ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
India
editorial board Editor in Chief Stanley Wolpert Stanley Wolpert is a distinguished professor em...
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ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
India
editorial board Editor in Chief Stanley Wolpert Stanley Wolpert is a distinguished professor emeritus of History at the University of California, Los Angeles. His publications include Tilak and Gokhale: Revolution and Reform in the Making of Modern India (1962); Morley and India, 1906–1910 (1967); Roots of Confrontation in South Asia (1982); Jinnah of Pakistan (1984); Zulfi Bhutto of Pakistan (1993); Nehru: A Tryst with Destiny (1996); Gandhi’s Passion: The Life and Legacy of Mahatma Gandhi (2002); A New History of India (7th edition, 2003); and India (3d edition, 2005) as well as his forthcoming Shameful Flight: The Last Years of the British Empire in India. Board Members Robert Brown Robert Brown is a professor in the Department of Art History at the University of California, Los Angeles and
the curator of Southeast Asian Art at the Los Angeles County Museum of Art. Deena Khathkate Deena Khathkate is the former assistant director of the Monetary and Financial Systems Department at the International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C. He is also the former managing editor of World Development, a monthly journal of development studies published by Elsevier. He has authored several articles on economics in academic journals, including Quarterly Journal of Economics, Review of Economics and Statistics, and Oxford Economic Papers. Raju G. C. Thomas Raju G. C. Thomas is the Allis Chalmers Distinguished Professor of International Affairs, Marquette University. Among his dozen books, edited and co-edited, are Indian Security Policy (1986); Perspectives on Kashmir (1994); Democracy, Security and Development in India (1996); and India’s Nuclear Security (2001).
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
India
VOLUME 2 E–J
Stanley Wolper t Editor in Chief
Encyclopedia of India Stanley Wolpert, Editor in Chief
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LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGING-IN-PUBLICATION DATA Encyclopedia of India / Stanley A. Wolpert, editor in chief. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-684-31349-9 (set hardcover : alk. paper)—ISBN 0-684-31350-2 (v. 1)—ISBN 0-684-31351-0 (v. 2)—ISBN 0-684-31352-9 (v. 3)—ISBN 0-684-31353-7 (v. 4) 1. India—Encyclopedias. I. Wolpert, Stanley A., 1927– DS405.E556 2005 954'.003—dc22 2005019616
This title is also available as an e-book. ISBN 0-684-31512-2 Contact your Thomson Gale representative for ordering information. Printed in the United States of America 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
table of contents Volume 1 List of Maps . . . . . . . . . . . . . Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . List of Articles . . . . . . . . . . . . Thematic Outline of Contents . . . . . . Directory of Contributors . . . . . . . Chronologies . . . . . . . . . . . . A–D Color Insert: Art, Architecture, and Sculpture
. . . . . .
. . ix . . xi . . xv . xxiii . xxxiii . xlvii
Volume 2 List of Maps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii List of Articles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix E–J Color Insert: Contemporary Life
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
India
Volume 3 List of Maps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii List of Articles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix K–R Color Insert: Handicrafts Volume 4 List of Maps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii List of Articles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix S–Z Color Insert: Physical Environment Primary Source Documents . . . . . . . . . 261 Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 287 General Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . 295 Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 299
v
list of maps Volume 1 The Mughal Empire, 1525–1707 . . . . . . . 30 The Empire of Alexander the Great . . . . . . 35 The Bengal Partition and Related Changes, 1905–1912 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132 The Revolt of 1857–1859 . . . . . . . . . . 170 The Advance of British Power, 1766–1857 . . . 178 Volume 2 Guptan Empire, c. 300–550 . . . . . . . . . 163 Invasions from the Northwest, 330–1 B.C. . . . 209 Indus Valley Civilization, c. 2800–1600 B.C. . . . 260
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
India
Volume 3 Jammu and Kashmir . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 The Marathas, 1646–1819 . . . . . . . . . . 95 Mauryan Empire, 321–185 B.C. . . . . . . . . 104 Muslim Expansion, 8th–15th Centuries . . . . 199 Territorial Changes, 1947–1955 . . . . . . . 304 Territorial Changes, 1956–2000 . . . . . . . 305 European Commercial Contacts, 16th–18th Centuries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 321
vii
list of articles A Abdul Kalam, Avul Pakir Jainulabdeen (A.P.J.) Advani, Lal Krishna Aesthetics Afghani, Jamal-ud-din Afghanistan Afghanistan, Military Relations with, 1994–2001 Agni Agra Agricultural Growth and Diversification since 1991 Agricultural Labor and Wages since 1950 Agricultural Prices and Production, 1757–1947 Agricultural Wages, Labor, and Employment since 1757 Ahmedabad AIDS/HIV Ajanta Akbar Akkamah¯ade¯vi ¯ ap Al¯ Albuquerque, Afonso de Alexander the Great Allahabad All-India Muslim League Ambedkar, B. R., and the Buddhist Dalits Amritsar Anand, Mulk Raj ¯ al And¯ Andhra Pradesh Andrews, C. F. Andy, S. Pulney Anglo-Afghan Wars: War One (1838–1842) Anglo-Afghan Wars: War Two (1878–1880) Anglo-Afghan Wars: War Three (May–August 1919) Armed Forces
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
India
Artha Sh¯astra Arunachal Pradesh ¯ Aryabhata ¯ Aryabhat¯ ı ya ¯ Arya Sam¯aj Asht¯adhy¯ay¯ı Ashvamedha Asian Development Bank (ADB), Relations with Asiatic Societies of Bengal and Bombay Assam Astronomy Auckland, Lord Aurangzeb Aurobindo, Sri Avat¯aras of Vishnu, Images of Ayodhya ¯ Ayurveda Azad, Maulana Abul Kalam Azariah, Vedanayakam Samuel
B Babur Bactria Bahadur Shah I Balance of Payments: Exchange Rate Policy Balance of Payments: Foreign Investment and the Exchange Rate B¯alasarasvati, T. Ballistic and Cruise Missile Development Ballistic Missile Defenses Baluchar Sari Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier “Bande Mataram” Bandhani
ix
LIST OF ARTICLES
Banerjea, Surendranath N. Bangalore Bangladesh Bank and Non-Bank Supervision Banking Sector Reform since 1991 Barahmasa Baroda Bene Israel Bengal Bentinck, Lord William Bhabha, Homi Bhagavad G¯ıt¯a Bh¯agavata Pur¯ana ˙ Bhajan Bhakti Bharat Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) Bhave, Vinoba Bhopal Bhubaneswar Bhuta ¯ Bhutto, Zulfikar Ali Bihar Bimbisara Biotechnology Revolution Bombay Bonnerji, Womesh C. Bose, Subhas Chandra Brahmacarya Br¯ahmanas · Brahmo Samaj Brazil–India Relations British Crown Raj British East India Company Raj British Impact British India Office, The Brocade Bronzes: Early Images Bronzes: South Indian Buddha, Life of the Buddhism in Ancient India Buddhist Art in Andhra up to the Fourth Century Burma
C Cabinet Mission Plan Calcutta Capital Market Caste and Democracy Caste System Central Banking, Developmental Aspects of Chaitanya Chalcolithic (Bronze) Age Chandigarh
x
Chatterji, Bankim Chandra Chaudhuri, Nirad C. Chelmsford, Lord Chidambaram China, Relations with Chola Dynasty Christian Impact on India, History of Cinema Civil-Military Relations Clive, Robert Commodity Markets Common Property Resources, Past and Present Congress Party Contract Farming Cornwallis, Lord Cripps, Sir Richard Stafford Curzon, Lord George
D Dalhousie, Marquis of Dalits Dance Forms: An Introduction Dance Forms: Bharata Natyam Dance Forms: Kathak Dance Forms: Kathakali Dance Forms: Koodiyattam Dance Forms: Kuchipudi Dance Forms: Manipuri Dance Forms: Mohini Attam Dance Forms: Odissi Das, Chitta Ranjan Debt Markets Deccani Painting Demographic Trends since 1757 Demography and Census-taking Desai, Morarji Development of Commercial Banking 1950–1990 Development Politics Dev¯ı Devi, Siddheshvari Dharma Sh¯astra Dhrupad Diaspora: Economic Impact Diaspora: History of and Global Distribution D¯ıkshitar, Muttusv¯ami D¯ıv¯al¯ı Dravidian Parties Dubois, Jean-Antoine Dufferin, Lord Dundas, Henry Dupleix, Joseph François
E Early Maritime Contacts
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
India
LIST OF ARTICLES
Economic Burden of Defense Economic Development, Importance of Institutions in and Social Aspects of Economic Policy and Change, 1800–1947 Economic Policy Under Planning, Aspects of Economic Reforms and Center-State Relations Economic Reforms of 1991 Economy Since the 1991 Economic Reforms Educational Institutions and Philosophies, Traditional and Modern Elephanta Ellenborough, Earl of Ellora (Elura) Elphinstone, Mountstuart Employment Structure Energy Politics and Policy Environmental Consciousness since 1800 Ethnic Conflict Ethnic Peace Accords European Union, Relations with External Debt Policy, 1952–1990
F Family Law and Cultural Pluralism Famines Federalism and Center-State Relations Feminism and Indian Nationalists Feudalism Filmı¯gı¯t Film Industry Finance Commission Fiscal System and Policy from 1858 to 1947 Fiscal System and Policy since 1952 Fitch, Ralph Folk Art Folk Dance Food Security Foreign Resources Inflow since 1991 Forster, E. M. French East India Company French Impact Fundamental Rights
G Galbraith, John Kenneth Gama, Vasco da Gandharan Art and Architecture Gandhi, Indira Gandhi, Mahatma M. K. Gandhi, Rajiv Gandhi, Sonia Gandhinagar Ganesha · Gat-Tora
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
India
Gender and Human Rights General (National) Elections Geography Globalization Goa Goddess Images Gokhale, Gopal Krishna Government of India Act of 1919 Government of India Act of 1935 Gujarat Gujral, Inder Kumar Guptan Empire Guptan Period Art Guru Nanak
H Haq, A. K. Fazlul Harappa Hardinge, Lord Harsha Hastings, Warren Health Care Health Care for Tourists Hindu Ancestor Rituals Hindu and Buddhist Thought in Western Philosophy Hinduism (Dharma) Hindu Nationalism Hindu Nationalist Parties Hindu Tantric Deities Hindutva and Politics History and Historiography Human Development Indicators Human Rights Humayun Hyderabad
I Indian Institutes of Technology (IITs) India Office and India Office Library India’s Impact on Western Civilization Indo–U.S. Relations, Cultural Changes in Indra Industrial Change since 1956 Industrial Growth and Diversification Industrial Labor and Wages, 1800–1947 Industrial Labor Market, Wages and Employment, since 1950 Industrial Policy since 1956 Indus Valley Civilization Informal Credit Markets Information and Other Technology Development Infrastructure and Transportation, 1857–1947 Infrastructure Development and Government Policy since 1950
xi
LIST OF ARTICLES
Insurance Industry Insurgency and Terrorism Intellectual Property Rights Internal Public Debt, Growth and Composition of International Monetary Fund (IMF), Relations with Iqbal, Muhammad Irwin, Lord Islam Islam’s Impact on India Israel, Relations with Ivory Carving
J Jahangir Jain and Buddhist Manuscript Painting Jainism Jain Sculpture Jamdani Jammu and Kashmir Jammu and Ladakh Jamshedpur Japan, Relations with Jewelry Jews of India Jinnah, Mohammad Ali Jodhpur Judicial System, Modern
K Kabir K¯alid¯asa K¯ama Sutra ¯ Kanpur Karachi Karaikk¯al Ammaiy¯ar Kargil Conflict, The Karnataka Kashmir Kashmir Painting Kashmir Shawls Kayasths Kerala, Coalition Politics Kerala, Model of Development Kerkar, Kesarbai Khajuraho Khan, Abdul Ghaffar Khan, Ali Akbar Khan, Liaquat Ali Khan, Vilayat Khayal Khusrau, Amir Kipling, Rudyard K¯ırtana Krishna in Indian Art
xii
Krishnamurti, Jiddu Kriti
L Land Tenure from 1800 to 1947 Land Tenure since 1950 Languages and Scripts Lansdowne, Lord Large-scale Industry, 1850–1950 Leaders, Christian Liberalization, Political Economy of Linlithgow, Lord Literature: Modern Literature: Tamil Love Stories
M Macaulay, Thomas Babington M¯adhaviah, A. Madras Madurai Magadha Mah¯abh¯arata Maharashtra Maldives and Bhutan, Relations with Mandal Commission Report Mangeshkar, Lata Manipur Maritime Commerce, 1750–1947 Mauryan Empire Media Medical Science Education Medieval Temple Kingdoms Meghalaya Menon, V.K. Krishna Metalware Military Interventions in South Asia Miniatures: Bikaner Miniatures: Bundi Miniatures: Central India Miniatures: Harem Scenes Miniatures: Kishangarh Miniatures: Kotah Miniatures: Marwar and Thikanas Minto, Lord M¯ırabai Mizoram Modern and Contemporary Art Mohenjo-Daro Monetary Policy from 1952 to 1991 Monetary Policy since 1991 Money and Credit, 1858–1947 Money and Foreign Exchange Markets Montagu, Edwin S.
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
India
LIST OF ARTICLES
Monuments: Eastern India Monuments: Mughal Monuments: Southern India Monuments: Western India Morley, John Mountbatten, Lord Mughal Painting Mughal Painting, Later Music: An Introduction Music: Karn¯atak Music: South India Muslim Law and Judicial Reform Muslims Mutual Funds, Role of Mysore
N Nabob Game Nagas and Nagaland Naidu, Sarojini Nainsukh Naoroji, Dadabhai Narayan, Jaya Prakash Narayan, R. K. Narayanan, K. R. National Security Decision-Making N¯atya Sh¯astra Nehru, Jawaharlal Nehru, Motilal Neolithic Period Nepal Nepal, Relations with New Delhi Nightingale, Florence Nizam of Hyderabad Nobili, Robert de Non-banking Financial Institutions, Growth of Northeast States, The Nuclear Programs and Policies Nuclear Weapons Testing and Development Ny¯aya
P Paithani Pakistan Pakistan and India Palaeolithic Period Pandit, Vijaya Lakshmi Pandita Ramabai P¯anini Pant, Govind Ballabh Papermaking Paramilitary Forces and Internal Security Parsis
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
India
Patanjali Patel, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patna Patola Paul, K. T. Pension Funds and Social Security Peshwai and Pentarchy Pillai, Samuel Vedanayakam Pingala Planning Commission Political System: Cabinet Political System: Constitution Political System: Parliament Political System: President Political System: Prime Minister Population, Gender Ratio of Portuguese in India Poverty and Inequality Prasad, Rajendra Premchand Presidents of India Price Movements and Fluctuations since 1860 Prime Ministers of India Princely States Private Industrial Sector, Role of Public Debt of States, since 1950 Public Expenditures Punjab
Q Qaww¯al¯ı
R Rabban, Joseph Radhakrishnan, Sarvepalli R¯aga R¯agam¯al¯a Rahman, Sheikh Mujibur Rajagopalachari, Chakravarti Rajneesh, Osho Rajput (Western, Central, and Hill) Painting Ramananda R¯am¯anuja R¯am¯ayana · R¯am¯ayana · and Mah¯abh¯arata Paintings Ranade, Mahadev Govind Rang¯oli Ray, Satyajit Reading, Lord Reddi, Muthulakshmi Reserve Bank of India, Evolution of Ripon, Lord Rishi Rock Art
xiii
LIST OF ARTICLES
Roy, Ram Mohan Rural Credit, Evolution of since 1952 Russia, Relations with
S Sabhas and Samitis Sam · ska¯ ra S¯ankhya Sarod Sassoon, David Satyagraha Saving and Investment Trends since 1950 Sayyid Ahmed Khan and the Aligarh Movement Scheduled Tribes Science Scientists of Indian Origin and Their Contributions Sculpture: Buddhist Sculpture: Kushana Sculpture: Mauryan and Shungan Sculpture and Bronze Images from Kashmir Secularism Securities Exchange Board of India (SEBI) Selected Macroeconomic Models Shah Bano Case Shah Jahan Shankar, Ravi Shankara Shiva and Shaivism Shivaji Bhonsle and heirs Shiv Sena Shore, Sir John Shrauta Sutras ¯ Shreni Shulba Sutras ¯ (Ved¯angas) Shy¯ama Sh¯astri Sikh Institutions and Parties Sikhism Simla Sind Singh, Bhagat Singh, Maharaja Ranjit Singh, Manmohan Singh, Sadhu Sundar Sirohi School Painting Sitar Size and Capital Intensity of Indian Industry since 1950 Small-Scale and Cottage Industry, 1800–1947 Small-Scale Industry, since 1947 Soma South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) South Asian Economic Cooperation Southeast Asia, Relations with Space Program
xiv
Sri Lanka Sri Lanka, Relations with State Finances since 1952 State Formation State-Level Performance since Reforms of 1991 Step-Wells of India Stock Exchange Markets Strategic Thought Subbalakshmi Ammal, R.S. Subbulakshmi, M. S. Subsidies in the Federal Budget Sultanate Painting Sultante-Period Architecture of South Asia
T Tabla Tagore, Rabindranath T¯ala Tanchoi Tansen Tantric Buddhist Images Tapas Tata, Jamsetji N. Taxation Policy since 1991 Economic Reforms Technical Change in Agriculture, 1952–2000 Temple Types (Styles) of India Textiles: Block-Printed Textiles: Early Painted and Printed Textiles: Karuppur Theater Theosophical Society Thumr¯ı Tibetan Buddhists of India Tilak, Bal Gangadhar Trade Liberalization since 1991 Trade Policy, 1800–1947 Tribal Peoples of Eastern India Tribal Politics Tripura Ty¯agar¯aja
U Underground Economy, Dimensions of United States, Relations with Upanishadic Philosophy Urbanism
V Vaisheshika Vajpayee, Atal Bihari Varanasi Varuna · Ved¯anga Jyotisha
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
India
LIST OF ARTICLES
Vedic Aryan India Vina Vishnu and Avat¯aras Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) Vivekananda, Swami
World Bank (WB), Relations with World Trade Organization (WTO), Relations with
W
Y
Wars, Modern Wavell, Lord Weapons Production and Procurement Wellesley, Richard Colley Women and Political Power Women’s Education Women’s Indian Association
Yajña Y¯ajnavalkya Yajur Veda Yoga
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
India
X Xavier, Francis
Z Zoroastrianism
xv
e EARLY MARITIME CONTACTS Conventional studies have tended to categorize maritime trade in the Indian Ocean in the pre-colonial period into ethnic networks, such as Roman trade, Arab trade, and European trade in the western Indian Ocean, as well as Indian trade across the Bay of Bengal. The basis for these identities was inevitably the nature of sources available. For example, the first century A.D. text, the Periplus Maris Erythraei (Periplus of the Erythraen Sea) provides the most comprehensive account of trade and trading commodities between the Red Sea and the west coast of India. The text itself nowhere refers to “Roman trade,” though it does mention a diverse range of communities involved, including the Ichthyophagoi, or coastal fishing communities, the Nabateans, Sabaeans, Homerites, Arabs, and Indians. Nevertheless, in historical writing, references to Roman trade supplying the markets of the Empire with luxury items such as Indian muslin continue.
second millennium B.C. includes those of Dilmun (the Bahrain archipelago), Magan (the Oman peninsula) and Melukkha (identified with the Harappan settlements). Around the beginning of the common era, this network had expanded to include large parts of the western Indian Ocean extending from the Red Sea to the east coast of India, as described in the Periplus Maris Erythraei. A corresponding network extended across the Bay of Bengal to incorporate large parts of island and mainland Southeast Asia. However, the distribution of a range of ceramics such as the rouletted ware, a fine textured pottery with rouletted decoration, at archaeological sites from lower Bengal to Sri Lanka, the north coasts of Java and Bali, and as far as Vietnam indicates several regional and transoceanic circuits. The Sassanians ruled Iran and adjacent countries from
Contrary to such assumptions, the archaeological data indicate that the initial stages of the maritime system in South Asia may be traced to around 10,000 B.C., when fishing and sailing communities settled in coastal areas and exploited a diverse range of marine resources. These communities formed the bedrock of maritime travel and often combined fishing with trading ventures, especially in regions such as Gujarat, where fishing grounds are located at some distance from the coast. By the third millennium B.C., these local and regional fishing and sailing circuits had evolved into trade networks between the Harappan settlements on the Makran and Gujarat coasts of the subcontinent and the Persian Gulf, as evident from finds of Harappan ceramics and seals at sites in the Gulf. A triad of names that figures consistently in Mesopotamian texts of the third to ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
India
A.D. 226 to 651 and were active participants in the trade of
the Indian Ocean, with Siraf, located in the Persian Gulf, an important center of trade. After a break in settlement, Siraf reemerged as a major center around A.D. 700 and, together with Sohar, its location close to the mouth of the Gulf on the coast of Oman enabled it to participate in a regional trade network in the ninth to eleventh centuries A.D. that extended to settlements in the Indus delta, such as Banbhore, several centers along the west coast of India, and Mantai on the north coast of Sri Lanka. One of the characteristic features of maritime trade from the ninth and tenth centuries onward was the location of markets in fortified settlements along the Indian Ocean littoral, as in the interior. Rules governing the payment of taxes and regulating the functioning of the markets were often inscribed on copper plates and provide useful insights into the organization of the trade network. 1
E A R LY M A R I T I M E C O N T A C T S
Trade and Exchange The commodities involved in maritime trade in the Indian Ocean may be divided into various broad categories, such as aromatics, medicines, dyes and spices; foodstuffs, wood, and textiles; gems and ornaments; metals; and plant and animal products. These categories find mention in a range of textual sources from the firstcentury Periplus Maris Erythraei to the Geniza documents of the eleventh to thirteenth centuries, Chinese accounts, and medieval Arab writings. Textiles were a major commodity involved in the Indian Ocean trade and included a wide range, from coarse cottons to fine silks and from dyed cloth to embroidered material. Furniture in Asia consisted mostly of various types of carpets, cushions, canopies and draperies—all produced by the textile industry. The value attributed to these varied not only temporally but also spatially in the different regions of the Indian Ocean littoral. It is suggested that textiles in Southeast Asia were recognized as a means of storing wealth, whereas in India domestic surplus income was traditionally stored in the form of gold and silver jewelry. Gold, silver, and copper were the main traded metals, exchanged both as currency and bullion. Though sources of copper and lead are available in the subcontinent, the Periplus refers to the import of copper, tin, and lead to Kane, Barygaza, and Muziris on the west coast. This is repeated in the Geniza documents, which refer to trade in metals from south India and the regular export of iron and steel, brass, and bronze vessels. In return, copper, tin, and bronze vessels were imported into the south, where new ones were created and old ones repaired. These commodities were exchanged through a complex diversity of transactions including gifts, barter, and trade. There are several references in the Periplus to presents given to the elite—for example, wine and grain in considerable quantity imported into the region of the Barbaroi in east Africa was “not for trade but as an expenditure for the good will of the Barbaroi.” Similarly, in the region of Barygaza, or Bharuch, on the west coast of India, the king imported slave musicians, beautiful girls as concubines, fine wine, expensive clothing with no adornment, and choice unguent. In addition to these gifts, the elite constantly tried to control trade. The Periplus refers to a customs officer and a centurion being dispatched to the harbor of Leuke Kome on the east coast of the Red Sea. The island of Socotra at the mouth of the Red Sea was under the control of the king of the frankincense-bearing land, who had leased it out; the island was hence under guard. Somewhat later in the text, there is reference to the harbor of Moscha Limen in the region of Omana, 2
where frankincense was guarded by some power of the gods.
Organization of Trade In the early centuries of the common era, Buddhist texts and inscriptions recording donations at early Buddhist monastic sites provide data on the organization of trading activity into guilds, in addition to the presence of individual merchants. The state no doubt derived revenue from taxing trade transactions at entry points to cities and towns. From the middle of the first millennium A.D. there are several instances of these taxes being transferred to religious establishments. The charter of Visnusena, dated to A.D. 592 from Lohata in the Gujarat-Kathiawar region, provides a detailed list of seventy-two trade regulations or customary laws to be followed by the “community of merchants” (vaniggrama) established in the region. For example, it is specified that merchants staying away for a year were not required to pay an entrance fee on their return. Other clauses specify duties that were to be paid. A boat full of vessels had to pay twelve silver coins, but if the vessels were for a religious purpose, then it was only one and a quarter silver coins. In the case of a boat carrying paddy, it was half this amount. Other commodities mentioned as being carried on boats included dried ginger sticks and bamboo. From the ninth to the mid-fourteenth centuries, two of the merchant guilds that dominated economic transactions in south India were the Manigramam and the Ayyavole. Associated with these two merchant guilds were associations of craftsmen such as weavers, basket makers, potters, and leather workers. Though these two guilds originated independently, from the mid-thirteenth century onward, the Ayyavole association became so powerful that the Manigramam functioned in a subordinate capacity. Not only did these merchant associations develop powerful economic networks, they also employed private armies. The range of their operations extended well beyond the boundaries of the Indian subcontinent into Southeast Asia. Several clusters of Tamil inscriptions have been found on the eastern fringes of the Indian Ocean from Burma to Sumatra. In contrast, the major states of Java and Bali reacted somewhat differently to the advent of Indian merchant groups. In the tenth century, local versions of these merchant guilds termed the banigrama appeared in the north coast ports of both the islands. While some foreign merchants may have been included in these groups, these appear largely as indigenous organizations associated with the local economic networks as tax-farmers. Around the turn of the second millennium, there was increasing evidence of fortified settlements in coastal ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
India
ECONOMIC BURDEN OF DEFENSE
areas and of attempts by the state and religious institutions to localize the sale and exchange of goods, either within the fortified precincts or in the vicinity of a Hindu temple. The tenth-century Siyadoni inscription from Gujarat records donations made to a temple of the god Vishnu between 903 and 968 by merchants and artisans and the endowment of shops in the textile market, main market, and so on.
networks overlapped in the Indian Ocean in the ancient period and brought together interest groups ranging from boat-building communities to religious functionaries, traders as well as armed groups. As the focus shifts from national histories to maritime history, researchers are only now unraveling the intertwined history of these communities.
Along the Konkan coast, there are references to the fortified market center of Balipattana. The Kharepatan plates of Rattaraja, dated to A.D. 1008, lists gifts to the temple of Avvesvara built by Rattaraja’s father and situated inside the fortifications. Also located within the fortifications were settlements of female attendants, oilmen, gardeners, potters and washermen, and also some land.
Himanshu Prabha Ray
Farther south is the Piranmalai inscription of the thirteenth century from the Sokkanatha temple, built like a fortress. The importance of the temple lay in its strategic location astride routes crossing the southern part of the peninsula from the Malabar coast to the east. The record lists a range of commodities on which a tax was levied for the benefit of the temple. These included cotton, yarn, thick cloth, thin cloth, and thread.
Aggression and Sea Battles versus Ritual and Ceremony The establishment of fortified coastal settlements is matched by references to settlements across the Bay of Bengal. In one of his inscriptions dated A.D. 1025, Rajendra Chola enumerates thirteen port cities of island Southeast Asia and the Nicobar islands, which were raided by the South Indian maritime force. Sastri used this reference to conclude that the Chola navy had conquered parts of the Malay Peninsula and Sumatra, and this is a trend found in subsequent writings. These references should, however, be reexamined within the overall developments in peninsular India and the increasing emphasis on the cult of the hero. Elaborately carved memorial stones have been found extensively in peninsular India, dating from the first to the twelfth centuries. These provide abundant information on the cult of the hero and are also significant indicators of sea battles, especially those from the region of Goa dating to the period of the Kadambas (950–1270). From the eleventh century onward, representations on memorial stones depict planked vessels, sharp-ended with a long projecting bow strongly raked, in addition to canoe-shaped craft. In contrast to this emphasis on sea battles and aggression along the west coast are the iconographic illustrations from Orissa and Bengal. A ceremonial barge is prominently depicted on the eleventh-century Jagannatha temple at Puri on the Orissa coast, stressing the ritual and ceremonial aspects of the boat. It is evident that several ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
India
See also Chola Dynasty
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Abraham, Meera. Two Medieval Merchant Guilds of South India. Delhi: Manohar, 1988. Casson, Lionel. The Periplus Maris Erythraei. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989. Christie, Jan Wisseman. “Asian Sea Trade between the Tenth and Thirteenth Centuries and Its Impact on the States of Java and Bali.” In Archaeology of Seafaring: The Indian Ocean in the Ancient Period, edited by Himanshu Prabha Ray. Delhi: Indian Council of Historical Research Monograph Series I, 1999. Deloche, Jean. “Iconographic Evidence on the Development of Boat and Ship Structures in India (2nd century th BC–15 century AD).” In Tradition and Archaeology: Early Maritime Contacts in the Indian Ocean, edited by Himanshu Prabha Ray and Jean-François Salles. Delhi: Manohar Publishers, 1996. Jain, V. K. Trade and Traders in Western India (AD 1000–1300). Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers, 1990. Mirashi, Vasudev Vishnu, ed. Inscriptions of the Silaharas. Delhi: Archaeological Survey of India, 1977. Ray, Himanshu Prabha. The Winds of Change: Buddhism and the Maritime Links of Early South Asia. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1994. ———. The Archaeology of Seafaring in Ancient South Asia. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Sastri, K. A. Nilakantha. The Colas. Chennai: University of Madras, 1955. Spencer, George Woolley. Royal Leadership and Imperial Conquest in Medieval South India: The Naval Expedition of Rajendra Chola I, c. 1025 AD. Ann Arbor, Mich.: University Microfilms, 1968. Tampoe, M. Maritime Trade between China and the West. Oxford: BAR International Series 555, 1989.
EAST INDIA COMPANY. See British East India Company Raj.
EAST PAKISTAN. See Bangladesh; Pakistan and India.
ECONOMIC BURDEN OF DEFENSE The question of “how much is enough” when addressed to estimating the optimal defense expenditure of nations 3
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Border Security Force Patrolling the Indo-Pakistan Border in Punjab. A large part of the defense budget is spent on maintaining the Indo-Pakistan Border Fencing. INDIA TODAY.
yields no easy answers. Peace and disarmament lobbies argue that outlays on defense and social welfare by the state embody zero sum games; increases therefore in defense expenditure must inevitably lead to reductions in social welfare, and vice versa. This is a maximalist position, since the maintenance of armed forces and paramilitary units is essentially intended to ensure national security. Modern defense forces should be able to deter inimical nations from eroding a state’s territorial integrity or abridging its national sovereignty. A new dimension to the need for greater defense expenditure to protect India from disruption is added by the increasing dangers arising from the menace of international terrorism.
India’s Defense Budget in Context Allocations for the defense budget in India are made in terms of “current rupees,” which is the usual practice followed across the world. For comparative purposes and for long-term planning, defense expenditure can be designated in terms of “constant rupees,” which has the advantage of discounting the inflationary factor. Assessing defense expenditure in “real terms” allows other 4
deflators to be applied, like currency fluctuations that would allow the actual value of the defense rupee to be informed. For making comparisons between the economic burdens on defense accepted by different nations, some generally accepted means of comparison are possible, notably by denoting defense expenditure as a percentage of either the gross domestic product (GDP) or the central government expenditure (CGE). The Indian Constitution envisages the legislative, administrative, and financial control over the armed forces in India vesting in the central government; thus, including therein expenditures by the state governments for comparison purposes is inappropriate, although some analysts in India have found this useful. There are other parameters that can be used to express the defense burden, like its per capita amount or the size of the armed forces in relation to the population of the country, but they are not helpful for making comparative studies.
Characteristics of the Indian defense budget. The Indian government deprecates its need to incur expenditure on defense by rather self-consciously suggesting that it is only providing the minimum irreducible outlays ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
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required. The official explanations are: “The endeavour of defence planners is to balance the minimum maintenance requirements of defence forces and the need to modernize them, without unduly straining the economy” (Ministry of Defence, Annual Report, 1997–1998, p. 12); and “Given India’s size and security concerns, the outlay on Defence, assessed either as a percentage of the total Central Government expenditure or of the Gross Domestic Product, continues to be one of the lowest among neighbouring countries” (Ministry of Defence, Annual Report, 1999, p. 16). India’s defense expenditure since the 1960s does not reveal any pattern of incremental growth, but rather suggests that periodic increases have been reactive to external conflicts and internal dynamics. The most important external factors were the wars that India fought with China and Pakistan: the Sino-Indian border conflict (October 1962); the Second Indo-Pak War (September 1965, preceded by the Kutch operations in April 1965), the Third Indo-Pak War (December 1971), leading to the creation of Bangladesh; and the Kargil conflict (May–July 1999). The yearlong Kashmir Line of Control buildup and border confrontation between India and Pakistan (December 2001–October 2002) also led to dramatic accretions in the defense budget. These periodic additions to India’s defense budget occurred in the years following these conflicts, and relected high costs to replace lost equipment, make up for perceived deficiencies in weapon systems, and heighten defense preparedness. The major internal factors bringing dramatic increases in defense allocations were required to implement the awards of the Pay Commissions of 1974, 1986, and 1996. Personnel and personnel-related military costs have radically increased over the years due to the generosity of successive Indian Pay Commissions. Recruiting suitable young persons for the armed forces in India has become progressively more difficult for various reasons, primarily the availability of attractive job opportunities in civil avocations and the disincentives of hard living conditions and inherent risks in the military profession. At the same time, the high value and complexity of modern weapon systems makes it imperative for the armed forces to recruit a fair share of the available talent by offering larger compensations and more attractive perquisites; these have added to manpower costs that approximated over 40 percent of the defense budget in India. Military pensions have also increased exponentially over the years due to the cumulative effects of the Pay Commission awards and the rapidly growing longevity of pensioners due to improved health conditions in India. Since 1984–1985, military pensions have been debited to civil estimates, but they now amount to around 20 percent of defense expenditure. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
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India’s major weapon systems were long of Soviet origin, available at “political prices,” and still comprise some 70 percent of the weapons in the armed forces. Over the years, the spares and ancillaries needed to keep these systems operational have progressively become more difficult to procure, and also much more expensive, as they are now only available at market prices. India is now diversifying its sources for procuring military supplies by turning to Western countries, and increasingly to Israel. These procurements, available only at commercial and market prices, add considerably to defense costs and spending.
Factors Influencing Defense Allocations Defense expenditure in India is predicated on the threat perceptions of its strategic elite, who influence the decision-making process. These special interest groups include the three Services Headquarters (Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Finance, Finance Division of the Ministry of Defence), the Standing Committee of the Parliament on Defence, and the political parties. Other, but less significant, groups are the voters, foreign arms suppliers, and domestic contractors supplying defense requirements. There are, moreover, a steadily growing number of retired civil and military officials, media personalities, and academics who are active in the seminar circuit, and in print or electronic media. The official articulation of India’s national security threats emphasizes its external dimensions and the dangers emanating from its strategic location in the northern Indian Ocean littoral, as well as its proximity to the volatile Gulf, Central Asian, and Southeast Asian regions. But the primary military threat is seen to arise from Pakistan, with its support of Islamic militancy and terrorism in Kashmir, and from China. A cross-border security threat is increasingly perceived, especially by the nongovernmental components of India’s strategic elite, as emanating from nonmilitary sources of insecurity, including international terrorism, arms and drug smuggling, organized crime, and money laundering, apart from forced migration and environmental decay. These threats require regional and global solutions. Furthermore, major threats to Indian security arise from internal factors, including ethno-nationalist upsurges, communal and caste conflicts, and the growing menace of indigenous extremist movements that have spread across several parts of the country. Cumulatively, these threat perceptions guide the defense planning process. Its basic determinants have been identified to be the need for a two-front defense to secure the borders with Pakistan and China; the need to acquire an independent deterrent capability, since it runs counter to India’s foreign policy to join any military alliance or strategic grouping; the inevitability of largescale involvement by the armed forces in internal security 5
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functions; and India’s strategic interests in the northern Indian Ocean, its Exclusive Economic Zone, and defending its island territories, highlighting its need for a bluewater navy.
Categorization
of
Indian
defense
budget.
Expenditure estimates in the defense budget are classified under five major demands; four are on the revenue account (for the army, navy, air force, and ordnance factories), and the fifth on capital account. Military expenditures can be divided into six broad categories: pay and allowances of the personnel of the armed forces; payments to industrial establishments employed by stores, depots, and factories; transportation and miscellaneous expenditure; stores purchases; works expenditure; and capital outlays such as capital works, purchase of vessels, plants, and machinery. The distinction made between revenue and capital expenditure in the Indian defense budget is an inherited British practice, which is not very satisfactory. In theory, revenue expenditure must not result in creating any permanent assets. Capital outlays are expended on acquiring lands, buildings, and machinery. This distinction is artificial, as expenditures on small and temporary buildings were classified under the revenue head. But it also included outlays on aircraft, aero-engines, and the naval fleet, which were anomalous. After 1987–1988, these latter outlays were classified under the capital head, which also includes expenditure on heavy and medium vehicles, equipment, and buildings that have a value of more than 200,000 rupees and a life of more than seven years. Yet another manner of classifying the defense budget is to differentiate between outlays on personnel and personnel-related costs, maintenance costs, and modernization costs. This classification disaggregates the defense expenditure in terms of its major functions, allowing its utilization for comparative purposes and more purposeful orientation. The empirical experience regarding the utilization of the Indian budget reveals that any reduction therein or any unforeseen expenditure requiring accommodation in the defense budget results in a negative effect on the modernization effort. (Personnel costs are sacrosanct and remain unaffected.) This leads to a diminution in the operational capabilities of the Indian armed forces, due to weapons systems becoming obsolete, the unavailability of essential equipment due to the shortages of spares and ancillaries, and inadequate training of the forces.
Can economy and efficiency be achieved in the defense budget? The answer to the above question must be unequivocally affirmative. The major reasons given for increasing India’s defense budget include such arguments as: no real increase in defense outlays has 6
occurred if inflationary factors over the years are discounted; allocations made to the army might have increased, but those for the navy and air force have remained almost static; capital outlays of around 30 percent of the budget are inadequate to cater to even highpriority modernization programs; and the financial implications of the Pay Commission reports are not being configured into the defense budgets. Moreover, a recurring complaint is that the defense plan is never finalized in time because of interminable bureaucratic delays, which disrupt the reequipment plans of the three services, adding to the cost of these acquisitions and ultimately to the defense burden. There are large areas, however, where economies can easily be effected in defense expenditure that could, paradoxically, also improve efficiency in the armed forces. These include: the scaling down of authorized unit holdings of tanks, heavy vehicles, and other equipment; reducing the consumption of fuel, oil, and lubricants by imposing quantitative restrictions on their issue; renovating the ordnance depots and achieving better inventory management in stores holdings; and effecting greater capacity utilization in the ordnance factories and defense public sector undertakings. More radical steps could also be taken to reduce defense expenditure, such as reviewing the manpower holdings of the armed forces and locating areas of wasteful use. This could also be achieved by integrating similar administrative functions that are being separately performed by the three services headquarters, such as the procurement of stores. The possibility of using civilians in place of uniformed personnel could also be accelerated for tasks like the manning of general and logistics establishments. Civilian personnel may be employed at less than half the cost of uniformed personnel in terms of compensation and perquisites. A more professional system for the procurement of indigenous stores or acquiring weapon systems from abroad could also ensure economies. Large economies can thus be effected in defense expenditure without jeopardizing the operational efficiency of the armed forces.
Effect of nuclearization. The nuclearization of India has not led to any reduction in defense expenditure, though India’s bomb protagonists had earlier argued that this would lead to a reduction in outlays on conventional weaponry. This reduction has not happened; instead, India’s defense expenditure has almost doubled since the nuclear tests in May 1998. India’s commitment in its Nuclear Doctrine to deploying the strategic triad of landbased missiles, long-range bombers, and submarinelaunched missiles, apart from establishing the requisite command and control arrangements, and early warning systems to achieve assured second-strike capability, will add considerably to the defense budget. The prevailing ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
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thesis is that outlays on conventional forces will simultaneously have to be increased to “raise the nuclear threshold,” so that conditions are not created that predicate the early use of nuclear weapons in any conflict.
Thomas, Raju G. C. The Defense of India: A Budgetary Perspective of Strategy and Politics. Delhi: Macmillan, 1978.
Interservice rivalries also increase expenditures, since each service chief would like to be remembered for the perquisites he wrested for his own service and the weapon systems acquired during his tenure. Establishing the strategic triad has much to do, therefore, with satisfying the aspirations of the army, air force, and navy to acquire their individual nuclear forces. For this reason it seems inevitable that expenditure on nuclear weapons and their delivery systems will grow over time, as will the outlays on conventional forces. Therefore, no economies will be possible in the allocations made for defense.
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, IMPORTANCE OF INSTITUTIONS IN AND SOCIAL ASPECTS OF A recent major advance in the analysis
Does defense expenditure strain the Indian economy? As a percentage of the GDP, the defense budget hovers between 2 and 3 percent, and between 13 and 16 percent of the CGE. This is by no means an insupportable economic burden for India. Nonetheless, it must be remembered that between a third and a fourth of India’s population (approximately 300 million) live below the poverty line and are deprived of the most basic needs for food, housing, education, and public health. Viewed from this perspective, defense expenditure, which has been steadily rising, preempts funds required for meeting the basic needs of India’s poor, representing significant lost opportunity costs. P. R. Chari See also Armed Forces; Wars, Modern
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Defence Services Estimates, 2003–2004. New Delhi: Government of India, 2003. Kargil Committee Report, published as From Surprise to Reckoning. New Delhi: SAGE Publications, 2000. Ministry of Defence. Annual Report, 1999–2000. New Delhi: Government of India, 2000. Ministry of Defence. Annual Report, 2002–2003. New Delhi: Government of India, 2003.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Chari, P. R. “Defense Expenditure in India: Can It Be Reduced?” In Defence Expenditure in South Asia: India and Pakistan. RCSS Policy Studies 12. Colombo: Regional Centre for Policy Studies, 2000. Ghosh, A. K. India’s Defence Budget and Expenditure Management in a Wider Context. New Delhi: Lancer, 1996. Rao, P. V. R. Defense without Drift. Mumbai: Popular Prakashan, 1970. Singh, Jasjit. India’s Defense Spending: Assessing Future Needs. New Delhi: Knowledge World, 2000. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
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of economic development is the recognition of the importance of institutions. This has moved us beyond sterile debates such as whether the economy should be left to the market or should be thought of as the responsibility of government. It is now recognized that government and markets are not alternatives between which we choose, but that government—in particular, good governance—is a prerequisite for the market to function effectively; and that, for an economy to progress, it may not be enough to raise savings and investment rates, improve trade policy, and control fiscal deficits if we do not have good institutions. One has to be careful about this kind of analysis because “institution” is not a well-defined term. In this article, “institutions” will refer to the social and political settings within which the economy is embedded. Thus the word will encompass not only the structure of government and its legal institutions but also the cultural and social norms within which the human beings of a nation function, and which can be even more important than the formally enacted laws of a nation. The significance of institutions thus defined is easy to see. Trade, exchange, investment, and business almost always involve transactions performed over time. You supply a commodity today, and your trading partner will pay for it tomorrow or may have paid for it yesterday. You, as the owner of an enterprise, send a salesperson to market your good in distant lands, and the salesperson is expected to pay you back on his or her return. Even when you take a taxi, you usually pay after you have taken the ride. If traders and ordinary citizens did not feel confident that, after they had done their share, their trading partners or business associates would fulfill their obligations, they would refuse to do business or make investments. In such a nation, the market would be stunted and development would remain a distant dream. If, on the other hand, a society’s laws are effective, and contracts are enforced by the state without individuals having to incur too large a cost, then trade, business, and investment will grow, leading to greater economic prosperity. Even in the absence of law enforcement, if a nation’s citizens are naturally trusting of one another, or its social norms are such that individuals keep their promises, then this society could also progress. Indeed, a disposition toward keeping one’s promise could be even 7
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Mother and Children in Front of Public Health Poster. Mother and her children front of sign proclaiming, “you can save your beloved child’s life by timely inoculation against fatal diseases.” The consistent underfunding of public health services by both central and state governments, which share responsibility for the provision and financing of health care, remains a major problem in India—with its infant and child mortality rates among the highest in the world. POPULATION COUNCIL.
better than the case in which contracts are enforced by formal legal machinery, which requires costly courts and enforcement bureaucracies. One of the basic premises on which a market economy is founded is the principle of free contract. The principle asserts that adults who voluntarily agree to a contract, which has no negative impact on others, should not have the contract nullified by the government and, in an ideal situation, should be able to seek governmental or societal help to prevent anyone from reneging on the contract. A major role of institutions is to provide a setting in which the principle of free contract is upheld. For India, it can be argued that the roots of its prolonged economic stagnation (and the optimism observed in recent years) cannot be fully understood if one ignores such variables as the social norms, collective beliefs, and the structure of polity and law—basically, the range of 8
institutions. An understanding of the role of culture and institutions in the life of a nation can help in the design of better and more appropriate economic policy. In the case of Russia, for example, it is now recognized that standard economic policies designed to speed transition did poorly because they amounted to changes that Russian society was not prepared to accept; the requisite culture and institutions for the market economy were not in place. The failure to adopt recommended economic policies (as in Tanzania or Venezuela), or the abortion of economic polices due to social instability (as in Indonesia or Yugoslavia), is often caused by a lack of understanding of the social and political context in which the policies were implemented. It is also arguable that a nation’s collective beliefs shape what is politically and economically feasible. In the case of independent India, the early economic policies ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
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Prem Chand Gupta, Minister for Company Affairs. Gupta at opening session of the First National Conference on Corporate Governance Trends, 18 October 2004. Corporate governance is increasingly recognized as an important aspect of sustainable economic growth, and the government in New Delhi, in partnership with several Indian institutions, has established the National Foundation for Corporate Governance (NFCG) to lead the way. INDIA TODAY.
were marked by deep mistrust of the market and big business. In a democracy, one cannot simply overrule such popularly held views, and it is not surprising that until quite recently, India remained burdened by a gargantuan bureaucracy appointed to plan and control the economy but which in reality had become the cause of India’s stagnation. Centuries earlier, the British had come to India not to rule but to trade. The initial contact that India had with Britain was not with the Crown but with one of the earliest multinational corporations of the world, the British East India Company. Later, British commercial interests merged with imperial conquests that proved more lucrative, and gradually, without much serious resistance, a huge subcontinent passed into the control of the British Empire, the center of which was thousands of miles removed from South Asia. Thenceforth, the Indians would be relieved of their resources not only through asymmetric trade and currency exchange, but also by ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
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taxation and state-sponsored extortion. Fears of multinationals and a general mistrust of business and trade were soon deeply etched into India’s collective memory. Independent India would design its economic policy in the shadow of this memory. And it is not surprising that it took decades of debate and ultimately the shock of recession in the early 1990s to shake the country out of its policy stupor. India’s policy was born out of two conflicting systems of beliefs and ideas—those of Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru—held together precariously, their differences often denied. The differences had roots that go back to well before 1947. Nehru’s education at Harrow and Cambridge helped forge his commitment to Fabian socialism; Gandhi’s ideas emerged from his grassroots struggles and his experiments in alternative communal village (ashram) lifestyles. The economic policies they envisaged for India were very different. In the 1930s and even the early 1940s, Nehru was enamored of Karl Marx and 9
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V. I. Lenin (though not of Russian Communism), referring to their works repeatedly in his diary and in letters to friends. He had shed his Marxism-Leninism, and even socialism, by the time India attained independence, but his faith in planning, heavy industry, modern science and technology would persist. Along with Prasanta Mahalanobis, he would try to give shape to those ideas in the form of what came to be called the Mahalanobis-Nehru strategy of development. Gandhi’s vision, on the other hand, was deeply rooted in rural hand labor, primarily cotton spinning and weaving, and the revitalization of India’s village handicrafts. The actual policy regime that India followed in its early days of independence was a mixture of these two competing institutional visions. A Soviet-style planning system was developed, but without the state having a monopoly of control over resources. Capitalism was allowed to flourish, but a large bureaucracy was nurtured. Huge investments were made in basic industries, but at the same time, several sectors were protected as belonging to the small-scale “Gandhian” sector. Capitalism was criticized, but it was at the same time relied upon. Socialism was never practiced, but the rhetoric of socialism was constantly reiterated. A burgeoning bureaucracy became the surrogate for socialism. Advisers from Washington and many economists recommend that Third World nations must have democracy and that they must open up their economy and privatize, oblivious of the fact that to ask for a democracy and then to insist what the democracy should choose could amount to a contradiction. Since most developing countries are not democracies they did not face the problem, but India did. Once people’s opinion had been shaped (and Nehru was instrumental in this), there was no way that policies could be easily dictated to them. Opinion would have to be molded before major policy shifts were possible. Institutional changes are probably the hardest policies to effect. When India’s reforms started in 1991, they began with standard economic policies. Thus ceilings on import tariffs were first brought down to 150 percent, and thereafter reduced steadily, virtually every year. The industrial licensing system was dismantled, fiscal deficits were curtailed, and controls on foreign exchange transactions were eased. Economic reforms, however, have not been able to alter India’s legal system and other institutions. Consider India’s labor laws, especially those enshrined in the Industrial Disputes Act of 1947. This law was a direct outcome of India’s mistrust of the market and a result of its own historical experience. When can a worker be fired, under what conditions can workers be retrenched, when can a firm be closed down? These were all matters that were written down as law, leaving very little room for the 10
principle of free contract by which workers and employers could use their own judgment, bargaining power, and information about their specific industries to reach independent agreements. This has now become a handicap. A fashion industry with variable demands may want to pay its workers more than the “market” but retain the freedom to close down its operations at short notice. The workers themselves may agree to such terms, but Indian law makes such a contract difficult to uphold, thereby having a dampening affect on the demand for labor, and thereby holding wages down. Clearly, in the next generations of reforms, India will need to take on these institutional matters, amending many of its labor laws, rent control laws, and contract legislation, and reducing delays in its courts and the bureaucracy. Such reforms could bolster economic growth, even without raising investment and savings or reducing the fiscal deficit. There is another class of policies, which only partly entail institutional change, but which should not be omitted from a discussion of development policy. This is what Jean Drèze and Amartya Sen broadly define as “social opportunity.” In order to be able to partake in market activities, individuals need a minimal amount of education (and what constitutes “minimal” is steadily increasing in today’s world of advanced technology) and to be in reasonably good health. Government has a major responsibility in ensuring that people are able to have access to basic health care and education. These are domains in which markets function poorly. In some sense, these are the prerequisites for the market to function well, rather than being what the market can deliver on its own. Hence, along with the role of providing good governance and better laws, a government has the responsibility to provide certain basic needs of its population, especially its poor, who are unable to marshal these for themselves. Kaushik Basu
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Basu, Kaushik. Prelude to Political Economy: A Study of the Social and Political Foundations of Economics. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. Basu, Kaushik, ed. India’s Emerging Economy: Performance and Prospects in the 1990s and Beyond. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2004. Clifford, Mark. Troubled Tiger. London: M. E. Sharpe, 1994. Drèze, Jean, and Amartya Sen. India: Economic Development and Social Opportunity. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995. Granovetter, Mark. “Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness.” American Journal of Sociology 91 (1985): 481–510. North, Douglass. Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance. Cambridge, U. K.: Cambridge University Press, 1990. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
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ECONOMIC POLICY AND CHANGE, 1800–1947
Platteau, Jean-Philippe. Institutions, Social Norms, and Economic Development. Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers. 2000. Wolpert, Stanley. Nehru: A Tryst with Destiny. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.
ECONOMIC POLICY AND CHANGE, 1800– 1947 India, by the end of the eighteenth century, had attained a high degree of development not only in agriculture but also in a wide variety of industries. Spinning and weaving remained the major industries, but iron manufacture, shipbuilding, and several other industries were also flourishing by 1800. India produced manufactured goods not only for home consumption but also for export. However, by about 1858, there was a marked decline in the output of the manufactures. In 1880 the Famine Commission noted that agriculture formed almost the sole occupation of the mass of the population, and that any remedy for India’s predicament must include the introduction of diversity of occupations. The agricultural sector by 1881 employed more than 70 percent of the male working force; this proportion did not change until 1931. Employment in manufacturing declined from about 25 to 30 percent of the workforce in 1800 to 18 percent in 1881, and further to 15 percent in 1931. Varying estimates of per capita income from 1850 to 1900 show that the average annual per capita income did not change much during 1867 to 1882, then declined somewhat by 1900. On the basis of the most reliable estimate for the years 1900 to 1947, there was an increase of about 12 percent in per capita income during this period. According to Simon Kuznets, et al. (1955), international differences in per capita income were not significant by about 1800. Colin Clark’s estimate (1957) of the per capita income of the United Kingdom, in international units, was 378 in 1688. India’s per capita income for that year was probably not different from that of the United Kingdom. Even assuming that India’s per capita income was 25 percent lower than that of the United Kingdom, it could not have been less than 284 in international units. India’s per capita income was about 200 in international units in 1925–1929, according to Clark. By these estimates, India’s per capita income declined by about 30 percent between 1688 and 1925–1929. The decline probably was much greater. All the available data suggest that India passed through a phase of economic stagnation, or even decline, for the 150 years before independence.
Aspects of Economic Policies Alexander Gerschenkron’s research suggests that, during the period from 1800 to 1914, the role of the state in economic development was an increasing function of the ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
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relative backwardness of a country, on the basis of the experience of France, Germany, and Tsarist Russia. In India, the state was not only passive but even inimical to development. However, it did create important prerequisites for development. It brought about political and administrative unity and established an administrative, legal, and judicial system. It developed the railways and communications and introduced modern education. In spite of these real achievements, its policies not only lacked an orientation toward development but were such as to retard economic progress. The capacity of Indian farmers to improve the productivity of land was hampered by excessive and uncertain land taxes. These excessive land taxes would not have brought about the deterioration of agriculture if a part of them had been spent in improving agricultural techniques, as in Japan. Nor were these tax receipts used for starting an iron and steel industry to provide inputs for railways, which would have reduced the need for imports. The development linkages of iron and steel would have stimulated industrial developments in general; the building of railways produced a great momentum to industrialization in Europe, Japan, and the United States. Far from fostering an iron and steel industry, the state prevented Indians from starting one; Indian entrepreneur J. N. Tata was denied permission to manufacture iron in the central provinces in the 1880s. Land revenue financed the export of capital to the United Kingdom for the payment of home charges (which included the expenses of the India office in London, and other commitments of the British government of India to England), interest on and repayment of avoidable and unproductive foreign debt, and some private remittances. The average annual level of this economic drain, on a conservative estimate, was about 2 to 3 percent of national income from 1800 to 1947. So India had to generate an export surplus of this magnitude. Thus, if the economic drain were excluded, India had a surplus on government as well as on external trade account. These surpluses could have been used for capital formation in India; they were actually used for the economic development of the United Kingdom. British commercial policies were such as to adversely affect Indian exports, particularly textiles. From 1800 to 1850, there was in force an elaborate network of mercantilist provisions designed to aid British textiles, which penalized Indian textiles and industrial products in British markets, in foreign markets, and even in Indian markets. Further, Indian shipping was hampered by the policy of not permitting Indian ships to participate in the trade between the United Kingdom and India. Even the government stores’ purchase policy discriminated against Indian industries, to the advantage of manufacturers in the United Kingdom. British industries, particularly the 11
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textiles industry, developed as a result of this protectionist policy, particularly against Indian imports, until 1858. Though all contemporary advanced countries protected their industries during the nineteenth century, India was unable to follow suit. Consequently, India’s manufacturing sector experienced a significant decline. The British government’s policy did change after World War I, with the adoption of discriminating protection to Indian industries; government purchasing procedures too were reorganized to allow potential Indian suppliers to bid on equal terms with British suppliers. However, the shift in policy was piecemeal. Tariff protection was granted only to existing industries; there was no provision for new industries such as chemicals and machine tools. Furthermore, the shift came when the major railway construction was already completed. Despite such halting tariff protection, India was able to develop industries that included steel, cement, sugar, matches, and textiles.
Urgency of Planned Process of Development Because of what has been described as a period of arrested economic development from 1800 to 1947, India faced tremendous problems of dire poverty, unemployment, and acute economic backwardness at the time of independence. Among the fifty-five countries for which the United Nations published per capita income data for 1952–1954, India’s per capita income was one of the lowest. All these problems were aggravated by its large population, increasing at the rate of 2 percent per annum. If a social catastrophe were to be avoided, India had to accomplish in a few decades the degree of economic development that had taken other countries more than a century. Under the circumstances, it was clear to the Indian leadership, even before independence, that there was an urgent need for initiating a planned process of development. In fact, the president of the Congress Party appointed a National Planning Committee in 1938 to create a program for planned development. The interrupted work of the committee was taken up by the Planning Commission of the Government of India in 1950. The era of planning thus began with the first Five-Year Plan (1951–1956) and still continues. Vinayak Bhatt See also British Crown Raj; Land Tenure from 1800 to 1947; Maritime Commerce, 1750–1947; Trade Policy, 1800–1947
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bhatt, V. V. Aspects of Economic Change and Policy in India 1800–1960. Bombay: Allied Publishers, 1963. 12
Clark, Colin. The Conditions of Economic Progress. 3rd ed. London: Macmillan, 1957. Dutt, Ramesh. The Economic History of India in the Victorian Age. 6th ed. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1950. ———. The Economic History of India under Early British Rule. 7th ed. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1950. Gerschenkron, Alexander. Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1962. Kuznets, Simon, et al., eds. Economic Growth: Brazil, India, Japan. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1955.
ECONOMIC POLICY UNDER PLANNING, ASPECTS OF Economic development in India was initiated in 1952 through the formulation of Five-Year Plans, which set the direction of growth for the Indian economy. The government’s economic policy under planning was predicated on four basic premises. First, the economy would not achieve rapid growth and egalitarian income distribution under free markets; therefore, the state must intervene in multiple ways. As a consequence, a comprehensive regulatory apparatus whose wings spread to all sectors of the economy emerged. Second, the economy should pull itself up by its own bootstraps, which meant in practice that it should operate almost as a closed economy, producing as many products as possible domestically and assigning a marginal role to foreign trade. Third, the public sector should occupy a commanding height in the economy, producing basic goods like steel and machinery, with consumer goods playing a complementary role. Fourth, the growth should benefit the most disadvantaged classes of society, affording them more employment opportunities and more equal income distribution.
Instruments of Economic Policy The instruments devised to ensure the outcome of the economic policy according to the plan priorities were— apart from the fiscal, foreign exchange, trade and monetary policies (which are discussed separately in related entries): domestic industrial licensing, foreign investment licensing, price controls, and regulation of monopolies. All these instruments except the last one originated with the Industrial Development and Regulation Act of 1951, although their nature and coverage changed over time.
Industrial licensing. Industrial licensing was directed toward creating capacity in existing lines of manufacturing and in intended new areas. As a priority, small-scale industries with fixed capital below 50 million rupees were exempted from licensing and labor legislation in order to increase employment through less capital-intensive methods of production. In addition, production of certain goods was reserved for this sector, which was also given a credit subsidy. The issue of a letter of intent, which was only the first step in a series under the licensing procedure, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
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often went through a bureaucratic tangle involving various ministries of the government of India and other concerned agencies. By the time a license was translated into concrete action, a considerable amount of time was spent, and in many cases, the investor either lost interest and withdrew or held the license without actually using it to start production. This dilatory procedure often ended in the hoarding of licenses for approved projects by influential producers, solely with a view to preventing their competitors from entering the field. Since 1985 there has been considerable relaxation of the regulations. Some categories of manufactures were completely delicensed, and industrial licensing was made more flexible by allowing additional capacity under different provisions of the act, like “automatic growth,” “unlimited growth,” and so on. However, the liberalization of industrial licensing remained half-hearted, with uncertainty hanging over its possible future reversal.
cost conditions in each, or different prices for different plants for the same product, depending on the obsolescence of the plant, or different prices for the same product from a given plant. On many occasions, the prices of products manufactured by public enterprises were raised only to wipe out their losses or to increase their profits. It was overlooked that the policy of jacking up prices of intermediate goods helped raise resources for financing public sector investment only in the short term, while creating a resource crunch in the medium and long run with higher intermediate goods prices. The chaotic and counterproductive price control regime was continued, despite a severe indictment of this regime by various official committees. The government did, however, eventually recognize the complexity and irrationality of price controls, though it persisted with the core of the administered price control system to accommodate populist opinion and the vested interests.
Foreign investment control and licensing of foreign technology. Being concerned about the free entry of for-
Regulation of monopolies. Whenever the industrial licensing mechanism failed to accomplish what it was designed to do, other regulatory measures, often draconian, emerged from its womb. One such was the Monopoly and Restrictive Trade Practice Act (MRTP) to control the size of firms. One of the committees of the government of India, set up in 1969 to evaluate the effectiveness of the licensing policy, concluded that the prevailing licensing framework did not succeed in regulating the growth of industrial output in the right direction and in fact facilitated concentration of economic power and monopolistic practices. The MRTP Act was passed to prevent this outcome by restricting the expansion of large industrial firms with gross assets exceeding 200 million rupees in interlinked undertakings, or of “dominant” undertakings with assets over 10 million rupees. Since 1985, however, the asset limit to be exempt from the application of MRTP was raised to 1 billion rupees. As a result, the large firms had to overcome more obstacles than other industrial firms to raise the production capacities or to introduce new products. Paradoxically enough, the MRTP-induced restrictions on large firm entry or expansion accentuated the prevailing market concentration and led to excessive profits, as the threat to the existing dominant firms from new competitors was substantially reduced.
eign capital into the country, many restrictions were imposed on foreign investment on the grounds of foreign exchange scarcity and the need to promote domestic enterprise and indigenous technology suited to India’s resource endowment. India opted for the purchase of foreign technology and minority foreign participation in equity during the 1960s. Royalty rates and fees were prescribed, and the conditions for Indianization of management and proportion of equity participation were set forth. The most restrictive policy was introduced through enactment of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act in 1973, under which maximum equity participation by foreign investors was limited to 40 percent, except in export-oriented and high-technology industries, and the royalty rates were lowered. In terms of the impact on industrial growth, however, these restrictions were less onerous because foreign investment, both in stock and flow terms, had been modest and the domestic industrial policy’s bias against competition and high profits hardly excited foreign firms.
Price controls. The government maintained comprehensive price controls on commodities, varying from essential consumption goods like sugar and gram to intermediate goods and even capital goods, accounting for about sixty-five individual goods or groups of commodities. Prices were usually set on a cost-plus basis, derived from technical relationship and the norms for reasonable rate of return on capital employed. The coverage of commodities was altered from time to time, depending on which prices needed to be raised or lowered. This mode of determining prices was not uniform and varied from industry to industry. As a result, there were anomalous situations, such as uniform pricing for all plants for a given product like steel, regardless of the ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
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Implications of Economic Policy The implications of economic policy, vaguely perceived initially by the government and the intelligentsia, became clear with the passage of time. If the public sector was to be the promoter of heavy industry, the private sector must be denied entry into that field. If employmentgenerating and quick-yielding small-scale industries were to be encouraged, large industries in the private sector 13
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must be prevented from encroaching on the areas reserved for small industries. If egalitarian goals were to be attained, luxury goods must not be allowed to be produced domestically or imported from abroad. These “don’ts” rather than “dos” received prominence in fashioning industrial policy as well as trade policy design. Initially, the government’s objectives were confined to steering investment allocation where it would yield maximum benefits, but once the regulatory machinery was set in motion, it developed a life of its own, with constricting impact on growth in industrial production, efficiency, and trade promotion, thereby creating opportunities for corruption. Indian economic policy under planning, often buffeted over the years for ideological reasons, can best be characterized as “unlearning by learning.” Right from the beginning, the basis of economic policy and the instruments of its implementation were influenced by a strong perception that there was a pervasive market failure and that salvation lay in frequent and decisive government intervention. The effectiveness of this interventionist approach was judged in terms of its “first impact effects.” If industrial licensing was used to determine the output pattern, import quantity, and composition of imports, it was believed that the final outcome would conform to the original intention. If foreign exchange was allocated according to a scale of priorities, it was assumed that it would go to the sectors that were designated as high priority. If bank credit was selectively channeled to what were designated as essential sectors, like agriculture, small-scale industries, and so on, it was concluded that the earmarked sectors would be the real beneficiaries. As it turned out, the actual effects of the remedies directed toward eliminating market failure were vastly different from the intended ones. Although impressive progress was achieved by the late 1960s in diversification of output and development of infrastructure, and in industrial and agricultural technology, there was widespread inefficiency in the use of labor and capital. Industrial production was of low quality and high cost; small-scale industry used more capital than labor; and the public enterprises, which were heralded as the instruments of resource mobilization and income distribution, drained away, instead, the resources mobilized by the government through massive tax efforts. The only beneficial consequences were discerned in several infrastructure activities and public distribution of essential supplies to the low-income population—the areas that were well suited to government intervention. However, such was the mesmerizing appeal of state intervention that it took several decades before the targeted groups could realize its pernicious effects and utter futility. In the meantime, 14
parasitic middlemen mushroomed to appropriate the gains flowing from the interventionist policies. The importance of competition and efficiency was recognized at times, as reflected in marginal changes in the economic policy frame in 1964 and 1965, 1981 to 1985, and 1989, but there were quick retreats from action to promote them at the slightest sign of protest from not only the left but the center and the right political parties as well. Despite the superficial diversity in political ideology, India’s political parties were usually in agreement with regard to the core of economic policy. Both those who advocated liberalization and those who urged interventionist policies held that the state should not abdicate its responsibility in economic management. If there was any difference among the various ideological camps, it was only about the degree of intervention. Though the parties rationalized their advocacy of state intervention by invoking the poor and downtrodden, the real reason lay in the enormous power that they wielded and the patronage they dispensed when the state remained strong and centralized.
Political Economy Perspective of Economic Policy The inability of a democratic polity and its highly modernized political leadership to pursue a growth-promoting and welfare-enhancing policy has to be seen from a political economy perspective. Policy instruments under planning, though designed as promotional measures, bred proliferating rent-seeking activities. The initial controls were the product of ideas and ideology, but they later created the interests that stalled a shift in strategy, even when ideas and ideology changed. As Jagdish Bhagwati (1988) argued, the regime of controls yielded a society with entrepreneurs enjoying squatters’ rights, “which created a business class that wanted liberalization in the sense of less hassle, not genuine competition. The bureaucrats, however idealistic at the outset, could not have noticed that this regime gave them the enormous power that the ability to confer rents generate. The politics of corruption also followed as politicians became addicted to the use of licensing to generate illegal funds for election. The iron triangle of businessmen, bureaucrats and politicians was born around the regime that economists and like-minded ideologues had unwittingly espoused.” The condition for such an “iron triangle” was made possible by the existence of a proprietary coalition of the industrial-capitalist class, white-collar bureaucrats, and rich farmers, all of whom belonged to the top percentile of the population, as propounded by Pranab Bardhan (1984). There have been continuing conflicts among these proprietary classes—conflict between urban industrial and professional classes and rural classes of rich farmers, between the professional class in the public sector and ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
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the other proprietary classes in industry and trade, and so on. The consequences of these conflicts were seen in the deceleration of public investment and the decline in the productivity of capital, which largely accounted for the slowdown of economic growth. The resources raised were frittered away through the competing demands of these various classes, entailing uncontrollable expansion of the government’s nonproductive current expenditure.
interests of all hues and was governed more by the impersonal judgments of the market. Deena Khatkhate See also Fiscal System and Policy since 1952; Industrial Growth and Diversification; Monetary Policy from 1952 to 1991; Private Industrial Sector, Role of
BIBLIOGRAPHY
In the name of social welfare, the proprietary groups created a regime that protected the administrative power of a literati bureaucratic power group, the business class, which easily manipulated its way through the maze of regulatory controls, being insulated from foreign and domestic competition, and the rich farmers who benefited from massive subsidies. This configuration of power derived legitimacy from the populist rhetoric of national self-reliance, the role of the benign state in providing distributive justice, and the need for protection from the greed of the unbridled private sector. In such a conjuncture, the economy that evolved only culminated in waste of resources, not to speak of lack of economic growth and poverty alleviation. The answer to the intriguing question of why the proprietary classes could exploit the state machinery with impunity for their parochial interests could be sought in the role of the prevailing political system in economic decision making. The weaknesses of the ineffective economic policy had its genesis in the inner workings of the political system, which operated in such a manner that, at one extreme, economic policy had punishment as its basis, but without any sanctions for enforcing it, and at the other, incentive as its basis but without any built-in mechanism to reward success. The omnipresent physical and price controls and licensing procedures, though motivated by the desire to punish the defaulters, left enough loopholes to render them ineffective. The announcement of penalties was more often than not in a nature of a quietus to hold in check the restiveness of the electorate. The reason for this opportunistic nature of economic policy lay in the concentration of political power at the center and the dominant role of the state in decision making. The economic reforms unleashed in 1991 transformed the Indian political landscape and consequently the framework of economic policy making. Through liberalization, the iron grip of the state on the economy was loosened, and this process was strengthened by changes in center-state relations induced partly by the economic reforms but more importantly by the eclipse of the dominant one-party rule at the center and its substitution by a coalition of different political parties. The economic policy making therefore tended to become less dependant on the arbitrary decisions of the bureaucracy and vested ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
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Bardhan, Pranab. The Political Economy of Development in India. Oxford and New York: Basil Blackwell, 1984. Bhagwati, Jagdish. “Poverty and Public Policy.” World Development (May 1988): 539–555. Bhagwati, Jagdish, and Padma Desai. India: Planning for Industrialization. London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1970. Bhagwati, Jagdish, and T. N. Srinivasan. Foreign Trade Regime and Economic Development: India. New York: Columbia University Press, 1975. Desai, Ashok. “Market Structure and Technology.” Paper presented at the Conference on Technology Transfer and Investment, European Community, Berlin, 1984. ———. “Technology Acquisitions and Applications: Interpretations of the Indian Experience.” In The Indian Economy: Recent Development and Future Prospects, edited by Robert Lucas and Gustav Papanek. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1988. Khatkhate, Deena. “Restructuring of the Political Process: Agenda for the New Government.” Economic and Political Weekly (2 July 1977): 1057–1062. ———. “National Economic Policies in India.” In National Economic Policies, edited by Dominick Salvatore, vol. 1. New York: Greenwood Press, 1991. ———. “India on an Economic Reform Trajectory.” In India Briefing, 1992, edited by Gordon Leonard and Philip Olderburg. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1992.
ECONOMIC REFORMS AND CENTERSTATES RELATIONS The founders of modern India set themselves the task of devising a Constitution that would suit India’s “unity in diversity,” adopting a federal Constitution with some unitary features. The states of the Indian Union have been vested with jurisdiction over important areas and assigned independent sources of tax and other revenues and are fairly autonomous within their spheres. However, the states’ powers are circumscribed by: a list of concurrent powers; powers given to Parliament to legislate with respect to any matter in the state list under certain conditions (Article 250); a requirement to obtain the president’s approval of proposals for state legislation in areas of concurrency before they can be enacted; and the placing in Entry 52 of the Union list “Industries, the control of which by the Union, is declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest.” With respect to a subject in the concurrent list, supremacy is given to the 15
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law passed by Parliament. Furthermore, the president can supersede a state government if he or she determines that there is a breakdown of the Constitution or a financial emergency subject to the approval of Parliament. These provisions make the Indian Constitution a quasi-federal one. To be sure, these Consitutional powers given to the Union (central) government in this regard are in the nature of enabling provisions, to be used when necessary in the national interest. So in practice, states could have had autonomy over broad areas of policy. Even powers in the concurrent list were, for the most part, introduced only to enable the central government to lay down the broad framework of policy, with the states formulating and implementing programs within that framework. Had the central government followed this policy in general, the states would have been autonomous with respect to the major part of governmental activities.
Economic Planning and Centralization However, the adoption of centralized economic planning with a large role assigned to central public enterprises led to considerable augmentation of the powers and responsibilities of the central government. For purposes of planning, the central government extended its activities and control to most of the important sectors of the economy. Using powers given under Entry 52 in the Union List, the Industrial Development and Regulation Act was passed which conferred on the central government the power to control all important industries. Establishing the Planning Commission within the central government gave it considerable power over the entire planning process, including the allocation of plan expenditures. The introduction of physical controls such as licensing of industries, import control, and control over foreign investment, intended to regulate the market, simultaneously diminished the area of autonomy of the states. The nationalization of large private banks by the central government added considerably to the process of centralization. Overwhelming economic power thus came to be wielded by the central government. Such centralization of economic decision making had led to inefficiencies in the allocation of resources, since market forces were suppressed. Also, the subnational governments found their freedom of action greatly diminished, and felt that the Indian Constitution had lost much of its federal character.
Liberalization and the Enlargement of States’ Area of Activities Economic reforms launched in 1991 were mainly designed to convert India’s economy into a market-oriented, open economy. This transition involved the gradual removal 16
of most of the physical controls such as industrial licensing, exchange control and import controls over a wide area, and the phased abolition of price controls. Another important aspect of liberalization has been a steep reduction of investment in public enterprises, public sector disinvestment, and the opening of most industries to the private sector. As a result of these policy changes, state governments, no less than private enterprises, have had their spheres and freedom of action enhanced. Each state now is free to develop its economic, social, and intellectual infrastructure in such a way as to attract and develop industries best suited to its natural and human endowments and geographic location. With the abolition of industrial licensing by the central government, states now have the power to approve of the establishment of large industries. States are also in a position to compete for foreign direct investment, with automatic approval of such investment assured in most areas. All these developments represent considerable decentralization of economic decision making. Since a major part of current investment in the economy is by the private sector, the Central Planning Commission’s control over investment has been drastically reduced. State government investments in sectors such as education, health, power, roads, and irrigation are (in most cases) only nominally under the scrutiny of the Central Planning Commission. These are areas in which a major part of public sector investment will take place in the future, all mainly in the sphere of the states. One can conclude that liberalization in India has not only led to a much more efficient economic system but has strengthened federalism. The state governments now enjoy powers that, in the spirit of the Constitution, they were meant to enjoy, but which the central government, in order to implement centralized planning, had previously prevented them from using.
Toward a Common Market In the field of taxation, the states had used the powers given to them by the Constitution, unhindered by central government intervention, except for prohibition of levying sales tax on sales at two stages, prior to export, and limitation of the rate of sales tax on “goods declared to be of special importance in inter-state trade.” Tax provisions of the Constitution were not really designed to create and sustain an efficient productive system within a common market. To cite an example, the cascading type of sales tax that was levied in European countries in the inter–world war years and old taxes surviving from the Mughal era like Octroi (tax on the entry of goods into a local area) were assigned to the states that used them. The founders had clearly stipulated that states could not tax interstate sales; however, the central government ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
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endowed itself with that power through a Constitutional amendment and levied a central sales tax on interstate sales, whose rate was raised from time to time to raise additional resources. These cost-increasing and distortionary taxes could be levied because the resulting inefficiencies were protected by import controls and high taxation of imports. To counteract the higher costs resulting from inefficient taxes, exports were subsidized in several ways that led to further distortions. Liberalization and globalization have meant that, in order to maintain competitiveness, the states have had to be persuaded to switch to economically efficient taxes, such as state value-added tax. Thus, liberalization, which made possible the enhancement of the area of powers that could be wielded by the states, has at the same time led to pressure for restraining them from actions that would adversely affect growth and national welfare. But the restraints that are being imposed would also mean that each state would be protected from the adverse effects of “wrong” tax policies of other states. Raja J. Chelliah
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Chelliah, R. J., et al. Trends and Issues in Indian Federal Finance. New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1981. Datta, Abhijit. Union-State Relations. New Delhi: Indian Institute of Public Administration, 1984. Rao, M. G., and T. Sen. Fiscal Federalism in India: Theory and Practice. New Delhi: Macmillan Publishers, 1996. Rao, M. G., and N. Singh. Political Economy of Indian Federalism. Oxford University Press, 2004. Sharma, J. N. Union and the States: A Study in Fiscal Federalism. New Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1974. Vithal, B. P. R., and M. N. Shastri. Fiscal Federalism in India. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2001.
ECONOMIC REFORMS OF 1991 The immediate factor that triggered India’s economic reforms of 1991 was a severe balance of payments crisis that occurred in the same year. The first signs of India’s balance of payments crisis became evident in late 1990, when foreign exchange reserves began to fall. With the onset of the Gulf War, world oil prices starting increasing, and remittances from Indian workers in the Gulf region fell sharply as many of these workers left the region. From a level of U.S.$3.11 billion at the end of August 1990, foreign exchange reserves dwindled to $896 million in January 1991. The rapid loss of reserves prompted the Indian government to initially tighten restrictions on the importation of goods. However, it was increasingly clear by the beginning of 1991 that the import compression, by limiting the imports of capital and intermediate goods, was restricting the rate of economic growth and of ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
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Mobile Phone Use in Agra, near the Taj Mahal. The 1991 reforms have freed Indian entrepreneurs from the shackles of bureaucratic controls, and the business class has responded to the new opportunities by significantly increasing its investments in productive capital. AKHIL BAKSHI / FOTOMEDIA.
exports. Furthermore, it was evident that the payments crisis was no longer primarily due to the trade deficit, but was driven by adverse movements in the capital account, in particular the drying up of commercial loans and a net outflow of deposits held in Indian banks by nonresident Indians, reflecting a loss of confidence in the government’s ability to manage the balance of payments situation. The new government of Prime Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao, who assumed office in June 1991, moved swiftly to deal with the situation. It implemented a macroeconomic stabilization program on an urgent basis, along with a comprehensive and far-reaching overhaul of the policies governing India’s and industrial sectors.
Rationale The decision to embark on the reforms following the crisis of 1991 was primarily motivated by the beliefs of former finance minister Manmohan Singh (prime minister 17
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FIGURE 1
Economic growth, 1971–2000
8 7 6 5 Percent growth averages
Agriculture Manufacturing GDP
4 3 2 1 GDP
0 1971–1975
Manufacturing 1976–1980
1981–1985
1986–1990
Period SOURCE: Economic
Agriculture 1991–1995
1996–2000
Survey, 2002–2003.
since 2005) that the roots of the financial crisis were structural in nature and lay in the import-substituting industrialization strategy followed by India’s governments since 1947. The main elements of this strategy were inward-looking trade and foreign investment policies, along with extensive bureaucratic controls over production, investment, and trade, and a substantial public sector presence in the economy, going beyond the conventional confines of public utilities and infrastructure.
introduced the system of licensing for private industry. The licensing system governed almost all aspects of firm behavior in the industrial sector, controlling not only entry into an industry and expansion of capacity, but also technology, output mix, capacity location, and import content. The principal aim of this act was to channel investments in the industrial sector in “socially desirable directions.”
The trade regime was highly restrictive, as nearly all imports were subject to discretionary import licensing or were channeled by government monopoly trading organizations. The only exceptions were commodities listed in the open general license (OGL) category. Capital goods were divided into a restricted category and the OGL category. While import licenses were required for restricted capital goods, those in the OGL could be imported without a license, subject to several conditions. The most important of these were that the importing firm had to be the “actual user” of the equipment and could not sell the latter for five years without the permission of the licensing authorities.
The system of controls was reinforced in the 1970s with the introduction of the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices (MRTP) Act in 1970 and the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (FERA) in 1973. The MRTP Act stipulated that all large firms (those with a capital base of over 20 million rupees) were permitted to enter only selected industries, and that too on a case-by-case basis. In addition to industrial licensing, all investment proposals by these firms required separate approvals from the government. The FERA provided the regulatory framework for commercial and manufacturing activities of branches of foreign companies in India and Indian joint-stock companies with a foreign equity holding of over 40 percent.
Regarding industrial policy, the two key components of the regulatory framework were the Industries Development and Regulation Act of 1951 and the Industrial Policy Resolution of 1956. The first piece of legislation
The industrial licensing system, in conjunction with the import licensing regime, led to the elimination of the possibility of competition, both foreign and domestic, in any meaningful sense of the term. As it became
18
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FIGURE 2
Foreign exchange reserves, 1990–2001 60,000
50,000
US$ million
40,000
30,000
20,000
10,000
0 1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
Year SOURCE:
Economic Survey, 2002–2003.
increasingly complex over time, it led to a wasteful misallocation of investible resources among alternative industries and also accentuated the underutilization of resources within these industries, thus contributing to high levels of inefficiency in the industrial sector. As J. Bhagwati (1993) noted, “the industrial-cum-licensing system . . . had degenerated into a series of arbitrary, indeed inherently arbitrary, decisions where, for instance, one activity would be chosen over another simply because the administering bureaucrats were so empowered, and indeed obligated, to choose.”
rate reduced from 300 percent to 150 percent and the peak duty on capital goods cut to 80 percent. The industrial licensing system was abolished altogether, except for a select list of environmentally sensitive industries. Sections of the MRTP Act that restricted growth or merger of large business houses were eliminated. The list of industries reserved for the public sector was reduced from seventeen to six, and private investment was actively solicited in the infrastructural sector. Foreign ownership restrictions were liberalized, and foreign direct investment was actively encouraged, particularly in the infrastructural sector.
The 1991 Reforms The economic reform program specifically targeted the highly restrictive trade and industrial policies. Quotas on the imports of most machinery and equipment and manufactured intermediate goods were removed. A large part of the import licensing system was replaced by tradable import entitlements linked to export earnings. Furthermore, the “actual user” criterion for the imports of capital and intermediate goods was removed. There was also a significant cut in tariff rates, with the peak tariff ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
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The Indian Economy in the Post-Reform Period Since the 1990s, the Indian economy has grown at a rate of 5–6 percent per annum, far exceeding the “Hindu rate of economic growth” observed for much of the previous decades since independence. Much of the increase in economic growth can be attributed to the strong performance of the manufacturing sector, in contrast to the 1970s, when the manufacturing sector’s performance was dismal (see Figure 1). A significant positive feature of 19
ECONOMY SINCE THE 1991 ECONOMIC REFORMS
economic performance in the 1990s has been control of the inflation rate, which has fallen to less than 3 percent, significantly below the historical average of around 5 percent. The performance regarding inflation is particularly noteworthy given that, in the context of the Indian economy, the control of inflation is considered to be among the most effective antipoverty measures. Another positive development in the 1990s was the large increase in foreign exchange reserves over the decade (see Figure 2). In 2001 foreign exchange reserves stood at U.S.$54,106,000,000, a fiftyfold increase to its level at the height of the 1991 economic crisis. The buildup of foreign exchange reserves reflects the sharp decline in the current account deficit as well as the large net capital inflows during the 1990s. The improvement in the balance of payments can be mainly attributed to the large inward remittances through legal channels, as nonresident Indians took advantage of a market-determined exchange rate that was steadily depreciating. The wide-ranging trade and industrial policy reforms have clearly had a positive effect on India’s engagement with the world economy. The openness of the economy— defined as exports plus imports as a ratio of gross domestic product (GDP)—had nearly doubled in less than a decade, and the openness ratio stood at 23 percent in 2000, a significant achievement for an economy that had remained closed to international trade for much of its post-independence period. The 1991 reforms freed Indian entrepreneurs from the shackles of bureaucratic controls and from a policy regime that encouraged unproductive rent-seeking activities at the cost of activities aimed at increasing productivity and output. The Indian business class responded to the new opportunities provided by the reforms by significantly increasing their investments in productive capital. The surge in private investment observed in the aftermath of the reforms, if continued, promises sustained economic prosperity for India and for its many citizens. Kunal Sen See also Economy since the 1991 Economic Reforms; Liberalization, Political Economy of; Saving and Investment Trends since 1950 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Agrawal, P., S. V. Gokarn, V. Mishra, K. S. Parikh, and K. Sen. Economic Restructuring in East Asia and India: Perspectives on Policy Reform. London: Macmillan, 1995. Bhagwati, J. India in Transition: Freeing the Economy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993. Bhagwati, J. N., and T. N. Srinivasan. Foreign Trade Regimes and Economic Development. New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1975. 20
Joshi, V., and I. M. D. Little. India’s Economic Reforms, 1991–2001. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996.
ECONOMY SINCE THE 1991 ECONOMIC REFORMS The 1990s saw far-reaching changes in India’s economic policy. A severe balance of payments crisis at the beginning of the decade triggered wide-ranging reforms in economic policy during the early 1990s. These reforms brought about a swift turnaround in India’s external sector and catalyzed an unprecedented spurt in economic growth during the five years from 1992–1993 to 1996–1997, coincident with the “Eighth Plan” period. Unfortunately, the program of policy reforms lost momentum after 1995, and the early partial success with fiscal consolidation was reversed after 1996. Coupled with some deterioration in the international economic environment in the final years of the decade, these factors contributed to a clear deterioration in growth for the ensuing six years.
Crisis and Reforms (1991–1992) The deep-seated roots of the 1991 crisis in fiscal laxity, growing reliance on external borrowing, a weakening financial sector and heavy-handed regulation of trade and industry are well known. The proximate trigger of the 1991 crisis was the Gulf War in the second half of 1990–1991, which jacked up international oil prices (and India’s oil import bill) and reduced remittance inflows from the Gulf. Unstable coalition politics of 1990–1991 compounded the economic problems and hastened a fullfledged balance of payment crisis. Foreign exchange reserves fell below U.S.$1 billion in early 1991, shortterm external debt rose steeply, and exports declined. Despite imposition of severe restrictions on imports, a default on payments seemed imminent by mid-1991, when the new Congress Party government took office. This government, with Manmohan Singh as finance minister, acted quickly to stabilize the macroeconomic situation and initiate long overdue structural reforms. The systemic nature of the 1991 reforms may be gauged from the fact that within a few months, the following steps had been taken: virtual abolition of industrial licensing; rupee devaluation by 20 percent; the complex import licensing replaced by a system of tradable import entitlements earned through exports (later replaced by a dual, and then market-determined exchange rate); phased reduction of customs duties; fiscal deficit cut by 2 percent of gross domestic product (GDP); foreign investment opened up; banking reforms launched; capital market reforms initiated; initial disinvestment of public enterprises announced; and major tax reforms outlined. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
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The Economy Rebounds (1992–1997) The reforms led to a swift restoration of health in India’s external sector. Export growth soared to 20 percent in 1993–1994 and the two years thereafter. Inward remittances by nonresident Indians quadrupled from U.S.$2 billion in 1990–1991 to $8 billion in 1994–1995, and rose further to exceed $12 billion in 1996–1997. The current account deficit in the balance of payments never again exceeded 2 percent of GDP and averaged only about 1 percent for ten years after 1990–1991. Foreign investment soared from a negligible $100 million in 1990–1991 to over $6 billion in 1996–1997. Foreign exchange reserves climbed steeply from the precarious levels of 1991 to over $25 billion by the end of 1994–1995. The debt service ratio was halved over the decade. The critical ratio of short-term foreign debt to foreign exchange reserves (proven critical again in the Asian crisis of 1997–1998) plummeted down from the stratospheric heights (380 percent) of 1991 to a very safe 20 percent by March 1995. The reforms of the early 1990s (with emphasis on deregulation and market orientation) and partial success with fiscal consolidation also ushered in a strong revival of investment and growth. Aggregate investment rose from 22.6 percent of GDP in 1991–1992 to nearly 27 percent in 1995–1996. GDP growth, which had dropped to hardly 1 percent in the crisis year of 1991–1992, recovered swiftly and averaged an unprecedented 6.7 percent in the five years from 1992 to 1997. Per capita GDP grew by almost 5 percent a year, compared to just over 1 percent in the three decades from 1951 to 1980. Growth was broad based, with all major sectors recording better performance than in the 1980s and far better than the outcomes in the thirty years from 1951 to 1980 (see Table 1). Among the factors propelling this growth acceleration were: the productivity gains from deregulation of trade, industry, and finance; the reform-assisted surge in exports; the investment boom of 1993–1996; the partial success with fiscal consolidation; the improvement in terms of trade for agriculture; and the buoyant world economy.
Growth Slows (1997–2002) The year 1997 was a watershed, which signaled the end of the economic party. In particular, three events occurred within a six-month period to disrupt the momentum of growth. In March, the instability inherent in coalition governments became manifest in the political crisis that ended the Deve Gowda United Front government and ushered in the Inder Gujral United Front government. In July, the Thai financial crisis raised the curtain on the Asian crisis saga, which dominated the international economic arena for the next eighteen ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
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months. Finally, in September, the Gujral government announced its decisions on the Fifth Pay Commission report (regarding government pay scales), decisions that were to prove costly for both the fiscal and economic health of the country. As the table shows, the rate of average GDP growth dropped to 5.5 percent in the “Ninth Plan” period, 1997–2002. Particularly disquieting were the sharp declines in growth of agriculture and industry. Indeed, the drop in GDP growth would have been much steeper but for the extraordinary buoyancy of the services sector, which averaged growth of 8 percent during these five years. This rapid growth in services was much faster than in industry, a pattern that is quite different from India’s past experience and that raises issues of future sustainability. Only a very small part of this services growth can be attributed to the remarkable dynamism in the relatively new sectors of information technology and business process outsourcing. Growth was rapid but from a very small base. By 2002 these new subsectors accounted for perhaps 2 percent of GDP, as compared to over 50 percent of GDP contributed by services as a whole. Both macroeconomic and structural factors contributed to the growth slowdown. On the fiscal front, there was a significant deterioration in the consolidated deficit of central and state governments, about half of which was directly due to government pay increases following the Fifth Pay Commission. This deficit, which had declined from 9.4 percent of GDP in 1990–1991 to 6.4 percent in 1996–1997, rose steadily in subsequent years to around 10 percent by the end of the decade. Revenue deficits (government dissaving) also worsened by over 3 percent of GDP and fully explained the sharp decline in public saving and aggregate saving. The fall in savings was reflected in similar declines in aggregate investment. From India’s perspective, the international economic environment also weakened after 1997. The Asian crisis of 1997–1998 hurt exports and private capital inflows. The problems were compounded by the economic sanctions, which followed the nuclear tests in May 1998. In the next two years, the surge in international oil prices (much of it eventually passed on to Indian energy users) exerted negative effects. Finally, from the last quarter of 2000, the global economic slowdown took its toll of India’s economic performance. The growth of exports slowed to below 10 percent per year in the period from 1996 to 2000. Other, more structural factors also influenced the deceleration in economic growth. They included the petering out of productivity gains from economic 21
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TABLE 1
Percentage growth of GDP and major sectors 1951/1952– 1980/1981
1981/1982– 1990/1991
1992/1993– 1996/1997
1997/1998– 2001/2002
2002/2003
2003/2004(1)
3.6 2.5 5.3 4.5
5.6 3.6 7.1 6.7
6.7 4.7 7.6 7.6
5.5 1.9 4.5 8.1
4.0 ⫺7.0 6.6 7.9
8.5 9.6 6.6 9.1
GDP Agriculture Industry Services (1) Provisional estimate. SOURCE:
Central Statistical Organization, Government of India.
reforms, which clearly slowed after 1995. Although reforms continued throughout the decade, they never regained the breadth and depth of those of the early 1990s. Key reforms in the financial sector, infrastructure, labor laws, trade and industrial policy, and privatization remained unfinished or undone. Despite good intentions, the bottlenecks in infrastructure became worse over time, especially in power, railways, and water supply, reflecting slow progress in reforms of pricing, ownership, and the regulatory framework. The low quality and quantity of investment in rural infrastructure, moreover, combined with distorted pricing of some key agricultural inputs and outputs to dampen the growth of agriculture. The continuing decline in governance and financial discipline in (especially, but by no means exclusively) the populous states of the Gangetic Plain constrained growth prospects for over 30 percent of India’s population. The postreforms period saw a significant decline in poverty headcount ratios. The percentage of people below a minimally defined poverty line fell from 36 percent in 1993–1994 to 26 percent in 1999–2000. However, over the same period, total employment growth was sluggish, just over 1 percent a year. This is partly attributable to a decline in the labor force participation rate and partly to various policy distortions (including rigid labor laws), which discourage a more labor-intensive pattern of development. Regarding the spatial distribution of income expansion, the continued slow growth of the populous states of Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, and Orissa in the 1990s has contributed to increasing regional inequalities and raised serious concerns.
Recent Trends and Outlook Since 2003 there has been renewed optimism about the growth prospects of the Indian economy. The “Tenth Plan,” published in early 2003, projected an overall growth of 8 percent for the period from 2002 to 2007. A 22
boom in software exports and remittances (together with reduced import needs of a somewhat sluggish industrial sector) has swelled the country’s foreign exchange reserves to unexpectedly high levels (exceeding U.S.$100 billion), dispelling the old fears of a “foreign exchange constraint.” The demographic outlook of a rapidly growing labor force and falling dependency ratios hold promise of rapid economic growth. GDP growth in 2003– 2004 actually exceeded 8 percent, lending credence to the Tenth Plan projections. In actual fact, the medium-term growth outlook for India is less bullish. The 8.5 percent growth in 2003–2004 followed slow economic expansion of 4 percent in the preceding year. Much of the economic dynamism of 2003–2004 reflected an exceptional rebound in agriculture from a drought-affected decline of 7 percent in 2002–2003 to a strong 9.6 percent recovery, thanks to the best monsoon in over twenty years. Growth requires investment. India’s investment-GDP ratio in recent years remained stuck in the 23 to 24 percent range, not enough to generate sustained growth at 7 to 8 percent. East Asian experience suggests the need for investment levels of 30 percent or higher. A major constraint on India’s investment performance has been the high levels of negative saving (revenue deficits) of government budgets, which have offset a strong private savings record. Although the reforms of the 1990s achieved a significant opening up of the Indian economy to external trade and investment, the country’s integration with the world economy remains limited, with merchandise exports accounting for only 0.8 percent of the world exports and foreign direct investment inflows for hardly 0.5 percent of the global total. Despite recent initiatives, infrastructure constraints remain severe, especially with respect to electric power, roads, ports, airports, and urban services. The low (2 percent) growth of agriculture reflects serious problems with the organization of support services, low investments, and inappropriate pricing policies. As for the “demographic dividend,” the constraints lie on the side of labor ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
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———. “Managing India’s External Economic Challenges in the 1990s.” In Macroeconomics and Monetary Policy, edited by Montek S. Ahluwalia, Y. V. Reddy, and S. S. Tarapore. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2002. Ahluwalia, Montek S. “India’s Economic Reforms: An Appraisal.” In India in the Era of Economic Reforms, edited by Jeffrey Sachs and Nirupam Bajpai. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2000. Chopra, A., et al. “India: Economic Reform and Growth.” IMF Occasional Paper 134. Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 1995. Joshi, Vijay, and I. M. D. Little. India’s Economic Reforms, 1991–2001. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1996.
EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND PHILOSOPHIES, TRADITIONAL AND MODERN “Education” comes from the Latin ex (out of) and
Upscale Shopping Mall in Gurgaon, Delhi’s Modern Township. After the economic rebounds of the first half of the 1990s and the ensuing slowdown, a new optimism has returned to India, with a rapidly growing labor force and falling dependency ratios holding the promise of economic growth. AKHIL BAKSHI / FOTOMEDIA.
demand, which remains seriously inhibited by policy impediments such as labor laws. Sustained economic growth at 7 to 8 percent is possible, but only if serious policy reforms are undertaken to reduce government deficits, improve infrastructure, revamp agriculture, enhance labor market flexibility, and accelerate integration with the international economy. Until then, India’s economy is more likely to average growth in the range of 6 percent, which is good but not commensurate with the country’s compelling needs for job creation and poverty alleviation. Shankar Acharya See also Banking Sector Reform since 1991; Economic Reforms of 1991; Trade Liberalization since 1991
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Acharya, Shankar. “Macroeconomic Management in the Nineties.” Economic and Political Weekly (20 April 2002): 1515–1538. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
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ducere (to lead, to guide); hence, to lead out of ignorance into knowledge, out of inability into competence. The desired knowledge and competence, however, will be shaped by historical circumstance and by cultural and social conditions. Education reflects the cultural selfunderstanding of a society and in turn helps both to determine it and to transmit it across countless generations. In India, with its long history and cultural diversity spanning many languages and religions, a comprehensive account of its educational character would require several volumes. The emphasis here, in this brief discussion, will be philosophical, highlighting the cultural and conceptual contexts of India’s various educational systems and the values and ideals they attempt to embody. It is obvious that such rigorous selectivity results in some lacunae, for example, the long period of Muslim rule stretching from around the tenth to the eighteenth century. Muslim influence on Hindu culture has undoubtedly been considerable, but its impact on general, as opposed to sectarian educational patterns and policies, is less salient.
The Traditional Period This period, for the purposes of this entry, extends from the early Vedic period to the coming of the British in the eighteenth century. It is dominated in the early period by the influence of classical Hinduism and Buddhism.The roots of the ancient Indian pattern of education may be traced to the earliest Vedic works, the four Vedas collectively known as Sam . hita¯s, the Bra¯hman.as, the A¯ran.yakas, and the Upanishads. The purport of the hymns and chants that comprise the Vedas was largely to achieve cosmic harmony (r.ta) and the human prosperity it was believed to bring. This cosmic order was sought initially through sacrifices offered to the gods. Increasingly, the sacrifice itself came to carry the powers that had formerly been attributed to the gods, and much effort was expended on coming up with the most 23
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efficacious sacrificial rituals. Concurrently with this emphasis on the sacrifice, there was a contemplative turn away from ritualism to philosophical reflections about the nature of reality and the place of humans within it. Now it is knowledge itself that is seen as salvific, and it sets up a pattern of education in which sages reveal the nature of ultimate reality to select students in search of sacred knowledge. That is the etymological connotation of the term “upanishads,” signifying a secret or esoteric knowledge that was largely confined to Brahmans. The rest of society, stratified along class lines, was provided the education appropriate to a particular class—the art of warfare in the case of Kshatriyas and agriculture, commerce, arts, and crafts in the case of Vaishyas. The Shudras who performed menial work were, however, deprived of education. The most detailed account of codes and laws, according to the caturvarna¯shrama (four varnas) scheme, is provided in the Manusmr.ti written by Manu, the lawmaker whose classification of social strata is said to have mirrored the makings of the world. Buddhist influence was responsible for expanding the Vedic scheme of education beyond the caste restrictions imposed by the latter. Part of the appeal of Buddhist institutions of learning, both in India and abroad, was their ecumenical, inclusive character. The Buddhist approach includes both monasteries concerned with the training of monks and “universities,” like Nalanda, involved in more secular education and systematic instruction in grammar, medicine, philosophy, and arts and crafts. Outside the religious framework, kings and princes were educated in the arts and sciences related to government: politics (dan.d.a-nı¯ ti), economics (va¯rtta¯), philosophy (a¯nvı¯ ks.iki), and historical traditions (itiha¯a). Here the authoritative source was Kautilya’s Artha Sha¯stra, often compared to Niccolò Machiavelli’s The Prince for its worldly outlook and political scheming.
Principles, values, and goals. Those types of education, though involving different groups, shared at least two characteristics. Religion broadly conceived provided a frame of reference, though to different degrees. Even the Kshatriya prince featured in the Artha Sha¯stra was made to study trayı¯ (the Vedas and their commentraries), while for Vedic students education was predominantly religious. Secondly, all ancient Indian education emphasized the role of the teacher, who in the Vedic scheme assumed the mantle of the guru (spiritual preceptor), or the a¯ca¯rya (authoritative teacher), revered and served by his student (shishya). The goal for the Vedic student might be termed “transcendent,” that is, transcending the mundane interests and attractions of life to attain direct experience of Brahman and in the ideal case to reestablish union with 24
it. The institution of brahmacarya (chastity) enjoined on the student served many purposes; on the one hand, it pulled him away from the lures of the world, and on the other, conserved and sublimated the vital force (pra¯na) for union with the divine. The spiritual character of his education was also marked by the upanayana, or initiatory rite, which he had to undergo before being formally accepted by his teacher and beginning his instruction. This solemn ceremony typically took three days, when as expounded in the Atharva Veda, the teacher held the student within him and gave birth to a dvija, or twice-born student. The first birth from his parents was physical, but the second birth was spiritual. The close bond with the guru was cemented by the student living with the teacher so as to imbibe his inner spirit and in that way facilitate the attainment of vidya¯ or the highest knowledge leading to mukti (liberation). The goal of Buddhist education, by contrast, was less transcendent and “vertical” and more immanent and “horizontal,” in accord with the humanistic character of Buddhism. Within the Buddhist scheme, there were two types of institutions, the monasteries concerned with the training of monks and general universities imparting a more secular education. The goals of the two institutions varied accordingly. The monks were required to follow Buddhist teachings in a strict manner, begging for their food and keeping to the monastic disciplines, so as to bring about an inner renunciation or emptiness (sunyata¯) and to awaken universal compassion. The students at the universities, on the other hand, while being instructed in the Buddhist teachings were trained to apply them in the world, as, for example, in the field of medicine, as mentioned in a canonical Pali work, Maha¯vagga. The goals of princely education were more secular. Mention was made earlier of the Artha Sha¯stra, a work concerned with the imperatives of royal or imperial power. Even though Kautilya describes the work as a species of ra¯ja-nı¯ ti, the ethics of government, there was far more Machiavellianism in it, designed to make the king an absolute monarch and the state he ruled absolutely dominant.
Agencies and institutions. Ancient Indian educational institutions tended to be located in forests rather than in towns or cities, in an atmosphere of quiet and of natural beauty conducive to mental and spiritual concentration. The A¯ran.yakas, or forest books, constitute a significant category of Sanskrit sacred literature. Radha Kumud Mookerji, the eminent Indian historian, says “India’s civilization through the ages has been very largely the product of her woods and forests. It started as a rural and not as an urban civilization,” and he goes on to cite Rabindranath Tagore: “a most wonderful thing we ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
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notice in India is that here the forest, not the town, is the fountain-head of all its civilization” (Mookerji, pp. 640–641). The home of the teacher served often as the school in the guru-shisya relationship that constituted the most important educational pattern of the Vedic system. The intimate bond that thus tied a student to his teacher was familial and sacred. After the upanayana ceremony that marked the formal acceptance of student by teacher, a student was expected to live in his master’s house and serve his needs, while the teacher was expected to be of high moral character and to teach as much by his life as by his explicit instruction. The Upanishads make frequent reference to pupils bringing firewood to their guru’s house, signaling their readiness to serve their teacher and also their desire to keep alive the flame of their own devotion and concentration (tapas). These homes of learning, known as a¯shramas, served as places of rest and spiritual focus, removed as they were from the din and bustle of the city. However, as population and human needs increased and as the division of labor to meet those needs grew more complex, education moved from these sylvan settings into the cities. The period from around 200 B.C. to the rise of the Guptas in the fourth and fifth centuries A.D. saw the emergence of many great urban centers of learning. The Jatakas (folk tales from the lives of the Buddha) provide us with detailed accounts of Taks.ashila, capital of the Gandhara kingdom in West Punjab, one of the first such centers where students flocked from all parts of the country, as they did also later to Benares (Varanasi). But without question the most famous such center was the Buddhist monastery Nalanda in Magadha (present-day Bihar). We owe the most meticulous accounts of the eminence of Nalanda, which drew students from all over India and beyond, to two seventh-century Chinese Buddhists pilgrims, Hsieun Tsang and I-Tsing. According to their reports, the curriculum included not only the works of all the eighteen Buddhist schools but also the Vedas, logic, grammar, medicine, metaphysics, arts and crafts, and a great deal more. Knowledge was thus systematized, and methods for imparting it were devised in ancient India long before universities were established in Europe.
The Modern Period This period spans the interval between Lord Macaulay’s Minute on Education of February 1835 to modern India, reflecting the tensions between traditions and modernity. Macaulay’s Minute was introduced to the British company’s education committee planning the course and general direction of education in British India. On one side were ranged the “Orientalists,” who ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
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favored the support of Arabic and Sanskrit and the knowledge opened up through these languages. On the other side were the “Anglicists,” who championed the cause of learning English and western textbooks. This debate was much more than a quarrel about the desired medium of instruction. Macaulay with his statement that “a single shelf of a good European library was worth the whole native literature of India and Arabia,” came down firmly on the Anglicist side. His intention was to produce a cadre of Indians who could help the British run the empire by mastering modern Western knowledge. He considered India’s education archaic and moribund. Macaulay’s ideas carried the company and Parliament, and with the introduction of modern English instruction, Indian education was brought into the Western world. Traditional Hindu culture, largely hierarchical, was averse to change, caste-based, status-oriented, religious in character, and generally accepted authority in the form of scriptures, teachers, or family or community elders. Modern Western culture, by contrast, was on the whole egalitarian, meritocratic, cosmopolitan in outlook, democratic in spirit, secular, reason-based, and oriented toward change and material advancement. It would be no exaggeration to say that the tensions between tradition and modernity brought into prominence by Macaulay are still unresolved today, with significant repercussions for the course of Indian education. An example from the field of philosophy might illustrate the point. While there was a vibrant philosophical climate until around the time of the Mughals in the sixteenth century, Indian philosophy in the modern period has by and large languished. This is not at all to say that there have not been outstanding thinkers in this time frame because there certainly have been a few. It is rather to claim that these few have been somewhat isolated figures whose work has not on the whole generated the schools of thought or the vigorous debate between them that characterized earlier periods. Contemporary Indian philosophers trained largely in a Western idiom are not able to draw creatively on ancient traditions. Part of the problem is linguistic: the ability to plumb the depths of the tradition requires a deep and sophisticated knowledge of Sanskrit and Pali in order to appreciate the subtleties of traditional philosophical argument, and not many contemporary Indian philosophers possess the requisite linguistic and philological skills. In the limited time at their disposal, young scholars prefer to focus on Western philosophy where the academic prestige lies. On the other hand, there are still great Sanskrit scholars whose mode of expression and style of argument is not the modern one, and so one finds two groups of scholars, the traditional pandits and the modern Western-trained 25
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philosophers, who ideally should communicate with each other but who unfortunately do not. As a result, a subject that was once the wellspring and foundation of the culture has today fallen on hard times. This tension between tradition and modernity has generated two responses. On the one side are revivalists, who want to return to a supposedly pure Hinduism and a purportedly golden age of the past. In a globalized and modern world such a simple return to the past is unviable. On the other side are those who tend to equate modernization with Westernization and turn their backs on tradition. This inevitably results in rootlessness and alienation. By far the most creative Indian educational thinkers have been those who have attempted both in their thought in general and in their educational philosophy in particular to effect a creative dialogue between past and present. It is instructive to consider two of them, Mahatma Gandhi and Rabindranath Tagore, before examining the actual situation prevailing in Indian education by way of considering the values and goals at play in education today.
Principles, values, and goals. Both Gandhi and Tagore were sympathetic to and deeply appreciative of India’s philosophical and spiritual traditions, though they drew on different parts of them in crafting their views on education. Gandhi was attracted to the moral and didactic parts of the tradition and to the Bhagavad Gı¯ ta¯ in particular. Tagore by contrast was drawn more to the speculative and metaphysical richness of the Vedas and the Upanishads and developed an aesthetic philosophy of a¯nanda¯ (joy). These temperamental and philosophical differences were reflected in their respective philosophies of education. While they agreed that education should have a social orientation and be situated in close proximity to nature, and while they also agreed that education should be holistic and integrative, encompassing the head, the heart, and the hands, they disagreed about the main goal of education. For Gandhi the chief purpose of education was moral and social; the focus should be on the building of character within a framework of service to the community. To that end he insisted that intellectual instruction be imparted through a craft and that manual labor be coordinated with academic pursuits. For Tagore, this was too restrictive a goal: for him the main purpose of education was to develop the creative potential of a student and through that creativity to achieve a unity with nature and with his fellow humans. “Deliverance is not for me in renunciation. I feel the embrace of freedom in a thousand bonds of delight” (Collected Poems, p. 34). Whatever their differences, Tagore and Gandhi were idealistic thinkers seeing the purpose of education as disciplining and elevating the spirit and as the balanced 26
development of intellect, imagination, and will. Of the two, it was Mahatma Gandhi who had greater influence on actual educational policies. After many years of preparation, he came up with a plan that became known as the Wardha Scheme of Basic National Education, whose salient features were free compulsory education, instruction in one’s mother tongue, handicrafts as an essential instrument of learning, self-supporting education, and training in nonviolence. The plan was tried for a few years but met with fundamental criticism, namely that it concentrated on primary education to the detriment of secondary and higher education and that it was largely village-based and too decentralized to allow for much operational coherence or development in towns and cities where employment opportunities attracted a swelling population. After independence and Gandhi’s death, the direction of India’s educational planning was much more pragmatic. The Constitution of India declared India a secular, socialist, and democratic republic, and much of the educational thinking swayed by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s vision of India as a modern developing industrial nation moved in directions quite different from those of Gandhi’s plan. Five national goals were highlighted to guide the course of education: the promotion of democracy; secularism, given the multireligious character of the country; the elimination of poverty through economic and technological development; the creation of a socialistic pattern of society; and national integration. To that end some of the prominent features of the educational planning of the 1950s and 1960s were universal, compulsory, and free education for children up to the age of fourteen, a stress on the education of illiterate adults, an emphasis on science and technology, enlarged and equalized opportunities for Dalits and other “backward” sections of the population, and finally an emphasis on vocational training in technical skills. In general, education was linked closely and directly to the economic growth of the country. As J. P. Naik, member-secretary of India’s Education Commission, in the mid-1960s put it: “The main justification for the larger outlay on educational reconstruction . . . is the hypothesis that education is the most important single factor that leads to economic growth . . . [based on] the development of science and technology” (p. 35). Modern Indian education is thus seen in terms of economic growth and material advancement rather than the acquisition of timeless spiritual knowledge. In its reliance on science and experimental reason, it calls into question traditional emphasis on authority. In its stress on equality of opportunity, it negates the old caste-based system of privilege. In its valorizing of productivity, it moves firmly in the direction of a meritocratic and egalitarian rather than a hierarchical order. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
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computer scientists who both in terms of quality and quantity are world-renowned. The success of the Silicon Valley in California, of German software production, and of firms like Infosys and Wipro in India is based to a large extent on the excellence and technical skill of a pool of computer personnel produced by Indian technical institutes. At the other end of the scale, however, basic education for the poor has been largely stagnant, so that problems of illiteracy and endemic poverty still remain for the most part unsolved. This imbalance has created what India’s preeminent sociologist, the late M. N. Srinivas, called the dual cultures of independent India, the urban middle class and the rural poor. The country’s professional classes are drawn largely from the former, which comprises chiefly the high and middle castes and the top strata of minority groups. Those living in villages, except for the middle and large landowners and a few successful traders and artisans, constitute the rural poor. In spite of the egalitarian goals that national education set itself soon after independence, the gap between these two groups has increased precipitously.
Twentieth-Century Primary School for Children in Rural Haryana. In spite of the egalitarian goals that the Indian educational system set for itself soon after independence, the gap between the urban middle class and the rural poor has increased precipitously, with the imbalance only furthering endemic poverty and illiteracy in some regions of the nation. AMAR TALWAR / FOTOMEDIA.
It is thus no exaggeration to say that India suffers from what the English scientist C. P. Snow once called the problem of two cultures. Snow was referring to the opposition between scientific and humanistic cultures, which to some extent troubles modern India as well. But there is a deeper gulf that is yet to be satisfactorily bridged: the gulf between two different mind-sets and outlooks, the traditional and the modern.
Agencies and institutions. Emphasis on technological development and economic growth in post-independence India has almost reversed the traditional and Gandhian emphasis on rural education. India’s major cities have all embraced universities, institutes of science and technology, and centers for advanced studies, many of them highly regarded. These institutions, especially the technical ones, have produced a cadre of engineers and ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
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India’s urban middle class and its intellectuals have thus for the most part adopted a modern Western mindset. This creates a reaction on the part of chauvinist and revivalist groups rendered queasy by what they view as deracination, and consequently raises shrill invocations of a “pristine,” mythic Hindu past.This is at times a political ploy to win mass allegiance or votes. The deeper Hindu values and ideals championed by Gandhi and Tagore, among others, are largely unheeded. At the other end of the scale, the rural poor, illiterate and uneducated, remain at the mercy of large- and middle-scale landowners in whose economic interests they work,. These dualities highlight at least four problems that Indian education continues to face: the increasing politicization of Indian schools and universities which compromises freedom of thought and inquiry; the lack of creative integration of tradition and modernity; an increasing religious polarization, especially in the form of Hindu-Muslim tensions, which calls into question the goals of national integration and a secular society invoked by the Constitution; and finally, the daunting inequalities between rich and poor and between higher and lower castes. Indian education still faces a formidable set of challenges as it attempts to meet the demands of a steadily growing population in a globalized world. Joseph Prabhu See also Artha Sha¯stra; Indian Institutes of Technology (IITs); Information and Other Technology Development 27
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BIBLIOGRAPHY
Kabir, Humayun. Education in New India. London: Allen & Unwin, 1956. Mookerji, Radha Kumud. “Ancient Indian Education.” In The Cultural Heritage of India, vol. II. Kolkata: Ramakrishna Mission Institute of Culture, 1962. Munshi, K. M., ed. The History and Culture of the Indian Peoples. 11 vols. Mumbai: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1951–1969. Naik, J. P. Educational Planning in India. Mumbai: Allied Publishers, 1965. Shills, Edward. The Intellectual between Tradition and Modernity: The Indian Situation. The Hague: Mouton, 1961. Srinivas, M. N. “The Dual Cultures of Independent India.” In Collected Essays. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2002. Tagore, Rabindranath. Collected Poems and Plays of Rabindranath Tagore. London: Allen & Unwin, 1958.
ELEPHANTA The island of Elephanta, located 6.8 miles (11 kilometers) off the coast of Mumbai, is well known for a large cave temple dedicated to Shiva. Six minor excavations are also located on the slopes of this island, which owes its name to the Portuguese who, in the sixteenth century, found a large sculpted elephant near the southern harbor. The caves were carved in the sixth century A.D., and it is disputed whether they were sponsored by Kalachuri rulers or by members of a late Maurya dynasty controlling the Konkan at the time. However, as suggested by Walter Spink, significant coin finds at Elephanta seem to link closely the Kalachuri king Krisnaraja, who was a supporter of the Pashupata sect, to the patronage of the main Shaiva cave on the western hillside. The main cave has a rectangular ground plan with openings on the north, west, and east sides. The north entrance has a two-pillared portico, while the eastern access opens to a court and the western one onto an unfinished space. The interior hall, carved 139 feet (42.5 meters) deep into the basaltic rock, is filled with four rows of pillars with fluted cushion capitals (16.4 feet, or 5 meters high) and displays an unusual layout with two main foci of worship: a square lingam sanctum placed next to the western opening, aligned with the eastern entrance; and a colossal relief depicting three faces of Shiva, carved at the center of the south wall and lined up with the northern entrance. This atypical plan has long puzzled scholars, who have tried to interpret the cave’s function and iconographical program, which consists of a number of large sculpted narrative panels placed next to the accesses and on the south wall. On either sides of the north entrance portico appear two slightly damaged reliefs depicting Shiva as Nataraja ( Dance King) and as Lord of the Yogis. These two well-known guises nicely counterbalance each other, as they emphasize the static and dynamic powers of Shiva, the god’s inner energy and 28
Large Carving of Elephanta Caves. Tourist contemplating the imposing figure of Shiva inside the Elephanta caves. CHRIS LISLE/CORBIS.
its outer manifestation. Inside the main hall, on the north wall bracketing the entrance, there are two reliefs, one representing Shiva impaling the demon Andhaka, and the other showing Ra¯van.a lifting Mount Kailas. These two scenes both focus on Shiva’s role as conqueror of demons and perhaps, much like the two panels in the north portico, seem to function as a pair. Across the pillared hall on the south wall, facing these reliefs, are representations of the god Shiva with his consort Pa¯rvat ¯ı: next to the west entrance is the marriage of Shiva and Pa¯rvat ¯ı (Kalyanasundara); and next to the east entrance, Shiva and Pa¯rvat ¯ı are gambling at dice (Umamahesvara). In these two family depictions, filled with heavenly figures, Shiva continues to be the absolute focus of the scene, as he is much larger in scale. Across the north entrance, in a recess of the south wall, is the central relief depicting three colossal heads of Shiva (18 feet, or 5.5 meters tall) guarded by two attendants. The iconography of this high relief, generally identified ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
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as representing Sadashiva, or “eternal” Shiva, has been object of great discussion. The frontal face depicts a serene aspect of the god, the left profile portrays the angry form of Shiva, and the right one focuses on his feminine appearance. The setting and design of the image implies the existence of a fourth, nonvisible face in the back, and some scholars have proposed that a fifth face, looking upward, should be imagined as completing the icon. The size, position, and quality of the image, as well as its alignment on the north-south axis of the cave, suggest that the patrons placed enormous relevance on this relief, which emphasizes the essence of the god Shiva rather than his actions. Two large-scale panels flank the central Sadashiva: Shiva bearing Gan.ga¯ (Gangadhara) appears on its right, and the androgynous form of Shiva (Ardhanarishvara) on its left. It is worth noting that these two images, which underline the all-encompassing nature of the god Shiva, beyond duality and distinctions, work as perfect complements to the central icon of Sadashiva. All the reliefs in this cave seem to be the product of a single vision and are related in style and composition. They display great affinity with late Guptan regional idioms from areas adjacent to the Konkan, in particular with the sculpture from Ajanta in inner Maharashtra, and Shamalaji in Gujarat. The other focus of the great cave at Elephanta is the perfectly square sanctum placed at the western end of the east-west axis. The shrine contains a lingam on a high square base (yoni), and has four entrances aligned with the cardinal directions, protected by imposing dvarapalas, or door guardians. A similar organization of space and placement of sanctum can be found at Ellora in the Dumar Lena cave (cave 29). At Elephanta, the relationships between the sanctum and the colossal image of Sadashiva on the south wall remain unclear—it is almost as if two different, independent layouts overlap in the same space. The presence of multiple entrances to the pillared hall confirms that the cave at some point in its history had two foci of worship, but it is uncertain whether this was part of the original plan. Recent interpretations maintain that some idiosyncratic features of this cave might be explained with its possible affiliation with the esoteric Shaiva sect of the Pashupatas. Two subsidiary caves are part of the main cave complex: the larger is next to the east entrance overlooking the east court, and has a small porch leading into a square chamber, with a central lingam shrine that can be circumambulated. The porch is decorated on the left by a large-scale relief of Ka¯rttikeya that appears visually linked to the Shaiva panels inside the main cave hall, and by a poorly preserved depiction of the seven mother goddesses (Saptamatrikas). In the unfinished west court, a . small linga shrine faces the entrance to the cave and is ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
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bracketed by damaged reliefs of Shiva Nataraja and Shiva as Lord of the Yogis, the latter very different in style from the other carvings at the site. Pia Brancaccio See also Shiva and Shaivism
BIBLIOGRAPHY
A recent and accurate overview of the site appears in George Michell, Elephanta (Mumbai: India Book House PVT LTD, 2002). For more in-depth analysis, see: W. O’Flaherty, G. Michell, and C. Berkson, Elephanta, The Cave of Shiva (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1983); C. Collins, The Iconography and Ritual of Siva at Elephanta (Albany: State University of New York, 1988); W. Spink, “The Great Cave at Elephanta: A Study of Sources,” in Essays on Gupta Culture, edited by B. Smith (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1983). A “classical” interpretation of the main cave appears in S. Kramrisch, “The Great Cave Temple of Shiva on the Island of Elephanta” in The Presence of Siva (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1981).
ELLENBOROUGH, EARL OF (1790–1871), governor-general of India (1842–1844). Edward Law, the earl of Ellenborough, served on the Board of Control of Indian Affairs (1828–1830, 1834–1835, 1841) where he advocated the transfer of the government of India to the Crown and took an interest in Central Asian affairs. He advocated a cautious Indian policy except where Britain’s long-term imperial interests were directly threatened. His term as governor-general would, however, be no more quiescent than that of his predecessor, Lord Auckland. Ellenborough hoped to repair some of the damage done by the loss of the “Army of Indus” in the First Afghan War. At his direction, British Indian forces returned to Kabul, sacked the city, then departed, allowing the return to power of Dost Mohammad, the Afghan amir that the war had been ostensibly fought to unseat. Ellenborough greeted the returning “victorious” troops with sumptuous celebrations and parades designed to revive flagging British prestige. Ellenborough then completed the other major order of business left unfinished by Auckland: the seizure of Sind. Ellenborough dismissed local warnings that the amirs’ sovereignty was protected by iron-clad treaties and that they were amendable to British interests. Unfortunately for the amirs, their domains stood between British territory and the southern strategic gateway to India, the Bolan Pass. They also straddled the River Indus. British leaders had long sought to control the northwestern approaches to India and, declaring that the rivalry “of European manufacturers is fast excluding our productions from the markets of Europe,” had identified the 29
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Indus one of the most likely “new vents for the produce of our industry” (prime minister Lord Palmerston, quoted in Webster, pp. 750–751). Ellenborough shared these strategic and commercial views. He also knew that the seizure of Sind would secure British control over the Parsi-dominated Malwa opium trade, thus stabilizing the price of Bengal opium and adding to India’s revenues. Accordingly, Ellenborough gave Sir Charles Napier, an able and ambitious general, leeway to provoke the amirs into rebellion, thereby justifying the annexation of the region, which was brutally accomplished in 1843. Ellenborough then aggressively dealt with a crisis in the domains of the late Maratha leader Daulat Rao Scindhia of Gwalior, which were then roiled by an internal succession dispute that held the potential of creating a linkage between Scindhia’s disaffected forty-thousandman army and the Sikhs, who could together threaten nearby Agra and key lines of British communications in the north. Having already ignored and violated a series of treaties with the amirs of Sind, Ellenborough now punctiliously evoked long-dead provisions of an 1804 treaty with Scindhia to justify intervening in the succession dispute. Scindhia’s forces were crushed, and a young Maratha puppet was placed on the state’s throne under a council of regency supervised by a British Resident. Ellenborough then contemplated moving against the Sikhs, but the Court of Directors, alarmed by the cost of Ellenborough’s militarism, exercised their constitutional right of recall, summoning him home in 1844. The British government was more generous, granting him an earldom for his work in ending the Afghan conflict. He was later reappointed as president of the Board of Control. He continued to take an active interest in Indian affairs until he was forced to resign from that post in 1858 for impulsively allowing the publication of a private letter critical of Lord Charles Canning’s settlement of the War of 1857. Marc Jason Gilbert See also Anglo-Afghan Wars: War One (1838–1842); Auckland, Lord; British East India Company Raj
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Huttenback, Robert A. British Relations with Sind, 1799–1834: An Anatomy of Imperialism. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962. Imlah, Albert Henry. Lord Ellenborough: A Biography of Edward Law, Governor General of India. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1939. Webster, Charles. The Foreign Policy of Palmerston, 1830–1831. London: G. Bell and Sons, 1951. Wong, J. Y. “British Annexation of Sind in 1843: An Economic Perspective.” Modern Asian Studies 31 (1997), part 2: 225–244. 30
ELLORA (ELURA) The Ellora caves are located in the heart of Maharashtra, near the town of Aurangabad, about 62 miles (100 kilometers) from the site of Ajanta. A modern Hindu shrine in the vicinity of the rock-hewn site is also renowned for being one of the twelve sacred tirthas, or pilgrimage centers associated with the Shiva . linga. The thirty-four caves, carved onto the steep face of a hill, can be divided into three main groups: Hindu, Buddhist, and Jain. The earliest caves at Ellora, mostly unfinished, appear to be the Hindu ones, clustered around and upstream of a waterfall at the center of the rock-hewn site. Caves 27 and 28, according to Walter Spink, were the first to be excavated, as they make reference to architectural features occurring at Ajanta. Caves 20, 21, 26, and 29, also known as Dhumar Lena, are grandiose in conception and appear to be architecturally and stylistically related to Elephanta and other sixth-century excavations in the Konkan. Caves 17 and 19 follow, showing a complete local assimilation of features common at other rock-hewn sites in the Konkan and inner Maharashtra. The last of the early excavations linked to the sphere of Kalachuri influence in the region is cave 14, also known as Ravana ka khai (Demon Ravana’s cave), judging from its location and innovative iconography. All of these early Hindu units are dedicated to Shiva, as the presence of reliefs depicting the god and his associates, as . well as linga shrines, seem to indicate. The most grandiose Hindu rock-cut temple of the subcontinent was completed at Ellora during the eighth century A.D. Cave 16, better known as Kailash, consists of a temple structure excavated in the round out of the Deccan trap, emerging like a freestanding structure from the hill out of which it was dug. This 197 foot long (60-meter) and 98 foot (30-meter) deep temple was carved mostly during the time of the Rashtrakuta king Krishna I (r. 757–783). Dedicated to Shiva, this monolithic structure evoking the god’s Himalayan dwelling materializes almost like a self-generated (svayambhu) structure within the domain of the Rashtrakutas to serve their political ambitions and help legitimize their power in the Deccan. The body of the Kailash temple consists of three independent parts, linked together by small bridges: an entrance pavilion, followed by a shrine hosting an image of Nandi (the “bull vehicle” of Shiva), and finally the actual temple. The southern style, or Dravida temple, cruciform in plan, consists of a pillared hall decorated with wall paintings (now mostly lost), and a sanctum . enclosing a Shiva linga surmounted by a shikhara (tower) on the outside. The outer walls of the Kailash, once also painted, are embellished with images portraying Hindu mythological scenes and deities carved deep into niches framed by pillars. Worth noting is the Ra¯van. a scene, rendered with great intensity; the three-dimensional figure of the demon powerfully emerges from the living rock. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
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arranged in each cave, following precise iconographical schemes that suggest the diffusion of early tantric beliefs at Ellora. Geri Malandra has argued that each cave should be understood as a mandala (cosmic diagram), thus implying the existence of a programmatic vision for the structures that merges imagery and design. However, most of the Buddhist caves appear to be unfinished. The most imposing Buddhist excavations at Ellora are caves 10, 11, and 12. Cave 10, or Vishvakarma cave, consists of an apsidal hall (caitya hall) containing a rockcut stupa (dome-shaped monument) measuring over 16 feet (5 meters) in diameter. On the stupa, facing the entrance to the hall, is carved an image of a seated Buddha, flanked by attendants, in a guise reminiscent of Ajanta caves 19 and 26. The elaborate ornamentation of the rock-hewn facade of this cave appears to be a development of earlier caitya hall types, with a central horseshoeshaped window. The cave opens onto a large court with a pillared corridor along the sides. Caves 11 and 12 are unfinished multistoried excavations, apparently conceived to be pillared halls with central chambers hosting a seated Buddha image. Noteworthy is the third floor of cave 12, a grandiose pillared hall with cells opening on either side in which are carved different types of seated buddhas. A row of seated female deities is sculpted on the back wall of this cave, flanking the entrance to the main Buddha sanctum. It is worth remarking that none of the Buddhist caves was intended to be a monastic residence. Rock Panel at Ellora Complex. Portion of sculpted back wall, cave 15 (also called Dashavatara) at the Ellora complex. Depicts the Gangadhara Shiva in the act of releasing Ganga (the river of heaven) from a lock of his hair. Dates to period of Rashtrakuta rule, c. eighth century A.D. ADITYA ARYA.
All around the base of the temple are sculptures of elephants, almost as if supporting the weight of the entire structure. The Kailash is placed at the center of a rectangular court with multistoried porticoes that house subsidiary shrines and large images of deities. While no inscriptions are immediately associated with this cave, a copper plate inscription from the region mentions this amazing structure as rivaling heavenly abodes. To the same phase of Rashtrakuta patronage can be ascribed the neighboring cave 15, carved high on the cliff, also known as Dashavatara, as well as caves 25 and 22, nestled among the earliest Hindu caves at the site. The Buddhist caves (2 to 12), located toward the southern end of the cliff, can be roughly dated to the seventh century A.D., an intermediate phase between Kalachuri and Rashtrakuta Hindu patronage at the site. Images of buddhas, bodhisattvas, female and other esoteric deities are ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
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The five Jain caves (30–34), all unfinished, sit isolated on the northern spur of Ellora hill and represent the last phase of patronage at the site. Some excavations appear very complex and elaborate. Cave 30 (also known as Chota [Little] Kailash) imitates on a smaller scale the monolithic structure of the Hindu Kailash cave. The two-storied Indra Sabha cave (32) and the Jagannatha Sabha cave (33) appear rather irregular in plan and are filled with images of Tirthankaras (Ford-crossers) and other Jain subsidiary gods and goddesses. Pia Brancaccio See also Ajanta; Buddhism in Ancient India; Elephanta; Maharashtra
BIBLIOGRAPHY
The most detailed description of the caves appears in the authoritative volume The Cave Temples of India by James Fergusson and James Burgess (1880; reprint, Delhi: Oriental Books, 1969). For more interpretative studies see: W. Spink, “Ellora’s Earliest Phase,” in the Bulletin of the American Academy of Benares 1 (1966); G. Malandra, Unfolding a Mandala (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993); and C. Berkson, Ellora: Concept and Style (New Delhi: Abhinav, 1992). 31
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ELPHINSTONE, MOUNTSTUART (1779–1859), governor of Bombay (1819–1827). One of the shrewdest administrators of the British East India Company, Mountstuart Elphinstone “settled” the vast region of Maharashtra after defeating the Brahman peshwa of Pune in 1818. His father, Baron Elphinstone, was governor of Edinburgh Castle, where Mountstuart attended school. Appointed to the East India Company’s Bengal Service, he landed in Calcutta at the age of seventeen, and six years later was made assistant to the company’s Resident in Pune. Fascinated by classical Greek and Roman history, Elphinstone proved himself singularly adept at governance, using both sticks and carrots in his daily dealings with the last peshwa of Pune, Baji Rao II, whom he viewed as “intriguing, lying, and corrupt,” but believed could be “restrained by fear” from becoming “treacherous.” Baji, however, tragically underestimated his young British master, mistaking Resident (Mountstuart was promoted in 1810) Elphinstone’s soft-spoken advice on how best to govern his “Land of Marathas” for weakness. One fateful day in June 1818, Baji watched his “mighty” Maratha force outside Pune, at Kirkee, crushed by the much smaller, yet better-armed company of British Sepoys under Elphinstone’s command, marking the dawn of British paramountcy over western India. Baji was pensioned off and shipped north with his courtiers to Bithur castle. Elphinstone remained in charge of settling Pune, before moving on to govern Bombay, ruling a region larger than all of England, Scotland, and Wales before he turned forty. Wisely using non-Brahman Maharashtrian Indians to govern the territory he settled, Elphinstone was careful to do nothing to rouse the fury of the Brahmans who continued to live in the region, preserving the sanctity of their Hindu temples, allowing them to remain tax-free, continuing to subsidize religious schools as well as other charitable societies. The company confiscated lands of the largest “nobles” (sirdars), who had supported the peshwas, but most other landowners were granted amnesty as long as they vowed loyalty to the “Great” (Bahadur) Company’s Raj. Peasants soon learned that, though British collectors of their land revenues demanded no less than the peshwa’s servants had, once taxes were paid they would be left in peace, no repeated demands made by princely robbers or petty pilferers, who had in the past returned to demand more grain or gold. Before Elphinstone left Pune, it was said that even an old woman could walk across that city at night with gold on her cane, without fear of robbers or molesters. The same was true of the work Elphinstone did as governor of Bombay, drafting a new Code of Laws, laying the foundation of an excellent educational system, one so widely appreciated by its populace that when he 32
retired from that job the city’s foremost institution of higher learning was renamed Elphinstone College. After leaving India, Elphinstone was repeatedly invited to return as governor-general by the company’s Board of Control, but he declined that honor, preferring to travel through Italy, writing his useful papers and later his History of India (1841) at his home in Surrey. Stanley Wolpert See also British Crown Raj; Maharashtra
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Ballhatchet, Kenneth. Social Policy and Social Change in Western India, 1817–1830. London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1957. Elphinstone, Mountstuart. Territories Conquered from the Paishwa: A Report. 1822. Reprint, Delhi: Orient Publications, 1973. Furber, Holden. John Company at Work: A Study of European Expansion in India in the Late Eighteenth Century. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1948. Roberts, Paul E. India under Wellesley. London: G. Bell and Sons, 1929. Wolpert, Stanley A. Tilak and Gokhale: Revolution and Reform in the Making of Modern India. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1962.
EMPLOYMENT STRUCTURE Given the paucity of dependable statistical evidence, the employment structure in India can be described only for a period beginning in 1881 to the present, from data based on the decennial population census until 1960, and the National Sample Survey (NSS) thereafter. Though the methodology used in these sources is different, the trends in employment and its pattern are broadly comparable.
The Nineteenth Century For India, most of the nineteenth century, at least up to the 1870s, was a period of economic decline. Exploitative features of British colonial rule, including the introduction of burdensome land revenues and tariffs, first by the British East India Company Raj, then directly by the Crown, were primarily to blame. More positive features appeared in the first quarter of the century as law and order improved, and economic infrastructure and modern communications were developed. Between 1860 and 1900, land revenue collection rose by just 25 percent, while the value of agricultural output (largely due to a rise in prices) increased by about 116 percent. National income estimates for the period after 1870 suggest that output kept pace with population, which grew by about 1 percent per annum. On the basis of the population census, the share of India’s primary sector (agricultural) workforce rose from ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
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approximately 60–65 percent to 70 percent in 1881; that of the secondary sector (industrial) declined from about 15–20 percent to 11 percent, and that in the services sector remained virtually unchanged. The increased relative and absolute size of the primary sector reflected not only a movement away from declining handicrafts within the manufacturing sector, but also increased acreage brought under cultivation, which may have increased agricultural output, though not necessarily output per acre. The industrial output was estimated to have declined.
The Period from 1881 to 1950 Between 1881 and 1911, the share of labor force in agriculture, including allied activities such as forestry, rose slightly, from 72.4 to 74.5 percent, and that of the labor force in manufacturing declined from 10.6 to 9.1 percent. The employment picture did not perceptibly change in the next forty years. The share of employment in the agricultural sector remained almost constant at 75 percent, rising from 74.8 percent in 1911 to 75.7 percent in 1951. On the other hand, the share of employment in the manufacturing sector and the services sector during the same period declined slightly. In the former case, the fall was from 12.2 percent to 11.9 percent, while in the latter case it was from 13 percent to 12.4 percent. Stagnation in employment in the manufacturing sector and the decline in employment in the other two sectors took place despite the rise in net domestic product. It should be noted that the data in 1951 pertain to undivided India (which included Pakistan and Bangladesh). However, the comparison is appropriate, as the figures for 1911 are also for undivided British India. The statistics relating to employment for the country as a whole fail to reflect the regional picture of employment. While a large part of central India had the same pattern of employment as India as a whole, two groups of states showed different patterns. In the first group, consisting of Kerala, Maharashtra, Madras, and West Bengal, there was a marked shift in the workforce away from agriculture and toward manufacturing. In the second group, consisting of Rajasthan, Orissa, and Punjab, while there was a notable rise in the share of agriculture in the workforce, the share of manufacturing fell sharply. The difference in the employment pattern in these two groups of states was attributable to the varying access of these states to transportation facilities such as internal waterways (as in the case of Kerala), seaports (as in the case of Maharashtra, Madras, and West Bengal), and the railway network.
The Second Half of the Twentieth Century Trends in employment for the latter half of the twentieth century may be more accurately described for the ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
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period from 1961 to 1999–2000, as the 1961 census adopted the concept of participation in productive work more inclusively than did the 1951 census, using income rather than work as the criterion for being in the labor force. The share of agricultural employment during the period from 1961 to 1999–2000 declined from 75.9 percent to 60.4 percent, while the corresponding shares in industrial and service employment sectors increased from 11.6 to 17.3 percent and 12.4 to 22.3 percent, respectively. In sharp contrast to the period from 1881 to 1950, there was a more decisive structural shift in the workforce away from agricultural employment to the fast growing industrial and service employment. The growth in total employment and a major change in its structure were induced by the acceleration in the aggregate and per capita national product. Thus, the gross domestic product at factor cost grew by about 3.4 percent between 1951 and 1980–1981, by 5.75 percent in the 1980s, and then by 6 percent in the 1990s. J. Krishnamurty See also Agricultural Labor and Wages since 1950; Demographic Trends since 1757
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Krishnamurty, J. “The Growth of Agricultural Labour in India.” Indian Economic and Social History Review 9, no. 3 (1972). ———. “Changing Concepts of Work in the Indian Censuses, 1901–1961.” Indian Economic and Social History Review 6, no. 3 (September 1977).
ENERGY POLITICS AND POLICY India is the world’s sixth-largest energy consumer and the world’s third-largest producer of coal. China is the second-largest energy consumer, after the United States. China’s production and consumption of coal, its dominant fuel, is the highest in the world. Oil demand and imports have been rising rapidly, making China the world’s second-largest petroleum consumer in 2003, surpassing Japan. The average projected economic growth rates of 7–8 percent in India and 9–10 percent in China will increase the demand for world energy enormously in the decades to come. Two major events of 1974—oil pricing shocks and India’s atomic test—highlighted some of the linkages of energy, security, and development policies in India. Heavy dependence on oil imports at the time from the Persian Gulf states, Libya, and the Soviet Union had implications for Indian diplomatic, economic, and military policies. Apart from the obvious need to maintain cordial relations with these states to keep oil flowing on affordable commercial terms, India had to step up exports to the oil-supplying 33
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and stabilization of international oil prices. Since socialism ended and marketization began in 1991, the Indian economy has grown at a healthy average rate of almost 7 percent per annum. There was a short phase when Indian oil imports from commercial goods exports to Iraq were dislocated following the 1992 Gulf War and the imposition of economic sanctions on Baghdad. But even this problem was overcome through higher oil imports from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf sheikdoms to offset Iraqi oil imports. Memories of the energy crisis faded at the beginning of the twenty-first century.
Nehru with Homi Bhabha. Nehru (left) conferring with Homi Bhabha, the principal architect of atomic energy in India. Although the pursuit of a nuclear program initially subjected India to international sanctions that adversely affected its general economy, today’s scientists and economic planners contend that expanded nuclear power is the only viable long-term solution to the nation’s massive energy needs. PRESS INFORMATION BUREAU / FOTOMEDIA.
countries to prevent a foreign exchange crisis that would have crippled the Indian development program. There was also a military dimension to the international oil crisis. The oil-exporting states of the Middle East were some of the largest buyers of technologically advanced weapons systems from the industrialized countries of the West, which were able to reverse the cost of their oil imports through arms sales. The proximity of these Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) arms importers to the subcontinent, and the overt or latent military links of states such as Saudi Arabia, Libya, and the shah’s Iran with Pakistan carried strategic implications for India. Special purchases of oil and military equipment from the Soviet Union at the time also accentuated India’s economic and military dependence on Moscow. The passing of the international energy crisis by the mid-1980s brought greater economic prosperity to India, both because of successful efforts to tap domestic oil resources, especially in the offshore Bombay High oil fields on the western coast, and because of the decline 34
India has three conventional sources of commercial and industrial energy: oil, coal, and hydroelectric power. Oil of various kinds and oil products are used primarily in the transportation, petrochemical, and household sectors of the economy. The other two energy sources—coal-fired thermal and hydroelectric power—provide some 70 and 25 percent, respectively, of electricity generation in India. India holds some 7 percent of the total estimated world coal reserves, and domestic coal production meets more than half of its total energy needs. Coal is still used marginally in locomotives in some sectors of the Indian railway network. In the rural economy, where about 70 percent of the Indian population lives, there is still considerable use of firewood and agricultural and animal waste. The extensive use of dried cow dung as fuel in the rural areas has led to the establishment of several biogas plants there. The government of India has also been exploring the potential use of geothermal, tidal, and solar power. India has relatively low oil and gas resources, with oil reserves estimated at 5.9 billion barrels (0.5 percent of global reserves), with total proven, probable, and possible reserves of close to 11 billion barrels. The majority of India’s oil reserves are located in Mumbai’s offshore fields and onshore at Assam. Due to stagnating domestic crude production, India imported approximately 70 percent of its oil in 2001, much of it from the Middle East (65 percent). This dependence is growing rapidly. The World Energy Outlook, published by the International Energy Agency, projects that India’s dependence on oil imports will grow to 90 percent by the year 2020. India is seeking oil import diversification from outside the Gulf. India’s investment in overseas oilfields is projected to reach $3 billion in a few years. Of particular interest is Africa, especially Sudan, where India has invested $750 million in oil, and Nigeria, with which India reached a deal in November 2004 enabling it to purchase about 44 million barrels of crude oil per year on a long-term basis. Russia, Vietnam, and Myanmar are also potential suppliers to the Indian oil market. India has entered the international competition in the Caspian Basin, seeking special rights and privileges with Tajikstan, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Iran. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
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In 2002 India’s electric generation capacity was a total of 120 gigawatts (GW), which included 90 GW thermal, 26 GW hydro, and 3 GW nuclear. In the same year its power plants generated 547 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity, of which 84 percent was conventional thermal, 12 percent hydro, and 3 percent nuclear. Coal reserves in India are substantial, projected to last another eighty to one hundred years at compound rates of consumption. Despite such large proven reserves, the productivity of operations under the government-owned corporation Coal India Limited and its subdivisions is low when compared with Western standards. The average output per man-shift (each day or night shift that miners work) for Coal India is 0.8 metric ton in underground mines, considerably lower than the range of about 2.5 to 4 metric tons in western Europe, and 8 to 12 in the United States, Australia, and South Africa. Indian productivity, however, compares favorably with China, where it is 0.5 metric ton. The problem with coal utilization is the location of coal reserves: West Bengal, Bihar, Orissa, and Madhya Pradesh. Political conditions in the first two states have been particularly volatile over the decades, and labor strikes and general political unrest have been extensive. The location of coal resources in the northeastern sector of India requires that it be transported and distributed throughout the country by railway. This makes it vulnerable to disruption or interruption if the powerful labor union, the All-India Railwaymen’s Federation, with a membership of between 2 million and 3 million employees, were to go on a nationwide strike. This would not only bring all railway passenger and goods traffic to a halt, it would also paralyze coal-fired thermal plants and thereby industrial activity throughout India. The seriousness of this internal security threat was probably best exemplified by the crisis of 1974, when the All-India Railwaymen’s Federation successfully launched a nationwide strike of its over 2 million members. With most power plants carrying less than two weeks of coal supplies, power had to be severely rationed in major industrial cities that were dependent on electricity from coal-fired thermal plants. Apart from this potential problem, there is the additional criticism that coal mining is hazardous to the health of the miners, and that its utilization causes considerable pollution of the atmosphere. Assessing the total potential of hydroelectric power resources in India is difficult because the flows of Indian rivers vary widely, ranging from thousands of cusecs (cubic feet per second) in the monsoon season to a few cusecs in the dry season. Consequently, estimates of hydroelectric potential in India usually amount to identifying specific targets in each river basin where the potential for hydroelectric power generation is both technically ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
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feasible and economically viable. In 1978 the Indian government estimated the potential annual energy generation from hydroelectric plants to be about 400 tetrawatt-hours (tWh). However, the installed hydroelectric generating capacity at that time was only 40 tWh, or just 10 percent of estimated potential, a share that changed little during the next two decades. This meant that a 90 percent potential for clean and renewable hydroelectric power was being wasted annually because of the failure to harness India’s rivers. Part of the problem has been the social opposition to large dam building for irrigation and hydroelectric power, as the construction of large dams is perceived to cause environmental damage and would also uproot several hundred thousand villagers from their traditional homes. This opposition eventually killed the huge Narmada Dam project in the mid-1990s, despite World Bank approval and offer of a loan. The Narmada project involved the building of thirty major dams and several hundred smaller dams. On the other hand, China has decided to go through with its highly controversial massive Three Gorges Dam project on the Chang (Yangtze) River. Critics have alleged that the Three Gorges Dam project could lead to another major Chinese disaster like the “Great Leap Forward” of the 1950s, but on a much larger scale. Although there are limitations and liabilities in developing coal-fired thermal and hydroelectric power and oil as sources of energy in India, these will continue to generate the bulk of electricity in India for several decades to come. But the growth in thermal and hydroelectric generating capacity is not expected to keep pace with industrial and urban demand. Projected energy needs beyond the year 2000 suggest serious shortfalls of up to 20 percent. The crucial gap cannot be filled by increasing oil production, since domestic oil reserves are too limited to meet industrial demand and, in any case, are being depleted rapidly. Almost all of the future oil imports are expected to be absorbed by the petrochemical, household, and transportation sectors of the economy. The concentrated geographic location of coal in the northeastern India and the vulnerability of transporting coal throughout India suggest that coal cannot be guaranteed for the generation of electricity in the major industrial cities. Indian planners and politicians perceive nuclear power as crucial to India’s energy needs. Nuclear energy constitutes less than 3 percent of its total electricity generation. However, the dual-use nature of the peaceful technology also provides India with nuclear weapons capabilities. Unlike Israel and Pakistan, and earlier South Africa under its apartheid regime—all three of which sought a dedicated path toward a nuclear weapons capability—India’s nuclear weapons program is mainly an offshoot of its nuclear energy program and 35
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TABLE 1
1995 comparative per capita consumption of electricity (in kilowatt-hours, kWh)
Bangladesh Kenya India Pakistan China Mexico Brazil Italy
84 139 314 416 719 1,486 1,783 4,588
United Kingdom Germany France Japan United States Sweden Canada
5,843 6,513 7,126 7,281 12,308 16,534 17,347
Compiled from India Means Business: Investment Opportunities in Infrastructure, Ministry of External Affairs, Investment Promotion and Publicity Division, Government of India, 1997.
SOURCE:
uses the plutonium extracted from the waste fuel. From an economic development standpoint, India has rationalized the necessity of a nuclear energy program to fill shortfalls in its overall electricity needs. Especially given the costs of mining and transporting coal throughout India from its location in the northeast-central regions, and considering that the great rivers of India cannot all be harnessed appropriately for hydroelectric power to service the major cities of India, a case is made for nuclear energy. Elsewhere in the world, especially in France, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and many of the European Union countries, nuclear energy is viewed as essential for meeting increasing energy demands and for reducing reliance on the oil of the Middle East. Oil supply and prices are subject to manipulation by OPEC, and coal mining and coal-fired power plants are considered health hazards. However, the pursuit of a nuclear weapons program subjected India to international economic sanctions that not only affected the general economy, but also hindered technological advances in its nuclear energy program. Many of the sanctions have now been lifted, but technical sanctions remain for India’s nuclear energy and space programs. Both India’s energy potential and its economy have been affected. Indian nuclear scientists and economic planners are convinced that nuclear power is the only long-term solution to India’s energy needs. The following statement in 1980 by Raja Ramana, director of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission, is reflective of the views of many members of the nuclear scientific community in India: “Looking at it [the future of nuclear energy] with the experience of the past and the terrifying energy problems of the future, I can think of no other source of energy that has been discovered to date except nuclear energy, which can solve the energy problems of this country during the 36
next twenty-five years and beyond. If I do not make the case now and point out . . . the urgency of accepting its inevitability, I will have done a great disservice” (Pachauri). There remains the question, however, whether nuclear-generated electricity is commercially viable and affordable compared to the conventional sources of energy. The pro-nuclear power lobby in India suggests that this source of energy may have a cost advantage over coal-fired thermal plants. This has been disputed in Germany and Britain, countries that are now cutting back on their nuclear power programs. However, France, Japan, and South Korea are convinced that nuclear power is a critical source of electricity. As noted earlier, France obtains 78 percent of its electricity from nuclear power. Japan has embarked on a major program of establishing nuclear power plants. Power remains in the public sector and was not privatized following the marketization and privatization measures of the 1991 economic reforms. Government-run energy corporations include: Oil and Natural Gas Corporation, Oil India Limited, and Indian Oil Corporation in the petroleum sector; Gas Authority of India Limited in the natural gas sector; and Coal India Limited in the coal sector. Government electric power corporations include National Thermal Power Corporation, National Hydroelectric Power Corporation, and various state electricity boards. Major oil terminals are located at the ports of Mumbai, Cochin, Haldia, Kandla, Chennai, and Vizagapatnam. In 2004 the capacity of the major oil refineries in India were as follows: Reliance-Jamnagar, 540,000 bbl/d (barrels per day); Koyali-Gujarat, 185,100 bbl/d; Mangalore, 180,000 bbl/d; Mathura-Uttar Pradesh, 156,000 bbl/d; Mahul-Bombay (Bharat Petroleum), 120,000 bbl/d; Madras, 130,660 bbl/d; and Mahul-Bombay (Hindustan Petroleum), 111,700 bbl/d. Since independence in 1947, India’s electricity generation capacity has grown by more than sixty times. In 1947 India generated 1,362 milliwatts (mW) of electricity. In 1997 this capacity reached 83,288 mW. Energy projections in India beyond the year 2000 suggest serious shortfalls of about 11 percent, rising to a high of 19 percent during peak periods. Demand for electricity is expected to rise at a rate of 8 percent per annum over the next decade, this despite the fact that overall generating capacity increased from 287 billion units (BU) in 1991–1992 to 420 BU in 1997–1998, and to 502 BU in 1999–2000. With the economic reforms since 1991 generating a growth rate of about 7 percent, the main obstacle to more rapid growth in India is its poor ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
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infrastructure of roads, water supply, telecommunications, and especially power. Raju G. C. Thomas See also Economic Reforms of 1991; Infrastructure Development and Government Policy since 1950; Nuclear Programs and Policies
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry. India Economic Profile. New Delhi: Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry, 1998. Institute for the Analysis of Global Security. “Energy Security.” Available at ⬍http://www.iags.org/n0121043.htm⬎ Pachauri, Rajendra K., ed. Energy Policy for India. New Delhi: Macmillan, 1980. Thomas, Raju G. C. “India’s Energy Policy and Nuclear Weapons Program.” In Nuclear India in the Twenty-first Century, edited by Damodar SarDesai and Raju G. C. Thomas. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2002. Thomas, Raju G. C., and Bennett Ramberg, eds. Energy and Security in the Industrializing World. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1990.
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSCIOUSNESS SINCE 1800 Reports in the early 2000’s that the Sariska wildlife reserve in northern India had lost all its remaining tigers is indicative of the deepening crisis into which India’s wildlife and its environment have fallen. Vanishing wildlife, depleted forests, and polluted air and water are grave ecological concerns in India. The survival of the majestic tiger—king of the jungle and the top of its food chain—is not just a battle to save an individual species but rather an entire ecosystem and a web of life that sustains human life and livelihoods as well. Concern for humankind and its environment in India dates back several centuries, when such coexistence was widely practiced among India’s tribes and indigenous communities. Tribal peoples, or adivasis, inhabiting the vast forests of the Chhotanagpur and Danakaranya regions in central and peninsular India and Garhwal and other parts of the Himalayas carefully nurtured their forests, as their existence depended on these resources. They usually faced little interference from local chiefs and landlords, who little valued forests, other than to practice shikars, or trophy hunts. British rule, however, dramatically altered these relationships and greatly increased forest exploitation.
India’s Forests The British at first showed total indifference to forests. The only threat to forests came from agricultural expansion, which was actively sought to generate revenue ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
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for the government. However, the growing timber needs of the colonial rulers for shipbuilding and other purposes soon hastened forest exploitation. The first reservation of teak was established by the British along the western Indian Malabar coast in 1806 to conveniently supply teak for ships built in dockyards in Goa and other coastal locations. Pressure on forests greatly increased with the arrival of the railways in India in the latter part of the century. Forests were recklessly cut to provide for railway sleepers and, before coal mines became operational, as fuel for locomotives. Such was the demand for timber that the governorgeneral in 1862 called for the establishment of a department that could ensure a sustained availability of the enormous timber requirements for railway sleepers. As a result, the first imperial forest department was set up in 1864. The Indian Forest Act of 1865 was the first official attempt at asserting state monopoly rights over forest resources and at curtailing the traditional rights of local communities. The 1865 act, to a large extent, dictated all successive forest legislation in British and postindependence India. The provisions of the 1878 Forest Act, for instance, empowered the state to usurp all “valuable” tracts of forest, needed especially for railway purposes, and to retain enough flexibility over the utilization of the remaining forests. The customary use of forest timber by villagers was henceforth considered not a “right” but a “privilege” exercised solely at the discretion of local rulers. The next assault on India’s forests came during the two world wars, when the British found it expedient to plunder the country’s forests to service the huge war demand. Approximately 1.7 million cubic feet of timber (mostly teak) were exported annually from 1914 through 1919 to meet the demands of the British military in Egypt and the Middle East. The impact of World War II was even more severe, when a special Timber Directorate was set up in Delhi to channel supplies of forest produce from India’s provinces. As a result of the growing military and mercantile demands of the colonialists, social and ecological needs were increasingly overlooked. Forest management in the post-independence era has not been much different. India’s 1952 Forest Policy is striking in its assertion of the state’s monopoly right over forests in order to safeguard the “national interest.” The policy states that “the country as a whole is not to be deprived of a national asset by the mere accident of a village being situated close to a forest.” While on one hand the rights of local communities to forest resources were severely curtailed, overexploitation of forests to supply the high demands of forest industries, especially pulp and paper, grew even further. The forest department argued that the low productivity of Indian forests was due to the 37
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government’s “uneconomic” and “conservation oriented” approach and called for replacing the existing natural forests with high-yielding industrially useful trees. The National Commission on Agriculture went even further, outlining a strategy for industrial forestry in 1961. A new program of social forestry was also launched to encourage local communities to raise their own forests, usually on degraded wastelands, to satisfy subsistence needs for fuel and fodder, but the program failed. Emphasis on industrial forestry extended beyond timber when several commercially attractive minor forest products such as tendu leaf (used in making local cigarettes), sal seed, and mahua flower were nationalized. Sale and marketing of these products was handed over to private contractors, not only depriving tribals of their livelihoods but encouraging corruption and misuse of the resource at the hands of middlemen. The resulting alienation of tribals, particularly in central India, has given rise to local protests, sometimes turning to violent conflicts. The recently established states of Jharkhand (meaning “forest land”) and Uttaranchal have their roots in secessionist struggles over natural resource rights. The rapid decimation of the country’s wildlife and forests has led the Indian government to enact new legislation: the Wildlife (Protection) Act of 1972 aimed at protecting wildlife in strictly controlled national parks and sanctuaries, and the Forest (Conservation) Act of 1980 contained strict provisions for preventing the diversion of forest land. However, it is the National Forest Policy of 1988 that is credited with being the watershed in forest governance. The new forest policy aims to achieve ecological balance through conservation of biological diversity, soil and water management, and reforestation, while at the same time meeting the subsistence needs of rural and tribal populations. Reversing the earlier stance, the demands of forest industries are now secondary to these social objectives. Encouraged by the new policy, a new program of joint forest management has been initiated in various parts of the country. The program aims at involving local communities in the management of state forest lands in return for regulated use of forest resources. Villagers are grouped in forest protection committees (named differently in different states) and work with local forest guards to protect specific forest areas. Community management, based on self-agreed rules and responsibilities, has helped curb misuse and corruption and has ensured a steady flow of forest benefits for participating communities. Although the program is viewed as a growing success, it operates on the basis of individual state resolutions (and often the goodwill of local forest officials), and local communities do not enjoy secure access to state forest resources. 38
Environmental Problems in the Modern Indian State While deforestation has been a growing concern, India’s environmental problems today span a much wider spectrum and are closely tied to its rapid pace of industrialization and urbanization in recent years. Problems of water and air pollution were first recognized when the government enacted the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act in 1974 and the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act in 1981. The 1984 Bhopal gas disaster—in which a toxic leak from the city’s Union Carbide chemical plant resulted in the deaths of more than three thousand people—significantly raised environmental awareness and activism in India. It also caused the formulation of the Environment (Protection) Act and the establishment of the Ministry of Environment and Forests (MoEF) as an independent federal department in 1985. The MoEF is tasked with the overall responsibility of administering and enforcing environmental laws and policies. Despite a greater commitment by the Indian government to protect public health and the environment, policies geared to develop the country’s economy have taken precedence in recent years. Market reforms launched in the early 1990s have significantly raised economic growth but have also resulted in a huge cost to the environment. According to the World Bank, environmental damage from unclean air and water and natural resource depletion was valued at U.S.$9.5 billion, or 4.5 percent of the country’s gross domestic product in 1992. A high proportion of these costs are attributed to premature mortality from exposure to indoor air pollution (from burning firewood in poorly ventilated kitchens) and the consumption of unclean water. Growth in energy consumption in the power, industrial, and transportation sectors has resulted in rising emissions of greenhouse gases—the main contributor to climate change—and other pollutants harmful for human health. While per capita emissions are still small, these are growing rapidly, and India already ranks fifth in the world in aggregate greenhouse gas emissions. Given the country’s reliance on low-quality coal—77 percent of electricity in India is produced from coal—and its soaring demand for electricity, carbon emissions are likely to grow exponentially. A stumbling block is artificially low electricity prices that have favored a few interest groups at the expense of those who really deserve its benefits. A commercially viable electricity sector could improve the quality of the electricity supply, improving access especially for rural households who otherwise would have to depend on dirty biomass fuels. Vehicular air pollution in India’s large metropolitan cities is already a serious human health hazard. Airborne particulate matter in New Delhi, the nation’s capital, has ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
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been recorded at five times the World Health Organization limit. The problem is not due to the absence of sound environmental legislation, but rather a lack of proper enforcement at the local level. Lack of official response led the Supreme Court of India to take matters into its own hands by ruling in 1998 that all buses in Delhi must be run on compressed natural gas, a cleaner fuel. But this has not solved problems for other parts of the country, where buses still use diesel, a far dirtier fuel, although its quality has improved due to government action in recent years. A particular problem, however, concerns the price advantage that diesel enjoys over gasoline, which encourages its rampant use. Availability of adequate freshwater is important for human consumption, growing crops, industrial use, and for sustaining all other life. But freshwater availability has been declining, both in terms of its quantity and quality in India. Water availability per capita reduced from 5,400 cubic meters in 1950 to 2,400 cubic meters in 1991, and several regions in the country are today water stressed. Following the “Green Revolution” of the 1970s, water demand for modern irrigation greatly increased. Overexploitation of groundwater for irrigation has depleted groundwater aquifers and has resulted in land salinization, particularly in intensively cultivated northern parts of India. In other regions, where agriculture is rain-fed, people traditionally took to harvesting scarce rainwater by building ponds and other water retention structures. Several such structures are in use even today in Rajasthan and several parts of southern India, testimony to indigenous knowledge, though concerns have been voiced about their maintenance in recent years. An equally serious issue concerns water pollution, both inland and along the vast Indian coastline. The most shocking instance is the pollution of the Ganges, the ancient holy river that flows through thickly populated plains of northern India. Municipal and industrial wastes have been allowed to be freely dumped in the river, rendering it unfit for safe human use. The government responded by launching the Ganga Action Plan in 1987, a multipronged project involving wastewater treatment, urban renewal, riverfront development, and public education to make the river pollution-free. Since then, three other rivers have been covered under similar projects. The Ministry of Environment and Forests has also undertaken the preservation of the country’s coastline by regulating urban development and controlling pollution along the coast. While India’s environment faces several challenges, there are also reasons for hope. The significance of the environment is recognized in the country’s Constitution. The various environmental laws and regulations have not been sufficiently implemented in the past, but the government is now taking its mandate for the environment ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
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more seriously. India is also an active participant in international environmental discussions, having ratified almost all United Nations conventions and treaties on the environment. With a vibrant civil society and a centuries-old tradition of coexistence with the environment, India has a good opportunity to tackle its environmental problems. How well it can balance its environment with the imperative for economic growth and development remains to be seen. Damanjit Singh See also Agricultural Growth and Diversification since 1991; Ethnic Conflict BIBLIOGRAPHY
Brandon, C., K. Hommann, and N. Kishor. “The Cost of Inaction: Valuing the Economy-Wide Cost of Environmental Degradation in India.” Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1995. Gadgil, M., and R. Guha. Ecology and Equity: The Use and Abuse of Nature in Contemporary India. London and New York: Routledge, 1995. Government of India. “Indian Forest Policy 1988.” Available at ⬍http://www.envfor.nic⬎ Guha, R. “Forestry in British and Post-British India: A Historical Analysis.” Economic and Political Weekly (October 1983). United Nations Environment Programme and The Energy and Resource Institute. India: State of the Environment, 2001. Nairobi and New Delhi: UNEP, 2001.
EPIC ERA. See Maha¯ bha¯rata; Ra¯ ma¯ yan.a. ETHNIC CONFLICT A defining force in India’s modern history and politics, ethnic conflict was the principal cause behind the creation of India and Pakistan as independent nation-states. It has made and unmade governments, led to wars, and precipitated domestic strife in many parts of India. Ethnicity has also been an incubator of Indian democracy. Without ethnic mobilization— made possible because of segmented social diversity— democracy would not have expanded as rapidly as it did in India. The stability of post-independence India has depended largely on the balance between the demands of ethnic communities and the need to build a unified nation-state. While India is recognized as an independent nation-state, its borders remain in dispute, and its ethnic communities spill across into neighboring states. Even when boundaries are well defined, as between India and Sri Lanka, ethnic overlap tends to blur international boundaries, causing conflict. Indian ethnic communities live on a scale of graded linguistic and cultural differences. Rajasthani, an IndoAryan language spoken mainly in the North Indian state 39
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Police in Action after Assam Killings in Nellie. Police take a Tiwa tribe member into custody after the Assam massacre. In February 1983, in one of several “sons of the soil” uprisings, the Tiwa massacred hundreds of migrant Bangladeshis in the border state of Assam. Tensions continue to run deep in the area, with the native Assamese accusing India’s central government, particularly the Congress Party, of ignoring its plight—the loss of jobs and land to the newcomers. INDIA TODAY.
of Rajasthan, changes every hundred miles whether one travels north or south, east or west. It absorbs local culture, words, and phrases as it gains distance from the original point and moves toward an area of the next proximate language. The Indian state of Bengal, parts of Assam, and Bihar, as well as what is today the nation of Bangladesh, share scores of dialects derived from Bengali. India’s ethno-linguistic communities are for the most part concentrated in compact areas or regions. Thus Bengali is the dominant language in Bengal state, as is Marathi in Maharashtra and Gujarati in Gujarat, although many other linguistic communities reside in those states. This concentration, however, enables an aspiring ethnic community to demand political recognition in forms that range from provincial autonomy to national separation, although demands for separation have mostly been made by ethnic communities living on the borders of India. Officially, India’s government recognizes fifteen regional state languages within its twenty-eight federal states and seven union territories. 40
There is no agreement among scholars about the distinctions between the languages and dialects of India. Linguistic scholars have suggested that there are 325 distinctive languages in India and thousands of dialects. To this linguistic diversity, we have to add several separate religions, as well as divisions of caste and locality. Each criterion divides Indian society differently. Together, all form the complex and layered identity of a modern Indian. The idea of ethnic identity then amalgamates linguistic, religious, and cultural attributes. Each ethnic composite possesses a geographic space, a distinctive history, and a singular perspective on its place within modern India. Some ethnic groups see themselves as targets of discrimination, while others are content with the autonomy and power they have managed to gain for themselves. Since religious and tribal manifestations of ethnic identities are discussed elsewhere in this encyclopedia, this article will focus on the broad cultural constructs that define ethnic identities. The objective here is to provide an overarching frame for understanding the causes of ethnic conflicts. It should be stressed that the ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
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story of India’s ethnic politics is one of success as well as large failures; some ethnic communities have therefore chosen to integrate, while others have sought separation.
Historical Background Scholars of ethnicity and nationalism disagree about how to define ethnic identity. Some view ethnic identities as primordial, given and immutable; others believe they are instrumental and are evoked in the service of other social and political objectives. To understand ethnic identity in the Indian context, however, one must view them as constructed identities, buffeted and shaped by historic and sociopolitical events. Several historical events have shaped ethnic evolution. The rise and fall of empires, the Mughal and then the British, led to the crystallization of ethnic consciousness in several regions of the Indian subcontinent. Before the British arrived on the scene, India was ruled by several large and small kingdoms, each multiethnic and multireligious but with one or two linguistic groups that had gained dominance because of size and royal patronage. The British absorbed these kingdoms into their empire by 1857, but for the most part ignored the ways in which local communities defined themselves. British policies nevertheless had a profound impact on ethnic self-definition. The British believed that India had not existed as a historical country, and that the British themselves had fashioned it out of a welter of regions and kingdoms. The British would build an overarching state while tolerating social and cultural diversity within their empire. But the British disregarded ethnic overlap when drawing of the borders of their Indian empire. The partition of ethnically united Bengal in 1905 was clearly a British administrative and political convenience. British policies—like the introduction of a census and the recruitment into their colonial army along ethnic (“martial race”) and religious lines—reinforced ethnic consciousness. The British colonialists based army recruitment on their belief that certain ethnic groups made better soldiers than others. The Punjabi-speaking Sikhs and the Marathas who spoke Marathi were viewed as hardy and soldierly; the Bengalis were regarded as soft and artistic, better suited to British civil service. These perceptions became part of ethnic folklore and endured beyond the British period into the political life of independent India. The rise of India’s nationalist movement and the way in which it came to be organized was another determining factor in the shaping of ethnic identity. It was, however, Mahatma Gandhi and the Congress Party that systematically wedded ethnicity to Indian nationalism. Congress delineated its provincial organization not along the imperial map of the Raj, but along the lines of ethnic and ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
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linguistic distinctions. The nationalist era taught ethnic communities the value of mass mobilization against a central government. It is then not surprising that for independent India, management of “ethnic nationalism” and its incorporation into pan-Indian nationalism has been the single most important problem since 1947.
The Nature of Ethnic Conflict Why have some ethnic groups in India long sought integration, while others have demanded separation? Several characteristics of ethnic demography and political economy can be offered as explanations. First, there is a correlation, though not a perfect fit, between ethnic “homeland” and ethnic identity. Possessing many of the features of a “nation,” ethnic communities seek cultural and political autonomy. This characteristic compelled Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru to agree in 1955 to a linguistic reorganization of the Indian federation, creating linguistically discrete provinces. Ethnicity thus became the principle on which India would henceforth create new or merge existing state-provinces. Since then, India has added many new states to its union through internal reorganization. The creation of three new states in 2000, carved out of Uttar Pradesh (Uttaranchal), Bihar ( Jharkhand), and Madhya Pradesh (Chhattisgarh), are instances of the most recent efforts at appeasing ethnic demands. The extent of autonomy granted to stateprovinces—on which the Constitution is ambivalent at best—has been a persistent source of domestic tension. Frequently, the success of one ethnic group has triggered demands for parallel recognition by other ethnic groups within the same state-province. The Sikh demand for a separate state triggered counterdemands by Punjabi Hindus and resulted in the creation of the state of Harayana, carved out of Punjab in 1966. The creation of Nagaland in 1963 triggered demands for separate provincial states all over the Northeast region, and led to the division of Assam into seven new states in 1972. Ethnic tensions are aggravated by the perception that the central leaders favor one ethnic group over another. Ethnic groups can be divided into those forming the core and those residing on the geographical periphery of India. The former are part of the Indian heartland, the latter frequently share kinship and identity with fellow ethnics across the borders. Overlapping ethnic nationalities include the Indian Kashmiris and the Kashmiris across the Line of Control in Pakistan; the Tamils in India’s state of Tamil Nadu and the Tamils in the north and east of Sri Lanka; the Bengalis in west Bengal and those in what is now Bangladesh; the Nagas on both sides of the India-Myanmar border; and the Nepalis on both sides of Indo-Nepal border. Frequently, ethnic communities on the border are poorly integrated into the Indian 41
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union. Pakistan would not have been able to foment insurgency in Kashmir had the Kashmiris been fully content to remain within the Indian Union. As most popular movements are prone to do, ethnic conflicts have a rhythm; they rise and fall. Ethnic communities are known to move from autonomy to separatist militancy, and then back to autonomy. The separatist movement in Punjab followed this rhythm between the 1970s and the 1990s. Democratic expansion and economic growth have also contributed to ethnic tensions. Relatively better economic opportunities have led to mass migration from Bangladesh into India, particularly into the bordering state of Assam. The native Assamese have mobilized in protest against the new migrants and have accused the central government of deliberately ignoring their loss of jobs, overcrowding, and political shifts unfavorable to the native Assamese. Assamese leaders charge that India’s central government, largely dominated by the Congress Party, sought the migrant vote and therefore ignored the Assamese demands. These suspicions led to several “sons of the soil” movements in Assam since the 1970s. Economic growth since 1947 has affected different ethnic groups differently. Some have gained while others have been slower to benefit. The sense of relative deprivation among rival ethnic groups has frequently led to violence. The separatist movement among the Sikhs in Punjab was nurtured by the perception that the government in New Delhi did not give Sikhs all that they deserved, and that their state of Punjab had been cheated out of its fair share of industrial investment for development. Economic nationalism constitutes an important element in the Naga and Assamese separatist movements. The Nagas claim they do not belong in India, while the Assamese charge that India’s central government has exploited Assam of its oil and other rich resources without making corresponding investments. Economic grievances are often combined with charges of mistreatment. Sikh anger flared up when Sikhs were searched and mistreated by the Harayana police during the Asiad games in 1983. By 1984 Punjab was in the grip of a violent insurgency. The Jharkhand Tribal movement and violence in Manipur and Assam also underline the importance of these grievances in the rise of ethnic protests. Ethnic conflicts also arise because they are grist to the political mill of electoral campaigns. Political leaders appeal to pride, historic achievements, and current injustices—real and imagined—to win elections, to deny the same to opponents, and to gain office, position, and power. Indian politicians have become extremely adept at mobilizing ethnic mass support for all manner of political and personal objectives. The threat of mass disaffection, whipped up by ethnic leaders, works effectively against a central 42
government unwilling to accede to ethnic demands. Ethnic leaders who command a large following in a particular province are not unlike feudal lords commanding loyalty from their “captive” fiefdoms based on myths of common origin, language, and religion. This is evidenced by the existence of a large number of regional and provincial political parties, which regularly win elections and form governments in India. A few examples are: the Akali Dal in Punjab, Telugu Desam in Andhra, Dravida Munnetra Kazagham (DMK) and All-Indian Dravida Munnetra Kazagham (AIDMK) in Tamil Nadu, and the Assam Gano Parishad in Assam. Similarly, ethnic leaders such as Lalo Prasad Yadav in Bihar, Chandrababu Naidu in Andhra, Jayalalita in Tamil Nadu, and Prafulla Mohanta in Assam have prevailed because of their appeals to fellow ethnics. Mindful of the political advantage of ethnicity, political parties nominate individuals who enjoy high standing in their ethnic constituencies. Excessive centralization and heavy-handed rule by central governments are usually behind the powerful surges of ethnic protests. A closer examination, however, suggests that centralization alone is rarely the sole reason for ethnic disaffection. More often than not, demographic pressures, as in Assam, a change in the distribution of power within an ethnic community, as in Punjab, or political competition among leaders and parties, witnessed almost everywhere else in India, can change the position of an ethnic group within India’s polity, leading to conflict. While fears of fragmentation propelled India’s National Congress leaders to adopt a largely unitary Constitution in 1950, the pulls of electorates mobilized along ethnic lines have since forced India to cede greater autonomy to linguistic regions and ethnic communities. Ethnic communities have in turn regularly organized under the banners of ethnic parties. From 1950 to the mid-1970s, India enjoyed a period marked mostly by ethnic cooperation, but from about 1975 that spirit of compromise had all but vanished. From 1980 to 1990, India was jolted by violent ethnic conflicts, several serious enough to revive fears of disintegration. Since 1990, however, with economic reforms and the growth of prosperity, the balance has again tilted in favor of unity and accommodation.
The Management of Ethnic Conflict During the last years of the British Raj and in the tragic year after partition in 1947, Hindu-Muslim-Sikh violence claimed the lives of more than a million people, and Indian leaders became extremely wary of separatist demands. The Constitution was therefore designed to balance the overriding need for unification against demands for autonomy. India was to be a secular federal ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
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democracy with a strong central government that had vast powers over its federal units, especially in the event of local or national emergency. India’s Constitution did not define the criteria by which India’s federal units were to be created. Originally, however, the federation was to be divided on the basis of administrative efficiency. The first reaction to the administrative federation began in South India’s Telugu-speaking Andhra with the demand for a linguistically defined Andhra province in 1952. Other large and numerically dominant ethnolinguistic groups soon followed, and by 1954, ethnic agitation had spread far and wide. In 1956 Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s government finally agreed to reorganize the Indian federation along ethno-linguistic lines. Problems remained, however, in areas that could not be neatly divided into separable ethnic spaces, such as the provinces of Bombay and Punjab. Northern Bombay, with its Gujarati majority, emerged as Gujarat in 1958; the rest of that province, with Bombay as its capital, became Maharashtra state, with a Maratha-speaking majority. The stories of ethnic conflict in Kashmir, Assam, Tamil Nadu, Darjeeling (Nepalis demanding Gorkhaland), Nagaland, Mizoram, and Manipur are too long and complex to be told here. We may, however, examine a couple to understand how various conditions combined together to create ethnic conflict. The province of Punjab consisted of Sikhs and Hindus, who both spoke Punjabi but worshiped at separate temples. This religious distinctiveness was exploited by ethnic leaders in each community. The Nehru government refused the demand for a separate Sikh Punjabi Suba (province) on the grounds that in secular India, religion could not be the basis for federal division. The Shiromani Akali Dal Party, which represented Sikhs demanding autonomy, subsequently abandoned the religious argument and claimed an autonomous Punjab state on the basis of language alone. In 1965 Indira Gandhi, the third prime minister of India, proposed the creation of three new states out of India’s existing Punjab: Harayana, Punjab, and Himachal Pradesh. The national Parliament, in which the Congress Party commanded a majority, promptly obliged. In the new Punjab, the Sikhs were a majority, but that numerical advantage did not translate into political dominance, which the Akali Dal leaders most coveted, since a substantial segment of the Sikh community continued to vote for the Congress Party. The Congress Party’s dominance in Punjab was based on putting together a winning alliance between Punjab’s Hindus and Sikhs, including the poor, lower caste farmers, and urban Sikhs. However, by the late 1970s, the political economy of Punjab had changed dramatically. A whole new class of peasant proprietors had emerged to take power in the Akali Dal. Economic changes brought Congress’s dominance to an end in Punjab, but Congress was unwilling to surrender Punjab to its rival, the Akali Dal. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
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The tensions between the two parties mounted to dangerous levels of violence. The Akalis led demonstrations and strikes, and passed their famous Anandpur Sahib Resolution of 1973, which demanded that Punjab be given autonomous jurisdiction over all subjects except foreign policy, defense, and currency. Changes in government at the center in 1977 temporarily defused the tensions, but they resurfaced in 1979, when the Congress Party and Indira Gandhi were reelected. The forces that had paralyzed Punjab previously—intensifying party competition, religious extremism, and tensions between the central government and the province—soon plunged the province into violence. This time the struggle revolved around Jairnal Singh Bhindranwale, an obscure Sikh preacher pushed into the limelight by Delhi’s Congress leaders with the purpose of splitting the Akali Dal. Bhindranwale soon gained enough Sikh support to abandon his erstwhile Congress sponsors, demanding the creation of Khalistan (Land of the Pure), a separate Sikh state where Sikhs could live without fear of Hindu dominance. The armed confrontation between Delhi’s government and Amritsar’s Sikh insurgents led to several tragic events: the assault on the Golden Temple, the holiest of all Sikh shrines, in June 1984; the death of Bhindranwale and his followers as well as many troops; and the subsequent assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi by two of her own Sikh bodyguards on 31 October 1984. Rajiv Gandhi, Indira’s older son, succeeded his mother as prime minister, then signed an agreement with Sikh Sant Harchand Singh Longowal, the Akali leader who had been marginalized by the militants. But Longowal was assassinated within months of the agreement, and Punjab was again plunged into prolonged militancy. It was not until 1992 that elections could be held in Punjab, and gradually normal political activity returned peace to Punjab. The erosion of the Congress Party’s dominance in Delhi, however, accounted for that turn of events, as the new ruling coalition, led by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), incorporated Punjab’s Akali Dal into its fold. Ethnic conflicts in Kashmir and the Northeast region can be traced to many of the same factors: arbitrary centralization of power in Congress’s quest for dominance; denial of political autonomy; and the rise of nativist, ethnic, and religious tensions in response to intensifying competition for economic and political opportunities. All were a result of modernization, uneven economic growth, and party competition. There are nevertheless important differences among them. Assam and the Northeast were poorly integrated, first into the British Raj, and later into independent India, and were populated by many hill tribes that had a distinctive culture from that of the plains of Assam. The first tribes to break with Assam and to demand autonomy were the Nagas. 43
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Once the Nagas were given a state, others with equally distinctive cultures and languages could no longer be denied. Between 1972 and 1987, the original province of Assam was divided into seven separate federal states. These measures brought temporary respite from ethnic violence in the Northeast region. In the Northeast, as well as in Kashmir, there is an added element that has aggravated tensions and increased conflict: interference by neighboring states into what India regarded as its domestic affairs. Pakistan had tried repeatedly in the first four decades to infiltrate and rouse Kashmiri masses against India, but such efforts were not well received on the Indian side of the cease-fire line (now called the Line of Control). This situation changed after 1989, when the National Conference government of Farooq Abdullah collapsed and Kashmir was plunged deeper into turmoil and violence. Militant Kashmiris found ready help in terms of arms and money, training, and safe sanctuaries across the line in Pakistan and returned to attack Indian army troops in Kashmir. The nature of the struggle in Kashmir in the 1990s has, however, changed with the rise of militant Islamic fundamentalism in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The conflict in Kashmir is no longer just about Kashmiri independence or autonomy; it is caught up in the wider struggle between Islamic fundamentalists and the governments of Pakistan and India. Naga separatism was similarly supported first by China. But such support is not in every instance provided by hostile governments. There are regional bazaars in arms where aspiring groups can purchase lethal weapons. Smuggling in drug, gold, arms, and contraband goods is yet another source of money to finance violent activities. In some instances it is difficult to draw the line between crime and an ethnic “cause.” This is evident in the evolution of the United Front for Liberation of Assam (ULFA). By 1986 ULFA had established contacts with agents of Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), as well as with militants from the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) and the Kachin Independence Army (KIA). With roughly only an estimated 3,000 armed militants, ULFA created terror in the state, disrupting communications, hitting various economic targets, kidnapping prominent businessmen, and killing government officials. Its activities escalated, reaching unprecedented heights in 1990. As the former government of Assam lost control, the state was brought under President’s rule from Delhi in November 1990, and ULFA was banned. Ethnic violence, from Kashmir and Punjab in the north and west, to Darjeeling in the east and Tamil Nadu in the south, has made it difficult to distinguish between political motivations and criminal purpose in any corner of troubled India. 44
The emergence of coalition governments and the demise of Congress Party dominance, and the relationship between ethnic nationalism and pan-Indian nationalism, have undergone a sea change. Coalition governments at the center brought direct and immediate access to national power and patronage for ethnic leaders and their cohorts. In fact, there are growing concerns in India’s media and press over the perceived weakness of the central government and its inability to withstand local pressures and policy compromises that benefit only politically stronger regional leadership. Ethnic leaders have used newly found powers to make and break governments at the center. In 1999 the BJP government collapsed when Tamil Nadu’s leader, Jayalalita, pulled her AIDMK Party from the ruling coalition. There are new tensions in Nagaland and Manipur as well as Assam. Violence has claimed thousands of lives in Kashmir, while Hindu-Muslim riots in Gujarat and Mumbai have become fairly routine. This suggests that, while power sharing between India’s various nationalities is critical for internal peace, that alone will not eliminate ethnic conflict. An increasingly important condition for social harmony is justice and governance. In India today, poor governance and the maldistribution of resources and employment opportunities have become potent causes of ethnic disaffection. Maya Chadda See also Amritsar; Assam; Bengal; Bihar; Congress Party; Ethnic Peace Accords; Gujarat; Insurgency and Terrorism; Kashmir; Manipur; Mizoram; Nagas and Nagaland; Northeast States, The; Paramilitary Forces and Internal Security; Sikh Institutions and Parties
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Basu, Amrita, and Atul Kohli, eds. Community Conflict and State in India. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998. Brass, Paul. Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison. New Delhi: Sage, 1991. Chadda, Maya. Ethnicity Security and Separatism in India. New York: Columbia Univeristy Press, 1997. ———. Building Democracy in South Asia: India, Pakistan and Nepal. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2000. De Silva, K. M., and S. W. R. de A. Samarasinghe, eds. Peace Accords and Ethnic Conflict. New York: Pinter, 1993. Ganguly, Sumit. The Crisis in Kashmir: Portents of War, Hopes of Peace. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1997. Hazarika, Sanjoy. Strangers of the Mist: Tales of War and Peace from India’s Northeast. New Delhi: Viking, 1994. Kapur, Rajiv. Sikh Separatism: The Politics of Faith. London: Allen & Unwin, 1986. Mitra, Subrata, and Alison Lewis, eds. Subnational Movements in South Asia. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1996. Phadnis, Urmila. Ethnicity and Nation-Building in South Asia. New Delhi: Sage, 1989. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
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Subba, Thanka B. Ethnicity, State and Development: A Case Study of Gorkhaland Movement in Darjeeling. New Delhi: Har Anand, 1992. Taras, Raymond, and Rajat Ganguly. Understanding Ethnic Conflict: The International Dimension. New York: Longman, 2002.
leadership. The remaining four ethnic movements (in Tripura, Assam, Manipur, and Nagaland) are continuing. Concerning the Tripura conflict, the Delhi central government signed two failed peace accords; both the Assamese and Manipuri conflicts have not thus far seen a peace process; and protracted negotiations are underway to end the conflict in Nagaland.
ETHNIC PEACE ACCORDS In the postindependence period, resolution of ethnic conflicts, as a part of a nation-building strategy, has been a daunting task of Indian leadership. Out of nine major ethnic conflicts faced by the country over a period of five decades, six were secessionist and three pertained to autonomy. The secessionist movements occurred in the states of Punjab, Tamil Nadu, Assam, Nagaland, Mizoram, and Manipur; the autonomy demand was made by the Bodos (Assam), Gorkhas (West Bengal), and Tripuris (Tripura). The underlying causes of these conflicts were rooted in the manifold grievances of the ethnic groups. For some, forcible territorial integration in the wake of decolonization has been the main issue. Some others have feared cultural assimilation engineered by the dominant groups in their region. The denial of equal socioeconomic and political rights has remained another reason, and some groups have felt powerless in the face of the hegemonic tendency of the central government. In all conflicts, either the perceived or real grievances of the ethnic groups and the nature of the state’s response determined the conflict goals. Every conflict turned violent, though the intensity varied. While the Punjab conflict witnessed collective violence against the Sikhs in 1984, as many as five conflicts in Nagaland, Mizoram, Assam, and Punjab attained the dimension of an internal war—a situation marked by continuous and prolonged military engagement between the insurgents and government security forces.
Failed Accords
Yet violence has been an important factor in peace processes, and India has used coercion in pursuit of peacemaking, with mixed results. All the nine major peace accords were reached in six conflicts; in three other conflicts—in Tamil Nadu, Assam, and Manipur—there have been no political negotiations. Three conflicts involving the Tripuris, Bodos, and Mizos have thus had two peace accords each. The government has always preferred to negotiate first with the moderate leaders; only after the failure of those talks would the government negotiate with the militant leadership. Two conflicts (involving the Mizos and Gorkhas) have so far ended in political settlement; it is likely that the Bodo conflict will be added to this list if the violent opposition to the 2003 peace accord is neutralized. Conflicts in Punjab and Tamil Nadu have ended in military suppression or coercion by the government, although, in the case of Punjab, it signed a peace accord with the moderate Sikh ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
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Six out of nine ethnic peace accords have failed. The first such accord was signed on 11 November 1975 between five representatives of a breakaway Naga group (the Revolutionary Government of Nagaland) and Nagaland governor L. P. Singh. Constant military pressure by the Indian forces and growing dissidence facilitated this accord. Popularly known as the Shillong Accord, it did not intend to redress the Nagas’ grievances but to end the conflict by seeking the rebels’ surrender, the precondition for reaching a final negotiated political settlement. The operative clauses of the accord stated that the representatives of the underground organizations accepted the Indian Constitution and agreed to surrender their arms—details of which were worked out under a supplementary agreement on 5 January 1976. It set a twentyday deadline for the arms surrender and created peace camps for housing the surrendered militants. Subsequently, a large number of detainees were released. The accord did not restore peace, because only a small section of the Naga leadership participated in the talks. Most Nagas considered the agreement an unequal deal, which the government had negotiated from a position of military strength. The antiaccord forces consolidated themselves under two new militant factions of the Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland. Thus, since the 1970s, India’s government has faced formidable opposition forces while trying to negotiate peace. The Mizo Accord came second in the series of failed peace accords. Signed on 18 February 1976, between India’s government and Mizo National Front (MNF) chief Laldenga, it was similar to the Shillong Accord. It secured the MNF leadership’s acknowledgment of Mizoram as an integral part of India as well as their desire to find a political solution within the framework of the Indian Constitution. However, there was no mention of the specific solution the government was willing to offer. The MNF agreed to ensure an end to the violence by its military wing—the Mizo National Army (MNA)—and to collect the underground cadres with their arms, placing them in camps run with government help. On its part, the government was to declare a suspension of military operations, but only after the rebels stopped their activities. As expected, the accord stimulated internal bickering in the MNF, whose members refused to surrender 45
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Naga Leaders. Thingaleng Muivah (left) with Isaac Chisi Swu prepare to meet then Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee on Indian soil after three decades in exile. Officials hope the talks will pave the way for a peaceful settlement of an insurgency that has haunted northeast India since independence in 1947. INDIA TODAY.
any arms. Laldenga was isolated in the organization and found his support failing in the Mizo Hills. At the same time, he was under pressure from the government to implement the accord. In 1978 violence erupted, and the government responded with full military operations. The Punjab Accord, signed on 24 July 1985, was different in two ways. First, it was entered into with the moderate Sikh leadership while the militants were actively involved in armed campaigns. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi himself was a signatory. The Akali Dal leader, H. S. Longowal, represented the Sikhs. Second, it tried to address some of the political grievances of the Sikhs. Its main thrust was to satisfy their territorial aspirations, as well as their desire for autonomy. It was agreed that Chandigarh, the shared capital of Punjab and Haryana, would be given to Punjab. In return, Punjab would transfer some of its Hindi-speaking areas to Haryana. Regarding the autonomy demand, the government was to refer 46
that issue to the Sarkaria Commission, set up to make recommendations on center-state relations. The accord also stipulated that the river water dispute between Punjab and Haryana would be referred to a tribunal headed by a Supreme Court judge. While the government considered the accord a sincere attempt at reconciliation with the Sikh community, the agreement evoked protests from many militant Sikh leaders, who bitterly opposed the Akali Dal’s cooperation with the Indian government. Intense violence ensued, including the assassination of Longowal by Khalistani Sikhs on 20 August 1985, during his election campaign. Soon after, the accord itself expired, as the government embarked on a comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy to crush the Khalistani militants. Two accords (in 1988 and 1993) to end the conflict in Tripura met similar fates. The trilateral accord of August 1988 involving the central and state governments and Tripura’s Tribal National Volunteers. The militant ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
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organization agreed to end all underground activities; the Indian government promised to extend resettlement facilities, increase tribal representation in the legislature through reservations, to protect tribal interests in land alienation, and to develop agricultural and irrigation facilities in tribal areas. The failure of the accord may be attributed not only to opposition within the militant movement, leading to the rise of splinter groups to carry on the fight, but also to political differences between the central and state governments over its implementation. It took about five more years for the government to coerce, through sustained military operations, another group— the Tripura Tribal Force—to negotiate an accord. Interestingly, the 1993 accord incorporated most of the provisions of the earlier accord. Additionally, it provided some safeguards to protect Tripura tribal culture. As soon as that accord was signed, however, another group of disgruntled leaders began a new armed movement, which continues to shatter Tripura’s “peace” as a low-intensity conflict. The movement for Bodoland presented a similar picture until 2003. The first accord signed between the Assam government and moderate Bodo leadership in February 1993 did not work. Though the accord provided limited autonomy to the Bodos under an autonomous council covering some two thousand villages and twenty-five tea gardens, a section of them remained dissatisfied because of the exclusion of areas lying on the southern bank of the Brahmaputra River, as well as rejection of their demand for a full-fledged state within the Indian union. Dissident militant groups—the Bodo Security Force (BSF) and the Bodo Liberation Tigers (BLT)—took advantage of the general discontent to continue their armed struggle amid heavy military pressure from Indian security forces.
Successful Accords Two accords have been successful; a third is likely to be the 2003 Bodo Accord. The Mizo, Bodo, and Gorkha leaders have accepted negotiated peace settlements only after they found military engagements futile. The strategy in the Mizoram conflict was to use military pressure to bring the MNF to the negotiating table, so the central government held peace parleys even after the breakdown of the 1976 accord. The talks became protracted due to the intransigence of the MNF, but the government capitalized on the military weakness of the MNA to reach a deal. Once the local population and religious leaders threw their weight behind the peace process, the MNF chief was forced to sign the Mizo Accord in 1986. A step forward from the 1976 accord, it separated the political solution from the immediate surrender of arms. However, the MNF ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
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agreed to bring out, within the agreed time limit, all underground personnel, along with their arms and ammunition. The government offered political concessions, such as conferment of statehood on Mizoram and constitutional guarantees for the religious and social practices of the Mizos. An enhanced allocation of central resources was assured as a special case. The accord generated positive responses from Mizo tribal society. The MNF joined the political mainstream; enduring peace returned to Mizoram—now the most peaceful state in northeast India. The same can be said about the Gorkhaland Accord of August 1988. The central government, which had been a signatory in the Mizo Accord, in this case merely mediated the accord between the state of West Bengal and the Gorkha National Liberation Front (GNLF). What made the accord possible was the compromise the GNLF made, under military pressure, regarding its original goal: it was prepared to give up its demand for a separate Gorkha state (within the Indian Union) and instead accepted the formation of a Hill Council in the Darjeeling district. Though peace returned to the district, the accord did not fully satisfy all leaders of the GNLF, whose desire for statehood is still articulated, though nonviolently. The latest peace accord pertains to the Bodo conflict. This is the second accord to be reached on the same conflict within a ten-year period. While the 1993 accord was signed between the state government of Assam and the moderate Bodo leaders in the presence of a representative of the central government, the February 2003 accord was a trilateral one, directly involving as signatories the central and state governments and the BLT, which had been formed in opposition to the 1993 accord. The 2003 accord has created an autonomous self-governing body, the Bodoland Territorial Council (BTC), within the state of Assam. The council’s jurisdiction is spread over 3,082 villages; additional villages can also be included if all three signatories agree. The BTC enjoys protection under the Sixth Schedule of the Indian Constitution. In addition, there are guarantees of accelerated infrastructure development in Bodoland; the fulfillment of the economic, educational, and linguistic aspirations of the Bodos; and the preservation of their land rights and ethnic identity. The BSF, which reemerged as the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB), has opposed the accord, whose success in restoring peace depends upon either defeating the NDFB or coercing it to join the political mainstream. As in many other countries, secessionist conflicts in India are more intractable than lesser conflicts. The only secessionist conflict to end in negotiated settlement has been the Mizo conflict, because in that case the MNF 47
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leadership has compromised, under heavy military pressure, on its original separatist goal. Ponmoni Sahadevan See also Ethnic Conflict; Insurgency and Terrorism; Paramilitary Forces and Internal Security; Tribal Politics BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bhattacharjee, Chandana. Ethnicity and Autonomy Movement: Case of Bodo-Kacharis of Assam. New Delhi: Vikas, 1996. Bhaumik, Subir. Insurgent Crossfire: North-east India. New Delhi: Lancer, 1996. Kapur, Rajiv A. Sikh Separatism: The Politics of Faith. London: Allen and Unwin, 1986. Phadnis, Urmila. Ethnicity and Nation-Building in South Asia. New Delhi: Sage, 1989. Subba, Thanka B. Ethnicity, State, and Development: A Case Study of Gorkhaland Movement in Darjeeling. New Delhi: Har-Anand, 1992. Verghese, B. G. India’s Northeast Resurgent: Ethnicity, Insurgency, Governance, Development. New Delhi: Konark, 1996.
EUROPEAN UNION, RELATIONS WITH India and the European Union (EU) have shared historical links, political institutions, and a liberal ethos. India’s independence and the initiation of the efforts to achieve regional cooperation in Europe both began shortly after World War II. India was among the first countries to recognize the then six-member European Economic Community (EEC), a precursor of the EU. Since then, India has enjoyed many areas of convergence with the EU, ranging from social and cultural relations to economic and political matters. Still, there are many problematic areas of divergence on which both parties will have to work diligently to ensure future cooperation.
Overview of Relations The table below reflects the slow progression in EUIndia relations. After an initial period of stabilization and cautious foreign relations, India established formal diplomatic relations with the EEC in 1963. Besides historical ties, the values of democracy and pluralism were significant promoters of this relationship. With India’s policy of nonalignment, this relationship was peripheral during the cold war. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi fully realized the potential significance of economic, cultural, and political cooperation with Western Europe. She was successful in evolving bilateral relations with France and former West Germany, but these agreements were country specific and could not reach the wider European community. The first major economic assistance came in 1970 when the EU contributed 147 million euros to the Operation 48
Flood Programme for dairy development in India. In 1973, India and the EEC signed their first Agreement on Commercial Cooperation. In 1971, India was included in the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) program of the EEC. Another Agreement for Five-Year Economic and Commercial Cooperation was signed in 1981. The evolution of the European Community as a political organization thus led to the establishment of closer political and trade relations with India. It was agreed formally to institute an India-EEC Political Dialogue with the establishment of the EEC delegation in New Delhi in 1983. Despite of all these developments, the bilateral relationship remained limited to certain economic areas. The end of the cold war era placed both India and the EEC in a new environment without ideological barriers. The EEC was formally transformed into the European Community (EC) under the Treaty of European Union (EU), which took effect on 1 November 1993, leading to deeper political and economic integration of the European nations. The EU also moved toward the adoption of a common currency and common foreign and security policies. In 1991 India also started implementing its economic deregulation and liberalization program, emerging as a major economic player in the global market, with a huge potential for investment. As a giant in information technology (IT), India provided additional impetus for the improvement of bilateral relations based on complementary interests. India’s first comprehensive agreement with the EU came into force in August 1994, with the signing of their Cooperation Agreement between the European Community and the Republic of India on Partnership and Development. That agreement covered issues that included respect for human rights and democratic principles; development and diversification of trade and investment; cooperation on technical, economic, and cultural matters; sustainable social progress and poverty alleviation; and support for environmental protection and sustainable development. Concrete steps toward these objectives were clearly stated in a communication approved by the council of the commission on EUIndia Enhanced Partnership in 1996. The same year, India’s Trade and Investment Forum was held in Brussels, jointly chaired by EC vice president Manual Marin and Indian minister of commerce B. B. Ramaiah. Indian minister for external affairs Jaswant Singh’s visit to Brussels in 1999 was another landmark in strengthening relations. Meanwhile, India-EU political dialogue was elevated to the Foreign Ministerial level and institutionalized through the Troika mechanism, comprising of the current EU presidency, the succeeding president and the previous president. The EU-Troika started holding annual talks with India on major bilateral and ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
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LANDMARKS IN INDIA–EU RELATIONS Year 1963 1971 1981 1983 1988 1992 1993
1994 1996
1999 2000 2001
2002
2003
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Event India establishes diplomatic relations with the European Economic Community (EEC). EEC includes India in the countries of general tariff preferences under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) program. India and the EEC sign a five-year Commercial and Economic Cooperation agreement (16 November). EEC delegation in India established in New Delhi. EC–India Joint Commission Meeting held (March). Indian and European businesspeople launch a joint initiative, Joint Business Forum (October). EC and India sign Joint Political Statement, simultaneously, with the Cooperation Agreement on Partnership and Development (20 December), effective from 1 August 1994. Setting up of Technology Information Center (TIC) in New Delhi. Commission adopts the communication on EU–India Enhanced Partnership (26 June), approved by the council on 6 December. EU–India Economic Cross-Cultural program is launched (26 November). European Parliament endorses the commission’s Communication on “EU–India Enhanced Partnership” (12 March). The first EU–India summit is held in Lisbon (28 June); the joint declaration emphasizes a strategic partnership to cover economy, trade, security, and democracy. The second EU–India summit is held in New Delhi (23 November). A joint communiqué issued after the summit focuses on an Agenda for Action for developing the full potential for bilateral partnership and addresses issues pertaining to global challenges. A Declaration against Terrorism, the EU–India Vision Statement on Information Technology, and the EU-India Agreement on Science and Technology are the highlights. The European Commission presents Country Strategy Paper 2002–2006 for India, which aims to chart out the course for development and economic cooperation between India and the EU. The third EU–India summit is held in Copenhagen to review the progress in bilateral relations (10 October). EU Troika meets Indian foreign ministers in Athens (11 January). EU Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy visits India on 13–14 March to discuss bilateral trade issues as well as the World Trade Organization’s negotiations under the Doha Development Agenda with the Indian leaders. EU Cultural Weeks 2003 organized in New Delhi, Bangalore, Chennai, Kolkata, Mumbai, and Chandigarh (22 November–4 December). The fourth EU–India Summit was held in New Delhi, India, on 29 November. Pluralism, democracy, the multipolar world and reconstruction of Afghanistan and Iraq also became the important points of discussion in the summit. EU Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy visits India on 19 January to enhance trade ties with the EU and to boost the WTO negotiations under the Doha Development Agenda. EU Commissioner for External Relations Chris Patten visits India on 16 February for a series of EU Ministerial Troika(1) meetings. The troika is led by the Irish minister of foreign affairs, Brian Cowen, accompanied by the Dutch minister for foreign affairs, Dr. Bernard R. Bot. Commission communication on “EU–India Strategic Partnership” of June 2004. The fifth summit between the EU and India was held in the Hague, the Netherlands, on 8 November. The focus of this summit was rich and diversified cultural traditions and the Action Plan for Strategic Partnership. The list was compiled with the help of Milestones in EU–India Relations, available at and bilateral documents available at the site of Ministry of External Affairs, India,
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international issues. European commissioner for trade Pascal Lamy visited Mumbai and New Delhi in 2000, which led to the first EU-India summit that year. That summit was held in Lisbon on 28 June 2000, and wide-ranging issues of political, economic, developmental, and environmental significance were discussed. The Joint Summit Declaration further ensured such summit meetings of foreign ministers every year to examine all impediments to trade and investment in India, with a view to removing them. The second summit convened in New Delhi on 23 November 2001, focusing on strategic and international issues. Its Agenda for Action was a joint statement on international terrorism, with both sides agreeing to help one another in facing the current international situation, with specific reference to Afghanistan and Pakistan. Initiatives on the economic front were striking. Some of the economic landmarks included a joint statement regarding trade and investment, the signing of an agreement on scientific and technological cooperation, and the adoption of a statement on information technology. The third EU-India summit met in Copenhagen on 10 October 2002, reviewing the challenges and possible responses in areas of regional and global peace, the integration of developing countries into the global economy, and issues related to civil society, including poverty alleviation, health care, and education. EU Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy played a very significant role in normalizing the bilateral trade issues when he visited India on 13–14 March 2003. The fourth EU-India summit was held in New Delhi, India, on 29 November 2003. Besides pluralism, democracy, and the multipolar world, both sides have reiterated their commitments toward strengthening the role of the United Nations (UN) in the maintenance of international peace and security, the common fight against terrorism and transborder crimes, and the UN Convention on Climate Change. In the changed global context, intense cooperation to promote peace, stability, and reconstruction of Afghanistan and Iraq also became the important points of discussion in the summit. The fifth summit between the EU and India was held in the Hague, the Netherlands, on 8 November 2004. The focus of this summit was rich and diversified cultural traditions enjoyed by both sides. There was an agreement to work toward the elaboration of a specific chapter on cultural cooperation within the EU-India Action Plan for Strategic Partnership. Successful conclusion of the Customs Co-operation, progress in the negotiations on Maritime Agreement and strategic dialogue on the Information Society was reviewed. The EU-India Action Plan for Strategic Partnership was also drawn in this summit, focusing on the regional and international dimensions of fight against terrorism. 50
Areas of Convergence Sociocultural cooperation. The vast English-speaking and technologically skilled population of India, along with the interest of European scholars in studies pertaining to Indian society and culture, forms the basis of sociocultural ties between India and the EU. After their first summit at Lisbon, a think-tank network and an India-EU Round Table were established to discuss social and civil issues. The first EU-India think-tank seminar declared that the EU and India share common goals in the battle against poverty and the welfare of marginalized sections of society. An EU-India Economic Cross Cultural Programme (ECCP) was initiated, with the overall objective of strengthening and enhancing civil society links and crosscultural cooperation through dialogue between European and Indian media and cultural organizations and by supporting educational and cultural activities. The European Union Film Festival held in New Delhi (6–13 October) and Kolkata (19–25 October) 2000, on the theme of “The City,” and the parallel conference on “Cities of Tomorrow” demonstrated mutual concerns over urban planning and sustainable development. Jawaharlal Nehru University’s European Studies Programme, with an EC support of 590,000 euros (approximately 30 million rupees), an EC contribution of 200 million euros to the Indian universal elementary education program, and attempts by scholars and the media to change stereotypical depictions of an underdeveloped India in the European media all pointed to the emergence of closer social and cultural ties.
Political and strategic concerns. At the political and strategic level, India and the EU have shared values of democracy, pluralism, commitment to multilateralism, the reformation of international organizations, and a common concern over terrorism and the protection of human rights. According to the EU-India Joint Statement on Political Dialogue adopted in 1994, both sides are committed to defending democracy, human rights, and a peaceful, stable, and just international order in accordance with the UN Charter. In the Declaration against International Terrorism made on 23 November 2001, India and the EU reiterated their commitment to cooperation against international terrorism. Science and technology. India’s inability to realize its goal of complete self-reliance, and the failure of the EU to match the United States and Japan in science and technology during the last half century, provided a foundation for bilateral cooperation in that field. The Agreement for Scientific and Technological Cooperation adopted by the EU council on 25 June 2002 was based on the principle of mutual benefit and reciprocal opportunities. This agreement will enable both India and the EU to share experience and utilize each other’s technology for ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
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poverty eradication, food security, and environmental sustainability. The conferment of observer status to India at the Council of the European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN) was a sign of cordial and confident bilateral relations. Information and Communication Technology (ICT) has been another mutually beneficial area of cooperation between the EU and India, both jointly agreeing to establish the Software Service Support and Education Center at Banglore to promote India-EU joint ventures in information technology. The Joint EUIndia Vision Statement on Development of the Information Society adopted on 23 November 2001 led to the establishment of the EU-India Working Group on the Information Society, which will work toward enhancing human capacity development, knowledge creation and sharing, and training in related fields.
Trade and economy. At the first bilateral summit, low levels of trade and the need for joint efforts to increase its potential were stressed. A joint initiative was adopted, in which four sectors were specified for potential investment: food processing, engineering, telecommunications, and IT. India exports textiles, jewelry, leather goods, chemicals, and agricultural products to the EU, while India imports chemicals, engineering goods, metal products, and transportation equipment from the EU. After the process of liberalization, and thanks to multilateral trading under the auspices of the World Trade Organization (WTO), EUIndia trade increased from 9,975 million euros in 1991 to 25,032 million euros in 2001, a phenomenal growth of 150 percent. By 2003 the EU accounted for a quarter of India’s imports and exports and was the largest source of foreign direct investment. Areas of Divergence WTO. Though the WTO has brought about greater trade at the multilateral level, the historical legacy of development process has made the WTO negotiations as a point of confrontation for both the sides. As a developed market the EU is seeking greater tariff reduction and more trade facilitation while representing the interests of developing countries. India always supported tariff reduction and inclusion of larger issues within the WTO ambit only after the phased elimination of support subsidies to the farmers of the developed countries. These differences were evident in the Fifth Ministerial Conferences of the WTO at Cancun and later negotiations.
principled stand against any discriminatory approach to nuclear nonproliferation. The EU as a whole had reacted sharply and bitterly against India’s nuclear tests and expects unconditional acceptance of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which India has refused to accept. After five years of tests, it is still not clear whether India and the EU will be able to accommodate and adjust to each other’s positions on this issue.
International power relations. India and the EU have their own realistic interests and perceptions of international power relations, and their consequent behavioral differences have affected their relations. Principally, India has always perceived the EU as the shadow of the United States, while India is perceived by the EU as a strategic ally of Russia. India has, moreover, consistently opposed undemocratic practices in governing international institutions, primarily the UN, the International Monetary Fund, and the WTO. The EU is not ready to forgo the superiority built up by its members in creating these institutions. On the question of its own bilateral relations with Pakistan, India has consistently opposed the EU’s policy of collaborating with military rulers in the international war against terrorism. India has genuine concerns over the violence abetted by Pakistan in Jammu and Kashmir, the reformation of the UN and the WTO, and the regional protectionist policies of the EU in agriculture and textile sectors. At the same time, the perception of India as a strategic and business partner is still largely negative within the EU. India is considered a country with administrative impediments and unethical, nontransparent practices in trade-related matters. At the political level, India is known as a country with uncertain and inconsistent policies due to enormous domestic pressures and constraints. India will have to speed up its internal reforms in social and economic matters, while building a positive image as democratic and commercially vibrant country. It will have to review its policy of focusing only on the EU’s larger countries, like France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, while ignoring smaller countries of enormous trade potential, like Belgium, the Netherlands, and Italy. More importantly, both sides will have to transcend the historical legacy of colonialism and the inherent conflicts between developed and developing countries, and they will have to strengthen communications and institutional mechanisms to address their mutual disagreements and concerns. Prafulla Ketkar
Nuclear nonproliferation. After India’s nuclear tests
BIBLIOGRAPHY
in 1998, nuclear nonproliferation has been an issue of contention between India and the EU. The joint communiqué of the second EU-India summit reiterated “unequivocal commitment to the ultimate goal of complete elimination of nuclear weapons.” However, India has a
“EC Country Strategy Paper, India.” Available at ⬍http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/india/csp/ 02_06en.pdf⬎ “EU-India Enhanced Partnership.” COM (96) 275. Brussels: Commission of the European Communities, 26 June 1996.
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“India’s Foreign Policy: Western Europe.” Available at ⬍http://www.indianembassy.org/policy/Foreign_Policy/w euro.htm⬎ “Milestones in EU-India Relations.” Available at ⬍http://www/delind.cec.eu.int/en/political_dialogue/mile stones.htm⬎ SECONDARY SOURCES
Bhattacharya, Swapan K. “European Union’s Trade with Asia and India: Prospects in the New Millennium.” Paper presented at the international seminar on “The European Union in a Changing World,” School of International Relations, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, 6–7 September 2001. Chaturvedi, Sachin. “India, the European Union and Geographical Indications (GI): Covergence of Interests and Challenges Ahead.” Paper presented at the international seminar on “India, the European Union, and the WTO,” organized by Centre des Sciences Humaines, EC Delegation, Fundacao, Oriente, JNU European Union Studies Project, and Konrad Adenauer Foundation, at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, 16–17 October 2002. Jain, Rajendra K. “India and the European Union.” In India, Germany and European Union: Partners in Progress and Prosperity, edited by Naushad Anwar Sulaiman. Delhi: Kalinga Publication, 2002. Katyal, K. K. “Strong Case for Enhancing India-EU Relations.” Hindu, 26 November 2001. Ram, A. N. “India and the European Union.” World Focus 21, no. 5 (May 2000): 9–12. Singh, Jasjit. “India, Europe and Non-Proliferation: Pokhran II and After.” Strategic Analysis 22, no. 8 (November 1998): 1111–1122.
EXTERNAL DEBT POLICY, 1952–1990 India chronically suffered from a shortage of resources necessary to finance a rising rate of investment required to yield a growing rate of income growth. India’s planned program of economic development began in 1952, with its First Five-Year Plan. Being a low-income country, its savings were inadequate to finance investment. Its difficulties were compounded because India needed foreign exchange to supplement its domestic savings to pay for the import of goods, essential for sustaining the rising investment rate. The growth of the domestic savings rate since the 1950s was impressive, but it was not sufficient to fully support the investment required to sustain rapid growth. Foreign resources were not easily forthcoming, as India’s exports were far below its import requirements, thereby impelling it to seek foreign assistance. The balance of payments difficulties and the resultant increase in foreign indebtedness that India faced were, therefore, not a temporary phenomenon but inevitable throughout the process of development, with its calculated strategy to keep the rate of investment consistently above the rate of saving. 52
During the First Plan, 1951–1956, external assistance served two functions: it would make available adequate supplies of foreign exchange to finance imports; and it would supplement the investment resources the country could raise on its own. The balance of payments did not present problems during the First Plan period. Foreign saving as a proportion of total investment turned out to be 4.6 percent, while the external debt to gross domestic product (GDP) ratio averaged 2.05 percent during the period. The Second Plan, 1956–1961, which put greater emphasis on industrialization, entailed a larger amount of foreign exchange. Of the estimated current account deficit of 11 billion rupees during 1956–1961, 8 billion rupees was assumed to be met by external assistance. The plan, however, ran into unexpected balance of payments difficulties from the very start, and had to be reappraised in 1958, signaling a turning point in India’s external position. Stringent restrictions were imposed on less essential imports, and its own foreign exchange reserves were drawn down to the largest extent of 6 billion rupees during the Second Plan period. In addition, external assistance of the order of 8.72 billion rupees was provided in the public as well as private sectors, besides commodity imports of 5.34 billion rupees under the commodity assistance program and borrowings from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) of 55 billion rupees. The external debt/GDP ratio increased to 8.06 percent during the Second Plan period. The Third Plan, 1961–1966, reflected some rethinking in India’s external financing strategy, highlighting self-sustaining growth as a major goal. While it envisaged that normal capital flows would continue, it set out the contours of the concept of self-reliance. The main elements of this concept were import substitution, with the expansion of capital goods and infrastructure industries on a scale that would enable the country to produce domestically the bulk of capital goods and machinery as well as consumer goods, and a well-defined export strategy. It therefore called for the maximum rate of investment and a change in its structure so as to secure an increase in national income of over 5 percent per annum. Accordingly, gross external assistance of 32 billion rupees was allowed for the Third Plan period, with the assistance net of repayments and liabilities arising from Public Law 480 (PL 480) imports and loans to the private sector being around 22 billion rupees. The Third Plan projection, however, went awry, partly because of its unrealistic nature and misconceived domestic and macroeconomic and foreign exchange policies, and partly because of the Indo-Pakistani hostilities that broke out in 1965. The same policy was continued during the Fourth Plan (1969–1974), more or less, with additional emphasis ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
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on doing away with concessional imports of food grains under the commodity assistance program by 1971. The goal was to reduce net foreign aid to one-half the Third Plan level. External debt to GDP ratio was 13.6 percent during the Fourth Plan. The Fifth Plan (1974–1979) strategy was based on massive exports growth and on containing imports. By the time the plan was adopted, however, the scenario had changed. Owing to a hike in oil prices and a sharp increase in the import prices of certain other important commodities, like fertilizers and food grains, the size of external assistance was pushed up to over 58 billion rupees from the original estimate of about 24 billion rupees. External debt to GDP ratio averaged 13.4 percent during this plan period.
29.2 percent, it was lower than that of Mexico (36.9 percent) and Indonesia (66.4 percent) but higher than Brazil’s 28.8 percent. The vulnerability of the Indian economy by the end of 1990 was reflected in large debt service payments on its huge stock of external debt. India’s debt service ratio in 1991, at 30.6 percent, was nearly equal to Brazil’s 30.8 percent and Mexico’s 30.9 percent and was higher than the average of 27.6 per cent for the moderately indebted low income countries group.
India’s Approach to External Debt Policy
The current account deficit of 29 percent during this period, which was widening rapidly, was financed by way of external assistance from multilateral and bilateral donors, 24 percent by commercial borrowings, 23 percent through nonresident deposits under the Foreign Currency Non Resident Account plan and Non Resident External Rupee Account, about 13 percent from other capital transactions, and the remaining by a draw-down of foreign currency reserves. External debt to GDP ratio as a result doubled to 30 percent, with foreign savings as a proportion of investment reaching 11.2 percent.
Until the beginning of the Fifth Plan, there was almost total reliance on official, especially multilateral flows, mainly on concessional terms and recourse to IMF facilities to meet extraordinary situations such as the drought of the 1960s and the oil shocks of the early and late 1970s. Thus, until the 1980s, external financing was confined to external assistance, mostly on concessional terms. The plan strategy was interventionist and biased against exports. This was an era of perpetual foreign exchange shortage, and foreign resources to a developing country like India, where reliance continued to be on external borrowings, was not easily forthcoming. The policy was to approach the developed countries and the World Bank group with an accent on soft terms of interest and other conditions governing loan repayment. In terms of multilateral financing, the relationship with the World Bank and its soft loan window, the International Development Association (IDA), evolved since the beginning of planning. Until 1979 IDA loans formed between 70 to 80 percent of loans from the World Bank group. These loans were at highly concessional rates and for very long maturities. Between 1980 and 1990, the World Bank loan component increased to about 50 percent of the total loans from the World Bank group, of which India was the largest debtor. Since 1958 the World Bank organized the Aid-to-India consortium, consisting of the World Bank group and thirteen other countries (Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, the former West Germany, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States). The consortium was formed to coordinate aid and establish priorities among the major sources of foreign assistance. Consortium aid was bilateral governmentto-government, and the loans from the World Bank group were loans given for specific projects.
India was the fourth-largest debtor (after Brazil, Mexico, and Indonesia) among developing countries at the end of March 1991. India’s total outstanding external debt, including the use of IMF credit and short-term credit, stood at U.S.$71.6 billion at the end of March 1991, steadily increasing from about $8.9 billion in 1971. In terms of the share of total outstanding debt in GNP at
The trends in external debt reflected the evolution of external debt policy during the plan periods. Until the end of the 1960s, the composition of India’s external debt was characterized by the predominance of long-term public and publicly guaranteed debt. Bilateral debt comprised about 75 percent of the total debt, while multilateral debt accounted for about 20 percent. The 1970s
The Sixth Plan (1980–1985) also saw a major change in the pattern of foreign borrowings, which until the end of the 1970s had contained a bulk of concessional foreign assistance. First, nonconcessional flows accounted for a growing proportion of official borrowings. Second, direct borrowings by financial institutions and the private sector grew substantially, unlike in the previous period of planned development. These factors, combined with outstanding borrowings from the IMF and nonresident Indian (NRI) deposits (transfer of funds by Indians living outside India) raised substantially the average cost of foreign debt, and consequently the external debt to GDP ratio spurted up to 15.5 percent. The situation did not improve during the Seventh Plan period (1985–1990). An increase in imports from hard currency areas; diversion of a substantial part of India’s exports to Eastern European, Soviet-dominated countries with nonconvertible currencies; and a shift to high cost commercial debt sharply increased India’s hard currency external debt.
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saw a shift in the composition of the official debt with the share of bilateral debt progressively reduced to about 50 percent. There was a shift from the official debt toward borrowings from private sources during the 1980s. The composition of official debt itself changed, with the share of bilateral debt decreasing sharply. As a consequence of the above two developments, the terms of borrowing, including maturity, interest rate, and the grace period, turned harder. Short-term debt increased during the latter half of the 1980s. Commercial borrowings accelerated, particularly during the latter half of the 1980s. This increased the cost of debt and reduced the average maturities of the debt portfolio. “Scarce” foreign exchange was also sought through a number of nonresident deposit plans, which offered higher rates of interest relative to prevailing international rates and, in addition, exchange guarantees. This change in strategy proved to be unsustainable toward the end of the 1980s, and in 1990, when the Gulf oil crisis erupted, the government was unable to roll over the short-term debt and commercial borrowings, which coincided with withdrawal of “hot” NRI deposits, which had initially flown in to take advantage of arbitrage in interest rates. India went into a crisis in August 1991 and resorted to use of IMF resources. Since 1991, its debt policy also changed, with de-emphasis on debt-creating flows and greater focus on
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nondebt creating investment flows, that is, equity. Even among debt flows, limits were imposed on commercial borrowings and within more stringent limits on shortterm debt. The high interest and exchange-guaranteed nonresident deposits were dismantled. The current NRI deposits offer interest rates around prevailing international rates, and the exchange rate risk is being borne by the depositor. Since the mid-1990s, India has surpassed the era of chronic foreign exchange shortages. India now has a strong economy, which attracts foreign capital—shortand long-term, equity and debt funds—under market determined conditions. A. Prasad See also Capital Market; Economic Reforms of 1991; Foreign Resources Inflow since 1991 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Government of India. Five Year Plan Documents. Delhi: GOI, 1951–1990. Kapur, Munish. “India’s External Sector since Independence: From Inwardness to Openness.” Reserve Bank of India Occasional Papers, vol. 18, nos. 2–3, June and September 1997.
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f FAMILY LAW AND CULTURAL PLURALISM India’s family laws, also called personal or customary laws, govern features of family life such as marriage, separation, divorce and its consequences, maintenance for children and other dependents, inheritance, adoption, and guardianship. Independent India retained many aspects of the plural family law system of the British colonial period as a means of cultural accommodation within its multicultural society, especially concerning the accommodation of Muslims. Different family laws govern India’s major religious groups—Hindus, Muslims, Christians, Parsis, and Jews—as well as many tribal peoples. Hindu family law also governs those who follow religions of South Asian origin, such as Sikhism and Jainism. Indian legal pluralism is in tension with the secular commitments of the Indian state, and with the constitutional aim to promote gender equality as the various family law systems uphold unequal gender relations. India’s political elite attempted to resolve these tensions in the first decade after independence, through the partial homogenization and reform of Hindu law, the introduction of optional marriage laws in a Special Marriage Act and a constitutional commitment to introduce a uniform civil code to govern all Indians. These policy choices restricted the state’s social engineering, however, to Hindu law. They appeared likely to limit efforts to promote gender equality through legal change, particularly through changes in the laws governing the religious minorities as such changes were supposedly left to the initiative of unspecified representatives of these groups, who in practice were often conservative religious and political elites. The price of Indian legal pluralism reflects the problems seen in most multicultural arrangements, in which laws justified in terms of enabling cultural pluralism do not necessarily reflect group norms or ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
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practices. The scope for legal change is limited even if citizens demand changes in gender-biased group laws. Complete legal pluralism involves the application of distinct laws to different cultural groups in all areas of social life, adjudication by distinctive community courts, and a lack of reference to common principles (such as those recognized by international human rights law or national constitutions) in making and implementing law. Where religious groups are the social units to which distinctive laws apply, religious leaders, religious scholars, and priests are the main or sole agents of lawmaking and adjudication. Legal pluralism is only partial in India in many respects. The laws governing Indians are uniform, other than those concerning family life. Indian judiciaries, largely trained in Western legal traditions, are the main agents of adjudication in all disputes brought to state courts. Aside from the state’s judiciary, different religious and cultural groups have their own community leaders who act as adjudicative agents, the community institutions involved in adjudication include Hindu caste associations, Muslim prayer groups (jamaats), and local Christian churches and Parsi temples. Individual religious figures, caste leaders, and popularly recognized informal judges also adjudicate family disputes. The complex nature of Indian legal pluralism provides some room for changes in family law, even while impeding rapid transformation. Over the last generation, Parliament changed the provisions governing all Indians for the prohibition of dowry, and for maintenance payments to indigent women upon separation or divorce. It made divorce easier for Hindus and Christians, including on grounds of mutual consent. Some state legislatures gave daughters the right to demand the partition of ancestral property so that they could access their shares, equal to those of sons, that the law assures them. 55
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Prompted by the growth of public interest litigation, especially since the “National Emergency” of the mid1970s, the judiciary initiated more changes in family law by interpreting some statutes and features of nonstatutory law in the light of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Indian constitution. The judiciary changed family law more often than legislatures did, and sometimes prompted subsequent legislative change. This was true, for instance, of the changes introduced in the grounds on which Hindus and Christians could seek divorce, and in the alimony rights of Muslim women.
A Comparison of Hindu and Muslim Law Many aspects of Indian family law are misunderstood. It is widely believed that the legislative reform of Hindu law in the 1950s made it secular and more conducive to gender equality, more so than the family laws of other groups, particularly Muslims. Many claim that the secularization and homogenization of family law is the only route to greater gender equality. After the Hindu law reforms of the 1950s, statutes governed more areas of Hindu law than Muslim law. But, religious texts and beliefs influenced these reforms, for instance, the introduction of divorce rights. In addition, these reforms weakened the rights of some women, for instance, the rights of widows to shares in their former husbands’ property if they chose to remarry. They further weakened the divorce rights of some Hindu women, who previously could get divorces more easily based on the recognized customs of their castes, and the property rights of others that were governed by matrilineal inheritance laws earlier. While legislation of the 1950s partly homogenized the major features of Hindu law, the Shariat Act of 1937 had the same effect earlier on Muslim law. It made “Muslim law” applicable to most areas of family life among Indian Muslims (while leaving the content of Muslim law unspecified), and in the process overrode the customs of some Muslim subgroups that had enjoyed legal recognition until then. Partial homogenization was effected in ways that increased the rights of Muslim women more often than it did the rights of Hindu women. This was true, for instance, of the inheritance rights of Muslim women. Daughters gained rights to half the shares that sons enjoyed in their parents’ property, in contrast with previously having no rights to inherit parental property. Although no statutes specified these rights, they were recognized in Islam’s founding texts as well as in later Islamic jurisprudence, and the Indian judiciary followed these prescriptions in adjudication. Muslim law is far less codified than Hindu law. Only three short statutes pertain to Muslim law in India: two 56
that outline the divorce and alimony rights of women, and the Shariat Act, which in effect leaves the content of Indian Muslim law to the judiciary’s discretion. In contrast, four elaborate acts define the major features of Hindu law. Judges refer far more often to religious sources in adjudicating cases involving Muslims than those involving Hindus. While Muslim law is less codified and more closely linked to religious sources than Hindu law, the rights of Muslim women are superior to those of Hindu women in some respects. This is true of a daughter’s inheritance rights. Hindu daughters have rights to share equally with sons in intestate succession to their parents’ self-earned property, in contrast with Muslim daughters, who have rights to only half the shares that Muslim sons enjoy. However, the succession rights of Hindu daughters are restricted to intestate cases, that is, cases in which the parent did not leave a will. Hindu parents are free to will self-earned property as they wish, typically leaving all or most of such property to their sons, or perhaps other male kin. Male coparcenaries, moreover, control ancestral Hindu property in much of India, and daughters do not have any right to demand the partition of such property so that they may control their shares. (They gained this right since the mid-1980s only in five states.) This gives Hindu women little effective access to most forms of family property. Muslim daughters have the right to half the shares left to sons in all forms of parental property. Muslim parents cannot deny their daughters rights to inherit shares in their property by willing self-earned property to male kin alone, or by effectively presenting more of the property they own as being of ancestral origin. While many do so, their daughters can effectively challenge such disinheritance in the courts. Hindu daughters have no legal recourse under such circumstances in much of India. Muslim women had fewer rights in other respects than did Hindu women at different points. For instance, until recently, most Indian courts recognized the unconditional right of Muslim men to unilaterally divorce their wives, without giving Muslim women similar rights. In contrast, statutory Hindu law allows divorce based only on mutual consent, or if a spouse is found guilty of a “fault” such as cruelty, desertion, or adultery. From 1973 onward, indigent Hindu women had the right to alimony until their remarriage or death. Many courts did not recognize the right of divorced Muslim women to maintenance from their ex-husbands beyond a three-month period after divorce. The courts allow Muslim men to marry up to four wives (while not permitting polyandry), while Hindu law bans bigamy. The ban on Hindu bigamy is, however, not very effective, as the courts set high standards to recognize ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
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the validity of bigamous Hindu marriages. Public debate has highlighted the ways in which Muslim women have fewer rights than Hindu women, though not vice versa, reflecting the recent growth of Hindu nationalism, the widespread vision of Muslims as marginal to Indian citizenry, and the limited understanding of Muslim law. The limited codification of Muslim law gave judges greater autonomy to initiate legal change, and the judiciary used this autonomy to address some of the gender inequalities in Muslim law over the last generation. The Supreme Court (India’s apex court) recognized the alimony rights of Muslim women and placed conditions for the validity of unilateral Muslim male divorce in two landmark judgments in 2001 and 2002. It decreed earlier that bigamy was a ground on which Muslim women could claim divorce, without criminalizing Muslim bigamy. As the apex court defines the law for the lower courts, these judgments made the alimony rights of Muslim women the same as those of non-Muslim women. They also meant that there was similar room for unilateral male divorce among Hindus and Muslims. While Hindu law does not explicitly recognize unilateral divorce, it permits divorce if a couple did not live together for a year after a decree of judicial separation or restitution of conjugal rights, a provision used by many Hindu men but very few Hindu women.
Feasible Routes to Change Recent judicial reforms in Muslim law indicate some routes available for changes in Indian family law that would give women greater rights. Judges introduced these reforms with reference to early and more recent Islamic religious and jurisprudential traditions, statutory Muslim law, and features of the Indian constitution (the fundamental rights to life, equality, and dignity). Their reference to constitutional principles did not lead them toward the secularization or homogenization of family law, yet enabled greater gender equality. Other judicial and legislative changes in Hindu and Christian law followed this pattern. For instance, divorce was made possible for Christian women on grounds other than adultery, because Protestants had long accepted divorce on such grounds, and even Catholic Church leaders came to support the right of Christian women to seek divorce under conditions of spousal cruelty or desertion. The recent legal changes effected convergence in some features of the different Indian family laws, and were restricted to some of the gender inequalities in family law. While more Hindus (especially Hindu nationalists) demand a uniform civil code (UCC), consensus has not yet emerged about the content of a UCC. Many Hindus are likely to resist a UCC that favors much greater gender ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
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equality, and others to resist a UCC that draws from the different existing family laws and associated cultural traditions. If change in family law occurs within a framework of legal pluralism, this is partly because of the changing patterns of mobilization regarding family law policy. The introduction of a UCC was a major demand of women’s organizations and other civic associations aiming to promote gender justice until the 1980s. This goal seemed increasingly unrealistic, however, with the passage of time. Hindu nationalists particularly embraced the demand for a UCC after the Congress Party government, under Rajiv Gandhi, appeared to give in to conservative Muslim pressure to overturn in 1986 earlier judicial reforms that gave Muslim women permanent alimony rights (the Shah Bano case). Many women’s organizations shifted their focus, from demanding a UCC to promoting gender-equalizing reform within the context of legal pluralism, because of their desire to avoid an association with the Hindu nationalists. While some key legislators engaged in making family law have belonged to parties that demand a UCC, their legislative initiatives have been for piecemeal changes that do not clearly move family law toward homogenization. Along with resistance from the religious minorities and the tribal peoples to a UCC, and resistance among many individuals in all religious and ethnic groups to the promotion of gender equality, the recent orientations of the major policy-making agents suggest the likelihood of gradual, halting gender-equalizing change, within the context of legal pluralism, in the foreseeable future. Narendra Subramanian See also Development Politics; Gender and Human Rights
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Agarwal, Bina. A Field of One’s Own: Gender and Land Rights in South Asia. Cambridge, U.K. and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994. Agnes, Flavia. Law and Gender Inequality: The Politics of Women’s Rights in India. New Delhi and New York: Oxford University Press, 1999. Basu, Srimati. She Comes to Take Her Rights: Indian Women, Property and Propriety. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999. Derrett, J. D. M. Religion, Law and the State in India. New York: Free Press, 1968. Larson, Gerald, ed. Religion and Personal Law in Secular India: A Call to Judgment. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001. Mansfield, John H. “The Personal Laws or a Uniform Civil Code?” In Religion and Law in Independent India, edited by Robert D. Baird. New Delhi: Manohar, 1993. Menski, Werner F. Modern Indian Family Law. Richmond, U.K.: Curzon Press, 2001. 57
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———. Hindu Law: Beyond Tradition and Modernity. New Delhi and New York: Oxford University Press, 2003. Mukhopadhyay, Maitrayee. Legally Dispossessed: Gender, Identity, and the Process of Law. Mumbai: Stree Press, 1998. Parashar, Archana. Women and Family Law Reform in India. New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1992.
FAMINES Famines, defined as large-scale episodes of acute starvation, were a frequent occurrence in South Asia until the mid-twentieth century. In 1770 nearly a third of the population of Bengal died due to a famine. Around 1877 about 4 million lives were lost, mainly in Bombay and Madras presidencies. In 1896–1897, more than 5 million perished, and in 1943, more than a million died in Bengal’s famine. The incidence of mass starvation leading to death diminished substantially in the post–World War II period. Devastations of such magnitude had long-term demographic, economic, social, and political consequences, raising two questions: Were famines in this region a product of natural disasters or the result of human agency? Why did famines disappear after 1943? Although famines have a long history in the region, some of the best-documented episodes of famine in India occurred after British rule began. The 1769–1770 famine in Bengal occurred five years after British takeover of taxation rights in the province. That famine reportedly followed two years of erratic rainfall, but was clearly worsened by the ruthless efficiency of the new regime in collecting land taxes, and by a smallpox epidemic. The 1812–1813 famine in western India, which particularly affected the Kathiawar region, came in the wake of several years of crop losses attributed to attacks by locusts and rats. The legendary Guntur famine of 1832–1833 followed crop failure as well as excessive and uncertain levels of taxation on peasants. In at least three episodes in nineteenth-century western India—in 1819–1820 in Broach, 1820–1822 in Sind, and 1853 in Thana and Colaba—famines were caused by monsoon flooding and resultant crop loss. The 1865–1867 famine in coastal Orissa followed several seasons of erratic rainfall, but was worsened by the persistent refusal of the local administration to import food. In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, major famines causing in excess of a million deaths occurred three times: 1876–1878, 1896–1897, and 1899–1900. In each case, there was a crop failure of unusual intensity in the Deccan plateau, possibly the most famine-prone region in India. In the twentieth century, major famines were fewer. In 1907–1908, an extensive crop failure and epidemic threat was effectively tackled by state relief machinery. Food procurement for World War II, combined with a crop failure, caused perhaps the harshest famine of the twentieth century, the 1943 Bengal famine. 58
Causes: Food Availability and Entitlement A section of the colonial bureaucracy believed that famines were expressions of a Malthusian imbalance between resources and population in the region, the impact of which colonial relief efforts helped mitigate. Whatever the merits of that view, an element of high risk was indeed intrinsic to the resource endowment of the region. The greater part of the Indian subcontinent combines three months of monsoon rains with extreme aridity the rest of the year, which dries up much of the surface water. The rains make growing one crop relatively easy, but growing another crop is dependent upon irrigation systems that need to harvest groundwater or to transport water from long distances and are, therefore, relatively expensive. The dependence on a natural supply of water increased the risk of crop failure, and single-cropping reduced security against the failure of the monsoon crop. El Niño–type disturbances of the tropical oceanic atmospheric systems could make rainfall more unpredictable. Sudden and large-scale scarcities of food, therefore, were potentially part of the cycle of India’s agricultural production. Nationalist critics of British colonialism in India believed the scale of mortality during the nineteenthcentury famines resulted from imperial economic policies. The argument consisted of two parts, an assertion that the intensity of famines increased in the nineteenth century, and a belief that British trade and taxation policies were primarily responsible. Land taxes were believed to be too high. Food exports were believed to increase food shortages for the local population, while nonfood crop exports encouraged farmers to give up food production. Both factors raised food prices. The colonial administration answered these charges by arguing that in fact foreign trade stabilized prices, since exports increased in times of low prices, and fell in times of high prices. Recent research on this question has found support for the thesis that foreign trade did stabilize food availability and prices. While both these perspectives identified mass starvation with absolute scarcity of food, more recently the relationship between food availability and starvation has been recast in the more general “entitlement” approach advanced by Amartya Sen. In this view, access to food depends on an individual’s entitlement to food by means of direct production, market purchase, or gifts and transfers. It is possible to consider scenarios in which food supplies are adequate, but certain groups face large declines in market-based or transfer-based entitlements to food. Famines can be caused by the inability to buy food or a collapse of transfers, even as food availability does not fall. The Bengal famine of 1943, and perhaps several other “war famines” in India, seem to illustrate this view. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
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Food for Work Program, Rajasthan. Since the 1960s, India has developed a number of comprehensive programs to address the poverty and famine resulting from severe drought. In this 1986 photo, women in hard-hit Rajasthan queue up for supplies as part of a rural Food for Work program. AMAR TALWAR / FOTOMEDIA.
Consequences Consistent with the predictions of the entitlement approach, the effect of famines varied according to livelihood, gender, and social status. Further, famines affected both livelihood and demographic patterns, and through these effects could delay a return to normal conditions even as the proximate cause of the famine disappeared. Crop failures affected artisans and wage workers in the rural areas much harder than the peasants. The latter usually had some stocks of food. But laborers were unable to obtain food as soon as food prices increased, because money wages were poorly indexed. The association between food prices and famine mortality, therefore, was a strong one. The effect of food prices on the incidence of rural poverty persisted in the late twentieth century, even as famines or starvation deaths became less frequent. Artisan incomes too declined during famines, for households stopped buying anything other than food with the onset of a famine. The 1876 famine drove large numbers of rural laborers and hand-loom weavers of ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
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South India to enlist for emigration to British tropical colonies abroad. The 1896 and 1899 famines again encouraged permanent migration. Famines also affected land transfers between the poor and the richer peasants, but these effects are not well researched. The two late nineteenth-century famines (1876–1878 and 1896–1898) had severe impacts on population growth rates. For example, almost the entire expected natural increment in population in Madras and Bombay presidencies between 1871 and 1881 was carried off by the excess mortality from 1876 to 1878. In both these episodes, the first few months after a harvest failure saw a rise in food prices, followed by a decrease in conceptions due to famine amenorrhea, and a rise in deaths. Deaths were more common among men, who left home in search of work, among children and the elderly, and among the lower castes. Short-distance migration increased during a famine, and caused severe health crises. Almost always, crop failure drove people to change diets and forage for food in the forests and commons. In 59
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the first few months of starvation, more fodders and seeds were consumed, and livestock mortality therefore increased. Toward the end of a famine, epidemic diseases claimed lives. Sustained malnutrition reduced biological resistance to smallpox, plague, cholera, pneumonia, and diarrhea, and left the population susceptible to malarial death. Ironically, the spread of malaria was sometimes attributed to waterlogging due to the construction of irrigation canals as part of famine relief measures. These demographic conditions, together with the shortage of livestock and seeds, made any return to normal cultivation difficult even as the rains came back. After a famine ended, the mean age at marriage for women declined somewhat, marital fertility and birth rates tended to rise above average, and death rates fell below average. Famines also created social stresses. Food riots, burglaries and raids, mob violence, and the sale of children increased, causing a rush of convicts into the prisons. Ironically, prisons were the only places where food was easily available.
Famine Policy In the early nineteenth century, the British East India Company left famine relief largely to the native princes. The very real prospect of famines had encouraged the construction of state granaries in pre-colonial India, which were used for relief purposes. Common measures to prevent the occurrence of famines included the building of irrigation tanks and canals. On a more limited scale, private and temple charity were also at work. However, both the granaries and the private systems were localized, whereas the incidence of starvation was widely dispersed. In the second and the third quarters of the nineteenth century, a discourse emerged in administrative circles on the need for building irrigation works and for the restoration of disused tanks as insurance against future famines. However, a clear policy in this regard did not take shape until 1880–1881. There was resistance within the administration to expenditure on irrigation, which, it was felt, brought uncertain returns. State agency in relief, it was sometimes argued, interfered with the agency of the market in bringing food to the needy. The ferocity of the 1876 famine, brought home by a series of influential books and articles in English, reduced such resistance. Between 1876 and 1896, a state relief infrastructure was put in place in British India. The main elements of the policy were relief camps, where starving persons could receive food in exchange for labor at public works projects, such as the construction of railways or irrigation canals. A Famine Insurance Fund was started in 1881, out of which relief-related expenditures were to be funded. The relief camp was not unknown in 1876, but its effectiveness during 60
that episode was in serious dispute. Its scale was limited, the labor requirement was rarely enforced due to a shortage of supervisors, and entry was based on the degree of distress, which was hard to define and subject to abuse. By the end of the century, however, the relief camp was a wellestablished institution in Madras and Bombay presidencies, and could mobilize thousands of laborers for construction works. The Famine Commission of 1881 outlined the relief policy, and the provincial Famine Codes wrote detailed instructions for local administrations to follow. If the relief camps were efficient in mobilizing labor, they were not very effective in averting large-scale mortality. Many seekers of relief, such as the artisans, could not offer the kind of labor the camps wanted and paid for. Some did not want to eat the same food as others due to caste prejudices. Women often avoided the camps. The Famine Codes became progressively lengthier to accommodate this heterogeneity. With the exception of the 1943 “war famine” in Bengal, famines causing large mortality more or less disappeared in twentieth-century India. The state relief system functioned much better. The spread of irrigation and multiple cropping stabilized food availability. In the interwar period, internal markets were efficient in carrying food from excess supply to shortage regions. Easier migration contributed to this process. The railway network, in facilitating these movements of goods and labor, had a mitigating impact. Along with market efficiency, there was a change in political attitudes. Free markets in food came to an end at about the time of World War II. The government during the war and subsequent governments in independent India controlled food trade. Exercise of state power in the former case led to a famine. Exercise of state power in the latter period prevented any recurrence. Serious and large-scale erosion of access to food did recur in India briefly in 1966–1967, but had no significant impact on mortality. Starvation deaths, though rarer, continue to occur in parts of the arid zones poorly served by irrigation and transportation. While large-scale starvation deaths became less frequent in post-independence India, malnutrition has persisted. Tirthankar Roy See also Economic Development, Importance of Institutions in and Social Aspects of; Poverty and Inequality BIBLIOGRAPHY
Dyson, T. “The Demography of South Asian Famines.” Population Studies 45, no. 1 (1991): 5–25, and 45, no. 2: 279–297. McAlpin, M. B. Subject to Famine: Food Crises and Economic Change in Western India, 1860–1920. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1983. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
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Report of the Indian Famine Commission. Part III: Famine Histories. London: Indian Famine Commission, 1885. Sen, A. K. Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981. Visaria, L., and P. Visaria. “Population (1757–1947).” In The Cambridge Economic History of India, vol. 2: c.1757–c.1970, edited by Dharma Kumar. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1983.
FEDERALISM AND CENTER-STATE RELATIONS The achievements of Indian federalism are quite astounding and counterintuitive. Despite the multiplicity of social and ethnic divisions, federal institutions have survived. In the 1940s and 1950s, language was a divisive issue, but since the implementation of linguistic states, language movements have been domesticated and multilinguism and bilinguism can be found in most regions of the country. Secessionist movements in Punjab and in the Northeast region have evolved into movements of regional autonomy, seeking recompense from the central government rather than independence. Despite fiscal stresses and strains, central revenue capacity continues to hold in India; tax revolts of the kind witnessed in Russia or Brazil are unheard of. A majority of India’s regional units have well-developed democratic systems with regular elections, party competition, and regional parties. Regionalization of the polity has proceeded in tandem with democratization, so that new regional forces representing hitherto unprivileged sections of society—for example, the Bahujan Samaj Party— have acquired strong roots in some states such as Uttar Pradesh, and new parties—Lok Shakti in Karnataka, for example—have arisen to challenge the monopoly of political power enjoyed by existing political formations. Most citizens’ strong regional identities coexist with their pan-Indian identities; in India there is no zero-sum relation between national and regional identities. Did federalism play a major role in these transformations? Federalism is ultimately a formal institution insofar as it refers to a set of constitutional provisions, but in the Indian case, its ethnic and socioeconomic roots give it a substantive and societal basis not necessarily found in other federations. Also, in the 1990s, federalism has become livelier and more dynamic, embedded within larger political and economic changes currently underway in India.
Ideas about Regional Autonomy, Central Power, and Federalism Federalism in India is not merely a set of institutions, but a set of evolving ideas and practices about how the balance of central and local power should be organized, and subnational movements perceived. At the center of ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
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the discourse around regional autonomy and central authority are the notions of state stability, the political unity of India’s boundaries, and the concept of the Indian nation. During the formation of India’s Constitution, debates concerning relations between the central government and the provinces were contentious and extensive. India’s Constituent Assembly debated whether to institutionalize a strong center or strong states, and what procedures were to govern the relations among them. The nature of pre-independence religious conflicts organized across territory (Punjab, Kashmir, and Bengal) and partition played major roles in generating and shaping ideas about the federal Constitution in India. One dominant theme of India’s Constituent Assembly was whether giving power to regional units would threaten the unity of India, and whether the principle of cultural autonomy and self-determination was contradictory to “national unity.” Some argued that India needed to embody “one corporate nation, a homogenous nation,” while others suggested that cultural autonomy and national unity could be made consistent with each other. B. R. Ambedkar, the leader of the Dalit community and the chairman of the Drafting Committee of the Constituent Assembly, argued that while he was an advocate of a “strong united Centre,” in the present circumstances, “it would not be prudent, it would not be wise,” since the problem was “how to make the heterogeneous mass we have today” make a decision “in common.” In December 1946 the Objectives Resolution moved by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru affirmed that the Constitution of an “undivided country” would allow the regional units to “retain the status of autonomous units” in a substantial manner. Immediately after Viceroy Lord Mountbatten announced his partition plan on 3 June 1947, the Constituent Assembly decided in favor of writing a Constitution with provisions for a strong center. Earlier, the term “Federation of India” had been used, but it was replaced by the term “the Union of India.” This terminology was meant to clarify that the federation was not the result of an agreement by the states to join the Union; therefore, no states had the right to secede from the Union. After independence, concepts of national integration and “unity in diversity” continued to animate discussions of federalism. Unfortunately, the issue of regional demands was understood as one that challenged the government and national unity. Thus, the central government sought to discipline such demands as well as make them discursively unacceptable. So, regional autonomy movements—in Kashmir, Assam, or Punjab—were framed by the government as challenges to the integrity 61
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of the state, and the enhancement of central government authority was seen in a zero-sum relationship to regional autonomy. In the 1980s, this created enormous strains in managing center-state relations. Since then, the language of terrorism has been inserted into the discourse, and India has instituted many terrorism-related laws, such as the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities Act and the Prevention of Terrorism Act. Thus, the discursive economy of state power was and continues to be negative toward regional movements, although the state has negotiated much more effectively with intransigents and “terrorists” in recent times.
Formal Institutions of Indian Federalism India’s federalism, similar to that of Canada and Germany, and in contrast to that of the United States, is framed within a parliamentary system. The Constitution of India is the foundational text that lays out the structure of center-state relations. In addition, certain juridical and legislative initiatives have created institutions that mediate center-state relations. India’s Constitution has been described as “quasifederal,” in that it frames many centralist features within a federal framework. The primary articles (Seventh Schedule of the Constitution) demarcate authority between the states and the center: a Union List, a State List, and a Concurrent List. While most key subjects such as defense and national infrastructure are controlled by the Union government, many important subjects are controlled by the states: law and order, agriculture, and health. Residual powers remain with the central government. This center-state allocation of powers was dominated by a highly centralist provision—Article 356, referred to as President’s Rule—that allows the national cabinet to disband a state legislature under certain conditions. A related constitutional provision that seeks to ensure central control is the role played by the governor, the appointed head of each regional government. In the 1970s and 1980s, the role of the governors became controversial as central rulers used their services to discipline states ruled by the political opponents of the Congress Party. It is notable that in the 1990s, the provision of President’s Rule has been challenged, and after a crucial judicial ruling, its institutional force to meddle in the democratic rights of states has declined substantially. In the S. R. Bommai judgment in 1994, the Supreme Court ruled against the misuse of Article 356. The unanimous judgment by the nine-judge constitutional bench, delivered on 11 March 1994, further held that any proclamation under Article 356 would be subject to judicial review, 62
thereby giving the federal compact a new institutional force. This, combined with the changes in India’s party system, has given some leeway to the president to refuse to impose President’s Rule. President K. R. Narayanan in October 1997 returned the Union cabinet’s recommendation to impose President’s Rule in Uttar Pradesh. Again, in 1998, Narayanan refused to support such a recommendation for Bihar. Thus, with changes in India’s party system and the political context of federalism, the power of the provision of President’s Rule to constrain the autonomy of states has been significantly attenuated. One interesting centralist feature of the Indian Constitution that has nevertheless operated to accommodate regional demands and substate movements can be found in Articles 2, 3, and 4, according to which the national Parliament has extensive powers to reorganize the boundaries of states. These provisions “enable Parliament by law to admit a new state, increase, diminish the area of any state or alter the boundaries or name of any state.” Seemingly a centralist provision, this has allowed a rare flexibility at the heart of Indian federalism so that central institutions can respond to pressure to create new states. In 1955, after the Linguistic Commission gave its recommendation, the provision was used for the first time to create language-based states. Since then, this provision has been used many times, most recently in 2000 to create three new states of Chhatisgarh, Uttaranchal, and Jharkhand, reconstituting Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, and Bihar, respectively. The formation of the new states did arouse some concern that there would be an intensification of demands for the creation of additional states in other parts of the country: Telengana in Andhra Pradesh and Vidarbha in Maharashtra have already staked their claims. Yet, these assessments have lost the power to challenge the basis of central power in India. This means that movements are able to address their demands of regional expression without challenging the integrity of the nation-state; thus, a centralist feature has acquired important decentralizing consequences, making Indian federalism stable. Another distinctive set of institutional features of Indian federalism is a set of asymmetric rules regarding some states, called “Special Category” states. Article 370 gave provincial autonomy to Jammu and Kashmir, and other provisions regulated the affairs of the Northeast states. Each of these provisions has given stability to India’s federal institutions. In addition to such constitutionally mandated rules, some institutions were created in response to demands and pressures from regional elements. In 1983, for example, the Sarkaria Commission was set up to study federal relations in India. The Sarkaria Commission invited responses by all regional governments and opposition ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
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parties. It concluded that India’s center-state relations suffered from “administrative over-centralization” and offered moderate changes in India’s institutional design. This commission became both a signpost of troubled center-state relations as well as the central government’s desire to address some of those problems by a comprehensive assessment. Yet, most of its recommendations (except two) were not implemented.
Cyclical Movements from Centralization to Decentralization Despite these centralist features, the Indian experience of federalism has moved from strong centralization imperatives to decentralizing ones, and the balance between national and local power has shifted over time. From 1947 to 1964 the central and national institutions held sway, although regional actors and subnational institutions were not trampled over, but rather aggregated in a different combination with central institutions. The dominance of the inheritor of the national movement— the Congress Party—and its ability to integrate and represent provincial interests was crucial to this integration. The relationship between national and local leadership was a mutually dependent one. In developmental terms, the state with its national plans and “rational” allocation across different regional units created a national market and a national development agenda, howsoever imperfect. From 1964 to 1969 the regional impulses held sway, as transitional instability after the death of Nehru and an economic crisis at the state level (food crisis) allowed regional elites—largely strong Congress state leaders—to lay claims on shaping the policies of the national government and the national Congress Party. Thus, tendencies toward localization, factionalization, and ruralization dominated the period between 1964 and 1971. Yet, Indira Gandhi reasserted executive and personal authority, reorganized the Congress Party, and rearticulated the developmental vision of the central government toward populist policies. She was able to craft a new national majority coalition that, at face value, undermined the power of regional powerbrokers. Thus, from 1971 to 1977, centralization tendencies again seemed dominant in India’s polity. After a brief decentralizing interlude, when the Janata government was in power (1977–1980), with Indira Gandhi’s return to power, the power of the central government and the Congress Party again seemed dominant. The prime minister intervened violently to control the resurgent Khalistan movement in Punjab and tried to undermine the regional party—the National Conference—in Jammu and Kashmir. Yet many of these centralist attempts backfired and made reconciling regional autonomy with expanding central power imperative. In the 1980s her centralization attempts were ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
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of a different quality, linked with regional concerns and interests more systematically than before; trampling over regional interests was proving more difficult than before in the face of regional resurgence. Thus, the pendulum swings between centralization and decentralization in India’s polity were not equally balanced; the center of gravity had begun to shift to localization and decentralization. In a similar vein, the process of consolidating central power always remains tenuous and begins to disintegrate soon after such attempts. In the 1990s, the trend certainly shifted much more toward decentralization or “decentering” (Echeverri-Gent). Changes in India’s party system contributed to this shift; it clearly seems that the regionalization imperative in India’s policy and political economy has become a stable feature.
The Changing Party System and Federalization The 1990s witnessed unprecedented changes in the party system: the era of one-party dominance (1947–1989) seems to be over; instead a competitive multiparty system seems here to stay. What is interesting is that the dominance of the Congress Party has not been replaced by another national party (the Bharatiya Janata Party, or BJP, for example) or multiple national parties, but rather by the rise of coalitional politics and the national importance of regional or single-state parties. In 2004, even when the Congress Party returned to power, it did so in a coalitional arrangement. India is undergoing a process of federalization or regionalization of its party system. This process of federalization encompasses multiple dimensions. First, as is apparent from the Table 1, the simple physical presence of regional parties has increased in the national Parliament. Regional parties have become important in national government formation. Both national parties—BJP and the Congress Party—need the support of regional parties and alliances with regional parties to form a government (this is also apparent after the 2004 elections). Third, national parties have themselves acquired regional personas. This is true of the BJP and the Communist Party of India (Marxist) as well as most other national parties. The Congress Party, a national party par excellence, too has had to accommodate to regional pressures in Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh, and West Bengal, where regional formations such as Nationalist Congress Party, Tamil Manila Congress, and Trinamool Congress have weakened its base and national scope. This emergent reality must be understood as mutually self-enforcing: party system change at the national level (the displacement of Congress party dominance) has evolved in a dialectical relationship with the regionalization of India’s polity. While both have independent sources 63
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TABLE 1
Percentage share of regional parties’ seats and votes in the Parliament in the 1990s
Lower house election year 1991 Parties
Seats
1996 Votes
Seats
1998 Votes
Seats
1999 Votes
Seats
Votes
Congress
42.7
36.5
25.8
28.8
26.0
25.8
21.0
28.3
BJP
22.0
20.1
29.6
20.3
33.4
25.6
33.5
23.8
Other national (multi-state) parties
20.9
24.7
18.8
20.0
11.8
6.6
13.3
14.1
Subtotal of national parties
85.6
81.3
74.2
69.1
71.2
58.0
67
66.2
6.9
9.3
20.4
17.7
26.3
26.4
26.8
23.5
Regional (single state) parties
Notes: These figures do not total 100 percent, as many small parties and independents are not included. Regional and single state parties: Telugu Desam, Samajwadi Party, Shiv Sena, DMK, AIADMK, Biju Janata Dal, National Congress Party, Trinamool Congress, Rashtriya Janata Dal, PMK, Indian National Lok Dal, J& K National Conference, MDMK, and RSP. Other national (multistate) parties: 1991: JD (Janata Dal), JP (Janata Party), LKDB (Lok Dal-Bahugana), CPM, CPI, and ICSS (Indian Congress Socialists) 1996: CPM, CPI, Samata, Janata Dal, AIIC (Tiwari), and Janata Party 1998: CPM, CPI, Samata, Janata Dal, and BSP 1999: CPM, CPI, Janata Dal (U), and BSP SOURCE: Author’s calculations from Butler, David, Ashok Lahiri, and Prannoy Roy, India Decides: Elections 1952–1995, New Delhi: Books and Things, 1995; election commission web site available at ; and Rao, G. V. L. Narasimha, and K. Balakrishnan, Indian Elections: The Nineties, New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications, 1999.
and origins, they have begun to acquire a mutually reinforcing effect in the late 1990s. Regionalization has speeded up the process of party system change, while the opening up of the national governmental system in the form of coalition governments has allowed important spaces to regional parties, who deploy their national roles and participation to regional ends; this accelerates the process of regionalization even more.
Identity Politics in India’s Regions Indian federal relations have seen an abundance of ethnic and secessionist movements at the subnational level. In the 1940s, the Dravidian movement arose in South India seeking a separate Dravidian state; since then, Punjab, Kashmir, and the Northeast states (Assam, Manipur, and Nagaland) all have witnessed strong quasi-separatist movements organized around territory, identity, and ethnicity. Many have transformed into regional parties that seek to govern their states (Tamil Nadu, Ghorkaland in West Bengal, and Jharkhand, among many others) by articulating a regional cultural identity; others have continued to be violent and confrontational (Manipur, Kashmir). Most analysts have explained these movements separately. Economic explanations fail to explain the persistence of regional movements in states such as Punjab and 64
Assam: while one state has the highest per capita income in India, the other has been one of the most backward states in the country. The level of development (in Punjab) did not prevent confrontational and mobilization movements against the central government; the economic deprivation of Assam and its exploitation by the central government and by economic elites within the state did play a role in enhancing the sense of relative frustration that sparked the rise of an antiBengali subnationalist movement. In the late 1980s the United Liberation Front of Assam described India’s relationship with Assam as “colonial” and demanded that multinational companies and Indian-owned companies do more for the development of the state. Yet, the Khalistan movement in Punjab arose soon after the “Green Revolution” in a prosperous state. Thus, the rise and persistence of subnationalist movements across different regions needs better explanations and answers. First, while cultural roots must be incorporated in any analysis, identities in India are not given or ascriptive, but rather can be created and mobilized by political entrepreneurs. Thus, the role of parties and politicians in shaping and activating identities can be important. These instrumental political actors, consciously or unwittingly, not only articulate regional aspirations, but also create or ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
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make available new social spaces for “the reproduction of subnational meanings and political projects” (Baruah 1997, p. 511). Second, understanding the role of society or what is fashionably called “civil society” may be necessary. Yet, analysis of civil society must not be seen as opposed to the role of party and ethnic entrepreneurs. The relationship between party (political organizations) and society may be the key to understanding the nature of and the changing prospects of ethnic regionalist movements. In Tamil Nadu, DMK (Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam) and its various inheritor parties played a major role in shaping Tamil identity over time. Similarly, in Assam, two organizations, the Asom Sahitya Sabha (the Assam Literary Society) and the All Assam Students Union, proved to be crucial. Moreover, the rise of subnationalism is not unrelated to economic processes: urbanization, expansion of communications, literacy, educational institutions, and industrialization. This has been true in Assam, Jammu and Kashmir, and Punjab. It is the process of modernization that activated feelings of relative deprivation and frustration among the mobile population of these regions. It is not a coincidence that students played a major role in both Assam’s and Kashmir’s movements. Despite the interactive effects of economic change on cultural identities, economic change has had an independent logic in shaping centerstate relations.
Economic Change and Federalism in India The fiscal structure of the Indian Constitution is quite centralized, as the central government collects most of the taxes and then distributes them to the regional states through the finance commissions that are constituted once every five years for that purpose. The revenue sources of the provinces are limited and inelastic, although the states have been politically constrained not to tap agricultural taxes, further limiting their revenue base. Despite a fiscally centralist Constitution, rapid changes in federal economic relations urge attention to ways in which the economic liberalization process has affected federalism and vice versa. Federalism and subnational governments have played a major role in shaping the nature of economic liberalization underway in India. First, federalism made economic reform politically sustainable by displacing opposition to reform at the state level. The “energies of economic interests” were dispersed in twenty-six states, leading to fragmentation of opposition along regional lines. This is true for both business interests and labor unions, whose actions, opposition, or protests tend to get “quarantined” within states. Second, federalism encouraged new supporters of reform to emerge from India’s ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
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regions. As subnational governments renewed their efforts to reregulate the central policy of liberalization, they created new coalitions, new interests, and new incentives in favor of reform. Many chief ministers themselves became aggressive supporters of economic reform (for example, Andhra Pradesh’s Chandrababu Naidu, Tamil Nadu’s J. Jayalalitha, and Digvijay Singh of Madhya Pradesh). Regional capitalists or capitalists concentrated in one region of the country began to support liberalization more forcefully than national-level capitalists. This is true of the software capitalists (Infosys, Wipro, and others) based in Karnataka. Interestingly, reform of subnational governance mechanisms was stimulated by these processes. Simultaneously, economic liberalization further accelerated the process of federalization, prompting “a change in federal relations from intergovernmental cooperation towards interjurisdictional competition among the states” (Saez, p. 135). Basically, competition unleashed by economic liberalization took an interstate form insofar as states began to compete with each other to offer concessions to global and national business actors. While this dynamic had some negative consequences in undermining regional states’ revenue capacities, it ensured some scope for market competition and the disruption of monopoly power of national business classes as well as the national bureaucracy. Both regional business classes and the regional bureaucrats were more supportive of reform than the national civil servants and national business interests. Thus, economic liberalization has begun to affect the nature of center-state relations quite substantially. New supporters of reform—regional elites—seek participation in the national government and national politics as a means of getting crucial benefits from the liberalization process. The national area continues to be an important site for their interaction with national resource-rich institutions, as well as access to global actors, such as the World Bank, and global capital. Second, economic reform has unleashed a fiscal crisis that has crucial center-state components. The central government has withdrawn from some of its functions by displacing its public goods responsibilities to the regional states; this creates strong hunger for resources and revenues at the regional level. At the same time, federal transfers to the regions are declining; this implies that the asymmetry between revenues and expenditures at the regional level continues to grow. Fiscal deficits of states in India grew quite substantially in the 1990s, constituting almost 40 percent of the total fiscal deficit. This phenomenon has been stimulated by the ongoing economic reform in India. Further, a “race to the bottom” effect is evident after the onset of economic liberalization, as regional elites shed their 65
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public expenditure responsibilities. Thus, the provision of health, education, and irrigation infrastructure, the responsibility of states in a federal system, suffers much more in federal India than it would in a unitary system undergoing liberalization. Aseema Sinha See also Political System: Constitution; State Formation
FEMINISM AND INDIAN NATIONALISTS The platform of women’s rights was central to the nineteenth-century social reform movement, which crystallized both nationalist aspirations and feminist responses to patriarchy. In the twentieth-century nationalist upsurge, Indian women mobilized against colonial rule. When independence was granted in 1947, they achieved important rights.
Colonial Constructions of Gender BIBLIOGRAPHY
Baruah, Sanjib. “Politics of Subnationalism: Society versus State in Assam.” In State and Politics in India, edited by Partha Chatterjee. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997. ———. India against Itself: Assam and the Politics of Nationality. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999. Brass, Paul R. “Pluralism, Regionalism and Decentralizing Tendencies in Contemporary Indian Politics.” In Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison, edited by Paul Brass. New Delhi: Sage, 1991. ———. “National Power and Local Politics in India: A Twenty-Year Perspective.” In State and Politics in India, edited by Partha Chatterjee. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997. Butler, David, Ashok Lahiri, and Prannoy Roy. India Decides: Elections 1952–1995. New Delhi: Books and Things, 1995. Echeverri-Gent, John. “India’s Decentered Polity.” In India Briefing, 2002, edited by Alyssa Ayres and Philip Oldenburg. Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 2002. Franda, Marcus F. West Bengal and the Federalizing Process in India. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1968. Ganguly, Sumit. The Crisis in Kashmir: Portents of War, Hopes of Peace. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press; Cambridge, U.K. and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997. Jenkins, Rob. Democratic Politics and Economic Reform in India. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1999. Saez, Lawrence. Federalism without a Centre: The Impact of Political and Economic Reform on India’s Federal System. New Delhi: Sage, 2002. Saha, Anindya. “The Indian Party System, 1989–1999.” Seminar 480 (August 1999): 24–34. Sinha, Aseema. “From State to Market via the State Governments: Horizontal Competition after 1991 in India.” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Association of Asian Studies, Boston, April 1999. Subramanian, Narendra. Ethnicity and Populist Mobilization: Political Parties, Citizens and Democracy in South Asia. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999. Wallace, Paul, ed. Region and Nation in India. New Delhi: Oxford and IBH Publishing, 1985.
FEMALE
INFANTICIDE. See
Gender
Human Rights.
FEMALE SEXUAL POWER. See Devı¯ . 66
and
Women’s rights were first advocated in India by men of the elite, whose missionary teachers compared the modern post-Enlightenment developments of the West with India’s apparently moribund society burdened by archaic caste and gender hierarchies. Filtering their understanding of these new Western ideologies through the humanistic lens of ancient Hindu scriptures like the Upanishads, men of the literate castes concluded that India had declined from a “golden age” free of caste and misogyny, which were medieval accretions. Like their British colonial rulers, the reformers denounced female illiteracy and high caste customs like prepuberty marriages, sati (widows’ immolation on their husbands’ funeral pyres), polygamy, widow abuse, and enforced widow celibacy. They also cast a critical eye on female domestic seclusion in the zena¯na¯ (women’s quarters) and the purdah (veil), a custom prevalent among Muslims and Hindus. Elite class men reinforced the rhetoric of Britain’s civilizing mission by accepting the colonial critique of Indian society. Early official surveys on the absence of high caste women in schools appeared to prove that Indian women were completely subjugated and submerged in ignorance. Feminist scholars argue that customs like sati became more common during the wars for colonial hegemony over India. Women of the literate classes, however, were often taught informally at home, and village women often chose religious mendicant vagrancy over a brutal domestic life. Influenced by Victorian views, literate Indian men undertook to improve the condition of elite caste women, while underestimating the potential of working-class women.
Male Reformers’ and Women’s Rights The earliest Bengali reformer was Ram Mohan Roy (1772–1833), who denounced polygamy and sati through his Amitya Sabha (Friendship Association) in 1815, and the Brahmo Samaj (Society of Brahma) in 1828. A similar bhadralok (elite class) humanist was Ishwarchandra Vidyasagar, who petitioned to legalize widow remarriage in Bengal in the 1850s; Vishnusastri Pandit, D. K. Karve, and Viresalingam Pantulu started widows’ remarriage associations in Bombay and Madras in the 1870s and 1880s. The Pra¯rthana Samaj (Prayer Society) in 1867 and ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
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the Vedic Hindu revivalist A¯rya Sama¯j (1875) also promoted women’s education and criticized misogynistic marriage customs as detrimental to female health. In 1896, Justice M. G. Ranade and his wife Ramabai started the Ladies Social Conference, a secular forum within the Indian National Congress. In 1884 B. M. Malabari’s tract on child brides and abused widows horrified Victorian England. In 1891 colonial legislators enacted the Scoble Bill, raising the age (of married girls) for consensual sex from ten to twelve in India. Liberal Hindus like Raghunatha Rao, M. G. Ranade, and Gopal Krishna Gokhale supported such legal reforms, unlike Bal Gangadhar Tilak who opposed colonial intervention in Hindu customs.
Feminist Writers and Activists Several nineteenth-century women writers refuted the charge of female intellectual inferiority and denounced child marriage, widow abuse, dowry, and purdah in vernacular and English literature, while founding schools. The pioneer was Pandita Ramabai Saraswati (1858–1922), a Sanskrit scholar who married out of her caste and who became a vociferous feminist after her husband and family died in a famine. She began the first Indian feminist organization, A¯rya Mahila¯ Sabha¯ (Association of Aryan Women) in 1881. Male reformers appreciated her call to the colonial government to create schools for women doctors and teachers. To pay for her studies in England, she wrote Stree Dharma Niti (Women’s religious ethics) in Marathi in 1881. After much soul-searching, she converted to Christianity in 1884, and she wrote The High Caste Hindu Women (1888) in English to finance her nonsectarian widows’ home, Sharada Sadan. Conservative Hindus like Bal Gangadhar Tilak accused her of proselytizing their daughters, whom they withdrew from the school. Clearly, feminists had to toe the line or be punished by male nationalists. In 1882 Tarabai Shinde wrote Stri Purush Tulana (A comparison of men and women) in Marathi, accusing men of lust and duplicity and of falsely portraying women as seductresses. In 1891 Sarat Kumari Chaudhurani exposed the neglect of girls in her Bengali work, Adorer na Anadorer? (Loved or unloved?). The Muslim Rokeya Sakhawat Hossain advocated gender equality in Bengali, while her English novel, Sultana’s Dream (1905), describes a topsy-turvy world of male seclusion in mardanas resembling women’s zena¯na¯s. Savitribai Phule (1831–1897), a dutiful Hindu wife, described her radical work of educating the lowest castes. Some others were loyal Indian wives but ardent Christians, like Kripabai Sattianadhan (1862–1894), who laid the blame for women’s plight squarely on Hinduism in her English novel, Kamala: The Story of a Hindu Life (1894). Less ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
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famous women criticized patriarchy in journals like Mathar Manoranjani in Tamil in the 1890s, Sadhana in Bengali in the 1890, Stree Darpan in Hindi in 1909, Khatoon in Urdu, and Stree Bodh in Gujarati.
Motherland and Mothers of the Nation Nationalism intensified after Bankim Chatterji’s 1883 poem “Bande Mataram” (Hail to the motherland) was set to music by Rabindranath Tagore (Thakur) and became the anthem of Indian nationalism. The paradigm of divine motherhood for the nation helped raise the status of its domestic mothers. After the 1905 Partition of Bengal, women joined men in boycotting and burning English goods. Young men in Maharashtra and Punjab, as well as Bengal, appeared ready to become martyrs for the motherland; “New Party” Congress activists, led by Bipin Chandra Pal and Tilak, advocated radical revolution. While some men felt threatened by women emancipated from domestic servitude, humanist authors Rabindranath Tagore (1861–1941), C. Subramania Bharati (1882–1924), and A. Madhaviah (1872–1925) praised women’s education in their prose and poetry. Women awakened to their dual identities as feminists and nationalists in this era. Sarladevi Ghoshal Chaudharani (1872–1946), a feminist Hindu revivalist, started her journal Bharati in 1895 and the Bharat Stree Mahamandal (Great Society of Indian Women) in 1910 at Allahabad. At an international women’s suffrage meeting in 1910 in Budapest, Kumudini Mitra advocated violent revolution to win gender rights. Women like Bina Das (b. 1911) and Santi Ghose (b. 1916) attempted to kill British officials. Communist women often subordinated feminism to the class struggle, while nationalists argued that freedom would guarantee women’s rights. Elite women believed that women’s rights were central to national revival through legal means, and they began feminist associations across India to improve their conditions. Mahatma Gandhi’s exhortations to men to emulate female moral superiority helped to empower women. Perceiving themselves as selfless mothers of the nation, they heeded his call to aid its poor women. When he launched his satyagraha (“hold fast to the truth”) campaigns of nonviolent resistance in India after 1917, many women joined, energized by his fervor.
Feminist Associations The primary goals of most women’s associations were to improve women’s literacy and health by abolishing child marriage, enforced widowhood, and purdah. Imitating Ramabai’s A¯rya Mahila Sama¯j, elite women formed similar sectarian and local organizations. In 1886, 67
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Swarnakumari Debi (1856–1932), Rabindranath Tagore’s sister, started Sakhi Samiti (Women’s Friendship League) to spread knowledge among women and widows. In 1900 in Bombay, Parsi women founded the Stri Zarothoshti Mandal (Parsi Women’s Organization). Other welfare groups included the Young Women’s Christian Association and, in 1915, the Anjuman-e-Khawatin-e-Islam (Association for Muslim Women). Viresalingam Pantulu and his wife Rajya Lakshmi founded the Andhra Mahila Sabha (Andhra Women’s Club) in 1910 for girls’ education and widow remarriage. Between 1902 and 1912, Indians established many girls’ schools based on the Indo-centric curriculum advocated by Annie Besant in 1904, and girls’ school enrollment rose substantially. In Madras in 1906, elite Indian and European women started the nonsectarian Tamil Ma¯thar Sangam (Tamil Women’s Organization), which met in Kanchipuram in 1907 and 1914. In 1908 its women activists delivered papers at an all-India Ladies’ Congress (parishad), from which the secular Women’s Indian Association (WIA) drew its initial members, on 8 May 1917 in Adya¯r, Madras. Impressed by the Tamil Ma¯thar Sangam, the Irish suffragist Margaret Cousins proposed an all-Indian organization in 1915. The WIA was India’s first major multiethnic feminist organization. Its initial success was partly due to its effective use of the framework of the Theosophical Society whose head, Annie Besant, was chosen as the first WIA President. Cousins became the WIA’s first honorary secretary, a role shared with Dorothy Jinarajadasa, the Irish wife of a Sri Lankan Theosophist. As the “daughters of India,” they pledged to guide the nation, serve the poor, promote women’s education, abolish child marriage, raise the age of sexual consent to sixteen for women, and win female suffrage and the right to elected office. The WIA was the first organization to connect women’s social and sexual subjugation with patriarchy, poverty, and political disenfranchisement. On 18 December 1917, Sarojini Naidu (1879–1949) headed a WIA delegation to Secretary of State Edwin Montagu. They requested female suffrage on a par with men in expanded provincial legislatures after the 1919 Government of India Act. Although the franchise commission in London did not immediately sanction their request, WIA feminists won an appeal supported by C. Sankaran Nair, the Indian member of the commission, and Indians in the legislative councils. Provincial legislatures were instructed individually to decide upon female suffrage, so that a few women voted in Madras in 1921, in Bombay in 1922, and in other provinces after 1930. In 1927 Muthulakshmi Reddi was elected to the Madras Legislative Assembly as India’s first woman legislator. 68
Portrrait of Sarojini Naidu Pioneer suffragette Sarojini Naidu. She was among fourteen women included in the Constituent Assembly, the body charged with drafting an independent India’s constitution in December 1946. FOTOMEDIA ARCHIVE.
Two other important organizations were the National Council of Women in India (NCWI), founded in 1925, and the All India Women’s Conference for Educational Reform (AIWC), founded in 1927. The NCWI was headed by Mehribai Tata, the wife of a prominent Parsi industrialist. Despite its commitment to women’s issues, the NCWI’s dependence on the British colonial government, patronization of the poor, and conservative attitudes precluded its popularity. The AIWC began with a secular agenda on women’s education and marriage reform in Poona in 1927, led by the Rani of Sangli, the Begam of Bhopal, and the Maharani Chinmabai Saheb of Baroda. However, there were ideological and class differences over how to effect social changes amongst women in purdah. The AIWC has become less elitist and still functions. After 1920 the WIA and AIWC published their own journals, providing information on legislative bills, such as the one to abolish the dedication of de¯vada¯si dancers to temples, where they were reduced to prostitution. The system was legally abolished in 1928 due to the eloquence ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
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of Muthulakshmi Reddi. The WIA also campaigned against purdah and for the 1930 Sarda Act, raising the minimum age of marriage for girls to fourteen. The AIWC campaigned to raise school enrollment of girls, and literacy rates rose over the next decades; it was also instrumental in revamping family laws on divorce and property rights.
commercial destruction of trees and the environment, as in the Chipko movement. Others strive to improve women’s literacy and health; yet these rights must be carefully and consistently guarded against resurgent erosion. Sita Anantha Raman See also Devı¯ ; Women and Political Power; Women’s Education
Women and Independence If early reformers had argued that women were the weaker sex, Mahatma Gandhi emphasized their nobility and self-sacrifice, and his cotton-spinning program was influenced by women. His appeal to elite class women to purify the nation and to aid their disadvantaged sisters was answered by donations of jewelry, the wearing of homespun cloth (khadi ), and the picketing of shops that sold foreign goods and liquor. However, he initially resisted allowing women to join his 1930 Salt March to Dandi, but Sarojini Naidu, Kamaladevi Chattopadhyaya (1903–1990), and Khurshed Naoroji (1894–1966) persuaded him to change his mind. Thousands of women from across India were jailed for “stealing” salt from India’s beaches. Aruna Asaf Ali (1906–1996), Durgabai Deshmukh (1909–1981), and Rajkumari Amrit Kaur (1889–1964) were in the front ranks of “salt thieves.” The formation of the women’s wing of the Indian National Congress in 1942, led by Kamaladevi Chattopadhyaya, facilitated women’s mobilization in the Quit India movement. Jawaharlal Nehru staunchly supported universal suffrage and women’s rights. In recognition of their contributions, fourteen women were included in the Constituent Assembly to draft independent India’s constitution in December 1946. These pioneers were Ammu Swaminathan, Kamala Chowdhuri, Begam Aizaz Rasul, Sarojini Naidu, Hansa Mehta, Sucheta Kripalani, Dakhsayani Velayudhan, Durgabai Deshmukh, Vijayalakshmi Pandit, Begam Jahanara Shah Nawaz, Begam Ikramullah, and Lila Roy. Besides the 1940 Hindu Marriage Validating Act, which removed the caste bar in marriage, post-independence acts favorable to women include the 1955 Hindu Marriage Act, which allowed divorce, and the 1956 Hindu Succession Act, which removed gender disparities in inheritance. Progressive and conservative grassroots women’s organizations have consolidated in postmodern India. Women now organize strikes and morchas (protests) against inflation, discriminatory labor practices, and economic marginalization. They have denounced ministerial interference over female inheritance, as in the Shah Bano case; the resurgence of sati in Rajasthan, in the Roop Kanwar case; dowry deaths related to consumerism; and ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
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BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bharati, C. Subramania. Chandrikaiyin Kadai (Chandrika’s story). 1925. Madras: Sangam Books, 1982. Chatterji, Bankim Chandra. Anandamath. 1882. Translated by Basanta Koomar Roy. Delhi: Orient, 1992. Deshmukh, Durgabai. Stone that Speaketh: The Story of the Andhra Mahila Sabha, vol. 1. Hyderabad: Andhra Mahila Sabha, 1980. Gandhi, Mohandas K. Women’s Role in Society, edited by R. K. Prabhu. Ahmedabad: Navjivan Trust, 1959.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Basu, Aparna, and Bharati Ray. Women’s Struggle: A History of the All India Women’s Conference, 1927–2002. Delhi: Manohar, 2003. Chatterjee, Partha. “The Nationalist Resolution of the Woman Question.” In Recasting Women: Essays in Colonial History, edited by Kumkum Sangari and Sudesh Vaid. Delhi: Kali for Women, 1989. Forbes, Geraldine. “The Indian Women’s Movement: A Struggle for Women’s Rights or National Liberation?” In The Extended Family: Women and Political Participation in India and Pakistan. Delhi: Chanakya, 1981. ———. Women in Modern India. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Kaur, Manmohan. Role of Women in the Freedom Movement, 1857–1947. Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1968. Kosambi, Meera. At the Intersection of Gender Reform and Religious Belief. RCWS Gender Series. Mumbai: SNDT Women’s University, 1993. Kumar, Radha. The History of Doing: An Illustrated Account of Movements for Women’s Rights and Feminism in India, 1800–1990. Delhi: Kali for Women, 1997. Lateef, Shahida. “The Indian Women’s Movement and National Development: An Overview.” In The Extended Family: Women and Political Participation in India and Pakistan. Delhi: Chanakya, 1981. Raman, Sita Anantha Raman. Getting Girls to School: Social Reform in the Tamil Districts, 1870–1930. Kolkata: Sree, 1996. ———. “Crossing Cultural Boundaries: Indian Matriarchs and Sisters in Service.” Journal of Third World Studies 18, no. 2 (Fall 2001): 131–147. Sharma, Radha Krishna. Nationalism, Social Reform, and Indian Women. Patna: Janaki Prakashan, 1981. Talwar, Vir Bharat. “Women’s Journals in Hindi, 1910–20.” In Recasting Women: Essays in Colonial History, edited by Kumkum Sangari and Sudesh Vaid. Delhi: Kali for Women, 1989. 69
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Tharu, Susie, and K. Lalitha. Women Writing in India 600 B.C. to the Early Twentieth Century. New York: Feminist Press, 1991. Wolpert, Stanley. Tilak and Gokhale. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1962.
FEUDALISM The word “feudalism” inevitably brings to mind a number of images: an aristocratic class of landed warrior-nobles constantly at war among themselves, a preponderantly agrarian economy serviced by an impoverished peasantry, and a religious establishment emphasizing values of hierarchy and submission to authority. While the images may have a pronounced European connotation, they may not be entirely out of place in India, and historians, both European and Indian, have for some time debated whether there could be an “Indian feudalism.” The problem, however, is first and foremost one of definitions, for it would seem that there can be as many conceptions of feudalism as there are historians working on the subject. Indeed, in European writing alone, the term has had an exceedingly complex history over the last three hundred years. Two general features, however, seem to unite most concepts of feudalism. First, feudalism is deemed the great political or social order that preceded the rise of the absolutist or colonial state, which, arguably, in turn gave birth to key features of recognizably modern societies and economies. Second, representations of feudalism have rarely been simply neutral descriptions. Many early writings on feudalism were written with a strong reformist agenda, and were part of the liberal project of defeating the political order of the ancien régime. Later, concepts of feudalism or semifeudalism have been regularly invoked in Marxist political thought as part of their own accounts of the rise of bourgeois society. The first systematic argument for the existence of feudalism in India was forwarded by Lieutenant Colonel James Tod, who served the British East India Company at the turn of the nineteenth century and first published what would become a famous work on western India, Annals and Antiquities of Rajasthan in 1829–1832. Inspired by Henry Hallam’s recently published History of the Middle Ages, Tod argued that the Rajputs of India had a system of “pure feuds” analogous to those of medieval Europe. For Tod, this was the case because the Rajputs, being of “Scythian” racial stock, were descended from the same Central Asian peoples who formed the forebears of the tribes in early Europe. The feudal compact that emerged in both places was based on obligations between vassal and sovereign secured through bonds of kinship or personal loyalty. The claims by Rajput kings to have descended from either the sun or the moon created a factional political system, in which disputes were 70
resolved through feuds. Though a strong king might reduce such internecine warfare, it remained a systemic feature of Rajput society. Tod admitted that the Rajputs, as he encountered them, had been subjected to an exterior despotic force from North India, and he counterposed Rajput feudalism to the centralized rule of powers like the Marathas and the Mughals. Tod believed that if the Rajputs could be restored to their original prosperity, they would not only pose no threat to British interests (with their own divisive tendencies keeping them in check), but that they would also prove potential allies against any Russian encroachment on Britain’s valuable possessions in India. Tod’s idea of Rajput feudalism was largely overtaken and displaced by other theories among British historians in colonial India, but some of its features tended to become absorbed into a more generalized notion of ancient and medieval Hindu polities as atomistic, divisive, and entropic, which often mixed uneasily with notions of Oriental despotism. Soon, this image itself became associated with a putative “medieval” period emerging among historians in both imperialist and nationalist circles. According to Vincent Smith’s famous history of early India, the great ancient imperial experiments of the Mauryans and the Guptas collapsed by the seventh century, giving way to a medley of petty states engaged in unceasing internecine warfare. Smith’s stance was that this was the natural state of affairs among Indian princes unless they were checked by some superior authority like the British. Nationalist historians mapped representations of feudalized political chaos onto the idea of the fall of the golden age and medieval decline, often using political chaos as an explanation for “national weakness” before invading Islamic armies. Though such notions of a vague political feudalism have persisted in some historical circles, they have been largely overtaken by a more systematic treatment of feudalism from an entirely different angle since the 1950s, when scholars of Marxist persuasion sought to come to terms with pre-colonial Indian society. The classification of societies through the “mode of production” concept had been an integral feature of Marxist historical thought from its inception. Its impetus came from Marx himself, who in order to develop a better understanding of the rise of capitalism, proposed a sequence of modes of production in Europe, beginning with primitive communism, which evolved sequentially into the “slave” and “feudal” modes of production and finally into a capitalist mode of production. What made each mode of production unique was its peculiar combination of forces of production (tools, materials, and labor processes) and relations of production (the ownership of productive forces), and following from this, the particular means by which a ruling ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
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class extracted surplus from the laboring class. Feudalism, from this point of view, could be characterized on the one hand as an agrarian society composed of small-scale peasant producers who met their own subsistence needs with a labor force based on the family, and on the other as a society in which a class of landed lords extracted surplus from these peasants through rent. Feudal rent was deemed “noneconomic” because it was not settled through the dynamics of the market forces, but instead on the superior force possessed by the land-owing class with its coercive, lordly prerogatives. This class was a military aristocracy whose ranks were divided into great lords and free vassals who entered into feudal “compacts,” whereby a piece of landed property (fief) was held by the vassal from the lord in return for military service or counsel. In contrast to the life of the aristocracy was the unfree condition of peasants or “serfs,” who had no property rights (save that of use), were restricted in movement, and were obliged to surrender the product of their labor over and above what was needed for the reproduction of the peasant household.
Marxist Interpretations How India measured up to this portrayal is a vexed and complex topic. Marxist thinking on India’s pre-colonial society may be traced to Karl Marx himself, who wrote several pieces on British imperialism in India from the 1850s. Drawing on diverse sources, Marx argued that Indian society, as elsewhere in Asia, differed substantially from that of Europe. Here Marx drew on thinking from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that, written against the backdrop of European absolutist states, saw Asiatic governments as despotic in nature. Other sources included Henry Maine’s theory of the self-sufficient, isolated village community in India and the general notion, championed by G. W. F. Hegel and others, that Asian societies were static and unchanging. On these bases, Marx concluded that India and other Asiatic societies could not be placed in the developmental continuum of European society (slave or feudal) and instead developed the controversial concept of the “Asiatic mode of production.” The key features of the Asiatic mode of production included the absence of private property resulting from the king’s absolute ownership of all land, state control of irrigation and public works, and the decentralized and communal nature of production at the village level. The absence of private property, combined with despotic (as opposed to feudal) rule, prevented India from developing the dynamic forces that led to social development, a process which was only brought about through the external force of colonialism. Despite its obvious moorings in the Orientalist perception of the East, the Asiatic mode of production suggested by Marx and Friedrich Engels represented an ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
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important and often neglected contribution to further social analysis—the attempt to account for the specificity of societies outside Europe. The concept, however, was largely abandoned during the period of the Third International (1919–1943), the congress of different communist parties across the globe, and during the anti-imperialist movements of the 1930s by communist intellectuals, who instead sought to understand Asiatic societies in terms of the unilinear development from primitive communism to capitalism. It is against this background, and the additional context of a robust nationalist historiography, that a number of Indian Marxist historians in the 1950s and 1960s reassessed early Indian society in terms of Marxist categories. A vast amount of new information on precolonial Indian society had come to light in the hundred years since Marx’s first articles on the subject, and much of this evidence contradicted the premises of the Asiatic mode of production. It suggested in the first instance that while the village remained to some extent an independent economic unit, it possessed a far greater degree of economic differentiation than Marx had assumed. Also, Marx’s idea that all of the surplus product of the village went entirely into the hands of the state was incorrect. There was, in fact, a whole class of hereditary claimants to shares in rent: courtiers, military retainers, provincial lords, and religious institutions in earlier times, and in later times Mughal zamindars (landowners). Such claims further indicate the presence of what Marx had thought was absent in India, the private ownership of land-shares. The situation of the classes that held these shares, placed between the king and the peasants, suggests an arrangement generally akin to feudal land ownership. Most importantly, it is clear that political and economic structures, land ownership, and trade and commodity production underwent change over time in pre-colonial India, contradicting the presumed stasis of Asiatic society before the coming of European imperialism.
Indian Feudalism Marxist historians subsequently developed the theory of “Indian feudalism” to explain the social formation emerging with the Guptas in the fourth century and extending down to the establishment of the Turkish power in Delhi during the thirteenth century. Marxist historians of later medieval India have been more reticent in applying the category of feudalism to the great Muslim empires of northern India. For the earlier period, the pioneering study of D. D. Kosambi suggested two phases of development: an initial phase of “feudalism from above,” in which kings alienated land rights to subordinates, functionaries, and religious institutions; and a later phase of “feudalism from below,” in which a class of 71
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landed intermediaries emerged at the village level. Kosambi’s observations were supplemented by the more detailed and comprehensive works of R. S. Sharma and others in the 1960s. Sharma began with the point that the alienation of tax revenues in the land grants from the Gupta period was accompanied by the surrender of administrative and judicial powers, resulting in the parcelization of sovereignty and the decentralization of state power. While most of the extant land grants preserved on permanent materials (copper plate or stone) were made to religious institutions, evidence suggests that royal functionaries and servants were also remunerated in land revenues. Numerous officials and military retainers from the sixth century appear to take titles that imply land ownership (bhogika, bhogapati). Part of the argument here has also rested on wider economic factors. There is a well-documented contraction of the larger urban centers, a decline in trade networks and petty commodity production, and an apparent paucity of coinage in North India during post-Gupta times. In such an increasingly ruralized economy, payment for services, whether religious or secular, was necessarily in land revenue rather than cash. The royal charters and records, which by the sixth century begin to include genealogical introductions in high poetic style, do seem to suggest considerable evidence for the growth of “lord-vassal” relationships among ruling elites, though no single feudal compact can be attested in the legal literature of the period. The famous Allahabad pillar inscription of the Gupta king Samudragupta (ruled c. 330–380) mentions that subordinate kings were expected not only to pay tribute and offer themselves for military assistance, but were to provide daughters (in marriage), and attend court to pay physical obeisance to the Gupta monarch. The emphasis on personal submission and courtly hierarchy was highly pronounced in political life, from the proliferation of increasingly calibrated titles (sa¯manta, maha¯samanta, mandalesvara, maha¯mandalesvara) for ranks of subordinates, to elaborate gestural, verbal, and sumptuary protocols (like the bearing of insignia and possession of five musical instruments in public procession), which were enacted between men of different rank at court. Literary and genealogical records also suggest the existence of a loose code of warrior ethics that emphasized a fierce but honorable heroism as well as a compassionate irenism. The latter tendency may have been the influence of religious elites (Brahmans and monks) who regularly attended or served at the more important aristocratic households. Religious institutions, however, tended to reinforce rather than undermine feudal social relations, and the symmetry between religious and political ideologies in this period is notable. Hindu temples, for example, were much like palaces in their spatial arrangement—the 72
central god of the temple was surrounded by subordinate forms and divinities in a carefully calibrated fashion to reflect perceived rank and hierarchy. The major religious ideology of the period, bhakti, or devoted participation in the majesty of god, conceived of lordship as an encompassing yet hierarchical mastery that mirrored the nested rights which obtained between lords and their inferiors in the secular realm. Religious and courtly texts in fact present a single dispositional and affective vocabulary to encode relations between lords and subordinates across both religious and political realms: the subordinate honored his lord with loyalty (bhakti) and service ( pu¯ja¯, seva¯), and the lord in turn exhibited his grace (anugraha) through the bestowal of favor (prasa¯da). In fact, religious and political realms were largely continuous, leading some scholars to argue for a great “chain of being” in medieval India. How the political order was constituted is somewhat uncertain, as some vassals seem to have originally been independent lords of minor royal status who entered service through conquest and subordination, while others seem to have been courtiers or functionaries who were granted lands by the king as favors. These two categories often merged over time. Because of the difficulty in interpreting the meaning of many terms for hereditary administrators and vassals left in the inscriptional record, and because of their regional variation, it is difficult to indicate the precise stages and structures of feudal organization. Yet by the sixth century it is clear that there were a large number of hereditary intermediaries between the royal authority and the producing classes. This situation was compounded by a tendency of subinfeudation, as the alienation of revenues in land grants often (and sometimes necessarily) conferred upon donees the right to have the land cultivated by other groups, leading to a hierarchy of shares and rights on the land. The consequences of this “feudalization” for peasants were serious. First, the system of land grants tended to transfer the communal rights of village cultivators to donees, who in turn often conferred shares to tenants, petty officials, and other “great men of the village” who enriched themselves from the threshing floor at the expense of the direct producer. The proliferation of intermediaries thus placed a continual burden on the actual cultivator, as the increase in rents and imposts drained all but the bare minimum of produce necessary for the reproduction of the peasant household. Sharma and others have additionally pointed out the existence of corvée or forced labor-rent (vishti) as well as legal restrictions on the movement of the peasantry (villages were granted with their inhabitants, and donees could restrain them) as indications of their serflike status. Historians of Indian feudalism recognized deficiencies in the evidence, differences on a number of points with ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
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the European model, and significant variations in regional development within the subcontinent itself. While the system of land grants was well-established in central India and Maharashtra, for example, it seems to have been significantly weaker in the Punjab, where very few land records have survived from medieval times. The explanation (not altogether satisfactory) for this state of affairs has been the existence of a more robust money economy in the region under the Hindu Shahi dynasty. It was generally held that the feudal system that evolved from Gupta times was effectively disrupted in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries by the establishment of the Delhi Sultanate, which saw the centralization of political power, the relegation of the feudal class to petty landlords, and a new invigoration of trade and commodity circulation.
Challenges and Debate By the late 1970s a number of dissenters to the theory of Indian feudalism had emerged from within the ranks of Marxist historians in India, and they were joined by scholars of various disciplines from outside the Marxist tradition working on such topics as monetary history, urbanization, and “state formation” in early India. The challenges to the feudalist thesis were twofold. The first was evidentiary. There were long-standing critiques by epigraphists that the evidence of the land charters could not support the existence of vassalage, but only of religious “landlordism” at best. The theory of a demonetized economy was challenged as resting on weak methodology, and it was suggested that North India, during the period between A.D. 600 and 1000, had just as many coins in circulation as in earlier times. Similarly, the thesis of widespread urban decay had to be counterbalanced by the fact that while archaeology seemed to demonstrate that the great cities of early historic India did witness a marked contraction in size, the period also saw considerable urban growth, as new regional capitals and smaller urban settlements emerged throughout many regions in the subcontinent. The other challenges to the feudalist position were theoretical. It was pointed out that the evolution of feudal structures was attributed entirely to state action instead of class relations, as in Europe. The notion of a subject peasantry was also challenged. These arguments combined with a number of other critiques, which suggested that the entire theory of Indian feudalism had borrowed too heavily from European precedents, and had a tendency to force the Indian evidence into ready-made European historical case studies rather than using Marxist theoretical tools to deal with the Indian evidence. Such criticisms for the most part were not intended to dismiss entirely the relevance of the feudalism concept or Marxist approaches as such, but to underscore the inability of such ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
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model-based methods to account for the specificity of the Indian situation. Needless to say, these critiques and alternatives elicited a vigorous debate, which featured in the pages of history journals sporadically for nearly two decades. The discussions have led to the question of whether there can be variants of feudalism, and if so, what degree of variation in any particular instantiation might risk rendering the concept so inclusive as to lose any discriminatory meaning. The debates took place in the context of new, often non-Marxist, theories of state formation and long durée development in early India. An important contribution of one of these latter approaches, which has been called “integrative” or “processual,” has been the emphasis on reading the evidence of the period as “productive”— mostly in criticizing the thesis of political fragmentation and urban decay—that is, inquiring into what grew up in medieval India rather than what fell apart. Such an approach, perhaps ironically, has considerable potential for re-orienting and invigorating any theory of Indian feudalism that has yet to be realized. As it stands, it is perhaps an open question as to whether the theory of Indian feudalism is in disrepute. But any trip to parts of the Indian countryside even today, where the rural poor endure conditions of abject poverty and staggering inhumanity at the hands of landed interests, in part as the result of age-old social relationships at the village level, surely vindicates the fundamental concerns of Marxist scholarship in India, whatever the fate of “Indian feudalism.” Daud Ali See also Guptan Empire
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bailey, Anne, and Josep Llobera, eds. The Asiatic Mode of Production: Science and Politics. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981. Chattopadhyaya, B. D. The Making of Early Medieval India. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1994. Deyell, John. Living without Silver: The Monetary History of Early Medieval North India. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1990. Habib, Irfan. The Agrarian System of Mughal India, 1556–1707. 2nd ed. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999. Jha, D. N. The Feudal Order: State, Society and Ideology in Early Medieval India. Delhi: Manohar, 2000. Kosambi, D. D. An Introduction to the Study of Indian History. Mumbai: People’s Publishing House, 1956. Mukhia, Harbans, ed. The Feudalism Debate. Delhi: Manohar, 1999. Sahu, Bhairabi Prasad, ed. Land System and Rural Society in Early India. Delhi: Manohar, 1997. Sharma, Ram Sharan. Indian Feudalism: c. 300–1300. 2nd ed. Delhi: Macmillan, 1980. 73
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Tod, James. Annals and Antiquities of Rajasthan, or the Central and Western Rajpoot States of India. 1829–1832. Reprint, London: George Routledge and Sons, 1914. Yadava, B. N. S. Society and Culture in Northern India in the Twelfth Century. Allahabad: Central Book Depot, 1973.
often accompanied by chords that, while resembling Western harmonic practice, are distinctly South Asian.
FILMI¯GI¯T Filmı¯ gı¯ t (English “film” + Hindi gı¯ t, “song”)
BIBLIOGRAPHY
refers to the music (particularly the songs) of popular South Asian movies. Many films have five or six major musical items; each song and its elaborate choreography acts as commentary on the drama. The songs are often as important as the story and the actors, and producers sometimes prerelease selected items in order to determine whether or not to release a film. A song’s success ensures a film’s release. Although each linguistic region has a film industry, the most important center is Bombay (Mumbai), which carries the moniker “Bollywood.”
Arnold, Alison. “Popular Film Song in India: A Case of Mass-Market Musical Eclecticism.” Popular Music 7, no. 2 (1988): 177–188.
The diverse audience within India, as well as other parts of the world, and the increasingly cosmopolitan attitudes of India’s middle class demand an exceptionally eclectic musical approach. The composers and music producers for popular film incorporate a variety of different regional genres, idioms, and instruments, as well as Western ideas. A film might incorporate a small orchestra, sitars, temple bells, electric guitars, synthesizers, and folk drums (such as the dholak); it may borrow from classical Indian and European compositions or imitate Latin American and East Asian musical styles. One result is a kind of pan-Indian musical style that has had a normalizing effect on South Asian communities around the world. Many songs follow the verse-chorus format of popular religious and folk songs, usually with an instrumental introduction and an interlude. One regional style of folk song and dance genre that composers have used extensively in Indian film is that of Panjabi bha¯ngra¯. Whether the film is set in northwest or south India, Bollywood music producers often insert bha¯ngra¯ rhythms and dance movements. Indeed, filmı¯ bha¯ngra¯, with the addition of Western bass and drums and an electronic mixing, has gained an appreciative young audience in Britain. Vocal melody dominates filmı¯ gı¯ t, and a select group of playback singers (most notably Lata Mangeshkar) are in demand to perform these songs. In a fiction well known to film fans, screen actors mouth the words of recordings made by the playback singers. The separation of roles has allowed some singers to be active for decades as new sets of fresh young actors add their dramatic gestures as part of their interpretation. Filmı¯ gı¯ t melodies have characteristic Indian vocal ornamentation and Indian and Western scale patterns 74
Gordon Thompson See also Film Industry; Music
FILM INDUSTRY In the years leading up to the 1990s, Bollywood was a glamorous cottage industry, churning out hundreds of films annually for a domestic market whose population was poised to edge over the one billion mark by the end of the millennium. Because the films were in Hindustani, a variant of the Hindi language, approximately 40 percent of the population, especially in the northern regions, became cinema fans. Whether they crowded the new multiplex theaters in the cities or huddled in the rural villages in front of makeshift screens fashioned from little more than a sheet stretched between two trees, they alone determined which film became a hit, not through a single viewing but by revisiting the same film dozens of times. The industry knew how to play to its audience and rarely strayed from convention. The films were structurally the same, the formula aptly described, somewhat tongue in cheek, by novelist Ashok Banker: “What else can you expect from a genre that requires every film to have a young goodlooking romantic lead couple, half a dozen or more lengthy songs lip-synced by actors to playback singers, costume changes every five minutes and an utter disregard for most film narrative conventions?” Nevertheless, in terms of production, the industry thrived. In 1991 Bollywood released a record 215 films. The market, however, remained relatively insular, with exports shipped mainly to the Gulf states. That changed in 1995 with Dilwale Dulhania Le Jayenge, a huge hit in the United Kingdom and the United States that launched a trend. Producers suddenly realized that scattered around the world was a vast nonresident Indian audience, estimated at 20 million in more than a dozen countries, all hungry to see the latest Bollywood films. To satisfy demand, and to attract an even wider audience, producers began releasing both contemporary and classic Hindi, and a few Tamil, films on DVD, with subtitles in English and wide-screen presentation. As a result, in 1995 the steadily increasing popularity of Bollywood films in emerging markets sparked an annual growth rate of 15 percent, three times that of India’s 5 percent gross ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
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got 4 million rupees for a film, when only two years earlier he had signed up to make an R. K. Nayyar film for a mere 50,000 rupees. Similarly, a screen heroine like Madhuri Dixit in 1993 was getting 2 million rupees a film. By 2000 a superstar like Shah Rukh Khan was charging up to 30 million rupees per film, while a costar of Dixit’s stature could expect between 10 million and 12.5 million rupees. The top Bollywood stars signed contracts to act in three to four films simultaneously, which considerably slowed production on individual films, sometimes by up to six months. Once the films were released, the producers of course expected a payday. Domestic rights sold to the various distributors made up the bulk of a film’s revenue, which hovered around 80 percent, while overseas rights drew close to 12 percent. Music rights, which brought in between 4 to 5 percent of a film’s earnings, were also a major revenue generator. Music companies like Saregama, TIPS, Sony Music, and Venus competed fiercely to acquire the music rights of the latest films, since film music accounted for 70 percent and new film music for 48 percent of India’s total music sales. Yet, even with a stellar cast, only 20 percent of the 160-odd Hindi films released in a year were commercially successful, and approximately eight of them were viable hits.
Bollywood Movie Poster. Advertisement for the 2000 film Kaho Naa . . . Pyaar Hai (Say this is love) that captured the imagination of the Bollywood-watching world. A huge hit on the subcontinent and blockbuster phenomenon with the Indian diaspora, it also made its lead, Hrithik Roshan (shown here), an international celebrity. FOTOMEDIA ARCHIVE.
domestic product growth. In a good year, a Bollywood hit could earn revenues of 25 percent or more, and by 2000 Bollywood’s global annual revenues were estimated at $1.3 billion. Overall, film revenues increased sixfold between 1991 and 1999. Whereas Saudagar, released in 1991, generated total revenues of a reported 43.6 million rupees, Subhash Ghai’s Taal, released nine years later, raked in 266.9 million rupees. As revenues rose substantially during that period, so did the cost of filmmaking. By the end of the decade, the cost of a major Bollywood production featuring the top stars was budgeted at between 150 and 200 million rupees. The leading actors commanded a lion’s share of the film’s budget, their fees ranging between 15 million and 30 million rupees, depending on their star status. In 1993, for example, Sanjay Dutt demanded and ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
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With the steady rise of revenues, the film industry attracted parallel criminal enterprises. As early as 1991, the same year the industry released its record number of films, Bollywood estimated it was losing as much as 10 million rupees a day to video piracy. By 2001 India estimated its trade losses due to piracy at $70 million. Throughout that ten-year span, pirated films were available in India’s major cities well before the film’s local theatrical release. Although India had its own copyright laws, enforcement was lax and haphazard. Raiding smallscale pirates was commonplace, but the larger pirates remained elusive, either because of official protection, or because they set up smaller “fall guy” operations to avoid capture. If arrested, their prosecutions were hampered. Such was the case of two factories in the state of Haryana and the state of Rajasthan known to be manufacturing a significant number of the pirated VCDs. The facilities were raided, but because of slow, cumbersome, and costly criminal procedures weighted against the legitimate copyright owners at every step, they soon reopened and were back in operation. By the end of 2001, the Bollywood film industry had 608 criminal cases pending in the courts, only four of which resulted in conviction. The first conviction was in January 1997, when a Bangalore court sentenced a video pirate to three years hard labor in a case that dated from 1993. The second conviction came in May 1997, when a New Delhi magistrate sentenced a cable operator (the 75
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first to be convicted for cable piracy) to six months hard labor and ordered him to pay a fine of 5,000 rupees, which at the time amounted to approximately $103. In early 1999, the third conviction, following a raid conducted in 1986, resulted in a sentence of one year in prison and a fine of approximately $118. The fourth case, the first of its kind brought against a video pirate under the new 1995 Indian Copyright Act, was decided in December 1998. Some of these cases, however, were reversed on appeal. If piracy had been financially damaging to the film industry, the infiltration of the Indian mafia was insidious. Yet the symbiosis between Bollywood and the Indian criminal underworld was nothing new. More than thirty years ago, crime boss Haji Mastan was so enraptured with an aspiring Bollywood actress that he began producing films with her in the starring roles. Decades later, Abu Salem, one of the more prominent gangland figures, even named his sons after his favorite on-screen heroes. Suketu Mehta, who wrote the critically acclaimed Mission Kashmir, explained the connection for this romance between film and crime: “The Hindi filmmakers are fascinated by the lives of the gangsters, and draw upon them for material. The gangsters, from the shooter on the ground to the don-in-exile at the top, watch Hindi movies keenly, and model themselves—their dialogue, the way they carry themselves—on their screen equivalents.” The romance ended there. Evading the jurisdiction of the Indian police by operating from Karachi in neighboring Pakistan, as well as from Nairobi, Dubai, and even New Jersey, and conducting their criminal activities by cell phone, the crime bosses lured financially strapped filmmakers into loan-sharking schemes, where the payoffs were exorbitant regardless of the film’s box-office performance. They also used overseas concerts as money-laundering fronts, with the stars agreeing to appear as headliners in order to avoid starring in mafiafunded films. An insight into just how deeply the crime bosses had insinuated themselves into the Bollywood film industry came to light when Sanjay Dutt was arrested on charges of dealing with the mafia following the Mumbai communal riots of 1993. During his trial, a taped phone conversation surfaced that allegedly featured Dutt ingratiating himself with mafia crime boss Chhota Shakeel. The tape was later introduced as evidence in a separate trial when film producer Bharat Shah was facing charges of conspiring with underworld figures to murder Bollywood superstars Hrithik Roshan, Aamir Khan, and Shah Rukh Khan. Stars were not the only ones targeted. Producer Mukesh Duggal was shot and killed in Mumbai in June 76
1997. Two months later, allegedly on orders from Abu Salem, producer Gulsham Kumar was shot dead outside a Mumbai temple. In December of that year, producer Manmohan Shetty survived an attempt on his life. In 2000 director Rajiv Rai also escaped a kidnapping/ murder attempt and moved to London. A year later, director Rakesh Roshan survived an assassination attempt outside his Mumbai office because he reportedly refused to sell the overseas rights of his Kaho Na . . . Pyaar Hai to gangsters. And in late 2001 the Indian police revealed a mafia plot to kill actor Aamir Khan and director Ashutosh Gowariker after they had spurned extortion attempts following the success of Lagaan. Toward the close of the decade, an estimated 40 percent of the film industry’s finances came from organized crime. To loosen the underworld’s grip on the film community and to stem the wave of attacks on its celebrities, the Indian government in 1998 granted Bollywood industry status. Two years later the official mechanisms were in place, which allowed filmmakers to obtain loans and other forms of aid from financial institutions as well as to secure insurance for delays and losses. Still, some remained skeptical. “The industry is often guilty of tax evasion, and big people in it lead a lifestyle far beyond their declared incomes,” the Hindu newspaper declared in its editorial pages. “Unless these cobwebs are cleared, the cinema here will continue to be plagued by failure and unsurmountable hardship.” But Bollywood made efforts to clean up its act. By 2002 there were at least half a dozen public offerings for film-related companies, although they all traded at less than half their opening price. Meanwhile, such Indian corporate titans as the $8 billion Tata Group and the $13 billion Reliance Industries were seriously considering venturing into film production. Bankers, too, saw Bollywood in a different light. In 2001 the Industrial Development Bank of India became the first to lend $13.5 million to fourteen Bollywood productions. Similarly, Insight Productions and iDream Productions, each an offshoot of local investment banks, were confident they could turn a profit by imposing hard-nosed business methods on what had long been a chaotic industry. Consequently, police authorities estimated that by 2002 only 10 percent of Bollywood’s films were backed by mob financing. Official governmental recognition also conferred cultural legitimacy. Ever since the premiere screening of the first Hindi, albeit silent, full-length feature film Raja Harishchandra in 1913 at Mumbai Coronation Cinematograph theater, Bollywood had been India’s orphan industry. According to writer Vijay Mishra, “The Cinematograph Acts of 1918 and 1919 and the establishment of the ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
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Indian Cinematograph Committee of Inquiry in 1927 were informed by an emphatic definition of cinema as pure entertainment without any social (and even artistic) significance. These assumptions about cinema made their way into postcolonial India’s Cinematograph (Amendment) Act of 1973, too.” Only recently has Mumbai cinema begun to receive attention as an object of serious critical scholarship from Mishra and others. Meanwhile, the debate over how Bollywood acquired its name raged on. Theories abounded, but Madhava Prasad believed she may have settled the issue. In a 1932 issue of American Cinematographer, she found an article by Wilford E. Deming, an American engineer who claims that “under my supervision was produced India’s first sound and talking picture.” In the article, he mentions a telegram he received as he was leaving India following his assignment: “Tollywood sends best wishes happy new year to Lubill film doing wonderfully records broken.” He went on to explain that “our Calcutta studio was located in the suburb of Tollygunge . . . Tolly being a proper name and Gunge meaning locality. After studying the advantages of Hollygunge we decided on Tollywood. There being two studios at present in that locality, and several more projected, the name seems appropriate.” Thus, Prasad concluded, “it was Hollywood itself, in a manner of speaking, that, with the confidence that comes from global supremacy, renamed a concentration of production facilities to make it look like its own baby.” Nowadays, Americans are familiar with Bollywood, more by its influence than by its product. Director Baz Luhrmann candidly admitted his Moulin Rouge! was inspired by Bollywood’s cinematic extravaganzas. Andrew Lloyd Webber’s musical Bombay Dreams, replete with Bollywood overtones, headed for Broadway following a successful run in London’s West End. In 2002 Hyperion Pictures announced it was going into production on the musical comedy Marigold, which represented the first full-fledged joint venture between Hollywood and Bollywood. That Western artists were borrowing from Bollywood remains significant. The last decade of the twentieth century marked the milestone when Bollywood came into its own as a vibrant industry, accorded respect and globally appreciated as a cultural phenomenon in its own right. Michel W. Potts BIBLIOGRAPHY
Banker, Ashok. Bollywood. London: Pocket Essentials Film, 2001. “Married to the Mob: Bollywood’s Mafia Underbelly.” Available at “Misty Frames.” Hindu 1 November 2000. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
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Mishra, Vijay. Bollywood Cinema: Temples of Desire. New York: Routledge, 2002.
FINANCE COMMISSION One of the distinguishing institutions of India’s federal polity, the Finance Commission provides a constitutional mechanism for the transfer of resources from the national to subnational governments in a fair and judicious manner. India’s Constitution vests powers to levy most of the major revenue-yielding taxes, including income tax and general excise duties, with the central government. The only massbased tax assigned to the states is the sales tax. On the other hand, many functions that require large expenditures, including police, public health, and sanitation, are assigned to the states, creating a serious gap in the fiscal system, with roughly 55 percent of aggregate expenditures undertaken at the state level, while only about 35 percent of aggregate revenues are raised by the states. All of India’s states need transfers, but the most backward states need the greatest assistance from the central government to enable them to provide even minimal public services. Article 280 of India’s Constitution mandates the president to appoint an independent Finance Commission at least once every five years to recommend to the president: the proper distribution of taxes collected by the central government, that are to be shared between the central government and the states and their allocation among the states; and the principles that should govern “grants-in-aid” to states in need of assistance, which the Parliament is authorized to make under Article 275. Since 2000, revenues from all central taxes constitute a divisible pool. The president may also refer “any other matter” to the commission for its recommendations “in the interests of sound finance.” Since 1993, following constitutional recognition of a “third tier” of government in the country, namely village and district panchayats and urban municipalities, the Finance Commission has been required to recommend measures to help state governments supplement the resources of the local bodies. The commission is also advised to keep in mind the revenue needs of both the central government and the states in meeting their essential expenditures. In recent years the commission has also been asked to review “the state of finances of the Union and the states” and suggest ways “to restore budgetary balance and maintain macroeconomic stability.” Every commission is normally required to make recommendations to cover a five-year period. Since independence there have been twelve Finance Commissions. Recommendations of the commission are accepted by Parliament without modification, with rare 77
FINANCE COMMISSION
TABLE 1
Criteria and relative weights for determining inter se shares of states in union taxes: Tenth and Eleventh Finance Commissions Criterion 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.
Population Income–distance(1) Area Index of infrastructure Tax effort(2) Fiscal discipline(2)
Tenth Finance Commission
Eleventh Finance Commission
20.0 60.0 5.0 5.0 10.0 —
10.0 62.5 7.5 7.5 5.0 7.5
(1) This reflects the difference in the per capita income of a given state from that of the highest income state or that of a group of states with the highest per capita income. (2) As measured by formulas spelled out in the respective commission’s reports. SOURCE:
Courtesy of author.
exceptions, regarded almost as an impartial “award.” Apart from taking note of the legitimate revenue needs of both levels of government, two cardinal commission principles have been to treat all states on a uniform basis, and to use the transfer mechanism to reduce interstate inequalities. “Upgradation grants” have been a regular feature of the transfers. Grants are also recommended for relief in the event of natural calamities. Commission transfers, comprising tax share and grants-in-aid, have generally been unconditional, the former being regarded almost as an “entitlement” of the states. The states have persistently complained that transfers have not been adequate, though transfers to states as a proportion of central government revenues have risen from less than 25 percent in the 1950s to around 35 percent by 2002. Nevertheless, the states find it increasingly difficult to meet their expenditure out of the revenues made available to them. Transfers have played a significant role in reducing revenue disparities among the states, per capita revenue of low-income states from their own sources usually being less than one-third that of the higher-income states. Per capita current expenditure of poorer states is nearly two-thirds that of the richer states. Even so, interstate disparities in revenue capacity have increased over the years, and federal transfers have not fully offset the fiscal disabilities of the poorer states. A factor undermining fiscal discipline among the states has been the manner in which commission grants are determined. After laying down the formula for tax devolution, the commission assesses the budgetary position of each state by projecting its revenue and expenditure. Although the projections are made on reasonable 78
assumptions regarding the likely growth of the states’ revenue and expenditure, in reality “history” dominates the estimates, tending to breed fiscal laxity among the states. The Tenth and Eleventh Finance Commissions have tried to rectify this deficiency by introducing weights for “tax effort” and “fiscal discipline” in their tax devolution formula as shown in Table 1. Debt relief measures recommended by the recent commissions are also linked to criteria designed to induce better fiscal management. How far such devices help inculcate fiscal discipline remains to be seen. Attaching strings to statutory transfers also raises questions about the central government’s infringement of the states’ fiscal autonomy. Not all the blame for the ills of the transfer system can be attributed to the commission, however. Contrary to the constitutional scheme, a substantial portion of transfers has been routed through other channels. About onethird of the revenue transfers to the states has been dispensed by the Planning Commission, a body created to draw up and implement the five-year plan. Some funds are transferred by central ministries at their own discretion. Such multiplicity of channels with overlapping jurisdictions has blurred the overall efficiency the transfers. Despite its perverse effects, the gap filling approach continues to cast its shadow over the commission’s transfer scheme. The Ninth Commission attempted to introduce normative principles in deciding the transfers. The Eleventh also tried to anchor the transfers to objective norms. But their attempts did not go very far. Even a fully normative transfer scheme may not succeed in inculcating fiscal discipline among the states without a credible commitment to a “no-bail-out policy” on the part of the central government. Debt relief granted by the commission periodically has not much helped to improve matters. There is thus urgent need for reforms of the transfer system if the Finance Commission is to play the constitutional role more effectively. Amaresh Bagchi BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bagchi, Amaresh. “Fifty Years of Fiscal Federalism in India.” Kale Memorial Lecture, Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics, Pune, 2001. Bird, Richard M., and F. Vaillancourt. Fiscal Decentralization in Developing Countries. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1998. Godbole, Madhav. “Finance Commissions in a Cul-de-Sac.” Economic and Political Weekly 36, no. 1 (6–12 January 2001): 29–34. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
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Rao, M. Govinda, and Tapas K. Sen. Fiscal Federalism in India: Theory and Practice. New Delhi: Macmillan, 1996. Vithal, B. P. R., and M. L. Sastry. Fiscal Federalism in India. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2001.
“permanent settlement,” raised less revenue than its land was worth and thus spent less. Bombay and Madras raised more land revenue and spent more.
Instability FISCAL SYSTEM AND POLICY FROM 1858 TO 1947 The fiscal system of British India has figured prominently in debates on the political origins of underdevelopment. The question often asked is: Did India’s political status compromise the government’s capacity to make investments?
Federal Structure Two features persistently influenced the fiscal system of British India: the federal structure, and susceptibility to external shocks. Before British Crown rule began in 1858, the finances of the three major presidencies— Bombay, Bengal, and Madras—were nearly autonomous. The basic structure of federal finance was established in the first twenty years of British rule. Under the new arrangement, customs, salt tax, opium tax, and railway income were the main revenues raised and used exclusively by the central government. Receipts of provincial administrative departments, such as law and justice or education, went only to the provinces. Land revenue and excise taxes were shared. Only the central government could borrow. As for expenditure, the central government was responsible for defense, while the provinces were left in charge of local administration, education, and public health. This structure caused persistent friction between the central government and the provinces. The provinces believed they had control over sources of income that were too few and too limited. The Government of India Acts of 1919 and 1935 and the legislative assemblies that were created after 1920 restructured federal finance and exposed it to organized pressures from elected representatives. Major changes were introduced: the divided heads of revenue were abolished, land revenue was given over to the provinces, and the central government took the income tax. The central budget now had to be balanced by contributions for the provinces, which increased contention. These changes did not alleviate provincial grievances over their minimal sources of revenue, while they remained responsible for expanding expenditures for a growing population. The 1935 Act, however, went somewhat further in giving a larger share of revenue to the provinces. One outcome of this system of divided sources of revenue was the growing inequality between the provinces in per capita tax burden and expenditure. Bengal, with its ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
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Under normal conditions, the government balanced its budget, that is, balanced current revenue and expenditure. In the pre–World War I period, government investment was financed out of public saving, but increasingly thereafter it had to be financed by borrowing. The equilibrium was often upset by famines, wars, and depressions. The wars fought by the British East India Company, the uprising of 1857, and the famines of 1876 and 1896 each imposed a burden of growing debt. Until the war, the main source of borrowing was London. Usually these debts were paid back from current revenues, but military expenditure during World War I created a crisis. It not only forced the government to borrow, but also forced it to turn to Indian sources of funding since London was no longer an easy money market. Another debt crisis appeared at the time of the Great Depression, when the creditworthiness of the Indian government came into question for the first time in history. World War II again found India in serious deficit. The government spent larger sums and proportions of the budget than ever before on defense, for its own troops and also on behalf of Great Britain’s war expenses. Taxes and borrowing proved insufficient to cover the deficit. But this time there was a central bank and substantial monetary autonomy. Consequently, the money supply increased to finance the deficit as never before. The supply of essential goods, including food grains, on the other hand, was being diverted to support the war effort. The net effect was massive inflation, with disastrous consequences for India’s rural poor. The last days of the war saw government controls imposed on supplies of essential commodities. This was the precursor of the public distribution system, with which independent India has become familiar. The end of the war also saw the liquidation of India’s accumulated foreign debt. Given Britain’s sterling debt to India throughout the war, India began its independence with an ample credit balance in sterling.
Revenue and Expenditure There were two major types of governmental expenditure in British India: expenditure in India and expenditure abroad. The two most important expenditures abroad were pensions paid in sterling to retired British employees and the interest on public debt raised in London. The government could finance its expenditure by three means. The first was current revenues, 70 to 80 percent of which were raised in taxes. The second was borrowings from abroad, and the third borrowings at home. 79
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In the nineteenth century, the most important tax was the land tax. In 1858, it accounted for as much as 50 percent of total revenues. Next in importance were the opium and salt taxes. The government had a monopoly on the production of opium, and a near monopoly on the production of salt. Together, these two taxes accounted for 24 percent of all revenues in 1858. The income tax and customs and excise taxes together yielded no more than 12 percent of revenue. Clearly, the tax structure was both income-inelastic and regressive. Over the next sixty years, the pattern changed: the share of the land tax decreased to about 20 percent of all revenue in the 1920s, opium and salt taxes dwindled, and income tax, customs and excise expanded their combined share to over 50 percent. The land tax as a proportion of the value of agricultural production declined from possibly 10 percent of net output in the mid-nineteenth century to less than 5 percent in the 1930s. At the same time, financial stringency forced the government to experiment with more elastic sources of revenue, such as customs and income tax. Until the interwar period, pressures from British exporters were too strong for comprehensive revenue tariffs to be introduced. The pressure eased, and counterpressures grew stronger. Income tax again became the scene of a battle, though a more subdued one. The government was unable to impose that tax on self-employed people. The groups that could be more easily targeted and assessed were those closest to the government, including prominent landlords, government employees, and owners of modern industry, many of whom were Europeans. Though some of these groups stoutly resisted being taxed, their resistance weakened over time. For most of this period tax revenue as a proportion of the national income remained small and almost static at about 5 to 7 percent. Shifts in the composition of tax revenues made little difference to the government’s spending power, even as the economy grew, leaving it ever more dependent on borrowing. The main items on the expenditure side were defense, civil administration, and debt service. Each of these items was politically controversial. The Indian army was not only costly to maintain, it was repeatedly drawn into serving Britain’s imperial interests outside India. The cost of imported administrative personnel was frequently excessive, and debt service was imposed by the poverty and dependence of the state itself.
as intolerably wasteful. The “drain theory” became an explanation for the political roots of India’s poverty and underdevelopment. There was some truth, and some exaggeration, in the drain theory. The truth was that British government employees serving in India were indeed often overpaid. The exaggeration was that measures of drain tended to lump all factor payments together, whereas a lot of these payments were for technical services that had no substitutes in India. The broadest measure of drain (Home Charges or net factor payments abroad as a ratio of national income) was about 1.5 to 2 percent in 1901. The real drain was considerably smaller, and therefore quantitatively insignificant. Further, the drain theory assumed that the amount potentially saved on this account would have been available for investment, which was not necessarily the case.
Investment and Growth Gross investment as a proportion of expenditure declined from 24 percent in the period from 1898 to 1913 (annual average) to 16 percent in the 1930s. Net investment was smaller still and falling faster. The three main areas of investment were railways, irrigation, and roads and buildings. The railways’ share in gross investment fell from 51 percent in the period from 1898 to 1913 to 27 percent in the period from 1930 to 1938. Irrigation accounted for about 11 to 16 percent throughout. The share of roads and buildings increased from 31 to 46 percent. In the prewar period, public investment was mainly financed from public savings. But in the interwar period, the percentage dropped sharply. Unquestionably, the primary objective of this fiscal system was governance and not development, on which it had a mixed effect. Did it actually contribute to underdevelopment? The question remains. Tirthankar Roy See also Balance of Payments; Money and Credit, 1858–1947; Trade Policy, 1800–1947 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Kumar, Dharma. “Fiscal System.” In The Cambridge Economic History of India, vol. 2, c. 1757–1970, edited by Dharma Kumar. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1983. Roy, Tirthankar. The Economic History of India, 1857–1947. Delhi and New York: Oxford University Press, 2000.
Drain The most controversial item of all was the “Home Charges,” or the government’s payments abroad for “services” received. These payments were called by Indian nationalists an imperial “drain” or “tribute,” seen 80
FISCAL SYSTEM AND POLICY SINCE 1952 India is a federal democratic republic with a multilevel parliamentary system of government. The Constitution ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
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of India mandates, since 1993, three levels of government (central, state, and local) with specification of the powers and functions of each tier, through lists set out in schedules seven, eleven, and twelve. India’s fiscal policy, emanating ultimately from the cabinet, must be approved by the Parliament and by the legislative assemblies of the states. Article 112 of the Constitution requires the government to lay before both houses of Parliament—the Lok Sabha (the lower “house of the people”) and the Rajya Sabha (the upper “council of states”)—an annual financial statement every year. The statement sets out estimates of expenditures separately for sums required to meet expenditures charged on the Consolidated Fund of India, including: the emoluments and allowances of the president and other expenditures of his or her office; debt charges for which the government of India is liable; salaries, allowances, and pensions of the judges of the Supreme Court; and expenditures declared by the Constitution or the Parliament to be so charged. Estimates of such expenditures are not open to voting in Parliament and can only be discussed. Estimates of all other expenditures must be presented in the form of demands for grants to the Lok Sabha for approval. Once the demands are approved, a bill has to be introduced for appropriation of moneys required to meet the grants for expenditures. India’s fiscal year begins on 1 April and ends on 31 March. The proposals for expenditures, taxes, and borrowings set out in the budget for the year commencing in the following April are presented to Parliament on the last working day of February every year. Parliament can be approached with proposals for supplementary, additional, or excess grants when the sums already authorized prove insufficient or when need arises for supplementary or additional expenditures on some new service not previously contemplated. Along with detailed accounts of the receipts and expenditures of the government for the year to come, budget documents contain information on receipts and expenditures for the year about to end as well as the preceding year, constituting a rich source of data on India’s public finances. The budgets are accompanied by statements by the finance minister reviewing the performance of the economy and announcing the intent of the government on various matters affecting the economy and the life of the people. The budget session of Parliament constitutes an important public event in India and is preceded and followed by intense lobbying and by discussions in the press and among the public, testifying to the vibrancy of India’s democracy. Similar procedures are followed in the states, with the difference being that the state budgets are usually ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
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presented in their respective legislative assemblies after the Union budget has been unveiled. The expenditures contained in the budget proposals for a given year on approval by the legislature are meant to be appropriated in the year in question; any excess requires ex post approval, while shortfalls are not allowed to be carried over to the subsequent year. In order to ensure that the expenditures incurred in a year are within the limits approved by Parliament (in the case of the Union), a detailed verification and scrutiny of the expenditures incurred is undertaken after the year’s end by the comptroller and auditor general of India, an authority mandated in the Constitution with statutory protection. The audit reports of the comptroller are submitted to the president, who then causes them to be laid before each house of Parliament (Article 151). The comptroller is also required to audit the accounts of the states; the state audit reports are submitted to the governor of each state, who thereafter transmits them to the state assemblies. There are also parliamentary committees to undertake the verification and scrutiny of government expenditures and accounts, including the Estimates Committee, the Public Accounts Committee, and the Committee on Public Undertakings, and there are standing committees for every ministry. Taken together, the budget process thus provides a comprehensive fiscal system to ensure that the finances of government are run according to the wishes of the people, articulated in Parliament by their representatives. Public funds should be used efficiently, irregularities duly detected, accountability enforced, and corrective measures taken. Government budgets are debated openly before they are adopted by Parliament. Their implementation also comes under close scrutiny, and yet the actual operation of the system is marked by shortcomings that have tended to undermine fiscal discipline and efficiency. The scrutiny of expenditures at the parliamentary stage is not as thorough or detailed as one might expect, partly because the accounts are not always transparent. Factors that make the budget nontransparent include: the multiplicity of budget heads for classification, such as “developmental” and “nondevelopmental” and “plan” and “nonplan.” Parliamentary scrutiny is also often perfunctory, inasmuch as large chunks of expenditure are “guillotined” in Parliament, without any discussion, for lack of time. Moreover, as the budgets are framed only for one year, supplementary budgets are routinely presented to Parliament and the state assemblies, as there is a tendency to underestimate expenditure in the original budget. Until recently there was no legal constraint on the central government to borrow either from the Reserve 81
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Bank of India (RBI) or from the market. As a result, deficits in government budgets that were not covered by borrowing from the market or from abroad were met ultimately by borrowing from the RBI through shortterm borrowing instruments called “Treasury bills.” Since 1997, by virtue of an understanding entered into with the RBI, recourse to Treasury bills by the Union government has been discontinued. Cash flow problems are met through ways and means advances from the RBI. Similar provisions exist for the states. However, this budgetary constraint is often evaded through off-budget borrowing (e.g., borrowing through state-owned enterprises guaranteed by the government). Parliament has recently taken measures to restrain the tendency to finance deficits with improvident borrowing, passing in 2003 the Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management Act to compel the Union government to reduce its deficits to stipulated levels. The law also requires the government to place before Parliament statements setting out its medium-term fiscal policy, fiscal policy strategy, and macroeconomic framework.
Fiscal Policy: The First Three Decades When India attained independence in 1947, the role of government was minimal, rarely extending beyond the maintenance of law and order and the provision of relief after calamities like droughts, floods, and famines. Some public works were undertaken from time to time, but their scale was limited. The proportion of gross domestic product (GDP) going into public spending was barely 9 percent. Current revenues (tax and nontax) were more than adequate to meet current expenditures. The gap between revenue and expenditures—the fiscal deficit— was less than 1 percent. After independence, government activity expanded rapidly, driven by initiatives taken by India’s leaders to promote economic development and the general welfare of the people. The aggregate expenditure of government (central and states combined) rose to over 15 percent of GDP in the first ten years and kept growing, reaching 22 percent in the 1970s. Capital expenditures increased from 1.7 percent to nearly 7 percent. Though the government resorted to borrowing for financing capital expenditures, the fiscal deficit remained moderate, no more than 4 or 5 percent of GDP. Current expenditures were financed entirely by current receipts; in fact the revenue budgets generated some surplus, which, though small, could be used for capital spending. Given the objectives set for fiscal policy by India’s policy makers, such expansion of government was to be expected. The strategy of planning that the government of India adopted for development envisaged a leading 82
role for the public sector in lifting the country out of abject poverty and satisfying the legitimate aspirations of the people. At the same time, emphasis was on “democratic planning,” allowing a large role to the private sector as well. The primary responsibility for raising the level of saving and investment in the economy—which was crucial for initiating development—was, however, assigned to the public sector. Since this was to be achieved within the framework of a mixed economy, it was recognized that fiscal policy, along with monetary and credit policy, would play a critical role. The other major objectives of planning, for which fiscal policy instruments were to be relied upon, were: to bring about a progressive reduction in inequalities and regional disparities; and to influence the level and direction of economic activity. These objectives were reiterated in successive plans, with varying emphasis. Additional instruments, “quasi-fiscal” in nature, were also employed to serve the objectives of the plans. To secure the flow of private investment into priority areas, a regime of licensing and control was imposed, empowering the central government to exercise control over all substantial investments in the private sector. Further, large segments of the economy were brought directly into the public sector through nationalization. Control was exercised over the flow of investment into the private sector with the creation of development finance institutions in the public sector and nationalization of major commercial banks in 1969. Control was then exercised over the production, distribution, and pricing of several commodities, like sugar and steel, and a fraction of their output was preempted through “levy” at below market prices, mainly by invoking the Essential Commodities Act of 1956. Even so, fiscal policy continued to play a vital role in running the economy and was used extensively to subserve the objectives of the plans. The results, however, did not always meet expectations. On the positive side, in less than ten years, the level of capital formation in India’s economy rose from 10 percent of GDP to over 16 percent, and further to 23 percent at the end of the next two decades. Gross domestic saving increased from less than 10 percent of GDP to nearly 13 percent in the early 1960s and to over 20 percent during the 1970s. Even at fairly high levels of investment during the 1970s, the resource gap of the Indian economy (that is, current account deficit) remained mostly below 1 percent of GDP. Although the bulk of savings originated in the private sector, the public sector also made a significant contribution, forming in some years over 20 percent of the total. But that was far from adequate to meet the requirements of the public sector. Nearly 40 to 50 percent of investment in the economy took place in the public sector, and that required intersectoral resource transfers on a ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
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large scale. Fiscal policy was used to play a supportive role in this endeavor. The fiscal system also provided support for investment in physical capital (plant and machinery, in particular) through liberal capital allowances in income tax. Also, there was tax holidays for new industrial undertakings in the early years. In view of their employment potential, concessional treatment was accorded to smallscale industries in both direct and indirect taxes. Along with quantitative restrictions on imports, customs tariffs were used to protect domestic industries and to help implement the policy of import substitution. Other objectives pursued through the tax system included environmental protection and encouraging the use of certain inputs in specified lines of production. Equity too figured prominently among the objectives of public policy pursued with the help of fiscal instruments. Personal income and wealth were taxed at steeply progressive rates. Then there were estate duties on wealth passing on death and gift taxes on gifts made inter vivos. Indirect taxes were used in a big way to favor the poor by distinguishing between essentials and luxuries. Several public services were provided free or at prices well below cost, particularly power and irrigation water. Exports were liberally subsidized. Whether or to what extent progressive taxation helped the cause of redistribution or regional equity is not clear. There is some evidence that estate duty and gift taxes served to restrain the concentration in the distribution of wealth. However, confiscatory income and wealth taxes were believed to have spawned a huge “black economy.” A study carried out in the late 1980s revealed that around 40 to 50 percent of taxable incomes were probably concealed from tax authorities. Attempts to mitigate the ill effects of high rates of income and wealth taxes through exemptions and concessions weakened the potency of the taxes as instruments of redistribution, opening up loopholes and undermining the revenue potency of India’s tax system. In any case, agricultural incomes remained outside the purview of central income tax by virtue of the constitutional plan of tax assignment. The weight of direct taxes in the country’s tax structure declined from 37 percent at the time of independence to about 14 percent in the 1980s. Regional disparities too did not come down significantly, though they did not worsen. The revenue productivity of indirect taxes suffered because of a plethora of exemptions and concessions. The revenue lost in this process was sought to be made up through high, multiple rates and by levying taxes on virtually all countries at all stages of production and sale, with excise levied by the central government and sales tax ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
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by the states, rendering the tax system complex, nontransparent, and distortionary. By virtue of an amendment to the Constitution in 1956, interstate sales were brought under taxation through parliamentary legislation (the Central Sales Tax Act). The states of origin were entrusted to administer the tax and retain the revenue. The tax structure that emerged as a result, rather than fostering an efficient, self-reliant economy, constituted a major source of distortion and inefficiency. Neither equity nor resource allocation was well served. Regarding stabilization, the main concern of fiscal policy in macromanagement was keeping inflationary pressures in check, rather than acting as a stabilizer or stimulator of the economy. Fiscal policy, working in tandem with monetary policy, was remarkably successful in maintaining macrostability and keeping inflationary pressures in check, barring a few episodes of double digit inflation in the 1970s. Unlike many developing countries, India did not experience hyperinflation. Nor did it suffer the convulsions that rocked many economies during the oil shocks of the 1970s. In fact, for nearly three decades after independence, government finances were in reasonable balance.
The 1980s and Beyond Things took a turn for the worse in the 1980s. The deterioration began in 1979–1980, as the central government’s revenue budget for the first time went into the red and the consolidated fiscal deficit rose beyond 6 percent of GDP. Consolidated fiscal deficit crossed 10 percent in 1986–1987, and the average for 1985–1990 measured 9 percent. As a fallout of those deficits, the ratio of government debt to GDP went up to nearly 62 percent in 1990–1991, compared to 46 percent in 1980–1981. The persistence of large fiscal deficits, together with a chronic imbalance in the external sector, led to a fullblown economic crisis in 1991. The crisis, triggered by the Gulf War, was marked by inflation of nearly 14 percent and a severe balance of payments problem. Foreign exchange reserves dwindled to a level sufficient for import cover of less than one month. The crisis compelled policy makers to undertake some radical reforms to stabilize the economy and launch a program of structural adjustment to correct the chronic imbalances and inefficiencies that had brought the economy to crisis. With liberalization as its keynote, India’s economy was opened up; quotas were removed, industrial licensing was all but eliminated, and the financial sector was unshackled. Fiscal consolidation figured prominently in the reform program. While the immediate task of reform was to reduce the fiscal deficit to manageable levels by compressing 83
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expenditure, the aim was to see that government finances were restored to health on a sustainable footing. Fiscal restructuring was undertaken with reforms on several fronts: reforms of the tax system to minimize inefficiencies while enhancing revenue productivity; reform of public expenditure management; and restructuring of the public sector. Institutional changes were also made to secure better coordination of monetary and fiscal policies.
Tax reform. Radical reforms were undertaken in both direct and indirect taxes to reduce heavy dependence on foreign trade taxes, turning more to taxes on income and domestic trade while minimizing their distortionary effects. The reforms that were initiated in 1991–1992 continued through the 1990s and are still in progress. The strategy was to have a small number of broadbased taxes with moderate rates and few exemptions or concessions. The maximum marginal rates of personal income tax were brought down from 60 to 30 percent, and corporate income tax to around 35 to 40 percent, from 65 to 70 percent in 1980–1981. Presumptive taxation sought to widen the base, bringing selected services under taxation. Customs duties were reduced progressively from a peak of 150 percent to 25 percent. Rates of major ad valorem excise duties were compressed, and a three-rate structure of 8, 16, and 24 percent was introduced.
Expenditure management. Measures were taken to cut down and check the growth of government expenditure and to change its composition. These measures included: zero-based budgeting for ongoing programs, review of staff requirements of government departments and agencies, and the introduction of a voluntary retirement program. Subsidies were brought under scrutiny and reduced through cost recovery. An Expenditure Reforms Commission was appointed to identify specific areas for action. To contain the growth of pension payments, a partly funded contributory pension plan has been instituted for central government employees.
Public sector restructuring. A major thrust of the reforms was aimed at restructuring the public sector by reducing its size and budgetary support. The aim was to downsize government by withdrawing from activities where the private sector could do better or equally well. The reforms also sought to establish better coordination between monetary and fiscal policies. The government of India entered into an agreement with the RBI to discontinue the issue of Treasury bills, which meant automatic monetization of deficits, relying instead on ways and means advances to meet temporary cash requirements. Large-scale preemption of bank deposits for subscribing government bonds through requirements of statutory 84
liquidity ratio was reduced by cutting down the ratio to 25 percent from nearly 40 percent. Measures were taken by the RBI to widen and deepen the government security markets.
Reforms at state level. Initially, the reforms were primarily the concern of the central government. The second half of the 1990s witnessed moves toward reform at the state level as well, with greater efforts made for revenue mobilization, expenditure compression, and downsizing of government through restructuring of the public sector. Prodded by the central government and realizing the need to reform archaic and inefficient sales tax systems and avoid tax competition among themselves, the states joined together to move toward a harmonized system of value-added tax in place of sales taxes. The process is, however, still to be completed. On the nontax side, state governments moved to reduce subsidies by raising user charges for public services. In public sector restructuring, the focus has been on reforms of the power sector, as the losses of the state electricity boards have been a major drag on state budgets. The central government sought to induce the states with various incentives to undertake reforms essential to the success of the reforms as a whole.
Outcomes and Outlook The measures initiated toward fiscal correction in the wake of the crisis of 1991 produced some tangible results. The consolidated fiscal deficit of the central government and the states came down from 9.3 percent of GDP in 1990–1991 to 6.9 percent in 1991–1992, then to 6.3 percent in 1996–1997. The ratio of government debt to GDP also registered a decline of 3.7 percent by 1995–1996. The improvement, however, proved shortlived. The fiscal deficit started moving up again in 1996–1997, crossing the 9 percent mark in 1999–2000, and was estimated to be over 10 percent in 2002–2003. Primary deficit, after coming down from 4.9 per cent in 1990–1991 to 1.1 percent in 1996–1997, moved up again, measuring 3.8 percent in 2001–2002. The debt-GDP ratio also moved up, standing in March 2003 at