Intertemporal Decision Making Studies on the working of myopia
Rijksuniversiteit Groningen
Intertemporal Decision Mak...
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Intertemporal Decision Making Studies on the working of myopia
Rijksuniversiteit Groningen
Intertemporal Decision Making Studies on the working of myopia
Proefschrift
ter verkrijging van het doctoraat in de Psychologische, Pedagogische en Sociologische Wetenschappen aan de Rijksuniversiteit Groningen op gezag van de Rector Magnificus, dr. D.F.J. Boscher, in het openbaar te verdedigen op donderdag 25 april 2002 om 16.00 uur
door
Alexander Ludwig Wolfgang Gattig
geboren op 23 october 1969 te Bremen, Duitsland
Promotores: Prof. Siegwart Lindenberg Prof. Jacques Siegers Prof. Charles Vlek
Manuscript Committee: Prof. George Loewenstein (Pittsburgh) Prof. Tom Snijders (Groningen) Prof. Frans van Winden (Amsterdam)
ISBN: 90 5170 603 0
Acknowledgements
This book summarizes research carried out when I was a Ph.D. student at the Interuniversity Center for Social Science Theory and Methodology (ICS) in Groningen. Though it has been written by a single author many people contributed to its completion and here I want to express my gratitude to them. First, I would like to thank my supervisors for the time and effort they took to improve this book but also for their patience and for the freedom they gave me to pursue research topics that I was interested in. Instead of beginning each chapter with the acknowledgement that their comments improved the quality of the text I would like to thank them here in the preface for their support. More specifically, I would like to thank Sigi Lindenberg for the numerous stimulating discussions with respect to theoretical issues. Further, he had a big impact on the structuring of the whole text. Jacques Siegers' quick and precise comments improved the accessibility of the text a lot. Although Charles Vlek was not involved in the initial stages of this project his impact on this book was profound. Not only are Chapters 6 and 7 results of our joint efforts, but his extensive and thorough comments on the other parts of the book made the text much more clear and substantially improved the reasoning. I also would like to thank the members of the Dissertation Committee for taking their time to read this thesis and for allowing me to defend it. Further, I would like to thank George Loewenstein, Drazen Prelec, Matthew Rabin, and Itamar Simonson for the time they took during my stay at Stanford to discuss several ideas concerning my Ph.D. thesis. Some others helped to improve this book. Maarten Reinink's support in designing the experiment reported in Chapter 7 and his help to collect the data for it were invaluable. Laurie Hendrickx provided competent comments on several parts of the manuscript. Jeroen Weesie helped to design the questionnaire used for Chapter 5 and he also improved the reasoning in this Chapter. However, the stimulating conversations with him also influenced many other parts of this book. I would like to thank all three of them not only for their help but also for the friendly atmosphere in which our conversations took place. I benefited a lot from my fellow Ph.D. students (past and present) at the ICS. Thus, instead of trying to single out individuals who contributed to the completion of this book (and forgetting others) I would like to thank them collectively not only for their professional support but also for sharing other activities with me than work, e.g., soccer, chess, or board games in general. Finally, though their contribution to this book was only indirect, I would like to thank my family for their support and patience.
Contents: Intertemporal Decision Making Chapter 1: Intertemporal choices 1. Introduction: intertemporal choices 1.1. The practical importance of intertemporal choices 1.2. The importance of intertemporal choices for rational choice theory 1.3. The Discounted-Utility model 1.4. Anomalies 1.4.1. Negative discount rates 1.4.2. Extra-ordinary high discount rates 1.4.3. Discount rates varying over time 1.4.4. Magnitude and sign effects 1.4.5. Different discount rates for different objects 1.4.6. Different discount rates due to framing effects 1.5. How to deal with these anomalies? 1.5.1. Denying the relevance of experimental results for actual behavior 1.5.2. Integration of the anomalies into neoclassical economic theory 1.5.3. Existing models to explain certain essential anomalies 1.5.4. Analogies between intertemporal choice and choice under risk 1.6. Problems treated in this book 1.7. Theory, general: framing and overview of arguments 1.7.1. Previous notions of framing in decision theory 1.7.2. Framing in sociology 1.7.3. Framing as used in this book 1.8. Application to intertemporal choice 1.8.1. Framing theory, the discrimination model and salience in intertemporal choice 1.8.2. Good-specific influences of patience: hedonic and utilitarian goods 1.8.3. Situation specific influences of patience: vividness 1.8.4. Individual determinants of patience 1.8.5. Outcome distance and discount rates 1.9. Outline of the book Chapter 2: Salience and the discrimination model in intertemporal choice 2.1. Introduction 2.2. A framing interpretation of ‘standard anomalies’ in intertemporal choice 2.3. Effects of salience on preference 2.4. Effects of discriminatory power on salience 2.5. Context effects in consumer choice 2.6. Linking context effects and similarity judgments 2.7. Overall conclusion and discussion
1 2 2 4 6 8 8 10 10 11 12 12 12 13 14 16 19 20 21 21 23 23 25 26 27 28 28 29 30 31 32 34 35 39 42 45 50
Chapter 3: Intertemporal choices for hedonic and utilitarian goods 3.1. Introduction 3.2. Theory 3.3. Method 3.4. Experiments and results 3.4.1 Conclusion 3.5. The influence of measurement on framing 3.6. Overall conclusion and discussion
53 54 55 56 57 59 60 64
Chapter 4: Vividness in intertemporal choices between hedonic and utilitarian goods 4.1. Introduction 4.2. Theory 4.3. Experiments and results 4.4. Overall conclusion and discussion
67 68 68 73 84
Chapter 5: Causes and consequences of patience 5.1. Introduction 5.2. Review and theory 5.2.1. Effects of parental characteristics on patience 5.2.2. Effects of family characteristics on patience 5.2.3. Effects of family environment on patience 5.2.4. Control variables 5.3. Tests of the hypotheses: subjects, procedure, and measurement 5.3.1. Subjects 5.3.2. Procedure 5.3.3. Measurement 5.4. Causes of patience: results for the cfc-measure 5.5. Consequences of patience 5.5.1. Measurement of the dependent variables 5.5.2. Consequences of patience: results 5.5.3. Discussion: patience as a general trait? 5.6. Patience for monetary outcomes (discount rates) 5.6.1. Measurement of patience by monetary discount rates 5.6.2. Corrections on the data 5.6.3. Causes of discount rates: results 5.6.4. Consequences of discount rates: results 5.7. Summary and discussion Appendix 5A: overview of causes of patience Appendix 5B: overview of consequences of patience Appendix 5C: consideration of future consequences scale Appendix 5D: money-scale
87 88 88 90 92 94 94 95 95 95 96 100 103 104 108 110 111 112 113 113 116 117 119 122 124 125
Chapter 6: Parallels in ‘anomalies’ in choice under risk and intertemporal choice 6.1. Introduction 6.2. Axiomatic models for EU, SEU and DU 6.3. Behavioral regularities in choice experiments
127 128 129 134
6.3.1. Anomalies in risky choice 6.3.2. Anomalies in intertemporal choice 6.4. Similarities between regularities in risky and intertemporal choice 6.5. Conclusions
134 140 144 146
Chapter 7: Generalizing ‘anomalies’ in choice under risk and intertemporal choice to other preference dimensions 7.1. Introduction 7.2. Spatial and social discounting 7.3. Effects investigated 7.4. Subjects and procedure 7.5. Stimuli and method 7.5.1 The interpersonal stimuli 7.6. Data analysis and control variables 7.7. Results 7.7.1. Consistency check for individual answers 7.7.2. Manipulation check for social distance 7.7.3. Common difference effects 7.7.4. Common ratio effects 7.7.5. Sign effects 7.8. Overall summary and discussion Appendix A: Preference distributions over choice problems
149 150 150 153 155 155 160 165 169 170 170 171 176 179 181 185
Chapter 8: Summary and discussion 8.1. Introduction 8.2. When do people act myopically 8.3. Who acts myopically 8.4. Generalization of effects 8.5. Measuring impatience 8.6. Suggestions for further research
187 188 189 191 192 193 193
References Appendix A: Questionnaire presented to the subjects in the first experimental session Appendix B: The logistic regression model Summary in Dutch
197 209 228 231
Chapter 1
Intertemporal choices
Summary In this chapter the importance of intertemporal choices in everyday life is underlined and the necessity for rational choice theory for modeling them appropriately is emphasized. Then the standard economic model and its anomalies are sketched, followed by a short review of responses to these empirical challenges. The research questions and a short overview of theoretical concepts used throughout this book conclude this chapter.
2
Chapter 1
1. Introduction: Intertemporal choices Do you prefer to receive $1000 now or $1200 in a year? Does your preference hold when the amount of money is substantively enlarged or reduced? Does preference change when the choice is between two consumer goods of corresponding value? Does it matter for your decision whether you yourself receive both goods or a friend gets both? Does it matter whether receipt of both alternatives is delayed the same amount of time? Why do some people invest in education or save substantial amounts of money while others do not and become drug addicts? Why are these questions important for social scientists? Except for the last one, these questions are central to decision theory in so far as it is devoted to intertemporal choice. Though already in the early 19th century similar questions as the ones posed above received scientific attention, until recently the three disciplines sociology, economics, and psychology approached these problems from quite different perspectives. If sociologists have realized the importance of this topic at all it is usually assumed, following Parsons (1937), that weighting of future costs and benefits is learned via socialization. By contrast, economics has - beginning in the 19th century with the investigation why there are positive interest rates (Rae 1834) - given more attention this question. In the beginning of this century, economic research on intertemporal choice culminated in Fishers (1930) theory of interest and in Samuelsons (1937) Discounted Utility model (in the following DUmodel) described in detail in section 1.3 below. Psychology, as the third social science interested in intertemporal choices, has headed by Mischel's work on delay of gratification in the 1960's explored intertemporal choice in more detail.1 Recently, interest in the behavioral mechanisms underlying intertemporal choices has increased in all three disciplines and there has been some convergence - at least for economics and psychology - in approaches towards these phenomena. In the following, how people balance current and future outcomes will be investigated by using arguments from all three disciplines. 1.1. The practical importance of intertemporal choices Decisions occur frequently, where costs and benefits spread over different time points have to be compared, e.g., in the choice between spending time for leisure vs. studying, whether or not to engage in healthy behavior, whether to have children now or later, or selecting appropriate health insurance and pension plans. Given the abundance and importance of intertemporal choices, neglect of future consequences potentially has profound impact on a variety of settings. Examples include investments in human capital and social resources such as networks or cultural resources, household relations; refusing to make relationspecific investments such as children, professional relations; jeopardizing the long term gains from a relation by shirking, or health; smoking or behave in otherwise unhealthy ways. Furthermore, stable individual differences in such investments may cumulate across domains and over time: people who continuously (relatively) neglect the future reach lower levels of wealth and a relatively worse health state.2 1
Loewenstein (1992) provides a historical overview and an elaboration how economical and psychological research on intertemporal choice related to each other. 2 As to evidence concerning the stability of such individual differences across settings Mischel (1968) concluded that though situational factors are more important in determining whether people are short-term
Intertemporal choices
3
Not only are intertemporal preferences potentially important in a variety of settings but there is also evidence for individual differences in the willingness to delay gratification, as well as for long-term effects of such differences. In a financial setting, Gately (1980) investigated consumer purchases, for example of air conditioners, where people had to make intertemporal trade-offs between the immediate purchase prices of a good and it’s long run energy costs. Discount rates for the long run energy costs were extremely high (up to 300% per year) and varied by 200% between individuals. Lawrence (1991) derives discount rates from expenses for consumption and reports differences in discount rates between races. As to consequences of differences in patience, Donkers and Van Soest (1997), using a nation-wide sample of Dutch households, demonstrated that, after controlling for income and family size, people more willing to wait for hypothetical rewards are more likely to own houses than less patient people. For educational achievements, Mischel, Shoda and Rodriguez (1992) report that children at age four, who were better able to delay gratification than their pre-school comrades, did significantly better at school more than a decade later. Moreover, these children turned out to be rated higher by their parents on such different abilities as social responsibility, achievement striving, verbal abilities, coping with stress and frustration, and intelligence.3 With respect to household behavior, impatient couples report more problems within and shorter duration of their relation (Snijders & Weesie 1998). Wunderink (1995) suggests effects of impatience on desired timing of births. As to deviant behavior, Hirschi and Gottfredson (1994) report correlations between several otherwise unrelated forms of deviant behavior such as car accidents, criminal behavior and drug abuse, and attribute this finding to a lack of self-control, which includes the ability to delay gratification. In addition, there exists a vast stream of research on intertemporal choices and addiction (Becker & Murphy 1988, Braun & Vanini 1998, Orphanides & Zervos 1998) or organizational behavior (Lindenberg 1995, O'Donoghue and Rabin 1999). Finally, differences in discount rates have been offered by Benartzi and Thaler (1995) as an explanation for the observation that people are much more willing to invest in bonds instead of stocks despite the latter offering much higher return in the long run (the 'equity premium puzzle'). They argued that when investing in stocks people sometimes experience (then) immediate losses. A strong focus on immediate outcomes in combination with loss aversion ('myopic loss aversion') thus might cause a preference for bonds. This reasoning was experimentally confirmed by Gneezy and Potters (1997). In the context of this research a study on consequences of impatience has been carried out. There, 165 students stated their concern about future consequences of their actions on a scale consisting of 12 items. Subjects relatively neglecting future consequences consumed more alcohol, more drugs, and were less likely to engage in sporting activities. In addition, these subjects did worse in a variety of topics related to education. For example, lower scores on the scale indicating less concern for future outcomes raised the probability of partying before exams, led to worse preparation of exams, reduced homework at high
or long-term oriented there are stable intraindividual differences. That is, subjects being more impatient than other in one situation are more likely to be more impatient in other situations. 3 Mischel et al. suggest (1992: 158), ‘that an early family environment in which self-imposed delay is encouraged and modeled also may nurture other types of behavior that facilitate the acquisition of social and cognitive skills’. Hence, more patient people should also be less aggressive and should engage in risky behavior less often. This view is consistent with the reasoning presented in this text and with results presented by Hirschi and Gottfredson (1994).
4
Chapter 1
school, and reduced the likelihood of following topics not required in a study. A more detailed account of the study and its results is provided in Chapter 5. 1.2. The importance of intertemporal choices for rational choice theory Besides the relevance of intertemporal choices for several otherwise unrelated streams of research, it is also important to study intertemporal choices for theoretical reasons. Rational choice theory has always been dominant in economics, but has recently also become prominent in sociology and political science.4 But despite its sophisticated theoretical elaborations, political scientists Green and Shapiro (1994: 6) criticize empirical applications of rational choice theory in political sciences as ‘either failed’ or ‘banal: they do little more than restating existing knowledge in rational choice terminology.’ Further ‘rational choice hypotheses are too often formulated in ways that are inherently resistant to genuine empirical testing' (Green & Shapiro 1994: 9). According to these authors, this is due to models that are too abstract. These models generally either lack statements about the relevant behavioral constraints in a situation or they model these constraints wrongly. Blossfeld (1996) provides a related critique from sociologists and Herrnstein (1990) is one of the numerous examples for a similar critique from psychologists. Even within economics recently there has been some concern with the strong concept of rationality as employed by mainstream economists, resulting in a growing interest to incorporate findings from psychology and behavior decision making (e.g., Hogarth & Reder 1987; Rabin 1998). Two reactions to such a critique are possible: First, abolish the approach (suggested by Herrnstein 1990), and second, extend simple (in terms of abstractness of the underlying assumptions) microeconomic theory by stepwise adding more complex assumptions about preferences, goals and cognitive imperfections. Not surprisingly, proponents of rational choice theory have chosen the second possibility. Examples include Lindenberg (1992) with his ‘method of decreasing abstraction’ for sociology, and Rabin (1998) or Laibson and Zeckhauser (1998) for economics. The economic theory of households and the family provides a nice example of this strategy and will therefore be briefly reviewed. The economic theory of households was developed in the 1970s (see Becker 1981, 1991 for an overview of method and theoretical insights) and allows for a consistent explanation of many of the associated phenomena by means of standard economic theory with more complex constraints and goals. In these models households allocate their resources (money and time) to maximize a household utility function given their constraints. This analysis was extended by game-theoretical modeling of household behavior (Manser & Brown 1980; McElroy & Horney 1981; Ott 1992). Here the joint household utility function is the result of a bargaining process of household members having different interests. Frey and Eichenberger (1996) introduced some complexities at the individual level (taken from findings in experimental economics and behavioral decision theory) in order to explain some puzzles in the household formation process. They argue that judgement biases in the assessment of probabilities are responsible for
4
Hechter and Kanazawa (1997) provide an overview of recent successfully empirical applications of rational choice theory to sociology.
Intertemporal choices
5
the underestimation of the probabilities of divorce and endowment effects5 result in too little search for and a biased evaluation of potentially better marriage partners. This present research aims at adding new constraints for intertemporal decision making. This is necessary for two reasons. First, given the evidence in section 1.4 below, in many situations current constraints are a poor description of reality and may lead to false predictions. Second, standard economic models by definition exclude many problems from study. Institutions, for example, serve as major means to overcome individual deviations from long-term rationality (e.g., Frey & Eichenberger 1996), an aspect of institutions usually neglected by economic theory. Lindenberg (1992) argued that often informal institutions (norms) guide behavior towards long-term goals while operating on the basis of short-term costs or benefits, such as social approval or disapproval. In addition, many individuals undertake action to limit their own possibilities for myopic behavior (Schelling 1992), for example. Standard economic theory has problems to explain these phenomena and has not given much attention to them (see Elster 1979, Schelling 1984, Lindenberg 1995). Assuming ‘rationality’ and the elimination of so-called ‘irrational’ behavior by the market, rules out all questions as to how and how efficient institutions and individuals promote rational (intertemporal) behavior. Consequently, Lindenberg (1998) explicitly stressed the necessity to develop an adequate theory of intertemporal choices: ‘At the present time, it looks like the most relevant foundation (for micro-sociology – AG) is research on short-term/long-term tendencies in decision making.’ Fortunately, in the last decades there has been an increasing interest in the positive validity of economic and decision-theoretic postulates. Anomalies6 to the axioms of subjective expected utility theory were found already in the 1950’s (Allais 1953) and several competing descriptive theories were developed (Kahneman and Tversky 1979, Luce and Fishburn 1991, Tversky and Kahneman 1992). Anomalies to other areas of standard economic theory received widespread attention in the last two decades, too. Experimental economics and behavioral decision making, both focussing on individual choice behavior, have become major streams in economics with their own journals (‘Journal of Experimental Economics, ‘Journal of Behavioral Decision Making’, ‘Journal of Risk and Uncertainty’) or regular sections on anomalous behavior (e.g., Thaler’s ‘Anomalies’ in the respected ‘Journal of Economic Perspectives’). Recently, also anomalies to the DU-model received considerable attention (e.g., Loewenstein & Elster 1992; special edition of the ‘Journal of Behavioral Decision Making [2000] on ‘Time and Decision’). Reviewing some of the anomalies Loewenstein and Prelec (1992: 574) conclude that the empirical evidence ‘present(s) a challenge to normative theory that is as least as serious as that posed by the more familiar EU (expected utility – A.G.) anomalies ... unlike the EU violations .... the counterexamples to DU are simple, robust and bear directly on central aspects of economic behavior.’
5
The endowment effect states that persons demand a higher selling price for objects which they already own than they are willing to pay in order to acquire the same object (in case of non-possession). This discrepancy grows with endowment time (Thaler 1980). 6 Anomalies, of course, are defined only against the axioms of standard economic theory. If a decision maker accepts these axioms as reasonable action principles, he should act in a certain way qualified as ‘rational’ – he may well behave differently, in case he does not feel that these axioms describe his preferences correctly. Economists usually regard these axioms as reasonable action principles for all people. Behavior departing from models based on these axioms then is called anomalous.
6
Chapter 1
Still there exist different viewpoints about how damaging these anomalies are to economic theory. Becker (1996: 22), for example states that ‘cognitive imperfections are sometimes important, but in recent years they may have received excessive attention at the expense of significant models of rational choice’. On the other hand, psychologists such as Herrnstein (1990: 356) concluded ‘rational choice theory.... accounts only poorly for actual behavior’ and should thus be abolished as a descriptive theory. In this dissertation, a mixed position is taken. Rational choice theory is seen as a useful means to analyze behavior but some assumptions will be investigated more closely and when being descriptively wrong they should be replaced with findings from behavioral decision theory (see Hogarth & Einhorn 1986; Rabin 1998, or Laibson & Zeckhauser 1998 for similar positions). By doing so, two main shortcomings of the many competing descriptive models in intertemporal choice presented in section 1.5 below can be avoided. The first shortcoming of these models is their limited range of application. For example, the prominent hyperbolic discounting model, accounting for procrastination of unpleasant tasks, is, despite of recent incorporation into axiomatic systems (Loewenstein & Prelec 1992; Ahlbrecht & Weber 1995), generally not related to other phenomena in intertemporal choice not to speak of phenomena outside of intertemporal choice. It would be more satisfying, however, if this hyperbolic discounting model could be related to other parts of economic and behavioral decision theory, e.g., S-shaped probability weighting functions or S-shaped utility functions. Second, competing descriptive models often use explanations unrelated to other economic assumptions. Akerlof (1991), for example, when investigating procrastination introduces the psychological term ‘salience’. While there is no general problem with explaining the delay of unpleasant tasks with changes in the salience of current and future costs and benefits, allowing for changing salience seems to be incompatible with the common assumption of stable preferences. The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. First, the DU-model and predictions resulting from it will be shortly presented. Despite its descriptive shortcomings, the DU-model serves as a cornerstone against which competing models are tested. Second, existing anomalies to this model will be reviewed, and thirdly, current attempts to explain these anomalies and their shortcomings are analyzed. Finally, the central questions of this dissertation and general theoretical considerations will be presented. 1.3. The Discounted-Utility model While philosophers, e.g. Rawls (1971), have frequently stated that future utility should not be discounted at all, economic theory assumes that people have a time preference (e.g., Olson and Bailey 1981). That is, they have a preference with respect to when outcomes should be received. Generally it is assumed that time preference is positive, i.e., people prefer to receive positive outcomes, such as monetary amounts, as soon as possible. Negative outcomes should accordingly be delayed as much as possible.7 The degree of time preference is expressed by a discount rate, describing the percentage of increase or decrease that is necessary to make a person indifferent between immediate and future rewards or
7
There exist different justifications for this proposition. Sometimes it is seen as a general psychological mechanism sometimes as a rational reaction upon the uncertainties of life and sometimes it is a theorem derived from more elementary propositions (e.g., Koopmans 1960, Fishburn and Rubinstein 1982).
Intertemporal choices
7
losses.8 This concept was introduced by Fisher (1930) and further developed by Samuelson (1937). Later, axiomatic formulations have been developed, presented in some detail in Chapter 6, by, e.g., Koopmans (1960), Lancaster (1963), and, more recently, Fishburn and Rubinstein (1982). According to the DU-model introduced by Samuelson (1937), a decision maker should prefer a temporal sequence of consumption levels (c0, ......, cT) to another sequence (c’0, ......, c’T) iff: T
∑ δ t u(ct) > t =0
T
∑ δ t u(c’t),
(1)
t =0
with u being a utility function and δ being the constant 9discount factor per time period t.10 ct and c't are sequences of consumption levels beginning at t = 0 and ending at t = T. There is some disagreement about the relation between the discount factor δ and the market interest rate r. While in principle every δ is consistent with the model, Loewenstein and Thaler (1989: 182) state that due to the existence of capital markets, ‘consumers should make intertemporal trade-offs so that their marginal rate of time preference equals the interest rate’ for money. They argue that if time preference was higher than r, consumers could borrow to satisfy their preferences more adequately. Otherwise, consumers would be better of by saving. Consequently, time preference should also be equal for all goods and situations. Olson and Bailey (1981) conclude that in equilibrium 0 < δ < r, because capital can also be used for production and not just for consumption. An initial stock of capital x yields thus in a future period x plus the gains from productivity. The interest rate r has to account for this gain in productivity as well as for time preference δ. Hence, r will be larger than δ. Nevertheless, also Olson and Baily (1981: 9) state that: ‘The marginal rate of substitution between future and present consumption in long-run equilibrium will of course always equal the rate of interest’ for reasons elaborated by Loewenstein and Thaler. Lea et al. (1982) argue that discount rates should also depend on expectations about the future state of the economy, as well as on the expected future utility level of the decision maker. In this line of reasoning discount rates only have to respond to market interest rates. Practically, all these positions result in the prediction that discount rates at least for a larger sample of subjects should be closely related to the market interest rate. This prediction also underlies the familiar ‘present value’ concept and it is frequently used in economic modeling. For example, when modeling investments in 8
Discount rates may reflect other things than time preference. Suppose a person prefers $100 now over $110 in one year. He thus reveals a discount rate of more than 10% per year. This discount rate reflects his time preference, the market interest rate, the utility difference between the outcomes ($110 may provide the same utility as $100), uncertainty with respect to actually obtaining the outcome and the utility derived from the $110 in one year, and rational considerations (he may have an investment opportunity which in his perception yields more than 10% per year). 9 Constancy of the discount factor is not a requirement of the model but an additional assumption standardly made on normative grounds to prevent time-inconsistent behavior. If the discount factor varies over time an individual could depart from his or her initial long-term consumption plans without changes in prices, income, or information (see section 1.4.3 for evidence and discussion). Likewise δ usually is taken to be bounded by 0 and 1. 10 This actually describes sequences of outcomes. However, it follows from the additively separable form of this formula that sequences are simple aggregations of the single outcomes to which the axioms of Fishburn and Rubinstein apply.
8
Chapter 1
human capital, it is assumed that individuals take into account and discount returns on investment. The same holds for losses due to dropping out of the labor force. This discounting should equal the market interest rate (Mincer & Ofek 1982, Becker 1991 [1981]: 26). However, in the following section we will see that not only this strong implication, but also virtually every other prediction of the models as well as its axioms have been challenged empirically. The anomalies11 listed below were observed either in experiments using actual or hypothetical monetary payoffs or in field studies. The general pattern of the anomalies remained the same no matter which method has been chosen. The following anomalies have been demonstrated. 1.4. Anomalies 1.4.1. Negative discount rates Perhaps the most striking anomaly, given a positive market interest rate, the impatience axiom and given that ‘the case for positive time preference is absolutely compelling... both in the positive and normative senses’ (Olson and Bailey 1981: 1), is that sometimes people exhibit negative discount rates. That is, people prefer to delay positive outcomes or to receive negative outcomes as soon as possible. This even has been observed for decisions dealing with monetary outcomes. In discussing negative discount rates, two distinctions are useful: sequences versus single-events and monetary/non-monetary decisions. Negative discount rates have been observed in three of these four domains. a) Sequences of monetary decisions Loewenstein and Thaler (1989) and Lindenberg (1993) reported instances where people prefer to get their annual income paid in twelve monthly installments instead of receiving the same yearly income within nine months (with a higher payment per month in the latter case). Obviously, these people would have been better off financially, if they had chosen the latter mode of payment and had put the difference of the monthly payments in the bank. Further, Loewenstein and Sicherman (1991) reported that people have a ‘taste' for increasing wage profiles. In their experiment, subjects were given the choice between equal life earnings that could be received in either increasing or decreasing monthly payments. Most subjects preferred the increasing sequence and - although the percentage declined somewhat - most subjects still did so even after having been made familiar with the economic reasoning that, given a positive interest rate, present value maximization would imply preference for an (otherwise equal) decreasing wage profile over an increasing one. Related to this phenomenon is Frank’s (1992) observation that wages rise also in professions in which virtually no changes in productivity can be reasonably assumed, e.g. for bus drivers and airplane pilots. This rising profile can also only insufficiently be explained by the deterrence of employee shirking, because it occurs independently of the costs associated with shirking. Frank argues that employers, by offering jobs with rising wage profiles, react to preferences of potential employees.
11
Again, note that these findings only constitute anomalies only insofar as one is willing to subscribe to the axioms above.
Intertemporal choices
9
b) Sequences of non-monetary decisions According to Loewenstein and Prelec (1991: 349) ‘negative time preference is applied selectively, to those events that are seen as a part of a meaningful sequence, having a welldefined starting and ending point.' The consumption level of the end point of such a sequence exceeds the level of the starting point due to a wish of improvement. In an experiment, subjects expressed preference of a French dinner to a Greek dinner and also to get the former as soon as possible. Nevertheless they chose to receive the French dinner after the Greek dinner, if the interval between these two is short enough (one week) to make it appear as a sequence of events (Loewenstein and Prelec 1991, 1993). However, preference reversed as the interval between the two events was prolonged (half a year) such that both dinners were no longer perceived as a sequence. The explanation of a wish for improving sequences also applies to the Loewenstein and Sicherman observation. In addition, in a series of experiments Kahneman and his co-workers demonstrated that this wish for improving sequences possibly results in preference for sequences including more pain over sequences including less pain (Kahneman & Varey 1992, Kahneman, Wakker & Sarin 1997)). For example, people being exposed to the unpleasant experience of putting a hand in cold water for a short period of time rated this experience as more harmful than people putting their hand in cold water for the same amount of time plus a short period where the water was slightly warmed. Note, that the period where the water was slightly warmed still created an unpleasant experience for the subjects but led to an improvement (less pain). This improvement outweighed the additional length of exposure to unpleasant experience. Hence, preference for improving sequences appears to be fairly general.12 c) Single decisions for non-monetary events Loewenstein (1987) reports experiments where subjects were willing to delay favorable events such as ‘a kiss from your favorite movie star' a certain time. On the other hand, subjects preferred to be exposed to an unpleasant event (‘a non-lethal electric shock of a hundred and ten volt') immediately, instead of delaying it as long as possible. Loewenstein argued that the delay of positive events is due to ‘savouring’ while getting over with things quickly is caused by ‘dread’. Displaying negative time preference then actually maximizes utility over the whole sequence. In this dissertation not much attention will be given to negative discount rates. The major focus will be on single events, for which negative discount rates seem to be somewhat exceptional. Note, that according to Loewenstein’s models, procrastination (delay of unpleasant experiences) should occur when people do not ‘dread’ this experience. That is, appointments at the dentist are kept when people are afraid of the treatment and cancelled and delayed otherwise. This counterintuitive result might be explained by the fact that subjects in the Loewenstein experiment stated that they would like to be exposed to negative events soon but not now. When actually facing the negative event they might, however, want to delay it further. Here further research might be needed. 12
Chapman (1996) demonstrated that this does not hold for sequences of health outcomes. In a series of experiments subjects preferred to be healthy when they are young, i.e., sooner as predicted by the DUmodel, and delay sickness until old age. Chapman attributes this result to norms as well as subjects expectations: people usually are and expect to be healthy when they are young.
10
Chapter 1
1.4.2. Extraordinary high discount rates As stated above, revealed discount rates should approach, and in a perfect market even equalize the market interest rate. Discount rates much higher than the usual market interest rates thus challenge this model13. Unfortunately for the DU model such behavior exists. Holocomb and Nelson (1992) report an experiment with actual payments ranging from to ‘high' (17 $) to ‘low' (5 $). Subjects chose between immediate and delayed payments with an offered interest rate of either 1.5 or 3 percent per day. Preferring the delayed payoff, including interest, thus reveals a personal discount rate below the offered interest rate and vice versa. In spite of the extraordinarily high offered interest rates, the largest percentage choosing the delayed payment (tomorrow instead of today) was 54 percent (for the 17$ and the 3% interest rate). For all other combinations only a minority chose the delayed payoff, the lowest value being 18% for 1.5% interest rate of 5$. In other words, a majority (82%!) revealed discount rates above 1.5% per day and 46% revealed a rate higher than 3% per day. Somewhat surprisingly, Holocomb and Nelson concluded that ‘this was not a startling result'. The Holocomb and Nelson experiments replicated the results of Benzion et al. (1989) and Thaler (1981). Thaler (in a less careful study) detected even higher discount rates for hypothetical choices. Also in field settings higher discount rates than implied by the market interest rate occurred. Hausman (1979) reports an estimated average consumer discount rate of 25% derived from actual purchases of air conditioners. Discount rates were calculated by taking into account buying prices and delayed savings on the energy use of the conditioners. Gately (1980) reports even more extreme results. Since myopic behavior occurs frequently and poses a strong challenge to normative concepts of rationality, in this dissertation I will look more closely at when it is likely. 1.4.3. Discount rates vary over time This is maybe the best-documented and the most well-known anomaly concerning choice over time. According to the DU-model, to be called rational the discount rate should be independent of the time delay and thus result in an exponential discount function. Instead, data from experiments with both animals and humans shows that the discount rate varies with time delay (e.g., Ainslie 1992, Kirby 1995). Stevenson (1986, 1993) demonstrated that payoffs, as predicted by the economic models, are discounted at a ratio-rate. That is, delayed outcomes are devalued by a percentage of the amount and not by a constant premium for delay. However, usually, contrary to the DU-model, payoffs closer to the present are discounted at a much higher rate than those in the distant future. One important (and quite unpleasant) property of such behavior is that it gives rise to a socalled ‘dynamic inconsistency’ (Strotz 1956) or ‘preference reversal' (Ainslie 1975)14. Suppose, an individual compares two future payoffs, one smaller and sooner, the other 13
Throughout the text ‘high’ or ‘extremely high’ discount rates refers to discount rates much higher than the market interest rate. 14 The Ainslie term might appear strange, because ‘preference reversal’ usually describes varying buying and selling price for bets and lotteries (e.g., in Lichtenstein and Slovic 1973). When comparing two gambles of equal expected value, subjects bid more for the gamble with the higher winning probability, but charge a higher selling price for the gamble offering the larger amount. Thus, in the following time-varying discount rates will be described by hyperbolic discounting, common difference effect or dynamic inconsistency.
Intertemporal choices
11
one larger but later. If he initially prefers the latter, he might well prefer the sooner payoff as both payoffs approach the present. This behavior implies a tendency to deviate from one's own (well-understood) long-term interests and might thus be exploited (see Strotz for further elaboration). The rates may well decline over time when the individual has no possibility to reverse his initial choice, i.e., if his initial decision is binding. Related to this overweighing of immediate rewards is the phenomenon of procrastination (Akerlof 1991, O’Donoghue & Rabin 1999). Because of the ‘undue salience' of present costs relative to future costs, a series of decisions - each resulting in not undertaking an unpleasant task now, but to delay it by one time unit - might lead to disastrous consequences in the long run without being fully anticipated at the moment of each decision. For the relevance of this ‘myopic' behavior for a classical topic of sociology (organizational sociology) see also Lindenberg (1993, 1995). In this book we will have a closer look when discount rates vary more or less strongly. 1.4.4. Magnitude and sign effects There is convincing evidence that people discount small payoffs much more strongly than large payoffs - independent of the payoff sign (Thaler 1980, Benzion et al. 1989). This partly explains the high discount rates obtained by Holocomb and Nelson (1989). In addition, this implies that discount rates derived from experiments with actual payoffs using small amounts overestimates time preference. Further, the discount rate for gains and losses is different. Because losses loom larger than gains (Kahneman &Tversky 1979, Tversky & Kahneman 1991), they are discounted less strongly (Thaler 1981, Loewenstein 1988, Benzion et al. 1989).15 Since the gain-loss asymmetry is strongest for small outcomes, it can not be due to decreasing marginal utility, since for small outcomes the utility function is (almost) linear. For larger outcomes, observed discount rates might be higher than the pure rate of time preference, because the difference in utility between an immediate small and a delayed larger reward is smaller than the numerical difference between the two. Hence, time preference might differ from observed discount rates but this difference should be wider for large outcomes and should even disappear for very small outcomes, when the utility function is almost linear (Loewenstein & Prelec 1992). Note, that magnitude and sign effects do not necessarily constitute ‘anomalies’ to the DU-model or other normative models, since these model refer only to utility. Individuals are free to derive whatever utility they want from varying amounts. Because the magnitude effect in intertemporal choice is satisfactorily explained with an appropriate utility function (e.g., Loewenstein & Prelec 1992) it will not be further investigated in this book. The same holds for the gain/loss asymmetry. However, different value functions for gains and losses will be assumed in several of the following chapters. In addition, it will be investigated whether magnitude and sign effects can be generalized to other preference domains.
15
Shelley (1993) argued that the gain/loss asymmetry results from an interaction of outcome sign and time frame. Differing discount rates are observed when subjects have to delay either gains or losses which are otherwise due immediately. Subjects thus give up something now for the later, and thus discounted, receipt. In a ‘neutral’ question format, not involving delays, the gain/loss asymmetry disappeared in Shelley (1993) as well as in Ahlbrecht and Weber (1997).
12
Chapter 1
1.4.5. Different discount rates for different objects According to economics, people maximize utility given their constraints, such as time and money. Different goods as well as different forms of money, e.g., lottery wins, income, bonuses, inheritances, are aggregated into final states of wealth. They are ‘fungible’. Consequently, the proportion of money spent immediately for consumption and money saved should be identical for a rise in income or a lottery win of equal value. However, Thaler (1990) and Shefrin and Thaler (1992) report that different forms of money had different marginal propensities to consume. A rise in income is much more likely to be spent for consumption than a rise in the savings for retirement. Akers et al. (1994) found that unanticipated money, ‘windfall gains’ was more likely to be spent immediately than money that was anticipated. The speed with which money is converted into consumption can be interpreted as being determined by discounting, thus resulting in different discount rates for equal amounts of fungible goods. Chapman (1996) found that discount rates for health, money and vacation trips differed even when controlling for utility. Empirical results on impulse buying (unplanned purchases which are regretted afterwards) also show differences in the likelihood of different goods to be purchased impulsively (Bellenger 1978, Dittmar et al. 1995). To sum up, there is ample evidence that discount rates differ between commodities of equal value. Despite the examples above, this anomaly has been relatively neglected in research on intertemporal choice. Therefore in this dissertation it will be investigated which goods are most likely to be discounted strongly. 1.4.6. Different discount rates due to framing effects In the DU-model only absolute time differences matter for the evaluation of outcomes. Therefore, jointly shifting the receipt of two different outcomes available at two different time points should not alter preference between them. As seen above, this runs counter to empirical evidence. The DU-model also implies that speeding up the receipt of an outcome and delaying its receipt by the same amount of time have a numerically identical effect on the evaluation of this outcome. Suppose a decision maker has a discount rate of 5% per year. Then, speeding up-the receipt of a good by one year results in a 5% higher value, delay of one year to 5% devaluation. However, postulating different value functions for outcomes that are framed as gains and losses (Kahneman & Tversky 1979, Tversky & Kahneman 1991) leads to a different prediction. When benefits are delayed subjects give up (lose) something now in order to gain it later, they compare an immediate loss to a future gain. This gain is discounted. In a speed-up situation, they gain something now and suffer from a later discounted loss. In the delay case, they require compensation whereas in the speed-up case they are willing to pay a premium. Loewenstein (1988) demonstrated that, due to different value functions for gains and losses, subjects charge more to delay video recorders, restaurant dinners, or money receipts than they are willing to pay for accelerating their receipt (‘delay-speedup asymmetry’). This finding has been replicated in studies by Shelley (1993) and Shelley and Omer (1996). 1.5. How to deal with these existing anomalies? The following overview summarizes several attempts to explain these empirical results and focuses on current streams of research. It contains the following sections: a) questions concerning the relevance of experimental research for actual behavior,
Intertemporal choices
13
b) integration of the anomalies into neoclassical economic theory, c) relaxing assumptions of neoclassical economic theory in order to build competing models explaining certain anomalies, d) analogies to peculiarities to human choice under risk. 1.5.1 Denying the relevance of experimental results for actual behavior Economists have up to now followed two strategies in order to generally reject the importance of findings demonstrating the existence of 'anomalies'. First, it has been argued that economics only deals with rational, i.e., consistent and utility maximizing, behavior - the above listed examples are thus excluded by definition. However, now there have been various attempts to demonstrate that even love, addiction, etc. though appearingly irrational can be well handled within economic approaches (for example in Becker’s work over the past decades) and hence, rational choice theory is of use for sociologists and political scientists, usually interested in appearingly 'irrational' behavior, as well. But if the economic approach is used as the leading paradigm, its anomalies and limitations are of central importance for a variety of disciplines. Second, anomalies may be taken seriously at the individual level, therefore being a very interesting topic for psychologists, but irrelevant on an aggregate level, thus being of no importance for economists. According to Frey and Eichenberger (1989a, 1989b) it might be claimed that: - anomalies at the individual level are irrelevant, if one assumes that deviations from the economic model follow a random distribution; - anomalies are only observed in experiments and, due to this ‘unnatural’ setting, have nothing to do with actual, i.e. real world, decisions; - the observed anomalies are due to insufficient incentives for serious behavior; - anomalies may exist, but in reality people learn from and thus avoid errors; - anomalies are eliminated by competitive markets - irrational actors score less well and thus disappear in the long run. As to the first argument – budget constraints drive out randomly distributed deviations from rationality at an aggregate level (Becker 1976 [1962]) - it can be stated that the above mentioned anomalies are far from being random. Instead, they reveal systematic behavioral tendencies, so this argument does not apply here. The same holds for the argument that the anomalies are caused by insufficient incentives for rational behavior. High incentives tend to reduce careless errors, but in general subjects behave similarly in case of high incentives. Camerer (1995) reviews evidence on this matter observed in a variety of contexts such as ultimatum games, experimental auctions or choice under risk and uncertainty and concludes that though it is likely that there are situations where incentives affect results, such effects seem to be the exception rather than the rule. Perhaps the strongest evidence against a general disappearance of anomalous effects in decision making when payments are involved comes from a study done by Kachelmeier and Shehata (1992) who investigated behavior under risk with Chinese subjects (Masters students with a background in economics). Although these subjects in some experiments could earn three times their monthly income, similar departures from neoclassical economic theory as in previous experiments occurred (Beattie & Loomes 1997 reach similar conclusions on the general effect of payments on choices under risk).
14
Chapter 1
Further, these anomalies are not restricted to experiments but were also found in ‘real life situations' (e.g., Lichtenstein & Slovic 1973, Hausman 1979), in situations where people are given the possibility to learn (e.g., Herrnstein, Loewenstein, Prelec & Vaugham 1991, Herrnstein & Prelec 1992) or in situations where experts (with sufficient possibilities to learn) make decisions (again Lichtenstein & Slovic 1973). Thaler (1987b, 1987c) and De Bondt and Thaler (1985, 1987, 1990) even report cases of anomalies in financial markets where one can quite safely assume expert actors, high incentives, and almost perfect competition. Anomalous behavior seems to do quite well under certain conditions even in highly competitive markets. Summarizing the above arguments Frey and Eichenberger (1987: 15) conclude: ‘serious theoretical reasons and empirical observations exist for the belief that in economic markets as they exist in reality -....- individual anomalies are not eliminated at the aggregate level'. They should therefore be taken seriously in economics as well as in sociology. This statement underlines that for certain problems a more complex behavioral theory is needed. 1.5.3. Integration of the anomalies into neoclassical economic theory Attempts to integrate the observed anomalies (for intertemporal choice) into neoclassical economic theory up to now only deal with certain anomalies like procrastination or varying discount rates. To Anderson and Block (1995) the problem of procrastination is due mainly to a misrepresentation of the individuals ‘true' preferences and not to a failure of their ‘true' utility maximization.16 They argue, that if people procrastinate or give in to a temptation, they do not fail to maximize utility, but have a couple of reasons to do so: They could want to make themselves or others believe they would have liked to make a different choice, they also could have other goals in a situation beside resisting this certain temptation (e.g. impress others) and finally, their ordering of preferences could have changed. For example, imagine a person fails to stick to his diet or to abstain from taking alcohol. This failure can, according to Anderson and Block (1995), be due to an only temporary wish to impress a person (maybe the spouse) which becomes less important as another goal appears. The failure might also be due to a strategic misrepresentation of the dieter’s preferences (i.e. the dieter did never really want to engage in this diet, but stated this wish only to keep the peace) and finally it can be due to a change in preferences, because ‘[t]he standard economic model assumes that individual preferences are consistent at any moment, yet not necessarily over time' (Anderson & Block 1995: 205). Therefore, people procrastinate or give in, because, given their set of preferences, it actually is the best they can do. So there clearly exists no problem for economic theory at all. Although anomalous phenomena may be due to a strategic misrepresentation of preferences, given the serious attempts that are sometimes made and the often quite high costs that are involved with these attempts, it seems rather implausible that people value, say, the next alcoholic drink more than the costs for a three-week therapy or undergo such a therapy for strategic reasons. The growing literature on self-command and commitment (e.g., Elster 1979, Schelling 1992, Ainslie & Haslam 1992) indicates that people are willing to pay quite significant costs in order to raise incentives not to deviate from their long-term 16
One could argue that they deny the relevance of anomalies and thus should be placed in the section above. However, that section reviews arguments accepting experimental anomalies but questioning their importance for aggregates in real world settings. Thus, an approach trying to prove that these results can be explained in standard economic terms is somewhat distinct.
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15
interest in the light of short-term temptations.17 Further, it is strange to explain violations of the standard micro-economic model by temporary changes in preferences. For good reasons preferences should be regarded as ‘similar among persons and stable over time' (Stigler & Becker 1977: 76). Abolishing this assumption would lead to the possibility of ‘explaining' almost every action by a sudden - and maybe even temporary - change in preferences - as it is done by Anderson and Block, thus rendering a systematic testing of predictions impossible. In this case the remedy seems to be much worse than the disease. Another, more sophisticated, attempt to integrate part of the observed phenomena is via endogenous changes in preferences (Becker & Murphy 1988, Becker 1996, Becker & Mulligan 1997; Wathieu 1997 offers a similar approach). Here present consumption of a good influences the utility derived from its future consumption. For example, drug use now raises current utility levels but in addition alters (lowers) the utility derived from consumption of the same amount of drugs later. Becker and his co-workers introduce a good-specific stock of consumption capital, which, as in human capital theory, depreciates when not used. Different goods have different rates of depreciation as well as different influences on the utility derived from future consumption. For example, immediate drug use influences future utility from drugs stronger than immediate consumption of chocolate influences future utility from chocolate. Note, that this influence of present on future consumption need not be harmful. Exercising (jogging, doing piano lessons) potentially raise utility of future consumption and thus are positive addictions.18 Next to the initial rate of good-specific consumption capital, the depreciation rate of this capital, and the influence of current consumption on future consumption, intertemporal utility then depends on discount rates. People discounting strongly will presently consume more of harmful goods despite the negative future consequences. Therefore, subjects may maximize intertemporal utility even in case of addiction. According to Becker and Murphy (1988) utility maximization does not imply that these persons achieve very high levels of utility, i.e., that they are very happy, but only that given their set of preferences and their consumption capital they behave optimally. In addition, the initial choice of experimenting with drugs or alcohol might very well be made under uncertainty (Becker 1992). When deciding to experiment with the use of drugs or not, it may simply not be clear whether one will become an addict or not. Thus, people might become addicted and later regret that fact and also their previous choices, but they still acted rational. Therefore people may undertake considerable pain in order to stop addictions.19 This model raises interesting research questions, e.g., which people have a high time preference and are at risk of becoming addicted and where such high time preferences stem from.
17
Note, that the prime example for the use of commitments – Ulysses letting himself bind to the ship’s mast in order not to fall prey to the singing of the sirens - used commitments much more efficiently than his modern descendants. Contrary to their attempts to remove chocolate bars in order to stick to their diets, Ulysses is able to reap the benefits of giving in to a temptation, without having to pay the price for it. 18 Because investment in beneficial addictions is no potential anomaly, the focus in this chapter lies on the more familiar harmful addictions. 19 Note, that this model incorporates addictive behavior but no longer assumes that intertemporal utility function is time-separable. However, with regard to the violations of the separability axiom, such a violation is not necessarily a defect of the model. Ironically it also runs counter to Becker’s own theory of the family where he assumes that people discount future benefits at the market interest rate.
Chapter 1
16
The problem with this model, despite its correct observation that addicts sometimes regret their choices, is its neglect of the ongoing shifting preferences of addicted people and their sometimes even repeated tremendous efforts and expenses to stop their addiction. If subjects have already been addicted, they should be able to judge the risks associated with drug much better than when making their initial choices. In addition, it remains unclear why people at one time prefer to stay away from taking harmful substances and next time to succumb to the need for these substances. 1.5.4. Existing models to explain certain essential anomalies Due to a plethora of competing models this section could be easily enlarged to a whole chapter. It will not, because generally these models do not cover a broader range of anomalies but are restricted to the anomaly under study (e.g., Akerlof's [1991] model of procrastination). As a result, they sometimes look like searching for an appropriate utility function. In this section only more general models will be reviewed. The most prominent model and a major descriptive advance over the DU-model is the well-confirmed hyperbolic discount curve (e.g., Ainslie 1975, 1991; Mazur 1987): U (V 0) , (2) (1 + αt ) U(V0) being the immediate value of an outcome, U(Vt) its value at time delay t, α being a constant determining the steepness of the discount function, and t the number of time periods the reward is to be delayed. 20 U (Vt ) =
Contrary to an exponential discount function, hyperbolic discount rates imply time-varying discount rates where the decision maker is relatively strongly aware of short delays. Due to the prominence of this ‘anomaly’ this hyperbolic discount function has been incorporated in several models as well as axiomatic systems. For example, Loewenstein and Prelec (1992), Harvey (1986) and Ahlbrecht and Weber (1995) developed axiomatic systems where the stationarity axiom is replaced with an axiom allowing hyperbolic discounting. Ahlbrecht and Weber (1995) further argue that hyperbolic discounting is normatively justified, i.e., rational, in cases where decisions are binding, that is, if current decisions are not reevaluated in the future. Certainly any successful theory of intertemporal choice must incorporate hyperbolic discounting. Yet, it remains quite unclear why certain things (clothes, alcohol or sweets) are usually related with ‘impulsive behavior' (Ainslie's term for the 20
There exist a variety of competing models for such a hyperbolic discount function, e.g., Harvey 1986, Mazur 1987; Loewenstein and Prelec 1992; Laibson 1997. The most general one, having been successfully tested also with survey data (Cairns & van der Pol 2000), is that of Loewenstein and Prelec (1992). They define decision weights (wt) for future time periods as follows:
(wt) =
1 . Depending on the parameter values for h and α this formulation encompasses standard (1 + αt ) h / α
exponential discounting, if α approaches 0, as well as Mazur's (1987) model above, if h / α equals 1. Note, that in Mazur's formula above as well as in the Loewenstein and Prelec model α may take negative values, indicating that a person values positive future outcomes more than immediate ones. If a person is indifferent between immediate and future outcomes, in the Loewenstein and Prelec model all parameters equal 1, while in the Mazur model α has to equal zero.
Intertemporal choices
17
overweighing of immediate gains in his seminal 1975 paper), while others, such as the decision which bank offer to accept in order to pay back one’s mortgage for the following twenty years, are not. Consequently, Ainslie (1991: 335) raises the question: ‘But then, which is the ”true” discount function - the matching law (implying hyperbolic discounting – AG) or the exponential discount rate available from the bank?’ Unfortunately, he leaves the problem unresolved by answering that this depends on the circumstances, and focuses instead on the means of arriving at a proper exponential rate. To specify such circumstances is indeed one of this book’s aims: who is most likely to behave myopic and when? While hyperbolic discounting accounts for time-varying discount rates the anomalies concerning the sign and magnitude effect are modeled via the value function for gains and losses. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) introduced a value function that is split by a reference point in two parts. Above the reference point the value function is concave, below the reference point it is convex.21 In addition, the function is steeper in the negative domain, resulting in an S-shaped utility function. Loewenstein and Prelec (1992) applied a similar value function in their model for intertemporal choices. Besides for the sign and magnitude effects, this value function also accounts for anomalies in sequences and the delay/speed-up asymmetry. With respect to sequences, Frank (1992) points out that people react to events and evaluate them in relation to some reference point, mostly the status quo. Past levels of consumption form reference points for future levels of consumption (Kapteyn & Wansbeek 1982), thus leading to a preference for sequences with growing consumption profiles as reported by Frank (1992) and Loewenstein and Sicherman (1991). As to the delay/speed-up asymmetry, Loewenstein (1988) found that charges to delay a good are higher than premiums people are willing to pay for speeding-up the receipt of the good the same amount of time. In delay situations people experience an immediate loss compensated by a later but discounted gain. In a speed-up situation they experience an immediate gain followed by a later and discounted loss. If losses weigh more heavily than gains, delay charges are higher than speed-up premiums. Unfortunately, the specification of the (quite important) reference point and the ensuing distinction between gains and losses remain unspecified. Hence, only in certain situations can predictions be derived about when an outcome is perceived as a gain and when as a loss. It seems unlikely, for example, that the average shopkeeper views his daily sales as a loss and that the amount of money he gained in exchange is unable to compensate him for this loss. Loss aversion seems to be of no importance in this situation. Fischhoff (1983) investigating the stability of perceived reference points found that subjects differed remarkably in the perception of the relevant frame in a situation. The missing specification of what constitutes the reference point is also responsible for the contradiction that Loewenstein (1988), in his work on delay and speedup, states that anticipated consumption serves as the reference point. By contrast Loewenstein and Sichermann (1991) as well as Frank (1992) in their work on increasing wage profiles pose that the current level of consumption serves as the reference point. While both explanations seem intuitively plausible they are certainly not derived from theory. 21
Such a utility function does not exhibit decreasing marginal utility in the negative domain, i.e., decreasing marginal disutility. Consequently, economists frequently question the S-shaped form of the utility function. For empirical evidence favoring S-shaped utility and a discussion see Fennema and Van Assen (1999).
18
Chapter 1
Worse, capturing the above-mentioned effects (sign, magnitude, delay/speed-up asymmetry and negative discount rates in sequences) by choosing an appropriate value function implies that objects valued equally are discounted equally, no matter whether it is drugs or garden furniture. Chapters 3 and 4 will provide evidence against this prediction, by assuming, among other things, that value functions in the negative domain differ between goods according to their hedonicness (Dhar & Wertenbroch 2000). As to the phenomenon that different objects (here: forms of money) are discounted in a different way, Thaler (1990) and Shefrin and Thaler (1992) argue that people ”act as if they used a system of mental accounts... Specifically some mental accounts, those that are considered ‘wealth’ are less tempting than others that are considered ‘income” (Shefrin & Thaler 1992: 290). They view mental accounting as part of framing (Kahneman & Tversky 1984) and predict the mental account ‘income’ to have a higher marginal propensity to be spent for consumption than ‘lump-sum payments’. These in turn have a higher marginal propensity than ‘pension increases’. They also predict a much higher marginal propensity for so-called ‘windfall gains' (i.e., unexpected gains), if these gains are small and a lower marginal propensity if these gains are large, because in the latter case they are framed as ‘wealth'. Although a precise distinction between ‘small' and ‘large' windfall gains might be quite debatable in practice, the prediction that windfall gains have a higher marginal propensity than expected gains has been successfully tested (Akers et al. 1994). Note, that in this section ‘framing’ has been used for a variety of different phenomena. Frank (1992) and Loewenstein and Sicherman (1991) assume that people adopt a reference point that influences the evaluation of outcomes depending on whether they are perceived as gains or losses. Loewenstein (1988) does the same, but additionally shows that the perception of the reference point can be manipulated. Shefrin and Thaler (1992) further add complexity by introducing their system of mental accounts for which discounting is not only depending on the reference point but also on relating an outcome to a specific mental account which in turn is related to a specific discount rate. While these models have a much higher positive validity than the DU-model, they still leave many questions open. I already dealt with the problems related to the specification of the reference point. As to the existence of mental accounts that influence the discount rate, other problems remain. If mental accounts are crucial, an explanation of how many of them exist for a certain object and which accounts are associated with which discount rates would be very desirable. Unfortunately, Shefrin and Thaler tell us nothing about this problem. Second, and even more important, their model assumes the ordering of mental accounts to be static. This implies, that if people reveal much higher discount rates for alcohol than for money, say, when celebrating in a pleasant environment at parties, the same ordering still holds if an alcoholic drink is offered at a conference. This implication does not seem very plausible.22 Another stream of research focuses on the relation between intertemporal choice and choice under risk and compares models between the two domains. Because this approach to intertemporal choice differs from building descriptively more valid models, it will be covered separately in the following section. 22
It is of course also possible to assume that events are linked to mental accounts, thus allowing for identical forms of consumption to be linked to different mental accounts and to be discounted differently. This makes the need to systemize mental accounts and their relation to temporal discounting even more urgent.
Intertemporal choices
19
1.5.5. Analogies between intertemporal choice and choice under risk
There is a striking similarity between most of the observed anomalies concerning choice behavior under risk and over time. That is, virtually the same violations of the standard models occur (see Chapter 6 for a demonstration). Based on this similarity, Prelec and Loewenstein (1991) as well as Quiggin and Horowitz (1995) argue that basically the same behavioral patterns underlie the deviations from the normative models. In both cases, alternatives are described by the notation (X, x), X being the payoff and x being either a time delay or a probability/degree of risk. Both choices (over time and under risk) are sensitive to the existence of reference points, i.e., it matters for the decision-maker whether the given alternatives include gains or losses. Further, in both cases the decisionmaker is sensitive to manipulations of the time/probability parameter that normatively should not affect preference. Thus, in both choice domains there is a preference for sure/immediate events and in both choices an initial indifference between two outcomes disappears, if the time/probability component is altered by the same ratio or the same difference for each outcome. For example, a person being indifferent between a smaller but less distant and a larger but more remote reward, prefers the latter one if both choices are delayed the same amount of time. Prelec and Loewenstein (1991) describe this as the common ratio/common difference effect. Finally, in both preference domains (under risk and over time) the same effects with regard to sign and magnitude of the reward can be observed. Prelec and Loewenstein (1991) conclude that these similarities reflect the intimate connection between intertemporal and risky choice: delayed objects are almost by definition uncertain. The observed regularities therefore do not necessarily hold for other multi-attribute choices. In contrast with this view Rachlin and Rainieri (1992) generalize the hyperbolic discount functions observed in intertemporal choice to the discounting of risk, social distance and other. Their models include important aspects of intertemporal choice, such as hyperbolic discounting or utility functions differing between gains and losses. But two important problems remain. First, as expressed in the Ainslie quotation above, discount rates are highly dependent on situational characteristics.23 Otherwise different goods of equal value should be discounted identically. Such situational aspects are completely left out. Consequently, they cannot explain different discount rates within an individual. Second, there exist also personal differences in discounting (Mischel, Shoda and Rodriguez 1992). Some people manage better than others to stick to their long-term consumption plans than others as every member of AA can tell. While in principle compatible with the models above, after being to some extent investigated in the 1950s and 60s such personal differences have been largely neglected in the past decades.
23
Even Loewenstein claims that ‘As a research agenda it may be more fruitful (than investigating whether time preference is positive or negative - AG) to adress the more nuanced question of why intertemporal choice behavior is so unstable and to discover the situational determinants of time preference’ (Loewenstein & Sicherman 1991: 81/82).
20
Chapter 1
1.6. Problems treated in this book
In the previous sections the importance of intertemporal choices was stressed, the DUmodel underlying most economic analysis and its accompanying anomalies were presented and some alternative models were reviewed. In this section the main problems treated in this book will be outlined briefly. Existing models in intertemporal choice were criticized for paying too little attention to varying discount rates within an individual.24 Hence, influences leading to high or low discount rates respectively will be specified. More specifically, it will argued that people act myopically when hedonic consumption is considered and that this short-term orientation is enhanced when consumption experience can be imagined vividly. By contrast people act according to their long-term interest when utilitarian considerations are prominent. Secondly, it was repeatedly underlined that existing models in intertemporal choice are agnostic with respect to individual differences in discount rates. Such differences usually are regarded as differences in tastes and hence, taken as given. In this book, we attempt to demonstrate that the ability to take future consequences of one’s actions into account is an asset produced by parents within their children. People are naturally shortsighted (see Ainslie 1992 for support) but are taught, mainly by parents, to take long-term consequences of their actions into account. Because parents differ with respect to abilities and restrictions to teach this ability and because people differ with respect to which they can learn this ability, people should differ systematically with respect to temporal discounting. Therefore, the first two problems treated in this book are: When do people act myopically and who behaves impatiently?
In addition, existing models in intertemporal choice were criticized for being unnecessarily restrictive. In this book it is argued that behavioral regularities observed in intertemporal choice cannot only be applied to choice under risk, as to some extent has already been demonstrated by Prelec and Loewenstein (1991), but can also be generalized to other preference dimensions, e.g., to interpersonal or interspatial choice. Thus, the third problem treated in this book is: How can the empirical results observed in intertemporal choice be generalized to other preference dimensions?
It will be argued that processes in temporal discounting are first much more specific than postulated by existing models, because these models do not take into account varying discount rates within individuals. It will also be argued that discounting is much more general than postulated in existing models: outcomes distant from a decision maker’s reference point are discounted in decisions concerning other preference dimensions than just temporal delay. 24
Recently, O'Donoghue and Rabin in a series of papers (O'Donoghue & Rabin 1999, 2000, 2001) as well as Laibson (1997, 1998) - all following suggestions from Schelling (1984) and Ainslie (1992) - used gametheoretical modeling to explain some of the empirical deviations of the DU-model. They argue that people consist of different selves that interact strategically to determine the behavior of a decision maker. From this assumption they also derive results as to when people are likely to behave impatient. The arguments developed in this book appear to be compatible with their reasoning.
Intertemporal choices
21
To tackle these problems, in the following sections a framing theory developed by Lindenberg will be presented which serves as an integrating framework to answer the two main research questions. It will also briefly be sketched how this theory is applied to answer the questions. 1.7. Theory, general: framing and overview of arguments
Because the research questions mentioned in the previous section will be tackled by using a framing theory, this section first briefly reviews other concepts of framing before elaborating the theory used throughout this dissertation. 1.7.1 Previous notions of framing in decision theory
Framing effects have been introduced into decision theory (for choice under risk) by the psychologists Kahneman and Tversky (1979). They developed a descriptive theory of choice under risk, Prospect Theory (PT), the central concepts of which have also been applied to intertemporal choice (e.g., Loewenstein 1988, Loewenstein & Prelec 1992). In Prospect Theory the value V of a prospect25 P is modeled by: V (Pi) = v(xi) δ(di)26 (3) v(xi) being a value function and δ(di) being a weighting function for probabilities Due to the existence of a reference point (usually the status quo) the value function implies that decision makers distinguish between gains and losses. Further, the function is concave above the reference point (for gains) and convex below it (for losses). It also is steeper for losses than for gains. These properties hold for risky as well as intertemporal choice. The probability weighting and intertemporal discounting function also show some similarities, viz. diminishing sensitivity with greater distance from the reference point. That is, changes on the risk or time attribute have less influence on the evaluation of prospects the more distant from the reference point they occur. For choice under risk this reference point can either be 'certainty' or 'impossibility', while for intertemporal choice it will generally be 'now'. Prospect Theory additionally assumes that there is an editing phase consisting ‘of a preliminary analysis of the offered prospects which often yields a simpler representation of these prospects’ (Kahneman & Tversky 1979: 274). In this phase the following four operations take place. Coding: Instead of integrating outcomes into final states of wealth, outcomes are usually perceived as gains or losses. When an outcome is perceived as a gain or a loss depends on a given (chosen or suggested) reference point.
25
Prospects are vectors either of the form (x1, p1; x2, p2; ...; xn, pn) for risky options and (x1, t1; x2, t2; ...; xn, tn) for intertemporal options. Xi describes the outcome attribute i in both prospects whereas pi and ti describe the corresponding risky or temporal attribute. A gamble offering a 50% chance to win $100 and a 50% chance to win nothing is thus described as (100, .5; 0, .5). For matters of convenience zero outcomes are usually omitted, hence the prospect reduces to (100, .5). The procedure for intertemporal options is analogous but note that in risky choice outcomes usually are mutually exclusive whereas in intertemporal choice this need not be the case. 26 This holds for prospects consisting of one outcome differing from zero and one risk or time attribute. For more outcomes the formula becomes more complex but the main properties remain unchanged.
22
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Combination: The probabilities of identical prospects can sometimes be combined. A prospect of (200, .25; 200, .25) will thus be combined and evaluated in the form (200, 50). Segregation: Some prospects contain a riskless component that is segregated from the risky component of the prospect. The prospect (100, 40; 300, 60) will thus be perceived as a prospect with a sure win of 100 and a 60% probability of winning an additional 200. Cancellation: Shared components of the offered prospects are cancelled. Thus a choice between (A, x; B, y; C, z) and (A, x; B', y'; C', z') will be reduced to a choice between (B, y; C, z) and (B', y'; C', z'), since (A, x) is a common component in each of these prospects. Elimination of stochastically dominated27 prospects also occurs during the editing phase. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) provide some empirical evidence for the existence of such an editing phase. However, no such effects up to now have been observed in intertemporal choice. Seidl and Traub (1998) report little evidence for the existence of an editing phase in choices with multiple attributes. To summarize, in Prospect Theory framing effects occur at several steps. They first influence the perception of the prospect via the editing operations. If these operations have an influence on the actual choice this constitutes a framing effect. Second, and most important, framing works via the setting of the reference point, i.e., via the distinction of outcomes as gains and losses. The evaluation of outcomes depends crucially on their perception as gain or a loss. In their famous Asian-disease problem28 Kahneman and Tversky demonstrate that the reference point can be altered by a different formulation and that such an alteration has considerable consequences for choice behavior. In a follow-up paper (1984) they also offer a third framing effect for multi-attribute choices. Kahneman and Tversky argue that 'in order to evaluate such a multi-attribute option, a person sets up a mental account that specifies the advantages associated with the option, relative to a multi-attribute reference state' (Kahneman and Tversky (1984: 346). The evaluation of such a prospect then depends on the balance of this mental account. Kahneman and Tversky (1984) introduce the following mental accounts: 1. A minimal account: only the differences between two options are included, shared features are of no relevance for the decision. 2) a topical account: the consequence of a choice is related to a reference level with respect to this choice, thus involving more dimensions. 3) A comprehensive account: the consequences of a choice are related to a reference level with respect to a wider range of choices. Framing effects here can be understood as a selection of relevant dimensions, which in turn influence the perceived costs and benefits of an option as well as the size of these costs and benefits. For example, options evaluated in a wider context as in the case of the comprehensive account appear much less important. Kahneman and Tversky (1984) suggest that decisions will generally be framed in terms of topical accounts. 27
A prospect (100, .1; 50, .5) stochastically dominates a prospect (100, .05; 50, .5) and will thus be preferred. 28 In the Asian-disease problem subjects have to choose between alternative programs to prevent a potentially deadly disease. Preference between alternatives depends on whether the consequences of the programs are described in terms of gains, ‘lives saved’ (which elicits risk-aversion’), or losses, ‘number of people dying’ (which provokes ‘risk-seeking’).
Intertemporal choices
23
In intertemporal choice, researchers have applied PT mainly with its distinction between gains and losses via reference points (Loewenstein 1988, Shelley 1993), resulting in different discount rates for such gains and losses, on the existence of different mental accounts which are related to different discount rates (Thaler & Shefrin 1992) and on reference point manipulation within the gain or loss domain making outcomes appear more or less immediate (Roelofsma 1994). 1.7.2 Framing in sociology
Contrary to behavioral decision theory framing, has a long tradition in sociology, but with a different notion. It is traditional sociological knowledge that actors define situations, i.e. they determine which aspects are relevant in a given situation. Depending on this definition they choose a proper behavior (see already Thomas & Znaniecki 1928; later this idea was developed further in the works of Mead and Schütz). Behavior is thus a product of the situation and the actor's definition of it. The term framing for the process of identifying and defining situations was introduced by Goffman (1974). For a long time the importance of a definition of the situation has been stressed mainly by proponents of interactionistic sociology (such as symbolic interactionists or ethnomethodologists) and has been neglected by theories that place little value on interactions, e.g., microeconomic consumer theory. Only in the 1980’s some attempts to combine the insights of traditional sociology and rational choice theory have been undertaken by Lindenberg in the belowsketched framing theory and by Esser (1990, 1991, 1996), both arguing that such an integration might contribute to our understanding of anomalous behavior.29 1.7.3 Framing as used in this book
The framing theory developed by Lindenberg, which will be used in this book, is based on the Discrimination Model, originally developed for stochastic repetitive choice (Lindenberg 1980) and successfully tested experimentally (Lindenberg 1981). Later the model was developed into a more elaborate framing theory (Lindenberg 1983, 1989) for which Braspenning (1992) provided some empirical support and which Ligthart (1995) successfully applied to bargaining. Recently, applications in the field of intertemporal choice have been suggested (Lindenberg 1993, 1995, 1996). The theory links two major findings of economics and sociology. From economics it borrows that goods are scarce and behavior is thus heavily influenced by the relative scarcities of these goods. More precisely, if goods become more scarce, prices rise and demand drops. From sociology it borrows that an actor's definition of a situation heavily 29
Esser even claims that the failure to look at the definition of the situation is responsible for almost all anomalies rational choice theory: 'Den Kern nahezu aller Anomalien der Theorie des rationalen Handelns bildet ein Vorgang, der von der Soziologie immer schon sehr betont worden ist: In jede Handlungsentscheidung wird eine besondere "Definition" der Situation geschaltet, die erst die Präferenzen und die Erwartungen strukturiert, von denen dann erst die Selektion eines Handelns ausgehen könne (Esser 1996: 2). Since the ‘definition of the situation’ structures preferences, it is by definition responsible for behavior irrespective of whether behavior is to be called ‘rational’ or ‘anomalous’. However, because this approach allows goal salience to change depending on what frame structures the situation, rationality is only possible within a definition of a situation, i.e. within a given frame. Hence, the distinction between rational and anomalous behavior is meaningless. Toda (1981) provides a similar argument from psychologists.
24
Chapter 1
influences his subsequent choice. In other words, the relevant goods in a situation might be very different for different types of actors and also the effect of a rise in the relative price on the demand of these goods might be very different depending on situation and actor (Lindenberg & Frey 1993). By doing so, it is possible to integrate the rich descriptiveness of classical sociology (especially the studies on the definition of the situation undertaken by symbolic interactionists) with the theoretical tradition of economics. By assumption, actors have limited cognitive capacity. Given that actors have goals and that action structures are complex, actors are forced to define a situation in real life decisions in terms of these goals. That is, in a given situation actors have dominant goals and restrict their attention to goal relevant aspects. The theory postulates that there is only one overarching goal that structures the situation and becomes the dominant goal, i.e., the frame, that defines the situation.30 For example, in a market situation it is typically assumed that gain-seeking or profit-maximizing is the dominant goal. This structuring is triggered automatically, i.e., the individual is unable to choose a frame. Contrary to the sociologist’s concept of the definition of the situation, the discrimination model assumes that goals potentially relevant in the situation but pushed into the background by the dominant goal still influence behavior, but only indirectly. They remain in the background of the decision maker's mind and affect the salience (strength) of the dominant goal. In a typical market situation, for example, the goal 'behave altruistically' will not be dominant but it might raise or lower the salience of 'gain'. This salience of the dominant goal determines the effect of the net utility of the alternatives (gi - g0) on the probability that the given alternative i will be chosen. Expressed algebraically: Pi = B (gi - g0) + 1/K, (4) where Pi is the choice probability of option i; gi is the expected utility of option i;31 g0 is the mean expected utility of all options. The parameter B denotes the salience of the respective frame, depending on other goals and K is the number of all options. Note, that formula (4) is about choice probabilities given frames. Hence, salience of frames in the discrimination model is exogenously given. As to frame selection, if no routine for handling certain decision situations has been developed, i.e., behavior is nonhabitual, the goal that discriminates best between the choice alternatives becomes dominant, structures the situation and pushes other situational goals in the background. If a routine for specific kinds of choice situations has already been developed, the dominant goal established previously prevails, until it fails to discriminate between the choice alternatives. Suppose, as an example, you bought an expensive ticket (say: f100) for a theatre show that received mixed reviews after you bought the ticket. While you are just leaving 30
'One overarching goal' is a somewhat misleading term, since in the theory 'one goal' may well comprise several attributes or goal variables. Suppose the goal is 'being a smart consumer'. Choosing between consumer goods being described by a variety of attributes the actor may well be able to compare goods by considering and weighing all the attributes. 31 As in the previous footnote, note that options may be described by several attributes. The expected utility of an option therefore weighs these attributes to determine the utility of an option. To arrive at an expected utility this weighted sum of the score of attributes is again weighed by the probability with which this options is to be expected.
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home to attend the show it begins to rain so heavily that you will get quite wet even when carrying an umbrella. The three most obvious goals in this situation are: a) to receive pleasure from attending the show, b) to avoid getting wet, and c) to avoid having thrown away f100 by not going to the show. Assume, you have no routine in handling such a decision situation. According to the model, alternative c should structure the situation. The enjoyment of the show is (due to the mixed reviews) unsure and thus not serving as a basis for a clear discrimination between going and not going. Because people in general are loss averse and because the subject already paid f 100, the utility difference between going and not going is likely to be larger in terms of losses than in terms of getting wet or not. However, the other goals do not vanish, but they remain in the back of the decision maker's mind and influence the salience of the structuring goal. In the example, the goal 'receiving pleasure from the show' raises the salience of the structuring goal 'loss-avoidance' and the goal 'avoid getting wet' lowers its salience. In this situation a change in the price for the theatre ticket (e.g., if your partner who bought the ticket tells you that the actual price was only f l0) has a much larger impact on the probability of 'going', than an increase in raining intensity. On the other hand, changes in raining intensity have a stronger impact if the dominant goal is ‘avoid getting wet’. Hence, changes in relative prices affect behavior quite differently depending on whether they occur on goods inside or outside the frame. To apply this theory to intertemporal choice, specifications are necessary as to what determines the salience of goals in an intertemporal context. Some goals promote behavior resulting in little attention to long-term consequences (say drug addicts search for means to overcome cravings) whereas other goals will make decision makers particularly sensitive to even small differences in long-term costs or benefits, e.g., when considering bank-offers to pay off your mortgage for the following 25 years. The remainder of this chapter lays out some mechanisms relevant in intertemporal choice. Note, that according to this model ‘rationality’ always is frame (or goal) dependent. Behavior is not necessarily rational across different frames. Behavior in one frame may appear ‘irrational’, if evaluated from another frame. 1.8. Application to intertemporal choice
To apply the theory laid out above, first the effect of goal salience on preference will be investigated, i.e., it will be tested for the effect of B on preference. Then, it will be investigated how changes in the choice set from which alternatives are chosen affect the discriminatory power of options and consequently preference. These tests are done in order to underline the general applicability of the discrimination model to intertemporal choice. Given that salience and discriminatory power are important in intertemporal choice, we will proceed by investigating other mechanisms for making goals salient, which lead to short-term or long-term orientation. For example, it will be argued that the salience of goals ignoring long-term consequences depends on characteristics of the good. More explicitly: hedonic goods, goods which provide direct utility, are more likely to lead to a frame in which ‘possession of the good’ is the dominant goal, than utilitarian goods are, goods serving as means to derive utility, even assuming that both goods have the same utility. Further, this
26
Chapter 1
likelihood depends on whether goods are presented vividly: staring at goods presented at a shop window affects preferences differently than choosing from a written list of items. It then will be argued that salience of frames depends on individual characteristics. The probability that in a specific situation a goal becomes dominant that ignores long-term benefits or costs, differs between individuals. Therefore, given identical resources and given an identical degree of deprivation, the propensity to frame this situation as ’end this miserable situation’ differs between people. Consequently, the probability of behaving impulsively differs between individuals, e.g., depending on whether how well they were socialized to delay gratification. Finally, the salience of rewards should decrease as a function of their distance from the decision maker. In intertemporal choice this is modeled by a discount function, may it be an exponential or a hyperbolic one. It will be argued that distance refers to several dimensions - outcomes might be risky (distant from certainty), temporally delayed (distant from ‘the present’), spatially distant (distant from ‘here’) or socially distant (distant from myself) – and that people discount outcomes according to their distance from a multi-dimensional reference point. While this is hardly a new statement – it is intuitively obvious that people prefer to receive benefits for themselves, ‘here’ and ‘now’ – it is also argued that these discounting processes follow similar discount functions and thus may yield almost identical preference shifts. Thus, preference reversals experimentally observed in intertemporal choice can be directly applied to interpersonal choice or risky choice due to a general influence of distance on salience. In the following sections, these considerations will be explained in somewhat more detail. 1.8.1 Framing theory, the discrimination model and salience in intertemporal choice
Lindenberg’s framing theory assumes that framing takes part habitually and automatically. If no decision routine for the respective decision situation has been established previously, the frame that discriminates best between choice options becomes dominant. The choice probability of the most favorable option within the dominant frame is enhanced or lowered by background goals depending on whether these goals are compatible with or run counter to the dominant frame. This model can incorporate hypotheses as to which people will be most impatient and when, as well as generate some new predictions. For example, the personal characteristics investigated in chapter 5 should influence the automatic triggering of the dominant frame. People with high selfcontrol thus more often ‘select’ frames which call for far-sighted behavior, i.e., have lower discount rates, than persons with low self-control. One could add an index capturing this to formula (4) above: Pij = Bj (gi - g0) + 1/K, j being an index for a specific personal characteristic, e.g., patience.
(5)
Because this dissertation is mainly concerned with intertemporal choices, only personal characteristics with respect to temporal discount rates are considered. However, personal characteristics should also influence the salience of frames in other domains. Lindenberg (1996) explicitly assumes framing in general to depend on institutions and norms. Adherence to norms as well as institutional effects differ between subjects - and if specifications of these influences analogous to those presented in Chapter 5 can be made
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27
- it may be reasonable to generally add such an individual index. For example, deviant behavior is more common and more pronounced for males than for females (Hirschi & Gottfredson 1994). This can be captured in formula 5 by assuming either that the expected utility of options available differs between sexes, that the salience of frames differs between sexes, or both. The hypotheses with respect to situation- and good-specific influences on discount rates likewise refer to the weight B in formula (4) and (5): for reasons elaborated below, hedonic goods and vivid presentations may lead to a larger salience of goals favoring short-term behavior, regardless of individual characteristics. However, it is possible to test the effect of discriminatory power on preference directly. For example, the attractiveness of the option ($100 in 4 weeks) according to the model should differ for the two choice sets C1: {($100 in 4 weeks), ($105 in 4 ½ weeks), ($120 in 6 weeks)} and C2 {($100 in 4 weeks), ($120 in 6 weeks)}. In the first choice set the option does not differ much from ($105 in 4 ½ weeks). Hence, a frame where ‘immediacy of receipt’ is a dominant goal does not discriminate between options and will therefore be replaced by a frame that discriminates better, while a frame where ‘amount of money’ is dominant does. The latter therefore is more likely to be dominant in this situation. 1.8.2. Good-specific determinants of patience: hedonic and utilitarian goods
It was already stated that the main shortcoming of the hyperbolic discounting perspectives is its failure to explain varying discount rates within an individual. Hyperbolic discounting heroically assumes that subjects reveal identical (hyperbolic) discount rates when buying designer clothes as in their gasoline purchases (see Chapman & Elstein 1995, and Dittmar, Beattie & Friese 1997 for counterevidence). Contrary to this position it will be argued that impatience is higher for hedonic than for utilitarian goods. Consumption of the former yields direct utility to a decision maker, while the latter serve as means to derive utility in future time periods.32 Hoch and Loewenstein (1991) argue that impulsivity is due to deprivation caused by the non-possession of certain goods. In this view, consumers adapt to the possession of a good and its actual non-possession then creates deprivation that is ended by buying the product. If hedonic goods provide direct utility, their non-possession elicits much higher levels of deprivation than the nonpossession of utilitarian goods. Recently, in fact Dhar and Wertenbroch (2000) demonstrated that loss aversion is more pronounced for hedonic than for utilitarian goods. Hedonic goods thus should create feelings of deprivation more easily and more strongly than utilitarian goods and subjects should therefore prefer to delay consumption of utilitarian rather than hedonic goods. In addition, impatience for hedonic over utilitarian goods should be stronger when subjects consider which good to receive sooner than when subjects have to determine adequate monetary compensation charges for delay. Asking subjects about their preference for immediate consumption raises the salience of hedonic frames, because immediate consumption is much more attractive when it provides direct utility. By contrast, asking for compensation charges raises the salience of utilitarian frames, because subjects have to consider alternative expenses, thereby distracting from the hedonic experience of immediate consumption.
32
Alinda van Bruggen (personal communication) suggested this definition.
28
Chapter 1
1.8.3. Situation-specific determinants of patience: vividness
In intertemporal choice the importance of vividness has been stressed frequently. A recurrent speculation is that vividness raises impatience. People walking along a shop front with nicely placed goods, maybe even smelling them, generally are much more eager to buy these goods than when sitting in their armchair spending time reading. It is thus often argued that forms of goods’ proximity raise discount rates (Loewenstein & Hoch 1991, Loewenstein 1996). This expected influence of vividness on discount rates is also supported by empirical evidence. Mischel and his co-workers conducted a series of experiments (summarized in Mischel et al. 1992) on children’s ability to delay gratification. They demonstrated that children are much less willing to wait for the reward when the reward was actually present. But this seems to be only part of the story. While standing in front of a bakery, viewing and smelling the products probably enhances one’s propensity to consume these goods. However, no such effects are reported, nor are they likely to be reported, for people at gas stations despite the fact that the smell of gasoline might provoke extremely vivid images. Intuition often quickly provides us with vivid examples of how and why vividness affects our judgments. Unfortunately, scientific scrutiny by and large has not corroborated this view. In a review on research about vividness Taylor and Fiske (1984) paint a rather dark picture and conclude that there is little evidence for vividness effects. It is argued here that vividness affects discount rates by affecting the deprivation felt by decision makers in two ways. First, vividness raises the perceived hedonic/utilitarian qualities of a good. That is, goods presented vividly are judged as more hedonic or utilitarian than non-vivid goods. Second, vividness raises adaptation to owning the good, thus creating stronger feelings of deprivation and more incentives to overcome this deprivation by buying the product immediately. Therefore, there is an interaction between type of good and vividness. Vividness is assumed to affect preferences for hedonic goods more strongly than for utilitarian goods, because the non-possession of hedonic goods inherently creates more deprivation. In addition, again there should be an effect of the elicitation method on impatience. As argued in the section above this effect should be dependent on the way impatience is measured. In choices which good to receive sooner, vividness should raise the attractiveness for hedonic goods more strongly than for utilitarian goods. When subjects determine financial compensation for the delay of these goods, vividness should affect the attractiveness of hedonic goods to a much lesser extent. 1.8.4. Individual determinants of patience
Economic theory usually regards preferences as tastes and thus as given. Due to the nonexistence of a reasonable theory of preference formation, tastes should be considered as 'similar among persons and stable over time' (Stigler & Becker 1977: 76). Only recently (e.g., Becker & Murphy 1988, Becker 1996) economists have begun to explore preference formation processes in more detail. As mentioned above preferences for the timing of rewards are an important part of a person's preference set. Fortunately, sociology has something to offer with respect to its formation: while tastes for chocolate ice cream instead of banana are probably distributed and acquired randomly among a population, delay of gratification is something that has to be taught. Consequently, children generally have more difficulties to realize that they cannot have all the pleasant
Intertemporal choices
29
things nicely displayed in supermarkets than do the standard (non-pathological) adult. To delay gratification is a major part of socialization, being taught mainly by parents but also by peers, institutions, such as schools or universities, and even professions. In this book the focus lies mainly on parental socialization for two reasons. First, with respect to later socialization factors it is not clear whether patience is a cause for further socialization or an effect of socialization. For example, a patient person, will be more likely to have higher educational achievements. He will be more likely to study instead of spending time on other things and more likely to value educational achievements, because they are seen as a valuable investment. This initial preference will again be reinforced by further attention of socializing institutions such as schools. Second, parental reinforcement and modeling influences children's preference formation more strongly than do other institutions (Bandura & Walters 1963). It is proposed here that parents differ in their ability to teach their children selfcontrol. In addition, incentives and restrictions for parents to teach their children selfcontrol differ. For example, parents with a high social status have more to lose when being blamed for misbehavior of their children than parents of low status (Coleman 1990, Cchapter 11). Hence, the former are expected to place greater value on a proper socialization. As to restrictions, parental time to teach children is reduced for single parents or when many children are present in the household. The latter reasoning is supported by results from research in areas where parental socialization is also relevant. For example, educational achievements generally are lower for children with many siblings due to limited parental resources, such as reading time or expenses (Downey 1995). 1.8.5. Outcome distance and discount rates
As stated above the relation between time delay and uncertainty has received considerable attention. It is argued here that empirical results obtained with respect to one preference dimension, e.g., risk, can in fact be applied to other preference dimensions as well, e.g., temporal delay. After a short comparison of the axioms underlying EU theory and DU theory, it will be demonstrated that the empirical regularities obtained by behavioral decision theorists apply to the outcome dimension (usually money) as well as to the distance dimension (time or risk). Then these regularities will be applied to other distance dimensions, viz. interpersonal and interspatial choice. For example, a person indifferent between $100 today and $150 in four weeks prefers the latter option when a time delay of four weeks is added to both options. Likewise, a person being indifferent between a sure win of $85 and a gamble offering $100 with a 90% chance prefers the later option, that is the higher amount, if a 30% chance of winning nothing is added to both options, i.e. the second choice is between ($85; .7) and ($100; .6). The addition of a four weeks delay is structurally equivalent to the addition of a 30% chance of winning nothing, because both alterations raise the distance of the considered options from the respective reference points (immediacy and certainty). Similar effects are expected to occur for other distance dimensions. Imagine the above-mentioned decision maker who is indifferent between $100 today and $150 in four weeks. Instead of choosing between temporally delayed outcomes adding an identical additional distance to both options should also change preference for interpersonal choices. Suppose, for example, the two amounts would be due to two persons being socially distant to varying degrees from the decision maker.
30
Chapter 1
1.9. Outline of the book
In the previous sections it has been stressed that intertemporal choices are relevant for real life decisions as well as rational choice theory. In addition, the DU-model, its accompanying anomalies, and competing models were explained in some detail. Further, a short overview of arguments used throughout this book was presented. Now, the rest of this book will be outlined briefly. Chapter 2 will test some of framing theory’s predictions concerning the effect of salience on preference and how salience depends on the choice set from which alternatives are chosen. In Chapter 3 hypotheses concerning good-specific influences on discount rates will be derived and tested experimentally. It is argued that hedonic goods are discounted more heavily than utilitarian or functional goods. In Chapter 4 it will then be investigated how a vivid presentation affects impatience for both types of goods. It will be argued that vividness raises impatience for hedonic goods more strongly when subjects have to state whether they would like to receive a hedonic or a utilitarian good sooner. For utilitarian goods vividness raises impatience more strongly when financial compensation charges have to be determined. Chapter 5 will specify how personal characteristics affect patience and how patience in turn has real consequences. It is suggested that parents differ in ability and incentives to teach their children to delay benefits. Experimental tests of these hypotheses are presented as well. Chapter 6 will compare similarities in the axiomatic systems underlying Expected Utility theory for choice under risk and Discounted Utility theory for intertemporal choices. Then the main empirical ‘anomalous’ regularities in intertemporal and risky choice will be compared and generalized to interpersonal and interspatial choice. It will be argued that decision makers compare outcomes to a multi-dimensional reference point and, due to diminishing sensitivity, discount deviations from this reference point in a similar fashion, viz. hyperbolically. Because anomalies in intertemporal choice and choice under risk are compared in this chapter there is some overlap between chapter 6 and section 1.4. in the current chapter. I am fully aware of the redundancies, but unfortunately presenting a full overview of anomalies in intertemporal choice together with a review of the main accompanying anomalies in choice under risk would mix up two different stories and therefore reduce accessibility of the text considerably. Chapter 7 will present empirical results of the generalizations of anomalies in intertemporal choice and choice under risk to interpersonal and interspatial choice. Chapter 8 will summarize and discuss the main ideas and results and present some suggestions for future research.
Chapter 2
Salience and the discrimination model in intertemporal choice
Summary
In this chapter it is first argued that the ‘anomalies’ in intertemporal choice described in chapter 1 can be interpreted as effects concerning the salience of decision attributes. Such changes in attribute salience and their effect on preference are compatible with the discrimination model underlying Lindenberg’s framing theory. The model postulates that preference and hence, choice probabilities depends on the salience of frames. This salience of frames in turn depends on their ability to discriminate between choice options. After demonstrating that attribute salience matters for determining preferences between intertemporal options, the postulates of the model are tested in several experiments specifying which factors influence discriminatory power. Because some of the tests require a manipulation of the choice context, i.e., the set of current and previous choice alternatives, previous research on context effects is briefly reviewed.
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Chapter 2
2.1. Introduction
In Chapter 1 it was proposed that patience differs between individuals as well as for different types of goods and situations. Further, in Chapter 1 it was argued that such differences can be integrated in Lindenberg’s framing theory. According to this theory changes in the choice probability of an option depends on changes in the salience of frames. Hence, predictions concerning the salience of frames for different individuals and between different types of goods serve as bridge assumptions specifying which frame is likely to become dominant in a given situation. However, before choosing framing theory and the discrimination model as an overarching framework to answer the research questions raised in Chapter 1, their general applicability to intertemporal choice has to be demonstrated. Fortunately, it is possible to test some of the discrimination model’s postulates directly than only specifying appropriate bridge assumptions and this is the aim of this chapter. According to the discrimination model the probability of choosing an option depends on the salience of a frame and the utility of options within that frame. Frames structure the decision maker’s definition of the situation by determining which aspects are important in a given situation. For example, in choices between simple intertemporal options, offering different amounts of money at different points in time, the frame, will either focus on immediate returns (‘immediacy - get money now’) or on returns being as large as possible (‘outcome - get as much money as possible’). Salience of frames resembles an attribute's decision weight, a concept more common in decision theory. Because a frame in such simple choice situations consists of only one decision attribute,33 higher salience of a frame directly corresponds with a larger decision weight of this attribute. The following sections will briefly recapitulate some of the discrimination model’s postulates - beginning with frame selection and then turning to choice behavior given a frame - and then demonstrate how these postulates relate to intertemporal choice. The discrimination model postulates that in a routine decision the frame previously present in a similar situation prevails. For example, if in a choice situation between simple intertemporal options a decision maker is routinely concerned with maximizing profits, 'gain' will be the dominant goal independent of the offered interest rates. The decision maker therefore will always prefer the largest option, even if it is the most delayed. If no frame has been established previously, the frame that structures the situation best becomes dominant. That is, the frame will be dominant which allows the decision maker to discriminate most clearly between choice options. To illustrate the latter case, imagine you have to choose between two intertemporal options, offering different amounts of money at different points in time. It is a non-routine situation with two possible goals, ‘immediacy - get money now’ and ‘outcome - get as much money as possible’. Suppose the two options differ little with respect to ‘immediacy - get money now’. Then, it is likely that ‘outcome - get as much money as possible’ will become the dominant frame and the option preferable with respect to the outcome dimension will be chosen.34 Again, this can be interpreted as 33
This is not generally the case. Frames in this theory may well combine several attributes. Whether two options differ little or much also depends on the subject’s sensitivity to the differences, i.e., on the salience of the frame. A highly salient frame makes even small differences in utilities appear relatively large. This salience of the frame is also affected by background goals. These goals may or may not be compatible with the frame. If they are compatible the salience of the frame rises, otherwise it is
34
Salience and the discrimination model in intertemporal choice
33
changes in attributes decision weights due to the attributes' ability to discriminate between choice options. When a frame has been established, the choice option that maximizes utility within this frame is preferred and hence, chosen. However, this choice is stochastic depending on the strength of the frame and the utility of the other options under consideration. Suppose for example, a decision maker has to choose between two gambles and he is only concerned with maximizing the expected value of an option. That is, he is neither risk-averse nor risk-seeking. The probability of choosing the option with the highest expected value now depends also on the expected value of the other options. If expected values differ little between options, the probability of choosing the option with the highest expected value is much lower than when an option offers a clearly superior expected value. In this chapter, the influence of the salience of decision attributes on preference will be investigated since in the discrimination model the salience of frames is a crucial parameter to predict choices. To experimentally test for the effect of salience on preference predicted by the discrimination model three strategies are possible and will be carried out. First, one can directly ask for salience ratings of attributes, i.e., attributes' decision weights, and check whether preference corresponds to these ratings. Since in this approach ratings and preference are both elicited within persons, the problem arises whether subjects’ ratings reveal salience or the wish to be consistent (or a mixture of both). For example, they may argue ‘I preferred A over B, thus I have to rate the attribute on which A is better as more important’. If there is a homogeneous pool of subjects, one can also use a different strategy, viz. divide the pool and let one group of subjects rate the salience of attributes for a specific choice problem and another group state preference for this problem. As before salience ratings of attributes should predict preference. Finally, one can manipulate salience of attributes, e.g., by changing the discriminatory power of attributes, and check whether preference shifts accordingly. However, this final strategy does not elicit salience ratings explicitly. In the remainder of this chapter, first empirical results in the literature on intertemporal choice will be interpreted from a framing point of view and related to shifts in the salience of decision attributes. Then experimental evidence on the influence of attribute salience on preference will be presented. To do so, effects both within and between subjects will be investigated. Finally, attribute salience will be manipulated directly and we will test for accompanying changes in preference. These direct changes in salience require manipulations of the choice set from which alternatives are chosen. Hence, related research (mainly from consumer choice) where such manipulations of the choice context have received considerable attention will be reviewed briefly and these results will be linked to shifts in salience. Diagram 1 summarizes the line of reasoning put forth in this chapter:
lowered and may be more easily replaced by another frame. This interaction between background and foreground goals is not investigated more closely in this book.
34
Chapter 2
Diagram 1: Relation between choice set, discrimination, salience, and preference
Changes in Changes in the the choice set ⇒ discriminatory power of attributes (e.g., adding an option)
Changes in Changes in ⇒ salience ⇒ preference (choice probabilities)
2.2. A framing interpretation of ‘standard anomalies’ in intertemporal choice
Chapter 1 described several ‘anomalies’ to the DU-model. Some of them are dealt with in chapter 4, viz., differing discount rates for different objects, some of them have been satisfyingly modeled previously, viz. time-varying discount rates, sign effect, magnitude effect, and reference point effects.35 To see how these latter effects fit into framing theory, suppose that a decision maker is indifferent between two options yielding two outcomes x and y at two different future time points t and t': (x, t) ~ (y, t')
0 < x < y and 0 < t < t'
The major dimensions here are time and outcome and thus the choice could be framed in terms of immediacy or in terms of outcome. Time-varying discount rates, sign effect and magnitude effects now affect the salience of attributes and thus the choice probability36 (chapter 6 provides a detailed analysis of the effects of these manipulations on salience for intertemporal choice and choice under risk). For example, adding an additional temporal delay to both options due to diminishing sensitivity (Tversky & Kahneman 1992) lowers the salience of the temporal dimension and makes the outcome dimension more salient. Hence, the option that is more attractive with respect to this dimension, i.e., that offers a higher but later outcome, becomes preferred (see section 1.4.3 on time-varying discount rates for evidence). Adding such a common constant, makes both time delays more similar; the perceived temporal similarity between ‘364 days’ and ‘365 days’ is greater than between ‘now’ and ‘tomorrow’. Consequently, the temporal dimension fails to discriminate sufficiently between options, and thus the outcome dimension becomes decisive. This is in accordance with the discrimination model postulating that the salience of frames depends on their discriminatory power. Likewise, making both outcomes negative to the same amount raises the salience of the outcome dimension (Tversky & Kahneman 1991). The option that is more attractive with respect to this dimension, i.e., offers a lower but sooner loss, becomes preferred. Again, this is in accordance with the discrimination model postulating that people are loss averse and loss avoidance is likely to become the dominant frame in a loss-prone situation. Since such a greater sensitivity to losses has been demonstrated in a variety of settings including intertemporal choices, it will not be investigated in this book in more detail. The above interpretation is not unique to the discrimination model. Prelec and Loewenstein (1991) review some similarities between empirical regularities in risky and 35
Note again, that the framing effects reported in Chapter 1 are based on a different notion of framing, viz. changes in preferences due to reference point manipulations caused by rephrasing of the choice problem. Therefore, framing in this case refers to different matters. 36 Since the discrimination model is stochastic, changes in choice probabilities imply changes in preference.
Salience and the discrimination model in intertemporal choice
35
intertemporal choice and argue that exactly the mechanisms described above are responsible for the parallelism in ‘anomalies’ to the respective normative models.37 In a similar fashion Leland (1994, 1998) argued that similarity judgements cause ‘anomalies’ in risky and intertemporal choice. Such similarity judgements are invoked if, based on expected or present value, no clear preference between options (either risky or temporal) exists. In our interpretation, if choice is non-habitual and no frame initially is dominant, preference between choice options is established according to the discriminating power of potential frames (here: attributes present in the choice situation). It is not the aim of the present chapter or the book to separate these different existing theories from each other. Framing theory and the discrimination model are chosen as an overarching framework, because they appear to be flexible enough to incorporate the anomalies frequently observed in intertemporal choice as well as to provide heuristics to answer the general research questions posed in the previous chapter. It might be possible that other theories are also able to do so. 2.3. Effects of salience on preference
To recapitulate, the discrimination model postulates that choice probabilities depend on the salience of potential frames, which for simple intertemporal options are equivalent to weights of decision attributes. Suppose a frame favoring short-term aspects of a situation, e.g., hedonic consumption experience, is salient. Then the option offering immediate gratification is preferred. This may also be expressed by a larger decision weight of the temporal attribute compared to a decision situation where long-term aspects are more salient, e.g., functional considerations. In the latter case, the decision weight of the outcome attribute is larger, hence the option preferable with respect to this attribute becomes more favorable. The salience of decision attributes can easily be elicited by simply letting subjects rate the relative importance of either outcome or temporal attribute. Preference between simple intertemporal options then should correlate with these ratings: higher importance ratings for the temporal attribute should go along with a larger probability of preferring the more immediate option and vice versa. Hence: H1: Higher salience (or weight) of a decision attribute raises the choice probability of the option that is preferable with respect to this attribute.
This hypothesis is tested in the following experiment. Experiment 1 Subjects: Subjects were 89 students at the university of Groningen from various disciplines recruited via e-mail and by flyers. Mean age was 22 years, 44% were males and 56% females, average monthly income was ƒ1057 ($500), and the main fields of study were psychology (21%), management science (20%), natural science (11%), sociology (10%), educational science (11%), and economics/econometrics (6%). One subject had to be removed from all analyses, because he did not understand several of the decision tasks. 37
A more elaborate and detailed review and argumentation concerning similarities between and generalizability of empirical results in intertemporal and risky choice is provided in chapter 6 and 7.
36
Chapter 2
Design: Subjects were given a standard choice between two simple intertemporal options (x, t) and (y, t’). Subsequently, they had to state on a nine-point scale which aspect of the situation was most important for them. Ratings on this scale were used to predict their preference between simple intertemporal options. Higher salience ratings for 'immediacy' should raise the likelihood of preferring the sooner option while higher ratings for 'outcome' are expected to raise the likelihood of preferring the larger option. Subjects in group 1 were confronted with the following text (in Dutch, immediate condition):
'What do you prefer? (circle) A: ƒ100 now B: ƒ110 in 4 weeks Indicate on the following scale how important the two aspects of the situation (receiving the amount quickly and receiving a high amount) were to you. If you are only interested in receiving a high amount then choose the value 1. If you are only interested to receive the amount quickly, choose the value 9. Circle: Amount of money most important
Immediacy of receipt most important 1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9'
Group 2 was given a choice between ƒ100 in 10 weeks and ƒ110 in 14 weeks (remote condition). Subsequently subjects gave judgements on the same scale as group 1. We predict preference for the sooner option in both groups to increase with higher salience ratings for 'immediacy' and vice versa. Procedure: Subjects gathered in groups ranging from 2 to 23 persons to participate in the experiment. They were each provided with a booklet containing the experimental tasks and a questionnaire concerning the personal background of subjects. Experimental tasks comprised the choice problems described below, some other choice problems on intertemporal choices, presented partly in Chapters 3 and 4, as well as several unrelated decision scenarios. The questionnaire items are described in more detail in Chapter 5. A version of such a complete booklet is given in overall Appendix A at the end of this book. Since the decision scenarios were varied between subjects, only part of the sample received the choice problems presented below and n generally is smaller than 89. Subjects were told about the context in which the research took place and that there were no wrong or right answers. The experimenter was present during the whole experiment to answer questions concerning the questionnaire items or the questionnaire. Filling in the booklet took between 40 and 75 minutes, most people needed between 50 and 60 minutes. Subjects were paid ƒf10 (then approximately $4.00) and had an additional opportunity to win a gift certificate worth between ƒf15 and ƒ25 depending on their choices in another experiment (see Chapter 3).
Salience and the discrimination model in intertemporal choice
37
Experiment 1: results
In the immediate condition (n=50) preference was divided equally between options. Fifty percent preferred the sooner option, and 50% preferred the later but larger option. In the remote condition (n=39) only 42% preferred the sooner option, but 58% preferred the later and larger option. Adding a temporal delay of 10 weeks to both options, in accordance with hyperbolic discounting and framing theory and contrary to the DUmodel, reduces preferences for the sooner option by approximately 8% (from 50% to 42%). A logistic regression analysis was carried out with preference for the later and larger option as the dependent variable (coded as 0 = preference for the sooner option; 1 = preference for the later option) and salience of goals (importance ratings) and experimental condition (dummy variable indicating whether subjects faced the immediate or remote choice problem) as the independent variables. There is a clear effect of salience of the outcome dimension on the probability of choosing the later and larger reward (Wald: 18.62; p < .001). There is no separate effect of experimental condition on preference (Wald: 2.21; n.s.), indicating that salience is the main factor in explaining choices, irrespective of whether the choice is made for an immediate or a remote choice problem. Salience ratings themselves were not affected by experimental condition (t: .71; n.s.). That salience is the main determinant of preference is further underlined by the good model fit (χ2: 28.2; p < .0001).38 Hence, not too surprisingly, we find clear support for hypothesis 1. Because salience of frames or decision attributes is such an important theoretical ingredient of the discrimination model, we replicated experiment 1 with different options enlarging the choice set from two to three options. As has been demonstrated repeatedly (e.g., Herne 1996, see also below in this chapter) adding options and thus enlarging the choice set may change perceptions and evaluations of decision attributes and consequently preference between options. This may even hold in cases where the added options normatively should not influence preference. Because subjects and procedure of experiment 2 were identical to experiment 1, we turn directly to the experimental design. Experiment 2: design
Subjects were given a choice between three intertemporal options (x, t), (y, t’), and (z, t’’). Subsequently, they had to state on a nine-point scale which aspect of the situation was most important for them. Salience ratings on this scale were used to predict their preference between options. As in experiment 1, higher salience ratings for 'immediacy' should raise the likelihood of preferring the sooner option while higher ratings for 'outcome' are expected to raise the likelihood of preferring the larger option. The whole sample was divided into two groups to carry out another experiment (not reported here). However, both groups faced three simple intertemporal options. Subjects were confronted with the following text (in Dutch; preference proportions indicated):
38
A logistic regression with experimental condition as the only independent variable consequently yields a 2 much worse model (χ : .54, p = .46, pseudo R2 = .08). Adding experimental condition as an independent 2 variable to salience ratings in a logistic regression yields a residual χ of 2.13 (n.s.), i.e., model fit is not significantly improved.
38
Chapter 2
'What do you prefer? (circle) Options A: ƒ 100 in 2 days B: ƒ 105 in 3 days C: ƒ 120 in 14 days'
Group 1 (n = 50) 16% 24% 60%
Group 2 Options (n = 33) A’: ƒ 100 in 2 days 18% B’: ƒ 145 in 12 days 12% C’: ƒ 150 in 14 days 70%
Subsequently, subjects in both groups used the respective scale for salience ratings as in experiment 1 (see above). Experiment 2: results
Since in this experiment there are three options in the choice set, the dependent variable is no longer dichotomous and a linear regression is adequate. Preference for the option with the later and larger outcome is the dependent variable and salience of goals (importance ratings) and experimental condition (dummy variable indicating which choice set was presented to subjects) are the independent variables. As in experiment 1 with two options in the choice set, there is a clear effect of salience of the outcome dimension on the probability of choosing the later and larger reward (beta: .52; p < .001). Again, there is no separate effect of experimental condition on preference, indicating that salience is the main factor in explaining choices, irrespective of the specific choice condition. This is also underlined by the good model fit (Adjusted R2: .26, F: 15.35; p < .0001). Hence, again we find clear support for hypothesis 1. Table 2.1 summarizes results for experiment 1 and 2. Recall that in experiment 1 a logistic regression analysis was carried out, while in experiment 2 a linear regression analysis was carried out. Table 2.1 Regressions for preference between options depending on salience of frames, experiments 1 and 2
χ Model fit: Pseudo R2/Adjusted R2 Coefficients:
Constant Experimental condition Salience of ‘outcome’
2
Experiment 1 (n=88) B (S.E.) Wald Sig.
28.2 .37
Experiment 2 (n=83) F Beta T Sig.
.0000 15.35 .26 1.29 (87)
2.21
.1374
.77 (.53)
2.11
.1486
.68 (.16)
18.62
.0000
.0000
11.77
.000
-.042
-.44
.661
.52
-5.52
.000
Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrate that salience of decision attributes is an important predictor of preference in simple choice tasks. The next section investigates whether salience of frames depends on their ability to discriminate between choice options.
Salience and the discrimination model in intertemporal choice
39
2.4. Effects of discriminatory power on salience
The previous section demonstrated the relationship of attribute salience with individual preferences. Since these experiments elicited salience ratings and preference within subjects, results might be biased by subjects’ attempt to behave consistently. Subjects may argue that, if they preferred a smaller but sooner outcome to a larger and later outcome, they also should give more weight to ‘immediacy of receipt’. To further demonstrate the applicability of the discrimination model to intertemporal choices such a ‘consistency bias’ should be ruled out. In addition, it is also necessary to relate preferences to the discriminatory power of attributes more directly, since up to now only the influence of salience on preferences has been demonstrated. The better an attribute discriminates between choice options, the more likely it is that this attribute becomes decisive and that the option preferable with respect to this attribute is chosen. Note that discriminatory power of an attribute might differ from its salience. H2: the stronger an attribute discriminates, the higher its salience and the stronger the preference for the option preferable with respect to this attribute.
It was argued that standard manipulations in intertemporal choice affect the discriminatory power of attributes. For example, suppose a decision maker is indifferent between (x, t) and (y, t'): both attributes, temporal and outcome, discriminate equally between choice options. Adding a common temporal constant to both options usually leads to a preference for the later and larger reward reflecting hyperbolic discounting. In other words, this manipulation relatively lowers the discriminatory power of the temporal dimension and relatively raises the discriminatory power of the outcome dimension. Thus, if there are changes in preference between choice problems, such changes are expected to be caused by changes in the discriminatory power of attributes: H3: changes in the discriminatory power of attributes lead to changes in preference between choice problems.
Note, that hypothesis 2 refers to the effect of discriminatory power within choice problems, whereas hypothesis 3 refers to the effect of discriminatory power between choice problems. These are actually two different implications of discriminatory power. For instance, it might be possible that in a specific choice problem A one attribute discriminates clearly between options and that preference between options corresponds to the discriminatory power of attributes as specified in H2. Now suppose, this previously discriminating attribute discriminates less strongly between options in choice problem B than in A. Nevertheless, its discriminatory power may be stronger than the discriminatory power of the other attribute and be sufficiently strong for preference to be distributed correspondingly. In this case, H3 predicts preference between options to be distributed unevenly between options in both problems but more evenly in problem B. Both hypotheses are tested in the following experiment 3. Because subjects and procedure are identical to experiments 1 and 2, we turn directly to the design of experiment 3.
40
Chapter 2
Experiment 3: design
In experiment 1, subjects were divided into two groups and stated their preference for two intertemporal choice problems ('ƒ100 now vs. ƒ110 in 4 weeks' and 'ƒ100 in 10 weeks vs. ƒ110 in 14 weeks' - see above). Subsequently, subjects rated the salience of decision attributes. After completion of this experiment, subjects were asked to rate the difference in attractiveness of the temporal and the outcome attribute for the other choice problem (see the experimental booklet in Appendix A at the end of this book). That is, subjects in group 1 who stated preference and salience ratings for the problem 'ƒ100 now vs. ƒ110 in 4 weeks' subsequently rated the difference in attractiveness of attributes for the problem 'ƒ100 in 10 weeks vs. ƒ110 in 14 weeks'. Subjects in group 2 stated preference for the choice option for which group 1 rated differences in attractiveness for each attribute ('ƒ100 in 10 weeks vs. ƒ110 in 14 weeks') and then rated differences in attractiveness for the choice problem for which group 1 stated preference. Now these attractiveness ratings of one group are used to predict preference of the other group. It is argued that difference in attractiveness serves as a measure for the discriminatory power of attributes. The more strongly an attribute is perceived to differ in attractiveness between options, the better this attribute is able to discriminate between options. The option preferable with respect to this discriminating attribute thus should be more attractive (H2). Therefore, preference within choice problems for one group is expected to correlate with the other group's independent ratings of the discriminatory power of attributes. In addition, due to hyperbolic discounting, we expect preference for the later and larger reward to be stronger in the remote choice problem. This should be reflected in a relatively increased discriminatory power of the temporal attribute as opposed to the outcome attribute (H3). Note, that in experiment 3 the questions pertain to the discriminatory power of attributes whereas the scale in experiments 1 and 2 pertained to the salience of attributes. Note further, that in experiment 3 we have two groups, two choice problems and four attractiveness ratings (two attributes for two groups). With this design it is possible to use independent ratings (at a group level) of discriminatory power – and hence avoid possible consistency biases - as predictors for the preference of other subjects. This allows for a rather strong test of hypotheses 2 and 3. Subjects were divided into two groups and confronted with the following text: 'Imagine you have to choose between an amount of ƒ100 which you receive in 10 weeks and an amount of ƒ110 which you receive in 14 weeks. If you only look at the amount, how large do you estimate the difference in attractiveness between f100 and f110? To answer the question, use the following scale from 1 to 9 (1 means 'identical attractiveness, 9 means 'very large difference in attractiveness'). Circle: ‘f 100’ and ‘f 110’ equally attractive
1
‘f 110’ much more attractive than ‘f 100’ 2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Salience and the discrimination model in intertemporal choice
41
The same question was asked for the difference in attractiveness between 10 weeks and 14 weeks. Group 2 answered the same 2 questions but for a hypothetical choice between ƒ100 now and ƒ110 in 4 weeks. We expected the sooner option to be preferred when the difference in attractiveness for the temporal attribute by the other group was perceived to be larger than the difference in attractiveness for the outcome dimension and vice versa (H2). In addition, we expected changes in preference between the immediate and the remote choice problem to correspond to changes in attractiveness ratings (H3). Experiment 3: results
In both problems, the temporal dimension discriminates better than then the outcome dimension: For the ‘immediate’ problem with temporal delays ‘now’ and ‘4 weeks’ the mean value for the discriminatory power of the temporal dimension is 6.5, for the ‘remote’ problem with temporal delays ’10 weeks’ and ’14 weeks’ the mean value is 5.8. The outcome dimension discriminates less well: the mean value lies closer to the endpoint ‘equally attractive’ (4.5 for the ‘immediate’ and 5.0 for the ‘remote’ problem). Adding a 10 weeks delay to both options in the second choice problem does not lower the discriminatory power of the temporal attribute (6.5 vs. 5.8; t: 1.17; n.s.). Hypothesis 2 proposes stronger preference for an option for which an attribute discriminates more clearly. In the ‘immediate’ choice problem the temporal dimension discriminates much better than the outcome dimension (6.5 vs. 4.5 paired sample t-test: t: 3.84; p < .001) and therefore the sooner option should be preferred more often. Though actually 58% prefer the immediate option (preferable with respect to the temporal dimension), this proportion does not significantly differ from 50% (χ2: 1.26; n.s.).39 In the delayed choice neither the temporal nor the monetary dimension clearly discriminates between options (paired sample t-test: t: -1.24; n.s.) and hence, we expect preference to be distributed approximately evenly between options as is found in the data (50% preferring the larger option vs. 50% preferring the sooner option). Thus, hypothesis 2 receives only mixed support. With respect to hypothesis 3, stating that between choice problems changes in discriminatory power of attributes lead to changes in preference, the evidence is mixed as well. Since in the ‘immediate’ problem one attribute discriminates clearly and in the ‘remote’ problem both attributes discriminate approximately evenly, we expect that preference shifts towards an even distribution between options in the remote problem. Though there is a difference in preference between options (50/50 versus 58/42) this difference is not significant. Table 2.3 summarizes mean ratings for differences in discriminatory power (measured by differences in attractiveness of the respective attribute). Significance levels and t-values refer to differences between attributes. For example, in a choice problem where subjects choose between ƒ100 now vs. ƒ110 over 4 weeks, the mean ratings for difference in discriminatory power of the other group were 6.3 for the time dimension and 4.4 for the outcome dimension. The difference between these means is significant: the temporal dimension discriminates better.
39
Because in the immediate choice problem the temporal attribute discriminates more clearly than the outcome attribute, the sooner option should be preferred in this problem. Hence, preference between options should differ from a 50/50 random distribution which is tested by using a χ2-test.
42
Chapter 2
Table 2.3 Mean ratings of attributes’ discriminatory power in simple choice problems Means (Std. D. and t- values between brackets): Choice problem 100 now vs. 110 in 4 weeks 100 in 10 weeks vs. 110 in 14 weeks
Time (Std. D.)
Money (Std. D.)
Sig. (t-value)
Preference for the sooner reward
6.5 (2.4) 5.8 (2.6)
4.5 (2.5) 5.0 (2.7)
.000 (3.84) .225 (1.24)
58% 50%
Note that, changing the temporal context from 'now vs. 4 weeks' to '10 weeks vs. 14 weeks' slightly lowers the attractiveness ratings of the outcome dimension (4.5 in the immediate condition vs. 5.0 in the remote condition) despite the two amounts being actually identical in both choice problems. Subjects might evaluate the difference between outcomes against the background of the differences between time delays. Differences in temporal delays perceived as relatively large, as in the immediate problem, lead to an evaluation of the differences in outcomes as relatively small, an effect analogously observed in choices between standard consumer goods (Simonson & Tversky 1992). In terms of the discrimination model we argue that frames discriminate more strongly when favored by comparable other (past or previous) trade-offs between attributes. Thus, the attractiveness of options might change, when such comparisons take place. For example, consider a simple intertemporal choice problem where one frame 'immediacy' = the temporal attribute) discriminates strongly between options while 'gain' does not. Now, in another choice problem the salience of 'gain' should be raised, when two options are presented where 'gain' discriminates much better than in the previous problem while 'immediacy does not. The next experiments investigate more closely how subjects compare such tradeoffs between attributes when choosing between simple options. In experiment 3, comparisons took place within a choice problem. Experiment 4 below investigates tradeoffs between taking place between current and past choice options but with respect to identical attributes. Experiments 5 and 6 then manipulate the discriminatory power and salience of attributes by enlarging the choice set to three intertemporal options. Since similar manipulations have received considerable attention in consumer research, results from this area will be reviewed briefly in the following section. 2.5. Context effects in consumer choice
Standard economic theory, of which the DU model is part, assumes that preference between choice options is independent of irrelevant alternatives. If I prefer X over Y, this preference should be independent of other options in the choice set. At an aggregate level, this implies the so-called regularity principle. Regularity states that enlarging the choice set cannot increase the choice share of an option, i.e., the proportion of subjects preferring this option. If the choice set B is a subset of choice set A, the proportion P of subjects preferring alternative X the most cannot be larger for A than for B: P(X, A) ≤ P(X, B). This is a weaker statement than the one that choice should be independent of irrelevant alternatives. The latter refers to individual preferences while the former only concerns aggregates. Hence, regularity may hold, even if preference of all individual subjects does depend on irrelevant alternatives. Though regularity is a seemingly weak requirement, it has been violated repeatedly in studies on consumer choice and choices among gambles (see Herne 1996
Salience and the discrimination model in intertemporal choice
43
for a review). Already in the early eighties Huber, Payne and Puto (1982) demonstrated the asymmetric dominance effect. Here the market share of two products X and Y, each described by two attributes (a1, b1), (a2, b2) respectively, is altered by the introduction of a third product C1, the so-called decoy, in a specific way. This decoy C1 is dominated by X but not by Y. Imagine, for example, that the products, X, Y, and C1, are all described by two attributes: quality and price. Dominance of X over C1 then means that X either offers the same quality at a lower price, better quality at the same price, or is strictly superior on both dimensions. Adding C1, dominated by X on both dimensions, to the choice set X and Y, contrary to regularity, increases the popularity and market share of X relative to Y. Figure 2.1 shows possible placements of C1 as well as two other decoys whose impact on preference between X and Y is discussed below. Figure 2.1 Addition of decoys C1, C2, and C3 to the initial choice set of X and Y
C3 Attribute 1 (e.g., price: X offers a better price than Y)
X C1
C2 Y
Attribute 2 (e.g., quality) Later, this asymmetric dominance effect was extended by Huber and Puto (1983) by the addition of products that are relatively inferior to X. That is, the decoy C2 is much less attractive than X on dimension 1, e.g., much more expensive, but slightly superior on dimension 2, e.g., offering a slightly better quality. Though C2 is not dominated by X its addition again raises the attractiveness of X. Simonson (1989) further generalized this effect to cases where C is no longer inferior but, compared to X and Y, clearly superior to both on one dimension and clearly inferior on the other. For example, suppose that X is superior to Y in price but Y is superior to X in quality. C3 then offers a much better price than X but at even lower quality. Hence, the addition of C3 makes X a compromise in the continuum between Y and C3, again raising the attractiveness of X. Finally, Tversky and Simonson (1993) demonstrated the influence of the ‘background context’, i.e., previous choices, on preference. For example, they let subjects choose twice between brands of tires, differing in price and mileage. Initial choices between brands of tires differed between subjects. Group 1 chose between tires differing clearly in price but little in mileage, e.g., ($25, 30.000 miles) and ($49, 35.000 miles), group 2 chose between tires clearly differing in mileage but little in price, e.g., ($85, 55.000 miles) and ($91, 75.000 miles). Both groups then were given the same choice between tires differing considerably in price and mileage, e.g., ($60, 40.000 miles) and ($75, 50.000 miles). In this second choice, group 2 preferred the former option, superior in price, whereas group 1 preferred the second one, superior in mileage.
44
Chapter 2
Tversky and Simonson (1993) argued that between the two choices subjects compare tradeoffs between attributes (for an interpretation of these comparisons in terms of attribute salience see section 2.6 concerning context effects and similarity judgements). Tradeoffs between attributes specify 'exchange rates' between them. For example, in the problem concerning tires and mileage group 1 in the first choice faces a choice set where a large difference in price is accompanied by a small difference in mileage, thus mileage is relatively ‘expensive’ ($24 yield 5000 additional miles). The tradeoff between attributes in the second choice (smaller difference in price vs. a larger difference in mileage) then favors the option with the larger mileage ($15 yield 10.000 miles). Here, larger mileage is relatively ‘cheaper’ than in the initial choice. Conversely, for group 2 the tradeoff comparison of price and mileage favors the option with the lower price, because this group initially has made a choice where mileage was relatively ’cheaper’ (in the first choice $6 yield 20.000 miles, while in the second choice $15 yield 10.000 miles). Likewise, Tversky and Simonson (1993) attributed the asymmetric dominance effect to subject's comparison of tradeoffs with other options. A decoy raises the attractiveness of an option, if it offers a much better tradeoff between attributes than the decoy, while the other option cannot that easily be compared with the decoy. Hence the decoy raises the attractiveness of the option superior to it.40 Context effects have been found using a variety of consumer goods ranging from paper towels, over beer brands and micro-wave ovens to photocameras and car tires, but also on gambles (Wedell 1991). Recently some of these effects have been reinterpreted as rational inferences about product quality (Wernerfelt 1995; Prelec, Wernerfelt & Zettelmeyer 1998). Here, it is argued that consumers have rather good information about the relative location of their ideal products, e.g., whether they want a cheap product or one of superior quality, but rather bad information about the absolute location of their ideal product, e.g., what exact trade-off between price and quality is acceptable. Consumers therefore use context information to infer the absolute location of their ideal product, e.g., that X, since it dominates a decoy, offers reasonable quality at a good price. However, this account fails to explain why context effects also have been observed among gambles or gift coupons. Here, it makes no sense to assume that decision makers have no information about their absolute ideal option. The attractiveness of gift coupons or gambles normatively is clearly independent of the presence of irrelevant alternatives. People should know how much they are willing to pay for a gift and whether a gamble is attractive or not. For intertemporal options where observable interest rates exist which specify the appropriate trade-off between waiting time and increase of rewards the argument applies even more strongly: whether waiting for a larger amount is acceptable for subjects or not is not at all related to other options in the choice set, since subjects can compare offered trade-offs with interest rates. Other options thus provide no additional information. 40
Tversky and Simonson (1993) argue that next to trade-off contrasts another psychological mechanism is responsible for the occurrence of some context effects (e.g., the compromise effect): extremeness aversion. Extremeness aversion uses the general finding that people are loss averse (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky 1991) and extends it by arguing that people dislike disadvantages more than they like advantages. Compared to options with intermediate values options with extreme values such as the cheapest option or the option offering the highest quality offer advantages and disadvantages and are therefore less popular. Because, these effects will not be used for tests of the discrimination model in intertemporal choice, they have not been reviewed here in detail. However, extremeness aversion as an extension of loss aversion is compatible with framing theory as well, because loss aversion is a core assumption of framing theory.
Salience and the discrimination model in intertemporal choice
45
2.6. Linking context effects and similarity judgments
Tversky and Simonson (1993) attribute the context effects observed to two psychological features, viz. trade-off contrast and extremeness aversion. As argued above, we will concentrate on the relationship between the trade-off contrast and the discrimination model. The trade-off contrast can be accounted for by the argument that the similarity between attributes of different options is altered by the introduction of other options. Introducing an option which is dominated by one of the remaining options but not by the other alters the perceived similarity between the attribute positions of X and Y. For example, in Figure 2.2 below, option C1, e.g., ƒ90 in five weeks, is added to the original choice set consisting of X, ƒ100 in four weeks, and Y, ƒ20 in three days. This addition alters the perceived similarity between X and Y. C1 is relatively similar to X but not to Y. If the similarity of X compared to Y is judged against the similarity of X compared to C1, X and Y will be perceived as less similar in the triple than in the duo. More specifically, the perceived similarity between the two attributes of X and Y, ‘outcome’ and ‘temporal closeness’, will be affected differently by the introduction of C1. In the example below, with respect to outcome X is still the most favorable option, since it is better than C1 and Y. However, evaluating the distance on outcome between X and Y against the distance on outcome between X and C1 makes X and Y appear more different. The same holds for the distance between X and Y on temporal closeness. Preference now changes in favor of X, if the decrease in similarity for ‘outcome’ is stronger than the decrease in similarity for ‘temporal closeness’. In terms of the discrimination model the trade-off contrast and the accompanying changes in similarity affect the discriminatory power of frames. The frame (attribute) ‘outcome’, due to the changes in similarity explained above, after the addition of another option discriminates more strongly between options and hence, the option being preferable with respect to this frame becomes more attractive. Figure 2.2 presents several decoys introduced at different locations in the choice set. Consequences of these different locations are discussed below. Figure 2.2 Addition of decoys C1, C2, and C3 to the initial choice set of X and Y
Attribute 1 (e.g., outcome)
C2
X C1
C3
Y Attribute 2 (e.g., temporal closeness, Y is temporally closer than X) Exactly this relationship between perceived similarity of attribute positions and accompanying changes in preference after the introduction of decoys at different locations has been investigated by Dhar and Glazer (1996). They argued that in order for changes in preference between X and Y to occur, changes in the perceived similarity of X and Y are necessary. In a study on several products, e.g., automobiles, stereos, or
46
Chapter 2
apartments, each described by two attributes, Dhar and Glazer demonstrated that adding C1 raises the attractiveness of X only when the perceived similarity of the X and Y decreased. More specifically, the decoy had a stronger effect on the share of X, the stronger the negative effect of the decoy on the perceived similarity of the initial products X and Y. In a second study, Dhar and Glazer (1996) demonstrated that changes in perceived similarity also cause changes in preference when the decoy was not dominated by one of the initial options but also by none or both. Here, the decoy is located such that it alters the perceived distance on only one attribute in the core set. For example, adding C2 increases the range of the attribute ‘temporal closeness’ where option Y is superior. Hence, the relative distance between X and Y with respect to this attribute decreases and X’s disadvantage against Y with respect to this attribute decreases as well. Consequently, X becomes more preferable compared to the initial choice set. Likewise, adding C3, though not dominated, makes X and Y less similar on attribute 1 – outcome - and raises the share of X, as does C1 in the first example. Dhar and Glazer conclude that there might be decoys that do not alter perceived similarity of the options in the core set and hence do not alter the preference between them. In fact, in some previous studies (Huber, Payne & Puto 1982, Wedell 1991) shifting the location of the decoy had no effect on the occurrence of the asymmetric dominance effect. However, since none of these studies explicitly controlled for changes in perceived similarity of attributes, this non-occurrence might be due to the absence of changes in similarity of attributes. While the above reported effects of similarity judgements on preference are compatible with the discrimination model, the latter leads to an extra prediction concerning a limiting effect for choice sets where - after the introduction of a decoy - some options become so similar that it is difficult to differentiate between them. In such cases we expect a shift in attribute weights in favor of the attribute that after the introduction of a decoy discriminates better between options. Consequently, the option preferable with respect to this discriminating attribute becomes more attractive after the addition of options. This effect differs from the asymmetric dominance effect, since here none of the two similar options dominates the other. In the following, we will first look at the effect of comparisons between attribute trade-offs on attribute salience. Since subjects compare trade-offs between attributes with trade-offs offered by other attributes in previous choices, such comparisons affect the salience of goals. The previously salient goal offers a worse trade-off in the second choice. Due to loss aversion its salience is reduced and it is replaced by another frame. Options offering better trade-offs between attributes than offered in previous choices, become preferred more strongly, since the salience of the attribute or dimension where such favorable trade-offs are being made is raised. H4: Attribute salience - and preference for the option preferable with respect to this attribute - increases, if compared to worse previous trade-offs for this attribute.
To test this hypothesis the following experiment was carried out: Again, subjects and procedure were identical to experiments 1-3 and therefore we turn to the design immediately.
Salience and the discrimination model in intertemporal choice
47
Experiment 4: design
Subjects were divided into two groups and had to make two successive choices. The second choice problem was identical for both groups, while the initial choices differed. Group 1 initially chose between option A and B where the time dimension discriminated strongly between options while the outcome dimension did not. Group 2 initially chose between options A’ and B’ where the outcome dimension clearly differed but not the time dimension. Both groups then chose between options C and D where both dimensions differed. Since for group 1, in the second choice the temporal attribute offered a worse trade-off than in the first choice problem, the salience of the temporal attribute should decrease and the later and larger option should gain popularity. For group 2, the temporal attribute in the second choice offers a better trade-off, i.e., in the second choice time is 'cheaper', than in the first choice problem. Hence, its salience increases and the sooner option should be more popular in group 2 as compared to group 1. Subjects where confronted with the following choices (in Dutch; preference proportions indicated): ‘What do you prefer? (circle) Group 1 (n = 54) A: ƒ 100 in 7 days 67% B: ƒ 110 in 42 days 33% What do you prefer? (circle) Group 1 (n = 53)42 C: ƒ 100 in 10 days 17% D: ƒ 200 in 17 days 83%
(n = 34)41
A’: B’:
Group 2 ƒ100 in 7 days ƒ 200 in 10 days
C: D:
Group 2 ƒ 100 in 10 days ƒ 200 in 17 days’
(n = 34) 50% 50%
100%)
Preference for option D was expected to be stronger in group 1, since for this group in the initial choice the temporal attribute provided a better trade-off and time was 'cheaper'. Experiment 4: results
In group 1, 67% of the subjects preferred A in the first choice and 83% preferred D in the second choice. In group 2 none of the subjects preferred A’ in the first choice and preference for C and D in the second choice was divided equally. Hence, in the second group preference for the later option was significantly lower than in the first group (t: 3.26; p = .002). Apparently, for group 1 the dominant goal in the first choice, ‘immediacy’, provided such a worse trade-off in the second choice – 7 days sooner now cost ƒ100 – that, due to loss aversion, it had been replaced by ‘gain’ and the choice is made according to this frame. For group 2 again the initially dominant frame, ‘gain’, leads to worse trade-off in the second choice problem, becomes less salient and was replaced, resulting in a random choice. Thus, attribute salience can be raised by offering favorable trade-offs. 41
The two groups differ in size due to pragmatic reasons. Experiments reported in this chapter were carried out as a by-product of the experiments reported in chapters 3-5. Since it was difficult to collect subjects, data collection was stopped, despite of the difference in group size for some of the experiments presented here, when sufficient subjects participated to test the hypothesis presented in the following chapters. 42 One subject in group 1 did not answer the second question.
48
Chapter 2
If attribute salience depends on the attribute’s ability to discriminate between choice options, another context effects can be expected. Suppose, that there are three options in a choice set, e.g., (a consumer good, now), (ƒ135, in 20 days), and (ƒ140, in 22 days), each consisting of an outcome and a temporal attribute. The two attributes, outcome and temporal delay, now differ with respect to their ability to discriminate between the three options. While the temporal attribute discriminates and clearly favors one option, the outcome attribute does not. Not only are the two monetary amounts similar to each other, it is also difficult for the outcome attribute, if salient, to discriminate between the amounts and the consumer good. As a result, the temporal attribute should be more salient and the option preferable with respect to this attribute should be preferred more often. In the example above, the consumer good available immediately should be preferred more often than when compared to a choice set where one of the options with an amount is removed: H5: in choice set X, consisting of A, B, and C (all defined by 2 attributes), preference for A is stronger than in choice set Y including A and B, if the attribute where A is superior in X discriminates better between all options.
This hypothesis was tested in experiment 5. Again, subjects and procedure were identical to experiments 1-4 and hence, we immediately turn towards the design of experiment 5. Experiment 5: design
Subjects were randomly divided into two groups. Group 2 chose from a choice set including options A, B, and C. B and C were relatively similar monetary amounts available after time delays of one and two weeks respectively. The sooner available and distinct option A was a standard consumer good, viz. ‘an outstanding CD-player', of roughly equal value well known to the subjects. Group 1 chose from a set including only A and B, with the 'similar' option C being omitted. We expected option A, due to a larger salience of the temporal attribute in the triple, to be preferred more strongly in group 2. Subjects were confronted with the following text (in Dutch; preference proportions indicated):
‘What do you prefer? (circle) A:
An outstanding CD-player in two days
B:
ƒ 500 in one week
C:
ƒ 520 in two weeks
Group 1 (n = 34) 3% 97%
Group 2 (n = 21) 24% 62% 14%
Experiment 5: results
As predicted the distinct option A is preferred more often in the triple than in the duo (24% vs. 3%). However, this effect is only marginally significant (one-tailed test: t: 1.36,
Salience and the discrimination model in intertemporal choice
49
p < .1).43 This unexpectedly weak effect may be due to an overly strict testing of the hypothesis. Note, that to compare preference changes between duo and triple only preference for the distinct option was considered. Preference for the other two options in the triple was collapsed in order to analyze the data. Thus, it is assumed that all subjects (14%) who in the triple preferred C not present in the duo would have preferred B similar to it in the duo. Hence, in the analysis above, the effect of adding a similar option might have been underestimated. A final experiment was carried out to investigate the effect of adding options to the choice set that are ‘easily comparable’ with and inferior to one of the remaining options but not with the other. Adding such an option should make the trade-off between attributes in one option appear more favorable while leaving the trade-off between attributes in the remaining option unchanged. Consider the following example, taken from Simonson and Tversky (1992), concerning a choice between microwave ovens varying in price, quality and discount (note that these options are three-dimensional). Here, an initial choice set consisting of a cheap standard and an expensive high-quality microwave was enlarged by adding a(nother) high quality microwave. However, this additional expensive microwave offered a lower discount than its roughly equally expensive initial counterpart. Consequently, the attractiveness of the initial high-quality product was raised compared to a choice between two microwaves. H6: Adding an option which is easily comparable with and relatively inferior to one of the other options in a duo raises the attractiveness of the superior option.
This hypothesis is tested in experiment 6. Again subjects and procedure are identical to experiments 1-5, so we turn directly to the design of experiment 6. Experiment 6: design
Subjects were randomly divided in two groups. Group 1 chose from a choice set including two options (a consumer good and a monetary amount), both available after some time delay. Group 2 chose from a choice set including three options (two consumer goods among which one is clearly superior to the other and a monetary amount) all available at different points in time. In group 2, preference for the superior consumer good was expected to be stronger than in group 1. Subjects were confronted with the following text (in Dutch; preference proportions indicated): What do you prefer? (circle): A:
An outstanding CD-player in two days
B:
ƒ 500 in one week
C:
A standard cassette recorder tomorrow
43
Group 1 (n = 34) 3% 97%
Group 2 (n = 33) 15% 85% 0%
Throughout this book, significance levels are generally based on two-tailed test (as in the previous experiments). For some experiments, only one-tailed tests of significance have been carried out since the interest is on the extent to which predicted changes in preference are significant. However, the reader should bear in mind that such tests are less strict than the standardly used two-tailed tests.
50
Chapter 2
Note, that in the text above none of the options strictly dominates the other: while subjects should prefer an ‘outstanding CD-player’ to a ‘standard cassette recorder’ the latter is available immediately. Note further, that the CD-player and cassette recorder are distinct enough to ensure that, contrary to experiment 5, all options differ from each other sufficiently. Experiment 6: results
As predicted, in group 2 the CD-player is preferred more often (15.6% vs. 2.9%; t: 1.75; p < .05; one-tailed-test). The addition of a standard cassette recorder, while being not at all attractive in itself (zero preference), raised the attractiveness of the CD-player. 2.7. Overall conclusion and discussion
This chapter aimed at demonstrating the general applicability of the discrimination model in intertemporal choice. To do so we tried to relate preference to goal/attribute salience and to the discriminatory power of goals/attributes. Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrated the importance of goal/attribute salience in intertemporal choice. Salience ratings of attributes served as good predictors for preference in simple intertemporal choice problems. Further, it was argued that preference should depend on the discriminatory power of goals/attributes. In fact, in experiment 3 for a choice problem where both goals discriminated equally well between choice options preference was distributed evenly. However, for a choice problem where the temporal dimension discriminated better and one therefore would expect the sooner option to be preferred more often preference for the sooner option (58%) did not statistically differ from an even distribution. Thus, there is some evidence for discriminatory power of goals/attributes to affect preference. In addition, it was argued that preference changes between choice problems, such as e.g., the common difference effect, are due to changes in the discriminatory power of goals. That is, if in problem A the sooner option is preferred more often than problem B, then the temporal dimension must discriminate more strongly than the outcome dimension in problem A than in problem B. Therefore, to test this hypothesis it is necessary that changes in preference occur between choice problems. Yet, in experiment 3 the addition of a temporal delay of ten weeks to both choice options did not result in such changes. Because results from the other experiments were by and large consistent with the predictions, the absence of a relation between discriminatory power and preference changes between choice problems is probably due to a failure of the experimental manipulation instead of a wrong theory. Besides these more direct tests of the model, hypotheses concerning manipulations of the choice set from which options are chosen were tested. Such manipulations were chosen to indirectly change the discriminatory power of goals, and consequently, preference. Experiment 4 demonstrated that salience of goals/attributes is sensitive to subjects’ comparisons of current alternatives to previous choice options. The attractiveness of intertemporal options could be raised by previously letting subjects answer similar choice problems where the temporal or outcome attribute discriminated clearly between options. In the second choice problem subjects compared the attractiveness of the current options with the options for which they previously made a choice. In case an attribute, e.g., time delay, appeared to offer an improvement in the
Salience and the discrimination model in intertemporal choice
51
second choice, e.g., because subjects have to wait less long for an amount than in the first choice problem, its salience increases and preference changes accordingly. Experiment 5 introduced a limiting case of the asymmetric dominance effect. This effect states that preference for a target option increases after the addition of a similar but dominated decoy. However, in experiment 5 the addition of a similar but difficult to distinguish option marginally decreased the popularity of a target. The goal/attribute for which the two similar options are superior to the remaining option does not sufficiently discriminate between the two similar options. Therefore, the goal/attribute with respect to which the two similar options are inferior to the remaining option structures the choice situation and the remaining option becomes preferred marginally more often. Finally, experiment 6 demonstrated that the salience of a goal/attribute can be raised by the addition of an option where one attribute is similar to only one of the other alternatives. In addition, the added option has to be relatively inferior to this similar alternative. The attribute that appears in two of the three options in this experiment is able to discriminate between options and therefore this goal becomes salient. These results all run counter to standard economic theory, but can be predicted from the discrimination model. Hence, this model in fact appears to have predictive value for intertemporal choices and the question what determines salience in intertemporal choices appears to be useful. Given that some of the effects demonstrated in this chapter have analogies in choices between consumer goods and given that the discrimination model is a general model for frame selection, the question arises whether effects observed are restricted to intertemporal choices or are generalizable to other domains as well. Chapter 6 argues that 'anomalies' in intertemporal choice have analogies in choice under risk, not only with respect to effects, but also with respect to underlying cognitive mechanisms. Chapter 7 investigates similar cognitive processes in seemingly unrelated choice situations, viz. interpersonal and interspatial choices. In a similar fashion Medin, Goldstone and Markman (1995) review similarities in decision-making and similarity judgements. Likewise, they argue that behavioral regularities in these domains are highly similar and, even more important, due to similar underlying cognitive mechanisms. Further research seems warranted to investigate other parallels between seemingly unrelated areas of decision research.
Chapter 3 Intertemporal choices for hedonic and utilitarian goods
Summary*
Future outcomes are generally valued less than immediate ones. The normative DUmodel as well as the standard descriptive hyperbolic discounting model imply that this devaluation depends on the present utility of the reward, delay time and a delay gradient, a personal measure of impatience. In this chapter it is argued that only certain types of consumption, viz. hedonic consumption instead of utilitarian consumption, are associated with impulsive behavior. People, we assume, behave myopically when buying fancy clothes or alcohol, but only rarely when purchasing gasoline or washing machines. We present three experiments that show that people are more impatient to receive hedonic goods than utilitarian goods, even in cases where utilitarian goods are valued more highly. According to the framing theory introduced in Chapter 2 this effect is stronger in choices about which good to receive sooner than when adequate compensation charges have to be determined. In fact, we do not observe differences between hedonic and utilitarian goods for such compensation charges. *
This chapter benefited from discussions with and comments from Laurie Hendrickx, George Loewenstein, and Drazen Prelec. Marcel van Assen, Alinda van Bruggen and Renee van der Hulst helped to formulate the Dutch scenarios. None of them is responsible for any remaining errors. An earlier version of this chapter has been presented at the ICS Forum Day in 1998.
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Chapter 3
3.1. Introduction
People generally have a preference to receive positive rewards as soon as possible. Delay of an outcome leads to a devaluation of the outcome's absolute value, i.e., it is discounted. As demonstrated by empirical research (e.g., Loewenstein & Elster 1992) this discounting of future outcomes is most appropriately modeled by a hyperbolic discount function: U (V 0) U (Vt ) = , (1) (1 + αt ) (V0) being the immediate value of an outcome, U(Vt) its value at time delay t, α being a constant determining the steepness of the discount function44, and t the number of time periods the reward is being delayed. This model implies that time delays close to immediacy lead to stronger discounting of an object's absolute value than identical time delays occurring later. People thus are relatively eager to receive rewards now instead of one day later but they care little whether they receive the same reward in 65 or in 66 days. The hyperbolic function describes preference for immediate rewards as well as impulsive or timeinconsistent behavior: people having the choice between a small reward available after some time and a later but larger reward initially may prefer the later reward. Their preference may, however, reverse, if both rewards become less delayed and the smaller reward is available immediately. In the hyperbolic discounting model discounting depends on the present utility of the reward, the delay time and discount factor α, which is usually interpreted as a personal measure of impatience. Hence, discount rates should be identical between objects of identical present utility. Hoch and Loewenstein (1991) and Loewenstein (1996) have pointed out two shortcomings of the hyperbolic discounting perspective. First, generally only certain types of consumption are associated with impulsivity. Common sense readily acknowledges impulsivity when drugs, alcohol or sweets are to be consumed, but only rarely are purchases of gasoline or kitchen facilities considered to be impulsive (for empirical evidence on good-specific discount rates see Chapman and Elstein 1995 and Dittmar, Beattie & Friese 1996; for evidence concerning impulse buying see Bellenger 1978). Casual inspection also suggests that people are quite sensitive to even small longterm consequences when considering which bank offer to accept in order to pay back their mortgage for the following twenty years. Second, hyperbolic discounting can also not explain why certain situational variables, e.g., direct contact with the object, sometimes raise impatience. If people discount the utility of delayed rewards hyperbolically, they would apply one and the same discount function regardless of situational or good-specific characteristics.45 If different goods would be discounted at different rates, this could result in preference reversals. That is, in a choice between two 44
In addition, α indicates whether a subject prefers immediate to future outcomes, if α > 0, future outcomes over immediate ones, α < 0, or is indifferent between receiving present or future outcomes, α = 0. See chapter 1 for an extensive discussion of hyperbolic discounting models. 45 Of course, in addition the utility the consumption of a good provides may be time-dependent. That is, my evaluation of a bottle of water may well depend on whether I am thirsty or not. But this is not a situationspecific influence of my discounting of the utility a bottle of water provides. Such a situation-specific influence would be, e.g., a vivid description of this water bottle (see chapter 4) leaving its utility from future consumption unaffected.
Intertemporal choices for hedonic and utilitarian goods
55
goods available immediately good A is preferred, while B might be preferred when both goods are being delayed the same amount of time. This chapter extends the standard hyperbolic discounting perspective by proposing that discount rates vary between ‘hedonic’ and ‘utilitarian’ goods. Hedonic goods are goods associated with fun and pleasure whose consumption provides direct utility. Utilitarian goods are instrumental goods that serve as means to reach higher utility levels. Because delaying goods means an immediate loss (one has to forego immediate use of the product) and due to the greater ease with which hedonic usage of goods can be imagined, we expect loss aversion and consequently impatience to be greater for hedonic goods. 3.2. Theory
Hoch and Loewenstein (1991) suggested that impulsivity is caused by shifts in the consumer’s reference point. When acting impulsively, consumers adapt to the reference state of owning a good. The actual non-possession of this good then creates deprivation, which is enhanced if the good is proximate, temporally or physically. Impulse buying consequently is more likely for proximate goods, because consumers want to end the experienced deprivation and buy the product. Likewise, Loewenstein (1988) and Shelley (1993) argue that delay charges, the standard measure for discount rates, reflect the decision maker’s adaptation to owning an object: telling a person that he will receive a certain object encourages him to adopt the reference state of owning this object. Asking to delay the receipt of a benefit to which he has partly or fully adjusted yields an immediate loss. This loss is compensated by the future discounted gain plus the delay charge.46 Hoch and Loewenstein model intertemporal choice as follows: D = a(P - r) + b(r-0),
(2)
a being the slope of the consumer's value function in the positive region, b its slope in the negative region,47 and r is the level of adaptation between purchase (P) and non-purchase (0). For example, consumers being able to imagine the possession of a good very well, adapt more strongly to its possession and are more likely to buy the product. Desire D represents the consumer’s motivation to purchase a product. Recently, Dhar and Wertenbroch (2000) investigated preferences for hedonic and utilitarian goods. They define hedonic goods as being characterized by an affective experience of sensual or aesthetic pleasure, fantasy, and fun. Utilitarian goods are those whose consumption is more cognitively driven, reasoned, and goal-oriented. They are thus more of an instrumental and functional nature. Although this distinction might seem somewhat vague, consumer goods have been successfully classified along these dimensions (Mano & Oliver 1993). In this book hedonic and utilitarian goods will be distinguished according to whether consumption of these goods provides direct utility as is the case for hedonic goods, or whether their consumption serves as means to derive
46
Note, that Hoch and Loewenstein’s argument refers to deprivation while the latter two deal with delay charges, i.e. monetary discount rates. 47 Hoch and Loewenstein assume linear utility functions for gains and losses. However, one could easily generalize the model to incorporate also S-shaped utility functions.
56
Chapter 3
utility from other goods as is the case for utilitarian goods.48 To give an example for the latter, for most people the use of a vacuum cleaner provides little utility in itself but instead is used to derive utility from a clean room. Dhar and Wertenbroch (2000) demonstrated that loss aversion is stronger for hedonic than for utilitarian goods. That is, people are less willing to forego hedonic goods instead of utilitarian goods of equal value. Stronger loss aversion for hedonic than for utilitarian goods implies that the slope of the value function in the negative region differs for hedonic and utilitarian goods: bh > bu. Hence, decision makers should feel more deprived when having to delay hedonic instead of utilitarian goods: Dh = a(P - r) + bh(r-0) > Du = a(P - r) + bu(r-0),
(2)
Because deprivation is stronger for hedonic than for utilitarian goods we hypothesize: H1: People prefer to receive hedonic goods sooner than utilitarian goods. 3.3. Method
Experiments used scenarios where subjects were told that they had won some reward in a lottery and had to delay receipt of this reward. Such lottery scenarios, introduced by Thaler (1981), were used in several previous experiments as well as in surveys and evolved into some standard paradigm for measuring discount rates. However, we did not investigate monetary discount rates as is usually done within this paradigm, but instead asked subjects which of two goods they would like to receive sooner when given the possibility. Subjects Subjects were 80 students at the university of Groningen from various disciplines recruited via e-mail and by flyers. They were confronted with decision scenarios presented on a computer screen and partly with decision scenarios and questions concerning their personal background presented on paper. Since the decision scenarios were varied between subjects, only part of the sample received the choice problems presented below and the number of subjects varies between problems. Mean age was 22 years, 42% were males and 58% females, average monthly income was ƒ1100 ($500), and the main fields of study were psychology (30%), management science (11%), languages (8.5%), sociology (8.5%), law (7%), economics/econometrics (8.5%) and natural sciences (7%). Method Subjects gathered in groups ranging from 6 to 15. They were assigned to a computer where the program concerning the experimental tasks described in chapter 7 had been installed and instructed about the context in which the research took place and that there were no wrong or right answers. In between these experimental tasks were regular breaks where subjects turned to the decision scenarios presented in this chapter as well as to the questionnaire. Decision scenarios varied between subjects to prevent order effects, hence not all subjects were confronted with all scenarios. The experimenter was present during the whole experiment in order to answer questions concerning the tasks.
48
This distinction was suggested to me by Alinda van Bruggen.
Intertemporal choices for hedonic and utilitarian goods
57
Completing the whole experiment took between 50 and 110 minutes, most people needed between 80 and 90 minutes. Subjects were paid ƒ25 for their participation. 3.4. Experiments and results Experiment 1: design
In the first experiment (n = 41) we tested whether there is indeed a stronger propensity to want hedonic goods sooner than utilitarian goods. We investigated preference for gift certificates for CD’s and computer diskettes. Both goods are comparable insofar as they both provide streams of utility and we expected subjects to be familiar with them. Gift certificates for CD's were considered hedonic, for computer diskettes they were considered to be utilitarian. After completion of the experiments part of the sample (n = 39) was asked to classify the consumer goods used in all three experiments as either type A: ‘hedonic’, type B: ‘utilitarian’, type C: ‘both’ or type D: ‘neither’.49 Subjects were told they had won two gift certificates in a lottery (each worth 20 guilders - approximately $9) and then asked which of the two certificates they would like to receive sooner. Forty-one subjects answered the following questions (in Dutch): Imagine: you participated in a lottery. You could not only win monetary prizes, but also consumer goods. You were so fortunate to win a gift certificate for CD’s and a gift certificate for computer diskettes. Both gift certificates are worth 20 guilders. What is the minimal amount for which you would sell the gift certificate for CD’s immediately? ƒ________ What is the minimal amount for which you would sell the gift certificate for computer diskettes immediately? ƒ________ Unfortunately there is a temporary shortage in prizes. Thus, not every winner can receive his or her prizes immediately. The organization of the lottery therefore asks you to wait for your prizes. You have two possibilities (circle what you prefer): A:
You get the CD certificate immediately and the certificate for computer disks in four weeks.
B:
You get the certificate for computer diskettes immediately and the certificate for CD’s in four weeks.
Order of presentation was varied. Half of the subjects stated selling prices for the computer diskettes certificate first and made their choice from an option set where Option A offered this certificate sooner. Eliciting selling prices is necessary to control for the trivial fact that subjects should wish to receive a higher valued object sooner. 49
The exact wording was: ‘Some people distinguish between goods. Some goods are pleasant and fun, give pleasure and appeal to your senses, e.g., perfume (type A). Some goods are useful, practical, functional, something that helps you to achieve a goal, e.g., a vacuum cleaner (type B). Could you indicate for each of the following goods whether they are type A, type B, both, or none. Circle.’
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Experiment 1: results
CD's were classified as primarily hedonic by 87%, as both hedonic and utilitarian by 7.7%, and as primarily utilitarian by 5.3% (χ2 = 35.89; p < .001). Computer diskettes were classified as primarily hedonic by 7.7%, as both hedonic and utilitarian by 7.7%, as primarily utilitarian by 82.6% and as none by 2% (χ2 = 31.54; p < .0001). Hence, the manipulation hedonic versus utilitarian appeared to have worked. Subjects on average valued a gift certificate for CD’s higher than certificates for computer diskettes (mean selling prices ƒ20 vs. ƒ18, t: 4.35; p < .001). Of the total sample 98% chose to receive the gift certificate for the CD sooner (χ2: 37.1; p < .0001). Note that for people valuing certificates for CD’s more than certificates for computer diskettes the choice between the two certificates resembles a choice whether to receive a smaller or a larger reward sooner. Since in such a choice situation the larger reward should be preferred sooner, it is more sensible to restrict the analysis to the part of the sample which values both goods equally. As it turned out for these subjects there is a clear preference to receive the certificate for CD’s sooner: twenty-four out of twenty-five subjects chose the CD certificate sooner (χ2: 21.6; p < .0001). Hence, we have a clear preference to receive hedonic goods sooner.50 Experiment 2: design
Since in experiment 1 the hedonic good on average was valued higher than the utilitarian good the result may partly be due to some unmeasured differences in value. For example, subjects may think that, despite greater preference for gift certificates for CD’s, they should be compensated with the nominal value of the certificate. Hence, we replicated experiment 1 with two other durable consumer goods (n = 66). This time we chose a sandwich toaster worth ƒ40 and a cassette with cutlery also worth ƒ 40. It was hypothesized that the sandwich toaster would be considered hedonic and the cassette with cutlery would be considered utilitarian. Subjects were given the same text as above but with other goods. Again, order of presentation was varied. Half of the sample received a question where the hedonic good was presented first, the other half answered a question where the utilitarian good was presented first. Experiment 2: results
The sandwich toaster was rated by 56% as ‘primarily hedonic’, by 23% as ‘both’ and by 23% as ‘primarily utilitarian’ (t: 2.49; p < .05). The cassette with cutlery was rated as ‘primarily utilitarian’ by 66.5%, by 20.5% as ‘primarily hedonic’, by 5% as ‘both’ and by 7.7% as ‘none’ (t: 4.24; p < .001). Consequently, in line with expectation, the sandwich toaster was rated as more hedonic than cassette met cutlery (t: 6.27; p < .001). 50
A pretest was done with 51 subjects who voluntarily answered an identical question. The answers were almost identical: gift certificates for CD’s were valued slightly more than for computer diskettes (mean selling prices ƒ18 vs. ƒ15; t: 3.18; p < .001). The number of subjects who preferred the certificate for computer diskettes sooner was slightly higher than in the experiment reported above (5 out of 51). Subjects valuing one certificate more than the other always preferred to receive this certificate sooner. Restricting the analysis to subjects who value both certificates equally again reveals strong preference (20 out of 21 subjects) to receive the hedonic good sooner (χ2: 17.19; p < .001).
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Mean selling prices (sandwich toaster: ƒ35, cassette met cutlery: ƒ34) are equal (t: .61; n.s.). In a direct choice which of these two goods to receive immediately, 66% of the subjects preferred to receive the hedonic good sooner (χ2: 6.06; p < .05). Restricting the sample to the number of subjects who stated identical selling prices for both goods (n = 30) led to an identical distribution (2/3 chose to receive the sandwich toaster sooner) but reduced significance (one-tailed test, χ2: 3.33; p < .05). Experiment 3: design
Experiment 1 and 2 demonstrated that there is a greater tendency to prefer hedonic goods sooner than utilitarian goods. We conducted a final experiment (n = 76) with respect to whether there is a greater propensity to want hedonic goods sooner than utilitarian goods. This time we selected goods such that the utilitarian good was valued slightly higher. This was done in order to test whether the greater immediate attractiveness of hedonic goods could even outweigh differences in utility. In addition, we chose somewhat more expensive goods. We chose an ‘exclusive coffee machine with which you can also make espresso’ (ƒ300) and a ‘complete coffee and tea service’ (ƒ350). The coffee machine was considered to be hedonic and the service was considered to be utilitarian. Subjects were given the same text as above but with other goods. Experiment 3: results
The exclusive coffee machine was rated as ‘primarily hedonic’ by 59%, by 23% as ‘both’, by 15.4% as ‘primarily utilitarian’ and ‘none’ by 2.6%. Hence, for the coffee machine the manipulation worked (one-sample t-test: t: 2.49, p < .05). The coffee and tea service was rated as ‘primarily utilitarian’ by 38.5%, by 33.5% as ‘primarily hedonic’, by 18% as ‘both’ and by 10% as ‘none’. Therefore the coffee and tea service was not clearly rated as utilitarian (one-sample t-test: t: 1.53; p = .133). Because, as intended, the coffee machine was rated as more hedonic than the coffee and tea service (one sample t-test: t: 4.3; p < .001) the goods were used nevertheless. As expected, mean selling prices were higher for the tea service than for the coffee machine: ƒ264 vs. ƒ246 (t: 2.5; p < .05). In a direct choice which of these two goods to receive immediately nevertheless 71% preferred to receive the more hedonic good sooner (χ2: 13.47; p < .001). 3.4.1. Conclusion
There is clear evidence for a greater preference to receive hedonic goods sooner than utilitarian goods. In three comparisons between goods, subjects preferred the more hedonic one immediately. Given that in such pairwise comparisons generally there is a strong tendency to be more impatient for goods which are valued more, it is especially striking that in experiment 3 subjects actually preferred to receive a lower valued hedonic good sooner than a higher valued utilitarian good.
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3.5. The influence of measurement on framing
According to the Discounted-Utility model different measures of time preference should yield identical discount rates. However, already Loewenstein (1988) demonstrated that temporal discount rates differ between choices that are framed as speeding-up and choices framed as delaying the receipt of a good (see chapter 1 for an extensive discussion). Framing theory, as presented in chapter 1, in addition predicts greater impatience for hedonic over utilitarian goods to depend on the measurement of impatience. More specifically, a stronger preference is expected for hedonic goods under measures that stress their hedonic aspects and a stronger preference is expected for utilitarian goods under measures that underline the utilitarian features. Generally, measures to elicit preferences that are 'scale compatible' with one of the options' attributes raise the salience of this attribute (Tversky, Kahneman & Slovic 1988). Asking subjects which good they would like to receive sooner may make hedonic considerations more salient, because this elicitation method focuses on the usage of the good and subjects can more easily imagine using hedonic goods. Asking subjects to specify monetary amounts as compensation charges for delay may underline the utilitarian features of an option, especially when larger amounts are involved. People might consider alternative utilization of the money when thinking about the correct trade-off between waiting time and compensation. Further, asking for compensation charges may provoke considerations as 'appropriateness' of the charge or considerations about the monetary costs of delaying an object. When subjects are forced to make a choice, the attributes attached to the options will influence framing (see Chapter 2). This has consequences for the way impatience can be measured. When the measurement does not itself introduce a frame, it will reflect the effect of the given attributes (here: ‘hedonic’ and ‘utilitarian’). If, however, the measurement itself introduces prominent attributes or makes existing attributes more salient, it will interfere with the framing effect and thus not measure what it is supposed to measure. In order to demonstrate this effect, we added a replication of experiments 2 and 3 in which (im)patience is measured by the subjects’ willingness to accept financial compensation. We argue that being forced to think in terms of the monetary value of their feeling of impatience leads subjects to adopt an utilitarian frame on the choice task and which will eradicate the difference between hedonic and utilitarian goods. Experiment 4: design
In the previous experiments subjects always had to choose to receive hedonic or utilitarian goods sooner. We therefore replicated experiment 2 and 3 but told subjects that they had won one good in a lottery and the lottery organizer subsequently asks them to delay receipt of this good for four weeks. Subjects in turn are offered to receive some financial compensation and then state whether they accept the compensation and are willing to wait or whether they would like to receive the good immediately. Thus, subjects again make binary choices, but this time are forced to think in terms of appropriate monetary compensation. If subjects are more eager to receive hedonic goods sooner, they should be less willing to accept the financial compensation offered for weeks delay. Subjects in group 1 were confronted with the following text, subjects in group 2 answered the same question for a cassette with cutlery (both in Dutch):
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'Imagine: you participated in a lottery. You could not only win monetary prizes, but also consumer goods. You were so fortunate to win a nice sandwich toaster (official price: ƒ 40). What is the minimal amount for which you would sell the sandwich toaster immediately? ƒ________ Unfortunately, there is a temporary shortage in prizes. Thus, not every winner can receive his or her prize immediately. The organization of the lottery therefore asks you to wait four weeks for your prize. You have two possibilities (circle what you prefer): A:
You get the sandwich toaster immediately.
B:
You get the sandwich toaster in four weeks plus ƒ15 in compensation for waiting.'
Subsequently subjects in group 1 answered the same question for 'a complete coffee and tea set (official price: ƒ350)' and a financial compensation of ƒ40 for a four weeks delay. Subjects in group 2 answered the same question for 'an luxurious coffee machine with which you can also make espresso (official price: ƒ300)' and also a compensation of ƒ40 for a four weeks delay. Therefore subjects in both groups made choice for hedonic and utilitarian goods. Again order of presentation was varied within groups. Experiment 4: results
Mean selling prices in this experiment did not differ from experiments 2 and 3 (sandwich toaster: ƒ32, cassette with cutlery: ƒ34, luxurious coffee machine: ƒ237, and complete tea set: ƒ21451). For all goods there is a strong tendency to wait for the receipt and receive the respective compensation instead of receiving the respective good immediately: 84% of the subjects preferred to wait for the cassette with cutlery (n = 26) as well as for the sandwich toaster (n = 19). For the coffee machine 90.6% preferred the later option (n = 53) and all subjects preferred to wait for the tea set and receive financial compensation (n = 29, t: 2.33; p < .05). As expected, combining answers for all four goods reveals no difference between hedonic and utilitarian goods (t: .75; n.s.) when offering financial compensation. Financial compensation seems to raise the salience of the utilitarian frame and can even, as in this case, lead to a frame switch. It is not an alternative way to measure impatience, even though it is often used in experiments to do just that. This point is so important that we conducted a second experiment where financial compensation is involved, but this time we decided to use an experiment with real payoffs.
The latter value appears to be much smaller than in experiment 3 (subjects then stated ƒ264), because of the reduced sample. Comparing the part of the sample who stated selling prices in both questions reveals no difference (t: .54; n.s). 51
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Experiment 5: design
Absence of greater impatience for hedonic goods in the previous experiment might be due to the relatively large compensation offered for a four weeks delay. The offered amounts may have been so high that the compensation outweighed any potential differences between hedonic and utilitarian goods. In fact, between 84% and 100% chose to wait for the good and receive financial compensation. To rule out this possibility we conducted a final experiment. Since up to now all experiments involved hypothetical questions, we this time also investigated intertemporal preferences for hedonic and utilitarian goods in a setting that potentially affects payoffs. Subjects Subjects were 89 students at the university of Groningen from various disciplines recruited via e-mail and by flyers. Since the decision scenarios were varied between subjects, only part of the sample participated in the experiment presented below. Mean age was 22 years, 44% were males and 56% females, average monthly income was ƒ1057 ($500), and the main fields of study were psychology (21%), management science (20%), natural science (11%), sociology (10%), educational science (11%), and economics/econometrics (6%). One subject had to be removed from all analyses, because he did not understand several of the decision tasks. Method Subjects gathered in groups ranging from 2 to 23 persons to participate in the experiment. They were each provided with a booklet containing the experimental tasks and a questionnaire concerning the personal background of subjects. Experimental tasks comprised the choice problems described below, some other choice problems on intertemporal choices, presented partly in chapters 3 and 4, as well as several unrelated decision scenarios. The questionnaire items are described in more detail in chapter 5. A version of such a complete booklet is given in overall Appendix A at the end of this book. Since the decision scenarios were varied between subjects, only part of the sample received the choice problems presented below and n generally is smaller than 89. Subjects were told about the context in which the research took place and that there were no wrong or right answers. The experimenter was present during the whole experiment to answer questions concerning the questionnaire items or the questionnaire. Filling in the booklet took between 40 and 75 minutes, most people needed between 50 and 60 minutes. Subjects were paid ƒf10 (then approximately $4.00) and had an additional opportunity to win a gift certificate worth between ƒf15 and ƒ25 depending on their choices in this experiment. Again subjects chose between gift certificates for Compact disks and computer diskettes, but this time they had to specify appropriate intertemporal trade-offs. Subjects were told that they had won a gift certificate in a lottery. Subsequently they made a series of choices where they could exchange this original gift certificate for a larger but later certificate. One group won a certificate for CD's worth ƒ20, the other group had a certificate for computer disks also worth ƒ20. When handing out the booklets subjects were told that they had a 5% chance that one of their choices in this experiment would actually be paid to them. In addition, it was also stated in the text that choices in this experiment could affect actual payoffs. Subjects were also asked to rate the two goods according to their hedonicness by the same question as in experiments 1-3. Since experiment 1 demonstrated a clear preference to receive gift certificates for CD’s sooner than gift certificates for computer diskettes, we expected that, if both measures for
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impatience yield identical results, the initial certificate for CDs should be kept and the certificate for computer diskettes should be exchanged for a later but larger one. Subjects were confronted with the following text (in Dutch): 52 ‘Suppose you have won a gift certificate for CD’s (worth 20 guilders) in a lottery. What follows is a series of choices. Each choice offers you the possibility between keeping your initial gift certificate you will get in one week or to exchange it for a different certificate at a different point in time. For each choice, circle the option you prefer. That is, circle either A or B. For example, suppose on choice number 4 you chose A instead of B. Hence, you prefer your initial certificate of f20 in one week over a certificate of f25 in 19 days. When everyone has completed their form one person is picked randomly. This person will actually get paid his or her gift certificate. It is randomly determined who wins, the choices of the winner determine the prize. 1. A gift certificate for f 20 in one week (A) or a gift certificate of f 25 in 10 days (B) 2. A gift certificate for f 20 in one week (A) or a gift certificate of f 25 in 13 days (B) 3. A gift certificate for f 20 in one week (A) or a gift certificate of f 25 in 16 days (B) 4. A gift certificate for f 20 in one week (A) or a gift certificate of f 25 in 19 days(B) 5. A gift certificate for f 20 in one week (A) or a gift certificate of f 25 in 22 days(B) 6. A gift certificate for f 20 in one week (A) or a gift certificate of f 25 in 25 days(B) 7. A gift certificate for f 20 in one week (A) or a gift certificate of f 25 in 28 days(B) 8. A gift certificate for f 20 in one week (A) or a gift certificate of f 25 in 31 days (B) 9. A gift certificate for f 20 in one week (A) or a gift certificate of f 25 in 34 days (B) 10. A gift certificate for f 20 in one week (A) or a gift certificate of f 25 in 37 days (B)’ Experiment 5: results
Subjects on average were willing to change their gift certificate for the CD for a larger certificate after 28 days or less (mean choice: 7; n = 33), while they were willing to wait approximately 25 days or less (mean choice: 5.8; n = 25) for a larger certificate for computer diskettes. However, this difference is not significant (t: 1.22; n.s.). Hence, when subjects make trade-offs we did not find higher discount rates, i.e. shorter delays, for hedonic goods, even though choices potentially affect real payoffs. These results may also be due to value differences. Suppose a ƒ20 gift certificate for CD’s is more valuable than a ƒ20 gift certificate for computer diskettes as it turned out in experiment 1. Assuming decreasing marginal utility exchanging the initial certificate adds more utility in case of the certificate for computer diskettes. Thus, subjects are more willing to wait for a smaller increase in utility in case of the certificate for the CD. In this experimental session we also conducted two other experiments where subjects had to state appropriate compensation charges for delaying hedonic and utilitarian goods. In experiment A subjects again had to delay expensive television sets and washing machines (both worth ƒ2400). In experiment B subjects stated compensation charges for the delay of a television set and a vacuum cleaner (both worth ƒ600). In both experiments subjects had to delay goods either 5 weeks or 9 weeks and write down an 52
The experimental design was adapted from Loewenstein (1988).
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amount sufficient to compensate them. Again, in both experiments we found no differences in compensation charges between hedonic and utilitarian goods. Though washing machines were valued slightly higher than television sets (ƒ2129 vs. ƒ2026, t: 2.14, p < .05; n = 88), in experiment A delay charges were equal for the 5 weeks delay (t: .81; n.s.). In the 9 weeks delay compensation charges were slightly higher for washing machines (t: 1.75; p = .084). Comparing discount rates (compensation charges divided by selling price) for each good reveals no difference between goods for either delay (t: 1.32; n.s. for the 5 weeks delay and t: 1.33; n.s. for the 9 weeks delay). In experiment B likewise an ANOVA with selling price for the goods and time delay as covariates revealed no effect of type of good (hedonic or utilitarian) on absolute compensation charges (F: 2.37; n.s.) or discount rates (F: 2.3; n.s.). 3.6. Overall conclusion and discussion
In choices where subjects have to state whether they would like to receive rewards sooner or later we find clear preference to obtain hedonic goods sooner, even when the utilitarian good is valued higher. This runs counter to both the standard Discounted-Utility model and the hyperbolic discounting model. These results indicate that the distinction between hedonic and utilitarian goods is useful in intertemporal choice as far as deprivation and impulsive behavior is considered. We did not observe such differences in immediate preference for hedonic or utilitarian goods when subjects had to state monetary compensation charges independent of whether compensation charges were fixed or had to be stated by subjects. If at all subjects charge higher monetary compensation for the delay of utilitarian goods. These results suggest that the hedonic/utilitarian distinction is much less valuable when financial considerations play a role in decision making. These results are in accordance with framing theory, since they suggest a greater salience of hedonic attributes when hedonic usage of goods is more important, viz., in decisions which good to receive sooner, and a greater salience of utilitarian attributes when functional considerations are more important as when determining adequate financial compensation. As a consequence of these results intertemporal utility seems to be more complex than it has been treated up to now. First, there is the valuation of goods as measured by selling price in the experiments reported above. Second, there is an immediate preference for goods that might differ from the valuation of these goods and for which the distinction between hedonic and utilitarian goods is highly relevant. Finally, there is intertemporal utility as measured by monetary trade-offs that appears to be distinct from immediate preference. Here discounting is much less sensitive to the difference between hedonic and utilitarian goods. We suggest that this is due to a framing effect comparable to scale compatibility. Forcing subjects to think in terms of monetary compensation makes utilitarian considerations such as alternative usage of the money more important and lowers the prominence of hedonic characteristics. In a similar fashion Prelec and Loewenstein (1998) report effects of the payment structure on hedonic consumption experience. There, thinking about the payment reduced subjects' utility derived from the consumption of goods. However, more research with respect to these phenomena is clearly warranted. With respect to the fact that in choices which good to receive sooner, experienced deprivation is stronger for hedonic than for utilitarian goods the experiments reported here supplement previous research by Metcalfe and Mischel (1999) and Loewenstein (1996). Loewenstein (1996) argues that impulsive behavior often occurs when visceral
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factors, e.g., cravings or hunger, are involved. Hedonic feelings involved in decisions whether to obtain goods now or later in some respects seem to play a similar role in intertemporal choice. Though hedonicness generally will have weaker effects than visceral factors, the former might become strong enough to produce similar results: one subject motivating a compensation charge of ƒ1500 for a five weeks delay of a television worth ƒ3000 to him argued: ‘ this is a very nice television and I want it immediately! It is a shame that the lottery promises such a nice thing and then does not deliver it immediately!’ Children being denied sweets at a supermarket also show reactions suggesting visceral factors instead of denial of hedonic consumption experience. Metcalfe and Mischel argued that in intertemporal choice the distinction between ‘hot’ and ‘cool’ aspects of a decision situation or presentation is relevant (Metcalfe & Mischel 1999). Hot decisions situations, e.g., presence of a reward, raise the need for immediate gratification, while cold aspects of a situation, e.g., abstract presentations of the reward, lower it. The hedonic/utilitarian distinction seems to be more precise than the hot/cool distinction, since goods can and have been rated consistently by a variety of subjects and a variety of goods, while Metcalfe and Mischel use their distinction to interpret three decades of Mischel's own research on children's willingness to delay gratification. However, the hot/cool distinction appears to be more generally applicable.
Chapter 4 Vividness in intertemporal choices between hedonic and utilitarian goods
Summary
In this chapter we investigate the influence of vividness on the desire to receive hedonic and utilitarian goods immediately. In analogy to chapter three also the influence of vividness on monetary compensation charges for delaying hedonic and utilitarian goods is investigated. Several researchers have suggested an influence of vividness on intertemporal preference, but there is disagreement about whether vividness raises or lowers impatience and how vividness affects the desired receipt of hedonic or utilitarian goods. In a series of experiments, we demonstrate no effect of vividness on monetary discount rates, but vividness strongly raises the attractiveness of hedonic goods when people choose whether to receive hedonic or utilitarian goods sooner. These results are in accordance with framing theory.
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4.1. Introduction
In the previous chapter we demonstrated greater impatience for hedonic goods than for utilitarian goods when subjects choose which of these goods to receive sooner. When subjects have to determine monetary compensation charges for delaying hedonic or utilitarian goods these differences in immediate preferences were much less pronounced. We now investigate intertemporal choices between hedonic and utilitarian goods in more detail, viz., how vividness affects impatience to receive either kind of good. An impact of vividness on intertemporal choices has been suggested by several authors (e.g., Mischel, Shoda & Rodriguez 1992; Becker & Mulligan 1997; Loewenstein 1996), but these suggestions are contradictory. Becker and Mulligan (1997) argue that vividness lowers impatience due to a perceived reduction in temporal distance, Loewenstein (1996) argues that vividness raises impatience when visceral factors, e.g., hunger, are involved, while Mischel et al. (1992) conclude that different kinds of vivid presentation, e.g., presence of the reward or photography of the reward, may either decrease or increase impatience, depending on whether the presentation of the reward focuses on its abstract or arousing qualities. We argue that vividness affects hedonic and utilitarian goods differently, since a vivid presentation raises the ease with which hedonic or utilitarian use of a good can be imagined. Because hedonic and utilitarian goods elicit different levels of deprivation, and consequently different levels of myopia, vividness is expected to raise impatience for hedonic goods more strongly than for utilitarian goods. As in the previous chapter, vividness should affect preference for hedonic over utilitarian goods stronger in choices about which good to receive sooner than when stating monetary compensation charges for delaying either good. In the following, we summarize the competing considerations about the influence of vividness on intertemporal preferences in more detail and then present some experiments testing their correctness. 4.2. Theory
In the psychological literature there has been extensive research on the effect of vivid information on behavior, yet the empirical evidence concerning this effect is, at best, mixed. Nisbett and Ross (1980: 45) define information as vivid ‘to the extent that it is a) emotionally interesting, b) concrete and image-provoking, and c) proximate in a temporal, spatial or sensory way’. Additionally, they state that emotional interest rises with social closeness and the hedonic relevance of events in a scenario to its participants. Nisbett and Ross (1980), mostly considering anecdotal evidence, take for granted that ‘people’s inferences on behavior are so much more influenced by vivid, concrete information than by pallid and abstract propositions of substantially greater probative and evidential value’ (1980: 44). Consequently, they immediately turn to the question what causes this effect, arguing that vivid information is more likely to be stored in memory and remembered than non-vivid information. Vivid information therefore is more accessible (Tversky & Kahneman 1973) than non-vivid information. In this view vividness potentially affects impatience for hedonic and utilitarian goods in several ways, making predictions concerning its overall effect difficult. First, this reasoning suggests a value effect. That is, vivid goods are valued higher, raising impatience for them, since people immediately prefer larger rewards to smaller rewards. Further, this value effect should be stronger for hedonic than for utilitarian goods, since hedonic goods are inherently more vivid and emotionally interesting than utilitarian
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ones.53 Second, a vivid presentation may make delayed goods appear to be temporally closer than they actually are, i.e., it shrinks the perceived temporal distance. A vivid presentation thus, should lead to less discounting. Similarly, economists Becker (1996) and Becker and Mulligan (1997) argue that discount rates are influenced by the degree to which people can imagine the future vividly. People with a high stock of visualization capital can imagine the future better and therefore value it higher and discount less. Here again, vividness shrinks the perceived temporal distance of delayed rewards and therefore makes people more patient. Fiske and Taylor (1984) review the effect of vivid stimuli on behavior in general, but summarize: ‘there is little empirical evidence for vividness effects... in sum, vividness does not work well empirically, although intuitively it seems as if it should’ (1984: 391). This has been corroborated by recent research: Jenni and Loewenstein (1997) found no vividness effect when investigating why people are much more willing to save identifiable instead of statistical victims. It seems that vividness, if at all, only works under very special conditions (McGill & Anand 1989, Anand & Keller 1998), e.g., when subjects are explicitly told to imagine goods vividly and follow their emotions when making choices. From research on vividness in general, we thus would expect no effect of vividness for intertemporal choices. Previous experimental research on delay of gratification however suggests that vividness is at least sometimes important in intertemporal choice. Drawing on research on pre-schooler’s ability to delay gratification, Mischel and his colleagues distinguished arousing and abstract presentation of rewards. In an arousing presentation the motivating qualities of the stimulus were stressed and the completion of the action sequence was suggested, e.g., eating food. In an abstract presentation the focus was more on the informative, symbolic aspects of the stimulus. This distinction seems to match the distinction between hedonic and utilitarian goods. Hedonic goods provide direct utility derived from the completion of action sequences and therefore are potentially arousing, while the utilitarian goods serve as means to derive utility from consumption and are more abstract. Mischel et al. (1992) report several experiments about pre-schoolers’ ability to delay gratification. The children were presented with several rewards differing in value, e.g., toys or snacks. The experimenter then left the room and asked the children to wait an unspecified amount of time (typically about 15 minutes) for the experimenter to return. When the children were able to wait until the experimenter returned, they were promised to obtain the larger of the two rewards, e.g., five pretzels instead of two small cookies. Children who were unwilling to wait could call the experimenter at any time by ringing a bell to receive the smaller reward, the two cookies, immediately. Contrary to the investigators’ expectation, presence of either the immediately available smaller or the delayed larger reward decreased waiting time, i.e., the average time children waited before ringing the bell. Vividness, i.e., presence of either reward, thus increases impatience. Inclining subjects to think about the rewards yielded the same result, whereas providing distracting (’fun’) thoughts, unrelated to the objects, raised 53
'Raising impatience' here is a somewhat tricky term. One may argue that due to the magnitude effect presented in Chapter 1 higher valued goods are discounted less strongly, and hence people are more patient. Suppose a person has to choose between two goods presented non-vividly and is indifferent which good to receive sooner. A vivid presentation of one good now potentially raises its value and results in a preference for the good presented vividly to be received sooner. The person therefore is more eager to receive this good, though his discount rates may decline. In the experiments below both discount rates and preference for immediate receipt are investigated to separate these effects.
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waiting time. Distracting thoughts were also able to cancel out the effect of exposure to either reward: children waiting in the presence of the reward and being provided with distracting thoughts waited roughly as long as children waiting in the absence of rewards and distracting thoughts. Vividness therefore raises impatience. However, providing children with photos of the reward increased their waiting time, implying that vividness can also lower impatience. Mischel et al. (1992: 154) concluded: ‘Thus different modes of presenting rewards may either hinder or enhance self-control’. Unfortunately, this approach then shifts the problem to what makes a presentation arousing or abstract. However, generally we would expect less patience and more discounting for arousing hedonic goods and more patience and less discounting for abstract utilitarian goods when presented vividly. In addition, Loewenstein (1996), when discussing why myopic behavior occurs frequently when ‘visceral factors’ are involved, argues: ‘Immediate emotions arising from future events are inevitably linked to some mental image or representation of those events.... the more vivid such images are, and the greater detail with which they are recalled, the greater the emotional response’ (Loewenstein 1996: 280). This emotional response directly affects the decision maker’s level of deprivation due to non-possession of an object (see Chapter 3 for further discussion): higher emotional responses lead to stronger deprivation. Loewenstein (1996) interprets the Mischel et al. results such that presence of rewards creates deprivation, which children wanted to overcome by consuming the earlier but smaller reward. This view is consistent with the reasoning in chapter three as well as Hoch and Loewenstein (1991). However, since Loewenstein (1996) restricts his analysis to situations where ‘visceral factors’ are involved, his analysis does not easily transfer to hedonic and utilitarian goods. While hedonic goods appear to be clearly more visceral than utilitarian goods and we thus would expect vividness to raise impatience for them more strongly, it is doubtful whether hedonic goods are able to evoke the strong physical reactions, e.g., deprivation of drugs involves for addicts. Hence, the arguments concerning visceral factors cannot be applied to hedonic goods without additional assumptions and from a visceral factors perspective we therefore expect no effect of vividness on intertemporal preference between hedonic and utilitarian goods. The reasoning put forth in chapter three suggests an effect of vividness on intertemporal preferences. In chapter three we modeled deprivation for hedonic and utilitarian goods as follows: Dh = a(P - r) + bh(r-0) > Du = a(P - r) + bu(r-0),
(1)
a being the slope of the consumer's value function in the positive region, b its slope in the negative region, and r is the level of adaptation between purchase (P) and non-purchase (0). For example, consumers being able to imagine the possession of a good very well, adapt more strongly to its possession and are more likely to buy the product. Desire D represents the consumer’s motivation to purchase a product. This motivation depends on the consumer's deprivation due to current non-possession of a product. Consequently, impatience rises with deprivation and especially is stronger for hedonic than for utilitarian goods. A vivid presentation now affects impatience in two ways. First, making a good appear more hedonic or more utilitarian due to a vivid presentation affects loss aversion for this good as measured by b in formula (1) above. Since loss aversion
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and deprivation due to non-possession are stronger for hedonic than utilitarian goods, deprivation and consequently impatience is raised more strongly when a vivid presentation makes a good appear more hedonic than when making a good appear more utilitarian. Second, because hedonic usage is easier to imagine, it is easier to adapt to the possession of hedonic instead of utilitarian goods when goods are presented vividly. This second effect of vividness thus pertains to the parameter a in formula 1. Extending equation 1 by assuming easier adaptation to the possession of hedonic goods and by assuming that vividness makes goods appear more hedonic or utilitarian respectively has two consequences. First, it raises deprivation for both goods as in equations 2 and 3: Dhv = av(P - r) + bhv(r-0) > Dh = a(P - r) + bh(r-0), for 1 ≥ av > a ≥ 0, and bhv > bh Duv = av(P - r) + buv(r-0) > Du = a(P - r) + bu(r-0), for 1 ≥ av > a ≥ 0, and buv > bu
(2) (3)
Second, it raises the inequality in equation 1 above. That is, a vivid presentation raises deprivation for hedonic goods more strongly than for utilitarian goods: Dhv = av(P - r) + bhv(r - 0) Duv = av(P - r) + buv(r - 0) > Dh = a(P - r) + bh(r - 0) Duv = a(P - r) + bu(r - 0) for 0 < au < ah ≤ 1, and bhv > buv.
(4)
Consequently, vividness raises impatience for both goods but more strongly for hedonic than for utilitarian goods (hypothesis 1). This reasoning is based on subject's experienced level of deprivation. In order to distinguish this ‘pure deprivation effect' from a framing effect (in the sense of framing theory), we will again use frame-sensitive measurement as in Chapter 3. Framing theory, as presented in Chapter 1, again predicts the effect of vividness to differ with the measurement of impatience. As in Chapter 3, we expect a stronger preference for hedonic goods to be received sooner under measures that do not stress utilitarian aspects and a stronger preference for utilitarian goods to be received sooner under measures that underline the utilitarian features. Again, monetary amounts should underline the utilitarian features of an option, because people might consider alternative utilization of the money when thinking about the correct trade-off between waiting time and compensation. Further, asking for compensation charges may provoke considerations such as 'appropriateness' of the charge or considerations about the monetary costs of delaying an object. Therefore, utilitarian goods should be more attractive when monetary compensation charges are involved, while hedonic goods are more popular when subjects simply state which of two goods they would like to receive sooner (hypothesis 2). Note, that this reasoning extends the 'pure deprivation effect', because the effects predicted in formulae 2-4 hold irrespective of the elicitation method. In the following paragraph we will have a closer look on the predictions of the other above-mentioned approaches on such a measurement effect. Applying Nisbett and Ross' considerations to intertemporal choices does not result in specific predictions how measurement affects impatience. Recall that their arguments concerning vividness pertained to a rise in value as well as to a shrinkage in perceived temporal delay. In may well be that different elicitation methods affect the valuation and perceived time delay for hedonic and utilitarian goods differently but to derive
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predictions, additional assumptions seem necessary. Fiske and Taylor expect no effect of vividness anyway and hence also no measurement effects, while for Becker and Mulligan, staying within the framework of neoclassical economics, different elicitation methods should yield identical results. Loewenstein's visceral factors perspective likewise suggests no effect of different elicitation methods. Since visceral factors exert physical influence on behavior, it is unclear why this effect should be dependent on the way impatience is measured. The only approach compatible with an effect of vividness depending on measurement is Mischel's arousing/abstract distinction. According to this view, impatience depends on whether abstract or arousing features of the reward are stressed. Asking subjects which of two goods they prefer to receive sooner then possibly focuses on the arousing features of the goods while asking for monetary compensation charges possibly focuses more on the abstract qualities of the good. Hence, Mischel's arousing/abstract distinction predicts similar measurement effects as framing theory. However, Mischel's position differs from the deprivation and framing arguments above, since it suggests greater impatience for hedonic goods when presented vividly and less impatience for utilitarian goods when presented vividly. This asymmetric effect of vividness on goods is due to the fact that for utilitarian goods when presented vividly the focus is likely to lie on the abstract qualities of the reward, thus making it even more abstract. Further, recall that presenting children with photos of the rewards lowered impatience. Since, the rewards were toys or snacks, they can safely considered to be hedonic. Likewise, photos can be considered more vivid than a pale description of the reward and should therefore, according to formulas 2 - 4 above, raise impatience. Table 4.1 summarizes the different approaches and their predictions with respect to the effects of vividness and measurement on discounting. Table 4.1 Different approaches and predictions on the effect of vividness on discounting Model Nisbett & Ross Fiske & Taylor Becker & Mulligan Mischel Loewenstein Deprivation/ Adaptation effect Framing theory
Effect of vividness on impatience Raises value and shrinks perceived time delay. Overall effect: unclear No effect of vividness Shrinks time delay, lowers discounting Depending on whether abstract or arousing properties are stressed: raises impatience for hedonic goods, lowers impatience for utilitarian goods. Effective when visceral factors are involved, no statement for hedonic or utilitarian goods Vividness raises impatience, but more strongly for hedonic goods Raises discounting for both goods, induced effects are confounded with measurement: greater impatience for hedonic goods in choices, greater impatience for utilitarian goods in financial compensation
Measurement effect No prediction No No Yes, depending on abstract or arousing presentation No No Yes
In the following, three experiments will be presented. Experiment 1, asking subjects whether they wold like to receive hedonic or utilitarian goods sooner, first investigates whether vividness affects impatience at all, second, it investigates whether vividness affects hedonic and utilitarian goods differently, and third, whether such a
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potential effect of vividness is due to a rise in the valuation of goods. In experiments 2 and 3, it is additionally investigated whether vividness affects impatience identically irrespective of the way impatience is measured. The question explored is, whether the potential effect of vividness also holds when subjects have to determine adequate financial compensation for delaying hedonic and utilitarian goods. Experiment 2 offers a fixed financial compensation for delaying goods, whereas in experiment 3 subjects are asked to specify exact monetary compensation charges for the delay of hedonic and utilitarian goods. 4.3. Experiments and results Experiment 1 Subjects Subjects were 89 students at the university of Groningen from various disciplines recruited via e-mail and by flyers. Mean age was 22 years, 44% were males and 56% females, average monthly income was ƒ1057 ($500), and the main fields of study were psychology (21%), management science (20%), natural science (11%), sociology (10%), educational science (11%), and economics/econometrics (6%). One subject had to be removed from all analyses, because he did not understand several of the decision tasks. Method Subjects gathered in groups ranging from 2 to 23 persons to participate in the experiment. They were provided with a booklet containing the experimental tasks, i.e., choice problems, and a questionnaire concerning the personal background of subjects described in detail in Chapter 5. A version of the complete booklet is presented in Appendix A at the end of this book. The experimental tasks consisted of experiments 1 and 3 below, several other experiments on intertemporal choices partly described in Chapters 2 and 3, and several unrelated decision scenarios. Subjects were told about the context in which the research took place and that there were no wrong or right answers. The experimenter was present during the whole session to answer questions concerning the choice tasks, the questionnaire items, or the questionnaire. Filling in the booklet took between 40 and 75 minutes, most people needed between 50 and 60 minutes. Subjects were paid ƒ10 (approximately $4.50) and had an additional opportunity to win a gift certificate worth between ƒ15 and ƒ25 depending on their choices in another experiment (experiment 5 in Chapter 3). Experiment 1: design
The previous chapter demonstrated a greater preference to receive hedonic goods sooner than utilitarian goods when subjects have to choose which of the two goods to receive sooner. To investigate whether and how vividness influences intertemporal preference for hedonic and utilitarian goods subjects were told that they had won a hedonic and a utilitarian good in a lottery. Subsequently, they were asked to chose which good they prefer to receive sooner. The goods were described either both vividly or both nonvividly. A television set was considered a hedonic good, a washing machine was chosen
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as a utilitarian good.54 Washing machines and television sets were chosen because of subjects’ familiarity with them and because both goods provide constant streams of utility. In fact 80% of the subjects in a control question indicated that they owned a washing machine and 92% owned a television. Both goods were offered simultaneously. In the non-vivid condition subjects were only told that they had won ‘an expensive television (list price ƒ2400)’ and ‘an expensive washing machine (ƒ2400)’. In the vivid condition subjects were told that they had won 'a flat-screen television with Dolby stereo to create cinema atmosphere (official price ƒ2400)’ and 'a high quality long-durable Miele washing machine with low energy use and five-year guarantee (official price ƒ2400)’. Note, that for the hedonic good the hedonic attributes are made more vivid, while for the utilitarian good utilitarian features are made more vivid. Prices for both goods given in the text were 'real prices' of comparable goods available in stores. In addition, selling prices for both goods were elicited. Eliciting selling prices is necessary to control for possible differences in value between the vivid/non-vivid conditions as well as between the hedonic/utilitarian conditions. For example, subjects may value a television set presented vividly higher than a television set presented nonvividly as suggested by Nisbett and Ross (1981). This in turn may affect preferences for which good to receive sooner. To suppress such possible differences in valuation between the vivid and non-vivid condition, in the non-vivid condition the information that the good is expensive was given. An expensive good suggests superior quality and thus it has to have some special features. To control for the fact that waiting for a washing machine and waiting for a television set may create different costs - not being able to watch television is one thing, to dwell in a flat covered with smelly laundry another - current alternatives to the possession of these goods were specified (‘you used a laundry to wash your clothes’, and ‘you watched TV at your friends place’) associated with roughly equivalent costs. To further control for possibly different costs, at the end of the experimental part in the booklet subjects stated selling prices and monetary compensation charges for both goods and motivated their responses. In this control question goods were presented either vividly or non-vividly according to this experiment. That is, subjects who were confronted with a vivid scenario in experiment 1 also stated selling prices and compensation charges for vivid television sets and washing machines. If, due to laundry costs, subjects perceive the costs of delay to be higher for washing machines than for televisions, this should be reflected in their arguments. Note, that such potentially different costs for delay between washing machines and television sets do not affect the effect of vividness on preference for immediate receipt. If delaying washing machines creates higher costs for subjects than delaying television sets their preference for immediate receipt of the utilitarian good is raised in both the vivid and non-vivid condition. Time delay was varied in this experiment as well. In one condition ('immediate condition') both goods were available either ‘now' or 'after four weeks’. In the other condition ('remote condition') receipt of both goods was shifted in four weeks in the past. Hence, the respective time delays were ‘four weeks' and 'eight weeks’. Time delay was additionally varied, because the effect of vividness might be restricted to options that are available immediately. For example, Mischel’s arousing/abstract distinction and 54
The experiment was carried out in the absence of major sporting events that may cause temporary rises in the utility derived from immediately getting a television.
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Loewenstein’s visceral factors perspective both seem to suggest that vividness raises impatience for the receipt of goods more strongly, if the goods are available immediately. After completion of the experiment the whole sample (n = 88) classified the goods used as either type A: ‘hedonic’, type B: ‘utilitarian’, type C: ‘both’ or type D: ‘neither’.55 Subjects were confronted with the following text (in Dutch, vivid condition): ‘Imagine: you have participated in a lottery. You could not only win monetary prizes but also consumer goods. You were so fortunate to win a television set and a washing machine. It is a flat-screen television set with Dolby stereo to create cinema atmosphere (official price of ƒ2400) and a high-quality long-durable Miele washing machine with low energy use and five-year guarantee (with an official price of ƒ2400, too). You did not have a television set or a washing machine at home. You watched television at friends or parents and did your washing at a laundry. What is the minimal amount for which you would like to sell this television set: _________? What is the minimal amount for which you would like to sell this washing machine: __________? Unfortunately, there is a temporary shortage in prizes, hence, not every winner can obtain his or her prize immediately. The organization of the lottery therefore asks you to wait for your prize. The organization is completely trustworthy. You have two possibilities (circle which you prefer): A:
You get the television set immediately and the washing machine in four weeks.
B:
You get the washing machine immediately and the television set in four weeks.’
Order of presentation for choices A and B was varied as well. That is, for part of the subjects getting the washing machine immediately was presented as option A. Note, that with this design it is only possible to distinguish whether vividness affects impatience for hedonic and utilitarian goods differently. When both goods are presented vividly either the hedonic good becomes more preferred, the utilitarian good becomes more preferred, or the relative desirability of both goods remains the same. It is not possible with this design to test whether impatience for both goods increases or decreases. This question will be addressed in experiments 2 and 3. Experiment 1: results Manipulation check The hedonic/utilitarian classification in fact worked as intended. For the whole subject pool washing machines were classified as 'primarily utilitarian' by 95.5% and as 55
The exact wording was: ‘Some people distinguish between goods. Some goods are pleasant and fun, give pleasure and appeal to your senses, e.g., perfume (type A). Some goods are useful, practical, functional, something that helps you to achieve a goal, e.g., a vacuum cleaner (type B). Could you indicate for each of the following goods whether they are type A, type B, both, or none. Circle.’
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'both hedonic and utilitarian' by 4.5% (χ2: 39.4; p < .001). Television sets were classified as 'primarily hedonic' by 75%, as 'both hedonic and utilitarian' by 20.5%, as 'primarily utilitarian' by 2.3% and as 'none' by 2.3% (χ2: 27.41; p < .001). There was no effect of vividness on classification. Thirty-nine subjects answered questions for the vivid goods, 49 for the non-vivid goods. As to different costs associated with the delay of the goods, there is some evidence that subjects in fact perceive the costs for delaying receipt of a washing machine to be higher than costs for delaying the receipt of a television set. In the control question at the end of the experimental booklet 42% of the subjects mentioned rental costs when motivating their financial compensation charge for delaying a washing machine, while only 1 subject mentioned rental costs in case of the television set. Selling prices Selling prices for the whole sample were approximately equal for hedonic and utilitarian goods (ƒ2010 vs. ƒ2032; t: 47; n.s.). Vividness did neither significantly affect selling prices for television sets (vivid condition: ƒ2072, non-vivid condition: ƒ1961; t: .88; n.s.) nor for washing machines (vivid condition: ƒ2072, non-vivid condition: ƒ2001; t: .55; n.s.). Thus, contrary to the suggestion of Nisbett and Ross, there is clearly no value effect present: if vividness affects intertemporal preferences, this is not due to differences in the valuation of goods. Comparing individual differences in the valuation of the two goods reveals a similar picture. In the non-vivid condition 26.5% of the subjects valued the television set more than the washing machine, 38.8% valued both goods equally, and 34.7% valued the washing machine more than the television. In the vivid condition the percentage of subjects who value the television set more than the washing machine remains stable (26.5%) and the percentage valuing both goods equally increases somewhat (44.1%). Consequently, slightly fewer subjects than in the non-vivid condition value the washing machine more than the television set (29.4%). None of these differences was significant. Impatience Preference to receiving hedonic or utilitarian goods sooner is affected strongly by vividness. In the non-vivid scenario where goods could be received either immediately or after a four weeks delay (non-vivid immediate condition) only 9% prefer to receive the television set sooner and 91% prefer to receive the washing machine sooner. In this immediate condition, preference for the hedonic good rises strongly when both goods are presented vividly: 56% now prefer to receive the television set immediately and to delay receipt of the washing machine. In the remote condition the picture is similar. In the nonvivid remote condition a majority of 60% prefers to receive the washing machine sooner and only 40% prefer to receive the television set sooner. Again, vividness strongly raises preference for the hedonic good. A vast majority (66%) prefers to receive the television set sooner when both goods are available after 4 or 8 weeks and only 34% prefer to receive the washing machine sooner. Table 4.2 summarizes differences in the valuation between goods (first 3 rows) and preference to receive the utilitarian good, i.e., the washing machine, sooner (rows 4 and 5). Values between brackets denote preference to receive the hedonic good, i.e., the television set, in the respective condition sooner.
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Table 4.2 Selling prices for both goods and preference to receive the utilitarian good sooner (between brackets preference to receive the hedonic good sooner)
Vivid Non-vivid
TV > WM
Equal
TV < WM
26.5% 26.5%
44.1% 38.8%
29.4% 34.7%
Now vs. 4 weeks 44% (56%) 91% (9%)
4 weeks vs. 8 weeks 34% (66%) 60% (40%)
N 39 49
We carried out a logistic regression analysis with ’choice for getting the utilitarian good sooner’ as the dependent variable. Independent variables were 'differences in selling prices' (selling price for the TV set – selling price for the washing machine); 'time delay' (dummy: ‘now vs. 4 weeks’ and ‘4 weeks vs. 8 weeks’); and 'vividness' (dummy: yes or no). This model predicts preferences between hedonic and utilitarian goods very well (χ2: 13.47; p < .001, Nagelkerke Pseudo R2: .48). As predicted there are strong effects of 'differences in selling price' and 'vividness'. Valuing the television higher than the washing machine strongly lowers the likelihood of preferring the washing machine sooner (Wald: 11.95; p < .001). A vivid presentation of both goods likewise strongly lowers preference for getting the washing machine sooner (Wald: 10.77; p = .001).56 That is, in choices which good to receive sooner vividness relatively raises impatience for hedonic goods. Though longer time delay lowers the probability of preferring the washing machine sooner, this effect is not significant (Wald: .92; n.s.). Table 4.3 summarizes results. Table 4.3 Factors affecting preference for receiving the washing machine sooner B Model: Chi-square Pseudo R2 Coefficients: Difference in selling prices (TV-set - Washing machine) Time delay Vividness Constant
S.E.
Wald
38.73 .48
Sig.
.0000 -.0038
.0011
11.95
.0005
-.537 1.881 -1.7
.572 .573 1.28
.924 10.77 1.76
.3374 .0010 .1842
N = 88
Discussion: The results above clearly reveal a stronger effect of vividness for hedonic than for utilitarian goods. This effect is not due to changes in the valuation of both goods and is not dependent on the time delay after which goods can be obtained. This strong effect of vividness is especially striking, given that the vividness manipulation for both goods consisted of only one sentence and was not very strong. In addition, there is as strong tendency to prefer to receive the higher valued good sooner. This tendency is in
56
The coefficient for vividness is positive, because the coding was (1 = Yes; 2 = No). A higher value for vividness thus raises the likelihood of preferring the washing machine sooner.
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accordance with the results in Chapter 3 as well as the DU-model and is taken as a validation of the experimental design and the goods chosen. However, the large preference to receive the utilitarian good in the non-vivid condition sooner is surprising. While only 35% valued the washing machine higher than the television set, 91% preferred the washing machine sooner in the non-vivid immediate condition, i.e., in a setting that resembles the experiments in the previous chapter. It was already mentioned that delaying these two goods might involve different costs. Since a laundry involves monetary and temporal costs, subjects might be more aversive to use it for washing than to visit friends for watching television. In the non-vivid condition this effect may overweigh the stronger deprivation for hedonic over utilitarian goods, while vividness raised deprivation for the television set so strongly that the difference in costs is overweighed. There is indeed some evidence for this reasoning. First, in the control question at the end of the booklet 42% of the subjects mentioned rental costs when motivating their financial compensation charges for the washing machine, while only 1 subject mentioned rental costs in case of the television set. Hence, subjects do seem aware of different costs for delaying these two goods. Regressing selling prices for washing machines reveals that subjects who mention rental costs charge marginally higher selling prices (Beta: .21; t: 1.85; p = .07), indicating that the awareness of different costs affects variables relevant for delay.57 Further, subjects indicating that rental costs play a role on average value the washing machine higher than the television (difference in selling prices: ƒ203), while subjects who base their compensation charges on other grounds value the television higher (difference in selling prices: ƒ86). This difference is significant at p < .01 (t: 3.08), indicating that rental costs affect influential variables. Finally, it is possible that there is a bias towards equating selling prices for both goods. Recall, that both goods were presented simultaneously with identical official prices given. Subjects might argue that since goods are presented next to each other with equal official prices identical selling prices should be charged. This might compress existing differences in valuation, which are reflected in a greater preference to receive the higher valued good immediately. The following two experiments will investigate this final explanation more closely by using again washing machines as a utilitarian and television sets as a hedonic good. Because in these experiments the goods are presented to subjects simultaneously, we can check whether or not a bias towards equating the selling prices in experiment 1 is a reasonable interpretation of the results. Experiment 2
Experiment 1 demonstrates that vividness raises the attractiveness of hedonic goods more than of utilitarian goods. However, it did not allow us to judge whether vividness absolutely raises or lowers impatience. It may be possible that vividness lowers impatience for both goods, but more so for utilitarian goods and that vividness raises impatience for both goods but more so for hedonic goods. Further, from chapter three we 57
In a logistic regression analysis 'reason for delay charge' (dummy: mentioning rental costs yes or no) affects preference to receive the washing machine sooner, when vividness is included as the only other 2 covariate in the model (χ = 20.91; p < .001; both variables significant at p < .05). Additionally including difference in selling price leads to insignificance of mentioning rental costs (Wald: 1.72; p = .19) but 2 improves the model (χ = 31.27, p < .0001). Contrary to the model presented in table 4.3., vividness now has a stronger influence than differences in selling price (Wald: 10.77 vs. 6.79).
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know that preferences in direct choices may not correspond to choice situations where subjects have to determine adequate financial compensation. To find out whether vividness raises or lowers impatience for both goods and whether vividness raises the immediate attractiveness of hedonic goods more strongly than for utilitarian goods also when subjects have to translate their impatience into adequate financial compensation charges another experiment was carried out. Subjects Subjects were 80 students at the university of Groningen from various disciplines recruited via e-mail and by flyers. Mean age was 22 years, 42% were males and 58% females, average monthly income was ƒ1100 ($500), and the main fields of study were psychology (30%), management science (11%), languages (8.5%), sociology (8.5%), law (7%), economics/econometrics (8.5%) and natural sciences (7%). Method Subjects gathered in groups ranging from 6 to 15. They were assigned to a computer where the program concerning the experiments described in chapter 7 had been installed and instructed about the context in which the research took place. They were told about the context in which this research took place and that there were no wrong or right answers. They were confronted with choice problems presented on a computer screen and with choice problems and questions concerning their personal background presented on paper.58 Choice problems on paper as well as the questions on paper were announced and presented to subjects as regular breaks in answering the choice problems at the computer screen. The experimenter was present during the whole experiment in order to answer questions concerning the tasks. Completing the whole experiment took between 50 and 110 minutes, most people needed between 80 and 90 minutes. Subjects were paid ƒ25 for their participation. Experiment 2: design
We again used the lottery scenario and offered subjects television sets (hedonic goods) and washing machines (utilitarian goods). Subjects then stated selling prices for the respective goods, thus again investigating whether potential effects of vividness on intertemporal preference are due to a change in the valuation of goods. Contrary to experiment 1, this time subjects were not offered both goods simultaneously, but subsequently. That is, subjects were told that they had won one good in a lottery that has to be delayed. Subjects then could either receive the good immediately or wait 4 weeks and receive a fixed financial compensation (ƒ100). Then the same text with the same choice tasks was presented to the subjects but with another good. Vividness was manipulated as in experiment 1. That is, in the non-vivid condition subjects were only told that they had won an expensive television (official price: ƒ2400) or an expensive washing machine (official price: ƒ2400). In the vivid condition subjects were told that they had won 'a flat-screen television with Dolby stereo to create cinema atmosphere 58
The choice problems on the computer screen are presented in chapter 7, the questions concerning the personal background of subjects are presented in chapter 5, and the other choice problems presented on paper are partly described in this chapter and partly consisted of other intertemporal problems not used for this dissertation.
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(official price: ƒ2400)’ and 'a high quality long-durable Miele washing machine with low energy use and five-year guarantee (official price: ƒ2400)’. Hence, this experiment tests not only whether there is a greater immediate attractiveness for hedonic than for utilitarian goods under a different measure for impatience, but also whether vividness absolutely raises the immediate attractiveness for both hedonic and utilitarian goods. Because in this experiment subjects made their choices for both goods subsequently, we additionally investigate whether the equation of selling prices observed in experiment 1 results from equal valuation or whether this result should be interpreted as a bias towards equal selling prices elicited by the equal monetary prices given in the experiment. Subjects were confronted with the following text (in Dutch, vivid condition, television set): ‘Imagine: you have participated in a lottery. You could not only win monetary prizes but also consumer goods. You were so fortunate to win a television set. It is a flat-screen television with Dolby stereo to create cinema atmosphere with an official price of f2400. You did not have a television at home. You watched television at friends. What is the minimal amount for which you would like to sell this television: _________? Unfortunately, there is a temporary shortage in prizes, hence, not every winner can obtain his or her prize immediately. The organization of the lottery therefore asks you to wait for your prize. You have two possibilities (circle which you prefer): A:
You get the television set immediately.
B:
You get the television set in four weeks plus ƒ100 as compensation for waiting.’
Subsequently subjects answered the same question for ‘a high quality Miele washing machine with low energy use and five-year guarantee (official price ƒ2400)’. Order of presentation was varied, part of the sample first answered questions for the hedonic good and part of the sample received questions for the utilitarian good first. In addition, also order of presentation for options A and B was varied. That is, part of the sample received a text where 'You get the television immediately' was presented as option B. Subjects either had to make choices for two vivid or two non-vivid goods. After completion of the experiments part of the sample (n = 39) was asked to classify the goods as either type A: ‘hedonic’, type B: ‘utilitarian’, type C: ‘both’ or type D: ‘neither’.59 Experiment 2: results Manipulation check The television set was rated as ‘being primarily hedonic’ by 59%, as ‘both’ by 38.5% and as ‘primarily utilitarian’ by 2.5% (t: 6.38; p < .001), Washing machines were rated as ‘primarily utilitarian’ by 97.5% and as ‘primarily hedonic’ by 2.5% (t: 18.5; p < 59
The exact wording was: ‘Some people distinguish between goods. Some goods are pleasant and fun, give pleasure and appeal to your senses, e.g., perfume (type A). Some goods are useful, practical, functional, something that helps you to achieve a goal, e.g., a vacuum cleaner (type B). Could you indicate for each of the following goods whether they are type A, type B, both, or none. Circle.’
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.0001). Though the television is rated slightly less often as hedonic than in experiment 1, the manipulation hedonic versus utilitarian appears to have worked again. As in experiment 1, vividness does not affect ratings. Selling prices Mean selling prices for washing machines (ƒ2234) are higher than for televisions (ƒ1869; t: 5.45; p < .001), indicating higher valuation of the utilitarian good in this experiment. This does not affect the appropriateness of the experimental design, because subjects do not have to make direct comparisons between the two goods but compare them against financial compensation. However, this might provide some explanation why in experiment 1 in the non-vivid immediate condition 91% of the subjects preferred to receive the washing machine sooner. Subjects in this experiment in fact might have valued the washing machine higher than the television set, but felt they should be compensated for both goods equally, since official selling prices for both goods are equal as well. Again, in experiment 2 vividness has no effect on selling prices for television sets (t: .09; n.s.) or washing machines (t: .52; n.s.), thus again, ruling out a potential value effect of vividness on intertemporal preferences. Impatience There is a greater overall tendency to prefer the utilitarian good immediately – and to reject the offered financial compensation - than the hedonic good. For the television set only 14% chose to receive it immediately while 84% were willing to wait four weeks and receive additional financial compensation (n = 79). For the washing machine (n = 53) 40% wanted the good immediately and 60% were willing to wait (t: 3.87; p < .01). Since washing machines are on average valued higher than television sets, offered interest rates for washing machines are lower than for television sets leading to less patient behavior. Further, recall that in the control question for experiment 1 some subjects perceived the costs of delaying a washing machine to be higher than for the delay of a television set (see above). This also favors greater preference for immediate receipt of the former. More interesting is the effect of vividness on preference for immediate receipt. Logistic regression analyses were carried out for hedonic and utilitarian goods separately. Dependent variable in both analyses was 'preference for immediate receipt', independent variables were 'selling price' of the respective good and 'vividness' (dummy: yes or no). For the television set neither vividness (Wald: .62; n.s.) nor selling price (Wald: 2.3; n.s.) influences preference for immediate receipt (χ2 of the model: 1.3; n.s; Nagelkerke Pseudo R2: .067). Hence, contrary to experiment 1, vividness did not affect intertemporal preferences for hedonic goods when financial compensation charges are involved. For the washing machine, vividness (Wald: 5.3; p < .05) raised preference for immediate receipt, but selling prices did not (Wald: 2.27; n.s.; χ2 of the model: 8.45; p < .05; Nagelkerke Pseudo R2: .20). Thus, vividness raised the immediate attractiveness of utilitarian goods when financial compensation charges are involved. Consequently, using a financial measure for impatience reveals a stronger effect of vividness for utilitarian than for hedonic goods. In experiment 1 this effect was the reverse, as hypothesized (see Table 4.1 above). Table 4.4 summarizes preferences for experiment 2.
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Table 4.4 Intertemporal preferences for hedonic and utilitarian goods in experiment 2
Television set Washing machine
Preference for the immediate receipt Vivid Non-vivid Total 17% 11% 14% (n=79) 61% 27%* 40% (n=53)
* Differences in preferences for immediate receipt between vivid and non-vivid condition significant in a logistic regression analysis at p < .05. Discussion In experiment 2, vividness did not affect preference for immediately receiving the hedonic good. Subjects considered ƒ100 as enough compensation for a four weeks delay, irrespective of their valuation of the good and irrespective of whether the good was presented vividly or not. For a utilitarian good the appropriateness of this financial compensation depended on vividness but also not on the valuation of the good. For washing machines presented vividly ƒ100 were much less likely to be seen as an appropriate compensation than for washing machines presented non-vividly. This holds even though there are no effects of vividness on the valuation of the good, again ruling out the value effect suggested by Nisbett and Ross. Thus, vividness affects impatience for utilitarian goods more strongly than for hedonic goods. Apparently offering financial compensation lowered the deprivation effect for the hedonic good and increased the immediate attractiveness of the utilitarian good. Note, that in experiment 2 for the utilitarian good vividness had an even stronger influence on preference than valuation of the good. Experiment 3: design
We conducted another experiment investigating the effect on vividness on hedonic and utilitarian goods. The experiment was carried out in the setting of experiment 1, therefore subjects and method are identical and will not be reported here in detail again. This time subjects stated exact appropriate compensation charges for delaying hedonic and utilitarian goods, presented vividly and non-vividly. That is, as in experiment 2 they had to determine adequate financial compensation for delaying these goods, but they had to do so even more carefully, because contrary to experiment 2 the compensation was not fixed but had to be determined by the subjects. The experiment was carried out because fixing the offered compensation may suppress changes in preference, e.g., because the offered compensation is too high to overrule the rise in attractiveness due to a vivid presentation. Again, the goods were television sets and washing machines with the same prices as above. Both goods were presented to subjects in sequence both either vividly or non-vividly. Vividness was manipulated as in experiments 1 and 2 and again selling prices were elicited to control for possible effects of value differences. Subjects had to delay goods either 5 weeks or 9 weeks. That is, if they had to delay a television first for 5 weeks, in the second choice problem they had to delay a washing machine for 9 weeks. Order of presentation was varied. Part of the sample first received a question concerning the delay of washing machines and part of the sample first received a question concerning the delay of television sets. Subjects specified and wrote down an amount minimally sufficient to compensate them for the respective delay.
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Experiment 3: results Manipulation check and selling prices Because experiment 3 was carried out in the same setting as experiment 1 the ratings of the two goods are identical to the ones reported above and the manipulation hedonic versus utilitarian appeared to have worked. As to selling prices, mean selling prices were higher for washing machines than for television sets (ƒ2129 vs. ƒ2026; t: 2.14; p < .05), thus replicating the results of experiments 2. This is striking, because the subject pool is identical to experiment 1 where selling prices were equal for both goods. It appears that in fact presenting goods simultaneously creates a biases towards equating selling prices, partly explaining why 91% preferred to receive the utilitarian good sooner in the non-vivid immediate condition in experiment 1. In experiment 3, vividness does not alter selling prices for either good (televisions: t: .59; n.s.; washing machines: t: .30; n.s.), replicating results of experiments 1 and 2. Impatience Compensation charges differ tremendously between subjects, making interpretation of the data difficult and suggesting that keeping the offered monetary compensation fixed is a more useful design. Several subjects charged unrealistically high amounts (more than ƒ1500 for a five or nine weeks delay of a good with a list price of ƒ2400) and were excluded from further analysis. For hedonic goods results are very noisy. Neither time delay nor vividness influences compensation charges. In the short delay condition mean charge was ƒ281 for a vivid television and ƒ295 for a non-vivid television, in the long delay condition mean charge for vivid television mean charge was ƒ273 and for a non-vivid television mean charge was ƒ224. T-values range from .01 to .5 and never approached significance. Hence, again vividness did not influence impatience for hedonic goods when measured by monetary compensation. For utilitarian goods likewise vividness did not affect compensation charges. Subjects mean charge for a five weeks delay was ƒ231 when the washing machine was presented vividly and ƒ194 when presented non-vividly. For the nine weeks delay the mean charge for a vivid washing machine was ƒ391 when presented vividly and ƒ527 when presented non-vividly. Though numerically these results appear to be impressive, due to the huge standard errors they are again not significant (short delay: t: .38; n.s.; long delay: t: .57; n.s.). These results do not change when the whole sample is used, i.e., when including the subjects charging unrealistically high amounts, or when discount rates are calculated instead of using absolute compensation charges. Table 4.5 summarizes compensation charges for experiment 3. Table 4.5 Compensation charges for hedonic and utilitarian goods (Standard error between brackets) TV vivid TV non-vivid WM vivid WM non-vivid
Mean compensation 5 weeks delay 281 (112) 295 (105) 231 (101) 194 (37)
Mean compensation 9 weeks delay 273 (25) 224 (39) 381 (101) 527 (161)
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Discussion It is obvious that vividness did not raise compensation charges for the hedonic good, thus replicating the result of experiment 2 where financial compensation was also involved. For utilitarian goods there appears to be no effect of vividness as well, however, the picture is very inconclusive due to the huge standard errors. The most interesting result is that in this experiment, as in experiment 2 selling prices were higher for utilitarian goods. This is striking because subjects and description of goods were identical to experiment 1 were subjects on average stated identical selling prices for both goods. This suggests that selling prices in experiment 1 were slightly biased downwards for washing machines. In experiment 1 average selling price for washing machines was ƒ2032, whereas in experiment 3 where goods were presented in sequence average selling price was ƒ2129. Selling prices for television sets on the contrary were approximately equal (ƒ2010 in experiment 1 vs. ƒ2026 in experiment 3). Presenting both goods simultaneously as in experiment 1 appears to lead to more equal selling prices of goods. This downward bias in selling prices for the utilitarian good might explain why in experiment 1, 91% in the non-vivid immediate condition preferred to receive the washing machine sooner. 4.4. Overall conclusion and discussion
An effect of vividness on intertemporal preferences has been suggested several times, but these suggestions are contradictory. Above, three experiments are presented where subjects have to express intertemporal preferences for hedonic and utilitarian goods presented both vividly and non-vividly. Intertemporal preferences could be expressed either in terms of monetary compensation or whether they prefer to receive hedonic or utilitarian goods sooner. In choices where subjects stated whether they would like to receive rewards sooner or later, vividness strongly raises preference to receive hedonic goods sooner. When monetary discount rates are involved, we did not observe effects of vividness for hedonic goods and higher impatience for utilitarian goods presented vividly. These results support the interpretation put forth in chapter 3 that in choices which good to receive sooner, the focus lies more on the hedonic features of goods whereas when financial compensation is involved, utilitarian aspects loom larger. Hence, vividness has a larger impact on hedonic goods when the former measure is used and a larger impact on utilitarian goods when the latter measure is used. These results further rule out several of the suggestions made in the literature about the effect of vividness. First, there is an effect of vividness on intertemporal preferences, running counter to Fiske and Taylor’s statement of a generally weak effect of vividness. Second, there is no effect of vividness on value, hence the effect of vividness is not due to a higher valuation of goods presented vividly, ruling out Nisbett and Ross' reasoning. Third, this effect of vividness is not due to a shrinkage in the perceived temporal distance as suggested by Becker and Mulligan, because vividness raises impatience for utilitarian goods when monetary compensation charges are involved. Since Becker and Mulligan predict less discounting for goods that can be visualized better, vividness according to them should lead to less impatience. In addition, their approach is unable to account for the different effect of vividness when using different elicitation measures for impatience. An effect of vividness on impatience in choices between consumer goods further extends Loewenstein's (1996) reasoning for the effect of vividness when visceral factors are involved to hedonic and utilitarian goods.
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However, the arguments Loewenstein provides cannot account for an effect of the way impatience is measured. As to the compatibility of the results with the research of Mischel and his co-workers several statements can be made. First, vividness raising impatience for hedonic goods more strongly than for utilitarian goods in choices which good to receive sooner is in accordance with the arousing/abstract distinction. Since for hedonic goods in a vivid presentation the focus is on arousing hedonic features, impatience for them rises more strongly. Also a stronger effect of vividness on hedonic goods in choices than when determining monetary compensation is compatible with the arousing/abstract distinction. However, the increasing impatience for the utilitarian good when subjects have to determine monetary compensation in experiment 2 runs counter his theory. Since in the vivid presentation of the utilitarian good the focus lies on the utilitarian and abstract features of the good, according to Mischel one would expect less impatience for vivid goods in this experiment. The different effect of vividness for hedonic and utilitarian goods depending on measurement also extends the 'pure deprivation effect' of vividness caused by better adaptation to the possession of an object and by making goods appear to be more hedonic or utilitarian. The only account compatible with the data is framing theory. It correctly predicts a stronger influence of vividness on hedonic goods in choices which good to receive sooner and a stronger influence on impatience for utilitarian goods when impatience is measured by determining adequate financial compensation. It also predicts vividness to increase impatience when monetary compensation is involved as observed in experiment 2. Intertemporal utility, as a consequence of the results of Chapters 3 and 4, seems to be more complex than it has been treated up to now in the literature. First, there is the immediate valuation of goods as measured by selling price. People here determine the utility options provide to them. This appears not to be affected by vividness. Second, there is an immediate preference for goods, which might differ from the valuation of these goods. Here, the distinction between hedonic and utilitarian goods is highly relevant, since, as reported in Chapter 3, hedonic goods are sometimes preferred sooner despite the fact that the utilitarian good was valued higher. For this immediate preference vividness is important, because vividness raises the attractiveness of hedonic goods over utilitarian goods irrespective of differences in valuation. Finally, there is intertemporal utility as measured by monetary trade-offs that normatively should be equivalent to but empirically is distinct from immediate preference.60 Here, discounting is much less sensitive to the difference between hedonic and utilitarian goods and sensitive to vividness only for utilitarian goods. We suggest that this is due to a framing effect. Forcing subjects to think in terms of monetary compensation makes utilitarian considerations such as alternative usage of the money more important and lowers the prominence of hedonic characteristics. More research with respect to this phenomenon is clearly warranted. Besides considerations of different forms of utility, another interesting question is how the results above relate to the experiments of Mischel et al. (1992). Metcalfe and 60
In addition, determining financial compensation for waiting appears to be much less reliable. In another experiment, subjects stated selling prices for washing machines and television sets presented both vividly and non-vividly as well as compensation charges for delaying these goods. After being exposed to several other decision scenarios the questions were repeated. While correlations between selling prices for both goods were reasonably high (between .8 and .95), regardless of whether presented vividly or non-vividly, correlations were strikingly low for compensation charges and not even significant for non-vivid television sets.
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Mischel (1999) argued that in intertemporal choice the distinction between ‘hot’ and ‘cold’ aspects of a decision situation or presentation is relevant. Hot decisions situations, e.g., presence of a reward, raise the need for immediate gratification, while cold aspects of a situation, e.g., abstract presentations of the reward, lower it. The hedonic/utilitarian distinction seems to match but to be more precise than Metcalfe and Mischel’s hot/cold distinction, since goods can be and have been rated consistently by a variety of subjects and for a variety of goods. However, the latter distinction appears to be more generally applicable. It is striking, given the similarity of the hot/cold and hedonic/utilitarian distinctions, that contrary to Mischel et al. (1992) in experiment 2 vividness raised impatience for utilitarian goods. Since the focus of the presentation lies on the abstract/utilitarian features of the reward one would have expected the contrary. The question as to what makes a presentation vivid has been raised only briefly in this chapter. However, it is striking that in two experiments presented here vividness, i.e., adding a sentence that stresses some hedonic or utilitarian features of the good, raised the need for immediate gratification, while in Mischel’s original experiments providing children with photos of the reward, and thereby making the reward more vivid, lowered their impatience. Mischel et al. (1992) argue that photos actually focus on the abstract qualities of the reward, even though the rewards chosen, snacks or toys, would be classified as hedonic. Using an 'extremely realistic color photo' (Mischel, personal communication) appears to be more arousing than stressing some hedonic features of a good in a description. The different effect of vividness in the experiments reported here might be due to different perceptions of adults and children as to arousing or abstract presentations. While children might consider realistic photos as abstract, adults might consider more or less extensive descriptions of a good already as arousing. Future research might investigate whether the different impact of vividness is due to differences between photos and text or due to different perceptions between adults and children.
Chapter 5 Causes and consequences of patience
Summary∗
People differ with respect to patience. The present chapter seeks to explain such individual differences. Patience, as an ability to counterbalance the natural tendency to overweight short-term benefits, by assumption is taught during socialization mainly in the parental household. Consequently, patience will vary systematically depending on the parental incentives, restrictions and ability to teach it. For example, parents who have relatively more to lose from misbehavior of their children face higher incentives to socialize them properly. Parents with stronger time pressure, be it due to the number of children present in a household or to work requirements, face more restrictions for socializing their children. Strong evidence is advanced for higher parental status and larger parental wealth to result in more patient children, but there is little evidence for effects of family composition on patience, suggesting that parental restrictions are of minor importance in teaching children to delay gratification. Further, consequences of patience are demonstrated in a variety of settings: more patient respondents undertake more effort in studying, behave in a more healthy way, and are less likely to report deviant behavior. In addition, this chapter compares two different measures of patience, viz. a scale measuring preference to delay various amounts of money and a psychological scale measuring considerations of long-term consequences. The latter measure appears to be much better predictable and to be much more predictive. It is concluded that calculating discount rates from compensation charges for the delay of various hypothetical amounts of money measures other traits than patience. The consideration of future consequences scale appears to be a much more reliable, though possibly not exhaustive, measure for patience.
∗
This chapter benefited from discussions with and comments of Marcel van Assen, Peer Scheepers, Inge Sieben, Christian Steglich and especially Jeroen Weesie. None of them is responsible for any remaining errors. An earlier version of this chapter jointly with Jeroen Weesie has been presented at the ICS Forum Day in Fall 1997.
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5.1. Introduction
In Chapter 1 it was argued that there are profound individual differences with respect to patience, i.e., time discounting, and that such differences have considerable impact in a variety of settings. This chapter first briefly reviews treatment of patience in economics, sociology, and psychology. Second, it investigates the origins of individual differences in people's tolerance for delay of gratification. It is argued that since patience is of advantage in numerous situations, parents will try to socialize their children accordingly and attempt to ‘produce’ the necessary preferences within their children. Because incentives, restrictions, and ability to socialize children ‘properly’ differ between parents, children differ with respect to patience as well (see Lindenberg 1993). In the following some systematic differences with respect to socialization and their consequences for people's tolerance for delay of gratification are specified and tested. Third, it is investigated whether patient people differ from myopic subjects in a variety of settings, e.g., health behavior or engagement at school or university. Finally, two different measures of patience are discussed, a psychological scale measuring general concern for the future and a scale measuring monetary discount rates. By doing so, we continue the discussion of Chapters 3 and 4 of whether discount rates calculated from the specification of monetary compensation charges for delay do in fact measure myopia or are instead relatively unrelated to (im)patience. To investigate where individual differences in tolerance for delay of gratification stem from, data are used from experiments containing a sample of students at the University of Groningen from various disciplines. The data contain two alternative measures for the ability to delay gratification, i.e., a more general psychological measure and a measure based on the delay of monetary amounts, detailed information on the parental home of the respondent as well as on the techniques used for socialization. Thus, the data provide rather specific knowledge about individuals. Finally, the data contain information on subjects' behavior in several areas where differences in patience should lead to differences in behavior. The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. In section 2, a short overview of the treatment of delay of gratification in various disciplines is given, theoretical considerations as to where differences in patience stem from are presented and research hypotheses are elaborated. Section 3 explains data and methods, section 4 presents results for causes of patience for the more general measure, section 5 presents results for consequences of different degrees of patience for the more general measure. Section 6 presents results for causes and consequences of patience as measured by delaying various hypothetical amount of money, and section 7 summarizes and draws conclusions. 5.2. Review and theory
Economics, sociology and psychology all assume that people prefer to receive benefits now and that waiting for them is aversive. In economics, differences in patience reflect themselves in different trade-offs between current and future consumption. These tradeoffs between current and future consumption are expressed by a person's time preference. A person with a high time preference, i.e., an impatient or even myopic person, will prefer a smaller but immediate reward to a larger but later reward. Thus, he strongly discounts future outcomes. The degree of time preference is measured by a discount rate specifying the devaluation of the delayed outcome per time period (see chapter 1 for an extensive discussion). In sociology and psychology, foregoing immediate benefits for later and
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larger ones is covered by the terms 'delay of gratification’ or ‘self-control’.61 Sociology and psychology explicitly regard the delay of gratification as problematic (see Ainslie 1992 for extensive support of this view). Individuals may fall prey to short-term temptations, i.e., they choose immediate small benefits, and later regret their choices. In classical economics, the assumption of rationality excludes such regretting one’s informed choices, but recently, behavioral economists focussing on behavior qualified by standard economic theory as ‘anomalous’ have also begun to investigate sub-optimal choices due to myopia (Loewenstein & Elster 1992).62 Although patience is potentially important for sociology and economics, both disciplines largely neglected the question where individual differences come from. Economists have mostly avoided to study individual determinants of time preference by making time preference part of individual tastes to which economists generally remain agnostic.63 If more precise statements are necessary for modeling purposes, the common assumption is made that all commodities are freely exchangeable, and hence trade-offs between current and future consumption should be made at the market interest rate, no matter what commodities are involved, (e.g., Loewenstein & Thaler 1989). Sociology treats delay of gratification as part of the general acquisition of norms and role expectations learned via socialization (Parsons 1951). The socialization process creates an internal sanctioning system via the internalization of norms and is mainly mediated by parents in early childhood. Differences in socialization then may lead to differences in the internalization of norms and role expectations and, in case of undersocialization, to deviant behavior. It is therefore not surprising that research on deviant behavior has taken the question which parents are successful in establishing 'appropriate' behavior, e.g., selfcontrol, most seriously (e.g., Gottfredson & Hirschi 1990). However, few attempts have been made to generalize these findings to other areas of research or to preference formation in general. Furthermore, research on deviant behavior provides little or no theory with respect to how different socialization techniques affect internalization of norms. In the following it is assumed that people are naturally shortsighted and have to be socialized in order to take long-term consequences of their actions into account.64 In line with classical sociology it is argued that children's learning is mainly mediated by parents. Such learning within childhood mainly takes place via reinforcement and modeling (see e.g., Bandura & Walters 1963). Reinforcement includes the reaction of parents towards behavior of their children either by punishment or by rewards. Modeling includes instruction of children by the parents and imitation of parental behavior by the children. 61
Self-control is a broader concept than time preference or delay of gratification. Self-control includes the delay of gratification (patience or time preference), restriction of aggressive behavior, tolerance of frustration, and the orientation towards risk. 62 In this stream of research also self-command is discussed (Schelling 1984, Lindenberg 1993). Selfcommand investigates the use of efficient means, e.g., commitments, in order not to fall prey to temptations. For example, a person with a low degree of self-control may know this and, because of high self-command, successfully try to prevent himself from actions he would regret later. He may develop rules such as ‘never shop when hungry’, ‘don’t shop with a credit card’, or ’always wait one day to make expensive purchases’. 63 Recently Gary Becker has argued in a series of articles (summarized in Becker 1996 that parents being altruistic towards their children try to influence their children's preference sets ('tastes') such that these tastes in turn benefit their children. However, no link is made to what makes parents successful in such preference manipulations. 64 Though most people learn to some extent to take long-term consequences into account, situations where hedonic consumption experience is important are especially prone to impulsive behavior (see chapters 3 and 4).
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Hence, for modeling parental ability with respect to the trait is also important, while reinforcement should be unaffected by different degrees of parental ability. Though there are also cultural effects with respect to reinforcement and modeling, e.g., by schools and religious communities, there is general agreement that parental behavior exerts the strongest influence on young children’s behavior (Parsons 1951, Bandura & Walters 1963) and therefore here the focus is on parental characteristics. How do parents differ with respect to modeling and reinforcements? In this chapter it is argued that, first, parents differ with respect to patience themselves. Parents who are better able to delay gratification serve as a better model than parents who frequently behave in a myopic fashion. Second, incentives to reinforce and instruct children differ between parents, depending, e.g., on the degree to which they are held responsible for their children’s behavior (Lindenberg 1986, Coleman 1990, Chapter 11). Parents, for example, may gain or lose status depending on whether their children behave appropriately or not. Parents having more to lose from children's inappropriate behavior thus have higher incentives to reinforce them. Finally, parents face different restrictions due to family composition. The amount of parental time available per child, for example, varies with the number of children in a household and with professional obligations of the parents, thus affecting opportunities to teach children complex abilities such as delay of gratification. In the following sections, first parental characteristics and then effects of family composition on patience will be investigated. Since it is argued that parental characteristics and family composition affect patience via socialization techniques, in another subsection these techniques will be investigated more directly by looking at the family environment in which the respondents grew up and it will be demonstrated how socialization techniques affect patience. 5.2.1. Effects of parental characteristics on patience
Following higher education is one of the most prominent examples of investment behavior where immediate benefits are forgone for the sake of larger future returns. Parents with high educational achievements should be more able to delay gratification, because of self-selection and because of the training higher education provides. Both effects make these parents provide a better model for the value of delayed outcomes and make it more likely that they value patience and place more value on its being learned by their children. Hence, higher parental education raises patience of the respondents. Consistent with this reasoning, higher parental education affects several potential consequences of (im)patience. For example, it raises children’s education (Downey 1995) and lowers their risk to become delinquent (Gottfredson & Hirschi 1994). Thus: H1: Patience increases with the level of parental education.
The parental profession likewise affects parental socialization efforts in several ways. Parents who regularly have to delay gratification at work, are trained to value this ability higher, and consequently teach it to their children more strongly. In addition, these parents also serve as better models. We argue that especially autonomy and responsibility at work serve as such training factors and consequently influence patience of children. Increasing autonomy at work creates more opportunities to delay unpleasant tasks and makes it more necessary to delay gratification. Increasing responsibility increases potential costs of myopic behavior. Hence, patience is expected to increase with increasing autonomy and responsibility. These effects will be enhanced by self-selection.
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Initially more patient people reach higher educational levels and will be more autonomous and responsible at work: H2: Patience increases with increasing parental autonomy and responsibility at work.
A special case where the above reasoning applies is self-employment. To ensure the long-run survival of the business, self-employed will have to pay greater attention to the future consequences of their immediate actions than employed people. Most often, for example, it is not possible for the owner of a business to use the firms assets to peruse immediate and personal goals, since this might endanger the long-run survival of the business. Such a restriction in the pursuit of immediate and personal goals provides a continuous training to delay gratification. This effect again will be strengthened by selfselection: patience may lead to self-employment, since the long-term advantages of selfemployment (more autonomy, higher income in the long run) then are more likely to outweigh the short-term costs (more work, possibly less initial income). Both, the training and the self-selection argument suggest that self-employed parents value patience higher, serve as a better model, and will take more efforts to teach their children to delay gratification. In addition, since more employees create greater responsibility, these effects should be stronger, the more employees there are in a parental business: H3: People whose parents are self-employed are more patient. H4: Patience increases with the number of employees in the parental business.
Most religions promote behavior that is directed towards reaching long-term goals, e.g., eternal life, and stimulate and support behavior to achieve these goals, for example, by establishing religious laws. Religious context therefore serves a prominent socializing factor, at least with respect to self-control. Thus, people socialized by religious parents are expected to be more patient. In line with Weber’s classical argument on the effect of religious beliefs on economic organization (Weber 1905), we expect a better ability to delay gratification for people socialized by more strict religions, e.g., protestant versus catholic. In the catholic doctrine (minor) deviations are not allowed but to some degree absolved in case of repentance, while the protestant doctrine takes a more restrictive position on them. This suggests that Protestants are more restrictive against their own impulsivity. These considerations result in the following two hypotheses: H5: Children socialized by religious parents are more patient. H6: Patience of children rises with stricter parental denomination.
With respect to the incentives to teach delay of gratification, Coleman (1990, Chapter 11) reasoned that socialization efforts are higher for families of a high status, as these families have relatively more to lose from inappropriate behavior of their children. Such higher socialization efforts should result in higher internalization of norms and better ability to delay gratification:
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H7: Patience increases with increasing parental status and wealth.65
A related argument pertains to social cohesion in a neighborhood. Higher cohesion raises negative consequences for parents from inappropriate behavior of their children, because they will be held more responsible. Hence, stronger cohesion raises incentives to teach children to delay gratification: H8: Increasing cohesion in the neighborhood raises patience.
As to restrictions, mothers working during early childhood of the respondents are expected to have less time to supervise and socialize the children. Junger (1994) actually reports that having a working mother in early childhood raises the probability of deviant behavior. Since in research on deviant behavior this effect in general disappears after controlling for parental supervision, this is mainly due to time restrictions. H9: Patience decreases, if the mother was working during the youth of the child.66 5.2.2. Effects of family composition on patience
Differences in socialization and consequently in patience can be expected between singleparent and two-parent families (see already Mischel 1961). Being raised in a single-parent household potentially affects patience for several reasons. First, again there is selfselection. Higher parental impatience raises the risk of separation, because it is more attractive to jeopardize the relation for short-term advantages (see Snijders & Weesie 1998 for empirical evidence). In this case, parents serve as a bad model with respect to patience. Second, after a separation, less time and effort can be put into socialization of the children by the remaining parent, if single parents face the same professional demands as twoparent families. Time and effort put into socialization of children should thus be lower the sooner the parents divorce. Actually, Hirschi (1994) reports that children in single-parent households report lower monitoring levels than children from two-parent families. Research on school achievement (Astone & McLanahan (1991) likewise reports lower levels of parental supervision and monitoring in single-parent households.67 According to Junger (1994) children of divorced parents run a higher risk of having an accident, which is taken to be an indicator for a neglect to take long-term risks of immediate pleasures into account. This effect disappears after controlling for parental supervision. Third, parents absent from their family have fewer incentives to teach and supervise their children, because they will receive only a small fraction of the benefits of children's proper behavior. Again, this effect should be stronger the sooner the parents divorced. Finally, not only absolute levels of supervision are lower for single-parent households but also the 65
Note, that the argument presented here pertains to parental incentives while the argument concerning the effect of parental education, which is obviously correlated with status and wealth, referred to parental modelling. It is therefore useful to test both hypotheses separately. 66 This effect is counterbalanced by the greater likelihood for higher educated mothers to re-enter the labor market after child birth. As argued above, these mothers have a higher likelihood of teaching their children patience. In the analysis below, we therefore add mother's education as another control variable when investigating this hypothesis. 67 The influence of divorced parents on educational achievements while pronounced in the short run, is not well established with respect to long-run consequences, especially after controlling for the economic consequences following separation (see, e.g., Ryan & Adams 1995).
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relationship with the remaining parent might be closer in these families. This reduces his or her ability to impose sanctions in case of children’s improper behavior. In fact, delinquents are afraid of the parental sanctions more often in two-parent families than in single-parent families (Hirschi 1994). To conclude, there are several reasons to expect stronger impatience for children with divorced parents and among these stronger impatience the sooner the parents divorced.
H10: Children with divorced parents are less patient.
H11: Patience decreases the younger the child's age at which parents divorced.
The number of siblings should also affect parental socialization. Two competing arguments can be developed. On the one hand, the more siblings are present, the more they have to take care of each other and they more they are restricted by the needs of the other siblings. This raises incentives to control themselves and increases patience. Coleman (1990, 1993) argued further that the more children in the household, the higher are the incentives for the parents to socialize their children with respect to self-control in general. If children are not properly socialized, parents will experience the costs of this behavior more directly. For example, having contact with the children more often, e.g., when sharing a common bedroom, creates severe annoyance in case of undersocialization (see Lindenberg1986, 1993 for further elaboration of this argument). However, this latter argument concerning externalities pertains to space restrictions and not to the number of siblings. Therefore:
H12: Patience increases with decreasing space for children at home.
On the other hand, a larger number of children reduces parental supervision and control per child, at least if parents do not supervise all children at once all the time. Hence, children will be surrounded by other children more often. Despite the strong incentives to monitor each other, it is unlikely that children teach themselves self-control, since complex and motivational skills are learned better from adults (c.f. Downey 1995). Consequently, Downey (1995) argues that the negative influence of the number of siblings on educational achievements is due to limited parental resources such as time, effort or expenses. He explicitly states that resource dilution outweighs the eventual effects of economics of scale. Research on deviant behavior supports this view. Here the number of siblings persistently has a positive influence on deviance (e.g., Hirschi 1994). These arguments suggest that patience decreases with the number of siblings. Therefore:
H13: Patience decreases with increasing number of siblings.
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5.2.3. Effects of family environment on patience
The previous sections focussed on relatively ‘hard’ but only indirect measures for the underlying socialization processes. In this section hypotheses on the effect of parental socialization techniques on patience will be formulated. To test these hypotheses, retrospective data will be elicited. Though these measures are by nature ‘softer’ than say, the number of siblings, the more direct testing of processes that is possible with this approach should outweigh the disadvantages of the noise inherent to these variables. Above it was argued that parents differ with respect to patience themselves. Consequently, parents who are perceived to be more patient and who place more value on delay of gratification, serve as better models and can teach their children more efficiently. This reasoning leads to two hypotheses. It might be possible that parents are patient themselves but nevertheless regard this ability as less important and hence, place little value on teaching it to their children. It is also possible that parents are impatient themselves but regret this and thus value this ability especially strong: H14: Patience increases with parental patience. H15: Patience is higher for respondents whose parents value patience more strongly.
It has been argued above that people's tolerance for delay of gratification to a large extent depends on parental effort and ability to teach it to their children. Parental supervision of children's behavior then is a necessary means to teach this ability. Parents who supervise their children more intensely should be better able to direct behavior of their children as intended. Such supervision can occur in two forms. First, there is strictness, i.e., number and enforcement of rules for the children. Second, parental engagement in leisure or school activities of the children also serves as a means to supervise and teach children. In addition, the stimulation of general intellectual abilities should also increase patience. Already Mischel et al. (1992) speculated that an early family environment that stimulates cognitive abilities in general also leads to a higher ability to delay gratification, because the latter is an important part of general cognitive abilities. All three possibilities will be explored in this chapter: H16a: Patience increases with increasing strictness of rules at home. H16b: Patience increases with increasing parental engagement in leisure or school activities. H16c: Patience increases with increasing intellectual stimulation of children. 5.2.4. Control variables
Because socialization continues during the life course, increasing age should improve delay of gratification and we thus should control for age when investigating these hypotheses. Further, we should control for sex, since socialization patterns for boys and girls differ in many respects. It is unclear, however, how these differences affect patience. Intuitively one would associate impatience with males, because males are much more likely to exhibit different forms of deviant behavior such as criminal behavior, excessive alcohol use or disregarding speed limits (Hirschi & Gottfredson 1994). On the other hand,
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in some previous studies gender worked in the other direction: women exhibited higher discount rates than men (Donkers & van Soest 1997; Snijders & Weesie 1998; Cairns & van der Pol 2000). Because of a lack of theoretical arguments pointing in either direction, sex is included only as a control variable. 5.3. Tests of the hypotheses: subjects, procedure, and measurement 5.3.1. Subjects
One-hundred and seventy subjects participated in the study.68 Subjects were students at the university of Groningen from various disciplines recruited via e-mail and by flyers. Mean age was 22 years, 44% were males and 56% were females, average monthly income was ƒ1087 ($500), and the main fields of study were psychology (25%), management science (15%), natural science (9%), sociology (9%), educational science (6.5%), and economics/econometrics (6%). One subject had to be removed from all analyses, because he did not understand several of the decision tasks. 5.3.2. Procedure
Data gathering took place in two experimental series. This was done to link the experiments used for Chapters 2-4 and 7 with the research described in this chapter. Differences with respect to subjects between the two series were small. In the first series 90 subjects had to answer questions in a questionnaire containing several choice problems, a measure of patience (see below), a measure concerning monetary discount rates (see below) and questions concerning the personal background of subjects. In the second series, 80 subjects partly were confronted with choice problems presented on a computer screen described in Chapter 7 and partly with choice problems on paper, a measure of patience, a measure for monetary discount rates, and questions concerning their personal background presented on paper. In the first series, subjects gathered in groups ranging from 2 to 23 persons to participate in the experiment. They were provided with a booklet containing the choice problems presented in Chapters 2-4 and the questionnaire used for this research. Subjects then were told about the context in which the research took place and that there were no wrong or right answers. They were also asked not to look back to check previous answers. A version of such a complete questionnaire is included in Appendix A at the end of this book. The experimenter was present during the whole experiment to answer questions concerning the tasks. Filling in the booklet took between 40 and 75 minutes, most people needed between 50 and 60 minutes. Subjects were paid ƒ10 (approximately $4.50) and had an additional opportunity to win a gift certificate worth between ƒ15 and ƒ25 depending on their choices. In the second series, subjects gathered in groups ranging from 6 to 15. They were assigned to a computer where the program concerning the experiments described in Chapter 7 had been installed. Then they were instructed about the context in which the research took place and that there were no wrong or right answers. In between the choice tasks on the computer were regular breaks where subjects turned to the other decision scenarios and to the questionnaire, both presented on paper. The experimenter was present during the whole experiment in order to answer questions concerning the 68
Analyses presented below did not use all 170 subjects. Five subjects participated in both experimental series (see below), reducing the number of usable measures for patience to 165.
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tasks. Completing the whole experiment (on the computer and on paper) took between 50 and 110 minutes, most people needed between 80 and 90 minutes. Subjects were paid ƒ25 for their participation. 5.3.3 Measurement
This section explains how the hypotheses presented above have been operationalized and how they were measured. We begin with an overview of the independent variables used in this study following the order of hypotheses and then turn to the measurement of patience. We are well aware of the fact that eliciting retrospective data concerning, e.g., the family climate during the respondents' youth, is less reliable than e