EUROPEAN SECURITY IN TRANSITION
This page intentionally left blank
European Security in Transition
Edited by GUNTH...
28 downloads
1370 Views
776KB Size
Report
This content was uploaded by our users and we assume good faith they have the permission to share this book. If you own the copyright to this book and it is wrongfully on our website, we offer a simple DMCA procedure to remove your content from our site. Start by pressing the button below!
Report copyright / DMCA form
EUROPEAN SECURITY IN TRANSITION
This page intentionally left blank
European Security in Transition
Edited by GUNTHER HAUSER Austrian Defense Academy, Austria and FRANZ KERNIC University of Innsbruck, Austria
© Gunther Hauser and Franz Kernic 2006 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher. Gunther Hauser and Franz Kernic have asserted their right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as the editors of this work. Published by Ashgate Publishing Limited Gower House Croft Road Aldershot Hampshire GU11 3HR England
Ashgate Publishing Company Suite 420 101 Cherry Street Burlington, VT 05401-4405 USA
Ashgate website: http://www.ashgate.com British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data European security in transition 1. National security - Europe 2. European Union countries Foreign relations I. Hauser, Gunther, 1968- II. Kernic, Franz 355'.03304 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data European security in transition / edited by Gunther Hauser and Franz Kernic. p. cm. Includes index. ISBN-13: 978-0-7546-4961-8 ISBN-10: 0-7546-4961-X 1. Security, International. 2. North Atlantic Treaty Organization--Europe. 3. European Union. I. Hauser, Gunther, 1968- II. Kernic, Franz. JZ6009.E94E97 2006 355'.03304--dc22 2006021149 ISBN-13: 978-0-7546-4961-8 ISBN-10: 0 7546 4961 X
Printed and bound in Great Britain by MPG Books Ltd. Bodmin, Cornwall.
Contents List of Tables List of Authors Introduction 1
European Security in Transition: The European Security Architecture since the End of the Second World War – An Overview Franz Kernic
vii viii 1
5
2
EU, NATO, OSCE: Interaction, Cooperation, and Confrontation Peter van Ham
23
3
The ESDP: The European Security Pillar Gunther Hauser
39
4
The New EU – A “Military Pact”? Solidarity – Neutrality – “Irish Clause” 63 Waldemar Hummer
5
Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) in Transition Arnold H. Kammel
6
From Reflections to Power: Implementing the European Security Strategy 87 Sven Biscop
7
US Defense Transformation and its Implications for Europe Benjamin Schreer
8
Plug to Operate: Command and Coordination of Armed Forces in Europe in Times of Transformation Ralph Thiele
9
Regional Approaches to Comprehensive Security in Europe Gunther Hauser
73
103
115
135
vi
10
European Security in Transition
The South Caucasus at the Crossroads: Ethno-territorial Conflicts, Russian Interests, and the Access to Energy Resources Martin Malek
11
Turkey’s Role in Post-Cold War European Security Policy ebnem Udum
12
European Union and the Greater Middle East: Economic Relations, Political Issues and Future Challenges Michele Brunelli
145
161
175
Conclusions
195
Index
201
List of Tables Table 10.1 Table 10.2 Table 10.3 Table 10.4
The South Caucasian Republics at a Glance The Armies of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan Separatist Armies Russian Bases
146 148 151 154
List of Authors Sven BISCOP, Dr., is a senior research fellow at the Royal Institute for International Relations (IRRI-KIIB) in Brussels, and a professor of European Security at Ghent University (Belgium). Michele BRUNELLI, Dr., is a researcher at the Research Centre on Southern System and Wider Mediterranean, Università Cattolica di Milano (Italy), and a research fellow at the Università degli Studi di Bergamo (Italy). Peter van HAM, Dr., is a director of the Global Governance Research Program at the Netherlands Institute of International Relations “Clingendael” in The Hague (The Netherlands), and a professor at the College of Europe in Bruges (Belgium). He is a member of the Advisory Council on International Affairs to the Dutch Government. Gunther HAUSER, Dr., is a researcher at the National Defense Academy, Vienna (Austria), and a director of the International Security Order Department, Dusseldorf Institute for Foreign and Security Policy, Dusseldorf (Germany). Waldemar HUMMER, Dr., is a professor at the Institute of European Law and Public International Law, University of Innsbruck (Austria). Arnold H. KAMMEL, Mag., is a researcher at the Austrian Institute for European Security Policy, Maria Enzersdorf (Austria). Franz KERNIC, Doz. Dr., Colonel (Oberst), is a lecturer and researcher at the University of Innsbruck (Austria), at the Bundeswehr University Munich (Germany) and at the National Defense Academy (Austria). Martin MALEK, Dr., is a researcher at the National Defense Academy, Vienna (Austria). Benjamin SCHREER, M.A., is a research fellow at the German Institute for International and Security Policy/ Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) in Berlin (Germany). Ralph THIELE, Colonel (Oberst iG), is a director of faculty, Bundeswehr Command and Staff College, Hamburg (Germany). ebnem UDUM, M.A., is a researcher at the International Relations Department, Bilkent University, Ankara (Turkey).
Introduction The project of a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) was launched within the framework European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) during the Austrian EU presidency in 1998. With the evolution of the CFSP and ESDP, the enlargement process of the EU, the Union’s increasing role on the global stage, and today’s War on Terrorism, security and defense issues have dramatically gained weight and importance in international politics. The tremendous changes in the security agenda since the end of the Cold War make a revision of Europe’s security and defense system inevitable. Since the early 1990s, all established security and defense organizations in Europe have been subject to major reform processes and radical changes as well. Their traditional functions and tasks have been replaced by new ones and new threat perceptions have caused a new political debate on the future design of the European security system. The primary task for the European Union is now to increase and coordinate capabilities both for its own security and for the stabilization of the European continent in order to fulfil the whole spectrum of EU Petersberg tasks – ranging from peacekeeping to peace enforcement actions. Therefore, the EU will also need efficiently coordinated advanced military capabilities to close capability gaps between the United States and the European allies. The general aim of this volume is to provide an interdisciplinary reference or handbook focusing on the development and current status of the European security system as well as on selected key issues of today’s security agenda. It has been written particularly for graduate and undergraduate students of the social and political sciences as an introduction into the current debate on Europe’s security system and agenda. It aims at giving a general overview of the historical development of the European security system since the end of the Second World War and particularly its transition in the post-Cold War era. The contributions are written by researchers from well known think tanks and practitioners from military institutions. The authors analyze and discuss major developments as well as present and future challenges related to the general topic of European security and defense. Franz Kernic describes and analyzes in his introduction European Security in Transition the development of the European security landscape and the emerging European security system since the end of the Second World War. The beginning of a coordinated European security system was characterized by the Western Union, the failed construction of a European Defense Community, the Western European Union, and, of course, by NATO. The author also scrutinizes the role of the CSCE
2
European Security in Transition
and UN during and after the Cold War and finally examines major changes in the European security system during the early post-Cold War period. Peter van Ham analyzes in his chapter about EU, NATO, OSCE: Interaction, Cooperation, and Confrontation, the objectives and approaches toward a coordinated European security system as well as the development of the cooperation between the main European security institutions – NATO, OSCE and EU. The author compares the mechanisms of cooperation and their effectiveness. This chapter focuses on the problematical relationship between Europe’s key security institutions: the EU, NATO, as well as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). These organizations have a markedly different membership, different capabilities, and, perhaps most importantly: different “security cultures.” Gunther Hauser compares in his contribution about The ESDP: The European Security Pillar the political and legal aspects and framework conditions of ESDP and analyzes the military and civil instruments in the framework of the transatlantic security relations. Possibilities and ways of enhanced security cooperation between ESDP and NATO are discussed as well as the civil-military coordination (CMCO) in this field. In his chapter on The New EU - a “Military Pact”? Solidarity – Neutrality – “Irish clause”, Waldemar Hummer analyzes the different political interpretations and meanings of neutrality and non-alliance in the context with duties of so-called neutral and non-aligned states in the framework of the European Security and Defense Policy. In the context of the reformation of the European Union (EU) into a “new EU” through the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (“Constitutional Treaty”) of 29 October 2004, a vital problem especially for the six neutral and non-aligned or non-committed member states of the EU – Austria, Finland, Ireland, Sweden as well as Malta and Cyprus – is being discussed. Arnold H. Kammel focuses in his contribution about Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) in Transition on JHA policy as an important pillar to achieve comprehensive security facing threats like terrorism, illegal migration, organized crime, and human trafficking. Mr. Kammel analyzes today’s challenges for JHA bodies. The author also compares links between JHA and ESDP. Sven Biscop underscores in his chapter From Reflections to Power: Implementing the European Security Strategy, the aspects of the European Security Strategy relating to those of the National Security Strategy of the United States of America. He analyzes major security aspects of the so-called European Security Strategy and shows deficits of EU member states facing today’s security challenges. The adoption of the European Security Strategy (ESS), A Secure Europe in a Better World, by the European Council on 12 December 2003 was a major step for the EU, though not necessarily one with lasting impact. For the very first time, the Member States solemnly adopted a common strategic vision for the whole spectrum of EU foreign policy. Benjamin Schreer scrutinizes in his contribution on US Defense Transformation and its Implications for Europe the phenomenon of Network Centric Warfare – the key instrument to transform European and American armed forces. He compares the
Introduction
3
multinational needs and possibilities of armed forces in transition in the transatlantic security framework from a strategic point of view. Ralph Thiele focuses in his article about Plug to Operate: Command and Coordination of Armed Forces in Europe in Times of Transformation on the transformation of the armed forces in the EU from an operative point of view. His chapter compares today’s transformation aspects based on case studies in the context of peace support operations and major challenges for future joint operations. Gunther Hauser compares in his contribution about Regional Approaches to Comprehensive Security in Europe different regional examples of comprehensive security cooperation and underscores the importance of regional approaches facing today’s security threats – e.g. on the Balkans through the European Stability Pact, in Southeastern Europe through the European Neighborhood Policy as well as ways and means of well-coordinated cooperation among armed forces and civilian bodies to achieve comprehensive security goals. Martin Malek scrutinizes in his chapter The South Caucasus at the Crossroads: Ethno-territorial Conflicts, Russian Interests, and the Access to Energy Resources the roles of the different political actors in this region. The European Security Strategy (ESS) identifies the South Caucasus as one of the regions, in which the EU should take a “stronger and more active interest”. Cooperation between the EU and this region is also on the way to be developed in the area of energy – as the Southern Caucasus is an important region both for the production (the Caspian basin) and the transit of energy. EU is the world’s largest energy (oil and gas) importer and the second largest consumer. Energy dependence is a special concern for Europe. Therefore, a stabile region of Caucasus is of strategic European interest. ebnem Udum analyzes in her contribution about Turkey’s Role in Post-Cold War European Security Policy the role of EU candidate country Turkey in European crisis management. She discusses the Turkish point of view relating to European security issues. Finally, Michele Brunelli focuses in his contribution about European Union and the Greater Middle East: Economic Relations, Political Issues and Future Challenges on European security relations to the Greater Middle East region and explains the relevant aspects of EU policies toward the Middle East. As the European Security Strategy states, the Middle East is of great security importance for Europe. The current and future challenges for European security are manifold, so that for all Europeans, a well-coordinated comprehensive approach to tackle security risks and uncertainties is pivotal. This publication will easily guide interested readers through the general landscape of the European security architecture.
This page intentionally left blank
Chapter 1
European Security in Transition: The European Security Architecture since the End of the Second World War – An Overview Franz Kernic
Over the sixty years since the end of the Second World War, Europe’s security landscape and architecture has changed dramatically. The Cold War split much of the world into two camps siding with either the United States or the Soviet Union. As a result, ideological, economic, and military rivalry dominated security considerations from 1945 until 1989. Each of the superpowers had its own sphere of influence; two strong military alliances, opposed to one another, shaped the political landscape of Europe. As the Soviet Union collapsed and the Berlin Wall fell, formerly communist Central and Eastern European countries gained independence and launched their transformation toward democracy and market economy; a new post-Cold War era was proclaimed. During this time, the Warsaw Treaty Organization dissolved and many opponents of the past suddenly became allies and partners to the Western powers. Undoubtedly, this radical transformation of the international system and global order also had a tremendous impact on the European security and defense agenda. At first, the post-Cold War era was perceived by many as a chance to spread “democratic peace” around the globe and to establish a new global system of international security. Some even phrased it the “new world order,” put into place and guaranteed by the only remaining superpower, the United States of America, though in close cooperation with the international community. However, much of this optimism quickly disappeared, when the US as well as other regional powers and smaller states saw themselves increasingly confronted with a number of newly emerging security threats. Within the blink of an eye, post-Cold War security became an issue of major political and societal concern. The so-called “certainties” of the past changed into “uncertainties”; indeed, in the post-Cold War era, uncertainty itself came to be seen as a new threat. In addition, other security concerns emerged, ranging from regional instabilities and conflicts (even in parts of Europe) to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, asymmetric warfare, and terrorism.
6
European Security in Transition
In particular, the outbreak of various major international crises and wars, e.g. in the Gulf and the Balkans, forced the European countries to rethink their traditional approaches to security and defense. The tremendous changes in the political landscape of the post-Cold War world, particularly in Europe, not only caused a new debate on security and defense issues, but also resulted in the radical transformation processes of established European military alliances and security organizations as well as national armed forces. Suddenly, there was a new impetus for re-looking at the existing European security architecture, i.e. for creating alternative structures for European and/or North Atlantic security. There was no doubt, for instance, that with the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, NATO had to be given a new role and function. At the same time, some of the old plans, concepts, and ideas regarding a stronger European pillar in the field of security and defense experienced a revival. All of a sudden, all of Europe seemed to be ready to take further decisive steps toward European integration; governments across the EU not only began to deliberately embrace security and defense issues but also began work to open up the EU framework for new member states from the former Eastern bloc. Thus, a European security and defense agenda gained new momentum. Today, consolidation seems to be on its way, although the whole transformation process must still be regarded as “work-in-progress”. However, a general orientation has been regained and important decisions have been taken, thus giving the traditional security and defense organizations of Europe, particularly NATO, a new “face”, i.e. new tasks and a new organizational design. At the same time new organizational frameworks, such as, for example, the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), have been established. But not only organizational structures have been transformed, the way of thinking about security, in general, and European security, in particular, has radically changed as well. In comparison with the Cold-War era, security is today defined in a much broader context, mostly as “comprehensive security” that combines efforts in all fields of political and societal life to guarantee the health and survival of a given society and state. Security is no longer narrowly defined as “military security,” with a predominant, almost exclusive focus on the armed forces and on armed conflict between nation-states. Even the question of “actorness” in International Relations theory, as related to security, has led to a tremendous shift away from a narrow state-centric view to a more open “capabilities”-approach, which also gives space for analysing the impact of certain actions of individuals, small groups, or networks on European security. This chapter aims at reviewing the development of the European security system and architecture since the end of the Second World War and scrutinizing the political landscape that has shaped the security and defense agenda in Europe from the ColdWar period until today. It focuses on institution-building processes with respect to European security and defense as well as the various reconfiguration processes, which have not only transformed established institutions and organizations over the years, but also led to the creation of new ones. The chapter will start by looking at the
European Security in Transition: The European Security Architecture
7
security and defense institution-building process of the early Cold War years. Then, the European debate on “alternative models” for European security will be reviewed, ranging from the Soviet efforts to establish a European collective system to the idea of creating a new forum for multilateral security dialogue, i.e. the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Finally, the post-Cold War era with its radical transformation of the whole European political and social landscape needs to be examined in detail, particularly with respect to its implications for the European security and defense system. Building New Security Institutions in Europe The traumatic experience of two world wars has shaped Europe’s security and defense agenda since 1945, resulting in the very strong desire of the European people to avoid future wars and conflicts among European nations. The Second World War left Europe divided, however, and exposed to the threat of another military confrontation between the recently emerged “European” powers of that time, the Soviet Union and the United States. Europe even felt threatened with becoming the battlefield of such a military conflict, which even carried the potential of becoming a nuclear war. This nuclear dimension of the East-West confrontation increased the significance of security and defense issues. On the one hand, it accounted for a new arms race and military competition between the two blocs starting already in the first years after the Second World War, but, on the other hand, it also made conflict prevention and the search for peaceful coexistence and conflict resolution, particularly with respect to Europe, an important political goal – even necessity – for both sides. These post-war security concerns also accounted for an increasing number of political efforts to strengthen peace and security in Europe. At the same time, the new political landscape encouraged all remaining post-war powers to engage in closer security and defense cooperation in order to guarantee peace and stability in the region. In 1948, European defense cooperation began to develop within the Brussels Treaty Organization.1 On 17 March 1948, the Brussels Treaty was signed by Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. The five signatories agreed upon an “unconditional mutual defense commitment” making provisions for mutual assistance in the event of an armed attack. Thus, the Brussels Treaty was in fact the first European defense organization set up in the aftermath of the Second Word War, establishing a European security and defense cooperation, which was known as the “Western Union”. The Treaty was, of course, also a response to the increasing expansion of the Soviet Union’s political influence over Central and Eastern Europe and to the United States’ reluctance at this time to become too heavily involved in European defense arrangements. Negotiations between the five defense partners and the United States and Canada followed. Their main goal was to build a new European security and defense
1
For treaty text, please see http://www.nato.int/archives/1st5years/appendices/2b.htm.
European Security in Transition
8
architecture upon the solid ground of a strong transatlantic pillar. Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway, and Portugal joined in and on 4 April 1949, the twelve parties signed the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington.2 The creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) must be seen as a milestone in post-War European history. NATO was to become Western Europe’s most powerful and influential security and defense organization of the Cold War period. Its political and military structures have remained powerful and vital even after the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Today, it still forms one of the key pillars – if not the main pillar – of European security, even though its functions, roles, and members have changed dramatically over the years. The parties to the North Atlantic Treaty not only reaffirmed their commitment to the principles of peaceful conflict resolution and the promotion of peace and stability in the North Atlantic area, they also expressed their determination to unite their efforts for collective defense and, in Article 5, agreed: that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently […] that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. (Treaty 1949)
Greece and Turkey joined the organization a few years later. After West Germany’s accession to NATO took place in 1955 (via the ratification of the so-called “Paris Agreements”),3 the North Atlantic Treaty Organization found itself facing a new, powerful, and important opponent: the Warsaw Pact or Warsaw Treaty Organization, officially named the “Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance”.4 The creation of this organization in May 1955 was, of course, prompted by the integration of West Germany to NATO and, according to the Soviet point of view, was nothing more than a response to the “re-militarization” of Germany in order to meet the new threats and challenges from the NATO alliance. All of the newly established communist states of Central and Eastern Europe, with the exception of Yugoslavia, signed the Treaty, which was prepared by the Soviet Union and designed as a mutual defense pact for their respective territories in case of an armed attack against one of the member states (the Soviet Union, Albania,5 Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, and, finally, East Germany, which joined in 1956). Though confrontation between these two military alliances quickly became the predominant pattern of the European Cold War security and defense structures, other forms of military and defense cooperation among European states continued 2 3 4 5
For treaty text, please see http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm. Text is available at http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b541023a.htm. Treaty text is available at http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1955warsawpact.html. Albania withdrew from the alliance in 1962 and formally left in 1968.
European Security in Transition: The European Security Architecture
9
to develop. For instance, discussion about a specific European pillar in the overall transatlantic security system was kept alive and from time to time even played an interesting role, particularly as a potential driving force for the European integration process among Western states. To give one example, the debate on the future European security architecture had – five years before the creation of the Warsaw Treaty – already led to a very ambitious proposal for creating a “European army”. This plan was presented by the French Prime Minister, René Pleven, in October 1950. It was related to the question about West Germany’s future involvement in Europe’s security and defense system. An important step in this direction was then in fact taken when Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands signed a treaty establishing the European Defense Community (EDC). This treaty was signed on 27 May 1952 in Paris. It included the idea of integrating the parties’ national armed forces into a European structure under the guidance of a single European authority. Two years later, however, the project came to a sudden end when the French Parliament rejected the proposal to set up the EDC. At the same time, the five Western Union governments decided to invite Germany and Italy to accede to the Brussels Treaty of 17 March 1948. The Paris Agreements of October 1954, which modified and completed the original Brussels Treaty, led to the establishment of the “Western European Union” (WEU). This multi-body organization, including a parliamentarian assembly, was built upon a binding commitment of mutual defense in the case of an armed attack in Europe. Article V of this modified treaty clearly states: If any of the High Contracting Parties should be the object of an armed attack in Europe, the other High Contracting Parties will, in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, afford the Party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power.
From the very beginning, the establishment of the Western European Union was linked to NATO. The treaty clearly called for close cooperation with NATO and stated that the WEU Council and its agency would “rely on the appropriate military authorities of NATO for information and advice on military matters” (Article IV of the Modified Brussels Treaty). In this context, it must be noted that this same Article IV already recognized the “undesirability of duplicating the military staffs of NATO” – an issue that has never lost its relevance and that even became increasingly important in the late 1990s. Nevertheless, this development clearly showed that the overall transatlantic security structure of the Cold War era was in fact also accompanied by a number of regional efforts to strengthen security and defense cooperation among a certain number of European states, thus leading to specific parallel structures and institutional linkages in the security and defense domain.
10
European Security in Transition
The Idea of a European Collective Security System and Other European Defense Cooperation Plans In the early 1950s, the question of creating a collective European security system caused a broad political and public debate. It was related particularly to the danger of Europe being torn into two parts, of creating a “divided Europe” that, in the worse case, could even turn into the battlefield of a major military confrontation between the two heavily armed military alliances. The emerging bloc confrontation, which later became the predominant pattern of international and European security during the Cold War, started to cause new security concerns on both sides. Closer defense cooperation among “friends” and the establishment of new alliances seemed to be one path toward increasing security and guaranteeing stability and peace in Europe. Later, the concept of deterrence aimed at underpinning this specific security concept based on hard power according to the old idea of “Si vis pacem, para bellum”. However, another path or alternative security concept seemed to be closer cooperation – politically and economically as well as militarily – between the counterparts themselves, regardless of whether such a structure would rather be based on a “common security” or a “collective security” concept. The increasing gap between Eastern and Western Europe, which became more and more visible as a result of the German question; the German Democratic Republic was formally established in 1949, making the idea of re-establishing a unified country seem much less likely by the early 1950s. This development not only raised new security concerns, but also prepared the ground for a new search for and debate on alternative security concepts for Europe. Undoubtedly, the emerging political and military cooperation and integration in Western Europe and the newly emerging security and defense systems in the West increasingly worried the Soviet Union. The public debate about ways of integrating the Republic of Germany into the newly established Western alliances and organizations, particularly NATO, quickly turned into a breeding ground for new ideas and concepts concerning the future European security and defense architecture. One of the most interesting concepts of this time was the Soviet proposal for establishing an all-European “collective security system”. This system was to be designed in a way that would have allowed all European states to participate without regard to their political, social, or economic systems. It was based on assumptions similar to those of the collective security concept of the United Nations Charter but followed a specific regional approach. A draft for a treaty on collective security in Europe was submitted by Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov to the Berlin Conference on 10 February 1954 but was rejected by the Western powers. This draft listed a number of basic provisions, including a collective defense clause, according to which an armed attack in Europe against any one or more of the parties to the treaty by any state or group of states was to be considered an attack against all the parties. In such a case, each one of the parties, in exercising the right of individual or collective self defense, would have had the duty to assist the attacked state or states by all means at its disposal, including the use of armed force.
European Security in Transition: The European Security Architecture
11
Through presenting this proposal, the Soviet Union tried to change the direction of the emerging European security agenda of the 1950s. At that point, it had become obvious that the Western countries wanted to head toward closer political, economic, and security cooperation, which also embraced defense and military issues and based on a mutual defense clause. The transatlantic umbrella, of course, posed an increasing threat to the Soviet Union with respect to its role and influence on the European continent. That is why, for example, the first version of the Soviet proposal clearly aimed at the exclusion of the United States from the all-European collective security treaty, although the Soviet government later declared that it had no objection to setting this question in a positive way. Soviet efforts to join NATO before establishing its own military alliance and to change NATO’s character into a collective security system followed the same track. Of course, rejection of the Soviet proposal boosted the formation of the two blocs that came to be the main counterparts of the Cold War’s East-West confrontation in Europe, NATO and Warsaw Pact. The formation of the two military alliances, i.e. of two groups of European states facing off against each other, could not be prevented through any alternative security system due to a general lack of credibility and trust in such concepts or systems. Of course, this new setting, based on hard power politics and deterrence, gave rise to new tensions, frictions, and strained relations among European states. From this point on, all efforts to safeguard peace and security in Europe had to take into account the structural “bipolarity” and confrontation as well as the nuclear capability of the newly emerging political and military Cold War system. Nevertheless, the 1960s also brought to light a few ideas and concepts aiming at establishing a strong “European pillar” in order to break up the icy structure of the bipolar world. In 1961, Charles de Gaulle promoted the idea of setting up a system of European foreign policy cooperation outside the institutions provided for in the Treaty of Rome. This proposal, commonly known as the Fouchet Plan, was rejected by the majority of the other member states for many reasons. However, this concept reflected the general idea, prevailing in France at that time, of building a common European foreign policy and European diplomacy as a kind of third force between the two competing superpowers of the Cold War. The Fouchet Plan was implicitly based on the idea of a strategic triangle of world powers: the US, Europe, and the Soviet-Union. In the early 1970s, a system of “Political Cooperation” was established within the framework of the European Community, which might be seen as the progenitor of what later became the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). It emerged from a number of informal meetings at the presidential level. The Belgian Political Director of the EC at that time, Davignon, might be seen as one of the key diplomats promoting informal discussions on foreign policy cooperation alongside the daily Community business. In terms of organization and structure, Political Cooperation was more of a loose consultative arrangement than an efficient and functioning machinery for a Common European Foreign Policy. EPC was an informal, transgovernmental means of addressing political issues by the EEC/EC member states. However, it provided
12
European Security in Transition
at least a “forum” in which the separate foreign policies of the Member States and key security issues of mutual interest could be commonly discussed. It must also be seen as an important platform that enabled member states to identify common grounds and common national interests. Thus, despite its informal character, the system of Political Cooperation turned out to be a useful instrument for the European Community to harmonize, at least in some cases, the foreign and security policies of its member states with respect to some specific areas of Community business. Of course, the system itself has changed tremendously since 1970. There cannot be any doubt that it underwent considerable development, which must be seen as an integral part of the radical changes in Europe’s political landscape that took place in the late 1980s and 1990s. The most important step was made in the mid-1980s, when the Single European Act established a treaty basis for foreign policy cooperation. The SEA first formalized political cooperation in the security and defense realms. This treaty was the result of initiatives taken by the three major political powers in Western Europe, e.g. the French, German and British governments. However, this step must be seen as just a first timid attempt by the European Community to put security and defense issues on its agenda and to increasingly deal with such issues, despite the fact that clearly defined military alliances and organizations already existed. In real politics, the EG only played a minor role in the European security and defense domain until the Maastricht Treaty establishing the European Union. However, the 1970s and 1980s brought to light another idea for a broader, over-arching East-West security organization, which surprisingly developed into a quite successful endeavour. From the mid-1950s until the 1970s, one of the moot questions that had always remained on the agenda was the idea of establishing an overall European “security umbrella” in the form of a European security conference, which would bring together – at one table – all parties, Eastern and Western, in order to discuss important measures to improve European security and strengthen mutual cooperation. During the 1960s, the Cold War conflict escalated (Cuban crisis, Vietnam, etc.) and prevented any substantial progress in this respect. But the situation changed in the early 1970s, when the need for comprehensive arms limitation and reduction talks was recognized by both sides in order to prevent further escalation and to slow down the ongoing arm race between the two superpowers. Talks concerning a future Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) started in Helsinki in 1972, leading to an initial three-stage conference, which became known as the “Helsinki process”. (This expression was later also used for the whole CSCE process leading to the follow-up conferences of the late 1970s and 1980s). The conference itself started in July 1973 with 35 participating states, the US and Canada among them. The second stage of the conference took place in Geneva from September 1973 until July 1975. This was the main working phase, where the final document was elaborated and prepared. This document, the Helsinki Final Act, was signed by all 35 states participating in the third stage of the conference, which was held in Helsinki from 30 July until 1 August 1975. The Helsinki Final Act contained a number of key commitments on political, economic, social, and military issues, including a reference to human rights. As
European Security in Transition: The European Security Architecture
13
a non-binding document in terms of international law, it carried the character of a “declaration,” expressing the sincere intention of all signing parties to follow the outlined principles and key commitments. The so-called “Decalogue” of the Helsinki Final Act, a number of listed fundamental principles, was supposed to guide and govern the future behaviour of the signatories toward their citizens as well as towards each other. The participating states also agreed on evaluating the principles’ implementation into practice through follow-up conferences, which were in fact held in Belgrade (1977–78), Madrid (1980–83), and Vienna (1986–89). The New Environment: The Post-Cold War Era and European Security With the end of the Cold War, more than four decades of East-West nuclear confrontation and permanent tensions between the two military blocs appeared to come to an end, giving way to East-West cooperation and new security arrangements. The United States appeared stronger than ever, as the only remaining hegemonic power on global stage, still holding its “protecting hands” over the European continent. However, the changed political landscape also called into question the US traditional role in European security and defense. The first years after the Berlin Wall was brought down were perceived by many Europeans as a chance to transform and reconfigure the existing security and defense organizations and alliances, which represented nothing more than the former East-West bloc rivalry and confrontation. But Europeans squandered most of the opportunities of the early 1990s due to a general lack of a clear vision about their future security architecture. As a result, the drive to transform the European security system once again came from outside, namely the United States. The US priority was to strengthen NATO’s role and to reconfigure its role and function. The NATO alliance, at the end of the Cold War, initially went through a period of questioning its continued relevance following the disappearance of the Warsaw Pact and the military threat it had been established to address. Nevertheless, demands for membership by former communist states of Central and Eastern Europe could not be ignored and the question of NATO expansion became an important issue for all Europe. When the idea of enlargement to the East became more politically acceptable in the mid-1990s and some Western powers even started to campaign for the idea, the “Partnership for Peace” Program (PfP) provided a useful umbrella organization for slowly establishing closer cooperation and preparing partner countries for future membership. NATO expansion was also linked to modernization processes of national armed forces, with the primary aim of setting up smaller, modern and more flexible military organizations and guaranteeing “interoperability” with other NATO forces. Consequently, other ideas, concepts, and visions for a new European post-Cold War system – outside the NATO framework – were pushed aside and the United States made it clear to their European partners that alternatives were not on offer. Political agreements with Russia made the political decision to expand toward the
14
European Security in Transition
East possible in the late-1990s. Since then, NATO has expanded twice (1999 and 2004), thus increasing its membership to 27 states. On the conceptual level, the post-Cold War era led to a shift away from a strong emphasis on external military threats, opening the door to a new understanding of security. With the dawn of a global “common risk society” (Beck 1999), an enlarged or broader security concept could emerge, which is no longer limited only to “the absence of military threats” or to defense of the state’s territory as the most important goal of national security and defense policy. As a result, the term “risk” came into use, and more and more often, replaced the old term “threat”. Increasing awareness of the effects of globalization also made post-Cold War societies more sensitive to the idea that they might have to deal with “non-territorial” threats and risks in the future. These changes in general threat perception and security requirements were followed by a re-evaluation of the traditional means and instruments of security and defense policy. As a result, NATO, the WEU, the OSCE, and all other existing security organizations on the national and international level started to reconfigure their organizational design and adapt to the new strategic and security environment. Transnational and non-governmental organizations and actors joined in and were increasingly confronted with security and defense matters. Civil-military relations turned out to be crucial in the development of a safer and peaceful post-Cold War Europe. The new global security environment of the post-Cold War era also changed public attitudes toward the project of “European integration”, which in the past had been seen as a purely civilian and economic endeavour. It became clear that, from now on, the European integration process would also deal intensively with security and defense issues, although from the outset it was obvious that the EU had to make a clear distinction between its own role and function within the broader security context and that of NATO. The transformation process of the European security architecture again gained momentum. Transatlantic or/and European? The Foundation of a CFSP and ESDP In the mid-1990s, former British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd pointed out that the concept of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in Europe: is not a glass palace, which descends whole and perfect from heaven as a result of the Maastricht Treaty. It can only be built brick by brick on the basis of shared national interests. (Hannay 1996: 2)
From today’s perspective, ten years on, Hurd’s statement seems to provide an adequate description of a process that has, over the last decade, in fact led to the establishment of a functioning CFSP and European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) pillar. There can be no doubt that it was extremely hard work to bring the Europeans together and to move on toward a common European security and defense policy that was not just rhetoric.
European Security in Transition: The European Security Architecture
15
In the past, the European experience was that many efforts to develop a specific “European” security and defense community were unsuccessful due to controversial opinions and views among the European states, specifically with regard to the question of the future political weight and importance of the transatlantic relationship for any form of closer European security and defense cooperation outside NATO. Some member states, like the United Kingdom, publicly portrayed the idea of CFSP/ESDP and of an improvement of European military capabilities for crisis management as a reinforcement of the European contribution to NATO. According to the British view, such efforts are meant to strengthen the transatlantic partnership and not to jeopardize the Atlantic alliance in any way. The French, on the other hand, tended to be relatively straightforward about the perceived need for a purely European force that could be used to better manage European crisis management without the involvement of NATO, particularly the United States of America. The decisive step toward the establishment of a specific European security and defense system within the framework of the European Community was taken in 1992, when the Maastricht Treaty was signed. Maastricht officially established the system of the “European Union” with the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as the “second pillar” of the Union. Furthermore, the treaty also referred to the eventual drawing up of a common defense policy, which might even lead to a common European defense, but left the specifics deliberately vague because of lack of widespread support among EU members concerning this issue. It also tightened up the requirements for coordination and introduced the concept of joint actions of the member states. According to the treaty, the CFSP aims to fulfil five fundamental objectives: 1. to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence, and integrity of the Union while respecting the principles of the United Nations Charter; 2. to strengthen the security of the EU in all ways; 3. to preserve peace and strengthen international security; 4. to promote international cooperation; and, finally, 5. to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, as well as respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms (Treaty). To pursue these goals, the CFSP was given two major instruments, i.e. common positions, where each member state would coordinate their policies to ensure a common European front, and joint actions, for member states to actively work together. Since the Treaty of Maastricht, and particularly since the late 1990s, the construction of a CFSP and ESDP has moved ahead dramatically. The initial groundwork required various NATO members, most importantly the US, to move toward acceptance of European efforts to construct a European pillar that was more than rhetorical. The NATO Oslo Summit of 1992 and the Berlin Summit of 1996 saw major decisions taken by NATO to support the development of links with the WEU, OSCE, the EU, and others. This opened the door for the EU to proceed with its own security and defense project without challenging NATO too much. In March 1996, an Inter-Governmental Conference was set up at Turin in order to explore ways to strengthen Europe’s CFSP. This conference witnessed a huge number of different approaches toward European security. On the one hand, a number
16
European Security in Transition
of member states wanted to see the second pillar as an integral part of the traditional European Community’s law, with wide-ranging authority for the Commission and the European Parliament. On the other hand, many proposals gave preference to a smoother way of harmonizing foreign and security policies. Some countries – France, for example – favoured the idea of setting up a Mr./Ms. CFSP in order to give the European security and defense endeavour a voice and a face. In general, a wide variety of suggestions were made, ranging from the idea of establishing a new European defense system (based on the principles of collective security), thus implementing gradually a origin “European” defense identity, to the concepts of building up the WEU as the future EU defense system or giving preference to a new strategic concept within the framework of an enlarged NATO. In the late 1990s, there was more common ground among European Union member states over the general proposition that the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) needed to be strengthened than there was over the political way this might be achieved. The public debate about the future European security system showed a wide variety of diverging proposals and opinions. In this respect, the specific “European” dilemma of quite sharp divergences between Member States, the Commission, and the European Parliament about the pace, scope, and limits of such a common policy was the result of the immense diversity of Europe itself, the differing European political systems and ways of political thinking, and, finally, a general lack of new guiding political ideas. These discussions led to the next important milestone in the development of the CFSP, the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997. The treaty brought a number of changes in order to make the CFSP more workable. CFSP’s capacity for action was reinforced particularly through the introduction of more coherent instruments and more efficient decision-making (e.g., “constructive abstention”). It also introduced a third instrument of CFSP, common strategies, and the treaty’s new Article 26 established the post of the High Representative for the CFSP, which was intended to give the Union’s common foreign and security policy a higher profile. Of course, the EU’s failure to respond effectively to the Balkan crisis of the 1990s was a spur for the EU to take decisive action to resolve its deficiencies in the area of “hard power” politics and to speak with one voice in foreign and international security matters. The first major step for the Union’s European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) was taken with the St Malo Declaration6 of 1998, when France and the United Kingdom, long time opponents of the ESDP idea, jointly declared the need for a common European defense policy backed up by credible armed forces. In fact, the Declaration removed major European obstacles, particularly the controversial attitudes of the United Kingdom and France, to the development of an EU capability to conduct autonomous operations where NATO was not inclined to be involved. However, the debate on how far the European intention to establish a specific European, and less transatlantic, security system should go remained in place. 6 For more information, please see http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=Op enMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1007029391629&aid=1013618395073.
European Security in Transition: The European Security Architecture
17
The Treaty of Nice,7 which came into effect in 2003, contained new CFSP provisions. Article 17 was amended to state that the: CFSP shall include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy, which might lead to a common defence, should the European Council so decide. It shall in that case recommend to the Member States the adoption of such a decision in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements. (Treaty of Nice)
Article 17 now also included a reference to all humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. In December 2002, the European Council decided on a course of action to deepen NATO/EU links. This was followed in March 2003, when the Berlin Plus arrangements were concluded, giving the EU access to NATO capabilities and assets for EU military operations. NATO had already furthered ESDP development by declaring its readiness to define and adopt necessary arrangements for ready access by the EU to NATO capabilities and assets at its Washington Summit of April 1999. In December 2003, the European Security Strategy (ESS) was adopted, giving the EU a framework security strategy for CFSP and ESDP. In May 2004, the Union expanded to 25 member states. This round of enlargement was not only driven by economic interests but also by security concerns. It concluded a series of “Euroagreements” with Central and East European states aiming at regional stabilisation, which came into place in the 1990s. These changes in the European post-Cold war security landscape also forced the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the former CSCE, to adapt to the new environment. CSCE adaptation occurred rapidly and during the 1990s included membership enlargement, organizational changes, new functions, and the development of a close linkage to NATO and the EU. Gradually the OSCE not only expanded from 35 states to more than 50, but also expanded its roles and functions, primarily by turning into a “soft power” aiming at conflict prevention and crisis management. To carry out its new roles of early warning, minorities’ protection, re-building of war torn societies, humanitarian aid, conflict prevention, and crisis management, the OSCE has developed specific tools such as confidenceand security-building measures, observer missions, and preventive diplomacy. Today, the OSCE adds to the European security architecture a very important element of soft power that is needed to address all aspects of security issues and to meet a number of new security challenges and threats of the post-Cold war era.
7
Treaty text available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/en/treaties/index.htm.
18
European Security in Transition
Conclusions and Outlook Since the end of the Second World War, the European security system has changed dramatically. Although the main security and defense organizations, particularly the North Atlantic alliance, founded and established in the early years of the Cold War, are still in place, their organizational designs, structures, goals, and functions have been radically transformed. The Cold War’s “bipolarity” has changed to a more “multipolar” world and the security concept itself has been widened. The notion of security has lost its narrow focus on military organizations and armed conflict between nation states. Today, civil-military relations and a proactive as well as preventive policy toward future crisis and conflicts play a much more decisive role with respect to safeguarding European security and guaranteeing peace and economic prosperity. In the last decade, Europe’s security architecture has developed a multi-level structure of close security and defense cooperation among all European states and the US and Canada, i.e. a system that aims at integrating a stronger European pillar into a broader defined transatlantic structure with strengthened cooperation and integration in the security and military domain among all European states. As a result, security and defense have become an integral part of the EU’s daily business, thus, gradually eroding the rigid distinction between foreign and security as well as defense cooperation and other Union policies. Although the Union’s military weakness is still a fact, continued efforts over the past ten years have led to the establishment of permanent political and military structures and to the development of civilian and military capabilities. The Union has also defined with NATO the framework of relations between the two organizations, allowing the Union to have access to NATO’s assets and capabilities. Generally speaking, the Union’s general approach to security and defense cooperation might be characterized as a cautious way of achieving the general goal by promoting so-called “evolutionary changes”, e.g. emphasizing smooth and slow development, both functionally and institutionally. There is, of course, a constant danger of duplicating Europe’s security and defense structures and capabilities, particularly with respect to NATO and CFSP/ESDP. It is clear that duplication must be avoided; this is a crucial issue for the future relationship between NATO and CFSP/ ESDP as fear of duplication is sure to remain controversial issue in the near future. The main problem in this respect is twofold: First, it is linked to the transatlantic question, particularly the definition of the US role in the European security system. Second, it has to do with the fact that CFSP/ESDP is in fact not just identical with the “European pillar” of NATO. Both organizations follow different rules and serve different purposes. Not all European NATO members are EU members and participate in the CFSP/ESDP. Denmark, for example, does not participate in the CFSP/ESDP but is a member of NATO; Turkey is a member state of NATO but does not (at least not yet) belong to the European Union. The current discussion about the future European security and defense system focuses on how to gradually design and develop such a new system within the
European Security in Transition: The European Security Architecture
19
global framework, so that external powers do not gain the perception that this new system poses any threat to them. Another important issue in this context is the idea of keeping a door open for an “opt-out” for those states not wishing or willing to participate in future EU military operations. The EU still comprises a number of socalled “militarily neutral countries,” which still wish to reserve the right to “opt out” through a general solidarity clause, as included, for example, in the draft for the EU Constitution. The overall patterns of today’s transformation process in Europe’s security and defense architecture are also apparent in the current public debate. When discussing the future European security system, references are mostly made to the two different, but in reality overlapping, concepts of European security: The first one is the traditional concept of security and defense as was generally understood and accepted as the prevailing idea during the Cold War era. Whoever still follows this path focuses on the primacy of national security and military defense. This view is clearly state-centric but allows security cooperation among states as long as this is in a mutual interest. According to this concept, the primary and overall task of the armed forces is to defend state territory against any external threat. For these people, European security policy is built on cooperation between sovereign nation-states, which may act together, bi- or multilaterally, and through alliances as long as they have a common interest in doing so. The second concept is built around the idea of shared responsibility of common values (a rather normative approach) as well as shared risks in a global society, in which the role of the state as an actor in world politics is rather limited. In this perspective, European security policy is viewed from a “supra-national” or even “global” point of view, binding societies together in order to guarantee peace and stability. This view is rather society-centric (in some cases even human-centric), following a “comprehensive security” concept, according to which societal forces and elements increasingly need to deal with security issues. Today’s ongoing European integration process puts a special emphasis on the second approach, although the intergovernmental structures still remain extremely active and important within the European Union. As a result, a wide array of different concepts and ideas concerning the future security and defense policies of the European continent are on the table and influence the current debate. It is obvious that there are a wide variety of different proposals; there are also quite sharp divergences between the 25 member states of the European Union and the 27 members states of NATO, just to name two of the key players, about the pace and scope of the changes that ought to be introduced in the near future. Nevertheless, the former, current, and emerging security system must always be seen as embedded in a broader political order, which forms an integral part of any continuing political, economic, or social transformation process that takes place in Europe. Furthermore, public debates on security and defense are always part of general public discourse about the present situation and future development of the political order. Any kind of policy directly derives from specific human perceptions and attitudes toward the political realm that reflect mutual interdependence between human societies and states and common as well as controversial approaches toward the question of how to meet new risks
20
European Security in Transition
and non-territorial security threats on a wide scale. Conceptually speaking, today’s security preoccupations and perceptions are very different from the possibilities envisaged during the Cold War or in the first years after the fall of the Iron Curtain. They also ensure that the European security architecture will remain a “work in progress” encompassing a number of new efforts toward reforming and rebuilding the European security system. References and Suggested Reading Borawski, J. and Young, T.-D. (2001), NATO after 2000: The Future of the EuroAtlantic Alliance (Westport-London: Praeger Publishers). Bothe, M., Ronzitti, N. and von Brill, A. R. (eds) (1997), The OSCE in the Maintenance of Peace and Security (The Hague: Kluwer Law International). Cuthbertson, I. M. (1992), Redefining the CSCE: Challenges and Opportunities in the New Europe (Boulder: Westview Press). Duke, S. (1994), The New European Security Disorder (New York: St. Martin’s Press). Dunay, P., Kardos, G. and Williams, A. J. (eds) (1995), New Forms of Security : Views from Central, Eastern and Western Europe (Aldershot: Dartmouth). Gärtner, H., Hyde-Price, A. and Reiter, E. (eds) (2001), Europe’s New Security Challenges (Boulder: Lynne Rienner). Gnesotto, N. (ed.) (2005), Die Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik der EU. Die ersten fünf Jahre (1999-2004) (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies). Haine, J.-Y. (2003), ‘From Laeken to Copenhagen: European Defence: Core Documents, Volume III’, Chaillot Papers 57 (February) (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies). Hannay, D. (1996), CFSP. The European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy: Menu for Reform (London: Action Centre for Europe). Hoffmann, S. (2000), ‘Towards a Common European Foreign and Security Policy?’, in Journal of Common Market Studies 38:2 (June), 189–98. Howorth, J. and Keeler, J. T. S. (eds) (2003), Defending Europe: The EU, NATO and the Quest for European Autonomy (New York: Palgrave Macmillan). Hunter, R. E. (2004), The European Security and Defense Policy: NATO’s Companion – or Competitor? (Santa Barbara: RAND). Jones, E. (2004), ‘Debating the Transatlantic Relationship: Rhetoric and Reality’, in International Affairs 80:4, 595–612. Kernic, F. and Hauser, G. (2006), Handbuch zur europäischen Sicherheit (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2nd edition). Lewis, D. W. P. and Lepesant, G. (eds) (1999), What Security for which Europe? Case Studies form the Baltic to the Black Sea (New York: Peter Lang). Lindley-French, J. (2002), ‘Terms of Engagement: The Paradox of American Power and the Transatlantic Dilemma post-11 September’, Chaillot Papers 52 (May) (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies).
European Security in Transition: The European Security Architecture
21
Missiroli, A. (2003), ‘EU Enlargement and CFSP/ESDP’, in European Integration 25, 1–16. Moens, A., Cohen, L. J. and Sens, A. G. (eds) (2003), NATO and European Security: Alliance Politics from the End of the Cold War to the Age of Terrorism (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers). Nuttall, S. J. (1992), European Political Co-operation (Oxford: Clarendon Press). Park, W. and Rees, W.G. (eds) (1998), Rethinking Security in Post-Cold War Europe (London-New York: Longman). Reinhardt, R. (2002), ‘From Weakness to Power with ESDP?’, in European Foreign Affairs Review 7, 453–471. Rutten, M. (comp.) (2001), ‘From St. Malo to Nice: European Defence: Core Documents’, Chaillot Papers 47 (May) (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, Western European Union). Rutten, M. (comp.) (2002), ‘From Nice to Laeken: European Defence: Core Documents, Volume II’, Chaillot Papers 51 (April) (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies). Smith M. (2004), Europe’s Foreign and Security Policy: The Institutionalization of Cooperation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). The Eisenhower Institute (ed.) (2006), NATO at Fifty. Online at http://www. eisenhowerinstitute.org/programs/globalpartnerships/securityandterrorism/ coalition/usandnato/NATOatFiftyBook/index.htm. Yost, D. S. (1998), NATO Transformed: The Alliances New Role in International Security (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press). Yost, D. S. (2002), ‘Transatlantic Relations and Peace in Europe’, in International Affairs 78:2 (April), 277–300. Official Publications The NATO Handbook of Documentation (Brussels: Office of Information and Press, NATO), online at http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/index.htm (updated version, 17 June 2004). The OSCE Handbook (3rd edition, 2002). Online available at http://www.osce.org/ item/13858.html. European Defence. A Proposal for a White Paper. Report of an independent Task Force, ed. EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris, May 2004.
This page intentionally left blank
Chapter 2
EU, NATO, OSCE: Interaction, Cooperation, and Confrontation Peter van Ham
Introduction: Rearranging Europe’s Institutional Deckchairs The senior diplomat I spoke with in the summer of 2005 shook his head in despair: “The EU and NATO are two security institutions working within Brussels’ city limits, but they might as well be on two different planets!” NATO’s Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer was equally clear in his assessment of EU-NATO relations: [S]trong and trusting NATO-EU relations are a strategic necessity. And yet, NATO-EU relations remain caught in an ambivalence that prevents both organizations from working closer together. Why? Because there are still too many who look at NATO-EU relations from the angle of competition rather than cooperation. (…) This must change. (de Hoop Scheffer 2004)
Of course this should change. But these calls for cooperation could already be heard a decade ago. One is therefore left wondering why European security institutions just don’t seem to get along. This article analyzes the problematical relationship between Europe’s key security institutions: the EU, NATO, as well as the Vienna-based Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). It focuses mainly on the complex and at times conflict-ridden process of institutional collaboration, with a specific emphasis on the last five years. The key challenge for Europe’s main security institutions is to reinforce each other in a constructive manner, rather than to get in each others way in useless (and wasteful) competition. The dreaded scenario is that of so-called interblocking institutions, frustrating each other without effectively addressing concrete European (and global) security challenges. Behind this saga of unsteady relationships, lies a mundane fact which needs to be clarified in advance. Although all three institutions deal with European security, they have a markedly different membership, different capabilities, and, perhaps most importantly, different security cultures. The concept of security has different meanings within these three institutions, and their different capabilities and policy tools taint their preferences and privileges certain policy responses. NATO has a clear comparative advantage in conducting military operations, the EU in economic
24
European Security in Transition
and diplomatic responses, whereas the OSCE mainly deals with conflict prevention and post-conflict reconciliation. The reason for many inter-institutional problems is that these niches are not watertight compartments. It remains unclear which institution is responsible for what, when, and how. Moreover, there is also considerable institutional envy and a certain apprehension that one institution may crowd others out. For example, all three institutions now have their own security platforms for the Middle East and North Africa, which have overlapping tasks and goals (OSCE News, 11 February 2004). Many officials discuss the same matters in all three fora, but without a decent system of feed-back and consultation. For all institutions it is an existential question to be present and visible on the security issue du jour, since it underlines their relevance and therefore assures their ultimate survival. Many more examples can be given of issues and areas of significant duplication. And this overlap is not getting less, but even seems to be growing. Several other examples will be analyzed below. Perhaps the most vexing problem is that member states use (or abuse) Europe’s key security institutions to further their own national foreign policy and security agendas. France, for example, pushes the EU as a security actor in its own right, without too much love lost for NATO. The United Kingdom, the United States and others (e.g. Denmark, the Netherlands, and Poland) support NATO’s role as the primes inter pares of European security, and see the EU (as well as the OSCE) as security actors of only marginal relevance. The OSCE has no member state which is keen to champion its cause. This is a considerable handicap for the organization as a whole, especially in its “competition” with other European security institutions. Institutional interaction is therefore imbued with national policy preferences, which, if they clash, may well result in institutional discord and even paralysis. This should make it clear from the onset that the workings of Europe’s security institutions are a reflection of a struggle for power and a jockeying for strategic position amongst Europe’s key national actors. At least in the security and defense field, Europe has not gone far beyond the Realist paradigm. The EU-NATO-OSCE triangle obviously has three sides. I will address each of these relationships, examine recent developments and evaluate the state of affairs of inter-institutional cooperation. NATO and the EU: Clash of Strategic Cultures? NATO’s relationship with the EU is clearly the most important side of this institutional triangle. With the slow decline of the WEU, the EU took over the task of organizing and implementing a common European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). This was agreed in the Amsterdam Treaty of 1999, and the subsequent European Council meeting (in June 1999) decided to give the EU the means and capabilities to implement ESDP. The EU’s Helsinki Headline Goals (of December 1999) indicated that the EU was committed to having its own troops to conduct military and crisis management operations. The EU also created its own permanent political and military structures, which closely resembled NATO’s: a Political and
EU, NATO, OSCE: Interaction, Cooperation, and Confrontation
25
Security Committee (PSC), a Military Committee (MC), and its own Military Staff (MS). Since then the NATO-EU relationship took on a new dimension since it now became clear that the EU was finally taking its military aspirations seriously. Before, the division of labour between the EU and NATO was rather obvious, whereby the Alliance remained the ultimate coordinator and guarantor of European and transatlantic security. The arrival of ESDP therefore led to confusion on both sides of the Atlantic: Will the EU now compete with NATO; will it duplicate NATO; how will both organizations cooperate? Even now, these questions remain largely unanswered, despite the progress made over the last five years. The dialogue between the EU and the Alliance took off in January 2001, when a special cooperation arrangement was signed. Since then meetings have taken place at Ministerial level at least every six months (i.e. once during each EU Presidency), and at least three meetings per year at Ambassadorial level. During times of crisis these get-togethers would of course intensify. Regular meetings between the EU’s PSC and the North Atlantic Council (NAC) have also taken place since then. Joint EU-NATO Ad Hoc Working Groups have been established and meet since mid-2000 to discuss shared security concerns, as well as many technical matters such as the exchange and sharing of classified information and intelligence, the modalities of the EU’s access to NATO assets and capabilities, etc. The first formal meeting of EU and NATO Foreign Ministers took place in May 2001 during NATO’s Budapest Summit. In March 2003, the so-called “Berlin Plus” arrangement was agreed whereby the EU was granted access to NATO planning assets and equipment. This came after many years of acrimonious debate over the exact modalities of EU-NATO military cooperation. The final compromise now means that the EU can make use of NATO planning and military assets, with only very few political strings attached. This arrangement was immediately put into practice when NATO’s Operation Allied Harmony in Macedonia was taken over by the EU (the so-called Operation Concordia) in March 2003. In December 2003, the European Council also approved a document called “European Defence: NATO/EU Consultations, Planning and Operations”, which has formed the basis for the Union’s operational relationship with NATO. Following this EU-NATO rapprochement, it was agreed at NATO’s Istanbul Summit (June 2004), that the EU would also take over NATO’s Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina in December 2004 (Operation Althea), using the same Berlin Plus arrangement. Operation Concordia was important for the EU since it proved the practical merit of the Berlin Plus understanding and offered the EU an opportunity to gain experience and some self-confidence. Concordia – subsequently followed up by the EU Police Mission named Proxima, in December 2003 – gave insight in the practical problems of daily EU-NATO cooperation. These problems were frequently minor and easy to solve (e.g. security clearances), but at times also of a more structural nature, such as the reluctance to share information and intelligence, as well as the unclear role of the Allied Forces South Europe (AFSOUTH), NATO’s regional command in Naples. When the chain of command for Concordia was devised, an EU Command Element
26
European Security in Transition
was included in AFSOUTH to ensure that consultations with other NATO operations in the Balkans would take place. A similar arrangement is now in place with EUFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina. But especially France has felt that this EU Command Element was not truly and fully under EU control, and too much dominated by US (and, one could say: hence NATO’s) military strategic culture. For the EU, Operation Althea is the biggest military-security challenge to dater. EUFOR comprises some 6,200 troops (down from the initial 7,000 troops), whereas previous operations were much more modest in size (Concordia only involved some 400 military personnel). EUFOR includes troops from 22 EU member states, as well as from regional partners (Albania, Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey), and further afield (e.g. Argentina, Canada and New Zealand). But links with NATO have remained close. For example, Althea’s HQ has been situated at SHAPE, and NATO’s deputy supreme allied commander for Europe, the German Admiral Rainer Feist, has functioned as the EU’s first operation commander. Moreover, NATO continues to have a small mission in Bosnia mainly to apprehend indicted war criminals and combat terrorism, whereas the US maintains its own base near Tuzla for similar reasons (Patrick Moore 2004). To a large extent, Althea’s success has been contingent upon the implementation of practical arrangements with NATO. But with Althea going as well as it does, the EU has proven both to itself and the outside world that it can merge its nascent military capabilities with its tried-and-tested economic and diplomatic instruments. One could therefore argue that the EU has passed the litmustest for the frequently made claim that the EU is well-equipped to deal with complex civil-military crisis management operations. But despite the ongoing success of Althea, the compromise of Berlin Plus will most likely be temporary since the pressure on the EU to develop more independent military capabilities, including its own military headquarters, will mount. Several EU member states – particularly Germany, France and Belgium – already favour the idea of establishing an EU operational planning staff and HQ. The argument for such an initiative is that the EU should be able to conduct autonomous military operations and therefore requires (or will require in future) its own operational planning capabilities. Most other EU member states disagree, arguing that the EU can now rely on NATO and the planners at SHAPE through Berlin Plus. They also argue that the EU’s permanent cell at SHAPE and the EU’s own civil-military cell within the EUMS (carrying out early-warning, situation assessment and strategic planning), already offer sufficient “autonomy” for a still fledgling ESDP. Moreover, the EU can also use national military HQ’s, a method used quite effectively with the EU-mission (named Artemis) for Bunia in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in June–September 2003, where a French HQ took the lead. Named after the initial Belgian idea to locate an EU HQ in the Brussels’ suburb of Tervuren, the “Tervuren governments” deny that more autonomous EU military planning capabilities will undermine NATO. But since this debate emerged most heatedly during the early stage of the American-led war on Iraq in early-2003, the Tervuren-option was generally seen as an attempt to develop a military counterweight against the US. For a while, conservatives in Washington even considered the
EU, NATO, OSCE: Interaction, Cooperation, and Confrontation
27
Tervuren proposal as a ploy to form an alternative to NATO and to marginalize the US from European security in general. US Ambassador to NATO Nicholas Burns (now Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs) described the Tervuren proposal as “one of the greatest dangers to the transatlantic relationship” (NATO News, 17 October 2003). The debate entered into calmer waters in 2005, but is essentially unresolved since the pressures to develop a more operational and effective ESDP remain. The acrimonious debate on Berlin Plus has been continued in a tussle to define an effective and efficient relationship between NATO’s Response Force (NRF) and the EU’s Rapid Reaction Force (RRF). Since both NRF and the EU’s RRF draw from the same (limited) pool of deployable forces, competition is almost inevitable. There is concern that the NRF may undermine the EU’s RRF and thereby hamper the development of the ESDP. Another risk is a division within the Alliance of countries favoring the NRF while others favour the RRF (Riggio 2003, de Wijk 2003-04). A concrete example of this dilemma has followed the African Union’s request to both NATO and the EU for logistical assistance to the AU’s peacekeeping operation in Darfur, western Sudan, in April 2005. Both organizations stressed that they planned to work closely and harmoniously together to help the AU, but this rhetoric proved difficult to realize. There was some discussion whether the EU and NATO could perhaps manage this operation jointly, but no agreement could be reached on such essential elements like a common planning centre, or a joint chain of command. Finally, NATO plans through SHAPE, and the EU uses the Strategic Airlift Coordination Center (SALCC) in Eindhoven, the Netherlands. This is the first time the EU and NATO operate alongside each other, but without using the Berlin Plus framework. Both the EU and NATO are offering the AU similar assistance, from strategic airlift, logistical support, to planning and technical expertise. Not surprisingly, France operates only through the EU, whereas the UK uses both NATO and the EU (“Support for the African Union in Darfur: A Test For EU-NATO Strategic Partnership”, ISIS Europe European Security Review, no. 26 (June 2005)). All these unresolved and contentious matters indicate that the EU-NATO relationship remains unsteady. “Tervuren” in particular has set much bad blood, confirming the stereotypes of French anti-Americanism and alleged American reluctance to accept Europe as a mature strategic actor. Clearly, the Tervuren-episode and the earlier difficulties to get to the Berlin Plus arrangement in the first place, may explain the continued and mutual EU-NATO suspicions which NATO Secretary General De Hoop Scheffer was referring to in July 2004. But behind the headline-grabbing difficulties between both organizations, one should not overlook that day-to-day cooperation on key security takes place unabated. Two reasons may explain why cooperation continues regardless. First, the membership of both organizations has never overlapped so much as since the enlargement of the EU toward Central Europe in May 2004: no less than nineteen of the EU-25 are now also NATO member states. This implies that few European states can afford that both institutions remain at loggerheads with each other. Instead, they actively encourage both institutions to work together in a complementary fashion. Operation Althea illustrates how harmonious this relationship may be, whereas the
28
European Security in Transition
messy response to the Darfur crisis indicates that the EU-NATO strategic partnership still requires much work. Second, since 9/11 the US-led “war on terror” puts pressure on all security institutions to be more output-oriented: what do they actually do to address key security challenges, and how effectively do they operate? The key word here is “effective multilateralism”: making institutions work, rather than mainly talk. This puts pressure on all Western states to set aside their national agendas and commit themselves to use Europe’s security institutions effectively. A clear case in point is the shared EU and NATO commitment to make sure that Afghanistan will take further steps on the difficult road toward stability and democracy. NATO took over command and coordination of ISAF in August 2003, its first ever military operation outside the Euro-Atlantic area. ISAF was initially limited to providing security in and around Kabul, but the Alliance has expanded over the years, and is now offering security assistance in 50% of Afghanistan’s territory with nine Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in the South and North of the country. NATO’s (and ISAF’s) task is to provide security for other international organizations and NGOs to offer humanitarian assistance and reconstruction aid. Another major task has been to provide security support for the presidential and parliamentary elections in the country (which took place in October 2004 and September 2005). Close cooperation with the EU, and the European Commission in particular, has proven essential. The EU is the main donor to Afghanistan, backing the current reconstruction process. The European Commission has earmarked €1 billion for reconstruction over 5 years (2002–2006), focusing mainly on institution-building, rural development, health and infrastructure, but also to support demining, human rights and civil society in Afghanistan. The EU and NATO therefore need each other in Afghanistan, since economic reconstruction and security go hand in hand (Brok and Gresch 2004). One other issue is the fight against WMD proliferation, which now tops the security agenda of both the EU and NATO. A transatlantic consensus on how to best deal with these new security challenges seems to be gradually emerging. However, it is indicative that the real dynamic of transatlantic cooperation no longer lies in NATO, but in the EU-US summits. In a joint EU-US statement on WMD proliferation on 25 June 2003, transatlantic leaders pledged to “use all means available to avert WMD proliferation and the calamities that would follow” (The White House 2003). Following their June 2005 EU-US summit, both partners agreed to “enhance information sharing, discuss assessments of proliferation risks, and work together to broaden global support for and participation in non-proliferation endeavors” (“European Union and United States Joint Program of Work on the Nonproliferation of Weapons of Mass-Destruction”, EU-US Summit, Washington DC, 20 June 2005). Although it remains to be seen whether these declarations will go beyond rhetorics, it indicates that NATO’s role as the strategic platform for a transatlantic security policy is eroding. Obviously, Washington sees merit in working directly with the EU (rather than through NATO) to address key security issues, be they HIV/Aids programs, airline and port security, WMD proliferation, or political reform in the
EU, NATO, OSCE: Interaction, Cooperation, and Confrontation
29
Middle East. Calls for a more political NATO – i.e., turning the Alliance in a more effective forum for political debate – may well have come too late (Rühle 2005). Shared membership and threat assessments between the EU and NATO may therefore ameliorate the animosity between Europe’s key institutions. But it is unlikely that the bickering will end before too long. Both NATO and the EU are claiming a global role in the broad area of peace support operations. The EU is also gradually taking over NATO’s role as a collective defense organization since the European Constitution (now still in a comatose condition) included a so-called “solidarity clause” which obliges all member states to “act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the victim of terrorist attack or natural or man-made disaster” (Article I-43). This covers NATO’s famous Article 5 collective defense clause which has been severely weakened since its invocation after 9/11 failed to turn the Alliance into the center of political gravity in the ensuing “war on terror”. Moreover, since the EU is acquiring more military tasks and NATO is increasingly focused on the non-military elements of security, both institutions will almost inevitably get in each others way. Now that NATO no longer has any qualms to go way “out of area” (e.g. into the Middle East), it will increasingly meet the EU as an institutional partner and occasional rival. EU-OSCE Relations: Soft Power and Conflict Prevention Both the EU and the OSCE are in the business of soft power, using economic, diplomatic, and other non-military instruments to reach political objectives (Cameron 1995). The main goal of the OSCE is to establish structures of cooperation in Europe (and beyond) to defuse tensions, prevent conflict, and reconcile enemies. Both institutions lack military capabilities and have a particularly civilian take on dealing with security challenges. The EU’s European Security Strategy makes it clear that “for the EU, the strength and effectiveness of the OSCE – and the Council of Europe – has a particular significance”. EU member states closely coordinate their positions within the OSCE (as a part of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy’s commitment to speak with one European voice in international fora), and provide the bulk of the OSCE’s funding in all three dimensions of security (the OSCE’s three baskets: politico-military security, the economy, and human rights) across the entire OSCE region. The EU also provides a large share of the OSCE’s field operations staff. Especially the so-called human dimension of security as developed by the OSCE, is of interest to the EU. The EU therefore funds the bulk of the OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), and many of ODIHR’s program’s in Central Asia. The potential for EU-OSCE cooperation is most obvious in the area of conflict prevention and crisis management. The EU and the OSCE work closely together on the ground, most notably in the Balkans and the southern Caucasus. EU and OSCE programs, projects, missions, and other policy ventures largely overlap in their objectives as well in their methods. The OSCE’s activities in Central Asia give
30
European Security in Transition
it a specific security niche, since this is an area where the EU’s has little experience and expertise. In 2006, the OSCE has seven field missions, and eight centres and offices in the Balkans, Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, as well as in Central Asia. This OSCE presence offers the organization eyes and ears and a real expertise. Rather than seeing the OSCE as a direct rival, the EU is actively involved in developing this OSCE-expertise. For example, at the OSCE’s Istanbul Summit (November 1999) the EU supported the establishment of REACT (Rapid Expert Assistance and Cooperation Teams), which includes a database of experts who can be used during crisis situations. Like the EU-NATO dialogue, the EU and OSCE have institutionalized political contacts at the Ministerial and Ambassadorial level. At the political level the EU is represented at most OSCE meetings by the delegation of the member state that holds the EU Presidency. The European Commission has its own delegation to most international organizations based in Vienna, the OSCE included. With the adoption of the 1999 Platform for Cooperative Security, the OSCE declared its firm intention to cooperate with other security institutions, the EU and NATO included. The first formal working group level exchange between both organizations took place in 2003, which indicates that the EU-OSCE dialogue is not very intensive until now. The troikas of both EU and OSCE meet twice annually and there is staff-to-staff contact on most levels. However, both organizations have committed themselves to improving the exchange of information as well as cooperation on a practical level. Ideas are also circulating to establish a permanent EU-mission to the OSCE and to strengthen the EU Council OSCE Working Group in Brussels. EU-OSCE cooperation in the field has developed gradually since the early1990s. For example, the OSCE was actively involved in the implementation of the Brioni Accords of July 1991, as well with the EU’s subsequent Monitoring Missions in the Balkans. The EU and the OSCE also worked closely together in implementing United Nations sanctions imposed on the Former Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republika Srpska. For Albania, both organizations initiated a so-called Friends of Albania-group (in September 1998) which coordinates the international efforts to support Albania in its development efforts. Moldova offers another example of successful EU-OSCE cooperation, since the OSCE Mission collaborated with the European Union TACIS program to encourage the Government of Moldova and the Trans-Dniestrian authorities to begin reconstruction projects. The EU and the OSCE have also worked closely and effectively together in implementing the 2001 Ohrid Agreement which works toward the stabilization of Macedonia. In 2004, the European Commission even lauded: the excellent cooperation which the EU has enjoyed over the years with the OSCE Spillover Monitoring Mission in Skopje. The work of the OSCE Mission has been a decisive factor in promoting stability and democracy in the country and complements the Union’s own efforts in this field. We remain confident that in the future this mutually reinforcing cooperation will continue (EU statement in response to the Address by Minister of Foreign Affairs of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia made in the Permanent Council of the OSCE, 5 February 2004).
EU, NATO, OSCE: Interaction, Cooperation, and Confrontation
31
But given the continued hitches between both organizations, both within the EU (European Commission and European Council) and the OSCE Secretariat, the possibilities for improving inter-institutional cooperation remain on the agenda. Areas of specific attention are cooperation in civil crisis management and the modalities of the EU’s contribution to OSCE-led missions; joint selection and training programs for field staff; and cooperation in the planning of new operations. Since both organizations focus on conflict prevention and stabilization, seeking more synergies would seem commonsensical. However, at the moment the EU seems to develop its own policies and capabilities in areas where the OSCE has been active for many years. For example, in the Balkans the EU seems to ignore the OSCE’s missions. The EU’s Althea operation has made it more difficult for the OSCE to call upon EU member states to assign staff for other civilian crisis management missions. Moreover, in the context of its new European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), the EU has appointed special representatives for Moldova, the southern Caucasus as well as Central Asia. These are regions where the OSCE has developed much expertise based on its long-established missions. Another example is the launch of the EU’s first rule of law mission to Georgia (known as EUJUST Themis) in July 2004. Themis involves some 10 international civilian experts plus local staff to support the local authorities in reforming the Georgian criminal justice system. This EU mission clearly overlaps with the OSCE’s REACT mechanism, which aims to pool civilian experts for rapid deployment. It has therefore been suggested that the EU should coordinate its contribution of national experts to OSCE missions via an EU pool, or that the EU could function as a sub-contractor to the OSCE and start EU-missions under EU-command at the OSCE’s request (Biscop 2005). Whatever the mechanism that will be chosen, the scarcity of civil crisis management experts simply requires more and closer EU-OSCE cooperation. It should be clear that with the EU’s enlargement the prospect for a larger EU role in the OSCE has grown; of the OSCE’s 55 participating states, 25 are now EU members. The EU has managed to speak with a single voice (of the rotating Presidency) in OSCE when there is an agreed position. But this good habit has eroded since the EU’s 2004 enlargement, and it is now all too often that other EU member states take the floor to air a dissenting opinion, which of course tends to dilute the EU’s overall message. It remains unclear what impact EU enlargement will have on the OSCE itself. Some observers believe that EU enlargement will gradually marginalize the OSCE, whereas others argue that it will prove that both organizations are “natural-born partners” (Wohlfeld 2003, OSCE 2002). As long as a country has a realistic prospect to accede to the EU, the pull of membership will offer Brussels a significant lever to steer this country toward democracy and a market economy. In this respect, the EU has much more soft power than the OSCE. But for some countries EU membership is not on the cards. To assure cooperation with these countries, the EU introduced its European Neighborhood Policy in May 2004. The EU will now focus more political attention (and limited financial resources as well) on countries such as Moldova, Belarus, Ukraine as well as the southern Caucasus. Some countries (such as Belgium, which holds the OSCE Chair in 2006),
32
European Security in Transition
see this as an opportunity for the EU to serve as a bridge between the US and Russia within the OSCE (Michel 2004). Indeed, the EU recognizes that for the ENP to be successful, close cooperation with the OSCE is important. European Commissioner Chris Patten therefore argued (in July 2004) that “EU enlargement inevitably means that we need to develop a very close and co-operative relationship to make the best of what the EU and regional organizations like the OSCE can bring to security and cooperation in Europe” (OSCE News, “EU External Relations Commissioner Patten praises level of cooperation with OSCE”, 15 July 2004). Monika Wohlfeld, the OSCE’s Head of Mission Program, even claims that “the EU’s new neighbors initiative is in fact a very important test case, also for the EU’s relations with the OSCE” (Wohlfeld 2003: 54). The OSCE will have to reconsider its role and place in Europe’s dynamic security architecture. In an influential report Common Purpose: Towards a More Effective OSCE (published in June 2005), a “Panel of Eminent Persons” argued that the OSCE “should focus on what [it] does best and where its value added lies” (Common Purpose: Towards a More Effective OSCE, final report and recommendations of the Panel of Eminent Persons, June 2005). Since the EU and OSCE have similar security visions, a more strategic partnership between both organizations would be politically pertinent. With Romania’s and Bulgaria’s EU-membership (in 2007) in sight, the EU’s influence in the OSCE will increase accordingly. What is more, three EU member states will hold the OSCE chairmanship between 2006 and 2008 in a row: Belgium, Spain and Finland. This would offer a good opportunity to strengthen the EU-OSCE relationship, for example by holding regular meetings between the EU Presidency, the EU’s High Representative for CFSP, the EU’s External Affairs Commissioner and the OSCE’s Chairman-in-Office. The logical focus of cooperation would be to incorporate the OSCE in developing the EU’s Neighborhood Policy. The President of the OSCE’s Parliamentary Assembly, Bruce George, argued in September 2003, that: the enlargement of both the EU and NATO cannot remain without significant consequences for other organizations. We must remember that the OSCE remains the most flexible and responsive Euro-Atlantic foreign policy instrument for non-military contingencies. (OSCE News, “OSCE Parliamentary Assembly President calls on OSCE to reassert its role in enlarging Europe”, 3 September 2003)
He may well be right, but the OSCE’s niche capabilities are increasingly also filled by the EU, as well as by a more ambitious and extravert NATO. NATO and the OSCE: Cooperative Security and its Limits After the end of the Cold War, both NATO and the OSCE had to reconsider their fundamental rationale, and subsequently devised quite successful strategies to remain relevant to a significantly changed European security environment. Although both
EU, NATO, OSCE: Interaction, Cooperation, and Confrontation
33
organizations are very different in their strategic culture and capabilities, they have been competing with each other in the area of cooperative security. With the implosion of the Soviet Union in December 1991, NATO developed a major new outreach-program to the Soviet successor states, initially under the institutional umbrella of the so-called North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC); later through the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). NATO’s PfP – which was launched in 1994 – was aimed at deepening the political and military ties with Central Europe and to forge a partnership with NATO on the basis of shared interest, joint values, and mutual trust. Although the OSCE has tried to reach similar objectives by somewhat different means (i.e. the monitoring of ethnic rights, free media, rule of law, etc.), the PfP process and the OSCE have overlapped significantly in their efforts to establish and strengthen a system of cooperative security in the region. Especially the US has privileged NATO’s PfP efforts, often at the detriment of the OSCE’s capabilities. With the signing of the NATO-Russian Joint Permanent Council (JPC) in May 1997, the OSCE even lost a bit of its comparative advantage of being the only European security institutions incorporating Russia. In 2001, the OSCE Troika started an initiative to enhance OSCE-NATO/EAPC relations, but without too many results until now. Since January 1998, NATO and OSCE staff meetings have taken place regularly. NATO officials have been invited to participate at senior level in OSCE Ministerial meetings, and at Ambassadorial level regular briefings take place as well. Since the adoption of the OSCE Charter for European Security (at the Istanbul Summit of November 1999), OSCE-NATO cooperation has further developed. In this Charter the OSCE clarifies its role in Europe’s security framework and sets out ambitions to develop its operational capabilities, especially in the field of peacekeeping, police operations, and conflict prevention. Practical cooperation in the field (especially in Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Albania) has shown the possibilities, limits, and problems of OSCE-NATO relations. For example, in Kosovo the OSCE and NATO were assigned complimentary verification tasks prior to the NATO-led war against the Milosevic-regime, which included the exchange of intelligence with regard to the security situation on the ground. OSCE and NATO staff cooperated closely, which was also the case after the return of the OSCE in July 1999, after the Kosovo war had halted. But the sharing of classified information has since proven complicated. NATO staff and the OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre have cooperated since 2000, but intelligence and information sharing has remained limited, which has put a brake on OSCE-NATO cooperation in the field. A first OSCE-NATO staff level meeting to discuss the Mediterranean platforms of both organizations was held in 2003. In a subsequent meeting in 2004, it was agreed that both organizations should cooperate more closely on the fight against international terrorism, disarmament issues, and small arms and light weapons. Joint OSCE-NATO conferences have been organized on issues high on both organizational agendas, for example on the disposal of rocket fuel components (in Kiev, July 2005), and combating terrorist financing (in Vienna, November 2005). OSCE-NATO
34
European Security in Transition
cooperation is also developing in the economic and environmental dimension. NATO, through its Science and Peace Program, joined the OSCE’s Environment and Security Initiative as an associate in 2004. (This initiative is supported by the OSCE, the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP)). This initiative (set up in 2002) aims to address environmental issues that are a threat to stability and peace, using environmental cooperation as a confidencebuilding exercise in the regions involved. Dimitrij Rupel, Slovenia’s Chairman-inOffice of the OSCE, argued in January 2005 that environmental cooperation between the OSCE and NATO can “make a real difference to those affected. It would be good to build on this work as well as the successful experience of the joint NATO-OSCE South Caucasus River Monitoring Project” (Statement by H.E. Dimitrij Rupel, Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE at the meeting of the North Atlantic Council, 26 January 2005). This has become all the more important after 9/11, since both the OSCE and NATO refocused their attention to the fight against international terrorism, as well as to the role and place of Russia and Central Asia. In its Budapest Plan of Action (December 2001), the OSCE pledged that it “will assist states in their implementation efforts in those areas in which it has expertise, where useful and appropriate in cooperation with the Council of Europe, the EU and NATO” (OSCE Budapest Plan of Action, December 2001). The OSCE’s long-standing presence in Central Asia made it a more interesting and useful partner for NATO than before. Former NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson therefore argued in 2003 that: geographically, beyond our joint efforts in the Balkans, I see scope for greater cooperation with regard to the Caucasus and Central Asia, strategically important regions where the OSCE has on-the-ground experience. We should also look for synergies in our work in the Mediterranean region. (Speech by NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson at the OSCE Permanent Council (Vienna), 6 November 2003)
Mr. De Hoop Scheffer equally argued that “there is scope for NATO and the OSCE to cooperate more effectively in engaging the countries of Northern Africa and the Broader Middle East”, building upon the positive experiences of NATO’s support of the OSCE “with its monitoring of the Afghan Presidential elections [of 2004], as well as the [2005] parliamentary and regional elections” (ibid). All in all, contacts between both institutions are developing but still remain rudimentary, and certainly not as effective as they should be. In November 2005, NATO’s Secretary General therefore called for closer NATO-OSCE cooperation on all institutional level, arguing that “we can, and must, do a lot better” (Speech by NATO Secretary General De Hoop Scheffer at the OSCE Permanent Council (Vienna), 3 November 2005). But what prospects are there for OSCE-NATO relations? The OSCE’s Chairmanin-Office, Bulgarian Foreign Minister Solomon Passy argued in January 2004, that practical cooperation should drive OSCE-NATO cooperation (Speech by Bulgarian Minister of Foreign Affairs Solomon Passy to the North Atlantic Council, 21 January 2004). The list of potential practical interaction between both organizations is
EU, NATO, OSCE: Interaction, Cooperation, and Confrontation
35
extensive. For the time being, OSCE-NATO cooperation will focus on the so-called soft security issues, such as the trafficking of human beings and general human rights issues. For example, at NATO’s 2004 Istanbul Summit, it was agreed that: all personnel taking part in NATO-led operations should receive appropriate training to make them aware of the problem and how this modern day slavery trade impacts on human rights, stability and security. (NATO Issues 2004)
For the OSCE, NATO’s interests in these soft security matters are a mixed blessing. On the one hand it offers possibilities for closer cooperation, but at the same time is will increase the overlap between both organizations and may well give rise to renewed bickering over mandates. Clearly, NATO is a newcomer in this area and will give the OSCE the right of way for the time being. But how the EU, NATO, and the OSCE will divide up and manage their overflowing and overlapping security agendas will remain a contentious issue. Conclusions and Prospects Europe’s main advantage over other continents is that it can rely on a dense network of institutions that encourage stability, transparency, and a high level of mutual trust. Europe has set itself high standards of effective multilateralism, and rightfully so. Europe’s key security institutions face serious challenges over the coming decade. Will Iran continue to develop nuclear weapons? Will Afghanistan and Iraq develop into stable democracies? Will the transatlantic relationship survive the imbroglio of the Bush-era? How will the EU and NATO react to a new terrorist attack? And, perhaps most importantly: how will Europe’s institutions adapt to the mounting pressure on the very idea of effective multilateralism? Since 9/11, the US considers itself the primes inter pares of the global community, and is increasingly wary to limit its scope of action by international law, international institutions, or the well-meaning advice of allies. Washington now prefers to act through coalitions of the willing, also known as the international community, or even less concrete, the club of civilized nations. The Wall Street Journal aptly characterized these set-ups as follows: “There’s no headquarters, no secretarygeneral, no talkfests – and, perhaps most important of all, no French or Russian veto” (“The New Multilateralism”, The Wall Street Journal, 8 January 2004). The Bush administration breathes a general distrust of multilateral institutions, and is keen to work around them. John Bolton, US Ambassador to the United Nations, made it very clear that: [t]he idea that we could have a UN Security Council resolution or a nice international treaty is fine if you have unlimited time. We don’t, not with the threats out there … We [don’t] want to engage in an endless legal seminar. (Roberts 2003)
This means that Washington follows a policy of multilateralism “by invitation”, asking others to work with the US, follow its leadership, and trust its judgment.
European Security in Transition
36
But this trend toward flexibility is not limited to the US. In Europe, the enlargement toward the EU-25 has led to a new system of structured cooperation which allows member states to develop small sub-groups within the EU of like-minded countries willing to engage in a certain (foreign) policy endeavor. The willingness to accept the lowest common denominator-solution by working endlessly inside international institutions, has waned quite dramatically. Bolton’s warning that there simply is not sufficient time to indulge in the luxury of multilateralism is obviously also heeded in Europe. What will this trend imply for Europe’s institutional architecture? Will we see more directoires such as the EU3 (France, Germany and the UK) leading the Union’s diplomatic attempts to keep Iran from developing nuclear weapons? What will emerge over the coming decades is a Europe not of concentric circles, in which some countries are at the centre and some at the periphery, but a European security framework that consists of Olympic circles in which all countries are involved in one way or the other. Like the five circles of the Olympic flag, there will be no single centre, but three or four; there will be no single periphery, but most countries will find themselves on the margins of some activity or some arrangement, either out of free will or because of necessity. As Javier Solana – in his capacity of NATO’s Secretary General – formulated it in February 1998: I would like to erase from our consciousness the words “dividing lines”. These are words from the Cold War. They meant that some countries were “in” and some were “out”. Today, none are in or out – some are only partly in and partly out. (Quoted in The Washington Times, 10 February 1998)
For many (if not all) European countries, NATO and the EU will remain the core of Europe’s developing security framework, but the flexible and ad hoc arrangements that will become increasingly more prevalent after enlargement, will gradually blur the practical distinctions between full membership and other institutional relationships. The borders between European countries in the Olympic model will not be static and cut in stone, but will be modified to reflect changing circumstances. References Biscop, S. (2005), “The EU, the OSCE and the European Security Architecture: Network or Labyrinth?”, Helsinki Monitor Conference, Vienna (9 September 2005). Brok, E. and Gresch, N. (2004), “Afghanistan – Lehren für ein Zusammenwirken von NATO und EU im internationalen Krisenmanagement”, Europäische Sicherheit, vol. 53 (July 2004). Cameron, F. (1995), “The European Union and the OSCE: Future Roles and Challenges”, Helsinki Monitor, vol.6, no.2 (1995). de Hoop Scheffer, J. (2004), NATO Secretary General, Speech at the European Policy Centre, Brussels, 12 July 2004.
EU, NATO, OSCE: Interaction, Cooperation, and Confrontation
37
Michel, L. (2004), Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Speech in Prague (2 March 2004). Internet: http://www.diplomatie.be/nl/press/speechdetails.asp? TEXTID=15925 (4 August 2004). Moore, P. (2005), “EU Peacekeeping in Bosnia: What’s in a Name?”, RFE/RL (18 July 2004). Internet: http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2004/07/03751b379c8d-4041-90a1-28155fa5df6f.html (5 August 2005). NATO Issues (2004), “Trafficking in Human Beings”, 9 July 2004. Internet: http:// www.nato.int/issues/trafficking/index.html (3 August 2004). OSCE Press Release (2002), “Javier Solana Describes the OSCE as a ‘Natural-born Partner’ of the EU”, 25 September 2002. OSCE News (2004), “OSCE CiO Proposes Closer Cooperation with EU and NATO on Mediterranean Issues”, 11 February 2004. Riggio, D. (2003), “EU-NATO Cooperation and Complementarity between the Rapid Reaction Forces”, The International Spectator, vol. 38, no. 3 (September 2003). Roberts, C. A. (2003), “The U.N.: Searching For Relevance”, The Wall Street Journal, 21 October 2003. Rühle, M. (2005), “A More Political NATO”, NATO Review (Special Issue Winter 2005). The White House (2003), “Joint Statement by President George W. Bush, European Council President Konstantin Simitis, and European Commission President Romano Prodi on the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction”, 25 June 2003. de Wijk, Rob (2003–04), “European Military Reform for a Global Partnership”, The Washington Quarterly, vol. 27, no. 1 (Winter 2003–04). Wohlfeld, M. (2003), “EU Enlargement and the Future of the OSCE: The Role of Field Missions”, Helsinki Monitor, vol. 12, no. 1 (2003).
This page intentionally left blank
Chapter 3
The ESDP: The European Security Pillar Gunther Hauser
Introduction When the European Union Treaty entered into force on 1 November 1993, the creation of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) became one of the main objectives of all member states of European Union (EU), including the so-called neutral and non-aligned states of Austria, Finland, Ireland, and Sweden. In CFSP, security policy is a part of foreign policy, not separate from it. Upon achieving CFSP, Europe should finally be able to speak with one voice. Achieving this goal shall also include the creation of a common defense policy, if the European Council so decides. The concept of a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) was launched during the Austrian EU presidency in the second half of 1998. French President Jacques Chirac and British Prime Minister Tony Blair decided in Saint Malo (3– 4 December 1998) to strengthen the European defense pillar. In Saint Malo, both political leaders accepted the French position that the “union must have the capability for autonomous action” on defense matters, whereas the United Kingdom was keen to stress the organic link between the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (van Ham: 6). Before, at the informal European Council meeting in the Austrian town of Pörtschach, 24–25 October 1998, the United Kingdom for the first time publicly referred to its altered position on European defense cooperation. Prime Minister Tony Blair stated that Europe’s policies relating to Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo were “unacceptable” and marked by “weakness and confusion” (ibid, 5). In the spring of 1999, the NATO air attacks against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to stop “ethnic cleansings” in Kosovo made it clear that Europe depends on US military capabilities. Pörtschach, therefore, symbolized the first, explicit step by EU member states toward establishing a European crisis management capability backed by a more effective military infrastructure (ibid). At the Cologne and Helsinki European Council Summits in 1999, heads of state decided that the European Rapid Reaction Force (EU RRF) – about 60,000 troops – should have the capacity to undertake autonomous actions until 2003 so the European Union “can take decisions and approve military action where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged” (North Atlantic Council 1999: para. 9a). To fulfill the whole spectrum of EU Petersberg tasks – from peacekeeping to peace enforcement actions – the European Union will need advanced military capabilities to close
European Security in Transition
40
capability gaps between the United States and the European allies. The primary task for the European Union is now to increase and coordinate capabilities both for its own security and for the stabilization of the European area. Defining European Security and Defense Policy With the entry into force of the Treaty on European Union on 1 November 1993, the CFSP became essential part of EU Treaty as an intergovernmental pillar in Title V (Articles 11 to 28 of the EU Treaty). Article 11 sets out its five main principles of CFSP. The Union shall define and implement a common foreign and security and security policy covering all areas of foreign and security policy, the objectives of which shall be: •
• •
• •
To safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the Union in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter; To strengthen the security of the Union in all ways; To preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter, including those on external borders; To promote international cooperation; To develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.
These principles were extended by the European Convention in the European Constitutional Treaty (Article III-292) as follows: to safeguard security; to preserve conflicts; to foster the sustainable economic, social, and environmental development of developing countries, with the primary aim of eradicating poverty; to encourage the integration of all countries into the world economy, including through the progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade; to develop international measures to preserve and to improve the quality of the environment and the sustainable management of global natural resources in order to ensure sustainable development; to assist populations, countries, and regions confronting man-made or natural disasters; and to promote an international system based on stronger multilateral cooperation and good global governance. These objectives emphasize the European security model of comprehensive multilateral cooperation. This is evidence by Paragraph 2 of Article 11 in the EU Treaty which states that “the Member States shall work together to enhance and develop their mutual political solidarity. They shall refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations.” The CFSP is also mentioned in Article 2 of the common provisions of the EU Treaty, which stipulates that one of the Union’s objectives is:
The ESDP: The European Security Pillar
41
to assert its identity on the international scene, in particular through the implementation of a common foreign and security policy including the progressive framing of a common defense policy, which might lead to a common defense [...].
Title V constitutes a separate pillar of the European Union, since the way it operates and its intergovernmental nature distinguish it from the traditional pillars of the Community, such as the single market and trade policy. This difference is most striking in the decision-making procedures, which require member state consensus, whereas in traditional Community areas, a majority vote suffices. Article 301 of the EC Treaty combines the first (European Communities – EC and Euratom) and second pillar (CFSP) by allowing the Council to apply economic sanctions on behalf of the Union. NATO obligations of EU member states are not in contradiction with engagement in EU security and defense issues: The policy of the Union [...] shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defense policy of certain Member States and shall respect the obligations of certain Member States, which see their common defense realized in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the common security and defense policy established within that framework.
Furthermore, “The progressive framing of a common defense policy will be supported, as Member States consider appropriate, by cooperation between them in the field of armaments” according to Article 17 (1) of the EU Treaty. Within the CFSP, it is possible to adopt measures by a qualified majority vote, with the dual safeguards of “constructive abstention” in Article 23 (1): Decisions under this Title shall be taken by the Council acting unanimously. Abstentions by members present in person or represented shall not prevent the adoption of such decisions. [...]
and the possibility of referring a decision to the European Council if a member state resorts to a veto. This is known as the “emergency brake”. The Military Integration of the Western European Union into the European Union Specifically, Article 17 (1) of the Treaty of Amsterdam stated that the CFSP covers: all questions relating to the security of the Union, including the progressive framing of a common defense policy, [...] which might lead to a common defense, should the European Council so decide.
In this article, Western European Union (WEU) was “an integral part of the development of the Union providing the Union with access to an operational capability [...]” for Petersberg crisis management operations. Article 17 (1) introduced a “possibility of
42
European Security in Transition
integration” for the WEU to join the EU, “should the European Council so decide”. In Article 17 (3), the European Union “will avail itself of the WEU to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defense implications”. In case of Petersberg tasks, Article 17 (3) states that: [...] all Member States of the Union shall be entitled to participate fully in the tasks in question. The Council, in agreement with the institutions of the WEU, shall adopt the necessary practical arrangements to allow all Member States contributing to the tasks in question to participate fully and on an equal footing in planning and decision-taking in the WEU.
With the Amsterdam Treaty, all of the Petersberg tasks have been incorporated into new structures of the Union, as have subsidiary bodies of the Western European Union such as the Satellite Center in Torrejón, Spain, and the Institute for Security Studies in Paris, which have been operational within the European Union since January 2002. The role of the WEU has not developed further since the majority of its powers have been transferred to other international institutions, notably NATO and the European Union. The WEU’s main responsibility relates to Article V (taken together with Article IV) of the modified Brussels Treaty, collective defense with all military assets, and its transfer to the European Union seems to have been postponed. In contrast, Article 5 of NATO’s Washington Treaty (4 April 1949) states that member states take collective defense measures only “as it deems necessary” to them. In fact, Article V embodies the only binding European mutual defense commitment. Nevertheless, the Western European Union played an important role in implementing the initial Petersberg tasks, such as the sending of police to Mostar, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and cooperation with the police in Albania. The Cologne Summit Declaration of 4 June 1999 confirmed that the European Union will take over the crisis management and conflict prevention function of the WEU to strengthen the European security and defense pillar. The Helsinki Summit of December 1999 launched the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) and proposed the later creation of an EU Rapid Reaction Force. In the Marseilles Declaration of 13 November 2000, the WEU Ministerial Council decided to formally disband all of its organizational structures and hand them over to the European Union as of 30 June 2001. Therefore, a decision was endorsed by the European Union at the Nice Council (Presidency Conclusions Nice European Council, Annex VI, “Presidency Report on the European Security and Defense Policy”). Toward a European Security and Defense Policy The Franco-British meeting in Saint Malo, and subsequently the Cologne European Council summit (3 and 4 June 1999), gave the political impetus to and set out the guidelines required for the strengthening of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). In Cologne, European governments declared that:
The ESDP: The European Security Pillar
43
the Union must have the capability for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crisis without prejudice to actions by NATO (Cologne EU Presidency Conclusions, 3–4 June 1999).
EU leaders saw the need to strengthen European capabilities in the fields of intelligence, strategic transport, and command and control, which implies efforts to adapt, exercise, and bring together national and multinational European forces. The capacities and structure of the ESDP, which have developed significantly since 1999, are divided into three components. The first two, military crisis management and civilian crisis management, are known as the Petersberg tasks. Conflict prevention, dealing with pre-conflict preventive diplomacy, is the third component of the main aims of EU external policy. The Petersberg tasks have been incorporated into Title V of the Treaty of Amsterdam. This was a crucial step forward at a time when there had been a resurgence of local conflicts posing a real threat to European security, even though the risk of large-scale conflicts had fallen significantly compared to those of the Cold War period. The Petersberg tasks represent a very fitting response by the Union, enshrined in Article 17 (2) of the EU Treaty and embodying the member states’ shared determination to safeguard security through operations such as humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks; tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking; and peace enforcement. The incorporation of the Petersberg tasks in the Treaty of Amsterdam was based on a Swedish and Finnish initiative put forth by the so-called non-aligned countries. Peacekeeping forces should be deployed to regions where crises may escalate into conflicts, but before acute crises arise. Therefore, the European Union will be able to define its leadership role by preventing conflicts and will be empowered to use all instruments, “from conflict prevention measures of various kinds to armed peacekeeping actions” (Hjalm-Wallén/Halonen 1996) to do so. In 1997, Italy obtained a UN Security Council mandate (UNSC Resolution 1101, 28 March 1997) and implemented a stabilization program, Operation Alba, though this was supported by a joint force of some 7,000 soldiers drawn from Austria, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, Romania, Spain, and Turkey. This was the first crisis management conducted in Europe by a multinational military force comprised of units from exclusively European countries. In June 1999, the Cologne European Council placed crisis management at the core of the process of strengthening the CFSP. This action led to priority being given to conflict prevention two years later at the Gothenburg Summit. Conflict prevention does not only mean preventing the initial outbreak of violence, but also its escalation and later recurrence (International Crisis Group 2001: 2). Major efforts were underway to assess and improve the EU’s capability to act, as evidenced, for example, by the joint report on conflict prevention presented to the Nice European Council in December 2000 by the Secretary-General (who is also the High Representative and so called Mr. CFSP) and Commission, and the endorsement at the Gothenburg European Council in June 2001. This report outlined the EU program for the prevention of violent conflicts. Yet, conflict management
44
European Security in Transition
also deals with how to respond to a crisis that has crossed the threshold into armed conflict, to prevent it from escalating and to bring it to a conclusion. NATO intervened in Kosovo in 1999, launching air-strikes against Yugoslavia. On 12 June 1999, NATO deployed the 40,000-strong Kosovo Force (KFOR). In June 2003, the North Atlantic Council confirmed that NATO would maintain an adequate level of forces to ensure a safe and secure environment in Kosovo. On the basis of the declaration at the NATO summit held in Washington in April 1999, the Union should be able to conduct operations with recourse to NATO resources and capabilities. To implement this category of operations, specific arrangements were agreed upon with the Alliance. At the Helsinki European Council meeting of 10–11 December 1999, the heads of state and government confirmed that they intended to give the European Union autonomous capacity to make decisions and made clear their intention, where NATO as a whole was not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises worldwide. Military Component The military component was introduced by the Helsinki (10–11 December 1999) and Nice (7–9 December 2000) European Councils. First, Helsinki established the headline goal for the EU Rapid Reaction Force to be deployable within sixty days and to sustain for at least one year, up to fifteen brigades (or 50,000 to 60,000 persons). However, the member states should also be able to deploy smaller rapid response elements with very high readiness. These forces must be self-sustaining, with the necessary command, control, and intelligence capabilities; logistics; other combat support services; and, additionally as appropriate, air and naval elements. A provision taking effect in 2004 requires a 5,000-strong military force to be kept in a state of permanent readiness for humanitarian operations and for actions to rescue populations under immediate threat. The EU RRF does not intend to establish a European army. The commitment and deployment of national troops are based on sovereign decisions taken by member states. Since 20 November 2000 when member states took part in a Capabilities Commitment Conference (CCC) and one year later participated in a Capabilities Improvement Conference (CIC), the member states committed themselves, in the framework of their national reforms, to continue to strengthen their capabilities to implement multinational solutions, including better ways to pool resources. The CCC confirmed the creation of the EU RRF to deploy peacekeeping and enforcement operations by 2003. At the Laeken Summit of December 2001, EU member states launched the European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP) in order to close the shortfalls in military capabilities; this plan was based on the Helsinki Headline Goal Catalogue (HHG) which is regularly adapted to new security challenges. This development was accompanied by new military structures introduced in Nice, the most important being the Political and Security Committee (PSC). Replacing the Political Committee, the PSC keeps track of international developments, helps define
The ESDP: The European Security Pillar
45
foreign policies, and monitors implementation of agreed upon policies. It exercises, under the responsibility of the Council, political control and strategic direction of all EU-led crisis management operations. The PSC is authorized by the European Council to take appropriate actions exercising political control and strategic direction of crisis management operations carried out in the context of ESDP. Composed principally of national representatives with the rank of Ambassador, it is the linchpin of crisis management activities that has a central role in the definition and follow-up of EU response to a crisis. Relating to Article III-307 of the EU Constitution: [...], a Political and Security Committee shall monitor the international situation in the areas covered by the common foreign and security policy and contribute to the definition of policies by delivering opinions to the Council at the request of the latter, or of the Union Minister of Foreign Affairs, or on its own initiative. It shall also monitor the implementation of agreed policies, without prejudice to the powers of the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs.
The PSC shall exercise, under the responsibility of the Council and of the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs, political control and strategic direction of crisis management operations, further clarification of which is found in Article III-309 (ex 17). Compared to Article 25 of the EU Treaty, in the last sentence, “the Presidency” and “the Commission” have been replaced by “the Union Minister of Foreign Affairs.” The PSC is assisted by a politico-military working group, a committee for civilian aspects of crisis management, as well as the European Union Military Committee (EUMC) and the European Union Military Staff (EUMS). The EUMC provides military advice to the PSC and the High Representative and exercises military command over all military activities. On 22 January 2001, the EUMC, a body of military representatives comprised of member states’ Chiefs of Defense, was established as a Council group to give military advice to the PSC and to direct the work of the EUMS. The EUMC is the forum for military consultation and cooperation between EU member states in the field of conflict prevention and crisis management. It is not legally subordinate to the PSC, but advises it on the Concept of [Military] Operations (CONOPS) developed by the Operation Commander and the associated Operation Plan (OPLAN). It is the Operation Commander, especially appointed for a new crisis management operation, who supervises the actual military planning. The planning for the actual military operations will be a decision of the Committee of Contributors, an ad hoc group to be formed from countries contributing military units to an EU force. The EUMS, which is part of the Secretariat of the Council, supplies military expertise. The task of EUMS is to provide early warning, situation assessment, and strategic planning for crisis management operations, including the identification of national and multinational European forces, and to implement policies and decisions as directed by the EUMC. The EUMS works under the military direction of the EUMC, but it is a Council Secretariat Department directly attached to the Secretary General/High Representative (Mr. CFSP). The structure of the military staff
46
European Security in Transition
includes five divisions: Policy and Plans, Intelligence, Operations and Exercises, Logistics and Resources, and Communications and Information Systems. In May 2005, a civilian/military cell became fully operable within the EUMS in order to improve coordination and to boost planning capabilities both between military and civilian institutions in crisis management – from disaster response to post conflict rehabilitation. The member states of the European Union have also established common capability goals in command and control, reconnaissance, and strategic transport. For those member states which are also members of NATO, their military capabilities must allow them to play their full role in NATO operations, as well. At the EU Foreign Ministers meeting at Kastelorizo, Greece, in early May 2003, ministers ordered Mr. CFSP, Javier Solana, to work on a statement of purpose for the EU security doctrine to be presented at the Porto Carras/Thessaloniki, Greece summit on 19 June 2003. The EU’s first global security strategy brought its security concerns broadly in line with those of United States. As in the US security strategy, European Union force could only be used as a last resort, in contrast to US strategy, EU enforcement actions should be authorized by the UN Security Council. The Union intends to strengthen the role of multilateral organizations (“effective multilateralism with the UN at its core”, Presidency Conclusions, Brussels European Council 17 and 18 June 2004, para. 50) and the role of international law. Effective multilateralism is a key aspect of EU foreign policy. The EU’s strategy paper, “A Secure Europe in a Better World” – prepared by Mr. CFSP Javier Solana and adopted during European Council on 12 December 2003 – identifies terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, failed states, and organized crime as key threats for EU security. As part of the implementation of the European Security Strategy, the Council also adopted an EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) to prevent the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery by promoting the universalization and reinforcement of multilateral agreements, by reinforcing export controls, and by enhancing physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities. In the aftermath of the Madrid terror attacks of 11 March 2004 in which 191 people died and about 1,500 were injured by attacks on city trains, the European Council adopted the declaration on terrorism guiding anti-terrorism activities and created the office of a European anti-terrorism coordinator. On 25 March 2004, Mr. Gijs de Vries from the Netherlands was appointed to counter-terrorism coordinator to improve coordination and visibility of the EU’s actions in this field. The United States is leading the global fight against terrorism. Key issues of counter-terrorism are improved cooperation between intelligence and security services and between these services and the police, timely implementation of existing instruments, and implementation of improvements based on the results of member state evaluations in the field of terrorism and the fight against chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) terrorism. The fight against international terrorism has become an important task of the ESDP since 11 September 2001.
The ESDP: The European Security Pillar
47
The EU Council agreed on 12 December 2003 to move forward work on the establishment of a civilian/military cell within EU Military Staff (EUMS). The cell began its work in May 2005. At NATO Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), a small EU cell was established – heading also the NATO liaison arrangements with the EUMS. The European Council agreed to move forward work on establishing an operations center – available by 1 January 2006 at the latest. There will not be a standing headquarters; the main option for autonomous military operations remains national headquarters. Civilian Component The civilian component, developed at the Feira European Council (June 2000) and Gothenburg European Council (June 2001) with extensive contributions by the Commission, aimed to improve actions in a field where the international community has shown itself to be lacking. In order to provide added value, the European Union intended to establish, before 2003, four main instruments that are mutually dependent: •
• •
•
Police cooperation which would provide up to 5,000 policemen, including 1,000 within thirty days, for tasks ranging from restoring order in cooperation with a military force to the training of local police (candidate countries and NATO members Iceland and Norway participate in this cooperation by providing police capacities); Strengthening the rule of law by providing up to 200 judges, prosecutors, and other experts in the field; Civilian administration which would provide a team to establish or guarantee elections, taxation, education, water provision, and perform similar functions; and Civil protection which would assist humanitarian efforts in emergency and other operations and would require the European Union be capable, within three to seven hours, of providing two to three assessment teams consisting of ten experts as well as intervention teams consisting of 2,000 people.
Therefore, the Feira European Council resolved to set up the Civilian Crisis Management Committee (CIVCOM), which was formally established by a Council decision on 22 May 2000 and met for the first time on 16 June 2000. CIVCOM provides expert advice on civilian crisis management. It reports formally to the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER), but receives guidance from and provides information to the PSC. Since then, conferences on the improvement of civil capabilities have been organized and a plan of action adopted for police capabilities. On 10 May 2001, Mr. CFSP, Solana, confirmed that a unit for police operations would be established in the External Action Division of the External Relations Directory General of the Council Secretariat. In June 2001, the Gothenburg
European Security in Transition
48
Council approved more specific requirements for the planning and execution of police operations. These included a planned police ministers’ summit for resolution of strategic planning issues, for development of draft status of forces agreements to provide legal cover for deployment, for development of command and control procedures, for enhancement of interoperability, and for financing arrangements. On 19 November 2002, the conference on civilian crisis management capabilities noted that voluntary commitments by the member states had outstripped the specific goals set for 2003 by the European Council for priority areas (police, rule of law, civil protection, and civil administration). With the goal of promoting peace and stability, the four main objectives are: • • • •
To make more systematic and co-ordinated use of the Community’s instruments; To identify and combat causes of conflict; To improve the capacity to react to nascent conflicts; and To promote international cooperation in this area.
(“The Common Foreign and Security Policy: Introduction.” The European Union Online (11 Nov. 2004)). A rapid reaction mechanism, developed by the Commission, was created in February 2001. Used to provide rapid financing for crisis management, the mechanism may be implemented where there is a threat to public order or public safety, or in other similar circumstances that might destabilize a country. This aid is provided in the short term, takes the form of grants, and encompasses all of the activities not covered by the European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO). In this way, the European Union was able to launch the political, economic, and social rebuilding of Afghanistan. Moreover, the Union does not intend, in most cases, to use its crisis response assets independently, choosing instead to recognize the lead role of the United Nations in orchestrating the international community’s response to security crises in which the European Union is most likely to be a player. The operational capability that the European Union acquires under the ESDP may prove to be an important element in conflict prevention and crisis management operations conducted by the United Nations. The establishment of the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina provided an opportunity for practical cooperation with the United Nations to effect the transition between the two operations. The EUPM followed the UN International Police Task Force (IPTF) which had been in place since December 1995. In accordance with the objectives of the Paris-Dayton Agreement of 1995, EUPM monitors, in cooperation with Bosnian police units, combat organized crime and corruption and prosecute terrorists. Thus 530 police officers from thirty-tree countries – about 80 percent from EU member states and 20 percent from third states – perform monitoring, mentoring, and inspection activities. The EU Council decided on 11 March 2002 to take over this mission from the UN; subsequently, the UN’s Peace Implementation Council Steering Board agreed that the European Union take over this mission, which is
The ESDP: The European Security Pillar
49
evidenced in UN Security Council Resolution 1396. Launched on 1 January 2003, EUPM represents the EU’s first-ever civilian crisis management operation under the ESDP. Since the 2001 Gothenburg European Council, the EU has worked to operationalize civilian ESDP and has launched: •
• • • • •
Four police missions: the EU Police Mission in Bosnia (EUPM), EUPOL Proxima in Macedonia, EUPOL Kinshasa in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and EUPOL COPPS in the Palestinian Territories; Two EU Rule of Law missions, EUJUST Themis in Georgia and EUJUST LEX for Iraq; A security sector reform mission (EUSEC DRC) in the Democratic Republic of Congo; Action to support the African Union’s Mission (AMIS) in Darfur, Sudan, helping the African Union strengthen its civilian policing capacity; A monitoring mission in Aceh, Indonesia in partnership with five ASEAN countries – Brunei, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand; A Border Assistance Misssion (EU BAM) at the border crossing point between Gaza and Egypt at Rafah.
EU Relations and Cooperation with NATO NATO formed a strategic partnership with the European Union so that both could bring their combined assets to bear in enhancing peace and stability. From 26 September 2001 to 31 March 2003, this partnership has successfully demonstrated its capabilities in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). The European Union and NATO combined to prevent civil war, and in Kosovo, their intervention helped to defuse conflict. Both the European Union and NATO created forums for enhanced comprehensive cooperation with Russia, the Ukraine, and within the Mediterranean Dialogue. The ESDP cannot be defined without making reference to NATO. Since 1 May 2004, nineteen European Union member states are members of NATO and are bound by a collective defense clause by virtue of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. Those states, with the exception of Denmark, are also members of the WEU and have, therefore, entered into a similar, if not wider, commitment under Article 5 of the Brussels Treaty. Six EU member states (Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, Malta, and Sweden) define their security policies as neutral or non-aligned. Austria, Finland, Ireland, and Sweden cooperate with NATO under the PfP Program and take part in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). They also have observer status in the WEU. Denmark enjoys special arrangements in the EU framework by virtue of a Protocol annexed to the EU Treaty. Pursuant to that Protocol, Denmark does not participate in the elaboration and the implementation of decisions and actions of the
50
European Security in Transition
Union which have defense implications and does not prevent the development of closer cooperation between member states in this area. Article 17.1 of the EU Treaty makes explicit reference to the obligations arising from the North Atlantic Treaty for those member states which are members of NATO: The policy of the Union in accordance with this Article shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defense policy of certain Member States and shall respect the obligations of certain Member States, which see their common defense realized in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the common security and policy established within that framework.
That means that under no circumstances, nor in any crisis, will the ESDP be used against any ally and that NATO military crisis management will not undertake any action against the European Union or its member states (European Council Presidency Conclusions 2002). At the EU Council Nice summit (7–9 December 2000), it was agreed to create permanent consultations with European non-EU members in security, defense, and crisis management issues. Therefore, a Committee of Contributors should be created to play a key role in preparing EU operations. Relating to the EU RRF, arguments between Greece and Turkey over the use of NATO assets and possible deployments in the Aegean Sea and Cyprus threatened the existence of the EU Rapid Reaction Force. At the European Council of Brussels (24–25 October 2002), Greece gave up its resistance. The “Berlin plus” agreement, which would guarantee access to NATO capabilities for the European Union, was concluded by the signing of the EU-NATO agreements on 14 March 2003. Arrangements were adopted at the Brussels European Council of 24–25 October 2002 for the involvement of non-EU European allies in EU-led operations when using NATO assets and capabilities. The “Berlin Plus” arrangements (Paragraph 10 of the 1999 NATO Washington Summit Declaration) contain four elements: assured EU access to NATO operational planning, presumption of availability of NATO capabilities and common assets to the EU, NATO European command options for EUled operations including the European role of Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), and adaptation of the NATO defense planning system to assess the availability of forces for EU operations. On 23 September 2002, four European headquarters were designated within NATO as international rapidly deployable headquarters at NATO’s European strategic command, Supreme Headquarters Allied Power Europe (SHAPE), in Mons, Belgium. These rapidly deployable command elements can be quickly dispatched to lead troops sent to a crisis area. Each corps-size headquarters can command up to 60,000 troops. The four land-based headquarters are the Rapid Deployable German/ Netherlands Corps in Münster, Germany; the Rapid Deployable Italian Corps in Milan, Italy; the Rapid Deployable Spanish Corps in Valencia, Spain; and the Rapid Deployable Turkish Corps in Istanbul, Turkey. More than one billion euro had already been invested by European NATO members in creating such capabilities. The Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) was the first deployable headquarters,
The ESDP: The European Security Pillar
51
based in Rheindahlen, Germany, since 1992. The ARRC framework nation is the United Kingdom; its first operation was leading forces to Bosnia-Herzegovina (IFOR/SFOR) following the Dayton Peace Accord (Operation Joint Endeavor) in 1995/1996 and to Kosovo in 1999 (KFOR, Operation Joint Guardian). These are examples of NATO’s non-Article 5 missions. The ARRC was concluded at NATO’s Rome Summit in 1991 in the framework of the strategic concept. In peacetime, the ARRC consists of 5,000 troops from seventeen nations, including Belgium, Denmark, Canada, the Czech Republic, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Including the ARRC, there are five deployable headquarters. The sixth command was formed with the Eurocorps in Strasbourg consisting of Belgian, French, German, Luxembourg, and Spanish units. The Eurocorps has signed a technical agreement with NATO; therefore, it also can be under NATO command. At the NATO Summit in Prague on 21–22 November 2002, the transformation of NATO was concluded to respond to new threats. A NATO Response Force (NRF) comprised of 25,000 troops, exhibiting high readiness, and planned to be deployable within five days had been partially operational since 13 October 2004 and has reached full operability by October 2006. The NRF consists of a technologically advanced, flexible, deployable, interoperable, and sustainable force, including land, sea, and air elements ready to move quickly to wherever needed, and it will be complementary to the EU RRF. While the EU RRF is a low-tech, small peacekeeping force which would only be capable of handling low-level peacekeeping operations in a crisis with no prospect of escalation, the NRF will be able to deal with crises where the possibility of escalation is great. The NRF is, therefore, more of a deterrent force. With a threepronged approach to improving alliance defense capabilities – a new capabilities initiative (the NATO Prague Capabilities Commitment), the creation of the NRF, and a streamlining of its military command structure – NATO should be equipped to respond to the full spectrum of modern military missions. Recognizing that the traditional, more static forces of the Cold War are no longer valid, NATO is creating forces that are able to be moved faster and further afield, to apply military force more effectively, and to sustain themselves in combat. Moreover, the Prague Capabilities Commitment and the European Union’s efforts to develop military capabilities are intended to be mutually reinforcing. All this should help to close the capabilities gap that has opened between the United States and its allies. The EU member states decided to reinforce military capabilities by developing the Union’s new military capabilities objective, the Headline Goal 2010, to set new requirements for rapid deployment, sustainability, and interoperability by developing criteria and standards for measuring improvements in this field. On 17 May 2004, during the Irish EU presidency, EU defense ministers also approved proposals by Mr. CFSP Javier Solana concerning to realise the concept for rapidly deployable battlegroups. From 2007 onwards, these forces – thirteen military units each comprising 1,500 troops – should be available for deployment to crisis areas outside Europe. The battlegroups are planned to be deployed to crisis theatres as far as 6,000
52
European Security in Transition
kilometers away from Brussels. Strong contingents would be deployable within ten days and able to stay on the ground for a few months in response to a UN request. At the informal meeting of EU defense ministers in Noordwijk, the Netherlands, on 17 September 2004, the member states agreed to establish EU battlegroups and to harmonize EU battlegroups and the NRF. EU defense ministers also agreed to consider the possibility of third countries participating in EU battlegroups. In Noordwijk, the ministers of defense of France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, and the Netherlands signed a Declaration of Intent concerning the establishment of a European Gendarmerie Force (EGF). The EGF will be a police force with military status, deployable within one month, and suited to deployment during or immediately after a military operation for maintaining public order and safety and in situations where local police forces are not (sufficiently) deployable. It will also be possible for the rapidly-deployable EGF to conduct operations in support of the fight against organized crime and the protection of participants in civil missions. The EGF is a multinational unit that is not only allocated to the European Union, but also to the UN, the OSCE, and NATO. The initiative for establishing EGF was taken in 2003 by the French minister of defense, Michèle Alliot-Marie. The force headquarters in Vicenza, Italy, was established in 2005. By 2007, the EGF should consist of 3,000 troops. The Globalization of EU and NATO Missions EU-NATO arrangements initiated on 16 December 2002 permitted the EU to take over NATO’s Task Force Fox/Allied Harmony mission in Macedonia – the first EU military operation (31 March–15 December 2003). This was the first concrete implementation of the Berlin Plus arrangements in support of EUFOR’s Concordia, a small peacekeeping operation mounted using NATO assets and with NATO’s Deputy Supreme Allied Commander in command. This operation was requested by Macedonia and backed by UN Security Council Resolution 1371. EUFOR Concordia was composed of 350 troops from thirteen EU countries and fourteen non-EU states. At first, EUFOR had a six-month mandate to oversee the political reforms stated in the Ohrid Peace Agreement and to monitor the security situation. It was also responsible for the protection of international monitors from the European Union and the OSCE. Finally, Concordia was succeeded by a police operation, EUPOL, also run by EU Proxima (as the 200-strong EUPOL is called), and it was launched on 15 December 2003 on the basis of a Joint Action adopted by the General Affairs and External Relations Council held on 29 September 2003. It followed an invitation from Macedonian Prime Minister Branko Crvenkovski to the European Union through Mr. CFSP Javier Solana. This operation helped Macedonian authorities develop their police forces to European and international standards and also focus on supporting the government’s efforts to fight organized crime. The EU-NATO arrangements allow the organizations to work closely together to manage crises in Europe and beyond. The development of this partnership is
The ESDP: The European Security Pillar
53
important for the further stabilization of the Balkans. The first NATO-EU joint crisis management operation started in 2003 when the European Union took over NATO’s Allied Harmony operation in Macedonia. In 2003, the European Union also expressed its intention to take on the SFOR command in Bosnia and Herzegovina. NATO has been running this peacekeeping operation in the country since 1995 in accordance with the UN Security Council Resolution 1031. As decided at the NATO Istanbul Summit at the end of June 2004, NATO handed over command of the former SFOR mission to the European Union on 2 December 2004, the first major EU-led military crisis management operation called EUFOR Althea. EUFOR is commanded by a British Army two-star general and stay under the oversight of NATO’s Deputy SACEUR in the Terms of Reference for Strategic EU Command, as defined in the Berlin Plus Agreement. NATO continues to maintain a presence through a Military Liaison and Advisory Mission (NATO HQ Sarajevo) and assists with specific competencies such as defense reform and preparations for the country’s potential future membership in the NATO PfP program. On 12 June 2003, the Council adopted a decision on the launching of the EU military operation (Operation Artemis) in the Democratic Republic of Congo. This decision followed the Council’s 5 June 2003 adoption of a joint action on this operation in accordance with the provisions of Article 14 of the EU Treaty. France acted as the framework nation for the operation. The operational headquarters were located in Paris and included staff members from the General Secretariat of the EU Council, as well as officers from several participating member states. Under the authority of the Council, the Political and Security Committee (PSC) exercised the political control and strategic direction of the operation. Fully 1,800 troops, most of them French, were sent to the north-eastern Congolese region of Ituri to stop fighting and atrocities, to contribute to the stabilization of security conditions and of the humanitarian situation in and around the city of Bunia, and to ensure the protection of the airport and the internally displaced persons in the camps in Bunia and, if required, to contribute to the safety of the civilian population, UN personnel, and the humanitarian presence in the town. Artemis was an EU-led military operation which was conducted in accordance with the mandate set out in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1484 of 30 May 2003. This resolution authorized the deployment of an Interim Emergency Multinational Force in Bunia in close co-ordination with the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) until 1 September 2003. Now MONUC is provided with a wider mandate, more robust rules of engagement, and an 16,000-strong multinational force. In Afghanistan, ISAF was set up by the United Nations in December 2001 weeks after US-led forces ousted the Taliban. On 11 August 2003 and at the request of Germany, the Netherlands, and Canada, NATO took the leading role in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Kabul, Afghanistan, under its existing UN mandate, by assuming strategic co-ordination, command, and control (C3). This was NATO’s first direct involvement in peace or support missions in Central Asia, although individual NATO member countries – originally the United Kingdom and Turkey – had provided the backbone of the ISAF since
54
European Security in Transition
it was established. Before NATO took over the ISAF III and following missions, Germany and the Netherlands shared lead nation responsibilities and commanded a multinational force of approximately 4,600 troops drawn from twenty-nine nations. The goal of NATO’s mission was to continue to assist the Afghan Transitional Authority (ATA) headed by Hamid Karzai in maintaining security in Kabul and the surrounding area so that the authority and United Nations personnel can carry out their work in a secure environment. On 9 August 2004, Europe’s five-nation military force, Eurocorps, took command of the ISAF VI – the NATO-run peacekeeping force – for six months. French General Jean-Luis Py, assisted by German General Wold-Dieter Loeser, commanded Eurocorps to help safeguard the presidential elections on 9 October 2004, the first since the radical Islamic Taliban regime was forced from power. Eurocorps is made up of detachments from Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, and Spain. This multinational 60,000-man force was created in 1992 by France and Germany (La Rochelle Report) and later put at the service of the European Union and has been certified since 2002 by NATO as a rapid deployable corps. Starting in 2002, those NATO and/or EU member states that so desired could also contribute to the Eurocorps staff at Strasbourg headquarters. Therefore, officers from Austria, Canada, Finland, Greece, Poland, and Turkey have been integrated into the Eurocorps’ staff. Italy, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom have liaison officers with the headquarters, but they are not integrated into its structure. The Afghanistan operation was its first outside Europe. Eurocorps troops took part in the NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina between 1998 and 2000. The Eurocorps mission in Afghanistan remained under the political and military authority of NATO in Kabul. In March 2005, ISAF further had been expanded into the West of Afghanistan. On 8 December 2005, NATO Foreign Ministers endorsed a revised Operational Plan, which is guiding the ISAF to expand the operation to include six additional provinces in the southern part of Afghanistan. In 2006, ISAF was increased up to 6,000 personnel potentially bringing the total number to approximately 15,000. The Crisis over Iraq The crisis and war in Iraq in 2002/2003 caused rifts within the European Union and NATO member states in relation to crucial foreign policy matters that had serious consequences for the CFSP. Deep divisions among EU governments over the war against Iraq were apparent, ranging from Britain’s firm support of the US line to firmly anti-war France and Germany. In the view of the US and British governments, the Saddam regime became a threat to world security planning to produce weapons of mass destruction. The US administration regarded the Iraqi Baath regime as a threat in the aftermath of 9/11. Eight European leaders called on France and Germany to stand united with America in the battle to disarm Iraq, while warning the United Nations that its credibility was on the line. On 30 January 2003, the leaders of Britain, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Spain, and, one day
The ESDP: The European Security Pillar
55
later, Lithuania combined to make an unprecedented plea for unity and cohesion. This joint appeal was suggested by former Spanish Prime Minister José María Aznar. US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld denounced France and Germany as “old Europe”, for he thought that the center of gravity was shifting to Eastern Europe (new Europe) whose states supported US policy toward Saddam Hussein. The European Union officially had no union-wide position on dealing with war on Iraq, and member states were split. Austria declared itself neutral, because the UN Security Council had not mandated the US-led war against the Saddam Hussein regime. The Presidency’s Statement on Iraq, given in Athens on 16 April 2003, implored the United Nations to “play a central role including in the process leading toward self-government for the Iraqi people, utilizing its unique capacity and experience in post-conflict nation building”. The United States had a different standpoint, believing the United States and United Kingdom should play a central role. A compromise was found in UN Security Council Resolution 1483 which was adopted by the Security Council on 22 May 2003: UN agencies would co-ordinate humanitarian and reconstruction assistance with the support of nongovernmental organizations. The United Nations recognized the specific authorities, responsibilities, and obligations under applicable international law of the United States and the United Kingdom as occupying powers under unified command. UN Security Council Resolution 1511 calls for enhanced cooperation within the international community to restore peace and stability to a sovereign, democratic and independent Iraq as soon as possible. During EU-US Summit, which took place in Dromoland Castle, County Clare, Ireland, on 25–26 June 2004, President Bush declared an end to differences between the United States and Europe over the Iraq war and secured an EU promise to assist the incoming Iraqi government. The Dromoland Castle Summit pledged a common commitment to Iraq’s future and a continued an expensive engagement of the UN in Iraq after the transfer of sovereignty, including support for “the training and equipping of professional Iraqi security forces” (EU-US Declaration of Support for the People of Iraq, Dromoland Castle, 26 June 2004) as requested by the interim Iraqi prime minister Ilyad Allawi in a letter to NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer from 22 June 2004. The Alliance, in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1546, responded positively to this request. On 30 July 2004, two days after the United States handed over sovereignty to the interim Iraqi government, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) reached agreement on the establishment of a NATO Training Implementation Mission (NTIM) in Iraq. NTIM was a distinct mission under the political control of the NAC and initially comprised approximately fifty officers and non-commissioned officers from several NATO nations. NTIM tasks included working closely with the Iraqi authorities to support them develop their organizational infrastructure, in particular in the Ministry of Defense and Military Headquarters. For this purpose, the NTIM started training personnel for selected Iraqi headquarters and training Iraqi security personnel. These decisions reflected NATO’s commitment to implement as quickly as possible the decisions taken in Istanbul on 28 June 2004 which was the first NATO summit after 2003 rift over
56
European Security in Transition
Iraq. Through the NTIM, NATO started to contribute substantially to the goal shared by the entire international community: to help Iraq provide for its own peace and security in order to arrive at the day when international forces are no longer required in Iraq. Since August 2004, NATO has been working on the ground in Baghdad to train and mentor senoir-level personnel from the Iraqi security forces, and to help equip the nascent forces. NATO – through the NATO Training Misssion in Iraq (NTM-I) – had been providing training to about 1,000 senior Iraqi officers in the country, and to about 500 outside Iraq, as well as a significant amount of military equipment (like 77 T-72 tanks from Hungary to Iraq) (NATO, www.nato.int). The Changes of the CFSP in the European Constitutional Treaty The Creation of an EU Minister of Foreign Affairs At the end of 2002, Working Group VII on external action recommended that greater coherence of EU action and clarity in EU representation could be found by creating a double-hatted position together ad personam the functions of the High Representative, who acts as the Union’s external face in the framework of CFSP and ESDP, and those of the Commissioner for External Relations. Draft articles on external action in the Constitutional Treaty of 23 April 2003 (The European Convention, Brussels, 23 April 2003, CONV 685/03, Chapter 1.A) had already foreseen the need to create the position of Minister of Foreign Affairs, appointed by the European Council with the agreement of the president of the Commission. This new minister should exercise tasks previously assigned to the High Representative, the Presidency, and the Commission. The Minister of Foreign Affairs will have the right of proposal for CFSP matters (former first pillar issues) and an explicit role in the formulation and implementation of policy decisions. According to Article I-40 (4), the CFSP will “be put into effect by the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs and by the Member Sates, using national and Union resources”. The CFSP will be implemented by the Union’s Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Minister may be granted a mandate by the Council of Ministers and the European Council to act on behalf of the Union on the international scene. He will defend the Union’s positions and conduct a dialogue with third countries and international organizations. The right of initiative is shared by the Minister for Foreign Affairs – alone or together with the Commission – and the member states. Article I-40 (2) defines the role of the European Council in this field as being to: identify the Union’s strategic interests and determine the objectives of its common foreign and security policy. The Council shall frame this policy within the framework of the strategic guidelines established by the European Council [...].
This text partly reproduces Article 13 (2) of the EU Treaty on common strategies, with the change in name relating to decisions on strategic interests and objectives. Article III-305 underscores that:
The ESDP: The European Security Pillar
57
Member States shall coordinate their action in international organizations and at international conferences. They shall uphold the Union’s positions in such fora. The Union Minister for Foreign Affairs shall organize this coordination.
The ESDP as an Integral Part of the CFSP The Constitution clearly states in Article I-41 (1) that the ESDP is an integral part of the CFSP: It shall provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on civil and military assets. The Union may use them on missions outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter.
For that purpose, the Petersberg missions have been updated, and the provisions for crisis management provide for a more coherent use of civilian and military instruments. Article I-41 (2) states that: the common security and defense policy shall include the progressive framing of a common Union defense policy. This will lead to a common defense, when the European Council, acting unanimously, so decides. It shall in that case recommend to the Member States the adoption of such a decision in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.
As stated in Article 17 of EU Treaty, the policy of the Union does: not prejudice the specific character of the security and defense policy of certain Member States and shall respect the obligations of certain Member States, which see their common defense realized in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), under the North Atlantic Treaty, and be compatible with the common security and defense policy established within that framework.
Extending Petersberg Tasks The European Convention decided in its draft constitution in Article III-309 to adapt the Petersberg tasks to the new challenges and threats in security policy. The tasks in the performance of which the Union may use civilian and military means include joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking and post-conflict stabilization. All these tasks contribute to the fight against terrorism, including actions to support third countries in combating terrorism in their territories. The European Convention Working Group VIII on Defense recommended this new definition of Petersberg tasks.
58
European Security in Transition
Improvement of Capabilities As the EU Constitutional Treaty states, Member States shall improve their military capabilities. The establishment of an agency in the field of defense capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments (European Defense Agency) has been foreseen to identify operational requirements, to promote measures to satisfy those requirements, to contribute to identifying and, where appropriate, implementing any measure needed to strengthen the industrial and technological base of the defense sector, to participate in defining a European capabilities and armaments policy, and to assist the Council in evaluating the improvement of military capabilities (Art. I-41 (3) in accordance with Art. III-311). Those Member States which together establish multinational forces may also make those forces available to the CFSP (Art. I-41 (3)). This agency shall be open to all Member States wishing to be part of it. Military and civilian capabilities should be made available to the CFSP. These are the multinational military units which have already been created by Member States, and which have headquarters or general staff. This is the case with Eurocorps (land forces: Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Spain); Eurofor (land forces: France, Italy, Portugal, Spain); Euromarfor (maritime forces: France, Italy, Portugal, Spain); European Air Group (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, United Kingdom); Multinational Division (Center) (Belgium, Germany, Netherlands, United Kingdom); and the General Staff of the German-Netherlands First Corps. There are also other multinational forces established between Member States, but which do not have joint headquarters – for example the British-Netherlands Landing Force and the Spanish-Italian Amphibious Force) and multinational military units (like the Scandinavian NORDCAPS, with the participation of three Member States – Denmark, Finland and Sweden – and also of Norway). The European Defense Agency (EDA) was established on 12 July 2004; it evaluates, for example, the pledged military contributions of the EU member states. The EDA also promotes further multinational cooperation and prevents the fragmentation of European defense efforts. The steering board of the EDA met for the first time on 17 September 2004 in Noordwijk, the Netherlands, under the chairmanship of the High Representative of the EU, Javier Solana. Mainly EU states cooperate within the framework of OCCAR (France, Great Britain, Germany, Italy) and in the “Letter of Intent (LoI) Group” (France, Great Britain, Germany, Italy, Spain, and Sweden). There is no interest by LoI countries in including EU states that have less clout in terms of their armaments industry. In view of the establishment of the EDA, European armaments cooperation takes place within the EU, so there was no longer need for activities in the framework of the Western European Armaments Group (WEAG) within the Western European Union (WEU). The Ministers of Defense of the 19 WEAG nations held their last meeting in Brussels on 22 November 2004.
The ESDP: The European Security Pillar
59
“Mutual Assistance” and “Structured” Cooperation In their contribution to the European Convention, Austrian governmental members supported in conformity with the Austrian Security and Defense Doctrine (Resolution of 12 December 2001) future efforts to realize the possibility of a common defense including a mutual security guarantee in the Treaty on European Union. When British Prime Minister Tony Blair began to support the introduction of mutual assistance in the EU Constitution in October 2003 after negotiating an agreement with US President Bush for this path, Austria changed its opinion and proposed, together with the neutral and non-aligned states Finland, Ireland, and Sweden, to introduce a limited mutual assistance. Therefore in the Union framework, limited mutual assistance is given in case of armed aggression: If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have toward it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defense policy of certain Member States. (Art. I-41 (7))
The second part of this sentence continued to be effective due to the role of Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden to be neutral or non-aligned states. Austria proposed in 2000 to introduce a mutual assistance defense clause into the EU Treaty; this proposal was rejected by all EU states – during a time when fourteen EU member states supported political sanctions against the Austrian government. The reason for the sanctions was the participation of the nationalist Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ) in the coalition government with the conservative Österreichische Volkspartei (ÖVP). The sanctions started on 4 February 2000 and ended on 12 September 2000. Only France could entertain the idea of introducing a mutual assistance clause in the EU Treaty during this time. After British political leadership started to support the idea of introducing mutual assistance in the EU Constitution in October 2003 together with France and Germany, the Italian EU presidency submitted a proposal for mutual military assistance to be included in the EU Constitution during the EU summit in Naples on 28 November 2003 – along with the idea of replacing the WEU Treaty’s policy of robust mutual military commitment. Suddenly, the Austrian government began to oppose this project by emphasizing Austria’s neutral status. Former Foreign Minister Benita Ferrero-Waldner underscored the necessity of coordination with the governments of the other neutral and non-aligned countries: Finland, Ireland, and Sweden. The compromise of the EU Summit on 12 December 2003 was to agree to mutual assistance, but with consideration given to “the specific character of the security and defense policy of certain Member States”. That’s why Austrian Chancellor Wolfgang Schüssel, former Foreign Minister Benita FerreroWaldner and Minister of Defense Günther Platter emphasized compatibility of neutral status and mutual military commitment. As Austrian President Heinz Fischer declared, EU security policy has to take into account the specific constitutional characters of Austria, Finland, Sweden, and Ireland (Interview with Heinz Fischer,
60
European Security in Transition
Wiener Zeitung 4 September 2004). In Article I-41 (7), military means are no longer explicitly mentioned as an element of that aid and assistance. There is again uncertainty about the manner in which the security of the six EU member states which are not NATO members – Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, Malta, and Sweden – is to be guaranteed. In 2006, ten of the EU’s member states were members of the WEU and were, therefore, bound by a robust mutual defense commitment under Article 5 of the Brussels Treaty. That is undoubtedly a form of cooperation outside the framework of the Union; hence there is a need to introduce closer cooperation enabling those wishing to do so to repeat the commitment already entered into under Article 5 of the Brussels Treaty in the Union framework. Member states who wish to engage in closer cooperation with others could take up in the Union framework the mutual assistance commitment made by Article 5 of the Brussels Treaty. Relating to Article I-41 (6): those Member States whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to the most demanding missions shall establish permanent structured cooperation within the Union framework. Such cooperation shall be governed by Article III-312.
The concerned states should notify their intention to the Council and to the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Council acts by a qualified majority after consulting the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs (Article III-312 (3)), but only members of the Council representing the participating member states take part in the vote. This qualified majority is defined as at least 55 percent of the members of the Council representing the participating member states, comprising at least 65 percent of the population of these states. A blocking minority must include at least the minimum number of Council members representing more than 35 percent of the population of the participating member states, plus one member, failing which the qualified majority shall be deemed attained (Article III-312 (4)). Participating member states could also make use of Union structures such as the PSC and the Military Committee. However, operations undertaken by that group of member states would not be Union operations. The New “Solidarity Clause” A “solidarity clause” will enable member states to mobilize all the necessary military and civilian instruments within the Union to prevent terrorist threats. Article III-294 (2) reads, “The Member States shall support the common foreign and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity.” Furthermore: they shall refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations.
This formulation also exists in Article 11 (2) of the EU Treaty. Article I-40 (1) reads:
The ESDP: The European Security Pillar
61
The European Union shall conduct a common foreign and security policy, based on the development of mutual political solidarity among Member States [...].
The requirement to consult and cooperate is stronger than in the EU Treaty, which reads as follows in Article 16: Member States shall inform and consult one another within the Council on any matter of foreign and security policy of general interest in order to ensure that the Union’s influence is exerted as effectively as possible by means of concerted and convergent action.
Article I-43 (1), in accordance with Article III-329 of the Constitution, contains the “solidarity clause” which reads: The Union and its Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster. The Union shall mobilise all the instruments at its disposal, including the military resources made available by the Member States, to: • • • •
prevent the terrorist threat in the territory of the Member States; protect democratic institutions and the civilian population from any terrorist attack; assist a Member State in its territory at the request of its political authorities in the event of a terrorist attack; assist a Member State in its territory, at the request of its political authorities, in the event of a natural or man-made disaster.
Articles I-43 and III-329 follow directly from the EU Convention Working Group VIII on Defense Issues’ recommendations for the inclusion of a solidarity clause in the Constitution. As regards assistance to a member state following a terrorist attack, states need to take action immediately after the event. Accordingly, the second paragraph provides that assistance should be triggered automatically at the request of the member state in question. The affected member state will need to specify its requirements, and the other states, meeting in Council, will co-ordinate the action and resources needed to remedy the situation. Conclusions European security and defense is continually developing in both military and civilian aspects. The main objective of ESDP is to achieve a coordinated approach to crisis management and to strengthen civilian/military cooperation (CMCO). However, NATO is a relevant security partner by supporting EU crisis managment operations with military and civilian assets. Through the EADRCC – the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Relief Coordination Centre – NATO responds to natural and man-made disasters including CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear) issues. In September 2000, the NATO PfP Trust Fund was established to help states like Ukraine, Albania or Moldavia to destroy stockpiles of surplus munitions, small arms and light weapons (SALW) and man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS).
62
European Security in Transition
The European Union and NATO share common interests in stabilizing Europe, by integrating Russia, the Ukraine, Central Asia and the Mediterranean countries in North Africa and in the Middle East into a Euro-Atlantic stabilization process exporting stability in these regions. In this context, both the European Union and NATO are mutually reinforcing. Relating to this EU-NATO security cooperation, neutrality as an EU member is not the way to strengthen comprehensive trans-Atlantic and common EU security initiatives. Nevertheless, all neutral states in the world have pledged to support the goals and resolutions of the United Nations, up to and including military actions. Therefore, coordinated force planning in the EU and trans-Atlantic contexts are based on the Headline Goal Catalogue 2010, the EU Framework Nation Concept, and the criteria of force planning within the NATO Partnership for Peace. International crisis management now contains the following scenarios: Conflict Prevention (CP), Separation of Parties by Force (SOPF), and Steady State (SS). The European Union defined the length of CP and SOPF scenarios as lasting eight to twelve months. European forces have to improve their performance in respect of availability, deployability, sustainability and interoperability in the framework of crisis management. The coordinated development of the ESDP will strengthen the Union’s contribution to international peace and security in accordance with the principles of UN Charter. References European Council Presidency Conclusions (2002), Annex II, ESDP: Implementation of the Nice Provisions on the Involvement of the Non-EU European Allies, paragraph 2, Brussels, 24 and 25 October 2002. van Ham, P., “Europe’s New Defense Ambitions: Implications for NATO, the US, and Russia”, The Marshall Center Papers No. 1. Hauser, G. (2005), “ESDP and Austria: Security Policy between Engagement and Neutrality”, in Bischof, G., Pelinka, A., and Gehler, M. (eds), Austrian Foreign Policy in Historical Context, Contemporary Austrian Studies, Volume No. 14, (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers), pp. 207–245. Hjalm-Wallén, L., and Halonen, T. (1996), Swedish-Finnish Initiative Designed to Strengthen the EU’s Conflict Management Capability, Published in Finland (Helsingin Sanomat) and Sweden (Dagens Nyheter) on 21 April. International Crisis Group (ICG) (2001), EU Crisis Response Capability: Institutions and Processes for Conflict Prevention and Management, ICG Issues Report No. 2, Brussels, 26 June. North Atlantic Council (1999), Washington Summit Communiqué, issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Press Release NAC-S(99)64, 24 April.
Chapter 4
The New EU – A “Military Pact”? Solidarity – Neutrality – “Irish Clause” Waldemar Hummer
The Obligatory “Mutual Defense Commitment” in the Constitutional Treaty (2004) In the context of the reformation of the European Union (EU) into a “new EU” through the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (“Constitutional Treaty”)1 of 29 October 2004, a vital problem especially for the six neutral and non-aligned or non-committed member states of the EU – Austria, Finland, Ireland, Sweden as well as Malta and Cyprus – is being discussed (Hummer 2001a: 443ff.). It is the question if these member states consent to a system of “collective self defense” or not when the Constitutional Treaty becomes effective. This question is also a matter of special importance for third nations because these have to know whether the neutral and non-aligned EU member states abandon or not their status of permanent neutrality (Austria) or at least their neutrality as a mere maxim of foreign policy in the sense of a status of non-alignment (Finland, Ireland, Sweden, Malta and Cyprus) as soon as the Constitutional Treaty becomes effective. Art. I-41 para. 7 subpara. 1 of the Constitutional Treaty provides the following: If a member state is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other member states shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.
By this obligatory (military) mutual defense commitment, the “new EU” clearly changes to a system of “collective self defense” in the sense of Art. 51 of the United Nations Charter, commonly known as a “military pact”, after the entry into force of the Constitutional Treaty. In the hitherto existing international law doctrine, the status of a permanent neutral state is incompatible with a full membership in a “military pact”, even if it is “asymmetrical”, what means that the neutral state will 1 CIG 87/05 of August 6th 2004; the original version CIG 50/03 which was adopted by the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) on June 18th 2004 was accordingly altered and improved by the legal and language experts and several Addenda and Corrigenda were attached.
64
European Security in Transition
be collectively defended by the other members of the “military pact” in the case of a military aggression against its territory but does not have to participate in a collective retaliation in the case of a military assault against any other pact member. But as the four neutral or non-aligned member states did not see any legal obstacles when initialling the Constitutional Treaty in the course of the Intergovernmental Conference 2003/2004 on July 18th and also were ready to sign the Constitutional Treaty on October 29th 2004 (EU Official Journal 2004, No C 310, 1ff) in Rome – in order to be able to ratify it without a problem subsequently – the interesting question arises what made the four neutral and non aligned states so sure to be able to do this. This question is all the more justified as the four neutral and non-aligned states were not completely convinced to be allowed to do this during the “drafting-phase” of the Constitutional Treaty because they had jointly tried to prevent the establishment of an “obligatory” mutual assistance guarantee in the Constitutional Treaty and made every possible effort to arrange this guarantee in an “optional” version. Thus, at first one has to take a look at the “drafting phase” of the Constitutional Treaty. The “Close Cooperation”: Clause as Mere “Facultative” Mutual Assistance Guarantee The Intergovernmental Conference 2003/2004 on the amendment of the treaties and on the establishment of the text of the provisional Constitutional Treaty (CT) which was adopted by the so called “Convention on the Future of Europe” (EU Official Journal 2003, No C 169, 3ff.) on July 18th 2003 established some new obligations to act in solidarity in the context of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) or the Common European Security and Defense Policy (CESDP): a. A “closer cooperation” in the sense of a mere “facultative” model of “collective self-defense” (Art. I-40 para. 7 CT); b. A (permanent) “structured cooperation” between member states whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to the most demanding missions (Art. I-40 para. 6 CT); c. A “Solidarity Clause” to combat terror, natural disasters and other catastrophes (Art. I-42 CT); d. An extension of the so called “Petersberg tasks” (humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking) to four new fields of activity (disarmament operations, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and post-conflict stabilisation) (Art. I-40 para. 1 CT); e. The possibility to enforce the “Petersberg tasks” by entrusting a “group of member states” to protect the Union’s values and serve its interests, which were appointed by the Council (Art. I-40 para. 5 CT);
The New EU – A “Military Pact”? Solidarity – Neutrality – “Irish Clause”
65
f. The establishment of a “European Defence Agency” in the field of defense capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments (Art. I-40 para. 3 subpara. 2 CT). Of all these incentives only the “mutual defense commitment” of Art. I-40 para. 7 CT and the “permanent structured cooperation” of Art. I-40 para. 6 CT require the enactment of primary EU legislation for their establishment. All the other “solidarity obligations” can be implemented by mere secondary legislation (Hummer 2005: 257ff.). In this context especially the “solidarity obligation” of the “closer cooperation” is of a significant importance because of the change of its material content. The (former) Art. I-40 para. 7 CT stipulated a mutual defense commitment and developed it further through the implementation rule of Art. III-214 CT. Within the scope of this “closer cooperation” between member states, “the other states concerned” had, in the case of an armed aggression on the territory of a state which is part of this cooperation – according to Art. 51 of the United Nations Charter – an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power. Thus, Art. I-40 para. 7 CT in its previous version enabled a cooperation of some member states of the Union by giving them the possibility to set up a system of “collective self defense” among themselves, however only inter se, that means only for the member states which consented to this system. By the wording “the other states concerned” it was guaranteed, that the mutual defense commitment should be a mere facultative, optional obligation which does not commit all EU Member States (obligatorily) to a collective self-defense against a military aggression. The former Austrian Foreign Minister, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, arguably had such a system of “closer collaboration” in the sense of a mere “facultative” defense commitment in her mind as she pronounced the following in a speech in September 2000: The Federal Government therefore argues for the incorporation of a support guarantee between the EU member states into the legislative acquis of the EU. This could be done by formulating a facultative protocol to the EU-Treaty…. (Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2000: 100)
Thus, she prompted the establishment of a mutual assistance guarantee in a (facultative) “additional protocol” – and not in the EU-Treaty itself – to give Austria the option not to have to take part in the “collective self-defense” mechanism of the EU. While the above cited former version of Art. I-40 para. 7 subpara. 7 CT gave the member states the option to participate in the “closer collaboration” (facultatively), the proposal of the Italian presidency for the text of this clause for the so called “Conclave of Naples” of the EU-Foreign Ministers on 28–29 November 2003 – where those diplomats tried to reconcile the different wordings which were still controversially debated at the Intergovernmental Conference – sounded more hortative:
European Security in Transition
66
If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other member states shall aid and assist by all the means in their power, in accordance with Art. 51 of the United Nations Charter. (CIG 52/03 ADD 1, Annex 17, 24)
Finally, in their definite formulation of this article the Foreign Ministers even went beyond this proposal of the Italian presidency and agreed to confirm the binding character of the “casus foederis”, stating a clear mutual defense commitment: If a member state is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other member states shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, military or other, in accordance with Art. 51 of the United Nations Charter. (CIG 57/1/03 REV 1, Annex I, 4)
The “Joint Letter” by the Four Neutral and Non-aligned States In the aftermath of the “Conclave of Naples” Finland and Sweden took the initiative and presented an alternative proposal to Art. I-40 para. 7 subpara. 1 CT by merely wanting to establish a “right”, but not an “obligation” to collective support in the case of an armed aggression against a member state of the EU. A state, that has been a target of an armed aggression, should (merely) have the “right” to ask the other member states for aid and assistance. Thus, Finland and Sweden wanted to replace the intended support “obligation” by a (mere) “right to ask” the other member states for collective assistance. Finally, Austria also followed this initiative.2 After Ireland had also got used to this idea, the Foreign Ministers of these four neutral and nonaligned states tried to propagate the following text version for Art. I-40 para. 7 subpara. 1 CT in a “joint letter” of 4 December 2003: If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression it may request that the other Member States give it aid and assistance by all the means in their power, military or other, in accordance with Art. 51 of the United Nations Charter. (CIG 62/03 of December 5 2003 (DELEG 30))
Explaining their opposition to a mandatory support obligation in their “joint letter”, the four neutral and non aligned states, interestingly enough, did not bring forward any concerns about the law and politics of neutrality but rather mere national security and constitutional law considerations: Moreover, we are prepared to underline the principle of EU solidarity more widely in the field of security, including in situations referred to in Article 51 of the UN Charter. However, provisions containing formal binding security guarantees would be inconsistent with our security policy or with our constitutional requirements.
2
“Neutrale wollen Abschwächung der Beistandsklausel”, in FAZ of December 9 2003.
The New EU – A “Military Pact”? Solidarity – Neutrality – “Irish Clause”
67
The “Irish Clause” as Sheet Anchor of Neutrality? In the definite formulation of the henceforth Art. I-41 para. 7 subpara. 1 CT the request of the four neutral and non-aligned states to merely formulate a “facultative” mutual assistance guarantee was only fulfilled partially. The “obligatory” support obligation was not commuted to a mere “facultative” one, but the so called “Irish Clause” was annexed to it as an immediately following sentence, without any break: If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have toward it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, military or other, in accordance with Art. 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States. (CIG 60/03 ADD 1 PRESID 14 of December 9th 2003, 33)
The following subpara. 2 states accordingly: Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which, for those States which are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defense and the forum for its implementation.
The close textual and systematic correlation between the mutual assistance obligation and the thus unprejudiced “Irish Clause” – as immediately following sentence and not as until then by special recourse to Art. I-41 para. 2 subpara. 2 CT (“The policy of the Union in accordance with this Article shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States”) – should obviously be an even more substantial argument for the four neutral and non-aligned States for the “non violation” of the concept of neutrality by the mutual assistance obligation than it was up to now. The Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs tries to underline this fact on its official homepage by stating:3 As a result of the hitherto process of the negotiations, Austria assumes that the “Irish Clause” is acceptable for all EU Member States – and in particular also for our EU partners Finland, Ireland and Sweden which are non-aligned and non-committed – and also should be part of a final consensus about the EU-Constitution.
Therewith the Ministry of Foreign Affairs wants to insinuate that the insertion of the “Irish Clause” into Art. I-41 para. 7 subpara. 1 CT was a “concerted” modus operandi between the four neutral and non-aligned states and the other EU-Member States. Therefore there remains no doubt that the neutral and non aligned member States are under the obligation to mutual (military) assistance in case of an armed attack. However, hereafter we have to examine how this “commitment of non violation” of the “Irish Clause” is to be understood and if it really can be used as a panacea for all legal problems stemming from the obligations of the concept of neutrality. 3
http://www.bmaa.gv.at/view.php3?f_id=53&LNG=de&version.
68
European Security in Transition
“Mutual Defense Commitment” Versus “Irish Clause” The so called “Irish Clause” – which was already enshrined in Art. J.4 para. 4 first half sentence of the EU-Treaty in the version of the Treaty of Maastricht (1992) as well as in Art. 17 para. 1 subpara. 2 of the EU-Treaty as amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) and which can also be found in the third consideration of the Preamble of the “Protocol on Permanent Structured Cooperation” in the Final Act of the Conference of Rome of 29 October 2004 (CIG 60/03 ADD1 (Fn. 13), 33 ff.) – can be attributed to a demand of Ireland [on the occasion of the elaboration of the Treaty of Maastricht (1992)] for making its mere “military neutrality” compatible with the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the EU. At this very moment Ireland was only prepared to agree to the abrogation of the restriction – still contained in Art. 30 para. 6 lit. a) Single European Act (1986) – of a collective security policy in the framework of the “European Political Cooperation” (EPC) to (mere) “political and economic aspects” of the security policy in the new CFSP. In the present academic literature the “Irish Clause” is interpreted in different ways. On the one hand it is stated that the “Irish Clause” “does not put the neutrality into question, but on the contrary explicitly accepts it as being in accordance with the agreement” (Cremer 2002: 192). On the other hand it is argued that the “Irish Clause” currently “leaves the question of neutrality open” which, however, will have to be decided – according to the given modalities of a collective defense policy – in due course (Kaufmann-Bühler: 6). A further perception, being in line with the above mentioned argumentation, assumes that the consequences of taking reference to the “Irish Clause” are not yet arranged and thus unclear. The formulation does not commit the EU to focus its defense policy on: the special character of the security- and defence policy of certain Member States, but merely leaves this character untouched (…). If the regulation had an autonomous meaning, the involved member state could have the possibility to refuse the participation in the defense policy without having to block corresponding resolutions. (Burghardt/ Tebbe/Marquart 2003: 222; Regelsberger/Kugelmann 2003: 82 do not mention the Irish Clause at all (sic))
In contrast to these rather hesitant respectively undetermined commentaries regarding the effects of the “Irish Clause” Austria qualifies the “Irish Clause” as a “Conflict Rule” in the sense of an absolute “non violation”-clause, what means that Austria’s permanent neutrality is not affected by the “Common Foreign and Security Policy” as well as the “Defense Policy” of the EU in the case of a collision and therefore neutrality prevails. Such a qualification of “non violation” in terms of Austria’s obligations stemming from the legal institute of neutrality taking “priority” over the obligations deriving from the “Common Foreign and Security Policy” and the “Defense Policy” of the EU, clearly shows – according to the “ordinary meaning” of the concept of “non violation” – that Austria’s permanent neutrality is not affected by primary and secondary law of the “Second Pillar” of the EU, but does not mean that Austria
The New EU – A “Military Pact”? Solidarity – Neutrality – “Irish Clause”
69
thereby is enabled to support resolutions concerning the “Common Foreign and Security Policy” or “Defense Policy” of the EU which are (flagrantly) adverse to neutrality obligations. In the (scarce) relevant literature it is often overlooked that the “Irish Clause” does not authorize a permanent neutral state to implement a legal act in one of the two legal areas (“neutrality” versus “solidarity”) (Hummer 2001b: 157ff.) – in the case at stake “solidarity obligations” within the Common Foreign and Security Policy or Defense Policy of the EU – which is clearly against neutrality law and at the same time still to feel bound by the law of permanent neutrality. According to Art. I-41 para. 7 subpara. 1 CT, this would certainly be the case when deliberately joining a “collective self defense alliance” in terms of Art. 51 United Nations Charter. The “non violation”-clause only protects against a violation of the permanent neutrality of individual Member States by secondary law of the “Second Pillar” of the EU, but does not enable these (permanent neutral) Member States to support actively resolutions issued within the framework of “Common Foreign and Security Policy” or “Defense Policy” of the EU which are clearly against neutrality law and which then – as secondary law of the EU – have repercussions on them. The special characteristic of the “Irish Clause” results from the fact that the relevant acts of secondary law in the “Second Pillar” of the EU – which can be issued only unanimously – are to be carried out deliberately and consciously agreed with the consent of the permanent neutral member states as well, even if they were adverse to neutrality law. It would be a classical “petitio principii” to enforce such secondary law of the EU, which Austria as a permanent neutral member also consented to, which clearly violates certain neutrality obligations and to deny (the “non violation”-effect of the “Irish clause” under consideration) at the same time its impact on the rights and duties of Austria under the law of permanent neutrality. Austria cannot “immunize” its voting behaviour – consenting to secondary law of the EU – which clearly would be in contrast to neutrality obligations, by claiming that this does not affect its status of neutrality on the basis of the “Irish clause”. Since Austria agreed to it voluntarily and deliberately this behaviour would be a classical (material) “venire contra factum proprium” and would lead (procedurally) to an “estoppel”. For this reason Austria developed – in addition to the “Irish clause” – the so called “solidarity doctrine” and tried by this doctrine to separate both (incompatible) “areas of obligations” adequately. “Solidarity” Versus “Neutrality” Early in 1995, the permanent neutral Austria did not only join the EU without making a reservation of neutrality, but also accepted – in a special “Joint Statement”, enshrined in the Final Act of the Conference of Corfu in June 1994 (EU Official Journal 1994, No. 241, p. 21) – the obligation to actively contribute to the further elaboration of the “Common Foreign and Security Policy” within the “Second Pillar” of the EU and not to hinder its progressive development in a spirit of solidarity. Therewith Austria accepted not only the duty of cooperation in good faith, enshrined in Art. 10 of the
70
European Security in Transition
Treaty establishing the European Community but also the obligation of “solidarity” in the “Second Pillar” of the EU – which is formulated both in a general (Art. 11 para. 2 subpara. 1 Treaty on European Union) and also specific (Art. 23 para. 1 subpara. 2 Treaty on European Union) way. According to the general obligation of solidarity “the Member States shall support the Union’s external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity” and refrain from, according to the above mentioned specific obligation of “solidarity” – despite the recourse to the “escape clause” of the so called “constructive abstention” in terms of Art. 23 para. 1 subpara. 2 Treaty on European Union – “any action likely to conflict with or impede Union action in a spirit of mutual solidarity”. In Austria, scientific doctrine and state practice subsequently developed various strategies to “immunize” the indissoluble dichotomy between “neutrality” and “solidarity”: at first (a) it developed altogether eight (!) restrictive doctrines of neutrality,4 then (b) the Austrian Government and National Assembly adopted the so called “Austrian Security- and Defense Doctrine (2001) and in a final step (c) the so called “Solidarity doctrine” was elaborated. Ad (a) Among the restrictive doctrines of neutrality two deserve special mentioning in this context; on the one hand the assumption (aa) of the (mere) “military key elements” of neutrality which was formulated by the Austrian government as follows: There is no antinomy between the obligations of a EU Member State in the common foreign and security policy and the key elements of neutrality. By joining the EU Austria is neither committed to take an active part in wars nor does Austria have to join a military alliance or to agree to the formation of military bases of foreign states on its territory, hence this key element of Austria’s neutrality remains untouched. (Explanatory Remarks to the government bill of the so called “EU-Beitritts-Begleit-Bundesverfassungsgesetz” of December 1994 (BGBL Nr 1013/94); compare also 1600 enclosures to the Stenographic Protocols of the National Assembly, XVIII. LP, 122 f.)
On the other hand (ab) one has to mention in this context the view held by the former Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Willibald Pahr, and the former Director of the “Bureau of Public International Law” of the Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Franz Cede, that the European security system in the EU: is not a military alliance but on the contrary a defense community and likewise the installation of military bases of foreign states is rather to be seen as a military activity of a community of which Austria is a part (…) In such a coherent community the individual right of self defense de facto merges into a collective one (sic).5
4 Those restrictive doctrines of neutrality not only served for the “immunization” of the participation of Austria in the process of European integration but also as far as the membership in the UN was concerned; compare Türk 1994, 439 ff., and Hummer 2003: 227 ff. (271 ff.). 5 Die Presse of July 27th 1996, p. 4.
The New EU – A “Military Pact”? Solidarity – Neutrality – “Irish Clause”
71
Ad (b) On 3rd May 2000, the Austrian government appointed a commission of experts to elaborate a new “Security- and Defense Doctrine” which should replace the old “National Defense Doctrine” of 1975 as well as the “National Defense Plan” of 1983. Referring to the essential conclusions of the analysis which had been compiled by the Commission of Experts, the National Assembly on 12th December 2001 passed the “Austrian Security- and Defense Doctrine” (ASDD/ÖSVD) (Archiv der Gegenwart of 12th December 2001, p. 45357 ff) (only) with the votes of the Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) and of the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ). The most significant political as well as legal statement about the Austrian permanent neutrality contained in this doctrine reads as follows: (…) Austria has – by its unconditional participation in the “Common Foreign and Security Policy” of the EU at the latest – sustainably modified its international law status of permanent neutrality. That’s why, in an international comparison, Austria’s international law status does not correspond with the status of a neutral state but with one of a nonaligned or non-committed state.
Therefore the essential statement of the new “Austrian Security- and Defense Doctrine” (2001) reveals that Austria – like Finland, Ireland and Sweden (but also like Malta and Cyprus) – is no more a (permanent) neutral but merely a “non-aligned” or “non-committed” state. Furthermore Austria has the right to decide autonomously if it wants to remain “non-committed” or if it prefers to join a “defense alliance” in the future. Ad (c) Taking the effect of “non violation” of the “Irish Clause” - which is to be understood in an absolute sense – into consideration, Austria at last also developed a so called “Solidarity Doctrine” – which means to be “solidary within the EU and neutral outside of it” – due to which two separate areas of legal obligations exist for the permanent neutral Austria: on the one hand a “solidarity area” within the EU – which is not affected by neutrality – and on the other hand an area of public international law outside the EU where neutrality prevails. It remains to be seen whether the community of states will understand this legal “salto mortale” or not – by accepting the view that a permanent neutral state at the same time can be bound by two dichotomous obligations: “solidarity” and “neutrality” – and to remain in this double status vis-à-vis two different groups of States. References Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (ed.) (2000), Documentation Nr. 4/2000, October 2000. Burghardt, G., Tebbe, G. and Marquart, S. (2003), Art. 17 EUV margin No. 9, in von der Groeben, H., and Schwarze, J. (eds), Vertrag über die Europäische Union und Vertrag zur Gründung der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, Kommentar, Vol. 6 A. Cremer, H.-J. (2002), Art. 17 EUV margin No. 5, in Callies, Ch., and Ruffert, M. (eds), Kommentar zu EU-Vertrag und EG-Vertrag, 2. ed.
72
European Security in Transition
Hummer, W. (2001a), Österreichs dauernde Neutralität und die “Gemeinsame Aussen- und Sicherheitspolitik” (GASP) bzw. “Gemeinsame Europäische Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik” (GESVP) in der Europäischen Union, SZIER 4/2001. Hummer, W. (2001b), Solidarität versus Neutralität. Das immerwährend neutrale Österreich in der Gemeinsamen Europäischen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik (GESVP) der EU, ÖMZ 2/2001. Hummer, W. (2003), “Austria’s Permanent Neutrality and the ‘Security and Defense Architecture’ in Europe”, in Hummer, W. (ed.), Europarecht im Wandel (Wien: Braumüller). Hummer, W. (2005), Zum weiteren Schicksal des Vertrages über eine Verfassung für Europa, JRP 4/2005. Kaufmann-Bühler, W. Art. 17 EUV margin No. 12, in Grabitz, E., and Hilf, M. (eds), Das Recht der EU. Kommentar, Vol. 1, loose-leaf. Regelsberger, E., and Kugelmann, D. (2003), Art 17 EUV margin No. 12, in Streinz, R. (ed.), EUV/EGV. Türk, H. (1994), “Neutralität und Mitgliedschaft bei den Vereinten Nationen”, in Ginther, K., Hafner, G., Lang, W., Neuhold, H. and Sucharipa-Behrmann, L. (eds), Völkerrecht zwischen normativem Anspruch und politischer Realität. Festschrift für Karl Zemanek zum 65. Geburtstag, (Berlin: Edition Duncker & Humblot).
Chapter 5
Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) in Transition Arnold H. Kammel
Cooperation in the field of JHA is one of the most recent policies of the EU. Due to its sensitive character, the will of cooperation among Member States was rather limited at the beginning and so this area was not explicitly mentioned in the founding Treaty of Rome of 25 March 1957 (Council 2005: 8) which gave the impetus for the European integration. Meanwhile, however, the customs union and a common market were gradually established. JHA policy first appeared as such in the Treaty of Maastricht and was further elaborated until the draft European Constitution. The Main Stages of Development of JHA The TREVI Group In the 1970s the need to strengthen the cooperation between the Member States of the European Community emerged due to the threat of terrorism of the Red Army Faction and the Red Brigades. The European Council of Rome on 1 December 1975 initiated the TREVI1 Group which met for the first time on 29 June 1976 at ministerial level to address questions related to combating terrorism. The self-given objective was exchanging information on the terrorist threat and working out coherent and complementary strategies between Member States. (For further information about TREVI see: Milke 2003: 23–28.) During the following years, the group met regularly and brought together the Home Affairs and/or Justice Ministers, senior officials and experts outside the framework of the European treaties. In 1985, the objectives of the TREVI Group were extended to illegal immigration and the fight against organized crime. The TREVI Group constituted the basis for JHA policy, especially in matters of counterterrorism (TREVI I), police cooperation (TREVI II), the fight against international crime (TREVI III) and the abolition of borders (TREVI 1992).
1
Terrorisme, Radicalisme, Extremisme et Violence Internationale.
European Security in Transition
74
The Schengen Area During the 1980s, Germany and France started initiatives to abolish border controls on persons within the European Community. The first Schengen Agreement was signed on 14 June 1985 in Schengen by Germany, Belgium, France, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. The Agreement entered into force on 2 March 1986 and laid down the principle of abolishing controls at common borders and postponed the implementation of this principle to a subsequent convention. The Schengen Convention implementing the before mentioned Schengen Agreement was signed on 19 June 1990 by the same five Member States. The Convention established the implementing conditions leading to the abolition of internal border checks. The Schengen area and the removal of internal borders became reality on March 26th 1995, beginning with Germany, Benelux, France, Spain and Portugal. Over the years, Italy (1990), Spain and Portugal (1991), Greece (1992), Austria (1995), Denmark, Finland, Sweden (1996) and the ten new Member States (2004) ratified the Schengen Agreement. Besides, non EU members like Iceland and Norway subscribed to the Schengen Agreement in 1996. Even Switzerland submitted an application to join the Schengen area, whereas two EU Member States, Ireland and the United Kingdom opted out of becoming members of the Schengen area. With the Schengen Agreement, an automated network was established enabling all police stations and consular agents of the Schengen members to obtain data on individuals or lost or stolen goods called the Schengen Information System (SIS). The SIS aims to strengthen police and judicial cooperation related to criminal matters, visa, immigration and free movement of persons. The SIS is currently operational in 13 Member States (Council 2005: 28). The Treaty of Maastricht and the Third Pillar of the European Union With the Treaty of Maastricht signed on 7 February 1992 and entered into force on 1 November 1993, the European Union was created. The new entity was built upon a three-pillar structure (Apap 2004: 15) the European Communities, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and cooperation in the fields of justice and home affairs (JHA policy). In the JHA policy, the intergovernmental cooperation that has been developing since the 1970s, is incorporated and organized. The legal basis is laid down in Title VI of the Treaty of Maastricht (Apap 2004: 17). Nine matters of common interest were defined (Neisser/Verschraegen 2001: 119): • • • • • •
Asylum; Crossing of external borders; Immigration; Policy relating to nationals of third countries; Fight against drugs and drug addiction; Fight against fraud on an international scale;
Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) in Transition
• • •
75
Judicial cooperation in civil matters; Judicial cooperation in criminal matters; Customs and police cooperation, including the creation of Europol.
Furthermore, the common provisions of the Treaty of Maastricht mention the creation of a citizenship of the European Union connected with specific rights. The Treaty of Amsterdam Substantial work in the area of JHA was carried forward during the Intergovernmental Conference of 1996-1997 (Isak 2000: 30). The aim was to facilitate the free movement of people while making international security a fully-fledged objective of the EU. With the signature of the Treaty of Amsterdam on 2 October 1997, the legislative procedures for JHA affairs were made more effective and democratic and clarified the legal basis of decisions in the field of JHA. With Amsterdam, a large part of cooperation in the area of JHA was put under the Community Method such as the participation of all the institutions, control of legality by the Court of Justice of the European Communities and the use of legal instruments best adapted to the objectives sought. The “Communitization” (Fischer, Köck, Karollus 2002: 967) concerns visa policy, conditions for issuing residence permits to immigrants, asylum procedures and rules for judicial cooperation in civil matters. Now, the third pillar covers only police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters. The Treaty of Amsterdam introduced the Schengen Convention into the Union’s single institutional framework and terminated the existence of two separate systems (Gusy, Schewe 2004: 346). With Amsterdam the EU put the “enhanced cooperation” mechanism in practice for the first time. The 13 States involved (the EU-15 except the United Kingdom and Ireland) have been pursuing their cooperation according to the legal basis of the new Treaty. A special regime has been established for Denmark. The provisions on Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters were put under title VI TEU. On 3 December 1998, the Justice and Home Affairs Council adopted an “Action Plan of the Council and Commission on how best to implement the provisions of the Treaty of Amsterdam on an area of freedom, security and justice”. This Action Plan was endorsed by the Vienna European Council on 11–12 December 1998 (Gusy, Schewe 2003: 185). On 20 May 1999 the Council determined the legal basis for the provisions related to Schengen and constituted the Schengen acquis (Council Decision of 1999/435/EG, OJEC 1999 Nr 176 17-30, see Fischer, Köck, Karollus 2002: 969). The Tampere Program The area of freedom, security and justice (AFSJ) was created gradually and as a consequence, the Treaty of Amsterdam established a period of five years from its entry into force (May 1999) during which the Council would continue to act
European Security in Transition
76
unanimously when adopting common measures in the fields of asylum, immigration and controls at the Union’s external borders (Council 2005: 11). As the importance of JHA grew steadily, a special European Council was held in Tampere on 15–16 October 1999 under the Finnish Presidency to focus on this important area. At the Council, the Heads of States or Government launched a promising five-year-program for implementing the area of freedom, security and justice. In the Council Conclusions2 the importance of internal security was stated which should be a priority for the Union and guarantee that European citizens are at the heart of the AFSJ. A follow-up mechanism was started in form of a “scoreboard” to be updated every six months by the European Commission to give an overview of the progress in the AFSJ and to list the measures still needed (Council 2005: 11). The main issues of the JHA program have remained the same since the Tampere Council: • • • •
Implementation of a European asylum and immigration policy; Creation of a European area of justice; Combating crime at Union level; Stronger external action.
Regarding asylum and immigration, the aims are the development of a Common European policy based on cooperation with migrants’ countries of origin, a common European asylum system, fair treatment for nationals of third countries residing legally in the Union and the fight against illegal immigration (Council Conclusions Point A). In the European judicial area (Council Conclusions Point B), special focus was given to the citizens’ effective access to justice and on the development of mutual recognition of judicial decisions. This can be seen as the cornerstone of judicial cooperation in criminal and civil matters between Member States, as a complement to the approximation of criminal law. In the Tampere Council Conclusion the creation of Eurojust, a new judicial cooperation unit, was mentioned as well. There are three guidelines directing the fight against organized and cross-border crime: a prevention policy at Union level, closer cooperation between Member States police and judicial administrations as well as specific actions by the Union to fight money laundering (Council Conclusions Point C). The Treaty of Nice and the Charter of Fundamental Rights In 2001, the Treaty of Nice was signed, and like in other matters, did not appreciably modify the provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty concerning matters of JHA as various first pillar decisions like visas, asylum, immigration and judicial cooperation in civil matters, were switched to qualified majority and Eurojust was explicitly mentioned in the Treaty of Nice for the first time (Council 2005: 12). More important than the Treaty of Nice was the proclamation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights in 2 Council Conclusions, European Council of Tampere, 15.-16. October 1999: http:// ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/00200-r1.en9.htm [20.03.2006].
Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) in Transition
77
December 2003. The text contains all the personal, civil and political, economic and social rights guaranteed to European citizens. The legal value was put in conjunction with the final adoption and ratification of the draft Constitutional Treaty. The Treaty on the Future of Europe A lot of important changes in JHA are being introduced by the European Constitution drafted by the Convention (Guild, Carrera 2005: 2-8). As already stated, when the Constitutional Treaty comes into force, the Charter of Fundamental Rights acquires constitutional value. Furthermore a bill of rights was introduced. These rights can constitute the basis of judgements before the Court of Justice of the European Communities. The draft Constitution also removes the “pillar structure” with the consequence that all issues and policies related to JHA will be “communitized” if the draft Constitution is ratified by all 25 Member States (Council 2005: 13). The new policy can be found in the third part of the new text entitled “Area of Freedom, Security and Justice” and covers border regimes, asylum, immigration as well as police and judicial cooperation. With the new Constitution, the proposed JHA policy will not be subject to the rule of unanimity except a limited number of issues in the field of criminal and civil judicial cooperation and operational cooperation between police authorities. Concerning the objectives of JHA policy, the Constitution has another important impact. The concept of “common system” is replaced in various areas with the idea of “minimum standards” (Council 2005: 13). The Union develops a common policy on asylum and temporary protection and should elaborate a common immigration policy. The actions are based on the principle of solidarity and fair responsibility sharing, including financial implications. The Commission has no exclusive right of initiative on the judicial cooperation in criminal matters and police cooperation, as there exist shared competences with the Member States. The principle recognition of judgements and judicial decisions is laid down in the Treaty. Minimum rules can be established in issues concerning mutual admissibility of evidence, the rights of individuals in criminal procedures, victims’ rights and the definition of sanctions for particularly serious crimes (e.g. terrorism and organized crime). This list can only be adapted in case of an unanimous decision of the Council. The Hague Program3 On 5 November 2004 the European Council approved the Hague program defining the Union’s future action in the area of JHA. The Hague program builds on the program adopted at the Tampere European Council in 1999 and it is planned to review the program by the entry into force of the Constitutional Treaty with a view 3 Council of the European Union 16054/04, Brussels, 13. December 2004 http://europa. eu.int/comm/justice_home/funding/doc/the_hague_programme.pdf [20.03.2006].
78
European Security in Transition
to incorporating the additions provided for in that Treaty. The Hague program groups the various JHA policies around the three values of freedom, security and justice underlying the area to be developed. The program states that fundamental rights have to be respected and it aims at making real and substantial progress as regards enhancing mutual confidence and promoting policies to the benefit of all EU citizens. Actors in JHA Policy JHA is embedded in a complex institutional framework (Fischer, Köck, Karollus 2002: 961). Through history, the Member States were the driving forces behind the development of JHA policy. With the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty, the role of the Commission, the European Parliament and the Court of Justice have been strengthened. Due to the difficulties reaching unanimous agreements between 25 Member States, the Community method gains more and more importance (Council 2005: 13). The main body in the third pillar is the European Council which defines the priorities and objectives and gives the impetus necessary for further development. The Council of the European Union, meeting in JHA matters in the format of the Justice and/or Home Affairs Ministers constitutes an essential decision-making body in JHA. Together with the European Parliament, the Council has the power to adopt or reject legislative texts proposed by the Commission or the Member States. Therefore the Commission attends the Council meetings to present and defend its proposals. Since 1 May 2004 the Commission holds the exclusive right of initiative in matters of JHA under the Community pillar. It shares this right with the Member States for police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters (third pillar). One Member of the Commission is specifically charged with JHA. Since 1 May 2004 the European Parliament has been co-legislator with the Council for visa, asylum and immigration policy. The European Parliament together with the Council is also co-legislator in various areas of judicial cooperation in civil matters. The European Parliament holds an annual debate on progress achieved in this field (Council 2005: 15). With the Treaty of Amsterdam the Court of Justice got the power to issue preliminary rulings on the validity and interpretation in the first and third pillar. Furthermore the Court decides on disputes between Member States over the interpretation and application of measures adopted in the area of JHA. With the adoption of the European Convention, the Court would have the opportunity to judge on the basis of the Charter of Fundamental Rights which is incorporated in the new Treaty. Legal Instruments in the Area of Justice and Home Affairs The beginnings of legal instruments in JHA date back to the 1950s when the Member States adopted conventions under international public law such as the European Convention on Human Rights of 4 November 1950 or the 1951 Geneva Convention
Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) in Transition
79
on Refugees (Council 2005: 17). The Treaty of Amsterdam helped clarifying and simplifying the instruments. The legal instruments of the area of freedom, security and justice must be differentiated between the Community (first) pillar and the third pillar (police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters). The legal instruments of the third pillar were originally copied from the second pillar concerning CFSP. Before the Amsterdam Treaty, the most important instruments in the field of JHA were the classic international conventions with their slow and difficult implementation. The Treaty of Amsterdam introduced two new types of instruments namely decisions and framework decisions (Fischer, Köck, Karollus 2002: 960). Now, the community instruments are gaining importance in implementing JHA policies. Community Instruments Regulations are obligatory in their elements and directly applicable in all Member States and must not be implemented by national measures. They have a general scope and are binding for all Member States. Other important instruments are directives. Member States must achieve certain objectives or results set up by the directive by national legislative or other appropriate measures. Decisions are binding and can be directed to one or more Member States in particular or to all Member States, to enterprises or individuals. Recommendations and opinions are not legally binding and are no proper legislative instruments. They are often addressed to the Member States and set a general objective or define a set of measures recommended by the Council. Resolutions, declarations and conclusions are non-binding instruments with which the Council gives its point of view on certain issues. They often have quite a substantial and important political impact. “Third Pillar” Instruments Conventions are the traditional instrument of international law. The Council of the EU may draw up conventions and recommend their adoption by the Member States. All national parliaments had to ratify these conventions before the Treaty of Amsterdam. Since then, the majority of conventions apply as soon as at least half the Member States have ratified them. Framework decisions are binding the Member States in terms of a result to be achieved, but they have no direct effect and cannot constitute the basis for judicial proceedings by individuals. They are used to approximate the laws and regulations of Member States. Decisions are compulsory without having direct effect. Normally they are accompanied by implementing measures. Decisions can be used for any purpose other than the approximations of national laws and regulations. When adopting framework decisions and decisions, the Council acts unanimously. However, certain implementing measures may be adopted by qualified majority. Common positions define the Union’s approach to a given issue which Member States must defend in international organizations and at international conferences.
80
European Security in Transition
Aims and Objectives in the Field of Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters (PJCC) Art. 29 TEU defines the aims and objectives of the cooperation: Without prejudice to the powers of the European Community, the Union’s objective shall be to provide citizens with a high level of safety within an area of freedom, security and justice by developing common action among the Member States in the fields of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters and by preventing and combating racism and xenophobia. (Art. 29 TEU in the version of the Treaty of Nice, OJEU Nr. C80 10 March 2001)
Fields of cooperation in the PJCC (Satzger 2003: 115-116) are: Preventing and combating crime a) General Remarks Art. 29 TEU comprises explicitly organized and not organized crime in its scope. Due to the principle of subsidiarity (Art. 2 par. 2 TEU) the Union will limit its work only to the area of organized cross-boarder crime (Satzger 2003: 116). b) Terrorism Terrorism has become one of the major threats these days. In 1996 already the Council adopted a Joint Action (JA 96/610/JHA, OJ 1996, L 273/1) where the Member States were obliged to share their knowledge and capacities in the fight against terrorism with all other Member States. In response to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in the USA, the Council adopted a framework decision (OJEC 2002 L 164/3, 2002/475/JHA) defining uniformly the term of “terrorist offence”. After the terrorist attacks in Madrid on 11 March 2004 (Hauser 2004:104) the EU adopted a declaration for the fight against terrorism (Council Declaration 7906/04). On the basis of Art. 42 of the draft Constitutional Treaty and according to the European Security Strategy the Member States committed themselves to cooperate closely and effectively against terrorism. The action plan against terrorism comprises the strategic aims of the Union and the solidarity clause as per Art. 42 draft Constitutional Treaty obliging the Member States to use all instruments at their disposal to prevent a terrorist threat in the territory of a Member State as well as to protect the democratic institutions and the civilian population and to assist a Member State in its territory, at the request of its political authorities in case of a terrorist attack. Moreover, Mr. Gijs de Vries was appointed the first EU Counter-terrorism Co-ordinator. c) Drug Trafficking The work of the EU in the field of combating drug trafficking based on various Action Plans dates back to the early 1990. Following the European strategies on drugs 2002–2004 and 2005–2012 which were endorsed by the European Council of 16-17 December 2004 and the action plan on drugs (COM (2004) 707 final), the EU pursues the approach to combining demand and supply reduction and
Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) in Transition
81
focuses on international cooperation in this matter as well as on research, evaluation and information. d) Corruption and Fraud To secure the financial interests of the Union an action plan 2001–2003 (COM (2001) 254 final) was adopted strengthening the issue of prevention of corruption and fraud. The cooperation in the area of combating corruption and fraud was originally stated within the third pillar, but due to the nonratification of agreements by the Member States, the Commission (COM (2001) 273 final) decided to secure its financial interests with a directive based on Art. 280 par. 4 TEC (Satzger 2003: 116). Other important measures to fight corruption and fraud are the European arrest warrant (Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002) and the second money laundering directive (OJEC 2001 L 344/7682). Besides, Eurojust and the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) created in 1999 (OJEU L 136/20-22), are working in this matter. Other Criminal Offences In addition to the before mentioned fields of cooperation the EU also started working in fields like trafficking in persons and offences against children, illicit drug and arms trafficking. Furthermore Art. 29 TEU declares preventing and combating racism as well as xenophobia as objectives of the Union. European Police Cooperation Art. 30 TEU stipulates that common action in the field of police cooperation shall include (Isak 2000: 38): a. Operational cooperation between the competent authorities in relation to the prevention, detection and investigation of criminal offences; b. The collection, storage, processing, analysis and exchange of relevant information on reports on suspicious financial transactions; c. Cooperation and joint initiatives in training, the exchange of liaison officers, secondements, the use of equipment and forensic research; d. Common evaluation of particular investigative techniques related to the detection of serious forms of organized crime. The Role of Europol The idea of creating a European police office with broad powers already arose in 1989 due to a proposal made by Germany. Taking up this proposal, but limiting it in its scope, the principle of a European police office was for the first time written down in the Treaty of Maastricht in its Art. K.1.9. Already in 1993, the Europol Drugs Unit was created by a ministerial agreement as a transitional organ for the time necessary to formalize and implement the Europol Convention and has been operating since January 1994.
European Security in Transition
82
Europol is an intergovernmental organization created by the Europol Convention based on Art. K.3 of the Treaty on the European Union of Maastricht in order to simplify European police cooperation (OJEU C 316 of 27.11. 1995, p.2). All Member States ratified the convention which came into force on 1 October 1998. Following a number of legal acts related to this Convention, Europol started its work on 1 July 1999. The organization was established in The Hague. Mandate Europol supports the law enforcement activities of the Member States mainly against: • • • • • • •
Illicit drug trafficking; Illicit immigration networks; Terrorism; Forgery of money and other means of payment; Trafficking in human beings; Illicit vehicle trafficking; Money laundering.
Other main priorities include crimes against persons, financial crime and cybercrime. This applies only where an organised criminal structure is involved and at least two Member States are affected. Function Europol serves four functions: •
• •
•
Facilitating and coordinating information exchange between Europol liaison officers (ELOs) who are seconded by the Member States as representatives of their national law enforcement agencies; Providing operational analysis in support of operations; Carrying out and generating strategic reports and crime analysis on the basis of information and intelligence supplied by the Member States and third parties; Providing expertise and technical support for investigations and operations carried out within the EU, under the supervision and legal responsibility of the Member States concerned.
Europol also plays an important role in promoting crime analysis and harmonization of investigative techniques within the Member States. Structure, Finance and Control The Directorate of Europol is appointed by the Council of the Ministers for Justice and Home Affairs. Europol is composed of a central unit divided into services and an exchange structure (Petri 2001: 31). The services of the central unit correspond to the different criminal phenomena mentioned in the Europol mandate. The exchange structure is composed of a platform of ELOs, the Europol National Units (ENU) that serve as transmitters of information and
Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) in Transition
83
information request between the national authorities and the Europol and finally the meetings of the heads of the ENUs (HENUs). Europol is funded by contributions of the Member States according to their GNP. In 2005, the budget was €63.4 million. Europol is accountable to the Council of Ministers for Justice and Home Affairs. The Council guides and controls Europol, appoints the Directorate and approves the budget. The Europol Management Board is set up by one representative of each Member State and has the task of supervising the activities of the organization. The Joint Supervisory Body consists of two data protection experts of each Member State and supervises the contents and use of all personal data held by Europol (Petri 2001: 32). European Judicial Cooperation Due to Art. 31 TEU, common action on judicial cooperation in criminal matters shall include: a. Facilitating and accelerating cooperation between competent ministries and judicial or equivalent authorities of the Member States in relation of proceedings and the enforcement of decisions; b. Facilitating extradition between Member States; c. Ensuring compatibility in rules applicable in the Member States to improve the cooperation; d. Preventing conflicts of jurisdiction between Member States; e. Progressively adopting measures establishing minimum rules relating to the constituent elements of criminal acts and to penalities in the fields of organized crime, terrorism and illicit drug trafficking. The Role of Eurojust The European Council of Tampere in 1999 established the basis for Eurojust with the intention of: facilitating the proper coordination of national prosecuting authorities and of supporting criminal investigations in organised crime cases, notably based on Europol’s analysis.
While waiting for adoption of the final text, the Council implemented a provisional unit named Pro-Eurojust which was based on a 14 December 2000 decision and started working on 1 March 2001. The Treaty of Nice included the mission to create a judicial cooperation unit in its Art. 29 TEU in conjunction with Art. 31 TEU. On 29 April 2003 the inauguration of Eurojust headquarters took place in The Hague. Jurisdiction and Composition The jurisdiction corresponds to that of Europol, but was extended by the Council to other forms of crime like computer crime and fraud against the financial interests of the Community (Milke 2003: 282). Eurojust has a
84
European Security in Transition
broader scope of action than does Europol (competence for combating certain types of crime related to organized crime) but narrower than that of the European Judicial Network (competence for combating all types of crime). Eurojust is composed of 25 National Members who form the Europol College, one seconded from each Member State in accordance with its legal system being a prosecutor, judge or police officer of equivalent competence (Milke 2003: 280). Additionally, there is an Administration Group led by the Administrative Director who reports to the College through the President. Remits and Powers Following the Tampere Conclusions and the Council Decision setting up Eurojust of 28 February 2002 (OJEC 2002 L63/1), the tasks of Eurojust can be divided into tasks of Eurojust itself, tasks of Eurojust acting through its national members and finally, tasks of Eurojust acting as a College. The main tasks are promoting and improving the coordination of cross-border investigations and facilitating the international legal assistance and extradition (Milke 2003: 282). The Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 establishing the European arrest warrant extended the powers also to issues related to the European warrant. Evaluation and Future Perspective for JHA Within the last twenty years, the will of cooperation in the area of JHA among EU Members increased steadily as a reaction to crisis situations which the Member States experienced. The area of JHA as well as institutions like Europol and Eurojust, which guarantee a good cooperation among Member States and an efficient implementation of the AFSJ, developed quite well and dynamically. Inspite of JHA having become the EU’s most active policy area, it still ranks among the least known or understood. However, there is strong public support for European countries to cooperate against the new threats and common concerns (Grabbe 2002: 1). Although there have been many achievements in the area of JHA, the foundations of an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice need to be revised. Unfortunately, the future of the Constitutional Treaty which would have improved the area of JHA substantially and would have facilitated and promoted democratic and judicial accountability, remains unclear. One of the biggest problem is the fragmentation of JHA within the EC First Pillar and the EU Third Pillar: The abolition of the duality in pillars would lead to increasing legal certainty, a set of uniform legal acts, stronger involvement of the European Parliament in the decisionmaking process, as well as the widening of the European Court of Justice’s jurisdiction to review and interpret those policies. (Guild, Carrera 2005: 13)
Furthermore, the Constitution would have incorporated the Charter of Fundamental Rights. The need of putting these fundamental rights in a strong and uniform legal framework is evident in order to guarantee a high degree of protection for the
Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) in Transition
85
individual. Irrespective of the Constitutional Treaty’s entering into force, reform work needs to be done in the area of JHA. In 2006, there will be an evaluation of the implementation of the Schengen acquis by the ten new Member States in order to start abolishing controls at internal borders as soon as possible after the Schengen Information System II (SIS II) will become operational in 2007. Therefore the need of strengthening the external borders of the Union and the collaboration between the 25 Member States becomes more and more important so as to meet the expectations of EU citizens: Securing freedom and protecting individual rights within the framework of effective democratic control are at the heart of a successful European Union. (Hagedorn 2002: 4)
The future will show us if the European Union will be as successful in this area as it has been so far! References Apap, J. (2004), Problems and Solutions for New Member States in Implementing the JHA Acquis, CEPS Working Document No. 212/October 2004. Baldus, M. (ed.) (2000), Polizeirecht des Bundes mit zwischen- und überstaatlichen Rechtsquellen, C.F. Müller. Council of the European Union (2005), Living in an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. Fischer, P., Köck, H. F. and Karollus, M. M. (2002), Europarecht. Recht der EU/EG, des Europarates und der wichtigsten anderen Organisationen, Edition Linde. Grabbe, H. (2002), Justice and Home Affairs: Faster Decisions, Secure Rights, Centre for European Reform Policy Brief. Guild, E., and Carrera, S. (2005), No Constitutional Treaty? Implications for the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, CEPS Working Document No. 231/ October 2005. Gusy, Ch., and Schewe, Ch. S. (2003), “Polizeiliche und justizielle Zusammenarbeit”, in Weidenfeld, W. and Wessels, W. (eds), Jahrbuch der Europäischen Integration 2002/2003, Edition Europa Union, pp. 185–193. Gusy, Ch. and Schewe, Ch. S. (2004), “Polizeiliche und justizielle Zusammenarbeit”, in Weidenfeld, W., and Wessels, W. (eds), Jahrbuch der Europäischen Integration 2003/2004, Edition Nomos, pp. 173–180. Gusy, Ch., and Schewe, Ch. S. (2004), “Die Rechts- und Asylpolitik der Europäischen Union”, in Weidenfeld, W. (ed.), Europa-Handbuch, Bd I, Edition Bertelsmann Stiftung, pp. 342–358. Gusy, Ch., and Schewe, Ch. S. (2006), “Polizeiliche und justizielle Zusammenarbeit”, in: Weidenfeld, W., and Wessels, W. (eds), Jahrbuch der Europäischen Integration 2005, Edition Nomos, pp. 185–192.
86
European Security in Transition
Hagedorn, F. (2002), Reforming Justice and Home Affairs. A Question of Balance: The Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, CAP EU Reform Convention Spotlight 2002/09. Hauser, G. (2004), Die Sicherheit Europas im Wandel transatlantischer Beziehungen, Schriftenreihe der Landesverteidigungsakademie 5/2004. Isak, H. (2000), Europarecht I. Strukturen-Institutionen-Verfahren, Edition Orac. Milke, T. (2003), Europol und Eurojust. Zwei Institutionen zur internationalen Verbrechensbekämpfung und ihre justitielle Kontrolle, Osnabrück: Universitätsverlag. Monar, J. (2003), “Justice and Home Affairs after the 2004 Enlargement”, The International Spectator 1/2003. Neisser, H., and Verschraegen, B. (2001), Die Europäische Union. Anspruch und Wirklichkeit, Edition Springer. Petri, T. B. (2001), Europol. Grenzüberschreitende polizeiliche Tätigkeit in Europa, Edition Nomos. Satzger, H. (2003), “Titel VI. Bestimmungen über die polizeiliche und justizielle Zusammenarbeit in Strafsachen”, in Streinz, R. (ed.), EUV/EGV. Vertrag über die Europäische Union und Vertrag zur Gründung der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, Beck, pp. 113–172. Streinz, R. (2003), Europarecht, Edition C.F. Müller. Thun-Hohenstein, Ch., Cede, F., and Hafner, G. (2005), Europarecht, Edition Manz. Websites Official Website of the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, http://www.emcdda.eu.int Official Website of Eurojust, http://www.eurojust.eu.int Official Website of Europol, http://www.europol.eu.int
Chapter 6
FROM REflECTIONS TO POWER: IM P LEM ENTING THE EUROP EAN SECURITY STRATEGY Sven Biscop
The adoption of the European Security Strategy (ESS), A Secure Europe in a Better World, by the European Council on 12 December 2003 was a major step for the EU, though not necessarily one with lasting impact. For the very first time the Member States solemnly adopted a common strategic vision for the whole of EU foreign policy. Yet reluctant Member States could still hope, as a number of observers did expect as well, that soon after its adoption the ESS would disappear into some dusty drawer – the key of which some would probably have liked to present to NATO for safekeeping. There was indeed a risk that the adoption of the ESS, which was accompanied by the necessary pomp and circumstance, would be nothing more than a one-off demonstration of regained unity after the intra-European divide over Iraq, a step of high symbolic value but with little impact on actual policy-making, a stratagem rather than a strategy. The ESS has certainly not disappeared however. Quite the contrary, it is omnipresent in EU discourse. In many policy documents and decisions on different aspects of foreign policy, especially those relating to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and its military dimension, the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), the guidelines fixed by the ESS are constantly being referred to. They also serve as the connecting thread throughout the trainings organized by the European Security and Defense College (ESDC) for practitioners from the Member States.1 In the decision-making process, Member States as well as the European institutions make good tactical use of the ESS: the more convincingly a proposed initiative can be linked to it, the more difficultly it can be opposed. A strategic culture is thus developing at the EU level, i.e. the habit of automatically referring to the strategic framework of the ESS when taking decisions, and the willingness to undertake the actions and commit the means required to achieve those strategic objectives.
1
The ESDC was formally created by Joint Action 2005/575/CFSP of 18 July 2005.
88
European Security in Transition
A Strategy is Born Contrary to the views of those observers who are perhaps too strongly influenced by the “strategic studies” of the Realist school (Heisbourg 2004; Toje 2005), the ESS effectively is a strategy, as it is defined in public management terms. A strategy is a policy-making tool which, on the basis of the values and interests of in this case the EU, outlines the long-term overall policy objectives to be achieved and the basic categories of instruments to be applied to that end. It serves as a reference framework for day-to-day policy-making in a rapidly evolving and increasingly complex international environment and it guides the definition of the means – i.e. the civilian and military capabilities – that need to be developed. A strategy thus obviously is not meant to be an operational document, another reason used to dismiss the strategic claims of the ESS (Maull 2005). It is a mission statement, which has to be translated into sub-strategies for specific policy fields and then into concrete policies and actions; it thus has an inspirational function vis-à-vis policy-making (Bailes 2005: 14). This mission statement does contain a number of explicit choices. Not all of these choices are new of course. The EU was able to build on an extensive foreign policy acquis, so many of the strategic choices contained in the ESS were already evident as emerging orientations in actual EU policies. Rather than adopting a fundamentally new orientation, to a large extent therefore the ESS must be seen as the codification of existing foreign policy guidelines. In other words, although the context of the Iraq crisis would suggest a deep division between Member States, the ESS actually builds on a strong consensus on the basic orientations of EU foreign policy. Because it builds on the past, on existing guidelines established during ten years of CFSP, and even before, the ESS has been able to transcend the context of its adoption. It thus has the potential to have a durable impact on the future of EU foreign policy-making. A comparison can be made with the codification of European Political Cooperation (EPC), the predecessor of the CFSP, in the Single European Act (SEA) of 1986. The SEA did not really strengthen the informal mechanisms of EPC, but by giving them a legal basis did prevent that they would be weakened. Codification creates a framework from which it is afterwards more difficult to depart; it circumscribes the room for manoeuvre of future policy-making. Naturally, the ESS is not perfect. It could only build on consensus in areas where that existed. On a number of issues it remains particularly vague because consensus was absent or not yet strong enough. Many issues are mentioned in the ESS, because not to do so would have invoked strong criticism, but no more than that. Most notably, no real choice has yet been made on the nature of the transatlantic partnership and the degree of autonomy of the EU as an international actor vis-àvis NATO and the US. The real intra-European divide over Iraq did not concern the substance and principles of policy. Based on an assessment of past policies, it can safely be argued that all Member States agree that in principle the use of force is an instrument of last resort which requires a Security Council mandate. The real issue at stake was the nature of the transatlantic partnership. If the US reverts to the use of force in a situation in which the EU in principle would not do so, or not yet,
From Reflections to Power: Implementing the European Security Strategy
89
what then has priority for the EU: steering an autonomous course, based on its own principles, or supporting its most important ally? This divide remains a fundamental obstacle to a fully cohesive and resolute CFSP (Dassù/Menotti 2005). Nevertheless, the ESS does contain a number of clear choices and thus certainly has the potential to serve as a strategic framework for EU foreign policy. An Integrated Strategy The ESS can best be characterized as a holistic, integrated or comprehensive approach (Biscop 2005). This comprehensive approach can be conceptualized through the notion of global public goods (GPG), which emerged in the context of the UN at the end of the 1990s. GPG have traditionally been seen in the context of development, but currently the concept is being used more and more in more general political terms, e.g. by Joseph Nye (Nye 2002). Starting point of this approach is the assumption that there are a number of “goods” that are global or universal in the sense that it is generally felt – at least in Europe – that every individual is entitled to them.2 Like in the “human security” approach, the individual is the point of reference. If to a certain extent the definition of the core GPG is a political and normative choice – Rotberg uses the term “political goods” (Rotberg 2004) – many elements have been recognized as being universal beyond any doubt, notably in the field of human rights. These goods are public in the sense that their provision cannot be left to the market but should be supervised by government at the different levels of authority (local, national, regional and global). These core GPG can be grouped under four broad headings: • • • •
physical security or “freedom from fear”; political participation, the rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; an open and inclusive economic order that provides for the wealth of everyone or “freedom from want”; social wellbeing in all of its aspects – access to health services, to education, to a clean and hazard-free environment, etc.
These GPG are strongly interrelated: ultimately, one cannot be ensured or enjoyed without access to the other; the four categories are therefore equally important. Effective global governance means ensuring access to GPG; a system that fails to provide the core GPG lacks legitimacy. Global stability, and therefore the security of all States, depends on the availability of sufficient access to the core GPG. Rather than terrorism, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or other military threats, the 2 GPG are sometimes defined more narrowly as comprizing only those public goods which cannot be provided but through international cooperation, excluding public goods of which the State is or should be the main provider, such as education or political participation. See e.g. the International Task Force on Global Public Goods, http://www.gpgtaskforce.org.
90
European Security in Transition
most important threat is the ever growing gap between haves and have-nots, a gap which can be best expressed in terms of access to the essential GPG. While this gap and the feelings of exclusion, marginalization and frustration resulting from it certainly do not justify conflict, they do help to explain it, which is a prerequisite for prevention and resolution of conflicts. The gap between haves and have-nots is foremost among the challenges of the globalized world, because it is a threat of a systemic nature, i.e. it results from the malfunctioning of, and impacts on, the global order itself. For unless mechanisms of governance are created or rendered more effective that can alleviate this situation, at a certain level of inequality, the resulting political upheaval, extremisms of all kinds, economic uncertainty and massive migration flows will become uncontrollable. Because of this interdependence GPG are non-exclusive, like true public goods: ultimately maintaining our access to GPG requires improving others’ access. Since it denies access to core GPG to a large share of the world’s population, the status quo is not an option. Against this background, specific politico-military challenges do stand out. They include regions of chronic tension and long-standing disputes and conflicts, failed States and civil wars, proliferation of WMD and excessive militarization, and terrorism. These challenges directly threaten people, States and regions. They have to be tackled head-on, but as they are symptoms of the “dark side of globalization”, effective global governance, improving access to GPG, must be pursued at the same time as the key to preventing such threats. “Security is the precondition of development”, the ESS States, but this works the other way around as well. Of course, the strength of the causal relationship between, on the one hand, the gap between haves and have-nots in the broadest sense and, on the other hand, specific politico-military issues differs from case to case. Nonetheless, in the long term no durable solution of politico-military problems can be achieved unless the stability of the world system itself is assured. Implementing a comprehensive or holistic approach, based on the notion of GPG, has evident policy implications. The first is integration. Because the core GPG are inextricably linked together, action must be undertaken to address all of them simultaneously and in a coordinated fashion, by all relevant actors, in all fields of external policy, putting to use all the instruments at their disposal, including trade, development, the environment, police, intelligence and legal cooperation, diplomacy, and security and defense. In the words of the ESS: Spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights are the best means of strengthening the international order.
The same plea for a comprehensive approach could be found in the objectives of EU external action as formulated in the draft Constitutional Treaty (Article III-292), which put additional emphasis on aspects of global governance, such as sustainable economic, social and environmental development, the eradication of poverty, the
From Reflections to Power: Implementing the European Security Strategy
91
integration of all countries into the world economy, and the abolition of trade restrictions. In its recent communications on development, the Commission has explicitly mentioned the provision of “universal public goods” as a basic factor.3 Although policies in all of these fields must be integrated under the same overall objective of increasing access to GPG, in order to avoid contradictory actions being undertaken, each policy should continue to operate according to its own rationale and dynamic. “Securitization”, i.e. the instrumentalization of non-military dimensions of foreign policy in function only of “hard” security concerns or “freedom from fear”, must be avoided, for it ignores the intrinsic importance of the other GPG. Here a difference can be seen between the ESS and the National Security Strategy of the US (NSS). The latter actually devotes more space to issues such as democracy, human rights and trade than the ESS, but these fields are all instrumentalized in function of the one near exclusive priority of US strategy: the “war on terror”. An integrated approach deals with all GPG simultaneously, but does not require that all issues must be put under the label of security. On the contrary, although this may raise their importance in the eyes of States, it also blurs the distinctions between policy areas. Poverty or HIV/AIDS are of a different nature than terrorism, proliferation or conflict: they can be life-threatening but they do not imply a threat of violence and cannot be tackled by politico-military means. Accordingly, rather than including all challenges under the label of security, issues must not be dealt with as security threats unless they pose an effective threat of violence. In that sense, the ESS has perhaps not really been aptly named. It really is a foreign policy strategy rather than just a security strategy, a title which apparently has been chosen in reference to the NSS (Toje 2005). The second policy implication is that by thus addressing the root causes of conflict, a policy oriented on the core GPG emphasizes structural conflict prevention. This presents a formidable challenge: it implies dealing with more issues, related to all core GPG, at an earlier stage, before they become security threats. Effective prevention is much more than mere appeasement: it demands a proactive stance, aiming to change circumstances that induce instability and conflict. Mark Duffield analyzes how structural prevention in effect amounts to the “merging of development and security”: [Development] is no longer concerned with promoting economic growth in the hope that development will follow. Today it is better described as an attempt, preferably through cooperative partnership arrangements, to change whole societies and the behaviour and attitudes of people within them. (Duffield 2002: 42)
In this broad sense, development “not only leads to the reduction of poverty, more political freedom, and greater affirmation of human rights, but also lays the foundation for more durable peace and security” (Culpeper 2005: 4). In the terms of the Commission: 3 COM (2005) 132 final, Speeding up Progress towards the Millennium Development Goals. The European Union’s Contribution.
92
European Security in Transition Development is crucial for collective and individual long-term security: they are complementary agendas and neither is subordinate to the other. There cannot be sustainable development without peace and security, and sustainable development is the best structural response to the deep-rooted causes of violent conflicts and the rise of terrorism, often linked to poverty, bad governance and the deterioration and lack of access to natural resources.4
A policy oriented on GPG will thus in fact be quite intrusive, which can make it rather contentious with the target countries (Hurwitz/Peake 2004). But as it is in the very nature of GPG that pursuing them is in the mutual interest of all concerned, it is at the same time a very positive approach, contrary to other, threat-based strategies. “For whom” rather than “against whom” is the question that determines policy. The sincere pursuit of GPG will bring greatly enhanced legitimacy. As Nye advises the US: “we gain doubly from such a strategy: from the public goods themselves, and from the way they legitimize our power in the eyes of others” (Nye 2002: 143). Thirdly, as effective action in all policy fields concerned requires the cooperation of a wide range of actors at many different levels, a GPG-oriented policy implies multilateralism: an intricate web of States, regimes, treaties and organizations, i.e. multi-level governance, implicating all levels of authority in a coordinated effort to improve people’s access to GPG. Although in the spirit of human security the individual is taken as point of reference, the State remains a primary partner, for no effective arrangements can be made with weak and failed States. In the words of the ESS: “The best protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic States.” Third States must therefore be seen as partners for cooperation rather than as mere subjects of EU policies; the aim is to influence rather than to coerce, to use the carrot rather than the stick. There will be cases where the use of force is inevitable, for not all actors are amenable to preventive initiatives and security threats will arise. But in the framework of multilateralism, the use of force can only be a measure of last resort to be mandated by the Security Council. In those cases, the legitimacy acquired through the pursuit of GPG can be capitalized upon. The EU is not the only actor pursuing an integrated approach. The Outcome Document of the UN’s Millennium+5 Summit of September 2005 puts forward the linkages between security, development and human rights, dubbed the three freedoms by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in his preparatory report.5 The important contribution of the EU to the debate on UN reform and its central role at the actual Summit has certainly influenced this outcome. Individual States as well are developing integrated approaches and have set up new structures in that light, such as the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit in the UK and the Office of the Coordinator 4 COM (2005) 311 final, Proposal for a Joint Declaration by the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission on the European Union Development Policy. “The European Consensus”, p. 8. 5 In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All. Report of the Secretary General for Decision by Heads of State and Government in September 2005, 21 March 2005.
From Reflections to Power: Implementing the European Security Strategy
93
for Reconstruction and Stabilization in the US. At the same time critics of the NSS are calling for an integrated approach (Haas 2005). In the development of integrated or holistic policies and institutions, the EU undoubtedly is a trend-setter. The Integrated Approach in Practice: The Neighborhood Policy The December 2003 European Council called for the mainstreaming of the ESS into all relevant policies. Integration, of all dimensions of foreign policy, is indeed the key to its implementation: “coherence is the key to all success”, in the words of Javier Solana (Solana 2004). Promoting everyone’s access to the core GPG can serve as the overall objective. In fact, the EU has at its disposal the full range of instruments to that end; only it does not always manage to use them in a coherent manner. Trade policies often have negative implications for development for example, or maintaining relations with certain regimes is sometimes difficult to reconcile with promoting democracy and respect for human rights. Bringing the integrated approach of the ESS into practice seems furthest advanced in the context of long-term policy vis-à-vis the EU’s direct neighbors: the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP). The ENP was launched in the same period as the ESS with the aim of building a “ring of friends” around the EU, the second objective mentioned in the ESS. With each neighboring country a comprehensive bilateral action plan incorporating all dimensions of relations is negotiated. The founding principle is “positive conditionality”: in return for progressive liberalization of the movement of persons, goods, services and capital (the “four freedoms”) the EU expects political, military, social and economic reforms and cooperation. The ENP, in spite of its contractual nature, thus reflects the intrinsically intrusive nature of the integrated approach. So far action plans have been agreed with Israel, Jordan, Moldova, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Tunisia and Ukraine; those for Armenia, Azerbaijan, Egypt, Georgia and Lebanon are in preparation. Although the basic philosophy of the ENP seems sound, implementing “positive conditionality” is far from evident, witness the fact that the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) after ten years of operating along the same lines has only very limited results to show for it. On the one hand the proverbial carrot offered by the EU is probably not substantial enough to convince the target States to make significant concessions. Those measures that probably would have more potential for the time being surpass the political will of the Member States, e.g. accepting more immigration into the EU or abandoning protectionist agricultural policies. Furthermore most of the neighbors on the European continent really aspire to full membership. On the other hand even a substantial carrot will not produce any influence on policy without a stick, i.e. if allocation of the carrot is not effectively conditional on the achievement of the reforms subscribed to in the action plans. But for that purpose the action plans seem insufficiently operational: rather than providing specific actions, a timeframe and clear benchmarks, they list general principles. Also it is not always clear how the process will be judged (Smith 2005).
94
European Security in Transition
Effective conditionality requires a degree of political courage which the EU is not always able to muster and the corporate culture of the Commission seems averse to it. A common strategy on the use of conditionality must still be elaborated (Youngs 2005). Consequently, in many Mediterranean countries e.g. the EU is perceived as preferring stability over democracy and therefore as dealing mainly with the regimes, while the US is considered the true champion of freedom. In the sense that in practice therefore the link between different aspects of relations is not always made, the ENP is insufficiently integrated or holistic. Furthermore certain challenges, such as the excessive militarization of the Middle East, require multilateral dialogue, but the ENP does not offer any reinforcement of the weak multilateral dimension of the EMP. It must be noted that “even though the carrot could be juicier, few partner countries haven chosen to absent themselves from the process” (Leigh 2005: 110). But perhaps there is an upper limit to what can be achieved through the consensual ENP. Many of the target States are ruled by authoritarian regimes serving only their own interests. In such States incremental progress can probably be achieved in terms of human rights and the rule of law without fundamentally attacking the regimes’ power base. Democratization however de facto amounts to regime change – and which regime would voluntarily abandon its power, regardless of the carrot on offer? The EU does not seem to have resolved what should be the desired endstate of the ENP: incremental progress while preserving stable relations with the regimes in place, or effective democratization and the at least temporary instability implied by every transformation? Recent events have highlighted the urgency of this dilemma. The gas crisis between Russia and Ukraine that marked the beginning of 2006 will probably lead to renewed attention on the part of the EU for its continental neighborhood, notably the Black Sea area. In that sense, if Russia’s aim was to mark its sphere of influence, its actions seem to have been counterproductive. Bringing in the energy perspective, which hitherto was not very prominent in European strategic thinking, will however complicate the difficult balancing act of building relations with these States even further. In the EU’s Mediterranean neighborhood, the victory of HAMAS in the Palestinian elections on 25 January 2006 demonstrates that even the probably most democratic elections in the Arab world bring problems of their own. Building on established EU policies toward the region and the Middle East peace process, careful diplomacy should stimulate the HAMAS leaders to renounce violence and capitalize on their victory to effectively pursue their objectives via political means. Effective Multilateralism: The Integrated Approach at the Global Level Effective multilateralism is the third objective mentioned in the ESS: “the development of a stronger international society, well functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order”. This can be translated as a network of multilateral mechanisms and institutions that together manage to provide everyone access to
From Reflections to Power: Implementing the European Security Strategy
95
the essential GPG or, in other words, effective global governance. Although this is the approach propagated by the UN as well, it proves to be even more difficult to implement at the global level then in the EU’s neighborhood. Much can be done at the country-specific or “global-bilateral” level. As in the framework of the ENP, agreements between the EU and the ACP countries increasingly link different dimensions of relations through conditionality mechanisms and have thus become more “political”. At the Millennium+5 Summit the creation of a Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) was decided, which in the postconflict phase would bring to the table all relevant UN and other actors on a countryspecific basis. Although it should not be considered a panacea, as certainly in the first stage it will deal with only a few countries every year, the PBC creates the institutional forum to bring the integrated approach into practice. By contributing financially and operationally, the EU should play an exemplary role in this context. An issue meriting particular attention is the exchange of information on specific countries. Like the UN, the EU collects a wide range of country-specific data. The Commission’s Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Unit assesses the conflict indicators in the Country Strategy Papers, for which the Commission Delegations in the field are a vital source of information, and in close cooperation with the Council Secretariat and the Joint Situation Centre provides a watch list of potential crisis States. The watch list is confidential, but in the framework of EU participation in the PBC, an arrangement should be found allowing for the complete sharing of all information available, in order to ensure its optimal use. Ideally, joint action plans integrating different actors’ programs would eventually be drawn up. It is not entirely sure thought that all actors involved subscribe to the integrated approach and the conditionality which, to a certain degree, it inevitably implies. An integrated approach of cross-border issues is rendered problematic by the fragmentation of the multilateral architecture, which sees different organizations dealing separately with each policy field. Although objectively the agendas are often linked, decision-making in e.g. the World Bank or the IMF does not necessarily take into account the Security Council, nor does the WTO always look to the ILO. Ecosoc, the Economic and Social Council of the UN, has not managed to fulfil the coordinating role that in principle it has been assigned and essentially remains a talking shop without any impact on the ground, in spite of a multitude of reform proposals. Effective socio-economic governance thus seems notably far away. Yet the question is whether country-specific policies can be successful in the long term without reform of the multilateral structure. Perhaps in due course positive experiences in the PBC can stimulate integration at the “global-multilateral” level. A related problem is that the EU Member States still do not speak with a single voice in the different UN and multilateral bodies, even if there is a trend toward increasing coordination, e.g. in the Security Council. The opportunity e.g. to have a single EU seat in the organizational committee of the PBC has not been grasped. The coordination between Member States’ delegations in different bodies remains minimal, so that even when Member States speak with a single voice in one organization, the same States often take a different position in another.
96
European Security in Transition
Again as in the framework of the ENP, effective multilateralism demands an effort on the part of the EU, including financially, notably achieving the 0.7 percent target for ODA, increasing the efforts in the field of debt relief and abandoning dumping and protectionism in trade policies. Crisis Management: An Integral Part of the ESS? Since the adoption of the ESS the EU has launched several operations, military, civil and civil-military. In early 2006 no less that 11 EU operations were ongoing, which demonstrates a growing awareness of the possibilities and responsibilities of the EU as a global actor. It is often overlooked that if all operations are taken into account (EU as well as NATO, UN, national and coalitions of the willing), on average 50 to 60,000 troops from EU Member States have been deployed at any one time in 2003–2006, including 4 to 5,000 for UN-commanded operations (blue helmets) and another 30 to 35,000 for UN-mandated operations (ISAF in Afghanistan, Althea in Bosnia and KFOR in Kosovo); the remainder are mostly in Iraq. EU Member States are thus certainly not averse to deploying their forces. Yet the large majority is deployed on the Balkans, where the EU and its Member States logically assume responsibility, and in Afghanistan and Iraq, as a follow-up to the invasion initiated by the US and a number of EU Member States themselves. The number of European troops in sub-Saharan Africa on the contrary is marginal, certainly when set against the political and economic weight of the EU. Nevertheless, in sub-Saharan Africa except for the African Union the EU seems to be the only actor potentially willing – at least on paper – to implement peace support operations, reason why the UN is likely to a