India’s Liberalisation Experience
2
INDIA’S LIBERALISATION EXPERIENCE: HOSTAGE TO THE WTO?
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India’s Liberalisation Experience
2
INDIA’S LIBERALISATION EXPERIENCE: HOSTAGE TO THE WTO?
India’s Liberalisation Experience Hostage to the WTO?
Edited by SUPARNA KARMAKAR RAJIV KUMAR BIBEK DEBROY
Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations
Copyright © Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations (ICRIER), 2007 All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or utilised in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or by any information storage or retrieval system without permission in writing from the publisher. First published in 2007 by SAGE Publications India Pvt Ltd B1/I-1, Mohan Cooperative Industrial Area Mathura Road New Delhi 110 044, India www.sagepub.in SAGE Publications Inc 2455 Teller Road Thousand Oaks, California 91320, USA SAGE Publications Ltd 1 Oliver’s Yard, 55 City Road London EC1Y 1SP, United Kingdom SAGE Publications Asia-Pacific Pte Ltd 33 Pekin Street #02-01 Far East Square Singapore 048763 Published by Vivek Mehra for SAGE Publications India Pvt Ltd, typeset in 11/13pt Berkeley by Star Compugraphics Private Limited, Delhi and printed at Chaman Enterprises, New Delhi. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data India’s liberalisation experience: hostage to the WTO?/edited by Suparna Karmakar, Rajiv Kumar and Bibek Debroy. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. India—Commercial policy. 2. India—Economic policy. 3. India—Economic conditions. 4. World Trade Organization. I. Karmakar, Suparna. II. Kumar, Rajiv, 1951– III. Debroy, Bibek. HF1589.I524
382'.30954—dc22
ISBN: 978-0-7619-3657-2 (HB)
2007
2007052012
978-81-7829-823-8 (India-HB)
The SAGE Team: Sugata Ghosh, Jasmeet Singh, Sanjeev Kumar Sharma and Trinankur Banerjee
Contents
List of Tables List of Figures List of Boxes List of Abbreviations Preface
7 11 12 13 20
1. Introduction Rajiv Kumar
23
2. India’s Economic Liberalisation and the WTO Bibek Debroy
39
3. From Uruguay to Doha: India at the Negotiating Table Suparna Karmakar
56
4. Prospects of Agricultural Trade Liberalisation: A View from India 78 Biswajit Dhar 5. The Political Economy of NAMA: A Note T C A Srinivasa-Raghavan 6. Indian Textile and Clothing Industry: Economic Policy Reform Experience During ‘ATC’ Period Samar Verma 7. GATS and Developments in India’s Service Sector Rupa Chanda and Sasidaran G.
125
134
169
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INDIA’S LIBERALISATION EXPERIENCE
8. Plurilateral Negotiations in Services Sumanta Chaudhuri 9. The Enhanced Intellectual Property Rights in India Pravin Anand and Neeti Wilson
213
235
10. Can Protection of Intellectual Property Rights be of any Consequence to the Poor People? 256 Anil K. Gupta 11. Trade Facilitation: The Next Big Step in India’s Trade Reform Jayanta Roy and Pritam Banerjee
294
12. Anti-Dumping through India’s Liberalisation Process Sharad Bhansali
321
13. ‘WTO Plus’ Arrangements: Impact of Regional Trade Agreements S. Narayan and Indu Rayadurgam
349
14. Shifting Streams: India, the Environment and the WTO Pradeep S. Mehta
372
Epilogue About the Editors and Contributors Index
398 400 410
List of Tables 4.A1 4.A2 4.A3 4.A4 4.A5 4.A6 4.A7 4.A8 4.A9
4.A10 4.A11 4.A12 4.A13 4.A14 4.A15 4.A16
Commodities Subjected to Import Prohibitions Tariff Rate Quotas Established by India Since 2000 Applied and Bound Tariffs on Major Agricultural Commodities/Groups Summary Analysis of India’s MFN Tariff, 1997–98 and 2001–02 Total Aggregate Measure of Support Product-Specific Aggregate Measurements of Support: Market Price Support Non-Product-Specific AMS Measures Exempt from Reduction Commitments—‘Green Box’ Measures Exempt from the Reduction Commitments—Special and Differential Treatment—‘Development Programmes’ Export Subsidies Granted by India Domestic Support Granted by the United States (1995–2001) Domestic Support Granted by the European Union (1995–2001) Domestic Support Granted by the European Union (1995–2001) De Minimis Spending by the US De Minimis Spending by the EC European Union: Outlays on Export Subsidies
103 104 105 107 108 108 109 109
111 112 113 113 114 116 116 116
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INDIA’S LIBERALISATION EXPERIENCE
4.A17 4.A18 4.A19
4.A20 4.A21 4.A22 4.A23 4.A24 4.A25
6.A1 6.A2(a) 6.A2(b) 6.A3 6.A4(a) 6.A4(b) 6.A5
6.A6
United States: Outlays on Export Subsidies Food Aid Provided by the US and the European Union Agricultural Export and Food Aid Programmes of the United States (1995–2002) MFN Bound Tariffs for Agricultural Products for OECD Countries MFN Applied Tariffs for Agricultural Products for OECD Countries MFN Bound Tariffs for Agricultural Products MFN Applied Tariffs for Agricultural Products Use of Non Ad Valorem Tariffs by Select WTO Members Simple Average Fill Rates of Tariff Quotas (1995–2000)
117 117
118 119 119 120 120 120 121
Overview of Indian Textile and Clothing Industry 154 Textile Imports during Ninth Five Year Plan Period (1997–98 to 2001–02) 156 Textile Imports from 2002–03 to April–December 2005 157 Comparative Plan Allocation for 8 Major Schemes/Programmes 158 Textiles Exports during Ninth Five Year Plan Period (1997–98 to 2001–02) 159 Textiles Exports from 2002–03 to April–December 2005 160 Total US Imports from India in Select Years, Value in Million US$, Volume in Million Units (Sorted in Descending Order of Value in 2005) 162 Peak Tariffs: US Imports in 2004 and Tariff Rates, Selected Products 166
LIST OF TABLES
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
7.8
8.1
Status Matrix for Actual or Proposed Liberalisation in India’s Telecommunications Sector Status Matrix for Actual or Proposed Liberalisation in India’s Financial Services Sector Status Matrix for Actual or Proposed Liberalisation in India’s Health Services Sector Status Matrix for Actual or Proposed Liberalisation in India’s Construction Services Status Matrix for Actual or Proposed Liberalisation in India’s Education Services Sector Status Matrix for Actual or Proposed Liberalisation in India’s Distribution Services Sector Status Matrix for Actual or Proposed Liberalisation in India’s Accountancy Services Sector Status Matrix for Actual or Proposed Liberalisation in India’s Legal Services Sector
9
179
184
190
191
194
196
201
203
List and Composition of the Plurilateral Groups Developed Countries’ Profile of Plurilateral Requests Developing Countries’ Profile of Plurilateral Requests Comparison between Bilateral and Plurilateral Requests Received/ Made by India
224
11.1 Gains from Trade Facilitation: Summary of Conclusions from Trade Facilitation Literature
296
8.2 8.3 8.4
221 222 222
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INDIA’S LIBERALISATION EXPERIENCE
11.2 Indian Policy and Implementation of Trade Facilitation Measures Defined under WTO Negotiations 11.3 Typical Cargo Dwell Time 11.4 International Comparison of Efficiency of Importation 11.5 Cargo Dwell Time Break-Up
306 309
12.1 12.2 12.3 12.4 12.5
325 327 329 331 346
Cases Initiated in India Initiations Definitive Duties Measures in Force Cases Against India
13.1 GATT Trade Rounds 1947–93 and the WTO Round, 2001 13.2 Tariff Profiles (MFN Applied Tariffs) 13.3 Trade between Sri Lanka and India 13.4 Focus and Horizon Countries Identified using the Country Selection Criteria by the New Zealand Government 14.1 Import of Hazardous Substances in India, 2004–05 14.2 Pros and Cons of Environmental Project Approach and List Approach 14.3 Ecolabelling Schemes in Selected Few Countries
300 306
355 357 361
367 381 386 391
List of Figures
9.1 9.2
9.3
Intellectual Property in India Prior to TRIPS Agreement International Arrangements of which India Became a Member/Signatory in the Given Year Intellectual Property in India after the TRIPS Agreement
12.1 Initiation Anti-Dumping Cases (1997–2004) 12.2 Definitive Duties (1997–2004) 12.3 Measures in Force as on 2004–05 12.4 Cases Initiated 12.5 Anti-Dumping as Per Year 12.6 Number of Cases
236
238 239 333 333 334 335 337 341
List of Boxes
11.1 11.2 11.3
11.4 11.5 11.6 12.1
Summarising India’s Commitment to Trade Facilitation in PTA Negotiations Impediments and Problems Faced by Indian Exporters at Foreign Borders Primary Causes of Delay in Declaration and Duty Payment at Indian Custom Points Export Facilitation Problems in India Recommendations of the Working Group on Trade Facilitation Integrated Sourcing Initiative in the US–Singapore FTA: Lessons for India Dumping Margin
303 307
310 311 312 315 323
List of Abbreviations
ADB Asian Development Bank AED–T&TA Additional Excise Duty–Textile and Textile Articles AGOA Africa Growth and Opportunity Act AI–FTA ASEAN–India FTA AIPO Australian Industrial Property Organisation AIPPI Association Internationale pour la Protection de la Propriété Intellectuelle AMS Aggregate Measure of Support ANDEAN Munidad Andina de Naciones AoA Agreement on Agriculture APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation APEDA Agricultural and Processed Food Products Export Development Authority ASEAN Association for Southeast Asian Nations ATC Agreement on Textiles and Clothing ATCC American Type Culture Collection ATDCs Apparel Training and Design Centres B2B Business-to-business BCI Bar Council of India BHEL Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd BIMSTEC Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Thailand—Economic Cooperation BoP Balance of Payment BPO Business Process Outsourcing BSP Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety CAGR Compound Annual Growth Rate CBD Convention on Biological Diversity CBEC Central Board of Excise and Customs CBI Caribbean Basin Initiative CECA Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement
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INDIA’S LIBERALISATION EXPERIENCE
CEPA CFCs CGIAR CHA CIEFL CII CITES
CIU CLCS CoP CRISIL CSS CTE CTESS CTF CTH DAE DDA DDR DGCI&S DGFT DGRI DMD DNA DPCO DRDO DSB DSM
Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement Chlorofluorocarbons Consultative Group for International Agricultural Research Custom House Agents Central Institute of English and Foreign Languages Confederation of Indian Industry Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna Criminal Intelligence Unit Credit Linked Capital Subsidy Conference of the Parties Credit Rating Information Services of India Limited Contractual Service Suppliers Committee for Trade and Environment Committee on Trade and Environment Special Session Centre for Trade Facilitation Change in Tariff Heading Department of Atomic Energy Doha Development Agenda Doha Development Round Directorate General of Commercial Intelligence and Statistics Director-General of Foreign Trade Directorate General of Revenue Intelligence Doha Ministerial Declaration Designated National Authority Drug Price Control Order Defence Research and Development Organisation Dispute Settlement Body Deutsche Sammlung von Mikroorganismen
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
DUS DWP EBA EC EDI EFTA EGS EHP EIC EMIT EMRs ENTs EPA EPPs ESCAP EU EXIM FAO FDIs FEMA FIIs FIPB FIPS FTAs FYP G&P GATS GATT GDP GIs GIAN GMOs GoI GRRF GST
15
Distinctiveness, Uniformity and Stability Act Doha Work Programme Everything But Arms European Communities Electronic Data Interchange European Free Trade Association Environmental Goods and Services Early Harvest Programme Export Inspection Council Environmental Measures and International Trade Exclusive Marketing Rights Economic Needs Tests Environmental Project Approach Environmentally Preferable Products Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific European Union Export Import Food and Agriculture Organisation’s Foreign Direct Investments Foreign Exchange Management Act Foreign Institutional Investors Foreign Investment Promotion Board Five Interested Parties Free Trade Agreements Five Year Plan Ginning & Pressing General Agreement on Trade in Services General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Gross Domestic Product Geographical Indications Grassroots Innovation Augmentation Network Genetically Modified Organisms Government of India Genetic Resource Recognition Fund Goods and Services Tax
16
INDIA’S LIBERALISATION EXPERIENCE
HKMC HKMD HLIMC HYO IC ICAI ICAR ICFR ICMR ICRIER ICT IFAC IIMA IITs ILFTA IMTEC INSTAR IOC IP IP IPRs IPTI IRDA IRRI ISBN ISI ISRO IT JSG JVs LDCs LMOs
Hong Kong Ministerial Conference Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration High Level Inter-Ministerial Committee Hank Yarn Obligation Integrated Circuit Institute of Chartered Accountants of India Indian Council of Agricultural Research Indian Council of Forestry Research Indian Council of Medical Research Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations Information and Communication Technologies International Federation of Accountants Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad The Indian Institutes of Technology Indo-Lanka Free Trade Agreement The Institute of Microbial Technology International Network for Sustainable Technologies, Application and Registration Indian Oil Corporation Independent Professionals Intellectual Property Intellectual Property Rights Intellectual Property Training Institute Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority International Rice Research Institute International Standard Book Number Integrated Sourcing Initiative Indian Space Research Organisation Information Technology Joint Study Groups Joint Ventures Least-Developed Countries Living Modified Organisms
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
LPG LTFR MA MEAs MFA MFN MMF MMTC MNCs MoCI MoEF MoU MRAs MTA MTNs MVIF NAFED NAFTA NAMA NDA NFIDCs NGOs NGP NIEPA NIF NIFT NREGA NRI NT NTBs NTM NTP OCB ODS
17
Liberalisation, Privatisation and Globalisation Less-Than-Full-Reciprocity Market Access Multilateral Environmental Agreements Multi Fibre Arrangement Most Favoured Nation Man-Made Fibre Minerals and Metals Trading Corporation Multi-National Corporations Ministry of Commerce and Industry Ministry of Environment and Forests Memorandum of Understanding Mutual Recognition Agreements Material Transfer Agreement Multilateral Round of Trade Negotiations Micro Venture Innovation Fund National Agricultural Cooperative Marketing Federation North American Free Trade Agreement Non-Agricultural Market Access National Democratic Alliance Net Food-Importing Developing Countries Non-Governmental Organisations Negotiating Guidelines and Procedures National Institute of Educational Policy and Administration National Innovation Foundation The National Institute for Fashion Technology National Rural Employment Guarantee Act Non Resident Indian Non-Tariff Non-Tariff Barriers Non-Tariff Measures National Telecom Policy Overseas Corporate Bodies Ozone-Depleting Substances
18
INDIA’S LIBERALISATION EXPERIENCE
OECD OGL PCP PEC PFC PIC PPMs PPP PSI PSUs PTAs PTA QRs R&D RBI RoO RTAs RTIA S&D SAFTA SASEC SCMF SEBI SECSCA SIIB SingTel SITP SMEs SPS SPs SRISTI SSI SSM
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development Open General Licence Pentachlorophenol Project and Equipment Corporation Patent Facilitating Centre Prior Informed Consent Production and Processing Methods Public-Private Partnership Pre-Shipment Inspection Public Sector Undertakings Preferential Trade Arrangements Preferential Trade Agreements Quantitative Restrictions Research and Development Reserve Bank of India Rules of Origin Regional Trade Agreements Regional Trade and Investment Area Special and Differential South Asian Free Trade Area South Asia Sub-regional Economic Cooperation State Cooperative Marketing Federations Securities and Exchange Board of India Subregional Economic Cooperation in South and Central Asia Special Investigation and Intelligence Branch Singapore Telecommunications Ltd. Scheme for Integrated Textile Park Small and Medium Enterprises Sanitary and Phytosanitary Special Products Society for Research and Initiatives for Sustainable Technologies and Institutions Small-Scale Industry Special Safeguard Mechanism
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
STC STOs TAA TAC TBGRI TBT TCIDS TCS TKDL TMC TNC TNCs TPA TPRM TRAI TRIMS TRIPS TRQ TUFS UC UN UNCTAD UNIDO UPOV USDA USPTO USTR UVR VAT VSNL WGTF WIPO WTO
19
State Trading Corporation Specific Trade Obligations Trade Adjustment Assistance Technical Advisory Committee Tropical Botanical Garden Research Institute Technical Barriers to Trade Textile Centre Infrastructure Development Scheme Tata Consultancy Services Traditional Knowledge Digital Library Technology Mission on Cotton Trade Negotiating Committee Trans-National Corporations Trade Promotion Agreement Trade Policy Review Mechanism Telecom Regulatory Authority of India Trade-Related Investment Measures Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Tariff Rate Quota Technology Upgradation Fund Scheme University of California United Nations UN Conference on Trade and Development United Nations Industrial Development Organization International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants United States Department of Agriculture United States Patent and Trademark Office United States Trade Representative Unit Value Realisation Value Added Tax Videsh Sanchar Nigam Limited Working Group on Trade Facilitation World Intellectual Property Organization World Trade Organization
Preface
T
he conventional wisdom or the common man’s view seems to be that commitments under the World Trade Organization (WTO) regime are the source of many ills in this country and indeed also several other developing countries. This has prompted its proponents to suggest a deceleration and from their perspective a complete stoppage of all WTO related initiatives and reforms. On the other hand, there is clear evidence for example from China and other countries, including ours, that liberalisation and economic reforms have accelerated economic growth and raised welfare levels all round. It was therefore topical for Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations (ICRIER) to commission a set of papers that would examine two related issues. First, if the process of policy formulation in India has been influenced by the commitments made in the WTO, and second, if the policies so formulated has been in the overall interest of the country. These two issues are addressed in both the general and the macro levels and for specific sectors by the authors of different chapters in this volume. These chapters highlight the fact that India’s reforms and the consequent liberalisation experience, in several sectors has been mostly autonomous and unilateral. The commitments made under the WTO have represented a post facto binding of positions already reached through unilateral policy action. The reader, we are sure, will draw his/her own inference from the contribution included here. We take this opportunity to acknowledge our profound gratitude to the Sir Ratan Tata Trust, with whose generous grants ICRIER has been conducting research on multilateral trade policy issues since 2000, and who provided the financial support
PREFACE
21
for this volume as well. In acknowledging the important role played by various persons in the initiation of this exercise and its completion, we start with the Commerce Minister Kamal Nath, S.N. Menon (past Commerce Secretary) and G.K. Pillai, all of whom have been towers of strength and inspiration. T C A Srinivasa-Raghavan’s inputs extend well beyond the chapter that he has contributed. Finally, Shreemoyee Patra who helped with copyediting, Priti Katiyar for her generosity in proof reading the entire manuscript, the editorial team at SAGE and Neena Bhatia at ICRIER deserve special mention for their cooperation and support. We are grateful to all and give them our sincere thanks.
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INDIA’S LIBERALISATION EXPERIENCE
Chapter 1 Introduction RAJIV KUMAR
BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT
W
orld Trade Organization (WTO) talks commenced in March 2007 after the Doha Round of trade talks stalled in July 2006 having encountered numerous roadblocks, especially over the lack of concessions on agriculture products which held up negotiations on industrial goods and services. The failure of the 2006 talks marked the loss of a major, perhaps, unique opportunity for more vulnerable economies to integrate into gains from international trade. This could have given these economies a much needed growth impetus from greater access to the markets of the developed countries and higher international prices for their principal exports. The irony is that the collapse came when negotiators were reportedly quite close to the landing zone and the majority in the G-5 were prepared to take the extra step to reach closure. The round of multilateral trade talks began in the Qatari capital Doha at the end of 2001, with the goal of reducing subsidies, tariffs and other barriers to commerce, and raising living standards in developing countries. But the negotiations have consistently been dogged by disputes between rich and poor nations, as well as among wealthy players such as the United States and the European Union (EU).
24
RAJIV KUMAR
The US and India are part of the so-called Group of Six, including Australia, Brazil, the EU and Japan, which failed to settle their trade differences in July 2006, with India and other developing countries demanding deeper reductions in tariffs on agricultural imports levied by rich nations, as well as bigger cuts in farm subsidies which allegedly help farmers in the wealthy world to undercut their poor competitors.1 Developed countries, such as the US, meanwhile, wanted key emerging nations such as Brazil and India to offer more open markets for industrial goods and services, such as banking and telecommunications. The key area of disagreement between the US and India was agriculture where the US was negotiating for agriculture market access for its subsidised products. Another Indian issue with the US in the WTO talks is over the reduction of tariff peaks and tariff escalations in Non-Agricultural Market Access (NAMA).2 The NAMA refers to negotiations to cut tariffs on industrial goods. It covers liberalisation of all manufacturing and industrial trade in sectors such as machinery, electronic goods, chemicals, textiles, wood and fish products. Ever since the suspension of the negotiations in mid-2006, India has been under tremendous pressure to drop its opposition to an agreement. WTO chief Pascal Lamy had time and again visited India and had used every opportunity to negotiate on behalf of the developed countries, urging strongly for an agreement on the Doha Round to be reached before the expiry of the US Trade Promotion Agreement (TPA) in June 2007.3 The WTO perspective is that opening up the farm sector for imports would not make the lives of Indian farmers any tougher and that India is unduly concerned about agriculture subsidies and the livelihood security of farmers. India remains a net exporter of food and has offensive interests in sugar, cotton, rice, wheat and wheat products, and there is every possibility to tap new markets abroad. Hence, the exposure of agriculture to international trade is just a small part of the overall reform that needs to be undertaken to address the concerns of the farming community. A two-day international seminar ‘Saving Doha and Delivering on Development’ organised by the Ministry of Commerce,
INTRODUCTION
25
Government of India (GoI), concluded at New Delhi on 13 March 2007. While the seminar was focused on bringing the Doha negotiations to a meaningful and speedy conclusion, it did provide a forum for the presentation of empirical evidence by Sandra Polaski, Director of Trade, Equity and Development Project of the US-based Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, that demonstrated the biases in the Doha negotiations that could go against developing countries’ interests.4 The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)-India study on Green Box subsidies and the benefits it would reap for the developing countries if the support were to be abolished is also of significant importance in this context. As far as resumption of the talks goes, India and Brazil represent the developing countries, while the EU and the US are the main voices of the developed world. India is willing to make concessions in industrial goods but is committed to protecting its agriculture sector, especially the subsistence farmers. Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has expressed India’s commitment to an early conclusion of the Doha Round of WTO talks with the hope that developed countries will make consequential offers to reduce the huge trade-distorting subsidies provided to the agricultural sector. India has undertaken regionspecific trade liberalisation crafting free trade agreements with many countries, including members of the Association for Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which should be viewed as building blocks of a larger agenda of trade liberalisation. As firm believer in a rule-based global trading system, India is keen that multilateral trade talks succeed.5 Equally, it must be recognised that in India agriculture is not just a business but a way of life and a major source of livelihood. India should, therefore, work towards an outcome which does not destabilise and cause distress to this large section of people.6 Hence, India will make every endeavour to conclude the negotiations within June 2007. This emerging flexibility in India’s policy stance in support of closure of discussions within is being viewed with extreme circumspection at best and strongly and volubly opposed at worst7 by sections of the academic community, activist groups, farming lobbies and NGOs with the agenda for protecting the interests
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RAJIV KUMAR
of marginalised groups. Indian reactions to globalisation cannot be considered independent of Indian reactions to liberalisation. Globalisation, in so far as it only concerns the external sector, is a subset of liberalisation. It is easy to argue that all three (Congress, United Front and National Democratic Alliance [NDA]) governments have made a hash out of handling the political economy of the reform process. There has been no attempt to sell reforms to the poor, the beneficiaries. Consequently, reforms have been perceived to be top down, with a pro-urban and pro-rich bias. Myopic governments at the Centre and the state have been driven by populist considerations. Major beneficiaries of true reforms will be unorganised labour, small farmers, efficient trade and industry and consumers. Their gains will more than compensate for losses suffered by organised labour, large farmers, inefficient trade and industry and the bureaucracy. If this message can only be hammered home, the political economy will be taken care of and governments will be able to convince sceptics that good economics is also good politics.8 In the present context of positions and counter-positions held by academic sections, political parties, activist groups as well as international bodies, there emerges a compelling need to dispel myths and misconceptions about the WTO and its true impact on the liberalisation process in India. The present volume comprises contributions from experts on India’s liberalisation experience in the last decade wherein some liberalisation measures could have resulted from the implementation of WTO obligations. The volume also reviews how India has coped with obligations under WTO Agreements and benefited from the rights granted under different protocols. Different chapters discuss how each sector or theme under the WTO-mandated liberalisation has impacted Indian policy-making and liberalisation initiatives.
OVERVIEW OF THE BOOK The second chapter titled ‘India’s Economic Liberalisation and the WTO’ by Bibek Debroy places the Indian reform experience in the context of its domestic process of liberalisation as opposed
INTRODUCTION
27
to the globalisation process of which the WTO negotiations and their outcome form an important component. In sum, the chapter professes that unilateral reforms in the Indian economy distinguished the decade of the 1990s and beyond from the period between 1947 and 1991. India ceased to be a perpetual outlier that opposed any liberalisation that was suggested, multilaterally or otherwise. Ultimately, multilateral liberalisation in cross-border flows is about greater competition and competition benefits efficient producers of goods and services, not those who are inefficient. Efficiency and inefficiency are functions of the environment within the country and the extent to which these are reformed. Notwithstanding warts and blemishes, Indian enterprises simply became more efficient not because of the WTO, but because of unilateral liberalisation. The chapter establishes that while the WTO may have been important in implementing Uruguay Round agreements and performing a dispute resolution function, in so far as influencing India’s liberalisation exercise is concerned, the WTO’s impact has been limited and peripheral. So which elements of reform were incremental? Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions (QRs) in general, elimination of QRs on some agro products, changes in intellectual property laws (not just patents, but trademarks and geographical indications (GIs) also), better enforcement of intellectual property, upgradation and modernisation of Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) offices, emphasis on traditional knowledge, trade facilitation improvements, enactment of competition policy law, liberalisation of service sectors like distribution, education or accounting and phasing out of the dividend balancing requirement are some areas in which reforms would probably have occurred later had it not been for the role played by the WTO. Having established that the WTO is perhaps ascribed with perpetration of many more atrocities in the country than it can actually be held responsible for, we have to chart out a way forward. So where do we head from here, what position should India take in the ongoing debate? The third chapter titled ‘From Uruguay to Doha: India at the Negotiating Table’ by Suparna Karmakar suggests the possible policy stance that can lead to more significant
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outcomes from the discussions for all stakeholders while breaking the ideological and policy deadlock that has been reached. If the talks are to resume, fresh perspectives are necessary for successful results. The chapter points out the elements that set the Doha Round apart from its predecessors. Karmakar emphasises that the scope of the ongoing negotiations is much larger and deeper than any of the previous rounds. The method of negotiation is also much more ambitious. The actors today are different from previous rounds, with active and vocal participation from developing countries. The round also suffers from lack of interest and support from the international business community. And finally, there exist serious imbalances in the global economy that are indirectly raising barriers to the successful conclusion of the talks. India’s traditionally hard-line approach to multilateral liberalisation must make way for proactive recognition of the fact that national interests of the country lie no longer in continued protectionism. Developing countries (including India) must also accept the reality that in terms of pure market access, industrialised countries would have little to offer by way of tariff cuts in this Round. In contrast, it is the developing countries themselves, and in particular the advanced developing countries, which would need to show progression. Developing country action is called for in: (i) reneging on the ‘Single-Undertaking’ principle; and (ii) the introduction of a credible regional trade policy shock into the system. The industrialised countries would need to: (i) undertake domestic and structural reforms; and (ii) recognise increased clout of developing countries at the negotiating tables of WTO which demands that the developing country concerns be put to the forefront of the WTO negotiations since over the last few years there has been a seismic shift in the competitive landscape facing the developed countries. While Bibek Debroy’s chapter clearly places WTO in the context of India’s overall globalisation process, segregating its impact from the country’s unilateral liberalisation process and outcomes, this compendium has emerged from the attempt to analyse those of
INTRODUCTION
29
India’s liberalisation measures which may have resulted from the fulfilment of WTO obligations. The various sectors and themes that have been studied here include agriculture, NAMA, textiles and clothing, service sector, IPRs, anti-dumping protocol, regional trade agreements and the environment. The potential impact of WTO-mandated liberalisation on the agricultural sector has been the well-spring of intense debate, media furore and activism in the country. The chapter by Biswajit Dhar titled ‘Prospects of Agricultural Trade Liberalisation: A View from India’ indicates the problems that have accompanied implementation of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture (AoA). The basic objective of AoA was to reduce and eventually eliminate the distortions in the markets for agricultural commodities. For realising this objective, the AoA introduced two sets of disciplines on the WTO members. Countries acceding to the WTO were expected to reduce the use of two forms of subsidies, namely, domestic support and export subsidies, over a period of time. However, in the period since the AoA has been implemented, there is little evidence to show that the AoA has had any meaningful influence on the markets. The major players in the global agricultural markets have continued to disburse large doses of subsidies to their domestic agricultural sectors. If anything has changed during the past six years, it has been the degree to which these countries have targeted the use of subsidies. Data on implementation of AoA in respect of major food crops which this chapter presents, demonstrates the fact that several WTO members are using subsidies to strengthen their position with the objective of gaining enhanced access in the markets that were opening up. As a result of this targeting, the prices of agricultural commodities included in this study are found to have declined quite steeply, quite contrary to the expectations prior to the implementation of the AoA. Countries like India had expected to gain from the implementation of the AoA since the withdrawal of subsidies by the major players in the global agricultural market was to bring about a rise in prices of agricultural commodities which would have benefited the low cost producers in the developing world.
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Removal of the gross imperfections that persist in global agricultural markets thus needs to be the focus of the ongoing WTO negotiations. This has indeed been the nub of the arguments that the G-20 countries have made during the negotiations. However, the prospects of any significant disciplining of agricultural subsidies by the two key players, namely, the US and the members of the EU, do not look very promising in light of the new Farm Bill proposals that were unveiled by the US Agriculture Secretary on 31 January 2007. These proposals indicate that the US could, in fact, increase farm subsidies, particularly on the ‘Green Box’ measures between 2008 and 2012. The global community would, therefore, have to wait considerably longer for the removal of policy induced distortions in agricultural markets. A core area of disagreement between the US and India that was instrumental in the failure of the Doha negotiations in July 2006 also related to ‘real market access’ in NAMA, which refers to all products not covered by the AoA. T C A Srinivasa-Raghavan in his chapter titled ‘The Political Economy of NAMA: A Note’ establishes that it is an attempt by the developed countries to extract a price from developing countries for righting a wrong that they, the developed countries, indulge in, namely, high agricultural subsidies combined with severely restricted market access for agricultural products from the developing countries. The instrument chosen, of eliminating the so-called ‘water’ in the tariffs on industrial products, is the thin end of the wedge. The various formulae being proposed will severely reduce room for manoeuvre for developing countries. This is all the more so because they have been unilaterally reducing the applied tariffs. Therefore, great care should be taken while arriving at any agreement that restricts elbow room in the negotiations. He concludes that the likelihood is greater that India will be a major importer of food rather than an exporter, and in that context worries that this issue is not being examined and, instead, policy and negotiations are proceeding on the basis that India will be a major exporter of agri-products. Samar Verma in Chapter 6 of the book titled ‘Indian Textile and Clothing Industry: Economic Policy Reform Experience During
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‘ATC’ Period’ explores India’s economic policy reform experience during the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) period (1995 to 2005) in the context of the Indian textile and clothing industry.9 Fundamental reforms in the industry have indeed occurred in the last decade; in particular at the dawn of the 21st century. This must not, however, be construed to imply that all the reforms have been triggered by, or in some ways caused by India’s obligations under the WTO. The ATC, through its promise of increased market access opportunities for trade, and simultaneous threat of increased imports into the Indian market, did create at least a sense of urgency for reform in the minds of the policy-makers. The external environment—of which WTO was an important part—also comprised newer contours of the global market place with rapidly changing consumer preferences, just-in-time deliveries, quick turnaround cycles, lean retailing systems, greater emphasis on ‘ethically certified’ production and distribution systems and ‘one stop shopping’ placing greater emphasis on reliability and investments in longterm vendor relationships. These changes imply massive restructuring and reorganisation of firms and business practices that build its competitive sinews. The importance of developing home demand in India should not be underestimated either. The chapter indicates that while Indian industry has managed to survive and grow in the second half of the 20th century despite government policies, it is now time for entrepreneurs to demonstrate that they can grow faster and better if facilitated by government policies. Rupa Chanda and Sasidaran G. present in Chapter 7 (titled ‘GATS and Developments in India’s Service Sector’) an analysis of India’s own liberalisation strategy vis-à-vis its multilateral commitment and reform strategy in services to demonstrate that the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) has not really played a catalytic role in India’s liberalisation process. Liberalisation of services has been undertaken as part of India’s general economic reform programme and has been shaped by domestic compulsions of enhancing efficiency in key input services like telecom and financial services for economy wide benefit and because of synergies with other sectors. Where opening has not been possible, the sector has not figured in the multilateral
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negotiations or figured only in a limited manner. Multilateral commitments and offers have typically lagged behind the autonomous liberalisation process and there are few occasions of pre-commitment. Also, multilateral commitments and offers have largely been less than the status quo, indicating an overall conservatism in the negotiating strategy and a strategy of keeping room for discretion or future leveraging of the negotiations in certain services. The GATS has also not been instrumental in expanding and securing opportunities for India’s services exports, the latter growing rapidly on their own strengths and spurred by technology and business imperatives. The chapter surmises that it is likely that India will continue to progressively liberalise and undertake regulatory reforms in its service sector, including the more sensitive services, and that the prospect of reversing such reforms will diminish over time. Hence, the value of locking in through multilateral commitments and the signalling value of multilateral offers is likely to diminish over time. Bilateral and regional deals will further undermine the value of the GATS for India. This brings us to the plurilateral approach to service negotiations which has been discussed in ‘Plurilateral Negotiations in Services’ by Sumanta Chaudhuri. The chapter establishes that the plurilateral approach is not a readymade solution to bringing about an ambitious outcome for services negotiations. The limited experience till date shows that this approach is unlikely to alter the basic architecture of GATS or fundamentally change the outcome of the negotiations. It will continue to supplement the bilateral approach and both will have their individual roles to play, though possibly the roles for each will differ depending upon the stage of the negotiations. The plurilateral negotiations are also not weighed against developing countries as had been anticipated by some. The approach has possibly led to better articulation of interests by at least some developing countries, which may prompt others in future to also do the same. It is also unlikely to develop into sectoral negotiations of the kind seen in the case of financial and basic telecommunication services earlier as the context is entirely different.
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Developing countries need to remain vigilant to ensure that this does not emerge. This approach, however, will not in itself fundamentally alter the level of ambition in the services negotiations. The links within and outside the services negotiations will continue to be the prime determinants. But this approach might be one of the contributors to a more positive outcome in services given that better trade-offs are possible within market access negotiations, the negotiations are restricted to only a limited number of members whose markets have current or future potential rather than the whole spectrum of the membership and the requests are more pragmatic and leave flexibility to meet individual needs of members, particularly developing ones. The Indian Intellectual Property (IP) regime has come a long way in recent years and more specifically in IP litigation in recent months and the outlook for the protection and enforcement of IP rights in India has never looked more positive. Pravin Anand and Neeti Wilson in their chapter titled ‘The Enhanced Intellectual Property Rights in India’ demonstrate how the Indian judiciary’s growing enthusiasm for and commitment to the protection of IPRs has encouraged IP owners to become more proactive in enforcing their rights by all means. They are exploring uncharted waters to obtain unique remedies from the courts. Although the benefits of specialised IP courts are still under debate in India, the present state of affairs is well suited to the protection and promotion of IPRs by brand owners. Although IP legislation has existed in India for decades, a real awareness and appreciation of IP issues has been noticeable only in the last decade. This radical change is a result of none other than the TRIPS agreement of WTO. In addition to overhauling almost every IP law to harmonise with international standards, India has taken steps to promulgate IP legislation in new areas in order to support growing areas of development. The progress made in 2005 to 2006 in particular has been critical for the consolidation of the IP legislation. While much still remains to be done regarding the criminal justice system, the Indian civil system for the protection of IPRs is improving daily. With a one billion-strong consumer pool from
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which to attract business, India is likely to remain the focus of the next generation global markets, and those who seek early protection of their IPRs in India and enforce them strategically will reap the benefits. In Chapter 10, Anil K. Gupta explores the relevance of the vigorous progress in the protection of IPRs in India for the economically challenged sections of the country especially in rural India which is a rich repository of traditional knowledge and practices. Poor people may produce innovations deserving respect, recognition and reward in the market place. Protection of IP and applications of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) can provide incentives for disclosure and dissemination at the same time. We have to reduce transaction costs for common people to learn from each other as has been attempted by Honey Bee Network. At the same time knowledge providers must not be anonymous and should not be short-changed in the market place. Making IP protection accessible to small innovators and local communities would be the first step in that direction. Jayanta Roy and Pritam Banerjee in Chapter 11 identify trade facilitation as the next big step in India’s trade reform agenda. India has done well to bring attention to the issues of harmonisation of standards (Article VIII) and accreditation of testing laboratories (Article IX). India has also consistently made technical cooperation and capacity building a major part of its agenda at the WTO. However, it needs to insist on additional language within the trade facilitation agenda that would require developed countries to show consistent and preferably institutionalised commitment to such an exchange. The chapter suggests that a broader institutional change would be crucial to the trade facilitation process in the longer run. It points out that while customs administrations have a leadership role to play in the area of trade facilitation in several countries, in a majority of these countries it is not a part of the finance ministry that has revenue generation as a primary objective. However, if like in India, customs falls under the aegis of the Finance Ministry then there might be a conflict of interest, that is, if revenue generation is a major objective of the customs department,
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then trade facilitation will, at best, be accorded a distant second priority. A better alternative in the Indian context is to entrust the primary responsibility of trade facilitation in the long run to a restructured Director-General of Foreign Trade (DGFT). In fact, DGFT should be transformed into a Centre for Trade Facilitation (CTF), with a small unit looking after the residual export incentives. Housing the CTF in the Ministry of Commerce and industry has another added advantage, that is, since trade facilitation will be a part of WTO policy; CTF can better coordinate with the trade policy division in the same ministry. It is an acknowledged fact that anti-dumping is a fairly complex exercise which requires deep understanding of law, finance, costing and economics. Sharad Bhansali, in Chapter 12, titled, ‘Anti-Dumping through India’s Liberalisation Process’, emphasises the need for a strong and well-equipped institution to enable fair, transparent and unbiased decision-making to render the system more credible. Much of the criticism against anti-dumping as a tool of trade policy can be obviated if the process is followed in a transparent manner. The strengthening of the institutions at the investigation stage as well as the appellate stage is certainly the need of the hour. Despite opposition and widespread criticism of anti-dumping mechanism, it needs to be appreciated that anti-dumping as a tool of trade policy has helped the Indian industry during the transition phase. There are several examples where the Indian industry has not only survived due to the timely protection against dumping but has thrived subsequently. An efficient and responsive anti-dumping administration also sends appropriate signals to the erring exporters who might be inclined to indulge in price undercutting and underselling to the detriment of the Indian industry. It cannot be denied that anti-dumping does suffer from many shortcomings when viewed from the theoretical perspective of perfect competition. But then, the real world of international trade is nowhere close to perfection—either in theory or in practice. Starting from the late 1980s, Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) have proliferated spanning countries, regions and continents. Of the
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149 members of the WTO, all but Mongolia are signatories to one or more RTAs. S. Narayan and Indu Rayadurgam discuss the impact of regional trade agreements on the international trade architecture while exploring the expanding scope of RTAs over the years. Many of the recent agreements include subjects under the Singapore Issues (trade facilitation, investment, government procurement and competition) and others like North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) have a separate dispute settlement mechanism. Indian trade policy has developed a balanced approach towards multilateral negotiations as well as regional and bilateral agreements. There has also been a strong unilateral movement to opening up the markets for international trade. The chapter envisages the analysis of India’s approach to trade agreements through a three-part strategy which includes unilateral liberalisation, and multilateral and regional liberalisation. In a Free Trade Agreement (FTA), member nations reduce barriers to trade between them and simultaneously raise higher barriers to trade at the international level. So an FTA with Sri Lanka or Singapore makes India flexible for such nations, whereas at the multilateral level, the ‘defensive posture’ would still be in place. RTAs afford India the flexibility of choosing its partners. Environmental conservation and sustainable development solutions have been a prominent area of policy attention in recent years. Pradeep S. Mehta places India’s environmental policy making in the context of the WTO mandate establishing how the country has played a fundamental role in both promoting and implementing the Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs). India was seen as one of the more proactive developing countries in attaining environmental conservation both in the domestic as well as international forums, before and during the initial stages of trade liberalisation. During the 1980s and early 1990s, numerous national environmental policies came into force, which gave backing to India’s positive approach on the international stage. Yet during the mid-1990s, environmental progress diminished and a passive and conservative stance took effect.
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It could be said that there was a fundamental shift in the mindset of how to achieve economic growth along with rapid poverty reduction. Negotiations in the Doha Round on the environmental goods and services (EGS) should be viewed in the context that overall, India would be a high net importer of EGS if it commits to liberalising its EGS markets, that is, import trade would outweigh export trade. Interestingly, there are Indian EGS sub-sectors (energy management, renewable energy and cleaner technology) that have healthier potential, especially in the perspective of South–South trade. Also, liberalisation of trade in environmentally preferable products (EPPs), such as jute and bamboo, generate double gains for India. Environmental standards can and in some cases do act as Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs) to the exports of India, as well as other developing countries and even developed countries. On the other hand, there are positives as well, but progress must be made for environmentally honest pricing with a holistic view taking into account both producers and consumers in a feasible manner. It is my belief that the contributions specially put together for this volume take forward the discussion on India’s interests and role in the on-going Doha Development Round (DDR) negotiations. India has rightly found a place on the ‘high table’ by joining the G-4 that has effectively replaced the QUAD as the principal negotiating group within the WTO. This position also carries additional responsibility. Along with protecting its own national interests as all member countries are expected to do, India also has to be conscious of safeguarding and strengthening the multilateral global trading regime. The credibility and effectiveness of the WTO, which forms the basic core of this multilateral system, has to be ensured as well. Therefore, Indian negotiators have to in a way graduate to a higher league that carries both higher recognition and responsibilities. This certainly requires that apart from reinforcing the ‘in-house negotiating capacity’, the Ministry of Commerce must interact more intensively with other line ministries, industry bodies and think tanks to formulate its negotiating positions that retain a degree of flexibility. At the same time, track two negotiating
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modalities can also be used far more effectively and with greater finesse to achieve early mover advantages and for informal testing of the feasibility of possible negotiation positions. This volume attempts at bringing together a wide range of view points in the hope that this will strengthen the interaction between our negotiators and policy supporting think tanks like Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations (ICRIER).
NOTES 1. The related issues have been analysed in detail in Chapter 4 of the book on the agricultural sector by Biswajit Dhar. 2. See Chapter 5 of the book by T C A Srinivasa-Raghavan. 3. See http://nation.ittefaq.com/artman/publish/article_34792.shtml 4. See http://nation.ittefaq.com/artman/publish/article_34792.shtml 5. For an exposition on possible strategies to break the impasse in the talks while protecting the interests of vulnerable groups see Chapter 3 of this book by Suparna Karmakar. 6. See http://www2.irna.ir/en/news/view/line-16/0703148496092844.htm 7. See http://nation.ittefaq.com/artman/publish/article_34792.shtml 8. See www.ccsindia.org/policy/glob/articles/debroy.doc 9. The ATC and all restrictions there under were terminated on 1 January 2005. The expiry of the 10-year transition period of ATC implementation meant that trade in textile and clothing products would no longer be subject to quotas under a special regime outside normal WTO/GATT rules but would now be governed by the general rules and disciplines embodied in the multilateral trading system.
REFERENCES AND SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY The Hindu Business Line. 2007. ‘Lamy Pitches for India’s Role in Revival of WTO Talks’, 20 January. ———. 2007. ‘Lamy wants India to budge on WTO issues’, 20 January. The Economic Times. 2006. ‘India, US to Hold Talks to Bridge WTO Differences’, 27 October. UNCTAD-India. 2006. ‘Green Box Subsidies: A Theoretical and Empirical Assessment’, UNCTAD-India Working Paper, July 2006.
Chapter 2 India’s Economic Liberalisation and the WTO BIBEK DEBROY
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his chapter is on India’s liberalisation experience and the World Trade Organization (WTO). The expression ‘India’s liberalisation experience’ has to be defined in at least two senses. First, there is a tendency to assume that India’s liberalisation dates from 1991 and this is a bit of a simplification. There has been continuity to India’s reform experience and Indian reforms can be traced back to the second half of the 1970s, although the pre-1991 reforms were piecemeal and ad hoc and certainly not as comprehensive as the post-1991 ones. Second, economic reforms have a domestic component and an external one, although the two are linked. For instance, in the post-1991 scenario, the external sector component involved six different strands—tariffs, Quantitative Restrictions (QRs), export subsidies (incentives), the exchange rate mechanism, Foreign Direct Investments (FDIs) and foreign portfolio investments. Traditionally, the mandate of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) has been external sector policies, especially tariffs and Non-tariff Barriers (NTBs). It is certainly the case that as international trade and business became more complicated and
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as tariffs dropped, the focus of GATT, and later the WTO, shifted to what can be called domestic economic policies. Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs), cross-border investments, services and agriculture are all examples of this shift in focus. Despite this, when one attempts to link India’s economic liberalisation with the WTO, one primarily means external sector reforms. Stated differently, when one discusses economic reforms in India, the words liberalisation, privatisation and globalisation (LPG) are occasionally used. The WTO is about globalisation, not about liberalisation and privatisation, although the word ‘liberalisation’ is used in the title of this chapter. Having said this, how does one link liberalisation with WTO? The WTO came into existence on 1 January 1995, as a consequence of the Uruguay Round (1986–94) of negotiations. By virtue of being a member of the erstwhile GATT, India automatically became a member of WTO and did not have to go through an accession process. Since there have not been any agreements under a WTO umbrella and the Doha Work Programme (DWP) is temporarily stuck, the question of liberalisation being pushed as a result of WTO agreements does not logically arise. Indeed, this is true not just of India, but of all the 150 countries that are WTO members. Barring accession instances where a country has become a member of WTO and was not earlier a member of GATT, the WTO has not had anything to do with promoting liberalisation, notwithstanding perceptions to the contrary. The only exception to this principle are instances where WTO’s dispute settlement role has led to certain trade policies being declared illegal and a member country has accordingly had to alter its policies. There remains the matter of the Uruguay Round package, which in a pedantic sense predates WTO’s establishment. Through a happy coincidence, the time-frame for implementation of the Uruguay Round agreements meshed in with India’s own post-1991 liberalisation exercise. Ipso facto, since unilateral liberalisation and the Uruguay Round dictated liberalisation were movements in the same direction, India was far more comfortable than the country had ever been with any
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other round of multilateral trade negotiations. The gap between what the Uruguay Round required India to do and what India would have wanted to do of her own volition was reduced. At the risk of some subjectivity in identification, the only areas where India was probably constrained to undertake reforms that she would not have immediately undertaken on her own had there been no Uruguay Round commitment, are IPRs, services, agriculture and QRs. Despite this, popular perception, which fails to distinguish between unilateralism and multilateral commitments, blames the WTO for much of the liberalisation and unilateral initiatives have now been complicated by the addition of Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs). There is also a difference between what the WTO requires India to do today and what liberalisation might be mandated in the future, once the DWP leads to an outcome and there are specific commitments.
THE TRADE POLICY REVIEW MECHANISM (TPRM) AND DISPUTES The Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM) was formally instituted as an outcome of the Uruguay Round agreement, although its antecedents go back to the mid-term review of the Uruguay Round in 1988. Every WTO Member has to go through a TPRM. The frequency of TPRMs varies from country to country. This is yet another channel through which India’s trade policies are scrutinised by the WTO secretariat and thus, by other WTO members. Therefore, in principle, TPRMs offer a mode for the WTO to influence Indian liberalisation. The frequency of India’s review is once every four years, although there is a flexibility of six months in the review cycle. In each such review, other than press releases, there are four separate documents—the secretariat’s report, the Indian government’s response, questions (and answers) by other WTO members and minutes of the final meeting, with the Chairperson’s summary. India went through TPRMs
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in 1993, 1998 and 2002. Of these, the 1998 and 2002 reviews are post-WTO, so to speak. These are not on trade policy alone, since the broader macro policy environment of the country in question is also sketched out. Consider first the two secretariat reports on India, in 1998 and 2002. In 1998, while appreciating the thrust of India’s trade policy reform, the points were made that despite tariff reductions, the tariff structure still remained complex, with a large number of bands, and tariff escalation was high in sectors like paper and paper products, printing and publishing, wood and wood products, textiles and clothing and food, beverages and tobacco. On import licensing, there was a problem with consumer goods and complaints were also raised about canalisation. The review was much more critical of the export subsidy and incentive structure. By the time it came to the 2002 review, import restrictions imposed for balance of payments (BoP) purposes had been scrapped. The 2002 secretariat report was thus primarily critical of complex tariff structures (such as end-use exemptions) and tariff escalation (special mention of paper and printing, textiles and clothing and food, beverages and tobacco). It also flagged India’s increased use of anti-dumping and the requirement that certain imports (like automobiles and natural rubber) could only take place through designated ports. The Government of India’s (GoI’s) response to these criticisms was predictable. In 1998, it was argued that at the eight-digit level of trade classification, imports of 2,714 tariff lines were restricted under Article XVIIIB of GATT and another 600 tariff lines were restricted under Articles XX and/or XXI of GATT. A six-year time-frame for eliminating QRs was reached with countries other than the US (that is, Australia, Canada, the European Communities, New Zealand, Switzerland, Japan). The points made were that (a) India had not deviated from the tariff reduction or binding commitments of the Uruguay Round, some zero or low level bindings on agro commodities were renegotiated upwards under Article XXVIII of GATT, (b) the Copyright Act was amended
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in 1994, under Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) the dividend balancing requirement and mixing requirements for newsprint were eliminated, and (c) anti-dumping and safeguard measures were WTO-compliant and India was not a signatory to the plurilateral agreement on government procurement, but signed (in April 1997) the plurilateral agreement on trade in information technology products. This 1998 response also flagged the NTBs Indian exports faced in other countries and included ‘(i) restrictive import policy regimes (import charges other than customs tariff, quantitative restrictions, import licensing, customs barriers); (ii) standards, testing, labelling and certification (including phytosanitary standards) which are set at unrealistic levels for developing countries or are scientifically unjustified; (iii) export subsidies (including agricultural export subsidies, preferential export financing terms, etc.); (iv) barriers on services (visible and invisible barriers restricting movement of service providers, etc.); (v) lack of intellectual property protection; (vi) government procurement regimes; (vii) barriers to investment; (viii) other barriers (including anti-dumping and countervailing measures)’. By the time it came to the 2002 response, the QR issue had disappeared. QRs were removed on 488 items in 1996, 391 in 1997, 894 in 1998, 714 in 2000 and the remaining 715 items in 2001. Indeed, the 2002 response was remarkable, because instead of being defensive about India’s trade policy, it paraded India’s liberalisation attempt and its successes, especially in the domestic segment. Indeed, if one tracks the questions posed by other trading partners, say in 2002, liberalisation made the GoI’s task remarkably simple. Most questions were Uruguay Round-plus, in the sense that they did not involve violation of any existing Uruguay Round agreements—Press Note No. 18 of 14 December 1998, enforcement of improved legislation on intellectual property and gaps between applied and bound rates being cases in point. It is unnecessary to cite the minutes of the 1998 and 2002 meetings, because they substantiate the same point.
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Consequently, there is little in the WTO’s TPRM process per se that triggered Indian liberalisation. The disputes are a slightly different matter and compared to many other developing countries, India has a far better capacity to handle disputes. So far, India has figured as a complainant in 17 cases and as a respondent in 18. The 17 cases where India figured as a complainant involved automobile import regimes (Poland), import of women’s and girls’ coats (US), imports of woven wool shirts and blouses (US), imports of textiles and clothing (Turkey), import prohibition on shrimp and shrimp products (US), import duties on rice (European Communities), anti-dumping duties on unbleached cotton fabrics (European Communities), anti-dumping duties on cotton-type bed linen (European Communities), anti-dumping duties on pharmaceutical products (South Africa), anti-dumping and countervailing measures on steel plates (US), anti-dumping and anti-subsidy duties (US), anti-dumping duties on jute bags (Brazil), import of pharmaceutical products (Argentina), rules of origin for textiles and apparel (US), granting of tariff preferences to developing countries (European Communities), anti-dumping duties on flat rolled iron or non-alloy steel products (European Communities) and a customs bond directive for merchandise subjected to antidumping and countervailing duties (US). Other than complaints that are generic in nature, this is also a surrogate indicator of products of export interest to India. The 18 cases where India figured as a respondent involved patent protection for pharmaceutical and agro chemical products (US), patent protection for pharmaceutical and agro chemical products (European Communities), QRs on imports (US), QRs on imports (Australia), QRs on imports (Canada), QRs on imports (New Zealand), QRs on imports (Switzerland), QRs on imports (European Communities), export licenses (European Communities), local content and export balancing requirements in the automotive sector (European Communities), QRs on imports (European Communities), special and additional customs duties (European Communities), local content and export balancing requirements in the automotive sector (US), QRs on imports
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(European Communities), anti-dumping measures (European Communities), anti-dumping measures on batteries (Bangladesh), antidumping measures (Chinese Taipei) and in-direct taxes on import and sale of wines and spirits (European Communities). Of these, the ones involving patents and QRs are the most significant. Towards the beginning of the chapter it was stated that the sectors where India would not have probably undertaken liberalisation on her own, had there been no WTO or Uruguay Round, were IPRs, services, agriculture and QRs. This now needs some qualification. In the preparatory phase of the Uruguay Round, India resisted the inclusion of what were then labelled as the new areas—Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), TRIMs and services. However, this was pre-1991 reform and it was also a period when India had donned the mantle of leadership of the South. It is a moot question whether such an opposition would have continued in the post-1991 era, had the Uruguay Round agenda emerged in the 1990s. For instance, from a general opposition to enhanced IPRs protection, the opposition boiled down to one of resisting product patents in pharmaceuticals, chemicals and fertilisers. On TRIMs, local content and dividend balancing requirements disappeared in the process of unilateral reforms. Perceptions also changed vis-à-vis services. Indeed, in service sector negotiations, although the Indian negotiating position continues to emphasise Mode 4 (cross-border movements of natural persons), Mode 3 (commercial presence) no longer remains a taboo as earlier. That leaves QRs and agriculture. That QRs are inefficient as a mode of protection, assuming there is going to be protection, was recognised as part of the unilateral liberalisation agenda. However, had India not lost the QR dispute, elimination of all QRs would probably not have been done in April 2001 but somewhere further down the line. Finally, while agriculture is perceived to be a contentious issue, there is a difference between applied rates and bound rates. Barring a few agro items (and some bound rates were renegotiated upwards), there is enough of a comfort zone in terms of a bridge between applied and bound rates. The elimination of
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QRs on agricultural products is a slightly different matter. Hence, at least so far as Uruguay Round agreements are concerned, the increment to India’s liberalisation exercise as a consequence of the existence of WTO are probably limited to patent law and the elimination of QRs. Before concluding this section, a comment is in order about post-Uruguay Round agreements. Although these do not exist as yet, their contours (but not the hard numbers) are obvious enough. It is also fairly obvious that the government of India would want to extract a quid pro quo from trading partners in return for any liberalisation measures it undertakes. This is the basis for all negotiations and reciprocity is also built into GATT articles. More accurately, GATT principles embody less than full reciprocity for developing countries and implementation of this rule is the major stumbling block for both Non-Agricultural Market Access (NAMA) and agriculture. Especially on NAMA, it is worth bearing in mind the timelines and levels of tariff reductions built into unilateral liberalisation agendas. While there are many versions of such agendas, one commonly cited one is the Kelkar Task Force’s recommendations on indirect taxes and these propose a maximum basic customs duty of 20 per cent on all manufactured products (20 per cent is actually for consumer goods; raw materials, inputs and intermediate goods have 10 per cent), with a maximum of 150 per cent for agricultural products. Since this report was submitted in 2002, there are additional compulsions for tariff reductions as a result of several Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), India is a party to. There remains an issue of subjecting imports to the same domestic indirect taxes that domestic producers are subjected to and this problem of an appropriate countervailing duty cannot be sorted out until there is a standardised goods and services tax (GST) in place, with all other indirect taxes eliminated. The GST is likely to become operational from 2010 and any DWP commitment is unlikely to bite before 2012. That is, while exacting reciprocal concessions from trading partners is a valid objective, as is the objective of increasing market access in developed countries, no conceivable DWP commitment on manufactured products can be a problem
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for India as long as tariff reductions are on bound levels and not on applied rates. The same logic also applies to agriculture, as long as some products can be kept out of the multilateral commitments. A similar argument can also be extended to services. That leaves the four so-called Singapore Issues (competition policy, trade facilitation, government procurement, trade and investment) and labour and environmental standards. Irrespective of what transpires at DWP, one should note that beyond perceptions of labour and environmental standards amounting to protectionism in disguise, India no longer should have any great problem with trade facilitation or competition policy. In all probability, irrespective of public posturing, India would have been quite content to accept multilateral negotiations on these two by the time the Seattle Ministerial Meeting was held in 1999. Nor should there be a problem with negotiating investments, or even accepting commitments on investment, as long as such commitments are restricted to the post-establishment stage. However, there remains a problem with government procurement, since any government procurement agreement is bound to cover services and also extend to the sub-national level. The impression from this section is thus what has already been said earlier. Never since 1947 has India been in such a happy position at multilateral trade negotiations. And that is thanks to the unilateral liberalisation exercise and the effects of liberalisation in the external sector.
PERCEPTION VERSUS THE REALITY While the description of the section ‘The Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM) and Disputes’ is based on facts and reality, there is nonetheless a perception that the WTO is responsible for many of India’s liberalisation-related problems and it is incorrect to presume that unilateral liberalisation has only gainers and no losers. The Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MoCI) newsletter India and the WTO is almost certainly largely designed to handle this perceptional problem. That is, while dissemination of information to the public is a desirable objective, there must also be a secondary objective of
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handling what may be called the political economy of the WTO. This newsletter has been in existence since January 1999 and a scrutiny across the various issues covered is probably indicative of the areas where the government feels that the WTO (and India’s commitments at the WTO) needs to be sold to the country at large. A similar listing is also possible on the basis of the Department of Economic Affair’s Economic Survey. But the Survey sketch is second-hand (since it is obtained from Commerce Ministry) and nowhere near as comprehensive. Accordingly, the following is a list of issues MoCI has especially decided to flag since the inaugural issue of the newsletter in January 1999. Since the timeline is important, the date of the newsletter is shown within brackets.
QRs on imports India had QRs on imports under Article XVIIIB of GATT and 2,400 tariff lines were covered. India eventually proposed a phase-out by 2003, but this was not accepted by the US and a dispute was pending (January 1999). For many tariff lines under QRs, India does not have tariff bindings and therefore, applied tariff rates can be increased over and above safeguard and antidumping measures (January 2000). Suo moto anti-dumping investigations were initiated against import of battery cells, battery-operated toys and sport shoes from China. Imports of packaged commodities were subjected to the Standards of Weights and Measures (Packaged Commodity) Order of 1977. Many imports were made conditional on compliance with Indian quality standards applicable to domestic goods (December 2000). The Livestock Importation Act was amended so that a Sanitary Import Permit could be imposed on imports of livestock products like dairy products (November–December 2004). Even when QRs are eliminated, imports of products like wheat, rice, maize, petrol, diesel, aviation turbine fuel and urea will only be canalised through state trading enterprises and a war room has been set up to track imports of 300 sensitive items (April 2001).
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In December 2002, the European Communities (EC) sought consultations with India on QRs maintained on more than 100 products under Articles XX and XXI of GATT. Independent of this, as a result of unilateral liberalisation, QRs on 69 tariff lines were removed in March 2003 and this list included some items on which EC sought consultations (May 2003).
Patent protection on pharmaceutical and agro chemical products India availed of the transition period to switch over to patents. But in the interim period, the country should have received product patent applications and granted Exclusive Marketing Rights (EMRs). Since this was not done, India lost a dispute at WTO and the Indian Patents Act had to be amended through an ordinance in January 1999. Ninety per cent of medicines in the world were generic medicines and none of the 279 drugs listed in the National Essential Drug List (1996) were covered by patents (May 2002). The Indian Patents Act was amended in March 1999 to introduce a transitional mailbox facility from 1 January 1995, to receive product patent applications and provide EMRs for five years. It was again amended in June 2002 to meet obligations (that were effective from 1 January 2000) on the rights of patentees, term of patent protection, compulsory licensing and reversal of burden of proof. To meet the TRIPS obligations from 1 January 2005, a Patents Amendment Bill was introduced in Lok Sabha to primarily introduce product patent protection in all fields of technology. The Bill also deleted provisions on EMRs, introduced a temporary safeguard provision for the EMRs already granted and introduced a provision enabling grant of compulsory licences for export of medicines to countries that have no or insufficient domestic production capacities to meet emergency public health situations (December 2003). Patent offices must be modernised as there is a large backlog of applications (March 1999). IPRs offices were being modernised (January 2002). Challenged by Agricultural and Processed Food Products Export
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Development Authority (APEDA), RiceTec withdrew certain claims on its US patent for basmati rice lines and grains and the Kasmati trademark registration was withdrawn in Britain (September 2000). A watch agency was set up in November 1996 to keep a global watch for new trademark applications for basmati or its deceptive variations (August 2001). The Patents (Second Amendment) Bill, 1999, included provisions for mandatory disclosure of source and geographical origin of biological material used and anticipation of invention by available local knowledge as a ground for opposition and revocation (January 2002). Patents granted overseas on the use of turmeric in wound healing, the fungicidal property of neem and waste treatment using Hessian were successfully challenged and revoked (May 2003).
Agriculture At 100 per cent for primary products, 150 per cent for processed products and 300 per cent for edible oils, India’s bound tariffs on agricultural products are high, and for commodities where bound rates are zero or low, re-negotiation upwards is being done (January 1999). The basic customs duty was re-negotiated upwards to 80 per cent for rice (70 per cent for semi-milled or wholly-milled rice), 50 per cent for maize, sorghum, millet and spelt, 35 per cent for fresh grapes, 50 per cent for apples and 35 per cent for preparations for infant use in retail packs (March 2000). The basic customs duty was re-negotiated upwards to 100 per cent for areca nut, 100 per cent for poultry products, 50 per cent for wheat and 60 per cent for skimmed milk powder beyond the tariff rate quota (TRQ) (December 2000). India had (on 1 April 1997) QRs on imports of 825 agro products. Even if QRs are eliminated, quantitative restrictions can be replaced with high tariffs because of the high bindings. Except for oilseeds, India’s agricultural products are price competitive and there should not be large-scale imports as a result of trade liberalisation (May 1999).
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Services India’s initial offer, tabled in December 2003, had greater commitments in engineering, computer and related services, telecommunications, construction and related engineering services, financial services, hospital services and tourism and travelrelated services. In addition, fresh commitments were offered in accounting and book-keeping services, medical, dental and midwives’ services and maritime transport services. India submitted requests in sectors like accounting, architecture, health, computerrelated, construction and engineering, financial, audio-visual, tourism and maritime transport services (December 2003). In addition to revised offers in sectors where commitments were made in the Uruguay Round or initial offers were made in the DWP, fresh sectors where India would make offers were distribution services, education services, environmental services and recreational, cultural and sporting services (May 2005). What does one make of all this? There are different levels at which one can answer this question. For instance, there are legitimate reasons for complaining about the WTO and the Uruguay Round agreements. First, the liberalisation in market access promised in the course of the Uruguay Round to developing countries did not materialise, primarily because the Uruguay Round package provided enough loopholes and caveats. Second, there was dirty tariffication and tariff escalation, the latter deterring value addition in exports from developing countries. To compound matters, tariffs on products of export interest to developing countries were high and specific duties converted to high ad valorem equivalents. Third, there was policy substitution, and as tariffs were disciplined, protectionism surfaced through NTBs, including anti-dumping and anti-subsidy investigation, technical barriers to trade, sanitary and phytosanitary measures and environmental measures, not to speak of a separate set of barriers for services. Fourth, while constraints to market access in developed countries remained a key issue, and agriculture in developed countries was not being liberalised, there was an attempt to
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overload the DWP agenda by plugging in the Singapore issues. Fifth, decision-making processes within the WTO system were flawed, despite the WTO being more democratic than many other international institutions, and as India’s economic clout increased, developed countries needed to adjust to reflect this new reality. Sixth, less than reciprocity measures from developing countries was not being faithfully implemented. Many of these concerns are reflected in civil society objections to the WTO, including global civil society, although it also needs to be recognised that some global NGOs often articulate protectionist sentiments in developed countries. These concerns about the WTO and its processes are all valid and other than civil society articulation, are also voiced in common positions adopted by the G-20, G-33 or NAMA-11. However, as a founder member of GATT in 1947 and as a subsequent member of the WTO, the pros and cons of membership, as opposed to opting out of the system, have been certainly weighed by India and the pluses outweigh the minuses, a fact also established by the large number of countries wishing to accede to the WTO. Accepting this proposition does not amount to arguing that the WTO has no warts or blemishes or that its functioning does not need to be improved. But this criticism about the WTO has little to do with the question posed in this chapter, about the degree to which the WTO has been instrumental in triggering, goading or determining India’s liberalisation experience. A second level at which one can address perceptions about the WTO is by recognising what should be obvious enough, that is, perceptions about liberalisation are confused with perceptions about the WTO. In a broad brush sense, the initial flush of India’s liberalisation was in the manufacturing sector, and after restructuring and some shake-outs, Indian manufacturing has survived and now successfully competes globally. Having recognised that an appropriate countervailing duty cannot be imposed without a GST in place, there is no great opposition to tariff reduction now, including tariff reduction that is unilateral or the outcome of regional agreements. In contrast, most of the present debate about unilateral liberalisation concerns services, where restructuring
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consequent to liberalisation has not yet happened and competition is imperfect, such as through assorted equity caps on foreign investments. Hence the resistance to opening up service sectors like accounting, law or education. And liberalisation is almost non-existent in agriculture. Unlike fast manufacturing (and industrial) and service sector growth, the performance of the agricultural sector since 1991 has been lacklustre, although the slowdown actually precedes 1991 and began in the second half of the 1980s. With a substantial share of the working population engaged in agriculture, it is understandable that agriculture and the rural sector should be a contentious issue, and the debate over growth and its connection with poverty reduction also has an obvious link, since poverty reduction is primarily a rural phenomenon. This can be spliced with what has been witnessed since the 1990s—a greater private sector expenditure on education and health, including among the poor, and often higher costs. But it is important to distinguish such reactions to liberalisation from specific WTO commitments, since in these important areas, the impact of WTO commitments has been minimal or non-existent. For example, an increase in drug prices has little to do with a product patent regime and has much more to do with an easing of the Drug Price Control Order (DPCO). In instances where agro products have faced an import threat, that has had much more to do with applied tariff rates that are below the bound rates mandated by the WTO. Reservations about liberalisation also feed on the perception that liberalisation has been implemented without sufficient consultations. While that is a separate issue, it is not quite the case that WTO negotiations have been entered into without adequate consultations. Indeed, there is a clear difference here between what happened in the late 1980s during the Uruguay Round negotiations and what has transpired since then, facilitated by the advent of information technology. The MoCI has been much more open in the placing information in the public domain or presenting facts to Parliament or consulting stakeholders like academic institutions, farmers’ associations, trade unions, civil society in general and the media, apart from state governments. A point can indeed be made
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that information dissemination should have been done much more in the vernacular, which is where popular misconception lies, or that much of the dissemination tends to be Delhi-centric. But it is a moot question whether information dissemination is a task of the government alone. How effective have chambers of commerce and associations been in performing this role? A third level is much more pertinent for purposes of this chapter and concerns a counter-factual. Which elements of reform are incremental? That is, which are the ones that would not have been undertaken had it not been for the WTO and, in that sense, which elements of liberalisation are the outcomes of WTO commitments? It is because this is counter-factual that there is subjectivity in assessment. Having said this, a possible identification is elimination of QRs in general, elimination of QRs on some agro products, changes in intellectual property laws (not just patents, but trademarks and geographical indications also), better enforcement of IPRs, upgradation and modernisation of IPRs offices, emphasis on traditional knowledge, trade facilitation improvements, enactment of competition policy law, liberalisation of service sectors like distribution, education or accounting and phasing out of the dividend balancing requirement. But one should be careful in this assessment. There is a difference between arguing that these reforms would not have happened at all and arguing that they would not have happened when they did, but would have occurred later. The former proposition is not plausible, while the latter is. Liberalisation tends to be easier when it is the outcome of endogenous and domestic demand and more difficult when it is perceived to be the result of external pressure and commitments. The contrast between changes in copyright law and patent law is a case in point, where the former was perceived to be in the interests of Indian exports of software, music, films, entertainment in general, and so on. To state it differently, in the sectors and areas just identified, the WTO trigger probably pushed liberalisation and advanced it by anything between five and 10 years and no more. That was the increment, not the liberalisation per se.
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In sum, unilateral reforms distinguished the decade of the 1990s and what came beyond from what happened between 1947 and 1991. India ceased to be a perpetual outlier that opposed any liberalisation that was suggested, multilaterally or otherwise. In the end, multilateral liberalisation in cross-border flows is about greater competition and competition benefits efficient producers of goods and services, not those who are inefficient. And efficiency and inefficiency are functions of the environment within the country and the extent to which these are reformed. Notwithstanding warts and blemishes, Indian enterprises simply became more efficient. Not because of the WTO, but because of unilateral liberalisation. The WTO may be important in implementing Uruguay Round agreements and performing a dispute resolution function. But insofar as influencing India’s liberalisation exercise is concerned, the WTO’s impact has been limited and peripheral.
Chapter 3 From Uruguay to Doha India at the Negotiating Table SUPARNA KARMAKAR∗
If trade talks were founded on a rational analysis of economic interests, they would be much easier to conduct and conclude. But most are not, and the Doha Round is no different. The key to ensuring that something worthwhile does emerge from it is to distinguish narrow political agendas from the broader public interest. Peter D. Sutherland, former WTO-Director General
INTRODUCTION
T
he World Trade Organization (WTO) Doha negotiations have formally resumed, albeit softly. However, it remains doubtful if there will be progress towards a resolution before the July 2007 expiry of the US President’s fast track negotiating authority. At a recent meeting of the WTO developing country members held at New Delhi, the predominant view from the floor was that from the perspective of a developing country, the content of the agreement is more important than the speed of conclusion of the Doha Round, and members should not be pressured or influenced by domestic imperatives of any negotiating member. The reason for pessimism stems from the lack of forward movement from major negotiators either on
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agricultural subsidy or agricultural tariff reduction and tariff rate quotas, the two most intractable issues in the round. Agriculture is the key to a successful conclusion of this round. Further, it is apparent to all that a forward movement in agriculture is critical for reinstating the credibility of the multilateral trading system. In December 2005, before the Hong Kong ministerial meeting, Bergsten had opined: ‘Virtually all observers concur that the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations in the World Trade Organization is faltering badly. Agreement may have been reached on the principle (although not the date) of eliminating export subsidies for agriculture, but very little else has been resolved since the talks were launched….’1 Unfortunately, the status quo continues till date. Though there have been periodic statements of good intent from the key negotiators on the importance of the multilateral trading system and on the need for reviving the stalled Doha talks, improved offers on agricultural subsidy, tariff reduction and future import quotas indicating forward movement are yet to come, especially from the US. The current US farm policy is ‘minimalist in terms of making concessions.... At the same time (we are) maximalist in making demands on others in terms of agriculture.’2 It is also significant that even at this critical juncture, there are still no formal meetings of the membership and most negotiators in Geneva seem to be unaware of ongoing developments, much less the nuances thereof. All this raises doubts on the prospects of a speedy conclusion of this round, despite the members having started ‘discussions’ in earnest (as opposed to ‘negotiations’) since late February 2007. Concluding a Multilateral Round of Trade Negotiations (MTNs) has never been easy. Although they might seem like successes in retrospect, it is important to recall that few of these MTNs went smoothly. Statistics indicate that WTO rounds have on average experienced a crisis at about five years into the round and then gotten into a hyper drive mode. It took the Tokyo Round five years to conclude, the Uruguay Round nearly eight years and several
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starts and stops to be sealed. For certain, it would have been a miracle if the Doha Round were to conclude in less than that time, which it has not; in the words of Jagdish N. Bhagwati, ‘miracles do not happen in trade (negotiations)’. And ‘with each successive round, the negotiators’ task has grown more complex, even as their ability to close trade deals has increasingly been impaired by the greater visibility of the process and the growing involvement of a variety of protectionist lobbies and stakeholders.’3 The Doha Round has been tough going from the start. However, pessimism is certainly not called for. As on date, we are only into the sixth year of negotiations in the Doha Round, and given the significant addition to the negotiating agenda in the ongoing round, most critically the inclusion of a high-ambition deal in agriculture as part of the single-undertaking principle, as well as the enhanced complexity of the issues under negotiation, it would be difficult to effect a rapid conclusion of this so-called Development Round to everyone’s satisfaction. Nor is a weak deal desirable. The current impasse, therefore, should be an opportunity for members to introspect and work out the extra steps they need to take for ensuring that the potential long-term gains from multilateralism are not sacrificed at the alter of short-term populism. Much depends on the compatibility among negotiators, between the dossiers they negotiate (and its interface with the political reality at home) and their real commercial interests, and the dynamism of the multiple stakeholders. This chapter traces the evolution of India (and developing countries in general) in the multilateral negotiations, especially in view of its increasing politico-economic clout in the postliberalisation period, looks at the changing dynamic of India’s negotiating position and evaluates her newly acquired status as one of the principal negotiators in the WTO. It is widely acknowledged today that for a successful conclusion of the Doha Round, constructive leadership from the developing country leaders is perhaps more important than what the industrialised country leaders could achieve on their own. Notwithstanding the important role played by the US and the EU in this round in terms of
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providing the much needed foresight and negotiating push, a credible and responsible developing country leadership would be critical in the attainment of a pro-development agreement. In the next section, we begin by outlining the specific constraints of this round and highlight elements which could provide the much needed forward movement to the WTO talks, and then evaluate the role of India in attaining the same. The chapter brings out the differences of the current round from the previous one and tries to assess if the cause of the (perceived) stalemate could be arising out of those differences, rather than being the result of a larger systemic problem. We analyse possible scenarios that could potentially consolidate India’s position as a suave negotiator and thereby establish the emerging developing country leadership in WTO.
WHAT AILS THE DOHA ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS To a casual observer, WTO is an international organisation dealing with external trade issues; however, both from a political as well as an economic perspective, international trade issues almost always are mirror reflections of domestic issues. This is best illustrated by the intrinsic conflicts of economic interest perceived between the exporting and import-competing activities/sectors in every country. Trade-offs in WTO negotiations therefore are essentially slug-offs between the well-established and entrenched interests within individual countries and sectors, to the detriment of others (both at home and outside) who would otherwise have benefited from freer trade. ‘Trade matters thus involve a domestic dimension … test the ability of [the] government[s] to take into account the most global welfare possible, to go beyond the narrow vested interests and favour long term interests.’4 And never before in the history of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)–WTO has this proved to be as true as in the ongoing Doha Round of multilateral negotiations. If this is the dynamics of the international trading system, the important question to ask here is which element sets the Doha Round apart from its predecessors? Or, what are the larger roadblocks
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specific to this round? Our literature survey and interactions with experts brings to light four distinct sets of issues. First, this is a very ambitious round on several counts. For one, the scope of the ongoing negotiations is much larger and deeper than in any previous round. Two, the method of negotiation is also much more ambitious. The substantive shift in the coverage from its traditional focus on border measures to a far more intrusive involvement in policy-making in a large number of issues in this round (ranging from intellectual property and services introduced in the Uruguay Round to attempts to include investment, labour, environment, competition and related governance issues in the ongoing round) conspire to impose new and burdensome demands on the trading system. Also, in previous rounds, there were no formulae agreed for tariff reductions; negotiators worked with averages so it was possible to hide products from tariff cuts with the resulting tariff peaks. Now with the adoption of a common (Swiss) formula, the process may be fairer but it is also much more difficult to come to any agreement because it hurts both developed and developing countries by addressing tariff peaks, in particular on products such as textile and clothing or automobiles. Further, this is a ‘Development Round’ which aims at addressing unfair rules remaining in the trade system, in particular industrialised countries’ trade distorting subsidies in agriculture. At the same time, the round allows for the protection of developing countries’ specific sensitivities in agriculture, through its provisions on special products or the special safeguard mechanism.5 In addition to all of above, ‘the large number of members and the diversity of topics under discussion coupled with the WTO’s traditional bottom-up approach and single-undertaking nature of the negotiating agenda—where nothing is agreed until everything is agreed—makes it more challenging to reach consensus.’6 Another associated problem lies in the fact that the WTO mandates a Ministerial conference every two years, a notable exception from the GATT system of holding Ministerial meetings only once the members arrived at a potential agreement.7 The problem here lies in the fact that a ministerial meeting raises expectations of
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members of a possibility of concluding negotiations, which in today’s scenario of a highly complex and ever increasing scope of negotiating agenda is not only unrealistic but rather improbable in the short time that has transpired in the current round. Thus, the ongoing impasse could just be a reflection of the premature nature of talks in intrinsically complex issues vis-à-vis expectations of quick resolution. For example, the failure of the Cancun meeting can in large part be attributed to unrealistic expectations of WTO members.8 So what could be a way out to make the negotiations more realistic? It appears that accepting that successive rounds of trade negotiations are mere steps in a continuous and incremental reform process rather than treating the Doha Round as a big bang reform movement could be one way out to tone down expectations. A continuous engagement of members in Geneva sans the hype and expectations inevitably raised by Ministerial meetings would certainly be more amenable to speedier resolution of existing differences. In the latter, the transparency concern however becomes paramount, as many members are now questioning the lack of inclusiveness of the ongoing discussions.9 Developing country members are apprehensive that their non-participation in the discussions on trade-offs would leave them with an agreement which is detrimental to their interests.10 To that extent even designating small group meetings as ‘mini-ministerials’ should be desisted. Second, there have been significant changes in the process and politics of the Doha Round of negotiations. The actors today are different from previous rounds, and also developing countries are much more active in this round. For more than 50 years, the US and EU have been leading the world in opening up global markets in an irregular but steady manner. In 1947, when GATT was instituted, only 23 nations participated in that first round of trade negotiations. The Uruguay Round had 110 signatories. Today, during the ninth round of WTO negotiations, there are 150 active participants (of which only 24 have the ‘developed’ country status), and an additional 20 countries are waiting for the accession procedures to complete. Now the role of the developing
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countries in sustaining this process of liberalisation of world markets has become significant. A larger and more diverse group of developing countries have started exercising their ‘veto power’ in every stage of the WTO negotiations. Each country also needs to show gains to their domestic constituencies in order to justify concessions made to the trading partners. Thus, there has been a decided shift from the US–EU power duopoly in the Uruguay Round to an oligopolistic form of decision-making in the Doha Round that incorporates the G-20 representation of the emerging country interests in agriculture as an integral part of the negotiating modality. This change in effective composition of the key negotiating members is a positive development and a sign of their deeper commitment was effected in part by the disappointments over the implementation processes of the Uruguay Round agreements, greater sensitisation and understanding of the negotiating dynamics and issues,11 and the growing economic prosperity in the developing south (in particular in Brazil, China and India). That said, it needs to be noted that effective negotiations only occur among equals. Developing countries needed somehow to create a semblance of equality in negotiating power to match the might of the traditional large players like the US and EU, which they have attempted by way of coalition building. This process had started in the Uruguay Round with the Jaramillo process;12 however, it is only after the Cancun Ministerial meeting that the process consolidated and coalitions became stronger and issue-based.There are now several developing country groups, the most prominent and active being the G-20, G-33, Non-Agricultural Market Access-1 (NAMA-11) and the Least-Developed Countries (LDC) Group, where coalitions are based on specific negotiating interests and issues, sensitivities and strategy.13 This is especially true in agriculture which is at the core of the current round. The discussions are also being held among a new QUAD: US, EC, India and Brazil; ‘the five interested parties’ or FIPS, which is QUAD plus Australia; and G-6, which is QUAD plus Australia and Japan. It is also a significant divergence from previous rounds that the launch of the current round of negotiations was not market or trade interest driven. In fact, the circumstances leading to the launch of the current round merits recounting. It was
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in the aftermath of the 9/11 terror strikes that the developed countries pushed (much against the wishes of the developing country members) the initiation of this round, at a time when there was widespread agreement that poverty creates conditions hostile to peace. It was expressly for this reason that it was decided that the ninth round of the multilateral talks would be termed a ‘development’ round. Further, the Doha negotiations were launched in 2001 under terms that envisaged only limited concessions from developing WTO members (enshrined in the less-than-full-reciprocity or LTFR principle) and none at all from the least-developed members. However, with the recession of the fears and tribulations of the terror strikes on the industrialised nations, today it is the mercantilist motive that reigns supreme in the minds of both negotiators and stakeholders in these countries. The reflection of this changed mindset was recently brought to the attention of the world by a statement from the United States Trade Representative (USTR) when Susan Schwab pointed out that the focus of US in the Doha Round is on real market access and ‘new trade flows’ rather than addressing ‘issues on development’. It is true that the WTO is a trade body and the issues of development and poverty are best dealt with in the other multilateral organisation designated for the job, namely the World Bank. Nor is it fair to expect trade negotiations to be a panacea for all ills. That said, while the current negotiations are focused on all the three pillars of market access, it needs to be recalled that the areas of greater gain lie in liberalisation of the non-tariff and regulatory issues in agriculture (subsidies) and services sectors, which unfortunately seems unlikely at present, given the political ‘sensitivities’ of all members. Further, in an era when services constitute more than 60 per cent of global Gross Domestic Product (GDP), developing as well as developed, over three-fourths of the world trade constitutes trade in manufactured goods. Restrictions on movement of service providers emanating out of immigration concerns is in large part responsible. The imbalance created by this and furthered by demands of very deep market access in industrial products without commensurate openings in the other two sectors are sure to accentuate the factors discussed earlier
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which had been sought to be eliminated in 2001 by making this round a ‘development’ round. Third, the missing business community. An important difference in the Doha Round of negotiations as opposed to the Uruguay Round is the lack of enthusiasm (even participation) of the business community, especially in the industrialised countries. It must be remembered that the industry stakeholders were a key motivator of the inclusion of certain negotiating elements in the previous round, most critically on intellectual property, and also it was their continued support that enabled the negotiators to bring a closure to the Uruguay Round. This drive is conspicuous in its absence this time around. ‘It is telling that business has not rallied to the Doha Round … the world’s largest economic actors are staying on the sidelines … the largest corporate actors are now backing bilateral deals which often do a better job of integrating and harmonizing national regulations.’14 The oft cited reason for the lack of business interest in Doha is that given the general expectation from this round of a minipackage of modest real gains, especially in trade in services where a substantial liberalisation of the mode 3 (commercial presence and investment) has been the demand from industrialised country stakeholders, the industry groups are focusing their negotiating capital on the regional and bilateral deals which could potentially lead to much deeper market openings. In contrast, while the Doha deal on services would at best lock in existing policy regimes in partner member countries, in Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) there are possibilities of ensuring ‘real market access commitments’ by incorporating suitable investment agreements as opposed to services reforms. Furthermore, in the current round of multilateral negotiations, the developing countries’ demand for dismantling the worst of regulatory anomalies that hinder market access in industrialised country services markets means that for an internal balance in the services negotiations, there is a possibility of a trade-off between a higher mode 3 access with removal of domestic regulatory barriers. This will put further pressure on employment and immigration related concerns in these markets, which could make the deal a political hot potato.
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A second (and most probably heretic) observation is that most likely the business stakeholders are concerned that the Doha Round will result in an agreement that will put limits on the trade-defence measures applied in the industrialised countries, in particular the indiscriminate use of anti-dumping provisions, the weapon of choice for protectionist governments pandering to sectoral lobby-group interests. The fact that the Dispute Settlement Board of the WTO has of late pronounced judgements against a large number of industrialised country measures has added to these concerns. The dispute settlement mechanism, which was touted as the most important contribution of the Uruguay Round to the multilateral trading system, now appears to have backfired on its champions’ commercial interests, by virtue of its impartiality and ‘fairness’. In contrast, the absence of such a mechanism in the bilateral and regional agreements leaves countries with more flexibility to continue to use domestic protectionist policies without fear of their being deemed violative of these agreements. Yet, the Doha agenda still has serious appeal for businesses interested in freer trade. Business opportunities in goods and industrial products will be significantly improved, particularly when it comes to exports to major developing countries. And binding countries to their currently applied tariff rates—which are lower than the ones agreed in the Uruguay Round—can increase stability and certainty in world trade. Further, given the increasing transnationalisation and fragmentation of businesses across the world in search of competitiveness and profits, there are substantial gains to be realised by industrialised country businesses from enhanced market access into industrialised country markets of developing country output. Compared to the alternatives, such as bilateral free trade agreements, the multilateral trading agenda is still the best offer around for global corporations, and has the potential to create a relatively superior businessfriendly mercantilist superstructure in the global trading regime. It is regrettable, therefore, that the producer interests that have been involved in this round have not been inclined towards liberalisation.15
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Last, but not the least, are the serious imbalances in the global economy that are indirectly becoming a barrier to its successful conclusion. Three factors stand out here: the current account imbalances and currency misalignments that has spurred protectionist sentiments across the US and Europe; the internationally strong and growing anti-globalising sentiments; and forthcoming elections in several of the important negotiating member countries. It needs to be recalled here that It was impossible to even launch the Uruguay Round in the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs, Doha’s immediate predecessor, until after the imbalances of the mid-1980s had been corrected by the 1985 Plaza Agreement on exchange rates and the Reagan administration’s simultaneous adoption of tough new trade policies against Japan. Nor could serious negotiations commence in the 1970s in the Tokyo Round, which preceded Uruguay, until protectionist pressures in the United States were quieted by several substantial currency realignments, forced by President Richard Nixon’s import surcharge and the de-linking of the dollar from gold in 1971. In both instances, large, indeed historic, monetary adjustments were required to clear the decks for global trade liberalization.16 The situation today is distressingly similar and all these concerns would most probably need to be resolved before a conclusion of the round can be contemplated. It is also not surprising that offers on the table have barely budged from the earlier stated positions, given the domestic political compulsions of the major negotiating countries which are going back to their constituencies in the coming months.
INDIA IN WTO NEGOTIATIONS: EMERGING DYNAMISM India, as a founder member of GATT in 1947 and as a member of the WTO, has always been acknowledged as a knowledgeable
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and sophisticated negotiator. India’s negotiators have always been treated with utmost respect by both the developed and the developing countries. However, the effective clout that the country wielded in the WTO has changed in recent times, improving in direct proportionality with her economic growth prospects in the last decade and half, and today India has emerged as one of the principal negotiators in the WTO. This relative power to influence belies the fact that India’s share in world trade is just about 1 per cent and that Indian businesses have just started their international forays. This gain needs to be grasped and nurtured, and thus it becomes imperative that India’s negotiating stance reflect its new-found pre-eminence in the world. Credible leadership from India is expected by one and all in the interests of a successful conclusion of the round, and in view of this author, a re-evaluation of our strategy would also serve India’s national interests because it will have consolidated its newly acquired status in WTO. A country’s negotiating strategies reflect not only its domestic economic and political conditions and sensitivities, but also its negotiators’ assessment of their ability to influence the discussions in their favour. To that extent the fact that India today continues to be an important part of all developing country coalitions (rather than striking out on its own as many seem to suggest it ought to) would imply that there is a realism among Indian negotiators in their assessment that being a part of a unified group of developing countries will accord greater gains to the country as a whole. The stylised facts of the Uruguay Round negotiations are that after a similar impasse, the resolution was largely a mutual adjustment of their respective interests by the US and EU with some minor side payments to other countries (like Japan and Korea on rice) and some token concessions to developing countries, in particular Brazil. This was exemplified in the Blair House agreement between the two trading partners. In addition, members requested the WTO Secretariat to provide a draft agreement that could be deliberated upon, thus paving the path for the creation of the (Arthur) Dunkel Draft, which subsequently faced
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considerable criticism from the developing country group as well as the civil society commentators. Neither of the above means of resolving the impasse seems plausible in the current round, and the emergence of the G-20 as an important bloc has changed the dynamic completely. The US–EU duopoly in negotiations no longer exists. The key difference of G-20 from other issue-based developing country coalitions is that it is a group of largely diversified developing countries with varied interests, which in turn accords them considerable bargaining power in their ability to trade concessions within the group across issue areas that can help facilitate agreement. It is also important that the diversity of the G-20 members’ interests imply that once the group arrives at a common position, it could be deemed to be a true middle-ground position of developing country demand. However, it would be inappropriate for the G-20 to assume that it represents the interests of ‘all’ developing countries, and therein lies the seed of multiplicity of negotiating groups on the same issue. On agriculture, the G-20 is the strongest bloc, but there exist other equally influential groups such as the G-33, CAIRNS17, Cotton Four LDCs, SingleProduct-Vulnerable-Economies, etc. And most importantly, as discussed earlier, having benefited from autonomous trade liberalisation themselves, the developing countries today are more likely to make trade-offs so that markets in industrialised countries could be opened up for their highly competitive exports. Further, a draft agreement from the WTO Secretariat would hardly be welcome in this round. At the Cancun Ministerial meeting, the compromise draft produced by Luis Ernesto Derbez did not enjoy any formal sanction, nor was it adopted, but it was treated merely as a survey of issues and possible means of resolving them.Even prior to the Hong Kong meeting, the draft texts circulated by the chairpersons of different negotiating groups was treated as indicative documents of members’ positions on different issues. They did not try to suggest any compromise. In fact the WTO secretariat is keen to be perceived as only a facilitator in the Doha negotiations as opposed to even being an ‘honest broker’.
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The WTO takes pride in being a member-driven institution, and the negotiations it brokers as member-driven rounds. India (along with other developing countries) also needs to rework its negotiating priorities. Traditionally, India has had a rather hard-line outlook to multilateral liberalisation. During the Uruguay Round, we opposed the introduction of new issues like services and intellectual property into the WTO. Even during the launch of Doha, India was rather a vocal opponent of any new element proposed to be introduced into the WTO and on proposals of deep reforms in any sector. Most probably, memories of our colonial past continue to weigh on the negotiators’ minds, and it has always been easier for India to undertake unilateral liberalisation (since it implies an action of an independent free will of the Nation) than make deep multilateral commitments. However, the country’s liberalisation moves since 1991 have started to bear fruit and the ‘national interests’ of the country lie no longer in continued protectionism. Voices across the world have started reminding us that the country must take a longerterm view of the negotiations and take positions that are more aligned to domestic interests and attainable objectives that best serve its development priorities. The change in India’s negotiating dynamic is palpable. In the current round, with the US and the EU, India is one of the few ‘demandeurs’ of a strong services agreement, as also in trade facilitation (the only Singapore Issue that was accepted by members in the 2004 July Framework), a major departure from its protectionist mindset of post-Seattle days when India resisted the launch of a new round of multilateral negotiations. However, there are domestic structural problems in the other two sectors, most critically in agriculture and primarily arising out of lack of internal reforms in the sector, which limits the country’s ability to be an overt pro-reformist in the ongoing round. In fact, we are in the proverbial on-the-fence situation, with some sectors requiring protection while others demanding aggressive liberalisation. This not only poses a dilemma but is also the cause of serious limitations for Indian negotiators in their ability to produce a good outcome from the round in any sector. The intra-sectoral
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trade-off as mandated by ‘comparable levels of ambition’ (para 24 of the Hong Kong declaration) appears to have become both a boon and a bane at the moment. There is little that India can achieve without deep domestic reforms and structural changes which will enable the country to bear the adjustment costs of the multilateral liberalisation proposed in this round. And these reforms are not easily instituted in multi-party democracies. Developing countries (including India) must also be realistic that in terms of pure market access in this round, industrialised countries would have little to offer by way of tariff cuts, except in reduction of their tariff peaks and tariff escalation. In contrast, it is the developing countries themselves, and in particular the advanced developing countries, which would need to show progression. However, there are distortions that have been built-in during the earlier rounds of multilateral negotiations within the industrialised countries, in particular in agriculture and textiles protections, that need to be addressed squarely and whose reversal calls for proactive engagement from the developing countries themselves. These are not easy concessions for the industrialised countries to make and to be able to justify to their domestic constituencies. It is the advanced developing countries that must make credible offers of significantly reduced trade barriers and secure market access. By not assuming leadership to affect a resolution to the intransigence in current talks, in effect the developing countries are foregoing potential benefits that greater market access and domestic reforms would bestow on their own economies.
THE WAY FORWARD What therefore needs to give? What short- and medium-term strategy should India’s negotiators focus on? It is clear now that solely focusing on the coalition building seems to have its limitations in terms of providing a credible solution, and for certain there is a call for exploring other options and negotiating strategies by India on behalf of the developing countries that
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need to provide a sufficient jolt to restart serious negotiations. The world community is waiting for leadership from India in resolving the present impasse. But before we discuss the possible developing country strategies for moving the negotiations forward, let us discuss the areas where the US and EU could move and provide leadership. The first and foremost would be for the industrialised countries to undertake domestic and structural reforms within their economies and eliminate the fear of adjustments that globalisation today requires of them. For this to happen they need in the long-run to substantially enhance the education and skill levels of the majority of their workforce, which would enable the latter to benefit from international trade liberalisation. In the short-run however, an expansion of the domestic safety nets18 to cushion the transitional costs of (trade-related) adjustment would be an appropriate policy choice. This would be more beneficial than the present policy of subsidising inefficient sectors or producer groups. In particular, domestic policy reforms in the US and structural reforms (including agricultural reforms) as per the Lisbon agenda in the EU are essential for a stable foundation of the international trading system.19 A second move would be for them to accept that over the last few years there has been a seismic shift in the competitive landscape facing the industrialised countries. India has become a world-class competitor in some of the highest technology services and increasingly all of the countries in and around China have arranged their markets and their productive patterns around China, rather than the US or the EU, or even Japan. It is important to remember that this shift happened without a single piece of government policy being signed from the industrialised countries, that there were no trade agreements responsible for the big shift in the competitive landscape with India’s entry into the service sector. It was all about technology and some unilateral policy changes by the Indian government. What is remarkable is that rather than setting the framework for this new competitive landscape, the industrialised country governments are barely keeping up with it.
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Further, the world economy may have ‘coped with China’s and India’s economic resurgence’, to quote Martin Wolf,20 but has not yet realigned itself to one of its fallouts, namely the increased clout of developing countries at the negotiating tables of WTO which demands that the developing country concerns be put to the forefront of the WTO negotiations. The fact remains that economics is making our world more interdependent and connected, and in so far as politics remains national or local, it makes the clash between economics and politics inevitable. A credible deal in Doha, which allows for a more immediate payoff for business, calls for an acceleration of the negotiations on nonagricultural market access and on services, independent of agriculture. EU farm commissioner Mariann Fischer Boel had commented, ‘Hong Kong cannot just be about agriculture’.21 And to get that movement, the US and Europe will have to make important decisions on agriculture. Recouping the rapidly disappearing ‘political will’ will be critical in ensuring this forward movement. The current shifts in national and international economic and political equilibria also need to get reflected in the decision-making processes within the WTO which demands that the developing country concerns be put to the forefront of the WTO negotiations. And as developing country economic clout increases, industrialised countries need to adjust to reflect this new reality. Till such a mindset change occurs, the probability of arriving at a high-ambition consensus outcome from this round seems to be limited. However, this alone would not suffice and the developing countries would also have to chip in. But given that even in the larger developing countries it may not be easy to absorb the drastic adjustment shocks that deep reforms would entail, there seems to be reluctance among negotiators to make ‘real’ commitments. Does that mean there is no way forward for the Doha Development Round? And more importantly, what then has to be given for a speedy conclusion of the round? In the absence of a determined leadership from emerging countries in laying down a new vision and guidance to the negotiations, the toss-up seems to be between a ‘Doha-lite’ outcome and reneging on the ‘Single-Undertaking’
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principle. In the WTO jargon, Doha-lite is a shallow low-ambition agreement, while the Single–Undertaking is the principle of ‘nothing is agreed unless everything is agreed’ that the WTO members had adopted in the Uruguay Round. This author’s preference would be for the latter to give, since a Doha-lite is unlikely to satisfy anyone, least of all the cause of substantial multilateral liberalisation. On the contrary, as in the erstwhile GATT model, a high-ambition deal on a few issues where members are likely to get a consensus reasonably quickly (viz. in NAMA, services including GATS Article VI negotiations, trade facilitation, etc.) would help open large sections of global market to non-discriminatory access for all. It is widely agreed that agriculture holds the key to Doha. However, issues in agriculture are too complicated and too diverse to expect a speedy resolution to the satisfaction of most WTO members. It will be unfair and unjust to miss out on the significant gains from liberalisation in other sectors. The problems in this round arise not only from an overly enhanced agenda and a larger number of developing country members who are active participants and demandeurs unlike in the earlier rounds, but also that the negotiations are focused on the ‘politically sensitive’ issues that call for difficult adjustments from all participants. Just as there are too many inconsistencies and conflicting priorities among the members’ demands from this round for the outcome to have a reasonably high development content, similarly a highambition single-undertaking seems to be an idea whose time is yet to come. A second solution could be introduction of a credible regional trade policy shock into the system. It would be good to recall here that at the time when the Uruguay Round was stagnating, a similar jolt had come from the creation of North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).22 A similar catalyst today could be an India–China FTA which by virtue of creating an integrated market of over two billion people would have a similar profound impact on the multilateral system, enough to shake the old–QUAD out of complacency. But a less drastic jolt could come from the forthcoming unilateral extension of preferential market access by the larger developing countries (like Brazil,
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China and India) to the LDCs and less developing countries in the same format as the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) and Everything But Arms (EBA) initiatives of the US and EU, respectively. This would do two things: one, it would boost goodwill among the developing countries suffering from a potential dissolution given their divergent interests from this round; and two, the increased and deeper trade among developing countries would provide incentive enough to force out deeper concessions from industrialised countries, whose domestic stakeholders seem to have become sceptical about the potential gains from continued trade liberalisation.
NOTES ∗ Views are personal and not to be attributed to the organisation represented. The research for this chapter was funded by the Sir Ratan Tata Trust. The author has benefited from an extensive interview–based survey of former and current negotiators in key industrialised and developing WTO member countries and experts in the WTO Secretariat. The author gratefully acknowledges the reviewer’s comments received from Mr S.N. Menon, former Commerce Secretary to Government of India. The usual disclaimer applies. 1. C. Fred Bergsten is the Director of The Institute for International Economics (Bergsten, 2005). 2. Bhagwati (2007). 3. Bhagwati (2005). 4. Messerlin (2005: 300). 5. Protection under ‘sensitive products’ has been designed to address the ‘developed’ country sensitivities in agriculture. However, the developing countries may also use the provision when linked with the negotiated tariff-rate quotas on tariff lines. 6. Lamy (2007). 7. The GATT system also worked because there were no compulsions for all countries to adhere to results. In contrast, the single-undertaking principle adopted during the Uruguay Round implied that all countries have to participate and because they have to make commitments of substantially greater reforms, they need to be better informed about issues under negotiation. 8. Jagdish N. Bhagwati (Bhagwati, 2007) interview in Council on Foreign Relations, February Newsletter: ‘Doha was started in 2001…. Two years later we were going to meet in Cancun. Everybody wanted it to finish in Cancun, which was nonsense because in two years you can’t finish.
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9. A similar concern has been voiced by Joseph E. Stiglitz and Andrew Charlton: ‘The WTO faces a representational crisis because many of its processes and outcomes do not reflect the needs (and concerns) of a majority of its membership’ (Stiglitz and Charlton, 2006). Also see Schott and Watal (2000). 10. In the earlier rounds of WTO negotiation, non-participation by developing countries had come at a cost. Though developing countries got to protect their own markets, however the negotiated results often excluded improved access to industrial country markets for the competitive agricultural and manufactured export products of developing countries (Schott, 2004). 11. In this the positive role played by the NGOs and civil societies worldwide as also international organisations like the UNCTAD and the World Bank in improving analytical capability and understanding of implications of issues and proposals, in particular for the lesser developing countries and the LDCs, have to be acknowledged. 12. Chaired by Ambassador Jaramillo, this was an issue-based coalition which initiated an open process by which members in the pre-Uruguay Round began to explore the options of resolving the impasse on inclusion of services in the WTO. This was a forum which transcended previous North-South boundaries as well as the ideological and hierarchical rigidities of the G-10. 13. Amrita Narlikar (2003: 177–78) has drawn attention to the ‘spaghetti bowl of coalition activity’ that occurs in trade rounds. ‘Coalitions … have begun to change from the secret societies of GATT days to more publicly prominent ones’. 14. Drache and Froese (2006: 22). 15. Erixon and Freytag (2007). 16. Bergsten (2005). 17. The Cairns Group is an interest group of 19 agricultural exporting countries, composed of Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, the Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, and Uruguay. The Group takes its name from the Australian city of Cairns, where its inaugural meeting took place in 1986. 18. Carla A. Hills (Hills, [2005]): ‘Self-interest alone should persuade Americans to urge their government to push the Doha negotiations to a successful conclusion. Currently, the US government spends about US$ 1 billion annually on Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA), a sum that is expected to increase to $2 billion annually when the reforms Congress passed in 2002 are implemented. Expanding the TAA Programme of 2002 and the Health Care Tax Programme to cover dislocated workers who are now excluded would help build public support for trade. Doing so would be surprisingly affordable. The Institute of International Economics estimates the costs to be US$ 3 to US$ 12 billion annually depending on the amount of benefits and breadth of coverage—far less than the US$ 1 trillion yearly gains the United States now reaps from open trade and the US$ 500 billion potential gain from further liberalization’. 19. Bergsten (2005: 4–5).
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20. Financial Times, 30 January 2007, http://www.salzburgseminar.org/mediafiles/ MEDIA28342.pdf 21. Agra Europe, 26 August 2005: EP/2. 22. Bergsten (2005: 6).
REFERENCES AND SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY Bagwell, Kyle and Robert W. Staiger. 2006. ‘What Do Trade Negotiators Negotiate About? Empirical Evidence from the World Trade Organization’, NBER Working Paper 12727, December. Bergsten, C. Fred. 2005. ‘Rescuing the Doha Round’, Foreign Affairs, WTO Special Edition, December. Bhagwati, Jagdish N. 2005. ‘From Seattle to Hong Kong’, Foreign Affairs, Special Edition, December. ———. 2007. ‘U.S. Must Rethink Doha Demands’, interview in Council on Foreign Relations, February Newsletter, http://www.cfr.org/publication/12592/bhagwati. html?breadcrumb=%2Fbios%2F1753%2Fjagdish_n_bhagwati Bhaumik, Tapan K. 2006. The WTO: A Discordant Orchestra. New Delhi: Sage Publications. Das, Bhagirath L. 2003. The WTO and the Multilateral Trading System: Past, Present and Future. London and New York: TWN and Zed Books. Drache, Daniel and Marc D. Froese. 2006. ‘An Empirical Analysis of Why the WTO is Broken and cannot be Fixed–Yet.’ Robarts Centre Working Papers, Robarts Centre for Canadian Studies. Toronto, Canada: York University. http://www.yorku.ca/ robarts/projects/wto/pdf/empirical_analysis.pdf Elsig, Manfred. 2006. ‘The World Trade Organisation’s Legitimacy Crisis: What Does the Beast Look Like?’, Journal of World Trade, 40(4), pp. 77–100. Erixon, Fredrik and Andreas Freytag. 2007. ‘Business Drops the Doha Ball’, The Wall Street Journal. January 18. http://www.ecipe.org/pdf/WSJ_20070118.pdf Grant, Wyn. 2006. ‘Why It Won’t Be Like This All The Time: The Shift From Duopoly To Oligopoly In Agricultural Trade’, CSGR Working Paper. No. 191/06, January. Hills, Carla A. 2005. ‘The Stakes of Doha’, Foreign Affairs, WTO Special Edition, December. ICTSD reporting. 2007. ‘Push for Progress in Doha Talks Proceeding Sluggishly’, BRIDGES Weekly, February. Available online at www.ictsd.org/weekly/07-02-28/ story4.htm Lamy Pascal 2007. Speech at ‘Time for Action in the Doha Development Round’, Philippines Chamber of Commerce and Industry (PCCI) Business Roundtable, 23 February, Manila, Philippines. Messerlin, Patrick A. 2005. ‘Three Variations on “The Future of the WTO”’, Journal of International Economic Law, 8(2), pp. 299–309. Moore, Mike (ed.). 2004. Doha and Beyond: The Future of the Multilateral Trading System. CUP and WTO.
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Narlikar, Amrita. 2003. International Trade and developing Countries: Bargaining Coalitions in the GATT & WTO, RIPE Studies in Global Political Economy. London and New York: Routledge. Schott, Jeffrey J. 2004. Reviving the Doha Round, Speeches, Testimony, Papers. Peter G. Peterson Institute for International Economics. May. http://www.iie.com/ publications/papers/paper.cfm?ResearchID Schott, Jeffrey J. and Jayashree Watal. 2000. Decision-Making in the WTO, IIE Policy Brief 00–2, March. http://www.iie.com/publications/pb/pb.cfm?ResearchID=63 Stiglitz, Joseph E. and Andrew Charlton. 2006. Aid for Trade: A Report for the Commonwealth Secretariat. United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. March draft. Available at www.uneca.org Sutherland, Peter D. 2005. ‘Correcting Misperceptions’, Foreign Affairs, WTO Special Edition, December. Wolf, Martin. 2007. ‘Globalisation’s Future is the Big Long-Term Question’, Financial Times—Comments & Analysis, January 9.
Chapter 4 Prospects of Agricultural Trade Liberalisation A View from India BISWAJIT DHAR∗
INTRODUCTION
I
n recent years, agriculture has emerged as one of the key areas under the World Trade Organization (WTO) discipline, especially for the developing countries. Two major factors have contributed to this development. First, the nature of benefits that developing countries expected from the introduction of the WTO discipline through the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) have largely remained unmet. Second, a few key areas of the AoA that were to be reviewed in a comprehensive manner as a part of the built-in agenda of the WTO, have brought to light the conflicting interests of the members that have appeared during the past seven years. The AoA was made an integral part of the WTO to get rid of domestic support mechanisms that distorted agricultural trade and promoted inefficient producers while discriminating against the more efficient ones. The agreement was thus meant to encourage traditional low cost producers of agricultural commodities against the financially powerful ones. The AoA sought binding commitments in three areas—domestic support, export subsidies and market access. Besides, the AoA also had guidelines that were meant to ensure that the more vulnerable least developed and the net
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food importing countries get access to foodgrains in the form of grants or other concessions. Several studies conducted in the past indicated that the results of the Uruguay Round in the agricultural sector would bring significant welfare gains for a number of developing countries. In various scenarios worked out by the analysts, developing countries as a whole were expected to witness major welfare gains.1 Thus, India had anticipated increase in exports of at least a few of its agricultural products. Traditional methods of cultivation being not too expensive in nominal terms and cheap farm labour being abundant, the prices of agricultural commodities in India were reasonable. These factors were expected to prove advantageous for India in the international market. India had expected that cost of production of agricultural commodities of the existing exporters would rise once they reduce domestic support and export subsidies in agricultural products. This, along with the removal of quotas and other non-tariff barriers (NTBs) and subsequent reduction of tariffs, would enable it to increase exports. This chapter makes an attempt to focus on the major concerns arising from the implementation of the AoA from an Indian perspective. The arguments in the chapter have been developed over several sections. At the outset, the chapter would provide an overview of the WTO AoA, which has been implemented since 1995. The second section (India’s WTO Commitments in Agriculture) would describe the commitments that India had untaken in the agriculture sector when it decided to become a founding member of the WTO. The following section will provide an analysis of the implementation of the AoA by the major players in the global agricultural market and the impact that the nature of implementation has had on the market for agricultural commodities. The fourth section (By way of conclusions) tries to give a flavour of the on-going discussions centring on the review of the AoA.
INDIA’S WTO COMMITMENTS IN AGRICULTURE At the end of the Uruguay Round negotiations, India had bound all its agricultural commodities, besides accepting the disciplines
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on domestic support and export subsidies. The details of the commitments taken by India are now discussed.
Market access commitments India assumed membership of the WTO with two regimes determining market access. One, tariffs were in place and two, most of the agricultural commodities were covered by quantitative restrictions on imports that India was maintaining for balance of payments (BoP) reasons in keeping with the provisions of Article XVIII:B of the GATT. Removal of QRs The first exposure of the agricultural sector in India to the WTO regime came through the country’s commitment to phase out the quantitative restrictions (QRs) that were maintained for balance of payments purposes.2 In the erstwhile GATT regime, India has invoked the provisions of Article XVIII:B of GATT 1947, which allowed developing countries to maintain restrictions on imports in order that these countries do not encounter BoP difficulties while embarking on a process of economic development. In keeping with the overarching objective of the Uruguay Round negotiations to reduce and eventually eliminate all forms of non-price trade restrictive measures, a separate understanding on the BoP provisions was finalised at the conclusion of the negotiations. This understanding reflected the commitment of all WTO members to ‘announce publicly … time schedules for the removal of restrictive import measures taken for BoP purposes’.3 Responding to this commitment, India had indicated that it was willing to phase out all such import restrictions by 2006. This position taken by India on the phase out of QRs was challenged by the US. In the ensuing, the Dispute Settlement Panel ruled that India did not have justifiable reasons to continue restricting imports using QRs maintained for BoP purposes. The Appellate Body confirmed this finding of the panel following which
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India removed all the QRs that it was maintaining for BoP purposes on 1 April 2001. After the removal of these QRs, India maintains import restrictions on a small set of commodities indicated in. Table 4.A1, which are in keeping with Section 11(2) of the Customs Act, 1962.4 Tariff commitments India’s tariff commitments in the agricultural sector involved binding of all commodities. The tariff bindings ranged from 0 per cent for primary products to 300 per cent for edible oils. The tariff bindings offered by India would result in average bound tariffs of 114.5 per cent in 2005. Average tariff bindings for the agriculture sector went up from 94 per cent as in 19975 after India renegotiated tariffs on some products under Article XXVIII of GATT 1994. The rectifications and modifications of India’s schedule have resulted in changes in tariffs of a number of products.6 These changes are, however, not yet certified because of reservations raised. India has, nevertheless, pursuant to Article XXVIII:3 of GATT 1947, applied these higher rates.7 The negotiations under Article XXVIII entered into by India resulted in the establishment of tariff rate quotas (TRQ) in four tariff lines, viz.: maize (other than seed), milk powder, refined rape/ mustard oil and sunflower or safflower seed oil. The details of the TRQs are given in Table 4.A2. The imports under the TRQs can be carried out by designated state-owned enterprises.8 However, these enterprises would be undertaking the imports only on behalf of the actual users.9 A feature of India’s tariff commitments under the AoA is that in a large number of cases the final bound tariffs are considerably higher than their corresponding current applied tariffs. Table 4.A3 gives an indication of the distance between the applied and the bound tariffs for a set of major commodities. The gap between the applied and bound tariffs is the highest for edible oils, the bound duties for which are as high as 300 per cent. Applied tariffs, on the other hand, are between 65 per cent for crude palm oil and 85 per cent for refined palm oil. The gap is considerable even for some of the more sensitive products like
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cereals and pulses. This so-called ‘water in tariffs’—which is not much in evidence in the Indian case—is likely to be a major issue in the ongoing negotiations on the review of the AoA. The gap between the applied tariffs and bound tariffs has, however, come down somewhat on account of the upward revision of the former that has taken place in case of a number of commodities in the more recent years. Table 4.A4 provides the details. Although average applied tariffs increased for most of the commodity groups appearing in the table, the increase in the average applied rates of grains would have made the most significant contribution. Average applied rates for this set of commodities was zero in 1997–98, which was due to the fact that their imports were controlled using the QRs.
Domestic support commitments India did not take any reduction commitments in case of domestic support since its total Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS) was considerably below the de minimis level as defined in Article 6.4(b) of the AoA. According to this Article, developing countries were expected to reduce their production-linked subsidies only if the total outlay of the government (or revenue forgone) exceeded 10 per cent of the value of agricultural production during the year. The figures for total AMS notified by India for the years 1995–96 to 1997–98 are provided in the Table 4.A5. India’s total AMS, which was a large negative amount in 1995–96, has subsequently reached positive territory. This was primarily because the product specific support, which took the form of market price support, was reported to have increased by more than US$ 26 billion between 1995–96 and 1996–97. In its first notification, India had indicated that its product specific support was extended to 11 commodities, while in the two subsequent years it was reported that only three commodities were receiving market price support. Besides rice and wheat, cotton was the only other commodity for which product specific support was reported. Furthermore, production eligible for support has
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sharply decreased from 386.96 million tonnes in 1995–96 to 22.98 million tonnes in 1996–97. In the following year, eligible production was reported to have increased to 28.53 million tonnes. Table 4.A6 gives the details. The sharp reduction was on account of a change in the reporting system adopted by the Government under which the amount of grains procured by the state agencies was considered for reporting the extent of market price support that was provided. While in 1995–96, the entire production of the commodities for which product specific support was reported was included for the purposes of calculating the AMS. In the two subsequent years the quantity procured from the farmers was included in the AMS calculation. For instance, in case of rice the eligible quantity was decreased from about 81 million tonnes for 1995–96 to 13 million tonnes for 1996–97, and for wheat the corresponding figures were 64 and 9 million tonnes. India provided non-product specific subsidy in the form of fertiliser subsidy, credit subsidy, subsidy on electricity, irrigation subsidy and subsidy on average supply of seeds. Subsidies on electricity declined by 42 per cent and that on irrigation fell by more than 86 per cent during the same period. Subsidy on average supply of seeds was only US$ 0.62 million in 1997–98, a steep drop from US$ 23.9 million in 1995–96. On the other hand, subsidies in case of fertilisers, the largest component of nonproduct specific subsidies, increased by about 28 per cent between 1995–96 and 1997–98. As a result of this increase in fertiliser subsidy, total non-product specific subsidy declined by only 15 per cent (Table 4.A7). But while the non-product specific subsidies had decreased, the ‘Green Box’ support provided by India increased by nearly a third during the period for which the data was provided (Table 4.A13). Subsides that can be provided to low income and resource poor farmers were also increased in this period (Table 4.A14). Quite clearly, thus, India was targeting its subsidies in a manner that would have taken care of the relatively neglected areas of its agricultural sector.10
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India’s exports subsidies India has not been a traditional user of export subsidies. The country did not extend any export subsidy during the period 1986–1990 that have been considered as the base years for the export subsidy discipline. Hence as per the provisions of the AoA, India cannot resort to export subsidisation in future though developed countries, especially the US and the members of the European Union (EU) who had been providing extremely large export subsidies could continue with the same after meeting the reduction commitments. India, however, benefits from the Special and Differential (S&D) measure which allows developing countries to provide subsidies for internal transport, freight charges on export shipments, handling, upgrading and other processing costs relating to exports.11 Export subsidies for costs of marketing exports of agricultural products and internal transport and freight charges are exempt from reduction commitments as per Articles 9.1(d) and 9.4. Hence, export subsidies provided by India in the form of internal transport subsidies are exempt from reduction commitments. The internal transport subsidy extended by India was only in terms of international airfreight assistance. India has notified to the WTO on export subsidies for the years 1996/97–2000/01. Internal transport subsidy was provided to five commodities/groups of commodities, viz.: fresh fruits, fresh vegetables, plants and flowers, poultry products and cardamom. The first three commodity groups received subsidies in all the years for which data were presented, while cardamom received subsidies for only one year (see Table 4.A15 for details). Total internal transport subsidies granted since 1996–97 increased to nearly US$ 4 million in 1996–97. In the subsequent years, however, subsides have declined and in 2000–2001 the lowest level was reached at US$ 1.1 million. This discussion indicates that India had not taken onerous commitments relating to the agricultural sector at the end of the Uruguay Round negotiations. While the bound duties on most of the major commodities remain high, additional market access commitments taken by the country in the form of TRQs were
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insignificant. This outcome was not entirely unexpected since the onus of the Uruguay Round negotiations was on the developed countries like the US and the members of the EU to reform their agricultural policies, an important component of which was significant reduction in the use of production related subsidies, or domestic support.
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMITMENTS The implementation of the commitments made by the WTO members, which is attempted in the sections below, would focus on the disciplines introduced in the three areas of the agricultural sector by the AoA, viz.: domestic support, export subsidies and market access. As would be clear from the discussion later, making the disciplines introduced by the AoA effective remains a major challenge for the multilateral trading system.
Domestic support commitments The implementation of the discipline on domestic support has to be seen largely from the perspective of the US and the members of the EU,12 two of the larger players in the market for agricultural commodities. The analysis presented below is based on data obtained from the notifications on domestic support to the WTO Committee on Agriculture (Tables 4.A1–4.A3). The data provided by the US and the members of the EU in their notifications to the Committee on Agriculture shows that domestic support extended by these two members of the WTO to their agricultural sector remained the highest among all WTO members in the period between 1995–96 and 2000–2001. In 2000/2001, for instance, the members of the EU provided domestic support, which was close to US$ 79 billion, and in case of the US the figure was more than US$ 72 billion in 2001. But while the former had decreased their domestic support by more than 30 per cent in dollar terms in five years,13 the latter had increased this form of subsidies by almost 20 per cent.
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Besides the difference in the overall trends as stated earlier, the allocation of subsidies of the US and the members of the EU was also at variance. The US had increased its spending on the subsidies exempt from reduction commitments, viz., ‘Green Box’ measures, quite considerably during the first two years of implementation; as a result, ‘Green Box’ spending accounted for around 88 per cent of its domestic support. In the subsequent years, however, the share of ‘Green Box’ spending came down to about 70 per cent of the total domestic support. In case of the members of the EU, the share of ‘exempt’ subsidies, that is, ‘Green’ and ‘Blue’ Boxes put together, went up from nearly 44 per cent in 1995 to more than 50 per cent in 2001. This, in other words, implies that both the US and the members of the EU had considerable flexibility in their use of production related subsidies in the WTO because of the high proportion of the subsidies that are not subjected to reduction commitments. The large volumes of domestic support granted by the US and the members of the EU have two interesting dimensions. The first is the extremely high levels of subsidies that farmers in these countries enjoy vis-à-vis their counterparts in the developing countries. The second is the fact that these countries have exercised considerable flexibility in the granting of subsidies, with a view to enhancing their market dominance. The flexibility that the countries doling out large volumes of subsidies have under the AoA appears in the most striking manner in case of product specific support. These countries benefited in two ways. One, they were allowed to include product specific support in the AMS in aggregate terms, and two, they could exclude product specific support that was below the de minimis level14 from the AMS. The implication of the latter is that the US could exclude more than US$ 7 billion of trade distorting support from its total AMS between 1999 and 2001 (the corresponding figure for the members of the EU was between EUR 1 and EUR 2 billion). In 2001, the de minimis spending was as much as 32 per cent of the Amber Box subsides that the country had provided (Table 4.A4).
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This flexibility was used to good effect by the US to heavily subsidise products in which they had substantial export interests. Producers of four commodities in which the country has the largest share in the total exports, viz.: corn, cotton, soybeans and wheat, benefited from very large increases in domestic support after 1997. This was particularly evident in corn and soybeans, commodities in which the share of US in the total global exports exceeded 50 per cent in the late 1990s; the increases in domestic support between 1995 and 2000 were nearly 8,500 per cent and 22,000 per cent respectively.15 Support for soybeans continued to increase in the following year, while that for corn declined by over 50 per cent. The largest proportionate increase in domestic support during the second half of the 1990s was witnessed in case of wheat, a commodity in which the US is the second largest producer having a 25 per cent share of global trade. Support for wheat increased from just less than US$ 5 million in 1995 to nearly US$ 974 million in 1999. Subsequently, however, support for wheat was reduced to below US$ 200 million. In case of cotton, on the other hand, the product specific support increased from just over US$ 32 million to 2.8 billion in 2001. Besides, the commodities mentioned above, product specific support granted to rice, a commodity in which US has started to emerge as a leading exporter, went up from US$ 11.6 million in 1995 to US$ 763 million in 2001. In case of the members of the EU, the product specific support was at high levels for a range of products, which included beef, sugar, butter and wheat, ever since the AoA discipline was introduced. In all these products, however, product specific support declined in terms of US dollar between 1995 and 1999.16 Beef received product specific support of US$ 10 billion in 2000/2001, and this high level of support was recorded after the level of support extended in 1995 was reduced by almost 44 per cent. However, in terms of Euros, support for beef declined by less than 20 per cent. Sugar, which was the largest recipient of product specific support after beef, also saw a decline in the level of support, although the level of reduction was much less in proportionate
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terms as compared to beef. Support for dairy products showed mixed tendencies, with butter registering an increase of more than 5 per cent in terms of Euros, while for skimmed milk powder a decrease of almost 17 per cent was registered. The members of the EU increased domestic support for common wheat by EUR 500 million, the largest increase for any single crop in absolute terms, between 1995–96 and 1998–99. This works out to an increase of 20 per cent since this WTO member started meeting its commitments under the AoA. Domestic support extended to maize increased by nearly 28 per cent during 1995–96 to 1999–2000 in terms of Euros. In both the commodities referred to above, prominent members of the EU, including France and Germany, have large trading interests. However, during 2000/2001, the levels of support for both these commodities were reduced. This discussion indicates that the two dominant players in the global market for agricultural commodities were targeting subsidies in a manner that provided them with additional advantage during a phase when markets have been opening in many countries. Product specific support in several countries had increased substantially, which increased the level of distortions in their markets.
Analysis of the implementation of commitments relating to export competition Disciplines in the area of export competition were intended to ensure that WTO members are prevented from taking recourse to mechanisms for disposing off their surpluses in the international market. Accordingly, the AoA principally looks at three issues under the rubric of export competition. These are: (i) export subsidies, (ii) international food aid and (iii) export credit and guarantees. The AoA, at present, provides clear disciplines in respect of export subsidies, when the disciplines in respect of the other two dimensions of export competition are not covered by an effective discipline. This has resulted in several problems, which are enumerated later.
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Data on export subsidies presented in Tables 4.A6 and 4.A7 for the two largest players in the global agricultural trade show that the members of the EU have used export subsidies relatively more extensively to gain additional market access in agricultural commodities as compared to the US. However, while the members of the EU have decreased the use of its export subsidies by more than 60 per cent during 1995–96 and 2000–01, the US has increased this form of subsidies. The latter targeted the use of export subsidies in respect of three products, viz.: poultry meat, skim milk powder and cheese, which went up from US$ 28,000 in 1995 to US$ 15 million in 2000. The wide fluctuations in the use of export subsidies for each of the products were the common feature. Thus, the subsidies on skimmed milk powder varied between nearly US$ 17,000 and US$ 133 million, and those granted for poultry meat were between zero and US$ 6 million. This implies that the use of export subsidies by the US had the potential to cause very large uncertainties in the international markets since the surplus that it was disposing varied quite considerably across years. Surplus disposal had become an easy option for the WTO members in the absence of an effective discipline on food aid. Data presented in Table 4.A8 shows the extent to which the US and the members of the EU were using food aid. The US used food aid as an instrument for disposing off its farm output most extensively. Food aid in the form of wheat, rice and vegetable oils increased substantially during the period 1995 to 1999. Although wheat was the largest component of food aid throughout the period, rice and vegetable oils given out as food aid registered the sharpest increases over the period. However, it is the wide fluctuations in the grant of food aid that the US displays which is the major source of problem for the markets. Food aid granted in the form of wheat fluctuated between 1.5 million tonnes to 5.3 million tonnes. This trend in rising food aid has been maintained in the subsequent years as well given that the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) had continued to increase allocations for these activities (Table 4.A9). A number of developing countries have challenged the position held by some of the industrialised countries that subsidised
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exports of food grains are beneficial to the Net Food-Importing Developing Countries (NFIDCs), since the beneficiaries have access to cheap imports.17 These countries have argued that trade promotion through export subsidies causes increasing food insecurity in developing countries. This argument, according to the countries presenting this viewpoint, is fallacious, as heavy dependence on imports of subsidised food can cause serious financial difficulties due to a more vulnerable BoP situation, regardless of the price of food. These countries have argued that effective solutions to the food security problem of NFIDCs can be achieved only if the domestic production capacities are strengthened in the import-dependent countries. For this to happen, paragraph 3(iii) of the ‘Ministerial Decision on Measures Concerning the Possible Negative Effects of the Reform Programme on Least-Developed and the Net Food Importing Developing Countries’ has to be put into effect. The paragraph in question instructs WTO member countries to facilitate technical and financial assistance to LDCs and NFIDCs so as to ‘improve their agricultural productivity and infrastructure’. It has been pointed out that the food aid mechanism mainly protects the immediate objectives of the donor countries while ignoring the longer-term interests of the recipient countries. Thus, food aid may adversely affect the incentive to carry out the policies that would foster agricultural development in the recipient countries. The inability of countries to reduce their food insecurity could in fact be attributed to the international food aid mechanisms.18 Apart from food aid there is another interesting aspect of US foreign trade policy which is aimed at promoting exports. As per the AoA, only the funding and scope of direct subsidy programmes are subjected to the limits and therefore the export credit and credit guarantee programme, which is an important area that needs to be given more attention but seems to be neglected or underestimated. The Export Credit and Export Credit Guarantee Programme provide support for agricultural exports to other countries through the provisions of credit guarantees to importers who seek to defer payments for the goods received. The credit provided by the
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exporter or the third party thus boosts exports by creating more incentive for the importing country to import. Available data show that agricultural exports close to US$ 34 billion have taken place from the US during 1993–2002 which have been covered under export credit guarantee programme.19 Two issues need to be pointed out in the context of the discussions in the foregoing. The first is that the major players have taken recourse to domestic support for providing their producers favourable conditions for exploiting the global agricultural markets. Export subsidies have become a less favoured option for even the members of the EU, the largest user of export subsidies. The second issue that should be mentioned is that the lack of an effective discipline in respect of international food aid and export credit and guarantees have been used by the US in particular for disposing off her surpluses. This has drawn the attention of several countries that have asked for a re-look at the food aid programmes and also those relating to export credit and guarantees during the ongoing review of the AoA.
Market access commitments As in the case of the subsidies discipline, the market access commitments taken by countries in the agricultural sector represent a considerable degree of variation across countries. Although the Uruguay Round negotiations took a major step to rein in the tariffs, it remains only a small first step as shall be explained later. There are two reasons for this situation. The first is that tariffs in agricultural sector have remained at relatively high levels in many WTO Members, even after the enforcement of the AoA discipline. The second factor relates to the implementation of the tariff rate quotas, which has been a problem area as far as the AoA discipline is concerned. Tariffs At least three concerns regarding the tariff structures that have emerged after the Uruguay Round negotiations need to be flagged. These are: (i) existence of tariff peaks, (ii) tariff escalation and
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(iii) the use of non-ad valorem tariffs. The last mentioned has a particular influence on market access prospects due to its inherent non-transparent nature. The following discussion provides the details. In respect of the bound tariffs, the problem of peaks seems a bigger problem in case of the advanced developing countries. South Africa’s tariff peak of 597 per cent and India’s 300 per cent resulted in an average of the peaks of more than 210 per cent for these countries, which was much above the 177 per cent observed for the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries. This is notwithstanding the fact that Korea had a bound tariff of 887 per cent, while the US and Canada had maximum bound tariffs of 350 per cent and 238 per cent respectively (Tables 4.A10–4.A13). It is interesting to note in this context that in most OECD countries average agricultural tariffs are higher than non-agricultural tariffs, with rates on some agricultural products exceeding 500 per cent.20 However in case of applied tariffs, the average of the peaks for the OECD countries was considerably higher. Peak tariffs retained by Korea, Poland and Norway, besides the US and Canada, influenced the high average peak for this set of countries as compared to the advanced developing countries. Tariff escalation seems to be a problem that exists across WTO members, irrespective of their stage of development.21 This observation can be made by looking at the levels of tariff protection that countries provide to products as they go up the processing chain. Thus, while for the North American countries tariff escalation was observed in animal and animal products, vegetable and vegetable products, sugar and sweeteners and tobacco and tobacco products, for the South Asian countries, grains and grain products and oil seeds and products thereof are the two most affected groups in terms of tariff escalation. As regards the product groups that were most affected because of tariff escalations, meat and meat products and grains and grain products were among the more prominent. It has been observed that the structure of agricultural tariffs has become more complex, especially in the case of the developed
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countries, because of an increase in the number of tariff lines to accommodate different tariffs applicable to the same product, such as seasonal, in-quota and above-quota tariffs, and the more frequent use of non-ad valorem tariffs.22 Table 4.A14 shows the use of non-ad valorem tariffs in respect of agricultural products for a select set of WTO member countries. It is interesting to note that most of the countries having very large reliance on non-ad valorem tariffs are from the developed world. In fact, the US and the members of the EU use non-ad valorem tariffs in just less than half of the total agricultural tariff lines, while in case of Switzerland 89 per cent of the agricultural tariff lines have non-ad valorem tariffs. There are a number of reasons for the use of non ad-valorem tariffs. These include the increased protection that a non-ad valorem tax can provide against large drops in import prices and the lack of transparency associated with these rates, which helps conceal the level of protection being provided.23 The use of non-ad valorem tariffs has been pointed by several developing countries as one of the key problems in securing additional market access in the major markets.24 Tariff rate quotas The implementation of the TRQs during 1995–2000 revealed that countries resorted to two types of TRQ allocations: a global TRQ or a country-specific TRQ. Under the global TRQ, all members of the WTO are free to compete for access to the quantity offered by the importing country. Since there is no pre-determination of where the commodity to be imported will be originating from, the importing country administers the quota. The country-specific quotas, on the other hand, provide a degree of predictability to both the importing and the exporting countries involved in the transactions. In this case, however, either of the countries can administer the quotas in order to obtain the quota rents. This form of administration of TRQs was used by most of the major industrialised countries. However, only 10 of the 37 countries that opened TRQs for 1995 opted to offer the quotas to specific countries. The more controversial among the methods of implementation of import licensing provisions is the one that is based
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on auctioning. One of the major disadvantages of the auctioning system stems from the ease with which it can be manipulated. Producer groups can conceivably purchase all or part of the available licences with the intention of ensuring that imports do not take place. The implementation of the TRQs was beset with two sets of problems. The first arises from the fact that countries were being transparent in establishing the basis for their quota commitments. The second, and possibly the more significant, is the fact that a sizeable proportion of the quotas remained unfilled. For all commodities taken together, the average fill rate was 64 per cent in 1995, and in 2000, it had fallen to 44 per cent (Table 4.A15). Among the major countries that had shown tardy implementation of the quota commitments was the US from the industrialised world and Malaysia and Thailand from the developing world. One of the features of the implementation of the TRQs is that unfilled quotas were the largest in case of commodities in which the importing country had a strong domestic interest. In 1997, for instance, the members of the EU filled only about 8 per cent of its quota commitment in wheat, while Thailand met 0.07 per cent its quota commitment in rice.25 Considering that in several developing countries, including the Philippines, domestic farmers faced unfair competition arising from the TRQ imports, the nonfulfilment of its quota commitment by Thailand may well have been beneficial to the domestic rice producers. The foregoing clearly points to the fact that the AoA is beset with two sets of problems. In the first instance, the agreement has an inherent imbalance, a reflection of which can be seen from the fact that the countries using large volumes of subsidies (largely belonging to the industrialised world) can maintain subsidies at much higher levels compared to those that do not use subsidies much. Most of the developing countries find themselves in the latter category. The second and perhaps the more important dimension is the tardy implementation of their commitments by the larger players like the US and the members of the EU. As a result, the primary objective of the AoA, viz., getting rid of the market
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distorting policies, has not been met. India and other developing countries that were anticipating significant gains for their farming communities at the end of the Uruguay Round negotiations, now find that not only have they not been able to reap any benefits, domestic agriculture in these countries faces threat from cheap imports as international prices for major commodities have been sticky at low levels since the mid-1990s. In many countries, thus, safeguarding food security and livelihoods have emerged as real issues of concern and this has been reflected in the proposals that developing countries have put forth during the negotiations for the review of the AoA, as would be indicated later.
NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE REVIEW OF THE AoA This section has two parts. At the outset, a brief account of the mandate, which spells out the guideposts for the on-going negotiations for the review of the AoA, is provided. In the second part, an attempt is made to capture the negotiating dynamics, as it has been unfolding since the post-Doha negotiations have been initiated.
The negotiating mandate The negotiations for the review of AoA are part of the built-in agenda, the mandate for which has been provided by Article 20 of the agreement. Besides providing for the time-frame for the commencement of the AoA review, which was five years from the period when it was enforced (that is, the year 2000), Article 20 includes three substantive points. First, it provides that members would take into account their experience of implementing the reduction commitment. Second, members will consider the effects of the reduction commitments on world trade in agriculture. And finally, members were expected to take note of ‘nontrade concerns, special and differential treatment to developing country members, and the objective to establish a fair and market oriented agricultural trading system’.
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The negotiating mandate was elaborated in the Doha Ministerial Declaration (DMD) of November 2001. In the first instance, the mandate was set in the backdrop of the ‘long-term objective’ of the AoA, which, as stated in the preamble of the agreement ‘is to provide for substantial progressive reductions in agricultural support and protection sustained over an agreed period of time, resulting in correcting and preventing restrictions and distortions in world agricultural markets’ (emphasis added). The DMD reflected the commitment of the WTO members to engage in ‘comprehensive negotiations aimed at: substantial improvements in market access; reductions of, with a view to phasing out, all forms of export subsidies; and substantial reductions in trade-distorting domestic support’. It was further agreed ‘that special and differential treatment for developing countries shall be an integral part of all elements of the negotiations and shall be embodied in the Schedules of concessions and commitments and as appropriate in the rules and disciplines to be negotiated, so as to be operationally effective and to enable developing countries to effectively take account of their development needs, including food security and rural development’.26 Members had thus clearly expressed their intent to rid agricultural markets of the distortions, while at the same time recognising the need to respond to the imperatives of food security and livelihoods, the two key concerns for the developing countries.
The negotiating dynamics The negotiations on agriculture have witnessed two clearly identifiable phases since the post-Doha confabulations began. The first phase was the period till the end of July 2003, which saw negotiations taking place between two groups of countries whose alignment was based on clearly defined positions. In the subsequent period, four groups of countries have figured prominently in the negotiations. These are the G-20 and G-33 representing the developing countries, the US and members of the EU, and the G-10 countries.27 With the groups being equally divided between the developed and the developing country members, this
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development represents the differentiations in the interests that exist in respect of both sets of countries. In the first phase of the post-Doha negotiations, countries with defensive interests were aligned with the members of the EU. This group of countries, the prominent among which were Japan, Korea and Switzerland, were supported by a number of significant developing countries led by India. These countries were primarily interested in keeping their agricultural markets protected using reasonably high levels of border protection. Some among this group were also keen to maintain their relatively high levels of subsidies in place. In other words, the countries having defensive interests were not looking for significant changes in the prevailing policy regime governing the agricultural sector, particularly in relation to tariffs. These countries favoured the Uruguay Round approach of average cut and a minimum cut per tariff line. That a number of developing countries were willing to be in this group appeared to have struck a discordant note with many observers. This was on account of two compelling reasons. The first arose from the fact that most of the developing countries had submitted to the Committee on Agriculture that the high subsidies granted by the developed countries, in particular the US and the members of the EU, had prevented them from realising the projected gains from the agriculture sector since the AoA discipline was introduced. The second point that developing countries had made during the negotiations was that they had little access to developed country markets on account of the market access impediments. Existence of high tariffs and tariff escalations in areas of export interest to developing countries, coupled with the discriminatory implementation of tariff rate quotas were among the evidences that these countries were able to produce in support of their views. But eventually the fact that they were getting the comfort of lower levels of tariff cuts themselves seems to have kept the group together. The second group of countries represented those that were primarily interested in obtaining additional market access through a rapid decline in the levels of tariffs. As has been witnessed in the past, this group was informally led by the US, with
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the Cairns Group countries providing active support. These countries argued that the tariff reductions should follow the tariff harmonisation approach (better known as the ‘Swiss formula’) with the US proposing that a coefficient of 25 should be adopted. Interestingly, although a number of the Cairns Group countries had argued that the Article 20 review on AoA should be aimed at reduction and an eventual elimination of trade distorting forms of subsidies, in most of the post-Doha confabulations, these countries showed considerable reluctance to address the issue of distortions caused in the market for agricultural commodities by the large volumes of subsidies granted by the two largest players as negotiations progressed. Market access was thus the only issue on which the negotiations on the review of AoA focused. Comprehensive reforms in the agricultural policies world-wide remained nothing more than a reference point for the conduct of the negotiations. This focus was in fact reinforced by the Chairman of the Committee on Agriculture in the draft modalities paper that he had prepared under his own responsibility. The Harbinson modalities made considerable efforts at ensuring that more than the minimal changes are effected in the tariff regime. The developing countries were provided an additional dispensation, which would have allowed them to provide higher levels of protection to commodities that are critical from the point of view of food security, livelihoods and rural development. But at the same time, the subsidies regime was left largely unaffected. While on the one hand, developed countries were allowed to maintain the existing levels of agricultural subsidies, the developing countries were also allowed the space to provide assistance to the resource-poor farmers. With the extreme positions taken by the US and the members of the EU becoming the sticking point not only for the agricultural negotiations but also for the Doha Development Agenda (DDA), the membership of the WTO urged the two members to find a common ground in order that an efficacious solution was found before the Cancun Ministerial Conference was held.28 A common ground was worked out by the US and the members of the EU
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on the market access issue and on the issue of subsidies.29 While in case of market access, the US and the members of the EU preferred a combination of the Uruguay Round approach of average tariff cuts and the tariff harmonisation approach, in case of the domestic support discipline both these members of the WTO found comfort while proposing that the existing discipline would not undergo major changes. This compromise between US and the members of the EU signalled coalition-building efforts among the developing countries resulting in the formation of the G-20. The base paper, which marked the emergence of this group of developing countries, had one important feature—it looked at the agriculture negotiations in the WTO for bringing about comprehensive reform in the agriculture sector world-wide.30 The focus of the interventions made by the prominent members of this group, including China, Brazil, South Africa and India, has been that the major distortions created by the subsidies’ regime in some of the more prominent members of the WTO have to be reduced and eventually removed. In view of these countries, effective disciplining of agricultural subsidies was the sine qua non for ensuring predictability in the markets for agricultural commodities, thus benefiting a large number of developing countries. On the issue of market access, the G-20 proposed that developing countries adopt the Uruguay Round approach of average tariff cuts. One of the key elements of the G-20 proposal is that the special needs of the developing countries need to be addressed in the revised AoA. This dimension was in fact elaborated by another group of developing countries, viz., G-33. These countries have proposed that developing countries should be able to designate a set of products as Special Products (SPs), which would be subjected to lower tariff cuts. In addition, they have argued for the introduction of a Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM) aimed at allowing developing countries to counter anticipated or actual import surges.31 The SPs and the SSM were seen by the developing countries as measures that would help them in addressing the twin problems of food security and livelihood concerns in the face of mounting pressures to lower agricultural tariffs.
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The developing country position received strong support in the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference (HKMC) where an agreement was reached that the developing countries ‘will have the flexibility to self-designate an appropriate number of tariff lines as SPs guided by indicators based on the criteria of food security, livelihood security and rural development’. The Ministerial Declaration added further that the developing countries will also have the right to have recourse to an SSM based on import quantity and price triggers, with precise arrangements to be further defined.’32 The Declaration emphasised that ‘Special Products and the SSM shall be an integral part of the modalities and the outcome of negotiations in agriculture.’33 It may be argued that the proposal of the developing countries, represented primarily by the G-20 and the G-33, on the modalities of the agriculture negotiations stands to reason on account of the fact that the tariff reductions of the kind that the US and the EC have been expecting can be possible only after distortions caused by the subsidies are substantially reduced in the markets for agricultural commodities. The large doses of subsidies provided by the US and the EC in particular, which was discussed at length in an earlier part of the chapter, have given rise to uncertainties in the markets in respect of the movement of the prices. At the same time, the proposal insisted that concrete measures such as lower tariff cuts SPs and SSM had to be provided for in the revised AoA so that some of the key concerns of the developing countries, in particular those related to food security and livelihoods, are addressed effectively. India has considerable interest in pushing for the reforms of global agricultural markets since relatively open markets would help the country in exploiting its potential as an agricultural exporter. At the same time, the negotiations are critical for they must ensure that the agreement reached at the end of the current round of negotiations addressed the country’s concerns pertaining to food security and rural livelihoods. This can be realised, as the G-20 and G-33 countries have argued, by allowing developing countries like India to maintain higher tariffs on
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commodities that are critical from the point of view of food security and protection of livelihoods. It needs to be recognised, however, that while the abovementioned approach would help in the short-run, the country must evolve long-term strategies that would enable the Indian agricultural sector to benefit from dynamic efficiencies. This can be possible only if the sector undergoes structural changes, with a view to improving resource management and utilisation. In this endeavour, cooperative sector can play a significant role in providing institutional basis for implementing the strategies necessary for improving the fortunes of Indian agriculture. The following section briefly enumerates this dimension.
BY WAY OF CONCLUSIONS This chapter tried to indicate the problems that have accompanied implementation of the WTO AoA. The basic objective of the AoA was to reduce and eventually eliminate the distortions in the markets for agricultural commodities. For realising this objective, the AoA introduced two sets of disciplines on the WTO members. Countries acceding to the WTO were expected to reduce the use of two forms of subsidies, viz., domestic support and export subsidies, over a period of time. However, in the period since the AoA has been implemented, there is little evidence to show that the AoA has had any meaningful influence on the markets. The major players in the global agricultural markets have continued to give large doses of subsidies to their domestic agricultural sectors. If anything has changed during the past six years, it has been the degree to which these countries have targeted the use of subsidies. Data on implementation of AoA in respect of major food crops, which this chapter has provided, have established the fact that several WTO members were using subsidies to strengthen their position with the objective of gaining enhanced access in the markets that were opening up. As a result of this targeting, the prices of agricultural commodities included in this study were found to have declined quite steeply, quite contrary to the
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expectations prior to the implementation of the AoA. Countries like India had expected to gain from the implementation of the AoA since the withdrawal of subsidies by the major players in the global agricultural market was to bring about rise in prices of agricultural commodities which would have benefited the low cost producers in the developing world. Removing the gross imperfections that persist in global agricultural markets thus needs to be the focus of the ongoing WTO negotiations. This has indeed been the nub of the arguments that the G-20 countries have made during the negotiations. However, the prospects of any significant disciplining of agricultural subsidies by the two key players, viz., the US and members of the EU, do not look very promising. This is particularly true of the US, which has unveiled the new Farm Bill proposals in January, 2007. These proposals indicate that the US could, in fact, increase farm subsidies, particularly on the ‘Green Box’ measures between 2008 and 2012. The global community would therefore have to wait considerably longer for the removal of policy induced distortions in agricultural markets. Most developing countries, including India, have responded to prospects of continued uncertainties in the global markets for agricultural commodities by insisting that the vulnerable sections of their farming communities must be adequately protected. Their demand that products of importance from the viewpoint of food security, livelihoods and rural development must receive added protection has now become an integral part of the on-going negotiations. Such a step would contribute immensely towards carving out a global regime for agriculture that finds acceptance amongst the WTO membership.
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ANNEXURE I: COUNTRY GROUPINGS IN WTO AGRICULTURE NEGOTIATIONS G-20 (current membership 22): Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, Cuba, Egypt, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, the Philippines, South Africa, Tanzania, Thailand, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zimbabwe. G-33 (current membership 46): Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, China, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kenya, Republic of Korea, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, the Philippines, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Tanzania, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Uganda, Venezuela, Zambia, Zimbabwe. G-10 (current membership nine): Iceland, Israel, Japan, Republic of Korea, Liechtenstein, Mauritius, Norway, Switzerland, Chinese Taipei. Table 4.A1 Commodities Subjected to Import Prohibitions Tallow, fat and/or oils, rendered, unrendered or otherwise, of any animal origin, including the following: (i) Lard stearine, oleo stearine, tallow stearine, lard oil, oleo oil and tallow oil not emulsified or mixed or prepared in any way; (ii) Neat’s-foot oil and fats from bone or waste; (iii) Poultry fats, rendered or solvent extracted; (iv) Fats and oils of fish/marine origin, whether or not refined; excluding cod liver oil, squid oil containing Eicospentaenoic acid and De-cosahexaenoic acid; (v) Margarine, imitation lard and other prepared edible fats of animal origin; (vi) Animal rennet; (vii) Wild animals including their parts and products and Ivory; and (viii) Beef and products containing beef in any form. Source: WTO, Trade Policy Review: India, Report by the Secretariat, WT/ TPR/S/100 22 May 2002.
A global tariff rate quota of 150,000 MT at an in-quota tariff rate of 50 per cent
Sunflower-seed oil or safflower oil and fractions thereof, crude oil
Source: Government of India, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Director General of Foreign Trade (various notifications).
A global tariff rate quota of 150,000 MT at in-quota tariff rate of 45 per cent
Year 1: 350,000 tonnes Year 2: 400,000 tonnes Year 3: 450,000 tonnes Year 4 and beyond: 500,000 tonnes per year
A global tariff rate quota of 10,000 MT at an in-quota tariff rate of 15 per cent for the following quantities:
A global tariff rate quota of 10,000 MT at an in-quota tariff rate of 15 per cent applicable cumulatively to both the tariff lines
Tariff quotas
Rape, Colza or Mustard oil and fractions thereof
Maize (other than seed)
Milk and cream in powder, granules or other solid forms, of a fat content, by weight, not exceeding 1.5 per cent— not containing added sugar or other sweetening matter
Milk and cream in powder, granules or other solid forms, of a fat content, by weight, not exceeding 1.5 per cent
Products
Table 4.A2 Tariff Rate Quotas Established by India Since 2000
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Table 4.A3 Applied and Bound Tariffs on Major Agricultural Commodities/Groups Applied and bound tariffs on major agricultural (as on 01.01.2006) Item description
Applied tariffs (%)
Bound tariffs (%)
10 50 50 80 80 70
100 100 70 80 80 70
Cereals and Pulses Pulses other than peas (pisum sativam) Wheat Maize (Corn) seed Rice in the husk Husked (brown) rice; broken rice Semi-milled or wholly milled rice whether or not polished Millet, Jowar Sorghum Buck wheat and canary seed Other cereals (rye, barley, etc.)
50 50 Free Free
Cereals Products Wheat Flour Wheat and potato starch Flour, meal and powder of dried leguminous vegetables including sago, tamarind and mango Other starches Roasted malt Unroasted malt Dairy Products Fresh milk and cream Butter and melted butter (ghee) Cheese Milk powder Yoghurt Plantation Crops Tea Coffee Coconut Copra Cassia and cinnamon Cloves Other spices
70 80 100/Free 100
30 30 30
150 35 150
30 30 30
100 100 100
30 40 30 60 30
100 40 40 60 150
100 100 70 70 30 35 30/70
150 100 100 100 100 100 150/100
(Table 4.A3 continued)
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(Table 4.A3 continued) Item description Meat & Poultry Chicken sausages Chicken leg (processed) Meat of poultry, not cut in pieces, fresh or chilled Raw hams, pig fat; meat of bovine animals Other meat and offal Processed ham Sugar Horticulture Apples Grapefruit Strawberries, dried apricots etc. Pears and quinces Oranges; lemons and limes; fresh grapes Fresh pomegranates, lichi, tamarind (fresh), custard apple Other fruits except Sapota (Black berries etc.) Garlic Onions Potato Hop cones (ground, powdered or inpellets) Apricot, peach or plum stones and kernels Edible Oils (Crude) Soyabean Oil Palm Oil (for manufacture of vanaspati) Groundnut Oil Sunflower/Safflower Coconut Oil Rapeseed Oil Colza or Mustard Oil Castor Oil/Tung Oil Other Oils Edible Oils (Refined) Soyabean Oil RBD Palmolein
Applied tariffs (%)
Bound tariffs (%)
100 100 30
150 150 100
30 30 30
100 100 55
60
150
50 25 30 30 30 15
50 100 100 35 100 100
30 100 5 30 30 30
100 100 100 100 75 100
45 80 85 75 85/100 75 75 85/100 85/100
45 300 300 300 300 75 75 100 300
45 90
45 300
(Table 4.A3 continued)
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(Table 4.A3 continued) Applied tariffs (%)
Item description Palm Oil Groundnut Oil Sunflower/Safflower Coconut Oil Edible grade Coconut Oil (Other) Rapeseed Oil Colza or Mustard Oil Castor Oil/Tung Oil Other Oils edible grade Other Oils other than edible grade
90 85 85 85 100 75 75 100 85 100
Bound tariffs (%) 300 300 300 300 300 75 75 100/300 300 100/300
Source: Government of India (GoI), 2006. Table 4.A4 Summary Analysis of India’s MFN Tariff, 1997–98 and 2001–02 MFN 1997–98 Products
MFN 2001–02
Average Range Coefficient Average Range Coefficient (%) (%) of variation (%) (%) of variation
Agricultural products 35.1 0–260 Live animals and 25.4 15–45 products thereof Dairy products 31.5 0–35 Coffee and tea, 37.6 15–192 cocoa, sugar, etc. Cut flowers and 25.1 10–45 plants Fruit and vegetables 32.7 0–127 Grains 0.0 0–0 Oil seeds, fats, 38.9 15–45 oil and their products Beverages and 114.8 15–260 spirits Tobacco 45.0 45–45 Other agricultural 27.8 0–45 products, n.e.s. Source: WTO (2002).
0.9 0.6
40.7 39.8
0–210 35–100
0.7 0.4
0.3 0.4
38.0 39.6
35–60 35–170
0.2 0.4
0.6
29.9
10–35
0.3
0.5 — 0.2
36.6 49.4 56.2
25–115 0–100 15–100
0.3 0.8 0.5
0.8
96.9
35–210
0.8
— 0.5
35.0 28.1
35–35 0–50
— 0.4
108
BISWAJIT DHAR Table 4.A5 Total Aggregate Measure of Support (in US$ million)
Nature of support Non-product specific support Product specific support Total AMS
1995–96
1996–97
1997–98
5,772.06 –29,619 –23,846.94
4,652.24 –3,155.93 1,496.31
5,017.41 –2,817.01 2,200.40
Sources: WTO, Notifications concerning domestic support commitments submitted by India in 1998 and 2002. Table 4.A6 Product-Specific Aggregate Measurements of Support: Market Price Support Description of basic products Rice Wheat Coarse cereals (bajra, jawar, maize and barley) Pulses (gram, urad, moong and tur) Groundnut Rapeseed and mustard toria Cotton Soya bean Tobacco Jute Sugar cane Total
Eligible production (million tonnes)
Total market price support (US$ million)
1995–96 1996–97 1997–98 1995–96 1996–97 1997–98 80.96 64 30.43
12.96 9.3 —
15.56 12.65 —
–7,577 –1,229.90 –1,384.84 –9,625 –1,459.73 –1,722.67 –4,530 — —
14.97
—
—
–1,706
—
—
7.37 6.59
— —
— —
–1,809 –1,689
— —
— —
0.32 — —
–2,106 –192 –181
–466.30 — —
290.50 — —
2.22 0.72 4.99 — 0.59 — (94–95) 1.43 — 174 — 386.96 22.98
— — 28.53
–388 — — 184 — — –29,619 –3,155.93 –2,817.01∗
Sources: WTO, Notifications concerning domestic support commitments submitted by India in 1998 and 2002. Notes: 1. Support for each of the listed products is below the relevant ‘product-specific’ de minimis level 3. ∗Notified as de minimis.
PROSPECTS OF AGRICULTURAL TRADE LIBERALISATION
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Table 4.A7 Non-Product-Specific AMS Total non-product-specific support (US$ million) Measure type(s)
1995–96
1996–97
Fertiliser subsidy Credit subsidy Subsidy on electricity Irrigation subsidy Subsidy on average supply of seeds Total
1,864.14 101.95 2,436.64 1,345.41 23.92 5,772.06∗
2,067.85 2,579.50 n.a. n.a. 1,867.77 1,712.59 716.10 724.70 0.52 0.62 4,652.24∗ 5,017.41∗
1997–98
Sources: WTO, Notifications concerning domestic support commitments submitted by India in 1998 and 2002. Note: ∗Notified as de minimis. Table 4.A8 Measures Exempt from Reduction Commitments—’Green Box’
Measure type General services
Public stockholding for food security purposes
Name and description of measure with reference to criteria in Annexure 2
Monetary value of measures in year in question (US$ million) 1995–96 1996–97 1997–98
Research 163.0 160.1 185.8 Pest and disease control 8.2 6.6 9.9 Training services 4.7 11.7 6.7 Extension and advisory n.a. 8.2 14.9 services Command area development 12.1 39.5 35.2 programme Marketing and promotion 104.8 5.2 7.3 services Inspection services n.a. n.a. n.a. Provision for livestock health 104.8 5.7 1.4 facilities Infrastructural services 0.0 2.3 3.4 Buffer stock operations 1,569.7 1,708.7 2,018.2
(Table 4.A8 continued)
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(Table 4.A8 continued)
Measure type Domestic food aid Income insurance Relief from natural disasters Structural adjustment assistance provided through investment aids Payment under environmental programmes
Total
Name and description of measure with reference to criteria in Annexure 2 n.a. Crop insurance scheme Crop insurance scheme Scarcity relief and natural calamities Dry land farming Scheme for reclamation of alkaline soils Drought-prone area programme Soil conservation in catchment areas of river valley projects Integrated watershed management in the catchment areas of flood prone rivers in the IndoGangetic basin Fodder grassland/pasture development Desert development programmes Control of shifting cultivation National Waste Land Development Programme Forest conservation aforestation & Economic Development
Monetary value of measures in year in question (US$ million) 1995–96 1996–97 1997–98 n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
10.9
n.a.
n.a.
n.a. 125.0
31.1 413.2
29.6 414.2
56.2 3.0
31.4 3.5
41.6 5.8
n.a.
1.4
28.7
19.5
13.1
13.8
9.0
0.3
0.2
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
30.2
31.6
4.8 n.a.
4.6 3.2
4.6 1.4
n.a.
22.4
18.6
2,195.6 2,502.3 2,872.9
Sources: WTO, Notifications concerning domestic support commitments submitted by India in 1998 and 2002.
PROSPECTS OF AGRICULTURAL TRADE LIBERALISATION
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Table 4.A9 Measures Exempt from the Reduction Commitments—Special and Differential Treatment—’Development Programmes’
Measure type
Name and description of measure with reference to criteria in Article 6:2
Monetary value of measure in year in question (US$ million) 1995–96 1996–97 1997–98
Investment subsidies generally available to agriculture
On farm development work 104.8 1,115.3 1,138.6 (field channels, land levelling, shallow wells, etc.) Small Sector Development — — 1.6 Scheme for Coffee Expansion and consolidation coffee — — 0.3 Interest DRI other subsidies — — 0.6 coffee Loan under coffee development — 0.4 — plan Subsidies for asset formation — 1.6 1.4 (provision of milch animals, farm implements to resource poor farmers, etc. under certain schemes) 149.5 15.6 15.0 Agricultural Small farmer development assistance input subsidies Other input subsidies∗ — 3,721.8 4,013.9 to low Grant-in-aid given for 0.1 0.0 income or production of planting material resource of cardamoms both small and poor large producers Subsidy given for replanting — 0.3 0.2 of senile and uneconomic cardamom gardens Grant-in-aid given for post— 0.1 0.1 harvest development of spices Assistance to smallholders for — — — easy access to inputs Subsidy for vanilla development — — 0.0 Total 254.3 4,855.1 5,171.8
Sources: WTO, Notifications concerning domestic support commitments submitted by India in 1998 and 2002. Note: ∗Includes support for fertilisers, irrigation, electricity, seeds, etc.
3.7 0.0 0.2 0.0
0.0 3.9
1.4 0.0 0.6 0.0
0.1 2.0
0.0 2.5
1.9 0.1 0.3 0.2
0.0 2.3
1.6 0.2 0.4 0.2
0.0 1.1
0.5 0.1 0.3 0.2
1996– 1997– 1998– 1999– 2000– 97 98 99 2000 2001
226.0 22,750.0
20,112.0 244.0 2,168.0 0.0
1996– 97
0.0 5,937.0
5,162.0 27.0 748.0 0.0
1997– 98
2000– 2001 67,554.0 88,052.0 190.0 366.0 77,892.0 18,172.0 2,725.0 4,059.0
1999– 2000
0.0 0.0 0.0 12,764.0 148,361.0 110,649.0
9,826.0 32.0 273.0 2,633.0
1998– 99
Quantity of subsidised exports (tonnes)
Source: WTO, Export subsidy notification submitted by Indian in 2002. Document G/AG/N/IND/3. Note: ∗Data is only in respect of international airfreight assistance in terms of Articles 9.1(d) and 9.4.
Fresh fruits Fresh vegetables Plants and flowers Poultry Products (day old chicks and hatching hens) Cardamom (small) Total
Description of products
Internal transport subsidies∗ (US$ million)
Table 4.A10 Export Subsidies Granted by India
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Table 4.A11 Domestic Support Granted by the United States (1995–2001) (US$ billion) Subsidies/Products
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
Green Box Blue Box Product Specific
46.03 51.83 51.25 49.82 49.75 50.06 50.67 7.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.31 5.98 6.49 10.57 16.89 16.70 14.63
of which Corn 0.03 0.03 0.15 1.53 2.55 2.76 1.27 Cotton 0.03 0.00 0.47 0.93 2.35 1.05 2.81 Dairy 4.66 4.69 4.46 4.56 4.66 5.07 4.48 Peanuts 0.41 0.30 0.31 0.34 0.35 0.44 0.30 Rice 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.43 0.62 0.76 Soybeans 0.02 0.01 0.05 1.28 2.86 3.61 3.61 Sugar 1.09 0.91 1.01 1.06 1.21 1.18 1.06 Tobacco 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.92 0.52 0.00 Wheat 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.52 0.97 0.85 0.19 Non-Product Specific 1.39 1.11 0.57 4.58 7.41 7.28 6.83 AMS (notified) 6.21 5.90 6.24 10.39 16.86 16.80 14.41 Total Subsidies 60.76 58.92 58.31 64.97 74.05 74.04 72.13 Source: Indian Institute of Foreign Trade, Centre for WTO Studies, Agriculture database. Table 4.A12 Domestic Support Granted by the European Union (1995–2001) (US$ billion) Subsidies
1995– 1996– 1997– 1998– 1999– 2000– 2001– 96 97 98 99 2000 2001 02
Green Box 23.84 25.08 20.32 20.42 18.37 19.56 19.47 Blue Box 26.46 24.39 22.86 21.85 18.24 19.90 22.36 Total Product Specific 63.54 58.01 56.20 49.75 44.11 39.10 37.23 of which Common wheat Barley Maize Rye Triticale Rice Dried fodder Sugar
3.29 2.85 1.00 0.40 0.19 0.64 0.38 7.58
3.36 3.04 1.06 0.34 0.22 0.61 0.34 6.68
3.20 3.02 1.17 0.35 0.26 0.57 0.34 6.56
3.29 2.86 1.01 0.35 0.27 0.47 0.33 6.19
2.69 2.34 0.92 0.27 0.21 0.36 0.29 5.31
2.03 1.97 0.63 0.21 0.19 0.35 0.27 5.20
1.17 1.55 0.36 0.20 0.17 0.37 0.30 5.40
(Table 4.A12 continued)
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(Table 4.A12 continued) Subsidies
1995– 1996– 1997– 1998– 1999– 2000– 2001– 96 97 98 99 2000 2001 02
Olive oil 1.75 2.12 2.54 1.92 1.91 1.85 2.52 Bananas 0.26 0.23 0.23 0.19 0.22 0.29 0.20 Skimmed milk powder 2.29 1.88 1.70 1.61 1.26 1.35 1.29 Milk 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.20 Butter 5.34 4.77 4.71 4.49 4.09 3.98 4.19 Beef 17.72 15.62 15.13 14.25 12.06 10.02 9.15 Citrus fruit for 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.12 0.16 0.12 0.20 processing Tobacco 1.32 1.14 0.97 0.97 0.91 0.86 0.90 Potatoes for 0.00 0.19 0.23 0.16 0.14 0.17 0.20 processing to starch Apples 3.20 2.38 2.18 2.04 2.02 2.01 1.94 Pears 0.94 0.67 0.68 0.59 0.56 0.56 0.51 Peaches/nectarines 0.57 0.53 0.26 0.43 0.54 0.45 0.45 Table grapes 0.48 0.25 0.26 0.24 0.20 0.19 0.20 Lemons 0.29 0.44 0.46 0.31 0.39 0.38 0.26 Clementines 0.21 0.18 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.18 0.16 Oranges 0.42 0.51 0.47 0.30 0.40 0.38 0.30 Cucumbers 0.83 0.49 0.68 0.63 0.53 0.48 0.50 Courgettes 0.00 0.28 0.18 0.19 0.15 0.14 0.16 Artichokes 0.29 0.24 0.25 0.24 0.10 0.10 0.18 Tomatoes 5.95 5.53 5.07 2.24 2.32 2.38 1.83 Wine 2.17 2.20 2.17 1.95 1.89 0.72 0.84 Seed for sowing 0.12 0.10 0.10 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.09 Cotton 0.99 0.88 0.91 0.76 0.57 0.71 0.54 Non-Product Specific 0.99 0.83 0.54 0.37 0.27 0.50 0.54 Total Subsidies 114.82 108.30 99.93 92.39 80.99 79.07 79.60 Source: Indian Institute of Foreign Trade, Centre for WTO Studies, Agriculture database. Table 4.A13 Domestic Support Granted by the European Union (1995–2001) (EUR billion) Subsidies
1995– 1996– 1997– 1998– 1999– 2000– 2001– 96 97 98 99 2000 2001 02
Green Box 18.78 22.13 18.17 19.17 19.93 21.84 20.66 Blue Box 20.85 21.52 20.44 20.50 19.79 22.22 23.73 Total Product Specific 50.06 51.19 50.25 46.69 47.87 43.66 39.50 (Table 4.A13 continued)
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(Table 4.A13 continued) Subsidies
1995– 1996– 1997– 1998– 1999– 2000– 2001– 96 97 98 99 2000 2001 02
of which Common wheat 2.59 2.96 2.86 3.09 2.92 2.27 1.24 Barley 2.25 2.68 2.70 2.69 2.54 2.19 1.64 Maize 0.79 0.94 1.05 0.95 1.00 0.71 0.38 Rye 0.32 0.30 0.31 0.33 0.29 0.24 0.21 Triticale 0.15 0.20 0.23 0.25 0.23 0.21 0.18 Rice 0.51 0.54 0.51 0.44 0.39 0.39 0.40 Dried fodder 0.30 0.30 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.32 Chick-peas, lentils 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 and vetches Sugar 5.97 5.90 5.87 5.81 5.76 5.81 5.73 Olive oil 1.38 1.87 2.27 1.80 2.07 2.07 2.68 Bananas 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.18 0.23 0.33 0.21 Skimmed milk powder 1.81 1.66 1.52 1.51 1.37 1.51 1.37 Milk 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.21 Butter 4.21 4.21 4.21 4.21 4.44 4.44 4.44 Beef 13.96 13.79 13.53 13.38 13.09 11.19 9.71 Citrus fruit for 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.11 0.18 0.13 0.21 processing Tobacco 1.04 1.01 0.87 0.91 0.98 0.96 0.95 Potatoes for 0.00 0.17 0.20 0.15 0.15 0.18 0.21 processing to starch Apples 2.52 2.10 1.95 1.92 2.19 2.25 2.06 Pears 0.74 0.60 0.61 0.55 0.60 0.63 0.54 Peaches/nectarines 0.45 0.47 0.23 0.40 0.59 0.50 0.47 Table grapes 0.38 0.22 0.23 0.22 0.22 0.21 0.22 Lemons 0.23 0.38 0.41 0.29 0.42 0.43 0.28 Clementines 0.17 0.16 0.18 0.18 0.23 0.21 0.17 Oranges 0.33 0.45 0.42 0.28 0.43 0.42 0.32 Cucumbers 0.66 0.44 0.61 0.59 0.58 0.54 0.54 Courgettes 0.00 0.25 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.17 Artichokes 0.23 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.11 0.11 0.20 Tomatoes 4.69 4.88 4.53 2.10 2.52 2.66 1.94 Wine 1.71 1.94 1.94 1.83 2.05 0.81 0.89 Seed for sowing 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.10 Cotton 0.78 0.77 0.81 0.72 0.62 0.80 0.58 Non-Product Specific 0.78 0.73 0.49 0.35 0.29 0.56 0.57 Total Subsidies 90.46 95.57 89.35 86.71 87.88 88.29 84.46 Source: Indian Institute of Foreign Trade, Centre for WTO Studies, Agriculture database.
116
BISWAJIT DHAR Table 4.A14 De Minimis Spending by the US
Years
De minimis spending (US$ billion)
De minimis spending as % of trade distorting domestic support
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
1.5 1.2 0.8 4.7 7.4 7.3 7.0
19.3 16.4 11.4 31.3 30.6 30.4 32.8
Source: Indian Institute of Foreign Trade, Centre for WTO Studies, Agriculture database. Table 4.A15 De Minimis Spending by the EC
Years
De minimis spending (EUR billion)
De minimis spending as % of trade distorting domestic support
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
0.8 0.9 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.6 0.8
1.6 1.7 1.1 0.8 0.6 1.3 2.0
Source: Indian Institute of Foreign Trade, Centre for WTO Studies, Agriculture database. Table 4.A16 European Union: Outlays on Export Subsidies (in US$ million) Years Major products
1995– 1996– 1997– 1998– 1999– 96 97 98 99 2000
Incorporated products 623.7 639.5 Other milk products 924.1 827.2 Beef Meat 1,913.3 1,725.2 Sugar (5) 481.3 593.3 Butter and butteroil 325.4 623.5
613.9 839.6 933.2 864.7 344.7
607.8 804.4 681.5 842.5 302.8
661.9 833.0 668.0 432.5 306.7
2000– 01 368.5 365.0 341.1 331.7 300.7
(Table 4.A16 continued)
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(Table 4.A16 continued) Years Major products
1995– 1996– 1997– 1998– 1999– 96 97 98 99 2000
2000– 01
Cheese 555.8 306.6 195.4 158.0 216.9 211.8 Coarse grains 385.3 439.6 303.3 809.9 671.8 170.4 Wheat and wheat flour 150.7 358.8 197.2 530.3 468.6 96.4 Alcohol 65.0 133.9 117.1 128.5 201.1 85.1 Poultry meat 147.2 82.5 84.5 95.1 69.1 50.6 Pigmeat 127.6 80.3 82.6 377.5 223.6 30.1 Rice 38.5 81.6 36.2 27.1 24.3 28.7 Fresh fruit and vegetables 89.4 69.8 28.9 33.5 34.2 24.0 Skim milk powder 178.9 192.2 129.2 203.2 310.8 23.3 Total 6,203.8 6,288.5 4,841.0 5,656.4 5,164.6 2,459.2 Source: Indian Institute of Foreign Trade, Centre for WTO Studies, Agriculture database. Table 4.A17 United States: Outlays on Export Subsidies (in US$ ’000) Years Major products
1995 1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
Poultry meat 5.2 0.0 862.5 1,399.8 1,643.5 6,823.3 Skim milk powder 16.8 93.8 88,798.4 133,284.3 45,333.0 6,727.5 Cheese 2.1 2.5 3,905.2 4,164.2 5,564.4 1,760.7 Total 27.6 123.5 112,229.2 146,709.9 80,165.6 15,313.5 Source: Indian Institute of Foreign Trade, Centre for WTO Studies, Agriculture database. Table 4.A18 Food Aid Provided by the US and the European Union (in tonnes) United States Description of products Wheat Coarse grains Rice Vegetable oils Skim milk powder
Years 1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
1,531.3 1,449.1 1,075.2 3,202.2 5,315.1 2,364.7 73.6 129.5 116.2 111.7 78.2 45.3 149.7 188.5 111.3 382.7 935.6 303.3 173.6 175.1 157.3 0.0 1,440.4 365.3 3.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 260.6 24.2 (Table 4.A18 continued)
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BISWAJIT DHAR
(Table 4.A18 continued) European Union Years Description of products Wheat and wheat flour Coarse grains Rice
1995– 96
1996– 97
1997– 98
1998– 1999– 2000– 99 2000 2001
1,536.9 775.6 (wheat (wheat eq.) eq.) 285.3 205.0 91.8 42.5 (July 95 June 96)
711.1 (wheat eq.) 215.5 110.2
630.8 1,186.1 436.4
136.5 63.5
119.3 125.5
44.8 21.2
Source: Indian Institute of Foreign Trade, Centre for WTO Studies, Agriculture database. Table 4.A19 Agricultural Export and Food Aid Programmes of the United States (1995–2002) (US$ million) Programmes
2001 2002 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 (Est.) (Budget)
Export 339 5 0 2 1 2 478 478 Enhancement Programme Dairy Export 140 20 121 110 145 77 34 42 Incentive Market Access 110 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 Programme Foreign Market — — — — 28 28 28 28 Devp. Programme CCC Export Credit 2,921 3,230 3,876 4,037 3,045 3,082 3,792 3,904 Guarantees P.L. 480 Food 1,286 1,207 1,054 1,154 1,796 1,076 1,107 995 Aid Section 416(b) 4 84 2 0.5 428 504 565 — Food for Progress 146 84 91 111 101 121 94 94 Foreign Agricultural 159 167 191 181 178 200 183 207 Service Total 5,105 4,887 4,425 5,790 6,271 5,310 6,390 5,838 Source: Hanrahan (2001), Agricultural Export and Food Aid Programmes, Congressional Research Service Issue Brief, The National Council for Science and Environment, Washington.
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Table 4.A20 MFN Bound Tariffs for Agricultural Products for OECD Countries (in %) Countries Australia Canada Czech Rep. European Union Hungary Iceland Japan Korea, Republic Mexico New Zealand Norway Poland Slovak Rep. Switzerland Turkey United States Average
Binding coverage
Simple average
Maximum ad valorem
Duty free
Non ad valorem
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 99.1 100 100 100 99.9 100 100 100 100 99.9
3.2 3.5 10 5.8 27 43.4 6.9 52.9 35.1 5.7 1.2 32.9 10 0 60.2 6.9 19.0
29 238.3 125 74.9 127.5 229 61.9 887.4 72 35.2 25.5 230 125 0 225 350 177.2
32.2 41.8 38.7 26.7 7.7 18.6 28.7 2.2 0.3 51.3 21.4 2.3 38.7 17.4 0 28.7 22.3
2.1 26 0 40.8 0 24.5 22.7 4.7 7.5 0.7 75.2 36.5 0 82.6 0 49.6 23.3
Source: WTO (2003d), pp. 196–217. Table 4.A21 MFN Applied Tariffs for Agricultural Products for OECD Countries (in %) Countries
Year
Australia Canada Czech Rep. European Union Hungary Iceland Japan Korea, Republic Mexico New Zealand Norway Poland Slovak Rep. Switzerland Turkey United States Average
2001 2001 2001 2002 2001 2000 2001 2001 2001 1999 2002 2001 2001 2001 2001 2001
Simple average
Maximum ad valorem
1.1 3 10 5.9 25.8 7 7.1 45.5 23.4 1.7 8.4 41.9 9.9 0 42.2 4.7 14.9
5 238 125 74.9 127.5 78 50 917 260 7 555 676.7 125 0 232.5 350 238.9
Source: WTO (2003d), pp. 196–217.
Duty-free Non ad lines (%) valorem 76.5 49.8 38.8 25.8 8.6 57.8 29.2 1.9 2.1 66.9 26.9 3 38.8 18.9 14.3 28.5 30.5
0.7 19.9 0 39.9 0 21.1 23.2 3.1 5.6 0.3 70.3 26 0 81.1 8.1 1.8 18.8
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BISWAJIT DHAR Table 4.A22 MFN Bound Tariffs for Agricultural Products (figures in %)
Countries
Binding coverage (%)
Simple average
Maximum ad valorem
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 99.7 100.0
32.6 35.5 15.8 114.5 35.1 39.8 45.6
35.0 55.0 65.0 300.0 72.0 597.0 187.3
Argentina Brazil China India Mexico South Africa Average
Duty-free Non ad tariff lines valorem 0.1 2.2 2.8 0.0 0.3 22.4 4.6
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 7.5 0.0 1.3
Source: WTO (2003d), pp. 196–217. Table 4.A23 MFN Applied Tariffs for Agricultural Products (figures in %) Countries
Year
Argentina Brazil China India Mexico South Africa Average
2001 2001 2002 2001 2001 2001
Simple average
Maximum ad valorem
Duty-free tariff lines
Non ad valorem
12.3 12.5 19.2 37.0 23.4 8.7 18.9
22.5 55.0 71.0 210.0 260.0 55.0 112.3
3.0 3.0 2.5 2.6 2.1 42.4 9.3
0.0 0.0 0.6 0.3 5.6 13.3 3.3
Source: WTO (2003d), pp. 196–217. Table 4.A24 Use of Non Ad Valorem Tariffs by Select WTO Members
WTO Member Australia Canada Egypt EC(15) Iceland India Japan Korea, Republic of Malaysia
Total no. of tariff lines in agriculture
No. of non ad valorem tariff lines
% of non ad valorem tariff lines
725 1,341 823 2,205 1,604 697 1,344 1,500 1,320
14 404 14 1,010 363 2 247 68 346
1.9 30.1 1.7 45.8 22.6 0.3 18.4 4.5 26.2
(Table 4.A24 continued)
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(Table 4.A24 continued)
WTO Member
Total no. of tariff lines in agriculture
No. of non ad valorem tariff lines
% of non ad valorem tariff lines
Mexico New Zealand Norway Switzerland Thailand United States
1,083 1,004 1,060 2,179 774 1,777
83 10 722 1,940 339 755
7.7 1.0 68.1 89.0 43.8 42.5
Source: WTO (2004). Table 4.A25 Simple Average Fill Rates of Tariff Quotas (1995–2000) Principal administration method
Simple average fill rates (%) 1995
Applied tariffs 71 First-come, first-served 56 Licences on demand 59 Auctioning 30 Historical importers 91 Imports by state trading 81 enterprises Producer groups/ 74 associations Other 37 Mixed allocation methods 75 Non-specified 100 Overall 66
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
65 61 57 38 81 83
65 47 55 60 76 90
71 51 54 39 71 91
70 63 52 24 65 100
67 n.a. 40 n.a. 44 n.a.
53
85
78
n.a.
n.a.
38 84 44 63
39 85 57 62
45 84 44 63
44 74 41 62
94 100 n.a. 44
Source: WTO (2001b). Note: Fill rates are calculated for 1,033, 1,081, 1,166, 1,134, 827 and 136 tariff quotas in the respective years 1995–2000.
NOTES ∗The views expressed are personal. 1. See for instance, Brandao and Martin (1993). 2. Quantitative restrictions in India covered over 2,714 commodities, out of which nearly 800 were from the agricultural sector.
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3. WTO, ‘Understanding on the Balance-of-Payments Provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994’ (available at http://www.wto.org/english/ docs_e/legal_e/09-bops_e.htm) 4. Under Section 11(2), the reasons for such a prohibition include, inter alia, security, public order, morality, prevention of smuggling and the conservation of foreign exchange and safeguarding the balance-of-payments (Government of India, Customs Act, 1962), GoI Press. 5. WTO (1998: 55). 6. Prominent among the products on which tariff bindings were increased are maize (2 tariff lines), rice (4 tariff lines), rape/mustard oil (2 tariff lines) and milk powder (2 tariff lines). Among the products whose tariff bindings were lowered are a range of fruits and olive oil. 7. WTO (2002: 28). 8. The quotas are placed at the disposal of the Agricultural and Processed Food Products Export Development Authority (APEDA) and are currently allocated to state trading companies, including the National Agricultural Cooperative Marketing Federation (NAFED), Minerals and Metals Trading Corporation (MMTC), State Trading Corporation (STC), the Project and Equipment Corporation (PEC) and State Cooperative Marketing Federations. 9. Government of India (GoI) (2002). 10. The ‘Green Box’ subsidies, particularly those that have been directed towards strengthening the rural infrastructure could not have come at a better time since the share of agriculture in the country’s gross capital formation had reached the historically low level of 7 per cent in the late 1990s. 11. These subsidies form a part of Articles 9.1(d) and (e). 12. The data used in this chapter relate to the 15 countries that were Members of the EU prior to the enlargement of the Union that took place on 1 May 2004. 13. The decrease was steeper in dollar terms because of depreciation of the Euro. In terms of the Euro, the European Communities reduced their domestic by a mere 3 per cent between 1995 and 1999. 14. Article 6 of the AoA provides that WTO Members shall not be required to include in the calculation of its Current Total AMS and shall not be required to reduce product and non-product specific domestic support which does not exceed 5 per cent of that Member’s total value of production of a basic agricultural product during the relevant year. 15. In terms of US dollars, the increase in product specific support for corn was from US$ 32 million in 1995 to US$ 2.8 billion in 2000, while in case of soybeans the corresponding figures were US$ 16 million and US$ 3.6 billion in 2001. 16. In two of these products, viz., wheat and butter, the product specific support went up in terms of the Euros. 17. See for instance WTO (2000a). 18. See Huff and Jimenez (2003), and Barrett and Maxwell (2004). 19. Oxfam (2003). 20. OECD (2001).
PROSPECTS OF AGRICULTURAL TRADE LIBERALISATION 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28.
29. 30. 31. 32. 33.
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Tariff bindings were taken for the exercise. For details see Gibson et al. (2001). UNCTAD (1999). Gibson et al. (2001). See for instance Indonesia’s statement to the Committee on Agriculture, WTO (2000b). In 2002, Thailand’s fill rate in case of rice was 0.2 per cent. WTO (2001b), paragraph 13. See Annex I. for details. This mandate was given at the conclusion of the Montreal WTO mini-ministerial meeting in late July 2003, to the two trading partners to work out a joint paper on agriculture. For details see, European Commission (2003). WTO (2003a). WTO (2003b). Support for the SPs and the SSM was lent by the G-33. WTO (2005), paragraph 7. Ibid.
REFERENCES AND SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY Barrett, C.B. and D.G. Maxwell. 2004. Food Aid after Fifty Years: Recasting its Role. London: Routledge. Available at http://aem.cornell.edu/faculty_sites/cbb2// foodaid.htm Brandao, A. and W. Martin. 1993. ‘Implications of Agricultural Trade Liberalisation for Developing Countries’, World Bank Working Paper, No. WPS 11/6. European Commission. 2003. ‘Background Brief EU–US Paper on Agriculture’. Brussels. Available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/agriculture/external/wto/ document/brief_en.pdf FAO. 2003. ‘WTO Agreement on Agriculture: The Implementation Experience— Developing Country Case Studies’. Rome. Gibson, Paul, John Wainio, Daniel Whitley and Mary Bohman. 2001. Profiles of Tariffs in Global Agricultural Markets. Agricultural Economic Report No. 796, Market and Trade Economics Division, Economic Research Service, US Department of Agriculture. Goreux, Louis. 2003. ‘Reforming the Cotton Sector in Sub-Saharan Africa’, Africa Region Working Paper Series No. 62, World Bank, November. Government of India (GoI). 2002. Public Notice No. 38/2002–2007, 4 October, Ministry of Commerce and Industry. ———. 2006. ‘Agriculture Statistics at a Glance 2006’, Ministry of Agriculture, Department of Agriculture and Cooperation. New Delhi: Government of India. Hanrahan, Charles E. 2001. ‘Agricultural Export and Food Aid Programs’, Congressional Research Service Issue Brief, The National Council for Science and Environment, Washington.
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Huff, Bruce and Michelle Jimenez. 2003. ‘The Food Aid Convention: Past Performance and Future Role within the new Global Trade and Development Environment’, Paper presented at the International Conference ‘Agricultural Policy Reform and the WTO: Where are we heading?’ Capri (Italy), 23–26 June. Available at http://www.ecostat.unical.it/2003agtradeconf/Contributed%20papers/ Huff%20and%20Jimenez.PDF OECD. 2001. ‘The Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture: An evaluation of its implementation in OECD countries’. Paris. Oxfam. 2002. ‘Cultivating Poverty: The Impact of US Cotton Subsidies on Africa’, Briefing Paper #30. ———. 2003. ‘US Export Credits: Denials and Double Standards’, Oxfam America Briefing Note. Available at http://www.oxfamamerica.org/newsandpublications/ publications/briefing_papers/art4894.htm UNCTAD. 1999. ‘Examining trade in the agricultural sector, with a view to expanding the agricultural exports of the developing countries, and to assisting them in better understanding the issues at stake in the upcoming agricultural negotiations’, Background Note by the UNCTAD Secretariat (TD/B/COM.1/ EM.8/2). WTO. 1998. Trade Policy Review: India. Report by the Secretariat (WT/TPR/S/33). ——— 2000a. Committee on Agriculture. ‘Export subsidies—food security or food dependency?’ Discussion paper presented by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay (MERCOSUR), Chile, Bolivia and Costa Rica (G/AG/NG/W/38). ———. 2000b. Committee on Agriculture. Fourth Special Session of the Committee on Agriculture 15–17 November 2000: Statement by Indonesia (G/AG/NG/ W/71). ———. 2001a. ‘Tariff Quota Administration Methods And Tariff Quota Fill’. Background Paper by the Secretariat, May. ———. 2001b. ‘Ministerial Declaration: Adopted on 14 November 2001’. WT/ MIN(01)/DEC/1. November. ———. 2002. Trade Policy Review: India. Report by the Secretariat (WT/TPR/ S/100). ———. 2003a. Joint EC–US Paper. Agriculture (JOB(03)/157). ———. 2003b. ‘Agriculture—Framework Proposal: Joint Proposal’ by Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, China, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, India, Mexico, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, the Philippines, South Africa, Thailand and Venezuela (JOB(03)/162/Rev.1). ———. 2003d. World Trade Report 2003. Geneva. ———. 2004. Committee on Agriculture. Calculation of Ad Valorem Equivalents (Aves): Data Requirements and Availability. Note by the Secretariat (TN/AG/ S/11). ———. 2005. Ministerial Declaration: Adopted on 18 December 2005. WT/MIN(05)/ DEC, December.
Chapter 5 The Political Economy of NAMA A Note T C A SRINIVASA-RAGHAVAN
INTRODUCTION
D
eveloping countries have, more often than not, tended to believe that if they unite they can resist the developed countries’ demands in trade negotiations. But two factors have prevented this from happening. One, of course, is the old game of divide and rule whereby the unity of the developing countries has always been under threat. The other is simply that some developing countries, if not becoming developed themselves, have developed complementarities and congruencies with the economies of the developed countries. This also threatens their unity. The result is that the developed countries have usually been able to introduce new areas for negotiation that enable them to pursue their interests while sowing confusion in the ranks of the developing countries. The latest such move came when the first post-Uruguay Round of trade negotiations began at Doha. This round has been labelled the Doha Development Agenda (DDA). Its main focus area has been agriculture. This is so for a very understandable reason. While an overwhelming majority of the populations of the
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developing countries are farmers, in contrast to the 3–5 per cent of the developed countries, the markets of the latter are more-orless closed to the former. So the developing countries have been demanding that the asymmetry between openness for industrial goods and agriculture be removed. The developed countries stood their ground for as long as it was possible but, when it became clear that the Doha Round would collapse if they did not give in, or appeared to give in, they came up with NAMA or non-agricultural market access. In a nutshell, what the developed countries mean by NAMA is that if you want access for agriculture, you had better give access to our industry. The economic reason: these products account for 90 per cent of global merchandise exports. Or, as the World Trade Organization (WTO) website puts it, ‘NAMA refers to all products not covered by the Agreement on Agriculture.’ The point being made by the developed countries was that they were not satisfied with what the previous rounds of negotiation had produced by way of industrial products’ market access into developing countries. They said tariffs were a nuisance (the jargon is important barrier to world trade) because not only were they not uniform, but they were also unpredictable. In theory, this covers things like fuel, mining products, or even fish and fish products, and forestry products. In reality, it means just industrial or manufactured goods. It needs to be borne in mind here that it is not as if the market access for industrial products has not been improving over the years. It has, and that too for the last half-century. Also, the Uruguay Round went further than the previous rounds for NAMA products. As the WTO∗ says: Tariff averages were reduced from 6.3 per cent to 3.8 per cent (and) in the case of developing countries, the most important contribution was made in the form of new tariff bindings. Binding coverage for NAMA products in developing countries increased from 21 per cent to 73 per cent, which has considerably increased the predictability of trade. The question is for whom or, rather, who has benefited more from this?
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Tariff binding, meanwhile, is an interesting concept in itself. It is the maximum tariff that a member can apply. The rates can be varied, of course, because that is a matter of sovereign right. But, as the Rajas and Maharajas discovered during the days of the Raj, compensation must be paid to those who are affected. The freedom is, therefore, quite illusory and abridges sovereignty. Nor is this the only reason why the notion of tariff bindings is a sleight of hand. The other reason is that though the applied tariff, that is, the customs duty actually imposed, cannot only be lower than the bound rate, it is almost invariably so. The whole argument is about this difference in what has been ‘bound’ and what is actually levied. And this gap is significant in developing countries. In an attempt to make trade jargon user-friendly, it has been dubbed ‘water’ or, more forbiddingly, ‘binding overhang’. Once the developed countries got this idea accepted—as one can see, for no good economic reason—the high preference for predictability in trade rules led inevitably to the idea of a formula. This formula would, in effect, determine the maximum tariff that countries would be allowed to impose. As the WTO∗ put it: A formula approach provides transparency (every member will know how the other will reduce its tariffs), efficiency (simpler process than request/offer approach), equity (tariff reduction depends on rules rather then ‘bargaining power’), predictability (easy to foresee the results of the negotiations). But having agreed to a formula-based approach, the developing countries, whose economies are highly heterogeneous, complained that the formula could not be applied uniformly to all countries. So a method to make it flexibly applicable was devised. The idea was to stretch out the time over which the new rule came into being. So, according to the WTO∗ in July 2004, everyone agreed that: Developing countries would enjoy longer implementation periods for their tariff reductions; and choose between: (1) less than formula cuts for up to [10 per cent] of their tariff lines
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representing up to [10 per cent] of their import value; or (2) not apply formula cuts, or leave unbound tariff lines, for up to [5 per cent] of their tariff lines representing up to [5 per cent] of their import value. The least-developed country participants were exempted from all this. There were some other provisions for special and differential treatment as well. But while all this was very well, there was the issue of non-tariff barriers as well. There is no universally agreed upon definition; it is like the beast that no one can define but everyone can recognise. Broadly, ‘it refers to any measure other than a tariff which protects domestic industry’. The WTO∗ has an interesting position on this: Many non-tariff measures are based on a legitimate goal (such as the protection of human health) and can be introduced in a WTO consistent manner. Agreements such as the SPS and TBT aim at allowing governments to take due care of these legitimate goals while minimizing the impact on trade and avoiding the temptation to use them as disguised protectionism. A little reflection will show how this discriminates against imports of agri-products into the developed countries. Not just that: the only way to solve the problem is bilaterally. Bargaining power has thus become important once again in the one area that would help the developing countries. Rules or no rules, it is relative strength that has been brought back. So the question is often asked whether NAMA helps the developing countries. The WTO∗ is at pains to explain that it does: As a result of the formula, tariff peaks, high tariffs and tariff escalation will diminish or disappear altogether. Consequently, market access opportunities will open up both in the markets of developed members, but also of other developing members. Such access will be further improved through the sectoral initiatives, which will be implemented on an Most Favoured Nation (MFN) basis by those members joining such initiatives.
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But the proof of the pudding is the eating of it. We have to wait and see what actually happens. The issue has moved from whether a developing country can keep its tariffs at levels it wants, to what is the highest that the developed countries are willing to accept. This is what is called bindings. You get bound at a rate that is acceptable to the developed countries. What’s more, there is a formula to bind yourself with.
THE NAMA FORMULAE There is a vast amount of literature on this. Much of it springs from questions about how to interpret Paragraph 14 of the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration (HKMD). That paragraph talked about a formula for tariff reduction and about ‘coefficients’. The most favoured formula is the one based on the so-called ‘Swiss Coefficients’. Everything depends on what these coefficients will be. This is because of the principle of less-than-full-reciprocity (LTFR) which would ensure that developing countries cut their tariffs less than the developed countries do. The lower it is, the less will be the room for manoeuvre as the cuts will have to be larger. This is because the final duty ‘F’ is calculated by dividing the product of the bound rate and the coefficient by the sum of the applied rate and the coefficient. But, as with all coefficients, which by definition have to be arbitrary, there is no mathematical reasoning behind this one at least. So the Swiss Formula looks as if it has simply been worked out backwards. After all, a coefficient is merely a number that is put before some variable. Indeed, that is why everyone is now arguing about this number rather than the variables that need to be multiplied by it. As attention-diverters go, Paragraph 14 would be a prize-winner. But now that it is there, India should probably consider making its own offer on the coefficient. Most experts expect it to be somewhere between 10 and 20, mainly because the US and EU think they can live with a ‘coefficient’ of 10 while offering 15 to the developing ones, who of course want at least 25. The argument,
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as we said earlier, is that the lower the average tariffs, the greater would be the cuts and this will help the developing countries. It is worth noting here that there will be two coefficients, which is a plus but if the difference between them is small, the benefits may not be very much. Everyone wants the others to make the deepest cuts and a formula that entails deeper cuts by the developing countries than by the developed ones may not be acceptable. Worst of all, the developed countries are trying to keep certain products out of NAMA such as textiles. Clearly, what is sauce for the goose is not sauce for the gander. On balance, therefore, this seems a rather nonsensical way of doing things because it depends on the difference between the coefficient that is applied to the developing and developed countries. This difference might sound workable on average bases, but when it comes to specific products, it is the politics of that product that will determine the outcome. And trade, as very senior WTO official said at a private meeting, is primarily about politics, not economics. If the politics fails as a result of the formula, it will be worthless.
INDIA AND NAMA The Indian situation in respect of NAMA is quite straightforward. India has a peak import duty of 10 per cent but that said, two things have to be kept in mind. One, there are still many products with very high duties, and two, its trade weighted tariff bindings are far higher, no one quite knows exactly how much. On agricultural products, the average rate India applies is around 40 per cent while bound rate is nearly three times as much, 115 per cent. In other words, there is a lot of ‘water’ in both sectors. The question now is not whether India will or should agree to reduce this. It will, as there is consensus in the country that low tariffs and hence more trade help, not hinder, growth. The question is how it uses the water to negotiate. India has to get what it wants from the others, most notably the developed
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countries which have clearly stated that if India wants access for its agricultural products, it must give access for their industrial products. So negotiating room is vital. This is where the ‘formula’ becomes important as it will determine the elbow room that countries have. On agriculture, at present, everyone is getting around to accept the so-called G-20 formula. If this comes into force, India’s bound tariffs could come down to around 65–75 per cent. There could still be huge variations on specific products such as edible oils where the new formula might see a bound rate of around 200 per cent. In other products also, Indian farmers will be well protected. In any case, there are provisions for special measures when imports begin to threaten livelihoods in a big way. Besides, Indian farmers are in distress mainly because of the failure of domestic reform. As far as NAMA is concerned, India has considerably softened its stand since the initial days. In 2002, India had argued that it wanted the approach to be of cutting duties on each product by a certain percentage. Then in 2005, it lent its support to a formula based on the Swiss Formula. This formulation was supported by Argentina and Brazil and was known as the Argentina-BrazilIndia (ABI) formula. Now it is coming round to the Swiss formula (but with two coefficients) and arguing about the coefficients, rather than the whole formula. It has also changed its approach to unbound tariffs. In that sense, the developed countries have breached the unity of the developing countries. Without being polemical about it, we need to ask: what has India gained by agreeing to modify its stance? This is a rather tricky issue because what happens eventually cannot be predicted with even the slightest degree of accuracy now. After all, in the late 1980s, only a few predicted India’s ascendance as a service providing economy. But one thing seems certain: fears that this will lead to the de-industrialisation of the developing countries are exaggerated. Where the idea of removing barriers to trade in ‘products of special interest to developing countries’ is concerned—in the
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case of India, apparel and leather goods, to name just two—it has gained nothing. However, the Swiss Formula will result in deep cuts in developed-country tariffs in these broad areas. Product specific cuts, however, are a different matter altogether. For example, as stated earlier, the developed countries are trying to keep textiles out. No progress has been made in respect of nontariff barriers, either. The Doha mandate had allowed countries to keep items that were politically sensitive from being subject to tariff cuts. As one peels the onion, it becomes evident that India has managed to retain this freedom but it is the only freedom it has retained. Only time will tell if this is good or bad. On balance, however, given India’s record in tariff cutting and offering tariff bindings unilaterally, and the consequent (largely) beneficial impact on the economy’s cost competitiveness, it would appear that India believes in generally low tariffs. In that sense, it has little to lose. There remains, however, the issue of trade-offs. In the context of NAMA, the most important is the coefficient it agrees to and what it gets in return for agreeing to a lower rather than a higher coefficient. There has been a temptation leading to policy and, therefore, to concerted efforts, to get concessions on agriculture. This is based on the assumption that India will be major exporter of agri-products. But is this assumption correct? This writer is of the view that it is not. Sustained and high economic growth will lead to the higher per capita incomes and Engel’s law will come into play. The resulting higher demand for food—the entire demand curve is shifting upwards—is unlikely to be met from domestic supply because of well-known policy and institutional reasons. Overall, and to conclude, the likelihood is greater that India will be a major importer of food rather than an exporter. This means it has more to gain from the subsidies of the developed countries as these keep export prices low. In other words, before India decides one way or another, it will have to come to a conclusion on whether it will turn into a sustained importer of food. It is worrying that this issue is not being examined and, instead,
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policy and negotiations are proceeding on the basis that India will be a major exporter of agri-products. The recent record suggests otherwise.
NOTE ∗All quotes in the chapter are sourced from: A simple guide to NAMA Negotiations, WTO, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/markacc_e/nama_negotiations_e.htm
Chapter 6 Indian Textile and Clothing Industry Economic Policy Reform Experience During ‘ATC’ Period SAMAR VERMA
INTRODUCTION
I
n a significant sense, during the second half of the 20th century, the Indian domestic policy regime did to its domestic industry what the international policy regime did to global textile and clothing industry. Operating at different levels, both created structural impediments, thwarted healthy competition, stunted competitive players, and tried to artificially support or create those that were uncompetitive. One of the outcomes of both regimes was a sector characterised by fragmentation, and production and trading capacities created by access to quotas rather than competitive sinews. Interestingly, the comparison does not cease to exist with demise of Multi Fibre Arrangement (MFA). Just when the MFA successor, the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC), began to unwind the impact of the quota system from 1995, reforms in India’s domestic policy— roughly coinciding with the ATC timeframe—too began to take place. Decades of archaic policies causing structural constraints
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have been reformed, with the result that the sector—both at global and national levels—has begun to experience healthier competition, and market shares are no longer a function of policy-determined quotas, but depend more on factors of competitiveness. Unfortunately, however, the comparison ceases here. While the Indian textile and clothing industry has witnessed unprecedented domestic policy reforms in the last decade, with the result that the constraining, textile-specific policies have now all been nearly reformed, this has not been so in the international sphere. The world’s largest consumer markets—US and EU—are seeking innovative policy instruments to prevent their consumers from making the most cost-effective choice on the one hand, while continuing to artificially prop up their uncompetitive domestic industry on the other. Peak tariffs, tariff escalation, arbitrary use of rules of origin, and a wide variety of measures, generically called non-tariff barriers (NTBs), are few such policy measures that are being widely deployed to serve the same purpose that underlay the system of quotas under the MFA.
INDIAN TEXTILE AND CLOTHING INDUSTRY Overview India’s textile industry is crucial to the Indian economy. It contributes about 3 per cent to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), accounts for over 14 per cent of total industrial production, generates 8 per cent of the central excise revenue, and contributes around 24 per cent of total exports. The sector is the second largest employment provider after agriculture, employing over 38 million people directly and another 50 million indirectly. The fortune of one out of every six households in the country is linked to the progress and well-being of this sector. For an overview of the sector, see Table 6.A1. The Indian government’s interventions since the country’s independence have resulted in freezing the capacity in the organised
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sector and scuttling economic incentives for modernisation. The structure of the textile and clothing industry, as it has evolved in the last half century, is primarily a response to government policies marked by ad hocism, fragmented vision and political opportunism. Indian entrepreneurs have done a commendable job in the cotton segments that they have chosen to export— mainly low-value cotton casual wear. If they have refrained from exporting high-value regular wear, or man-made fibre (MMF) based products, it is mainly because of the constraints imposed by domestic policies, which ranged from promoting anti-export bias to a lopsided fiscal policy, full of exemptions and exceptions.
Impact of the WTO So what have been the changes in domestic policy regime and business practices in India in the last decade and to what extent has the World Trade Organization (WTO) been responsible for bringing about these changes? As a matter of fact, and to be fair, reforms in textile industry in India predate the coming into force of the WTO. Some policy reforms did take place in the late 1980s, specially in the spinning sector, and these changes have indeed been—to a significant extent—responsible for the rapid growth of yarn production and exports from the export-oriented units in India, specially in the early 1990s. In the Uruguay Round, India agreed to eliminate Quantitative Restrictions (QRs) on imports of all products (save select few for balance of payment [BoP] reasons) as well as reduce and bind tariffs on several products. While India chose to remove QRs on imports of most products with economic reform in 1991, it maintained them on 2,134 items (8/10 digit Harmonised System of classification), of which 1,589 were on account of BoP reasons. Following a successful challenge by the US at the WTO (and not due to India’s obligations under the WTO), QRs on 1,429 items— covering almost all textile items—were removed by 1 April 2001. India committed to binding its import-weighted average tariffs in textile and clothing (Ch XI) at 64.3 per cent, compared to
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94.1 per cent prevailing in the ATC base period [1 September 1986 to 1 January 1990]. India’s applied rate, however, in 1995– 96 was lower than the bound rate, at 57.8 per cent.1 This has indeed been the case for the entire ATC period. Clearly, therefore, in the case of tariffs, India has paced ahead with unilateral liberalisation at a much faster rate than that committed at the WTO. These liberalisation initiatives have had an impact on the industry in terms of changes in productivity, lowering antiexport bias, and so on, and they have not been mandated by the WTO commitments.
Impact on imports Contrary to widespread fears of sharp rise in imports following removal of QRs, the imports of these items did not grow at a rate much faster than the growth rate of aggregate imports during 2001–02 and 2003–04.2 Total textile and clothing imports grew at a Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) of 7 per cent during 2002–03 and 2004–05, compared to 17 per cent for the total imports. Consequently, the share of textile and clothing in total Indian imports declined from 2.68 per cent to 2.02 per cent between 2002–03 and 2004–05. The biggest increase in imports happened in cotton yarn and fabric (26 per cent CAGR). Interestingly, import of textiles and clothing grew at a faster rate during India’s Ninth Five Year Plan (FYP) (1997–98 to 2001–02). Total textile and clothing imports grew at a CAGR of 19 per cent, compared to total Indian imports of 10 per cent during the period. Consequently, share of textile imports in India’s total imports grew from 1.99 per cent to 2.99 per cent in the period. Clearly, the growth rate in import of textiles has been significantly lower in the first three years of the Tenth FYP, compared to the entire Ninth FYP (second half of 1990s).3 The biggest increase took place in cotton fibre (91 per cent) and raw silk (23 per cent). Such unprecedented increase in raw cotton imports—after an average annual decline in growth rate of 4 per cent during the entire Ninth FYP—was because cotton imports were placed under
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Open General Licence (OGL) in 1994. Subsequently, to check massive imports, specially in 1999–2000 to 2001–02, an import duty of 5.5 per cent was levied from 1 September 1999, which was then raised to 10 per cent in January 2002. The CAGR of import of cotton textile during ninth FYP was higher (29 per cent) compared to during 2002–03 to 2004–05 at 26 per cent. (See Tables 6.A2[a] and 6.A2[b]). In terms of impact on exports, the impetus has come more from the fact of the promise of increased export opportunities into the world’s largest consumer markets (US and EU) and, consequently, a slew of domestic policy reforms that were strongly ‘felt needed’ by the industry and policy-makers to enable India to take advantage of the ATC promise of improved export opportunities. It is worth noting that the export opportunities have been ‘limited’ during the ATC period too, even though the quota growth rates in the last 10 years have been more predictable and liberal than during MFA period. It may be worthwhile to highlight some of the key policy changes that have taken place in the sector in recent times.
Domestic policy reforms during ATC period The critical need for the far-reaching reforms in the industry that have taken place specially in the last five years can be underlined by the simple fact that the share of Indian textile and clothing industry in world trade has declined from 11 per cent in 1950 to just over 3 per cent now.4 The world trade in textiles and clothing has grown all along this period at a CAGR exceeding 5 per cent.5 Clearly, therefore, there has been something wrong with our domestic policies and business practices. In the last decade, there have been several policy measures to address the structural issues in the industry. For analytical purposes, they could be divided into textile-specific and economy-wide reforms.6 The central government—albeit lately and late—has brought about fundamental reforms in the textile sector. Evidently, and as has been stated as a preamble to every
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reform announcement, these measures have been directed to ensure that the industry is better prepared to take advantage of the quota-free global textile and clothing trade from 2005. In that sense, certainly, most of these reforms have been triggered—as opposed to mandated—by the new trading system that ATC promised to herald.
Policy reforms during ATC period 1. Hundred per cent Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)/Non Resident Indian (NRI)/Overseas Corporate Bodies (OCB) investment has been allowed in the textile sector under the automatic route. FDI inflow in the textile sector was Rs 3.6 billion in 2004–05 against Rs 1.96 billion in the previous fiscal year. Between April 2005 and February 2006, it increased to Rs 5.96 billion. 2. Import duty on textile and apparel have been reduced, though the Indian import tariffs in this industry are still among the highest in the world, ranging between 25 and 40 per cent.7 With quota now abolished, the global attention has turned towards tariffs in this industry, as witnessed in the recent WTO Non-Agricultural Market Access (NAMA) negotiations, when India came under tremendous pressure to accept a tariff cutting formula coefficient that would effectively cap its peak tariffs to around 30 per cent. India, rightly, seems to be using this as an opportunity to minimise the threat from proliferating regional trading arrangements by using ‘reduction in import tariffs’ as a bargaining tool to get MFN tariff rates (specially peak rates) in US and EU negotiated downwards as a reciprocal measure. That would significantly reduce the adverse tariff impact of Preferential Trade Arrangements (PTAs) on India vis-à-vis the PTA member countries of US/EU. 3. Rationalisation of excise duty structure could be argued as a fundamental reform that was long overdue, and has widespread ramifications. Numerous studies in the 1990s concluded a strong need for a moderate, uniform value added
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tax (VAT) as the long-term objective. The necessary measures needed to be taken were doing away with exemptions on ginned cotton, hank yarn, grey fabric, hand processors (and a few specified processes), knitwear and hosiery and smallscale industry (SSI) units in garments, rationalisation of excise duty incidence at spinning stage,8 and abolish Additional Excise Duty (Textile and Textile Articles)—AED (T&TA) on MMF/yarn and cotton yarn. Thankfully, farreaching decisions have been taken to remove the discriminatory excise duty structure which placed the organised industry at a disadvantaged position and throttled investment in the modern mills. In the Union Budget 2004–05, the duty structure of textiles was completely revised. The excise duty for textiles was made optional with mandatory duty only on MMF/yarns. For those opting to pay the duty and thereby avail of duty credit, the duty was reduced to a nominal rate of 4 per cent was for cotton textiles whereas 8 per cent for non-cotton textiles, and textiles is defined as yarns, fabrics, garments and madeups in both cases. Additional excise duty was abolished. The process of fiscal duty reforms continued in the Union Budget 2005–06. Excise duty on Polyester Filament Yarn and customs duty on a number of textile machinery items were reduced. Texturising of Polyester Filament Yarn was, however, exempted from excise duty. The impact of these fiscal duty reforms on the structure of the industry would be felt over time, since these reforms have been made in the last two to three years only. However, one could expect the Inspector Raj to be significantly reduced. Moreover, the decentralised sector—powerloom, handloom as well as small garmenting units—would be relieved of problems of maintaining excise records and complying with excise procedures. There would also be a reduction in the cost of production as multiplicity of taxes has been done away with. One could expect fresh investment to flow in the textile sector for capacity addition and modernisation/ technology upgradation.
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These would go a long way in realignment of the industry structure at all stages, since the structure of the textile sector particularly has been the result of distortionary and discriminatory excise policy, replete with exemptions. New industry structure based on market forces would be more attractive for productive investments, thereby raising the technological standards and quality levels of the entire industry. 4. Remove policy bias against synthetic fibre/yarn. The reforms suggested by various studies were: z
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Rationalise excise duties on synthetic fibre to bring it in line with cotton fibre. Lower customs duty on raw materials used in manufacture of synthetic fibre/yarn.
This was thought to enable the development of a vibrant synthetic fibre base in India, which is critical to correct the predominance of cotton in Indian exports and consumption. Global consumption of synthetic is growing faster than that of cotton, and share of cotton is expected to decline to less than that of synthetic fibre. India has virtually no presence in this area. This is also essential to grow into the vast area of technical textiles that is emerging as a special-use textile in the world. India is just not present in the huge and growing area of non-apparel textile applications. Most of the standardised items of clothing require some form of blend as well. Moreover, that would enable Indian exports to diversify into non-quota markets where the demand for synthetic apparel is much higher compared to that in the quota-markets. And finally, that would take off some pressure on cotton to clothe the domestic market (due to which cotton prices have been subsidised in India). Cotton, then, can concentrate on higher value addition. In the recent Union Budget of 2006–07, excise duty on MMF and yarns has been reduced from 16 per cent to 8 per cent, and customs duty from 15 per cent to 10 per cent. 5. Removal of manufacturing of knit fabric and woven garments from SSI reservation list has been another long-standing
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demand of the Indian industry. One of the chief reasons for the fragmented, decentralised garment sector in India is that it was reserved for SSI. De-reservation would attract largescale firms into manufacturing mass-items of clothing, which reap scale economies. Large-scale firms would not, in any case, enter the product lines, where order size is small, and considerable manufacturing flexibility is required. So SSIs would not be wiped out. De-reservation would allow India to enter into market segments, which are among the fastest growing and are factory-based. Besides, ceiling on scale has prevented modernisation and investment in the sector. That would also eliminate the peculiar dichotomy whereby the Indian garment units were protected from Indian large-scale manufacturers, but had to compete with foreign large-scale units in the domestic turf following removal of quantitative restrictions on imports. De-reservation would allow processing of bulk orders from large retailers overseas as well as at home (after FDI in retailing is allowed). This would make the sector attractive for quality investment through technological upgradation. Very importantly, this would also enable the sector to invest in products not on the basis of SSI constraints, but on the basis of composition of demand. Finally, since building non-price competitive competencies are crucial for export growth, the sector would begin to invest in brands, designs, Information Technology (IT)-driven superior customer services, unique style and patterns, and so on. In the 2005–06 Union Budget, 30 items of knitting and knitwear have been de-reserved. The government has dereserved the readymade (woven) garments, hosiery and knitwear from SSI sector. Knit garments however, continue to remain reserved for SSI. 6. Abolition of Hank Yarn Obligation (HYO). The HYO is related to the supply of yarn for the handloom sector, and is exempted from excise duty. In reality, however, around 40 per cent of hank yarn was being consumed by powerlooms at zero excise duty.9 The HYO was tantamount to granting a
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subsidy to the handloom sector on one hand, and taxing the yarn producers on the other. It was abolished in 2002. 7. For technology upgradation, modernisation and textile infrastructure development, several initiatives have been taken by the central government. The cost of replacing the obsolete technology is estimated to be Rs 1,400 billion. z
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The Technology Upgradation Fund Scheme (TUFS)—in operation since April 1999—is designed to ensure availability of the bank finance at rates comparable with the global rates. Under this scheme, government reimburses 5 per cent of the interest rates charged by the banks and financial institutions, thereby ensuring credit availability for upgradation of technology at global rates. During 2000–04, projects worth Rs 70 billion were sanctioned. During 2004–05 projects worth Rs 68.74 billion were sanctioned, logging a growth of 168 per cent over 2003–04. In cumulative terms, of the 4,184 project proposals sanctioned under TUFS involving an aggregate project cost of Rs 142.6 billion until January 2006, the number of TUFS proposals cleared was 3,544 and the loan disbursed was Rs 110 billion.10 To improve the productivity and quality of cotton, the Government has launched the Technology Mission on Cotton (TMC). Incentives are provided for better farm practices, quality seeds, improvement in market infrastructure and modernisation of ginning & pressing (G&P) sector. Under Mini-Mission IV of the TMC, 678 G&P units have been approved for modernisation, of which 343 had been modernised as on 23 May 2006. To provide the industry with world class infrastructure facilities for setting up their textile units, a new scheme— Scheme for Integrated Textile Parks’—was launched. Support under the scheme by way of grant or equity has been limited to 40 per cent of the project cost subject to a ceiling of Rs 400 million. For upgrading infrastructure facilities at important textile centres, the ‘Textile Centre Infrastructure Development
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Scheme (TCIDS)’ was launched. Under TCIDS, 18 projects have been sanctioned with an estimated support from Government of India of Rs 2.71 billion. The import of specified textiles and garment machinery items has been allowed at a concessional rate of customs duty to encourage investments. The cost of machinery has also been reduced through fiscal policy measures. In 2005– 06 Union Budget, the customs duty on textile machinery was reduced to 10 per cent on all except 23 machinery which attracts Basic Customs Duty of 15 per cent. In order to facilitate modernisation of the powerloom sector, schemes such as high-tech weaving parks, modernisation and strengthening of powerloom service centres, Group Workshed Scheme and Credit Linked Capital Subsidy Scheme at the rate of 20 per cent have been introduced. Also, the Government has enhanced, with effect from 13 January 2005, the capital ceiling for machinery from Rs 6 million to Rs 10 million under 20 per cent capital subsidy scheme—TUFS for small scale textile and jute industrial units, the Government has enhanced the rate of Credit Linked Capital Subsidy (CLCS) from 12 per cent to 15 per cent since January 2005. For the textile processing sector, since 20 March 2005, the rate is 10 per cent, in addition to the existing 5 per cent interest reimbursement under TUFS. To provide the textile industry with world-class infrastructure facilities for setting up their textile units meeting international environmental and social standards, a Public–Private Partnership (PPP)-based scheme known as the ‘Scheme for Integrated Textile Park (SITP)’ has been introduced in July 2005. Facilities like eco-testing laboratories have been created to enable exporters to get garments/textiles pre-tested so that they conform to the requirements of the importing countries.
These are important policy initiatives that are expected to go a long way in enabling the industry to modernise and upgrade its technology.
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8. Human Resources Issues in Textile industry. According to one estimate,11 the industry needs to employ 11 million semiskilled and one million skilled people in order to achieve the government target of 12 million new jobs by 2010. z
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The National Institute for Fashion Technology (NIFT) and the Apparel Training and Design Centres (ATDCs) have been running various courses/programmes to meet the skilled manpower requirements of the textile industry, especially apparel, in the field of design, merchandising and marketing. To take a serious look at fashion education in the changing business context, the government has announced steps for establishing an institution of national excellence for imparting fashion business education with international benchmarking, appointing a nodal agency for standardising and benchmarking fashion business education in the country, and setting up an apex body to train the teachers/trainers imparting fashion business education in the country. The industry has been demanding modification of labourrelated provisions in Industrial Disputes Act 1948 (Ch V-B), Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act 1970 (Section 10) and Trade Union Act 1926, to bring them in line with current realities and market requirements. That fabricators are today the ‘backbone’ of the garment industry is chiefly due to the outdated labour laws in India. That has created fragmentation specially in the garment industry (since it is more labour-intensive). Outmoded laws related to retrenchment, transfers, dismissals, and job rotations have adversely affected organised mills too. This has given rise to an industry structure that is incapable of becoming globally competitive. It has prevented modernisation, scale economies in bulk purchases, production and marketing, and product-diversification into assemblyline produced items.12 According to recent reports, the textile industry has recommended an increase in the permissible weekly working hour limit from 48 to 60 hours.
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The industry has been demanding flexibility in hiring contractual labour while committing itself to providing at least 100 days a year for contract workers in line with provision of the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA). The industry has also been seeking permission to deploy women workers in night shifts and a ‘realistic’ exit policy for defunct units.13 However, the trade unions have been opposing these demands, and the government is still to make up its mind. A quick glance at plan allocations for schemes under textiles does indicate the seriousness of the government in achieving its objectives and the vision for 2010 (see Table 6.A3). Union Budget allocation for textiles in 2005–06 increased by over 113 per cent as compared to the average annual allocation during 1999– 2004. Allocation for the infrastructure schemes has increased by 11 times.
EXPORT PERFORMANCE OF THE INDIAN TEXTILE AND CLOTHING INDUSTRY Since most of the policy reforms have happened in the last three– four years, data on production and consumption of textiles comes with a significant lag, and there have been quota and other restraints on market access into US and EU. It is difficult to establish a causal relationship between the reforms and exports in the last few years. However, it can be argued that the export performance in recent times, especially in the post-quota year (2005), is definitely enabled—in significant measure—by the reforms.14 Numerous studies have been conducted on this subject and there is a vast body of work available. However, the few common conclusions of almost all studies are that the quota phase-out would bring about a massive restructuring in production and exports, a price fall in clothing and textile products, and significant gains to at least two countries from the A