairness: A restatement. Belknap Rawls J (2005) Political liberalism: expanded edition, 2nd edn. Columbia University Press, New York Rousseau J (1763) The social contract. public domain Sen A (2009) The idea of justice. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA Stiglitz J, Charlton A (2005) Fair trade for all: how trade can promote development. Oxford University Press, New York

Consent PAUL M. HUGHES Department of Literature, Philosophy, and the Arts, University of Michigan – Dearborn, Dearborn, MI, USA

The Oxford English Dictionary defines “consent” as “voluntary agreement to or acquiescence in what another proposes or desires; compliance, concurrence, permission,” and the verb “consenting” as agreeing with what someone else desires, or granting them permission to do what they desire, or assenting to what they desire. This definition encourages the interpretation that consent is a psychological state roughly characterized as a coming together of two minds, or a concurrence of attitude between two or more persons. But consent may also refer to such objective states as having achieved a certain moral or legal status (e.g., the “age of consent”) or having

actualized a capacity or trait (e.g., the ability to give consent), or the action by which assent is indicated (e.g., the signing of a contract, the utterance of certain words in specific contexts). Consent may sometimes be regarded as a promise which engenders both a legitimate expectation on the part of the recipient of the promise, and a moral obligation on the part of the person making the promise to fulfill it. If I agree that my neighbor may borrow my car a week from Saturday then, other things equal, he or she may take my car at the agreed-upon time. Consent may also serve to authorize or allow others to act in certain ways, as when a court of law allows a physician to withdraw life support from a terminally ill patient. Consent as promising and consent as authorizing are instances of a broader concept of consent which is essentially the power to create, modify, or extinguish specific normative relations among people (Kleinig 2001). In addition to these formal conceptions of consent, the nature of consent is also a function of the specific normative contexts within which it occurs and the experience of consent by people differently situated within those contexts. For example, informed consent in medical contexts, especially with regard to treatment options and decisions about life and death, is regarded as a crucial condition of patient autonomy. In law, the distinction between criminal and legally permissible behavior often hinges on the presence or absence of consent. In rape cases, consent or its lack grounds legal judgments of guilt or innocence. And consent sometimes excuses, partly or entirely, otherwise criminal behavior, as when a person is entrapped by law enforcement agents into violating the law. But consent does not always eliminate or transfer a consenter’s moral or legal responsibility, since there are many ways in which consent may be negligent, reckless, or otherwise inappropriate. The parent who allows his or her inebriated teenage child to operate a motor vehicle does not by doing so escape all responsibility for the harmful consequences of the child’s actions. Though commonly thought to be indicated by such explicit behaviors as speech acts (e.g., “I agree” or “I promise”), the signing of official documents such as treaties or contracts, a handshake, and other overt behaviors, some philosophers (e.g., Rawls, Locke, and Plato) have suggested that consent may be implied or hypothetical. Social contract theories, which argue that legitimate political authority and the obligation of citizens to obey the law may be grounded in tacit consent, are an example. On these views, a person’s residing within and benefitting from the actions of an at least minimally just state is thought to generate the aforementioned

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duties. Although the idea of implied consent is often at the heart of contemporary philosophical discussions of political legitimacy and political obligation within democratic forms of government, for those concerned with issues of global justice, the notion may have no meaningful application to a global order characterized in part by vast and long-standing inequalities and little meaningful reciprocity. The idea of implied consent to bodily organ harvesting is another example. So-called policies of “presumed consent” maintain that unless people explicitly refuse to allow their viable organs to be harvested upon their death, the state may take those organs if there is a need for them. The concept of “dissent” helps delimit the boundaries of consent. Dissent expresses disagreement with another person’s desires, with his or her or others’ proposals, or with a particular state of affairs. Dissenting attitudes or behaviors may generate questions as to the validity of consent in any given case, and, by extension, questions about the autonomy of those who consent. While it would be too strong to insist that all dissent compromises or negates consent, it is perhaps safe to say the presence of dissent gives a prima facie reason to query the validity of the consent at issue. Moreover, since empirical evidence suggests that people experience consent in ways related to gender, ethnicity, and perhaps even social and economic class, what constitutes in specific circumstances continues to be a contested question. (Scheppelle 1991). It is within specific contexts of where issues of local and global justice naturally arise, since obstacles to valid or genuine consent are numerous. The concept of informed consent within medical, legal, and political contexts invites queries about the types of knowledge requisite for legitimate consent in such domains, the conditions under which such knowledge is lacking or unavailable, and the bearing these epistemological concerns have on a person’s competency to consent, which in turn affects the validity of consent. It is, moreover, a commonplace that coercion, duress, and necessity often compromise, if not undermine, voluntary consent. Thus, for example, unjust global poverty fuels illegal markets in the human sex trade, illegal and legal commerce in human transplant organs, menial and dangerous employment, and requests by poor nations for financial aid from wealthy ones; all of which may be contexts of constraint similar in important respects to blackmail and yielding to the gunpoint demand “your money or your life,” which are typically regarded as canonical instances of lack of valid consent. Consent in circumstances of unequal bargaining power may likewise be compelled or “exploited,” generating concerns about

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whether participation by the economically impoverished in such activities are instances of global injustice. More generally, questions arise about whether and to what extent those governed by fraudulently elected political regimes or imposed military dictatorships validly consent to participate in those regimes, or in what ways international treaties and trade agreements made by governing officials reflect the consent of local populations. Given widespread and trenchant global economic disparities within which agreements between poor and wealthy nations often occur, there is reason to worry that such agreements are unjust, in part because the consent that undergirds them is invalid. In general, questions of consent are central to issues of global justice, since consent is so frequently thought to underwrite morally legitimate or “just” transactions between individuals and groups of people, and its lack is often an indication of injustice.

Related Topics

▶ Coercion ▶ Contractarianism ▶ Social Contract ▶ Toleration/Tolerance, Liberal Principle of

References Faden RR, Beuachamp TL, King NMP (1986) A history and theory of informed consent. Oxford University Press, New York Hughes P (2009) Presumed consent: state organ confiscation or mandated charity? HEC Forum 21(1):1–26 Kleinig J (2001) Consent. In: Becker LC, Becker CB (eds) Encyclopedia of ethics, vol 1. Routledge, New York, pp 299–304 Peter F (2004) Choice, consent, and the legitimacy of market transactions. Econ Philos 20(1):1–18, Cambridge University Press Plamenatz JP (1968) Consent, freedom, and political obligation. Oxford University Press, Oxford Scheppele K (1991) The reasonable woman. Responsive Community 1(4):36–47

Conspiracy Theory ROBERT P. ABELE Department of Humanities and Philosophy, Diablo Valley College, Pleasant Hill, CA, USA

According to political scientist Michael Barkun, conspiracy theory was once a general definition for any conjoint operation of persons, whether it was civil, criminal, or political (Barkun). But particularly after the events in the

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United States on September 11, 2001, the term has become a derisive one for those who believe that some secretive group is responsible for a significant and/or tragic event. Thus, for example, University of Florida Law School professor Mark Fenster defines conspiracy theory as “the conviction that a secret, omnipotent individual or group covertly controls the political and social order or some part thereof” (Fenster 2008: 1). Additionally, prominent activist and political writer Michael Albert defines conspiracy theory as “a hypothesis that some events were caused by the intractable secret machinations of undemocratic individuals” (Albert 1995: 1). Regardless of how it is defined, conspiracy theory bears some important implications for global justice. Some academicians reject conspiracy theory on the grounds that it is non-falsifiable (e.g., Barkun), while some reluctantly accept that moniker as a description of their studies (e.g., David Ray Griffin). But while it is certainly true that there are many theories about important events that are non-falsifiable and therefore intellectually dubious, that does not imply that they all are. While Barkun seems to make this mistake, Fenster does not. The latter author seeks to analyze conspiracy theory from what he terms a “culturalist” model, which indicates that the dismissive definitions and wholesale rejections of conspiracy theory miss the important role played by conspiracy theory within popular culture and therefore are misplaced. This entry is intended to demonstrate by example what a conspiracy theory looks like, and then to compare and contrast the main analyses of conspiracy theory, from the analysis that conspiracy theory is “paranoid” and “dangerous” (Hofstadter), to the institutional critique that rejects conspiracy (Chomsky 2006), to the “culturalist” and ultimately dismissive position taken by Fenster. Fenster is at once critical of the conspiracy perspective, but simultaneously maintains its importance in postmodern democracy. Next, the Fenster analysis will be compared with the conspiracy theory of Peter Dale Scott, emeritus professor of English at University of California at Berkeley, whose conspiracy theory seems to avoid the criticisms made by Fenster and others. Finally, the relation of conspiracy theory to global justice will be examined. Central to much of the discussion of conspiracy theory today are the events of 9/11/01 in the United States. Generally speaking, there seem to be two distinct aspects of conspiracy theories about 9/11: the actual attack on the World Trade Center towers and the Pentagon, and the official government version of events contained in the 9/ 11 Commission Report. Those whom Fenster calls “conspiracy theorists” reject the official report on the grounds

that the actual events could not have been perpetrated in the manner the Report describes: That 19 men hijacked planes and flew them into the towers and Pentagon, causing the former to collapse and massive damage to the latter. The “conspiracy” dimension occurs when an analyst maintains that the events of 9/11 were intended to serve as a “precipitating event for some larger, more nefarious project” (Fenster 2008: 241). Although Fenster does not suggest this, one might add that such a belief opens up both a “forward-looking” and a “backward-looking” reconstruction of events around 9/11, both directions of which may or may not show the movement of a number of players, united in purpose, whose machinations are in some way intertwined with the events of 9/11. Perhaps the best example of a conspiracy theorist today – one connected directly with 9/11 analysis – is David Ray Griffin, emeritus professor of philosophy and religion at Claremont School of Theology, in Claremont, California. As a self-proclaimed reluctant conspiracy theorist, Griffin regularly engages in vocabulary that portrays 9/11 as was what he calls “an inside job” (Griffin and Falk 2004: xvii–xviii; Griffin and Scott 2007: Chapter One). From there, he attempts to show how some nefarious agents, likely governmental, had to be involved in the events of 9/11. Additionally, Griffin consistently encourages a wider understanding of the term “conspiracy theorist” as “any time two or more people conspire in secret to do something illegal,” so that everyone in essence becomes a conspiracy theorist (Griffin and Scott 2007). All of this is susceptible to Fenster’s criticisms, as we will see. While this entry will not address the 9/11 issue directly, it is important to underscore the role that this significant event plays both underneath and within the studies being done today on conspiracy theory. It is also important to expose the presuppositions of justice that conspiracy theory holds, with direct implications for a global view of relations between nations and peoples. One of the original academic analyses of conspiracy theory came from historian Richard Hofstadter, who titles his book on conspiracy with the phrase he uses in the book to describe it: The Paranoid Style in American Politics. Conspiracy theories reflect “the non-rational side of politics” (Hofstadter 1966: ix). Thus for Hofstadter, conspiracy theory is a pathology, a psychological illness that can infect mainstream, healthy politics because they do not communicate through cognitive and open styles of communication, but rather rely on the rhetorical style. “Style,” says Hofstadter, is concerned above all with “the way in which ideas are believed and advocated rather than with the truth or falsity of their content” (Hofstadter 1966: 5). Whether or not such theories have small

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elements of truth within them, the fact remains that they are placed within an “apocalyptic and absolutist framework” which he thinks makes such theories either false or too exaggerated to be taken rationally and seriously (p. 17). This is not to say that Hofstadter rejected conspiracy theories on the grounds of their form: This paranoid style also refers to the content of such theories, in which the hysteria of the position twists or even determines the evidence needed to support the position. This is what puts conspiracy theories into the category of the nonrational. This is true for both left-wing and rightwing conspiracies, as Hofstadter takes pains to note in his book. It is the politics of extremism that such views produce that leads Hofstadter to hold them to be threatening to a democratic society. They see political events as a series of plots to undermine “proper” democratic order, and the enemy doing this is in fact a projection of the conspiracy theorists’ own fears and desires (Hofstadter 1966: 4). Contrary to Hofstadter, Fenster maintains that conspiracy theories are neither pathological nor dangerous, but in fact form an integral aspect of postmodern political life. He is critical of Hofstadter for applying a theory of individual pathology to a social phenomenon. Additionally, says Fenster, by broadly labeling as “pathological” any challenge to consensus, the characterization of conspiracy as a “paranoid style” serves as an excuse for neglecting and even repressing political protest and mass political action of all kinds, since it distorts them all by putting them under the same category. Thus, Fenster suggests an analogical use of the term “paranoia” in politics with its clinical definition. Hence, conspiracy theory is an interpretive framework that is in many cases delusional, but structured in an internally consistent and logical fashion. Conspiracy theorists are paranoid – Hofstadter is right – because they draw conclusions that are too strong on the basis of the scant evidence they provide, and their explanations of events are either too simplistic or too complex to explain the phenomena they seek. In essence, they bring totalizing explanations to events that move well beyond the norms of inference. Thus, conspiracy theory as a hermeneutical device is not pathological, just paranoid, by explaining events through a master narrative. Fenster does not deny that conspiracies do in fact occur. It is certainly true that secretive alliances between private individuals with shared interests who use institutions to further their own interests and power do take place. But he does not classify these as “conspiracies.” Nor does he think that structural, institutionally based inequities, or direct manipulation and abuse of state power for personal or interest group gain constitute

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conspiracies. Rather, these are the political and economic consequences of capitalism (Fenster 2008: 11). Fenster’s specific way of analyzing conspiracy theory as interpretative device is to conceive of it as both “desire” and “production.” Together, these concepts allow us to see conspiracy theory as an active, endless process that continually seeks, but never arrives at, a conclusion. Such a hermeneutic is an ideological, circular, and endless desire for a totalizing method of understanding and mapping social phenomena. Conspiracy theory also produces meaningful and intense effects along with a never-ending chain of interpretation (Fenster 2008: 96). It is from these two ways of defining conspiracy theory that he is able to conclude not only their ubiquitous nature in society, but also their marginal character. In fact, for Fenster, conspiracy theories really function to replace political engagement with a circular narrative of conspiracy, with its insatiable need to find information to justify conspiratorial assertions. To put the matter as Noam Chomsky does, it “draws enormous amounts of energy and effort away from activism directed to real and ongoing crimes of state” (Chomsky 2006). For Chomsky and Michael Albert, conspiracy theory is to be rejected on the grounds that a “proper” leftist critique concerns institutional analysis only. For both authors, there is an exclusive disjunction between conspiracy theory and their own preferred method of scrutiny of structural or institutional phenomena. For them, conspiracy theorists fail to recognize how “the normal operations of some institutions generate the behaviors and motivations” that lead to events such as 9/11. As Albert puts it, the primary assumption of his model (and that of Chomsky) is that “if the particular people hadn’t been there to do it, most likely someone else would have” (Albert 1995). Thus, individual agents and their interests are only facts about the institutions. Policies arise from institutions, not persons, in this perspective. Thus, Chomsky’s position might be called an “institutional conspiracy,” except that conspiracies require human agents, since there can be no “conspiracy” without individual intent. The institutional analysis of Chomsky and Albert, as legitimate as it is, is unwarrantably suspicious about evidence that might indicate the role of human agency within institutional activities. Their commitment to institutional analysis results in their own reduction of human agency to little or no merit in significant events. While Chomsky and Fenster are at times sarcastically dismissive of the conspiracy theory position on 9/11, the actual reasons Fenster presents for his dismissal are illustrative of a deeper point, and that is his ultimate faith in the very institutions that conspiracy theorists undermine.

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This would partially explain his sarcasm. Fenster’s presupposition of the legitimacy of the state’s actions and projects concerning the events and subsequent investigation of 9/11 (seen most clearly in his chapter on 9/11) are directly challenged by the conspiracy hypotheses. This brings us to the position of Peter Dale Scott, who argues empirically that the events of 9/11 and after demonstrate the “deep politics” that have been expanding in US government operations since the end of World War II. The institutional movement in this direction was precipitated by individuals who sought to increase their own wealth and power. If Scott is correct in his analysis, then Fenster’s institutional confidence is misplaced, as is his criticism of conspiracy theories. Since Fenster identifies Scott as a “conspiracy theorist” (Fenster 2008: 267, 355, FN 20), this comparative analysis is appropriate. What differentiates the conspiracy analysis of Peter Dale Scott, in comparison to the features of conspiracy theory delineated and rejected by Fenster, is that Scott does not presume a totalizing narrative. Nor does he seek an endless loop of information to support a position that can never be proven definitively anyway. For some, this might remove Scott from consideration as a conspiracy theorist. But what makes him one, according to Fenster’s analysis, is that he aims to trace out historically the movements, events, and “secret” decisions that “small cabals” of persons within our (public) governmental institutions have taken to replace (by intent) the “public” dimension of US foreign (and even domestic) policy with what Scott calls the “deep state”: an elite, authoritarian politics whose concern is with global hegemony. But because Scott’s analysis is at once historical, factual, non-totalizing, and non-paranoid, if his analysis is plausible, his may represent the most cogent place to situate oneself between Fenster’s rejection of conspiracy theories and those who fully embrace them, such as David Ray Griffin. But the key question here is whether or not Scott is vulnerable to Fenster’s analysis. For Peter Dale Scott, 9/11 can and should be analyzed from two different directions. First, it is the culmination of a series of historical actions on the part of the US government that dismantled public politics and led to an authoritarian, top-down approach to government. Second, 9/11 is the cataclysmic event which now threatens to move America beyond public politics into authoritarianism. The prima mobile for this movement is “secret topdown decision making by small cabals, toward the militarization of law enforcement, toward plans for the sequestering of those who dissent, toward government off-the-books operations. . .and toward governance by those who pay for political parties rather than those who

participate in them” (Scott 2007: 2). The major cause of this is “Wall Street’s secret intrusion of its views and personnel into American covert policy.” This is what Scott refers to as an American “overworld”: that realm of wealthy or privileged society that is not formally authorized by the people to run the government, but nevertheless have successfully influenced government operations and policies. It is the “bureaucratic paranoia” that results in the “deep state” that culminated in 9/11 and now seeks its fulfillment in the top-down form of government. This is popularized in former Vice President Cheney’s “one percent doctrine,” which states that even if there is a 1% chance of the unimaginable happening, one must act as if it is a certainty. As Scott sees it, this is “a license for untrammeled expansion of the secret deep state.” Note, though, that Scott does not attribute to the “overworld” a unity or coherence (conspiracy) that it does not possess. Rather, it indicates “a somewhat amorphous realm of sociopolitical change” (Scott 2007: 5). By tracing the secret creation of organizations within the government and by not involving the Congress in their existence or actions, Scott shows how, step by step, both by institutional expansion and individual and group agency intention, the authoritarian state has come to prevail in American politics, now all but erasing the public state of citizen representation and involvement. Although these are Scott’s main theses, he does not begin with them as a totalizing perspective or as givens, and then seek to prove them, thus winding up in the vicious circle that so concerns Fenster. Rather, Scott painstakingly demonstrates the historical events and institutional organizations and actions that have sequentially, through the decades after World War II, the American government slowly and deliberately was shifted toward private-sector control of government. Thus, Scott demonstrates the institutional movements that trended toward the top-down idea of government. However, he also combines the agency analysis so dear to conspiracy theorists. He explicitly states that since the 1970s, there has been “a coordinated campaign by a few wealthy individuals (such as Richard Mellon Scaife), foundations (such as Coors, Allen-Bradley, Olin, Smith Richardson), and their media (such as Rupert Murdoch’s News Corporation) to shift the political culture of the country radically to the right” (Scott 2007: 4). By this blending of agency and institution, Scott produces a narrative that has historical and factual documentation, and finishes with the kind of conclusion that so repulses Hofstadter, Fenster, and Chomsky. It is a position with which it is difficult to argue, since it does not advocate nor require circular attempts to justify its position, given that it is not a totalizing master narrative.

Conspiracy Theory

As Scott states, he is not opposed to deep state politics, since public politics is fallible, and since some secret machinations are needed in government. But the proper balance must also be struck, and right now it has been lost. Restoring it is urgently imperative. This demonstrates another dimension of Scott’s position that is not normal to conspiracy theory, and that is his attempt to demonstrate what actions are needed on the part of US citizens in order to overcome the movement toward the deep state. These solutions include the United States leading by example of its citizens instead of its authoritarian leaders, the people retaking control of Congress, and the muchneeded people’s effort to reunify civil society (left and right) in a recognition of common values, such as Poland’s Solidarity movement in the 1970s and 1980s. This would replace the current state of things, with populist movements attacking other populist movements with whom they disagree. The focus should be on the unrepresentative government under which we currently live, not fellow citizens (Scott, Chapter 15). By advocating these kinds of solutions and others, Peter Dale Scott capitulates and concludes his analysis. It is at once conspiratorial and institutional, evidence-based and solution-oriented. So, even if Fenster believes Scott to be a conspiracy theorist, Scott combines the best of that interpretative tradition with the institutional critique advocated by Chomsky and the New Left, concluding by advocating solutions to the problems he articulates, having demonstrated that the conclusions he has reached are based on the preponderance of the evidence. If conspiracy theories are engaged by taking into account both agency and structure, they can play a critical role in analyzing political institutions and their machinations. Although contemporary conspiracy theorists do not normally analyze their position from a deliberated viewpoint on justice, this notion certainly plays a pivotal role in the underpinnings of conspiracy analysis. After all, what good would it do to point out “nefarious” deeds of agents and institutions unless some paradigm of justice was assumed? On the global level, such a paradigm of justice may be woven into the fabric of conspiracy theory along two distinct lines: Just War Theory, and larger concerns for justice. Regarding Just War Theory, each of the analytic positions discussed above is concerned with the issues of dominance and power. Thus, any attempt on the part of government agents or institutional actions to enhance either of these desires by attacking another nation or oppressing them economically or militarily would be susceptible to sharp criticism. The only just cause of a war is a defensive one, not a preventive one. There is a long

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tradition in Western thought that morally condemns such actions regarding other principalities or nations. For example, St. Augustine provides only two justified causes for going to war: a defensive war – that is, one which punishes unjust actions on the part of an aggressor; and an offensive war, justified if a state refuses to make reparations for wrong done, or if it fails to return pilfered property (City of God, I, 21). Thomas Aquinas adds to this that it is justified for a state to respond when being attacked. These two thinkers helped to establish our tradition of justice concerning political or military domination and power over others (Summa Theologiae, I-II, Q. 105, a. 3). In contemporary thinking on this issue, Michael Walzer has continued this tradition by stating that “just cause” means a response to a threat to territorial integrity or sovereignty (Walzer 1977). Threats by one nation to attack in order to control the resources or actions of another nation would give the latter nation a right to war in defense. Thus, such wars for dominance would be inherently unjust, having committed the crime of aggression. As to global justice per se, the function of conspiracy theory in pointing out the use of political institutions and operations for the purpose of increasing wealth and power, and subsequently hegemony in the world by dominating resources and potential threats to dominance would be quite useful for analytical purposes. If, for example, the United States is in fact operating under the Cheney “one percent doctrine,” then notions of universal justice and condemnations of acts which threaten and abuse other peoples and nations must be engaged. The inherent injustice of such paranoid need for domination can be seen in the cosmopolitan viewpoint of philosophers like Thomas Pogge and Charles Beitz, both of whom argue that there is ample evidence of a global pattern of economic and cultural interlinking between persons. National boundaries do not mark off the limits or extent of social obligations. On this view, global justice requires cooperation of all persons regardless of national standing. Or, to put it as Charles Beitz does in adapting Rawls’ Original Position, “the parties to the original position cannot be assumed to know that they are members of a particular national society;” thus, the principles one would choose to see operative in the world would include all the persons in the world, such that the scheme of social cooperation would be to the advantage of the least advantaged in the world (Beitz 1979; see also Pogge 1989). From whatever viewpoint of global justice one takes, the practices of dominance and the self-interested motives of power and wealth are eschewed as incongruent with justice. But if conspiracy theory is after anything, it is after

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the actions of powerful elite engaging in nefarious activities for their own benefit, and this is an element of political analysis that all parties can begin dialogue by agreeing to.

Related Topics

▶ Agency, Collective ▶ Beitz, Charles ▶ Cosmopolitan Justice ▶ Empire ▶ Foreign Policy ▶ Global Basic Structure ▶ Global Justice ▶ Political Representation

References Albert M (1995) Conspiracy theory. Z Magazine, Aug 1995 Barkun M (2003) A culture of conspiracy: apocalyptic visions in contemporary America. University of California Press, Berkeley Beitz Ch (1979) Bounded morality: justice and the state in world politics. Int Organ 33(3):405–424 Chomsky N (2006) 9–11: institutional analysis vs. conspiracy theory. Z Magazine, Oct 2006 Clark S (2007) Conspiracy theories and the internet: controlled demolition and arrested development. Episteme 4(2):167–180 Coady D (2006) Conspiracy theories: the philosophical debate. Ashgate Publishing, London Fenster M (2008) Conspiracy theories: secrecy and power in American culture. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis Griffin DR, Falk R (2004) The new Pearl Harbor. Interlink Publishing Group, Inc., Northampton Griffin DR, Scott PD (2007) 9/11 and American empire: intellectuals speak out. Interlink Publishing Group, Inc., Northampton Hofstadter R (1966) The paranoid style in American politics. Knopf, New York Keeley BL (1999) Of conspiracy theories. J Philos 96(3):109–126 Parenti M (1996) Dirty truths. City Lights Books, San Francisco Pogge Th (1989) Realizing Rawls. Cornell, Ithaca Scott PD (2007) The road to 9/11. University of California Press, Berkeley Walzer M (1977) Just and unjust wars: a moral argument with historical illustrations. HarperCollins, New York

Constructivism MICHAEL BUCKLEY Department of Philosophy, Lehman College, City University of New York, Bronx, NY, USA

The metaphor of construction has been used in various ways to name different theoretical approaches across a range of disciplines, including mathematics, education, legal theory, and social epistemology. In political theory,

the metaphor is closely associated with international relations theory and political philosophy, where it names theories emphasizing the role of human thought in creating, or constructing, the principles and concepts that guide political action. Despite this shared feature, international relations (IR) constructivists are interested in different questions than constructivists in political philosophy. Constructivism in IR theory focuses on how social processes of collective meaning help form identities and interests, which in turn define situations as calling for certain actions. Constructivism in political philosophy is a theoretical position concerning the justification and objectivity of political principles and judgments. Since the former does not directly address issues of global justice, this entry will focus on constructivism in political philosophy, which is directly concerned with justice. The metaphor of construction might seem to imply a subjective approach to normative political theory, since human thought plays a critical role in constructing political principles. However, the opposite is the case. Constructivism says that principles are justified as objectively valid whenever they result from deliberations guided by appropriate standards of practical reasoning, and that these principles specify which facts about persons, institutions, and society are morally relevant. In this way, constructivism reverses our ordinary view of “truth” as an accurate judgment about some “fact” existing independently of us by making “true” political judgments, and the “facts” to which they refer depend upon our having first constructed, through practical reason, objectively valid principles. As such, particular moral judgments are “true” when they are consistent with objective principles, and the “facts” serving as the objects of true moral judgments are singled out only after objective principles have been constructed. At the core of this approach is an attempt to balance the following two claims: First, moral and political principles depend on us – especially on our concepts of persons and society together with certain facts about human relations. Second, the proper combination of those concepts and facts generate objectively valid principles. The first claim is familiar to ethics, but is usually associated with a subjective rather than objective view of ethics, as in the case of moral or cultural relativism. However, constructivism in political philosophy says that mind-dependent principles can be objective. As a result, constructivism attempts to navigate a middle path between moral realism and subjectivist ethical theories. The political philosopher John Rawls is most often associated with contemporary versions of constructivism.

Constructivism

On his view, principles are justified as objectively valid in virtue of being chosen within a hypothetical choice procedure called the original position. Rawls argues that the original position reflects appropriate standards of rationality when thinking about issues of social justice, and that anyone reasoning in accordance with these standards will arrive at the correct principles of social justice. The challenge faced by this approach is to explain why certain standards of practical reason, such as those modeled into the original position, appropriately guide deliberations. Rawls provides two responses reflecting two historical sources of constructivism. The first response is that the standards modeled into the original position, along with the principles they support, match our everyday intuitions about justice on due reflection. Rawls calls this reflective equilibrium; it represents a kind of coherentist justification of the original position and the principles chosen within it. The second response emphasizes the manner in which the ideas embedded in the original position – along with the principles chosen – solve particular political problems. On this view, justification is conceived as a practical enterprise. These two responses share certain features and a common history. One historical source is Immanuel Kant, who employed a procedural device called the Categorical Imperative to determine whether subjective maxims were universalizable, and thus objectively valid. According to Kant’s deontological approach, the constructivist aims to identify certain axiomatic rules of practical reason from which to derive normative principles of right that constrain conceptions of the good. A second historical source is social contract theory, which aims to justify principles by showing them to be, in virtue of a freely entered contractual agreement, acceptable to all affected by the principles. On certain interpretations of social contract theory, the aim is to analyze political problems and offer solutions satisfying the interests of all involved. Rawlsian constructivism is significantly influenced by both historical approaches, and each is naturally associated with the more general features of constructivism, given their emphasis on human agency in the creation and justification of principles. Indeed, it is this emphasis that lends constructivism its liberal character. Often, constructivists favor liberal political arrangements stressing individual human rights and equality. However, constructivism does not demand liberalism. For this reason, a constructivist like Rawls can defend a set of domestic principles supporting liberal political arrangements, and without contradiction defend a set of global principles

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accepting non-liberal states as legitimate members of a just global order. Rawls’s The Law of Peoples represents the first substantial attempt to develop a constructivist theory of global justice. As with the domestic case, Rawls employs a hypothetical procedure incorporating what he believes to be the appropriate standards of practical reasoning for global justice. Unlike his domestic theory, the principles chosen within this hypothetical procedure do not support a robust liberal conception of justice. Instead, they support an international order consisting of both liberal and non-liberal states, or peoples, whereby the legitimacy of each state depends upon its respecting and following standard post–World War II principles of international relations, including the principle of nonintervention, just war principles, and respect for basic human rights. Because Rawls’s theory takes states as the key actors of global justice, it is often labeled “statist.” This contrasts with “cosmopolitan” theories of global justice, which view individual persons as the basic unit of moral analysis from which all political institutions – both domestic and global – are assessed. Interestingly, it was Rawls’s domestic theory of social justice that inspired contemporary cosmopolitan theory. For example, Charles Beitz relied heavily on Rawls’s domestic theory when designing a hypothetical procedure for global distributive principles of justice. Not surprisingly, the Rawlsian-inspired procedure employed by Beitz supports a robust liberal principle of global distributive justice, with strong egalitarian implications. The fact that two constructivist theories of global justice result in two different conceptions of justice returns us to the key challenge of constructivism, namely, to identify why certain standards of practical reason appropriately govern practical deliberations about a particular political subject. Absent an answer to this question, constructivism opens itself up to the charge of circularity, whereby the critic maintains that the procedure is purposely designed to generate the philosopher’s preferred outcome. Much of the current work on constructivism focuses on this issue, with theorists developing both the deontological strand represented by Kantian constructivism, and the pragmatic strand represented by social contract theory.

Related Topics

▶ Cosmopolitanism ▶ Global Distributive Justice ▶ Law of Peoples ▶ Rawls, John

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References Beitz C (1979) Political theory and international relations. Princeton University Press, Princeton Korsgaard C (2003) Realism and constructivism in twentieth-century moral philosophy. J Philos Res (APA Centennial Suppl):99–122 O’Neill O (1996) Towards justice and virtue: a constructive account of practical reasoning. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Rawls J (1999a) Kantian constructivism in moral theory. In: Freeman S (ed) Collected papers. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, pp 303–358 Rawls J (1999b) The law of peoples. Harvard University Press, Cambridge Wendt A (1992) Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics. Int Organ 46(2):391–425

Consumerism RYAN JENKINS Department of Philosophy, University of Colorado at Boulder, Boulder, CO, USA

Consumerism refers fundamentally to the belief that continued and increasing consumption is economically beneficial. Other meanings of the term derive from this core meaning, including: a person’s engaging in overconsumption or “conspicuous consumption,” or governmental policies meant to encourage this kind of behavior. Finally, and most importantly, critics have used the term pejoratively to refer to any of the above. The focus of this chapter will be those criticisms of consumption as, in the light of global justice, the term consumerism is used most commonly in criticisms of these societal practices and policies. Concerns about consumerism are concerns about the way consumers spend money and the way they are encouraged to spend money. There are many reasons why concerns about consumerism would dovetail into considerations of global justice. Utilitarians, to begin, would object that the kinds of spending embodied by consumerism are not the kinds of spending that can be expected to maximize utility. This line of argument is straightforward: buying a Cadillac when I could contribute to UNICEF is not the kind of action that a utilitarian would normally endorse, and they might fault a culture of consumption for making those kinds of decisions more common. There are other reasons why critics charge we should be concerned about how we spend our money as consumers. First, many of the products purchased in the developed world are the result of unjust labor practices. This is perhaps the most notorious cause ce´le`bre of critics

of consumption, as for a long time the anti-sweatshop movement was one of the most visible factions of the anti-consumerist movement. Many items are produced by workers in the developing world under poor conditions for compensation resembling “wage slavery.” Workers are often coerced into working or brutalized in these conditions. Critics of consumerism, then, would argue that we ought not reward this kind of production process with our spending. Second, critics assert we ought to be worried about how our patterns of consumption adversely affect the environment. There are two ways this could happen. First, many countries in the developing world have minimal environmental protections, meaning that their industries can be especially harmful to the ecosystem. This includes practices like slash-and-burn farming for soybean production, mountaintop removal for mining coal, or overfishing of already threatened stocks in international waters. Critics assert that buying products that result from these practices is irresponsible because the practices are unsustainable. Second, besides the production of items in the developing world, our consuming resources in the developed world can also have a serious impact on the environment. Since the debate over anthropogenic climate change has been settled in the scientific community, the moral question of how we consume – and how much we consume – has been brought into higher relief. Rising ocean temperatures threaten to alter global weather patterns, causing unpredictable changes that might disrupt food supplies or flood lowland areas. This is an especially worrisome problem, as the developed world is responsible for the overwhelming majority of climate change emissions, while the developing world is in the worst position to adapt to changing weather patterns or rising sea levels. Many feel this is an injustice because the benefits enjoyed by the global north result in burdens shouldered primarily by the south. Third, many corporations in the United States benefit from partnerships with notoriously undemocratic regimes. Critics accuse these international corporations of turning a blind eye to the kind of violence and repression that is part and parcel of their supply line. Diamonds have become a symbol of the link between conspicuous consumption and atrocious mining methods, perhaps in part because of the irony of such a connection. Diamonds have been mined from Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Angola by rebel groups and sold to international buyers in order to fund violent insurgencies. Worries persist that titanium, tungsten, gold, and other minerals mined in the Democratic Republic of the Congo are produced by the use of slavery. There is great demand for these minerals in the

Consumerism

developed world, as they are popular in electronics and rechargeable batteries, for example, and the local mining profits are used to finance the Second Congo War, the deadliest conflict since World War II. These have been identified as some of the ways – presumably the most important ways – that our choices as consumers have an impact on people in the developing world. There are two strains in the literature that offer different solutions to this problem: a broadly utilitarian strain and a broadly structuralist one. What follows is a discussion of both traditions.

The Utilitarian Approach In John Stuart Mill’s Utilitarianism, Mill famously said that morality requires us to be as “strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator.” This would seem to demand that we include all humankind in our moral deliberations, and Mill indeed lauded this generalized benevolence. At the same time, however, he said it was a mistake to think that utilitarianism demanded a globalized concern for others from its adherents. “It is a misapprehension of the utilitarian mode of thought,” Mill says, “to conceive it as implying that people should fix their minds upon so wide a generality as the world.” This, he thought, was because “the occasions on which any person. . . has it in his power to. . . be a public benefactor, are but exceptional,” while the great majority of our decisions will only affect the well-being of those much closer to us. However, by the time Peter Singer published his groundbreaking essay, “Famine, Affluence and Morality” in 1972, the situation had changed. Singer’s article is today regarded as the paradigm of contemporary utilitarian arguments in favor of global redistributive justice. Singer lambastes the developed world for lavishing money on the Concorde Project and on the new Sydney Opera House, comparing the amount spent on those with the amount given so far to ameliorate the then-current Bengali refugee crisis. Differentiating himself from Mill, Singer argues that, since the rise of transnational charity organizations, the great majority of us in the developed world now have the capacity to significantly relieve the suffering of those in the developing world. Every dollar we spend, therefore, whether on a sandwich, a new car, or a movie rental, is a dollar that could have been given to Oxfam International – is a dollar that could have saved a life. Since donating our money to charity would bring about a better effect than spending it on a sandwich or a new car for ourselves would, we are obligated to do the former. Singer has since become a public intellectual, writing books on our ability

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to alleviate global poverty and urging us to do so rather than, say, buy that new Camaro. Peter Unger is another proponent of the utilitarian approach to global justice. His book Living High and Letting Die is subtitled, “Our Illusion of Innocence.” He makes skilled use of thought experiments to show that the justifications we commonly give for failing to benefit those in the developing world are faulty ones. He falls in line with Singer’s approach, and the broader utilitarian tradition, of arguing that we are required to bring about the best state of affairs we can, which almost certainly means opting to donate money to global charities rather than engaging in the kind of conspicuous consumption that characterizes Western capitalism.

The Structuralist Approach Opposed to the utilitarian tradition is the structuralist approach. The clear virtue of the utilitarian criticism of consumption is its simplicity. But structuralist theorists worry that this simplicity can only take us so far. Structuralists say in response that there is more to eradicating global poverty, environmental degradation, etc., than just “buying this and not that.” Even the most considerate and reflective consumers cannot overturn unfair tariffs or strengthen environmental protections in the developing world. Barack Obama came under fire during the 2008 presidential campaign for suggesting that Americans check the air in their tires as a way to conserve gasoline. The sentiment echoed from his critics on that occasion was likely a structuralist one: making sure my tires have air – though it does improve my car’s fuel efficiency – will not alter OPEC’s practices or decrease demand for coal power plants. (This occurred while Obama privately confided to Newsweek that he was well aware of the collective nature of the problem, saying, “The truth is. . . we can’t solve global warming because I [expletive] changed light bulbs in my house.”) It may do more good to donate my money to charity than it would to spend it on some luxury for myself, as utilitarians say, and it may do some good to decrease my power consumption by installing CFLs in my house. But those actions do not do enough to alter international structures that tend to perpetuate global economic injustice and inequality. We might worry that there is only so much good that we can do by working within the system, and that fundamental changes in the system itself will eventually be required. Schor, for example, argues that the centrality of consumption to American life neuters any moral appeal we might wish to make to consumers. A related problem she highlights is the collective action

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problem of keeping up with the Joneses, which always threatens to drive consumption to new heights. The only solution to such a problem is “the intervention of a central authority” – a structural change, not to be effected by individual consumers on the scale of individuals. Many structuralists are concerned about the motives people have for consuming more and more. Theorists float cultural and psychological explanations, like the drive to keep up with the Joneses, which Lichtenberg calls “status-related desires” for equality or superiority. The psychology of the consumer is also implicated in the problem, as Wachtel wonders aloud how people can “have more while enjoying it less” and Lane observes that, despite the increase in purchasing power, depression is also on the rise in advanced economies. The belief is that people turn to consumption to fill a psychological need while being continually disappointed by mere things’ inability to satisfy that need. The result is a cycle of consumption and dissatisfaction resulting in higher demand. Maniates decries what he calls the “individualization of responsibility” that characterizes anti-consumerist movements. He refers to the impact of consumption on climate change when he observes that no matter how diligently we sort our recyclables, ride our bikes to work, or take our canvas bags to the grocery store, a fundamental reconceptualization of the causes of and solutions to environmental degradation is needed. We are told, he says, that the aggregate of individual choices is to blame for the destruction of the environment (though this argument would work as well to criticize the movements to combat labor injustice or autocratic regimes). We then believe that, if individual choices are to blame, then an effective response is to alter our own spending behavior as individual consumers. But even when consumers demonstrate a genuine desire to change their habits, capitalism is there to take them by the hand and guide them to the Energy Star appliances and CFLs. Maniates, on this point, faults capitalism’s unique ability to “commodify dissent” as a way of cashing in on these naı¨ve – though wellmeaning – desires. Sooner or later, no matter how conscious our consumer choices, we will butt up against the “core tenets of liberalism” or the “historical baggage of mainstream environmentalism,” and we will get stuck. Overconsumption and all of its attendant negative effects constitute a problem that consumers will not be able to buy their way out of. Many theorists agree with Maniates that one fundamental requirement of any solution is reducing overall consumption in general. Rather than “buying this

and not that,” we should ask ourselves whether we need to buy at all, and we ought to confront the “underlying forces driving the escalation of needs and desires” that lead to the spiraling production and consumption of unnecessary and wasteful goods.

Related Topics

▶ Poverty ▶ Sustainable Development ▶ Utilitarianism

References General Material on Consumerism Affluenza. PBS documentary Crocker D, Linden T (eds) (1998) Ethics of consumption. Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham Princen T, Maniates M, Conca K (eds) (2002) Confronting consumption. MIT Press, Cambridge Utilitarian Approaches to Consumerism and Global Justice Singer P (1972) Famine, affluence & morality. Philos Public Aff 1:229–243 Singer P (2002) One world: the ethics of globalization. Yale University Press, New Haven Unger P (1996) Living high and letting die. Oxford University Press, Oxford Structuralist Approaches to Consumerism and Global Justice Young I (2004) Responsibility and global labor justice. J Polit Philos 12:365–388

Contractarianism WIN-CHIAT LEE Department of Philosophy, Wake Forest University, Winston-Salem, NC, USA

Contractarianism as a Type “Contractarianism” refers to a type of moral or political theory that employs the idea of contract (or, in less formal terms, agreement) among individuals to account for the content and the normative force of the requirements applicable to them, principally those governing their interaction. The contract involved can be either actual or hypothetical depending on the particular contractarian theory. It is, however, often unclear whether the contract invoked in a given contractarian theory is actual (explicit or tacit) or hypothetical. Even when the contract involved is claimed to be actual, it would still be appropriate in some cases to understand it to

Contractarianism

be hypothetical, as it is unlikely that such a contract or agreement has actually been reached. How the norms governing certain individuals are supposed to be justified by appealing to an actual contract or agreement reached by those individuals is relatively clear. Barring some disqualifying conditions such as deceit or coercion, the fact that a person enters into a contract voluntarily can normally be used to hold her to the terms of the contract. How the appeal to a hypothetical contract among individuals is supposed to justify the norms governing them is, however, less clear. One possibility is to argue that an actual agreement would have existed if not for some contingent, but morally insignificant fact, such as (in some cases) the fact that the person happens to not have been asked. Another possibility is to argue that only agreements reached by individuals under some ideal conditions, such as those ruling out the unfair advantages or distorted communication, can provide the proper grounding for the basic norms governing them. Yet another possibility is that only agreement motivated by certain considerations, such as rational self-interest or the desire to justify oneself to others on mutually acceptable grounds, can count as the proper grounding for the relevant norms. Although a specific contract theory might have other things to be said for it, as a general type, contractarianism has two distinctive features that some consider its strengths. One distinctive feature is that the norms that are justified on the basis of a contract or agreement among those governed by them are thereby self-imposed, directly or indirectly. Those who are governed by the norms either agree to the norms themselves or agree to the authority of the institution, such as the state, which imposes those norms on them. In this way, contractarianism can be seen as not only compatible with, but in fact originating in the autonomy of the individual. The other distinctive feature of contractarianism is its individualism. On the contractarian approach, the justification of the norms governing the interaction between individuals themselves or the authority of the social institutions imposing such norms stems ultimately from some facts about the individual, namely, her consenting to those norms or the authority of those institutions for her own reasons. Social entities, such as nations or cultures, are not to be considered independent sources of moral claims on such approach.

Varieties of Contractarianism In political theory, contractarianism is usually associated with a theory popular in the early modern period known as “social contract theory.” It is advocated by philosophers

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such as Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and Immanuel Kant. Contractarianism, in this context, is used to account for the legitimacy of the state’s exercise of political authority, as well as the citizens’ correlative obligation to obey that authority. It does so by appealing to the notion that citizens have a contract among themselves or with the state to enter into civil society, and to abide by the norms imposed by the state, such as its law, or to surrender their natural rights or to delegate their enforcement to the state. In moral theory, contractarianism takes primarily two forms along the two different lines of moral thinking started by Hobbes and Kant, respectively. In the Hobbesian version, morality is a creation by agreement among rational agents for the sake of advancing their mutual benefit. The idea is that mutual forbearance is in the rational self-interest of each of the parties to the agreement. Among contemporary contractarians, David Gauthier stays closest to this approach. The kind of rationality relevant to this kind of account is purely instrumental. The Kantian version (often referred to as “contractualism” in recent literature) begins with the idea that morality is a matter of principles that can be adopted by all rational agents. A morally wrong act, on this account, is one that is based on principles not acceptable to all rational agents. A contemporary version of the Kantian contractualist view is held by T. M. Scanlon who takes morality to be fundamentally a matter of informed and unforced general agreement among persons. A wrong act, on Scanlon’s account, is an act that cannot be justified on any principle that others could not reasonably reject as a basis for such an agreement. It is important to note that on Kantian contractualism, the relevant kind of consideration of rationality or reason (or reasonableness, in Scanlon’s case) is not merely instrumental and cannot be captured by rational choice theory. John Rawls’ theory of justice, perhaps the most influential contemporary contractarian theory, is also the most difficult to classify. Unlike traditional social contract theory, it is not a direct attempt to account for the legitimacy of state authority. But it is not the case that it has nothing to do with that either. Rather, more fundamentally, the Rawlsian contract has to do with arriving at basic moral principles governing the terms of social cooperation, i.e., principles of justice, which would have implications for the design of basic institutions, including political ones. As a moral theory, Rawls’ contractarian theory shares both similarities and differences with Hobbesian contractarianism, on the one hand, and Kantian contractualism, on the other. Like Kantian

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contractualism, it appeals to the notion of acceptability by rational agents in deriving these principles of justice. Like Hobbesian contractarianism, and unlike Kantian contractualism, it also appeals to the instrumental rationality of self-interested, but mutually distinterested agents in determining what is acceptable. But with greater affinity with Kant than with Hobbes, the relevant rational selfinterest in Rawls’ theory is one conceived under restricted conditions, i.e., without knowledge of a person’s morally arbitrary characteristics, which practically deletes all knowledge of one’s individual identity, so as to factor out any unfair advantage any of the contracting parties might enjoy over others.

Contractarianism and Global Justice Both of the distinctive features of contractarianism mentioned above – autonomy and individualism – would have key roles to play in how the topic of global justice is to be approached in this type of theory. In contractarianism, since norms are self-imposed by individuals via a contract or agreement, one would expect that principles of global justice would be the result of a global contract among all individual members of humanity (which can be referred to as “the cosmopolitan contract”). However, this need not rule out Rawls’ “two-stage” approach whereby in the first stage individuals in each of the political entities (which Rawls calls “peoples”) would enter into contract with one another to derive principles of justice that govern the basic structure of their political entities. In the second stage, representatives from each of these peoples would then enter into a second contract with one another to derive the principles governing the interaction among these political entities. As long as the representatives at the second stage truly represent the individual members of their community and the interests of these individual members under the principles of justice they have already agreed to in the first stage, this two-stage approach is quite consistent with the contractarian idea that norms are selfimposed by individuals. Which of these two approaches to use on issues concerning global justice or whether they would yield equivalent results are points of contention among contractarians. It is, however, important to note that traditional social contract theory as a political theory is used to account for political obligation, which presents a problem for global justice. It is what the contemporary political philosopher A. John Simmons calls “the particularity requirement” for any adequate theory of political obligation. If one understands political obligation, as Simmons does, as the special obligation to obey political authority which one owes to one’s state as its member but not to any other state, then to

account for political obligation as contractual, social contract theory would have to think of the world as divided up into multiple discrete political communities and that social contracts only exist “locally” among members of each of these political communities, to the exclusion of any other social contract that might exist across community lines or globally. For Hobbes in particular, since sovereignty in a civil society has to be unitary and absolute in order to be functional, once the contract for individuals to enter into civil society is made, there is no room left for the sovereigns themselves to enter into contract with each other to create an overarching sovereignty in order to curtail their power to harm each other. This may have been the reason why Hobbes does not go on to theorize about the international realm in the state of nature, i.e., the state of war of all against all, via an international social contract. The amoralist approach to international relations, often referred to as “realism,” follows from this Hobbesian view. Even for Kant, the social contract is “local” in that although our natural duty of justice may bind us to all human beings, it requires that we enter into contract in the first instance only with those around us to form civil society so as to escape the nasty state of nature. Even though this Kantian approach does not preclude the possibility of a global contract among all human beings or a contract among sovereign states that would curtail state sovereignty in favor of some global principles of justice, Kant also sees the practical difficulties as well as the undesirability of creating out of another social contract an overarching political entity wielding sovereign power of its own over the nations. Nevertheless, Kant thinks that it is our duty, as well as in our advantage, to lift ourselves out of the state of nature internationally. He proposes a different kind of contract for international relations instead. This is his famous proposal for a league of peace, i.e., a federation of free states, which, whatever means it might employ to maintain peace and the freedom of individual states, would not involve the exercise of the kind of political power individual states possess. Finally, as a general moral theory, contractualist theory as put forward by either Kant or Scanlon, precisely because it relies on principles that are either acceptable to or cannot reasonably be rejected by others, is fundamentally cosmopolitan in that everyone has an equal say on whether a person’s act is justifiable regardless whether the person is her compatriots or has any other special relation to her. However, this is not to say that on such a theory, no preferences may be given to oneself, one’s compatriots, or family, or people with certain other special relations to

Corporate Social Responsibility

oneself. That would depend on whether the relevant principles, such as aid or rescue principles, that allow for such partiality would be among the ones that people may reasonably be expected to agree to or may not reasonably reject. Similarly, on this approach, the level of burden one may be morally expected to bear in order to provide international aid or assistance to others whose lives might depend on some personal sacrifices one makes (the kind of problem articulated and discussed by the contemporary philosopher Peter Singer) is also to be settled by testing the relevant principles against the idea of what others may reasonably be expected to agree to or not reasonably reject.

Related Topics

▶ Global Contractarian Justice ▶ Hobbes, Thomas ▶ Kant, Immanuel ▶ Law of Peoples ▶ Original Position ▶ Rawls, John ▶ Rousseau, Jean-Jacques

References Beitz CB (1979) Political theory and international relations. Princeton University Press, Princeton Gauthier D (1986) Morals by agreement. Oxford University Press, Oxford Hobbes T (1962) Leviathan, with introduction by RS Peters. Simon and Schuster, New York Kant I (1983) Perpetual peace and other essays (trans: Humphrey T). Hackett, Indianapolis Kant I (1993) Grounding for the metaphysics of morals, 3rd edn (trans: Ellington JW). Hackett, Indianapolis Kant I (1999) The metaphysical elements of justice, 2nd edn (trans: Ladd J). Hackett, Indianapolis Nussbaum M (2006) Frontiers of justice. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA Rawls J (1971) A theory of justice. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA Rawls J (1999) The law of peoples. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA Scanlon TM (1998) What we owe to each other. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA Simmons AJ (1980) Moral principles and political obligations. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ Singer P (1972) Famine, affluence and morality. Philosophy and public affairs 1:229–244

Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) ▶ Okin, Susan

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Corporate Social Responsibility MICHAEL MINCH Department of Philosophy/Humanities, Utah Valley University, Orem, UT, USA

A conventional view held by advocates of corporate business is that the purpose of the corporation is to make a profit for its shareholders. On this view, as long as laws are not violated, corporate managers are driven by one proper goal: maximizing profit. This perspective comports with the classical capitalist version of market exchange, put memorably in Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations, where he writes of such markets, “It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity, but to their self-love. . ..” There has arisen a competing view against this position. Here, it is thought that there are various stakeholders, who have or represent important interests, associated, directly or indirectly, with a corporation. In addition to vendors, customers, employees, and others, one stakeholder is society itself, or indeed, in some cases, international communities, and even the planet itself. In short, this view holds that corporations have a responsibility to keep from positively harming others; and further, a responsibility to contribute to the health, safety, and well-being of others, even outside of its market relationships. Those who advocate for corporate social responsibility do not typically disavow capitalism, but seek to “soften,” “humanize,” or otherwise direct some of its energies and consequences to the benefit and welfare of those living in nonmarket relationships to the corporation. The concept of corporate social responsibility is associated with other terms, such as, “corporate responsibility,” “corporate citizenship,” “responsible business,” and “corporate social performance.” Corporations fall along a broad continuum as to how deeply ingrained or ignored corporate responsibility is institutionalized into their respective business structures, models, and practices. Corporations most committed to being socially responsible citizens understand their mission; structure; stakeholder relationships; research and development; commodity production, marketing, sales; management, decision making; and all business dynamics as shaped by concern for the public interest. To the “bottom line” of profit, such corporations also seek to respect, protect, and promote the values, or “bottom line,” of people and the planet.

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Corporate social responsibility remains controversial. For its proponents, it is not only moral behavior, but good business. For its critics, this idea of corporate citizenship dilutes or detracts from the essential purpose of business, and may weaken a corporation in respect to its long-term and fundamental purpose, which is making money. Some critics tend to see corporate social responsibility as a kind of pretense, farce, or public relations strategy. They argue that good corporate citizenship is often employed to distract the public from ethical problems perpetrated by the very same corporations. Such charges have been made against, for example, British Petroleum, Shell, MacDonald’s, and tobacco companies. It is interesting and ironic to note that in at least one respect, some advocates and detractors may come close to the same view. Those who think it is “good business” to be socially responsible may simply confirm the view of some critics insofar as it looks as though good corporate citizenship is about profits after all. In this case, it may be a measure of a corporation’s authentic commitment to the public welfare, to see what profit is sacrificed, rather than enhanced, by its conduct (although such measurement would be difficult to make). Corporate social responsibility grew considerably in public and corporate discourse and expectation in the 1970s. Increased knowledge about widespread corporate irresponsibility led to the rise of the corporate responsibility movement. The single most influential organization, at least in the United States, to come into existence to promote corporate responsibility was the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility. The ICCR was founded in 1971 when representatives from several Protestant denominations joined together to confront banks and corporations for their support of Apartheid in South Africa. Today, the ICCR is an association of 275 faithbased institutional investors, including denominations, religious communities, pension funds, foundations, economic development funds, asset management companies, unions, and more. The ICCR seeks dialogue with corporate executives about policies and practices ICCR members conclude are irresponsible and damaging to human welfare and/or nature. At times, such dialogue changes corporate behavior, but quite often, shareholder resolutions are filed by investors associated with the ICCR. Shareholder resolutions are proposals submitted by stockholders for a vote at a corporation’s annual meeting. Whereas, they usually pertain to ordinary corporate governance, they have become a means of communicating and protesting corporate policies and practices. Pioneered

as a strategy of this sort by the ICCR, shareholder activism is now used by many other organizations, including the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), the largest and most powerful labor coalition in the USA. One value of shareholder activism is manifest when resolutions are reported by the media. Shareholder resolutions were effective in pressuring corporations to divest in South Africa during Apartheid and in ending various other activities widely seen to be unethical. Resolutions against the use of sweatshop labor and the construction of nuclear power plants are examples of shareholder activism (often paired with boycotts of certain commodities). Many corporations now tout their own corporate responsibility quite prominently (including in their advertisements), and organizations closely related to corporate business also emphasize corporate citizenship. The Corporate Social Responsibility Newswire and mallenbaker.net are two examples of business-friendly locations of corporate responsibility news and discussion. Further, corporations are now proactive in their behavior in ways not necessarily tied to the kind of business in which they engage or commodities they produce. Corporations sometimes simply give funds to nonprofit organizations that engage a large number of social problems. Some corporations have also instituted principles of “social accounting,” which describes and communicates a corporation’s economic activity in respect to its social and environmental impacts. A number of reporting guidelines have been developed for this purpose. These standards involve accounting, auditing, and reporting. Examples include AccountAbility’s AA1000 standard, based on John Elkington’s “triple bottom line” (3BL) of profits, people, and planet; the Accounting for Sustainability’s Connected Reporting Framework; the Global Reporting Initiative’s Sustainable Reporting Guidelines; the Green Global Certification Standard; Social Accountability International’s SA8000 standard; and the standards put forward by the United Nations’ Global Compact and its Intergovernmental Working Group of Experts on International Standards of Accounting and Reporting (ISAR). One set of standards that has received much attention came in the wake of the 1989 environmental disaster caused when the Exxon-Valdez spilled 10.8 million gallons of oil into Alaska’s Prince William Sound. These are the Ceres Principles. Six months after the spill, a group of investors launched an organization to tackle the problematic of environmental damage done by corporate

Corporate Social Responsibility

actors. The nonprofit was called Ceres, and its mission is to integrate sustainability into capital markets “for the health of the planet and its people.” The ten principles are meant to guide corporate conduct, become publically endorsed, and used to hold corporations accountable. Fifty corporations have endorsed the Ceres Principles. The Principles are, and elaborate upon: – – – – – – – – – –

Protection of the Biosphere Sustainable Use of Natural Resources Reduction and Disposal of Wastes Energy Conservation Risk Reduction Safe Products and Services Environmental Restoration Informing the Public Management Commitment Audits and Reports (which includes an annual selfevaluation of progress in adhering to the Ceres Principles)

In respect to global justice, at least two issues are important. One is the question of whether, and to what degree, corporations can be free to guide and monitor their own social behavior. Not only is there an important role for independent, nonbusiness related actors to help keep corporations accountable for their activities, there is certainly a crucial role for governments and international institutions and regimes to fill as well. History seems to show that corporations left on their own perpetrate violations against the public welfare with a frequency and consequence that disallows the notion that they can be counted on to act as good public citizens without some kinds of coercion. Numerous times, corporations have engaged in responsible behavior, most often to repair or offset damage they have done, only when forced to do so by one or another governmental actor. In December 2008, the Danish Parliament passed into law a bill making it mandatory for the largest Danish companies to include certain information on their respective social responsibility. Such laws are likely to increase around the world. A second issue is the question of stakeholders. Who are they? Perhaps we can see, in our increasingly interconnected world, that peoples are less and less independent from one another, and that the welfare of any group is closely, if not inherently, tied to the welfare of others. In a world where global capitalism is uniquely powerful in scope and impact in human history, and where approximately 50 of the world’s largest Gross

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Domestic Products belong not to countries, but to corporations; it is probable that they also have hidden and indirect stakeholders that often number in the hundreds of millions, and perhaps extend to the planet itself. The welfare of the planet and its people are closely connected. Global justice has conventionally been understood to mean justice to the world’s peoples; but we now know that the word global is to be understood more literally. Global justice is achieved just insofar as it is manifest in the lives of people and the planet. Many corporations have global reach and immense power. They have the responsibility to use and control that power for the benefit of all stakeholders, not just shareholders.

Related Topics

▶ Common Good ▶ Environmental Sustainability ▶ Free Trade ▶ Global Justice ▶ Multinational Corporations ▶ Neoliberalism

References Barnet R, Mu¨ller R (1974) Global reach: the power of the multinational corporation. Touchstone, New York Blowfield M, Murray A (2008) Corporate responsibility: a critical introduction. Oxford University Press, Oxford Brummer J (1991) Corporate responsibility and legitimacy: an interdisciplinary analysis. Greenwood Press, New York Crane A et al (2008) The Oxford handbook of corporate social responsibility. Oxford University Press, Oxford Friedman M (1970) The social responsibility of business is to increase its profits. The New York Times Magazine, vol 13, August 1970 Hanisch A et al (eds) (2005) Corporate social responsibility across Europe. Springer, Heidelberg Hirschland M (2006) Corporate social responsibility and the shaping of global public policy. Palgrave, New York Klein N (2002) No logo: no space, no choice, no jobs. St. Martin’s Press, New York Powers C, Gunnermann S (1972) The ethical investor: universities and corporate responsibility. Yale University Press, New Haven Schreck P (2009) The business case for corporate social responsibility understanding and measuring impacts of corporate social performance. Physica-Verlag, Heidelberg Spence L et al (eds) (2004) Responsibility and social capital: the world of small and medium sized enterprises. Palgrave, New York Visser W et al (eds) (2007) The A to Z of corporate social responsibility. Wiley, New York Werther W, Chandler D (2006) Strategic corporate social responsibility: stakeholders in a global environment. Sage, Thousand Oaks World Business Council for Sustainable Development (1999) Corporate social responsibility: meeting changing expectations. WBCSD, Geneva

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Correlative Obligations

Correlative Obligations ZACHARY HOSKINS Department of Philosophy, Washington University, St. Louis, MO, USA

It is a commonly held view that rights imply correlative obligations. That is, if someone has a right to x, then someone else (some person, group of people, institutions, etc.) bears some obligation, or duty, with respect to that right. Sorting out the nature of the obligations implied by rights, however, turns out to be a contentious matter. This is particularly the case in the context of debates about human rights and global justice, where difficult questions emerge about the nature of human rights, the correlative obligations they imply, and the bearers of these obligations. Of central concern in contemporary debates is the issue of whether the global poor have a human right to subsistence, and if so, what correlative obligations this right implies and for whom. Traditionally, theorists have distinguished between negative rights and positive rights. Negative rights are rights to noninterference (e.g., the right not to be robbed, or assaulted, or in general deprived of some good), whereas positive rights are rights to the provision of some good, or the performance of some action (e.g., the right to medical care, or to education). Positive rights are more controversial than are negative rights, in that a positive right implies that others have a correlative obligation to help the right-holders, whereas a negative right appears to imply merely a correlative obligation not to harm them. A fundamental question in debates about global justice is whether all human rights are negative rights, and thus imply only negative correlative obligations, or whether there are positive human rights (and positive correlative obligations) as well. Basic economic rights, or what have been called subsistence rights (minimally, the right to sufficient food and water, clothing, shelter, etc., to ensure a reasonably healthy life), have often been characterized as positive rights. Thus they have been understood as implying positive correlative obligations on others to help ensure the provision of basic necessities to the global poor. Because of this, the notion of a human right to subsistence has met with significant skepticism from libertarians, who typically accept the notion of negative natural rights (and correlative obligations of noninterference) but maintain that positive rights (and positive correlative obligations) can be generated only by contract. From a standard libertarian

perspective, then, appeals to human rights may ground obligations not to deprive individuals of their means of subsistence (i.e., to do no harm), but not additional, positive obligations to help. Scholars sympathetic to the idea that we have genuine obligations to help reduce global poverty have responded to this general libertarian challenge in a number of ways. One option is to contend that there are positive human rights and that subsistence rights are among these. Typically, accounts that defend positive human rights ground them in the fundamental interests human beings have in basic goods such as, among other things, sufficient nourishment and shelter. Understood as positive human rights, subsistence rights straightforwardly imply positive correlative obligations to help ensure the provision of these basic goods. Henry Shue similarly contends that the fundamental moral importance of subsistence can ground positive correlative obligations (1996). Shue’s strategy, however, is explicitly to collapse the traditional distinction between positive and negative rights. Shue believes that basic moral rights represent our “minimum reasonable demands” on humanity. Central to these demands is that the enjoyment of the rights be socially guaranteed against standard threats. Because individuals’ interests in subsistence are no less morally important than their interests in physical security or basic liberties such as freedom of thought and expression, interests in subsistence may ground demands for social guarantees no less than security or liberty interests may ground such demands. Furthermore, as many scholars have pointed out, providing social guarantees to protect against violations of individuals’ security or liberty rights may require positive investments of resources that could rival those required to secure basic economic rights. Thus Shue contends that the distinction of negative and positive rights, and the libertarian notion that human rights imply only negative obligations, is unjustified. Rather, he argues that all basic rights imply positive as well as negative correlative duties: (negative) duties to avoid depriving right-holders of the substance of the right, (positive) duties to protect them from deprivation of the right, and (positive) duties to aid those who have been deprived. Guaranteeing moral rights requires fulfilling all three of these correlative duties. An alternative strategy, employed by Thomas Pogge, is to accept the libertarian claim that all human rights are negative rights, and thus imply solely negative correlative duties not to harm others, but then to contend that the members of affluent nations are in fact responsible for harming the global poor (2002). Pogge claims that we, the members of affluent nations, bear responsibility for

Corruption

the plight of the world’s poor through our nations’ support of the existing global economic order. If this is true, he contends, then even given the libertarian notion that human rights confer only negative correlative duties not to harm, members of affluent nations are implicated for failing to fulfill these negative duties. Rectifying this, Pogge believes, requires that we take positive steps to promote reform of our global institutions. Note, however, that these positive obligations derive from the more fundamental negative duty to do no harm. Related to the issue of what sorts of correlative obligations are implied by human rights is the question of who bears these obligations. It is uncontroversial that insofar as human rights imply negative obligations (not to torture or enslave others, etc.), these obligations are borne by everyone. If we accept the view that human rights also imply positive obligations; however, then disagreement emerges about who properly bears these obligations. One option is that the positive obligations fall on those who are somehow responsible for the rights violations. This is consistent with the libertarian view that human rights are negative rights and thus imply positive obligations only insofar as those who violate the primary, negative correlative duty not to harm are thus obligated to take positive steps to stop harming their victims, and perhaps to make restitution. On this view, a political regime that violated its citizens’ human rights by threatening their security, restricting their basic freedoms, or depriving them of the means of subsistence, would bear obligations to take the positive steps needed to stop harming them in these ways. But the human rights at issue would imply no correlative obligations on members of the global community who were not responsible for the violations to get involved to protect or aid the victims. Note that, because Pogge essentially accepts a responsibility-based view, it is crucial to his project that he demonstrates that those of us in affluent nations really do share responsibility for global poverty, and thus we similarly share an obligation to work to reform the harmful global structure we currently support. An alternative view is that the positive obligations implied by human rights are borne by all those who have the capacity to help put an end to the rights violations, whether or not they are responsible for them. Those who endorse a positive human right to subsistence, grounded in fundamental human interests, will tend to regard this right as implying positive obligations on whomever is in a position to help. On this sort of account, the human right to subsistence implies essentially a universal correlative obligation to help eradicate poverty by working to create institutions (or reform existing institutions) to

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safeguard people against poverty and aid those who are currently impoverished. Significant disagreement exists, then, both about what correlative obligations are implied by human rights, and also who bears these obligations. Debates about these points will continue to be of central importance in contemporary discussions of global justice.

Related Topics

▶ Duties, Positive and Negative ▶ Global Justice ▶ Human Rights ▶ Negative Rights ▶ Pogge, Thomas ▶ Positive Rights ▶ Poverty ▶ Shue, Henry ▶ Subsistence Rights ▶ United Nations: Rights and Duties

References Braybrooke D (1972) The firm but untidy correlativity of rights and obligations. Can J Philos 1:351–363 Holmes S, Sunstein C (1999) The cost of rights: why liberty depends on taxes. Norton, New York Nickel J (2007) Making sense of human rights. Blackwell, Malden O’Neill O (2009) The dark side of human rights. In: Christiano T, Christman JP (eds) Contemporary debates in political philosophy. Wiley-Blackwell, Malden Pogge T (2002) World poverty and human rights. Polity Press, Cambridge Pogge T (ed) (2007) Freedom from poverty as a human right: who owes what to the very poor? UNESCO/ Oxford University Press, Oxford Shue H (1996) Basic rights: subsistence, affluence, and US foreign policy, 2nd edn. Princeton University Press, Princeton

Corruption LYNETTE E. SIEGER Gallatin School, New York University, New York, NY, USA

Corruption, in terms of global justice, is the misuse of public offices for private gain. Public and private parties – such as corporations – play mutually reinforcing roles in perpetuating the problems of corruption. On the one side, interested parties incentivize public office holders toward corrupt behavior by offering high rewards (commonly financial gains) in order to promote their interests. On the other side, public office holders may demand personal benefit prior to executing public duties or incentivize

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interested parties toward offering bribes in exchange for expedited services or favoritism in distribution of grants, rents, or purchases – of public resources such as oil, gas, and mining – and public contracts. Corruption is a transborder problem because it involves global actors, such as heads of state and multinational corporations (MNCs). Theorists, such as Samuel Huntington, argue that corruption in government is not negative. Rather, corruption has had a role in promoting development, and in turn development encourages state stability. This norm on corruption was dominant up until the late 1990s, with states such as France, Switzerland, and Japan allowing bribes to be tax-deductible. Anticorruption movements and legislation took hold in 1977 with the passage of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) in the United States. The FCPA made the bribing of foreign government officials a criminal offense. Recognizing the potential for a competitive disadvantage, US firms pushed for uniform international criminalization of bribery. Alongside corporate interests, value-based ethical development theorists emerged arguing that corruption in the form of bribing government officials has a devastating impact, especially on developing countries. Development ethicists, such as economist Joseph Stiglitz, argue that the balance of interests in corrupt systems is tilted toward private financial gains without due consideration of the impact on local populations or environment. The consequences of environmental degradation, displacement of indigenous persons, and the siphoning off of resources and profits from resources from the public, all contribute to long-term instability. Monies that should be used toward public development programs such as health and education which promote stability are staying in private hands. Furthermore, power maintained through corrupt practices subverts democracy while promoting authoritarian government, which need not be accountable or transparent in its dealings. Michael Walzer argues that corruption is fundamentally at odds with democracy because it interferes with the process of deliberation with the outcomes reflecting partiality and bias. Interest and value-based movements led to efforts, in the international community, to deter corruption, centering on anti-bribery legislation. In 1997, the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) passed the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. The OECD Convention – which is legally binding on the OECD’s 34 member states and four non-member states which have adopted the Convention – criminalizes the bribery of foreign public officials in business transactions.

While the Convention signifies an important commitment to the normative shift away from corruption, it is hardly the effective means to ending the debate and development of anticorruption legislation. International Conventions urge states to regulate corruption and impose sanctions internally, with very little international monitoring or compliance mechanisms. During World Trade Organization (WTO) rounds on corruption, leaders of developing states were critical of the push by US and EU leaders towards anticorruption legislation. The emphasis on bribery of public officials was argued to be biased toward dealing with the sort of corruption that is prevalent in developing states while ignoring the sorts of corruption – such as large sum private campaign contributions – that are more prevalent in developed states. The form that anticorruption legislation takes seems to some an exertion of powerful states constraining the self-interest of leaders of weak states without checks to similar excesses of corruption which they – wealthy public figures – themselves profit from. Certainly, the future development of global anticorruption legislation will have to address all forms of corruption in order to be ethically consistent and practically effective. The WTO had not (to date) passed anticorruption legislation. The WTO is one of the most effective wielders of power within the community of international organizations (IOs) because of its effective enforcement mechanism of trade penalties. Stiglitz argues that effective international constraints on corruption should involve the active role of the WTO. Universal acceptance of and adherence to anticorruption is paramount to its success. With MNCs having subsidiaries throughout the world, and the contaminating influence that even only a handful of corporations that actively engage in bribery can have, uniformity in the criminalization of corruption not only between states but also between IOs, is essential. In 2005, the United Nations Convention against Corruption went into effect. The UN’s large member base and universal reach is a step toward greater uniformity. A key aspect of the UN Convention was to recover assets given in exchange for public favors effectively de-incentivizing even short-term gains for would-be corrupt actors. The challenge to overcome is that the UN lacks effective enforcement mechanisms reinforcing the importance of a uniform anticorruption code for all IOs. Though bribery of public officials is the most commonly addressed issue in corruption debates, there may be other influences that contribute to the conditions that allow for corruption to flourish. Political philosopher

Cosmopolitan Democracy

Thomas Pogge argues that beyond what MNCs from wealthy states actively do to bribe foreign public officials, wealthy states themselves play an active role in facilitating corruption. The problem begins with international resource and borrowing privileges. As it is, any leader who holds effective power over a state is internationally recognized as legally entitled to sell the state’s natural resources and to borrow money. This unqualified right, Pogge argues, gives high incentives for authoritarian rule and attempts at coups d’e´tat – perpetuating the destabilizing force of civil wars – in resource-rich countries. The conclusion is that stripping authoritarian leaders of their power to profit from local resources and rights as the power holder would effectively end any incentive toward corruption and at least some factors that encourage civil war. In conclusion, the impact of the behavior of MNCs, how states implement and execute anticorruption laws, and the significance of international legislation and enforcement make corruption a global issue and its resolution a primary concern in the realm of global justice. Political regimes that make public decisions on the basis of personal gain undermine the interests of the people and the environment that they govern. The consequences too cross borders. Persons seeking refuge from civil wars, or oppressive authoritarian regimes, or those in search of greater economic opportunity free from distorting influences of corruption spill into other states. Likewise, the environment is porous and exposure to environmental risks taken in development to enhance profits affects all. International legislation toward eradicating corruption is evolving but in order to be effective it must address corruption at all levels, giving equal consideration to forms of corruption in both poor and wealthy states.

Related Topics

▶ Coercion ▶ Corporate Social Responsibility ▶ Democratic Legitimacy ▶ Duty to Prosecute ▶ Exploitation ▶ Global Ethic ▶ Moral Legitimacy ▶ Multinational Corporations ▶ Oil ▶ Poverty ▶ Public Interest ▶ Resource Curse ▶ Sustainable Development

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References Abbott K (2001) Rule-making in the WTO: lessons from the case of bribery and corruption. J Int Econ Law 4(2):275–296 Abbott K, Snidal D (2002) Values and interests: international legalization in the fight against corruption. J Leg Stud 31(S1):S141–S177 Cuervo-Cazurra A (2006) Who cares about corruption? J Int Bus Stud 37(6):807–822 Hindess B (2005) Investigating international anti-corruption. Third World Q 26(8):1389–1398 Huntington S (1968) Political order in changing societies. Yale University Press, New Haven/London OECD (1997) Convention on combating bribery of foreign public officials in international business transactions. OECD, Paris Pogge T (2008) World poverty and human rights, 2nd edn. Polity, Cambridge Stiglizt J (2007) Making globalization work. W.W. Norton, New York United Nations (2005) Convention Against Corruption Walzer M (2004) Politics and passion: toward a more Egalitarian liberalism. Yale University Press, New Haven

Cosmopolitan Democracy RAFFAELE MARCHETTI Department of History and Political Science, Luiss University, Rome, Italy

Cosmopolitan democracy refers to a model of political organization in which citizens, regardless of their geographical location, have rights to political participation through representation in global affairs in parallel with and independently of their own government. “Global governance cosmopolitans,” in particular, tend to recommend a decentralized governance structure characterized by multiple decision-making centers, in which states still retain a certain degree of national autonomy, and only those agents which are part of a given sociopolitical interaction are entitled to join in the decision-making process. In this vein, the agencies of global governance that these cosmopolitans propose would be characterized according to a mixed model of diffuse authority. Although the term originated in Greek stoic philosophy (cosmos=world, polis=city, demos=people, cratos= power), the modern use of the cosmopolitan ideal was first proposed by Kant with the concept of jus cosmopoliticum deployed in his project for a Perpetual Peace (1795). More recently, David Held and Daniele Archibugi and Held (1995) revived this notion, initiating the contemporary discussion of cosmopolitanism. Underpinning the model of cosmopolitan democracy are two prescriptive assumptions concerning moral

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cosmopolitanism and political democracy and an empirical assumption regarding world interdependence. According to the prescriptive assumptions, the scope of justice should be universal insofar as no discrimination is justified when considering the ultimate entitlement of every citizen to control his/her own destiny (ethical universalism). Conversely, the second presupposition holds that individuals as equals should be entitled to exercise collective self-determination over public issues that affect them, in so far as only by simultaneously retaining the status of legislators and subjects can citizens remain free (congruence/reflexivity between decision takers and decision makers). Finally, when these principles are coupled with the empirical observation of the increasing global interdependence of current international affairs, a fundamental right to autonomy and self-legislation emerges, which requires the creation of an authoritative global institutional framework to permit the implementation of such democratic prerogatives. In presenting a model in between confederation and federation, cosmopolitan democracy aims to avoid both the indirect representation of the first (and consequently the likely exclusive pursuit of national interests) and the risk of despotism of the second (and, consequently, the likely pursuit of technocracy and homogenization). Through cosmopolitan citizenship, individuals are allowed to have a direct political voice on several decisionmaking levels, participating thus in the deliberative process of local, state, and world politics. The global institutional system should thus be reformed toward an issue-oriented structure of cosmopolitan governance, according to which those agents that directly interact on a given issue area are entitled to a political voice, regardless of their territorial or national affiliation. Cosmopolitan democracy fosters democratic reform of both UN institutions and the wide network of global governance organizations. With regard to the UN, the following proposals are supported: the creation of a second advisory Peoples’ Assembly, the abolition of the veto system together with the enlargement of the Security Council, the compulsory jurisdiction before the International Court of Justice, and the establishment of an international humanitarian force. Conversely, regarding global governance, the changes recommended are in the direction of the enhancement of regionalization, the diffusion of authority to different bodies, and the strengthening of democratic procedures within such institutions. Critics point to two principal and opposite deficiencies of cosmopolitan democracy. On the one hand, the model of global institutionalism is seen as inherently dangerous in terms of cultural and political imperialism of the

West as the most powerful international actors, which would sanction their de facto influence by means of a legal endorsement. Given the absence of a global demos able to demand an effective global accountability, global governance institutions would end up in the hands of transnational elites, politics would become governance, and technical negotiation would replace agonistic politics. On the other extreme, such a model world democracy is claimed to be failing in establishing a viable structure through which citizens’ consensus can be expressed, in that it remains based on a system of independent jurisdictions based on the principle of stakeholdership. Only a limited number of self-appointed actors would participate in those jurisdictional decision-making processes. In suggesting a net of delimited institutions, such a proposal would not guarantee representation to citizens outside that structure and would not offer a chance to compare the effects of the uncoordinated decisions taken by different monofunctional agencies, which are considered equal in political authority. In multiplying specialized agencies (supposedly, one for each global issue), this cosmopolitan governance model would consequently fail to establish a central authority, where a legitimate political discussion could take place to determine the allocation of competencies and responsibilities on any determined issue area.

Related Topics

▶ Cosmopolitanism ▶ Democracy, Transnational ▶ Democratic Citizenship ▶ Global Citizenship ▶ Global Democracy ▶ Global Federalism ▶ Human Right to Democracy ▶ World Citizenship

References Archibugi D (2008) The global commonwealth of citizens. Toward cosmopolitan democracy. Princeton University Press, Princeton Archibugi D, Held D (eds) (1995) Cosmopolitan democracy: an agenda for a new world order. Polity Press, Cambridge Archibugi D, Held D, Ko¨hler M (eds) (1998) Re-imagining political community: studies in cosmopolitan democracy. Polity Press, Cambridge Beck U (2006) Cosmopolitan visions. Polity Press, Cambridge Cabrera L (2004) Political theory of global justice: a cosmopolitan case for the world state. Routledge, London Falk R (1995) On humane governance: toward a new global politics. Polity Press, Cambridge Hayden P (2005) Cosmopolitan global politics. Ashgate, Aldershot Held D (1995) Democracy and the global order: from the modern state to cosmopolitan governance. Polity Press, Cambridge

Cosmopolitan Justice

Cosmopolitan Justice SHARON ANDERSON-GOLD Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (RPI), Troy, NY, USA

World Citizen/Civil Right The concept of a “cosmopolis” or world city has its roots in the Stoic idea of a human community based upon the worth of reason in each and every human being. According to the Stoic Marcus Aurelius, reason provides each person with an equal worth and is the ground of an innate natural law common to us all which makes us fellow citizens of a universal moral order. The idea of a natural law accessible to all human beings was rearticulated in Christian theology by Thomas Aquinas as an expression of divine creation. When natural law was transformed into the basis of natural right in the seventeenth century, the state became the locus for the realization of all right. With the institutional apparatus of the state to transform social values into enforceable rights, the idea of a world society based upon universal Christian values receded in favor of an international society of sovereign states founded upon civil rights. The contractual nature of the social pact creating the state entails that the “rights” of citizens pertain only to signatories to the pact. Civil rights stop at the borders of the state and therefore have no implications for noncitizens. With this change in the locus of “rights,” cosmopolitanism was faced with the challenge of either rejecting the system of states outright in favor of a contractual world state (Cloots) or presenting its principles in the form of institutional supplements to or conditions necessary for the proper functioning the society of states. (Kant).

Human Rights The cosmopolitan is one who views herself as a citizen of a world community based upon common human qualities and values. Because cosmopolitanism is based upon the inherent dignity and equality of the human person it is often associated in its modern formulations with universal human rights. Universal human rights however cannot be so easily contained within conventional positivist legal doctrines. Like all forms of universal values, human rights transcend conventional contractual boundaries. Moreover, since rights entail enforcement, human rights require some form of international law that provides the terms of legitimate interaction both between and within political societies. It is generally assumed that the contemporary cosmopolitan rejects an exclusionary politics based on

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national or ethnic identity and looks forward to a future condition in which citizens of different nation states will enjoy a common set of rights and privileges. Cosmopolitanism then stands opposed to various forms of communitarianism that assert a universal moral priority of obligations to members of local associations over obligations to nonmembers. Cosmopolitanism stands opposed to limitations of duties of justice to such communities.

Justice At the center of cosmopolitanism is the claim that the individual human being is the unit of moral evaluation deserving of equal concern and respect. Justice concerns the proper order of human relationships based upon what is “owed” to each individual person by moral right. Justice covers rewards and punishments, as well as access to material goods. Justice is different than benevolence or charity. With benevolence there is latitude to decide on whom we will bestow our benefits and how much of our goods we will provide to others. There are many things that it would be good to do and that we may even have a moral obligation to do that are not “owed” to another by moral right. It would be good to use our skills to teach others how to do difficult tasks but we do not “owe” everyone access to our talents. What is “owed” to others varies with particular theories of justice and may be based on such concepts as desert or need. It is important to be clear about what constitutes justice as these obligations are thought to have a greater “weight” than the obligations of benevolence and are enforceable by third parties. Justice is said to have “priority” over charity. Cosmopolitanism can take a purely moral form where institutions are merely instrumental to the achievement of universal human values. But when the notions of cosmopolitanism and justice are combined we get the view that global institutions are necessary to secure the background conditions for settling the claims of justice. This is sometimes called political or institutional cosmopolitanism. Institutional cosmopolitans reject the notion that the claims of the poor to a decent standard of living can be secured by charity alone. Rather, economic rights like all other rights are a matter of the rules of the basic institutional structure of the social order. Therefore the global institutions that make up the basic structure of the global social order must be designed so as to achieve fundamental human rights. The enforcement component of justice is reflected in the manner in which justice is said to be the foundation of positive law. Since legal systems tend to be of limited scope, the universal character of human rights raises the question of how cosmopolitan justice can come to be global in scope and how the institutions which are

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responsible for the achievement of cosmopolitan justice relate to the particular systems of law of nation states.

World State When we combine the global scope of cosmopolitan justice with the issue of the application and enforcement of its principles we get the view that cosmopolitan justice requires a world state. This was the view of Anacharsis Cloots in the eighteenth century. However, for both pragmatic and moral reasons, this identification has been largely rejected by contemporary cosmopolitan theorists in favor of a view of cosmopolitan justice that builds upon the concept of global governance through the development of international institutions with global jurisdiction. In this institutional form, the objective of global governance is the attainment of cosmopolitan justice. Since global governance is the set of institutions, standards, and regulations that are voluntarily accepted by states, states continue to be an important instrument in the achievement of cosmopolitan justice.

Nationalism/Patriotism The continued significance of states in the context of a cosmopolitan community raises the question of the role of sentiments such as patriotism and nationalism that traditionally have been the bonds between particular individuals and particular states. The addition of a cosmopolitan conception to our conception of justice has implications for the underlying conception of citizenship at work in a cosmopolitan community. It broadens our sense of community and connection with others who are citizens of other countries. Most contemporary cosmopolitans argue that this extension of our sense of community need not displace our sense of patriotism or special connection to fellow citizens. They argue that cosmopolitan justice is compatible with limited (liberal) forms of patriotism and nationalism. It is argued that as long as our commitments to our fellow citizens do not detract from the fulfillment of the claims of noncitizens to just treatment, one can be both a patriot, one who has a special connection to a particular state, and a cosmopolitan.

Interdependency/Sovereignty The contemporary concern with the issue of global justice has arisen in the context of globalization wherein interactions between human societies have created increased interdependence. One of the central tenants of contemporary cosmopolitans is that as a consequence of international association, states have in effect extended the “boundaries of justice.” Although the international

community appears to be an organization of independent states, the multidimensional interdependency that has evolved due to economic, technological, cultural, and social interactions between nations has created new forms and sites of power that challenge the traditional notion of states as independent actors. This interdependence means that actions originating in one society or nation have effects on other societies or nations. International interdependence has weakened the ability of any one nation to solve contemporary problems in a unilateral manner making international cooperation necessary to each nation’s long-term well-being.

Legitimacy By shaping and constraining the policy options available to states, the global context has transformed many of the functions of national sovereignty and has thereby challenged the very basis of the legitimacy of the state. Insofar as traditional theories of state accountability presumed a symmetrical relationship between a state’s actions and the subjects of its own jurisdiction, external impacts were not considered a significant moral or legal concern. In a global system of increasingly dense international interaction, the policies of powerful states routinely affect the life chances of persons who are not subject to their jurisdiction. They do this not only by shaping economic, social, and cultural institutions at the international level to their favor but also by titling political power toward elites in developing nations and away from domestic democratic control. This potential for extensive negative impacts on the lives of others is the basis for the cosmopolitan’s claim that justice has become fundamentally a global issue.

Global Standards/Accountability The need for global cooperation entails the development of rules and regulations that curtail the freedom of action of individual nations leading to the issue of limited “sovereignty” or the transfer of some of the powers of individual governments to international institutions. The emergence of international institutions with regulatory power such as the International Monetary Fund or the World Trade Organization has led to conflict over the standards to be used. The developed nations have generally taken the lead in the creation of these institutions and have often designed the regulations to reflect their overall interests and goals. This has led to the questioning of the legitimacy and accountability of the institutions of global governance. To whom should such institutions ultimately be accountable? Whose interests should they serve, the interests of nations or the interests of individual human

Cosmopolitan Republicanism

beings regardless of nationality? From the perspective of cosmopolitan justice the answer has to be that global institutions must serve the interests of individuals equally regardless of nationality. The current institutional structure of global society does not reflect this normative ideal. The very existence of great economic inequality both between and within nations serves as evidence that cosmopolitan justice is not being served. Cosmopolitan theorists therefore call for the reform of global institutions to include greater representation of underdeveloped nations in the standard setting agencies. Some cosmopolitans go further and call for more direct representation of ordinary individuals in the form of a globally elected Parliament.

Practicality Opponents of cosmopolitan justice tend to criticize either its practicality or its desirability. Those who question its practicality claim that states and powerful elites will not willingly forgo their powers to achieve cosmopolitan justice. However, we have seen that the need for cooperation has already led to the transfer of some of the traditional powers of the state to global institutions and that there are segments of society willing to challenge the claims of elites to dominate these institutions. These challenges have led to incremental reforms within these institutions. Those who think that a cosmopolitan community is not desirable argue that human beings are limited in their ability to care about the well-being of others. They argue that attempting to stretch that concern beyond our local communities risks creating individuals who do not really care about much at all. Cosmopolitans are likely to reply that justice is not necessarily based on feelings but upon reasoned judgments that all human beings are in fact capable of. They point to the fact that states are already composed of multitudes and that people successfully stretch their concerns from their family to their local communities to their states. Therefore the idea of membership in a global community is but another extension of this concern.

Related Topics

▶ Cosmopolitan Democracy ▶ Cosmopolitan Republicanism ▶ Cosmopolitanism ▶ Global Governance ▶ International Monetary Fund (IMF) ▶ Moral Cosmopolitanism ▶ Political Cosmopolitanism

References Anderson-Gold S (2001) Cosmopolitanism and human rights. University of Wales Press, Cardiff

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Appiah K (2006) Cosmopolitanism: ethics in a world of strangers. Norton, New York Aurelius M (1983) The meditations. Hackett, Indianapolis Benhabib S (2004) The rights of others: aliens, residents and citizens. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Cabrera L (2004) Poltical theory of global justice: a cosmopolitan case for the world state. Routledge, London Cheah P, Robbins B (eds) (1998) Cosmopolitics: thinking and feeling beyond the nation. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis Cloots A (1980) Oeuvres. Kraus Reprint, Mu¨nchen Held D (2003) Cosmopolitanism: a defence. Polity Press, Cambridge Jones C (1999) Global justice: defending cosmopolitanism. Oxford University Press, Oxford Kant I (1991) Perpetual peace. In: Reiss H (ed) Kant’s political writings. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge O’Neil O (2000) Bounds of justice. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Tan K (2004) Justice without borders. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

Cosmopolitan Republicanism MICHAEL ALLEN Department of Philosophy, East Tennessee State University, Johnson City, TN, USA

Cosmopolitan republicanism has only very recently begun to figure in contemporary global justice debates. Despite this, however, it can be traced back to the republicanism of the Enlightenment. Indeed, Enlightenment republicans, such as Price, Diderot, Turgot, and Kant, broke radically from the earlier commonwealthmen tradition of republicanism, emphasizing civic membership in a bounded political community. Instead, they equated the republican ideal of common liberty under the rule of law with federal and transnational political structures. This shift to federalism and transnationalism was motivated by the insight that membership in a bounded community can simply perpetuate the oldest form of domination: the domination of noncitizens by citizens. For there to be secure nondomination without domination globally, it became necessary to construct a cosmopolitan republic of humanity. The republican ideal of liberty as nondomination under the rule of law came to the forefront of contemporary discussion in the 1990s with the publication of Philip Pettit’s Republicanism. Here Pettit appeals, however, only to the anti-cosmopolitan commonwealthmen tradition. Nonetheless, his republicanism has decisively shaped the present-day context in which the ideal of nondomination has, once more, come to be conceived in federal and

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transnational terms. In what follows, I shall first outline the key features of Pettit’s republicanism, and discuss the difficulty of nondomination with domination in the bounded political community noted by contemporary cosmopolitan republicans. I shall then consider how these difficulties may be addressed by a novel cosmopolitan republicanism that revisits the themes of Enlightenment republicans, while engaging current problems of globalization. In doing so, I appeal mostly to the work of James Bohman. Finally, I shall consider how this latter conception provides an alternative to much more familiar liberal conceptions of cosmopolitan justice.

Pettit’s Republicanism In returning to the commonwealthmen tradition, Pettit was concerned with reviving the notion of liberty as a civil, as opposed to natural, condition of humanity. In contrast with classical republicans, modern liberals stressed that liberty is only ever a natural condition sometimes limited by law, albeit justifiably, in the interest of security. This produced the notion of liberty as noninterference: humanity is most free when law and government interferes the least. Pettit, however, set out to expose the basic conceptual inadequacy in this liberal view by appeal to the republican contrast between citizens and slaves. Indeed, noninterference is insufficient for liberty given the conceptual possibility of a noninterfering slavemaster. This possibility may, however, be countered with another one: that of the nonmastering – or nondominating – interference of the republican rule of law. Here the defining claim of Pettit’s republicanism is that liberty is actually created by the nonarbitrary interference of such rule, under a representative government that tracks the common interests of all citizens. This fully captures the republican idea that libertas is indeed civitas, but it also deemphasizes the role of active citizenship in defining the common terms of participation through which liberty is realized, assigning instead to citizens the more responsive role of contesting the judgments of government officials when tracking fails. Nonetheless, Pettit’s conception of domination as arbitrary interference checked by the republican rule of law as constitutive of liberty has subsequently undergone certain refinements. Pettit has rightly been criticized for placing too much stress on the arbitrariness of interference, thereby failing to identify the normative dimension of domination. Dominators typically act under the color of right, claiming the normative power, or authority, to define the rights and duties of the dominated. Such normative power of the dominator may be exercised arbitrarily, consisting in randomly changing

the rights and duties of those who suffer domination, thus violating settled expectations and creating feelings of civic insecurity. But dominating exercises of normative power need not be arbitrary. A dominator might, for instance, be an entirely rational administrator who decides impartially to impose new rights and duties against an established background of settled expectations and publicly known rules, indeed carefully tracking everyone’s shared interests. Here domination might be said to consist not in arbitrary interference at all, but rather in the absence of redress or remedy among the dominated. Consequently, nondomination requires the exercise of suitable normative powers by citizens as well as government officials, whether through responsively contesting decisions or more actively shaping the contents of the political obligations by which their liberty is created. This recasting of domination and nondomination in the language of normative powers to shape the common terms of cooperation constitutive of liberty deeply influences the subsequent turn to cosmopolitan republicanism, as I discuss shortly. But what are the specific concerns of cosmopolitan republicans in responding to Pettit’s revival of the commonwealthman tradition of republicanism? Here there are two principal concerns, both pointing to the cosmopolitan republican problem of nondomination with domination. On the one hand, securing nondomination at home in a republic of citizens, historically speaking, has proven to be consistent with citizens establishing imperial dominium over noncitizens in colonial outposts. This is the concern that motivated the anticolonial republicans of the Enlightenment. On the other hand, securing nondomination among citizens also frequently led to the problem of citizens dominating noncitizens within their own borders. This is a problem that concerned Enlightenment thinkers, such as Kant, but which remains no less urgent in the present age of globalization.

Nondomination with Domination: The Shift to Cosmopolitan Republicanism In the commonwealthman tradition, common liberty is created as a condition of citizens under the rule of law in a bounded political community. But it is not created as a condition of all humanity, unless the rule of law gains a properly cosmopolitan reach. Here Pettit’s superannuated commonwealthman conception of republican liberty as created through nondominating legal interference itself presents no impassable conceptual barrier to such an extension of reach in a republic of humanity. At any rate, it presents no such barrier as long as interference may be

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embedded in inappropriately responsive institutions beyond the sovereignty of the representative nation state. But is it also necessary for nondomination that there should be this kind of extension to cosmopolitan institutions? In its strongest form, the cosmopolitan republican answer to this question is affirmative. Indeed, it is not just that nondomination among the citizens of the closed political community may exist alongside the domination of noncitizens outside or even within its borders, but also that nondomination among citizens is undermined absent extension of the benefits of nondomination to all humanity. This, above all, is the insight of anticolonial Enlightenment thinkers who appealed to the idea of a peaceful federation as being the key institutional innovation of modern republicanism. Here the Enlightenment thinkers distinguished themselves from advocates of undifferentiated world empire, such as Dante, who had sought in the late middle ages to concentrate power in the incorruptible rational administration of a world monarch, ruling strictly according to Christian natural law. But this merely produced the normative problem of nonarbitrary domination, as discussed earlier. The Enlightenment solution to the modern resurgence of the Empire in the form of colonialism was to stress the dispersal of normative powers and authority across various subunits of a world federation. Indeed, such world federal dispersal of power was concerned, in part, with overcoming domination of the colonies by the center. But it was also, just as much, concerned with preventing those processes whereby imperial overreach leads inexorably to the corruption of republican liberties at home. Here power exercised by the colonizing nation over its new subjects quickly extends to its own citizens, undermining domestic constitutional provisions designed to guarantee their powers and liberties, as the exclusive members of a sovereign national republic. This concern that no single republic can realize nondomination on its own has recently become the focus of cosmopolitan republican criticism of the United States for resorting increasingly to anti-civil libertarian measures both at home and in Iraq, to which it claimed to be extending the benefits of liberty. But this same concern that nondomination cannot be sustained domestically in the absence of a federated scheme of cosmopolitan institutions beyond the nation state also applies to the phenomenon of migrant populations; or what Kant once called the auxiliaries of the republic to whom citizens should owe the right of hospitality. The present age of globalization has indeed produced the circumstance of politics in which citizens live alongside noncitizens, many of whom lack any secure

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status as legally recognized persons under the constitution of the national republic. This circumstance exists not only when so-called illegals are viewed by American agribusiness as exempt from labor laws and subject to the constant threat of detention and deportation, but it can also exist among citizens who are themselves economic migrants in their own country, denizens of illegal squatter settlements on public lands, such as the so-called political society of megalopolises like Kolkata in India. Here pervasive illegality even among citizens clearly points beyond sovereign constitutionalism as the paradigm of republican liberty. If the commonwealthmen appealed to the idea that to be free is to be the citizen of a free state, then this model of republican liberty effectively breaks down. Indeed, the issue with respect to freedom from domination created by the rule of law entails an expansion of the scope of political membership beyond the self-enclosed constitutional nation state. This, at any rate, is the key claim made by the leading theorist of cosmopolitan republicanism, James Bohman. According to Bohman, nondomination without domination requires an appeal to humanity as itself constituting a political community. Here he distinguishes between humanity as the empirical aggregate of all humans and humanity as the moral quality of all persons, as providing the basis for the attribution of rights. Membership in this all-encompassing human political community, or republic of humanity, then consists in the “right to have rights.” This indeed amounts to the political human right to legal recognition sufficient for nondomination, regardless of any more particular political memberships of this or that state or regional body; or, for that matter, the absence of any such memberships at all as in the case of persons who are entirely stateless. Here the basis of the universal right to have rights creating the common liberty of all humanity can be found in article 28 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: “Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this declaration can be fully realized.” Understood as a specifically normative power, this right to have rights then enables any member of the human political community to make binding claims to justice on all other members of this community who also possess human rights. In Bohman’s estimation, such a cosmopolitan republican model of the normative power to initiate such claims on all other members of the human community of rights holders is presently captured most adequately in the European Convention on Human rights.

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Indeed, it is most adequately captured here in that this Convention entitles foreigners without nationality in any EU member state to initiate appeals to the European Human Rights Court and the EU Court of Justice for the juridical recognition of their basic rights. This extends the normative rights and powers of nondomination to noncitizens by creating transnational adjudicative institutions, building upon the existing constitutional traditions of EU member states. Making each particular constitutional state responsive to cosmopolitan institutions of human rights law thus equalizes the fundamental rights status of citizens and noncitizens alike, resolving the problem of nondomination with domination characteristic of national republics. Bohman contends that the European model of human rights courts may be applied beyond the EU, advocating, for instance, a cosmopolitan human rights court in the United States, whereby “illegals” could initiate claims to justice against the exclusive body of US citizens. Here the larger goal of the republic of humanity would be to create multiple ways and intersecting institutional locations through which all of humanity may come to exercise the minimum power to meet the threshold of transnational nondomination. Such threshold may be conceived as a democratic minimum insofar as it would guarantee all human beings the fundamental democratic capacity to begin deliberation over assignments of rights and duties, across diverse localized contexts of community and membership. Not only does the realization of nondomination without domination in the cosmopolitan republic of humanity entail the active exercise of such power by all humans pointing beyond merely contestatory powers, but it also builds on the reformulation of Pettit’s original problem of domination in explicitly normative terms. One objection to Bohman’s cosmopolitanism is that humanity cannot properly be a community. Here it may be insisted that any political community must be capable of promulgating law. But humanity cannot do this in the absence of a soulless and despotic world state, as opposed to a differentiated set of intersecting human rights institutions. The reply to this objection is, however, that it appeals to an overly narrow definition of community in the capacity to promulgate law; a capacity that may indeed be concentrated as a singular power of domination, as in the case of Dante’s monarch. Consequently, the basis of community is better conceived more broadly in terms of universal rights-based membership, where such membership distributes the power to shape communicatively the normative contents of law across diverse national and regional contexts through transnational adjudicative institutions.

Cosmopolitan Republicanism in Contrast with Liberal Cosmopolitanism Liberalism is much more frequently associated with cosmopolitan thought than republicanism. This is hardly surprising given the old anti-cosmopolitan commonwealthman emphasis on bounded political community, as now controverted by Bohman’s appeal to humanity as unbounded community. By contrast with republicanism, the normative core of liberalism consists not in the idea of membership so much as contract and negative duty. Here the emphasis on contract sorely limits the commitment to cosmopolitanism, as when Rawls argues that under the veil of ignorance states would choose minimalist social contracts binding themselves only to obey treaties and limits on war. This, however, clearly falls short of the democratic minimum of normative powers to shape terms of cooperation in various national and regional contexts, regardless of particular national memberships, advocated by Bohman. Pogge’s liberalism, though, achieves a cosmopolitan reach by stressing instead negative duties of the citizens of rich nation states to refrain from doing harm to noncitizens and distant others. Here Pogge, like Bohman, makes an appeal to human rights as the basis of his cosmopolitanism. But, while Bohman interprets human rights in terms of inclusive membership in the republic of humanity and the dispersal of minimally democratic powers of noncitizens to make binding claims on citizens, Pogge does nothing of the kind. According to Pogge, rights to initiate claims based on such inclusive membership are moot. Noncitizens do not make any democratic claims of justice on citizens by participating in shaping the normative contents of legally binding rights and duties. Instead, it is entirely up to the citizens of presently dominant nation states to desist from causing harm to noncitizens, given some plausible attribution of causal responsibility for their distress. From Bohman’s perspective, however, this approach would ultimately fail the republican test of nondomination, even on Pettit’s conception of domination as arbitrary interference. In Pogge’s liberal cosmopolitanism, arbitrary interference should be checked exclusively by dominators themselves recognizing a negative duty to do no harm. But this need not even entail formally extending to the dominated powers of contestation, as necessary to ensure a nonarbitrary rule of law. Indeed, the authority to determine the rights and duties of the dominated remains entirely within the hands of the dominators. This leaves fully in place the normative problem of domination as arising from the dominator’s monopolistic hold on the normative power, or authority, to determine the binding contents of obligations under law.

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Herein lies the core difference between the liberal and republican approaches to cosmopolitanism. Addressing domination as a normative problem of monopolistic determinations of the contents of rights and duties, cosmopolitan republicanism points in the direction of transnational democracy, extending powers of co-determining the contents of law to citizens and noncitizens alike, as the necessary condition of nondomination without domination. For its part, liberal cosmopolitanism entails no such commitment to transnational democracy, appealing instead to those citizens in a position to be dominators of noncitizens to engage in moral self-regulation according to the standard of negative duty. Absent the commitment to transnational democracy, it thus enables citizens to retain monopolistic control over the determination of the meaning and application of basic human rights norms. To this extent, liberal cosmopolitanism does not address the central insight of the current revival of interest in republicanism: that noninterference and negative duty remain consistent with ongoing relations of domination, as relations both across and within national borders.

Related Topics

▶ Bohman, James ▶ Cosmopolitan Democracy ▶ Democracy, Transnational ▶ Global Democracy ▶ Kant, Immanuel ▶ Pogge, Thomas

References Allen M (2009) Misrecognition and domination in transnational democracy. Contemp Polit Theory 9:2 Bohman J (2001) Cosmopolitanism republicanism. Monist 84:3–22 Bohman J (2004) Republican cosmopolitanism. J Polit Philos 12(3):336–353 Bohman J (2007) Democracy across borders: from demos to demoi. MIT Press, Cambridge Pettit P (1996) Republicanism: a theory of government and freedom. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

Cosmopolitanism LUIS CABRERA Department of Political Science and International Studies, University of Birmingham, Edgbaston, Birmingham, UK

The cosmopolitan moral orientation is one in which individuals, rather than states or other communal groupings,

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are seen as morally primary. All individuals are seen as possessing equal moral worth, and that worth is to be respected because of their status as human beings, rather than their status as citizens of any particular political community. That is not to say a cosmopolitan orientation dictates some first-order impartialism, where no special attachments are considered in moral questions. Rather, it would presume, especially in recent formulations, that any special status attached to membership in a specific political community should be justifiable to all others, in particular if there are resource or security implications for those outside of the community. The roots of cosmopolitanism penetrate nearly as deeply as those of democracy, and cosmopolitanism has seen similar periods of ascendancy and decline among prominent thinkers. Diogenes the Cynic is credited with first declaring himself to be a “citizen of the world,” defining his moral aspirations in specifically universal terms. While famously dwelling in an upturned tub in the streets of fourth century BCE Athens, Diogenes challenged convention at all levels, including conventional views on love of country and moral belonging (Nussbaum 2002). His Greek and Roman Stoic successors espoused and expanded cosmopolitan ideas. Roman jurist Cicero (106–43 BCE), for example, argued that the laws of any given polity should be measured against a universal natural law. Roman Emperor Marcus Aurelius (121–180), in his Meditations, emphasized the oneness of all things in the world, and ways in which all humans were linked by their rational capacity, or right reason. The cosmopolitan tradition can be traced through the individualistic universalism of Enlightenment thinkers, in particular Immanuel Kant. His Perpetual Peace (1795) remains highly influential as a comprehensive approach to globally applicable cosmopolitan law and the promotion of stable interstate relations through some political integration. Many later thinkers active during and around the world state “heyday” of the 1940s, when global political integration was advocated by many as the solution to fears of nuclear annihilation, also can be seen as extending aspects of the cosmopolitan tradition. That is not to say that a cosmopolitan view is compatible with any sort of argument for global integration. For example, it would be generally at odds with an approach to securing global peace that permitted or required the large-scale repression of individuals within states. Some rights-based approaches to global integration, such as that offered by H.G. Wells (1941), could be consistent with an emphasis on the equal moral worth of individuals. Most current cosmopolitan thinkers, however, would distance their

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Cosmopolitanism

accounts from the world state concept, on which more below. Recent decades have seen a flowering of cosmopolitan thought. Amid deepening global economic integration, cosmopolitan theorists have explored the implications of a genuinely universalist moral view in such areas as distributive justice, democratic practice, global trade, just war, and immigration. Unlike in the classical treatments, when cosmopolitan thought was equated with conceptions of world citizenship, most recent accounts distinguish between the two. World citizenship focuses more on individual ethical behavior in a global human community, and cosmopolitan accounts emphasize the application of principles of justice to global institutions. In contemporary thought, the cosmopolitan moral orientation is seen as having three main features: it is individualistic, viewing individuals, rather than any political groupings, as the primary moral unit; it is universal, seeing all of those individuals as possessing equal moral worth; and it is general, meaning that all persons should be viewed as morally primary and of equal worth by all other persons, and not just members of their own group (Pogge 2008: Ch. 7). Charles Beitz adds useful precision in his characterization of a cosmopolitan view as one in which all individuals are seen as having equal standing as addressees of justification. Actions which would deeply affect individuals’ interests must in principle be justifiable to them. Thus, some “morality of states” view which sees states or state leaders as the appropriate ends of moral action would not meet the standard. A cosmopolitan orientation is fundamentally concerned with the scope of moral principles. It does not prescribe some specific scheme of distributive justice within or across states, or dictate specific democratic forms at any level. That is not to say that any set of principles extended to the global level could be included. Some universal principle dictating gender oppression, for example, would not fit the rubric. Further, consequentialist approaches, which often are counted as cosmopolitan since they do not attach intrinsic worth to state boundaries, may not fit. That is primarily because of familiar worries arising in some modes of consequentialism about the possibility of sacrificing individuals in order to achieve a desired outcome. The question is particularly significant for such issues as international emergency or development aid, where choices can arise between devoting a set amount of resources to merely protecting the lives of one set of highly vulnerable persons, or enabling an already less-vulnerable group to achieve greater gains by putting the resources to use, for example, in an economic enterprise. Permitting the sacrifice of the worst-off group would

seem at deep odds with an emphasis on equal moral worth, and of course with offering a justification that all persons could, in principle, accept. Within the cosmopolitan orientation, three prominent current approaches can be identified: cosmopolitan democracy, moral cosmopolitanism, and institutional cosmopolitanism. A cosmopolitan democracy approach seeks to recapture or reinforce individual autonomy against the perceived forces of economic integration, or globalization. Such integration is said to be eroding the capacity of individuals to participate in shared rule that is actually decisive. Democracy must be recaptured through the creation of broader polities and new democratic institutions above the state, up to and including the fully global level. A world parliament, perhaps taking the form of a second, directly elected chamber for the United Nations, is a common proposal (see Held 2004; Archibugi 2008). Moral cosmopolitanism is viewed as a means of assessing the justice of current global institutions. Institutions are understood broadly as systems of rules specifying actions that are permissible within a particular domain. The current global system is seen as a set of myriad interlinked institutions grounded in the norms of Westphalian state sovereignty. Sovereign states are recognized as formally equal under international law, and possessing strong, though not absolute, ability to determine political structures and rules for fair treatment of their own citizens. These two fundamental norms of sovereignty are intrinsic to many injustices that cosmopolitans have identified in the current system. Noninterference and related norms of internal sovereignty, for example, can facilitate the oppression of individuals or minority groups and impede external protections of those individuals. While the creation of the International Criminal Court can be seen as a significant step toward implementing cosmopolitan law – law that attaches to and protects individuals rather than states – it remains the case that states’ leaders choose whether or not their states will fall under the court’s jurisdiction. Related norms recognizing a state’s leaders, no matter how oppressive their regimes, as having the right to sell or use natural resources, as well as to borrow in their own citizens’ name, also are singled out for criticism (Pogge 2008). More broadly, global economic institutions, including the rules and practices of intergovernmental organizations such as the World Trade Organization, are seen as contributing to vast global inequalities. Theorists such as Charles Beitz (1979) and Thomas Pogge have argued that the fact of massive global deprivation, and the fact that interdependence between states has created in effect a cohesive scheme of global institutions, justifies a global

Cosmopolitanism

extension of principles of distributive justice. Beitz, among others, has argued for an extension of John Rawls’s difference principle, according to which any distributive inequalities must be arranged so that they are to the greatest benefit of the worst-off societal groups. Such a principle, he argues, should deeply inform the operation of existing global institutions. Others, notably Simon Caney (2005), but also the more recent Beitz, reject any strong emphasis on interdependence to justify a global extension of distributive justice. They argue that it is most consistent with cosmopolitanism to focus on the moral worth of individuals, rather than whether the states in which individuals happen to reside are deeply embedded in global institutions. Separate applications of moral cosmopolitanism would include assessments of the ways in which life-saving drugs are developed and priced, often leaving them inaccessible to the world’s poorest. In an immigration context, some accounts have challenged the legitimacy of norms of sovereignty that permit states exclusive rights to determine who gets in and who will be excluded (Risse 2008). Others have explored a just war theory informed by moral cosmopolitan principles, including circumstances under which some form of preventive warfare might be justifiable (Buchanan and Keohane 2004). Institutional cosmopolitanism is seen as more fundamentally concerned with institution building in order to achieve global outcomes consistent with an emphasis on individual moral standing. It often is equated with some hierarchical world state, controlling a monopoly on the legitimate global means of coercion and imposing its laws on all states and individuals. Most cosmopolitans take pains to make clear that they are not advocating such institutional transformation. Many have proposed the creation of narrower but still strongly empowered institutions of international and cosmopolitan law, as well as bodies capable of securing state compliance with just requirements on environmental protections, immigration and emigration, the regulation of multinational corporations, and in other areas. Pogge (2008) and Caney (2005) in particular have called for more radical global institutional change, in service of better securing individual rights within states. Both advocate the creation of a multi-level global system, where states would be embedded in regional institutions, which would themselves be embedded in some global institutions, though not in a strictly hierarchical relationship. Both emphasize that they do not envision a system where a single institutional entity would exercise absolute power. Some limited principle of supremacy at the global

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level would seem to be required, however, if global compliance is to be secured with requirements relating to issues affecting the great majority of individuals, for example, climate change. Finally, we can note that some accounts would attempt to accommodate special relationships within a fully cosmopolitan frame. Kok-Chor Tan (2004), for example, has defended a liberal-nationalist cosmopolitan approach. Associative duties to conationals are seen as permissible, but they are subordinate to global duties, which are expected to be far more pressing given the extent of global deprivation. Gillian Brock (2009) defends a broadly similar approach, arguing that a justifiable accommodation of the local gives reason to reject the kind of global principle of equal opportunity that Caney (2005) would defend. How much accommodation can or should be made for national identity, and whether such shared identity can serve as justification for excluding individuals from higher-level distributions of resources or opportunities, are likely to remain significant questions in a cosmopolitan frame and in the debate on global justice in general.

Related Topics

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