International Water Treaties: Negotiation and Cooperation Along Transboundary Rivers (Routledge Studies in the Modern World Economy)

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International Water Treaties

As demand for fresh water rises, together with population, water scarcity features on the national security agenda of many countries, especially in the Middle East, North Africa, and Central Asia. While it is true that water disputes have taken a military turn on several occasions, thousands of water agreements have been concluded, the oldest of them dating back to 3100 BC. Despite the sensationalist appeal of the “water wars” thesis, the history of hydro-politics (e.g., the politics of water) has been rather one of cooperation and negotiation. The author of this book develops a theory to explain solutions to property rights conflicts over shared rivers. Through systematic analysis of available treaty texts, corresponding side-payment and cost-sharing patterns are gleaned. Geographic and economic variables are used to explain recurring property rights outcomes. Rather than focusing on a specific river or particular geographic region, the book analyzes numerous rivers, dictated by the large number of treaty observations, and is able to test several hypotheses, devising general conclusions about the manner in which states resolve their water disputes. Thereby policy implications are also gained. While the book simultaneously considers conflict and cooperation along international rivers, it is the focus on negotiated agreements, and their embodied side-payment and cost-sharing regimes, that justifies the use of particular independent variables. International Water Treaties is particularly relevant for scholars, researchers, and graduate-level students in the fields of international relations, geography, water engineering, natural resource economics, and international environmental law among others, and will also benefit practitioners, policy makers, and international organizations. Shlomi Dinar is Assistant Professor at the Department of International Relations and Geography, Florida International University.

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Routledge Studies in the Modern World Economy

1 Interest Rates and Budget Deficits A study of the advanced economies Kanhaya L. Gupta and Bakhtiar Moazzami 2 World Trade after the Uruguay Round Prospects and policy options for the twenty-first century Edited by Harald Sander and András Inotai 3 The Flow Analysis of Labour Markets Edited by Ronald Schettkat 4 Inflation and Unemployment Contributions to a new macroeconomic approach Edited by Alvaro Cencini and Mauro Baranzini 5 Macroeconomic Dimensions of Public Finance Essays in honour of Vito Tanzi Edited by Mario I. Blejer and Teresa M. Ter-Minassian 6 Fiscal Policy and Economic Reforms Essays in honour of Vito Tanzi Edited by Mario I. Blejer and Teresa M. Ter-Minassian

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13 Competition and Trade Policies Coherence or conflict Edited by Einar Hope 14 Rice The primary commodity A. J. H. Latham 15 Trade, Theory and Econometrics Essays in honour of John S. Chipman Edited by James C. Moore, Raymond Riezman and James R. Melvin 16 Who Benefits from Privatisation? Edited by Moazzem Hossain and Justin Malbon 17 Towards a Fair Global Labour Market Avoiding the new slave trade Ozay Mehmet, Errol Mendes and Robert Sinding 18 Models of Futures Markets Edited by Barry Goss 19 Venture Capital Investment An agency analysis of UK practice Gavin C. Reid

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31 Capital Flows without Crisis Reconciling capital mobility and economic stability Edited by Dipak Dasgupta, Marc Uzan and Dominic Wilson

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49 International Perspectives on Temporary Work and Workers Edited by John Burgess and Julia Connell 50 Working Time and Workers’ Preferences in Industrialized Countries Finding the balance Edited by Jon C. Messenger 51 Tax Systems and Tax Reforms in New EU Members Edited by Luigi Bernardi, Mark Chandler and Luca Gandullia 52 Globalization and the Nation State The impact of the IMF and the World Bank Edited by Gustav Ranis, James Vreeland and Stephen Kosak 53 Macroeconomic Policies and Poverty Reduction Edited by Ashoka Mody and Catherine Pattillo 54 Regional Monetary Policy Carlos J. Rodríguez-Fuentez 55 Trade and Migration in the Modern World Carl Mosk 56 Globalisation and the Labour Market Trade, technology and less-skilled workers in Europe and the United States Edited by Robert Anderton, Paul Brenton and John Whalley

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66 Street Entrepreneurs People, place and politics in local and global perspective Edited by John Cross and Alfonso Morales

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68 Globalization and Regional Integration The origins, development and impact of the single European aviation market Alan Dobson 69 Russia Moves into the Global Economy: Breaking Out John M. Letiche

72 International Water Treaties Negotiation and cooperation along transboundary rivers Shlomi Dinar

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International Water Treaties Negotiation and cooperation along transboundary rivers

Shlomi Dinar

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First published 2008 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016 This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2007. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.” Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2008 Shlomi Dinar All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data A catalog record for this book has been requested ISBN 0-203-93445-8 Master e-book ISBN ISBN10: 0–415–77208–7 (hbk) ISBN10: 0–203–93445–8 (ebk) ISBN13: 978–0–415–77208–2 (hbk) ISBN13: 978–0–203–93445–6 (ebk)

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To Rebecca, Gideon, and Issa

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Contents

List of illustrations Preface Acknowledgments

xiii xv xvii

1

Introduction

1

2

Explaining conflict, cooperation, and negotiation along international rivers

9

3

4

5

6

Treaty design and property rights: theory and hypotheses

37

Empirical analysis of treaty design differences: core configurations

64

Empirical analysis of treaty design differences: additional configurations

85

Conclusion Appendix A: Rivers, configurations, and associated treaties Appendix B: Geographical configurations for rivers shared by two states Appendix C: Selected literature for select river basins Appendix D: Treaty analysis for bilateral river configurations

104

118 132 135 141

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Appendix E: Threshold, rounding justification, and country asymmetry ratios Notes Bibliography Index

296 301 307 329

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Illustrations

Figures 1.1 Through-border and border-creator configurations 2.1 Toset, Gleditsch, and Hegre configurations E.1 Diminishing significance of threshold asymmetry point

3 18 298

Tables 2.1 Is cooperation over water dependent on hegemony? 4.1 International water treaties issue areas 4.2 Specific treaties for through-border configuration (water quantity) 4.3 Specific treaties for through-border configuration (hydropower, flood control, monitoring, dam construction, facility use) 4.4 Specific treaties for through-border configuration (pollution) 4.5 Specific treaties for border-creator configuration 5.1 Specific treaties for mixed configuration 5.2 Specific treaties for partial border-creator configuration 5.3 Specific treaties for border-creator but enters state configuration 5.4 Specific treaties for through-border * 2 configuration 5.5 Specific treaties for partial border-creator but returns configuration 5.6 Specific treaties for mixed zigzag configuration 5.7 Summary of results for additional configurations 6.1 Summary of results for all configurations A.1 Rivers, configurations, and associated treaties C.1 Selected literature for select river basins D.1 Treaty analysis for bilateral river configurations E.1 Descriptive statistics of the GDP ratio (raw and rounded) E.2 Two-sample T-test assuming equal variance E.3 Economic asymmetries and ratios

27 66 70

73 79 82 87 91 96 97 98 100 102 112 118 135 142 297 297 298

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Preface

This book develops a theory to explain solutions to property rights conflicts over shared rivers. Through systematic analysis of available treaty texts, corresponding side-payment and cost-sharing patterns are gleaned. Geographic and economic variables are used to explain recurring property rights outcomes. Rather than focusing on a specific river or particular geographic region (the so-called case study approach), this work analyzes numerous rivers, dictated by the large number of treaty observations, and is able to test several hypotheses, devising general conclusions about the manner in which states resolve their water disputes. The work is also unique because it explores the design of international water agreements that states negotiate in practice. Thus, while international water law attempts to provide river riparians with a general framework of principles for cooperation, the analysis of agreements clearly reveals the compromises states achieve. While the book simultaneously considers conflict and cooperation along international rivers, it is its focus on negotiated agreements and their embodied side-payment and cost-sharing regimes that justify the use of particular independent variables. Since an international river is essentially a commons resource, and commons problems are in many respects geographic in nature, the spatial domains of the river itself and the location of the respective riparians along the river should be important. The results presented in this book indicate that this is the case, not only for examining conflict and cooperation, but especially for understanding how property rights solutions are devised. Indeed, if side-payments and cost-sharing patterns are investigated then a state’s “willingness to pay” should also be significant. In other words, it should matter not only which state is upstream or downstream, but also which state is richer or poorer. That being said, when both geography and economics are considered together (a richer upstream riparian vs. a poorer upstream riparian, for example) compelling side-payment and cost-sharing patterns are exposed. The theoretical underpinnings, and the results, of this work provide equally interesting policy implications. Since side-payment and cost-sharing patterns are revealed across time, state precedent may be inferred. That is, despite the uniqueness

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of each river basin and water problem, similarities across regions and transboundary rivers are depicted in the property rights solutions that states devise for particular water disputes. Therefore, states currently in a conflict over a shared river, or mediators attempting to foster inter-state cooperation and negotiation, can consider how other states successfully concluded their own disputes, applying similar lessons and principles as they attempt to negotiate their particular water agreement.

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Acknowledgments

This project could not have been completed without the tutelage and assistance of a number of key people. My greatest debt goes to Scott Barrett of the School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) at Johns Hopkins University. Scott, a recognized scholar and authority on the issues of international cooperation and environmental agreements, is a committed mentor to his students. He was always willing to talk and discuss the project, reading the manuscript countless times and encouraging me to fine-tune the theory. Over the years Scott has been both a role model and friend. William Zartman, also of SAIS, deserves special mention. An international relations theorist and a renowned expert in the areas of conflict resolution and negotiation, he read the manuscript from beginning to end and motivated me to underscore the implications of my findings for both theory and practice. Other SAIS faculty that read the manuscript and provided helpful comments include Charles Doran and Jakub Grygiel. Aaron Wolf, of Oregon State University, played a pivotal role throughout the course of this project. His expertise in the area of hydropolitics and his readiness and enthusiasm to provide comments and suggestions proved invaluable. As this project was nearing completion, I was awarded a National Academy of Sciences (NAS) Award and had the great fortune and honor of spending time at the Institute of Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) located in Austria. Rudolph Avenhaus, Victor Kremenyuk, and Gunnar Sjöstedt of the Processes of International Negotiation Program all provided very useful comments and shared with me their vast expertise in negotiation theory and environmental politics. I am forever grateful to NAS and IIASA. Other people who provided me with an opportunity to run my ideas by them include: Samuel Barkin, Joanne Bayer, Elizabeth DeSombre, Eran Feitelson, Itay Fishhendler, Peter van Grinsven, Philippe Le Prestre, Richard Matthew, Thomas Naff, George Shambaugh, and Shira Yoffe. For their time I am obliged. Since the project required an analysis of a vast amount of treaties, numerous other organizations and people were tapped for assistance. The staff at Oregon State University’s Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database Project, one of the main on-line water treaty depositories, provided me with their entire list of international water agreements. Likewise, the Treaty Section at the United Nations Office of Legal Affairs, specifically Andrei Kolomoets, furnished me

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xviii Acknowledgments with a comprehensive list of all the relevant international water agreements they had available. Different staff members, too many to name here, at the Library of Congress in Washington, DC were extremely helpful, assisting me in locating treaties, or volumes where treaties could be found, from different national depositories. Foreign embassies in Washington, DC also provided assistance in locating agreements by putting me in touch with the right contacts in their home countries. It is due to their diligence and time that I was able to supplement agreements already available in different on-line depositories and test my theory on an expanded set of data. A number of experts in the respective river basins provided additional assistance for a clearer assessment of various treaties, or provided other types of treaty-related support. I am grateful to Pete Ashton, Frank Bevacqua, Stefano Burchi, Carlo Carraro, Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, Daniel Doctor, Viktor Dukhovny, Len Falkiner, Raymond Flynn, Carlo Giupponi, Ramaswamy Iyer, Rudolph Kobelt, Rustam Madumarov, Daene McKinney, Stefan Meisser, Peter Molinari, Shawn Morton, Markku Ollila, Richard Paisley, Umesh Nath Parajuli, Frank Quinn, Doug Robinson, Maria Saleth, Salman Salman, Jean Luc Salome, Christel Sauer, François Schröter, Sally Spener, Larry Stout, Anthony Turton, Kishor Uprety, Rick Walden, Anthony White, Niel Van Wyk, and Pieter Van Der Zaag. I am also indebted to a team of translators, which helped me understand the text of treaties written in various foreign languages. Countless times we convened and reconvened to decipher technical lingo and their hydro-political implications. Among them are Franco Furger, Jennifer Linker, Malka Older, Paulina Rudnicka, Mansour Sarre, and Adnan Vatansever. Mapping of rivers was also required to understand the geo-political implications of their flow. The staff at the World Bank and National Geographic Society Map Rooms in Washington, DC facilitated my efforts and provided me with any resource needed. A number of other people remain to be thanked: Danielle Mesko of SAIS helped to facilitate all affairs related to my project. The library staff at SAIS was also instrumental in locating books and offered other bibliographic aid. Tanja Huber, Aviott John, Eduard Löser, and Natalia Ovchinnikova assisted with all of my research needs at IIASA. Pradeep Kurukulasuriya and Camille Pecastaing helped with all of my statistical queries. Terry Clague, John Clement, Sarah Hastings, Robert Langham, Victoria Lincoln, and Joon Won Moon of Routledge were of great assistance throughout the publishing stages of the book. Geoffrey Needler, my father in law and a semantics and linguistics guru, took the time to read every word in this manuscript, making sure each chapter was grammatically sound. For his “wordsmithery” I am grateful. Geoffrey’s difficult battle with cancer ended a few months before the publication of this book. May he rest in peace. Finally, my family has contributed in extraordinary ways. My father Ariel Dinar, a respected authority in the fields of water and economics, provided a helping hand at every instance. Undoubtedly, this project benefited from his expertise and skill. My mother Mati, who has always given of herself for the sake

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of her family, never stopped encouraging me throughout this journey. My brother Roee and sister Shira were also of great inspiration. Unquestionably my adoring wife Rebecca deserves the most praise. She has seen me in the most stressful times throughout this project. Without her love, affection, friendship, and support this project would not have progressed. I am forever indebted to her. In addition, this project may not have come to fruition at the time that it did without the birth of Gideon, our first-born son. Gideon’s anticipated arrival prompted endless nights of typing. While Issa, my second son, was not around to see the completion of the research, he is around to see it being turned into a book form. For his inspiration in this final stage, I am thankful.

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Introduction

Background to the study The wars of the next century will be about water1

So goes a grim twenty-first century prediction echoed by well-respected institutions such as the World Bank. As demand for fresh water and populations rise, water scarcity is already on the national security agenda of many countries, especially in such regions as the Middle East, North Africa, and Central Asia. But despite the sensationalist appeal of the “water wars” thesis, the history of hydropolitics, or the politics of water, is one of cooperation and negotiation. Compared to the one all-out war that was sparked solely for the sake of water, 4,500 years ago, thousands of agreements over water have been recorded (Wolf and Hamner 2000: 57). The aim of this work is to systematically analyze this history of cooperation and negotiation by turning to the actual treaties states have negotiated. Among the transboundary environmental problems susceptible of empirical study, freshwater is unique in that the same kinds of problems occur throughout the world. While there is only one ozone depletion game, and climate change leads to a single outcome, numerous international freshwater problems share similar features. To be sure, the details are unique to each problem. To cite a single example; some river basins are made up of rich upstream states and poor downstream states. Nevertheless, the similarities are sufficient to make comparison of their outcomes possible. The empirical approach is facilitated by the more than 200 documented international river basins, 176 of which are shared by just two states (Wolf et al. 1999: 424). Furthermore, there are some 100 rivers that flow from one country into another without ever forming a common border, and a further 17 rivers that form the entire border between two countries without ever entering either country.2 When rivers and other bodies of water transverse or divide countries, transboundary externalities often produce conflict. The cause of the conflict is not simply attributable to resource scarcity or the fact that one riparian (e.g., a state sharing a river) harms another but, more importantly, that international law is broad in its definition of their rights and responsibilities. At the same time, conflict provides impetus for cooperation, and cooperation is almost always codified in international treaties.

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The following work explores the nature of bilateral conflicts over a river, and the treaty remedies open to the two countries (from 1864 to 2000). International water law provides only hints and suggestions as to how states should resolve their water disputes and coordinate their differing plans for the uses of a given river. This analysis, therefore, investigates actual negotiations between states over shared water resources, and explores the intricacies of the actual water treaties these states have negotiated. Specifically, the work inquires whether the observed variation in treaty outcomes (the dependent variable) can be explained by differences in geography and economics (the independent variables). The theory and testable hypotheses are developed in Chapter 3, which in particular, will test hypotheses regarding cost-sharing patterns and the transfer of side-payments between parties to ameliorate pollution problems and resolve disputes over flood control, hydropower, and water allocation. Side-payments and cost-sharing patterns provide perhaps the clearest means by which to evaluate agreements. They are often particularized in an agreement, thereby providing a useful tool for the assessment of treaty outcomes and revealing the negotiated property right solution. In essence, the “willingness to pay” of a particular country, expressed in the side-payment and cost-sharing patterns embodied in the agreement, reflects on the property right solution and is explained by geography and economics. For example, if a downstream state pays an upstream state to abate pollution, we can infer from this agreement that the downstream state does not have the exclusive right not to be harmed. It will be shown that side-payments do not conform to the extreme legal principles so often advocated. On the contrary, compromises are frequently negotiated. Yet the allocation data is not random: regularities emerge. The riparian location, while especially important, is not the only determinant of side-payments and cost-sharing patterns. The significance of this research, therefore, is not simply founded on a demonstration of how international agreements have resolved water conflicts in the past, but also discerns precedent for the resolution of pending and future conflicts. A further aim of this research is to probe the question of why cooperation over international rivers takes place at all. Is an agreement over an international river facilitated or impeded by geographical differences among the states along its length? Do power distinctions matter? What role does scarcity play? In Chapter 2, these and other questions are discussed in the context of the relevant literature. In addition, Chapter 2 considers the role of side-payments in promoting cooperation, thereby creating the basis to discuss how property right conflicts over water are resolved and how treaties differ in their design.

The essence of the book The geographical configuration of the river and economic asymmetries The main goal of this work is to investigate the relationship between the geographical configuration of a river shared between two states and differences

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3

in treaty design. As Mark Giordano has eloquently argued: “the commons problem is in many respects geographic in nature, in that the phenomenon is predicated on the relationship between the spatial domains of resources and resource users” (2003a: 365). My goal, therefore, is to investigate whether the location of a state on a river and the geographical configuration of the river – the most rudimentary element of the relationship between a resource and the resource users – result in different commons regimes. Earlier literature on the subject reveals that the conventional model of a transboundary river has an upstream and a downstream state. As such, the literature has only focused on a subset of rivers. But a river’s flow is multiform. This study has been able to identify a total of 226 rivers shared by two – and only two – states (see Appendix A)3 as well as 14 types of geographical configurations (see Appendix B). The map collections housed in the World Bank Map Room and the National Geographic Society Map Room, both in Washington, DC, were examined to identify the respective river configurations. While 14 configurations have been identified, this research focuses on two extreme types: the through-border river that flows from one country into another, crossing the border only once, and the border-creator river, which divides countries. Both types are depicted in Figure 1.1. There are two reasons for the selection of these distinct configurations. The first is to test differences between river geographies. A geographically asymmetric relationship exists in the through-border configuration. (The working assumption is that upstream country A can harm downstream country B’s part of the river but not vice versa.)4 A geographically symmetric relationship exists in the bordercreator configuration. In this instance, any state that engages in a harmful activity may harm itself as well as its neighbor. (Also, harm can be reciprocated.) Given the differences between the two configurations, tests of corresponding hypotheses can proceed in a relatively methodical and systematic manner, and multiple observations can be applied to the same configuration. The second reason for the typological dichotomy is that all rivers share features of these core geographical configurations. Thus, while Mother Nature does not purpose all rivers to be either through-border or border-creator, as Appendix B demonstrates, all shared rivers have properties of each of these distinct configurations. Through-Border

Border-Creator

River and flow direction State A

State B

State A

Border

State B

Figure 1.1 Through-border and border-creator configurations.

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The remaining chapters of this book will elaborate the differences between these two configurations and their contingent implications. Since each geographical configuration presents a different environmental problem, the solution may also have to be constructed differently (Dasgupta 1982: 31). An analysis of the additional configurations, demonstrating how the applied theory and hypotheses perform vis-à-vis the outlying data, is also provided. In short, a commons solution based on geography shall depend on the geographical configuration of the river and most importantly, the location of the riparians vis-à-vis one another. While geography is the main variable investigated, it is not sufficient for this type of analysis. That is, if only geography mattered, it would not be important that economic asymmetries characterized the relationship between river basin states and the downstream state were richer or poorer than the upstream state. But this may not be the case since a richer state may be better able, and willing, to expend particular costs for abating pollution, relative to a poorer state, in the river basin. Such a relationship directly impinges on a country’s “willingness to pay.” In this case, therefore, a commons solution shall depend on whether the riparians are economically symmetric or asymmetric (measured in GDP per capita). Therefore, a country’s economic circumstance, relative to its fellow riparian, is also under scrutiny. Case study focus To date, much of the research dealing with conflict and cooperation over shared waters has followed the motif of the individual case study. Rigorous analysis of particular regions and river basins has been the mainstay of the field (see Appendix C), and some comparative and analytical work has been conducted on conflict and cooperation over shared water in specific regions, with application potential to other river basins. However, very little work – exceptions different from this work are discussed later – has gleaned such a substantial number of treaties in order to identify patterns, empirically test, or devise, general conclusions about the manner in which states resolve their water disputes. Similarly, no work has investigated the relationship between geographic and economic variables and variations in treaty outcomes across a large data set. Moreover, patterns in side-payment transfers between countries have yet to be studied and empirically tested in this context. Other new approaches Wolf (1999) conducts a qualitative analysis of 49 treaties relating to water allocation. As with the present research, Wolf (1999) was interested in how vague and conflicting international legal principles are reconciled in actual negotiations among and between states. However, Wolf’s work differs from this in not seeking to empirically test or systematically explain variations in treaty outcomes according to any particular variable or set of hypotheses. Rather, Wolf describes how conflicting and extreme legal principles are often reconciled and moderated in

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negotiations among and between states. By so doing, he makes a theoretical contribution to the field and demonstrates how general patterns emerge from different negotiations over international water resources. For example, he argues that quantifiable concepts such as “needs-based” approaches for water allocation emerge in negotiations rather than the extreme and often intangible “rights-based” approaches. He also shows that existing uses by states are generally protected. Other differences between this research and that of Wolf (1999) include the numbers and kinds of observations used for making broader conclusions, as well as giving consideration to side-payment transfers as a function of property rights conflict resolution. Moreover, Wolf (1999) looks at several treaties that refer to compensation to draw attention to the “economic” and “beneficial use” criteria that emerge in water negotiations. This book, on the other hand, considers the direction of the side-payment transfer between states involved in specific disputes to conclude how property right conflicts are resolved in different situations. In an effort to statistically test the relationship between particular variables and treaty outcomes across a large data set, two articles, one by Espey and Towfique (2004) and the other by Song and Whittington (2004) deserve special mention as they attempt to make both theoretical and empirical contributions to the field of hydro-politics. The work of both sets of authors is similar to the work envisioned here only with respect to the goal of testing hypotheses across a large set of treaty observations. The chief difference between the work here and these two papers, however, is the underlying question being posed and answered. Espey and Towfique (2004) and Song and Whittington (2004) ask why agreements are formalized in some river basins but not others, or among some countries but not others. This work, on the other hand, is primarily interested in both why – as well as how – agreements vary in their design. Rather than inquire why conflict ensues in one river basin and cooperation in another river basin, this book undertakes to show how treaties vary in their design. It studies cooperation and negotiation, and adumbrates the ways in which conflict may abate between states sharing a given river. At the same time, by looking at actual treaties that have been formalized between nations, this work demonstrates how international legal principles, devised specifically to help settle water disputes, are employed (or not, as the case may be) in actual negotiations, according to specific variables. Other differences between this work and that of Wolf (1999), Espey and Towfique (2004) and Song and Whittington (2004) are noteworthy. For one, the authors use different data than the treaty data used here. In addition, they employ Oregon State University’s International Freshwater Treaties Database, a compilation of about 400 bilateral and multilateral international water treaties. Song and Whittington (2004) also make use of other references for attaining additional treaties. The Oregon State Treaties Database has also been used here, but additional treaties have been obtained from individual governments, as well as other depositories and references that were not cited by the other authors. The substance of the data that was obtained from these sources has been of prime importance. While taking into consideration some of the same treaties used by the authors mentioned in the preceding paragraph, making use of additional

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treaties gleaned from other sources, has provided substantially more treaty information. Neither Espey and Towfique (2004) nor Song and Whittington (2004) evince much interest in the content of the treaties, nor do they focus on agreements that speak to specific problems. On the other hand, the analysis of content has been the focus in reviewing the treaties, which leads, importantly, to a related point. While water treaties that deal broadly with “cooperation” have been collected and analyzed, the essential aim here is to isolate those agreements that undertake to resolve specific problems, such as combating pollution and settling hydropower complications. Accordingly, only these problem-specific treaties are included within the main hypotheses testing. The reasoning behind this approach is explained later. The need to understand the specific nature of each agreement and to provide an accurate analysis has also led to personal interviews with those who are familiar with the respective agreements. Another significant distinction is that many recorded treaties were crafted in languages other than English, making translation necessary. Such treaties make up a relatively important part of data employed here, while the larger research questions of Espey and Towfique (2004) and Song and Whittington (2004) do not require translation. The investigation of bilateral treaties by Espey and Towfique (2004) includes bilateral treaties for river basins with more than two riparians. Song and Whittington (2004), in turn, focus on both bilateral and multilateral treaties. Wolf (1999) also includes both bilateral and multilateral treaties. This book looks at bilateral treaties within river basins shared by only two riparians. The reasoning behind this approach is also elaborated below. In summary, then, all three of the cited works, as well as the research envisioned here, employ both a general and broad approach, attempting to make theoretical contributions to the field by observing large numbers of international water treaties. However, the major contribution of this work is not only in the underlying questions being posed and answered but also in the theory and set of hypotheses developed for systemically testing across a large number of observations. Why only bilateral and specific agreements? To understand the nature of negotiated water treaties, the emphasis has been placed on bilateral agreements over rivers shared by only two states. River basins with more than two riparians, if governed by a bilateral agreement, have been excluded, as have agreements among three or more countries. There are important methodological advantages to focusing on the two-country grouping. The aim is to study treaty outcomes for rivers having a similar geography. There are many rivers with an upstream and downstream riparian, but fewer for other possible configurations. In fact, river basins with only two riparians are more numerous than those with more riparians; 176 versus 85, respectively (Wolf et al. 1999: 424). Thus, prospects for cooperation are more likely when there are fewer actors (Barrett 2003; Olson 1965: 53; Ostrom 1992: 299; Oye 1986: 18; Russett and Sullivan 1971). In a situation with a relatively large number of actors, both the probability of defection and the feasibility of sanctioning defectors decrease (Oye 1986: 19). As a

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corollary, the number of water agreements affecting rivers shared by only two states, will be larger. Bargaining theory also shows that there can be a huge difference between situations involving three rather than two parties, because of the potential for forming coalitions (Barrett 2003: 80; Shapley and Shubik 1969). Obviously, the fewer the parties to the negotiations, the less the process will be susceptible to extraneous complexities such as their role differentiation (Zartman 1994: 4–7). Further, taking into account bilateral scenarios within multilateral contexts opens up the possibility that an issue thought to be limited to two states actually involves a third or fourth state. In a river basin with three countries, for example, pollution harming country A is thought to come from country B when, in fact, pollution may be traceable to country C. Because of a bilateral focus in such a multilateral context, measurement or analysis of the pollution problem does not take this into account. For the foregoing reasons, focusing on rivers shared by only two states makes analysis methodologically simpler. Similarly, once initial broader conclusions and patterns can be formulated for the bilateral case, the analysis can then be extended in later research to take account of the qualities intrinsic in multilateral settings. Particular kinds of treaties are also described. All the relevant bilateral agreements that were collected (see Appendix D) are investigated, described, and catalogued (just over 280 agreements). Still the main interest is in treaties that bind signatories to take specific actions, such as reduction of pollution, or diversion of water, or construction of a hydroelectric dam. This is because the goal of this work is to understand how treaties resolve property rights conflicts. In fact, in order to investigate patterns of side-payments and their relationship to particular problems, the treaties selected for empirical testing were only those dealing specifically with those issues ( just over 90 agreements). General accords that vaguely oblige the parties to cooperate over a given river must necessarily omit side-payments since they do not solemnize any specific action or project. General cooperative agreements have been omitted from the main analysis, which is reported in Chapters 4 and 5. The pool of such agreements is undoubtedly smaller – since it is always easier for states to agree on generalities rather than specificities5 – yet general agreements are often negotiated to set the context for more specific future arrangements. Though this work embraces a smaller pool of treaties, the strategy it employs can be telling for the process of negotiation over water. More often than not, contention between states erupts over such specific issues as water allocation, pollution, flood control, or hydropower. Conflicting interests over specific issues are what drive international water conflicts and, contingently, make specific agreements crucial. These conflicts and, likewise, prospects for their resolution, form the inspiration underlying international legal principles. Property rights and international water law: poorly defined and unclear The main contribution this research aspires to make is to demonstrate how international legal principles for negotiating water disputes are expressed in actual practice.

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Arguments presented here show that the international legal principles that have evolved over the years have provided states with only contradictory and vague directions for resolving conflicting uses for, and interests in, a shared international river. The two seminal legal principles are, on the one hand, the principle of absolute territorial sovereignty and, on the other hand, the principle of absolute territorial integrity. The former principle recognizes that the property right belongs to the upstream state allowing it to take any action it wants with “its” river, without necessarily considering the harm done to the downstream state. The latter principle recognizes the property right as belonging to the downstream state, which has the right not be harmed by any action taken upstream. To its credit, contemporary international water law has articulated a compromise principle, arguing the two extreme principles by themselves do not hold. These conflicting principles may achieve compromise under the auspices of legal societies whose international declarations invariably include language that places them in unison in the same legal clause. In 1997 the General Assembly adopted the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses. Seven years later, due to an insufficient number of favoring states, the Convention has yet to be ratified. But its text has come to serve as a general agreement framework that is rich in material developed for use by states in resolving their water disputes. Among its 37 articles, the Convention celebrates a small number of key principles yet these are not only vague but also effectively, and not infrequently, at odds with one another. Under such circumstances, it is not surprising that only a handful of nations have ratified the Convention while most have faulted it. Some have criticized its main principles for being too lofty and ambiguous while others, depending on their geographical position on a river, have grumbled that it benefits the other riparian country. Chapter 3 will address this in greater detail. To be fair, international water law does not pretend to prescribe explicit rules for states to follow but rather broad guidelines and recognized principles. International water law, therefore, provides the general framework, while the negotiated treaty prescribes the specific actions to be taken by the states. In fact, states have been able to negotiate agreements over shared international rivers with great skill, and have also been able to resolve property rights conflicts. As this work shows, treaties over shared waters allow us to discern patterns. These, in turn, point the way to clearer guidelines, which, in fact, exist to assist states experiencing – or trying to resolve – conflict over shared water resources. Thus while high legal principles may be explicitly expressed in a treaty, the manner by which they are articulated can be observed and scrutinized. The remaining chapters are dedicated to that analysis.

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Explaining conflict, cooperation, and negotiation along international rivers

The essential purpose of this work is to explain how and why treaties over water differ in their design. Before delving into that specific question, however, the more general phenomenon of why treaties are negotiated at all needs to be understood. That is, why do some countries negotiate treaties over shared rivers while other countries do not? Why does cooperation arise in some situations and not in others? Once we understand why countries cooperate, the context will be set for explaining differences in treaty design. Understanding of how conflicting international legal principles are reconciled in practice will follow. This chapter reviews the literature and analyzes the hydro-political cooperation dilemma, paying special attention to the role of side-payments in fostering cooperation.

Scarcity: driving conflict but also cooperation According to Elhance, “hydro-politics is the systematic study of conflict and cooperation between states over water resources that transcend international borders” (1999: 3). Indeed, the international and transborder characteristics of shared water bodies make them a compelling test case for the analysis of conflict and cooperation. River riparians are physically interdependent because water bodies respect no political borders. The hydrology of an international river basin links all the riparian states, requiring them to share a complex network of environmental, economic, political and security interdependencies. Therein lies the potential for interstate conflict as well as opportunities for cooperation (Elhance 1999: 13). Countries may suffer from scarcity in water supply, energy, flood prevention facilities or pollution control and may be, therefore, inclined to exploit an international river. In arid regions, for example, countries may utilize the waters of their shared rivers for domestic water consumption. Water scarcity may then be exemplified in the periodic shortages a nation may experience that, in turn, may be intensified by the conflicting uses to which its neighbors have put the river. Falkenmark has argued that environmental stress results when the population grows large in relation to the water supply derived from the global water cycle. In consequence, conflicts may easily arise when users are competing for a limited resource to supply the domestic, industrial and agricultural sectors (Falkenmark 1992: 279–80).

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The same author has also argued that 1,000 cubic meters of water per capita per year constitutes the minimum necessary for an adequate quality of life in a moderately developed country (1986: 192–200). When water availability drops below this figure, scarcity problems grow intense. As water scarcity and environmental scarcity, in general, become more acute, violent conflict becomes more probable. This link embraces such issues as constrained agricultural and economic activity, migration, greater segmentation of society, and disruption of institutions (Homer-Dixon 1999: 80). Various conflicts can develop, whether at the individual, or the national level (Falkenmark 1992: 292). In the case of pollution, for example, the cost of water contamination is often borne by the downstream riparians, abetting a further lack of bilateral cooperation (Kratz 1996: 26). Nations may, therefore, suffer from scarcity in water supply, energy, flood prevention facilities, or pollution control and may be apt to exploit the river or request fellow riparians to take particular actions. Naturally, this may provoke conflict between the riparians (Gleick 1993: 79–110; 1998: 4; Homer-Dixon 1999: 67–9; Myers 1993; Samson and Charrier 1997: 6). As Elhance has observed about the unilateral exploitation of a shared resource: by itself scarcity of natural resources does not necessarily lead to interstate conflict . . . It is when such a resource is rightly or wrongly perceived as being overexploited or degraded by others at a cost to oneself, that states may become prone to conflict. (1999: 4) Choucri and North (1975) have further argued that countries facing high resource demands and limited resource availability would seek the needed resources through trade or conquest. According to the lateral pressure theory propounded by those authors, when national capabilities (including resources) cannot be attained at a reasonable cost within national boundaries, they may be sought beyond (Choucri and North 1975: 16). Scarcity and poor distribution can, therefore, just as easily magnify the potential for conflict (Naff 1994: 282). This argument is also related to the “water wars” thesis, which argues that water disputes, driven by water scarcity and resource capture between states, are likely to lead to interstate war (Cooley 1984; Starr 1991). On the other hand, for the same reasons that scarcity can lead to interstate conflict, it can also lead to cooperation. Attempting to ameliorate scarcity or to exploit a river so as to satisfy a particular need, whether water quantity or hydroelectricity can encourage states to cooperate for their mutual benefit. As Deudney has suggested, resource scarcity based on environmental degradation tends to encourage joint efforts to halt such degradation (1991: 10). With regard to the “water wars” thesis, Wolf (1998a) has documented the results of a systematic search for interstate violence involving water specifically as a scarce and/or consumable resource and found only one true water war – 4,500 years ago – along with only seven cases of acute water-related violence between

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1918 and 1994. As Wolf and Hamner have noted in a survey of hundreds of nonnavigational water treaties: “the more valuable lesson of international water is as a resource whose characteristics tend to induce cooperation” (2000: 66). Homer-Dixon (1999: 141) has likewise argued that historic and contemporary evidence shows that violent conflict related to river water is almost always internal rather than international. As such, international water issues seldom turn violent, though that is not to say that international disputes over water do not arise. However, just as water may be an impetus to dispute among states, it is often a catalyst for international cooperation. As even Choucri and North claim in articulating their lateral pressure theory, one method of increasing capabilities (including resources) is to secure favorable alliances. Such alliances, treaties, and other international compacts are frequently enacted to end or moderate conflicts of interest. Such bonds usually imply the pooling of some capabilities for the maintenance of shared interests (1975: 21, 219). Environmental disparities modify the meaning of ecological interdependence whereby “states and groups of states will try to seek alliances as they seek to exploit, or to escape, these disparities” (Brock 1992: 99). As Dokken argues, in some cases such environmental scarcities and environmental problems may be considered the starting points for cooperation (Dokken 1997). With regard to water’s attributes in fostering conflict or facilitating cooperation Gottman has suggested that: “hydrographic considerations certainly play an increased part in national and international politics, sometimes as a binding link, and sometimes as a dividing line in human destiny” (1951: 160). It becomes important, therefore, to emphasize that just as scarcity may lead to conflict among states, it is often due to scarcity that states tend to cooperate. The goal of a cooperative venture is to ameliorate the scarcity and coordinate uses along a river. Realism, neorealism, liberalism, neoliberal institutionalism and strategic interaction: understanding the larger context of conflict and cooperation The choice between conflict and cooperation over international rivers may be illuminated in the larger context of differing theories of international relations. These theories offer alternative explanations for why states may elect to cooperate in some instances and not others, and are briefly explicated in the following section. Realism and neorealism Scarcity compounded by the complex interdependence ascribed to river riparians places parties in a very precarious and potentially volatile situation. According to neorealist thinking, interdependence not only highlights the sensitivities between countries but also their reciprocal, mutual vulnerabilities. This tends to make cooperation difficult and tensions more likely as states attempt to reduce their dependence on other countries (Waltz 1970: 206, 210; 1979).

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Cooperation is made difficult for other more general reasons. Realists and neorealists argue that the anarchical nature of the international system implores states to care for their survival (Gilpin 1975; Greico 1990: 38; Morgenthau 1967; Waltz 1979). Similarly, since no world government exists, states essentially coexist in an environment of self-help (Waltz 1979). According to neorealists, states are also preoccupied with the gains of other states, relative to their own gains, in addition to their concerns about survival (Greico 1990: 28; Powell 1991: 315; Snidal 1991; Waltz 1979: 105). Cooperation among states may produce a situation where one country attains more than another, allowing it to use these gains to inflict harm on the other state. A state may, therefore, decline to join, leave, or limit its commitment to a cooperative arrangement if it comes to believe that the discrepancies in otherwise mutually desirable gains favor its treaty partners (Greico 1990: 10). According to realists and neorealists, the relative gains dilemma combined with the challenges to a state’s security, all in the context of anarchy, make cooperation an anomaly. States often fail to cooperate even when they have common interests (Gilpin 1975: 26, 34; Stein 1990: 109; Waltz 1979: 105). Potential for conflict is rooted in the very nature of international politics, in the constant struggle for power, survival and relative gains. Moreover, concerned with their relative gains, states may decline to cooperate even when they are confident their partners will honor their commitments to cooperate (Greico 1990: 44). The cooperation that emerges between states is either the result of collaborative arrangements that favor each of them with balanced and equitable gains (since disproportionate gains in favor of one party may be used to the other’s detriment), or is simply a reflection of the distribution of power (Gilpin 1987; Greico 1990: 47; Mearsheimer 1994/1995: 7). Side-payments may be used to offset the relative gains concerns of disadvantaged parties (Greico 1990: 231). In the latter case, states cooperate when cooperation serves the interests of the most powerful state that takes the initiative in formulating a cooperative regime. Otherwise known as hegemonic stability theory, the theory predicts that cooperation will take place only in the presence of a hegemon and only if that hegemon chooses to formulate a cooperative regime. Such imposed orders are not only fostered by dominant powers but often do not require the consent of subordinate actors. They are usually established by coercion, cooptation and the manipulation of incentives (Young 1982: 284). In this view of malevolent hegemony, states are waiting to defect and need to be compelled not to do so. Power asymmetries are therefore conducive to cooperation if the hegemon is so inclined. Liberalism and neoliberal institutionalism Opposing the realist and neorealist schools is a less gloomy view of the emergence of cooperation. While liberals agree with realists that anarchy challenges interacting states, liberals do not agree with realists that anarchy necessarily evolves into conflict. In fact, cooperation is preferred to conflict, and its failure is often due to

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misunderstandings and misperceptions among states (Ferguson and Mansbach 1988: 91–7; Hollis and Smith 1991: 18; Stein 1990: 55). Cooperation emerges as self-interested actors, coexisting in an anarchic environment, reach autonomous and independent decisions that lead to mutually desirable cooperative outcomes. States are “rational egoists” and will therefore cooperate if they have mutual interests and stand to gain from cooperation. In fact, the complex interdependence that characterizes river riparians is not purely a form of vulnerability between them, as the neorealist school would hold, but rather a type of relationship where neither state may act without some type of coordination with the other party (Burton 1972). Utilizing the river and ameliorating scarcity often require joint actions, especially when unilateral efforts are not deemed efficient. Such a requisite constitutes the riparians’ mutual interest in cooperation and coordination. The ability of states to attain a mutually satisfying outcome, thus making cooperation more common, derives from the neoliberal assumption that states are concerned with absolute gains, rather than relative gains. In short, states will seek to maximize their particular individual gains and will remain indifferent to the gains achieved by others (Axelrod 1984: 14; Lipson 1984: 2, 5; Stein 1990: 46). Most importantly for the discussion on cooperation and negotiation related to transboundary water agreements, neoliberal institutionalists contend that it is the prospect of cheating, rather than the relative gains dilemma, which provokes curtailment of cooperation. However, cheating may be mitigated and cooperation facilitated. In fact, cooperation and attempts to mitigate cheating often depend on the creation of institutional arrangements among states. A state’s behavior in the international arena is often a reflection of established rules, norms, and conventions, and these arrangements highlight compliance, prescribe behavioral roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations (Haggard and Simmons 1987: 495; Keohane 1989: 2, 4, 14; Krasner 1983: 2–5). Therefore, the emergence of cooperation among parties is possible when compliance problems and mistrust among them can be mitigated with the help of institutions that provide information, lower transaction costs, increase transparency, and reduce uncertainty (Keohane 1982: 338; 1989: 2, 4, 14; Keohane and Martin 1995: 42; Oye 1986: 20–2; Stein 1983: 123). Neoliberal thinkers are less clear when it comes to explaining the emergence of institutions, regimes, and cooperative arrangements. Though they refer to hegemonic stability theory and argue that the supply of regimes and institutions requires a hegemon (Keohane 1980: 136; 1990: 741), they also support an opposite view to the effect that the demand for international regimes will likewise create their supply (Keohane 1982: 141–2). That is, states are concerned with absolute gains, rather than relative gains, and when it is realized that these gains can be attained through cooperation states will form cooperative regimes. As Stein has observed: regimes arise because actors forgo independent decision making in order to deal with the dilemmas of common interests and common aversions . . .

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Conflict, cooperation, and negotiation [actors] do so in their own self-interest, for in both cases jointly accessible outcomes are preferable to those that are or might be reached independently. (1990: 39)

Strategic interaction: the missing link for explaining cooperation Acknowledging the realist assumptions – self-interest and sovereignty – that would otherwise impede cooperation, Barrett (2003) argues from a neoliberal standpoint that unilateralism often fails to sustain a mutually satisfying outcome and that cheating often curtails cooperation. He further claims that the key to cooperation and treaty formation (regimes and institutions) is self-enforcement (see also Frisvold and Schimmelpfennig 1998: 27). By including a strategic interaction approach to cooperation and treaty making, Barrett has operationalized institutions and cooperative arrangements. He is able to explain not only how agreements come about, but also how they may succeed. Such a strategic interaction approach, making the agreements self-enforcing, is crucial in explaining how cooperation and agreements over transboundary rivers emerge. It is explained later and explored, in the context of international rivers, throughout the book. According to Barrett, cooperation and treaties must satisfy several conditions. Due to the impeding influence of sovereignty on treaty formation, and cooperation in general, cooperative arrangements need to be “individually rational.” The idea of individual rationality presumes that states decide independently whether to participate in an international agreement, with the ultimate aim of maximizing their own payoff. Further, it means that (1) no party to the treaty can gain by withdrawing, given the choices made by other countries, and (2) no party may gain by failing to comply, given the treaty’s design. “Collective rationality,” on the other hand, presumes that cooperating states maximize their collective payoff. That is, countries will not gain collectively by changing their treaty. Barrett also argues that treaties must be fair and legitimate (2003: xii–xiv). Though the parties may benefit by cooperating, the possibility that commitments could be broken may impede cooperation. Self-enforcement is therefore critical in assuring cooperation. Most relevant, therefore, is Barrett’s assertion that a successful self-enforcing international treaty should have the effect of restructuring the incentives of the parties in order to conform their behavior to its tenets. He affirms that the use of side-payments may be one way of restructuring incentives and altering a state’s behavior. Side-payments may be most compelling with regard to cooperation in asymmetric situations (Barrett 2003: xv, 338–40, 351). Side-payment arrangements are the main interest of this research and are further dealt with later and in Chapter 3. Along the same lines as Barrett, Axelrod and Keohane have argued that the payoff structure of a game often affects the level of cooperation (1985: 228). These authors do not speak specifically about the role of side-payment arrangements as a means to alter payoffs. But like Barrett, they argue that parties may benefit from continuing cooperation if they can once achieve it. This makes the

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choice of strategies for changing payoff structures extremely important (Axelrod and Keohane 1985: 231). More to the point, Oye (1986) suggests that if mutual benefit cannot be realized through cooperation – because the parties do not perceive gains resulting from their cooperation – then cooperative agreements will not be forthcoming (1986: 10–11). Concern about the future, or the “shadow of the future,” also helps to promote cooperation and alters payoffs (Axelrod and Keohane 1985: 232; Oye 1986: 12–18). This is especially true in “iterated interactions” as opposed to single interactions among states (Jervis 1978: 179–80). In the absence of continuing interaction between the parties, defection will likely emerge as the dominant strategy. Retaliation targeted at the defecting party cannot be employed in the context of a single interaction among states if no further opportunities for contact are anticipated. However, if the parties expect to be placed in a similar situation in the future, the prospects for cooperation improve as the would-be defector considers the potential gains from future interaction. “Iterated interactions” also allow the parties to resort to a strategy of reciprocity, whereby a promise to respond to present cooperation with future cooperation and a threat to respond to present defection with future defection can improve the prospects for cooperation (Axelrod 1984: 13–31; Oye 1986: 15). Reciprocity may, therefore, give rise to extensive cooperation without making the cooperating participants excessively vulnerable to exploitation by each other (Axelrod and Keohane 1984: 244). Issue-linkage is another strategy that may be used to foster cooperation and alter payoffs (Oye 1986: 11; Susskind and Ozawa 1992: 153; Victor et al. 1998: 12; Young 1993: 446–7). Issue-linkage refers to attempts to gain bargaining leverage on any single issue contingent on the other party’s interest in another, perhaps unrelated, issue (Haas 1980: 372; Young 1975: 394). The parties’ resources may be sufficiently different so that it makes sense to trade one issue for another. Styled “issue aggregation” by Hopmann, this process entails linking asymmetric issues among the parties such that Country A feels strongly about one issue while Country B feels just as strongly about the other issue, creating a ripe environment for tradeoffs (1996: 81). Cooperation can occur, but requires a favoring contractual environment, whereby states are able to make credible commitments, enact joint rules, and monitor each other’s behavior. It must “be feasible for governments to make and keep agreements that incorporate jointly enacted rules, without debilitating fear of free riding or cheating by others” (Keohane et al. 1993: 19). As the literature on strategic interaction implies, cooperation is not only fostered by the creation of institutions and regimes, but most importantly, depends on the kind of regime or agreements negotiated between the parties. The agreement must be able to restructure the parties’ incentives to cooperate. Concluding remarks For the neorealists, cooperation is an anomaly. Scarcity and the complex interdependence, which bind river riparians, place states in a precarious situation making

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cooperation less likely. Similarly, the relative gains dilemma often scuttles the desire of states to foster agreements and regimes. Concerned with their survival, states will not enter into arrangements that may provide more gains to another party. Only when they sense that the benefits are balanced will they cooperate with other states. If cooperation does emerge it is often a reflection of an interested (and often coercive) hegemon. In short, due to the anarchical system of self-help, which encourages relative gains concerns, states are motivated by mutual fear and distrust. Competition is thus built into all forms of collective action and international politics always takes place in the shadow of security rivalries. For the liberals, cooperation is the norm and is often scuttled by misunderstandings among states. According to neoliberal institutionalists, anarchy impedes cooperation but defection is a function of the fear of cheating. Therefore, states concerned with maximizing their benefits, and attaining absolute benefits, can realize cooperation through regimes such as institutions and agreements. States cooperate when it is in their interest. Alleviating scarcity provides the main impetus for coordination. Similarly, the interdependence ascribed to river riparians often means that cooperation is more efficient, and often more reasonable, than undertaking unilateral and uncoordinated initiatives. Indeed, cooperation in the international arena is not an anomaly. One need only consider the example of international rivers to realize that cooperation between states can and does take place. In fact, as the section below argues (1) states will cooperate if it is in their mutual benefit; (2) states are concerned with maximizing their benefits and will cooperate if agreements are self-enforcing or if cooperation can provide for mutual gains; and finally (3) cooperation does not depend on hegemony but rather on voluntary contracting among states. Yet if a hegemon is a party to the negotiations it is seldom a coercive actor. The very character of international rivers causes states to cooperate electively when they perceive that immediate or future mutual gains may result from cooperation. Cooperation among states is often facilitated when regimes and treaties are able to restructure their incentives, and such restructuring is brought about by strategic interaction, which can also help regimes and/or international agreements to become self-enforcing. Issue-linkage, reciprocity, and side-payments are the building blocs of strategic interaction. While this book discusses all three phenomena, side-payments are of special interest and its main focus.

Conflict and cooperation: the hydro-political context In the context of hydro-politics, scarcity, or critical dependence on a shared river, often positions states between the extremes of conflict and cooperation. Realist and neorealist concerns regarding autonomy, self-interest, and sovereignty are relevant in the study of cooperation over water. In fact, scholars have argued that cooperation over international rivers often fails because it challenges core concerns of states such as sovereignty, territorial integrity, and security (Elhance 1999: 7; Just and Netanyahu 1998: 10). In general, a state does not like to share its natural resources. Combined with the unpredictability of interstate

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relations, and the vulnerabilities associated with interdependence, states are reluctant to enter into binding, long-term water-sharing agreements with their neighbors (Elhance 1999: 237). Acknowledging realist concerns, it is striking that cooperation over shared rivers (and by extension agreements) takes place at all. To be sure, cooperation occurs among those states preoccupied with their security, sovereignty, and political animosity toward a neighbor. As liberals and neoliberals contend, countries are able to realize joint gains and pursue cooperative arrangements when it is in their interest to do so. In the context of an international river, tackling scarcity and coordinating uses along its course provide this important impetus. Having exhausted unilateral options or having realized that cooperative and integrated projects would produce additional benefits, countries have turned to cooperation rather than remain in conflict over a shared river. The problem of cooperation, therefore, centers on assuring that all states will honor their commitments to an agreement. Institutions and regimes are created for this purpose. The main obstacle to fostering cooperation, therefore, is negotiating the terms of institutional arrangements that bind the parties or that provide mutual benefits for all concerned. Strategic interaction, therefore, becomes instrumental in understanding why and how agreements and regimes take shape. To assess this phenomenon in the context of international rivers, it is necessary to delve even deeper into the hydro-political context for understanding incentives to cooperation. Geography The starting point for contemplating the hydro-political cooperation dilemma reposes in the river itself. The physical geography of the river defines the possibilities for where, how, and when the multiple uses of its water can be developed and used by riparian states (Elhance 1999: 15). The imposition of political boundaries on rivers creates different geographical relationships between basin countries, which often provide different incentives for cooperation. It is possible to divide international rivers into two “pure” and extreme configurations, as noted in Chapter 1. These are the through-border and border-creator configurations. The former provides for an asymmetric relationship between upstream and downstream states, because one country occupies a geographically superior position. The latter creates a relationship based on a geographically symmetric relationship between two states, both of which are situated beside a shared river. Because they are such opposite configurations, the juxtaposition of the through-border configuration with the border-creator configuration helps to assess the potential for cooperation over international rivers. In addition to the powerful role played by scarcity in explaining why cooperation may or may not occur, the geography of the river may facilitate or inhibit cooperation over a river. In fact, the literature has consistently pointed to geography, and especially the geographic discrepancies between upstream and downstream states, as the main

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reason water conflicts have not been solved (Falkenmark 1990: 184; Gottmann 1951: 159; Just and Netanyahu 1998: 11; Toset et al. 2000: 980–1). It is by no means certain that conflict in the exploitation of border-creator rivers can be avoided (Falkenmark 1986: 96), but the geography of border-creator rivers helps by simplifying both retaliation and reciprocity. In the first large-observation study, Toset et al. (2000) have attempted to test the potential for conflict between pairs of nations, based on the river configurations they share. While the authors do not test the likelihood of either conflict and cooperation over shared rivers per se – they are rather interested in the likelihood of militarized and low intensity disputes between states based on the river types they share – their approach affords insight into the likelihood of conflict or cooperation based on river geography. Toset et al. (2000) discern three river types. Like this book, they recognize the through-border configuration – which they call an “upstream/downstream” relationship – but they do not investigate the border-creator configuration. Rather they test two other river geographies. Both of these – labeled “mixed” and “river boundary” relationships – embed an inherent potential for retaliation and reciprocity. These types are diagramed in Figure 2.1. In obtaining their results for the relationship between conflict and river geography, these authors find that all three configurations are significant and have a positive relationship with interstate militarized disputes. But they go on to point out that the “upstream/downstream” relationship is indeed the most conflict-prone type (given their coefficients), with the “mixed” and the “river border” relationships, in that order, less prone to conflict (Toset et al. 2000: 989–90). LeMarquand (1977) presents perhaps the first analysis that speculates about the relationship between different river geographies and the potential for conflict and cooperation over a shared water body. He discusses “successive” (e.g., the upstream/downstream configuration) and “contiguous” (e.g., where the river forms some part of the border between the two states) rivers (1997: 8). While LeMarquand does not necessarily distinguish between the through-border and border-creator configurations, which this book investigates, he draws two distinct conclusions about conflict and cooperation based on these two river geographies.

Upstream/Downstream

Mixed

River Boundary

border

State B

State B

State B

river State A

State A

Figure 2.1 Toset, Gleditsch, and Hegre configurations.1

State A

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According to LeMarquand, when the river is “contiguous,” there is significant incentive for cooperation. The incentive to attain such cooperation is to avoid the “tragedy of the commons” (LeMarquand 1977: 9). Alternatively, cooperation finds no incentive when the upstream country uses the river’s water to the detriment of the downstream country and that country has no reciprocal power over the upstream country (LeMarquand 1977: 10). Generally, then, conflict is facilitated in the through-border configuration while cooperation is facilitated in the border-creator configuration. Therefore, in the through-border configuration, potential for conflict is greater and agreement less likely. Conversely, in the border-creator configuration, potential for conflict is much smaller and agreement more likely. By extension, since the potential for conflict is reduced – due to simple geography – it might be expected that border-creator rivers would figure prominently in any survey of cooperative arrangements over international waters. Conversely, in the through-border configuration, because the upstream country can use the river to the detriment of the downstream country, and because the two riparians may have incompatible utilization plans, agreement may be more difficult to achieve. Geography and aggregate power Following LeMarquand’s (1977) geographical argument to its logical conclusion, an upstream state using an international river to the detriment of the downstream state ought not to be expected to cooperate in its use. To be fair, LeMarquand (1977) does argue that a downstream state will need to utilize some reciprocal power to sway the upstream state to cooperate, thereby motivating the following discussion about military and economic power that can be used to offset the geographical advantage of upstream states. In fact, if we incorporate some element of military and economic power, the so-called aggregate power held by a state, into the hydro-political equation we are then able to better understand how cooperation may ensue in upstream/downstream situations. In the hydro-politics literature, some have affirmed that imbalances in power relationships impede cooperation (Hijri and Grey 1998: 89; Just and Netanyahu 1998: 9). Yet a variant of hegemonic stability theory has been regularly applied in the hydro-politics literature to explain cooperation over shared waters. Writing in the context of arid regions, Lowi (1993) has been its main advocate. According to Lowi, the interest of the hegemonic state along a river is often a prerequisite to cooperation. But cooperation is more likely to ensue if the hegemon is located in a strategically inferior position (e.g., downstream) and if the hegemon’s relationship to the water resources is that of critical need. Conversely, cooperation will not be forthcoming if the hegemon is upstream since it holds the strategic geographical position. Thus, if the hegemon is upstream, the likelihood of cooperation decreases as opposed to when the hegemon is downstream and is more vulnerable to the actions of the upstream state (Lowi 1993: 203–4). According to Lowi’s analysis, therefore, LeMarquand’s (1977) assessment of the decreased likelihood of cooperation when an upstream state is using a shared river to the

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detriment of a downstream state will only be applicable when the upstream state is also the stronger. One can also frame the hydro-political variant of hegemonic stability theory in terms of conflict potential followed by the increased likelihood of cooperation fostered by the downstream hegemon. As previously noted, when an upstream country is also the hegemon it may not require the cooperation of the weaker downstream state. By extension, conflict, or at least the ability of the downstream country to challenge the upstream country, is less likely (Soffer 1999: 248–9). Accordingly, antagonisms between states increase when the river water is used to the detriment of the downstream country and that country perceives itself to be more powerful than the upstream country (Frey 1993: 62; Homer-Dixon 1999: 139–41; Naff 1994: 280–2; Naff and Matson 1984: 192–4). According to this assessment, the prospects for conflict are therefore greater when a hegemon is downstream and less when that hegemon is upstream. As such, the opportunity for cooperation will be greater as the downstream hegemon attempts to constrain the uses of the upstream country through some form of an agreement. Powerful upstream states, on the other hand, can simply exploit a shared river as they desire. According to Lowi (1993), when it is applied to hydro-politics, the variant of hegemonic stability theory best explains the lack of cooperation on the Tigris-Euphrates Basin. Turkey is the upstream hegemon and is able to exploit its position to the detriment of downstream Iraq and Syria. To this day no comprehensive agreement has been forthcoming on the river, taking into account the desires of the weaker downstream states. This theory also explains the cooperative agreement fostered by downstream Egypt on the Nile River with upstream Sudan in 1959 (Lowi 1993). However, the presence of an upstream hegemon does not always mean that a state will be averse to cooperation with a weaker downstream state (Elhance 1999). As Elhance points out in the context of the Parana-La Plata Basin, Brazil’s hegemonic position actually facilitated cooperation. Second, Brazil’s inability to unilaterally exploit its shared waters actually prompted the cooperative option (Elhance 1999: 50–1). Brazil required additional energy supplies, and cooperation with its downstream neighbors provided the only option of harnessing the hydroelectric potential of its shared rivers (Elhance 1999: 40). To be sure, Lowi’s (1993) hydro-political variant of hegemonic stability theory suggests that an upstream hegemon will find little incentive to cooperate on international river management, while a downstream hegemon will have much more incentive to form a cooperative regime, especially if it views the shared water source as important to some specific need. It also suggests that hegemonic downstream powers may be able to impose certain arrangements on weaker riparians or not seek their consent in formulating these arrangements. Elhance’s (1999) example of Brazil as a benevolent upstream hegemon challenges Lowi’s expectations. Other examples, used by Lowi (1993) herself, challenge the basis of her theory. While a comprehensive agreement on the Tigris-Euphrates has not been forthcoming (which also takes into account the new water demands of each country), largely due to Turkey’s intransigence, Lowi (1993) discounts several other

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protocols that have been signed in the basin and their ramifications for her general assessment of conflict and cooperation. Among them is the 1987 Agreement struck between Turkey and Syria, which guarantees Syria a minimum flow of 500 cm/s (about 16 billion cubic meters a year) in the Euphrates River. Likewise, in her evaluation of the 1959 Nile River Agreement, Lowi ignores Egypt’s efforts to court the much militarily weaker Sudan, giving the perception that Egypt, the hegemon on the Nile, had its way. Sudan’s ability to win two major concessions is ignored in Lowi’s (1993) analysis. These were: (1) higher water allocation than Egypt’s compared to an earlier agreement and; (2) equal division of any increase in the natural yield of the river rather than in proportion to their respective shares. The agreement also provided for Egypt to pay compensation (Waterbury 1979: 72–3). In general, the agreement allocated to Sudan the majority of the flows created by the construction of the Aswan High Dam and Lake Nasser (Phillips et al. 2006: 81). Following Lowi’s (1993) theoretical assumptions, an agreement between the United States and Mexico over the Colorado River should have never taken place. In 1973, the United States is at the same time the hegemon and the upstream state, and should have had no incentive to cooperate with Mexico or come to an agreement over their shared river. Contrary to the predictions of Lowi’s (1993) variant of hegemonic stability theory, however, the United States not only entered into an agreement with Mexico (temporary actions actually culminated in 1972) but also paid the costs of desalinating the waters of the Colorado that flow into the territory of its southern neighbor. The Colorado River example compels a conclusion that cooperation over international rivers requires explanations that go beyond pure strategic locale and power politics. The hegemonic precondition to cooperation, as noted, also leaves much to be desired. Examples of international cooperation between economically symmetric countries, such as those between European parties in the 1976 Rhine Agreement (Rhine Chlorides Agreement), will be discussed later. In short, hegemonic explanations do not take into account strategic interaction between states that espouse such concepts as issue-linkage, reciprocity, and the role of side-payments. These factors alter a nation’s payoffs, inclining it more favorably toward cooperation.

The spectrum of cooperation over international rivers: strategic interaction Though states may obviously be in a position to not cooperate, they do not always exploit their strategic location on a river or their aggregate power to the detriment of the downstream state. There are several explanations for this phenomenon, of which the main one is Elhance’s (1999) and the neoliberal contention that unilateralism often fails to sustain a satisfying outcome. As noted before, geography may play a role too. LeMarquand has suggested that cooperation in situations where the economic incentive to cooperate is otherwise not apparent (e.g., in an upstream/downstream situation where the upstream state may use the river to the detriment of the

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downstream state) actually can take place because that same river may also form the border between the states, thereby creating a geographically symmetric relationship in another area (1977: 10). For example, the geographical regime of the Parana River has also been touted as one of the main incentives for Brazil’s cooperation with Paraguay. While Brazil is upstream on the Parana River, the location where the hydropower project was to be constructed was on a part of the river that formed the border between the two countries and Paraguay’s accession was, therefore, required (Elhance 1999: 40–1). However, and as discussed earlier, cooperation may also be a product of strategic interaction, including linkage, reciprocity, and side-payments. Linkage and reciprocity Countries that share more than one river may be upstream on some rivers yet downstream on others. As such, countries may not wish to exploit their strategic location on the first river to the detriment of the other state, setting precedent for the other state to act in the same manner on the second river where it is more strategically located. Utton (1988) has argued that although the Colorado River may flow from the United States into Mexico, several rivers flow from Mexico north to the United States, and the US needs Mexico’s help in maintaining their water quality. A nation may follow a similar strategy when it shares several rivers, each with a different neighbor. It will not want its strategic behavior on one river, shared with one country, to affect its hydro-policial relations with another country on a different river. This has often been Syria’s dilemma relative to the Yarmouk and the Euphrates Rivers. On the Yarmouk, Syria is upstream of Jordan and Israel while on the Euphrates it is downstream of Turkey. Any strategic behavior employed on the Yarmouk could weaken its position with Turkey on the more important Euphrates River (Elhance 1999: 106, 145). Navigation Upstream states may also be inclined to cooperate with downstream states, especially if they are landlocked or include landlocked territories, and can therefore obtain navigational benefits by cooperating with downstream states. Navigational rights may be used to offset the upstream advantage. Naturally, the extent of cooperation will depend on the upstream country’s reliance on navigational routes and the navigability of the rivers it shares with a downstream country. This scenario, for example, may influence India’s hydropolitics with downstream Bangladesh on the Ganges River. Both countries have been able to cooperate only on a limited number of hydro-political issues, mostly to the detriment of Bangladesh. Because cities in northeastern India are much closer to a Bangladeshi port than they are to an Indian port (Elhance 1999: 165; Salman and Uprety 2002: 198), granting navigational rights to those cities through Bangladeshi ports may potentially induce cooperation on other Indian and Bangladeshi water issues. As Verghese has observed with regard to navigational

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benefits that may accrue to upstream India through Bangladesh, “India has ignored its vital interests in the northeast which was geopolitically isolated, indeed virtually landlocked and marginalized by partition, losing its traditional markets and arteries of communication by land and inland water in and through Bangladesh” (Verghese 1996: 38). Although not as able to exploit the upper reaches of the Mekong River as India can the Ganges, China may also rely on its downstream neighbors for access to southern seas through the Mekong (Elhance 1999: 213). The same may be said about weaker upstream states, such as Nepal and Bhutan, which are landlocked but depend on powerful downstream India for transit routes and access to the sea (Elhance 1999: 182; Salman and Uprety 2002: 79; Verghese 1996: 38–9, 45). Foreign policy considerations Finally, foreign policy considerations may also help to promote cooperation where otherwise not expected, offsetting the temptation of upstream states to reject cooperation. As Hopmann has noted: “since negotiation is perhaps the most ubiquitous tool of diplomacy it follows that its conduct is dependent on the foreign policy decision making process of the states or organizations that are interacting diplomatically” (Hopmann 1996: 156). LeMarquand has also advanced this specific argument in the context of the 1973 Colorado River Agreement (1977: 12–14). According to him, the costs of removing the salt from the Colorado River water provided to Mexico were considered uneconomical for the United States. However, not only did the United States not want to be considered a belligerent bully by its southern neighbor, and the rest of Latin America, by rejecting cooperation, but also considered cooperation on the water issue as a form of gaining cooperation and support on other fronts (LeMarquand 1977: 46). While “no explicit linkage was made between these issues in the agreement itself, doubtless the desire to build a ‘reservoir of goodwill’ was a significant consideration behind the executive’s desire to reach agreement for the salinity issue” (LeMarquand 1977: 43). Foreign policy considerations indeed played a role in shaping the American reaction to demands by Mexico for better quality water flowing downstream, and concerns with linkage as well as reciprocity provided the impetus for cooperation. As both LeMarquand and Barrett have concluded, America’s need for Mexican cooperation on issues such as drug trafficking and migration played a role in softening America’s response on the water issue (Barrett 1994: 19, 2003: 120; LeMarquand 1977: 43). The Colorado River example, therefore, shows that a state may balk at negotiations with another country, though its own foreign policy concerns may be better served by settlement rather than conflict (Murphy and Sabadell 1986: 143). Browder (2000) has likewise claimed that foreign policy considerations played a large role in fostering cooperation among the Mekong River riparians, which culminated in the 1995 Mekong Agreement. Vietnam and Thailand, for example, viewed the Mekong regime as an impetus to foster stability, cooperation, and

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solidarity in the post-Cold War era. They not only considered the Mekong regime as a means to solve conflict over water in the region but also did not want a dispute over water to threaten the prospects of forging a new cordial relationship in the region relating to trade, migration and transportation issues. Cambodia and Laos were more interested in fostering the Mekong regime in anticipation of the financial and technical assistance they would receive and the regional projects they expected to enjoy (Browder 2000: 242–3). As in the Colorado River case, the Mekong riparians linked water to other issues they could benefit from, which facilitated the cooperative outcome. Finally, Turkey and Syria relied on linkage in their 1987 Agreement over the Euphrates River. According to Elhance, Turkey guaranteed a minimum flow to Syria in exchange for the latter’s concessions on border issues that ranged from the smuggling of illegal arms and narcotics to infiltration into Turkey by separatist groups – primarily the Kurdistan Workers Party or PKK (Elhance 1999: 143). Side-payments, the final “strategic” tool to be discussed later, also played a role in the 1959 Nile River Agreement whereby downstream Egypt compensated upstream Sudan for the damages created by the Aswan High Dam it was planning to build (Waterbury 1979: 72–4). The role of side-payments in inducing cooperation Concern about its national image, or a sharing of a spectrum of issues with a downstream country, are not the only motivations for an upstream country to cooperate. As the earlier discussions of cooperation and the specific applications to hydro-politics have suggested, states will cooperate when electing the unilateral alternative provides few or no benefits. Thus, the incentive for upstream states to cooperate with downstream states derives from the benefits that can accrue to basin countries from integrated development of a river basin, as opposed to prospects for the river’s national development (LeMarquand 1977: 9). Obviously, such mutual development refers less to unidirectional externalities flowing largely in the downstream direction, which tend to reduce the incentive of upstream states to cooperate, and more to regulation projects such as flood control and hydropower development that accrue mutual benefits. It would not be correct, therefore, to assume that upstream states, whether hegemons or not, are less likely to negotiate some form of a cooperative agreement, especially when mutual benefits may be realized. In fact, an upstream country may be able to gain more by cooperating on a joint project than by unilaterally exploiting its part of the river. Cooperation is, therefore, not an anomaly, as realists contend, when all parties can gain. Hydropower, flood control, and side-payments Beyond a general interest in cooperation, a subsequent motivation for the upstream country to conclude an agreement with the downstream country on projects that provide benefits to both countries (such as hydropower and flood control), is related to side-payments. That is, regulation of the river will generally

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provide external benefits downstream for which the upstream country will not be compensated unless an agreement is negotiated (LeMarquand 1977: 9). Similarly, if the downstream state perceives that the upstream riparian will go forth with a regulation project and is not interested in being compensated for the downstream benefits it thereby creates, the downstream state will not elect to sign an agreement since it will receive benefits at no cost to itself. Dual incentives exist for an upstream state to negotiate an agreement with a downstream state. First, it can benefit more simply by utilizing the river in cooperation with the downstream state. Second, in lieu of the cooperative arrangement and project, it can derive compensation and side-payments from the downstream state thanks to the benefits it creates in favor of that state. The power of the weak and side-payments Weaker and smaller upstream states can be even more handsomely rewarded by more powerful and larger downstream states desiring to exploit a river basin. While the weaker upstream country may have neither sufficient need nor capability to exploit the river basin to its advantage, the stronger downstream state does. Where regulation of the river for flood control and hydropower purposes is sought and the majority of the facilities need to be built upstream, upstream states can take advantage of the situation. An upstream state may agree to cooperate in exchange for some kind of compensation, whether side-payments or in-kind through projects that will be largely funded by the downstream country. The upstream state will, therefore, incur little if any capital costs for the project but will gain particular benefits as a prerequisite for opening its territory to the project. The hydro-political relations between Nepal and India, and Bhutan and India, follow this scenario. Both Nepal and Bhutan are upstream of India, but have the capacity of satiating, at least some of, India’s enormous hydropower needs. By harnessing Nepal’s and Bhutan’s water resources and immense hydropower potential, India is able to vastly benefit. In fact, India has pursued bilateral agreements for hydropower generation with both Nepal and Bhutan. While the extent of the benefits accrued to both Nepal and Bhutan, as a result of their agreements with India, is still debated, it is largely agreed that both countries have benefited from such cooperation (Bandyopadhyay 2002: 203–8; Crow and Singh 2000: 1919; Salman and Uprety 2002: 65–95; Verghese 1996: 38–43). It is also not correct to assume that a hegemonic power, in this case downstream, will be able to impose its desire to exploit a river basin, and thus extract cooperative arrangements from a weaker nation. Such a scenario implies that the downstream hegemon may utilize a shared river to the detriment of the upstream state or at least do so with no benefits accruing to the upstream state. This scenario, however, ignores the fact that in order for the project to be constructed in the upstream state’s territory, the upstream state needs to be compensated. If it is not compensated, the agreement may be scuttled and economic development delayed downstream. Consent by the weaker state is thus a prerequisite and benefits in the upstream direction need follow to consummate the deal. In the context of Nepal–India hydro-politics, Salman and Uprety argue: “storage

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[facilities] in Nepal give significant downstream benefits to India, whether small or big projects, including not only irrigation but also flood control, power, as well as navigation and fishing. Hence justifications for appropriate compensation abound” (2002: 121). Negative externalities, pollution, and side-payments Negative externality problems created upstream and felt far downstream from where they originated are naturally exacerbated in the through-border configuration. An upstream state may have little incentive to cooperate in abating the pollution since it is strategically located. As such, the externality is not reciprocal but rather unidirectional in the downstream direction. Upstream countries may be motivated by reasons other than economic incentives and strategic locale and choose the cooperative option of abating pollution for the benefit of the downstream country. Side-payments may figure into this geographically asymmetric relationship, as downstream states will need to provide some sort of incentive for the upstream state to abate the pollution. In fact, side-payments played a prominent role in solving the Rhine River pollution problem, which culminated in the 1976 Agreement. In this instance, Netherlands is situated downstream and was the sole victim from chloride emissions originating in upstream France and, to a lesser degree, in Germany and Switzerland. For many years the Dutch attempted to persuade the upstream states to abate their salt emissions. But it was not until a compromise that stipulated the Dutch contribution to the costs of abating pollution upstream, that the deal was consummated (Barrett 2003: 128–32; LeMarquand 1977). When faced with the salinity issue and the French refusal to underwrite all the abatement costs, the Netherlands had little choice but to contribute to the costs and at a higher level than either of the two major polluters, France and Germany (LeMarquand 1977: 119). LeMarquand adds that Switzerland, which had the least to gain from pollution abatement and contributed the smallest amount of chlorides into the Rhine, participated in the abatement costs so that its actions on the Rhine might be reciprocated on issues that concern the Alpine nation more (LeMarquand 1977: 120). As an aside to the realists, the Rhine Chlorides case evinced no clear hegemon and cooperation was rather a function of the compensation regime formulated; that is, of the strategic management of the incentives to cooperate. Even more interesting, the compensation regime was neither “even” nor “balanced” among the signatory countries. The Netherlands had to pick up the majority of the clean-up tab. Side-payments, then, provide a motivation for an upstream state to cooperate and correct transborder externalities. Projects affecting upstream state and side-payments The final scenario wherein an upstream state is likely to cooperate concerns a cooperative agreement over a project that is built solely for the benefit of the downstream state in the territory of the upstream state, or a project that is built in

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the downstream country but causes harm upstream. As with the examples cited earlier, cooperation will only be forthcoming when the downstream state compensates the upstream state (LeMarquand 1977: 10). This was the case in the 1959 Agreement between downstream Egypt and upstream Sudan. Further examples will be cited in Chapters 4 and 5. Final note on side-payments Side-payments and their relationship to the sort of river configuration to which they relate, are the main focus of this book and will be elaborated more rigorously later. Chapter 3 discusses treaty design and the ways in which side payments determine property right conflicts, taking into consideration the river geography shared between two states. The underlying argument is that geographical asymmetries between upstream and downstream states affect regime formation and agreements due to the downstream state’s ability to foster cooperation by providing incentives to the upstream riparian. This section concludes with Table 2.1 that divides the typology of cooperative projects and agreements discussed earlier. It also includes additional treaties, which were not discussed earlier, but will be elaborated more usefully in Chapters 4 and 5. These are grouped according to economic criteria to show that hydro-political cooperation has many facets and does not necessarily depend on hegemony. Table 2.1 Is cooperation over water dependent on hegemony? Treaty issue

Economic asymmetry between upstream and downstream states Upstream richer

Hydropower, 1987 Euphrates Flood control, Agreement and/or Water (issue-linkage) quantity Turkey and Syria 1944 Colorado Agreement (riverlinkage) USA and Mexico 1952 Orawa Agreement (sidepayment) Poland and Czechoslovakia Pollution

1973 Colorado Agreement (issue-linkage) USA and Mexico

Economic symmetry between upstream and downstream states

Downstream richer 1974 Wangchu 1961/1964 Columbia Agreement Agreement (side-payment) (side-payment) Bhutan and India Canada and USA 1959 Nile River Agreement (side-payment) Sudan and Egypt 1960 Witka 1967/1984 Skagit (Smeda) Agreement Agreement (side-payment) (side-payment) Czechoslovakia Canada and USA and Poland 1985 Tijuana 1976 Rhine Agreement Agreement (side-payment) (side-payment) Mexico and USA Switzerland,2 France, Germany, and Netherlands

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Similarly, even when one hegemon exists, the relationship is not one of coercion. Rather the hegemon, especially if it is downstream, must “entice” the upstream country to cooperate. Finally, as explained earlier, cooperation may also take place if the hegemon is upstream. The discussion in the next section treats other variables that may explain how cooperation over international rivers comes about.

Other variables influencing conflict and cooperation over international rivers Constructivism: the role of transnational organizations and epistemic communities Transnational organizations, nongovernmental organizations (Litfin 1997; Raustiala 1997; Wapner 1995; Weinthal 2002) and epistemic communities (Haas 1989, 1990: 55, 1992; Rosenau and Durfee 1995: 57–61; Rosenberg 1990: 291; Ruggie 1998: 868) also play an instrumental role in facilitating cooperation and international agreements. According to Elhance, such actors are often needed to overcome the many barriers to interstate cooperation in hydro-politics and to persuade and enable the respective states to view cooperation as a win-win situation for all concerned (1999: 7). These organizations often build consensus, define the negotiating agenda, and create a problem-solving atmosphere (Aall 1996; Hopmann 1996: 234–5; Litfin 1997: 192; Mathews 1997: 63–6; Rubin 1993; Victor et al. 1994: 471; Young 1993: 432–3). They may also provide financial assistance that might make an agreement more attractive by changing the payoffs for cooperation. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP), in the Mekong River negotiations, and especially the World Bank, in the Indus River negotiations, for example, played instrumental roles in facilitating cooperation between the parties and financially contributing to large projects necessary to make the cooperative agreement work (Alam 2002; Browder 2000; Lowi 1993: 198; Pitman 1998; Radosevich 1996). To understand how transnational organizations, and specifically epistemic communities, are able to foster cooperation, it is necessary to look beyond their technical efforts and financial assistance and consider the constructivist aspects of international politics. According to constructivists, “epistemic communities are professional and knowledge based groups that believe in the same cause and effect relationships, test truths to assess them, and share common values and a common interpretive framework” (Haas 1992: 55). Constructivists argue that world politics is socially constructed. That is, normative and collective understandings have consequences for the physical and social worlds. This involves two basic claims. Namely that the fundamental structures of international politics are social rather than strictly material and that these structures shape actors’ identities and interests rather than just their behavior (Wendt 1995: 71–2). Constructivists subscribe to the view that the manner in which the material world shapes and is shaped by human action and interaction depends on dynamic, normative, and epistemic interpretations of the material world.

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Since knowledge based networks, such as epistemic communities, are often consulted on technical issues that require expertise that regular politicians and diplomats do not have, they are able to affect policy with their authority. Epistemic communities, the theory goes, are able to exert influence on policy innovation, policy diffusion, policy selection, and policy persistence (Adler and Haas 1992: 375–85). By so doing, they play a role in creating norms, social realities, and perceptions among the policy makers. In turn nation states will exert power on behalf of the values and practices promoted by the epistemic community and will thus help in their international institutionalization (Adler and Haas 1992: 372). Blatter (2001), for example, explores the notions of network analysis and discourse analysis in the context of Lake Constance, which is shared among Switzerland, Germany, and Austria. He argues that the influence of ideas, institutions and crossborder networks in transboundary water policies, culminated in the development and success of crossborder cooperation in regulating boating and pollution on the Lake (Blatter 2001: 94, 103–17). Epistemic communities, however, often depend on many exogenous variables, which challenge their role in negotiations and constructing knowledge. For example, the role of ideas often becomes more salient and powerful at times of crisis. Epistemic communities become more relevant when policy makers seek advice from expert communities. Then, however, a crisis situation (or scarcity) may be driving the cooperative outcome or negotiations, and not the epistemic communities (Lang 2001: 232; Zartman 2001: 3, 309). The influence of an epistemic community also rests on the domestic influence it is able to amass for its position (Haas 1990: 57). By extension, the proliferation of an epistemic community’s ideas also depends on how it is able to institutionalize its views in the domestic political arena (Milner 1992: 489). By extension, it also depends on an interested government and the political will of that government to accept its ideas. Epistemic communities, for example, played an instructive role in the Ganges River negotiations by bringing the positions of Bangladesh and India closer together (Nishat and Faisal 2000: 305–8). But the 1996 Agreement between the two countries became possible only when new governments came to power through democratic processes in both India and Bangladesh. Sincere and intense efforts by both governments ultimately resulted in the 1996 Agreement (Elhance 1999: 180, 188; Khan 1996: 470; Nishat and Faisal 2000: 308). A similar verdict may be applied to the role of Israeli–Palestinian water expert groups in the context of the Israeli–Palestinian water dispute and the larger Israeli–Palestinian conflict. While both groups have been instrumental in fostering cooperation and putting forward ideas that have been instituted in the 1993, 1994, and 1995 interim agreements, their ultimate role in bringing forth a final water agreement has been dwarfed by the political stalemate on the ground and the intransigence of the respective leaderships (Dinar 2002: 244–5; Jägerskog 2003). The Mekong River Agreement also benefited from the role of a third party. But while the UNDP played an instrumental role in fostering cooperation among the

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signatories, its success was ultimately due to the river riparians’ engagement, involvement, and desire to form a cooperative management scheme (Browder 2000: 259; Elhance 1999: 222–3). The World Bank’s role in the Indus River negotiations was also instrumental. But it is important to note that its functions were more as a conduit of financial assistance and side-payments to the two governments. In addition, the agreement negotiated did not espouse the notion of integrated development and interdependence. Their relations characterized by rivalry and suspicion, both India and Pakistan were uninterested in joint utilization of the river and the water system was rather partitioned into two separate parts. A settlement on the river was, however, sought and it was the notion of “no interdependence” complemented by side-payment transfers to both parties that made the agreement possible. These illustrations demonstrate that while epistemic communities and other third-party organizations play important roles in the outcome of negotiations, it becomes difficult to isolate their influence from all the other variables that determine state behavior. For example, ideas fostered by epistemic communities are often important in shaping agreements and negotiating agendas; especially regarding issues where experts are required to negotiate a particular matter. However, the influence of epistemic communities in fostering cooperation, or swaying governments, is often subject to the political will and interest of those governments and the domestic support they are able to muster for their ideas. In fact, the political will of governments to cooperate, and the gains they anticipate from cooperation, is an essential component of agreements, often overshadowing the role of expert groups or transnational organizations. Even when epistemic communities, or third-party organizations, take an active role in negotiations, it is their ability to provide side-payments or other incentives that makes otherwise recalcitrant parties want to cooperate. Domestic and cultural explanations Domestic explanations Domestic explanations are related to the role and success of third parties in cooperation over shared international waters, because these elements are often dependent on a ripe domestic environment. According to Milner, cooperative agreements create winners and losers domestically. Therefore they generate supporters and opponents (Milner 1997: 11). Putnam has eloquently described international negotiations as a two-level game. He argues that “domestic groups pursue their interest by pressuring the governments to adopt favorable policies at the national level,” while “national governments seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures at the international level, while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign developments” (Putnam 1998: 434). This implies that the international system is not only a consequence of domestic politics and structures but also a cause of them (Gourevitch 1978: 911).

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While all states are guided in their negotiating behavior by some overriding notion of the national interest, they are also divided internally, to a greater or lesser degree, by greater interpretations of what constitutes the national interest (Hopmann 1996: 155). Therefore, conflict and cooperation are to a larger extent, shaped by the shifting and differing interests of domestic elements, which in turn reflect on how states formulate their initial positions regarding a particular issue (Ikle 1964: 122; Moravcsik 1997: 516–20). As Stein has argued, internal political factors can be important in choosing foreign policy strategies when there are competing logics for assessing the national interest. Nations with certain characteristics may be more likely to pursue competitive rather than individualistic gains (Stein 1990: 184). Finally, domestic variables often indicate how preferences are aggregated, national interests constructed, and how costs and benefits are calculated (Milner 1992: 493). Domestic explanations, therefore, also require serious consideration as they too may explain how cooperation takes place or how it may be torpedoed in international river basins. As Frey argues: “a nation’s goals in transnational water relations are usually the result of internal power processes, which may produce a set of goals that does not display the coherence, transitivity or ‘rationality’ assumed in many analyses of transparent national interest” (1993: 63). As mentioned earlier, it was only after friendly governments in both India and Bangladesh came to power that cooperation became feasible over the Ganges River. While their negotiations took place long before the 1996 treaty was finalized, the political environment was not ripe for a breakthrough until the governmental changes. The Colorado River salinity problem and its subsequent resolution in 1973 can also be associated with domestic political explanations. When Mexico first registered its complaint with the United States, the State Department refused to acknowledge responsibility for the increased salinity in the Colorado, or that its occurrence was a violation of an earlier agreement (signed in 1944) between the two countries. However, when the matter was brought to the attention of the American executive by the Mexican executive, President Kennedy (and later, President Nixon) exerted executive power so that the conflict would be settled (Murphy and Sabadell 1986: 143). According to LeMarquand, when a president or prime minister takes an active interest in the outcome of an international river dispute, it is generally possible to bypass bureaucratic entanglements and achieve a rapid solution (LeMarquand 1977: 17). Another domestic political explanation, provided by LeMarquand (1977), for the resolution of the Colorado salinity problem pertains to the notion of “pork barrel” politics. In fact, the desalting plant built in the United States was not one of the cheaper alternatives that could have been used to improve the water quality going into Mexico. The desalting plant funded by the federal government not only satisfied the desires of all of the Colorado River riparians within the US but also the concerned government offices and departments. As LeMarquand has argued the basin-wide salinity control program satisfied the Environment Protection Agency (EPA) by making its standards more politically acceptable; the

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Conflict, cooperation, and negotiation Bureau of Reclamation . . . has found new opportunities to employ its talents in salinity control; the Department of the Interior now has the opportunity for the first time to implement the expertise and technological advances developed by its office of Saline Waters in a grand showpiece desalting plant; the lower basin states gain some assurances of a slower rate of increase in salinity concentration; the upper basin states will not have future water resource development curtailed. (1977: 44)

Another argument derived from domestic politics can be made for Nepali–India relations, especially as the parties seek to transcend their limited agreements, for exploiting their shared waters. A sector of Nepalese society regards some of the water agreements entered into with India to provide that country with great benefits at the expense of Nepal. As such, desires for pursuing additional cooperation with India have been tainted with domestic skepticism that has culminated in the incorporation of a clause in the country’s constitution, which requires any treaty pertaining to the exploitation of Nepal’s natural resources to be ratified by the National Assembly with a two-thirds majority (Gyawali 2000: 140; Shrestha and Singh 1996: 87; Verghese 1996: 39–40). Future cooperation among the parties will, therefore, be subject to strong domestic scrutiny and final approval. Nationalism and identity issues constitute related barriers in domestic acceptance of negotiated agreements or the prospects for cooperation. Ethnonational communities may be driven by concerns for security against physical and economic threats from states with rival ethnonational communities. People’s perceptions of a threat may be a reaction to their own government’s actions, especially when government authorities appear to be jeopardizing the national interest by compromising, or by cooperating with a state that is perceived as a rival (Levy 1989: 271). As Janice Gross Stein has pointed out, enemy images tend to become deeply rooted and resistant to change and the images themselves perpetuate and intensify conflict (Stein 1996: 96). Because water is considered a national security concern in some reaches of the world, it is understandable how a natural resource may be embroiled in nationalistic and identity issues. According to Elhance, this is especially salient between Hindu India and Islamic Bangladesh along the Ganges. Despite recent democratization, Bangladesh remains vulnerable to Islamic fundamentalism and other domestic political factions that accuse their government of compromising the nation’s sovereignty and national interest if they pursue negotiations with India. Such posturing often curtails cooperation and undercuts the would-be benefits (Elhance 1999: 169–71). Lowi (1993) has similarly used ideological issues, domestic politics, and identity to explain why basinwide cooperation did not ensue when the United States attempted to impose an agreement on the riparians of the Jordan River in 1955. According to Lowi, an attempt to solve a low politics problem (e.g., a dispute over a river) cannot succeed if a conflict on the level of high politics

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ensues. The impact of the larger political conflict is subsumed in three interrelated variables. These are: (1) the protracted nature of the conflict between the parties; (2) core values and organizing principles; and (3) perceptions of the adversary. In the Jordan Basin “neither party could treat the possibility of sharing water as an unambiguous issue. . . . rather implicit in water-use arrangements was formal acceptance of the other and its rights as a political entity” (1993: 195). Finally, domestic politics may also explain whether or not an agreement is ratified. As Milner has argued: “states may devise internationally cooperative solutions and overcome cheating and relative gains concerns, only to find that their domestic situations will not support them” (1992: 493). Browder has made this same argument in the context of the Mekong River Agreement. He notes that if Thailand had required parliamentary approval of the Mekong River Agreement, the treaty would not have been ratified due to domestic opposition (Browder 2000: 257). Cultural explanations The 1973 Colorado River Agreement aside, the examples above have largely alluded to the negative influences of domestic politics on cooperation over international rivers. Positive influences are often much harder to come by for, as Elhance has argued, domestic political support for hydro-political cooperation is often hard to generate and sustain and is rather vulnerable to appeals both to nationalism and interest groups (Elhance 1999: 237). Perhaps where positive influences on hydro-political cooperation may be detected more rigorously is in the context of cultural similarities and differences among states and the relationship to the success or failure of cooperation over shared waters. Faure and Rubin (1993) have touted culture as an explanatory variable for cooperation and conflict. They hypothesize that with regard to interaction and communication, culture may be both an obstacle and a facilitator. Culture is an obstacle to the extent that cultural stereotypes and differences cause misunderstandings, meaning that the perceptions and expectations that the two parties have of each other must be affected in a negative way. On the other hand, culture may be a facilitator to the extent that with cultural similarities the parties share overarching values, communication, and other forms of interaction (Faure and Sjöstedt 1993: 4). As questionable as these theoretical assumptions may be, Dupont (1993), arguing from the cultural perspective, has claimed that the success of the Rhine River negotiations, that culminated in the 1976 Agreement, was in large part due to the cultural components that were more amenable to cooperation than to conflict. According to Dupont, the culture-based factors that facilitated cooperation were several. These include: (1) the high degree of homogeneity among the parties; (2) close geographical proximity; (3) strong communication links; (4) great familiarity in values and norms; (5) a growing feeling of European continental unity; (6) the emotional value and mystique embedded in the issue at stake; (7) similar attitude toward the environment; (8) institutional structures, and (9) similar negotiating styles (1993: 104–15).

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The cultural argument presented here provides the appropriate motivation for some concluding remarks. First, as the list of factors provided by Dupont (1993) demonstrates, the notion of culture seems to include attributes that transcend its academic definition. It spotlights variables that may be significant in explaining negotiated outcomes but which, for the sake of convenience, were placed under the “culture” rubric. It is, therefore, difficult to know culture when we see it. It also becomes difficult to distinguish culture from other influences, positive or negative, on the negotiated outcome. A second critique of the cultural argument derives from the Rhine Chlorides case. As suggested in the earlier discussion on side-payments, the Rhine Chlorides Agreement required that the harmed state, Netherlands, provide some sort of incentive to the harming states to abate pollution. In fact, before the compensation scheme was devised, the upstream states had little incentive to cooperate and abate pollution in favor of the Dutch. The cultural and institutional homogeneity, which characterized the relations among the five affected European states, was therefore not the decisive factor in promoting cooperation. Cultural homogeneity may have helped to promote cooperation but it was not instrumental. Rather, it was the strategic restructuring of incentives that cemented the deal among the riparians. The greatest challenge to the cultural argument is based in cases where the cultural attributes of two states are totally different yet cooperation still ensues. The most salient example is of course the 1960 Indus Water Agreement where Pakistan, an Islamic country, and India, a Hindu country, cooperated in hammering out an agreement to settle their differences on the Indus River. Finally, domestic politics may be an important factor in facilitating cooperation since the benefits to be derived from an agreement are often calculated through the prism of domestic acceptance and the inclinations of the current regime. Ratification of an agreement may also be subject to concurrent domestic turmoil. Yet, and as has been suggested here, the perceptions of winners and losers can often be manipulated by the use of incentives and side-payments to encourage acceptance of an agreement which can either overshadow or change domestic perceptions.

Conclusion This chapter has discussed the incentives and disincentives for cooperation faced by states sharing international rivers. The relationship between culture, domestic politics, third parties, epistemic communities and cooperation was also assessed. Most importantly, Chapter 2 has argued that while concerns for security and survival may play an inhibiting role vis-à-vis cooperation, mutuality of interest, fostered by scarcity, combined with the inadequacies of autonomous and unilateral strategies due to the interdependence ascribed to river riparians, are the main underlying incentives to cooperation. Despite the cooperation dilemma often faced by states, this chapter has argued that the hydro-political context needs to be clearly assessed for understanding the

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incentives for hydro-political cooperation. Payoffs need to be altered so that otherwise uninterested states may follow the route leading to cooperation, thereby overshadowing variables such as epistemic communities, third parties, culture, and domestic politics. This strategic interaction approach embodies tactics such as linkage, reciprocity, and side-payments. Although scarcity provides the impetus for cooperation, the analysis in Chapter 2 has argued that the geography of the river is often the basic instrument for investigating the incentives and disincentives for cooperation and treaty making. All else being equal, an upstream country on a through-border river, being the geographically superior party, would seem to have little incentive to cooperate with a downstream state. This is especially true when that country is using the river to the detriment of the downstream country, or when a unidirectional externality (such as pollution) produced upstream flows in the downstream direction. For the opposite reasons, cooperation is facilitated in the border-creator geography. A survey of the scholarship in the field reveals that geographical superiority may be offset by variables such as aggregate power. That is, a downstream hegemon may take the lead in creating a cooperative regime with an upstream country since it is dependent on the water resource. It is able to sway the upstream country to cooperate, despite its geographical disadvantage, due to its aggregate power capabilities. However, this chapter has argued that if a hegemon is upstream, it may still choose to cooperate with a downstream state even if the incentives to cooperate indicate otherwise. Similarly, hegemony is not a prerequisite to cooperation, since even economically symmetric countries cooperate. The chapter related such geographical and power-related considerations to reciprocity and issue-linkage. That is, a country may be upstream on one river it shares with its neighbor but downstream on another river. A country will, therefore, not wish to take advantage of its strategic position on that river, knowing its neighbor may reciprocate by exploiting its strategic position on the other river. Issue-linkage may also apply in inducing countries to cooperate where they are otherwise not so inclined. An upstream country may cooperate with its downstream neighbor to (say) abate pollution, knowing it will require that neighbor’s cooperation on an unrelated issue in the future. Concerns with navigation may also provide the impetus for an otherwise uninterested upstream state to cooperate with a downstream state that may have an outlet to the sea. As will be suggested in Chapter 3, and demonstrated in Chapters 4 and 5, economic asymmetry may also provide an explanation as to why rich upstream countries, averse to cooperate due to strategic disincentives, and given the few immediate benefits that would accrue from cooperation, will nonetheless cooperate with poorer downstream countries. Information on the economic asymmetries between the parties could be ascertained from investigating the parties to the treaty itself. As far as issue-linkage and reciprocity are concerned, this is not necessarily the case, since such information is seldom available by directly examining only the treaty.

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Finally, this chapter spoke about the role of side-payments in altering payoffs and making cooperation more enticing. That is, an upstream country may wish to cooperate with a downstream country on a joint project, knowing not only that it will gain direct benefits from the joint project but also that it will gain side-payments and compensation by acquiescing to the cooperative venture. This is because the main facilities of the project need to be built upstream or perhaps because measures realized upstream will produce benefits downstream. Whether the countries were symmetric or asymmetric in aggregate power terms is not expected to make a difference as to whether or not cooperation takes place, since cooperation is more a function of scarcity and the mutual benefits that can be derived thereby. Rather, the only asymmetry that needs to be offset to encourage cooperation is a function of the river configuration, and the Rhine Chlorides Agreement provides the best example for this contention. Side-payments were also shown to play a role in fostering cooperation between asymmetric countries. That is, a powerful downstream state may require the cooperation of the weaker upstream state. But rather than coercing the upstream state to cooperate, as the variant of hegemonic stability theory might imply, the downstream state provides incentives to the upstream state to pay for the use of its territory for building the projects that will provide benefits downstream. Side-payments were also argued to be important in providing an incentive for upstream states to abate pollution that affects downstream states. In addition, side-payments were also regarded as crucial in facilitating cooperation when a project is built largely for the benefit of the downstream state yet either requires the territory of the upstream state for the construction of the project or affects the territory of the upstream state. In conclusion, though linkage and reciprocity are important strategies for fostering cooperation along international rivers, the main interest of this work is the use of side-payments in affecting state behavior. Therefore, this work focuses on the side-payment phenomenon, as a component of the concept of strategic interaction. Further inquiry about side-payments, cooperation, and treaty design follow in Chapter 3.

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Treaty design and property rights: theory and hypotheses

Of the elements that make for political controversy in human affairs, the control of rivers is one of the most persistent . . . the last community to get the water is always suspicious of the intentions of those upstream. (Birdwood 1954: 130, quoted in Hirsch 1956: 203)

This chapter moves beyond the broad explanations associated with why states may cooperate in some instances and not in others, to focus on how treaties differ in their design. Rather it looks at the manner in which states negotiate their conflicting interests and activities along international watercourses. Indeed, that is the main thrust of this book. International water law is vague and general, providing states with no clear rules as to how they are to solve property rights conflicts. In fact, international legal principles, enshrined in such rulings as the 1972 Stockholm Declaration, argue that while states may have the sovereign right to exploit the natural resources in their own territories, they have the responsibility to ensure that activities within their territories do not cause damage to the environment of other states. The idea of compromise is surely implicit in these two potentially conflicting principles, and such compromise must be negotiated between the states since it cannot be ascertained from existing legal clauses. Only by analyzing the actual treaties, therefore, can the negotiated outcome and impending property rights solution be extrapolated. Also considered are the cost–sharing patterns negotiated among the parties, following-up on some of the same variables that were discussed in Chapter 2, including side-payments, and the provision of other incentives to make cooperation possible. This is also salient in guiding the analysis on how treaties differ in their design. With regard to the incentives for cooperation, as noted by one commentator, side-payments “ratchet up” the cooperation problem by inducing states to cooperate that might not have done so otherwise (Barrett 2003: 357). But as the same author perceptively argues, “side-payments may reflect an implicit agreement about property rights” (Barrett 2003: 358). It is only by looking at actual treaties, then, and the means by which side-payments have been negotiated among states, that we can say something conclusive about (1) the incentives and disincentives

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encountered by nations when considering the cooperative route and (2) how they resolve property right conflicts. Looking at the side-payments, in turn, affords insight into how the states have actually negotiated their differing interests in – and potentially conflicting uses of – the development and utilization of a shared river. Considering the side-payment or cost-sharing arrangement negotiated in an international agreement tells us which state has the property rights to a particular action or use of the river and how the two extreme principles, noted earlier, have been reconciled. For example, if a downstream state pays an upstream state to abate pollution, we can infer from this agreement that the no harm rule (officially known as the obligation not to cause significant harm principle) does not stand. Side-payments also provide an analyst with the most direct way to detect how property rights conflicts are resolved because they can be ascertained by reading the actual agreement. Thus, while treaties may differ in many qualitative ways, one means by which to tangibly compare them is by investigating negotiated sidepayment and cost-sharing arrangements. I begin with a short discussion on property rights, and then discuss the role of international water law in resolving water disputes. In line with the main theme of this work, I then delve deeper into the relationship between the geographical configuration of a given river and the side-payment and cost-sharing arrangements negotiated between states as they conclude an agreement and resolve a property rights conflict. I first discuss the role of geography in explaining side-payments in the context of the literature and then formulate a theoretical foundation and testable hypotheses to investigate the role of geography vis-à-vis side-payment and cost-sharing arrangements negotiated in an agreement. As this chapter will also argue, while geography is an important variable for explaining how property rights conflicts are resolved, economic differences between the states also play a role in this determination. These two independent variables are ascertained by considering a particular agreement, the geographical configuration of the associated river, and the parties involved. They are used to explain side-payment and cost-sharing patterns outlined in any given agreement (the dependent variable). In essence a particular nation’s “willingness to pay” reflects on the property rights outcome and may be explained by geographic and economic factors. This property rights solution is expressed in the side-payment and cost-sharing patterns enshrined in the agreement.

Property rights and international water law: poorly defined and unclear The main contribution of this work is to demonstrate how international legal principles for negotiating water disputes are expressed in state practice. By extension, it is interested in explaining how property rights conflicts over international rivers are resolved. The relevance of the Coase Theorem The Coase Theorem tells us that in any initial allocation of rights, no transaction costs, and the ability of countries to negotiate and enforce redistributions of

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rights, final allocations of resources will be efficient (Coase 1960). The location of the state is unimportant to the Coase Theorem. Whether the upstream state has the right to pollute or the downstream state has the right not to be harmed, the final allocation will be the same. Therefore, if the victim had the right to a clean environment then the polluter would pay the victim to accept that level of pollution at a point where the marginal benefit to the polluter of an additional increment of production would equal the marginal cost to the victim of an additional increment of pollution. Conversely, if the polluter had a right to pollute then the victim would have to pay the polluter to abate the pollution at a point where the marginal benefit of another increment of cleanliness would equal the marginal costs of the foregone production (Coase 1960: 2–8). I will show that location plays an important role in determining who pays for abatement of pollution in international rivers. Taking other factors into consideration, Coase is not really relevant to international rivers, since it takes as “given” an initial allocation of rights. Similarly, it presumes that judges and governments (basically operating in a domestic setting) would be able to attribute and enforce voluntary agreements to reassign property rights. This assumes some kind of trans-national authority. However, in the international arena no world government exists either to allocate rights or to enforce contracts (treaties). Similarly, transaction costs are often greater than zero. That being said, a variant of the Coase Theorem is at work in the context of international rivers and water law for property rights exist but are simply vague and poorly defined. International water law has attempted to ameliorate this problem, suggesting that the property right does not strictly belong to one party or the other. As such, a compromise must ensue. Yet, as the discussion later suggests, despite international water law’s development and evolution, legal principles are nebulous and contradictory and provide no real direction to states for resolving property rights conflicts. Rather, property rights conflicts are usually resolved in negotiations among states. International water law To a great extent, conflict on international watercourses arises because property rights are not clearly defined. For example, if the property right belonged to the upstream state, it can do what it wants regardless of harm to the downstream state. In water lingo this is known as the principle of absolute territorial sovereignty. Conversely, if the property right belonged to the downstream state, that state would have a right not to be harmed by the upstream state. This is the principle of absolute territorial integrity. Both Principle 21 of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment and Principle 2 of the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development recognize this conflict but do little to resolve it. Both declarations emphasize that: States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own

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Treaty design and property rights resources pursuant to their own environmental and developmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. (Stockholm Declaration 1972; Rio Declaration 1992)

Both the Stockholm and Rio Declarations support a compromise by juxtaposing these two principles against one another. Yet the ambiguity of their formulations is striking. What are states in dispute over a shared watercourse to do? What principle should they look to? How should they develop their common resource given conflicting positions and uses? What is the compromise? International legal experts have claimed that the prevailing theory of international watercourse rights and obligations is probably the doctrine of limited territorial sovereignty (McCaffrey 2001: 137).1 Accordingly, the sovereignty of the state over its territory is limited by the obligation not to use the territory in such a way as to cause “significant harm.” It has been observed that: . . . most modern commentators and decisions support the proposition that states sharing an international watercourse have rights to the use of its waters, that those rights are in principle equal, and that accordingly each state must respect the rights of others. (McCaffrey 2001: 138) This principle of limited territorial sovereignty seems to be the compromise both the drafters of the Stockholm and Rio Declarations intended to imply by sorting out the two extreme principles of territorial sovereignty and territorial integrity, separating them in a single sentence with only a simple comma. Exactly how this compromise principle is tangibly translated in practice is still a mystery. An attempt has been made over the years to draft a convention pertaining solely to the non-navigational uses of international watercourses. In fact, the International Law Association’s 1966 Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers and, principally, the International Law Commission’s [an entity associated with the United Nations] 1991 and 1994 Draft Articles on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses culminated in the 1997 Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses. The Convention, which was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly, provides a general framework agreement containing numerous articles developed for use by states in resolving their common water disputes. However, as of October 2006, only 14 out of the 35 countries needed for the Convention to enter into force have ratified, accepted, approved or acceded to it. The deadline for signatures has long since passed. Nonetheless, three of its Articles in particular should be noted. The principle of equitable and reasonable utilization, Article 5, was an attempt to foster a compromise between the two extreme principles mentioned earlier. Article 5, complementing the principle of limited territorial sovereignty, establishes that

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a state both has a right to utilize its waters in an equitable and reasonable manner and at the same time the duty to cooperate in the river’s protection and development. In other words, a state has a right to an equitable and reasonable share in the beneficial uses of the waters of the basin, yet that state should not use these waters in such a way as to unreasonably interfere with the legitimate interests of other states (Bilder 1976: 18). As expressed by legal commentators, Article 5 also recognizes that states that have had a later start in developing their water resources (e.g., Ethiopia vis-à-vis the Nile) may have the right to develop these resources despite the harm caused to other riparian states that got an earlier start (e.g., Egypt) (McCaffrey 1993: 99). Article 6 provides a non-exhaustive list of how “equitable utilization” may be determined. The list includes factors such as “effects of the use or uses of the watercourses in one state on other watercourse states,” as well as such factors as “existing and potential uses of the watercourse.” These factors are also equal to one another in weight. That is, neither has priority over the other. Article 5 is balanced by Article 7, which imposes an obligation not to cause significant harm. According to Article 7, states are obliged to undertake all necessary measures to ensure that their utilization of a shared watercourse does not “significantly” harm another riparian state. Since the Convention was adopted in 1997, international legal scholars have argued that Article 5 takes priority over Article 7 (Caflisch 1996: 280; Dellapenna 1996: 231–4; 2001: 285; McCaffrey 1998: 22; 2001: 254–5, 308–10; Wouters 1996).2 As one scholar has argued, “ . . . in the field of international water courses it is not the causing of significant harm per se, but the unreasonable causing of such harm that is prohibited” (McCaffrey 2001: 370–1). So essentially, the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization subsumes the obligation not to cause significant harm since the harming activity may need to be tolerated to achieve an overall regime of “equitable and reasonable utilization” (McCaffrey 2001: 370–1). To confuse things even more, McCaffrey has also argued that “analytically” the earlier combination of the two Articles has meant that “significant harm” is but one factor in an “equitable utilization” determination (2001: 370). Thus the two principles may not be two separate doctrines but rather “two sides of the same coin” (McCaffrey 2001: 371; Tanzi and Arcari 2001: 302).3 As suggested above, however, the emphasis on equitable and reasonable utilization has not meant much for states in conflict over an international river. Such emphasis only suggests increased support for reconciling the various interests of river basin states in the development of their shared waters (Bourne and Wouters 1997: xxiv). It does not say which state has the property rights or which use by one state subordinates a different use by another state. Similarly, the clauses and factors that make up the main principles, such as “equitable, reasonable, and significant” are fuzzy and afford a poor definition of rights. In short, Articles 5 and 7 simply call on states “to consider the interests of other riparian states and incorporate them into their water development plans” (Eckstein 2002: 85). Similarly, a state that got a late start in developing the water resources on its side of the border may develop these water resources as long as they do not cause

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injury to co-riparians. In so doing, a state must also take into account the interests of other watercourse states (McCaffrey 2001: 305; Wouters and Bourne 1997: 26). The fact that only 12 states have thus far ratified the 1997 Convention indicates its lack of broad support, and it can also be inferred that the United Nations was articulating norms it hoped states would aspire to. Schwabach (1998: 258) finds that the states voting on the Convention have expressed two more principle concerns. In addition to its ambiguity, it is perceived as showing bias in favor of downstream states, and to evidence a lack of regard for state sovereignty. Territorial sovereignty and territorial integrity, therefore, remain issues lurking in the background of any negotiation. The Convention’s fifth and seventh articles are merely general principles attempting to balance the extremes. Specifically, while the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization has been used to balance extreme principles, it merely recognizes that rights are shared. It is a compromise, and does not say how rights are to be shared. At the same time equitable and reasonable utilization often finds itself competing with the obligation not to cause significant harm. As Haftendorn has argued: “Consensus is difficult to reach on what constitutes equitable and reasonable utilization . . . when another state is adversely affected by the utilization” (2000: 51). To be fair, although the 1997 Convention has stirred some controversy among states, which may favor one article over another, it is important to note that it does not attempt to provide countries with specific guidelines for dispute resolution. Rather it attempts to codify customary law in the most general terms. As an umbrella agreement it does not pretend to replace individual agreements negotiated between countries over specific disputes. Commenting on this, Barrett has written, “custom gives expression to this need for restraint and treaties impose further constraints and apply them with greater specificity” (2003: 110), by which he means treaties give expression to accepted international principles. In a way, once countries agree to a specific formula, codified in an international water agreement, they have agreed on the compromise principle of equitable and reasonable utilization. Therefore, as Westcoat (1996: 70–1) argues, there needs to be a shift from a focus on conflicting legal principles towards a geographical and historical context for analyzing treaties. And as Wolf (1999: 9) finds in his analysis of 49 water allocation treaties, states often search for creative solutions to solve their water disputes. It is through existing agreements, therefore, that we may better detect how states go about reconciling conflicting interests in developing water resources or solving transboundary pollution problems. Property rights are essentially negotiated, and water treaty observations have made clear the ability of states to develop systems of property rights and liability rules in the absence of an overarching international body. Some international legal principles may be more recognized than others, but they are subordinate to treaties and custom (Barrett 2003: 108). As suggested earlier, equitable and reasonable utilization and the obligation not to cause significant harm are not canonic. Rather they have been negotiated as specific formulas, and these formulas are under scrutiny here. When analyzing actual treaties, the impending property rights can be extrapolated from the outcome. Using geographic and economic variables to explain and

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determine how property rights outcomes are derived, a theory and testable hypotheses are presented later.

The variables The geographic imperative In particular, this research explores the relationship between the geography of a water body and the terms of the agreement aimed at resolving conflict. It seeks, that is, to learn whether the observed variation in treaty outcomes can be explained by differences in geography. Stated differently, it seeks to know what are the differences in resource use outcomes and property rights regimes that result from variation in the spatial characteristics of commons resources. Clearly, some of the differences are due to factors unrelated to spatial characteristics and geography. Yet it seems reasonable to assume that part of the expected variation exists because different geographic forms of the commons are better governed under some regimes than others (Giordano 2003a: 371–2). This may well be the case, since the most fundamental elements in the analysis of conflict and cooperation over an international river is the geography of the river itself and the location of each state vis-à-vis that river. As Chapter 2 noted, although scarcity provides the impetus for cooperation, the basic incentives and disincentives for cooperation proceed from the geography of the river. The river, though the main source of contention, binds states into a complex web of interdependencies. As Weinthal has argued: “how an environmental resource is classified affects both the nature of the problem and the form of the solution” (Weinthal 2002: 25). The role of geography in the study of conflict and cooperation over water has been extensively examined. As noted in Chapter 2, the geographical location of a state is deemed to be a factor that may either facilitate cooperation or engender dispute (Allan 2000: 225; Lowi 1993: 10, 203; Naff 1994: 278; Wolf and Amery 2000: 6). While this is a helpful foundation for understanding the role of geography, the literature does not go beyond affirming that a nation’s geographic position might impact its negotiations by making it more (or less) amenable to cooperation (Elhance 1993; Lowi 1999). As noted in Chapter 2, LeMarquand (1977) was perhaps the first to argue that the geography of the river is not only associated with the incentives and disincentives to cooperate but that side-payments may also have to be incorporated to offset the asymmetry between upstream and downstream states. Yet LeMarquand does not develop a theoretical foundation and testable hypotheses for evaluating the conjecture that side-payments may often have to figure into a scenario with differently situated states. Most importantly, he does not attempt to test this relationship across a large set of observations. Rather he considers only four cases, which is less than adequate for broader, more generalized conclusions as to how states resolve water disputes. Neither does LeMarquand attempt to extend the argument to investigate how property rights conflicts may be resolved and

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what role side-payments may play. That is, while he discusses the vague international legal clauses so often espoused by states sharing a common river, he does not attempt to explain how side-payment arrangements may shed light on the compromise that is often sought between negotiating parties. It is also clear from LeMarquand’s analysis that when he distinguishes between “successive” rivers (rivers spanning an upstream and downstream country) and “contiguous” rivers (a river flowing along the border), he does not differentiate between the core configurations presented in this research. In addition, he does not consider additional configurations identified here. Furthermore, though he includes a brief discussion about the nature of “contiguous” rivers, he excludes virtually any analysis related to the role side-payments may play in facilitating cooperation and indicating how property right conflicts are resolved. Finally, LeMarquand’s work does not consider the influence of economic asymmetries among states on the side-payment gambit. The following chapter takes up this theme, however. Understanding side-payment and cost-sharing arrangements in the context of negotiations sets the stage for analyzing both how cooperation may ensue in geographically asymmetric situations and how property rights conflicts are resolved. Indeed, the significance of the location of states along a river, and the manner by which it is exemplified in actual negotiations, is the main interest of this section. Additional writings, noted later, elaborate on the role of geography more thoroughly and afford useful approaches to negotiations over waterways. Their arguments and conclusions, however, have often been made without reference to one another or have been simply hypothetical, rather than tested empirically using an expanded data set. On the other hand, when they are linked, elaborated, and adjusted, they can provide an appropriate means to test the utility of geography as an explanatory variable in international negotiations over water. Such writings, then, comprise the building blocs of the hypotheses of this study. In the context of the through-border and border-creator configurations, scholarship has made several important points, which have been synthesized as the theoretical basis of this research. Broader context: geography and bargaining power According to the realist school of international relations, state power is largely made up of military capabilities (Claude 1962: 6). Some realists, however, define power more broadly, including the ability to utilize natural resources and persuade, though such definitions are always placed in the context of military force and military preparedness (Morgenthau 1967: 114, 521). Neo-realists, too, confirm that the ability to use force is a key to state power. Survival is the ultimate concern of states and military might is the essential factor to achieve it. Similarly, the use of force is the ultimate means to influence the policies of other states (Waltz 1979: 104, 113, 126, 209). Even the classic negotiation school concurs, arguing that “power tends to rigidity in international negotiations, and total power tends to total rigidity” (Lall 1966: 338).

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More recent negotiation literature, however, disagrees. It considers the importance of issue-specific structural power (Dupont and Faure 1991: 41; Habeeb 1988: 18, 145; Hopmann 1998: 107). As Habeeb argues: Whereas aggregate structural power is concerned with an actor’s capabilities and position vis-à-vis the external environment as a whole issue-specific structural power is concerned with an actor’s capabilities and position vis-à-vis another actor in terms of a specific mutual issue. (1988: 18) In particular, bargaining power not available to downstream states may be available to upstream states (Clarke 1991: 94; Kremenyuk and Lang 1993: 8, 9; Lockhart 1979: 92; Rangarajan 1985: 187–8; Sprout and Sprout 1962: 366). As Spykman and Rollins argue, whoever controls the upper valley has a distinct strategic advantage since control of the upper valley allows for regulation of the water supply (1993: 591). This is most compelling when an asymmetric power relationship exists between a militarily and economically muscular downstream country and a weaker upstream country as in the case of Lowi’s (1993) variant of hegemonic stability theory. The strong downstream country may have the military and economic power and may use it to influence the upstream country, yet the weaker upstream country is strategically located at the source of the river and may use the power conferred by its location accordingly in the bargaining process. Thus, “powerful states may turn out to be weak in a given confrontation with seemingly weaker states” (Zartman 1971: 5). As Gyawali has observed: . . . land-locked Nepal does not have much power in conventional quantitative terms [as compared to India] . . . it does however enjoy power as the upper riparian nation owning the sites where storage dams can be built . . . this power allows Nepal the final veto in negotiations. (Gyawali 2000: 130) In the bargaining process, therefore, the countries may be asymmetrical in brute power but the weaker party enjoys veto symmetry with its stronger neighbor (Zartman 1991: 66). The geographical location of the state, then, is key to this veto symmetry. The role of military power may be even less instrumental, as opposed to geographical power, when considering bargaining over international rivers. As Elhance has argued: “ . . . even the strongest riparian is compelled to seek some form of cooperation with their weaker neighbors . . . because in a situation of growing water scarcity hydrological interdependencies restrict the unilateral options available to the riparian states” (1999: 234). One also wonders how a state might use brute force to coerce a weaker state to cooperate when the stronger state depends on the weaker state to honor an agreement. Countries may, therefore, find it “no less expedient and morally advisable . . . to call for moderation and for greater reliance on means other than

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coercive power” (Wolfers 1962: 165). As Zartman and Rubin suggest, the weaker state has something that the stronger state values but that the stronger state chooses not to take by stealth or force but rather by the give and take of negotiations. Alternatively, the stronger side is not strong enough – or does not deem efficient – to take what it wants by force and can do better by giving a sense of equality to the weaker side (Zartman and Rubin 2000: 289). In the study of hydro-politics, where control of the resource is vital, an upstream geographical position becomes a coveted advantage. Coupled with the inefficiency of deploying military force for gains vis-à-vis the water source Wolf (1998a), the militarily strong, yet geographically disadvantaged, state may find negotiations the only practical means to strike some form of an acceptable agreement. Therefore, while a downstream hegemon may play a role in the formulation of a cooperative regime, that hegemon, strong as it may be in terms of aggregate power, may not always be able to impose its will on other states in the formation of institutional arrangements (Young 1994: 128; Zartman 1991: 66; Zartman and Rubin 2000: 2). As Young has observed: “those countries in possession of structural power will often find that they can achieve more by using their power to make promises and offer rewards than they can by relying on threats and punishments” (1994: 135). Therefore, the notion that a powerful country may have a greater need to develop a shared river but less of a need to negotiate a dispute with a weaker country affected by its development is challenged (Murphy and Sabadell 1986: 143). FINAL NOTE

Generally, a combination of factors – geographic location, economic might, and military muscle determine symmetry and asymmetry in international river control. As Spykman has argued: “The geography of a country is rather the material for than the cause of its policy . . . ” (1938: 30). Issue-specific structural power, such as the geographical location of a state along a given river, however, may be important when bargaining over an issue such as its shared development. It requires more than just economic and military capabilities to influence the outcome. A downstream state, albeit stronger in military and economic capabilities, lacks the geographical upper hand, a circumstance that may be instrumental in negotiations over a through-border river. The advantageous location of the other state along the river, therefore, may preclude a downstream state from imposing its entire will in the formation of a treaty. Geography, a state’s interest in negotiations, and side-payments Geography sets the context for bargaining (Waterbury 1994: 40). The unidirectional feature of some rivers means that resolution of river conflicts through mutual control of reciprocally operating external effects (as in the border-creator geography) is generally ruled out (Rogers 1993: 118). With regard to through-border rivers, Haftendorn states: “symmetry between the actors will only exist

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as far as the hydrological asymmetry between the actors is balanced out by other factors” (2000: 63). Conversely, reciprocal externalities are the hallmark of common property resources (Dasgupta et al. 1997: 2) such as border-creator rivers. It is because all parties do not necessarily have to bear the full economic consequences of their actions that the through-border configuration confers certain powers on the upstream country (Durth 1996: 62). Therefore, cooperation is seldom attained due to the disincentives entrenched in this geographical configuration (Dolsak and Ostrom 2003: 347). Reciprocal externalities differ from unidirectional externalities in that there exists a direct means by which one party may punish or reward the other’s behavior, though not necessarily substantially (Barrett 1994: 28). The through-border case, exhibits a “fugitive” scenario, whereby the initial user gains all the benefits from exploitation but to the extent that the costs of exploitation move with the resource, may not bear all the costs. In the border-creator case, the full benefit of the resource’s exploitation falls to the party undertaking the exploitation, but both countries share at least some of the costs (Giordano 2003a: 370). These two differing geographical configurations afford differing incentives for cooperation and the subsequent design of an agreement. As Fox and LeMarquand have pointed out: . . . the potential uses for which a river can be managed and the location of developmental and use activities in relation to the location of political boundaries influence in a significant way what the incidence of benefits and costs will tend to be, and determine the kinds of arrangements that will be necessary to achieve what will be mutually regarded as an acceptable sharing of such benefits and costs. (1979: 11) Considering pollution problems for the through-border and border-creator configurations may be especially instructive when comparing the incentives of states to negotiate. In fact, the negotiating positions taken by basin countries concerning the issue of water quality can vary greatly depending on such factors as a country’s position along a river (Giordano 2003b: 114). A downstream nation will likely ask for strict controls of water pollution caused by its upstream nation. In turn, upstream states may be far less inclined to take the problem seriously let alone bear responsibility for devising an appropriate solution, as compared to the downstream state (Faure and Rubin 1993: 22–3; Matthew 1999: 171). Similarly, while water quality is of interest to downstream countries, the upstream countries have little incentive to invest in pollution prevention. If one party likes things the way they are and the other wants to change them, then the former has less bargaining power than the latter (Rangarajan 1985: 188). In a situation of geographical asymmetry, those who want to change the status quo do not have the means to provide incentives to those interested in maintaining it (Linnerooth 1990: 641–3; Linnerooth-Bayer and Murcott 1996: 533;

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Victor et al. 1998: 25). List and Rittberger (1992) have called it a “Rambo situation,” such that regulation of the underlying behavior is quite urgent to the victim country yet not so urgent to the harming country. Therefore, regime formation is unlikely to occur because the externalizer has no incentive to shoulder the burden of abating pollution (1992: 98, 101). To change the incentives, the downstream state (the victim country) may have to offer side-payments to the upstream state. As such, compensation may be the prerequisite to cooperation. Compensation may even encourage upstream countries to engage in more conservation practices (Nickum and Easter 1990: 217). The situation in a border-creator river is different. Pollution from wastewater effluents, for example, also affects the banks and territory of the country responsible for the pollution, just as it affects the neighboring state. The incentive to abate pollution or prevent it before it is discharged into the water is thus intrinsic to the geography of the river. For this reason, pollution may be less of a problem for this kind of geography. In fact, side-payments are less likely to be provided for abating pollution if it is seen that the problem is reciprocal and not unidirectional. All else being equal, the externalities are at least partially internalized due to the river’s geography. Sigman, measuring pollution quantities along and across state borders in the United States, has shown that “water quality is significantly lower at stations upstream and downstream of state borders than at other stations,” such as those along contiguous rivers (2002a: 17). Therefore, if pollution occurs, “the polluting country continues to experience damages for border rivers, so perhaps the incentives for control are sufficiently great to offset the lack of natural attenuation” (Sigman 2002a: 13). Sigman, finds somewhat similar results for international rivers at least in the case of upstream stations relative to other stations (2002b: 1157–8). In cases of geographical symmetry between the states, therefore, reciprocal benefits are much easier to establish and, as opposed to a through-border configuration, side-payments will not need to be used as incentives for cooperation since both states are on an equal geographical footing. The geographical symmetrical relationship between the principles, at least in comparison to the through-border configuration, also implies that development of the shared river will more often require a commensurate participation of both countries. Both share the same stretch of the river and the geography of the river acts as a focal point. In the border-creator case the incentive to reach agreement is to avoid the “tragedy of the commons.” FINAL NOTE

The through-border configuration facilitates a situation whereby an upstream state, in (say) the case of pollution, will be less inclined to voluntarily engage in a cooperative abatement regime with the downstream state. For externalities along a through-border river the downstream state may have to provide incentives to the upstream state to induce its cooperation. The opposite case may hold true for the border-creator river. Since externalities are partially internalized and

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states are able reciprocate each other’s harmful actions, incentives become less important. Development of a joint project on a border-creator river will more often require equal participation by both. Geography, international water law, and side-payments As noted in the beginning of this chapter, international disputes over water arise, to a large degree, because property rights are not clearly defined in international law. Equitable and reasonable utilization only guides states to reconcile their conflicting interests and is similarly challenged by the obligation not to cause significant harm. Though absolute territorial sovereignty and absolute territorial integrity are incompatible, both principles are referred to in the 1972 Stockholm and 1992 Rio Declarations. While both principles, on their own, are largely rejected in contemporary international water law and state practice4 (in favor of the compromise principle of equitable and reasonable utilization) they nonetheless encompass some of the varied grievances of states. International legal principles only offer suggestions and broad guidelines as to how these extreme principles might be moderated and reconciled. Another such hint and suggestion that should be mentioned here to motivate the following discussion on geography and side-payments is the “polluter pays principle” (PPP). The PPP proposes that the polluter shall be responsible for abating the pollution and compensate the harmed party where appropriate, which is in line with the extreme principle of absolute territorial integrity favored by downstream states. Conversely, the “victim pays” regime holds that the polluter is not responsible for the pollution it causes, does not owe compensation to the harmed party, and can continue its harmful activity, which is in line with the principle of absolute territorial sovereignty favored by upstream states. Depending on which principle dominates, the property rights are defined quite clearly. Of course, as has been demonstrated, no priority for either principle exists, and even the compromise is vague. While international legal scholars, panels of experts, and conventions have attempted to create a normative appeal for accepting, in principle, that the polluter bear the cost of pollution5 (especially relative to the “victim pays” regime) those same legal commissions suggest that states have the sovereign right to exploit their own water resources pursuant to their own environmental and developmental policies.6 Specifically, and with regard to the most recent 1997 United Nations Convention on International Watercourses, Article 21, which deals directly with pollution issues on international watercourses, implores states to “. . . individually and, where appropriate, jointly, prevent, reduce and control the pollution of an international watercourse that may cause significant harm to other watercourse states . . . ” The law again introduces such vague terms and thresholds as “significant harm.” At the same time, it requires states to take action to prevent, reduce and control pollution before the harm from the polluting activity becomes “significant” – becoming an ambiguous tool for the resolution of water pollution disputes.7

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The vagueness of international water law also applies to another important query. Does the PPP (or the “victim pays” regime, for that matter) mean that the harming, or the harmed, state pays to clean up the pollution? Answering this question with regard to the PPP is perhaps most relevant, as far as international law is concerned, because it is the normatively favored principle. According to Article 21 of the 1997 Convention, for example, a state is required to mitigate the pollution only when it causes “significant harm” to another state yet requires a state to prevent such pollution from becoming “significant.” While the notion of “significant” implies an ambiguous and subjective threshold, it does argue that prevention, reduction, and control of the pollution ought to be employed. While not indicating so specifically, Article 7 of the Convention argues that if “significant harm” is nonetheless caused, the harming state shall “take all the appropriate measures . . . in consultation with the affected state, to eliminate or mitigate such harm, and, where appropriate, to discuss the question of compensation.” Although not referring to the notion of damages per se, it is safe to assume that compensation refers to the damages incurred from the polluting activity. However, Article 7 does not make compensation for damages mandatory. Rather, it argues that states shall discuss this option. International law, therefore, leaves states with a nebulous outcome. Not only is agreement on a threshold of harm left unclear, but so are the steps the harming state is required to take.8 Undoubtedly, the right of the upstream state to pollute or the right of the downstream state to demand compensation for damages depends on the allocation of property rights. The Coase Theorem declares that to presume that the producer of an externality should automatically be liable for all damages caused cannot be justified on grounds of efficiency and is an arbitrary and inequitable rule (Conybeare, 1980: 309–10). If the downstream state has the right not to be harmed, then the upstream state suffers by not being able to develop. Similarly, an inefficient outcome arises when the upstream state must pay for all the costs of abatement, while the downstream state has no incentive to defend itself from pollution (Coase 1960). While international water law recognizes this conflict it does little to settle the matter. Property right allocations have been negotiated, however, and existing water treaties help us distinguish how pollution disputes have been settled between upstream and downstream states. The balance between the discretion of one state to undertake polluting activities and the constraint of that state to prevent transboundary pollution is thus concluded in an international water agreement.9 As for the general application of the PPP in actual negotiations, by considering the geographical asymmetry of a through-border river, we may be able to infer some conclusions about how the actual property rights allocation is expressed in practice. While the legal community has adopted the PPP as the morally superior principle, the polluting state has a strong incentive to reject this principle since it would require that country to abate its discharges at its own expense for its neighbor’s benefit. “The result is an impasse or a compromise, which international law provides only the initial negotiating position of the victim country, not the basis for the final settlement” (LeMarquand 1977: 13).

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Researchers have been unanimous in pointing out that where upstream countries are degrading the river for use by the downstream countries, the downstream countries – contrary to prevailing opinion regarding the PPP – may have to pay, at least partly, for the cost of ending the damaging activity (Faure and Rubin 1993: 23; Fox and LeMarquand 1979: 18; Giordano 2003a: 371; Linerooth 1990: 645; Mäler 1990; Sigman 2002a: 3). As one of them has observed: . . . in most cases in which polluters and the victims of pollution find themselves separated by international boundaries, the victims must rely on their own resources to persuade polluters to reduce trans-boundary environmental threats to an acceptable level. . . . one possible response is a direct financial incentive . . . in other words a bribe. (Darst 2001: 36) While the above discussion referred mostly to pollution issues, tackling the geographically induced asymmetry is critical (Haftendorn 2000: 52, 62, 68) in all domains of water use such as hydropower, flood control and even access to water. Side-payments are again used to overcome the implicit geographical advantage and induce the political will of upstream states (LeMarquand 1981: 147–8; Rogers 1993: 118). The aim here is to create a situation whereby the geographically advantaged state may be compensated for giving up its relatively superior position (Haftendorn 2000: 64). This is perhaps most obvious in the well documented 1961/1964 Columbia River Agreement where upstream Canada was reluctant, in the first place, to go ahead with its projects unless it was assured of receiving some compensation for the unrealized benefits it was to send downstream to the United States (Barrett 1994: 22; Giordano 2003a: 371; Housen-Couriel 1994: 16; Krutilla 1967: 10; LeMarquand 1976: 886; Lepawsky 1963: 542). Barrett notes that the United States believed that Canada would want to develop the Columbia River on its side of the border anyway, and so felt that it did not need to compensate Canada for constructing the project. When Canada threatened to construct an alternative project on a different river which would provide the United States with no benefits, the United States heeded the threat as a credible one and Canada was able to secure a more attractive deal (Barrett 1994: 22). This illustration reflects directly on the resolution of property rights conflicts in this domain too. For example, a downstream state that wants to develop the hydropower potential of a river basin and benefit from flood control facilities, in cooperation with an upstream state, has to provide side-payments as compensation for the benefits that would be accrued downstream from the projects constructed upstream. The property rights conflict, intrinsic to how the river is to be developed, will, therefore, be resolved in the form of side-payments transferred to upstream states as compensation for the resulting downstream benefits. The same may hold true for projects that solely benefit downstream states but affect upstream states. To gain the accession of upstream states to the project, sidepayments are again provided to the upstream state. The downstream state may, therefore, have the property right to construct the project but it must provide

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compensation to seal the deal, thus recognizing the upstream state’s property right to the river as well. The compromise is again expressed in the form of side-payments. FINAL NOTE

It is evident, then, that international legal principles purporting to manage the allocation of international water resources are vague and contradictory. While the PPP enjoys some normative support, it is challenged not only by the “victim pays” regime but also by the right of sovereign states to exploit their water resources. Treaties may be used to “back out” how property rights are really negotiated. Agreements negotiated for through-border rivers are likely to require side-payments. This includes side-payments for correcting or preventing an externality. Side-payments are also provided as an incentive to cooperate, and compensation for benefits created upstream but enjoyed downstream, on projects related to hydroelectricity, flood control and even access to additional water. In essence, the downstream state must be willing to compensate the upstream state. The direction of side-payment transfers reflects on the property rights conflict and its subsequent resolution. Linkage and asymmetry Before concluding this section on geography, the phenomenon of issue-linkage in relation to the notion of side-payments requires comment. Chapter 2 noted that countries might often solve unidirectional externality problems or mitigate the geographical asymmetry problem through issue-linkage. However, Bennett et al. (1998) have further argued that issue-linkage is often a more rational means to solving unidirectional externality problems than side-payments (see also Folmer et al. 1993). The authors argue that a side-payment transfer from a downstream to an upstream state is essentially a bribe provided to the upstream country for the sharing of water. The transfer of side-payments also implies the application of the “victim pays” regime. According to Bennett et al. (1998) such a cooperative outcome is unsatisfactory when the international community prefers the PPP. Second, nations are often reluctant to implement “victim pays” outcomes when they are the victims because they risk earning a “weak negotiator” reputation (Mäler 1990: 86). A proponent of issue-linkage, Mäler has pointed out that: Two countries with a boundary pollution problem will have a large number of links other than the flow of pollutants from one of the countries to the other . . . . One country may want to make concessions in order to improve friendly neighborhood relations and thereby achieve advantages in other areas of mutual interest. (1990: 86–7) Thus, in an attempt to avoid side-payment transfers, issue-linkage may be employed not only vis-à-vis similar issues – such as linking two rivers – but also among unrelated issues, such as trade (Folmer et al. 1993: 315).

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According to Bennett et al. (1998), downstream Mexico was able to improve its bargaining position in the 1944 Colorado River Agreement on the Colorado River because it was able to link negotiations over the Colorado with the Rio Grande. While the United States is upstream on the Upper Rio Grande, whereby the river then forms the border between the two countries, Mexico is actually upstream on the tributaries that feed the Lower Rio Grande. By linking the Colorado with the Rio Grande, Mexico improved its negotiation leverage because it controlled significant headwaters for the Lower Rio Grande, which is used for irrigation in the United States. These authors claim that if the Colorado River were to be negotiated independently of the Rio Grande, the side-payment scenario would predict that Mexico would have had to bribe the United States to receive additional water (Bennett et al. 1998: 66–7). Krutilla (1966) has investigated the 1961/1964 Columbia River Agreement. He points out that the treaty cannot be considered an isolated affair. With reference to the Columbia River, he states that: [it is an] arena in which the United States could make an attractive arrangement in exchange for concessions perhaps involving North American continental defense or perhaps other areas in which the vital interests of the United States are at stake. (Krutilla 1966: 96) The example of the Colorado River salinity problem exemplifies this phenomenon. When the United States agreed to take on the costs of constructing the desalination plant so as to provide Mexico with less saline water, the Mexicans, for their part, agreed to accept less than parity in water quality with the United States. That is, the water quality they would be getting would not be the same quality of water as they were receiving prior to the salinity problem. At the same time the Mexicans agreed that the solution would be definitive (LeMarquand 1977: 36). Similarly, as noted in Chapter 2, knowing that it would require Mexico’s cooperation on other issues, the United States was also building a “reservoir of goodwill” in its future relations with its southern neighbor. As Mäler concludes: . . . even if it seems superficially that the ‘polluter pays principle’ has been adhered to, the ‘victim pays’ principle has been applied, although the payment has not been in cash but in kind, and made in such a way that it may be difficult or impossible to register it. (1990: 88) Therefore, linking such issues as trade or economic incentives with cooperation over water could be explained as a side-payment in another form. The upstream state is getting something that it would have not otherwise received for either providing, unhindered water downstream or abating pollution. As Holsti argues, the promise of a reward is in a sense a bribe or inducement that offers some future advantage in return for agreement on a specific point under contention. This may

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range from promises of soft peace terms, monetary loans, or diplomatic support at some future conference (Holsti 1992: 148). As Abidi writes in reference to the 1973 Helmand Water Treaty between Iran and Afghanistan: “Iran initiated the idea of buying closer relations with Afghanistan, and for the first time it offered financial payment and concessional transit rights for Afghan exports through Bandar Abbas in return for more water by Afghanistan” (1977: 370). As Barrett has observed, although cash is often paid, side-payments need not be monetary (Barrett 2003: 78). Similarly, linkage is not always the best strategy in forging an agreement. Whether linkage will assist cooperation depends on the issues being linked and the manner in which they are linked (Barrett 2003: 308). Consequently, a successful linkage may require that a party’s concern for one issue is the same as the other party’s concern for the issue with which it is to be linked (Hopmann 1996: 81), something that cannot always be certain. As Young has argued, the parties are frequently loath to make concessions about specific issues more out of a concern for how this might affect their negotiating postures in other issues, rather than out of any commitment to the particular issue at hand (1989: 356; Sebenius 1983). As Darst has remarked, although the options available to a victim country in the context of a unidirectional externality may include a set of alternatives such as issue-linkage, sanctions, and a threat of force, all of these impose costs on the victim country as well. “Consequently, in a growing number of cases, the victims of transboundary pollution have decided that the most effective way to improve their own environmental quality is to subsidize environmental protection, even if the results are far from optimal” (Darst 2001: 38). While this book focuses on the larger notion of side-payments, it is also interested in identifying whether the downstream state provides some sort of incentive to the upstream state in return for its cooperation (Whether that is a monetary payment or a benefit through other means is perhaps less important for this particular discussion). However, monetary side-payments may provide analysts with the best means to review international agreements since they are clearly articulated in an agreement, and as such reveal how legal principles are negotiated. This is often in contrast to linkages, especially those that combine water with non-water issues, which may not be negotiated directly in the agreement but may be agreed upon between the parties outside the scope of the water agreement itself. Similarly, a nation may not necessarily press to link a water issue to another issue at the time of the agreement. Rather it may be building a “reservoir of goodwill” to be “cashed in” at a later time. Finally, and as the next section will suggest, economic differences between rich and poor states may also play a role in treaty outcomes. This is especially true if a rich and powerful upstream state cooperates with a poor and weaker downstream state to take some uncompensated action on behalf of the downstream state. In fact, considering the geographically strategic advantage of the upstream state, the disincentives to cooperate, may be reversed due to that state’s higher “willingness to pay.” This may help to explain cases where issue-linkage and reciprocity are thought to be the only variables at work in fostering cooperation.

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Concluding remarks for geography section The earlier analysis of the scholarship in this field makes a case for the role a river configuration may play in facilitating either conflict or cooperation. As noted, international law assigns rights to shared resources ambiguously. By looking at the final allocations as agreed to in a treaty, however, we can infer the implicit initial allocation. For example, if the downstream state pays the upstream state for all pollution control upstream, then the upstream state is essentially recognized as having the right to pollute. Similarly, the direction of side-payments will also tell us not only how cooperation may be fostered between states, in either of the two configurations, but also how uses along a river are coordinated and how property rights disputes are reconciled. Yet if it were only geography that matters, then treaty outcomes should be consistent between the through-border and border-creator configurations and treaty designs consistent between upstream and downstream states. That is, if we only looked at geography and the situation of states along a river to infer the regime outcome, then the relative wealth or poverty of the two states would not be important. Of course this is not the case and such (economic) differences do matter in regard to environmental problems. Both in terms of benefits received from abating and its costs, environmental problems are often characterized by large asymmetries across countries (Botteon and Carraro 1997: 27). This work distinguishes itself from other works in the field by elaborating on the role of geography in negotiations over water and by focusing on two extreme geographical configurations. However, it recognizes that economic factors also play explanatory roles.

The economic imperative Economic asymmetry as a bargaining tactic: the side-payment game The deficiencies of hegemonic stability theory in explaining cooperation, do not negate “the existence of asymmetries among parties in a given issue area both with respect to the intensity of their interest in the problem and with respect to the usable bargaining strength” (Young 1989: 354). The literature on asymmetrical environmental negotiation deals with the limited resources and assets a poor nation can bring to bear relative to a richer nation. The premise is that an economically asymmetrical relationship may actually favor the poorer state. As a negotiating tactic, the only card held by the weaker party is to deprive the stronger actor of what it desires. Cooperation from the poorer country will ensue if the richer country provides economic and financial incentives (Barrett 2003: 335–51; Sjöstedt and Spector 1993: 311–12; Young 1994: 128, 132–3). It is generally thought that the more asymmetric the power relationship, the more unequal will be the distribution of gains. It does not follow, however, that

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the asymmetries of gains will always favor the stronger state, which is the malign view of the hegemon as a coercer. Indeed, the opposite may be true more of the time, which is the benign view of hegemony (Barrett 2003: 344; Haggard and Simmons 1987: 502–3; Milner 1992: 470; Snidal 1985: 581). In this case, the smaller power will gain proportionately far more benefit from the bigger one’s exertions than vice versa. The traditional view of hegemony in the international arena is thus turned on its head (Snidal 1985: 581). Side-payment transfers in asymmetric situations are also in line with the notion of fairness. Side-payments are more likely to facilitate self-enforcing agreements (Barrett 2003: 300, 333–4). Similarly, the more international agreements are perceived as legitimate the more this will contribute to their effectiveness (Bodansky 1999: 603; Oakerson 1992: 52). Those states that believe they have been treated fairly and whose core demands have been addressed will be more inclined to make agreements work and stand by their commitments (Lewicki and Litterer 1985: 101; Underdal 2002: 123; Young 1994: 136). Defection from an agreement is therefore more likely when “one party perceives it has been bullied or deceived into accepting a solution giving it payoffs substantially below what its negotiating partner would have, in fact, been ready to concede” (Underdal 2002: 123). This approach is also in line with the desire of some countries to create a “committed coalition” whereby a player that benefits more from cooperation, or one that takes the initiative, provides incentives to other parties so as to obtain a sufficient number of “players” committed to a cooperative management strategy (Becker and Easter 1998: 187–92). Stronger states are, therefore, often able to provide weaker states with benefits or compensation to induce their cooperation (Barrett 2003: 338–54; Keohane 1980; 1984; Milner 1992: 480; Snidal 1985). In the case of public goods, or reciprocal externalities, the larger state may also find it worthwhile to provide it in its entirety, regardless of whether the others contribute anything (Olson and Zeckhauser 1966; Russett and Sullivan 1971: 853). Under such circumstances, the burdens and sacrifices it bears are disproportionate. As Russett and Sullivan propose, this is a classic case of “the exploitation of the large by the small” (1971: 853; Haggard and Simmons 1987: 503; Olson 1965: 29). To be fair the stronger party still gains. However, it is unable to exercise power over other states to its sole advantage. When a weak state and a strong state share a common environmental resource and the strong state feels more committed than the weak one to maintain this common resource, then it follows that the strong state will have to entice the weak one to cooperate (border-creator case). The same can be said when a weak state is upstream and does not necessarily uphold the same environmental standards as the downstream state (through-border case). The richer downstream state might have to entice the poorer upstream state to cooperate to (say) abate pollution. The use of force or brute power to compel cooperation may be futile. Enticement is seen as a better strategy and a state’s position along a river, or preferences for the environment, dictate how the enticing will take place (Young 1982: 283). Thus a leadership position may still be taken by the hegemon, but the relationship is one of bargaining rather than coercion.

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FINAL NOTE

Negotiations between rich and poor states may often require some form of side-payments to encourage cooperation. Similarly richer states are likely to bear a bigger share of the burden of costs than poorer states. For the through-border configuration, if the downstream state is richer (or poorer) it is likely to pay more (or less) as compensation for the upstream state. Similarly, for the border-creator configuration, the richer border state is likely to pay more than half the costs of the shared payments or even provide a direct side-payment to encourage cooperation and solve a property rights dispute. Differing income levels/pollution standards, bargaining, and side-payments The optimistic repercussion raised in the discussion about the border-creator configuration presented earlier and in Chapter 2, has been disputed by other scholars. The combination of non-excludability and rivalness in consumption, which are the hallmark characteristics of a border-creator river, means that there is rather a stronger individual incentive to exploit common pool resources (Barkin and Shambaugh 1999: 6). This is especially the case when the two states have different time horizons vis-à-vis the resource (Barkin and Shambaugh 1999: 13, 178). That is, states may value the same resource differently (Darst 2001: 39). Of course, a state’s discount rate regarding a resource and its preferences for the environment (which can be reflected in its pollution standards), is also a function of its economic well-being (Barrett and Graddy 2000: 442; Botteon and Carraro 1997: 27; Compte and Jehiel 1997: 63; Congleton 1992: 419–20; Murdoch and Sandler 1997: 338, 347; Murdoch et al. 1997: 296–7; Rogers 1996: 113–15; Sandler 1997: 71; Susskind and Ozawa 1992: 153). Poor countries may have more of a propensity to pollute to the detriment of wealthier countries with higher pollution standards. Developing countries are therefore more likely to utilize the resource for present development as compared to uses and applications more in line with environmental concerns. They are more likely to “free ride,” lack the necessary resources for alternative positions, and suffer from increased constraints to manage their resources (Durning 1989: 40; Hollander 2003: 13, 17, 201; Matthew 1999: 172; Snidal 1995: 64; Swanson 1996: 22). Poor resource endowment, low income, as well as high discount rates, therefore, tend to decrease a party’s endogenous valuation of the environment (Larson and Bromley 1990: 256). Conversely, positive links exist between income and environmental quality, as there is an increased demand for environmental protection at higher income levels (Dasgupta and Mäler 1994: 4–5; Grossman and Krueger 1995: 369; Hettige et al. 1992: 479; Holtz-Eakin and Selden 1992: 3; Selden and Song 1994: 161; Shafik and Bandyopadhyay 1992: 10). As Hopmann has observed with regard to the outcomes of asymmetrical negotiations, the party that incurs the least losses associated with being left at the status quo point of no agreement will often be the favored party in the bargaining

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game. In other words, those states with the least to lose from non-agreement can, in fact, exert greater influence on those states with more to lose from non-agreement (Hopmann 1978: 162–3, 176). Alternatives to negotiation, expressed in the degree of urgency of poor countries to abate pollution, therefore, determine in some sense their negotiating power (Zartman 1991: 69). The threat to over-consume the common resource is most credible when it comes from the country perceived to have the shorter “shadow of the future.” By threatening to delay an agreement, and with the ability to over-consume, the country with the shorter “shadow of the future” can threaten to generate costs for other countries that it will not have to bear. The country with the longer “shadow of the future” has a strong incentive to behave in a concessionary manner toward the country with the shorter “shadow of the future” in order to secure an agreement (Barkin and Shambaugh 1999: 13). As Shue has argued: . . . if what poor nations want from negotiations . . . .is for rich nations to pay most of the bill for action, they may be able to get it . . . The rich nations have the most to lose and are the only ones able to pay – so either they pay or no cooperative effort will be undertaken. (1992: 375) For developed countries, therefore, gaining the participation of developing states in international agreements has often required paying the costs of their participation (Raustiala and Victor 1998: 696). According to Scott (1974: 842), similarities in standards for environmental quality enhance the success of treaty organizations and joint action (see also Ostrom 1992: 299). States with a shorter “shadow of the future” for the resource have more bargaining power relative to those states with a longer “shadow of the future” vis-à-vis the resource. Side-payments may often figure into such a relationship (Scott 1974: 842). Negotiations among states with homogeneous preferences, such as the weight states ascribe to environmental issues, will require smaller transfers. Conversely, when constraints are imposed on transfers, mutually beneficial agreements may not exist, in particular if state preferences are very heterogeneous (Compte and Jehiel 1997: 64). The more heterogeneous the parties, the more difficult common property rules are to maintain (Barkin and Shambaugh 1999: 18; Johnson and Libecap 1982: 1006–16; Libecap 1995: 188).10 FINAL NOTE

A relationship exists between national income and preferences for the environment. Poor states are less willing (and able) to pay for environmental quality as compared to richer ones. Despite the reciprocal nature of the border-creator configuration, a richer state may have to provide side-payments to a poorer state as an incentive to abate pollution if the poorer nation has an increased propensity to pollute and the richer nation a lesser propensity to accept the pollution. In the case of two symmetric states with similar environmental priorities, side-payments may

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not need to be transferred for abating or preventing pollution. In the through-border configuration, a poor upstream state emitting pollution in the downstream direction will also be able to obtain monetary transfers from the richer downstream state for its abatement. Economic asymmetries and pollution standards Increased financial capacities and prosperity enable wealthy governments to finance water quality projects in neighboring countries (Shmueli 1999: 439). As noted in the previous section, poorer countries may have different and perhaps weaker pollution standards than richer countries. As Linerooth has observed: “. . . the more developed upper riparian nations may wish to create ‘good will’ with their neighbors by contributing more to pollution control while [themselves] benefiting less” (1990: 643). Interestingly, Article 8 of the 1979 Athens Resolution of the Institut de Droit International, an international legal society, actually makes specific recommendations for developed states to assist developing states, technically or by whatever means, by fulfilling their obligations for pollution abatement. Principle 9 of the Stockholm Declaration and Principle 6 of the Rio Declaration also remark that the special needs and environmental vulnerability of developing states must be taken into account. That is, financial aid and technological benefits can be transferred to remedy the environmental deficiencies that result from underdevelopment. From a negotiating point of view, the richer country is willing to pay more. This relationship between economically asymmetric countries may also transcend itself, to affect other issues beyond pollution abatement. The ability of the richer country to pay more is especially important when considering the notion of side-payments and cost-sharing. The case of the throughborder configuration provides perhaps the best context for articulating this argument. Chapter 2 initially suggested that more powerful upstream states would have little incentive to cooperate with downstream states in projects that provide little benefit upstream without appropriate compensation. The disincentive to cooperate largely derives impetus from the asymmetrical qualities of the river geography. Issue-linkage, reciprocity, and/or side-payments were listed as the main tools for use by the downstream state to foster cooperation. Yet this section has argued that the upstream country may actually take actions that would mostly benefit the downstream country without compensation, a sort of side-payment in the opposite direction. In fact, those economic asymmetries between the countries that favor the one upstream may provide the explanation for the reversed side-payment outcome. The disincentives to cooperate are, therefore, moderated by the upstream state’s greater “willingness to pay.” Such a phenomenon may also be in line with the general principles of equity and fairness often relating to the gap between rich and poor countries. From a methodological point of view, data on economic asymmetries is fairly easy to obtain. As opposed to information on issue-linkage and reciprocity, which is not necessarily available by reading the agreement, information about the

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economic differences between the parties may be better suited to parsing by a treaty analyst. This economic analysis may also help to explain cases where issue-linkage and reciprocity are thought to be operative. Chief among these examples is the 1973 Colorado River Agreement. This case is a favorite of the issue-linkage and reciprocity literature. Yet the economic disparities between the two signatories may also explain America’s favorable treatment toward Mexico in the face of the immediate disincentives to do so. Chapter 5 will discuss this case in more detail from the economic perspective.

FINAL NOTE

All else being equal, economic asymmetries among countries may lead to situations where rich countries assist poorer countries in water related projects regardless of their location along a river. The greater willingness of a richer upstream state to pay, despite its strategic position along the river, mitigates its disincentives to cooperate. Concluding remarks for economic section The location of the riparian states along a river, as well as its geography, are important for explaining international conflict, cooperation, and property rights outcomes, but they are not sufficient. Were it otherwise, outcomes would not differ in cases, involving either rich or poor riparians. Compared to a poorer state, a richer nation will evince a greater “willingness to pay” for particular projects and, in the case of pollution, a lower tolerance. Such dispositions should reinforce the outcomes predicted by the geographic theory with respect to a richer downstream state. Alternately, they might produce an outcome opposed to that predicted by the geographic theory with respect to a richer upstream state. A similar scenario holds for economically asymmetric riparians situated along a river with a border-creator configuration. The richer nation may be able to take on the majority of the costs of a joint project or provide incentives to the poorer state for abating pollution. Despite the harm the poorer state causes itself by polluting on a border-creator river, its threshold for accepting pollution is much higher than that of the richer state, due to its shorter “shadow of the future.” This in itself can be used as a bargaining tactic to give impetus to a cooperative attitude.

Theory and hypotheses for treaty design investigation: applying the literature Geography Following upon the detailed discussion presented earlier, a concise theory follows that explains the relationship between river geography, cooperation, property rights solutions and the design of a treaty. Testable hypotheses will also be presented.

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Geography matters in the statecraft of treaty making. In the basic through-border prototypical case the upstream state has a geographical advantage over the downstream state. Such a geographical advantage has its benefits. The upstream state can pollute causing a unidirectional externality in the downstream direction. Similarly, the upstream state may use water in its territory to the detriment of the downstream state. Therefore, while the downstream state may have a de jure right to water and a right not to be “significantly” harmed from pollution, the de facto right belongs to the upstream state. The right is acquired by sheer location and not necessarily by law. The positional asymmetry of this configuration, therefore, determines geographically bounded winners and losers. While both the through-border and border-creator configurations are susceptible to conflict between riparian states, the geography of the through-border configuration may facilitate conflict. A geographically asymmetrical relationship exists in the through-border configuration while the border-creator configuration implies a geographically symmetric relationship between riparian states. This fosters retaliation and reciprocity between and among them. Similarly, externalities are partially internalized and deter harming behavior. As far as the design of a treaty and the resolution of a property right conflict pertaining to a specific project or issue are concerned, the through-border configuration implies that for a downstream state to induce cooperation from its upstream neighbor, a side-payment need be provided. Furthermore, if a project that requires the strategic territory of the upstream state is conceived for the benefit of both states, the downstream state must still provide an incentive to the upstream state to induce cooperation. Downstream benefits created upstream are recognized through compensation. Conflicting interests and/or uses (e.g., property rights conflicts) on a particular river are therefore reconciled through side-payments. Side-payments shall also be provided to an upstream state when a project downstream affects the territory of the upstream state. The strategic territory of the upstream country and the acquiescence of the upstream country are required for the project to go forward. As far as externalities are concerned, it follows that if an upstream state pollutes and harms the downstream state, the PPP will not be the sole guiding principle. Instead a “victim pays” regime may be instituted meaning that while the upstream state pollutes, inducing it to abate pollution will require a side-payment from the harmed downstream state. Alternatively, the downstream state may have to absorb some of the costs of pollution abatement (in effect a side-payment). In practice, this means that the harming state may either have partial or no responsibility to abate. Since the situation with the border-creator geography is one of positional symmetry, externalities are partially internalized and reciprocity is embedded. Countries may be both the source and the victim of any action taken. Geographically speaking, both countries equally share the river. There is less potential for strategic maneuvering given that not one state controls the headwaters or can pollute the river solely to the detriment of the other state. There is therefore a sense that the river is equally shared and joint projects more often require the equal participation of both countries. What follows for treaties governing rivers

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with this configuration is that costs for projects are more commonly equally shared and side-payments rarely involved for inducing cooperation. Two hypotheses follow: Hypothesis One: All else being equal, in the through-border configuration side-payments will be provided by the downstream state to the upstream state. Hypothesis Two: All else being equal, in the border-creator configuration side-payments will not be provided and costs will, more often, be shared equally. Economics Economic discrepancies create a situation wherein a richer country is able to provide side-payments to a poorer country either to encourage cooperation or as a gesture of goodwill to assist with a particular project. For example, the tendency for the “victim pays” regime is reinforced when a downstream state, either because of a greater preference for the environment or a higher per capita income, relative to the upstream state, has higher pollution standards. Thus, another element is added whereby, higher per capita income and higher pollution standards force the richer downstream state to transfer payments or funds, giving an incentive to the polluting upstream state to abate. Likewise, a richer state may have to absorb the costs of instituting more effective pollution abatement. Geography may not be the main explanatory variable in this scenario, but it makes up a large part of the reasoning behind the outcome. In any case, the through-border configuration intensifies the externality problem for asymmetric countries if the poorer country is upstream. The situation may not be as severe when the riparians are symmetric and the environmental preferences of each country are relatively similar. Another instance where, despite economic discrepancies between the riparian states, the geographical configuration may not be the sole explanatory variable, is in the case of the border-creator configuration. Regardless of the self-damaging nature implicit in the geography of this configuration, states with different incomes – and by extension environmental preferences – may have different propensities to pollute and thresholds for acceptance. In general, the asymmetric relationship between the states may mean that the richer nation must provide side-payments to the poorer nation to induce abatement. Alternatively the richer state may take on a higher portion of the cost arrangement for non-pollution related projects (in effect a side-payment). In the case of the through-border configuration with a richer upstream state and a poorer downstream state, geography may not explain the expected side-payment patterns at all. Since the upstream state has a higher per capita income relative to the downstream state, and has the ability to assist the downstream state, the downstream state may have to pay less to change the behavior of its upstream neighbor (such as for pollution abatement). More often, the richer state’s greater “willingness to pay” may also lead to a situation where the upstream state internalizes costs in favor of the downstream state and perhaps even provides side-payments. If the upstream state undertakes actions that benefit the downstream

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riparian without compensation this, too, can be considered an effective side-payment in favor of the downstream state. Such actions and payments are, therefore, a function of the relative income of the parties. Two hypotheses follow:11 Hypothesis Three: All else being equal, for the through-border configuration, the richer is the upstream state relative to the downstream state, the smaller will be the side-payment paid by the downstream state. The upstream state may even provide side-payments to the downstream state or take actions in favor of the downstream state without compensation. Hypothesis Four: All else being equal, for the border-creator configuration, the richer state will provide side-payments to the poorer state, or bear a larger fraction of the joint costs of river development (in effect providing a side-payment to the poorer state). In Chapters 4 and 5 these hypotheses will be tested across an expanded set of treaty observations.

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Empirical analysis of treaty design differences: core configurations

This chapter explores both the geographic and economic hypotheses presented in Chapter 3, testing them through a substantial corpus of treaty observations. It analyzes concluded treaties dealing with rivers shared by (only) two states. Centrally, it focuses on rivers that fall under either of the two core configurations: the through-border and border-creator. Employing this pair of configurations enables the systematic testing of this work’s underlying theory and its contingent hypotheses across a substantial catalog of geographically distinct rivers. If the geography of a river matters in the formulation of agreements, the resolution of property rights conflicts, and for an understanding of the incentives and disincentives to cooperation, then differences between the two configurations should matter, with as much significance, for treaty outcomes. If the economic differences between states are also purported to make a difference in treaty outcomes, then agreements ought to reflect differences between richer and poorer countries. In short, these two variables are purported to explain variations in side-payment and cost-sharing regimes, a country’s “willingness to pay” and the impending property rights solution, negotiated in an agreement. Appendix D lists all the rivers under study together with their associated agreements. It includes the riparian countries sharing the river, and indicates the river’s geography. It also notes whether or not side-payments were provided and, if so, how the costs for the project were divided between the riparians. It also briefly describes each agreement. These tables provide all the information needed to test the hypotheses. Although the analysis of the two core configurations is central for the main purposes of this book – in order to be able to say something compelling about differently situated states on rivers with opposite geographical characteristic – treaty data for rivers that do not correspond to the particular characteristics of the through-border and border-creator configurations has also been studied. These additional configurations embody geographical elements identical to the two pure configurations. Following the analysis of the two opposite cases, attention shifts to the other cases in order to gauge the instructive value of this information for testing the theory and hypotheses across the outlying data. No distinct theory and hypotheses for these cases is formulated. Rather, they make it possible to compare the results for these observations to the results derived from the pure

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configurations in order to detect whether similarities or stark differences are evidenced. These additional configurations are investigated in Chapter 5.

Analyzing the agreements Descriptive information As noted, Appendix D includes the respective river under investigation, its associated agreements, as well as the location of the states along the river, the concluded side-payment regime, and a short summary of the agreements’ terms. In addition, a set of key words is included to depict the content and issue areas of the agreement. The treaties identified in Appendix D subsume fourteen issue areas. However, since the content of each treaty often spans a selection of these issues, each associated agreement is given its correlated key words. The first key word in the list indicates the main issue underpinning the agreement. Subsequent key words provide information on the secondary issues the agreement addresses. The issue areas are identified and explained in Table 4.1. As noted in Chapter 1, and as Appendix D will demonstrate, some of the analyzed agreements can be described as “general” while others may be seen as “specific.” This distinction is important because general agreements do not call on the parties to undertake any particular action or deal with any particular property rights dispute. Due to the general nature of these agreements, side-payments also do not factor into the negotiated outcome. In such agreements, states express a broad commitment to collaborate on matters of mutual interest. Such agreements also outline broad rules and regulations that govern the states’ behavior vis-à-vis their shared river. Finally, these general agreements often commit states to negotiate a separate agreement if they are to undertake specific actions with regard to the river, whether jointly or alone. Specific agreements, on the other hand, may call on the parties to take concrete steps or to set out detailed solutions to common property rights conflicts, such as how to reconcile conflicting river uses, or abate pollution. Due to the specific actions envisioned in such agreements, information on side-payments is more likely to characterize them. To distinguish between these two categories, Appendix D shows the specific treaties – the main focus of this analysis – in bold-type, while the general treaties are denoted by plain-type. A brief assessment of these agreements also appears in the tables in this chapter. The data It’s important to note that the subject of analysis of this study is the river itself and its respective geographical configuration, while a single treaty might apply to several rivers. In such cases, the agreement is included in the count according to the number of rivers it represents. Thus, if one agreement applies to (say) five rivers, it would be as if five agreements had been negotiated.1 In fact, in some cases the

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Table 4.1 International water treaties issue areas Issue area

Description

Water quantity

Applies to agreements that make either specific reference to dividing the shared waters among the parties or general reference to water utilization and/or the facilities required for the supply of these agreed upon quantities. Applies to agreements that make specific or general reference to pollution, water quality, pollution abatement, and the facilities required for abatement. Applies to agreements that make either specific or general reference to hydropower and the facilities required for its generation. Applies to agreements that make either specific or general reference to flood control and the relevant facilities. Applies to very general rules and principles that the parties have agreed to, which will govern their actions on the shared river. It pertains to what the parties may or may not do in broad terms. Applies to non-specific works that both parties have expressed interest in. This term applies to any agreement, which does not specify a particular area of cooperation such as hydropower, pollution, flood control, and water utilization but instead refers to joint projects and works. Applies to agreements that establish a joint commission between the two parties. Applies to agreements whereby the parties agree to conduct a joint study or investigation. Applies to agreements that refer to the parties’ desire to engage in scientific and technical cooperation.

Pollution

Hydropower Flood control General regulations General works

Commission creation Joint study Scientific and technical cooperation Monitoring Dam construction

Facility use

Scenic works Border issues

Applies to agreements that call on the parties to engage in monitoring (e.g., water levels, water quantity) of their shared rivers. Applies to agreements that refer to a dam project but do not specify the reason for building the dam (such as for hydropower, flood control, water quantity). Applies to agreements that refer specifically to water supply facilities shared between the states. The agreement does not pertain to water allocations between the parties. Applies to agreements that refer to protective works for the physical beautification of the shared river. Applies to agreements that deal with border matters, which are often associated with shared rivers.

agreement specifically mentions the rivers to which the agreement pertains. In other cases the agreement refers to no river in particular but rather to rivers the countries share. While qualifications of that sort mostly pertain to general agreements, several agreements that refer to water quantity issues fall under these

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conditions. Based on the work of Wolf et al. (1999), who provide a listing of river basins and their riparian countries, it is possible to match the agreements with the respective river(s). This work made use of Oregon State University’s International Freshwater Treaties Database, a widely recognized and authoritative depository of international water agreements, for purposes of comparison. In total this research has added 94 new agreements, treaty translations, texts and/or titles to the current count recorded by Oregon State’s research.2 In general, a total of 281 (including the relevant treaties in Oregon State’s research) agreements that correspond to the different identified configurations and rivers were catalogued. Of these 281 agreements, 91 may be regarded – as defined above – specific treaties and are relevant for the analysis below. The large number of general agreements, relative to specific agreements, should come as no surprise since general agreements are much easier for the parties to negotiate and conclude. As suggested earlier, general agreements are also often negotiated as a prelude to more specific treaties; to set the framework for a cooperative relationship. That being said, it is specific agreements that provide information on side-payments and cost-sharing patterns sought for investigating property rights solutions. Beyond the useful Oregon State Treaties Database, the texts of other agreements listed and analyzed here were located through other depositories and sources.3 Since some depositories and sources identify treaties only by title, their texts had to be solicited from the relevant embassies or acquired through other official, foreign, and governmental sources. Surely, more treaties remain to be identified as the above depositories do not provide an exhaustive list of available freshwater treaties. That being said, all relevant treaty texts that could be located were included. As such, the extent of the observations was delimited by their availability. The under representation of any particular region of the world or river basin is due solely to the accessibility of that region’s or basin’s river treaties, rather than to any deliberate sampling bias. The tables throughout this chapter provide information on the respective countries, their geographical configurations, the side-payment or cost-sharing regimes, and other relevant information. The tables also consider the side-payment or cost-sharing regimes in the context of the economic asymmetries between the countries for the year the treaties were signed. For consistency and clarity each treaty, throughout the following chapters, is labeled according to the year and river it pertains to (e.g., 1944 Colorado River Agreement) although this might not be the formal title of the agreement. When available, Appendix D provides the formal title of each treaty. Operationalizing the dependent and independent variables Side-payment and cost-sharing patterns were operationalized as follows. The side-payment investigation took on a binary nature where treaties were assessed only for the presence of side-payments. When a party undertook actions that favored another party, without compensation, this too, was considered a side-payment.

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Similarly, the investigation of cost-sharing arrangements focused on the proportion of the cost-burden assumed by each party. A given cost-sharing regime between two parties is likened to an intrinsic side-payment when one party assumes a higher cost burden for a joint project, regardless of the manner in which benefits are shared. When the victim country (e.g., in a dispute related to pollution) absorbs some of the abatement costs this, also, was considered an effective payment (Dinar 2006: 423). The location of a state along a given river and the geographical configuration of the river were ascertained from maps housed in the Map Rooms of the World Bank and the National Geographic Society, both in Washington, DC. The river basin listing compiled by Wolf et al. (1999) was used to locate the rivers on the maps. Other rivers were identified, based on the treaty texts themselves. A GDP per capita ratio between the two countries is used to judge the economic asymmetries between them. GDP per capita, rather than GDP, is used in order to obtain a measure of a country’s “willingness to pay,” rather than a country’s total power. A country’s financial capacities provide a better assessment on side-payments and cost-sharing patterns. The Penn World Table 6.14 serves as the as the main data source. Other data sources are used when data is not available through the Penn World Table 6.1. In general, either the Penn World Table 5.65 or Maddison (1995)6 is used. The Maddison source is used for the pre-1950 treaty observations. In cases where the above-mentioned three sources do not provide any data, recourse is to the United Nations Statistical Databases, National Accounts Main Aggregates.7 For consistent comparisons within each country pair, GDP per capita for each pair is derived from the same source.8 A relationship between two countries is considered asymmetric when the ratio between the richer country and the poorer country is at least two. In addition, the ratios are rounded. The asymmetry threshold is, likewise, two. Appendix E provides the statistical explanations for both rounding and threshold determination. Country dyad asymmetry ratios are also presented. The hypotheses In order to test the four hypotheses restated below, the analysis of the agreements begins with the two core configurations. The first two hypotheses relate strictly to the geographical variable and the latter two relate to the economic variable. Hypothesis One: All else being equal, in the through-border configuration side-payments will be provided by the downstream state to the upstream state. Hypothesis Two: All else being equal, in the border-creator configuration sidepayments will not be provided and costs will, more often, be shared equally. Hypothesis Three: All else being equal, for the through-border configuration, the richer the upstream state relative to the downstream state, the smaller will be the side-payment paid by the downstream state. The upstream state may even provide side-payments to the downstream state or take actions in favor of the downstream state without compensation.

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Hypothesis Four: All else being equal, for the border-creator configuration, the richer state will provide side-payments to the poorer state, or bear a larger fraction of the joint costs of river development (in effect providing a side-payment to the poorer state).

The core configurations Through-border configuration Out of 118 agreements, only 35 are specific. Interestingly, the majority of agreements (66 percent) incorporate side-payments from the downstream country to the upstream country. This is especially noteworthy, as explained in the discussion on linkage presented in Chapter 3, wherein the arguments of Bennett et al. (1998), Mäler (1990), and Folmer et al. (1993) make clear that issue-linkage is often a more rational means for solving cooperative problems between geographically asymmetric countries than side-payments. According to these authors, the side-payment option is considered a bribe. Consequently, the downstream state will be less inclined to provide this type of compensation since it may be considered a weak negotiator. Therefore, while linkage may be a strategy used for offsetting geographical asymmetries, this does not preclude the use of side-payments as a strategic tool in negotiations, either for fostering cooperation or solving property rights conflicts between geographically asymmetric countries situated along an international river. Perhaps one of the main deficiencies of the aforementioned writings is their lack of a wide range of empirical support for demonstrating that side-payments are seldom used as a strategic tool in negotiations, or that they are uncommon. As this section shows empirically, the side-payment component in negotiations over water is quite common and is used extensively between geographically asymmetric parties. In fact, the large number of agreements that incorporate side-payments demonstrates that they provide an acceptable means for solving conflicts that fall under such spatial considerations. Appraising these agreements in more detail may shed some additional light on the prevalence of side-payments in geographically asymmetric situations. The 35 specific agreements pertaining to the through-border configuration, listed below, are divided according to issue area. In addition to summarizing the negotiated side-payment arrangements, the economic symmetries (or asymmetries) between the countries are noted. For each issue area, a table characterizes the side-payment regime, and another table analyzes the economic symmetries (or asymmetries) balance. Because this work purposes an analysis of the patterns of side-payments across a large set of observations, it presents only a brief analysis of a few cases from each table. These are dealt with in somewhat greater detail in the explanation of exceptional cases. This approach suggests that while analysis across an extended set of data is helped by reference to numerous water agreements, the case studies provide clearer explanations.

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Water quantity Ten specific treaties under the through-border configuration relate to water quantity. These agreements deal either with water allocation or provide the riparian states with specific rights to the river water. Table 4.2 organizes the agreements according to the economic asymmetries of the countries and the associated side-payment regimes. In fact, six out of the ten water quantity agreements do not reflect side-payments at all. One of the ten agreements reflects side-payments from the upstream state to the downstream state. Only three out of the ten agreements reflect a side-payment from the downstream state to the upstream state. Table 4.2 Specific treaties for through-border configuration (water quantity) Symmetric relationship (GDP/capita)

Asymmetric relationship (GDP/capita)

Side-payments

Upstream richer

N a DN to UPb UP to DN c

Downstream richer

1909; St. Mary; USA and Canada (UK) 1914; Roya; France and Italy

X X Xd

1925/1951; Gash; Italy (Eritrea) and UK (Sudan) 1957; Isonzo (Mrzlek Springs); Yugoslavia and Italy 1967; Roya; France and Italy 1968; Lima (Limia); Spain and Portugal

X

X X 1973; Helmand; Afghanistan and Iran

1975; Gangir; Iraq and Iran 1975; Kanjan Cham; Iraq and Iran 1975; Tib (Mehmeh); Iraq and Iran

X

X X X

Notes a No side-payment regime. b Side-payments from downstream to upstream state. c Side-payments from upstream to downstream state. d Payments were discontinued when Italy ended its colonial rule over Eritrea in 1941. Eritrea was then governed as a protectorate by the UK. Sudan was a colony of the UK during the time period of this agreement.

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GENERAL FINDINGS

It has previously been noted here that negotiations over water allocation might also be subject to side-payments between upstream and downstream states. The upstream country, which is able to strategically control the river’s headwaters will, at least theoretically, be able to use or divert the river’s water as it wishes to the detriment of the downstream state. To secure uninhibited access to the water, a downstream state may have to provide a side-payment to the upstream state. The literature on issue-linkage has also discussed the asymmetries between upstream and downstream states in water quantity issues, and has argued for the need to utilize trade-offs to offset them (Bennett et al. 1998). Among the ten water quantity examples provided above, three agreements reflect this side-payment phenomenon from the downstream to the upstream state. These are: (1) the 1925/1951 Gash River Agreement; (2) the 1957 Isonzo River Agreement; and (3) the 1973 Helmand River Agreement. In fact, the 1925/1951 Gash River Agreement has previously been touted by Wolf (1999) as one of the few examples of outright payment for water. As the table above reflects, two more examples can now be added to the list of cases reflecting payment for water between downstream and upstream states. The 1957 Isonzo River Agreement actually refers to the Mrzlek Springs, which are indigenous to Yugoslavia – a region that is today Slovenia – but feed the Isonzo River (Interview, Doctor 2004). The treaty reflects an agreement by the two countries to divide the waters of the Spring’s water plant, 85 percent to Italy and 15 percent to Yugoslavia. In addition, downstream Italy provides payment to upstream Yugoslavia for the water it uses. Furthermore, Italy also contributes to the maintenance of the plant used by both countries. The other water allocation agreement reflecting payment for water is the 1973 Helmand River Agreement.9 Such examples reflect on Hypothesis One, the main geographical premise of this work. Although the table above provides three examples of outright payments for water from the downstream state to the upstream state, six agreements reflect no side-payments at all for water allocation between the upstream and downstream states. The respective states are economically symmetric (a relationship of 1:1 between them). Half of these agreements call for an equal division of the shared waters while the other half of the agreements does not reflect any precise division. These outcomes, especially those that embody no side-payments from the downstream state to the upstream state, appear to weakly contradict the principal geographical hypothesis (Hypothesis One).10 However, these outcomes are not discrepant with the existing literature. Regarding the phenomenon of compensation and payment for water, legal scholars have argued that: . . . modern international law does not accept the notion that seems to underlie such a claim for compensation, namely, that a state owns the waters of an international watercourse that are, for the most part, situated in its territory and is free to do with them as it pleases regardless of the consequences for other riparian states. On the contrary, upper riparians are under an obligation not to prevent such waters from flowing to a lower riparian country. (McCaffrey 2001: 264)

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This notion is also in line with Article 3 of the 1949 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which stipulates a right to water as a component of the right to life. While some of the agreements in the table above, in fact, reflect this so-called “modern” legal principle, and are in line with the existing literature, other agreements – the 1973 treaty being the most recent recorded by this study – reflect a principle of compensation for water allocation between upstream and downstream states. The next section provides a specific discussion about the agreements but also considers the exceptional case noted in Table 4.2. DISCUSSION OF SPECIFIC TREATIES

The Roya and implications for the Isonzo, Gash, and Helmand Rivers The exception to be noted in the table above, relates to the 1967 Roya River Agreement, wherein downstream Italy is to grant a water concession to the French Commune of Menton, which, in turn, pays Italy for the water concession and is responsible for the acquisition of land and the construction of facilities. This side-payment outcome goes against Hypothesis One. The upstream and the downstream states are economically symmetric so differences in income cannot explain the outcome. Two other explanations may be driving the result. In fact, Menton is located in Southern France, far from the source of the Roya, which is in Northern France, so that it is more economical to obtain the water concession from Italy. A second explanation may provide a more viable justification. The 1967 Agreement is not a water allocation agreement between the two countries per se but rather a water concession, purchased by a single municipality. The exception noted above may also reflect on the 1957 Isonzo River Agreement. While the side-payment regime is commensurate with Hypothesis One the “water purchase deal” was initiated by the Italian town of Gorizia. Although the Mrzlek Springs are indigenous to (then) Yugoslav territory and their waters flow into the Isonzo, the agreement is not a water allocation agreement between the two countries, but rather a water purchase agreement initiated by a single municipality. Both the 1967 Roya River Agreement and the 1957 Isonzo River Agreement are, thus, different than the agreements on the Gash and Helmand Rivers, which allocate their waters between the riparians. Hydropower, flood control, monitoring, dam construction, and facility use This section analyzes agreements that pertain to hydropower, flood control, monitoring, dam construction, and facility use. Due to their small number, these agreements are grouped together in Table 4.3, though under a distinct issue area. GENERAL FINDINGS

Among the nineteen agreements that pertain to the “hydropower and/or flood control” issue area and the “monitoring, dam construction, or facility use” issue area, one agreement (5 percent) does not provide for any type of side-payments

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Table 4.3 Specific treaties for through-border configuration (hydropower, flood control, monitoring, dam construction, facility use) Symmetric relationship (GDP/capita)

Asymmetric relationship (GDP/capita)

Side-payments

Upstream richer

N a DN to UPb UP to DN c

Downstream richer 1949; Reno di Lei; Italy and Switzerland

X

1951; Näätämöjoki; Finland and Norway 1952; Orawa; Poland and Czechoslovakia 1954/1966; Kosi; Nepal and India 1955; Mont Cenis; France and Italy

X

X X X 1958; Carol; France and Spain

X

1960; Mont Cenis; France and Italy 1961/1964; Columbia; Canada and USA 1963; Garona; Spain and France

X X X 1972; Vuoksi; Finland and USSR

X 1974; Wangchu; Bhutan and India

1967/1984; Skagit; Canada and USA 1988; Red; USA and Canada 1995; Kurichhu; Bhutan and India 1996; Wangchu; Bhutan and India 1955; Sarisu; Turkey and Iran

X

X X X X

X (Table 4.3 continued )

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Table 4.3 Continued Symmetric relationship (GDP/capita)

Asymmetric relationship (GDP/capita)

Side-payments

Upstream richer

N a DN to UPb UP to DN c

Downstream richer

1960; Witka (Smeda); Czechoslovakia and Poland 1963; Allaine; Switzerland and France 2000; Talas; Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan

X

X X

Notes Refer Table 4.2 for the notes.

and compensation between downstream and upstream countries. Rather, in the 1955 Sarisu River Agreement each party undertakes its own monitoring obligations on its side of the border. The parties are economically symmetric. Just two – the 1963 Allaine River Agreement and the 1957 Carol River Agreement – out of nineteen agreements pertain to side payments from the upstream country to the downstream country (11 percent). While a direct sidepayment is not provided in the Carol River Agreement, the upstream country undertakes particular actions in favor of the downstream country – in a way a side-payment. The Carol and Allaine River Agreements both reflect on Hypothesis Three (e.g., that the richer upstream state is more likely to take action or provide a side-payment in favor of the downstream state regardless of the immediate economic and strategic disincentives to do so). The strategic disincentives to cooperate are, therefore, moderated by the higher “willingness to pay” of the richer upstream state. In general, sixteen out of the nineteen agreements (84 percent) reflect sidepayments from the downstream to the upstream state, again reinforcing Hypothesis One (e.g., that the notion of side-payment transfers and compensation between geographically asymmetric countries is not anomalous). These agreements reflect three types of situations including: (1) actions taken upstream that likewise benefit the downstream country; (2) use of the strategic territory of the upstream state, or actions taken by the upstream state, for the integrated development of the river largely for the benefit of the downstream state and (3) activities taken downstream, solely for the benefit of the downstream state, that affect the upstream country’s territory in some form or fashion. In two of these agreements, the 1972 Vuoksi River Agreement and the 1960 Witka (Smeda) River Agreement, the upstream country is richer than the downstream state (twice the difference in either case!), yet the side-payments are

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still forthcoming in the direction predicted by Hypothesis One. While Hypothesis Three recognizes that the opposite side-payment regime may ensue when an upstream state is richer, it does not deny the possibility that the asymmetrical geographical configuration may still dictate the outcome, meaning that the downstream state, albeit poorer than the upstream state, may still have to provide a side-payment. In relationship to cooperation and property rights conflicts, the prevalence of side-payments demonstrates not only that compensation can “ratchet-up” the cooperation problem in geographically asymmetric situations, but also that coordinating uses (such as hydropower or flood control development of the river) in geographically asymmetric situations often requires side-payments. The resolution to the property rights dispute is often concluded through side-payments from the downstream to the upstream country, recognizing the “downstream benefits” created by works upstream. A specific discussion of several agreements follows. SPECIFIC DISCUSSION ABOUT TREATIES

Although the eleven cases mentioned above all follow the same side-payment pattern, a brief review of three of them follows. India–Bhutan hydro-politics Three agreements have been negotiated between India and Bhutan over hydropower. They are the 1974 Chukkha Hydroelectric Agreement (Wangchu River), the 1995 Kurichhu Hydroelectric Agreement (Kurichhu River), and the 1996 Tala Hydroelectric Agreement (Wangchu River). As their titles suggest, the three were negotiated largely for the exploitation of the hydroelectric potential of the countries’ shared rivers. The main purpose has been the exploitation of Bhutan’s strategic location on the headwaters of these rivers. In fact, Bhutan has used the energy produced in the hydroelectric plants built in its territory for its own domestic purposes. However, since Bhutan is unable to use all of the hydropower produced, surplus power is sold to India. This has been the main impetus for India’s interest in developing the hydropower potential of its neighboring Himalayan kingdom. The content of the agreements negotiated and the side-payment patterns reveal even more compelling information. In all three agreements India has taken it upon itself to provide all the financing for the project. Although 60 percent of the funding was contributed as a grant, 40 percent was provided as a low interest loan (e.g., 5, 10.75, and 9 percent, for the three respective agreements). Bhutan is also the owner of these facilities, and as indicated, is able to sell the power it does not use to India. Since Bhutan can use only a miniscule amount of the power produced by the three plants, compared to India’s vast needs, exporting power to India accounts for a handsome share of Bhutan’s domestic revenue (Bandyopadhyay 2002: 204). In fact, the accruing revenues have enabled Bhutan to service its loan from India and to finance additional development, investing in new power projects. In short, hydroelectric generation has wrought an economic and social transformation on the tiny kingdom, becoming the main engine of development in Bhutan, providing an improved quality of life for its people (Verghese 1996: 41–2).

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Although India and Bhutan are economically symmetric in terms of GDP per capita (except at the time of the 1974 Chukkha Hydroelectric Agreement where India is richer than Bhutan), in the period for which the agreements were signed, India is consistently more powerful than Bhutan in aggregate power terms. However, the example of India–Bhutan hydro-politics, and the treaties negotiated between them, reflects India’s benevolent hegemony toward Bhutan, and also shows that in the exploitation of the headwaters of the two rivers for hydropower purposes, India has had to reward Bhutan for its strategic upstream location (Elhance 1999: 184). The Garona River The 1963 Garona River Agreement provides another example of how the actions taken by the upstream state, which also benefited the downstream state, and the use of the upstream state’s strategic territory, are ultimately codified in the form of a side-payment. In the case of the Garona River, France elected to build a dam for hydropower purposes in its territory. The water reservoir created by the dam would flood land tracts in both France and upstream Spain. France agreed to compensate Spain for any damages created. For its part, Spain was obliged to provide an uninhibited flow of a set amount of river water into the reservoir. Spain was also required to take particular measures so that in times of flooding French territory would not be harmed. As compensation Spain received a share of the energy produced in France, free of charge, and was compensated for the works and responsibilities undertaken on its soil. The Talas River and implications for Central Asian hydro-politics The third example is the 2000 Talas River Agreement negotiated between upstream Kyrgyzstan and downstream Kazakhstan.11 This Agreement actually carries with it much political weight and possible precedent for the Central Asian region as a whole, since the major current conflict over the Syr Darya and Amu Darya Rivers (two larger rivers that that are shared among six riparians) also pertains to the issue of compensation (Dinar 2005). Since independence in 1991, Kyrgyzstan has been demanding compensation for the water facilities it is operating and maintaining, which also benefit downstream countries. Kyrgyzstan inherited these facilities from the Soviet era. Since Kyrgyzstan was strategically located on the headwaters of several key rivers, the dams and reservoirs, which are used for collecting the waters before they are to be released downstream for rice and cotton growing, were constructed by the Soviets in Kyrgyz territory. While the conflict over the Syr Darya and Amu Darya continues to this day, in 2000 both Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan agreed that Kyrgyzstan was owed yearly compensation from Kazakhstan for operation and maintenance of the water facilities on the Talas River. Kyrgyzstan’s strategic upstream position and control of the reservoirs, together with Kazakhstan’s reliance on these facilities for cotton and rice cultivation, have worked in Kyrgyzstan’s favor. According to an International Crisis Group Report, the Kazakhs have agreed to pay Kyrgyzstan about $100,000 a year to maintain the facilities (2002: 16). The Allaine River One exception, wherein the upstream state actually pays the downstream state, must be noted. The 1963 Allaine River Agreement between

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France and Switzerland pertains to a canal that used to supply Allaine River water to the towns of Delle and Boncourt. After the Napoleonic wars the borders between the two countries were redrawn and Delle became a town situated in France while Boncourt remained situated in Switzerland. The border also divided the canal. Boncourt, Switzerland, now upstream on the Allaine River, constituted the area where the canal was being fed. Even so, until the 1960s France had particular rights to the canal waters. Yet, it was also at this time that Switzerland wanted to carry out operations on the Allaine, which would have meant that the present canal would no longer bring water across the border into France. A compromise was reached whereby France built a new canal in its territory to bring water from the Allaine to Delle, and Switzerland would provide compensation (Interview, Salome 2003). The Allaine case contradicts Hypothesis One of expected outcomes between upstream and downstream states. Yet the outcome resembles the Colorado River case discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, where upstream United States took it upon itself to mitigate the highly saline water flowing into Mexico, despite the economic disincentives to do so. Issue-linkage and the desire to develop a “reservoir of goodwill” was purported to be a major explanation for the outcome. It was also argued that the United States did not want Mexico to retaliate with a similar action on another river, where Mexico is strategically situated. The same concept could be seen to be at work in the case of the Allaine River, as Switzerland wanted her generosity to be rewarded in the future, whether in relation to other rivers shared by the two countries or touching on non-water related issues. Often, however, the outcome predicted by the geographical hypothesis may not emerge due to the economic asymmetries among states. That is, richer states, despite their strategic location on a river, may finance particular projects within (or in favor of ) downstream states. Or they may be more likely to provide compensation even if their strategic location and economic disincentives indicate otherwise (Hypothesis Three). As with the Colorado River, the two riparians on the Allaine create economic asymmetry. At the time of the agreement, Switzerland was twice as rich as downstream France. Switzerland’s geographically strategic disincentives to reject compensation to France were tempered by its much higher per capita GDP and its greater “willingness to pay.” It also provided an incentive to internalize the costs of the externality. Accordingly, Switzerland provided France with a side-payment of 45,000 Swiss Francs. The Carol River The 1958 Carol River Agreement actually began with a dispute between upstream France and downstream Spain. France asserted its right to divert water from Lake Lanoux, for hydropower purposes in France. The lake lies entirely within France but sources the Carol River, which crosses into Spain. At first, France assured Spain that no decision on diverting the Carol’s waters would be taken without prior notification. As plans for the diversion developed, France offered compensation to its southern neighbor in light of the possible reduction of the Carol’s flow within Spain. But Spain’s intransigence led France to regard itself as bound only to return a quantity of water corresponding to the actual needs of the Spanish users. However, France subsequently decided to adopt a scheme that would return to the Carol all of the water that it diverted for

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hydropower purposes (McCaffrey 2001: 145; Wolf 1999). When Spain persisted in its objections, both countries decided to refer their dispute to an arbitration panel. In essence, the tribune decided in favor of France’s position but argued that France must commit to returning the same amount of water, and the same quality of water, to the Carol River before it entered Spain. The decision culminated in the 1958 Agreement. International legal experts have touted the Lake Lanoux arbitration as a case in point for the compromise between the principles of absolute territorial sovereignty and absolute territorial integrity. That is, both parties accepted the right of one state to exploit the waters that traverse its territory for its own benefit yet the other state’s right not to be significantly harmed by that activity. Because France’s action did not cause “significant harm” to Spain, equitable and reasonable utilization was evinced as the dominant principle. What seems fascinating about this dispute between upstream France and downstream Spain, is that despite its strategic locale and economic disincentive to bend before Spain’s protests, France not only offered to return the same amount of water to the Carol River before it entered Spanish territory, but also agreed that the quality of the water would be the same. As with the Colorado River and the Allaine River, discussed above, France’s decision to undertake actions that would comply with Spanish concerns could be explained by the notion of reciprocity and the desire to build a “reservoir of good will.” Similarly, it is also possible to take into consideration other rivers shared by the two countries where France is not as strategically favored. France would, therefore, not want its behavior in the case of the Carol River to be reciprocated by Spain, with a similar response, on another river. But in line with Hypothesis Three, the economic asymmetries seem noteworthy, with the per capita GDP favoring France by two-to-one. As with the Allaine River, France was able to internalize the costs of the diversion back into the Carol River, and the immediate economic disincentives to cooperate were thus moderated. Pollution Under the through-border configuration, only the Tijuana and New Rivers, with a total of six corresponding agreements, include clauses that pertain to property right conflicts stemming from pollution. While the set of cases is limited to North America, these seven agreements provide appropriate applications to how the PPP and a “victim pays” regime may be reconciled in practice. These agreements reflect on Hypothesis One. But they also afford a test case for asymmetric countries; that is, two states whose respective propensity to accept pollution and abate it, is very different.12 Table 4.4 organizes these specific agreements and their associated side-payment arrangements, including the economic asymmetries of the countries. An analysis follows these tables. GENERAL FINDINGS

As Table 4.4 indicates, four out of six agreements reflect a side-payment transfer from the downstream to the upstream state (66 percent).

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Table 4.4 Specific treaties for through-border configuration (pollution) Asymmetric relationship Symmetric (GDP/capita) relationship (GDP/capita) Upstream Downstream richer richer 1985; Tijuana; Mexico and USA 1990/1997; Tijuana; Mexico and USA 1997; Tijuana; Mexico and USA 1980; New; Mexico and USA 1987; New; Mexico and USA 1995; New; Mexico and USA

Side-payments N a DN to UPb UP to DNc X X X X X X

Notes Refer Table 4.2 for the notes.

While the upstream geographical location of Mexico on the Tijuana and New Rivers makes the pollution problem that much more salient for downstream United States, the economic discrepancies between the countries also factor into the outcome of the agreements. Mexico’s propensity to pollute is higher in comparison to America’s propensity to accept this pollution. Chapter 3 noted that differences in GDP per capita are symbolic of this relationship, making the geographical asymmetry that much more salient for pollution problems. Overall, for the six treaty years, the GDP per capita of the United States is much higher (by three times) than that of Mexico. Therefore, because Mexico is upstream it can exploit its geographical position, extracting monetary concessions from the United States, especially since the United States wants Mexico to abate the pollution (Hypothesis One). In addition, Mexico’s relative inability to pay for the pollution abatement, at least to the standards demanded by the United States, gives additional impetus for the United States to grant the appropriate compensation. Two agreements (33 percent) that do not incorporate direct side-payments, nonetheless, recognize Mexico’s responsibility for the pollution flowing downstream and require it to undertake actions in favor of the United States – in a way a side-payment. These two agreements do not require Mexico to pay for the damages or provide compensation to the United States, but due to Mexico’s responsibility to abate the pollution, they seem to point to the recognition of the PPP. But because the two agreements are temporary, this is not the entire story. In fact, the two agreements do not solve the pollution problem satisfactorily, and are part of a larger set of agreements (e.g., the four others). In fact, those four agreements embody side-payments and compensation from the downstream state to the upstream state and demonstrate that the richer state often absorbs the financial burden for instituting increased pollution controls. The four agreements for the Tijuana and New Rivers recognize a “victim pays” regime. A compromise, is therefore, negotiated. Despite the settlement negotiated between the PPP and a “victim pays” regime, the most interesting lesson for this pollution problem (and other pollution problems)

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is that the compromise was reflected in the side-payments provided by the downstream state to the upstream state for abating pollution. It suggests that while the United States has a right to unpolluted waters emanating from Mexico, the United States is to contribute to the costs of such abatement. Moreover, if the United States demands augmented pollution control standards it shall be responsible for the costs. The compromise is thus reflected in the side-payment regime agreed to by the parties – a function of both the geographical positions of the countries along the river and their economic status. The PPP, while the normatively favored principle, does not stand alone in practice. SPECIFIC DISCUSSION ABOUT TREATIES

The Tijuana River The first specific agreement concluded between the United States and Mexico over the Tijuana River was negotiated in 1985, Minute 270. It was agreed that the sanitation problems were coming from Mexico, and it was further agreed that Mexico should take action to abate the pollution. While the United States offered assistance if Mexico should require it, the agreement concluded that Mexico was to internalize the costs of abatement and take immediate action – in a way a side-payment in favor of the United States. If Minute 270 alone were to be considered, it might be concluded that the PPP appears the dominating principle and that the United has the right not to be harmed while Mexico the full duty to clean up the pollution. But the substance of Minute 270 must be taken together with later agreements concluded between Mexico and the United States over the Tijuana. In fact, while Mexico undertook some of the actions required of her in 1985, other required steps were not taken. Minute 270 was also temporary and other agreements followed. A subsequent Minute, addressed the continued sanitation and pollution problems coming from the Mexican side. It was proposed that Mexico would not have to complete her undertakings from the 1985 Agreement. Rather, an international wastewater plant would be built in the United States so as to treat sewage that would otherwise have continued to flow from Mexico into the United States. This was stipulated in 1990, in Minute 283. To finance this international wastewater plant, Mexico was to contribute the same amount of money it would have had to expend anyway on fulfilling its obligations in the 1985 Agreement ($16.8 million). The United States, recognizing that the sewage coming from Mexico would only be sufficiently treated in this wastewater plant – at least according to its standards – agreed to finance the greater part of the project, which amounted to $297 million (Interview, Stout 2002). This was concluded in 1997, in Minute 296. Thus, while Mexico was producing the externality it was agreed that an international plant would provide the best means for abating the pollution. In essence, although most of the pollution came from Mexico, the United States, realizing that Mexican efforts at abating pollution will most likely be unsatisfactory, undertook to finance the majority of the international wastewater plant project. Another agreement negotiated over the Tijuana in 1997, Minute 298, affirmed that additional action was required to abate pollution coming from the Mexican side. A disposal system and rehabilitation works were required to complement the sewage

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collection and treatment works established in the 1985 Agreement, which were the responsibility of Mexico. These works were also to provide back up service for the international wastewater treatment plant. The United States contributed $17.5 million toward these works. As in the previous agreement governing the Tijuana, the richer riparian again assumed the majority of the pollution abatement tab. The New River Negotiations over the New River reflect the same pattern as the negotiations over the Tijuana. The first agreement, Minute 264, negotiated in 1980, called on Mexico to recognize its obligation to abate the pollution emanating from its side of the border – an indirect side-payment in favor of the United States. However, Minute 274, signed in 1987, recognized that additional pollution coming from the Mexican side required further attention. The agreement called for building a plant in Mexico and, as with the subsequent agreements negotiated over the Tijuana, the United States participated in the construction of the New River plant, providing a direct side-payment to Mexico by covering half the costs. Finally, an additional agreement, Minute 294, concluded in 1995, recognized the need to build another plant that would handle the pollution that continued emanating from Mexico. Although Mexico was to pay for the operation and maintenance costs of the Mexicali II Wastewater Treatment plant, and despite Mexico’s responsibility for the pollution, the United States again committed itself to contribute to the construction costs, thereby providing Mexico $8.7 million (out of a total bill of $15.7 million). Fundamentally, Minutes 274 and 294 demonstrate how the richer downstream state often has to assume some share of the abatement costs to ensure agreement upstream. The next section considers the border-creator configuration and associated agreements. Border-creator configuration Of the 14 agreements pertaining to the border-creator configuration nine are specific.13 None of these agreements incorporate side-payments. Similarly, the majority of the agreements embody an equal cost-sharing regime among the parties. Table 4.5 organizes the nine agreements according to the economic asymmetries of the riparians and the associated payment and cost-sharing regimes. General findings and specific discussion Without exception, the treaties reveal a relatively symmetric relationship between the paired nations with respect to GDP per capita, making it difficult to test Hypothesis Four. In one agreement the parties divide the water equally between them – the 1997 Cuareim (Quraí) River Agreement. Similarly, no side-payments are provided to either party to induce cooperation, and costs are not shared. The remaining three agreements, which fall under this monetary regime, allocate water for hydropower production. More interesting, perhaps, are the five remaining agreements that do not entail side-payments, but rather create an equal cost-sharing regime for the joint project (as posited by Hypothesis Two). These outcomes demonstrate that “all else being equal,” side-payments are not required to “ratchet up” the cooperation problem in geographically symmetric

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Table 4.5 Specific treaties for border-creator configuration Symmetric relationship (GDP/capita) 1909; Niagara; USA and Canada (UK) 1941; Niagara; USA and Canada 1997; Cuareim (Quraí); Brazil and Uruguay 1941; Niagara; USA and Canada 1950/1954; Niagara; USA and Canada 2000; An Nahr Al Khabir; Syria and Lebanon 1969; Niagara; USA and Canada 1977; Yaguarón (Jaguarão); Brazil and Uruguay 1955; Karasu; Turkey and Iran

Asymmetric relationship (GDP/capita)

Side-payments Na

R to P b

Cost-sharing P to R c

Nd

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

EQ e

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

NSI f

Notes a No side-payment regime. b Side-payments from richer to poorer state. c Side-payments from poorer to richer state. d No cost-sharing regime. e Equal cost-sharing regime. f Cost-sharing regime not specifically indicated.

situations. In addition, a project undertaken for a river that flows along the shared border often requires the equal participation of the adjacent states. As for the agreements that prescribe an equal cost-sharing regime, two involve the United States and Canada and pertain to the Niagara River. One agreement, concluded in 1969, between Canada and the United States, pertains to a dam to

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be built on the Niagara River for the purposes of investigations into hydroelectricity production. Through private companies representing each country, that may be able to exploit the hydropower potential of the river, both governments agree that each will contribute half the costs to the construction of the dam. The agreement also establishes that the benefits to be derived from the hydropower exploitation of the “cofferdam” are to be divided equally among the parties. It is therefore the only treaty among this group of agreements that explicitly acknowledges the equal benefits that both parties derive from the dam and, in consequence, the equal costs for funding it. The other agreements do not make this explicit, nor do they mention equal benefits. They nonetheless divide the costs equally among the parties. The 1950/1954 Niagara River Agreement signed between Canada and the United States, pertains to scenic works for the river whereby the costs of these works are to be divided equally. Another agreement, between Iran and Turkey over the Karasu River in 1955, calls on both countries to establish monitoring stations on their respective sides of the river. The costs of establishing these monitoring stations are divided equally between the countries. Another treaty – between Brazil and Uruguay, and signed in 1977 – is a general works agreement that pertains to infrastructure the parties may wish to build in the future. That is, while the document is not specific in the sense that the parties have agreed to the actual works they may want to build, the two nations have explicitly agreed on how these works are to be financed in the future. The parties agree that costs pertaining to joint studies and costs pertaining to the construction, operation, and maintenance of joint works shall be borne equally. Similarly these joint works and installations shall be owned in equal shares. The final agreement to be considered for the border-creator geography is a treaty negotiated in 2000 between Syria and Lebanon. The parties agreed to build a joint dam on the An Nahr Al Khabir. The dam will be used for allocating the waters of the river. The waters are divided 60 percent to Syria and 40 percent to Lebanon, yet the costs for the construction of the dam are shared equally. Juxtaposing the1969 Niagara River Agreement, introduced above, against the 2000 An Nahr Al Khabir Agreement, provides perhaps the best grounds to conclude the discussion on this configuration. In fact, while the issues of benefits sharing and subsequent cost allocation have not been discussed in detail, the 1969 Niagara River Agreement implies that since the parties divided the hydropower benefits between them in an equal fashion, the costs are similarly divided. Yet the other agreements that correspond to the border-creator configuration do not provide information on benefits at all. In addition, some treaties evince a different pattern completely, wherein the benefits are shared unequally but the costs are shared equally. The 2000 An Nahr Al Khabir Agreement provides the best example of this latter phenomenon.

Conclusion for the core configurations Comparison of the two distinct geographical configurations allows some interesting insights into how the geography of a river may influence a treaty’s outcome.

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Since the river is the basic consideration in any analysis of an international water agreement, the geography of the river and the strategic positions of the states along its course should matter for the analysis of their conflict and cooperation. As hypothesized, the majority of agreements pertaining to the through-border configuration evince side-payments from the downstream nation to the upstream nation to encourage cooperation, resolve a property rights conflict for a specific dispute, and compensate for benefits enjoyed downstream (Hypothesis One). In essence, side-payments are used to offset the geographical asymmetry between upstream and downstream parties. Agreements that pertain to water allocation do not evince a laudable pattern of side-payments. This finding has been substantiated by other scholarship on the use of monetary incentives to resolve interstate water allocation disputes. It is clear, therefore, that despite strategic behavior by upstream states, as portrayed by some agreements, the use of side-payments to solve water allocation disputes is not common. The water flowing through the physical river is not possessed by one riparian, despite their strategic upstream position and their ability to exploit the resource to the detriment of the downstream state. Side-payments and cost-sharing arrangements are much more salient in agreements that create and divide benefits between the riparians or pertain to pollution issues. In general, 80 percent of agreements related to benefits sharing and pollution issues embodied side-payments from the downstream state to the upstream state (Hypothesis One). Specifically, for pollution issues and their respective treaties, the PPP was always balanced with a “victim pays” regime. Where the opposite side-payment regime was evinced, or when actions upstream were taken in favor of the downstream riparian without compensation, the upstream state was usually richer (Hypothesis Two). All the border-creator agreements, which pertained to a given project (e.g., excluding agreements that simply divided the water among the riparians), embodied an equal cost-sharing regime between the riparians and, unlike the through-border configuration, no side-payments were transferred either to encourage cooperation or solve a property rights dispute (Hypothesis Three). Because all the country dyads in this sample embodied an equal economic relationship, Hypothesis Four could not be tested. Chapter 5 will evaluate the side-payment and cost-sharing regimes of the additional configurations providing further testing grounds for the hypotheses. Chapter 6 will consider the overall implications of these results, as they pertain to all of the configurations, in more detail.

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Empirical analysis of treaty design differences: additional configurations

Beyond the two core configurations that characterize bilateral river treaties, this investigation has looked at additional treaty configurations in order to understand the extent to which such configurations reflect on the outcomes posited by the theory. These have been compared to the patterns evinced by the throughborder and border-creator configurations, focusing only on agreements dealing with particular projects and specific issues. The tables later enumerate the different geographical configurations and their associated agreements. Projects can be undertaken at different stretches of a river that is subject to categorization under either of the two pure configurations. As might be expected, therefore, the outcomes of the respective agreements will be dictated by location. Hence, to facilitate the testing of the hypotheses, the tables later will also categorize the agreements according to the stretch of the river they pertain to. As Appendix B demonstrates, the mixed configuration is, in a way, a cross between the through-border and border-creator configurations. The river originates in the territory of one country, continues downstream to flow along the common boundary between the two countries, then enters the territory of the other country and continues its flow. Second, under the partial border-creator configuration, the river originates in one country and then continues downstream, flowing along the common border, but never enters the other country. Clearly, if only one country can be upstream the other country must be, by default, downstream. Yet both countries are, in essence, downstream and share the entire stretch of the river flowing along their common border. The other configurations, embodied in a smaller number of specific treaties, are the border-creator but enters state, through-border * 2, partial border-creator but returns, and mixed zigzag configurations. The remaining few configurations are not subject to any specific treaties and are, therefore, not considered by this chapter.

The additional configurations Mixed configuration Out of 56 agreements, 20 are specific. As can be confirmed below, the side-payment and cost-sharing patterns embodying these agreements are not as consistent as in

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the case of the through-border and border-creator configurations. Some agreements incorporate side-payments while others stipulate equal cost-sharing patterns and this is not surprising since the mixed configuration embodies characteristics of the two core configurations. Table 5.1 includes all twenty agreements, dividing them according to the relevant stretch of the river, the economic asymmetries of the concerned riparians, and the associated side-payment and cost-sharing regimes. An analysis will follow. General findings The tables below that correspond to the mixed configuration reveal the rationale behind choosing the methodology for this study, which bases the main analysis on two opposite configurations. In the mixed configuration, some treaties embody a side-payment regime from the downstream state to the upstream state, while others embody an equal sharing of costs for joint projects. The outcomes, as the configuration label suggests, are mixed. However, the stretch of the river, resembling either the through-border or border-creator configurations – where the project is to take place – is especially important. Several overarching patterns emerge. The following section provides some general statistics only for the agreements that clearly outline side-payment and cost-sharing patterns or provide enough information to discern this relationship.1 The agreements that do divulge the appropriate information are categorized according to the stretch of the river where the agreed upon project or task is to be undertaken. The economic asymmetries between the parties are also considered. In total, nine agreements are relevant. In general, out of the six agreements that refer to a project or task to be undertaken upstream, or that mainly affect the upstream state,2 83 percent of the agreements evince side-payments from the downstream state to the upstream state – confirming Hypothesis One. Of these five agreements, two (the 1944 and 1966 Colorado River Agreements) embody an asymmetric relationship between the parties where the upper riparian is also the richer country. However, unlike the expectation of Hypothesis Three, the rich country does not provide side-payments to the poorer country or undertake any actions in its favor without compensation. Interestingly, both agreements do make the side-payments, provided by the poorer downstream state, provisional. The sixth agreement, the 1973 Colorado River Agreement, which actually calls on the rich upstream state to undertake actions in favor of the poor downstream state (in a way a side-payment) confirms Hypothesis Three. In short, the majority of agreements reflect how actions taken upstream or projects that affect mostly the upstream state, which likewise provide benefits to the downstream state, in practice are coordinated through sidepayments from the downstream to the upstream state. Among projects and tasks to be undertaken solely on the part of the river that flows along the border, three agreements are relevant. However, one of these agreements embodies two symmetric riparians – the 1966 Saar (Sarre)

1968; Guadiana; Spain and Portugal

1959; Gandak; Nepal and India 1964; Duoro; Spain and Portugal

NC d

1966; Colorado; USA and Mexico

1957; Spöl; Italy and Switzerland

X

X X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

DN to UP f

UP to DN g

EQ i

NSI j

(Table 5.1 continued)

X

X

X

X

X

X

Nh

Cost-sharing

12:13 PM

1944; Colorado; USA and Mexico

1912; Duoro; Spain and Portugal 1912; Guadiana; Spain and Portugal 1912; Tagus (Tajo); Spain and Portugal

MX c

Ne

Nb

Ya

Upstream richer

Downstream richer

Side-payments

Treaty-border

Asymmetric relationship (GDP/capita)

17/11/07

1935; Artibonite; Dominican Republic and Haiti

Symmetric relationship (GDP/capita)

Table 5.1 Specific treaties for mixed configuration

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1975; Duverij (Doveyrich); Iran and Iraq 1983; Teesta; India and Bangladesh

1968; Tagus (Tajo); Spain and Portugal

1994; Colorado; USA and Mexico

1971; PuyangoTumbes; Ecuador and Peru

X

X

MX c

NC d

X

X

X

X

X

X

DN to UP f

Ne

Nb

Ya

Upstream richer

Downstream richer

Side-payments

Treaty-border

Asymmetric relationship (GDP/capita)

X

UP to DN g

X

X

X

Nh

EQ i

Cost-sharing

X

NSI j

12:13 PM

Symmetric relationship (GDP/capita)

17/11/07

Table 5.1 Continued

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X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

12:13 PM

Notes a Treaty pertains to the part of the river that flows along the border. b Treaty does not pertain to the part of the river that flows along the border; respective part of the river is wholly in the territory of the upstream state. c Treaty pertains to the part of the river that flows along the border and a part of the river wholly in the territory of the upstream state. d Treaty does not make it clear which part of the river the agreement applies to. e No side-payment regime. f Side-payments from downstream to upstream state. g Side-payments from upstream to downstream state. h No cost-sharing regime. i Equal cost-sharing regime. j Cost-sharing regime not specifically indicated.

1970/1972; Torrente Breggia; Switzerland and Italy 1972/1973; Colorado; USA and Mexico

X

X

X

17/11/07

1966; Saar (Sarre); France and Germany

1995; Nestos (Mesta); Bulgaria and Greece 2000; Chu; Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan

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River Agreement – and the costs of the project or task envisioned by the agreement is divided equally (Hypothesis Two). This signals that the equal participation of the parties is required for the development of the common border. Similarly, no side-payments are required to “ratchet up” the cooperation issue. The two other agreements – the 1970/1972 Torrente Breggia River Agreement and the 1944 Colorado River Agreement – embody asymmetric parties and the larger cost-sharing burden is always borne by the richer country (Hypothesis Four). Partial border-creator configuration Out of 53 agreements, 20 are considered specific and analyzed below.3 As with the mixed configuration, the agreements representing the partial border-creator configuration produce a combination of outcomes. Indeed, some agreements incorporate side-payments while others share costs equally, which are characteristics of the core configurations. Table 5.2 includes all twenty agreements, dividing them according to the relevant stretch of the river, the economic asymmetries of the riparians, and the associated side-payment and cost-sharing regimes. An analysis follows. General findings While a river representing the partial border-creator configuration consists of an upstream country, the river continues its flow along the border separating the two countries. Unlike the mixed configuration, the river never enters the other state after flowing along the border. Like the mixed configuration, however, the countries are geographically symmetric for a portion of their shared border. They are geographically asymmetric due to the strategic location of the upstream country. This geographic blend is apparent in the results summarized in the preceding tables. This section provides some general statistics only for the agreements that clearly outline side-payment and cost-sharing patterns and provide enough information to discern this relationship.4 Twelve agreements are relevant and are analyzed below according to the stretch of the river they pertain to. In general, two agreements refer to a project or task to be undertaken upstream or that mainly affect the upstream state (1926 and 1969 Cunene River Agreements). In both cases side-payments are forthcoming, thereby recognizing the downstream benefits created upstream and the impending property rights solution (Hypothesis One). These agreements also entail water deliveries from the upstream state for the benefit of the downstream state. While payment is not required for any deliveries of water used only for subsistence purposes, payment is required for any use beyond that. Such treaties may, therefore, be added to the small but growing list of documented agreements that depict some form of payment for water allocation.

Symmetric relationship (GDP/capita) MX c

NC d

X

X

X

X

X

EQ i

NSI j

(Table 5.2 continued)

X

X

Nh

12:13 PM

X

X

X

UP to DN g

Cost-sharing

17/11/07

1906; Rio Grande (Río Bravo del Norte); USA and Mexico 1933; Rio Grande (Río Bravo del Norte); USA and Mexico 1912; Chanza; Spain and Portugal 1912; Minho (Miño); Spain and Portugal

DN to UP f

Ne

Nb

Ya

Upstream richer

Downstream richer

Side-payments

Treaty-border

Asymmetric relationship (GDP/capita)

Table 5.2 Specific treaties for partial border-creator configuration

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MX c

NC d

1944; Rio Grande; (Río Bravo del Norte); USA and Mexico 1949; Prut; USSR and Romania X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

UP to DN g

X

Nh

X

EQ i

Cost-sharing

X

NSI j

12:13 PM

1944; Zarumilla; Ecuador and Peru

1926; Cunene; Portugal (Angola) and South Africa (Namibia)

DN to UP f

Ne

Nb

Ya

Upstream richer

Downstream richer

Side-payments

Treaty-border

Asymmetric relationship (GDP/capita)

17/11/07

1938; Paz; Guatemala and El Salvador

Symmetric relationship (GDP/capita)

Table 5.2 Continued

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1959; Hermance; France and Switzerland

X

X

X

X

X

X

(Table 5.2 continued )

X

X

12:13 PM

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

17/11/07

1968; Chanza; Spain and Portugal 1968; Minho (Miño); Spain and Portugal 1969; Cunene; Portugal (Angola) and South Africa (Namibia)

1957; Atrak; Iran and USSR 1957; Atrak; Iran and USSR 1958; Timok; Yugoslavia and Bulgaria

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MX c

NC d

1956; Argun; China and USSR

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

UP to DN g

Nh

X

X

X

EQ i

Cost-sharing NSI j

12:13 PM

Notes a Treaty pertains to the part of the river that flows along the border. b Treaty does not pertain to the part of the river that flows along the border; respective part of the river is wholly in the territory of the upstream state. c Treaty pertains to the part of the river that flows along the border and a part of the river wholly in the territory of the upstream state. d Treaty does not make it clear which part of the river the agreement applies to. e No side-payment regime. f Side-payments from downstream to upstream state. g Side-payments from upstream to downstream state. h No cost-sharing regime. i Equal cost-sharing regime. j Cost-sharing regime not specifically indicated.

1971; Prut; USSR and Romania

DN to UP f

Ne

Nb

Ya

Upstream richer

Downstream richer

Side-payments

Treaty-border

Asymmetric relationship (GDP/capita)

17/11/07

1986; Gander; Luxembourg and France 1998; Zarumilla, Ecuador and Peru

Symmetric relationship (GDP/capita)

Table 5.2 Continued

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95

For projects and tasks to be undertaken solely on the part of the river that flows along the border, ten agreements are relevant. Four of these agreements embody two symmetric riparians. The costs of the project or tasks envisioned by the agreement are divided equally in 75 percent of the cases (Hypothesis Two). They include the: 1957 Atrak River Agreement, 1998 Zarumilla River Agreement, and 1958 Timok River Agreement. The fourth agreement – the 1968 Minho (Miño) River Agreement – stipulates that the state, which benefits most pays the most. The six remaining agreements which pertain to projects to be undertaken on the part of the river the flows along the border embody two asymmetric riparians. Half of these agreements stipulate that the richer country shall bare the majority of the cost burden (Hypothesis Four). They include the: 1906 and 1933 Rio Grande Agreements, and 1959 Hermance River Agreement. The remaining agreements require both states to share the costs equally. The 1949 and 1971 Prut River Agreements, and 1956 Argun River Agreement, demonstrate that despite the economic asymmetries, the costs are always divided equally, recognizing that property rights conflicts are to be resolved by co-equal participation (Hypothesis Two). Like the mixed configuration, the geographical hypotheses of the pure configurations are reflected in the outcomes of these river agreements, depending on where the project is to be constructed. Effects of the economic asymmetries between the countries, however, seem to matter in those cases where the treaty pertains to the common border, but not in others of this particular configuration and stretch of a river. Border-creator but enters state configuration The border-creator but enters state configuration resembles the partial bordercreator configuration. However, the river flows on the part of the border that separates the two states. In such cases no clear upstream state can be identified and, accordingly, no upstream state can utilize a geographical advantage. Of the seven treaties corresponding to this configuration, two are specific. Table 5.3 includes the two agreements, dividing them according to the relevant stretch of the river, the economic asymmetries of the riparians, and the associated sidepayment and cost-sharing regimes. A brief analysis is provided below. General findings and specific discussion The 1956 Amur Agreement incorporates an equal cost-sharing regime for a joint study to be undertaken for that part of the river that flows along the common border. Despite economic asymmetries, the richer country does not take on a higher cost-sharing burden. Hypothesis Two is more salient than Hypothesis Four. The second of this group – the 1958 Amu Darya River Agreement – also relates to a joint study, yet costs are not shared. Still given the parties’ interests in jointly utilizing the part of the river that flows along their shared border, they agree that the USSR shall assist Afghanistan in conducting its studies on its side of the border. While this does not constitute a direct side-payment or explicit cost-sharing

NC d

1958; Amu Darya; Afghanistan and USSR

X

X

X

X

DN to UP f

UP to DN g

Nh

X

EQ i

Cost-sharing NSI j

12:13 PM

1956; Amur; USSR and China

MX c

Ne

Nb

Ya

State A richer

Downstream richer

Side-payments

Treaty-border

Asymmetric relationship (GDP/capita)

17/11/07

Notes a Treaty pertains to the part of the river that flows along the border. b Treaty does not pertain to the part of the river that flows along the border; respective part of the river is wholly in the territory of the upstream state. c Treaty pertains to the part of the river that flows along the border and a part of the river wholly in the territory of the upstream state. d Treaty does not make it clear which part of the river the agreement applies to. e No side-payment regime. f Side-payments from downstream to upstream state. g Side-payments from upstream to downstream state. h No cost-sharing regime. i Equal cost-sharing regime. j Cost-sharing regime not specifically indicated.

Symmetric relationship (GDP/capita)

Table 5.3 Specific treaties for border-creator but enters state configuration

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burden, the richer USSR assists poorer Afghanistan – in a way a side-payment. Hypothesis Four becomes quite relevant where this greater cost sharing is effected. Through-border * 2 configuration The through-border * 2 configuration resembles the through-border configuration. Yet the river does not stop in the downstream state after originating upstream. Rather it flows on and re-enters the upstream state. Of the 11 treaties that correspond to this configuration, only three are specific. Table 5.4 includes the three specific agreements, dividing them according to the relevant stretch of the river, the economic asymmetries of the riparians, and the associated sidepayment and cost-sharing regimes. A brief analysis is provided below. General findings and specific discussion The first agreement – the 1909 Milk River Agreement – is a water-sharing treaty and incorporates no side-payments. Yet the two other agreements do, in fact, incorporate side-payments. These are the 1961/1964 Kootenay River Agreement and the 1989 Souris River Agreement. Both these agreements call on the upstream state to undertake projects in it own territory that will also benefit the downstream state. Indeed, the 1989 Souris River Agreement obligated the United States to provide Canada with payments for building two dams that would afford flood control benefits downstream. The dams were also built for the benefit of Canada for water allocation. The 1961/1964 Kootenay River Agreement is actually part of the formal 1961/1964 Columbia River Agreement. The United States provided a side-payment to Canada for building dams on the Columbia River and

Table 5.4 Specific treaties for through-border * 2 configuration Symmetric relationship (GDP/capita)

Asymmetric relationship (GDP/capita)

Side-payments

Upstream richer

Na

Downstream richer

1909; Milk; USA and Canada (UK) 1961/1964; Kootenay; Canada and USA 1989; Souris; Canada and USA Notes a No side-payment regime. b Side-payments from downstream to upstream state. c Side-payments from upstream to downstream state.

DN to UP b

X X

X

UP to DN c

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provided half the downstream benefits as compensation for the hydropower created by those dams. The agreement also included a dam to be built on the Kootenay River. In all the cases, the countries are economically symmetric, and the treaty outcomes for the Kootenay and Souris Rivers are commensurate with Hypothesis One. Not surprisingly, the outcomes for this configuration are similar to those for the through-border case. That is, compensation and side-payments need to be provided for projects built upstream that provide benefits downstream. Partial border-creator but returns configuration The partial border-creator but returns configuration resembles the partial-border creator configuration. The only difference is that while the river originates in one of the countries and forms the border between them after flowing downstream, the river once again enters the first country. Of the three treaties corresponding to this configuration, only one is specific. Table 5.5 includes this treaty, dividing it according to the relevant stretch of the river, the economic asymmetries of the riparians, and the associated side-payment and cost-sharing regimes. A brief analysis is provided below. General findings and specific discussion about treaties The 1930 Chute du Châtelot Agreement (Doubs River) does not entail a joint project per se. Rather the interest of the signatories is the exploitation of the hydropower potential of the stretch of the river that flows along their common border. According to the agreement, only one concessionary company can exploit this hydropower potential. Therefore, the parties agree to divide the power potential equally and not construct individual hydropower facilities, but rather benefit equally from the power to be produced. As such, no explicit costs are provided. The parties are also economically symmetric.

Table 5.5 Specific treaties for partial border-creator but returns configuration Symmetric relationship (GDP/ capita)

Asymmetric relationship (GDP/capita)

Treaty-border

Side-payments

Costsharing

Upstream Downstream Y a N b MX c NC d N e DN to UP f UP to DN g N h EQ i NSI j richer richer 1930; Chute du Châtelot (Doubs River); France and Switzerland Note Refer Table 5.3 for the notes.

X

X

X

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Mixed zigzag configuration The mixed zigzag configuration is by far the most intricate of all the configurations mentioned in this chapter. The river originates in one country but meanders in and out of both countries’ territory. In addition, some stretches of the river form the border. Only one specific treaty corresponds to the mixed zigzag configuration, the 1996 Mahakali River Agreement between India and Nepal. However, this agreement also formalized two other agreements negotiated in earlier years and they are presented in Table 5.6. Therefore, while these two agreements are subsumed by the 1996 Mahakali Agreement, they are considered as separate observations in this particular analysis. The agreements are divided according to the relevant stretch of the river, the economic asymmetries of the riparians, and the associated side-payment and cost-sharing regimes. A brief analysis follows. General findings and specific discussion The other two agreements formalized by the 1996 Mahakali River Agreement are the 1920 Sarada River Agreement and the 1992 Tankapur Project Agreement.5 Finally, the 1996 Mahakali River Agreement also established the Pencheshwar Multipurpose Project between India and Nepal. These agreements are analyzed below. Interestingly, each of these agreements dealt with a different stretch of the river and was of a slightly different nature. For example, the Sarada River Agreement, which established the Sarada Barrage, and the 1992 Agreement, which established the Tankapur Project, were works constructed by India for India’s use. These two projects were built in Indian territory, on the stretch of the river that flows wholly through India (although the Tankapur Dam was built close to the border in Indian territory). In both cases, Nepalese territory was required to complete the Indian project. In fact, inundation of Nepalese territory was a desired consequence of the dams built in India (Uprety 2003). In both cases Nepal was upstream on the respective stretch of the river and in both cases a compensatory scheme was forthcoming from India to Nepal (consistent with Hypothesis One). For example, in the case of the Sarada Agreement, Nepal provided India with 4,000 acres of its territory for completing the project and was provided with an equal portion of territory from India. In addition, Nepal obtained the right to a supply of water from India for irrigation purposes. As far as the Tankapur Project is concerned, Nepal provided India with 2.9 hectares of its land to complete the project on Nepali territory. While Nepal did not receive the same amount of land in return from India, it received rights to a set amount of water from India as well as free hydroelectricity. In both the Sarada and Tankapur cases, India was to build the appropriate facilities so as to supply the water and energy to Nepal at the border. The Pencheshwar Project on the other hand was built strictly on the portion of the river that forms the border between the two countries. Unlike the previous two projects, this was a joint project that was to provide hydropower, flood control, and water quantity benefits. The costs of the project were to be divided according

MX c

NC d

1996; Mahakali; (1920 Sarada River Agreement); Nepal and India 1996; Mahakali; (1992 Tankapur Project Agreement); Nepal and India 1996; Mahakali; (Pencheshwar Multipurpose Project); Nepal and India X

X

X

UP to DN g

Nh

EQ i

Cost-sharing NSI j

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X

X

DN to UP f

Ne

Nb

Ya

Upstream richer

Downstream richer

Side-payments

Treaty-border

Asymmetric relationship (GDP/capita)

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Notes a Treaty pertains to the part of the river that flows along the border. b Treaty does not pertain to the part of the river that flows along the border; respective part of the river is wholly in the territory of the upstream state. c Treaty pertains to the part of the river that flows along the border and a part of the river wholly in the territory of the upstream state. d Treaty does not make it clear which part of the river the agreement applies to. e No side-payment regime. f Side-payments from downstream to upstream state. g Side-payments from upstream to downstream state. h No cost-sharing regime. i Equal cost-sharing regime. j Cost-sharing regime not specifically indicated.

Symmetric relationship (GDP/capita)

Table 5.6 Specific treaties for mixed zigzag configuration

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to the benefits accrued by each party. However, the agreement also guaranteed Nepal an allocation of water from India. More importantly richer India did commit to purchase a set amount of energy from Nepal’s share of hydroelectricity. Since Nepal would have a surplus of power, it could sell a portion to India, with its greater energy demand. In line with the theoretical assumptions of this research, India has argued that its commitment to provide water and to purchase Nepali energy was also an attempt to lower the costs of the joint project for Nepal (Uprety 2004). While the final costs of the joint project are not known, India’s gesture is consistent with Hypothesis Four.

Conclusion for additional configurations The mixed configuration and the partial border-creator configuration not only evince the greatest number of treaties beyond the analysis of the through-border and border-creator configurations, but also embody physical characteristics that resemble these core configurations. Similar associations can be made with the remaining geographical configurations outlined in this chapter. Given the physical characteristics of these configurations, and their relationship to the pure configurations, it is perhaps no surprise that their associated agreements embody a mix of outcomes that resemble the outcomes of the agreements corresponding to the two opposite configurations. Most compelling is that the particular segment of the river where a project is to be undertaken, and its relationship to the core configurations, guides to a large degree the outcome of the treaty. While sidepayment transfers from the downstream to the upstream state are posited in some agreements, equal cost-sharing arrangements take place in others. Economic asymmetries affect the outcome in some cases but not others. The stretch of the river in question Noting the characteristics of the stretch of the river where a project is to be undertaken, as well as its relationship to the through-border and border-creator configurations, can be important for guiding treaty outcomes. As such, a general look at the agreements that pertain to a given section of the river, and the associated monetary regime, is appropriate. Based on the above analysis, some general statistics regarding side-payment and cost-sharing patterns appear later.6 Table 5.7 organizes these treaties accordingly. In total, twenty-eight agreements are relevant. In general, out of the twelve agreements that refer to a project or task to be undertaken upstream or mainly affecting the upstream state, 92 percent evince side-payments from the downstream state to the upstream state.7 The outcome corresponds to the expectations of Hypothesis One. As with the through-border configuration, however, the result also demonstrates that downstream benefits created by upstream works are often recognized (e.g., rewarded) through compensation and side-payments transferred upstream. The compromise to the property rights dispute, and the coordination of the river’s uses between the parties, is expressed through side-payments.

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102 Analysis of additional configurations Table 5.7 Summary of results for additional configurations Regime

Stretch of the river in question Stretch of the river in the upstream state’s territory

Stretch of the river along the border

Symmetric Upstream Downstream Symmetric Asymmetric economic richer richer economic economic relationship relationship relationship Side-payments from 9 treaties downstream to upstream state Side-payments from upstream to downstream state No side-payments, equal cost-sharing Side-payments from state A to state B Side-payments from richer to poorer state

2 treaties

1 treaty

4 treaties

4 treaties

1 treaty

7 treaties

Three of the twelve agreements embody an asymmetric relationship between the parties where the upper riparian is also the richer country. Interestingly, two of these agreements indicate that the side-payments from the downstream to the upstream state are conditional. Only the remaining agreement evinces an outcome where the upstream state takes actions that benefit the downstream state without compensation. This particular accord is the 1973 Colorado River Agreement. Here, it must be concluded, the motivation of the United States to engage in works that favored Mexico on the Colorado, was not only a function of her desire to build a “reservoir of goodwill,” as previous literature has argued, but also her ability to internalize the costs of the project that would otherwise provide her no immediate economic incentives (Hypothesis Three). As this case demonstrates, the economic differences among the parties make a difference. A richer upstream state has a higher “willingness to pay” and the disincentives to cooperate are moderated. Actions that mostly favor the downstream state undertaken by the upstream state (and by extension side-payment transfers downstream) can therefore be understood. In the cases where projects and tasks are to be undertaken only on the part of the river that flows along the border, sixteen agreements are relevant.8 Among the five agreements that embody symmetric riparians, 80 percent provide for an equal sharing of costs (Hypothesis Two). The final agreement divides the costs unequally. Eleven agreements embody two asymmetric riparians. Interestingly, 36 percent of such agreements provide for an equal cost-sharing regime, while 64 percent

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demonstrate that the larger cost-sharing burden is borne by the richer country. As expected, the economic asymmetries of the states matter (Hypothesis Four). For the most part, projects and tasks to be undertaken on the part of the river that flows along the common border require the equal participation of the parties, and side-payments are not required. Asymmetry between the states matters, with the richer country taking on the higher cost-sharing burden most of the time. As in Chapter 4, several of the cases investigated here embodied cost-sharing regimes which were determined by the benefits accrued to each of the parties. However, in the majority of these cases the agreement did not indicate how benefits should be defined or how they are to be concretely divided. Thus, while benefits may provide an indication of how costs for a particular project will be divided, they are often difficult to calculate, especially when taking into account all the costs a nation may have had to incur. As noted before, it is precisely due to these complexities that this study did not incorporate a cost-benefit assessment.

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The principle raison d’etre of this research is the clarification of the ways in which conflicting interests and differing uses along rivers shared by (only) two states are reconciled in practice. As noted, existing international legal principles, both vague and contradictory, do not pave a clear path along which disputing states can travel. On the one hand, the right is attributed to states to use their portion of the river in furtherance of their own national development policies. This is the principle of absolute territorial sovereignty. On the other hand, states are enjoined not to cause harm to neighboring states by such uses, which is the principle of absolute territorial integrity. Even the putative “compromise principle” – equitable and reasonable utilization – affords scant assistance, since it implies only that while states may freely utilize their water resources, they are obliged to reconcile such utilization with the vital interests of other states. The statutory obligation not to cause significant harm tends to further vitiate the utility of the equitable and reasonable utilization principle. It is important to note that international water law does not attempt to provide states with specific guidelines for solving disputes over an international river. The main international legal principles rather act as an umbrella “doctrine” that comes to life only when an international agreement is articulated. It is, therefore, ever more evident that to identify how compromise solutions are sought in practice requires a close perusal of past negotiations – the actual treaties states have negotiated. It is only within that context that we can determine which state has the property right that justifies taking a specific action. By considering a large number of agreements we are able to ascertain in a systematic and empirical manner how compromise is sought in practice. The second impetus to this work is the preference for a departure from the case study approach so common in the study of hydro-politics. As Appendix C demonstrates, the analysis of particular river basins and regional water conflicts is the mainstay of the field. In addition to this present work, only three others have ever attempted to make broad generalizations about conflict and cooperation over water usage based on a large corpus of treaty observations. These are Wolf (1999), Espey and Towfique (2004), and Song and Whittington (2004). What differentiates this work from that of Wolf (1999) is that the approach is empirical and undertakes a broad analysis. It attempts to systematically test

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specific hypotheses after developing a theoretical foundation. More importantly, it not only attempts to extrapolate general conclusions about how cooperation might be facilitated, but also about how property rights conflicts are resolved in practice, and how the design of agreements varies accordingly. In contradistinction to the writings of Espey and Towfique (2004) and Song and Whittington (2004), the approach here not only poses different questions but also affords the flexibility to move back and forth between an extensive data set and individual cases, thereby providing more precise explanation and analysis of both theory and hypotheses. The patterns revealed by this research serve as a template to superimpose past precedents in negotiated outcomes to present or future conflicts. Obviously, nations as yet in conflict over the development and use of their common water resource have lessons to learn from previous negotiated solutions.

Structural analysis The methodology used here can best be described as what Zartman calls a structural analysis approach to negotiations (1988: 33), which is “based on a distribution of . . . instrumental elements or power, defined either as parties’ relative positions (resource possessions) or as the relative ability to make their options prevail (or to counter the other’s efforts to make its options prevail).” This “probabilistic” approach has been employed to analyze, describe, and predict the outcome of international water agreements and, by extension, the reconciliation of legal principles in practice, according to geographical and economic criteria. The dependent variable is the side-payment and cost-sharing regime embraced by the signatory states in an agreement that addresses a given project, task, or other specific matter of concern. The independent variables comprise, primarily, the kind of river configuration and the relative location of the two nations along a river and, secondly, the economic asymmetries between the riparians. In essence, the “willingness to pay” of a given riparian, conveyed in the side-payment and cost-sharing patterns embodied in the agreement, depicts the property rights solution and is explained by geography and economics. Side-payments and cost-sharing patterns were selected because they enable the analyst to concretely review the arrangements agreed to under these headings. Such measures reflect on the property rights solution and cooperative outcome, which this research has sought out. If, for example, a downstream state pays an upstream state to abate pollution, it may be inferred not only that side-payments are required to “ratchet up” the cooperation dimension, but that the no harm rule does not stand. Geographic probablism It follows that this research seeks to explain that for a given geographical configuration, some choices or outcomes are more probable than others (Sprout and Sprout 1965: 109). Compelling arguments can be developed about the effect of a river’s geography on the expected treaty outcome by juxtaposing opposite configurations (specifically, the through-border and border-creator).

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Therein can be found the third contribution of this work to the field of hydro-politics. While it has been argued that the geographical location of a state is an important variable, making states more (or less) amenable to cooperation, scholarship has only probed slightly beyond this initial premise. Awareness of the effect of geography on hydro-politics has been overshadowed by other variables, such as a state’s aggregate power. This work has attempted to operationalize the effects of geography relative to the negotiated outcome of shared river disputes, showing how geography can be used to determine the probable resolution of property rights disputes. It has also demonstrated that even a weaker upstream country can greatly benefit from negotiations with an otherwise stronger, if geographically less favored, downstream state (e.g., the weaker state is not necessarily coerced to negotiate or gains little from cooperating due to the assumed malevolent behavior of its co-riparian). This book began by introducing the geographical variable, demonstrating that beyond the two core geographical configurations, twelve additional configurations have been identified for rivers shared by only two states. If it is true that the geography of the river, and the location of the riparians along the river, constitute the most basic issues in shared river disputes, then the resolution to such commons problems should, at least to some extent, depend on the geographical configuration of the resource. As such, rivers with different geographical configurations would require different commons solutions. A close review of a large number of treaties has made possible a productive use of side-payments and cost-sharing regimes to identify these different commons solutions.

Conflict and cooperation: scarcity, geography, hydro-politics, strategic interaction, and side-payments Chapter 2 laid the foundation for understanding how side-payments could be used to foster cooperation in a geographically asymmetric situation such as the through-border configuration, thereby setting the stage for the investigation of treaty design. That chapter began with a general discussion of the notion of scarcity, arguing that scarcity and/or the need of the respective states to coordinate their uses along a shared river often positioned them between the extremes of conflict and cooperation. Obviously, states sharing a river are interdependent. Yet, while the consequence of scarcity might intensify a given river dispute, it may well be this same characteristic of scarcity that provides the impetus for cooperation. Clearly the degree of regional scarcity, together with a mutual perceived need to coordinate uses along the river, creates urgency and incentive toward treaty formation. Related to notions of scarcity, interdependence, and state interest, Chapter 2 further considers the theoretical assumptions of realism and neo-realism, as well as liberalism and neo-liberal institutionalism. Acknowledging realist and neo-realist concerns such as state sovereignty and security, and their inhibiting effect on cooperation, the chapter argued that the track record of cooperation over international rivers has challenged such assertions. Similarly, the presence of a hegemon

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has seldom been required to foster cooperation – as the neo-realist argument would suggest. In fact, symmetric states have concluded water agreements too, and if a wealthier or more powerful country was indeed one of the participating parties, hegemons have seldom played the coercive role so often attributed to them. Following the neo-liberal contention, the chapter argued that states pursue cooperation when unilateral options have been exhausted and/or when additional benefits are to be attained only through cooperation. This is especially salient in the context of transboundary rivers where states have to act in unison to alleviate scarcity and exploit a river. In essence, the interdependence attributed to river riparians necessitates coordination arranged in an international agreement. The success of cooperation was argued to be a function of sustainable regimes and agreements. It was further argued that the strategic management of incentives to cooperate is a key factor for successful regime formation. Strategic interaction is an invaluable component of a comprehensive explanation of how cooperation comes about between states, how the parties attain mutual benefits, and how agreements are made self-enforcing. Strategic interaction consists of measures like linkage, reciprocity, and, of course, side-payment transfers between the parties. While this research touched on all three phenomena of strategic interaction, side-payments were the main focus. It was also shown that to understand the hydro-political cooperation dilemma and to recognize both the incentives and disincentives to cooperation, the basic characteristics of the river in contention must be taken into consideration. These are its geographical configuration as it crosses or defines international borders, and the strategic locale of the respective riparians along the river. In particular, the through-border configuration embodies an asymmetric relationship between an upstream and a downstream state. An upstream state can, at least in theory, divert and pollute the waters to the detriment of the downstream state. The externalities flow in the downstream direction. If the upstream state were to use the river to the detriment of the downstream state, and the downstream state had no reciprocal power over the upstream state, cooperation would be less likely. The situation in the border-creator configuration is the opposite. This is a relationship of geographical symmetry and the incentive for cooperation is that of preventing the “tragedy of the commons.” Geographically speaking, the through-border configuration does not necessarily imply perpetual conflict between states, but the intrinsic asymmetry makes conflict that much more likely. Similarly, while conflict is not any less likely on the border-creator configuration, the symmetrical relationship and the reciprocity tend to lessen conflicting relations between the states. It was, therefore, argued that intrinsically, beyond scarcity, the basic incentives and disincentives for cooperation proceed from the geography of the river. The through-border configuration gives rise to another question. What would sway an upstream state to cooperate with a downstream state if the geographical advantage rests with the former? On the one hand, it was noted that a more powerful downstream state could use its brute power to sway the upstream state to cooperate. This would especially pertain if the downstream nation were highly

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dependent on the water resource. This, of course, is Lowi’s (1993) variant of hegemonic stability theory. Conversely, and consistent with the same line of thinking, the situation would not be conducive to cooperation at all if the hegemon were also upstream. Nevertheless, the 1973 Colorado River Agreement, whereby the (stronger) United States had no immediate economic incentive to heed the demands of downstream Mexico for better quality water, challenges Lowi’s (1993) and the realist “hegemonic” contention. The Colorado River Agreement demonstrates the formative concept of strategic interaction. Linkage and the prospects for reciprocity have been cited most frequently in explanation for bilateral cooperation in this otherwise uncooperative situation. Consequently, the upstream state is not always averse to cooperation, despite its geographical upper hand. In fact, upstream states may well elect to cooperate with downstream states after evaluating the bonuses accruing from cooperation, as contrasted with the benefits derived from pursuing a project unilaterally. More importantly, there is no reason to expect that just because upstream states are upstream they will elect an uncooperative stance. In fact, upstream states will cooperate when they can benefit from such cooperation. Moreover, they will be especially interested in cooperating because they know that if they are to undertake particular tasks on their territory, in their own as well as the other country’s benefit, in the absence of an agreement, their initiatives will go unrewarded by side-payments or other forms of compensation. The agreement guarantees a side-payment in recognition of the measures taken upstream that also benefit the downstream state. The incentive to cooperate derives not solely from the benefits that can be accrued upstream, due to scarcity or the need to coordinate a river’s uses, but also from the side-payments and compensation the upstream state will receive by entering into the agreement. Thus, strategic interaction is complemented by material incentives. This same line of argument was advanced for an upstream country that may be substantially poorer than a downstream state. In fact, such a weaker state may gain additional benefits since the richer downstream state has the wherewithal to execute the project alone and may even fund it in its entirety upstream, thereby providing significant upstream benefits. Side-payments would also play an important role in pollution problems. Upstream polluters have little incentive to cooperate in the absence of a sidepayment, since the externality is unidirectional. In addition, projects built downstream (or even upstream but benefiting mostly the downstream country) that affect the territory of the upstream state, most likely require some kind of a side-payment to encourage accession to the agreement. Finally, another important point elucidated by Chapter 2 provided an additional challenge to the realist framework. It was shown that the brute power that may be used by a militarily superior riparian to sway or bully a militarily weaker country may prove feckless in negotiations over water. This may be especially salient in cases where the militarily superior country is downstream and is dependent on the geographically superior upstream state for the construction of specific projects. The issuespecific structural power (in the form of an advantageous geographical position),

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possessed by the upstream country must be instrumental in negotiations over water. As such, militarily and economically superior countries may be better served by negotiating with weaker states, providing them a sense of equality, and providing promises and rewards rather than advancing threats and punishments. While Chapter 2 also considered the role of epistemic communities, third-parties, domestic politics, and cultural attributes in fostering or impeding cooperation, the stage was set for the discussion of property rights conflicts and their subsequent resolution.

The vagueness of international water law and treaty design: geography, economics, side-payments, and cost-sharing patterns Building on the initial arguments made in Chapter 2, Chapter 3 elaborates the core of this work. It unfolds as the theoretical explanation of how cooperation may be facilitated, and property rights disputes resolved, in both asymmetric and symmetric geographical situations. It also demonstrates how treaties differ in design. Here again, the geography of the river, which is the most basic element for analyzing hydro-politics, was shown to be an invaluable key to understanding property rights outcomes. However, much importance is attributed to the economic differences between the sovereignties and their perception of the future uses of the hydro-resource. Indeed, in some cases, these even change the expectations of the geographical argument. Side-payment and cost-sharing arrangements stipulated in a given treaty were therefore dependent, to some extent, on the geographical configuration of the river as well as on the economic asymmetries between the signatories. Both variables reflected on the “willingness to pay” of the parties. International water law, as noted, provides states with little substantive direction in pursuit of resolution to their disputes, while conflict over a shared resource arises, to a great extent, because property rights are not clearly defined. Yet our planet yields enough examples of interstate cooperation over international rivers, now codified in international agreements. The goal, therefore, has been to investigate whether overall variations in treaty outcomes and property rights solutions could be explained by spatial characteristics of commons resources. Surely, variations in treaty outcomes cannot be explained by geographical differences alone. However, the geography of the river and the relative location of the parties that share the river are so intrinsic to a hydro-dispute that ignoring them discounts the obvious explanatory power of these two fundamental elements. In fact, although the two opposite configurations would seem to provide different property rights solutions and strategies for states to pursue, international legal principles do not identify any particular rights and duties uniquely applicable to either through-border and border-creator rivers. For this reason, the book’s first hypothesis argues that the geographical asymmetry embodied in the through-border configuration means that side-payments from the downstream state to the upstream state would not only serve as an incentive to

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cooperation but also as the tangible and measurable solution to the property rights conflict. All else being equal, the geographical upper hand of the upstream state requires the downstream state to provide side-payments to resolve water allocation and pollution control disputes, or to coordinate particular uses, such as flood control and hydropower, along their shared river. Benefits created upstream, and enjoyed downstream, would also have to be compensated via a side-payment. Finally, it was suggested that a side-payment would also have to be forthcoming in order to cement the deal if a project was built on territory of the downstream state, or even on territory of the upstream state, whereby the downstream state benefited the most and the upstream state negatively affected. In short, the downstream state must be willing to pay. A different scenario would take place in the border-creator configuration in cases of joint projects. In fact, due to the geographical symmetry inherent in this configuration combined with the embedded ability to reciprocate actions and/or retaliate, side-payments would seldom have to be incorporated to encourage cooperation. Pollution problems, for example, would also be less of a problem in this configuration because the externality is reciprocal rather than unidirectional. In fact, the book’s second hypothesis affirms that if the parties share the entire length of the river, joint projects would more often require equal bi-national participation. Chapters 2 and 3 contended that the use of brute military power would be of questionable significance in the case of hydro-political negotiations. Yet the same may not hold true for the role of economic prowess in negotiations between rich and poor states. In the former case, brute power would seem to be inimical to a state’s cooperative objective, considering that even a stronger state can find itself in a situation wherein it must negotiate with a weaker one. In addition, it must be questioned why and how a militarily superior state would use its armaments against a weaker state upon which it relies to honor an agreement. The whole purpose of a state undertaking negotiation is to demonstrate that it recognizes that brute military force cannot be used to attain the particular benefits it is seeking. Conceding to the other state some status of equality is inherent to the process of negotiation, and the give-and-take of bargaining is surely preferable to taking up arms. The economic differences between the respective states may tip the scales and, therefore, can entail important implications for the study of hydro-political negotiation. As the theory argued, then, wealthier countries typically manifest a higher “willingness to pay.” A richer downstream state may be willing to pay more to a poorer upstream state than vice versa. Second, the economic well-being of a state normally reflects on its propensity to pollute and capacity to accept pollution. Poorer states have a higher propensity to pollute and a higher threshold for co-existing with pollution. Compared to them, richer states have a lower propensity to pollute, and a lower tolerance of pollution. Thus, both in the through-border and border-creator cases, richer states may be willing to pay more or provide side-payments for pollution abatement on the part of the poorer state. A rich downstream state, in the through-border case, and one that may be simply

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described as rich, in the border-creator case, may thus be at the mercy of the poorer upstream state, or a neighboring poor one, respectively, which has less to lose by not negotiating to abate the pollution. On the other hand, the higher willingness of a richer upstream state to make payments might imply that the side-payment game is entirely reversed. In fact, the richer upstream state may provide a side-payment or take action benefiting the downstream state, providing little or no immediate incentive to the upstream state. The richer state’s greater “willingness to pay” may impinge on the predicted outcome inherent to the geographical argument, which is the book’s third hypothesis. This economic analysis may also help to explain cases where issue-linkage and reciprocity are thought to be at work. Chief among these examples is the 1973 Colorado River Agreement where the richer (upstream) United States took on an expensive task on behalf of poorer (downstream) Mexico. This case is a favorite of the issue-linkage and reciprocity literature, yet the economic disparities between the two countries may also explain America’s actions in the face of the immediate disincentives to do so. With reference to the border-creator case, the fourth hypothesis postulates, that the richer state willingly pays more for a joint project, even providing side-payments to induce the poorer state to cooperate.

Data analysis and results Chapters 4 and 5 undertook to apply the theory and test the various hypotheses. Chapter 4 was devoted to a test of the hypotheses across the two core configurations. Chapter 5 tested the hypotheses across the additional configurations in order to determine how well they accounted for the outlying data. Among the 281 agreements researched, assessed, and classified for this work, there were 91 specific treaties. The preferred pre-selection criterion was for agreements that spoke of particular actions to be taken by states, and thus had direct bearing on property rights conflicts and their subsequent resolution. Evaluating the relationship between the river geography, the treaty outcomes, and the economic differences between the states, allowed for some revealing conclusions. Rather than repeating the conclusions of Chapters 4 and 5, it might be more useful to provide a comprehensive analysis, including the throughborder, border-creator, and additional configurations. As argued, where a joint project or task is begun, the outcome is dictated, to a large degree, by characteristics of the particular stretch of the river and its resemblance to either of the two core configurations. Therefore, since the entire length of the river may comprise segments that resemble either of the two opposite configurations, the location of a given project relative to a particular river segment is significant. Therefore, for the purpose of the following discussion, treaties that pertain to the through-border configuration and the stretch of the river that is in the upstream state’s territory will be grouped as one category. The second category will consider all the treaties that pertain to the border-creator configuration and the stretch of the river that straddles the border. The distinct river geographies, and the associated

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Table 6.1 Summary of results for all configurations Regime

Stretch of the river in question Stretch of the river in the upstream state’s territory (including throughborder configuration)

Stretch of the river along the border (including border-creator configuration)

Symmetric Upstream Downstream Symmetric Asymmetric economic richer richer economic economic relationship relationship relationship Side-payments 20 treaties from downstream to upstream state Side-payments from upstream to downstream state No side-payments, equal cost-sharing Side-payments from state A to state B Side-payments from richer to poorer state

4 treaties

9 treaties

3 treaties

2 treaties

9 treaties

4 treaties

1 treaty

7 treaties

economic asymmetries of the riparians, can then be compared. A summary of the results is enumerated in Table 6.1. Only the agreements that clearly outline sidepayments and cost-sharing patterns are catalogued.1 An analysis follows. Through-border configuration and stretch of the river in the upstream state’s territory As predicted by the geographic hypothesis (Hypothesis One), most agreements (87 percent) pertaining to the through-border configuration and the stretch of the river in the upstream state’s territory incorporated side-payments from the downstream to the upstream state. Typically, these were earmarked either to solve a property rights conflict, such as pollution abatement, joint construction of hydropower projects, development of flood control facilities, or simply to promote cooperation. Most agreements that pertain to water allocation issues did not subsume side-payments. This circumstance supports both past findings and current thinking regarding payments for actual water allocation between upstream and downstream states. The exclusion of such water allocation agreements from the count notably strengthened the relationship between the agreements,

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the respective configuration, and the associated side-payment outcomes. The debate between issue-linkage and side-payments was thereby affected. As noted, the issue-linkage literature argued that compensation, transmitted as side-payments, is not common and that, moreover, it is seldom used to promote cooperation in asymmetric situations such as along a through-border river. Though lacking any empirical evidence for such an assertion, the literature contends that side-payments give the impression that the compensating party is a “weak negotiator” or can be easily bribed. Empirically, however, the posited theoretical base and supporting evidence provided in this book show the opposite to be true. Side-payments frequently occur to offset an asymmetric geographical relationship between upstream and downstream states, and are commonly regarded as an appropriate instrumentality for fostering cooperation in this context. The evidence indicates that side-payments from the downstream state to the upstream state are frequent concomitants of bilaterally negotiated cooperation in geographically asymmetric situations. It further demonstrates that property rights conflicts, and the reconciliation between extreme legal principles, are often embodied in the side-payment arrangement. In such situations, compromise expressed as compensation, may serve as recognition of the downstream benefits created by works upstream (for hydropower and flood control projects, for example), or the upstream acquiescence in cooperation. The negotiated compromise is most interesting in addressing pollution problems. Despite its normative appeal, the PPP did not dictate the way out of the pollution problem on its own (Two initial agreements governing two different rivers, and shared by the same riparians, codified the PPP). Rather, the outcome also included the less normatively accepted “victim pays” regime, whereby a compromise was achieved with the costs of abatement borne by both the harming and harmed parties (Four subsequent agreements for the above mentioned rivers codified a “victim pays” regime). The compromise was expressed in the form of side-payments from the harmed state to the polluting state, to abate the pollution upstream. The economic asymmetries between the richer downstream state and the poorer upstream state, which were evident in all the analyzed pollution agreements, unquestionably increased the salience of the geographical asymmetry and amplified the effects of pollution on the richer downstream state. The different propensities of each state to tolerate a given level of pollution entails that the victim (and richer) country shall absorb some of the abatement costs. The economic hypothesis (Hypothesis Three) fared well only when the side-payment outcomes went contrary to the expectations of the geographical hypothesis, except for the two aforementioned pollution agreements codifying the PPP. For two cases, in which a direct side-payment transfer proceeded from the upstream to the downstream state, or the actions taken favored the downstream state (in a way a side-payment), the economic asymmetries between the states were twice the difference, which is a statistically appropriate threshold for determining asymmetry. Although Hypothesis Three recognizes that the geographical characteristics of a river may still play a part in dictating the commons outcome, in some of the cases the higher “willingness to pay” of the upstream state

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assuaged the disincentives to cooperate that might be presumed inherent in its superior strategic location (hence the consequence of the often cited 1973 Colorado River Agreement). Border-creator configuration and stretch of the river along the border As expected by Hypothesis Two, agreements associated with the border-creator configuration and the stretch of the river along the border evinced the opposite pattern from the agreements discussed in the earlier configurations (62 percent). No side-payments were noted in many of the agreements, either to promote cooperation or to resolve a property rights dispute. Equal cost-sharing was likewise instituted. As expected by Hypothesis Four, agreements that constituted asymmetric riparians, embodied side-payments from the richer riparian to the poorer riparian most of the time – the richer country assumes the bulk of the cost burden (64 percent). Several conclusions follow from the agreements governing these types of river configurations. All else being equal, the symmetry embedded in this type of river geography does not usually compel one state to induce another to cooperate. Furthermore this particular geographical configuration facilitates – and necessitates – the participation of both parties in planning and undertaking a joint project. More often than not, they participate equally. This type of geography acts almost as a focal point for joint projects and the respective equal participation of each country. Solutions to property rights conflicts in geographically symmetric situations rarely require side-payments, while the coordination of uses along the shared river often demands the parties’ equal participation. In short, where there is an equal division of the costs entailed in a joint project, then the compromise principle in the case of these geographies can be expressed as an exclusion of side-payments.

Closing argument and policy implications Closing argument As this book has demonstrated, an understanding of property rights compromises can best be ascertained by studying the agreements states negotiate. International water law provides vague principles, which states struggle to deploy in practice. Legal principles, to a large degree, also espouse normative precepts rarely employed or followed by sovereignties in everyday negotiations. To its credit, international water law does not attempt to provide specific guidelines for states to employ. Rather, these umbrella principles are expressed by states through international agreements. As such, the compromises that states seek, and the principles states affirm, are best achieved via an international agreement. By breaking away from the case study approach, this work has also demonstrated that despite the uniqueness of each water problem, patterns in international water

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treaties are discernable and that these patterns can be studied systematically. Interestingly, the property rights solution devised among riparians for different use disputes has stayed the same over time, despite the many social, normative and legal changes (especially environmental legal norms related to transboundary rivers) that have taken place in international politics and society. This is at least the case for the pool of observations examined here, wherein the oldest specific agreement dates to 1906 and the most recent to 2000. Inasmuch as a dispute over an international river is essentially a commons problem, this research argued that to some extent the commons characteristics of a river ought to be able to guide the analysis of the solution to a commons problem. By juxtaposing the two core configurations described, it was possible to demonstrate that particular solutions to international water disputes along a river may be more common and appropriate for one configuration and not another. In so doing, it has also been possible to demonstrate that geography has significance in the more general study of hydro-politics, as well as in the more specific study of negotiations over a given river. It has also been shown that in geographically asymmetric situations, sidepayments are often transferred from the downstream state to the upstream state to facilitate cooperation, coordinate a river-use project, or solve a property rights dispute. The solution and compromise is expressed through side-payments. In addition, downstream benefits created upstream are rewarded, and recognized, through compensation from the downstream state to the upstream state. In geographically symmetric situations, equal participation is the norm for coordinating uses along a river and side-payments are less likely required to induce a party to cooperate. Geography may only guide the outcome, so this book also argued that economic differences among the states should matter. All the configurations confirm that, contrary to the expected direction of the side-payment, when an upstream state takes action on behalf of the downstream state without compensation, or it provides a direct side-payment to the downstream state, the upstream state is more likely to be the richer of the two. The disincentives to cooperate by taking action on the upstream state’s side of the border without appropriate compensation, are moderated by the higher “willingness to pay” of the richer upstream state. The costs of taking action, despite the disincentives to do so, are, therefore, internalized. The geographical and economic hypotheses were also tested on the additional configurations identified by this study. Most fascinating was that outcomes for an agreed upon task or project were guided by the corresponding stretch of the river where the project was to be undertaken and its relationship to the core configurations. Economic differences also played an important role with the richer country paying the majority of the costs for projects undertaken on the stretch of the river that flows along the common border. In cases whereby projects were undertaken upstream in favor of the downstream state, without compensation, the upstream state was richer. In short, this work has endeavored to show that the “willingness to pay” of a particular river riparian, expressed in the side-payment and cost-sharing patterns

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exemplified in an agreement, reflects on the property rights solution and is explained by geography and economics. While the cost-benefit issue was shown to be an important variable requiring additional scrutiny in order to assess treaty outcomes, it was likewise shown that even this relationship might be difficult to discern in a systematic manner. Notably, this research has also shown that, despite the obvious need for a general and empirical approach in the study of a large number of documented river agreements, the individual case study approach continues to retain its traditional appeal for scholarship. Departing from reliance on the case study, however, this work makes a theoretical and empirical contribution to the field of international relations, in general, and that of hydro-politics, in particular, by examining the dynamics of international hydro-negotiations and agreements. Patterns emerge from the data, as do the identified case anomalies. But it is well to bear in mind that beyond extrapolating data from real cases, from time to time, real cases must be consulted, analyzed, and understood. Following through on the implications of this verity differentiates this work from other works in the field. Policy implications This study has attempted to formulate a theoretical basis for explaining how water treaties differ in their design and how agreements over shared rivers are negotiated and concluded. In this context, the work has also reflected on the larger issue of conflict and cooperation over shared international rivers. Extending beyond the theoretical foundation of this work, empirical applications and tests were also conducted across a large spectrum of data. Thus, despite the uniqueness of each water problem, patterns in international water treaties are discernable and these patterns can be studied systematically. The empirical testing of the theory provides some interesting policy implications for states currently in conflict over a specific shared river or for mediators (whether they be international organizations or other states) attempting to foster cooperation among river riparians. Perhaps the most compelling insights may be provided to states negotiating over a through-border river. Recall that it is by no means certain that conflict in the use of a through-border river is inevitable, but the geography of a throughborder river helps by facilitating conflicts of interest, at least in comparison with the border-creator river. For this reason this section will focus on the former river configuration. As past precedent has shown, in upstream/downstream situations side-payments are more likely to factor into negotiated agreements for the coordination of hydropower, flood control uses, and pollution control of a given river. While not as common as the former three issue-areas, water quantity disputes and the subsequent resolution between upstream and downstream states may also require side-payments. All else being equal, the upstream state is geographically superior. It often owns the sites where flood control facilities can be built, where dams for hydropower generation can be located, where reservoirs for water collection can be placed, and where pollution control – given upstream pollution – can be instituted.

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As such, projects that take place in the upstream state’s stretch of the river, including the construction of reservoirs and dams, or that require the territory of the upstream state, and which also benefit the downstream state, are often recognized through side-payments in the upstream direction. This phenomenon better coined as compensation for downstream benefits created upstream is true across different continents and between both developing and developed countries. Therefore, countries currently undergoing conflict over a shared through-border river may find it most practical to institute side-payments so as to overcome the intrinsic asymmetry and come to an acceptable solution of their impending property rights dispute. Side-payment regimes may be deemed most instrumental for alleviating pollution disputes. Despite the normatively accepted PPP, downstream states may have to contribute to the abatement of pollution, which originates upstream. Given their superior geographical position and the unidirectional nature of the externality, upstream states will be less inclined to abate the pollution without appropriate incentives. However, as this book has demonstrated, the economic discrepancies between the states may make a difference. When a richer upstream state is negotiating with a poorer downstream state, the side-payment outcome may be reversed. In other cases no side-payments may be provided at all, yet the richer upstream state might still take on actions that benefit, for the most part, the poorer downstream state. The higher GDP per capita not only signals greater “willingness to pay” on the part of the richer country but also assuages its disincentives to cooperate when most of the benefits flow downstream, given its actions. As demonstrated by the many cases analyzed in this study, side-payments are a most acceptable means for solving property rights disputes in geographically asymmetric situations. Contrary to the claim that side-payments are rare because states perceive them as a bribe (Bennett et al. 1998; Folmer et al. 1993) or fear gaining the reputation of a “weak negotiator” (Mäler 1990: 86), compensation is a common panacea for international river disputes.

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Appendix A

Rivers, configurations, and associated treaties Includes rivers documented by Wolf et al. 1999 Table A.1 Rivers, configurations, and associated treaties Through-border (100)

Countries (upstream, downstream)

Identified Treaty (date) by Wolf et al. (68)

1 Venta 2 Näätämöjoki 3 Garona

Latvia, Lithuania Finland, Norway Spain, France

Y Y Y

4 Carol

France, Spain

N

5 Vuoksi

Finland, USSR (Russia)

Y

6 Klaralven

Norway, Sweden

Y

7 Lima (Limia)

Spain, Portugal

Y

8 Tuloma

Finland, Russia

Y

9 Kogilnik 10 Mius 11 Latorica

Moldova, Ukraine Ukraine, Russia USSR (Ukraine), Czechoslovakia (Slovakia) 12 Uzh USSR (Ukraine), Czechoslovakia (Slovakia) 13 Orawa Poland, Czechoslovakia (Slovakia) 14 Desna (Smolenska) Russia, Ukraine 15 Barta Lithuania, Latvia

Y Y N

1) 4/25/1951 1) 7/14/1866 2) 7/29/1963 1) 7/14/1866 2) 7/12/1958; 1/27/1970 1) 10/28/1922 2) 12/9/1948 3) 4/24/1964 4) 7/12/1972 5) 8/26/1989 1) 10/26/1905 2) 5/11/1929 1) 5/29/1968; 2/12/1976 2) 5/6/1971 3) 11/30/1998 1) 10/28/1922 2) 12/9/1948 3) 4/24/1964 1) 11/23/1994 1) 10/19/1992 1) 4/28/1955

N

1) 4/28/1955

N

1) 12/20/1952 2) 3/21/1958 1) 10/19/1992

N Y

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Table A.1 Continued Through-border (100)

Countries (upstream, downstream)

16 Witka (Smeda)

Czechoslovakia (Czech Republic), Poland France, Italy

N

Switzerland, Italy Switzerland, Italy Italy, Switzerland Switzerland, France France, Italy

N N N N N

Moldova, Ukraine Bulgaria, Greece Greece, Albania Yugoslavia (Macedonia), Greece Yugoslavia (Serbia), Albania Poland, USSR (Russia) Ukraine, Romania Yugoslavia (Slovenia), Italy

Y Y Y Y

17 Roya 18 Doveria 19 Maira (Mera) 20 Reno de Lei 21 Allaine 22 Mont Cenis River (Part of the Lac du Mont Cenis system) 23 Sarata 24 Struma 25 Vijose 26 Vardar 27 Belli Drim 28 Lava-Pregel 29 Siret 30 Isonzo (Mrzlek Springs)

Identified Treaty (date) by Wolf et al. (68)

Y

Y Y N Y

31 Iizer France, Belgium 32 Morghab (Murgab) Afghanistan, Turkmenistan 33 Helmand Afghanistan, Iran

Y Y

34 Talas 35 Terek 36 Onon 37 Selenga 38 Kerulen 39 Bulgan 40 Prohladnaja 41 Coruh 42 Ishim

Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan Georgia, Russia Mongolia, Russia Mongolia, Russia Mongolia, China Mongolia, China Poland, USSR (Russia) Turkey, Georgia Kazakhstan, Russia

N Y N N N N Y Y N

43 Gangir 44 Kanjan Cham 45 Tib (Mehmeh) 46 Nahr El Khabir 47 Sarisu 48 Oued Bon Naima 49 Veleka

Iraq, Iran Iraq, Iran Iraq, Iran Turkey, Syria Turkey, Iran Morocco, Algeria Turkey, Bulgaria

N N N Y N Y Y

Y

1) 4/2/1960 2) 3/21/1958 1) 12/17/1914 2) 9/28/1967 1) 4/20/1972 1) 4/20/1972 1) 6/18/1949 1) 4/4/1963 1) 1/12/1955 2) 9/14/1960 1) 11/23/1994 1) 7/12/1971 1) 5/25/1954 2) 6/18/1959 1) 12/5/1956 1) 7/17/1964 1) 9/20/1997 1) 7/18/1957; 7/19/1977; 5/9/1979 2) 11/10/1975

1) 9/7/1950 2) 3/13/1973 1) 1/21/2000 1) 2/11/1995 1) 2/11/1995 1) 4/29/1994 1) 4/29/1994 1) 7/17/1964 1) 8/27/1992 2) 6/26/1997 1) 12/26/1975 1) 12/26/1975 1) 12/26/1975 1) 11/10-11/18/1955 1) 10/23/1968 2) 9/13/1975 (Table A.1 continued )

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Table A.1 Continued Through-border (100)

Countries (upstream, downstream)

Identified Treaty (date) by Wolf et al. (68)

50 Kosi

Nepal, India

N

51 Kaladan 52 Wangchu

India, Myanmar Bhutan, India

Y N

53 Kurichhu 54 Sembakung 55 Sujfun 56 Karanfauli 57 Negro

Bhutan, India Malaysia, Indonesia China, Russia India, Bangladesh Brazil, Uruguay

N Y Y Y N

58 Palena

Argentina, Chile

Y

59 Lauca-Concoso 60 Gallegos-Chico

Bolivia, Chile Chile, Argentina

Y Y

61 Comau

Argentina, Chile

Y

62 Coatan

Guatemala, Mexico

Y

63 Grijalva

Guatemala, Mexico

Y

64 Barima 65 Chico (Carmen Silva) 66 Cullen

Guyana, Venezuela Chile, Argentina

Y Y

Chile, Argentina

Y

67 Belize 68 Catatumbo 69 Rio Grande

Guatemala, Belize Colombia, Venezuela Chile, Argentina

Y Y Y

70 Mira 71 San Martin

Ecuador, Colombia Chile, Argentina

Y Y

72 Yelcho (Futaleufu)

Argentina, Chile

Y

73 Sabi

UK (Zimbabwe), Portugal (Mozambique)

Y

74 St. Paul 75 Baraka 76 Little Scarcies

Guinea, Liberia Eritrea, Sudan Guinea, Sierra Leone

Y Y Y

1) 4/25/1954; 12/19/1966; 4/7/1978 1) 3/24/1974 2) 1996 1) 1995

1) 12/20/1933 2) 6/12/1975; 3/11/1991 1) 6/26/1971 2) 8/2/1991 1) 6/26/1971 2) 8/2/1991 1) 6/26/1971 2) 8/2/1991 1) 11/9-12/21/1961 2) 4/10/1987 1) 11/9-12/21/1961 2) 4/10/1987 1) 6/26/1971 2) 8/2/1991 1) 6/26/1971 2) 8/2/1991 1) 6/26/1971 2) 8/2/1991 1) 6/26/1971 2) 8/2/1991 1) 6/26/1971 2) 8/2/1991 1) 6/11/1891 (this is a navigation agreement and is not analyzed in Appendix D) 2) 12/20/2002

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Table A.1 Continued Through-border (100)

Countries (upstream, downstream)

Identified Treaty (date) by Wolf et al. (68)

77 Loffa 78 Daoura 79 Buzi 80 Gash

Guinea, Liberia Morocco, Algeria Zimbabwe, Mozambique Italy (Eritrea), UK (Sudan)

Y Y Y Y

81 Benito

Y

84 Medjerda 85 Tagwai (El Fadama) 86 Yukon 87 Stikine 88 Columbia

Gabon, Equatorial Guinea Morocco, Algeria Equatorial Guinea, Gabon Tunisia, Algeria Nigeria, Niger Canada (UK), USA Canada (UK), USA Canada (UK), USA

Y Y Y

89 Firth 90 Whiting 91 Red

USA, Canada (UK) Canada (UK), USA USA, Canada (UK)

Y Y N

92 Skagit

Canada (UK), USA

N

93 Taku 94 Alesek 95 St. Mary 96 Chilkat 97 Tijuana

Canada (UK), USA Canada (UK), USA USA, Canada (UK) Canada (UK), USA Mexico, USA

Y Y N Y Y

98 New

Mexico, USA

N

99 Candelaria

Guatemala, Mexico

Y

Germany, Czech Republic

N

82 Gulr (Guir) 83 Mbe

100 Eger (Ohre)

1) 12/20/2002 1) 6/12-6/15/1925; 4/18/1951

Y Y Y N

1) 7/18/1990 1) 1/11/1909 1) 1/11/1909 1) 1/11/1909 2) 2/25-3/3/1944 3) 1/17/1961; 1/229/16/1964 1) 1/11/1909 1) 1/11/1909 1) 1/11/1909 2) 8/30/1988 1) 1/11/1909 2) 1/10/1967 3) 4/2/1984 1) 1/11/1909 1) 1/11/1909 1) 1/11/1909 1) 1/11/1909 1) 11/14/1944 2) 8/14/1983 3) 4/30/1985 4) 7/18/1985 5) 7/2/1990; 4/16/1997 7) 12/2/1997 1) 8/26/1980 2) 8/14/1983 3) 7/18/1985 4) 4/15/1987 5) 11/24/1995 1) 11/9-12/21/1961 2) 4/10/1987 1) 12/12/1995 (Table A.1 continued )

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Table A.1 Continued Border-creator (17)

Countries (State A, State B)

Identified Treaty (date) by Wolf et al. (13)

1 Jacobs 2 Oyopock 3 Golok

Norway, Russia French Guiana, Brazil Thailand, Malaysia

Y Y Y

4 Pakchan 5 Yalu

Thailand, Myanamar China, N. Korea

Y Y

6 An Nahr Al Khabir 7 Niagara

Syria, Lebanon USA, Canada (UK)

Y N

1) 3/7/1997 (this a dredging/navigation agreement and is not analyzed in Appendix D) 1) 9/27/1958 2) 5/26/1960 3) 3/17/1971 4) 11/25/1963 (this is a navigation agreement and is not analyzed in Appendix D) 5) 12/31/1957 (this agreement pertains to floodgate construction works yet the river is not specified and is not analyzed in Appendix D) 6) 12/2/1965 (this is a navigation agreement and is not analyzed in Appendix D) 7) 1/14/1956 (this is a timber floating agreement and is not analyzed in Appendix D) 8) 5/23/1960 (this is a navigation agreement and is not analyzed in Appendix D) 9) 11/24/1961 (this is a timber floating agreement and is not analyzed in Appendix D) 1) 4/20/2002 1) 1/11/1909 2) 5/20/1941 3) 10/27-11/27/1941

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Table A.1 Continued Border-creator (17)

Countries (State A, State B)

8 St. Croix USA, Canada (UK) 9 Yaguarón (Jaguarão) Brazil, Uruguay

Identified Treaty (date) by Wolf et al. (13)

Y N

10 Cuareim (Quraí)

Brazil, Uruguay

N

11 Sixaola 12 Pandaruan 13 Akpa Yafi 14 Utamboni 15 Astara Chay 16 Bangau 17 Karasu

Costa Rica, Panama Brunei, Malaysia Cameroon, Nigeria Gabon, Equatorial Guinea Iran, Azerbaijan Malaysia, Brunei Turkey, Iran

Y Y Y Y Y Y N

Mixed (35)

Countries (upstream, downstream)

1 Tagus (Tajo)

Spain, Portugal

Y

2 Duoro

Spain, Portugal

Y

3 Guadiana

Spain, Portugal

Y

4) 2/27/1950; 9/13/1954 5) 3/21/1969 1) 1/11/1909 1) 12/20/1933 2) 7/07/1977 3) 6/12/1975; 3/11/1991 1) 12/20/1933 2) 6/12/1975; 11/1991 3) 3/11/1991; 9/16/1991 4) 5/6/1997

1) 11/10-11/18/1955

Identified Treaty (date) by Wolf et al. (22) 1) 9/29/1864; 11/4/1866 2) 9/17/1912 3) 5/29/1968; 2/12/1976 4) 5/6/1971 5) 11/30/1998 1) 9/29/1864; 11/4/1866 2) 9/17/1912 3) 8/11/1927; 6/29/27/1951 4) 7/16/1964; 6/10/1988 5) 11/30/1998 1) 9/29/1864; 11/4/1866 2) 9/17/1912 3) 5/29/1968; 2/12/1976 4) 5/6/1971 (Table A.1 continued )

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Table A.1 Continued Mixed (35)

Countries (upstream, downstream)

Identified Treaty (date) by Wolf et al. (22)

4 Saar (Sarre)

France, Germany

N

5 Lys

France, Belgium

N

6 Torrente Breggia

Switzerland, Italy

N

7 Melezza 8 Nestos (Mesta)

Switzerland, Italy Bulgaria, Greece

N Y

9 Tundzha

Bulgaria, Turkey

N

Albania, Yugoslavia (Macedonia) Lithuania, Latvia Poland, Czechoslovakia (Slovakia) N. Ireland (UK), Ireland Ireland, N. Ireland (UK) N. Ireland (UK), Ireland Italy, Switzerland

Y

10 Crni Drim 11 Lielupe 12 Dunajec 13 Castletown 14 Fane 15 Flurry 16 Spöl 17 Song Vam Co Dong 18 Gandak 19 Fenney 20 Teesta 21 Samur 22 Ca-Song-Koi 23 Chu 24 Tobol

Y N

5) 11/30/1998 1) 10/27/1956 2) 12/20/1961 3) 5/10/1966 1) 2/3/1982 (this is a navigation agreement and is not analyzed in Appendix D) 1) 4/20/1972 2) 6/15/1970; 6/23/1972 1) 4/20/1972 1) 7/12/1971 2) 12/22/1995 1) 10/23/1968 2) 9/13/1975 1) 12/5/1956 1) 3/21/1958 2) 3/21/1975

Y Y Y N

Cambodia, Vietnam Nepal, India India, Bangladesh India, Bangladesh Russia, Azerbaijan Laos, Vietnam Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan Kazakhstan, Russia

Y N Y Y Y Y N N

25 Jenisej (Yenisei) 26 Duverij (Doveryrich) 27 Han 28 Catamayo-Chira

Mongolia, Russia Iran, Iraq

Y N

N. Korea, S. Korea Ecuador, Peru

Y Y

29 Puyango-Tumbes

Ecuador, Peru

Y

1) 5/27/1957 2) 4/20/1972 1) 12/4/1959 1) 7/20/1983 1) 1/21/2000 1) 8/27/1992 2) 6/20/1996 1) 2/11/1995 1) 12/26/1975 1) 5/22-5/24/1944 2) 9/27/1971; 6/10/1972; 2/26/1975 1) 5/22-5/24/1944

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Table A.1 Continued Mixed (35)

Countries (upstream, downstream)

Identified Treaty (date) by Wolf et al. (22)

30 Artibonite

Dominican Republic, Haiti

Y

31 Cross 32 St. John

Cameroon, Nigeria USA, Canada (UK)

Y Y

33 Colorado

USA, Mexico

Y

34 Coliba-Corubal

Guinea, Guinea Bissau Guinea, Sierra Leone

Y

35 Great Scarcies (Kolenté)

2) 9/27/1971; 6/10/1972; 02/26/1975 1) 1/21/1929 2) 2/20/1929 3) 2/27/1935; 3/9/1936 1) 1/11/1909 2) 9/21/1972 3) 2/22/1984 1) 3/1/1889; 10/1/1895; 11/6/1896; 10/29/1897; 12/2/1898; 12/22/1899; 11/21/1900; 2/3/1944 2) 2/3/1944 3) 8/24/1966 4) 7/14/1972; 4/30/1973; 8/30/1973 5) 8/14/1983 6) 7/18/1985 7) 11/13/1992 8) 7/16/1994 1) 10/21/1978

Y

Partial bordercreator (31)

Countries (upstream, downstream)

Identified Treaty (date) by Wolf et al. (22)

1 Minho (Miño)

Spain, Portugal

Y

2 Chanza

Spain, Portugal

N

1) 9/29/1864; 11/4/1866 2) 9/17/1912 3) 5/29/1968; 2/12/1976 4) 5/6/1971 5) 11/30/1998 1) 9/29/1864; 11/4/1866 2) 9/17/1912 (Table A.1 continued )

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Table A.1 Continued Partial bordercreator (31)

3 Bidassoa

Countries (upstream, downstream)

Spain, France

Identified Treaty (date) by Wolf et al. (22)

Y

4 Gander Luxembourg, France 5 L’Hermance France, Switzerland 6 Rezvaya (Rezovska) Turkey, Bulgaria

N N Y

7 Bojana

Albania, Yugoslavia (Montenegro) USSR (Ukraine and Moldova), Romania

N

N

12 Ussuri

Yugoslavia (Serbia), Bulgaria Indonesia, Australia (Papua New Guinea) Iran, USSR (Turkmenistan) USSR (Russia), China

N

13 Argun

China, USSR (Russia)

N

14 Paz

Guatemala, El Salvador Guatemala, Honduras

Y Y

Guatemala, Belize Guatemala, Mexico

Y Y

Honduras, El Salvador Brazil, Uruguay

Y

Ecuador, Colombia Haiti, Dominican Republic

Y Y

8 Prut

9 Timok 10 Tami 11 Atrak

15 Montaqua (Motaqua) 16 Sarstun 17 Suchiate 18 Goascoran 19 Chuy 20 Mataje 21 Pendernales

N

Y Y

Y

3) 5/29/1968; 2/12/1976 4) 5/6/1971 1) 7/14/1866 2) 5/23/1964 3) 7/14/1959 (this is a fisheries agreement and is not analyzed in Appendix D) 4) 12/14/1978 1) 6/3-6/23/1986 1) 12/2/1959 1) 10/23/1968 2) 9/13/1975 1) 12/5/1956 1) 11/25/1949 2) 12/25/1952 3) 12/16/1971 4) 4/9/1986 1) 4/4/1958 2) 4/4/1958 1) 11/13/1973 1) 5/14/1957 2) 8/11/1957 1) 1/2/1951 2) 5/27/1994 1) 1/2/1951 2) 8/18/1956 1) 4/9/1938 2) 12/14/1951

1) 11/9-12/21/1961 2) 4/10/1987 1) 12/20/1933 2) 6/12/1975; 3/11/1991 1) 1/21/1929 2) 2/20/1929

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Table A.1 Continued Partial bordercreator (31)

Countries (upstream, downstream)

Identified Treaty (date) by Wolf et al. (22) 3) 2/27/1935; 3/09/1936

22 Courantyne (Corantijin) 23 San Juan 24 Zarumilla

Suriname, Guyana

Y

Nicaragua, Costa Rica Ecuador, Peru

Y Y

25 Tano 26 Cunene

Ghana, Ivory Coast Portugal (Angola) S. Africa (Namibia)

Y Y

27 Umba 28 Komadougou-Yobe 29 Morro-Mano 30 Mono 31 Rio Grande (Río Bravo del Norte)

Tanzania, Kenya Nigeria, Niger Liberia, Sierra Leone Togo, Benin USA, Mexico

Y N Y Y Y

Border-creator but enters state (9)

Countries (State A, downstream)

1 Foyle

3 Major

Ireland, N. Ireland (UK) Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia France, Spain

N

4 Amur

USSR (Russia), China

Y

2 Krka

River identified by Wolf et al. (5)

1) 4/15/1858 1) 5/22-5/24/1944 2) 10/8/1998 1) 7/1/1926 2) 4/29/1931 3) 1/21/1969 1) 7/18/1990 1) 3/1/1889; 10/1/1895; 11/6/1896; 10/29/1897; 12/2/1898; 12/22/1899; 11/21/1900; 2/3/1944 2) 5/21/1906 3) 2/1/1933 4) 2/3/1944; 10/24/1960 5) 8/14/1983 6) 7/18/1985 7) 6/24-11/10/1987 8) 11/13/1992 Treaty (date)

Y Y 1) 10/19/1994 (this is a navigation agreement and is not analyzed in Appendix D) 1) 1/2/1951 2) 8/18/1956 (Table A.1 continued )

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Table A.1 Continued Border-creator but enters state (9)

5 Amu Darya 6 Panduaran 7 Bermejo 8 Grande de Tarija 9 Amacuro Through-border * 2 (11)

Countries (State A, downstream)

Afghanistan, USSR (Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan) Brunei, Malaysia Bolivia, Argentina Bolivia, Argentina Guyana, Venezuela Countries (upstream, downstream)

River identified by Wolf et al. (5)

N Y N N Y

1) 6/9/1995 1) 6/9/1995 Treaty (date)

1) 10/28/1922 2) 12/9/1948 3) 4/24/1964

Russia, Finland

Y

2 Erne 3 Elancik 4 Ma 5 Sepik

Ireland, N. Ireland (UK) Ukraine, Russia Vietnam, Laos Australia (Papua New Guinea), Indonesia Nigeria, Niger

Y Y Y Y

Iran, Pakistan

Y

Ghana, Ivory Coast Canada (UK), USA

Y N

10 Milk 11 Kootenay

USA, Canada (UK) Canada (UK), USA

N N

Partial border-creator but returns (12)

Countries (upstream, downstream)

1 Gauja 2 Tana 3 Judrio

Latvia, Estonia Norway, Finland Italy, Yugoslavia (Slovenia) France, Switzerland

4 Chute du Châtelot (Part of the Doubs River that creates the border between the two countries)

3) 3/11/1959 4) 5/27/1994 1) 6/25/1958

River identified by Wolf et al. (7)

1 Olanga

6 Gada (Goulbi) (Part of the Maradi River) 7 Rudkaneh-ye (BahuKalat) 8 Bia 9 Souris

Treaty (date)

N

1) 10/19/1992 1) 11/13/1973 1) 7/18/1990

1) 1/11/1909 2) 11/15/1989 1) 1/11/1909 1) 1/11/1909 2) 1/17/1961;1/229/16/1964

Identified Treaty (date) by Wolf et al. (10) Y Y N

1) 11/10/1975

N

1) 11/19/1930

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Table A.1 Continued Partial border-creator but returns (12) 5 Fly 6 Saigon (Song Nha Be) 7 Chiriqui 8 Choluteca 9 Negro 10 Orinoco 11 Dra 12 St. Lawrence

Countries (upstream, downstream)

Identified Treaty (date) by Wolf et al. (10)

Australia (Papua New Guinea), Indonesia Vietnam, Cambodia

Y Y

Panama, Costa Rica Honduras, Nicaragua Honduras, Nicaragua Venezuela, Colombia Morocco, Algeria Canada (UK), USA

Y Y Y Y Y Y

1) 11/13/1973

1) 1/11/1909 2) 6/30/1952 (this is a navigation agreement and is not analyzed in Appendix D) 3) 11/12/1953 (this is a navigation agreement and is not analyzed in Appendix D) 4) 8/17/1954; 10/24/1956; 11/712/4/1956; 7/2310/26/1956; 11/30/1956; 4/84/9/1957; 5/19/1955; 2/27/1959; 6/8/1959 10/17/1961 (these are navigation agreements and are not analyzed in Appendix D) 5) 3/9/1959; 3/20/1978; 11/1311/16/1984; 5/3/1985; 3/308/1/1989; 4/265/1/1991; 12/1212/20/1991; 6/156/30/1992; 6/107/12/1994; 8/910/18/1995 (these are navigation agreements and are not analyzed in Appendix D) (Table A.1 continued )

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Table A.1 Continued Partial bordercreator * 2 (3)

Countries (upstream, downstream)

1 Ural

Russia, Kazakhstan

2 Salzach Austria, Germany 3 Massacre (Dajabon) Dominican Republic, Haiti

Partial border-creator but returns but then enters other state (1)

Countries (upstream, downstream)

1 Seim (Kurska)

Russia, Ukraine

Partial bordercreator * 2 but enters state first (1)

Countries (upstream, downstream)

1 Hal Ha

China, Mongolia

Through-border * 2 but creates border (2)

Countries (upstream, downstream)

1 Seversky Donets 2 Olma

Russia, Ukraine Poland, Czechoslovakia (Czech Republic)

Mixed zig zag (1)

1 Mahakali

River identified by Wolf et al. (2)

Treaty (date)

Y

1) 8/27/1992 2) 6/20/1996 1) 10/16/1950 1) 1/21/1929 2) 2/20/1929 3) 2/27/1935; 3/9/1936

N Y

River identified by Wolf et al. (0)

Treaty (date)

N

1) 10/19/1992

River identified by Wolf et al. (0)

Treaty (date)

N

1) 4/29/1994

River identified by Wolf et al. (0)

Treaty (date)

N N

1) 10/19/1992 1) 2/18/1928 2) 3/21/1958

Countries (upstream, downstream)

River identified by Wolf et al. (0)

Treaty (date)

Nepal, India

N

1) 2/12/1996

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Table A.1 Continued Partial bordercreator * 2 but enters state second (1)

Countries (upstream, downstream)

1 Nyanga

Gabon, Republic of the Congo

Through-border but creates border (1)

Countries (upstream, downstream)

1 Coco (Segovia)

Honduras, Nicaragua

River identified by Wolf et al. (1)

Treaty (date)

Y River identified by Wolf et al. (1) Y

Treaty (date)

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Appendix B

Geographical configurations for rivers shared by two states 1. Through-border

2. Border-creator

River and flow direction State A

State A

Border State B

3. Mixed

State B

4. Partial border-creator

State A

State A

State B

State B

5. Border-creator but enters state

6. Through-border * 2

State A

State A

State B

State B

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7. Partial border-creator but returns

8. Partial border-creator * 2

State A

State A

State B

State B

9. Partial border-creator but returns but then enters other state

10. Partial border-creator * 2 but enters state first

State A

State A

State B

State B

11. Through-border * 2 but creates border

12. Mixed zig zag

State A

State A

State B

State B

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13. Partial border-creator * 2 but enters state second

14. Through-border but creates border

State A

State A

State B

State B

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Appendix C

Selected literature for select river basins Table C.1 Selected literature for select river basins River(s)/River basin(s) Countries/Entities Columbia Canada and USA Jordan/Yarmouk Lebanon, Israel, Syria, Jordan, Palestinians

Study Krutilla (1966), Krutilla (1967), LeMarquand (1977), Rogers (1997) Naff and Matson (1984), Starr and Stoll (1988), Bulloch and Darwish (1993), Lowi (1993), Wolf (1993a), Wolf (1993b), Frey (1993), Brooks (1993), Myers (1993), Zarour and Isaac (1993), Lowi and Rothman (1993), Eaton and Eaton (1994), Soffer (1994), Mustafa (1994), Caponera (1994), Hillel (1994), Waterbury (1994), Naff (1994), Bakour and Kolars (1994), Isaac and Shuval (1994), Murakami (1995), Wolf (1995), Lowi (1995a), Lowi (1995b), Allan with Court (1996), Rouyer (1997), Libiszewski (1997), Just, Horowitz and Netanyahu (1997), Gleick (1997), Lonergan (1997), Biswas et al. (1997), Shapland (1997), Biswas (1997), Dombrowsky (1998), Kuffner (1998), Renger (1998), Schiffler (1998), Wolf (1998b), Murakami (1998), Soffer (1999), Elhance (1999), Lowi (1999), Dolatyar and Gray (2000), Beaumont (2000), Lonergan (2000), (Table C.1 continued )

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Table C.1 Continued River(s)/River basin(s) Countries/Entities

Study Rabi (2000), Shuval (2000), Wolf (2000), Hof (2000), Kay and Mitchell (2000), Kliot (2000), Lowi (2000), Rowley (2000), Haddadin (2000), Rouyer (2000), Beach et al. (2000), Lonergan (2001), Feitelson and Haddad (2001), Haddadin (2002), Amery (2002), Allan (2001), Giordano et al. (2002), Lowi (2002), Jägerskog (2002), Dombrowsky (2003), Phillips et al. (2006)

Nile Ethiopia, Sudan, Egypt, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Eritrea, Burundi, Rwanda, Democratic Republic of the Congo

Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna/ Ganges-Brahmaputra-Barak India, Bangladesh, Nepal, China, Bhutan, Myanmar

Waterbury (1979), Naff and Matson (1984), Murphy and Sabadell (1986), Starr and Stoll (1988), Bulloch and Darwish (1993), Frey (1993), Myers (1993), Deng (1993), Lowi (1993), Hillel (1994), Waterbury (1994), Naff (1994), Mageed (1994), Howell and Allan (1994), Murakami (1995), Rogers (1997), Shapland (1997), Biswas et al. (1997), Schiffler (1998), Schiffler (1998), Soffer (1999), Elhance (1999), Dinar and Alemu (2000), Green Cross International (2000), Beach et al. (2000), Lowi (2000), Allan (2001), Waterbury (2002), Swain (2002), Peichert (2003), Phillips et al. (2006)

Verghese (1996), Nishat (1996), Rogers (1997), Salman (1998), Salman and Uprety (1999), Elhance (1999), Nishat and Faisal (2000), Green Cross International (2000), Beach et al. (2000), Salman and Uprety (2002), Faisal (2002), Bandyopadhyay (2002), Sainju (2002), Giordano et al. (2002)

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Table C.1 Continued River(s)/River basin(s) Countries/Entities Tigris-Euphrates/Shatt al Arab Turkey, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia

Helmand Afghanistan and Iran Colorado USA and Mexico Tijuana Mexico and USA New Mexico and USA Colorado USA and Mexico Paraguay (Part of the La Plata) Brazil, Bolivia, Paraguay, Argentina Parana-La Plata Brazil, Bolivia, Paraguay, Uruguay, Argentina Bermejo Bolivia and Argentina

Study Naff and Matson (1984), Kolars and Mitchell (1991), Bulloch and Darwish (1993), Lowi (1993), Frey (1993), Slim (1993), Myers (1993), Hillel (1994), Kolars (1994), Bakour and Kolars (1994), Waterbury (1994), Naff (1994), Lowi (1995a), Murakami (1995), Beaumont (1997), Biswas et al. (1997), Gleick (1997), Shapland (1997), Biswas et al. (1997), Scheumann (1998), Durth (1998), Schiffler (1998), Soffer (1999), Güner (1999), Elhance (1999), Dolatyar and Gray (2000), Green Cross International (2000), Kibarog˘lu and Ünver (2000), Beach et al. (2000), Kolars (2000), Lowi (2000), Allan (2001), Kibarog˘lu (2002), Scheumann (2003) Abidi (1977) LeMarquand (1977), Murakami (1995), Cohen (2002) Utton (1988) Doughman (2001) Murphy and Sabadell (1986), Garcia-Acevedo (2002) Tucci et al. (1999)

Murphy and Sabadell (1986), Biswas et al. (1999), Elhance (1999), Beach (2000) Uitto and Duda (2002) (Table C.1 continued )

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Table C.1 Continued River(s)/River basin(s) Countries/Entities Amazon Brazil, Peru, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Venezuela, Guyana, Suriname, French Guiana Chu and Talas Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan Salween China, Myanmar, Thailand Mekong Myanmar, China, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Vietnam

Rhine Switzerland, France, Germany, Netherlands, Austria, Liechtenstein, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg Skagit Canada and USA Indus India, Pakistan, China, Nepal

Kosi, Gandak, and Mahakali Nepal and India

Wangchu and Kurichhu India and Bhutan Scheldt France, Belguim, Netherlands

Study Biswas et al. (1999)

Hutchens and McKinney (1999) Onta et al. (1996), Hashimoto (1996), Beach et al. (2000) Akatsuka and Asaeda (1996), Miller (1996), Radosevich (1996), Elhance (1999), Jacobs (2000), Browder (2000), Green Cross International (2000), Beach et al. (2000), Jacobs (2002), Phillips et al. (2006) LeMarquand (1977), Dupont (1993), Dupont (1993), Villeneuve (1996), Correia and da Silva (1997), Durth (1998), Schiffler (1998) LeMarquand (1977) Mehta (1988), Biswas (1992), Lowi (1993), Murakami (1995), Schiffler (1998), Pitman (2000), Beach et al. (2000), Lowi (2000), Salman and Uprety (2002), Alam (2002), Giordano et al. (2002) Shrestha and Singh (1996), Verghese (1996), Elhance (1999), Gyawali (2000), Green Cross International (2000), Gaan (2001), Salman and Uprety (2002), Bandyopadhyay (2002), Sainju (2002) Verghese (1996), Elhance (1999), Bandyopadhyay (2002) Meijerink (1999)

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Table C.1 Continued River(s)/River basin(s) Countries/Entities Orontes Lebanon, Syria, Turkey

Syr Darya and Amu Darya (Aral Sea) Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan,Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan

Senegal Mauritania, Guinea, Mali, Senegal Danube Germany, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Ukraine, Moldova, Romania, Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Slovenia, Austria, Hungary Iberian Penninsula Rivers Spain and Portugal Seversky Donets Russia and Ukraine Cunene Angola and Namibia Incomati S. Africa, Swaziland, Mozambique Zambezi Zambia, Namibia, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Angola, Mozambique, Malawi, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Tanzania

Study Naff and Matson (1984), Bakour and Kolars (1994), Shapland (1997), Gleick (1997), Soffer (1999) Micklin (1992), Horsman (2001), Heltzer (2003), Bos (1996), Klotzli (1997), Boisson de Chazournes (1998), Glantz (1998), Tsukatani (1998), Glantz (1999), Beach et al. (2000), Sergen and Malone (2000), Green Cross International (2000), International Crisis Group (2002), Micklin (1992), Uitto and Duda (2002) Jellali and Jebali (1994), Green Cross International (2000) Linnerooth (1990), Linnerooth-Bayer and Murcott (1996), Correia and da Silva (1997), Beach et al. (2000), Jansky (1994), Green Cross International (2000) Correia and da Silva (1997), Llamas (1997) Spirin et al. (1997) Meissner (2000), Meissner (2003) Leestemaker (2000)

Nakayama (1998), Hijri and Grey (1998), Mulendema and Nundwe (2000), Chonguica (2000), Chenje (2003), Nakayama (2003), Salewicz (2003) (Table C.1 continued )

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Table C.1 Continued River(s)/River basin(s) Countries/Entities Senqu/Orange Lesotho, S. Africa, Namibia, Botswana Limpopo Botswana, S. Africa, Zimbabwe, Mozambique Okavango Angola, Namibia, Botswana, Zimbabwe Chobe Namibia and Botswana Umbeluzi Swaziland, Mozambique, S. Africa Volta Ghana, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Togo, Benin, Mali

Study Mochebelele (2000), Ashton (2000), Beach et al. (2000), Turton (2003), Mohamed (2003) Mohamed (2003)

Ashton (2000, 2003)

Ashton (2000) Chonguica (2000)

Hijri and Grey (1998)

(1,2, . . . ) – Number of agreement corresponding to the geographical configuration (@) – Treaty citation, treaty title, and/or treaty text identified by this study (translation undertaken if needed) ( ! ) – Text of treaty identified by this study (&) – Treaty translated by this study or English version of agreement was located NSI – Side-payment or cost-sharing regime not specifically indicated

12:11 PM

Oregon State University’s International Freshwater Treaties Database was used as the comparative treaty depository

Entries in bold indicate a specific treaty.

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GUIDE

Treaty analysis for bilateral river configurations

Appendix D

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Upstream state

USA

River, treaty year, and topic

St. Mary 1909 – Water quantity, Border issues, General regulations and Commission creation (1)

Through-border

The parties establish an International Joint Commission. The parties claim they have exclusive jurisdiction and control over the use and diversion of all the waters on their own side of the border, which in their natural channels would f low across the boundary or into boundary waters. The injured party on either side of the border will be entitled to the same legal remedies as if such injury took place in the country where such diversion or interference occurs. These diversions or obstructions shall be governed by an agreement. The waters of the St. Mary and Milk [through-border * 2] Rivers shall be considered one stream and the waters shall be divided equally between the two parties. The agreement also specifically pertains to the Niagara River [border-creator]. Since the agreement also pertains to boundary waters, in general, it also includes the Kootenay [through-border * 2], Souris [through-border * 2], Columbia [through-border], Skagit [through-border], Red [throughborder], St. John [mixed], Yukon [through-border], Stikine [through-border], Firth [through-border], Whiting [through-border], Taku [through-border], Alesek [through-border] and Chilkat [through-border] Rivers in this table.

Treaty between Great Britain and the United States relating to boundary waters and boundary questions

Brief analysis

12:11 PM

N

Sidepayments from downstream to upstream state

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Canada (UK)

Downstream state

Table D.1 Treaty analysis for bilateral river configurations

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USA

Columbia 1944 – Joint study (3)

(Table D.1 continued)

The parties agree to a Joint Commission study regarding the utilization of the Columbia River for flood control, water supply, hydropower, flood control, irrigation, reclamation of wetlands, conservation of fish and wildlife, navigation, sanitation, and other beneficial public purposes.

The parties establish an International Joint Commission. The parties claim they have exclusive jurisdiction and control over the use and diversion of all the waters on their own side of the border, which in their natural channels would flow across the boundary or into boundary waters. The injured party on either side of the border will be entitled to the same legal remedies as if such injury took place in the country where such diversion or interference occurs. These diversions or obstructions shall be governed by an agreement. The waters of the St. Mary [through-border] and Milk [through-border * 2] Rivers shall be considered one stream and the waters shall be divided equally between the two parties. The agreement also specifically pertains to the Niagara River [border-creator]. Since the agreement also pertains to boundary waters, in general, it also includes the Columbia, St. Croix [border-creator], St. Lawrence [partial border-creator but returns], Kootenay [through-border * 2], Souris [through-border * 2], Skagit [through-border], Red [through-border], St. John [mixed], Yukon [throughborder], Stikine [through-border], Firth [through-border], Whiting [through-border], Taku [through-border], Alesek [through-border] and Chilkat [through-border] Rivers in this table. Exchange of notes constituting an agreement between the United States of America and Canada relating to a study to be made by the International Joint Commission with respect to the Upper Columbia River Basin

Treaty between Great Britain and the United States – relating to boundary waters and boundary questions

12:11 PM

N

N

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Canada

USA

Columbia Canada (UK) 1909 – Water quantity, Border issues, General regulations and Commission creation (2)

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Downstream state

USA

Upstream state

Canada

River, treaty year, and topic

Columbia 1961/1964 – Hydropower and Flood control (4)

Through-border

Table D.1 Continued

Canada is to build 15,500,000 acre-feet of usable storage in Canadian territory for flood control, and improved water flow and hydropower production. USA is to operate, maintain, and construct hydroelectric facilities in its territory. USA shall pay Canada $64,000,000 for the construction of flood control storage facilities equivalent to 8,450,000 acre feet of the total usable storage. Compensation is also given for each of the first four flood periods and for operating facilities during those flood periods – $1,875,000. USA will also provide electric power equal to the hydroelectric power lost by Canada as a result of operating the storage to meet the flood control. Additional compensation is given to Canada for operating costs and opportunity cost of foregoing alternative uses during flood periods. Half the downstream power

Exchange of notes constituting an agreement between Canada and the United States of America regarding sale of Canada’s entitlement to downstream benefits under the treaty relating to the cooperative development of the water resources of the Columbia River Basin

12:11 PM

Treaty between the United States of America and Canada relating to the cooperative development of the water resources of the Columbia River Basin

Brief analysis

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Y

Sidepayments from downstream to upstream state

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USA

USA

Canada (UK)

Canada

Skagit 1909 – Water quantity, Border issues, General regulations and Commission creation (5)

Skagit 1967 (@) – Hydropower (6)

(Table D.1 continued)

12:11 PM

Agreement text is not available. Information available in Kirn and Marts (1986).

The parties establish an International Joint Commission. The parties claim they have exclusive jurisdiction and control over the use and diversion of all the waters on their own side of the border, which in their natural channels would flow across the boundary or into boundary waters. The injured party on either side of the border will be entitled to the same legal remedies as if such injury took place in the country where such diversion or interference occurs. These diversions or obstructions shall be governed by an agreement. The waters of the St. Mary [through-border] and Milk [through-border * 2] Rivers shall be considered one stream and the waters shall be divided equally between the two parties. The agreement also specifically pertains to the Niagara River [border-creator]. Since the agreement also pertains to boundary waters, in general, it also includes the Skagit, St. Croix [border-creator], St. Lawrence [partial border-creator but returns], Columbia [through-border], Kootenay [through-border * 2], Souris [through-border * 2], Red [through-border], St. John [mixed], Yukon [through-border], Stikine [through-border], Firth [through-border], Whiting [through-border], Taku [through-border], Alesek [through-border] and Chilkat [through-border] Rivers in this table. Agreement between British Columbia and the City of Seattle [later consummated with a treaty by the United States and Canada]

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Y

N

benefits, created by the improved water flow due to the storage dams to be built in Canada, are to be provided to Canada. In the 1964 Exchange of Notes between Canada and the USA, Canada chose to sell these downstream power benefits to the USA for $254,000,000. Treaty between Great Britain and the United States relating to boundary waters and boundary questions

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Downstream state

USA

Upstream state

Canada

River, treaty year, and topic

Skagit 1984 – Hydropower (7)

Through-border

Table D.1 Continued

Paper Dam solution. USA to pay Canada for delivering the same amount of energy as would have been produced by the High Ross Dam. The price is the same as construction and operation of the would-be High Ross Dam – $21,900,000 million for 35 years and another $100,000 for 80 years. An environmental fund was also created whereby the USA contributed 80% of the funds to repair much of the environmental damages in the Ross reservoir in Canada created by the initial building of the Ross Dam in the United States.

12:11 PM

USA will be able to increase the size of the Ross Dam (High Ross Dam) in its territory. Flooding will take place in Canada. USA to compensate for the damages ($34,000 for 99 years, or in equivalent energy, plus taxes on the reservoir land). This agreement was repudiated in 1972 due to a Canadian government decision. The 1984 Agreement, outlined below, delineated the new understanding between the countries. For the aforementioned reason this agreement is not considered a separate observation by this study. Treaty between the United States of America and Canada relating to the Skagit River and Ross Lake, and the Seven Mile Reservoir on the Pend D’Oreille River

Brief analysis

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Y

Sidepayments from downstream to upstream state

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Canada (UK)

Canada

USA

USA

Red 1909 – Water quantity, General regulations and Commission creation (8)

Red 1988 – Flood control (9)

(Table D.1 continued)

12:11 PM

Canada and the USA agree to upgrade levee segments on their side of the border and similarly construct an international levee segment along the border – the projects will protect communities on both sides of the border from flooding. Canada shall acquire the lands and construct the

The parties establish an International Joint Commission. The parties claim they have exclusive jurisdiction and control over the use and diversion of all the waters on their own side of the border, which in their natural channels would flow across the boundary or into boundary waters. The injured party on either side of the border will be entitled to the same legal remedies as if such injury took place in the country where such diversion or interference occurs. These diversions or obstructions shall be governed by an agreement. The waters of the St. Mary [through-border] and Milk [through-border * 2] Rivers shall be considered one stream and the waters shall be divided equally between the two parties. The agreement also specifically pertains to the Niagara River [border-creator]. Since the agreement also pertains to boundary waters, in general, it also includes the Red, St. Croix [border-creator], St. Lawrence [partial border-creator but returns], Skagit [through-border], Columbia [through-border], Kootenay [throughborder * 2], Souris [through-border * 2], St. John [mixed], Yukon [through-border], Stikine [through-border], Firth [through-border], Whiting [through-border], Taku [through-border], Alesek [through-border] and Chilkat [through-border] Rivers in this table. Exchange of notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America constituting an agreement concerning the construction of a joint ring levee

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Y

N

Kirn and Marts (1986) provided additional information relating to the agreement. Treaty between Great Britain and the United States relating to boundary waters and boundary questions

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Upstream state

Finland

Brazil

River, treaty year, and topic

Näätämöjoki 1951 – Hydropower (10)

Negro 1933 – Border issues, Water quantity and General regulations (11)

Through-border

Table D.1 Continued

Uruguay

N

Determination of the legal status of the frontiers. Also each party shall be entitled to half the waters flowing in the frontier watercourses. However an additional Protocol is included whereby it is said that Brazil assents to work by Uruguay for utilizing the Negro River if it so wishes. The Negro

Electric power station is to be built in Norway, requiring the transfer of water for the benefit of this station. To reduce the inconvenience caused by this action to fishing, compensate for any hydropower losses, and pay for some of the clearing operations conducted by Finland, Norway shall facilitate the movement of fish upstream, and pay the sum of 15,000 Norwegian kronor. Convention regarding the determination of the legal status of the frontier between Brazil and Uruguay

levee on her own side of the border. The USA shall do the same on her side of the border. Canada is to pay the United States for the construction of the international levee segment. Similarly, Canada shall pay the United Stated $17,000 for routine maintenance of the international levee segment. Agreement between the Governments of Finland and Norway on the transfer from the Näätämöjoki River to the course of the Gandvik of water from the Garsjöen and Förstevannene Lakes

Brief analysis

12:11 PM

Y

Sidepayments from downstream to upstream state

17/11/07

Norway

Downstream state

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USSR

Vuoksi 1922 – General regulations (13)

(Table D.1 continued)

This is largely a navigation and fishing agreement. Reference to specific rivers is only made in relation to fishing issues. In this table the agreement applies to the Vuoksi, Tuloma [through-border] and Olanga [through-border * 2] Rivers. The agreement states that no construction of works or water diversion may be allowed that may harm the other party. Exceptions may be made to this rule but compensation shall be provided in some form of agreement negotiated before the works are undertaken.

This is a general agreement of scientific and technical cooperation. No specific river is mentioned but in this table the agreement refers to the Negro, Cuareim (Quraí) [border-creator], Yaguarón (Jaguarão) [border-creator] and Chuy [partial border-creator] Rivers. The parties agree to cooperate in the area of information exchange and mutual projects. Any specific projects relating to shared waters will be agreed upon by an agreement. Convention between the Republic of Finland and the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic concerning the maintenance of river channels and the regulation of fishing on water courses forming part of the frontier

Complementary accord to the basic accord of scientific and technical cooperation between the Government of the Eastern Republic of Uruguay and the Government of the Federal Republic of Brazil in the area of water resources

12:11 PM

N

N

17/11/07

Finland

Uruguay

Negro Brazil 1975/1991 (@) – Scientific and technical cooperation and General works (12)

River is the only water body specified. In this table the Yaguarón (Jaguarão) [border-creator], Cuareim (Quraí) [border-creator] and Chuy [partial bordercreator] Rivers are also included for this treaty. Basic accord of scientific and technical cooperation between the Government of the Eastern Republic of Uruguay and the Government of the Federal Republic of Brazil in the area of water resources

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Upstream state

Finland

Finland

River, treaty year, and topic

Vuoksi 1948 (@) – Pollution, Border issues and General regulations (14)

Vuoksi 1964 (!) – Pollution, General regulations and Commission creation (15)

Through-border

Table D.1 Continued

USSR

N

This is a general agreement, which refers to no specific river. The only specific rivers provided pertain to fishing issues. In this table the agreement refers to the Vuoksi, Tuloma [through-border] and Olanga [through-border * 2] Rivers. In addition, the agreement calls on the parties to take measures to ensure that the frontier waters are not polluted. The parties shall also decide on water quality standards. Damage that is caused by one party to another

This is a larger territorial agreement regarding frontier issues and border markings. No river is specifically mentioned but in this table the agreement applies to the Vuoksi, Tuloma [through-border] and Olanga [through-border * 2] Rivers. With regards to water, the parties shall respect the rights and interests of the other party, ensure that the frontier waters are kept clean and are not polluted as well as prevent the banks from damage. They shall exchange information concerning water volume and levels. Agreement between the Republic of Finland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics concerning the frontier watercourses

Agreement between the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the Republic of Finland concerning the regime of the Soviet-Finnish frontier

Brief analysis

12:11 PM

N

Sidepayments from downstream to upstream state

17/11/07

USSR

Downstream state

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Finland

Finland

Finland

Vuoksi 1972 – Hydropower (16)

Vuoksi 1989 (@) – Hydropower and Monitoring (17)

Tuloma 1922 – General regulations (18)

USSR

N

(Table D.1 continued)

This is largely a navigation and fishing agreement. Reference to specific rivers is only made in relation to fishing issues. In this table the agreement applies to the Tuloma, Vuoksi [through-border] and Olanga [through-border * 2] Rivers. The agreement states that no construction of works or water diversion may be allowed that may harm the other party. Exceptions may be made to

Mentions Finland’s tasks for monitoring Lake Saimaa (indigenous to Finland yet the source of the Vuoksi River) and for the releasing of water to prevent damage to the lake and the Vuoksi River during the periods of high and low water flow. Convention between the Republic of Finland and the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic concerning the maintenance of river channels and the regulation of fishing on water courses forming part of the frontier

Actions (raised water levels) on the side of the USSR (related to the Svetogorsk Hydropower Station) cause hydropower loss upstream (concerning the Imatra Hydroelectric Station). Compensation is provided to Finland in the amount of 19,900 MWh per year. Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Finland and the Government of the Union of Socialist Republics concerning the regulations governing Lake Saimaa and the Vuoksi River

12:11 PM

N

Y

17/11/07

USSR

USSR

shall be compensated for. A Joint Finish-Soviet Commission shall be established. The parties shall come to an agreement, prior to taking any works that may affect one another. The parties may also elect to take the matter to the Commission and the Commission’s decision shall be binding on the parties. The agreement is in force for 10 years whereby it may be extended. This agreement supersedes the 1922 Agreement. Agreement between the Republic of the Government of Finland and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics concerning the production of electric power in part of the Vuoksi River bounded by the Imatra and Svetogorsk Hydroelectric Stations

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Upstream state

Finland

Finland

River, treaty year, and topic

Tuloma 1948 (@) – Pollution, Border issues and General regulations (19)

Tuloma 1964 (!) – Pollution, General regulations and Commission creation (20)

Through-border

Table D.1 Continued

USSR

N

This is a general agreement, which refers to no specific river. The only specific rivers provided pertain to fishing issues. In this table the agreement refers to the Tuloma, Vuoksi [through-border] and Olanga [through-border * 2] Rivers. In addition, the agreement calls on the parties to take measures to ensure that the frontier waters are not polluted. The parties shall also decide

This is a larger territorial agreement regarding frontier issues and border markings. No river is specifically mentioned but in this table the agreement applies to the Tuloma, Vuoksi [through-border] and Olanga [throughborder * 2] Rivers. With regards to water, the parties shall respect the rights and interests of the other party, ensure that the frontier waters are kept clean and are not polluted as well as prevent the banks from damage. They shall exchange information concerning water volume and levels. Agreement between the Republic of Finland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics concerning the frontier watercourses

this rule but compensation shall be provided in some form of agreement negotiated before the works are undertaken. Agreement between the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the Republic of Finland concerning the regime of the Soviet-Finnish frontier

Brief analysis

12:11 PM

N

Sidepayments from downstream to upstream state

17/11/07

USSR

Downstream state

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UK (Sudan)

Iran

Iran

Afghanistan

Helmand 1950 – Commission creation (22)

Helmand Afghanistan 1973 (@) – Water quantity (23) Y

(Table D.1 continued)

Agreement text is not available. Information available in Abidi (1997).

Helmand River Delta Commission is established. The Commission recommends to both Afghanistan and Iran an engineering basis for mutual accord regarding the apportionment of the waters of the Helmand River. Helmand River water treaty between the Government of Iran and the Government of Afghanistan

1951 Agreement text is not available. According to Oregon State’s Database the agreement reaffirms the above agreement. However, when the UK takes over Eritrea in 1941 side-payments are discontinued. Terms of reference of the Helmand River Delta Commission and an interpretive statement relative thereto, agreed by conferees of Afghanistan and Iran

Division of the waters between the two countries. Eritrea is to use a set amount of water. The amount remaining in the river shall go to Sudan. Sudan pays Eritrea each year a share of the sum, which it receives in respect to cultivation by irrigation of land in the Gash delta amounting to 20% of such sum received by Sudan in excess of 50,000 pounds annually.

12:11 PM

N

Y

17/11/07

Gash Italy 1925/1951 – (Eritrea) Water quantity (21)

on water quality standards. Damage that is caused by one party to another shall be compensated for. A Joint Finish-Soviet Commission shall be established. The parties shall come to an agreement, prior to taking any works that may affect one another. The parties may also elect to take the matter to the Commission and the Commission’s decision shall be binding on parties. The agreement is in force for 10 years whereby it may be extended. This agreement supersedes the 1922 Agreement. Exchange of notes between the United Kingdom and Italy respecting the utilization of the waters of the River Gash

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Gangir Iraq 1975 – Water quantity and Commission creation (24)

Iran

Downstream state

N

Sidepayments from downstream to upstream state

The agreement specifically mentions the Gangir, Kanjan Cham [through-border], Tib (Mehmeh) [through-border] and Duverij (Doveyrich) [mixed] Rivers, although it applies to other rivers in general. In this table the agreement applies to the specific aforementioned rivers. As for the waters of the Gangir River, they shall be divided between the parties equally. The parties also establish a Joint Commission which will decide how to divide the waters of some of the other, specifically mentioned, rivers.

Afghanistan is to release a set amount of water and Iran is to receive a set amount of water per year. Side-payments are not mentioned explicitly in any of the agreement articles. However, Abidi (1977: 370) reveals that “Iran offered financial payment and transit rights for Afghan exports through Bandar Abbas in return for more water byAfghanistan.” Agreement between Iran and Iraq concerning the use of frontier watercourses

Brief analysis

River, treaty year, and topic

Upstream state

12:11 PM

Through-border

17/11/07

Table D.1 Continued

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Iraq

Russia

Tib (Mehmeh) Iran 1975 – Water quantity and Commission creation (26)

Onon 1995 – Pollution and General regulations (27)

N

(Table D.1 continued)

Agreement text is not available. According to Oregon State’s Database this is a general agreement that provides for qualitative protection of water

The agreement specifically mentions the Tib (Mehmeh), Gangir [through-border], Kanjan Cham [through-border] and Duverij (Doveyrich) [mixed] Rivers, although it applies to other rivers in general. In this table the agreement applies to the specific aforementioned rivers. As for the waters of the Tib (Mehmeh), they shall be divided between the parties on the basis of the reports of the 1914 Commission on the Delimitation of the Iranian-Ottoman frontier and in accordance with custom. The parties also establish a Joint Commission, which will decide how to divide up the waters of the Tib (Mehmeh). Agreement between the Government of Mongolia and the Government of the Russian Federation on the protection and use of transboundary waters

The agreement specifically mentions the Kanjan Cham, Gangir [through-border], Tib (Mehmeh) [through-border] and Duverij (Doveyrich) [mixed] Rivers, although it applies to other rivers in general. In this table the agreement applies to the specific aforementioned rivers. As for the waters of the Kanjan Cham, they shall be divided between the parties on the basis of the reports of the 1914 Commission on the Delimitation of the Iranian-Ottoman frontier and in accordance with custom. The parties also establish a Joint Commission, which will decide the waters of the how to divide up Kanjan Cham. Agreement between Iran and Iraq concerning the use of frontier watercourses

Agreement between Iran and Iraq concerning the use of frontier watercourses

12:11 PM

N

N

17/11/07

Mongolia

Iraq

Kanjan Cham Iran 1975 – Water quantity and Commission creation (25)

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Italy

Roya France 1967 – Water quantity (30)

Russia

Agreement text is not available. According to Oregon State’s Database this is a general agreement that provides for qualitative protection of water resources. In this table the agreement applies to the Selenga, Onon [through-border] and Jenisei (Yenisei) [mixed] Rivers. Convention between France and Italy for the use of the River Roya and its tributaries

resources. In this table the agreement applies to the Onon, Selenga [through-border] and Jenisei (Yenisei) [mixed] Rivers. Agreement between the Government of Mongolia and the Government of the Russian Federation on the protection and use of transboundary waters

Brief analysis

The two parties agree that they will take no action that will harm the other party. The two parties also agree to a division of the waters. Any works by either side shall have to be governed by an agreement. The parties establish a Joint Commission. N, from Franco-Italian Convention concerning the supply of water to the upstream Commune of Menton to downstream French Commune of Menton is granted a public water concession from state Italy to supply it with water. As security for obligations deriving from the

N

N

Sidepayments from downstream to upstream state

12:11 PM

Italy

Mongolia

Selenga 1995 – Pollution and General regulations (28)

Downstream state

17/11/07

Roya France 1914 (&) – Water quantity and Commission creation (29)

Upstream state

River, treaty year, and topic

Through-border

Table D.1 Continued

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France

France

Carol 1866 (!&) – Border issues, Water quantity and General regulations (31)

Carol 1958/1970 – Hydropower (32)

(Table D.1 continued)

12:11 PM

This is an agreement, which was signed after the parties took their dispute to an Arbitral Tribune. France wanted to divert part of the waters of Lake Lanoux (a lake solely in French territory) for hydropower purposes in France. The Carol River is an outlet of Lake Lanoux, which enters Spanish territory. Spain uses the waters of the river for irrigation purposes and objected to French desires to divert the water for power purposes. Protest continued even when the French offered compensation and likewise offered to divert the waters taken out for hydropower purposes back into the Carol River system before it crossed the border into Spanish territory. The tribunal argued that France was allowed to use the waters of Lake Lanoux for its development but at the same time would need to return the same amount of water back into the river, before

Part of a territorial limits agreement. The parties establish general rules for use of common waters. The Carol is not specifically mentioned in the agreement. In this table the Garona [through-border] and Bidassoa [partial border-creator] Rivers also apply to this agreement. In terms of water quantity, the parties agree that waters shall be divided according to need and according to an agreed upon formula. N, from Agreement between the Government of the French Republic and the upstream Spanish Government relating to Lake Lanoux to downstream Exchange of letters constituting an agreement between France and Spain state amending the 1958 arrangement relating to Lake Lanoux

N

17/11/07

Spain

Spain

concession, 10,000,000 lira will be provided to Italy. Menton shall be responsible for acquisition of land and the construction of the facilities. Decree of the French Emperor: promulgation of the Additional Act to the Treaties of delineation of territories concluded on 12/2/1856, 4/14/1862, and on 5/26/1866 between France and Spain

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Upstream state

Mexico

River, treaty year, and topic

Tijuana 1944 – Water quantity and General works (32)

Through-border

Table D.1 Continued

This is a water allocation and general works agreement pertaining to the Rio Grande (Río Bravo del Norte) [partial border-creator] and the Colorado River [mixed]. However the Tijuana is the other river specifically mentioned. With regards to the Tijuana, it is agreed that a Commission will advise both governments with regards to future work. The Commission shall also recommend how the costs for these works may be divided. The commission will also recommend how the waters of the river shall be divided. The implementation of these recommendations will require the approval of the two governments. It is agreed, however, that the parties will equally divide costs of joint operation and maintenance for works. The International

The 1970 Agreement is simply an extension of the first agreement. Treaty between the United States of America and Mexico relating to the utilization of the waters of the Tijuana and Colorado Rivers and of the Rio Grande

it entered Spanish territory. The agreement formalized this decision. France was responsible for setting up the appropriate installations for the re-diversion back into the Carol River. These actions were undertaken without compensation.

Brief analysis

12:11 PM

N

Sidepayments from downstream to upstream state

17/11/07

USA

Downstream state

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USA

Mexico

Mexico

Tijuana 1985 (@) – Pollution (34)

Tijuana 1985 – Pollution and General regulations (35)

(Table D.1 continued)

12:11 PM

This is a general agreement referring to cooperation in environmental protection and pollution abatement due to discharges of hazardous substances. The parties establish the United States-Mexico Joint Contingency Plan to provide

This is a general agreement referring to environmental protection and pollution abatement in the border areas. The parties agree to cooperate in the field of environmental protection and agree that they will adopt appropriate measures to eliminate, reduce or prevent pollution in their side of the border that may harm the other country. Specific projects may be agreed to. The agreement refers to no river in particular but in this table the agreement pertains to the Tijuana, Colorado [mixed] and New [through-border] Rivers and the Rio Grande (Río Bravo del Norte) [partial border-creator]. N, from Minute 270: Recommendations for the first stage treatment and disposal upstream facilities for the solution of the border sanitation problem at San Diego, to downCalifornia-Tijuana, Baja California stream state Border sanitation problems coming from Mexico. Abatement shall be the responsibility of Mexico. Mexico agreed to pay for certain sanitation works in its country. Mexico, therefore, undertakes actions which favor the United States. The second module, however, for dealing with pollution, discussed in the agreement, was never completed by Mexico. N Agreement of cooperation between the United States of America and the United Mexican States regarding pollution of the environment along the inland international boundary by discharges of hazardous substances

N

17/11/07

USA

USA

Mexico

Tijuana 1983 – Pollution and General regulations (33)

Boundary Commission becomes the International Water and Boundary Commission. Agreement between the United States of America and the United Mexican States on cooperation for the protection and improvement of the environment in the border area

Dinar-App-D.qxd Page 159

Downstream state

USA

Upstream state

Mexico

River, treaty year, and topic

Tijuana 1990 – Pollution (36)

Through-border

Table D.1 Continued

Increased capacity needed to deal with the sewage that is still coming from the Mexican side. Proposed Rio Almanar plant (second module) in Mexico will not be built. International Wastewater Treatment Plant (IWTP) is to be built in the USA for reasons of increased capacity to treat sewage that would otherwise have flowed into the USA from Mexico. Mexico will participate in the costs of this project. Mexico is to fulfill her obligations under the 1985 Agreement (Minute 270). The United States will contribute a maximum of $4,000,000 to bring the sewage from Tijuana to the IWTP. Mexico shall also be responsible for the operation

12:11 PM

cooperative measures to deal effectively with polluting incidents. The parties agree to come up with response plans to deal with imminent, or already existing, polluting incidents. An agreement will determine a joint response to the incident. Specific arrangements for the solution of common problems may be agreed upon by the parties. The agreement refers to no specific river but in this table the agreement applies to the Tijuana, Colorado [mixed] and New [through-border] Rivers and the Rio Grande (Río Bravo del Norte) [partial border-creator]. Minute 283: Conceptual plan for the international solution to the border sanitation problem in San Diego, California/Tijuana, Baja California

Brief analysis

17/11/07

Y

Sidepayments from downstream to upstream state

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USA

USA

Mexico

Mexico

Tijuana 1997 (@) – Pollution (37)

Tijuana 1997 (@) – Pollution (38)

(Table D.1 continued)

12:11 PM

More pollution control is needed. Construction works parallel to the city of Tijuana, wastewater pumping and disposal system, and rehabilitation of the San Antonio De Los Buenos Treatment Plant are needed to complement the sewage collection and treatment works established in 1985. The works will also provide back up service for the IWTP. The United States will provide $1,500,000 for the works needed in the US. Also the USA, from funds managed by the North American Development Bank, will cover $16,000,000 of the project. The remainder $2,200,000 million will be provided by Mexico.

This agreement provides a more specific account of the duties of each party set out in Minute 283 (for this reason it is considered part of the 1990 Agreement). While the agreement does not make this indication specifically the USA is to finance the majority of the IWTP project ($297,000,000). Mexico (and this is indicated in the agreement) only pays the amount it would have spent anyway on the Rio Almanar plant – $16,800,000 (Interview, Stout 2002). Minute 298: Recommendation for construction of works parallel to the City of Tijuana, B.C. wastewater pumping and disposal system and rehabilitation of the San Antonio De Los Buenos Treatment Plant

17/11/07

Y

Y

and maintenance of these works. Mexico will be responsible for dumping the sludge coming from its territory, which it will receive from the IWTP. Additional costs regarding the international wastewater treatment plant are outlined below (Minute 296). Since Minute 296 delineated the formal understanding between the countries this agreement is not considered a separate observation by this study. Minute 296: Distribution of construction, operation, and maintenance costs for the international wastewater treatment plant constructed under the agreements in commission Minute 283 for the solution of the border sanitation problem at San Diego, California/Tijuana, Baja California

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Upstream state

Mexico

Mexico

River, treaty year, and topic

New 1980 (@) – Pollution (39)

New 1983 – Pollution and General regulations (40)

Through-border

Table D.1 Continued

USA

Brief analysis

This is a general agreement referring to environmental protection and pollution abatement in the border areas. The parties agree to cooperate in the field of environmental protection and agree that they will adopt appropriate measures to eliminate, reduce or prevent pollution in their side of the border that may harm the other country. Specific projects may be agreed to. The agreement refers to no river in particular but in this table the agreement pertains to the New, Tijuana [through-border] and Colorado [mixed] Rivers and the Rio Grande (Río Bravo del Norte) [partial border-creator].

12:11 PM

N, from Minute 264: Recommendation for solution of the New River border sanitation upstream problem at Calexico, California-Mexicali, Baja California Norte to downstream Interim solution to border sanitation problem coming from Mexico. state Mexico shall take full responsibility for the works envisioned in this agreement. Mexico, therefore, undertakes actions which favor the United States. N Agreement between the United States of America and the United Mexican States on cooperation for the protection and improvement of the environment in the border area

Sidepayments from downstream to upstream state

17/11/07

USA

Downstream state

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Mexico

Mexico

Mexico

New 1985 – Pollution and General regulations (41)

New 1987 (@) – Pollution (42)

New 1995 (@) – Pollution (43)

USA

Y

(Table D.1 continued)

Sanitation problem coming from Mexico. Mexicali II Wastewater Treatment Plant to be built in Mexico. USA and Mexico to both put up funds but USA pays majority ($8,700,000 out of $15,700,000). Mexico also to pay operation and maintenance costs. Currently Mexico is considering moving the plant further south, which will require additional funds (Interview, Spener 2002 and 2003).

Sanitation problem coming from Mexico. USA to pay half ($600,000) of the costs of a plant to be built in Mexico. Minute 294: Facilities planning program for the solution of border sanitation problems

This is a general agreement referring to cooperation in environmental protection and pollution abatement due to discharges of hazardous substances. The parties establish the United States-Mexico Joint Contingency Plan to provide cooperative measures to deal effectively with polluting incidents. The parties agree to come up with response plans to deal with imminent, or already existing, polluting incidents. An agreement will determine a joint response to the incident. Specific arrangements for the solution of common problems may be agreed upon by the parties. The agreement refers to no specific river but in this table the agreement applies to the New, Tijuana [through-border] and Colorado [mixed] Rivers and the Rio Grande (Río Bravo del Norte) [partial border-creator]. Minute 274: Joint project for improvement of the quality of the waters of the New River at Calexico, California-Mexicali, Baja California

Agreement of cooperation between the United States of America and the United Mexican States regarding pollution of the environment along the inland international boundary by discharges of hazardous substances

12:11 PM

Y

N

17/11/07

USA

USA

Dinar-App-D.qxd Page 163

Upstream state

N

N

Y

Greece

Kazakhstan

Sidepayments from downstream to upstream state

Kazakhstan is to provide compensation to Kyrgyzstan for operation and maintenance costs of the facilities according to the amount of water it uses. All these facilities are located in Kyrgyz territory and owned by the Kyrgyz Republic. Costs for operation and maintenance will be

This agreement also establishes the Yugoslav-Greek Hydroeconomic Commission, which will study the hydroeconomic problems and projects concerning the Vardar River, its regulation and improvement. Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic on utilization of the water facilities of interstate use on the Chu and Talas Rivers

Agreement between the People’s Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Kingdom of Greece concerning hydro-economic questions.

Title of agreement is not known. Agreement text is also not available. According to Oregon State’s Database this agreement created a Joint Commission between the two countries. Among the issues discussed are water quality issues and other water economy issues.

Brief analysis

12:11 PM

Greece

Downstream state

17/11/07

Vardar Yugoslavia 1954 – Pollution and Commission creation (44) Vardar Yugoslavia 1959 – Commission creation and General works (45) Talas Kyrgyzstan 2000 (@) – Facility use and Commission creation (46)

River, treaty year, and topic

Through-border

Table D.1 Continued

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Bhutan

Bhutan

Kurichhu 1995 (@) – Hydropwer (48)

Wangchu 1996 (@) – Hydropwer (49)

Italy

Y

Y

Y

Y

(Table D.1 continued)

There exists a water drinking plant on the Mrzlek Springs – one of the tributaries of the Izonzo River. A pipeline delivering water to Gorizia (Italy) is also in place. The parties agree that Gorizia will receive

Chukkha Hydroelectric Project; India finances hydroelectric project (60% grant; 40% low interest loan) to be built in Bhutan. Bhutan is the owner of the project and shall use the power generated. However, any surplus power (e.g., all the power over and above that required for use in Bhutan) shall be purchased by India. Title of agreement is not known. Agreement text is also not available. A detailed description of the project is provided on the website of the Indian Embassy in Bhutan. Kurichhu Hydroelectric Project; India finances hydroelectric project (60% grant; 40% low interest loan) to be built in Bhutan. Bhutan is the owner of the project and shall use the power generated. However, any surplus power (e.g., all the power over and above that required for use in Bhutan) shall be purchased by India. Title of agreement is not known. Agreement text is also not available. A detailed description of the project is provided on the website of the Indian Embassy in Bhutan. Tala Hydroelectric Project; India finances hydroelectric project (60% grant; 40% low interest loan) to be built in Bhutan. Bhutan is the owner of the project and shall use the power generated. However, any surplus power (e.g., all the power over and above that required for use in Bhutan) shall be purchased by India. Accord between Italy and Yugoslavia concerning water supplies to the Commune of Gorizia

12:11 PM

India

India

India

17/11/07

Isonzo (Mrzlek Yugoslavia Springs) 1957 (&)/1977 (@)/1979 (@) – Water quantity,

Bhutan

Wangchu 1974 (@) – Hydropower (47)

established by a Joint Commission. The parties will also take joint measures to protect the water facilities within their areas of influence from adverse effects. Agreement also refers to the Chu River [mixed]. Agreement Between the Government of India and the Royal Government of Bhutan regarding the Chukkha Hydroelectric Project

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Yugoslavia

Italy

Downstream state

N

Sidepayments from downstream to upstream state

The parties establish a permanent Joint Water Resources Management Commission to study water problems of common interest and to propose

The 1977 and the 1979 Agreements are simply extensions of the original agreement. In these agreements the parties agree to raise the price of the water per CM. Finally, it is agreed that the technical offices from each side will meet to agree on a price when necessary. Agreement on the development of economic cooperation between the Italian Republic and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

85% of the plant’s water capacity (a maximum of 4.5 million cubic meters [MCM]) while the Yugoslavs will receive 15%. The parties also agree that a Commission will be set to decide what will take place if Gorizia will require more water. The proportion of the water shall be the same if less water is available. The parties will maintain the plant jointly but Gorizia will be responsible for providing the plant with chlorine and replacement parts equal in proportion to the value of water they are getting. If the plant requires heavy revamping, Yugoslavia will be responsible for such tasks but will be assisted by Gorizia. Gorizia will pay 13 lira per cubic meter (CM) of water. The agreement will be in force for five years and renewed every year if the parties agree.

Brief analysis

12:11 PM

Isonzo 1975 – Commission creation, Hydropower,

Upstream state

17/11/07

Commission creation (50)

River, treaty year, and topic

Through-border

Table D.1 Continued

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Poland

Poland

Orawa 1952 (@) – Hydropower (52)

Orawa 1958 (@) – Pollution, General regulations and Commission

Flood control and Water quantity (51)

(Table D.1 continued)

12:11 PM

This is a general agreement. The parties agree that any specific works to be undertaken by the parties shall be governed by an agreement. The parties

Building of Orawa Dam in Czechoslovak territory. Flooding of some parts of the Polish territory will take place. A defense belt will be built around the flooding zone to prevent damages to other parts of the territory. Other investment for the functioning of the dam will also be undertaken. Rebuilding of roads and the relocation of non-agricultural machinery will come at the cost of Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovakia also agrees to pay Poland for the damages emanating from the flooding and for the losses of agricultural production in the defense belt. Poland will ensure that the reservoir created will have a fish station and will likewise make sure the reservoir is stocked with fish and the continued inflow of these fish into Polish territory. Energy will be created from the dam and Czechoslovakia is to provide Poland with a set amount. The conditions of supply and payment for the energy will be enumerated in an agreement. The Czechoslovak side will build a transmission line to provide the energy to the border. Agreement between the Government of Czechoslovak Republic and the Government of the Polish People’s Republic concerning the use of water resources in frontier waters

17/11/07

Czechoslovakia N

Czechoslovakia Y

appropriate solutions. The agreement mentions the Judrio River [partial border-creator but returns] but of particular interest is the construction of a dam and a hydroelectric plant on the Isonzo River. If the dam does not seem feasible, a regulating pond shall be constructed in Yugoslav territory as a joint venture for the purpose of regulating the flow of the Isonzo River and irrigating the land in Italian territory south of Gorizia. Agreement between the Government of the People’s Republic of Poland and the Government of the Czechoslovakian Republic on regulation of certain problems related to the construction of a dam on the Orawa River near Ujfcie on the banks of the Orawa

Dinar-App-D.qxd Page 167

Czechoslovakia

Poland

Downstream state

N

Sidepayments from downstream to upstream state

This is a general agreement. The parties agree that any specific works to be undertaken by the parties shall be governed by an agreement. The parties also agree to abate pollution in their shared rivers. The parties agree to appoint plenipotentiaries from each country to carry out the tasks emanating from the agreement. The agreement only refers specifically to the Petruvka [through-border * 2] and Olma [through-border * 2] Rivers saying that the 1928 Agreement shall cease to exist. Only the provisions included in the 1928 Agreement shall apply in respect to the execution of works until

also agree to abate pollution in their shared rivers. The parties agree to appoint plenipotentiaries from each country to carry out the tasks emanating from the agreement. The agreement only refers specifically to the Petruvka [through-border * 2] and Olma [through-border * 2] Rivers saying that the 1928 Agreement shall cease to exist. Only the provisions included in the 1928 Agreement shall apply in respect to the execution of works until 12/31/1958. In this table the agreement also pertains to the Orawa, Witka (Smeda) [through-border] and Dunajec [mixed] Rivers. Agreement between the Government of Czechoslovak Republic and the Government of the Polish People’s Republic concerning the use of water resources in frontier waters

Brief analysis

12:11 PM

Witka (Smeda) 1958 (@) – Pollution, General regulations and Commission creation (54)

Upstream state

17/11/07

creation (53)

River, treaty year, and topic

Through-border

Table D.1 Continued

Dinar-App-D.qxd Page 168

Y

(Table D.1 continued)

The parties agree not to take any unilateral action regarding the respective rivers that could result in harming the other party. The parties agree to improve respective water installations, as well as to erect new installations, in order to protect the parties’ territories from flooding. The parties will undertake works on their own side of the border but the extent of these works will be determined and agreed upon by the parties. The expenses for these works are the sole responsibility of each party. The parties establish a Joint Commission. The agreement refers specifically to the Latorica and Uzh [through-border] Rivers.

Poland builds a dam (for hydropower and water supply purposes) in its territory and Czechoslovakia understands it may have to incur some damages. The Polish government compensates Czechoslovakia with a one-time payment of 22,600 Czechoslovak crowns for the soaking of the soil in Czechoslovakia. Other works deemed necessary to prevent damages in Czechoslovakia will be the responsibility of Poland. Additional compensation will be given to Czechoslovakia due to the water levels exceeding the minimum agreed upon levels in the dam. Poland will also be responsible for battling malaria and mosquitoes in Czechoslovak territory, as a consequence of the dam. Convention on the management of the water regime of the Latorica and Uzh Rivers signed between the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the Republic of Czechoslovakia

12:11 PM

Czechoslovakia N

Czechoslovakia Poland

17/11/07

Latorica USSR 1955 (@) – General regulations, General works, Flood control and Commission creation (56)

Witka (Smeda) 1960 (@) – Hydropower and Water quantity (55)

12/31/1958. In this table the agreement also pertains to the Witka (Smeda), Orawa [through-border] and Dunajec [mixed] Rivers. Treaty between the Government of the People’s Republic of Poland and the Government of the Czechoslovakian Republic on regulating certain issues related to the construction of the dam on the River Witka (Smeda)

Dinar-App-D.qxd Page 169

USSR

Uzh 1955 (@) – General regulations, General works, Flood control and Commission creation (57)

Sidepayments from downstream to upstream state

Albania

N

This is a general agreement but with special reference to the Belli Drim, Bojana [partial border-creator] and Crni Drim [mixed] Rivers. The parties

The parties agree not to take any unilateral action regarding the respective rivers that could result in harming the other party. The parties agree to improve respective water installations, as well as to erect new installations, in order to protect the parties’ territories from flooding. The parties will undertake works on their own side of the border but the extent of these works will be determined and agreed upon by the parties. The expenses for these works are the sole responsibility of each party. The parties establish a Joint Commission. The agreement refers specifically to the Uzh and Latorica [through-border] Rivers. Agreement between the Government of the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia and the Government of Federal People’s Republic of Albania concerning water economy questions, together with the statute of the Yugoslav-Albanian Water Economic Commission and with the protocol concerning fishing in frontier lakes and rivers

Convention on the management of the water regime of the Latorica and Uzh Rivers signed between the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the Republic of Czechoslovakia

Brief analysis

12:11 PM

Czechoslovakia N

Downstream state

17/11/07

Belli Drim Yugoslavia 1956 – General regulations, Hydropower, Flood control, Water quantity and Commission

Upstream state

River, treaty year, and topic

Through-border

Table D.1 Continued

Dinar-App-D.qxd Page 170

Spain

Spain

Garona 1866 (!&) – Border issues, Water quantity and General regulations (59)

Garona 1963 (!&) – Hydropower and Commission creation (60)

creation (58)

(Table D.1 continued)

France will establish, at her expense, a reservoir by way of a dam on her side of the territory, which will occupy the part of the river’s course, which forms the border between the two countries as well as a stretch immediately above this territory, located in Spanish territory. If damages occur, France is obligated to compensate. Spain concedes to France the right to exploiting the hydraulic power available to Spain in the stretch of the course of the river occupied by the reservoir. Spain will maintain in the Garona, at its entrance into France, a set flow of water until the dam in France is constructed. After the dam is constructed Spain will deliver a minimum of 350,000 CM to the reservoir. Provisions will also be undertaken in Spain (it is unclear if the works needed to fulfill these provisions are to be constructed or have already been constructed by Spain at an earlier time), by Spain, so that the flow into France will be attenuated so as not to cause flooding. As compensation, France will deliver to Spain, free of cost, certain quantities of energy. Also, France may petition Spain for additional regulations through Spain’s upstream

Part of a territorial limits agreement. The parties establish general rules for use of common waters. The Garona is not specifically mentioned in the agreement. In this table the Bidassoa [partial border-creator] and Carol [through-border] Rivers also apply to this agreement. In terms of water quantity, the parties agree that waters shall be divided according to need and according to an agreed upon formula. Utilization of the Garona River

12:11 PM

Y

N

17/11/07

France

France

also agree that they will reach agreement if either party wants to change the water economy relations on the watercourses regarding hydropower, flood control, and water supply. Costs and payments will also be agreed upon in such an agreement. A Joint Yugoslav-Albanian Water Commission will be formed. Decree of the French Emperor: promulgation of the Additional Act to the Treaties of delineation of territories concluded on 12/2/1856, 4/14/1862, and and on 5/26/1866 between France and Spain

Dinar-App-D.qxd Page 171

Upstream state

Y

Sidepayments from downstream to upstream state

The Kosi project consists of the construction of a barrage, head-works and other appurtenant works in Nepal. Although the barrage provides hydropower and irrigation benefits to both countries, its main aim is to provide flood control benefits to both countries. Nepal also benefits from anti-erosion and anti-caving works provided by India. The barrage consists of two canals: one (Eastern Main Canal) solely in the territory of India while the other (Western Main Canal) traversing Nepal before entering India. These canals provide irrigation benefits to both countries. A power-house for generating power, by making use of the head

Agreement between Nepal and India on the renovation and extension of Chandra Canal, Pumped Canal, and distribution of the Western Kosi Canal

Amended agreement between His Majesty’s Government of Nepal and the Government of India concerning the Kosi Project

works that will benefit France downstream. If Spain agrees to these petitions France shall compensate Spain, keeping in mind the improvement of hydroelectric production. The agreement establishes a Joint Commission. Agreement between the Government of India and the Government of Nepal on the Kosi Project

Brief analysis

12:11 PM

India

Downstream state

17/11/07

Kosi Nepal 1954/1966/ 1978 – Hydropower, Flood control, Water quantity, Facility use and Commission creation (61)

River, treaty year, and topic

Through-border

Table D.1 Continued

Dinar-App-D.qxd Page 172

Reno di Lei 1949 (&) – Hydropower (62)

Italy

Switzerland

Y

(Table D.1 continued)

Switzerland is to build and own a dam on the river. For convenience, the part of land where the dam is located (on Italian territory) is ceded to

12:11 PM

The 1978 Agreement refers to maintenance and new construction regarding the Chandra Canal. In addition, Nepal obtains additional amounts of water. 1978 Agreement text is not available. Information was obtained from Oregon State’s Database. Accord between Switzerland and Italy concerning the grant of the hydraulic power of the Reno di Lei

17/11/07

The 1954 Agreement was renegotiated in 1966. The renegotiated version contains only minor additions that do not reflect differently on the side-payment regime. The major changes provided by the revised 1966 Agreement was that India did not own the lands it acquired from Nepal but rather leased them. Compensation, of course, was still forthcoming. India also builds the appropriate transmission lines, providing the power from India to a point on the Nepal–India border.

drop of the Eastern Main Canal, is situated along the canal. All works are to be done at the cost of India. Compensation will be provided to Nepal for the land used. India will pay for lost revenue from the lands at the time of their acquisition. India shall own all the land acquired from Nepal for the project. Barrage to be built in Nepal. India will have the right to regulate the water in the Kosi Barrage for the hydropower produced although Nepal will have the right to utilize the water as may be needed for irrigation or for any other purposes from time to time. Nepal shall have a right to 50% of the power produced at the power-house for an agreed upon tariff. Nepal will receive royalties in respect of power generated and utilized in India at rates to be settled by agreement – no royalty will be paid on the power sold to Nepal. Payment of royalties shall also be provided to Nepal for power used for the project and materials obtained from Nepal to build the works. A Coordination Committee for the Kosi Project is set up.

Dinar-App-D.qxd Page 173

Upstream state

Switzerland

River, treaty year, and topic

Allaine 1963 (@) – Facility use (63)

Through-border

Table D.1 Continued

Brief analysis

12:11 PM

Switzerland (Italy is provided with the same amount of land from the Swiss side). Italy receives 30% of the hydropower produced from the project free of charge. Switzerland is responsible for the establishment, maintenance, exploitation and transport of the electrical energy to the Italian territory. N, from Decree concerning the publication of the exchange of letters between France upstream and Switzerland, regarding the compensation of the French authorities by to downSwitzerland for the water rights due to the diversion of the Allaine River stream state The Canal du Moulin (a canal which supplied Allaine River waters) dates back to the Napoleonic period. After the Napoleonic wars the borders were redrawn and one of the villages that used the Canal was now in Switzerland (Boncourt) and the other in France (Delle). Until the 1960s Delle enjoyed particular rights to the waters of the Canal that was now being fed in Switzerland. But the Swiss then wanted to conduct certain works on the river which would have meant that water would no longer feed the Canal into Delle, France. Negotiations ensued and the agreement entailed that Switzerland would be able to conduct the works it envisioned and France would build a new canal in French territory. Compensation would be provided to France – the sum of 45,000 Swiss francs (Interview, Salome 2003).

Sidepayments from downstream to upstream state

17/11/07

France

Downstream state

Dinar-App-D.qxd Page 174

Doveria 1972 – Pollution, General regulations, General works and Commission creation (64) Maira (Mera) 1972 – Pollution, General regulations, General works and Commission creation (65) Mont Cenis River (Part of the Lac du Mont Cenis system) 1955 (@) – Hydropower (66)

Italy

Italy

Italy

Switzerland

Switzerland

France

Y

(Table D.1 continued)

This is a provisional agreement. Italy is to pay France the sum of 17,000,000 francs a year for the supply of water to the Gran Scala factory. It is not obvious where the plant is, but it is apparent from the 1960 agreement (see below) and the 1947 Treaty of Peace with Italy (Article 9: “In order to secure to Italy the same facilities as Italy enjoyed in respect of hydroelectric power and water supply from the Lake of Mont Cenis before cession of this district to France, the latter shall give Italy, under bilateral agreement, the technical guarantees set out in Annex III.”) that the plant used to be on Italian territory and then was on French territory due to the ceding of land to France.

Temporary accord concerning the operation of the Gran Scala Factory

12:11 PM

This is a general convention regarding the protection of the waters between Italy and Switzerland against pollution. The agreement specifically mentions the Maira (Mera), Doveria [through-border], Spöl [mixed], Melezza [mixed] and Torrente Breggia [mixed] Rivers. The parties also establish the Mixed Commission for the Protection of Italo-Swiss Waters Against Pollution. Any specific works or investigations, and the expenses relating to them, shall be established in an agreement.

Convention concerning the Italo-Swiss waters against pollution

This is a general convention regarding the protection of the waters between Italy and Switzerland against pollution. The agreement specifically mentions the Doveria, Spöl [mixed], Melezza [mixed], Torrente Breggia [mixed] and Maira (Mera) [through-border] Rivers. The parties also establish the Mixed Commission for the Protection of Italo-Swiss Waters Against Pollution. Any specific works or investigations, and the expenses relating to them, shall be established in an agreement.

Convention concerning the Italo-Swiss waters against pollution

17/11/07

N

N

Dinar-App-D.qxd Page 175

Upstream state

France

Germany

River, treaty year, and topic

Mont Cenis River (Part of the Lac du Mont Cenis system) 1960 (@) – Hydropower and Flood control (67)

Eger (Ohre) 1995 (&) – Pollution, Flood control, General regulations and Commission creation (68)

Through-border

Table D.1 Continued

This is a general frontiers water agreement. It pertains to rivers that flow along or cross the border (those rivers that cross the border, 15 meters along the river into one of the country’s territory, shall constitute the river as a frontier river) but the Eger River is mentioned specifically. The parties agree to set up a Commission and to cooperate in the protection against floods and

This is a permanent agreement. A high capacity reservoir is being built in France to increase the hydroelectric potential of the Mont Cenis. Italy has the opportunity to benefit from these works on the Mont Cenis River. One of the purposes of the barrage is to assure the security of inferior valleys. The provisional agreement of 1955 is still applicable and the yearly 17,000,000 francs payment will only be given to France if Italy continues to utilize the Gran Scala factory. If Italy chooses to no longer use the Gran Scala factory but rather use a hydroelectric plant now in her own territory than the sum owed to France will be about 6% of the 17,000,000 francs once owed to France on a yearly basis. Regulation for the treaty of 12/12/1995 between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Czech Republic concerning the common work of the economy on border waters

Convention between France and Italy regarding the hydroelectric management of the Mont Cenis

Brief analysis

12:11 PM

Czech Republic

Y

Sidepayments from downstream to upstream state

17/11/07

Italy

Downstream state

Dinar-App-D.qxd Page 176

Turkey

Spain

Sarisu 1955 (@) – Monitoring, Water quantity and Commission creation (69)

Lima (Limia) 1968/1976 – Water quantity, Hydropower and Commission creation (70)

(Table D.1 continued)

The parties agree to develop the waters of the international reaches of the Lima (Limia), Minho (Miño) [partial border-creator], Tagus (Tajo) [mixed], Guadiana [mixed] and Chanza [partial border-creator] Rivers for the benefit of the two nations. Efforts shall be made to harmonize such development. The parties agree to divide the waters of these rivers among them. In order to supplement the planned hydroelectric facility in Portuguese territory, Portugal will be able to use, in Spanish territory, the declivity of the river Lima (Limia) (no specific division of water indicated, only that each state shall enjoy exclusive use of the agreed upon part of the river). In general, all the works for the utilization of

Second additional protocol to the above mentioned agreement

Three monitoring stations will be established on the Sarisu River. Two stations will be placed on the Turkish side while one station on the Iranian side. No mention of costs or payments is made. Each side will be responsible for the stations on its side of the border and for the monitoring. A Commission shall be established to determine how the measurements shall be made. Turkey has the obligation to safely provide Iran with at least 1.8 CM per second, even in the dry season. The agreement also refers to the Karasu River [border-creator]. Agreement regulating the use and development of the water resources of the international reaches of the Miño, Limia, Tajo, Guadiana, and Chanza and of their tributaries (with additional protocol)

12:11 PM

N

N

17/11/07

Portugal

Iran

pollution issues. Every party is responsible for the works on its side of the border. However, if there is a project of interest to both countries, the costs will be divided according to interest (benefits) regardless of where the project is located. If a project wholly benefits another country but is located in the territory of another country, the benefiting country shall pay the costs incurred. Treaty between Turkey and Iran on the Sarisu and Karasu Rivers

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Upstream state

Spain

River, treaty year, and topic

Lima (Limia) 1971 (@) – General regulations, Hydropower, Water quantity and General works (71)

Through-border

Table D.1 Continued

The agreement states the rules established by the Spanish-Portuguese Commission that would govern how concessionary companies can utilize and exploit the river for different purposes as indicated in the 1968 Agreement. The agreement refers to the Lima (Limia), Guadiana [mixed],

The 1976 Protocol also refers to the above rivers but specifically pertains to the Minho (Miño) when it says that both governments may grant a concession for the building of the hydroelectric facility, which must operate as a joint venture. The concessionaries shall participate in the construction and operation of the facility in the proportion indicated (see Minho {Miño} River below). Decree which permits the publication and operation of the Statute of Use of the Spanish-Portuguese Commission to regulate the use and exploitation of the international sections of the rivers Miño, Limia, Tajo, Guadania, and Chanza and their tributaries

the river shall be located in the national territory of the state entitled to such utilization. However, the parties shall be guided by the notion of reciprocity if supporting works need to be built on one’s territory for the other’s benefit. The parties also establish the Spanish–Portuguese Commission.

Brief analysis

12:11 PM

N

Sidepayments from downstream to upstream state

17/11/07

Portugal

Downstream state

Dinar-App-D.qxd Page 178

Spain

Poland

Poland

Lima (Limia) 1998 – Pollution, General regulations and Commission creation (72)

Lava-Pregel 1964 – Flood control, Water quantity, Hydropower, Pollution, Scientific and technical cooperation and General regulations (73)

Prohladnaia 1964 – Flood control,

USSR

N

(Table D.1 continued)

This is a general agreement. The parties shall cooperate in economic, scientific and technical activities relating to the use of the water resources including regulation of flood waters, provision of water, protection of watercourses from pollution and erosion and joint utilization of hydraulic structures and installations. Works on the rivers shall be governed by an agreement. The two parties also agree to appoint a plenipotentiary for the purpose of implementing the agreement. The agreement does not pertain to any specific river by name but in this table it pertains to the Lava-Pregel and Prohladnaia [through-border] Rivers. Agreement between the Government of the Polish People’s Republic and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics concerning the use of water resources in frontier water

This is a general agreement but is specific to the Lima (Limia), Minho (Miño) [partial border-creator], Duoro [mixed], Tagus (Tajo) [mixed] and Guadiana [mixed] Rivers. The agreement is in Portuguese but was not translated since it is a general agreement. According to Oregon State’s Database, a Joint Commission is created concerning the rivers. The focus is on environmental protection although the agreement also discusses changes to the hydrology of the river courses and other general issues of transboundary impact. The agreement also discusses terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems that depend on the said waters. Agreement between the Government of the Polish People’s Republic and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics concerning the use of water resources in frontier water

12:11 PM

N

N

17/11/07

USSR

Portugal

Minho (Miño) [partial border-creator], Tagus (Tajo) [mixed] and Chanza [partial border-creator] Rivers. Convention concerning cooperation for the protection and sustainable use of the waters of Portuguese-Spanish hydrological basins and additional protocols and annexes

Dinar-App-D.qxd Page 179

Ukraine

Downstream state

N

Sidepayments from downstream to upstream state

Agreement text is not available. According to Oregon State’s Database this is a general agreement whereby the countries agree on prevention, reduction and control of indirect inputs into waters of solids, liquids and gaseous substances of radionuclides and of thermal energy. The agreement also pertains to prevention of floods, regulations, water supply and other water related issues. No river seems to be mentioned in specific but in this table the agreement will apply to the Desna (Smolenska), Seversky Donets [through-border * 2 but creates border], Elancik [through-border * 2], Mius [through-border] and Seim (Kurska) [partial border-creator but returns but then enters other state] Rivers.

Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of Ukraine concerning the joint use and protection of transboundary waters

This is a general agreement. The parties shall cooperate in economic, scientific and technical activities relating to the use of the water resources including regulation of flood waters, provision of water, protection of watercourses from pollution and erosion and joint utilization of hydraulic structures and installations. Works on the rivers shall be governed by an agreement. The two parties also agree to appoint a plenipotentiary for the purpose of implementing the agreement. The agreement does not pertain to any specific river by name but in this table it pertains to the Prohladnaia and Lava-Pregel [through-border] Rivers.

Brief analysis

12:11 PM

Russia

Upstream state

17/11/07

Water quantity, Hydropower, Pollution, Scientific and technical cooperation and General regulations (74) Desna (Smolenska) 1992 – Pollution, Flood control, Water quantity and General regulations (75)

River, treaty year, and topic

Through-border

Table D.1 Continued

Dinar-App-D.qxd Page 180

Ukraine

N

N

Bulgaria

N

(Table D.1 continued)

This is a general agreement, which pertains specifically to the Veleka, Tundzha [mixed] and Rezvaya (Rezovska) [partial border-creator] Rivers. The parties agree that they will cooperate in determining which structures and installations can be constructed and used for the benefit of the two countries especially in the case of protection from floods and water for irrigation. The parties shall also avoid causing any damages to the other party.

Agreement between the People’s Republic of Bulgaria and the Republic of Turkey concerning cooperation in the use of the waters of rivers flowing through the territory of both countries

Agreement text is not available. According to Oregon State’s Database this is a general agreement whereby the parties agree to qualitative and quantitative protection of water resources, prevention of pollution, flood control and construction and operation of hydrotechnical works.

Agreement text is not available. According to Oregon State’s Database this is a general agreement whereby the countries agree on prevention, reduction and control of indirect inputs into waters of solids, liquids and gaseous substances of radionuclides and of thermal energy. The agreement also pertains to prevention of floods, regulations, water supply and other water related issues. No river seems to be mentioned in specific but in this table the agreement will apply to the Mius, Seversky Donets [through-border * 2 but creates border], Elancik [through-border * 2], Desna (Smolenska) [through-border] and Seim (Kurska) [partial border-creator but returns but then enters other state] Rivers. Agreement between the Government of Romania and the Government of Ukraine of cooperation in the field of transboundary water management

Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of Ukraine concerning the joint use and protection of transboundary waters

12:11 PM

Romania

Russia

17/11/07

Siret Ukraine 1997 – Pollution, Flood control, Hydropower and General regulations (77) Veleka Turkey 1968 – General regulations, General works, Flood control and Commission creation (78)

Mius 1992 – Pollution, Flood control, Water quantity and General regulations (76)

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Bulgaria

Mexico

Turkey

Guatemala

Veleka 1975 (@) – Scientific and technical cooperation, Water quantity, Hydropower and General works (79) Coatan 1961 (@) – Commission creation, Water quantity, Pollution, Hydropower, Flood control

Downstream state

Upstream state

River, treaty year, and topic

Through-border

Table D.1 Continued

N

The parties establish an International Boundary and Water Commission. The Commission shall study all respective joint rivers but it is specifically stated that this Commission will study the Suchiate River [partial bordercreator] with future utilization in mind, determining available hydraulic resources, studying the necessary works to prevent floods and the general

This is a general agreement that refers to no specific river by name. It is a larger economic, technical, industrial and scientific cooperation agreement. The parties agree to cooperate in the field of energy and agriculture, including the common use of the waters, which the two parties share. In this table the agreement pertains to the Veleka, Tundzha [mixed] and Rezvaya (Rezovska) [partial border-creator] Rivers. Exchange of notes between Mexico and Guatemala constituting an agreement on the establishment of an International Boundary and Water Commission

12:11 PM

An agreement will govern any specific measure taken by the parties. A Mixed Bulgarian-Turkish Commission will be established. Accord pertaining to long term economic, technical, industrial, and scientific cooperation between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Government of the People’s Republic of Bulgaria

Brief analysis

17/11/07

N

Sidepayments from downstream to upstream state

Dinar-App-D.qxd Page 182

Mexico

Mexico

Guatemala

Mexico

Guatemala

Guatemala

(Table D.1 continued)

This is a general environmental protection agreement. No specific river is mentioned. The parties agree to cooperate in the field of environmental protection and pollution abatement. The Grijalva, Suchiate [partial border-creator], Coatan [through-border] and Candelaria [through-border] Rivers are included for this agreement.

The parties establish an International Boundary and Water Commission. The Commission shall study all respective joint rivers but it is specifically stated that this Commission will study the Suchiate River [partial bordercreator] with future utilization in mind, determining available hydraulic resources, studying the necessary works to prevent floods and the general development of these resources for the benefit of both countries. In this table the Grijalva, Candelaria [through-border] and Coatan [through-border] Rivers are also included for this agreement. Agreement between the United Mexican States and the Republic of Guatemala on the protection and improvement of the environment in the border area

This is a general environmental protection agreement. No specific river is mentioned. The parties agree to cooperate in the field of environmental protection and pollution abatement. The Coatan, Suchiate [partial border-creator], Grijalva [through-border] and Candelaria [through-border] Rivers are included for this agreement. Exchange of notes between Mexico and Guatemala constituting an agreement on the establishment of an International Boundary and Water Commission

12:11 PM

N

N

N

development of these resources for the benefit of both countries. In this table the Coatan, Candelaria [through-border], and Grijalva [through-border] Rivers are also included for this agreement. Agreement between the United Mexican States and the Republic of Guatemala on the protection and improvement of the environment in the border area

17/11/07

Grijalva 1961 (@) – Commission creation, Water quantity, Pollution, Hydropower, Flood control and General regulations (82) Grijalva 1987 – Pollution and General regulations (83)

and General regulations (80) Coatan 1987 – Pollution and General regulations (81)

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Upstream state

Moldova

Moldova

River, treaty year, and topic

Kogilnik 1994 – Pollution, Flood control, Water quantity and General regulations (84)

Sarata 1994 – Pollution, Flood control, Water quantity and General regulations (85)

Through-border

Table D.1 Continued

Ukraine

N

Agreement text is not available. According to Oregon State’s Database this agreement pertains to quantitative and qualitative protection of water resources, prevention, control and reduction of direct and indirect inputs into waters of solid, liquid and gaseous substances, of radionuclides, and of thermal energy, floods, regulating, water-supply and other management

Agreement text is not available. According to Oregon State’s Database this agreement pertains to quantitative and qualitative protection of water resources, prevention, control and reduction of direct and indirect inputs into waters of solid, liquid and gaseous substances, of radionuclides, and of thermal energy, floods, regulating, water-supply and other management activities. In this table the agreement refers to the Kogilnik and Sarata [through-border] Rivers. Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Moldova and the Government of Ukraine on the joint use and protection of and protection of waters

Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Moldova and the Government of Ukraine on the joint use and protection of transboundary waters

Brief analysis

12:11 PM

N

Sidepayments from downstream to upstream state

17/11/07

Ukraine

Downstream state

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Bulgaria

Kazakhstan

Kazakhstan

Struma 1971 (@) – Commission creation, Hydropower and Water quantity (86)

Ishim 1992 – Pollution, Water quantity, Flood control and General regulations (87)

Ishim 1997 (@) – Pollution, Water quantity, Flood control,

Russia

NSI

(Table D.1 continued)

Agreement text is not available. According to UNECE (2003) the agreement pertains to qualitative and quantitative protection of water resources,

Agreement text is not available. According to Oregon State’s Database this is a general agreement with reference to quantitative and qualitative protection of water resources and water-supply. It also refers to other issues such as irrigation and floods. The agreement specifically refers to the Ishim, Ural [partial border-creator * 2] and Tobol [mixed] Rivers. Protocol on joint use and protection of transboundary water bodies and coordination of water management in the Ishim River Basin

The two parties establish a Greek-Bulgarian Commission for cooperating in the area of electric energy and water utilization. The mandate of the Commission consists of studying and making decisions on questions related to the cooperation between the two countries on the issues mentioned above. The Commission will also be able to formulate propositions to the two governments, if these are shown to be necessary, and study other issues of common interest, which could be suggested by these governments. No specific river is mentioned in this agreement (although the agreement refers to rivers that cross their territories) but in this table the agreement applies to the Struma and Nestos [mixed] Rivers. Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Government of the Russian Federation concerning the joint use and protection of transboundary waters

12:11 PM

N

N

17/11/07

Russia

Greece

activities. In this table the agreement refers to the Sarata and Kogilnik [through-border] Rivers. Accord between the Government of the Kingdom of Greece and the Government of the People’s Republic of Bulgaria with regards to the creation of a GrecoBulgarian Commission for cooperation between the two countries in the areas of electric energy and the utilization of the waters of rivers crossing their territories

Dinar-App-D.qxd Page 185

China

Downstream state

N

Sidepayments from downstream to upstream state

This is a general agreement that refers to the waters shared between the two countries. The agreement specifically refers to the Bulgan, Kerulen [through-border] and Hal Ha [partial border-creator but enters state first] Rivers. The parties agree to cooperate in the investigation, protection and development of transboundary waters, maintenance and rational use of transboundary waters, maintenance and rational use of water conservation projets and flood prevention facilities. The parties should jointly protect the ecological system of their transboundary waters and develop and utilize these waters in a way that should not be detrimental to the other side. Any development and utilization of transboundary waters should follow the principle of fairness and equity. The parties will decide, via consultation, on the annual consumption of the transboundary waters. The parties establish a

Agreement between the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Government of Mongolia on the protection and utilization of transboundary waters

water supply, irrigation, floods and regulation. A Joint Working Group is also established.

Brief analysis

12:11 PM

Mongolia

Upstream state

17/11/07

General regulations and Commission creation (88) Bulgan 1994 – Pollution, Water quantity, Hydropower, Flood control, General regulations and Commission creation (89)

River, treaty year, and topic

Through-border

Table D.1 Continued

Dinar-App-D.qxd Page 186

Mongolia

Norway

Kerulen 1994 – Pollution, Water quantity, Hydropower, Flood control, General regulations and Commission creation (90)

Klaralven 1905 (!) – Border issues and General regulations (91)

(Table D.1 continued)

Agreement is in French but was not translated since it is a general agreement. According to Oregon State’s Database the parties’ shared waters will be used in the same manner as they were when the countries were united. Each country shall inform the other with regards to construction works and with regards to changing levels of the water. The Klaralven is not specifically mentioned but the agreement applies to it in this table.

This is a general agreement that refers to the waters shared between the two countries. The agreement specifically refers to the Kerulen, Bulgan [through-border] and Hal Ha [partial border-creator but enters state first] Rivers. The parties agree to cooperate in the investigation, protection and development of transboundary waters, maintenance and rational use of water conservation projects and flood prevention facilities. The parties should jointly protect the ecological system of their transboundary waters and develop and utilize these waters in a way that should not be detrimental to the other side. Any development and utilization of transboundary waters should follow the principle of fairness and equity. The parties will decide, via consultation, on the annual consumption of the transboundary waters. The parties establish a Joint Commission on Transboundary Waters to handle matters related to this agreement. Treaties and conventions concerning the dissolution of the Swedish Norwegian union

12:11 PM

N

N

17/11/07

Sweden

China

Joint Commission on Transboundary Waters to handle matters related to this agreement. Agreement between the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Government of Mongolia on the protection and utilization of transboundary waters

Dinar-App-D.qxd Page 187

Upstream state

Norway

Nigeria

River, treaty year, and topic

Klaralven 1929 (@) – General regulations and Commission creation (92)

Tagwai (El Fadama) 1990 – General regulations, Water quantity and Commission

Through-border

Table D.1 Continued

Niger

N

This is a general agreement. The parties agree that each party has a right, in its own territory, to an equitable share in the development, conservation and use of the water resources in the shared river basins. To determine equity, the parties agree to a number of factors (the agreement lists 12

This is a general agreement with regards to installations and works, which may cause appreciable change in the other country. The parties agree that negotiations, and a mutual agreement, shall govern such works unless it is believed that no harm may be caused from such works. Compensation shall follow the laws and regulations of the country, which suffers the damage. With regards to preventing damage, the laws of the country undertaking the works shall apply. A Commission will be established to examine questions that concern both countries. This agreement replaced the above 1905 Agreement. Agreement between the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the Republic of Niger concerning the equitable sharing in the development, conservation, and use of their common water resources

Convention between Norway and Sweden on certain questions relating to the law on watercourses

Brief analysis

12:11 PM

N

Sidepayments from downstream to upstream state

17/11/07

Sweden

Downstream state

Dinar-App-D.qxd Page 188

Canada (UK)

USA

(Table D.1 continued)

12:11 PM

The parties establish an International Joint Commission. The parties claim that they have exclusive jurisdiction and control over the use and diversion of all the waters on their own side of the border, which in their natural channels would flow across the boundary or into boundary waters. The injured party on either side of the border will be entitled to the same legal remedies as if such injury took place in the country where such diversion or interference occurs. These diversions or obstructions shall be governed by an agreement. The waters of the St. Mary [through-border] and Milk [through-border * 2] Rivers shall be considered one stream and the waters shall be divided equally between the two parties. The agreement also specifically pertains to the Niagara River [border-creator]. Since the agreement also pertains to boundary waters, in general, it also includes the Yukon, St. Croix [border-creator], St. Lawrence [partial border-creator but returns], Kootenay [through-border * 2], Souris [through-border * 2], Skagit [through-border], Red [through-border], St. John [mixed], Columbia [throughborder], Stikine [through-border], Firth [through-border], Whiting [through-border], Taku [through-border], Alesek [through-border] and Chilkat [through-border] Rivers in this table.

general factors). All these factors are to be given the weight warranted by the circumstances peculiar to each river and shall be considered in unison. An existing use, which is in competition with a factor relevant for determining equitable sharing, shall take precedent only if that existing use benefits both parties. Other factors shall also be weighed. The parties also agree to the establishment of a permanent technical committee of water experts. The agreement specifically refers to the Tagwai (El Fadama), Gada (Goulbi) [through-border * 2] and Komadougou-Yobe [partial bordercreator] Rivers. Treaty between Great Britain and the United States relating to boundary waters and boundary questions

17/11/07

Yukon 1909 – Water quantity, General regulations and Commission creation (94)

creation (93)

Dinar-App-D.qxd Page 189

Upstream state

Canada (UK)

River, treaty year, and topic

Stikine 1909 – Water quantity, General regulations and Commission creation (95)

Through-border

Table D.1 Continued

Sidepayments from downstream to upstream state

The parties establish an International Joint Commission. The parties claim that they have exclusive jurisdiction and control over the use and diversion of all the waters on their own side of the border, which in their natural channels would flow across the boundary or into boundary waters. The injured party on either side of the border will be entitled to the same legal remedies as if such injury took place in the country where such diversion or interference occurs. These diversions or obstructions shall be governed by an agreement. The waters of the St. Mary [through-border] and Milk [through-border * 2] Rivers shall be considered one stream and the waters shall be divided equally between the two parties. The agreement also specifically pertains to the Niagara River [border-creator]. Since the agreement also pertains to boundary waters, in general, it also includes the Stikine, St. Croix [border-creator], St. Lawrence [partial border-creator but returns], Kootenay [through-border * 2], Souris [through-border * 2], Skagit [through-border], Red [through-border], St. John [mixed], Yukon [throughborder], Columbia [through-border], Firth [through-border], Whiting [through-border], Taku [through-border], Alesek [through-border] and Chilkat [through-border] Rivers in this table.

12:11 PM

Treaty between Great Britain and the United States relating to boundary waters and boundary questions

Brief analysis

17/11/07

USA

Downstream state

Dinar-App-D.qxd Page 190

USA

Canada (UK)

Firth 1909 – Water quantity, General regulations and Commission creation (96)

Whiting 1909 – Water quantity, General regulations and Commission creation (97)

(Table D.1 continued)

12:11 PM

The parties establish an International Joint Commission. The parties claim that they have exclusive jurisdiction and control over the use and diversion of all the waters on their own side of the border, which in their natural channels would flow across the boundary or into boundary waters. The injured party on either side of the border will be entitled to the same legal remedies as if such injury took place in the country where such diversion or interference occurs. These diversions or obstructions shall be governed by an agreement.

The parties establish an International Joint Commission. The parties claim that they have exclusive jurisdiction and control over the use and diversion of all the waters on their own side of the border, which in their natural channels would flow across the boundary or into boundary waters. The injured party on either side of the border will be entitled to the same legal remedies as if such injury took place in the country where such diversion or interference occurs. These diversions or obstructions shall be governed by an agreement. The waters of the St. Mary [through-border] and Milk [through-border * 2] Rivers shall be considered one stream and the waters shall be divided equally between the two parties. The agreement also specifically pertains to the Niagara River [border-creator]. Since the agreement also pertains to boundary waters, in general, it also includes the Firth, St. Croix [border-creator], St. Lawrence [partial border-creator but returns], Kootenay [through-border * 2], Souris [through-border * 2], Skagit [through-border], Red [through-border], St. John [mixed], Yukon [throughborder], Stikine [through-border], Columbia [through-border], Whiting [through-border], Taku [through-border], Alesek [through-border] and Chilkat [through-border] Rivers in this table. Treaty between Great Britain and the United States relating to boundary waters and boundary questions

Treaty between Great Britain and the United States relating to boundary waters and boundary questions

17/11/07

USA

Canada (UK)

Dinar-App-D.qxd Page 191

Upstream state

Canada (UK)

River, treaty year, and topic

Taku 1909 – Water quantity, General regulations and Commission creation (98)

Through-border

Table D.1 Continued

Sidepayments from downstream to upstream state

The parties establish an International Joint Commission. The parties claim that they have exclusive jurisdiction and control over the use and diversion of all the waters on their own side of the border, which in their natural channels would flow across the boundary or into boundary waters. The injured party on either side of the border will be entitled to the same legal remedies as if such injury took place in the country where such diversion or

12:11 PM

The waters of the St. Mary [through-border] and Milk [through-border * 2] Rivers shall be considered one stream and the waters shall be divided equally between the two parties. The agreement also specifically pertains to the Niagara River [border-creator]. Since the agreement also pertains to boundary waters, in general, it also includes the Whiting, St. Croix [border-creator], St. Lawrence [partial border-creator but returns], Kootenay [through-border * 2], Souris [through-border * 2], Skagit [through-border], Red [through-border], St. John [mixed], Yukon [through-border], Stikine [through-border], Firth [through-border], Columbia [through-border], Taku [through-border], Alesek [through-border] and Chilkat [through-border] Rivers in this table. Treaty between Great Britain and the United States relating to boundary waters and boundary questions

Brief analysis

17/11/07

USA

Downstream state

Dinar-App-D.qxd Page 192

USA

(Table D.1 continued)

The parties establish an International Joint Commission. The parties claim that they have exclusive jurisdiction and control over the use and diversion of all the waters on their own side of the border, which in their natural channels would flow across the boundary or into boundary waters. The injured party on either side of the border will be entitled to the same legal remedies as if such injury took place in the country where such diversion or interference occurs. These diversions or obstructions shall be governed by an agreement. The waters of the St. Mary [through-border] and Milk [throughborder * 2] Rivers shall be considered one stream and the waters shall be divided equally between the two parties. The agreement also specifically pertains to the Niagara River [border-creator]. Since the agreement also pertains to boundary waters, in general, it also includes the Alesek, St. Croix [bordercreator], St. Lawrence [partial border-creatr but returns], Kootenay [throughborder * 2], Souris [through-border * 2], Skagit [through-border], Red [throughborder], St. John [mixed], Yukon [through-border], Stikine [through-border], Firth [through-border], Whiting [through-border], Taku [through-border], Columbia [through-border] and Chilkat [through-border] Rivers in this table.

12:11 PM

Canada (UK)

17/11/07

Alesek 1909 – Water quantity, General regulations and Commission creation (99)

interference occurs. These diversions or obstructions shall be governed by an agreement. The waters of the St. Mary [through-border] and Milk [through-border * 2] Rivers shall be considered one stream and the waters shall be divided equally between the two parties. The agreement also specifically pertains to the Niagara River [border-creator]. Since the agreement also pertains to boundary waters, in general, it also includes the Taku, St. Croix [border-creator], St. Lawrence [partial border-creator but returns], Kootenay [through-border * 2], Souris [through-border * 2], Skagit [through-border], Red [through-border], St. John [mixed], Yukon [throughborder], Stikine [through-border], Firth [through-border], Whiting [through-border], Columbia [through-border], Alesek [through-border] and Chilkat [through-border] Rivers in this table. Treaty between Great Britain and the United States relating to boundary waters and boundary questions

Dinar-App-D.qxd Page 193

Upstream state

Canada (UK)

River, treaty year, and topic

Chilkat 1909 – Water quantity, General regulations and Commission creation (100)

Through-border

Table D.1 Continued

Sidepayments from downstream to upstream state

The parties establish an International Joint Commission. The parties claim that they have exclusive jurisdiction and control over the use and diversion of all the waters on their own side of the border, which in their natural channels would flow across the boundary or into boundary waters. The injured party on either side of the border will be entitled to the same legal remedies as if such injury took place in the country where such diversion or interference occurs. These diversions or obstructions shall be governed by an agreement. The waters of the St. Mary [through-border] and Milk [through-border * 2] Rivers shall be considered one stream and the waters shall be divided equally between the two parties. The agreement also specifically pertains to the Niagara River [border-creator]. Since the agreement also pertains to boundary waters, in general, it also includes the Chilkat, St. Croix [border-creator], St. Lawrence [partial border-creator but returns], Kootenay [through-border * 2], Souris [through-border * 2], Skagit [through-border], Red [through-border], St. John [mixed], Yukon [throughborder], Stikine [through-border], Firth [through-border], Whiting [through-border], Taku [through-border], Alesek [through-border] and Columbia [through-border] Rivers in this table.

12:11 PM

Treaty between Great Britain and the United States relating to boundary waters and boundary questions

Brief analysis

17/11/07

USA

Downstream state

Dinar-App-D.qxd Page 194

Argentina

Argentina

Palena 1971 (@) – General regulations, Pollution and Commission creation (101)

Palena 1991 (@) – General regulations, Pollution, General works and Commission creation (102)

(Table D.1 continued)

This is an additional protocol that is part of a larger environmental agreement. The parties agree that projects undertaken by one party in its side of the border should not cause harm to the water resources, the shared river or the environment. Although the parties recognize each other’s existing water uses, these usage programs shall be harmonized with future possible uses and works. Use of the shared waters will be carried out in a coordinated or joint manner by means of general plans of use. The parties will study and carry out joint or coordinated programs regarding the conservation of hydrobiological populations. The parties will establish a working group, in the framework of the Subcommittee of the Environment, to prioritize and

This is a general cooperation agreement that applies to no specific river. The agreement is concerned with ecological protection of the parties’ shared waters – to prevent harm to living resources through pollution prevention. On rivers that form the border between the two countries, the two states agree that a treaty by the coast dwellers will precede any use. As for rivers that cross the border, each party is entitled to use the waters in their own territory with the obligation not to cause significant harm to the other party. A state will have to provide the information regarding the set project to its neighboring country, which will be able to provide a response and modifications if significant harm is indeed to result with the original plan. Any disputes may be resolved by a Mixed Technical Commission. If the matter can still not be resolved, the parties shall take their dispute to the respective governments. The parties are also committed to exchange information between them. In this table the agreement applies to the Palena, Gallegos-Chico [through-border], Comau [through-border], Chico (Carmen Silva) [through-border], Cullen [through-border], Rio Grande [through-border], San Martin [through-border] and Yelcho (Futaleufu) [through-border] Rivers. Specific additional protocol regarding shared water resources between the Republic of Chile and the Argentine Republic

Act of Santiago pertaining to river basins

12:11 PM

N

N

17/11/07

Chile

Chile

Dinar-App-D.qxd Page 195

Upstream state

Chile

River, treaty year, and topic

Gallegos-Chico 1971 (@) – General regulations, Pollution and Commission creation (103)

Through-border

Table D.1 Continued

This is a general cooperation agreement that applies to no specific river. The agreement is concerned with ecological protection of the parties’ shared waters – to prevent harm to living resources through pollution prevention. On rivers that form the border between the two countries, the two states agree that a treaty by the coast dwellers will precede any use. As for rivers that cross the border, each party is entitled to use the waters in their own territory with the obligation not to cause significant harm to the other party. A state will have to provide the information regarding the set project to its neighboring country, which will be able to provide a response and modifications if significant harm is indeed to result with the original plan.

identify shared water resources and plans for use. The general plans of usage will be provided to the respective governments for consideration. The agreement refers to no specific river (however the agreement does recognize that rivers that either flow along or cross the border are relevant for this treaty) but in this table the agreement refers to the Palena, Gallegos-Chico [through-border], Comau [through-border], Chico (Carmen Silva) [throughborder], Cullen [through-border], Rio Grande [through-border], San Martin [through-border] and Yelcho (Futaleufu) [through-border] Rivers. Act of Santiago pertaining to river basins

Brief analysis

12:11 PM

N

Sidepayments from downstream to upstream state

17/11/07

Argentina

Downstream state

Dinar-App-D.qxd Page 196

Chile

Argentina

N

12:11 PM

(Table D.1 continued)

This is an additional protocol that is part of a larger environmental agreement. The parties agree that projects undertaken by one party in its side of the border should not cause harm to the water resources, the shared river or the environment. Although the parties recognize each other’s existing water uses, these usage programs shall be harmonized with future possible uses and works. Use of the shared waters will be carried out in a coordinated or joint manner by means of general plans of use. The parties will study and carry out joint or coordinated programs regarding the conservation of hydrobiological populations. The parties will establish a working group, in the framework of the Subcommittee of the Environment, to prioritize and identify shared water resources and plans for use. The general plans of usage will be provided to the respective governments for consideration. The agreement refers to no specific river (however the agreement does recognize that rivers that either flow along or cross the border are relevant for this treaty) but in this table the agreement refers to the Gallegos-Chico, Palena [through-border], Comau [through-border], Chico (Carmen Silva) [throughborder], Cullen [through-border], Rio Grande [through-border], San Martin [through-border] and Yelcho (Futaleufu) [through-border] Rivers.

17/11/07

Gallegos-Chico 1991 (@) – General regulations, Pollution, General works and Commission creation (104)

Any disputes may be resolved by a Mixed Technical Commission. If the matter can still not be resolved, the parties shall take their dispute to the respective governments. The parties are also committed to exchange information between them. In this table the agreement applies to the Gallegos-Chico, Palena [through-border], Comau [through-border], Chico (Carmen Silva) [through-border], Cullen [through-border], Rio Grande [through-border], San Martin [through-border] and Yelcho (Futaleufu) [through-border] Rivers. Specific additional protocol regarding shared water resources between the Republic of Chile and the Argentine Republic

Dinar-App-D.qxd Page 197

Upstream state

Argentina

River, treaty year, and topic

Comau 1971 (@) – General regulations, Pollution and Commission creation (105)

Through-border

Table D.1 Continued

This is a general cooperation agreement that applies to no specific river. The agreement is concerned with ecological protection of the parties’ shared waters – to prevent harm to living resources through pollution prevention. On rivers that form the border between the two countries, the two states agree that a treaty by the coast dwellers will precede any use. As for rivers that cross the border, each party is entitled to use the waters in their own territory with the obligation not to cause significant harm to the other party. A state will have to provide the information regarding the set project to its neighboring country, which will be able to provide a response and modifications if significant harm is indeed to result with the original plan. Any disputes may be resolved by a Mixed Technical Commission. If the matter can still not be resolved, the parties shall take their dispute to the respective governments. The parties are also committed to exchange information between them. In this table the agreement applies to the Comau, Palena [through-border], Gallegos-Chico [through-border], Chico (Carmen Silva) [through-border], Cullen [through-border], Rio Grande [through-border], San Martin [through-border] and Yelcho (Futaleufu) [through-border] Rivers.

Act of Santiago pertaining to river basins

Brief analysis

12:11 PM

N

Sidepayments from downstream to upstream state

17/11/07

Chile

Downstream state

Dinar-App-D.qxd Page 198

Argentina

Chile

Comau 1991 (@) – General regulations, Pollution, General works and Commission creation (106)

Chico (Carmen Silva) 1971 (@) – General regulations, Pollution and Commission creation (107)

(Table D.1 continued)

This is a general cooperation agreement that applies to no specific river. The agreement is concerned with ecological protection of the parties’ shared waters – to prevent harm to living resources through pollution prevention. On rivers that form the border between the two countries, the two states agree that a treaty by the coast dwellers will precede any use. As for rivers that cross the border, each party is entitled to use the waters in their own territory with the obligation not to cause significant harm to the other party. A state will have to provide the information regarding the set project to its neighboring country, which will be able to provide a response and

This is an additional protocol that is part of a larger environmental agreement. The parties agree that projects undertaken by one party in its side of the border should not cause harm to the water resources, the shared river or the environment. Although the parties recognize each other’s existing water uses, these usage programs shall be harmonized with future possible uses and works. Use of the shared waters will be carried out in a coordinated or joint manner by means of general plans of use. The parties will study and carry out joint or coordinated programs regarding the conservation of hydrobiological populations. The parties will establish a working group, in the framework of the Subcommittee of the Environment, to prioritize and identify shared water resources and plans for use. The general plans of usage will be provided to the respective governments for consideration. The agreement refers to no specific river (however the agreement does recognize that rivers that either flow along or cross the border are relevant for this treaty) but in this table the agreement refers to the Comau, Palena [through-border], Gallegos-Chico [through-border], Chico (Carmen Silva) [through-border], Cullen [throughborder], Rio Grande [through-border], San Martin [through-border] and Yelcho (Futaleufu) [through-border] Rivers. Act of Santiago pertaining to river basins

Specific additional protocol regarding shared water resources between the Republic of Chile and the Argentine Republic

12:11 PM

N

N

17/11/07

Argentina

Chile

Dinar-App-D.qxd Page 199

Upstream state

Chile

River, treaty year, and topic

Chico (Carmen Silva) 1991 (@) – General regulations, Pollution, General works and Commission creation (108)

Through-border

Table D.1 Continued

This is an additional protocol that is part of a larger environmental agreement. The parties agree that projects undertaken by one party in its side of the border should not cause harm to the water resources, the shared river or the environment. Although the parties recognize each other’s existing water uses, these usage programs shall be harmonized with future possible uses and works. Use of the shared waters will be carried out in a coordinated or joint manner by means of general plans of use. The parties will study and carry out joint or coordinated programs regarding the conservation of

modifications if significant harm is indeed to result with the original plan. Any disputes may be resolved by a Mixed Technical Commission. If the matter can still not be resolved, the parties shall take their dispute to the respective governments. The parties are also committed to exchange information between them. In this table the agreement applies to the Chico (Carmen Silva), Palena [through-border], Gallegos-Chico [through-border], Comau [through-border], Cullen [through-border], Rio Grande [throughborder], San Martin [through-border] and Yelcho (Futaleufu) [through-border] Rivers. Specific additional protocol regarding shared water resources between the Republic of Chile and the Argentine Republic

Brief analysis

12:11 PM

N

Sidepayments from downstream to upstream state

17/11/07

Argentina

Downstream state

Dinar-App-D.qxd Page 200

Chile

Argentina

N

(Table D.1 continued)

12:11 PM

This is a general cooperation agreement that applies to no specific river. The agreement is concerned with ecological protection of the parties’ shared waters – to prevent harm to living resources through pollution prevention. On rivers that form the border between the two countries, the two states agree that a treaty by the coast dwellers will precede any use. As for rivers that cross the border, each party is entitled to use the waters in their own territory with the obligation not to cause significant harm to the other party. A state will have to provide the information regarding the set project to its neighboring country, which will be able to provide a response and modifications if significant harm is indeed to result with the original plan. Any disputes may be resolved by a Mixed Technical Commission. If the matter can still not be resolved, the parties shall take their dispute to the respective governments. The parties are also committed to exchange information between them. In this table the agreement applies to the Cullen, Palena [through-border], Gallegos-Chico [through-border], Comau [throughborder], Chico (Carmen Silva) [through-border], Rio Grande [through-border], San Martin [through-border] and Yelcho (Futaleufu) [through-border] Rivers.

17/11/07

Cullen 1971 (@) – General regulations, Pollution and Commission creation (109)

hydrobiological populations. The parties will establish a working group, in the framework of the Subcommittee of the Environment, to prioritize and identify shared water resources and plans for use. The general plans of usage will be provided to the respective governments for consideration. The agreement refers to no specific river (however the agreement does recognize that rivers that either flow along or cross the border are relevant for this treaty) but in this table the agreement refers to the Chico (Carmen Silva), Palena [through-border], Gallegos- Chico [through-border], Comau [throughborder], Cullen [through-border], Rio Grande [through-border], San Martin [through-border] and Yelcho (Futaleufu) [through-border] Rivers. Act of Santiago pertaining to river basins

Dinar-App-D.qxd Page 201

Upstream state

Chile

River, treaty year, and topic

Cullen 1991 (@) – General regulations, Pollution, General works and Commission creation (110)

Through-border

Table D.1 Continued

This is an additional protocol that is part of a larger environmental agreement. The parties agree that projects undertaken by one party in its side of the border should not cause harm to the water resources, the shared river or the environment. Although the parties recognize each other’s existing water uses, these usage programs shall be harmonized with future possible uses and works. Use of the shared waters will be carried out in a coordinated or joint manner by means of general plans of use. The parties will study and carry out joint or coordinated programs regarding the conservation of hydrobiological populations. The parties will establish a working group, in the framework of the Subcommittee of the Environment, to prioritize and identify shared water resources and plans for use. The general plans of usage will be provided to the respective governments for consideration. The agreement refers to no specific river (however the agreement does recognize that rivers that either flow along or cross the border are relevant for this treaty) but in this table the agreement refers to the Cullen, Palena [through-border], Gallegos-Chico [through-border], Comau [through-border], Chico (Carmen Silva) [throughborder], Rio Grande [through-border], San Martin [through-border] and Yelcho (Futaleufu) [through-border] Rivers.

Specific additional protocol regarding shared water resources between the Republic of Chile and the Argentine Republic

Brief analysis

12:11 PM

N

Sidepayments from downstream to upstream state

17/11/07

Argentina

Downstream state

Dinar-App-D.qxd Page 202

Chile

Chile

Rio Grande 1971 (@) – General regulations, Pollution and Commission creation (111)

Rio Grande 1991 (@) – General regulations, Pollution, General works and Commission creation (112)

(Table D.1 continued)

This is an additional protocol that is part of a larger environmental agreement. The parties agree that projects undertaken by one party in its side of the border should not cause harm to the water resources, the shared river or the environment. Although the parties recognize each other’s existing water uses, these usage programs shall be harmonized with future possible uses and works. Use of the shared waters will be carried out in a coordinated or joint manner by means of general plans of use. The parties will study and carry out joint or coordinated programs regarding the conservation of hydrobiological populations. The parties will establish a working group, in

This is a general cooperation agreement that applies to no specific river. The agreement is concerned with ecological protection of the parties’ shared waters – to prevent harm to living resources through pollution prevention. On rivers that form the border between the two countries, the two states agree that a treaty by the coast dwellers will precede any use. As for rivers that cross the border, each party is entitled to use the waters in their own territory with the obligation not to cause significant harm to the other party. A state will have to provide the information regarding the set project to its neighboring country, which will be able to provide a response and modifications if significant harm is indeed to result with the original plan. Any disputes may be resolved by a Mixed Technical Commission. If the matter can still not be resolved, the parties shall take their dispute to the respective governments. The parties are also committed to exchange information between them. In this table the agreement applies to the Rio Grande, Palena [through-border], Gallegos-Chico [through-border], Comau [through-border], Chico (Carmen Silva) [through-border], Cullen [throughborder], San Martin [through-border] and Yelcho (Futaleufu) [throughborder] Rivers. Specific additional protocol regarding shared water resources between the Republic of Chile and the Argentine Republic

Act of Santiago pertaining to river basins

12:11 PM

N

N

17/11/07

Argentina

Argentina

Dinar-App-D.qxd Page 203

Upstream state

Chile

River, treaty year, and topic

San Martin 1971 (@) – General regulations, Pollution and Commission creation (113)

Through-border

Table D.1 Continued

This is a general cooperation agreement that applies to no specific river. The agreement is concerned with ecological protection of the parties’ shared waters—to prevent harm to living resources through pollution prevention. On rivers that form the border between the two countries, the two states agree that a treaty by the coast dwellers will precede any use. As for rivers that cross the border, each party is entitled to use the waters in their own territory with the obligation not to cause significant harm to the other party. A state will have to provide the information regarding the set project to its neighboring country, which will be able to provide a response and

the framework of the Subcommittee of the Environment, to prioritize and identify shared water resources and plans for use. The general plans of usage will be provided to the respective governments for consideration. The agreement refers to no specific river (however the agreement does recognize that rivers that either flow along or cross the border are relevant for this treaty) but in this table the agreement refers to the Rio Grande, Palena [through-border], Gallegos-Chico [through-border], Comau [through-border], Chico (Carmen Silva) [through-border], Cullen [through-border], San Martin [through-border] and Yelcho (Futaleufu) [through-border] Rivers. Act of Santiago pertaining to river basins

Brief analysis

12:11 PM

N

Sidepayments from downstream to upstream state

17/11/07

Argentina

Downstream state

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Chile

Argentina

N

(Table D.1 continued)

12:11 PM

This is an additional protocol that is part of a larger environmental agreement. The parties agree that projects undertaken by one party in its side of the border should not cause harm to the water resources, the shared river or the environment. Although the parties recognize each other’s existing water uses, these usage programs shall be harmonized with future possible uses and works. Use of the shared waters will be carried out in a coordinated or joint manner by means of general plans of use. The parties will study and carry out joint or coordinated programs regarding the conservation of hydrobiological populations. The parties will establish a working group, in the framework of the Subcommittee of the Environment, to prioritize and identify shared water resources and plans for use. The general plans of usage will be provided to the respective governments for consideration. The agreement refers to no specific river (however the agreement does recognize that rivers that either flow along or cross the border are relevant for this treaty) but in this table the agreement refers to the San Martin, Palena [through-border], Gallegos-Chico [through-border], Comau [through-border], Chico (Carmen Silva) [through-border], Cullen [through-border], Rio Grande [through-border] and Yelcho (Futaleufu) [through-border] Rivers.

17/11/07

San Martin 1991 (@) – General regulations, Pollution, General works and Commission creation (114)

modifications if significant harm is indeed to result with the original plan. Any disputes may be resolved by a Mixed Technical Commission. If the matter can still not be resolved, the parties shall take their dispute to the respective governments. The parties are also committed to exchange information between them. In this table the agreement applies to the San Martin, Palena [through-border], Gallegos-Chico [through-border], Comau [through-border], Chico (Carmen Silva) [through-border], Cullen [throughborder], Rio Grande [through-border] and Yelcho (Futaleufu) [throughborder] Rivers. Specific additional protocol regarding shared water resources between the Republic of Chile and the Argentine Republic

Dinar-App-D.qxd Page 205

Upstream state

Argentina

River, treaty year, and topic

Yelcho (Futaleufu) 1971 (@) – General regulations, Pollution and Commission creation (115)

Through-border

Table D.1 Continued

This is a general cooperation agreement that applies to no specific river. The agreement is concerned with ecological protection of the parties’ shared waters – to prevent harm to living resources through pollution prevention. On rivers that form the border between the two countries, the two states agree that a treaty by the coast dwellers will precede any use. As for rivers that cross the border, each party is entitled to use the waters in their own territory with the obligation not to cause significant harm to the other party. A state will have to provide the information regarding the set project to its neighboring country, which will be able to provide a response and modifications if significant harm is indeed to result with the original plan. Any disputes may be resolved by a Mixed Technical Commission. If the matter can still not be resolved, the parties shall take their dispute to the respective governments. The parties are also committed to exchange information between them. In this table the agreement applies to the Yelcho (Futaleufu), Palena [through-border], Gallegos-Chico [through-border], Comau [through-border] Chico (Carmen Silva) [through-border], Cullen [through-border], Rio Grande [through-border] and San Martin [throughborder] Rivers.

Act of Santiago pertaining to river basins

Brief analysis

12:11 PM

N

Sidepayments from downstream to upstream state

17/11/07

Chile

Downstream state

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Argentina

Guatemala

Yelcho (Futaleufu) 1991 (@) – General regulations, Pollution, General works and Commission creation (116)

Candelaria 1961 (@) – Commission creation, Water quantity, Pollution, Hydropower, Flood control and General regulations (117)

(Table D.1 continued)

The parties establish an International Boundary and Water Commission. The Commission shall study all respective joint rivers but it is specifically stated that this Commission will study the Suchiate River [partial border-creator] with future utilization in mind, determining available hydraulic resources, studying the necessary works to prevent floods and the general development of these resources for the benefit of both countries. In this table the Candelaria, Coatan [through-border] and Grijalva [through-border] Rivers are also included for this agreement.

This is an additional protocol that is part of a larger environmental agreement. The parties agree that projects undertaken by one party in its side of the border should not cause harm to the water resources, the shared river or the environment. Although the parties recognize each other’s existing water uses these usage programs shall be harmonized with future possible uses and works. Use of the shared waters will be carried out in a coordinated or joint manner by means of general plans of use. The parties will study and carry out joint or coordinated programs regarding the conservation of hydrobiological populations. The parties will establish a working group, in the framework of the Subcommittee of the Environment, to prioritize and identify shared water resources and plans for use. The general plans of usage will be provided to the respective governments for consideration. The agreement refers to no specific river (however the agreement does recognize that rivers that either flow along or cross the border are relevant for this treaty) but in this table the agreement refers to the Yelcho (Futaleufu), Palena [through-border], Gallegos-Chico [through-border], Comau [through-border], Chico (Carmen Silva) [through-border], Cullen [throughborder], Rio Grande [through-border] and San Martin [through-border] Rivers. Exchange of notes between Mexico and Guatemala constituting an agreement on the establishment of an International Boundary and Water Commission

Specific additional protocol regarding shared water resources between the Republic of Chile and the Argentine Republic

12:11 PM

N

N

17/11/07

Mexico

Chile

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Mozambique

Mozambique

Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe

Buzi 2002 (@) – Commission creation and Water quantity (119) Sabi 2002 (@) – Commission creation and Water quantity (120) N

N

Title of agreement is not known. Agreement text is also not available. A short description of the treaty is provided in an article by the Herald (2002). The agreement sets up a Joint Water Commission, which will initiate water projects on shared watercourses (specifically, managing, sharing and developing of water resources). No specific river is mentioned but in this table the agreement refers to the Sabi and Buzi [through-border] Rivers.

This is a general environmental protection agreement. No specific river is mentioned. The parties agree to cooperate in the field of environmental protection and pollution abatement. The Candelaria, Suchiate [partial bordercreator], Grijalva [through-border] and Coatan [through-border] Rivers are included for this agreement. Title of agreement is not known. Agreement text is also not available. A short description of the treaty is provided in an article by the Herald (2002). The agreement sets up a Joint Water Commission, which will initiate water projects on shared watercourses (specifically, managing, sharing and developing of water resources). No specific river is mentioned but in this table the agreement refers to the Buzi and Sabi [through-border] Rivers.

Agreement between the United Mexican States and the Republic of Guatemala on the protection and improvement of the environment in the border area

Brief analysis

12:11 PM

N

Sidepayments from downstream to upstream state

17/11/07

Mexico

Guatemala

Candelaria 1987 – Pollution and General regulations (118)

Downstream state

Upstream state

River, treaty year, and topic

Through-border

Table D.1 Continued

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State A

Canada (UK)

Canada

River, treaty year, and topic

Niagara 1909 – Water quantity, Hydropower, General regulations and Commission creation (1)

Niagara 1941 – Hydropower (2)

Border-creator

Table D.1 Continued

(Table D.1 continued)

Boundary waters agreement. The parties establish an International Joint Commission. The parties agree that diversions from the Niagara River will be limited. No diversions shall be made on the Niagara above the Falls from the natural course and stream with the following exceptions. The United States shall not permit the diversion of water for hydropower purposes, not exceeding in the aggregate a daily diversion at the rate of 20,000 cubic feet (CF) per second. Canada will be able to divert 36,000 CF per second. The agreement also pertains to the Milk [throughborder * 2] and St. Mary [through-border] Rivers. Since the agreement also pertains to boundary waters, in general, it also includes the St. Croix [border-creator], St. Lawrence [partial border-creator but returns], Souris [through-border * 2], Kootenay [through-border * 2], Columbia [through-border], Skagit [through-border], Red [throughborder], St. John [mixed], Yukon [through-border], Stikine [throughborder], Firth [through-border], Whiting [through-border], Taku [through-border], Alesek [through-border] and Chilkat [throughborder] Rivers in this table. Exchange of notes between the Government of the United States and the Government of Canada constituting an agreement concerning temporary diversion for power purposes of additional waters of the Niagara River above the Falls

Treaty between Great Britain and the United States relating to boundary waters and boundary questions

Brief analysis

12:11 PM

N

N

Sidepayments

17/11/07

USA

USA

State B

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USA

USA

Canada

Niagara 1941 – Hydropower (3)

Niagara Canada 1950/1954 (@) – Scenic works (4)

State B

State A

River, treaty year, and topic

Border-creator

Table D.1 Continued

N

Costs will be shared equally for remedial works necessary to enhance the beauty of the Falls by distributing the waters so as to produce an unbroken crest line on the Falls. A portion of the water, other than the water needed for scenic works that may be diverted for hydropower purposes of each country, will be divided equally. Exchange of notes confirms above agreement.

Exchange of notes constituting an agreement between the United States of America and Canada regarding the construction of remedial works at Niagara Falls

12:11 PM

The two governments will not object to additional diversions for hydropower purposes of 7,500 CF per second for the United States and 6,000 CF per second for Canada. Treaty between Canada and the United States of America concerning the diversion of the Niagara River

Given the energy needs of both countries in this time of war both parties agree that each of them will divert a set amount of water from the Niagara for hydroelectric purposes. The diversions shall be undertaken, keeping in mind the scenic beauty of the Falls. The United States will utilize an additional 5,000 CF per second and Canada an additional 3,000 CF per second. Exchange of notes constituting an agreement between the United States of America and Canada relating to an additional temporary diversion for power purposes of waters of the Niagara River above the Falls

Brief analysis

17/11/07

N

Sidepayments

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Canada

Canada (UK)

Niagara 1969 – Hydropower (5)

St. Croix 1909 – Water quantity, Border issues, General regulations and Commission creation (6)

(Table D.1 continued)

The parties establish an International Joint Commission. The parties claim that they have exclusive jurisdiction and control over the use and diversion of all the waters on their own side of the border, which in their natural channels would flow across the boundary or into boundary waters. The injured party on either side of the border will be entitled to the same legal remedies as if such injury took place in the country where such diversion or interference occurs. These diversions or obstructions shall be governed by an agreement. The waters of the St. Mary [through-border] and Milk [through-border * 2] Rivers shall be considered one stream and the waters shall be divided equally between the two parties. The agreement also specifically pertains to the Niagara River [border-creator]. Since the agreement also pertains to boundary waters, in general, it also includes the St. Croix, St. Lawrence [partial bordercreator but returns], Kootenay [through-border * 2], Columbia [through-border], Souris [through-border * 2], Skagit [through-border], Red [through-border], St. John [mixed], Yukon [through-border], Stikine [through-border],

A temporary cofferdam is to be built on the Niagara for on site investigations and studies. The exact costs are not indicated by this agreement. However, it is also proposed that the diversions caused by the cofferdam and additional energy resources produced shall be exploited. Entitlement to these power benefits will be divided equally and given to two companies, one representing each country. Each company will provide the sum of $385,000 as contribution for the construction of this dam. Treaty between Great Britain and the United States relating to boundary waters and boundary questions

Exchange of notes constituting an agreement between the United States of America and Canada for the construction of a temporary cofferdam at Niagara

12:11 PM

N

N

17/11/07

USA

USA

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Lebanon

Uruguay

Uruguay

Syria

Brazil

An Nahr Al Khabir 2000 – Dam construction and Water quantity (7) Yaguarón (Jaguarão) 1933 – Border issues, Water quantity and General regulations (8)

Yaguarón Brazil (Jaguarão) 1975/1991 (@) – Scientific

State B

State A

River, treaty year, and topic

Border-creator

Table D.1 Continued

N

N

Determination of the legal status of the frontiers. Also each party shall be entitled to half the waters flowing in the frontier watercourses. However an additional Protocol is included whereby it is said that Brazil assents to work by Uruguay for utilizing the Negro River [through-border] if it so wishes. The Negro River is the only water body specified. In this table the Yaguarón (Jaguarão), Cuareim (Quraí) [border-creator] and Chuy [partial bordercreator] Rivers are also included for this treaty. Basic accord of scientific and technical cooperation between the Government of the Eastern Republic of Uruguay and the Government of the Federal Republic of Brazil in the area of water resources

Convention regarding the determination of the legal status of the frontier between Brazil and Uruguay

12:11 PM

The waters of the river are divided between the two states. Syria will have a right to utilize 60% and Lebanon 40%. Costs are shared equally for building a dam.

Firth [through-border], Whiting [through-border], Taku [through-border], Alesek [through-border] and Chilkat [through-border] Rivers in this table. An agreement between the Syrian Arab Republic and the Lebanese Republic for the sharing of the great Southern River Basin water and building of joint dam on the main course of the river

Brief analysis

17/11/07

N

Sidepayments

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Brazil

Uruguay

N

(Table D.1 continued)

This is a treaty on the Mirim Lagoon Basin but a protocol is added to the treaty regarding the Yaguarón (Jaguarão). It is said that the contracting parties shall bear equal responsibility for the cost of studies and projects and the costs of constructing, operating and maintaining joint works. Joint works and installations shall be owned jointly, in equal shares, by the contracting parties. Non-joint works shall be the responsibility of each party. Joint works will entail river diversion works, cofferdams, dams, bridges, spillways, structures and engineering works for the power station, delivery channels, water gates and attached installations, roller bridges and auxiliary equipment for the power station. Non-joint works shall be the transformation of sub-stations, frequency converters, turbines, generators, water intakes and water supply works, transmission lines and auxiliary installations for hydroelectric power purposes and water intakes, irrigation and drainage channels and attached installations for agriculture and livestock purposes, fish-farms, tourist facilities and permanent staff housing.

12:11 PM

Protocol for the utilization of the water resources of the land bordering on the Jaguarão River annexed to the above mentioned treaty

This is a general agreement of scientific and technical cooperation. No specific river is mentioned but in this table the agreement refers to the Yaguarón (Jaguarão), Cuareim (Quraí) [border-creator], Negro [through-border] and Chuy [partial border-creator] Rivers. The parties agree to cooperate in the area of information exchange and mutual projects. Any specific projects relating to shared waters will be agreed upon by an agreement. Treaty on co-operation for the utilization of the natural resources and the development of the Mirim Lagoon Basin

Complementary accord to the basic accord of scientific and technical cooperation between the Government of the Eastern Republic of Uruguay and the Government of the Federal Republic of Brazil in the area of water resources

17/11/07

Yaguarón (Jaguarão) 1977 – General works, Hydropower and Water quantity (10)

and technical cooperation and General works (9)

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Uruguay

Uruguay

Brazil

Cuareim (Quraí) 1933 – Border issues, Water quantity and General regulations (11)

Cuareim (Quraí) Brazil 1975/1991 (@) – Scientific and technical cooperation and General works (12)

State B

State A

River, treaty year, and topic

Border-creator

Table D.1 Continued

N

This is a general agreement of scientific and technical cooperation. No specific river is mentioned but in this table the agreement refers to the Cuareim (Quraí), Yaguarón (Jaguarão) [border-creator], Negro [through-border] and Chuy [partial border-creator] Rivers. The parties agree to cooperate in the area of information exchange and mutual projects. Any specific projects relating to shared waters will be agreed upon by an agreement.

Complementary accord to the basic accord of scientific and technical cooperation between the Government of the Eastern Republic of Uruguay and the Government of the Federal Republic of Brazil in the area of water resources

12:11 PM

Determination of the legal status of the frontiers. Also each party shall be entitled to half the waters flowing in the frontier watercourses. However an additional Protocol is included whereby it is said that Brazil assents to work by Uruguay for utilizing the Negro River [through-border] if it so wishes. The Negro River is the only water body specified. In this table the Cuareim (Quraí), Negro [through-border], Yaguarón (Jaguarão) [border-creator] and Chuy [partial border-creator] Rivers are also included for this treaty. Basic accord of scientific and technical cooperation between the Government of the Eastern Republic of Uruguay and the Government of the Federal Republic of Brazil in the area of water resources

Convention regarding the determination of the legal status of the frontier between Brazil and Uruguay

Brief analysis

17/11/07

N

Sidepayments

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Brazil

Brazil

Turkey

Cuareim (Quraí) 1991/1991 – General regulations and Commission creation (13)

Cuareim (Quraí) 1997 (@) – Water quantity, Pollution and General regulations (14)

Karasu 1955 (@) – Monitoring, Water quantity and Commission creation (15)

N

(Table D.1 continued)

Three stations will be established on the Karasu. The costs for their establishment will be divided equally. Measurements on the first two stations shall be undertaken by Turkey while the measurements in the third station shall be undertaken by Iran.

Both countries agree to a set division of the waters–the water volume of the river is divided equally between the two parties. Each country will designate an institution in charge of giving out the rights of usage to their own nationals. If any institution is petitioned by their nationals for a total volume of water greater than 50% of the agreed divisions, that institution will have to obtain the approval of the other party’s institution. Both parties promise to adopt the adequate measures so that the quality of the water is in conformity with international standards. Additional information regarding this agreement is available in Brunnée and Hey (1998: 191–2). Treaty between Turkey and Iran on the Sarisu and Karasu Rivers

The exchange of notes confirms the above agreement. Complementary settlement to the accord of cooperation between the Government of the Eastern Republic of Uruguay and the Government of the Federal Republic of Brazil for the use of the natural resources and the development of the Cuareim River Basin

In addition to enumerating a set of general regulations, the agreement establishes a Brazilian-Uruguayan Joint Commission for the Development of the Cuareim (Quraí) River Basin.

Exchange of notes constituting an agreement putting into effect provisionally the above mentioned agreement

Agreement on cooperation for the utilization of the natural resources and development of the Quraí River

12:11 PM

Iran

N

N

17/11/07

Uruguay

Uruguay

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State A

China

China

China

River, treaty year, and topic

Yalu 1958 (@) (16)

Yalu 1960 (@) (17)

Yalu 1971 (@) (18)

N. Korea

N. Korea

NSI

NSI

NSI

Sidepayments

Agreement text is not available. Title retrieved from Ginsburgs and Kim (1977)

Protocol on work of board of directors and inspectors of North Korea and China Yalu River Hydroelectric Company

Agreement text is not available. Title retrieved from Ginsburgs and Kim (1977)

Agreement text is not available. Title retrieved from Ginsburgs and Kim (1977) and Johnston and Chiu (1968). However, this agreement does not appear in Chapter 4 since additional supporting information is not available. Agreement on strengthening cooperation in border zones along the Yalu River

A Commission shall be established to determine how the measurements shall be made. Both sides have the right to use water from the Karasu River as long as they do not violate the border. The agreement also refers to the Sarisu [through-border]. Protocol on China’s supply of whole sets of equipment and machinery for the joint construction of a power station on the Yalu River

Brief analysis

12:11 PM

N. Korea

State B

17/11/07

Border-creator

Table D.1 Continued

Dinar-App-D.qxd Page 216

Upstream state

India

Downstream state

Y

Sidepayments from downstream to upstream state

(Table D.1 continued)

12:11 PM

India fully funds the works in Nepal, which are similar to the works envisioned in the Kosi River Agreement mentioned above. A barrage will be built on the part of the river that forms the border between the two countries. Compensation will be provided for land acquired as well as for any damages that result from the works. Compensation from land revenue is also to be paid. Land taxes are also to be paid. Royalty on materials needed for the project is also paid to Nepal. Nepal will have the right to utilize the water from the river as may be needed for irrigation or for any other purposes from time to time but will not exercise this right in such a manner that will detrimentally affect the water requirements of the project. Irrigation canals will be built by India and will benefit both Nepal and India. Other channels and canals are to be funded by Nepal with India contributing a reasonable sum of money to meet the cost of construction. All these canals are to be handed (except for the main western Canal) over to Nepal whereby operation and maintenance are the responsibility of Nepal. The canals are to provide irrigation benefits to both countries. India is also to build a 15,000 kilowatt (KW) hydropower plant in Nepal. A set amount of power shall be sold to Nepal. India agrees to supply Nepal up to 60% of this load factor. India is also to build a transmission line so as to

Agreement between His Majesty’s Government of Nepal and the Government of India on the Gandak Irrigation and Power Project

Brief analysis

17/11/07

Gandak Nepal 1959 – Hydropower, Flood control, Water quantity, Facility use and Commission creation (1)

River, treaty year, and topic

Mixed

Table D.1 Continued

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India

Teesta 1983 – Water quantity (2)

Kazakhstan

Y

N

Sidepayments from downstream to upstream state

Kazakhstan is to provide compensation to Kyrgyzstan for operation and maintenance costs of the facilities according to the amount of water it

Pending completion of scientific studies it is agreedthat an ad hoc sharing regime of the Teesta River,during the dry season, will be as follows: 36% for Bangladesh and 39% for India with 25% of the water flow not allocated to any particular party. These shares are subject to reallocation after the scientific studies are completed. This ad hoc sharing will be valid until 1985. Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic on utilization of the water facilities of interstate use on the Chu and Talas Rivers

provide the power on any point in one of Nepal’s power grids. The cost would include production of power, at cost, and transmission costs. Ownership and management of the hydropower house shall be transferred to Nepal on one year’s notice and after the full load of 10,000 KW had been developed in Nepal. For 15 years Nepal would sell the power to India at cost. Nepal could elect to purchase the transmission line from India at cost minus depreciation. Agreement on ad-hoc sharing of the Teesta waters between India and Bangladesh reached during the 25th meeting of the Indo-Bangladesh Joint Rivers Commission

Brief analysis

12:11 PM

Bangladesh

Downstream state

17/11/07

Chu Kyrgyzstan 2000 (@) – Facility use and Commission creation (3)

Upstream state

River, treaty year, and topic

Mixed

Table D.1 Continued

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Germany

Germany

Portugal

France

France

Spain

Saar (Sarre) 1961 – Commission creation, Pollution and General regulations (5) Saar (Sarre) 1966 (@) – General Works and Flood control (6) Duoro 1864/1866 – Border issues, Water quantity

Germany

France

Saar (Sarre) 1956 – Border issues, Pollution and General regulations (4)

N

N

(Table D.1 continued)

Regulations annexed to the Boundary Treaty between Spain and Portugal of 9/29/1864

Treaty of Limits between Portugal and Spain

Both parties agree to engage in maintenance works on the part of the river that forms the border between the two countries. The cost of these works will be 600,000 francs, which the countries will divide equally.

Exchange of notes constituting an agreement concerning the infrastructural works on the part of the Saar, with canals, which forms the border

12:11 PM

The parties establish an International Commission to protect the Saar (Sarre) against pollution.

Agreement is largely a territorial one where the disputed Saarland issue is resolved. As for the Saar (Sarre) River, both countries agree that no projects on the part of the river that creates the border between them shall be constructed without an agreement. Parties also agree that they will take measures to ensure the protection of the water quality. Protocol concerning the establishment of an International Commission to protect the Saar against pollution

17/11/07

N

N

uses. All these facilities are located in Kyrgyz territory and owned by the Kyrgyz Republic. Costs for operation and maintenance will be established by a Joint Commission. The parties will also take joint measures to protect the water facilities within their areas of influence from adverse effects. Agreement also refers to the Talas River [through-border]. Treaty between the French Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany for the settlement of the question of the Sarre

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Portugal

Duoro 1927(!)/1951 – Hydropower,

Spain

Portugal

Downstream state

N

N

Sidepayments from downstream to upstream state

This is a very general agreement that does not refer to any river by name but rather refers to the rivers covered by the1866 Annex. The agreement does affirm that both states have equal rights to the waters of the bordering rivers – allowing them to use half of the available water. The countries may grant concessions for the utilization of the rivers but these plans have to be governed by rules dictated by a Commission made of representatives from both countries. The Duoro, Minho (Miño) [partial border-creator], Tagus (Tajo) [mixed], Guadiana [mixed] and Chanza [partial border-creator] Rivers apply to the agreement in the table. Convention between Spain and Portugal to regulate the hydroelectric development of the international section of the River Duoro

This annex is part of a larger territorial agreement. The part of the river that creates the border between the two countries shall be used in common by the peoples of both kingdoms. While the agreement speaks more about the Minho (Miño) River [partial border-creator], it also refers to the Duoro and Tagus (Tajo) [mixed] Rivers in this table. Although not specified, the Guadiana [mixed] and Chanza [partial border-creator] Rivers are also applied to the agreement in this table. The provisions largely refer to land owners that straddle the banks of the rivers. Agreement between Spain and Portugal respecting the industrial use of frontier waters

Brief analysis

12:11 PM

Duoro Spain 1912 (@) – Water quantity, General regulations and Commission creation (8)

Upstream state

17/11/07

and General regulations (7)

River, treaty year, and topic

Mixed

Table D.1 Continued

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Portugal

N

(Table D.1 continued)

The 1988 Agreement is an exchange of notes affirming an amendment to the 1964 Agreement that concerns one of the articles referring to the water division between the two countries.

The parties agree to utilize the international section of the Duoro for hydropower generation. The waters are divided among the parties for the sole development by each for hydropower purposes (no specific divisions are indicated). In general, all the works for the hydropower utilization of the river shall be located in the national territory of the state entitled to such utilization. However, the parties shall be guided by the notion of reciprocity if supporting works need to be built on one party’s territory for the other party’s benefit. The parties also agree to establish a Spanish-Portuguese International Commission to Regulate the Hydroelectric Development of the International Sections of the River Duoro and its tributaries.

12:11 PM

Exchange of notes constituting an agreement amending the above mentioned convention

The 1951 Agreement simply establishes that one additional voting member will be added to the Joint Commission from each country. Convention between Spain and Portugal for regulating the hydroelectric development of the international reaches of the Duoro River and of its tributaries

See the 1964 Convention below. This early convention was revised by the 1964 Convention. Other than the wording, no noticeable changes are apparent between the two conventions.

Exchange of notes amending Article 14, paragraph 2, of the Convention of 8/11/1927

17/11/07

Douro Spain 1964/1988 (!) – Hydropower and Commission creation (10)

Water quantity and Commission creation (9)

Dinar-App-D.qxd Page 221

Upstream state

Spain

Spain

River, treaty year, and topic

Douro 1998 – Pollution, General regulations and Commission creation (11)

Guadiana 1864/1866 – Border issues, Water quantity and General regulations (12)

Mixed

Table D.1 Continued

N

This annex is part of a larger territorial agreement. The part of the river that creates the border between the two countries shall be used in common by the peoples of both kingdoms. While the agreement speaks more about the Minho (Miño) River [partial border-creator], it also refers to the Guadiana and Tagus (Tajo) [mixed] Rivers in this table. Although not specified, the

Regulations annexed to the Boundary Treaty between Spain and Portugal of 9/29/1864

This is a general agreement but is specific to the Duoro, Lima (Limia) [through-border], Minho (Miño) [partial border-creator], Tagus (Tajo) [mixed] and Guadiana [mixed] Rivers. The agreement is in Portuguese but was not translated since it is a general agreement. According to Oregon State’s Database, a Joint Commission is created concerning the rivers. The focus is on environmental protection although the agreement also discusses changes to the hydrology of the river courses and other general issues of transboundary impact. The agreement also discusses terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems that depend on the said waters. Treaty of Limits between Portugal and Spain

Convention concerning cooperation for the protection and sustainable use of the waters of Portuguese-Spanish hydrological basins and additional protocols and annexes

Brief analysis

12:11 PM

Portugal

N

Sidepayments from downstream to upstream state

17/11/07

Portugal

Downstream state

Dinar-App-D.qxd Page 222

Portugal

Portugal

Guadiana Spain 1912 (@) – Water quantity, General regulations and Commission creation (13)

Guadiana Spain 1968/1976 (!) – Water quantity, Hydropower and Commission creation (14)

(Table D.1 continued)

The parties agree to develop the waters of the international reaches of the Guadiana, Lima (Limia) [through-border], Minho (Miño) [partial border-creator], Tagus (Tajo) [mixed] and Chanza [partial bordercreator] Rivers for the benefit of the two nations. Efforts shall be made to harmonize such development. The parties agree to divide the waters of these rivers among them. In order to supplement the planned hydroelectric facility in Portuguese territory, Portugal will be able to use, in Spanish territory, the declivity of the river Lima (Limia) (no specific division of water indicated, only that each state shall enjoy exclusive use of the agreed upon part of the river). In general, all the works for the utilization of the river shall be located in the national

12:11 PM

Second additional protocol to the above mentioned agreement

This is a very general agreement that does not refer to any river by name but rather refers to the rivers covered by the1866 Annex. The agreement does affirm that both states have equal rights to the waters of the bordering rivers – allowing them to use half of the available water. The countries may grant concessions for the utilization of the rivers but these plans have to be governed by rules dictated by a commission made of representatives from both countries. The Guadiana, Minho (Miño) [partial border-creator], Tagus (Tajo) [mixed], Duoro [mixed] and Chanza [partial border-creator] Rivers apply to the agreement in this table. Agreement regulating the use and development of the water resources of the international reaches of the Miño, Limia, Tajo, Guadiana, and Chanza and of their tributaries (with additional protocol)

17/11/07

N

N

Duoro [mixed] and Chanza [partial border-creator] Rivers are also applied to the agreement in this table. The provisions largely refer to land owners that straddle the banks of the rivers. Agreement between Spain and Portugal respecting the industrial use of frontier waters

Dinar-App-D.qxd Page 223

Upstream state

Spain

River, treaty year, and topic

Guadiana 1971 (@) – General regulations, Hydropower, Water quantity and General works (15)

Mixed

Table D.1 Continued

The agreement states the rules established by the Spanish-Portuguese Commission that would govern how concessionary companies can utilize and exploit the river for different purposes as indicated in the 1968 Agreement. The agreement refers to the Guadiana, Lima (Limia) [throughborder], Minho (Miño) [partial border-creator], Tagus (Tajo) [mixed] and Chanza [partial border-creator] Rivers.

The 1976 Protocol also refers to the above rivers but specifically pertains to the Minho (Miño) when it says that both governments may grant a concession for the building of the hydroelectric facility, which must operate as a joint venture. The concessionaries shall participate in the construction and operation of the facility in the proportion indicated (see Minho {Miño} River below). Decree which permits the publication and operation of the Statute of Use of the Spanish-Portuguese Commission to regulate the use and exploitation of the international sections of the rivers Miño, Limia, Tajo, Guadiana, and Chanza and their tributaries

territory of the state entitled to such utilization. However, the parties shall be guided by the notion of reciprocity if supporting works need to be built on one’s territory for the other’s benefit. The parties also establish the Spanish-Portuguese Commission.

Brief analysis

12:11 PM

N

Sidepayments from downstream to upstream state

17/11/07

Portugal

Downstream state

Dinar-App-D.qxd Page 224

Portugal

Portugal

Spain

Tagus (Tajo) 1864/1866 – Border issues, Water quantity and General regulations (17)

Tagus (Tajo) Spain 1912 (@) – Water quantity, General regulations and Commission creation (18)

Portugal

Spain

Guadiana 1998 – Pollution, General regulations and Commission creation (16)

N

(Table D.1 continued)

This is a very general agreement that does not refer to any river by name but rather refers to the rivers covered by the1866 Annex. The agreement does affirm that both states have equal rights to the waters of the bordering rivers – allowing them to use half of the available water.

This annex is part of a larger territorial agreement. The part of the river that creates the border between the two countries shall be used in common by the peoples of both kingdoms. While the agreement speaks more about the Minho (Miño) River [partial border-creator], it also refers to the Tagus (Tajo) and Guadiana [mixed] Rivers in this table. Although not specified, the Duoro [mixed] and Chanza [partial border-creator] Rivers are also applied to the agreement in this table. The provisions largely refer to land owners that straddle the banks of the rivers. Agreement between Spain and Portugal respecting the industrial use of frontier waters

12:11 PM

Regulations annexed to the Boundary Treaty between Spain and Portugal of 9/29/1864

This is a general agreement but is specific to the Guadiana, Lima (Limia) [through-border], Minho (Miño) [partial border-creator], Tagus (Tajo) [mixed] and Duoro [mixed] Rivers. The agreement is in Portuguese but was not translated since it is a general agreement. According to Oregon State’s Database, a Joint Commission is created concerning the rivers. The focus is on environmental protection although the agreement also discusses changes to the hydrology of the river courses and other general issues of transboundary impact. The agreement also discusses terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems that depend on the said waters. Treaty of Limits between Portugal and Spain

Convention concerning cooperation for the protection and sustainable use of the waters of Portuguese-Spanish hydrological basins and additional protocols and annexes

17/11/07

N

N

Dinar-App-D.qxd Page 225

Upstream state

N

Sidepayments from downstream to upstream state

The parties agree to develop the waters of the international reaches of the Tagus (Tajo), Lima (Limia) [through-border], Minho (Miño) [partial border-creator], Guadiana [mixed], and Chanza [partial border-creator] Rivers for the benefit of the two nations. Efforts shall be made to harmonize such development. The parties agree to divide the waters of these rivers among them. In order to supplement the planned hydroelectric facility in Portuguese territory, Portugal will be able to use, in Spanish territory, the declivity of the river Lima (Limia) (no specific division of water indicated, only that each state shall enjoy exclusive use of the agreed upon part of the river). In general, all the works for the utilization of the river shall be located in the national territory of the state entitled to such utilization. However, the parties shall be guided by the notion of reciprocity if

Second additional protocol to the above mentioned agreement

The countries may grant concessions for the utilization of the rivers but these plans have to be governed by rules dictated by a Commission made of representatives from both countries. The Tagus (Tajo), Minho (Miño) [partial border-creator], Guadiana [mixed], Duoro [mixed] and Chanza [partial border-creator] Rivers apply to the agreement in this table. Agreement regulating the use and development of the water resources of the international reaches of the Miño, Limia, Tajo, Guadiana, and Chanza and of their tributaries (with additional protocol)

Brief analysis

12:11 PM

Portugal

Downstream state

17/11/07

Tagus (Tajo) Spain 1968/1976 (!) – Water quantity, Hydropower and Commission creation (19)

River, treaty year, and topic

Mixed

Table D.1 Continued

Dinar-App-D.qxd Page 226

Spain

Spain

Tagus (Tajo) 1998 – Pollution, General regulations and Commission creation (21)

N

N

(Table D.1 continued)

This is a general agreement but is specific to the Tagus (Tajo), Lima (Limia) [through-border], Minho (Miño) [partial border-creator], Guadiana [mixed] and Duoro [mixed] Rivers. The agreement is in Portuguese but was not translated since it is a general agreement. According to Oregon State’s Database, a Joint Commission is created concerning the rivers. The focus is on environmental protection although the agreement also discusses changes to the hydrology of the river courses and other general issues of transboundary impact. The agreement also discusses terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems that depend on the said waters.

The agreement states the rules established by the Spanish-Portuguese Commission that would govern how concessionary companies can utilize and exploit the river for different purposes as indicated in the 1968 Agreement. The agreement refers to the Tagus (Tajo), Lima (Limia) [through-border], Minho (Miño) [partial border-creator], Guadiana [mixed] and Chanza [partial border-creator] Rivers. Convention concerning cooperation for the protection and sustainable use of the waters of Portuguese-Spanish hydrological basins and additional protocols and annexes

12:11 PM

Portugal

Portugal

17/11/07

Tagus (Tajo) 1971 (@) – General regulations, Hydropower, Water quantity and General works (20)

supporting works need to be built on one’s territory for the other’s benefit. The parties also establish the Spanish–Portuguese Commission. The 1976 Protocol also refers to the above rivers but specifically pertains to the Minho (Miño) when it says that both governments may grant a concession for the building of the hydroelectric facility, which must operate as a joint venture. The concessionaries shall participate in the construction and operation of the facility in the proportion indicated (see Minho {Miño} River below). Decree which permits the publication and operation of the Statute of Use of the Spanish-Portuguese Commission to regulate the use and exploitation of the international sections of the rivers Miño, Limia, Tajo, Guadiana and Chanza and their tributaries

Dinar-App-D.qxd Page 227

Upstream state

Albania

Bulgaria

River, treaty year, and topic

Crni Drim 1956 – General regulations, Hydropower, Flood control, Water quantity and Commission creation (22)

Tundzha 1968 – General regulations, Flood control, General Works and Commission creation (23)

Mixed

Table D.1 Continued

N

This is a general agreement, which pertains specifically to the Veleka, Tundzha [mixed] and Rezvaya (Rezovska) [partial border-creator] Rivers. The parties agree that they will cooperate in determining which structures and installations can be constructed and used for the benefit of the two countries especially in the case of protection from floods and water for irrigation. The parties shall also avoid causing any damages to the other

This is a general agreement but with special reference to the Crni Drim, Bojana [partial border-creator] and Belli Drim [through-border] Rivers. The parties also agree that they will reach agreement if either party wants to change the water economy relations on the watercourses regarding hydropower, flood control and water supply. Costs and payments will also be agreed upon in such an agreement. A Joint Yugoslav-Albanian Water Commission will be formed. Agreement between the People’s Republic of Bulgaria and the Republic of Turkey concerning cooperation in the use of the waters of rivers flowing through the territory of both countries

Agreement between the Government of the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia and the Government of the Federal People’s Republic of Albania concerning water economy questions, together with the statute of the Yugoslav-Albanian Water Economic Commission and with the protocol concerning fishing in frontier lakes and rivers

Brief analysis

12:11 PM

Turkey

N

Sidepayments from downstream to upstream state

17/11/07

Yugoslavia

Downstream state

Dinar-App-D.qxd Page 228

Czechoslovakia N, from upstream to downstream state

(Table D.1 continued)

This is actually a border shifting agreement. The geography of the river prior to the agreement is unknown. Territorial exchanges are required because Poland wants to build a dam on the Dunajec River and requires territory that

This is a general agreement. The parties agree that any specific works to be undertaken shall be governed by an agreement. The parties also agree to abate pollution in their shared rivers. The parties agree to appoint plenipotentiaries from each country to carry out the tasks emanating from the agreement. The agreement only refers specifically to the Petruvka [through-border * 2] and Olma [through-border * 2] Rivers saying that the 1928 Agreement shall cease to exist. Only the provisions included in the 1928 Agreement shall apply in respect to the execution of works until 12/31/1958. In this table the agreement also pertains to the Dunajec, Orawa [through-border] and Witka (Smeda) [through-border] Rivers. Agreement concerning a change in the boundary line of the state frontier and certain other matters relating to the construction and operation by Poland of a dam on the Dunajec River

This is a general agreement that refers to no specific river by name. It is a larger economic, technical, industrial and scientific cooperation agreement. The parties agree to cooperate in the field of energy and agriculture, including the common use of the waters, which the two parties share. In this table the agreement pertains to the Veleka, Tundzha [mixed] and Rezvaya (Rezovska) [partial border-creator] Rivers. Agreement between the Government of Czechoslovak Republic and the Government of Polish People’s Republic concerning the use of water resources in frontier waters

12:11 PM

Poland

Czechoslovakia N

Poland

N

Turkey

Bulgaria

17/11/07

Dunajec 1975 (@) – Border issues and Dam construction (26)

Tundzha 1975 (@) – Scientific and technical cooperation, Water quantity, Hydropower and General works (24) Dunajec 1958 – Pollution, General regulations and Commission creation (25)

party. An agreement will govern any specific measure taken by the parties. A Mixed Bulgarian-Turkish Commission will be established. Accord pertaining to long term economic, technical, industrial, and scientific cooperation, between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Government of the People’s Republic of Bulgaria

Dinar-App-D.qxd Page 229

Upstream state

Ecuador

Ecuador

River, treaty year, and topic

Catamayo-Chira 1944 – Border issues (27)

Catamayo-Chira 1971/1972/ 1975 (@) – General works, Water quantity and Commission creation (28)

Mixed

Table D.1 Continued

Peru

N

Exchange of letters constituting an agreement amending the rules of procedure of the Mixed Commission for the Puyango-Tumbes and

Exchange of letters constituting an agreement approving the rules of the Mixed Peruvian-Ecuadorian Commission for the Puyango-Tumbes and CatamayoChira Basins as provided for in Article 16 of the above mentioned agreement

This is an agreement that is specific to the Catamayo-Chira, Puyango-Tumbes [mixed] and Zarumilla [partial border-creator] Rivers. The agreement specifies where the boundary line will fall. Agreement for the development of the binational Puyango-Tumbes and Catamayo-Chira Basins by Peru and Ecuador (with provisional rules of procedure of the Mixed Peruvian-Ecuadorian Commission for the PuyangoTumbes and Catamayo-Chira Basins)

is under Czechoslovak sovereignty. The Czechoslovaks agree to the land swap whereby Poland will receive the same amount of land from Czechoslovakia as it will provide in return. Poland will reimburse Czechoslovakia for particular costs associated with expropriation proceedings in respect to land now transferred to Poland and compensation with regards to part of a road and telecommunications equipment. Compensation may also be provided if damage is caused in the Czechoslovak territory from the dam unless Poland can show it was not responsible for the damage. This agreement is not considered in Chapter 5 because it does not pertain to the river per se. Declaration and exchange of notes concerning the termination of the process of demarcation of the Peruvian-Ecuadorian frontier

Brief analysis

12:11 PM

N

Sidepayments from downstream to upstream state

17/11/07

Peru

Downstream state

Dinar-App-D.qxd Page 230

Peru

Peru

Ecuador

PuyangoEcuador Tumbes 1971/1972/ 1975 (@) – General works, Water quantity, Hydropower and Commission creation (30)

NSI

N

(Table D.1 continued)

Exchange of letters constituting an agreement approving the rules of the Mixed Peruvian-Ecuadorian Commission for the Puyango-Tumbes and Catamayo-Chira Basins as provided for in Article 16 of the above mentioned agreement

This is an agreement that is specific to the Puyango-Tumbes, Catamayo-Chira [mixed] and Zarumilla [partial border-creator] Rivers. The agreement specifies where the boundary line will fall. Agreement for the development of the binational Puyango-Tumbes and Catamayo-Chira Basins by Peru and Ecuador (with provisional rules of procedure of the Mixed Peruvian-Ecuadorian Commission for the Puyango-Tumbes and Catamayo-Chira Basins)

12:11 PM

PuyangoTumbes 1944 – Border issues (29)

17/11/07

The 1972 and 1975 Exchange of Notes reaffirm some of the rules of the Mixed Commission and amend other rules, respectively. Declaration and exchange of notes concerning the termination of the process of demarcation of the Peruvian-Ecuadorian frontier

This is an agreement specific to the Catamayo-Chira and Puyango-Tumbes [mixed] Rivers. The parties agree that the Chira flow rate is sufficient for carrying out specific national projects concerning irrigation, water management and conservation. Projects in both basins will be carried out on the understanding that implementation thereof shall be governed by the criteria of rational utilization consistent with the social and economic needs of the people living in the areas to be serviced. Both countries will consult with each other if projects that are planned may lead to structural changes. The parties also establish a Peruvian-Ecuadorian Mixed Commission.

Catamayo-Chira Basins established in accordance with the above mentioned agreement

Dinar-App-D.qxd Page 231

River, treaty year, and topic

Mixed

Upstream state

Table D.1 Continued

Downstream state

Sidepayments from downstream to upstream state

12:11 PM

This is an agreement specific to the Puygango-Tumbes and CatamayoChira [mixed] Rivers regarding irrigation, water management and conservation. The part of the agreement concerning the Puango-Tumbes River affirms that both parties shall carry out the activities for implementing the bi-national Puyango-Tumbes project with the development of at least 50,000 hectares in Ecuador and at least 20,000 hectares in Peru. Studies shall cover the possibility of making additional arable land available (for example, an additional 16,000 hectares in Peru). The two parties will submit, to the Inter-American Development Bank or another international financing body, an application for financing the studies for the bi-national project in order to facilitate the financing of the actual works. The costs of the studies and the joint construction works shall be defrayed by both countries in proportion to the water quantity and power, which are eventually delivered to each country. Pending completion of the definitive studies, each country will be responsible for one half of the costs. An initial adjustment will be made in proportion to the quantities of water and power supplied to each country after the studies have been officially approved by the two countries. The parties also establish a Peruvian-Ecuadorian Mixed Commission.

17/11/07

Exchange of letters constituting an agreement amending the rules of procedure of the Mixed Commission for the Puyango-Tumbes and Catamayo-Chira Basins established in accordance with the above mentioned agreement

Brief analysis

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Haiti

Haiti

Dominican Republic

Artibonite 1929 (!&) – Border issues, Water quantity and General regulations (32)

Artibonite Dominican 1935/1936 (@) – Republic Water quantity and Border issues (33)

Haiti

Dominican Republic

Artibonite 1929 (@) – Border issues (31)

N

(Table D.1 continued)

This is a territorial limits treaty which settles particular difficulties regarding tracing the frontiers between the two countries that arose since the signing of the 1929 Treaty of Delimitation. The agreement refers specifically to the Artibonite River and affirms that the waters of the river belong equally to the two parties and the use of the river shall be governed by the provisions of the 1929 Treaty of Delimitation.

Additional protocol to the Treaty of 1/21/1929 regarding the delimitation of the frontier between the two countries

12:11 PM

This is a general treaty of friendship and peace between the two countries. It does not refer to any specific river. The parties undertake not to carry out, or be a party to, any construction works calculated to change the natural course of the river and to affect the waters derived from them. This provision does not prevent the parties from making equitable use of the waters in their territory. In this table the agreement pertains to the Artibonite, Pendernales [partial border-creator] and Massacre (Dajabon) [partial border-creator * 2] Rivers. Boundary agreement between the Dominican Republic and the Republic of Haiti

This is a general territorial limits agreement. The treaty refers specifically to the Artibonite, Pendernales [partial border-creator] and Massacre (Dajabon) [partial border-creator * 2] Rivers but only in reference to borders and other territorial issues. Treaty of peace, friendship and arbitration between the Dominican Republic and Haiti

17/11/07

N

N

The 1972 and 1975 Exchange of Notes reaffirm some of the rules of the Mixed Commission and amend other rules, respectively. Treaty of the delimitation of the frontier between the Dominican Republic and the Republic of Haiti

Dinar-App-D.qxd Page 233

Italy

Torrente Switzerland Breggia 1970/1972 (&) – General works and Flood control (35)

Downstream state

The 1936 agreement simply affirms the settlement of the above mentioned difficulties. The provisions related to the Artibonite remain unchanged. In this table, the agreement pertains to the Artibonite, Pendernales [partial border-creator] and Massacre (Dajabon) [partial border-creator * 2] Rivers. Convention between Switzerland and Italy concerning the protection of Italo-Swiss waters against pollution

Brief analysis

The parties agree to develop the area where the river forms the boundary. The 1972 Agreement codifies many of the points raised by the 1970

This is a general convention regarding the protection of the waters between Italy and Switzerland against pollution. The agreement specifically mentions the Torrente Breggia, Spöl [mixed], Doveria [through-border], Melezza [mixed] and Maira (Mera) [through-border] Rivers. The parties also establish a Mixed Commission for the Protection of Italo-Swiss Waters Against Pollution. Any specific works or investigations, and the expenses relating to them, shall be established in an agreement. N, from Exchange of letters between Switzerland and Italy concerning works upstream related to the flow of the Breggia on the Italian-Swiss border to downstream Convention relating to the hydraulic development of the Torrente Breggia state on the Italian-Swiss border (with annexes)

N

Sidepayments from downstream to upstream state

12:11 PM

Italy

Upstream state

17/11/07

Torrente Breggia Switzerland 1972 – Pollution, General regulations, General works and Commission creation (34)

River, treaty year, and topic

Mixed

Table D.1 Continued

Dinar-App-D.qxd Page 234

Italy

Mexico

Colorado USA 1889/1895/1896/ 1897/1898/ 1899/1900/ 1944 – Border issues, General regulations, and Commission creation (37)

(Table D.1 continued)

This is a boundary waters agreement that refers to the Colorado River and the Rio Grande (Río Bravo del Norte) [partial border-creator]. The agreement states that with regards to the part of the river that forms the border between the two states, if any questions or differences arise they shall be submitted to an International Boundary Commission, which shall have exclusive jurisdiction in the case of the said differences and questions. The Commission will be made up of participants from both parties and will be responsible to attend to either natural or man-made changes (works or projects) to the river that are taking place on the frontier region that may be harming to either party.

This is a general convention regarding the protection of the waters between Italy and Switzerland against pollution. The agreement specifically mentions the Melezza, Spöl [mixed], Doveria [through-border], Torrente Breggia [mixed] and Maira (Mera) [through-border] Rivers. The parties also establish a Mixed Commission for the Protection of Italo-Swiss Waters Against Pollution. Any specific works or investigations, and the expenses relating to them, shall be established in an agreement. Convention to avoid the difficulties occasioned by reason of the changes which take place in the beds of the Rio Grande and Colorado (Also known as the Boundary Waters Agreement)

12:11 PM

N

N

17/11/07

Melezza Switzerland 1972 – Pollution, General regulations, General works and Commission creation (36)

Exchange of Notes. The responsibilities for this development will be divided among the parties. Each party will be responsible for the expenses emanating from its responsibilities. Annex A of the agreement actually considers the benefits derived from each of the works and the associated fraction of the costs incurred on each party. The cost of the works for Switzerland will total 2,233,000 Swiss francs. The costs of the works for Italy will total 152,000,000 lira. In dollar terms, the costs are $678,723 and $254,180, respectively – exchange rates are based on first trade day of the year for 1972 at 3.920 Swiss francs per US dollar and 598 Italian lira per US dollar (Triacom). Convention between Switzerland and Italy concerning the protection of ItaloSwiss waters against pollution

Dinar-App-D.qxd Page 235

Upstream state

USA

River, treaty year, and topic

Colorado 1944 – Water quantity and Flood control (38)

Mixed

Table D.1 Continued

This is an agreement that relates to both water allocation between the parties and the construction of works. It refers specifically to the Colorado and the Tijuana [through-border] Rivers and the Rio Grande (Río Bravo del Norte) [partial border-creator]. In addition to dividing the waters among them for the Colorado, (guaranteed 1,500,000 acre feet to Mexico annually) the parties also agree to several works. Mexico is to build at its expense a diversion structure (known later as Morelos Dam located below the point where the northernmost part of the international land boundary intersects the Colorado River). If this structure is located on the boundary, the plans shall be subject to the approval of the Commission. Regardless, Mexico will also be responsible for the costs incurred for flood protection facilities that will protect the USA from floods or seepage given the said diversion structure. The United States shall build, operate and maintain the Davis storage dam and reservoir, a part of the capacity of which shall be used to make possible the regulation at the boundary of the waters to be delivered to Mexico. The United States shall also construct or acquire in its own

The other agreement years are simply extensions of the original agreement. Treaty between the United States of America and Mexico relating to the utilization of the waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande

Brief analysis

12:11 PM

Y

Sidepayments from downstream to upstream state

17/11/07

Mexico

Downstream state

Dinar-App-D.qxd Page 236

12:11 PM

(Table D.1 continued)

17/11/07

1944 Agreement also indefinitely extends 1889 Agreement

territory the works that may be necessary to convey a part of the waters of the Colorado River allotted to Mexico under this agreement to the Mexican diversion points on the international land boundary line referred to in this treaty. Among these works shall be included: the canal and other works necessary to convey water from the lower end of the Pilot Knob Wasteway to the international boundary, and, should Mexico request it, a canal to connect the main diversion structure (Morelos Dam), if this diversion structure should be built in the limitrophe section of the river, with the Mexican system of canals at an agreed upon point. Such works shall be constructed or acquired and operated and maintained by the United States section at the expense of Mexico. Mexico shall also pay the costs of any sites or rights of way required for such works. Finally, Mexico shall also pay the United States the costs of using the All-American Canal to make particular water deliveries to Mexico. Mexico shall also pay a portion of the construction costs of Imperial Dam given the proportionate uses of these facilities by the parties and their operation and maintenance. In the event that revenues from hydropower generated at one of the facilities, used to deliver water to Mexico, can be used to amortize the costs of all the facilities Mexico is benefiting from for its water deliveries, Mexico’s costs will be reduced or repaid in the same proportion as the balance of the total cots are reduced or repaid. Both countries shall also construct and maintain, in their own territories, gauging systems so as to measure the water quantities being received by Mexico and to monitor the river. The Commission shall be responsible for these stations on the limitrophe sections of the river. Plans for flood control shall also be recommended by the Commission and once approved by the two governments shall be constructed and financed according to the respective project undertaken by each party. Joint works, as recommended by the Commission, shall be operated and maintained at equal costs. International Boundary Commission becomes International Water and Boundary Commission.

Dinar-App-D.qxd Page 237

Upstream state

USA

USA

River, treaty year, and topic

Colorado 1966 – Water quantity (39)

Colorado 1972/1973/ 1973 – Pollution (40)

Mixed

Table D.1 Continued

Mexico

Exchange of notes constituting an agreement concerning the loan of waters of the Colorado River for irrigation of lands in the Mexicali Valley

Brief analysis

The United States does not provide a direct side-payment to Mexico but it does commit itself to provide Mexico with much improved water quality

Minute 242: Agreement setting forth a permanent and definitive solution to the international problem of the salinity of the Colorado River

12:11 PM

Mexico is requesting an additional amount of water to be delivered by the United States to relieve the critical shortage of irrigation water in the Mexicali Valley. The United States therefore supplies Mexico an amount of water, in addition to the water allotted to Mexico under the 1944 Agreement with the United States (an additional 40,535 acre feet during the months of September and December 1966). The United States will retain this amount in 1967 from its scheduled allotments to Mexico under the 1944 Agreement. Mexico agrees to reimburse the USA for any power generation loss caused by the loss of power head resulting from the release of the said waters to Mexico under this agreement. N, from Minute 241: Agreement of the International Boundary and Water upstream Commission to downstream Agreement extending Minute 241 of the International Boundary and Water state Commission

Y

Sidepayments from downstream to upstream state

17/11/07

Mexico

Downstream state

Dinar-App-D.qxd Page 238

USA

Mexico

N

(Table D.1 continued)

This is a general agreement referring to environmental protection and pollution abatement in the border areas. The parties agree to cooperate in the field of environmental protection and agree that they will adopt appropriate measures to eliminate, reduce or prevent pollution in their side of the border that may harm the other country. Specific projects may be agreed to. The agreement refers to no river in particular but in this table the agreement pertains to the Colorado, Tijuana [through-border] and New [through-border] Rivers and the Rio Grande (Río Bravo del Norte) [partial border-creator].

12:11 PM

Colorado 1983 – Pollution and General regulations (41)

17/11/07

Through the final 1973 Agreement the solution to the salinity problem now becomes definitive. The USA adopts measures where the waters delivered to Mexico upstream of Morelos Dam shall have an average salinity of no more than 115 parts per million. Mexico agrees to the United States dumping some of the drainage waters, and an accepted amount of brine from the desalting activity, in Mexico. It is important to mention that the water quality was not the same quality as it was before the pollution problem began. Thus, Mexico had to settle for lower quality water. At the same time this was a final solution to the problem and was not revisited. Agreement between the United States of America and the United Mexican States on cooperation for the protection and improvement of the environment in the border area

which will reduce the salinity of such waters by 100 parts per million as compared to what Mexico was getting before. As such the United States undertakes actions which favor Mexico without compensation. The volumes of water delivered stay the same. The 1973 Agreement is simply an extension of the original agreement. These agreements are temporary solutions between the parties regarding the salinity problem of the Colorado River.

Dinar-App-D.qxd Page 239

Mexico

Mexico

USA

Colorado 1985 – Pollution and General regulations (42)

Colorado USA 1992 – Pollution and General regulations (43)

Downstream state

Upstream state

River, treaty year, and topic

Mixed

Table D.1 Continued

N

Approves a proposed program of sampling and analyses of the waters of the international part of the Rio Grande (Río Bravo del Norte) [partial border-creator]. The International Boundary and Water Commission will then propose to the two governments some recommendations regarding this issue. The agreement also makes very brief reference to the Colorado in the larger context of the Rio Grande (Río Bravo del Norte) and water quality.

12:11 PM

This is a general agreement referring to cooperation in a environmental protection and pollution abatement due to discharges of hazardous substances. The parties establish the United States-Mexico Joint Contingency Plan to provide cooperative measures to deal effectively with polluting incidents. The parties agree to come up with response plans to deal with imminent, or already existing, polluting incidents. An agreement will determine a joint response to the incident. Specific arrangements for the solution of common problems may be agreed upon by the parties. The agreement refers to no specific river but in this table the agreement applies to the Colorado, Tijuana [through-border] and New [through-border] Rivers and the Rio Grande (Río Bravo del Norte) [partial border-creator]. Minute 289: Observation of the quality of the waters along the United States and Mexico border

Agreement of cooperation between the United States of America and the United Mexican States regarding pollution of the environment along the inland international boundary by discharges of hazardous substances

Brief analysis

17/11/07

N

Sidepayments from downstream to upstream state

Dinar-App-D.qxd Page 240

USA

Bulgaria

Colorado 1994 – Flood control (44)

Nestos (Mesta) 1971 (@) – Commission creation, Hydropower and Water quantity (45)

(Table D.1 continued)

12:11 PM

The two parties establish a Greek-Bulgarian Commission for cooperating in the area of electric energy and water utilization. The mandate of the Commission consists of studying and making decisions on questions related to the cooperation between the two countries on the issues mentioned above. The Commission will also be able to formulate propositions to the two governments, if these are shown to be necessary, and study other issues of common interest, which could be suggested by these governments. No specific river is mentioned in this agreement (although the agreement refers to rivers that cross their territories) but in this table the agreement applies to the Nestos and Struma [through-border] Rivers.

N, from Minute 291: Improvements to the conveying capacity of the international upstream boundary segment of the Colorado River to downstream This agreement is concerned with the improvement of the conveying state capacity of the Colorado River – that is sediment removal in the Morelos Dam area (located on the part of the river that creates the border). The sediment removal would assist Mexico in diverting its allotted waters under the 1944 Agreement. Both states will act to remove sediments in the Morelos Dam area within their own jurisdictions. The United States will also remove sediments in the territory of Mexico. The USA, therefore, is undertaking actions which favor Mexico without compensation. Mexico will provide the appropriate site for the sediment dumping. Alternatives to improve the conveyance capacity of the Colorado River will be proposed by the United States to Mexico. N Accord between the Government of the Kingdom of Greece and the Government of the People’s Republic of Bulgaria with regards to the creation of a Greco-Bulgarian Commission for cooperation between the two countries in the areas of electric energy and the utilization of the waters of rivers crossing their territories

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Greece

Mexico

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Greece

Russia

Bulgaria

Nestos (Mesta) 1995 (&) – Water quantity and Commission creation (46)

Jenisei (Yenisei) Mongolia 1995 – Pollution and General regulations (47)

Downstream state

Upstream state

River, treaty year, and topic

Mixed

Table D.1 Continued

N

Agreement text is not available. According to Oregon State’s Database this is a general agreement that provides for qualitative protection of water

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The parties agree to exchange information on water quality and water quantity and regarding existing, under construction, and under consideration projects that may affect the flow of water and its quality. The parties also agree that Greece shall have a right to utilize 29% of the total quantity of waters that are formed in Bulgaria (this is based on the total amount of water that naturally flow from Bulgaria over a period of many years). Based on the years 1935–1970 the average flow has been determined to be 1.5 billion cubic meters (BCM). This amount shall be updated within a maximum of three years after this agreement takes force. The number will then be updated every seven years. The parties have agreed to establish a Permanent Hellenic-Bulgarian Water Economy Commission. Disputes regarding this agreement shall be resolved by the Commission. If the Commission is not successful, the dispute shall be resolved by negotiations between the two governments. This treaty shall remain in force for 35 years. Agreement between the Government of Mongolia and the Government of the Russian Federation on the protection and use of transboundary waters

Agreement between the Government of the Hellenic Republic and the Government of Bulgaria regarding the waters of the Nestos River

Brief analysis

17/11/07

N

Sidepayments from downstream to upstream state

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Russia

Russia

Canada (UK)

Tobol Kazakhstan 1992 – Pollution, Water quantity, Flood control and General regulations (48)

Kazakhstan

USA

Tobol 1996 (@) – Pollution, Water quantity, Flood control and General regulations (49) St. John 1909 – Water quantity, General regulations and Commission creation (50) N

(Table D.1 continued)

The parties establish an International Joint Commission. The parties claim they have exclusive jurisdiction and control over the use and diversion of all the waters on their own side of the border, which in their natural channels would flow across the boundary or into boundary waters. The injured party on either side of the border will be entitled to the same legal remedies as if such injury took place in the country where such diversion or interference occurs. These diversions or obstructions shall be governed by an agreement. The waters of the St. Mary [through-border] and Milk [through-border * 2] Rivers shall be considered one stream and the waters shall be divided equally between the two parties. The agreement also specifically pertains to the Niagara River [border-creator]. Since the agreement also pertains to boundary waters, in general, it also includes the St. John, St. Croix [border-creator],

Treaty between Great Britain and the United States relating to boundary waters and boundary questions

12:11 PM

Agreement text is not available. According to UNECE (2003) the agreement pertains to qualitative and quantitative protection of water resources, water supply, irrigation, floods and regulation. A Joint Working Group is also established.

Agreement text is not available. According to Oregon State’s Database this is a general agreement with reference to quantitative and qualitative protection of water resources, water-supply. It also refers to other issues such as irrigation and floods. The agreement specifically refers to the Tobol, Ishim [through-border] and Ural [partial border-creator * 2] Rivers. Protocol on joint use and protection of transboundary water bodies and coordination of water management in the Tobol River Basin

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NSI

N

resources. In this table the agreement applies to the Jenisei (Yenisei), Onon [through-border] and Selenga [through-border] Rivers. Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Government of the Russian Federation concerning the joint use and protection of transboundary waters

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Canada

St. John USA 1984 – Pollution and General regulations (52)

Downstream state

N

N

Sidepayments from downstream to upstream state

The parties agree to continue to preserve and enhance the water quality of the international section of the St. John River. Both governments agree to utilize the water quality objectives suggested by the Committee as indicators for implementation and the development of specific programs in both countries.

The parties establish a Canada-United States Committee on Water Quality. The Committee shall be responsible for exchanging information, defining water quality objectives and making appropriate recommendations to the parties regarding the international section of the St. John River. Exchange of notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America constituting an agreement regarding the continued preservation and enhancement of the water quality in the international section of the St. John River

St. Lawrence [partial border-creator but returns], Skagit [through-border], Columbia [through-border], Red [through-border], Kootenay [throughborder * 2], Souris [through-border * 2], Yukon [through-border], Stikine [through-border], Firth [through-border], Whiting [through-border], Taku [through-border], Alesek [through-border] and Chilkat [through-border] Rivers in this table. Agreement relating to the establishment of a Canada-United States Committee on Water Quality in the St. John River and its tributary rivers and streams which cross the Canada-United States boundary (with annex)

Brief analysis

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Canada

Upstream state

17/11/07

St. John USA 1972 – Pollution, General regulations and Commission creation (51)

River, treaty year, and topic

Mixed

Table D.1 Continued

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Iran

Italy

Duverij (Doveyrich) 1975 – Water quantity and Commission creation (53)

Spöl 1957 (&) – Hydropower (54)

(Table D.1 continued)

The parties wish to exploit the hydroelectric potential of the Spöl River. A dam is built to create a reservoir (Livigno Reservoir) and is built on the part of the border where the river flows. The Swiss (through a concessionary) are responsible for the construction of the dam. The hydropower plant will also be operated by the Swiss. Italy will have a right to a set amount of energy. No taxes shall be levied for this energy. The Swiss shall also be responsible for the maintenance of the infrastructure for delivering this energy to Italy. The subsequent reservoir mostly inundates Italian territory. The reservoir supplies a chain of hydroelectric plants solely in Swiss territory. While the agreement is named after the Spöl River the waters accumulating in the Livignio Reservoir also originate in Switzerland and flow into the Reservoir. Thus, while Italy is upstream on the Spöl, Switzerland is upstream on other rivers flowing into the reservoir such as the Val Mora. Another river that collects into the Livigno Reservoir is the Ova dal Gal. The river originates in Italy. Before the reservoir was built, the river

This is a water sharing agreement. The agreement specifically mentions the Duverij (Doveyrich), Kanjan Cham [through-border], Gangir [through-border] and Tib (Mehmeh) [through-border] Rivers, although it applies to other rivers in general. In this table the agreement applies to the specific aforementioned rivers. As for the waters of the Duverij (Doveyrich) they shall be divided between the parties on the basis of the reports of the 1914 Commission on the Delimitation of the IranianOttoman frontier and in accordance with custom. The parties also establish a Joint Commission, which will decide how to divide up the waters of the Duverij (Doveyrich) River. Convention between the Swiss Federation and the Italian Republic concerning the hydroelectric utilization of the Spöl

Agreement between Iran and Iraq concerning the use of frontier watercourses

12:11 PM

Y

N

17/11/07

Switzerland

Iraq

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River, treaty year, and topic

Upstream state

Downstream state

Sidepayments from downstream to upstream state

The agreement, however, is also made up of a second part. In this part of the agreement Italy is to build two reservoirs (San Giacomo and Cancano) and dams solely in its own territory for the creation of hydropower. However, 97 MCM per year of the waters flowing into the Livigno Reservoir that could have been used in Switzerland to create

12:11 PM

flowed from Italy up towards the border with Switzerland. It then flowed along the border between the two countries and finally into the part of the Spöl that creates the border between the two countries. After the reservoir was built, the Ova dal Gal flowed directly into the reservoir. The geographical issues associated with this agreement are, therefore, quite complex. The agreement recognizes that Italy contributes water to the Livigno Reservoir, which is used to produce hydroelectricity in Switzerland. Therefore, Italy is owed a set amount of hydropower from Switzerland (36.5 million KW hours per year).

Brief analysis

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Mixed

Table D.1 Continued

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Guinea-Bissau

Coliba-Corubal 1978 – Commission creation, Pollution, Hydropower and Water quantity (56)

N

N

(Table D.1 continued)

The agreement is in French but was not translated since it is a general agreement. According to Oregon State’s Database, the parties establish a Joint Commission to study the hydrology of the river and develop management plans for the basin.

This is a general convention regarding the protection of the waters between Italy and Switzerland against pollution. The agreement specifically mentions the Spöl, Melezza [mixed], Torrente Breggia [mixed], Doveria [throughborder] and Maira (Mera) [through-border] Rivers. The parties also establish the Mixed Commission for the Protection of Italo-Swiss Waters Against Pollution. Any specific works or investigations, and the expenses relating to them, shall be established in an agreement. Protocol of the agreement between the Republic of Guinea and the Republic of Guinea-Bissau on the management of the Coliba-Corubal River

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Guinea

Switzerland

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Spöl Italy 1972 – Pollution, General regulations, General works and Commission creation (55)

hydropower are diverted into the reservoirs. These waters are taken from the Ova dal Gal. For this reason, Switzerland is entitled to a set amount of hydropower from Italy (128 million KW hours per year). The balance of the energy owed to Italy and energy owed to Switzerland, however, favors Switzerland. In fact, the inter-company agreement (agreement between the private companies exploiting the hydropower potential) states that Italy has a right to use the balance (given that it has the most need for it) for a payment (Interview, Schröter 2004). Convention concerning the Italo-Swiss waters against pollution

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Upstream state

Yugoslavia

Yugoslavia

River, treaty year, and topic

Timok 1958 – General regulations, Pollution, Water quantity, Flood control, Hydropower, General works and Commission creation (1)

Timok 1958 (@) – Flood control and Commission creation (2)

Partial border-creator

Table D.1 Continued

N

Each party shall carry out 50% of the work provided for in the adopted project using its own funds and its own organization. This river begins in

This is a general agreement, which makes reference to no specific agreement. In this table it pertains to the Timok River. The parties agree to cooperate in water economy issues. The parties also commit, jointly (in the case of rivers followed or intersected by the state frontier) or separately, to maintain in good condition the beds of the rivers and their associated installations. The two contracting parties shall participate, each in proportion to the benefit accruing to it, in the maintenance of existing structures and installations in rivers and tributaries and in the erection and maintenance of new structures and installations of interest to both parties. The apportionment of expenses and the method of payment shall be determined by agreement between the contracting parties. The parties also establish a Yugoslav-Bulgarian Water Economy Commission. Protocol of the Delegations of the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia and the People’s Republic of Bulgaria for water economy questions, concerning the beginning of work for the regulations of the frontier sector of the Timok River

Agreement concerning water economy questions between the Government of the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia and the Government of the People’s Republic of Bulgaria

Brief analysis

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Bulgaria

N

Sidepayments from downstream to upstream state

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Bulgaria

Downstream state

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USSR

Romania

N

12:11 PM

(Table D.1 continued)

This is a larger agreement concerning the Soviet-Romanian frontier. Regulations governing the use of frontier waters refer to rivers along which the frontier line runs. No specific river is mentioned. In this table the agreement applies to the Prut River. Both parties will jointly take the necessary steps to remove obstacles that may cause changes in the beds of the frontier waters. Where joint works are to be carried out on these frontier waters, the parties will divide the costs equally, unless otherwise agreed. Where banks have to be strengthened on either side, this will be the responsibility of each particular party. Should the bed of a frontier river be changed as a result of natural phenomena, the parties will jointly, and on an equal basis, be responsible for correcting the bed. Agreement shall govern any alteration and obstruction of the natural flow of any frontier river. Works that may affect another party will need to be governed by agreement. Frontier watercourses shall be cleaned out in sectors where such work is jointly considered essential by the parties. The costs will be divided equally. The cleaning of frontier watercourses situated wholly in the territory of one of the parties shall be carried out at the expense of that party. The parties shall take steps to maintain the waters free from pollution.

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Prut 1949 – Flood control and Pollution (3)

Yugoslavia but forms the border with Bulgaria. The projects envisioned in the treaty are for the part of the river that forms the border and for the respective side of each country. This agreement pertains to the systematic regulation of the river whereby sound and straight stretches will be retained and cuts will be made through winding stretches. The parties shall establish a sub-Commission to monitor the works and ensure their proper execution. Treaty between the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the Romanian People’s Republic concerning the regime of the Soviet-Romanian state frontier and final protocol

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Upstream state

USSR

USSR

River, treaty year, and topic

Prut 1952 – General regulations, Flood control and Hydropower (4)

Prut 1971 – Flood control, Hydropower and Commission creation (5)

Partial border-creator

Table D.1 Continued

N

The project agreed upon is to be constructed on the part of the river that creates the border between the USSR and Romania. The project constitutes a hydraulic engineering plant to regulate the flow of the river and to use the regulated flow waters for domestic uses, to control floodwaters and to produce electrical energy. The cost of the construction will be 61,867,000 transferable roubles. This cost also includes compensation for damage caused by the flooding. The parties shall share in equal parts the costs of the engineering scheme and of compensation

Each party will not take any unilateral action that might cause damage to the other party. The parties agree to carry out works for the purpose of regulating the water systems of the Prut River and to develop the existing hydraulic installations and construct new ones in order to protect the territories against floods. The works shall be carried out by each party in its own territory and will be governed by an agreement. A Joint Commission will be established. Agreement between the Government of the Socialist Republic of Romania and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the joint construction of the Stinca-Costesti Hydraulic Engineering Scheme

Treaty between the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the Romanian People’s Republic concerning measures to prevent floods and to regulate the water regime of the River Prut

Brief analysis

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Romania

N

Sidepayments from downstream to upstream state

17/11/07

Romania

Downstream state

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USSR

Yugoslavia

Albania

N

N

NSI

(Table D.1 continued)

This is a general agreement but with special reference to the Bojana, Belli Drim [through-border] and Crni Drim [mixed] Rivers. The parties also agree that they will reach agreement if either party wants to change the water economy relations on the watercourses regarding hydropower, flood control and water supply. Costs and payments will also be agreed upon in such an agreement. A Joint Yugoslav-Albanian Water Commission will be formed. Treaty between the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Imperial Government of Iran concerning the regime of the SovietIranian frontier and the procedure for the settlement of frontier disputes and incidents

Agreement text is not available. According to UNECE (2003) the agreement pertains to qualitative and quantitative protection of water resources, water supply, irrigation, floods and regulation. The Prut River is mentioned specifically. Agreement between the Government of the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia and the Government of Federal People’s Republic of Albania concerning water economy questions, together with the statute of the Yugoslav-Albanian Water Economic Commission and with the protocol concerning fishing in frontier lakes and rivers

12:11 PM

Iran

Romania

USSR

17/11/07

Atrak 1957 – Pollution (8)

Prut 1986 (@) – Pollution, Water quantity, Flood control and General regulations (6) Bojana 1956 – General regulations, Hydropower, Flood control, Water quantity and Commission creation (7)

for damage caused by flooding. A Mixed Romanian-Soviet Commission will be established. Since two hydroelectric stations are to be built, one will be situated in the USSR and the other in Romania. Each party will be responsible for operation of the plant on its side of the border. The water at the storage lake created by the dam, and the energy created, will be divided equally. Agreement between the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of Romania concerning cooperation in the field of transboundary waters

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Russia

China

China

USSR

NSI

NSI

Agreement text is not available. Title retrieved from Johnston and Chiu (1968). Agreement applies to Ussuri, Amur [border-creator but enters state] and Argun [partial border-creator] Rivers. Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the People’s Republic of China concerning protection, regulation, and reproduction of living water resources in frontier rivers of the Amur and Ussuri

No specific projects mentioned but the parties agree that all the water and power derived from their common frontier waters shall be divided equally. The parties will consider possible joint works. Joint studies will be carried out. Navigation procedures and construction on border rivers (including Amur, Ussuri, Argun)

No specific project mentioned but costs to clean artificial pollution and fouling on frontier waters, which is considered essential by both parties, shall be divided equally. The cleaning of those frontier waters, which are situated wholly in the territory of one of the parties, shall be carried out by that party as necessary, at its own expense. Specific works likely to change the flow of such rivers is to be governed by an agreement. Agreement between Iran and the Soviet Union for the joint utilization of the frontier parts of the Rivers Aras and Atrak for irrigation and power generation

Brief analysis

12:11 PM

N

Sidepayments from downstream to upstream state

17/11/07

Ussuri 1994 (@) – Pollution and General regulations (11)

USSR

Iran

Atrak 1957 – Hydropower, Water quantity and Joint study (9) Ussuri 1951 (@) – General works (10)

Downstream state

Upstream state

River, treaty year, and topic

Partial border-creator

Table D.1 Continued

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USSR

France

Argun China 1956 – Joint study, Hydropower, Water quantity and Flood control (13)

Gander 1986 – Flood control (14)

(Table D.1 continued)

The parties shall carry out research operations to determine the prospects for developing the productive potentialities of areas in their own territories. Whilst in the frontier sectors they shall carry out joint research operations with equal participation by the Soviet and Chinese sides. The purpose of these studies is the potential development of the river for the sake of water quantity, hydropower and flood control. The treaty pertains to the Argun and Amur [border-creator but enters state] Rivers. Exchange of notes constituting an agreement concerning the execution of improvement works on the River Gander at Mondorff (France) and Mondorf-les-Bains (Luxembourg)

Agreement text is not available. Title retrieved from Johnston and Chiu (1968). Agreement applies to the Argun, Ussuri [partial border-creator] and Amur [border-creator but enters state] Rivers. Agreement between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the People’s Republic of China on joint research operations to determine the natural resources of the Amur River Basin and the prospects for development of its productive potentialities and on planning and survey operations to prepare a scheme for the multi-purpose exploitation of the Argun River and the Upper Amur River

12:11 PM

N

N

NSI

17/11/07

Luxembourg

USSR

China

Argun 1951 (@) – General works (12)

Agreement text is not available. According to UNECE (2003) the agreement mentions and applies to the Ussuri and Amur [border-creator but enters state] Rivers. The agreement pertains to protection, regulation and reproduction of living water resources. Navigation procedures and construction on border rivers (including Amur, Ussuri, Argun)

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Upstream state

Spain

Spain

River, treaty year, and topic

Bidassoa 1866 (!&) – Border issues, Water quantity and General regulations (15)

Bidassoa 1964 (!&) – General works (16)

Partial border-creator

Table D.1 Continued

France

N

The parties agree that certain works may be necessary to improve the flow of the Bidassoa River. Works on the river banks will also be needed to permit access to fishing boats and stabilize the river banks. The parties also agree that they

Part of a territorial limits agreement. The parties establish general rules for use of common waters. The Bidassoa River is not specifically mentioned in the agreement. In this table the Garona [through-border] and Carol [throughborder] Rivers also apply to this agreement. In terms of water quantity, the parties agree that waters shall be divided according to need and according to an agreed upon formula. Decree stating the publication of the exchange of letters between France and Spain concerning the management of the Bidassoa River

The part that forms the border has caused floods on both sides. But in the part of France, the lands that have been affected belong to Luxembourg citizens. Works will be conducted on the Gander to reduce the risks of flooding. The cost of this project is estimated at 10,230,000 Luxembourg francs. Given that the works benefit only Luxembourg citizens, the costs will be totally defrayed by Luxembourg. Decree of the French Emperor: promulgation of the Additional Act to the Treaties of delineation of territories concluded on 12/2/1856, 4/14/1862, and on 5/26/1866 between France and Spain

Brief analysis

12:11 PM

N

Sidepayments from downstream to upstream state

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France

Downstream state

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S. Africa (Namibia)

Switzerland

France

The parties establish a Mixed Technical Commission. Convention between Switzerland and France concerning the correction of the Hermance

(Table D.1 continued)

Treaty concerns irrigation and hydropower and relates to two separate projects. The part of the treaty concerning the hydropower dam gives either country the ability to build the dam. If both countries decide to build the dam they shall split the costs equally. Yet the hydropower dam part of the agreement is a tentative project making no indication as to how the project shall proceed. Yet the irrigation part of the agreement gives South Africa the right to build a dam and diversion works in upstream Portugal so as to bring water to South West Africa (what is today Namibia, which

The parties agree to undertake particular works for the prevention of flooding. Costs are not clearly mentioned but the particular tasks are indicative. France is responsible for the works on the part of the river that flows only in its territory. Switzerland is responsible for the works on the part of the river that flows along the common border. As for maintenance of the river, each party will be responsible for the maintenance of its part of the river. However, Switzerland shall also undertake particular maintenance works on her side and the French side of the river that flows along the common border. Switzerland, therefore, assumes more of the cost-sharing burden. Y, but Agreement between the Government of the Union of South Africa and the depends Government of the Republic of Portugal regulating the use of the waters on actions of the Cunene River for the purposes of generating hydraulic power and the inundation and irrigation in the mandated territory of South West Africa

Y

N

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Portugal (Angola)

France

Spain

17/11/07

Cunene 1926 (!) – Water quantity and Hydropower (19)

Bidassoa 1978 (@) – Commission creation (17) Hermance 1959 (&) – Flood control (18)

will work together (prior to starting these works) in order to research solutions that are likely to prevent damage to ancient works on the two banks. Decree stating the publication of the protocol concerning the mixed technical commission of the Bidassoa between the Government of the Republic of France and the Government of Spain

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Upstream state

Portugal (Angola)

Portugal (Angola)

River, treaty year, and topic

Cunene 1931 – Water quantity (20)

Cunene 1969 – Hydropower, Water

Partial border-creator

Table D.1 Continued

S. Africa (Namibia)

Y

Agreement text is not available. According to Oregon State’s Database water is to be supplied to the inhabitants of Ovamboland (in Angola) for drinking and cattle. However, this agreement does not appear in Chapter 5 since more supporting information is not available. Agreement between the Government of the Republic of South Africa and the Government of Portugal in regard to the first phase of the development of the water resources of the Cunene River Basin

Additional information about the agreement was available in Paisley (2002: 288–9). Exchange of notes respecting the boundary between the mandated territory of South Africa and Angola

was administered by South Africa at the time). Portugal concedes to South Africa half of the flood waters of the Cunene River for the purpose of irrigation in South Africa. If the diversion of water is used for purposes other than subsistence (such as benefit) the benefits derived from this water need be recognized by some form of payment. All temporary dwellings, buildings and labor camps that were erected during the construction will be handed over to Portugal after its termination. Portugal retains sovereignty over the areas affected by the works.

Brief analysis

12:11 PM

NSI

Sidepayments from downstream to upstream state

17/11/07

S. Africa (Namibia)

Downstream state

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quantity and Commission creation (21)

17/11/07 12:11 PM

(Table D.1 continued)

Building a dam in Angola for the regulation of the Cunene River. South Africa shares the costs of building the dam. Half of the contribution given to Portugal is a grant while the other half is a loan (8,125,000 rand) to be paid back in 20 years with 5% interest. Portugal shall own the dam. Portugal will also be responsible for the operation and maintenance of the dam. Given that South Africa has contributed the costs of the dam, Portugal will not abstract more than 50% of the resulting regulated flow of the river. South Africa will be responsible for the costs of building a pumping scheme and another dam (Calueque Dam) from the Cunene River (in Angola) for diverting water for irrigation and human use in South West Africa (Namibia) and in Ovamboland (in Angola). No charge shall be levied on South Africa for these waters with a maximum pumping rate of 6 CM per second. According to Sadoff, Whittington and Grey (2002: 52) water used for subsistence purposes was not levied a charge. Yet payment to Portugal was forthcoming for water used for gain. It will be the entire responsibility of South Africa to provide compensation for indemnities caused by the works. It is agreed that South Africa will compensate Portugal for the lands used for the dam and works and for the lands flooded (220,000 rand). Other than the movable works, all other facilities from the dam and diversion scheme shall be the property of Portugal, and upon completion, operated by Portugal. South Africa is also to build a hydropower station (Ruacana station) in Portugese territory and will be responsible for its operation and maintenance. The station shall benefit from the river regulations provided by the dams mentioned above. South Africa shall pay royalties for the power produced. The royalty rates shall be calculated by the benefits provided by the two dams discussed above. The royalty provided will be given at a rate that will cover, over twenty years, the loan owed to South Africa from the construction of the initial dam. After that loan is paid the royalty rate will be adjusted.

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Portugal

Portugal

Spain

Minho (Miño) 1864/1866 – Border Issues, Water quantity, General regulations and General works (22)

Minho (Miño) Spain 1912 (@) – Water quantity, General regulations and Commission creation (23)

Downstream state

Upstream state

River, treaty year, and topic

Partial border-creator

Table D.1 Continued

N

This is a very general agreement that does not refer to any river by name but rather refers to the rivers covered by the1866 Annex. The agreement does affirm that both states have equal rights to the waters of the bordering rivers – allowing them to use half of available water. The countries may grant concessions for the utilization of the rivers but these plans have to be governed by rules dictated by a Commission made of

This annex is part of a larger territorial agreement. The part of the river that creates the border between the two countries shall be used in common by the peoples of both kingdoms. While the agreement speaks more about the Minho (Miño) River, it also refers to the Duoro [mixed] and Tagus (Tajo) [mixed] Rivers in this table. Although not specified, the Guadiana [mixed] and Chanza [partial border-creator] Rivers are also applied to the agreement in this table. The provisions largely refer to land owners that straddle the banks of the rivers. Agreement between Spain and Portugal respecting the industrial use of frontier waters

Regulations annexed to the Boundary Treaty between Spain and Portugal of 9/29/1864

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Treaty of Limits between Portugal and Spain

Brief analysis

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N

Sidepayments from downstream to upstream state

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Minho (Miño) Spain 1968/1976 (!) – Water quantity, Hydropower and Commission creation (24)

Portugal

(Table D.1 continued)

12:11 PM

Referring specifically to the Minho (Miño) River, the agreement affirms that the upper 27 meters of the declivity of the international reach of the river shall be used for a single hydroelectric facility. The benefits shall be divided 79.5% and 20.5% between Spain and Portugal, respectively. The costs will be shared in the same manner. Either state may sponsor the construction of the facility or the parties may elect to do so jointly.

17/11/07

The parties agree to develop the waters of the international reaches of the Minho (Miño), Lima (Limia) [through-border], Tagus (Tajo) [mixed], Guadiana [mixed] and Chanza [partial border-creator] Rivers for the benefit of the two nations. Efforts shall be made to harmonize such development. The parties agree to divide the waters of these rivers among them. In order to supplement the planned hydroelectric facility in Portuguese territory Portugal will be able to use, in Spanish territory, the declivity of the river Lima (Limia) (no specific division of water indicated, only that each state shall enjoy exclusive use of the agreed upon part of the river). In general, all the works for the utilization of the river shall be located in the national territory of the state entitled to such utilization. However, the parties shall be guided by the notion of reciprocity if supporting works need to be built on one’s territory for the other’s benefit. The parties also establish the Spanish-Portuguese Commission.

representatives from both countries. The Minho (Miño), Duoro [mixed], Tagus (Tajo) [mixed], Guadiana [mixed] and Chanza [partial border-creator] Rivers apply to this agreement in this table. N, from Agreement regulating the use and development of the water resources of the upstream international reaches of the Miño, Limia, Tajo, Guadiana, and to downChanza and of their tributaries (with additional protocol) stream state Second additional protocol to the above mentioned agreement

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Portugal

Portugal

Spain

Minho (Miño) 1971 (@) – General regulations, Hydropower, Water quantity and General works (25)

Minho (Miño) Spain 1998 – Pollution, General regulations and Commission creation (26)

Downstream state

Upstream state

River, treaty year, and topic

Partial border-creator

Table D.1 Continued

N

This is a general agreement but is specific to the Minho (Miño), Lima (Limia) [through-border], Duoro [mixed], Tagus (Tajo) [mixed] and Guadiana [mixed] Rivers. The agreement is in Portuguese but was not translated since

12:11 PM

The agreement states the rules established by the Spanish-Portuguese Commission that would govern how concessionary companies can utilize and exploit the river for different purposes as indicated in the 1968 Agreement. The agreement refers to the Lima (Limia), Guadiana [mixed], Minho (Miño) [partial border-creator], Tagus (Tajo) [mixed] and Chanza [partial border-creator] Rivers. Convention concerning cooperation for the protection and sustainable use of the waters of Portuguese-Spanish hydrological basins and additional protocols and annexes

The 1976 Protocol also refers to the above rivers but specifically pertains to the Minho (Miño) River when it says that both governments may grant a concession for the building of the hydroelectric facility, which must operate as a joint venture. The concessionaries shall participate in the construction and operation of the facility in the proportion indicated. Decree which permits the publication and operation of the Statute of Use of the Spanish-Portuguese Commission to regulate the use and exploitation of the international sections of the rivers Miño, Limia, Tajo, Guadania, and Chanza and their tributaries

Brief analysis

17/11/07

N

Sidepayments from downstream to upstream state

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Portugal

Portugal

Spain

Chanza Spain 1912 (@) – Water quantity, General regulations and Commission creation (28)

Chanza 1864/1866 – Border issues, Water quantity and General regulations (27)

(Table D.1 continued)

12:11 PM

This is a very general agreement that does not refer to any river by name but rather refers to the rivers covered by the1866 Annex. The agreement does affirm that both states have equal rights to the waters of the bordering rivers – allowing them to use half of the available water. The countries may grant concessions for the utilization of the rivers but these plans have to be governed by rules dictated by a Commission made of representatives from both countries. The Chanza, Minho (Miño) [partial border-creator], Duoro [mixed], Tagus (Tajo) [mixed] and Guadiana [mixed] Rivers apply to this agreement in this table.

This annex is part of a larger territorial agreement. The part of the river that creates the border between the two countries shall be used in common by the peoples of both kingdoms. While the agreement speaks more about the Minho (Miño) River [partial border-creator], it also refers to the Duoro [mixed] and Tagus (Tajo) [mixed] Rivers in this table. Although not specified, the Guadiana [mixed] and Chanza Rivers are also applied to the agreement in this table. The provisions largely refer to land owners that straddle the banks of the rivers. Agreement between Spain and Portugal respecting the industrial use of frontier waters

Regulations annexed to the Boundary Treaty between Spain and Portugal of 9/29/1864

17/11/07

N

N

it is a general agreement. According to Oregon State’s Database, a Joint Commission is created concerning the rivers. The focus is on environmental protection although the agreement also discusses changes to the hydrology of the river courses and other general issues of transboundary impact. The agreement also discusses terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems that depend on the said waters. Treaty of Limits between Portugal and Spain

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Upstream state

Portugal

Downstream state

N

Sidepayments from downstream to upstream state

The 1976 Protocol also refers to the above rivers but specifically pertains to the Minho (Miño) River when it says that both governments may grant

The parties agree to develop the waters of the international reaches of the Chanza, Lima (Limia) [through-border], Minho (Miño) [partial bordercreator], Tagus (Tajo) [mixed], Guadiana [mixed] and Chanza [partial border-creator] Rivers for the benefit of the two nations. Efforts shall be made to harmonize such development. The parties agree to divide the waters of these rivers among them. In order to supplement the planned hydroelectric facility in Portuguese territory Portugal will be able to use, in Spanish territory, the declivity of the river Lima (Limia) (no specific division of water indicated, only that each state shall enjoy exclusive use of the agreed upon part of the river). In general, all the works for the utilization of the river shall be located in the national territory of the state entitled to such utilization. However, the parties shall be guided by the notion of reciprocity if supporting works need to be built on one’s territory for the other’s benefit. The parties also establish the SpanishPortuguese Commission.

12:11 PM

Second additional protocol to the above mentioned agreement

Agreement regulating the use and development of the water resources of the international reaches of the Miño, Limia, Tajo, Guadiana, and Chanza and of their tributaries (with additional protocol)

Brief analysis

17/11/07

Chanza Spain 1968/1976 (!) – Water quantity, Hydropower and Commission creation (29)

River, treaty year, and topic

Partial border-creator

Table D.1 Continued

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Mexico

Mexico

Guatemala

Guatemala

Suchiate 1961 (@) – Commission creation, Water quantity, Pollution, Hydropower, Flood control and General regulations (31) Suchiate 1987 – Pollution and General regulations (32)

Portugal

Spain

Chanza 1971 (@) – General regulations, Hydropower, Water quantity and General works (30)

N

(Table D.1 continued)

This is a general environmental protection agreement. No specific river is mentioned. The parties agree to cooperate in the field of environmental

12:11 PM

The parties establish an International Boundary and Water Commission. The Commission shall study all respective joint rivers but it is specifically stated that this Commission will study the Suchiate River with future utilization in mind, determining available hydraulic resources, studying the necessary works to prevent floods and the general development of these resources for the benefit of both countries. In this table the Coatan [through-border], Candelaria [through-border] and Grijalva [through-border] Rivers are also included for this agreement. Agreement between the United Mexican States and the Republic of Guatemala on the protection and improvement of the environment in the border area

The agreement states the rules established by the Spanish-Portuguese Commission that would govern how concessionary companies can utilize and exploit the river for different purposes as indicated in the 1968 Agreement. The agreement refers to the Chanza, Lima (Limia) [throughborder], Guadiana [mixed], Minho (Miño) [partial border-creator] and Tagus (Tajo) [mixed] Rivers. Exchange of notes between Mexico and Guatemala constituting an agreement on the establishment of an International Boundary and Water Commission

17/11/07

N

N

a concession for the building of the hydroelectric facility, which must operate as a joint venture. The concessionaries shall participate in the construction and operation of the facility in the proportion indicated (see Minho {Miño} River above). Decree which permits the publication and operation of the Statute of Use of the Spanish-Portuguese Commission to regulate the use and exploitation of the international sections of the rivers Miño, Limia, Tajo, Guadania, and Chanza and their tributaries

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Upstream state

Nicaragua

Guatemala

River, treaty year, and topic

San Juan 1858 (@) – Border issues, Water quantity and General regulations (33)

Paz 1938 – Water

Partial border-creator

Table D.1 Continued

El Salvador

N

This is a boundary agreement and pertains mostly to navigation. Yet Article 6 of the agreement provides Nicaragua with the exclusive dominion and sovereignty over the waters of the river from its origin to its discharge into the Atlantic Ocean. Similarly, Costa Rica shall have the right of free navigation. In 1888 a settlement was rendered on a dispute regarding the validity of the treaty. The settlement rendered that Costa Rica did not have the right to navigate the river with vessels of war. Similarly, Costa Rica cannot prevent Nicaragua from taking any action in her territory such as works of improvement so long as those works do not result in the occupation, flooding or damage of the Costa Rican territory, or in the destruction or serious impairment of the navigation of the river or any of its branches where Nicaragua is allowed to navigate. Costa Rica has a right to compensation for any lands belonging to her on the right bank of the river, which may be occupied without her consent and any lands on the same bank, which may be flooded or damaged in consequence of the works. Treaty for the delimitation of the boundary between Guatemala and El Salvador

protection and pollution abatement. The Suchiate, Coatan [through-border], Grijalva [through-border] and Candelaria [through-border] Rivers are included for this agreement. Treaty of territorial limits between Costa Rica and Nicaragua

Brief analysis

12:11 PM

N

Sidepayments from downstream to upstream state

17/11/07

Costa Rica

Downstream state

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Turkey

Turkey

Rezvaya (Rezovska) 1975 (@) – Scientific and technical cooperation, Water quantity, Hydropower

Guatemala

N

N

N

(Table D.1 continued)

This is a general agreement that refers to no specific river by name. It is a larger economic, technical, industrial and scientific cooperation agreement. The parties agree to cooperate in the field of energy and agriculture, including the common use of the waters, which the two parties share. In this

This is a general agreement, which pertains specifically to the Rezvaya (Rezovska), Veleka [through-border] and Tundzha [mixed] Rivers. The parties agree that they will cooperate in determining which structures and installations can be constructed and used for the benefit of the two countries especially in the case of protection from floods and water for irrigation. The parties shall also avoid causing any damages to the other party. An agreement will govern any specific measure taken by the parties. A Mixed Bulgarian-Turkish Commission will be established. Accord pertaining to long term economic, technical, industrial, and scientific cooperation between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Government of the People’s Republic of Bulgaria

This is a larger free trade and economic integration agreement. Article 19 affirms that both countries shall coordinate their activities with a view to protecting water resources in the frontier regions. The Paz River is not specifically mentioned. Agreement between the People’s Republic of Bulgaria and the Republic of Turkey concerning cooperation in the use of the waters of rivers flowing through the territory of both countries

12:11 PM

Bulgaria

Bulgaria

El Salvador

Agreement text is not available. According to Oregon State’s Database each government has the right to use half the volume of the water in frontier rivers. No concessions may be given to companies to utilize the water. The Paz River is not mentioned specifically. Treaty of free trade and economic integration (with annexes and exchange of letters)

17/11/07

Rezvaya (Rezovska) 1968 – General regulations, General works, Flood control and Commission creation (36)

quantity and Border issues (34) Paz 1951 (@) – General regulations and Pollution (35)

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Dominican Republic

Dominican Republic

Haiti

Pendernales Haiti 1935/1936 (@) – Border issues

Dominican Republic

Downstream state

N

N

Sidepayments from downstream to upstream state

This is a general treaty of friendship and peace between the two countries. It does not refer to any specific river. The parties undertake not to carry out, or be a party to, any construction works calculated to change the natural course of the river and to affect the waters derived from them. This provision does not prevent the parties from making equitable use of the waters in their territory. In this table the agreement pertains to the Pendernales, Artibonite [mixed] and Massacre (Dajabon) [partial border-creator * 2] Rivers. Boundary Agreement between the Dominican Republic and the Republic of Haiti

This is a general territorial limits agreement. The treaty refers specifically to the Pendernales, Artibonite [mixed] and Massacre (Dajabon) [partial bordercreator * 2] Rivers but only in reference to borders and other territorial issues. Treaty of peace, friendship and arbitration between the Dominican Republic and Haiti

Treaty of the delimitation of the frontier between the Dominican Republic and the Republic of Haiti

table the agreement pertains to the Rezvaya (Rezovska), Veleka [throughborder] and Tundzha [mixed] Rivers.

Brief analysis

12:11 PM

Pendernales 1929 (!&) – Border issues, Water quantity and General regulations (39)

Haiti

Upstream state

17/11/07

and General works (37) Pendernales 1929 (@) – Border issues (38)

River, treaty year, and topic

Partial border-creator

Table D.1 Continued

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Ecuador

Ecuador

Zarumilla 1998 (@) – Facility use and Commission creation (41)

N

Y

(Table D.1 continued)

Agreement text not available. According to Brunnée and Hey (1999: 234–5), this agreement is part of a larger navigation treaty. The agreement is about rehabilitating the Zarumilla Canal and establishes short term and long term obligations. Peru has undertaken to rehabilitate the Canal on its own and pay one half of the expenses for

This is an agreement that is also specific to the Puyango-Tumbes [mixed] and the Catamayo-Chira [mixed]. The agreement simply specifies where the boundary line will fall. However, for the Zarumilla River additional obligations are specified. Given the territorial changes (before the agreement the river was solely in Ecuador yet after the border agreement the border was to be established along part of the river), Peru agrees to take the needed steps to guarantee the supply of water necessary for the life of the Ecuadorian villages on the right bank of the so-called ‘old bed’ of the Zarumilla River, fixed as the frontier. Peru also undertakes to pay indemnity to the Ecuadorian owners of the farms, as a result of the determination that the frontier line has come under Peruvian sovereignty. Agreement on the criteria for the rehabilitation or reconstruction of the headworks and ancillary works of the Zarumilla Canal

12:11 PM

Peru

Peru

17/11/07

Zarumilla 1944 – Border issues and Water quantity (40)

The 1936 agreement simply affirms the settlement of the above mentioned difficulties. This agreement pertains to the Pendernales, Artibonite [mixed] and Massacre (Dajabon) [partial border-creator * 2]. Declaration and exchange of notes concerning the termination of the process of demarcation of the Peruvian-Ecuadorian frontier

This is a territorial limits treaty which settles particular difficulties regarding tracing the frontiers between the two countries that arose since the signing of the 1929 Treaty of Delimitation.

Additional protocol to the Treaty of 1/21/1929 regarding the delimitation of the frontier between the two countries

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Upstream state

Brazil

River, treaty year, and topic

Chuy 1933 – Border issues, Water quantity and General regulations (42)

Partial border-creator

Table D.1 Continued

Determination of the legal status of the frontiers. Also each party shall be entitled to half the waters flowing in the frontier watercourses. However, an additional Protocol is included whereby it is said that Brazil assents to work by Uruguay for utilizing the Negro River [through-border] if it so wishes. The Negro River is the only water body sxecified. In this table the

operation and maintenance. Ecuador has undertaken ancillary and complementary obligations to Peru and has agreed to pay the other half of the operation and maintenance costs. In addition the parties also agree to remove all obstacles from the Canal, to keep it clean, to abate pollution of the waters flowing in it and to stop all removal of sand and gravel. The parties also agreed to minimum flow requirements necessary to secure the ecological integrity of the Zarumilla River downstream of the Canal. The parties also establish a Joint Commission for the Administration of the Canal and the Utilization of the Canal Waters to operate, maintain and improve the canal and to manage and allocate the waters flowing into it. Water allocations will be made on the basis of 55% to Ecuador and 45% to Peru. When the available flow falls below a set limit, the parties will take turns using it. The base flow will be shared according to the same percentages. Convention regarding the determination of the legal status of the frontier between Brazil and Uruguay

Brief analysis

12:11 PM

N

Sidepayments from downstream to upstream state

17/11/07

Uruguay

Downstream state

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Brazil

USA

Chuy 1975/1991 – Scientific and technical cooperation and General works (43)

Rio Grande (Río Bravo del Norte) 1889/1895/ 1896/1897/ 1898/1899/ 1900/1944 – Border issues, General regulations and Commission creation (44)

(Table D.1 continued)

This is a boundary waters agreement that refers to the Rio Grande (Río Bravo del Norte) and the Colorado River [mixed]. The agreement states that with regards to the part of the river that forms the border between the two states, if any questions or differences arise they shall be submitted to an International Boundary Commission, which shall have exclusive jurisdiction in the case of the said differences and questions. The Commission will be made up of participants from both parties and will be responsible to attend to either natural or man-made changes (works or projects) to the river that are taking place on the frontier region that may be harming to either party.

This is a general agreement of scientific and technical cooperation. No specific river is mentioned but in this table the agreement refers to the Chuy, Cuareim (Quraí), Yaguarón (Jaguarão) [border-creator] and Negro [through-border] Rivers. The parties agree to cooperate in the area of information exchange and mutual projects. Any specific projects relating to shared waters will be agreed upon by an agreement. Convention to avoid the difficulties occasioned by reason of the changes which take place in the beds of the Rio Grande and Colorado (Also known as the Boundary Waters Agreement)

Complementary accord to the basic accord of scientific and technical cooperation between the Government of the Eastern Republic of Uruguay and the Government of the Federal Republic of Brazil in the area of water resources

12:11 PM

N

N

17/11/07

Mexico

Uruguay

Chuy, Cuareim (Quraí) [border-creator], Negro [through-border] and Yaguarón (Jaguarão) [border-creator] Rivers are also included for this treaty. Basic accord of scientific and technical cooperation between the Government of the Eastern Republic of Uruguay and the Government of the Federal Republic of Brazil in the area of water resources

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Upstream state

USA

River, treaty year, and topic

Rio Grande (Río Bravo del Norte) 1906 – Water quantity (45)

Partial border-creator

Table D.1 Continued

Brief analysis

12:11 PM

The other agreement years are simply extensions of the original agreement. N, from Convention between Mexico and the United States for the distribution of upstream waters of Rio Grande to downstream This is an agreement that supplies Mexico with a set amount of irrigation state water from the Rio Grande (Río Bravo del Norte) – 60,000 acre feet. The United States will deliver this water to Mexico. Mexico shall not have to pay for these deliveries or for the water. The United States, at its cost, will build the appropriate dam and prepare the appropriate reservoir to store such waters and to accordingly deliver them to Mexico. The agreement, however, does not constitute recognition by the United States of any claim by Mexico to the waters. It is also agreed that in consideration of such delivery of water, Mexico waives any and all claims to the waters of the Rio Grande (Río Bravo del Norte) for any purpose whatsoever between the head of the present Mexican Canal and Fort Quitman, Texas (small part of the frontier region). The understanding of both parties is that the arrangement contemplated by this treaty extends only to the portion of the Rio Grande (Río Bravo del Norte), which forms the international boundary, from the head of the Mexican Canal down to Fort Quitman, Texas, and in no other case.

Sidepayments from downstream to upstream state

17/11/07

Mexico

Downstream state

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USA

USA

Rio Grande (Río Bravo del Norte) 1933 – Flood control (46)

Rio Grande (Río Bravo del Norte) 1944/1960 – Water quantity, Flood control and Hydropower (47)

(Table D.1 continued)

This is an agreement that covers both water allocation between the parties and the construction of works. It also refers specifically to the Rio Grande (Río Bravo del Norte), Colorado [mixed] and the Tijuana [through-border] Rivers. In addition to dividing the water of the Rio Grande (Río Bravo del Norte) – divisions specified in terms of fractional use of tributaries and main channel – the parties also agree to several works on the main channel of the river. The costs for the international storage dams will be prorated between the two governments in proportion to the capacity allotted to each party for conservation purposes in the reservoir at such dam. The cost of construction, operation and maintenance of each of the dams and other joint works required for the diversion of the flows of the river shall

12:11 PM

Agreement to proceed with the construction of Amistad Dam on the Rio Grande to form part of the system of international storage dams provided by the Water Treaty of 2/3/1944

N, from Convention between the United States of America and the United Mexican upstream States for the rectification of the Rio Grande (Rio Bravo del Norte) in the to downEl Paso-Juarez Valley stream state The United States and Mexico agree that in order to relieve the towns and agricultural lands located within the El Paso-Juarez Valley from flood dangers, and at the same time securing the stabilization of the international boundary line (which owing to the present meandering nature of the river it has not been possible to hold within the mean line of its channel) they will carry out rectification works that will be divided among them 88% and 12%, respectively given the different benefits they would receive from these works. NSI Treaty between the United States of America and Mexico relating to the utilization of the waters of the Tijuana and Colorado Rivers and of the Rio Grande

17/11/07

Mexico

Mexico

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Upstream state

USA

River, treaty year, and topic

Rio Grande (Río Bravo del Norte) 1983 – Pollution and General regulations (48)

Partial border-creator

Table D.1 Continued

This is a general agreement referring to environmental protection and pollution abatement in the border areas. The parties agree to cooperate in the field of environmental protection and agree that they will adopt appropriate measures to eliminate, reduce or prevent pollution in their side of the

The 1960 Agreement states that both countries will go forth with the construction of the Amistad Dam which is part of the dam construction portfolio emanating from the 1944 Agreement. Agreement between the United States of America and the United Mexican States on cooperation for the protection and improvement of the environment in the border area

be prorated between the two Governments in proportion to the benefits which the respective countries received there from, as determined by the Commission and approved by the two Governments. Flood control mechanisms shall also be recommended to both governments and upon their approval shall be financed (operation and maintenance costs included) by each government according to the works undertaken by each government. Plans for hydroelectric works may also be recommended by the Commission and upon governmental approval shall be constructed and financed by the respective governments according to the project undertaken. International Boundary Commission becomes International Water and Boundary Commission. The 1944 Agreement also indefinitely extends 1889 Agreement

Brief analysis

12:11 PM

N

Sidepayments from downstream to upstream state

17/11/07

Mexico

Downstream state

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Mexico

Rio Grande (Río Bravo del Norte) 1987 – General works and General regulations (50)

(Table D.1 continued)

Mexico wants to construct certain works in order to divert some of the waters it is entitled to from the Rio Grande (Río Bravo del Norte). This would mean returning the water it gets from the Rio Grande (Río Bravo del Norte) via the United States and conveying the water some distance downstream and then re-diverting the waters. The United States has no objection to this action so long as the diversions do not alter, in any way, the water allocations provided to each party (since the water entitled to the Americans and water entitled to the Mexicans will be commingled given Mexico’s desire to divert

This is a general agreement referring to cooperation in environmental protection and pollution abatement due to discharges of hazardous substances. The parties establish the United States-Mexico Joint Contingency Plan to provide cooperative measures to deal effectively with polluting incidents. The parties agree to come up with response plans to deal with imminent, or already existing, polluting incidents. An agreement will determine a joint response to the incident. Specific arrangements for the solution of common problems may be agreed upon by the parties. The agreement refers to no specific river but in this table the agreement applies to the Rio Grande (Río Bravo del Norte), Tijuana [through-border], Colorado [mixed] and New [through-border] Rivers. Boundary waters agreement between the United States of America and Mexico effected by exchange of notes

12:11 PM

N

N

17/11/07

USA

Mexico

Rio Grande USA (Río Bravo del Norte) 1985 – Pollution and General regulations (49)

border that may harm the other country. Specific projects may be agreed to. The agreement refers to no river in particular but in this table the agreement pertains to the Rio Grande (Río Bravo del Norte), Tijuana [through-border], Colorado [mixed] and New [through-border] Rivers. Agreement of cooperation between the United States of America and the United Mexican States regarding pollution of the environment along the inland international boundary by discharges of hazardous substances

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Australia (Papua New Guinea)

Indonesia

Tami 1973 – Pollution and General regulations (52)

Downstream state

N

N

Sidepayments from downstream to upstream state

This is a general agreement that pertains more to border crossings between the two countries for traditional and customary purposes (crossing for social

Approves a proposed program of sampling and analyses of the waters of the international part of the Rio Grande (Río Bravo del Norte). The International Boundary and Water Commission will then propose to the two governments some recommendations regarding this issue. The agreement also makes very brief reference to the Colorado River [mixed] in the larger context of the Rio Grande (Río Bravo del Norte) and water quality. Agreement between the Government of Australia (acting on its own behalf and on behalf of the Government of Papua New Guinea) and the Government of Indonesia concerning administrative border arrangements as to the border between Papua New Guinea and Indonesia.

the waters back into the system and further downstream). It is also agreed that the International Boundary and Water Commission shall monitor the works and the flow of water quantities given the new arrangements. Minute 289: Observation of the quality of the waters along the United States and Mexico border

Brief analysis

12:11 PM

Mexico

Upstream state

17/11/07

Rio Grande USA (Río Bravo del Norte) 1992 – Pollution and General regulations (51)

River, treaty year, and topic

Partial border-creator

Table D.1 Continued

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KomadougouNigeria Yobe 1990 – General regulations, Water quantity and Commission creation (53)

Niger

N

12:11 PM

(Table D.1 continued)

17/11/07

This is a general agreement. The parties agree that each party has a right, in its own territory, to an equitable share in the development, conservation and use of the water resources in the shared river basins. To determine equity, the parties agree to a number of factors (the agreement lists 12 general factors). All these factors are to be given the weight warranted by the circumstances peculiar to each river and shall be considered in unison. An existing use, which is in competition with a factor relevant for determining equitable sharing, shall take precedent only if that existing use benefits both parties. Other factors shall also be weighed. The parties also agree to the establishment of a permanent technical committee of water experts. The agreement specifically refers to the Komadougou-Yobe, Tagwai (El Fadama) [through-border] and Gada (Goulbi) [through-border * 2] Rivers.

contacts and ceremonies). The parties agree to undertake precautionary measures to prevent serious pollution of rivers. Consultations on measures to prevent pollution can be requested. The agreement does not specifically refer to the Tami River. The agreement also pertains to the Fly [partial bordercreator but returns] and Sepik [through-border * 2] Rivers in this table. Agreement between the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the Republic of Niger concerning the equitable sharing in the development, conservation, and use of their common water resources

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China

China

USSR

USSR

Amur 1951 (@) – General works (1)

Amur 1956 – Joint study, Hydropower, Water quantity and Flood control (2)

Downstream state

State A

River, treaty year, and topic

Border-creator but enters state

Table D.1 Continued

N

The parties shall carry out research operations to determine the prospects for developing the productive potentialities of areas in their own territories. Whilst in the frontier sectors they shall carry out joint research operations with equal participation by the Soviet and Chinese sides. The purpose of these studies is the potential development of the river for the sake of water quantity, hydropower and flood control. The treaty pertains to the Amur and Argun [partial border-creator] Rivers.

Agreement text is not available. Title retrieved from Johnston and Chiu (1968) Agreement applies to Amur, Argun [partial border-creator] and Ussuri [partial border-creator] Rivers. Agreement between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the People’s Republic of China on joint research operations to determine the natural resources of the Amur River Basin and the prospects for development of its productive potentialities and on planning and survey operations to prepare a scheme for the multi-purpose exploitation of the Argun River and the Upper Amur River

12:11 PM

Navigation procedures and construction on border rivers (including Amur, Ussuri, Argun)

17/11/07

NSI

SideBrief analysis payments from downstream state to state A

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Argentina

China

Russia

N

NSI

NSI

(Table D.1 continued)

The agreement refers specifically to the higher part of the basin of the Bermejo and Grande de Tarija [border-creator but enters state] Rivers. The parties will agree on specific projects to be carried out. Particular importance will be given to the use of private capital for the construction, maintenance administration of these projects. The parties establish the Bi-national Commission for the Development of the Upper Basin of the Bermejo River and the Grande de Tarija. The Commission will identify programs of sustainable development and select the works to be carried out. The Commission will be able to negotiate with interested investors with the goal of giving out the corresponding concessions. The Commission will also give out concessions for the implementation and exploitation of the works to be carried out, without guarantees or government endorsements. The Commission will also have the responsibility of assigning the levies, tolls, or tariffs to be collected by the awardees. Specific works will be subject to an accord between the two states. The Commission will have jurisdiction over joint works.

Agreement text is not available. According to UNECE (2003) the agreement mentions and applies to the Amur and Ussuri [border-creator but enters state] Rivers. The agreement pertains to protection, regulation and reproduction of living water resources. Agreement for the multiple uses of the resources of the upper basin of the Bermejo River and Grande de Tarija River

Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the People’s Republic of China concerning protection, regulation, and reproduction of living water resources in frontier rivers of the Amur and Ussuri

Text not available. Retrieved from Johnston and Chiu (1968)

Joint use of Amur River

12:11 PM

Bolivia

China

USSR

17/11/07

Bermejo 1995 (&) – General regulations, Hydropower, Water quantity, Pollution, Flood control and Commission creation (5)

Amur 1959 (@) – General regulations (3) Amur 1994 (@) – Pollution and General regulations (4)

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State A

Bolivia

Afghanistan

River, treaty year, and topic

Grande de Tarija 1995 (&) – General regulations, Hydropower, Water quantity, Pollution, Flood control and Commission creation (6)

Amu Darya 1958 (@) – Joint study and General works (7)

Border-creator but enters state

Table D.1 Continued

Y

This agreement concerns the part of the Amu Darya that forms the border between the two countries. The parties agree to cooperate in the

The agreement refers specifically to the higher part of the basin of the Grande de Tarija and Bermejo [border-creator but enters state]. The parties will agree on specific projects to be carried out. Particular importance will be given to the use of private capital for the construction, maintenance and administration of these projects. The parties establish the Bi-national Commission for the Development of the Upper Basin of the Bermejo River and the Grande de Tarija. The Commission will identify programs of sustainable development, and select the works to be carried out. The Commission will be able to negotiate with interested investors with the goal of giving out the corresponding concessions. The Commission will also give out concessions for the implementation and exploitation of the works to be carried out, without guarantees or government endorsements. The Commission will also have the responsibility of assigning the levies, tolls, or tariffs to be collected by the awardees. Specific works will be subject to an accord between the two states. The Commission will have jurisdiction over joint works. Protocol between the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Royal Government of Afghanistan on works aimed at the use of water resources of the Amu Darya River in the area of the common border between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan

Agreement for the multiple uses of the resources of the upper basin of the Bermejo River and Grande de Tarija River

12:11 PM

USSR

N

SideBrief analysis payments from downstream state to state A

17/11/07

Argentina

Downstream state

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Upstream state

Canada (UK)

Kootenay 1909 – Water quantity, Border issues, General regulations and Commission creation (1)

USA

Downstream state

N

(Table D.1 continued)

The parties establish an International Joint Commission. The parties claim they have exclusive jurisdiction and control over the use and diversion of all the waters on their own side of the border, which in their natural channels would flow across the boundary or into boundary waters. The injured party on either side of the border will be entitled to the same legal remedies as if such injury took place in the country where such diversion or interference occurs. These diversions or obstructions shall be governed by an agreement. The waters of the St. Mary [through-border] and Milk [throughborder * 2] Rivers shall be considered one stream and the waters shall be divided equally between the two parties. The agreement also specifically

Treaty between Great Britain and the United States relating to boundary waters and boundary questions

SideBrief analysis payments from downstream to upstream state

12:11 PM

River, treaty year, and topic

17/11/07

Through-border * 2

utilization of the waters through particular works. The Soviets have completed the investigations and explorations (needed for these proposed works) on their side of the border. The results of these explorations have been communicated to the Afghans. Exploratory works will also take place on the Afghan side of the river between 1958 and 1959. The Soviet Union will, at its own expense, send a group of experts to work with Afghan specialists for the purpose of the exploratory works on the Afghan side. The USSR, therefore, undertakes actions which favor Afghanistan without compensation. At the end of these exploratory works the sides will draft a report, which will be provided to both governments and if there is further interest in these works, principles and terms shall be agreed upon.

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Upstream state

Canada

River, treaty year, and topic

Kootenay 1961/1964 – Hydropower and Flood control (2)

Through-border * 2

Table D.1 Continued

Canada is to build 15,500,000 acre-feet of usable storage in Canadian territory for flood control, and improved water flow and hydropower production. USA is to operate, maintain, and construct hydroelectric facilities in its territory. USA shall pay Canada $64,000,000 for the construction of flood control storage facilities equivalent to 8,450,000

Exchange of notes constituting an agreement between Canada and the United States of America regarding sale of Canada’s entitlement to downstream benefits under the treaty relating to the cooperative development of the water resources of the Columbia River Basin

pertains to the Niagara River [border-creator]. Since the agreement also pertains to boundary waters, in general, it also includes the Kootenay, St. Croix [border-creator], St. Lawrence [partial border-creator but returns], Columbia [through-border], Souris [through-border * 2], Skagit [throughborder], Red [through-border], St. John [mixed], Yukon [through-border], Stikine [through-border], Firth [through-border], Whiting [through-border], Taku [through-border], Alesek [through-border] and Chilkat [through-border] Rivers in this table. Treaty between the United States of America and Canada relating to the cooperative development of the water resources of the Columbia River Basin

Brief analysis

12:11 PM

Y

Sidepayments from downstream to upstream state

17/11/07

USA

Downstream state

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Canada (UK)

USA

N

(Table D.1 continued)

12:11 PM

Boundary waters agreement. The parties establish an International Joint Commission. The parties claim that they have exclusive jurisdiction and control over the use and diversion of all the waters on its side of the border, which in their natural channels would flow across the boundary or into boundary waters. The injured party on either side of the border will be entitled to the same legal remedies as if such injury took place in the country where such diversion or interference occurs. These diversions or obstructions shall be governed by an agreement. The waters of the St. Mary [through-border] and Milk [through-border * 2] Rivers shall be considered one stream and the waters shall be divided equally between the two parties. The agreement also pertains to the Niagara River [border-creator]. Since the agreement also pertains to boundary waters, in general, it also includes the Souris, St. Croix [border-creator], St. Lawrence [partial border-creator but returns], Columbia [through-border], Skagit [through-border], Red [through-border], St. John [mixed], Yukon [through-border], Stikine [through-border], Firth [throughborder], Whiting [through-border], Taku [through-border], Alesek [through-border] and Chilkat [through-border] Rivers in this table.

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Souris 1909 – Water quantity, General regulations and Commission creation (3)

acre-feet of the total usable storage. Compensation is also given for each of the first four flood periods and for operating facilities during those flood periods – $1,875,000. USA will also provide electric power equal to the hydroelectric power lost by Canada as a result of operating the storage to meet the flood control. Additional compensation is given to Canada for operating costs and opportunity cost of foregoing alternative uses during flood periods. Half the downstream power benefits, created by the improved water flow due to the storage dams to be built in Canada, are to be provided to Canada. In the 1964 Exchange of Notes between Canada and the USA, Canada chose to sell these downstream power benefits to the USA for $254,000,000. This agreement also applies to the Columbia River [through-border]. Treaty between Great Britain and the United States relating to boundary waters and boundary questions

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N

Y

The parties establish an International Joint Commission. The parties claim they have exclusive jurisdiction and control over the use and diversion of all the waters on their own side of the border, which in their natural channels would flow across the boundary or into boundary waters. The injured party on either side of the border will be entitled to the same legal remedies as if such injury took place in the country where such diversion or interference occurs. These diversions or obstructions shall be governed by an agreement. The waters of the Milk and St. Mary [through-border] Rivers shall be considered one stream and

Canada is to construct Rafferty and Alameda Dams, providing the US with a minimum of 377,800 acre feet of flood control storage capacity and providing Canada with water supply benefits. The United States is to pay Canada $41,100,000 for the flood control storage provided by the Rafferty and Alameda Dams. Canada will operate and maintain the two dams at no cost to the United States. Treaty between Great Britain and the United States relating to boundary waters and boundary questions

Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America for water supply and flood control in the Souris River Basin

Brief analysis

12:11 PM

Canada (UK)

USA

Canada

Souris 1989 – Flood control and Water quantity (4)

Sidepayments from downstream to upstream state

17/11/07

Milk USA 1909 – Water quantity, General regulations and Commission creation (5)

Downstream state

Upstream state

River, treaty year, and topic

Through-border * 2

Table D.1 Continued

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Australia (Papua New Guinea)

Ukraine

Elancik 1992 – Pollution, Flood control, Water quantity and General regulations (7)

N

N

(Table D.1 continued)

Agreement text is not available. According to Oregon State’s Database this is a general agreement whereby the countries agree on prevention, reduction and control of indirect inputs into waters of solids, liquids and gaseous substances of radionuclides and of thermal energy. The agreement also pertains to prevention of floods, regulations, water supply and other water related issues. No river seems to be mentioned in specific but in this table

This is a general agreement that pertains more to border crossings between the two countries for traditional and customary purposes (crossing for social contacts and ceremonies). The parties agree to undertake precautionary measures to prevent serious pollution of rivers. Consultations on measures to prevent pollution can be requested. The agreement does not specifically refer to the Sepik River. The agreement also pertains to the Tami [partial border-creator] and Fly [partial border-creator but returns] Rivers in this table. Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of Ukraine concerning the joint use and protection of transboundary waters

12:11 PM

Russia

Indonesia

17/11/07

Sepik 1973 – Pollution and General regulations (6)

the waters shall be divided equally between the two parties. The agreement also specifically pertains to the Niagara River [border-creator]. Since the agreement also pertains to boundary waters, in general, it also includes the Kootenay, St. Croix [border-creator], St. Lawrence [partial border-creator but returns], Columbia [through-border], Kootenay [through-border * 2], Souris [through-border * 2], Skagit [through-border], Red [throughborder], St. John [mixed], Yukon [through-border], Stikine [throughborder], Firth [through-border], Whiting [through-border], Taku [through-border], Alesek [through-border] and Chilkat [through-border] Rivers in this table. Agreement between the Government of Australia (acting on its own behalf and on behalf of the Government of Papua New Guinea) and the Government of Indonesia concerning administrative border arrangements as to the border between Papua New Guinea and Indonesia

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Upstream state

USSR

USSR

River, treaty year, and topic

Olanga 1922 – General regulations (8)

Olanga 1948 (@) – Pollution, Border issues and General regulations (9)

Through-border * 2

Table D.1 Continued

Finland

N

This is a larger territorial agreement regarding frontier issues and border markings. No river is specifically mentioned but in this table the agreement applies to the Olanga, Vuoksi [through-border] and Tuloma [through-border] Rivers. With regards to water, the parties shall respect the rights and interests of the other party, ensure that the frontier waters are kept clean and are not

This is largely a navigation and fishing agreement. Reference to specific rivers is only made in relation to fishing issues. In this table the agreement applies to the Olanga, Vuoksi [through-border] and Tuloma [throughborder] Rivers. The agreement states that no construction of works or water diversion may be allowed that may harm the other party. Exceptions may be made to this rule but compensation shall be provided in some form of agreement negotiated before the works are undertaken. Agreement between the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the Republic of Finland concerning the regime of the Soviet-Finnish frontier

the agreement will apply to the Elancik, Mius [through-border], Seversky Donets [through-border * 2 but creates border], Desna (Smolenska) [through-border] and Seim (Kurska) [partial border-creator but returns but then enters other state] Rivers. Convention between the Republic of Finland and the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic concerning the maintenance of river channels and the regulation of fishing on water courses forming part of the frontier

Brief analysis

12:11 PM

N

Sidepayments from downstream to upstream state

17/11/07

Finland

Downstream state

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USSR

N

N

(Table D.1 continued)

This is a general agreement. The parties agree that each party has a right, in its own territory, to an equitable share in the development, conservation and use of the water resources in the shared river basins. To determine equity, the parties agree to a number of factors (the agreement lists 12 general factors). All these factors are to be given the weight warranted by the circumstances peculiar to each river and shall be considered in unison. An existing use, which is in competition with a factor relevant for determining equitable sharing, shall take precedent only if that existing use benefits both parties. Other factors shall also be weighed. The parties also agree to the establishment of a permanent technical committee of water experts. The agreement specifically refers to the Gada (Goulbi), Tagwai (El Fadama) [throughborder] and Komadougou-Yobe [partial border-creator] Rivers.

This is a general agreement, which refers to no specific river. The only specific rivers provided pertain to fishing issues. In this table the agreement refers to the Olanaga, Vuoksi [through-border] and Tuloma [through-border] Rivers. In addition, the agreement calls on the parties to take measures to ensure that the frontier waters are not polluted. The parties shall also decide on water quality standards. Damage that is caused by one party to another shall be compensated for. A Joint Finish-Soviet Commission shall be established. The parties shall come to an agreement, prior to taking any works that may affect one another. The parties may also elect to take the matter to the Commission and the Commission’s decision shall be binding on the parties. The agreement is in force for 10 years whereby it may be extended. This agreement supersedes the 1922 Agreement. Agreement between the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the Republic of Niger concerning the equitable sharing in the development, conservation, and use of their common water resources

12:11 PM

Niger

Finland

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Gada (Goulbi) Nigeria (Part of the Marada River) 1990 – General regulations, Water quantity and Commission creation (11)

Olanga 1964 (!) – Pollution, General regulations and Commission creation (10)

polluted as well as prevent the banks from damage. They shall exchange information concerning water volume and levels. Agreement between the Republic of Finland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics concerning the frontier watercourses

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Upstream state

Australia (Papua New Guinea)

Italy

River, treaty year, and topic

Fly 1973 – Pollution and General regulations (1)

Judrio 1975 – Commission creation, Hydropower and Water quantity (2)

Partial border-creator but returns

Table D.1 Continued

N

The parties establish a permanent Joint Water Resources Management Commission to study water problems of common interest and to propose appropriate solutions. The agreement mentions the Judrio River but of particular interest is the construction of a dam and a hydroelectric plant on the Isonzo River [through-border]. If the dam does not seem feasible, a regulating pond shall be constructed in Yugoslav territory as a joint venture for the purpose of regulating the flow of the Isonzo River and irrigating the land in Italian territory south of Gorizia.

This is a general agreement that pertains more to border crossings between the two countries for traditional and customary purposes (crossing for social contacts and ceremonies). The parties agree to undertake precautionary measures to prevent serious pollution of rivers. Consultations on measures to prevent pollution can be requested. The agreement does not specifically refer to the Fly River. The agreement also pertains to the Tami [partial bordercreator] and Sepik [through-border * 2] Rivers in this table. Agreement on the development of economic cooperation between the Italian Republic and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

Agreement between the Government of Australia (acting on its own behalf and on behalf of the Government of Papua New Guinea) and the Government of Indonesia concerning administrative border arrangements as to the border between Papua New Guinea and Indonesia

Brief analysis

12:11 PM

Yugoslavia

N

Sidepayments from downstream to upstream state

17/11/07

Indonesia

Downstream state

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Chute du France Châtelot (Part of the Doubs River that creates the border between the two countries) 1930 (&) – Hydropower and Commission creation (3) St. Lawrence Canada (UK) 1909 – Water quantity, Border issues, General regulations and Commission creation (4)

N

N

Switzerland

USA

(Table D.1 continued)

12:11 PM

The parties establish an International Joint Commission. The parties claim they have exclusive jurisdiction and control over the use and diversion of all the waters on their own side of the border, which in their natural channels would flow across the boundary or into boundary waters. The injured party on either side of the border will be entitled to the same legal remedies as if such injury took place in the country where such diversion or interference occurs. These diversions or obstructions shall be governed by an agreement. The waters of the St. Mary [through-border] and Milk [throughborder * 2] Rivers shall be considered one stream and the waters shall be divided equally between the two parties. The agreement also specifically pertains to the Niagara River [border-creator]. Since the agreement also pertains to boundary waters, in general, it also includes the St. Lawrence, St. Croix [border-creator], Kootenay [through-border * 2], Columbia [throughborder], Souris [through-border * 2], Skagit [through-border], Red [throughborder], St. John [mixed], Yukon [through-border], Stikine [through-border], Firth [through-border], Whiting [through-border], Taku [through-border], Alesek [through-border] and Chilkat [through-border] Rivers in this table.

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Treaty between Great Britain and the United States relating to boundary waters and boundary questions

This is a framework convention. The parties have agreed that there is a potential for exploitable hydropower but that only one plant can be built. The parties agree that one company will utilize the power and the produced energy shall be divided equally between the parties. The parties establish a Joint Commission.

Convention between France and Switzerland on the subject of the concession of the Chatelot Waterfall

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Haiti

Haiti

Dominican Republic

Massacre (Dajabon) 1929 (&) – Border issues, Water quantity and General regulations (2)

Massacre Dominican (Dajabon) Republic 1935/1936 (@) – Border issues (3)

N

N

Additional protocol to the Treaty of 1/21/1929 regarding the delimitation of the frontier between the two countries

This is a general treaty of friendship and peace between the two countries. It does not refer to any specific river. The parties undertake not to carry out, or be a party to, any construction works calculated to change the natural course of the river and to affect the waters derived from them. This provision does not prevent the parties from making equitable use of the waters in their territory. In this table the agreement pertains to the Massacre (Dajabon), Pendernales [partial border-creator] and Artibonite [mixed] Rivers. Boundary Agreement between the Dominican Republic and the Republic of Haiti

This is a general territorial limits agreement. The treaty refers specifically to the Massacre (Dajabon), Pendernales [partial border-creator] and Artibonite [mixed] Rivers but only in reference to borders and other territorial issues. Treaty of peace, friendship and arbitration between the Dominican Republic and Haiti

Treaty of the delimitation of the frontier between the Dominican Republic and the Republic of Haiti

Brief analysis

12:11 PM

N

Sidepayments from downstream to upstream state

17/11/07

Haiti

Dominican Republic

Massacre (Dajabon) 1929 (@) – Border issues (1)

Downstream state

Upstream state

River, treaty year, and topic

Partial border-creator * 2

Table D.1 Continued

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Kazakhstan

Kazakhstan

Germany

Russia

Russia

Austria

NSI

(Table D.1 continued)

Agreement text is not available. According to Oregon State’s Database the Salzach is mentioned specifically. The agreement is about hydropower and water rights.

Agreement between Austria and Germany concerning the OsterreichischBayerische Kraftwerke AG

Agreement text is not available. According to UNECE (2003) the agreement pertains to qualitative and quantitative protection of water resources, water supply, irrigation, floods and regulation. A Joint Working Group is also established.

Agreement text is not available. According to Oregon State’s Database this is a general agreement with reference to quantitative and qualitative protection of water resources and water-supply. It also refers to other issues such as irrigation and floods. The agreement specifically refers to the Ural, Ishim [through-border] and Tobol [mixed] Rivers. Protocol on joint use and protection of transboundary water bodies, coordination of water management in the Ural River Basin

12:11 PM

NSI

N

17/11/07

Ural 1992 – Pollution, Water quantity, Flood control and General regulations (4) Ural 1996 (@) – Pollution, Water quantity, Flood control and General regulations (5) Salzach 1950 – Hydropower and Water quantity (6)

The 1936 agreement simply affirms the settlement of the above mentioned difficulties. In this table the agreement pertains to the Massacre (Dajabon), Pendernales [partial border-creator] and Artibonite [mixed] Rivers. Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Government of the Russian Federation concerning the joint use and protection of transboundary waters

This is a territorial limits treaty which settles particular difficulties regarding tracing the frontiers between the two countries that arose since the signing of the 1929 Treaty of Delimitation.

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Russia

Seim (Kurska) 1992 – Pollution, Flood control, Water quantity and General regulations (1)

Ukraine

Downstream state

Upstream state

China

Hal Ha 1994 – Pollution, Water

Mongolia

Downstream state

N

Agreement between the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Government of Mongolia on the protection and utilization of transboundary waters

SideBrief analysis payments from downstream to upstream state

Agreement text is not available. According to Oregon State’s Database this is a general agreement whereby the countries agree on prevention, reduction and control of indirect inputs into waters of solids, liquids and gaseous substances of radionuclides and of thermal energy. The agreement also pertains to prevention of floods, regulations, water supply and other water related issues. No river seems to be mentioned in specific but in this table the agreement will apply to the Seim (Kurska), Desna (Smolenska) [throughborder], Seversky Donets [through-border * 2 but creates border], Elancik [through-border * 2] and Mius [through-border] Rivers.

Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of Ukraine concerning the joint use and protection of transboundary waters

12:11 PM

River, treaty year, and topic

N

SideBrief analysis payments from downstream to upstream state

17/11/07

Partial border-creator * 2 but enters state first

Upstream state

River, treaty year, and topic

Partial border-creator but returns but then enters other state

Table D.1 Continued

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Upstream state

Russia

Seversky Donets 1992 – Pollution, Flood control, Water quantity and General regulations (1)

Ukraine

Downstream state

N

(Table D.1 continued)

Agreement text is not available. According to Oregon State’s Database this is a general agreement whereby the countries agree on prevention, reduction and control of indirect inputs into waters of solids, liquids and gaseous substances of radionuclides and of thermal energy. The agreement also pertains to prevention of floods, regulations, water supply and other water related issues. No river seems to be mentioned in specific but in this table the

Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of Ukraine concerning the joint use and protection of transboundary waters

SideBrief analysis payments from downstream to upstream state

12:11 PM

River, treaty year, and topic

This is a general agreement that refers to the waters shared between the two countries. The agreement specifically refers to the Hal Ha, Kerulen [through-border] and Bulgan [through-border] Rivers. The parties agree to cooperate in the investigation, protection and development of transboundary waters, maintenance and rational use of water conservation projects and flood prevention facilities. The parties should jointly protect the ecological system of their transboundary waters and develop and utilize these waters in a way that should not be detrimental to the other side. Any development and utilization of transboundary waters should follow the principle of fairness and equity. The parties will decide, via consultation, on the annual consumption of the transboundary waters. The parties establish a Joint Commission on Transboundary Waters to handle matters related to this agreement.

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Through-border * 2 but creates border

quantity, Hydropower, Flood control, General regulations and Commission creation (1)

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Upstream state

Poland

Poland

River, treaty year, and topic

Olma 1928 (@) – Flood control (2)

Olma 1958 (@) – Pollution, General

Sidepayments from downstream to upstream state

Czechoslovakia N

This is an agreement that pertains mostly to flood control. The agreement specifically refers to the Olma and Petru°vka [through-border * 2] Rivers. The parties agree to divide up the costs for the drawing up of the plans equally. The costs of drawing up the detailed plans will be divided up according to which party prepared the plans. The actual regulation and conservancy works will be divided up equally for parts of the rivers. The other parts of the river that will also require works will be funded by Czechoslovakia with Poland making a 12.5% contribution not to exceed 1,100,000 Czechoslovak crowns. This agreement will not appear in Chapter 5 for it is difficult to ascertain the stretches of the river and the corresponding project and cost-sharing/side-payment scheme (Petru°vka cannot be identified in the maps). Agreement between the Government of the Czechoslovak Republic and the Government of the Polish People’s Republic concerning the use of water resources in frontier waters

12:12 PM

agreement will apply to the Seversky Donets, Desna (Smolenska) [throughborder], Elancik [through-border * 2], Mius [through-border] and Seim (Kurska) [partial border-creator but returns but then enters other state] Rivers. Convention between the Polish Republic and the Czechoslovak Republic concerning the improvement of the river Olma and Petru°vka

Brief analysis

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Czechoslovakia Y

Downstream state

Through-border * 2 but creates border

Table D.1 Continued

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Upstream state

India

Downstream state

Y

Sidepayments from downstream to upstream state

(Table D.1 continued)

The Mahakali Agreement formalizes two earlier agreements: the 1920 Sarada Agreement and the 1992 Tankapur Project Agreement. These two projects are really Indian projects built on the part of the river flowing entirely in India (although the Tankapur Barrage was built close to the border). In the Sarada Agreement, Nepal agreed to exchange a set of territory with an equal amount of land from British controlled India. The agreement also gave Nepal a right to a supply of water from the Sarada Barrage. The Tankapur Agreement provided for the construction of the left afflux bund (the retaining wall) on the course of the river

Treaty between His Majesty’s Government of Nepal and the Government of India concerning the integrated development of the Mahakali River including Sarada Barrage, Tankapur Barrage, and Pancheshwar Project

Brief analysis

12:12 PM

Mahakali Nepal 1996 – Hydropower, Water quantity, Flood control and Commission creation (1)

River, treaty year, and topic

This is a general agreement. The parties agree that any specific works to be undertaken by the parties shall be governed by an agreement. The parties also agree to abate pollution in their shared rivers. The parties also agree to appoint plenipotentiaries from each country to carry out the tasks emanating from the agreement. The agreement only refers specifically to the Olma and Petru°vka [through-border * 2] Rivers saying that the 1928 Agreement shall cease to exist. Only the provisions included in the 1928 Agreement shall apply in respect to the execution of works until 12/31/1958. In this table, the agreement also pertains to the Orawa [through-border], Witka (Smeda) [through-border] and Dunajec [mixed] rivers (Petru°vka cannot be identified in the maps).

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Mixed zig zag

regulations and Commission creation (3)

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Upstream state

Downstream state

Sidepayments from downstream to upstream state

within Nepalese territory for which the Nepalese provided 2.9 hectares of land. This agreement, however, did not provide for an even exchange of land. Instead, India was to build a canal so that a set amount of water could be delivered to Nepal. In addition, India was also required to provide Nepal with 10 megawatts of electricity – India would build the appropriate transmission lines to the border so as to provide the energy. The canal would bring the water from the Sarada Barrage and the water, as promised under the Tankapur Agreement, all the way to the India-Nepal border. The waterways are to be operated jointly by the two countries. If it desires, Nepal shall also have additional energy equal to half of the incremental energy produced at that Tankapur Power House. Nepal shall bare half of the operation costs and if required the additional capital costs at the Power House for the generation of this incremental energy. The compensation regime is, therefore, based on the

Brief analysis

12:12 PM

River, treaty year, and topic

Mixed zig zag

17/11/07

Table D.1 Continued

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fact that tracks of land were affected by the Indian projects. The main element of the Mahakali Agreement was the Pancheshwar Multipurpose Project (PMP). This integrated project was to be built on the part of the river the forms the border between the two parties. The PMP is to provide hydropower through the erection of two separate power houses on both sides of the border. The total of this energy would be divided equally. In total the project will be shared according to the benefits accrued to both parties. Nepal will be able to sell a portion of its power to India. In any case, the costs for the hydropower component of the project shall be shared equally. The benefits for the non-hydropower component of the project shall be calculated through the measurement of flood control benefits created from the project and the augmentation of the river and water allocated to each party. Nepal is guaranteed to a set amount of water from India. Similarly, India is committed to purchasing a part of Nepal’s portion of the hydroelectricity produced. The parties also establish a Mahakali River Commission (Salman and Uprety, 2002: 96–118; Interview, Uprety 2004).

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Appendix E

Threshold, rounding justification, and country asymmetry ratios Threshold and rounding justification The reason for choosing two times the difference as the threshold is explained below, but the reason for rounding the calculated ratio is to obtain an overall perspective of the relationship. That is, though obtaining the GDP per capita differences for the year the treaty was signed is important, so is capturing the economic power relationship (EPR) between the countries during the period when the treaty was negotiated. Because the data only provides a point figure for the year the treaty was signed, rather than a time series around the time the treaty was negotiated, a proxy of the EPR is introduced by rounding the ratio. For example, any ratio below (and including) 1.5 is considered a 1:1 relationship between the states, which is a perfectly symmetric relationship. On the other hand, any ratio above (and including) 1.6 and up to 2 is considered a relationship of 1:2 between the countries, which is an asymmetric relationship. The highest ratio identified in this study is 1:15. Additional statistical justification for rounding follows. Choosing two times the difference in identifying an economic asymmetric relationship has several justifications. First, there is a statistical explanation for this in the context of the study. In running a descriptive statistics test for all the ratio values that are obtained (raw values) the mean is 2.135, indicating that choosing two times (after rounding) as the threshold for economic asymmetry is sound. For additional statistical assurance, the hypothesis states that the raw and rounded values do not defer statistically. Table E.1, below, provides the values that are obtained in the calculation of the statistical parameters of the two sets (the raw and rounded ratios) and Table E.2 tests the statistical difference between the two sets. A second reason for choosing two times the difference for the threshold of economic asymmetry has to do with past work conducted on a similar subject. Although Song and Whittington (2004) do not show it statistically, they also use two times the difference as their threshold for determining and categorizing countries that are stronger or (weaker) in terms of population and economic well-being.

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Appendix E

297

Table E.1 Descriptive statistics of the GDP ratio (raw and rounded) Statistics

GDP ratio raw values

GDP ratio rounded values

Mean Standard error Standard deviation Variance Confidence level (95%)

2.135 0.193 1.849 3.419 0.385

2.032 0.201 1.917 3.676 0.399

Table E.2 Two-sample T-test assuming equal variance Statistics

GDP ratio raw values

GDP ratio rounded values

Mean Variance Observations Hypothesized mean difference Df t-Statistic P(T
 t) one-tail t-Critical one-tail P(T
 t) two-tail t-Critical two-tail

2.135 3.419 91 0 180 0.365 0.357 1.653 0.714 1.973

2.032 3.676 91

The results in Table E.2 suggest that the two samples do not differ statistically because the t-Statistic (0.365) does not exceed the t-Critical of 1.653 for a one-tail test. Therefore, by using the rounded GDP ratio, a balanced set of treaties is created, whereby nearly 54 percent of the treaties are concluded between countries with equal economic power (ratio of 1:1) and 46 percent of the treaties are concluded between countries of unequal economic power (ratio of 1:2 and above). Finally, it can be demonstrated statistically that: (1) two times the difference in GDP per capita is the appropriate threshold for determining that a relationship between two countries is asymmetric, and (2) among the other possible thresholds for determining asymmetry (three times the difference, four times the difference, etc.) two times the difference in GDP per capita is most significant. Using two times the difference for referring to a relationship as asymmetric is, therefore, the best estimation. Using three or four times the difference is not demonstrably superior. As Figure E.1 demonstrates, the significance level drops as the possible thresholds increase beyond two times, becoming the least significant at five times the difference. (Although another explanation for the diminishing significance can be the smaller amount of observations available for the thresholds beyond two times). So it can be demonstrated statistically that a rounded ratio for EPR can replace the raw data for the EPR between countries. Similarly, these extrapolations indicate that the most appropriate and significant asymmetry threshold was two times.

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Country dyad asymmetry ratio calculations Table E.3 presents the economic asymmetry calculations for each country dyad and the associated treaty. The entries correspond exactly to the tables in Chapters Four and Five for the configurations presented.

5

t-Critical t-Statistic

t-values

4 3 2 1 1

2

3

4

5

6

Threshold asymmetry point

Figure E.1 Diminishing significance of threshold asymmetry point.

Table E.3 Economic asymmetries and ratios Year; River; States (GDP/capita); Largest/smallest GDP/capita ratio 1909; St. Mary; USA ($5,023) and Canada (UK) ($3,647); difference: 1.4 times 1914; Roya; France ($3,206) and Italy ($2,487); difference: 1.3 times 1925/1951; Gash; Italy (Eritrea) ($2,857) and UK (Sudan) ($4,912); difference: 1.7 times 1957; Isonzo (Mrzlek Springs); Yugoslavia ($1,992) and Italy ($5,008); difference: 2.5 times 1967; Roya; France ($10,679) and Italy ($9,570); difference: 1.1 times 1968; Lima (Limia); Spain ($8,151) and Portugal ($5,645); difference: 1.4 times 1973; Helmand; Afghanistan ($129) and Iran ($794); difference: 6.1 times 1975; Gangir; Iraq ($5,463) and Iran ($5,832); difference: 1.1 times 1975; Kanjan Cham; Iraq ($5,463) and Iran ($5,832); difference: 1.1 times 1975; Tib (Mehmeh); Iraq ($5,463) and Iran ($5,832); difference: 1.1 times 1949; Reno di Lei; Italy ($3,193) and Switzerland ($8,637); difference: 2.7 times 1951; Näätämöjoki; Finland ($5,515) and Norway ($6,610); difference: 1.2 1952; Orawa; Poland ($2,519) and Czechoslovakia ($3,598); difference: 1.4 times 1954/1966; Kosi; Nepal ($826) and India ($900); difference: 1.1 times 1955; Mont Cenis; France ($6,362) and Italy ($5,370); difference: 1.2 times 1958; Carol; France ($7,182) and Spain ($4,489); difference: 1.6 times 1960; Mont Cenis; France ($7,824) and Italy ($6,889); difference: 1.1 times 1961/1964; Columbia; Canada ($10,383) and USA ($12,319); difference: 1.2 times 1963; Garona; Spain ($6,271) and France ($8,925); difference: 1.4 times 1972; Vuoksi; Finland ($8,751) and USSR ($4,429); difference: 1.9 times 1974; Wangchu; Bhutan ($672) and India ($1,050); difference: 1.6 times 1967/1984; Skagit; Canada ($19,875) and USA ($23,056); difference: 1.2 times 1988; Red; USA ($25,607) and Canada ($22,631); difference: 1.1 times

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Table E.3 Continued Year; River; States (GDP/capita); Largest/smallest GDP/capita ratio 1995; Kurichhu; Bhutan ($1,968) and India ($2,117); difference: 1.1 times 1996; Wangchu; Bhutan ($1,968) and India ($2,117); difference: 1.1 times 1955; Sarisu; Turkey ($2,402) and Iran ($1,736); difference: 1.4 times 1960; Witka (Smeda); Czechoslovakia ($5,108) and Poland ($3,218); difference: 1.6 times 1963; Allaine; Switzerland ($16,807) and France ($8,925); difference: 1.9 times 2000; Talas; Kyrgyzstan ($3,014) and Kazakhstan ($7,390); difference: 2.4 times 1985 (Minute 270); Tijuana; Mexico ($7,673) and USA ($23,623); difference: 3 times 1990/1997 (Minutes 283 and 296); Tijuana; Mexico ($7,639) and USA ($30,190); difference: 3.9 times 1997 (Minute 298); Tijuana; Mexico ($7,639) and USA ($30,190); difference: 3.9 times 1980 (Minute 264); New; Mexico ($7,654) and USA ($21,335); difference: 2.8 times 1987 (Minute 274); New; Mexico ($7,250) and USA ($24,831); difference: 3.4 times 1995 (Minute 294); New; Mexico ($7,174) and USA ($28,408); difference: 3.9 times 1909; Niagara; USA ($5,023) and Canada (UK) ($3,647); difference: 1.4 times 1941; Niagara; USA ($8,215) and Canada ($5,733); difference: 1.4 times 1941; Niagara; USA ($8,215) and Canada ($5,733); difference: 1.4 times 1997; Cuareim (Quraí), Brazil ($7,014) and Uruguay ($9,715); difference: 1.4 times 1950/1954; Niagara; USA ($10,702) and Canada ($9,092); difference: 1.2 times 2000; An Nahr Al Khabir; Syria ($4,093) and Lebanon ($5,785); difference: 1.4 times 1969; Niagara; USA ($16,525) and Canada ($14,051); difference: 1.2 times 1977; Yaguarón (Jaguarão); Brazil ($5,701) and Uruguay ($6,743); difference: 1.2 times 1955; Karasu; Turkey ($2,402) and Iran ($1,736); difference: 1.4 times 1912; Duoro; Spain ($2,255) and Portugal (1,354); difference: 1.7 times 1912; Guadania; Spain ($2,255) and Portugal (1,354); difference: 1.7 times 1912; Tagus (Tajo); Spain ($2,255) and Portugal (1,354); difference: 1.7 times 1935; Artibonite; Dominican Republic ($1,195) and Haiti ($924); difference: 1.3 times 1944; Colorado; USA ($12,348) and Mexico ($1,804); difference: 7 times 1957; Spöl; Italy ($5,757) and Switzerland ($13, 708); difference: 2.4 times 1959; Gandak; Nepal ($778) and India ($847); difference: 1.1 times 1964; Duoro; Spain ($6,566) and Portugal ($4,248); difference: 1.5 times 1966; Colorado; USA ($15,396) and Mexico ($4,896); difference: 3.1 times 1968; Guadania; Spain ($8,151) and Portugal ($5,645); difference: 1.4 times 1968; Tagus (Tajo); Spain ($8,151) and Portugal ($5,645); difference: 1.4 times 1975; Duverij (Doveyrich); Iran ($5,832) and Iraq ($5,463); difference: 1.1 times 1983; Teesta; India ($1,295) and Bangladesh ($1,132); difference: 1.1 times 1994; Colorado; USA ($27,877) and Mexico ($7,648); difference: 3.6 times 1995; Nestos (Mesta); Bulgaria ($5,523) and Greece ($12,472); difference: 2.2 times 2000; Chu; Kyrgyzstan ($3,014) and Kazakhstan ($7,390); difference: 2.4 times 1966; Saar (Sarre); France ($7,645) and Germany ($8,002); difference: 1.1 times 1971; Puyango-Tumbes; Ecuador ($2,358) and Peru ($4,776); difference: 2 times 1970/1972; Torrente Breggia; Switzerland ($21,537) and Italy ($11,671); difference: 1.8 times 1972/1973; Colorado; USA ($18,670) and Mexico ($6,147); difference: 3 times 1906; Rio Grande (Río Bravo del Norte); USA ($5,085) and Mexico ($1,351); difference: 3.8 times 1933; Rio Grande (Río Bravo del Norte); USA ($4,783) and Mexico ($1,272); difference: 3.8 times 1912; Chanza; Spain ($2,255) and Portugal (1,354); difference: 1.7 times 1912; Minho (Miño); Spain ($2,255) and Portugal (1,354); difference: 1.7 times (Table E.3 continued)

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Table E.3 Continued Year; River; States (GDP/capita); Largest/smallest GDP/capita ratio 1926; Cunene; Portugal (Angola) ($2,416) and S. Africa (Namibia) ($4,136); difference: 1.7 times 1938; Paz; Guatemala ($2,160) and El Salvador ($2,830); difference: 1.3 times 1944; Zarumilla; Ecuador ($1,637) and Peru ($2,837); difference: 1.7 times 1944; Rio Grande (Río Bravo del Norte); USA ($12, 348) and Mexico ($1,804); difference: 7 times 1949; Prut; USSR ($2,834) and Romania ($1,182); difference: 2.4 times 1957; Atrak; Iran ($2,946) and USSR ($2,397); difference: 1.2 times 1957; Atrak; Iran ($2,946) and USSR ($2,397); difference: 1.2 times 1959; Hermance; France ($7,404) and Switzerland ($13,807); difference: 1.9 times 1958; Timok; Yugoslavia ($2,054) and Bulgaria ($2,508); difference: 1.2 times 1968; Chanza; Spain ($8,151) and Portugal ($5,645); difference: 1.4 times 1968; Minho (Miño); Spain ($8,151) and Portugal ($5,645); difference: 1.4 times 1969; Cunene; Portugal (Angola) ($5,800) and S. Africa (Namibia) ($6,646); difference: 1.1 times 1971; Prut; USSR ($4,281) and Romania ($862); difference: 5 times 1986; Gander; Luxembourg ($21,697) and France ($17,439); difference: 1.2 times 1998; Zarumilla, Ecuador ($3837) and Peru ($4,550); difference: 1.2 times 1956; Argun; China ($872) and USSR ($3,557); difference: 4 times 1956; Amur; USSR ($3,557) and China ($872); difference: 4 times 1958; Amu Darya; Afghanistan ($110) and USSR ($1,659); difference: 15 times 1909; Milk; USA ($5,023) and Canada (UK) ($3,647); difference: 1.4 times 1961/1964; Kootenay; Canada ($10,383) and USA ($12,319); difference: 1.2 times 1989; Souris; Canada ($22,834) and USA ($26,278); difference: 1.2 times 1930; Chute du Châtelot (Doubs River); France ($4,489) and Switzerland ($6,160); difference: 1.4 times 1996; Mahakali; Nepal ($1,272) and India ($2,117); difference: 1.7 times

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1 Introduction 1 The prediction, made by Ismail Serageldin, Vice President of the World Bank at the time, was quoted in Crosette (1995); Kofi Annan, United Nations Secretary General at the time, made a similar prediction in remarks addressed to the 97th Annual Meeting of the Association of American Geographers (2001). 2 This is the number of rivers clearly identified by this research that conform to both geographical configurations. Other geographical configurations exist but will be referred to later. 3 The 176 documented river basins identified by Wolf et al. (1999) were used to locate each respective river and its associated configuration. Out of the 176 river basins identified by Wolf et al. (1999), there were some rivers that could not be located or that were not relevant for this study given that the river basin was international in name only – that is, the individual river for which the basin was named neither crossed nor straddled a border. As can be ascertained from the above count, this study has also identified other rivers not documented by Wolf et al. (1999) – they are 73 in number. However, Wolf et al. (1999) identify river basins rather than individual rivers so some rivers identified in this research may be part of a larger basin specified by Wolf et al. (1999). 4 This is a proto-typical case. Yet there are instances where dams built downstream cause inundation or environmental damage upstream. Such a case is noted in Chapter 3. 5 See for example, Meredith Giordano’s work (2003b: 121–2) on water quality treaties. She divides treaties into three categories ranging from treaties that codify “indefinite commitments” among the basin states (Category Three), treaties that codify “defined activities” among the basin states (Category Two), and treaties that codify “explicit standards” among the riparians (Category One). She finds that out of the 62 treaties that pertain to water quality nearly one-half of the treaties fit within the parameters of Category Three and 24 treaties within the parameters of Category Two. Only a few treaties fit the parameters of Category One. 2 Explaining conflict, cooperation, and negotiation along international rivers 1 Diagram slightly modified by the author. Reprinted from Political Geography, 19, Toset H.P.W, Gleditsch, N.P. and Hegre, H., Shared Rivers and Interstate Conflict, p. 980, 2000, with permission from Elsevier. 2 Switzerland is by far the richer country in terms of GDP per capita for 1972. The other countries are all economically symmetric. However, while Switzerland participated in the agreement much of the pollution came from Germany and France (98 percent). For that reason this agreement is most appropriately placed in the “symmetric” column.

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3 Treaty design and property rights: theory and hypotheses 1 A fourth principal theory of water utilization also exists. Called the community of interests (McCaffrey 2001: 149) principle or the drainage basin approach (Bourne and Wouters 1997: 3), it implies a “community” in the sense that all of the riparian states share the watercourse in common, all have interests in it, and all have the capacity to affect the other in some way. Therefore, riparians should work together to advance these interests in a mutually acceptable way. It presupposes the concept of a unified development of an international basin and interdependent countries that rely on the common water source (Bourne and Wouters 1997: 22). According to McCaffrey (2001: 172) this principle has found expression in agreements establishing joint institutional mechanisms for the protection, management, and development of shared freshwater resources. 2 Caflisch (1996), Dellapenna (1996), and Wouters (1996) write before the 1997 Convention was adopted. Caflisch (1996) argues that in the debate between Articles 5 and 7, Article 5 should be the dominant principle. The no harm rule should therefore be subordinate to equitable and reasonable utilization. Dellapenna (1996) analyzes the evolution of the Draft Articles, which culminated in the 1997 Convention, and shows that changes made to Articles 5 and 7 reflect the dominance of Article 5. Wouters (1996) argues that states are not likely to embrace a dominant no harm approach to watercourse development. Rather states recognize that “harm” may take place, but accept this “so long as the use is equitable and reasonable and the harming state undertakes efforts to limit the trans-boundary harm” (Wouters 1996: 437–8). McCaffrey also refers to the ruling of the International Court of Justice in the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case involving Hungary and Slovakia where the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization was relied upon without any reference to the obligation not to cause significant harm principle as evidence that the former principle is the more important of the two (1998: 27). 3 Tanzi and Arcari (2001) do not see Articles 5 and 7 in competition. However, a clear conflict is implied not only in the earlier discussion but also in how states regard the 1997 Convention, which is addressed later in this section. 4 Another example includes the Lake Lanoux case, where a 1957 arbitration tribunal ruled that downstream Spain could not veto reasonable upstream works. Similarly, upstream France must consider downstream interests. A compromise between the two countries was finally reached based on this ruling. Equitable and reasonable utilization was considered the dominant principle by legal scholars, which came out of this ruling. 5 1997 United Nations Convention on the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, Articles 7 and 21; Institut de Droit International, 1961 Salzburg Resolution on the Use of International Non-Maritime Water, preamble; Institut de Droit International, 1979 Athens Resolution, Articles 2, 3, 5, and 6; 1966 Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers, Chapter 3, Articles 10 and 11; 1992 Rio Declaration, Principles 2 (second part of the sentence), 14 and 16; 1972 Stockholm Declaration, Principle 21 (second part of the sentence). 6 1997 United Nations Convention on the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, Article 5; Institut de Droit International, 1961 Salzburg Resolution on the Use of International Non-Maritime Water, Article 2; Institut de Droit International, 1979 Athens Resolution, Article 2; 1966 Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers, Chapter 2, Articles 4, 7 and 8; 1992 Rio Declaration, Principle 2 (first part of the sentence); 1972 Stockholm Declaration, Principle 21 (first part of the sentence). 7 Albert Utton (1996) considers the debate regarding Articles 5 and 7, but his contribution is more in the area specific to pollution issues. Utton argues that the confusion caused by the apparent conflict between the two Articles could have been reduced if the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization was used for water quantity issues and if the no harm rule had been used for water quality matters. Utton, actually proposes a way by

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which to incorporate the pollution issue into Article 7 rewriting it according to those standards. This would mean that Article 5 would be the preeminent principle in water quantity issues and Article 7 the principle for water pollution issues. Yet, his recommendations do not appear to clear the confusion when he argues that, “a state could go forward with a project if on balance the benefits outweighed the costs. However, if the project caused adverse and significant changes in water quality or harm to the ecological system, than the harming state would have to exercise due diligence or consult with the harmed state over reasonableness, mitigation and compensation” (Utton 1996: 640). Along the same lines, Nollkaemper argues that in cases of threats to the environment there are good arguments to prefer the no harm rule to the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization. “A watercourse state’s right to utilize an international watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner finds its limits in the duty of that state not to cause appreciable [significant] environmental harm to other watercourse states.” Therefore the utilization of the watercourse is not equitable if it causes other watercourse states “appreciable harm” (1993: 68–9). McCaffrey (2001) suggests that Article 21 does not address pollution that does not rise to the level of causing “significant harm” to other watercourse states. Therefore, McCaffrey also makes the connection with Article 5, suggesting that Article 21 and the notion of “significant harm” means that the polluting state would have an obligation to ensure that the polluting use was both equitable and reasonable vis-à-vis the other watercourse states (McCaffrey 2001: 386). In short, McCaffrey argues that while a polluting activity that causes “significant harm” may be regarded as inequitable and unreasonable (and here he agrees with Nollkaemper 1993) this does not necessarily mean that there is no scope for the concept of an equitable right to pollute if that pollution does not rise to the level of “significant harm” to other states. However, a state may still need to take action to prevent (relates to new pollution), reduce, and control (relates to existing pollution) the polluting activity before it becomes “significant.” Still pollution that falls short of causing “significant harm” can still violate Article 20 (concerning the protection of ecosystems) and Article 23 (concerning the protection of the marine environment) of the 1997 Convention (McCaffrey 2001: 386). Needles to say, and given the earlier discussion and viewpoints, the main issues grappling states seem to be defining the notion of “significant” and how they shall settle the harming activity. 8 Other international rulings provide different assessments on the issues of pollution abatement and compensation for damages: Institut de Droit International, 1979 Athens Resolution, Articles 2, 3, 5, and 6 argue that states shall “prevent any new form of pollution or any increase in the existing degree of pollution, and abate existing pollution within the best possible limits,” “incur international liability under international law for any breach of their international obligations with respect to pollution of rivers and lakes,” and conclude international conventions “with a view to ensuring an effective system of prevention and compensation for victims of trans-boundary pollution;” 1966 Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers, Chapter 3, Articles 10 and 11 argue that “states must prevent any new form of water pollution or any increase in the degree of existing water pollution in an international drainage basin which would cause substantial injury in the territory of a co-basin state,” and “states should take all reasonable measures to abate existing water pollution in an international drainage basin to such an extent that no substantial damage is caused in the territory of a co-basin state.” In the case of the former clause, “the state responsible shall be required to cease the wrongful conduct and compensate the injured co-basin state for the injury that has been caused to it.” In the case of the latter clause, “if a state fails to take reasonable measures, it shall be required promptly to enter into negotiations with the injured state with a view towards reaching a settlement equitable under the circumstances;” Rio Declaration, Principle 16, argues that “national authorities should endeavor to promote the internalization of environmental costs and the use of economic instruments, taking into account the approach that the polluter should, in principle, bear the cost of pollution, with due regard to the public interest and without distorting international trade and investment.”

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9 The terms “constraint” and “discretion” are taken from (Nollkaemper 1993: 3). 10 Martin (1995: 88) argues that heterogeneity of capabilities and preference intensities are not necessarily a hindrance to cooperation vis-à-vis common pool resources, especially when mechanisms like issue-linkage may be employed among the parties. Martin’s argument does not oppose the earlier contentions since actors with different preference intensities for a normal good still need to employ incentives to promote cooperation among them. 11 Another hypothesis that logically follows is: “All else being equal, for the through-border configuration, the richer is the downstream state relative to the upstream state, the larger will be the side-payment provided to the upstream state.” While this conjecture may be compelling it is impossible to compare across river projects and test the validity of this hypothesis. For example the project agreed upon for one river may be quite different from a project agreed upon for another river. Because the costs are also different, depending on the kind of project, it is inconceivable to compare the projects and the associated side-payments. I argue, therefore, that income differences matter for a given agreement and not across agreements. For this reason I do not include this hypothesis. 4 Empirical analysis of treaty design differences: core configurations 1 Due to the geographical nature of this work (e.g., testing the effects of different geographies on commons solutions) this type of counting was necessary. 2 In opposition to the above endnote, the total number of new agreements, treaty translations, texts and/or titles are not counted according to the number of rivers they represent. In other words, if one agreement applies to (say) five rivers, it is still counted as only one new agreement which, in turn, is supplemented to Oregon State’s research. 3 League of Nations Treaty Series; United Nations Treaty Series; United States Treaties in Force; Food and Agriculture Organization (1978; 1984); Food and Agriculture Organization (FAOLEX and WATERLEX); United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE, 2003); French Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Repertorio Cronológico de Legislación (Spain); Central Asia Regional Water, Environment, and Energy Agreements, Department of Civil Engineering at the University of Texas; International Water Law Project; Parry (1969); Rohn (1984). 4 Heston et al. (2001). 5 Summers and Heston (1991). 6 The Penn World Table 6.1 uses 1996 dollars; The Penn World Table 5.6 uses 1985 dollars; Maddison (1995) uses 1990 dollars. 7 Per capita GDP is calculated at current prices in US dollars by the UN Statistical Databases. 8 Other qualifications include: (a) where riparians were under the colonial rule of another country, while the agreement was signed, the GDP data for that colonial state was used; (b) where per capita GDP data for a particular year (for a given riparian) was not available, the closest year possible was chosen. 9 The full text of the Agreement could not be located, but one source, Abidi (1977) provides an account of the negotiation process preceding the treaty. Abidi’s description of the agreement is unclear as to whether side-payments were directly and officially included, but it is clear that side-payments were provided to Afghanistan. Abidi writes that the agreement called on Afghanistan to release a set amount of water a year for Iran’s use from the Helmand River. As Abidi (1977) adds, “Iran offered financial payment and concessional transit rights for Afghan exports through Bandar Abbas in return for more water by Afghanistan” (1977: 370). 10 A strong contradiction would have the payments go the other way.

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11 The agreement also refers to the Chu River but this is categorized in the mixed configuration and considered in Chapter 5. 12 Chapter 2 noted that the 1976 Rhine Chlorides Agreement is an example of geographical asymmetry between otherwise economic symmetric countries. While the agreement is indeed multilateral and, therefore, does not pertain to the pure through-border typology and for a river shared by only two states (and is therefore beyond the scope of this Chapter’s analysis) it provides some hints as to how economically symmetric states may solve unidirectional externality problems such as pollution. The Tijuana River and New River examples suggest the same for economically asymmetric countries, where the poorer country is upstream and also the polluter. 13 It could not be ascertained if three agreements pertaining to the Yalu River were general or specific since their texts could not be located. Naturally, they were not included in the count of treaties in this chapter. 5 Empirical analysis of treaty design differences: additional configurations 1 Excluded are: the 1912 Duoro River Agreement, the 1912 Guadiana River Agreement, the 1912 Tagus (Tajo) River Agreement, the 1935 Artibonite River Agreement, the 1964 Duoro River Agreement, the 1968 Guadiana River Agreement, the 1968 Tagus (Tajo) River Agreement, the 1975 Duverij (Doveyrich) River Agreement, the 1983 Teesta River Agreement, and the 1995 Nestos (Mesta) River Agreement. Another agreement not included is the 1971 Puyango-Tumbes River Agreement. This agreement does not clearly explain how costs are to be shared between the two states since future water and energy allocations need to be finalized. 2 The 1957 Spöl River Agreement and the 1959 Gandak River Agreement pertain to a dam built on the part of the river that flows along the common boundary. However, the territory of the upstream country is largely affected by this project (through flooding). The reservoir created by the dam is located in the territory of the upstream state. The other four agreements include: the 1973 Colorado River Agreement, the 2000 Chu River Agreement, the 1944 and 1966 Colorado River Agreements. 3 The 1931 Cunene River Agreement, albeit a specific agreement, was removed from the count because the text has not been identified and no clear actions or obligations are provided by the description of the treaty. 4 Excluded are: the 1912 Chanza River Agreement, the 1912 Minho (Miño) River Agreement, the 1938 Paz River Agreement, and the 1968 Chanza River Agreement. The following agreements are also ignored: the 1944 Zarumilla River Agreement (this is a border shift agreement); the 1944 Rio Grande (Río Bravo del Norte) Agreement (costs are not specified); the 1986 Gander River Agreement (not a joint agreement per se), the 1957 Atrak River Agreement (no mention of costs or side-payments; only that the power and water exploited will be divided equally). 5 Sarada is the name of the Mahakali River in India. 6 See notes 1, 3, and 4 of this chapter for a list of agreements not included in the analysis. Also excluded from this count are the 1930 Chute du Châtelot Agreement (Doubs River), and the 1909 Milk River Agreement (since they did not divulge any side-payment or cost-sharing patterns). 7 Included here are: the 1920 Sarada River Agreement, the 1992 Agreement on the Tankapur Project, the 1957 Spöl River Agreement, the 1959 Gandak River Agreement, the 1973 Colorado River Agreement, the 2000 Chu River Agreement, the 1944 and 1966 Colorado River Agreements, the 1926 and 1969 Cunene River Agreements, the 1961/1964 Kootenay River Agreement, and the 1989 Souris River Agreement. 8 They include: the 1996 Mahakali River Agreement (Pancheshwar Multipurpose Project), the 1956 Amur River Agreement, the 1958 Amu Darya River Agreement, the 1956

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Argun River Agreement, the 1998 Zarumilla River Agreement, the 1971 Prut River Agreement, the 1968 Minho (Miño) River Agreement, the 1959 Hermance River Agreement, the 1958 Timok River Agreement, the 1957 Atrak River Agreement, the 1949 Prut River Agreement, the 1906 and 1933 Rio Grande (Río Bravo del Norte) Agreements, the 1970/1972 Torrente Breggia River Agreement, the 1966 Saar (Sarre) River Agreement, and the 1994 Colorado River Agreement. 6 Conclusion 1 Although a cost-benefit assessment guided several treaties, this book shows that the phenomenon required additional scrutiny since the benefits are not spelled out in many other agreements. For example, one of the agreements embodied unequal benefits to each party yet the costs were shared equally. Therefore, also ignored is the cost-benefit assessment outlined in a treaty, if one is indeed provided.

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Note: Page numbers in italics denote text in tables or figures. Abidi, A. 54 absolute territorial integrity 8, 39, 40, 49, 78, 104 absolute territorial sovereignty 8, 39, 40, 49, 78, 104 additional configurations 4, 44, 64, 85–103, 111, 115; border-creator but enters state configuration 95–7, 101–3, 127–8, 132, 276–9; mixed configuration 18, 85–90, 101–3, 123–5, 132, 217–47; mixed zigzag configuration 99–103, 130, 133, 293–4; partial border-creator * 2 but enters state first configuration 130, 133, 290–1; partial border-creator * 2 but enters state second configuration 131, 134; partial border-creator * 2 configuration 130, 133, 288–9; partial border-creator but returns but then enters other state configuration 130, 133, 290; partial border-creator but returns configuration 98, 101–3, 128–9, 133, 286–7; partial border-creator configuration 85, 90–5, 101–3, 125–7, 132, 248–75; through-border * 2 but creates border configuration 130, 133, 291–2; through-border * 2 configuration 97–8, 101–3, 128, 132, 279–85; through-border but creates border configuration 134 Afghanistan: Amu Darya River 76, 95, 96, 128, 139, 278–9, 300; Aral Sea Basin 139; Helmand River 54, 70, 71, 72, 119, 137, 153–4, 298; Morghab (Murgab) River 119 aggregate power (aggregate structural power) 19–21, 35, 36, 45, 46, 76, 106 Akpa Yafi River 123

Albania: Belli Drim River 119, 170, 228, 251; Bojana River 126, 170, 228, 251; Crni Drim River 124, 170, 228, 251; Vijose River 119 Alesek River 121, 142, 143, 145, 147, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 209, 212, 244, 280, 281, 283, 287 Algeria: Daoura River 121; Dra River 129; Gulr (Guir) River 121; Medjerda River 121; Oued Bon Naima River 119 Allaine River 74, 76–7, 119, 174, 299 Amacuro River 128 Amazon River (Basin) 138 Amu Darya River 76, 95, 96, 128, 139, 278–9, 300 Amur River 95, 96, 124, 127, 252–3, 276–7, 300 An Nahr Al Khabir River 82, 83, 122, 212, 299 Angola: Cunene River 90, 92, 93, 127, 139, 255–7, 300; Okavango River 140; Zambezi River 139 Aral Sea Basin 139 Argentina: Bermejo River 128, 137, 277, 278; Chico (Carmen Silva) River 120, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199–201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207; Comau River 120, 195, 196, 197, 198–9, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207; Cullen River 120, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201–2, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207; Gallegos-Chico River 120, 195, 196–7, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207; Grande de Tarija River 128, 277, 278; Palena River 120, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207; Paraguay (Part of the La Plata Basin) River 137;

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Argentina (Continued ) Parana-La Plata Basin 20, 137; Rio Grande River 120, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207; San Martin River 120, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207; Yelcho (Futaleufu) River 120, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207 Argun River 94, 95, 126, 252–3, 276, 300 Artibonite River 87, 125, 233–4, 266, 267, 288, 289, 299 Astara Chay River 123 Aswan High Dam 21, 24 asymmetric power relationships 45–6, 55–60, 78–81 Atrak River 93, 95, 126, 251–2, 300 Australia: Fly River 129, 275, 283, 286; Sepik River 128, 275, 283, 286; Tami River 126, 274, 275, 283, 286 Austria: Constance, Lake 29; Danube River 139; Rhine Basin 138; Salzach River 130, 289 Axelrod, R. 14–15 Azerbaijan: Astara Chay River 123; Samur River 124 Bangau River 123 Bangladesh: Fenney River 124; Ganges River (Ganges-BrahmaputraMeghna/Barak Basin) 22, 23, 29, 31, 32, 136; Karanfauli River 120; Teesta River 88, 124, 218, 299 Baraka River 120 bargaining power 44–6, 55–60; economic asymmetries 27, 35, 55–6, 77, 296–8; and geography 44–55; income levels 57–8 Barima River 120 Barrett, S. 14, 23, 37, 42, 51, 54 Barta River 118 Belgium: Iizer River 119; Lys River 124; Rhine Basin 138; Scheldt River 138 Belize: Belize River 120, 126; Sarstun River 126 Belize River 120, 126 Belli Drim River 119, 170, 228, 251 Benin: Mono River 127; Volta River 140 Benito River 121 Bennett et al. (1998) 52, 53, 69 Bermejo River 128, 137, 277, 278 Bhutan: Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna/ Barak Basin 136; Kurichhu River 73,

75, 120, 138, 165, 299; Wangchu River 27, 73, 75, 120, 138, 165, 298, 299 Bia River 128 Bidassoa River 126, 157, 171, 254–5 bilateral treaties (agreements) 6–7, 25 Blatter, J. 29 Bojana River 126, 170, 228, 251 Bolivia: Amazon Basin 138; Bermejo River 128, 137, 277, 278; Grande de Tarija River 128, 277, 278; LaucaConcoso River 120; Paraguay (Part of the La Plata Basin) River 137; Parana-La Plata Basin 20, 137 border issues 66, 142, 143, 145, 148, 150, 152, 157, 171, 187, 211, 212, 219, 222, 225, 229, 230, 231, 233, 254, 258, 261, 266, 267, 268, 269, 279, 284, 287, 288 border-creator configuration 3, 17, 19, 35, 44, 47, 55, 57, 58, 60, 61, 63, 68–9, 81–4, 85, 90, 101, 107, 110, 111, 112, 114; and compensation 57, 58, 60, 110, 112, 114; and cooperation 17–19, 47–9, 107; definition 3; diagram 132; economic factors 110–11; hypotheses 62, 63, 68, 69; river treaties 122–3, 209–16; treaty design 61–3, 81–4; see also additional configurations; stretch of the river Bosnia-Herzegovina: Danube Basin 139; Krka River 127 Botswana: Chobe River 140; Limpopo River 140; Okavango River 140; Senqu/ Orange Basin 140; Zambezi River 139 Brazil: Amazon River 138; Chuy River 126, 149, 212, 213, 214, 268–9; Cuareim (Quraí) River 81, 82, 123, 149, 212, 213, 214–15, 269, 299; Negro River 120, 129, 148, 149, 212, 213, 214, 268, 269; Paraguay (Part of the La Plata Basin) River 137; Parana-La Plata Basin 20, 22, 137; Oyopock River 122; Yaguarón (Jaguarão) River 82, 123, 149, 212, 213, 214, 269, 299 Browder, G. 23, 33 Brunei: Bangau River 123; Pandaruan River 123 Bulgan River 119, 186, 187, 291 Bulgaria: Danube River 139; Nestos (Mesta) River 89, 124, 185, 241, 242, 299; Rezvaya (Rezovska) River 126, 181, 182, 228, 229, 265, 266; Struma River 119, 185, 241; Timok River 93, 95, 126, 248, 300; Tundzha River 124,

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Index 331 181, 182, 228, 229, 265, 266; Veleka River 119, 181, 182, 228, 229, 265, 266 Burkina Faso: Volta River 140 Burundi: Nile Basin 136 Buzi River 121, 208 Cambodia: Mekong River 23–4, 28, 29, 33, 138; Saigon (Song Nha Be) River 129; Song Vam Co Dong River 124 Cameroon: Akpa Yafi River 123; Cross River 125 Canada: Alesek River 121, 142, 143, 145, 147, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 209, 212, 244, 280, 281, 283, 287; Chilkat River 121, 142, 143, 145, 147, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 209, 212, 244, 280, 281, 283, 287; Columbia River 27, 51, 53, 73, 97–8, 121, 135, 142–5, 147, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 195, 209, 211, 244, 280, 281, 283, 287, 298; Firth River 121, 142, 143, 145, 147, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 209, 212, 244, 280, 281, 283, 287; Kootenay River 97–8, 128, 142, 143, 145, 147, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 209, 211, 244, 279–81, 283, 287, 300; Milk River 97, 128, 142, 143, 145, 147, 189, 190, 191, 193, 194, 209, 211, 243, 279, 281, 282–3, 287, 300; Niagara River 82, 83, 122, 142, 143, 145, 147, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 209, 210, 211, 243, 280, 281, 283, 287, 299; Red River 73, 121, 142, 143, 145, 147, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 209, 211, 244, 280, 281, 283, 287, 298; St. Croix River 123, 143, 145, 147, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 209, 211, 243, 280, 281, 283, 287; St. John River 125, 142, 143, 145, 147, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 209, 211, 243, 244, 280, 281, 283, 287; St. Lawrence River 129, 143, 145, 147, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 209, 211, 244, 280, 281, 283, 287; St. Mary River 70, 121, 142, 143, 145, 147, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 209, 211, 243, 279, 281, 282, 287, 298; Skagit River 27, 73, 121, 138, 142, 143, 145, 146, 147, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 209, 211, 244, 280, 281, 283, 287, 298; Souris River 97, 98, 128, 142, 143, 145, 147, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 209, 211, 244, 280, 281, 282, 283, 287, 300; Stikine River 121, 142, 143, 145, 147, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 209, 211,

244, 280, 281, 283, 287; Taku River 121, 142, 143, 145, 147, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 209, 212, 244, 280, 281, 283, 287; Whiting River 121, 142, 143, 145, 147, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 209, 212, 244, 280, 281, 283, 287; Yukon River 121, 142, 143, 145, 147, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 209, 211, 244, 280, 281, 283, 287 Candelaria River 121, 183, 207–8, 263–4 Carol River 73, 74, 77–8, 118, 157–8, 171, 254, 298 Ca-Song-Koi River 124 Castletown River 124 Catamayo-Chira River 124, 230–1, 267 Catatumbo River 120 Chanza River 91, 93, 125, 177, 178–9, 220, 223, 224, 225–6, 227, 258, 259, 260, 261–3, 299, 300 cheating 13 Chico (Carmen Silva) River 120, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199–201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207 Chile: Chico (Carmen Silva) River 120, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199–201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207; Comau River 120, 195, 196, 197, 198–9, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207; Cullen River 120, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201–2, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207; Gallegos-Chico River 120, 195, 196–7, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207; Lauca-Concoso River 120; Palena River 120, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207; Rio Grande River 120, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207; San Martin River 120, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207; Yelcho (Futaleufu) River 120, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207 Chilkat River 121, 142, 143, 145, 147, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 209, 212, 244, 280, 281, 283, 287 China: Amur River 95, 96, 124, 127, 252–3, 276–7, 300; Argun River 94, 95, 126, 252–3, 276, 300; Bulgan River 119, 186, 187, 291; GangesBrahmaputra-Meghna/Barak Basin 136; Hal Ha River 130, 186, 187, 290–1; Indus Basin 138; Kerulen River 119, 186, 187, 291; Mekong River 23, 138;

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China (Continued ) Salween River 138; Sujfun River 120; Ussuri River 126, 252, 253, 276, 277; Yalu River 122, 216 Chiriqui River 129 Chobe River 140 Choluteca River 129 Choucri, N. 10, 11 Chu River 89, 124, 138, 164, 165, 218–19, 299 Chute du Châtelot (Chatelot Waterfall), Doubs River 98, 128, 287, 300 Chuy River 126, 149, 212, 213, 214, 268–9 Coase Theorem 38–9, 50 Coatan River 120, 182–3, 207, 208, 209, 263, 264 Coco (Segovia) River 131 Coliba-Corubal River 125, 247 collective rationality 14 Colombia: Amazon Basin 138; Catatumbo River 120; Mataje River 126; Mira River 120; Orinoco River 129 Colorado River 21, 22, 23–4, 27, 31, 33, 53, 60, 67, 77, 78, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 102, 108, 111, 114, 125, 137, 158, 159, 160, 162, 163, 235–41, 269, 271, 273, 274, 299; cooperation 21, 23, 27; domestic environment 31–2; economic factors 77, 86, 90, 102, 111; linkage 22, 53, 60, 108; literature 137; treaties 87, 88, 89, 125, 235–41 Columbia River 27, 51, 53, 73, 97–8, 121, 135, 142–5, 147, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 195, 209, 211, 244, 280, 281, 283, 287, 298 Comau River 120, 195, 196, 197, 198–9, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207 commission creation 66, 142, 143, 145, 147, 150, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 164, 166, 168–72, 175, 176–7, 179, 181, 182, 183, 185, 186, 187, 188–207, 208–9, 211, 215, 217, 218, 219–23, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 231, 234–5, 241, 243, 244, 245, 247–8, 250, 251, 255, 257–9, 260, 261–2, 263, 265, 267, 269, 275, 277–8, 279, 281, 282, 285, 286, 287, 291–3 common pool resources 57–8 compensation 25, 26, 51, 55–60; see also side-payments compliance 13 configurations: and associated treaties 118–31, 141–295; types 132–4

conflict 11–21 Congo, Democratic Republic of the: Nile Basin 136; Zambezi Basin 139 Congo, Republic of the: Nyanga River 131 Constance, Lake 29 constructivism theory 28–30 contiguous rivers 18–19; see also border-creator configuration cooperation: and cost-sharing 37–8, 44, 68; domestic environment 30–3; incentives 16–21, 34–6; international relations theories 11–16; organizations’ role 28–30; role of 10–11, 106–9; and side-payments 24–8; and strategic interaction 21–8 core configurations 4, 64–84; see also border-creator configuration; through-border configuration Coruh River 119 Costa Rica: Chiriqui River 129; San Juan River 127, 264; Sixaola River 123 cost-benefit assessment (issue) 103, 116 cost-sharing 2, 37, 38, 44, 59, 64, 67–8, 81, 82, 84, 85–6, 87–9, 90, 91–4, 95–7, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102–3, 105, 106, 109, 112, 114, 115, 255, 292; border-creator but enters state configuration 95–7; border-creator configuration 81–3, 84; evaluation of agreements 2, 67; and geographical factors 44–55, 109–10; mixed configuration 86–90; mixed zigzag configuration 99–101; partial border-creator but returns configuration 98; partial border-creator configuration 90–5; and property rights 105; see also stretch of the river Courantyne (Corantijin) River 127 Crni Drim River 124, 170, 228, 251 Croatia: Danube River 139; Krka River 127 Cross River 125 Cuareim (Quraí) River 81, 82, 123, 149, 212, 213, 214–15, 269, 299 Cullen River 120, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201–2, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207 cultural influence (cultural explanation) 33–4 Cunene River 90, 92, 93, 127, 139, 255–7, 300 Czech Republic: Danube Basin 139; Eger (Ohre) River 121, 176–7; Olma River 130; Witka (Smeda) River 119

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Index 333 Czechoslovakia: Dunajec River 124, 168, 169, 229–30, 293; Eger (Ohre) River 121, 176–7; Latorica River 118, 169, 170; Olma River 130, 168, 229, 292–3; Orawa River 27, 73, 118, 167, 168, 169, 229, 293, 298; Uzh River 118, 169, 170; Witka (Smeda) River 27, 74, 119, 168, 169, 229, 293, 299 dam construction 66, 72–8, 212, 229 Danube River (Basin) 139 Daoura River 121 Darst, R. 51, 54 data analysis and results 111–14, 141–295 dependent variables 2, 38, 67–8, 105; see also cost-sharing; side-payments Desna (Smolenska) River 118, 180, 181, 284, 290, 292 Dokken, K. 11 domestic environment (domestic explanations) 30–3 Dominican Republic: Artibonite River 87, 125, 233–4, 266, 267, 288, 289, 299; Massacre (Dajabon) River 130, 233, 234, 266, 267, 288–9; Pendernales River 126, 233, 234, 266, 267, 288, 289 Doveria River 119, 175, 234, 235, 247 downstream benefits: Columbia River 97, 144, 280; compensation 25, 51, 75, 90, 102, 115, 117; Nepal–India hydro-politics 26; through-border configuration 61, 101, 113 Dra River 129 Dunajec River 124, 168, 169, 229–30, 293 Duoro River 87, 123, 179, 219, 220–2, 223, 225, 226, 227, 258, 259, 260, 261, 299 Dupont, C. 33, 34 Duverij (Doveyrich) River 88, 124, 154, 155, 245, 299 economic factors (economic asymmetries): hypotheses 63, 68–9; negotiation incentives 110–11; and property rights 55–60; quantification of 68, 296–300; role of 115; treaty design 62–3, 69–83, 85–103 Ecuador: Amazon Basin 138; CatamayoChira River 124, 230–1, 267; Mataje River 126; Mira River 120; PuyangoTumbes River 88, 124, 230, 231, 232, 267, 299; Zarumilla River 92, 94, 95, 127, 230, 231, 267, 268, 300

Eger (Ohre) River 121, 176–7 Egypt: Nile River 20, 21, 24, 27, 41, 136 El Salvador: Goascoran River 126; Paz River 92, 126, 264, 265, 300 Elancik River 128, 180, 181, 283–4, 290, 292 Elhance, A. 9, 10, 20, 21, 24, 28, 32, 33, 45 empirical analysis, methodology 64–9 environmental concerns 57–60 epistemic communities 28–30 Equatorial Guinea: Benito River 121; Mbe River 121; Utamboni River 123 equitable and reasonable utilization 40–2, 49, 78, 104 Eritrea: Baraka River 120; Gash River 70, 71, 72, 121, 153, 298; Nile Basin 136 Erne River 128 Espey, M. 5–6, 104, 105 Estonia: Gauja River 128 Ethiopia: Nile River 20, 21, 24, 27, 41, 136 Euphrates River (Tigris-Euphrates/Shatt al Arab Basin) 20–1, 22, 24, 27, 137 facility use 66, 72–8, 164, 172, 174, 217, 218, 267 Falkenmark, M. 9–10 Fane River 124 Faure, G.O. 33 Fenney River 124 Finland: Näätämöjoki River 73, 118, 148, 298; Olanga River 128, 149, 150, 151, 152, 284, 285; Tana River 128; Tuloma River 118, 149, 150, 151, 152, 284, 285; Vuoksi River 73, 74, 118, 149, 150, 151, 152, 284, 285, 298 Firth River 121, 142, 143, 145, 147, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 209, 212, 244, 280, 281, 283, 287 flood control 24–5, 66, 72–8, 144, 147, 167, 169, 170, 172, 176, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186–7, 207, 217, 219, 228, 234, 236, 241, 243, 248–51, 253, 255, 263, 265, 271, 276, 277–8, 280, 282, 283, 289, 290–1, 293 Flurry River 124 Fly River 129, 275, 283, 286 Folmer et al. (1993) 69 foreign policy 23–4 Fox, I. 47 Foyle River 127

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France: Allaine River 74, 76–7, 78, 119, 174, 299; Bidassoa River 126, 157, 171, 254–5; Carol River 73, 74, 77–8, 118, 157–8, 171, 254, 298; Chute du Châtelot River (Chatelot Waterfall), Doubs River 98, 128, 287, 300; Gander River 94, 126, 253–4, 300; Garona River 73, 76, 118, 157, 171–2, 254, 298; Hermance River 93, 95, 126, 255, 300; Iizer River 119; Lys River 124; Major River 127; Mont Cenis (Lac du Mont Cenis) River 73, 119, 175, 176, 298; Rhine River 21, 26, 27, 33, 34, 36, 138; Roya River 70, 72, 119, 156, 298; Saar (Sarre) River 86, 89, 124, 219, 299; Scheldt River 138 French Guiana: Amazon Basin 138; Oyopock River 122 Frey, F. 31 Gabon: Benito River 121; Mbe River 121; Nyanga River 131; Utamboni River 123 Gada (Goulbi) River 128, 189, 275, 285 Gallegos-Chico River 120, 195, 196–7, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207 Gandak River 87, 124, 138, 217–18, 299 Gander River 94, 126, 253–4, 300 Ganges River (Ganges-BrahmaputraMeghna/Barak Basin) 22, 23, 29, 31, 32, 136 Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna/Barak Basin see Ganges River Gangir River 70, 119, 154, 155, 245, 298 Garona River 73, 76, 118, 157, 171–2, 254, 298 Gash River 70, 71, 72, 121, 153, 298 Gauja River 128 general agreements 65, 67 general regulations 66, 142–3, 145, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 155, 156, 157, 159, 162–3, 167, 168, 169, 170–1, 175, 178, 179, 180–1, 183–4, 185–208, 209, 211, 212, 214–15, 219–20, 222, 223, 224–5, 227–8, 229, 233, 234–5, 239–40, 242–4, 247, 248, 250, 251, 252, 254, 258, 260–1, 263–5, 266, 268, 269, 272–8, 279, 281, 282–6, 287, 288, 289, 290–1, 293 general works 66, 83, 149, 158, 164, 169, 170, 175, 178, 181, 182, 195, 197, 199, 200, 202, 203, 205, 207, 213, 214, 219, 224, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 234–5,

247, 248, 252–3, 254, 258, 260, 263, 265, 266, 268, 273, 276, 278 geographic probablism 105–6 geographical configurations 2–4, 47, 83–4, 106, 107, 132–4 geographical factors (geographical asymmetries): and hegemony 19–21; hypotheses 62, 68; and property rights 43–55; role of 17–19, 105–6, 107–10, 115; treaty design 60–2, 69–83, 85–103 Georgia: Coruh River 119; Terek River 119 Germany 29; Danube River 139; Duoro River 87, 123, 179, 219, 220–2, 223, 225, 226, 227, 258, 259, 260, 261, 299; Eger (Ohre) River 121, 176–7; Rhine River 21, 26, 27, 33, 34, 36, 138; Saar (Sarre) River 86, 89, 124, 219, 299; Salzach River 130, 289 Ghana: Bia River 128; Tano River 127; Volta River 140 Giordano, M. 3 Goascoran River 126 Golok River 122 Gottman, J. 11 Grande de Tarija River 128, 277, 278 Great Scarcies (Kolenté) River 125 Greece: Nestos (Mesta) River 89, 124, 185, 241, 242, 299; Struma River 119, 185, 241; Vardar River 119, 164; Vijose River 119 Grijalva River 120, 183, 207, 208, 263, 264 Guadiana River 87, 123, 177, 178, 179, 220, 222–5, 226, 227, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263 Guatemala: Belize River 120, 126; Candelaria River 121, 183, 207–8, 263–4; Coatan River 120, 182–3, 207, 208, 209, 263, 264; Grijalva River 120, 183, 207, 208, 263, 264; Montaqua (Motaqua) River 126; Paz River 92, 126, 264, 265, 300; Sarstun River 126; Suchiate River 126, 182, 183, 207, 208, 263, 264 Guinea: Coliba-Corubal River 125, 247; Great Scarcies (Kolenté) River 125; Little Scarcies River 120; Loffa River 121; St. Paul River 120; Senegal Basin 139 Guinea-Bissau: Coliba-Corubal River 125, 247 Gulr (Guir) River 121

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Index 335 Guyana: Amacuro River 128; Amazon Basin 138; Barima River 120; Courantyne (Corantijin) River 127 Gyawali, D. 45 Habeeb, W. 45 Haftendorn, H. 42, 46–7 Haiti: Artibonite River 87, 125, 233–4, 266, 267, 288, 289, 299; Massacre (Dajabon) River 130, 233, 234, 266, 267, 288–9; Pendernales River 126, 233, 234, 266, 267, 288, 289 Hal Ha River 130, 186, 187, 290–1 Hamner, J. 11 Han River 124 hegemonic stability theory 12, 13, 19–21, 45, 108 hegemony: bargaining power 44–6, 55–6; and cooperation 12, 13, 19–21, 25–6, 27, 106–7; treaties 75–6 Helmand River 54, 70, 71, 72, 119, 137, 153–4, 298 Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers (1966) 40 Hermance River 93, 95, 126, 255, 300 Holsti, K. 53–4 Homer-Dixon, T. 11 Honduras: Choluteca River 129; Coco (Segovia) River 131; Goascoran River 126; Montaqua (Motaqua) River 126; Negro River 120, 129, 148, 149, 212, 213, 214, 268, 269 Hopmann, T. 15, 23, 57–8 Hungary: Danube River 139 hydro-politics, definition 9 hydropower 24–5, 27, 66, 72–8, 83, 144, 145, 146, 148, 151, 157, 165, 166, 167, 169, 170, 171–3, 175–6, 177–8, 179–80, 181, 182, 183, 185, 186, 187, 207, 209–11, 213, 217, 221, 223, 224, 226–9, 231, 241, 245, 247–8, 250, 251–2, 253, 255, 256, 259–60, 262–3, 265, 271, 276, 277, 278, 280, 286, 287, 289, 290, 293 hypotheses of river treaties 62, 63, 68–9, 109–11 Iberian Peninsula Rivers 139 Iizer River 119 Incomati River 139 incomes 57–9, 62 independent variables 2, 38, 67–8, 105; see also economic factors; geographical factors

India: Fenney River 124; Gandak River 87, 124, 138, 217–18, 299; Ganges River (Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna/ Barak Basin) 22, 23, 29, 31, 32, 136; Indus River 28, 30, 34, 138; Kaladan River 120; Karanfauli River 120; Kosi River 73, 120, 138, 172–3, 217, 298; Kurichhu River 73, 75, 120, 138, 165, 299; Mahakali River 99, 100, 130, 138, 293–5; Teesta River 88, 124, 218, 299; Wangchu River 27, 73, 75, 120, 138, 165, 298, 299 individual rationality 14 Indonesia: Fly River 129, 275, 283, 286; Sembakung River 120; Sepik River 128, 275, 283, 286; Tami River 126, 274, 275, 283, 286 Indus River (Basin) 28, 30, 34, 138 interdependence 11–12 international relations theories 11–16 international water law 7–8, 37, 39–43, 49–52, 104, 109, 114 Iran: Astara Chay River 123; Atrak River 93, 95, 126, 251–2, 300; Duverij (Doveyrich) River 88, 124, 154, 155, 245, 299; Gangir River 70, 119, 154, 155, 245, 298; Helmand River 54, 70, 71, 72, 119, 137, 153–4, 298; Kanjan Cham River 70, 119, 154, 155, 245, 298; Karasu River 82, 83, 177, 215–16, 299; Rudkaneh-ye (BahuKalat) River 128; Sarisu River 73, 74, 119, 177, 215, 216, 299; Tib (Mehmeh) River 70, 119, 154, 155, 245, 298; Tigris-Euphrates/Shatt al Arab Basin 137 Iraq: Duverij (Doveyrich) River 88, 124, 154, 155, 245, 299; Gangir River 70, 119, 154, 155, 245, 298; Kanjan Cham River 70, 119, 154, 155, 245, 298; Tib (Mehmeh) River 70, 119, 154, 155, 245, 298; Tigris-Euphrates/Shatt al Arab Basin 20, 137 Ireland: Castletown River 124; Erne River 128; Fane River 124; Flurry River 124; Foyle River 127 Ishim River 119, 185–6, 243, 289 Isonzo (Mrzlek Springs) River 70, 71, 72, 119, 165–7, 286, 298 Israel: Jordan/Yarmouk River (Basin) 22, 29, 32–3, 135 issue-linkage 15, 22–4, 52–4, 113 issue-specific structural power 45, 46

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Italy: Doveria River 119, 175, 234, 235, 247; Gash River 70, 71, 72, 121, 153, 298; Isonzo (Mrzlek Springs) River 70, 71, 72, 119, 165–7, 286, 298; Judrio River 128, 167, 286; Maira (Mera) River 119, 175, 234, 235, 247; Melezza River 124, 175, 234, 235, 247; Mont Cenis (Lac du Mont Cenis) River 73, 119, 175, 176, 298; Reno di Lei River 73, 119, 173, 298; Rhine Basin 138; Roya River 70, 72, 119, 156, 298; Spöl River 87, 124, 175, 234, 235, 245, 246, 247, 299; Torrente Breggia River 89, 90, 124, 175, 234, 235, 247, 299 iterated interactions 15 Ivory Coast: Bia River 128; Tano River 127; Volta River 140 Jacobs River 122 Jenisei (Yenisei) River 124, 156, 242–3 joint study 66, 143, 252, 253, 276, 278 Jordan: Jordan/Yarmouk River (Basin) 22, 32–3, 135; Tigris-Euphrates/Shatt al Arab Basin 137 Jordan/Yarmouk River (Basin) 22, 29, 32–3, 135 Judrio River 128, 167, 286 Kaladan River 120 Kanjan Cham River 70, 119, 154, 155, 245, 298 Karanfauli River 120 Karasu River 82, 83, 177, 215–16, 299 Kazakhstan: Aral Sea Basin 139; Chu River 89, 124, 138, 164, 165, 218–19, 299; Ishim River 119, 185–6, 243, 289; Syr Darya River 76, 139; Talas River 74, 76, 119, 138, 164, 218, 219, 299; Tobol River 124, 185, 243, 289; Ural River 130, 185, 243, 289 Kenya: Nile River 136; Umba River 127 Keohane, R. 14–15 Kerulen River 119, 186, 187, 291 Klaralven River 118, 187, 188 Kogilnik River 118, 184, 185 Komadougou-Yobe River 127, 189, 275, 285 Kootenay River 97–8, 128, 142, 143, 145, 147, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 209, 211, 244, 279–81, 283, 287, 300 Kosi River 73, 120, 138, 172–3, 217, 298 Krka River 127 Krutilla, J. 53

Kurichhu River 73, 75, 120, 138, 165, 299 Kyrgyzstan: Aral Sea Basin 139; Chu River 89, 124, 138, 164, 165, 218–19, 299; Syr Darya River 76, 139; Talas River 74, 76, 119, 138, 164, 218, 219, 299 Laos: Ca-Song-Koi River 124; Ma River 128; Mekong River 23–4, 28, 29, 33, 138 lateral pressure theory 10, 11 Latorica River 118, 169, 170 Latvia: Barta River 118; Gauja River 128; Lielupe River 124; Venta River 118 Lauca-Concoso River 120 Lava-Pregel River 119, 179, 180 Lebanon: An Nahr Al Khabir River 82, 83, 122, 212, 299; Jordan/Yarmouk River (Basin) 32–3, 135; Orontes River 139 legal principles 7–8, 37, 104; see also international water law LeMarquand, D. 18–20, 21–2, 23, 26, 31–2, 43–4, 47, 50 Lesotho: Senqu/Orange River 140 liberalism theory 12–14, 16, 17 Liberia: Loffa River 121; Morro-Mano River 127; St. Paul River 120 Liechtenstein: Rhine River 138 Lielupe River 124 Lima (Limia) River 70, 118, 177–9, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 259, 260, 262, 263, 298 limited territorial sovereignty 40–1 Limpopo River 140 linkage 15, 22–4, 52–4, 69 Linnerooth, J. 59 List, M. 48 Lithuania: Barta River 118; Lielupe River 124; Venta River 118 Little Scarcies River 120 Loffa River 121 Lowi, M. 19–21, 32–3, 45, 108 Luxembourg 138; Gander River 94, 126, 253–4, 300; Rhine Basin 138 Lys River 124 Ma River 128 McCaffrey, S. 41 Macedonia: Crni Drim River 124; Vardar River 119 Mahakali River 99, 100, 130, 138, 293–5

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Index 337 Maira (Mera) River 119, 175, 234, 235, 247 Major River 127 Malaysia: Bangau River 123; Golok River 122; Pandaruan River 123; Sembakung River 120 Mäler, K.G. 52, 53, 69 Mali: Senegal River 139; Volta Basin 140 Massacre (Dajabon) River 130, 233, 234, 266, 267, 288–9 Mataje River 126 Mauritania: Senegal River 139 Mbe River 121 Medjerda River 121 Mekong River 23–4, 28, 29, 33, 138 Melezza River 124, 175, 234, 235, 247 methodology of empirical analysis 64–9, 105–6 Mexico: Candelaria River 121, 183, 207–8, 263–4; Coatan River 120, 182–3, 207, 208, 209, 263, 264; Colorado River 21, 22, 23–4, 27, 31, 33, 53, 60, 67, 77, 78, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 102, 108, 111, 114, 125, 137, 158, 159, 160, 162, 163, 235–41, 269, 271, 273, 274, 299; Grijalva River 120, 183, 207, 208, 263, 264; New River 78, 79, 81, 162, 163; Rio Grande (Río Bravo del Norte) 53, 95, 127, 158, 159, 160, 162, 163, 235, 236, 239, 240, 269, 270, 271, 272–4, 299, 300; Suchiate River 126, 182, 183, 207, 208, 263, 264; Tijuana River 27, 78, 79, 80, 81, 121, 137, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 236, 239, 240, 271, 273, 299 military power 44–6, 108–9, 110 Milk River 97, 128, 142, 143, 145, 147, 189, 190, 191, 193, 194, 209, 211, 243, 279, 281, 282–3, 287, 300 Milner, H. 30, 33 Minho (Miño) River 91, 93, 95, 125, 177, 178, 179, 220, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 258–61, 262, 263, 299, 300 Mira River 120 Mius River 118, 180, 181, 284, 290, 292 mixed configuration 18, 85–90, 123–5, 132, 217–47; see also stretch of the river mixed zigzag configuration 99–101, 130, 133, 293–4; see also stretch of the river Moldova: Danube River 139; Kogilnik River 118, 184, 185; Prut River 126; Sarata River 119, 184, 185

Mongolia: Bulgan River 119, 186, 187, 291; Hal Ha River 130, 186, 187, 290–1; Jenisei (Yenisei) River 124, 156, 242–3; Kerulen River 119, 186, 187, 291; Onon River 119, 155, 156, 243; Selenga River 119, 156, 243 monitoring 66, 72–8, 151, 177, 215 Mono River 127 Mont Cenis (Lac du Mont Cenis) River 73, 119, 175, 176, 298 Montaqua (Motaqua) River 126 Montenegro: Bojana River 126; Danube Basin 139 Morghab (Murgab) River 119 Morocco: Daoura River 121; Dra River 129; Gulr (Guir) River 121; Oued Bon Naima River 119 Morro-Mano River 127 Mozambique: Buzi River 121, 208; Incomati River 139; Limpopo River 140; Sabi River 120, 208; Umbeluzi River 140; Zambezi River 139 Mrzlek Springs see Isonzo River multilateral treaties (agreements) 6–7 Myanmar: Ganges-BrahmaputraMeghna/Barak Basin 136; Kaladan River 120; Mekong River 23, 138; Pakchan River 122; Salween River 138 Näätämöjoki River 73, 118, 148, 298 Nahr El Khabir River 119 Namibia: Chobe River 140; Cunene River 90, 92, 93, 127, 139, 255–7, 300; Okavango River 140; Senqu/Orange River 140; Zambezi River 139 Nasser, Lake 21 national interest 32 navigation 22–3 negative externalities 26 Negro River 120, 129, 148, 149, 212, 213, 214, 268, 269 neoliberal institutionalism theory 12–14, 16, 17 neorealism theory 11–12, 15–16 Nepal: cooperation 23, 25, 32, 45; Gandak River 87, 124, 138, 217–18, 299; Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna/ Barak Basin 136; Kosi River 73, 120, 138, 172–3, 217, 298; Mahakali River 99, 100, 130, 138, 293–5 Nestos (Mesta) River 89, 124, 185, 241, 242, 299 Netherlands: Rhine River 21, 26, 27, 33, 34, 36, 138; Scheldt River 138

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New River 78, 79, 81, 162, 163 Niagara River 82, 83, 122, 142, 143, 145, 147, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 209, 210, 211, 243, 280, 281, 283, 287, 299 Nicaragua: Choluteca River 129; Coco (Segovia) River 131; Negro River 120, 129, 148, 149, 212, 213, 214, 268, 269; San Juan River 127, 264 Niger: Gada (Goulbi) River (Part of the Maradi River) 128, 189, 275, 285; Komadougou-Yobe River 127, 189, 275, 285; Tagwai (El Fadama) River 121, 188, 189, 275, 285 Nigeria: Akpa Yafi River 123; Cross River 125; Gada (Goulbi) River (Part of the Maradi River) 128, 189, 275, 285; Komadougou-Yobe River 127, 189, 275, 285; Tagwai (El Fadama) River 121, 188, 189, 275, 285 Nile River (Basin) 20, 21, 24, 27, 136 nongovernmental organizations 28–30 North, R. 10, 11 North Korea (N. Korea): Han River 124; Yalu River 122, 216 Northern Ireland (N. Ireland): Castletown River 124; Erne River 128; Fane River 124; Flurry River 124; Foyle River 127; see also United Kingdom (UK) Norway: Jacobs River 122; Klaralven River 118, 187, 188; Näätämöjoki River 73, 118, 148, 298; Tana River 128 Nyanga River 131 obligation not to cause significant harm (no harm rule) 38, 40, 41–2, 49, 71, 104, 105 Okavango River (Basin) 140 Olanga River 128, 149, 150, 151, 152, 284, 285 Olma River 130, 168, 229, 292–3 Onon River 119, 155, 156, 243 Orawa River 27, 73, 118, 167, 168, 169, 229, 293, 298 Oregon State University, International Freshwater Treaties Database 5, 67, 141 Orinoco River 129 Orontes River 139 Oued Bon Naima River 119 Oyopock River 122 Pakchan River 122 Pakistan: Indus River 28, 30, 34, 138; Rudkaneh-ye (BahuKalat) River 128

Palena River 120, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207 Palestinians: Jordan/Yarmouk River (Basin) 29, 32–3, 135 Panama: Chiriqui River 129; Sixaola River 123 Pandaruan River 123 Papua New Guinea: Fly River 129, 275, 283, 286; Sepik River 128, 275, 283, 286; Tami River 126, 274, 275, 283, 286 Paraguay: Paraguay (Part of the La Plata Basin) River 137; Parana-La Plata Basin 20, 22, 137 Paraguay (Part of the La Plata Basin) River 137 Parana-La Plata Basin 20, 22, 137 partial border-creator * 2 but enters state first configuration 130, 133, 290–1; see also border-creator configuration; stretch of the river partial border-creator * 2 but enters state second configuration 131, 134; see also border-creator configuration; stretch of the river partial border-creator * 2 configuration 130, 133, 288–9; see also border-creator configuration; stretch of the river partial border-creator but returns but then enters other state configuration 130, 133, 290; see also border-creator configuration; stretch of the river partial border-creator but returns configuration 98, 128–9, 133, 286–7; see also border-creator configuration; stretch of the river partial border-creator configuration 85, 90–5, 125–7, 132, 248–75; see also border-creator configuration; stretch of the river payoff structures 14–15 Paz River 92, 126, 264, 265, 300 Pencheshwar Multipurpose Project 99, 100 Pendernales River 126, 233, 234, 266, 267, 288, 289 Peru: Amazon River 138; Catamayo-Chira River 124, 230–1, 267; PuyangoTumbes River 88, 124, 230, 231, 232, 267, 299; Zarumilla River 92, 94, 95, 127, 230, 231, 267, 268, 300 Poland: Dunajec River 124, 168, 169, 229–30, 293; Lava-Pregel River 119,

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Index 339 179, 180; Olma River 130, 168, 229, 292–3; Orawa River 27, 73, 118, 167, 168, 169, 229, 293, 298; Prohladnaia River 119, 179–80; Witka (Smeda) River 27, 74, 119, 168, 169, 229, 293, 299 policy implications 116–17 pollution 26, 27, 39, 47–51, 57–61, 62, 66, 78–81, 110, 113, 150, 152, 155, 156, 159–64, 167, 168, 175, 176, 179–81, 182–4, 185, 186–7, 195–208, 215, 219, 222, 225, 227, 229, 234, 235, 238–40, 242, 243–4, 247, 248, 249, 251, 252, 260, 263, 264, 265, 272–3, 274, 277, 278, 283, 284–5, 286, 289–92; agreements 66; and cooperation 27; economic asymmetries 27, 35, 55–6, 77, 296–8; geography 26, 47, 48, 49–51, 52, 55, 61, 110, 113; income levels 57–8; negative externalities 26; negotiation incentives 47–8, 110–11; policy implications 117; polluter pays principle (PPP) 49–52, 53, 61, 78–81, 84, 113; reciprocal externalities 47, 56; side-payments 108; standards 57–60, 62; unidirectional externalities 24, 26, 35, 47, 48, 52, 54, 108, 110, 117 Portugal: Chanza River 91, 93, 125, 177, 178–9, 220, 223, 224, 225–6, 227, 258, 259, 260, 261–3, 299, 300; Cunene River 90, 92, 93, 127, 139, 255–7, 300; Duoro River 87, 123, 179, 219, 220–2, 223, 225, 226, 227, 258, 259, 260, 261, 299; Garona River 73, 76, 118, 157, 171–2, 254, 298; Guadiana River 87, 123, 177, 178, 179, 220, 222–5, 226, 227, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263; Iberian Peninsula Rivers 139; Lima (Limia) River 70, 118, 177–9, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 259, 260, 262, 263, 298; Minho (Miño) River 91, 93, 95, 125, 177, 178, 179, 220, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 258–61, 262, 263, 299, 300; Sabi River 120; Tagus (Tajo) River 87, 88, 123, 177, 179, 220, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 299 Prohladnaja River 119, 179–80 property rights 38–55, 105, 114 Prut River 92, 94, 95, 126, 249, 250, 251, 300 Putnam, R. 30 Puyango-Tumbes River 88, 124, 230, 231, 232, 267, 299

realism theory 11–12 reciprocity 22–4 Red River 73, 121, 142, 143, 145, 147, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 209, 211, 244, 280, 281, 283, 287, 298 Reno di Lei River 73, 119, 173, 298 “reservoir of goodwill” 23, 53, 54, 77, 102 Rezvaya (Rezovska) River 126, 181, 182, 228, 229, 265, 266 Rhine River (Basin) 21, 26, 27, 33, 34, 36, 138 Rio Bermejo see Bermejo River Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (1992) 39–40, 59 Rio Grande (Río Bravo del Norte) 53, 95, 127, 158, 159, 160, 162, 163, 235, 236, 239, 240, 269, 270, 271, 272–4, 299, 300 Rio Grande River 120, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207 Rittberger, V. 48 river basin literature 135–40 river boundaries 1, 18, 68; see also border-creator configuration rivers, and associated treaties 118–31, 141–295 Rollins, A. 45 Romania: Danube River 139; Prut River 92, 94, 95, 126, 249, 250, 251, 300; Siret River 119, 181 Roya River 70, 72, 119, 156, 298 Rubin, J. 33, 46 Rudkaneh-ye (BahuKalat) River 128 Russett, B. 56 Russia (USSR): Amu Darya River 95, 96, 128, 278–9, 300; Amur River 95, 96, 124, 127, 252–3, 276–7, 300; Argun River 94, 95, 126, 252–3, 276, 300; Atrak River 93, 95, 126, 251–2, 300; Desna (Smolenska) River 118, 180, 181, 284, 290, 292; Elancik River 128, 180, 181, 283–4, 290, 292; Ishim River 119, 185–6, 243, 289; Jacobs River 122; Jenisei (Yenisei) River 124, 156, 242–3; Latorica River 118, 169, 170; Lava-Pregel River 119, 179, 180; Mius River 118, 180, 181, 284, 290, 292; Olanga River 128, 149, 150, 151, 152, 284, 285; Onon River 119, 155, 156, 243; Prohladnaia River 119, 179, 180; Prut River 92, 94, 95, 126, 249, 250, 251, 300; Samur River 124;

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Russia (USSR) (Continued ) Seim (Kurska) River 130, 180, 181, 284, 290, 292; Selenga River 119, 156, 243; Seversky Donets River 130, 139, 180, 181, 284, 290, 291, 292; Sujfun River 120; Terek River 119; Tobol River 124, 185, 243, 289; Tuloma River 118, 149, 150, 151, 152, 284, 285; Ural River 130, 185, 243, 289; Ussuri River 126, 252, 253, 276, 277; Uzh River 118, 169, 170; Vuoksi River 73, 74, 118, 149, 150, 151, 152, 284, 285, 298 Rwanda: Nile Basin 136 Saar (Sarre) River 86, 89, 124, 219, 299 Sabi River 120, 208 Saigon (Song Nha Be) River 129 St. Croix River 123, 143, 145, 147, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 209, 211, 243, 280, 281, 283, 287 St. John River 125, 142, 143, 145, 147, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 209, 211, 243, 244, 280, 281, 283, 287 St. Lawrence River 129, 143, 145, 147, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 209, 211, 244, 280, 281, 283, 287 St. Mary River 70, 121, 142, 143, 145, 147, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 209, 211, 243, 279, 281, 282, 287, 298 St. Paul River 120 Salman, S. 25–6 Salween River 138 Salzach River 130, 289 Samur River 124 San Juan River 127, 264 San Martin River 120, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207 Sarata River 119, 184, 185 Sarisu River 73, 74, 119, 177, 215, 216, 299 Sarstun River 126 Saudi Arabia: Tigris-Euphrates/Shatt al Arab Basin 137 scarcity 9–10, 106 scenic works 66, 83, 210 Scheldt River 138 Schwabach, A. 42 scientific and technical cooperation 66, 149, 179, 180, 182, 212–13, 214, 229, 265, 269 Seim (Kurska) River 130, 180, 181, 284, 290, 292 Selenga River 119, 156, 243

self-enforcement 14 Sembakung River 120 Senegal: Senegal River 139 Senegal River (Basin) 139 Senqu/Orange River (Basin) 140 Sepik River 128, 275, 283, 286 Serbia: Belli Drim River 119; Danube River 139; Timok River 126 Seversky Donets River 130, 139, 180, 181, 284, 290, 291, 292 “shadow of the future” 15, 58, 60 Shue, H. 58 side-payments (compensation) 24–8, 51, 55–60, 75, 90, 108, 109–10, 112–14, 115, 117; border-creator but enters state configuration 95–7; border-creator configuration 81, 82; and cooperation 24–8; and economic factors 55–60, 62–3; evaluation of agreements 2; and geographical factors 44–55, 61–2, 109–10; identification of 67; mixed configuration 86–90; mixed zigzag configuration 99–101; partial border-creator but returns configuration 98; partial border-creator configuration 90–5; and property rights 105; role of 37–8; and self-enforcement 14; through-border * 2 configuration 97–8; through-border configuration 69–81, 84; see also stretch of the river Sierra Leone: Great Scarcies (Kolenté) River 125; Little Scarcies River 120; Morro-Mano River 127 Sigman, H. 48 Siret River 119, 181 Sixaola River 123 Skagit River 27, 73, 121, 138, 142, 143, 145, 146, 147, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 209, 211, 244, 280, 281, 283, 287, 298 Slovakia: Danube River 139; Dunajec River 124; Latorica River 118; Orawa River 118; Uzh River 118 Slovenia: Danube Basin 139; Isonzo (Mrzlek Springs) River 119; Judrio River 128 Song, J. 5–6, 104, 105, 296 Song Vam Co Dong River 124 Souris River 97, 98, 128, 142, 143, 145, 147, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 209, 211, 244, 280, 281, 282, 283, 287, 300 South Africa (S. Africa): Cunene River 90, 92, 93, 127, 139, 255–7, 300;

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Index 341 Incomati River 139; Limpopo River 140; Senqu/Orange River 140; Umbeluzi Basin 140 South Korea (S. Korea): Han River 124 Spain: Bidassoa River 126, 157, 171, 254–5; Carol River 73, 74, 77–8, 118, 157–8, 171, 254, 298; Chanza River 91, 93, 125, 177, 178–9, 220, 223, 224, 225–6, 227, 258, 259, 260, 261–3, 299, 300; Duoro River 87, 123, 179, 219, 220–2, 223, 225, 226, 227, 258, 259, 260, 261, 299; Garona River 73, 76, 118, 157, 171–2, 254, 298; Guadiana River 87, 123, 177, 178, 179, 220, 222–5, 226, 227, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263; Iberian Peninsula Rivers 139; Lima (Limia) River 70, 118, 177–9, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 259, 260, 262, 263, 298; Major River 127; Minho (Miño) River 91, 93, 95, 125, 177, 178, 179, 220, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 258–61, 262, 263, 299, 300; Tagus (Tajo) River 87, 88, 123, 177, 179, 220, 222, 223, 224, 225–7, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 299 specific agreements 65, 67 Spöl River 87, 124, 175, 234, 235, 245, 246, 247, 299 Spykman, N. 45, 46 Stein, A. 13–14, 31 Stein, J.G. 32 Stikine River 121, 142, 143, 145, 147, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 209, 211, 244, 280, 281, 283, 287 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment (1972) 39–40, 59 strategic interaction 14–15, 21–8, 107 stretch of the river 48, 85, 86, 90, 95, 97, 98, 99, 101–3, 111–15, 117 structural analysis 105–6 Struma River 119, 185, 241 successive rivers 18–19; see also upstream/downstream configuration Suchiate River 126, 182, 183, 207, 208, 263, 264 Sudan: Baraka River 120; Gash River 70, 71, 72, 121, 153, 298; Nile River 20, 21, 24, 27, 136 Sujfun River 120 Sullivan, J. 56 Suriname: Amazon Basin 138; Courantyne (Corantijin) River 127 Swaziland: Incomati River 139; Umbeluzi River 140

Sweden: Klaralven River 118, 187–8 Switzerland: Allaine River 74, 76–7, 78, 119, 174, 299; Chute du Châtelot River (Chatelot Waterfall), Doubs River 98, 128, 287, 300; Constance, Lake 29; Doveria River 119, 175, 234, 235, 247; Hermance River 93, 95, 126, 255, 300; Maira (Mera) River 119, 175, 234, 235, 247; Melezza River 124, 175, 234, 235, 247; Reno di Lei River 73, 119, 173, 298; Rhine River 21, 26, 27, 33, 34, 36, 138; Spöl River 87, 124, 175, 234, 235, 245, 246, 247, 299; Torrente Breggia River 89, 90, 124, 175, 234, 235, 247, 299 Syr Darya River 76, 139 Syria: An Nahr Al Khabir River 83, 122, 212, 299; Euphrates River (TigrisEuphrates/Shatt al Arab Basin) 20–1, 22, 24, 27, 137; Jordan/Yarmouk River 22, 32–3, 135; Nahr El Khabir River 119; Orontes River 139 Tagus (Tajo) River 87, 88, 123, 177, 179, 220, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 299 Tagwai (El Fadama) River 121, 188, 189, 275, 285 Tajikistan: Amu Darya River 76, 128, 139; Aral Sea Basin 139; Syr Darya River 76, 139 Taku River 121, 142, 143, 145, 147, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 209, 212, 244, 280, 281, 283, 287 Talas River 74, 76, 119, 138, 164, 218, 219, 299 Tami River 126, 274, 275, 283, 286 Tana River 128 Tankapur Project 99, 100 Tano River 127 Tanzania: Nile River 136; Umba River 127; Zambezi Basin 139 technical cooperation 66 Teesta River 88, 124, 218, 299 Terek River 119 Thailand 23–4, 33, 138; Golok River 122; Mekong River 23–4, 28, 29, 33, 138; Pakchan River 122; Salween River 138 through-border * 2 but creates border configuration 130, 133, 291–2; see also stretch of the river through-border * 2 configuration 97–8, 128, 132, 279–85; see also stretch of the river

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through-border but creates border configuration 134; see also stretch of the river through-border configuration 3, 17, 18, 19, 26, 44, 48, 57, 59, 61, 62, 63, 64, 68, 69–81, 101, 107, 109, 110, 111, 112–14; and compensation (side-payments) 57, 59, 109–10, 112–14; and cooperation 17–19, 47–9, 52, 107–8; definition 3; diagram 132; economic factors 110–11; hypotheses 62, 63, 68; policy implications 116–17; river treaties 118–21, 142–208; treaty design 61–3, 69–81, 84; see also stretch of the river Tib (Mehmeh) River 70, 119, 154, 155, 245, 298 Tigris-Euphrates/Shatt al Arab Basin see Euphrates River Tijuana River 27, 78, 79, 80, 81, 121, 137, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 236, 239, 240, 271, 273, 299 Timok River 93, 95, 126, 248, 300 Tobol River 124, 185, 243, 289 Togo: Mono River 127; Volta Basin 140 Torrente Breggia River 89, 90, 124, 175, 234, 235, 247, 299 Toset et al. (2000) 18 Towfique, B. 5–6, 104, 105 transnational organizations 28–30 treaties: border-creator but enters state configuration 95–7, 127–8, 276–9; border-creator configuration 81–3, 84, 122–3, 209–16; data 65–9; economic factors 62–3; geographical factors 60–2; issue areas 65–6; mixed configuration 85–90, 123–5, 217–47; mixed zigzag configuration 99–101, 130, 293–4; partial border-creator * 2 but enters state first configuration 130; partial border-creator * 2 but enters state second configuration 131; partial border-creator * 2 configuration 130, 288–9, 290–1; partial border-creator but returns but then enters other state configuration 130, 290; partial border-creator but returns configuration 98, 128–9, 286–7; partial border-creator configuration 90–5, 125–7, 248–75; through-border * 2 but creates border configuration 130, 291–2; through-border * 2 configuration 97–8, 128, 279–85; through-border but creates border configuration 131; through-border configuration 69–81, 84, 118–21, 142–208; see also stretch of the river

Tuloma River 118, 149, 150, 151, 152, 284, 285 Tundzha River 124, 181, 182, 228, 229, 265, 266 Tunisia: Medjerda River 121 Turkey: Coruh River 119; Euphrates River (Tigris-Euphrates/Shatt al Arab Basin) 20–1, 22, 24, 27, 137; Karasu River 82, 83, 177, 215–16, 299; Nahr El Khabir River 119; Orontes River 139; Rezvaya (Rezovska) River 126, 181, 182, 228, 229, 265, 266; Sarisu River 73, 74, 119, 177, 215, 216, 299; Tundzha River 124, 181, 182, 228, 229, 265, 266; Veleka River 119, 181, 182, 228, 229, 265, 266 Turkmenistan: Amu Darya River 76, 128, 139; Aral Sea Basin 139; Atrak River 93, 95, 126, 251–2, 300; Morghab (Murgab) River 119 Uganda: Nile River 136 Ukraine: Danube River 139; Desna (Smolenska) River 118, 180, 181, 284, 290, 292; Elancik River 128, 180, 181, 283–4, 290, 292; Kogilnik River 118, 184, 185; Latorica River 118; Mius River 118, 180, 181, 284, 290, 292; Prut River 126, 300; Sarata River 119, 184, 185; Seim (Kurska) River 130, 180, 181, 284, 290, 292; Seversky Donets River 130, 139, 180, 181, 284, 290, 291, 292; Siret River 119, 181; Uzh River 118 Umba River 127 Umbeluzi River (Basin) 140 United Kingdom (UK): Alesek River 121, 142, 143, 145, 147, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 209, 212, 244, 280, 281, 283, 287; Castletown River 124; Chilkat River 121, 142, 143, 145, 147, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 209, 212, 244, 280, 281, 283, 287; Columbia River 121, 142, 143, 145, 147, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 209, 211, 244, 280, 281, 283, 287; Erne River 128; Fane River 124; Firth River 121, 142, 143, 145, 147, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 209, 212, 244, 280, 281, 283, 287; Flurry River 124; Foyle River 127; Gash River 70, 71, 72, 121, 153, 298; Kootenay River 128, 142, 143, 145, 147, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 209, 211, 244, 279–80, 283, 287; Milk River

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Index 343 97, 128, 142, 143, 145, 147, 189, 190, 191, 193, 194, 209, 211, 243, 279, 281, 282–3, 287, 300; Niagara River 82, 122, 142, 143, 145, 147, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 209, 211, 243, 280, 281, 283, 287, 299; Red River 121, 142, 143, 145, 147, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 209, 211, 244, 280, 281, 283, 287; Sabi River 120; St. Croix River 123, 143, 145, 147, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 209, 211, 243, 280, 281, 283, 287; St. John River 125, 142, 143, 145, 147, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 209, 211, 243–244, 280, 281, 283, 287; St. Lawrence River 129, 143, 145, 147, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 209, 211, 244, 280, 281, 283, 287; St. Mary River 70, 121, 142, 143, 145, 147, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 209, 211, 243, 279, 281, 282, 287, 298; Skagit River 121, 142, 143, 145, 146, 147, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 209, 211, 244, 280, 281, 283, 287; Souris River 128, 142, 143, 145, 147, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 209, 211, 244, 280, 281, 283, 287; Stikine River 121, 142, 143, 145, 147, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 209, 211, 244, 280, 281, 283, 287; Taku River 121, 142, 143, 145, 147, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 209, 212, 244, 280, 281, 283, 287; Whiting River 121, 142, 143, 145, 147, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 209, 212, 244, 280, 281, 283, 287; Yukon River 121, 142, 143, 145, 147, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 209, 211, 244, 280, 281, 283, 287 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses (1997) 8, 40–3, 49–50 United Nations Development Program (UNDP) 28, 29–30 United States (USA): Alesek River 121, 142, 143, 145, 147, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 209, 212, 244, 280, 281, 283, 287; Chilkat River 121, 142, 143, 145, 147, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 209, 212, 244, 280, 281, 283, 287; Colorado River 21, 22, 23–4, 27, 31, 33, 53, 60, 67, 77, 78, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 102, 108, 111, 114, 125, 137, 158, 159, 160, 162, 163, 235–41, 269, 271, 273, 274, 299; Columbia River 27, 51, 53, 73, 97–8, 121, 135, 142–5, 147, 189, 190, 191,

192, 193, 195, 209, 211, 244, 280, 281, 283, 287, 298; Firth River 121, 142, 143, 145, 147, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 209, 212, 244, 280, 281, 283, 287; Kootenay River 97–8, 128, 142, 143, 145, 147, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 209, 211, 244, 279–81, 283, 287, 300; Milk River 97, 128, 142, 143, 145, 147, 189, 190, 191, 193, 194, 209, 211, 243, 279, 281, 282–3, 287, 300; New River 78, 79, 81, 162, 163; Niagara River 82, 83, 122, 142, 143, 145, 147, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 209, 210, 211, 243, 280, 281, 283, 287, 299; Red River 73, 121, 142, 143, 145, 147, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 209, 211, 244, 280, 281, 283, 287, 298; Rio Grande (Río Bravo del Norte) 53, 95, 127, 158, 159, 160, 162, 163, 235, 236, 239, 240, 269, 270, 271, 272–4, 299, 300; St. Croix River 123, 143, 145, 147, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 209, 211, 243, 280, 281, 283, 287; St. John River 125, 142, 143, 145, 147, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 209, 211, 243–244, 280, 281, 283, 287; St. Lawrence River 129, 143, 145, 147, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 209, 211, 244, 280, 281, 283, 287; St. Mary River 70, 121, 142, 143, 145, 147, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 209, 211, 243, 279, 281, 282, 287, 298; Skagit River 27, 73, 121, 138, 142, 143, 145, 146, 147, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 209, 211, 244, 280, 281, 283, 287, 298; Souris River 97, 98, 128, 142, 143, 145, 147, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 209, 211, 244, 280, 281, 282, 283, 287, 300; Stikine River 121, 142, 143, 145, 147, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 209, 211, 244, 280, 281, 283, 287; Taku River 121, 142, 143, 145, 147, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 209, 212, 244, 280, 281, 283, 287; Tijuana River 27, 78, 79, 80, 81, 121, 137, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 236, 239, 240, 271, 273, 299; Whiting River 121, 142, 143, 145, 147, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 209, 212, 244, 280, 281, 283, 287; Yukon River 121, 142, 143, 145, 147, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 209, 211, 244, 280, 281, 283, 287 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 72 Uprety, K. 25–6

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upstream/downstream configuration 18; see also through-border configuration Ural River 130, 185, 243, 289 Uruguay: Chuy River 126, 149, 212, 213, 214, 268–9; Cuareim (Quraí) River 81, 82, 123, 149, 212, 213, 214–15, 269, 299; Negro River 120, 129, 148, 149, 212, 213, 214, 268, 269; Parana-La Plata Basin 22, 137; Yaguarón (Jaguarão) River 82, 83, 123, 149, 212, 213, 214, 269, 299 USSR see Russia Ussuri River 126, 252, 253, 276, 277 Utamboni River 123 Utton, A. 22 Uzbekistan: Amu Darya River 76, 128, 139; Aral Sea Basin 139; Syr Darya River 76, 139 Uzh River 118, 169, 170

268, 270, 271, 275, 276, 277–8, 279, 281–2, 283, 285, 286, 287, 288–91, 293 “water wars” thesis 10–11 Weinthal, E. 43 Westcoat, J. 42 Whiting River 121, 142, 143, 145, 147, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 209, 212, 244, 280, 281, 283, 287 Whittington, D. 5–6, 104, 296 “willingness to pay”: economic asymmetries 4, 59, 63, 68, 74, 109, 110, 115–16, 117; linkage 54; property rights 2, 38, 64, 105; treaty design 77, 102, 111, 113–14 Witka (Smeda) River 27, 74, 119, 168, 169, 229, 293, 299 Wolf, A. 4–5, 6, 10–11, 42, 71, 104 Wolf et al. (1999) 67, 68, 118–31 World Bank 28, 30

Vardar River 119, 164 Veleka River 119, 181, 182, 228, 229, 265, 266 Venezuela: Amacuro River 128; Amazon Basin 138; Barima River 120; Catatumbo River 120; Orinoco River 129 Venta River 118 Verghese, B.G. 22–3 “victim pays” regime 49, 52, 53, 61, 62, 78–81, 84, 113 Vietnam 23–4; Ma River 128; Mekong River 23–4, 28, 29, 33, 138; Saigon (Song Nha Be) River 129 Vijose River 119 Volta River (Basin) 140 Vuoksi River 73, 74, 118, 149, 150, 151, 152, 284, 285, 298

Yaguarón (Jaguarão) River 82, 123, 149, 212, 213, 214, 269, 299 Yalu River 122, 216 Yarmouk River see Jordan/Yarmouk River (Basin) Yelcho (Futaleufu) River 120, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207 Young, O. 46, 54 Yugoslavia: Belli Drim River 119, 170, 228, 251; Bojana River 126, 170, 228, 251; Crni Drim River 124, 170, 228, 251; Isonzo (Mrzlek Springs) River 70, 71, 72, 119, 165–7, 286, 298; Judrio River 128, 167, 286; Timok River 93, 95, 126, 248, 300; Vardar River 119, 164 Yukon River 121, 142, 143, 145, 147, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 209, 211, 244, 280, 281, 283, 287

Wangchu River 27, 73, 75, 120, 138, 165, 298, 299 war 10–11 water quantity 66, 70–2, 142, 143, 145, 147, 148, 153–5, 156–8, 165, 167, 169, 170–1, 172, 177–8, 179–81, 182, 183, 184–7, 188, 189–94, 207, 208–9, 211–12, 213–14, 215, 217–18, 219–21, 222–4, 225–7, 228, 229, 230, 231, 233, 236, 238, 241–3, 245, 247–8, 251–2, 253, 254, 255–60, 261–4, 265, 266–7,

Zambezi River (Basin) 139 Zambia: Zambezi River 139 Zartman, I.W. 46, 105 Zarumilla River 92, 94, 95, 127, 230, 231, 267, 268, 300 Zimbabwe: Buzi River 121, 208; Limpopo River 140; Okavango Basin 140; Sabi River 120, 208; Zambezi River 139