Justice and the Politics of Difference

Justice and the Politics of Difference Iris Marion

PRINCETON PRINCETON,

Young

UNIVERSITY NEW

JERSEY

PRESS

Copyright © 1990 by Princeton University Press Published by Princeton University Press, 41 William Street, Princeton, N e w Jersey 08540 In the United Kingdom: Princeton University Press, Chichester, West Sussex All Rights Reserved Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publicatiou Data Young, Iris Marion, 1 9 4 9 Justice and the politics of difference / Iris Marion Young, p. cm. Includes bibliographic references and index. ISBN 0-691-07832-7 (alk. paper) - ISBN 0-691-02315-8 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Social justice. 2. Oppression (Psychology) 3. Pluralism (Social sciences) 4. Political participation. 5. Social institutions. I. Title. JC578.Y68 1990 90-36988 320'.01'l-dc20 This book has been composed in Linotron Caledonia Princeton University Press books are printed on acid-free paper, and meet the guidelines for permanence and durability of the Committee on Production Guidelines for Book Longevity of the Council on Library Resources Printed in the United States of America 10

9

8

7

For Dave

Contents

Acknowledgments

ix

INTRODUCTION

3

CHAPTER 1

D i s p l a c i n g the Distributive The Distributive The Distributive

Paradigm

Paradigm Paradigm

15 16

Presupposes

and

Obscures

Institutional Context Overextending the Concept of Distribution Problems with Talk of Distributing Power Defining Injustice as Domination and Oppression

18 24 30 33

CHAPTER 2

F i v e F a c e s of O p p r e s s i o n

39

Oppression as a Structural Concept The Concept of a Social Group The Faces of Oppression Applying the Criteria

40 42 48 63

CHAPTER 3

I n s u r g e n c y and t h e Welfare Capitalist S o c i e t y

66

Normative Principles of Welfare Capitalist Society The Depoliticization of Welfare Capitalist Society The Ideological Function of the Distributive Paradigm The Administered Society and New Forms of Domination Insurgency and the Repoliticization of Public Life The Dialectic of Recontainment versus Democracy Democracy as a Condition of Social justice

67 70 74 76 81 88 91

CHAPTER 4

T h e Ideal of Impartiality a n d t h e Civic Public Postmodernist The Ideal

Critique

of the Logic of Identity

of Impartiality

The Impossibility

as Denying

99

of Impartiality

102

The Logic of Identity

in the Ideal

of the Civic

of the Ideal

of Impartiality

Public

98

Difference

Ideological Participatory

96

Functions

Democracy

and the Idea of a

Public

107 111

Heterogeneous 116

viii

•

Contents

CHAPTER 5

T h e Scaling of B o d i e s and t h e Politics of I d e n t i t y

122

The Scaling of Bodies in Modern Discourse Conscious Acceptance, Unconscious Aversion Behavioral Norms of Respectability Xenophobia and Abjection Moral Responsibility and Unintended Action Justice and Cultural Revolution

124 130 136 141 148 152

CHAPTER 6

Social M o v e m e n t s and t h e Politics of D i f f e r e n c e

156

Competing Paradigms of Liberation Emancipation through the Politics of Difference Reclaiming the Meaning of Difference Respecting Difference in Policy The Heterogeneous Public and Group Represenation

158 163 168 173 183

CHAPTER 7

Affirmative A c t i o n and t h e M y t h o f M e r i t

192

Affirmative Action and the Principle of Nondiscrimination Affirmative Action Discussion and the Distributive Paradigm The Myth of Merit Education and Testing as Performance Proxies The Politics of Qualifications Oppression and the Social Division of Labor The Democratic Division of Labor

193 198 200 206 210 214 222

CHAPTER 8

C i t y Life and D i f f e r e n c e The Opposition

between

The Rousseauist

Dream

Privileging Undesirable

226 Individualism Relations

Consequences

City Life as a Normative Cities

and Social

Empowerment

Ideal

Injustice

without

227 229

Face-to-Face Political

and Community

Autonomy

E P I L O G U E : INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE

232 of the Ideal

of Community

234 236 241 248 257

References

261

Index

277

i .j

Acknowledgments

T H E WHITING o f this book w a s s u p p o r t e d by a grant from t h e A m e r i c a n C o u n c i l o f L e a r n e d S o c i e t i e s and by a sabbatical leave from t h e W o r ­ cester Polytechnic Institute. M a n y of t h e central positions in this book w e r e i n s p i r e d b y t h e s t i m u ­ lating d i s c u s s i o n s a b o u t g e n d e r , race, and class h e l d at m e e t i n g s of t h e Radical P h i l o s o p h e r s Association from 1 9 8 5 to 1987. M a n y c o l l e a g u e s c o m m e n t e d o n various portions of t h e m a n u s c r i p t in various s t a g e s of its d e v e l o p m e n t . Thanks to S e y l a B e n h a b i b , L a w r e n c e B l u m , C h a r l e s E l l i s o n , A n n F e r g u s o n , N a n c y Frascr, Marilyn F r i e d m a n , R o b e r t F u l l i n w i d e r , R o g e r G o t t l i e b , Philip G r e e n , N a n c y Hartsock, Ali­ son Jaggar, W i l l i a m M c B r i d e , Linda N i c h o l s o n , L u c i u s Outlaw, D e b o r a h R h o d e , Richard S c h m i t t , Mary S h a n l e y , James Sterba, and John Trimbur. T h e ideas in this book h a v e b e e n e n r i c h e d by m a n y c o n v e r s a t i o n s w i t h Martha M i n o w , Susan O k i n , and T h o m a s W a r t e n b u r g . T h a n k s to Frank H u n t for a s y m p a t h e t i c and e x p e r t e d i t i n g j o b . M o s t of all, thanks to D a v e Alexander, w h o read several drafts of t h e m a n u s c r i p t and offered irreplaceable h e l p ; w h o d i s c u s s e d t h e ideas w i t h m e d u r i n g m a n y e v e n i n g s , and l i s t e n e d to m y c o m p l a i n t s and frustrations; w h o offers m o r e than o n e c o u l d ask in intellectual and e m o t i o n a l c o m p a n ­ ionship. Portions of this book h a v e a p p e a r e d e l s e w h e r e in different form. I w o u l d like to thank t h e p u b l i s h e r s for p e r m i s s i o n to make u s e of t h e following materials: " F i v e F a c e s of O p p r e s s i o n , " Philosophical Forum 19, no. 4 ( S u m m e r 1988), p p . 2 7 0 - 9 0 , r e v i s e d as C h a p t e r 2. "Impartially and t h e C i v i c Public: S o m e Implications of F e m i n i s t Cri­ t i q u e s of Moral and Political T h e o r y , " in Seyla B e n h a b i b and D r u c i l l a C o r n e l l , e d s . , Feminism as Critique (Polity Press and U n i v e r s i t y of M i n ­ n e s o t a P r e s s , 1987), p p . 5 6 - 7 6 , for s o m e material in C h a p t e r 4. "Polity and G r o u p D i f f e r e n c e : A C r i t i q u e of t h e Ideal of U n i v e r s a l Cit­ i z e n s h i p , " Ethics 9 9 , no. 2 (January 1989), p p . 2 5 0 - 7 4 , and " D i f f e r e n c e and Social Policy: Reflections in t h e C o n t e x t of Social M o v e m e n t s , " Uni­ versity of Cincinnati Law Review 5 6 , no. 2 (Fall 1987), p p . 5 3 5 - 5 0 , b o t h for s o m e material in C h a p t e r 6. "Abjection and O p p r e s s i o n : U n c o n s c i o u s D y n a m i c s of Racism, Sexism and H o m o p h o b i a , " in A r l e n e D a l l e r y and C h a r l e s Scott, e d s . , The Crisis in Continental Philosophy ( S U N Y Press, 1990), for a portion of C h a p t e r 5. "The Ideal of C o m m u n i t y and t h e Politics of D i f f e r e n c e , " Social Theory and Practice 12, no. 1 (Spring 1986), p p . 1 - 2 6 , for a portion of C h a p t e r 8.

Introduction

W H A I are t h e implications for political p h i l o s o p h y of t h e claims of n e w g r o u p - b a s e d social m o v e m e n t s associated w i t h left p o l i t i c s — s u c h m o v e ­ m e n t s as f e m i n i s m , Black liberation, A m e r i c a n Indian m o v e m e n t s , and gay and lesbian liberation? W h a t are t h e implications for political p h i l o s o ­ p h y of p o s t m o d e r n p h i l o s o p h y ' s c h a l l e n g e to t h e tradition of W e s t e r n rea­ s o n ? H o w can traditional socialist appeals to equality and d e m o c r a c y b e d e e p e n e d and b r o a d e n e d as a result of t h e s e d e v e l o p m e n t s in late t w e n t i ­ e t h - c e n t u r y politics and t h e o r y ? Justice is t h e primary subject of political p h i l o s o p h y . T h e s e q u e s t i o n s are thus inseparable from q u e s t i o n s about j u s t i c e . W h a t c o n c e p t i o n s of social j u s t i c e d o t h e s e n e w social m o v e m e n t s implicitly a p p e a l to, and h o w d o t h e y confront or modify traditional c o n ­ c e p t i o n s of j u s t i c e ? T h e s e are s o m e of t h e q u e s t i o n s that p r o p e l t h e inquiry in this book. In a d d r e s s i n g t h e m I e x p l o r e s o m e p r o b l e m s of positivism and r e d u c t i o n i s m in political t h e o r y . T h e positivism of political t h e o r y consists in too often a s s u m i n g as g i v e n institutional structures that o u g h t to b e b r o u g h t u n d e r n o r m a t i v e e v a l u a t i o n . T h e r e d u c t i o n i s m I e x p o s e is m o d e r n political t h e ­ ory's t e n d e n c y to r e d u c e political subjects to a unity and to v a l u e c o m ­ m o n n e s s or s a m e n e s s o v e r specificity and difference. I a r g u e that instead of focusing o n distribution, a c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e s h o u l d b e g i n w i t h t h e c o n c e p t s of d o m i n a t i o n and o p p r e s s i o n . S u c h a shift brings out i s s u e s of d e c i s i o n m a k i n g , division of labor, and c u l t u r e that bear o n social j u s t i c e but arc often i g n o r e d in philosophical d i s c u s s i o n s . It also e x h i b i t s t h e i m p o r t a n c e of social g r o u p differences in structuring so­ cial relations and o p p r e s s i o n ; typically, philosophical t h e o r i e s of j u s t i c e h a v e o p e r a t e d with a social o n t o l o g y that has n o room for a c o n c e p t of social g r o u p s . I argue that w h e r e social g r o u p differences exist and s o m e g r o u p s are p r i v i l e g e d w h i l e o t h e r s are o p p r e s s e d , social justice r e q u i r e s explicitly a c k n o w l e d g i n g and a t t e n d i n g to t h o s e g r o u p differences in o r d e r to u n d e r m i n e o p p r e s s i o n . A l t h o u g h I d i s c u s s and a r g u e about j u s t i c e , I d o not construct a t h e o r y of j u s t i c e . A t h e o r y of j u s t i c e typically d e r i v e s f u n d a m e n t a l p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e that apply to all or m o s t s o c i e t i e s , w h a t e v e r their c o n c r e t e configu­ ration and social relations, from a f e w g e n e r a l p r e m i s e s about t h e nature of h u m a n b e i n g s , t h e n a t u r e of s o c i e t i e s , and the nature of reason. T r u e to t h e m e a n i n g of theoria, it w a n t s to s e e justice. It a s s u m e s a p o i n t of v i e w

4

•

Introduction

o u t s i d e t h e social c o n t e x t w h e r e issues of j u s t i c e arise, in o r d e r to gain a c o m p r e h e n s i v e view. T h e t h e o r y of j u s t i c e is i n t e n d e d to b e self-standing, s i n c e it e x h i b i t s its o w n foundations. As a d i s c o u r s e it aims to b e w h o l e , and to s h o w j u s t i c e in its unity, It is d e t e m p o r a l i z e d , in that n o t h i n g c o m e s b e f o r e it a n d future e v e n t s will not affect its truth or r e l e v a n c e to social life. T h e o r i s t s of j u s t i c e h a v e a g o o d reason for abstracting from t h e particu­ lar c i r c u m s t a n c e s of social life that g i v e rise to c o n c r e t e claims o f j u s t i c e , to take a p o s i t i o n o u t s i d e social life that rests o n reason. S u c h a self-stand­ i n g rational t h e o r y w o u l d b e i n d e p e n d e n t of actual social institutions and relations, a n d for that r e a s o n c o u l d s e r v e as a reliable and o b j e c t i v e nor­ m a t i v e standard for e v a l u a t i n g t h o s e institutions and relations. W i t h o u t a u n i v e r s a l n o r m a t i v e t h e o r y of j u s t i c e g r o u n d e d i n d e p e n d e n t l y of t h e e x ­ p e r i e n c e of a particular s o c i e t y , it is often a s s u m e d , p h i l o s o p h e r s and so­ cial actors c a n n o t d i s t i n g u i s h l e g i t i m a t e c l a i m s o f justice from socially s p e ­ cific p r e j u d i c e s or s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d claims to p o w e r . T h e a t t e m p t to d e v e l o p a t h e o r y of j u s t i c e that b o t h stands i n d e p e n d e n t of a g i v e n social c o n t e x t a n d y e t m e a s u r e s its j u s t i c e , h o w e v e r , fails in o n e of t w o w a y s . If t h e t h e o r y is truly universal and i n d e p e n d e n t , p r e s u p p o s ­ i n g n o particular social situations, institutions, or practices, t h e n it is s i m ­ p l y t o o abstract to b e useful in e v a l u a t i n g actual institutions and practices. In o r d e r to b e a useful m e a s u r e of actual j u s t i c e and injustice, it m u s t c o n t a i n s o m e s u b s t a n t i v e p r e m i s e s about social life, w h i c h are usually d e ­ r i v e d , e x p l i c i t l y or implicitly, from t h e actual social c o n t e x t in w h i c h t h e t h e o r i z i n g takes p l a c e . M a n y h a v e a r g u e d that Rawls's t h e o r y of j u s t i c e , for e x a m p l e , m u s t h a v e s o m e s u b s t a n t i v e p r e m i s e s if it is to g r o u n d s u b ­ s t a n t i v e c o n c l u s i o n s , and t h e s e p r e m i s e s implicitly d e r i v e from experi­ e n c e of p e o p l e in m o d e r n liberal capitalist s o c i e t i e s ( s e e Young, 1 9 8 1 ; S i m p s o n , 1980; Wolff, 1 9 7 7 , pt. IV). A t h e o r y of j u s t i c e that claims universality, c o m p r e h e n s i v e n e s s , and n e c e s s i t y i m p l i c i t l y conflates moral reflection w i t h scientific k n o w l e d g e ( W i l l i a m s , 1 9 8 5 , c h a p . 6). Reflective d i s c o u r s e about j u s t i c e , h o w e v e r , s h o u l d n o t p o s e as k n o w l e d g e in t h e m o d e of s e e i n g or o b s e r v i n g , w h e r e t h e k n o w e r is initiator a n d m a s t e r of t h e k n o w n . D i s c o u r s e about j u s t i c e is not m o t i v a t e d originally b y curiosity, a s e n s e of w o n d e r , or t h e d e s i r e to figure o u t h o w s o m e t h i n g w o r k s . T h e s e n s e of j u s t i c e arises n o t from look­ ing, b u t as J e a n - F r a n c o i s Lyotard says, from listening: For us, a language is first and foremost someone talking. But there are language games in which the important thing is to listen, in which the rule deals with audition. Such a game is the game of the just. And in this game, one speaks only inasmuch as one listens, that is, one speaks as a listener, and not as an author. (Lyotard, 1985, pp. 71-72)

Introduction

•

5

W h i l e e v e r y d a y d i s c o u r s e about j u s t i c e certainly m a k e s c l a i m s , t h e s e are not t h e o r e m s to b e d e m o n s t r a t e d in a s e l f - e n c l o s e d s y s t e m . T h e y are i n s t e a d calls, p l e a s , claims upon s o m e p e o p l e b y o t h e r s . Rational reflec­ tion o n j u s t i c e b e g i n s in a h e a r i n g , in h e e d i n g a call, rather than in assert­ ing and m a s t e r i n g a state of affairs, h o w e v e r ideal. T h e call to "be just" is always situated in c o n c r e t e social and political practices that p r e c e d e and e x c e e d t h e p h i l o s o p h e r . T h e traditional effort to transcend that finitude toward a u n i v e r s a l t h e o r y y i e l d s o n l y finite constructs w h i c h e s c a p e t h e a p p e a r a n c e of c o n t i n g e n c y usually by recasting t h e g i v e n as n e c e s s a r y . R e j e c t i n g a t h e o r y of j u s t i c e d o e s not entail e s c h e w i n g rational dis­ c o u r s e about j u s t i c e . S o m e m o d e s of reflection, analysis, and a r g u m e n t aim not at b u i l d i n g a s y s t e m a t i c t h e o r y , b u t at clarifying t h e m e a n i n g of c o n c e p t s and i s s u e s , d e s c r i b i n g and explaining social relations, and articu­ lating and d e f e n d i n g ideals and principles. Reflective d i s c o u r s e about j u s ­ tice m a k e s a r g u m e n t s , b u t t h e s e are not i n t e n d e d as definitive d e m o n s t r a ­ tions. T h e y are a d d r e s s e d to o t h e r s and await their r e s p o n s e , in a situated political d i a l o g u e . In this book I e n g a g e in s u c h situated analysis and argu­ m e n t in t h e m o d e of critical t h e o r y . As I u n d e r s t a n d it, critical t h e o r y is a n o r m a t i v e reflection that is histor­ ically and socially c o n t e x t u a l i z e d . Critical t h e o r y rejects as illusory t h e effort to c o n s t r u c t a universal n o r m a t i v e s y s t e m insulated from a particu­ lar s o c i e t y . N o r m a t i v e reflection m u s t b e g i n from historically specific cir­ c u m s t a n c e s b e c a u s e t h e r e is n o t h i n g b u t w h a t is, t h e g i v e n , t h e situated i n t e r e s t in j u s t i c e , from w h i c h to start. Reflecting from w i t h i n a particular social c o n t e x t , g o o d n o r m a t i v e t h e o r i z i n g cannot avoid social and political d e s c r i p t i o n and explanation. W i t h o u t social t h e o r y , n o r m a t i v e reflection is abstract, e m p t y , and u n a b l e to g u i d e criticism w i t h a practical i n t e r e s t in e m a n c i p a t i o n . U n l i k e positivist social t h e o r y , h o w e v e r , w h i c h sepa­ rates social facts from v a l u e s , and claims to b e v a l u e - n e u t r a l , critical t h e ­ ory d e n i e s that social t h e o r y m u s t a c c e d e to t h e g i v e n . Social d e s c r i p t i o n and e x p l a n a t i o n m u s t b e critical, that is, aim to e v a l u a t e t h e g i v e n in nor­ m a t i v e t e r m s . W i t h o u t s u c h a critical stance, m a n y q u e s t i o n s a b o u t w h a t o c c u r s in a s o c i e t y and w h y , w h o benefits and w h o is h a r m e d , will not b e a s k e d , and social t h e o r y is liable to reaffirm and reify t h e g i v e n social reality. Critical t h e o r y p r e s u m e s that t h e n o r m a t i v e ideals u s e d to criticize a s o c i e t y are r o o t e d in e x p e r i e n c e of and reflection o n that v e r y s o c i e t y , and that n o r m s can c o m e from n o w h e r e e l s e . B u t w h a t d o e s this m e a n , and h o w is it p o s s i b l e for n o r m s to b e b o t h socially b a s e d and m e a s u r e s of s o c i e t y ? N o r m a t i v e reflection arises from h e a r i n g a cry of suffering or d i s ­ tress, or f e e l i n g distress oneself. T h e p h i l o s o p h e r is always socially situ­ a t e d , and if t h e s o c i e t y is d i v i d e d b y o p p r e s s i o n s , s h e e i t h e r reinforces or s t r u g g l e s against t h e m . W i t h an e m a n c i p a t o r y interest, t h e p h i l o s o p h e r

6

•

Introduction

a p p r e h e n d s g i v e n social c i r c u m s t a n c e s not m e r e l y in c o n t e m p l a t i o n b u t w i t h passion: t h e g i v e n is e x p e r i e n c e d in relation to d e s i r e . D e s i r e , t h e d e s i r e to b e h a p p y , creates t h e d i s t a n c e , t h e n e g a t i o n , that o p e n s t h e s p a c e for criticism o f w h a t is. This critical d i s t a n c e d o e s not o c c u r on t h e basis of s o m e p r e v i o u s l y d i s c o v e r e d rational ideas of t h e g o o d and t h e just. O n t h e contrary, t h e ideas of t h e good and t h e just arise from t h e d e s i r i n g n e g a t i o n that action brings to w h a t is g i v e n . Critical t h e o r y is a m o d e of d i s c o u r s e w h i c h projects n o r m a t i v e possibil­ ities u n r e a l i z e d but felt in a particular g i v e n social reality. E a c h social reality p r e s e n t s its o w n u n r e a l i z e d possibilities, e x p e r i e n c e d as lacks and d e s i r e s . N o r m s and ideals arise from t h e y e a r n i n g that is an e x p r e s s i o n of f r e e d o m : it d o e s not h a v e to b e this w a y , it c o u l d be o t h e r w i s e . Imagina­ tion is t h e faculty of transforming t h e e x p e r i e n c e of w h a t is into a projec­ tion of w h a t c o u l d b e , t h e faculty that frees t h o u g h t to form ideals and norms. H e r b e r t M a r c u s e d e s c r i b e s this g e n e s i s of ideals from an e x p e r i e n c e o f t h e p o s s i b i l i t i e s d e s i r e d but u n r e a l i z e d in t h e given: There are a large class of concepts—we dare say, philosophically relevant con­ cepts—where the quantitative relation between the universal and the particular assumes a qualitative aspect, where the abstract, universal seems to designate potentialities in a concrete, historical sense. However "man," "nature,' "jus­ tice," "beauty," or "freedom" may be defined, they synthesize experiential con­ tents into ideas which transcend their particular realizations as something to be surpassed, overcome. Thus the concept of beauty comprehends all the beauty not yet realized; the conception of freedom all the liberty not yet attained. . . . Such universals thus appear as conceptual instruments for understanding the particular conditions of things in light of their potentialities. They are historical and supra-historical; they conceptualize the stuff of which the experienced world consists, and they conceptualize it with a view of its possibilities, in the light of their actual limitation, suppression, and denial. Neither the experience nor judgment is private. The philosophic concepts are formed and developed in the consciousness of a general condition in a historical continuum; they are elaborated from an individual position within a specific society. The stuff of thought is historical stuff—no matter how abstract, general, or pure it may be­ come in philosophic or scientific theory. (Marcuse, 1964, pp. 214-15) In his n o t i o n of interpretation as social criticism, M i c h a e l W a l z e r e n ­ d o r s e s a similar approach to moral reflection. T h e social critic is e n g a g e d in and c o m m i t t e d to t h e s o c i e t y h e or s h e criticizes. S h e d o e s not take a d e t a c h e d point of v i e w toward t h e s o c i e t y and its institutions, t h o u g h s h e d o e s stand apart from its ruling p o w e r s . T h e n o r m a t i v e basis for h e r criti­ c i s m c o m e s from t h e ideals and t e n s i o n s of t h e s o c i e t y itself, ideals already t h e r e in s o m e form, in e s p o u s e d principles that are v i o l a t e d , for e x a m p l e ,

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7

or in social m o v e m e n t s that c h a l l e n g e h e g e m o n i c ideas. T h e criticism of t h e social critic "does not r e q u i r e e i t h e r d e t a c h m e n t or e n m i t y , b e c a u s e h e finds a warrant for critical e n g a g e m e n t in t h e i d e a l i s m , e v e n if it is a h y p o t h e t i c a l i d e a l i s m , of t h e actually e x i s t i n g moral w o r l d " (Walzer, 1987, p. 61). This b o o k has its p h i l o s o p h i c a l starting point in claims about social d o m ­ ination and o p p r e s s i o n in t h e U n i t e d States. Ideas and e x p e r i e n c e born in t h e n e w left social m o v e m e n t s of t h e 1960s and 1970s c o n t i n u e to inform t h e t h o u g h t s and actions of m a n y individuals and organizations in c o n t e m ­ porary A m e r i c a n political life: d e m o c r a t i c socialist, e n v i r o n m e n t a l i s t , Black, C h i c a n o , P u e r t o Rican, and A m e r i c a n Indian m o v e m e n t s ; m o v e ­ m e n t s against U . S . military i n t e r v e n t i o n in t h e Third World; gay and l e s ­ bian liberation; m o v e m e n t s of t h e d i s a b l e d , t h e old, t e n a n t s , and t h e poor; and t h e f e m i n i s t m o v e m e n t . T h e s e m o v e m e n t s all claim in varying w a y s that A m e r i c a n s o c i e t y contains d e e p institutional injustices. But t h e y find little k i n s h i p w i t h c o n t e m p o r a r y philosophical t h e o r i e s of j u s t i c e . M y aim is to e x p r e s s rigorously and reflectively s o m e of t h e claims about j u s t i c e and injustice implicit in the politics of t h e s e m o v e m e n t s , and to e x p l o r e t h e i r m e a n i n g and implications. I identify s o m e b a s e s for dis­ parity b e t w e e n c o n t e m p o r a r y situated claims and theoretical claims about j u s t i c e in f u n d a m e n t a l a s s u m p t i o n s of m o d e r n W e s t e r n political p h i l o s o ­ p h y . T h i s project r e q u i r e s b o t h criticism of ideas and institutions and t h e assertion of p o s i t i v e ideals and principles. I criticize s o m e of t h e l a n g u a g e and p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e that d o m i n a t e in c o n t e m p o r a r y p h i l o s o p h y and offer a l t e r n a t i v e p r i n c i p l e s . I e x a m i n e a n u m b e r of p o l i c i e s , institutions, and practices of U . S . s o c i e t y , and s h o w h o w s o m e of t h e philosophical p r i n c i p l e s I criticize are also ideological insofar as t h e y reinforce t h e s e institutions and practices. I offer, finally, s o m e alternative visions of ideal social relations. T h o u g h m y m e t h o d is d e r i v e d from critical t h e o r y , I reject s o m e t e n e t s of critical t h e o r i s t s . W h i l e I follow Habermas's a c c o u n t of a d v a n c e d capi­ talism and his g e n e r a l notion of c o m m u n i c a t i v e e t h i c s , for e x a m p l e , I n e v ­ e r t h e l e s s criticize his implicit c o m m i t m e n t to a h o m o g e n e o u s p u b l i c . I am also i n d e b t e d to several o t h e r approaches to p h i l o s o p h y and political t h e ­ ory. I e x t e n d s o m e c o n t e m p o r a r y feminist analyses of t h e m a l e bias im­ plicit in t h e ideals of rationality, c i t i z e n s h i p , and equality central to m o d ­ ern moral and political t h e o r y . M y inquiry about a p o s i t i v e s e n s e of g r o u p difference and a politics that attends to rather than r e p r e s s e s difference o w e s m u c h to d i s c u s s i o n s of t h e m e a n i n g of difference in such p o s t m o d e r n writers as D e r r i d a , Lyotard, Foucault, and Kristeva. F r o m this p o s t m o d ­ ern o r i e n t a t i o n , in w h i c h I also i n c l u d e s o m e of t h e writings of A d o r n o and Irigaray, I a p p r o p r i a t e a c r i t i q u e of unifying d i s c o u r s e to analyze and crit­ icize s u c h c o n c e p t s as impartiality, t h e general g o o d , and c o m m u n i t y .

8

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Introduction

F r o m t h e l e s s o n s of t h e s e c r i t i q u e s I d e r i v e an alternative c o n c e p t i o n of differentiated social relations. T h e analyses and a r g u m e n t s in this book also draw o n analytic moral and political p h i l o s o p h y , Marxism, participa­ tory d e m o c r a t i c t h e o r y , and Black p h i l o s o p h y . R e c e n t years h a v e w i t n e s s e d m u c h d i s c u s s i o n a b o u t t h e virtues and v i c e s of e a c h of t h e s e t h e o r e t i c a l a p p r o a c h e s , and m a n y w o u l d find t h e m i n c o m p a t i b l e . A d e b a t e about m o d e r n i s m v e r s u s p o s t m o d e r n i s m has r e ­ c e n t l y r a g e d a m o n g critical theorists, for e x a m p l e — a d e b a t e w h i c h has an a n a l o g u e a m o n g f e m i n i s t theorists. In this book I d o not explicitly treat m e t a t h e o r e t i c a l q u e s t i o n s a b o u t t h e criteria for evaluating theoretical ap­ p r o a c h e s to social and n o r m a t i v e theorizing. W h e n social theorists and social critics focus o n s u c h e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l q u e s t i o n s , t h e y often abstract from t h e social i s s u e s that originally g a v e rise to t h e d i s p u t e s and impart an intrinsic v a l u e to t h e e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l e n t e r p r i s e . M e t h o d o l o g i c a l and e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l i s s u e s d o arise in t h e c o u r s e of this s t u d y , b u t I treat t h e m always as i n t e r r u p t i o n s of t h e s u b s t a n t i v e n o r m a t i v e and social i s s u e s at h a n d . I d o n o t regard any of t h e theoretical a p p r o a c h e s w h i c h I take u p as a totality that m u s t b e a c c e p t e d or r e j e c t e d in its e n t i r e t y . E a c h p r o v i d e s useful tools for t h e a n a l y s e s and a r g u m e n t s I w i s h to m a k e . I b e g i n in C h a p t e r 1 b y d i s t i n g u i s h i n g b e t w e e n an approach to social j u s ­ tice that g i v e s p r i m a c y to h a v i n g and o n e that g i v e s p r i m a c y to d o i n g . C o n t e m p o r a r y t h e o r i e s of j u s t i c e are d o m i n a t e d b y a distributive para­ d i g m , w h i c h t e n d s to focus o n t h e p o s s e s s i o n of material g o o d s and social p o s i t i o n s . This distributive focus, h o w e v e r , o b s c u r e s o t h e r i s s u e s of insti­ tutional organization at t h e s a m e t i m e that it often a s s u m e s particular in­ stitutions and practices as g i v e n . S o m e d i s t r i b u t i v e t h e o r i e s of j u s t i c e explicitly s e e k to take into a c c o u n t i s s u e s of j u s t i c e b e y o n d t h e distribution of material g o o d s . T h e y e x t e n d t h e d i s t r i b u t i v e paradigm to c o v e r s u c h g o o d s as self-respect, o p p o r t u ­ nity, p o w e r , and honor. S e r i o u s c o n c e p t u a l confusion results, h o w e v e r , from a t t e m p t i n g to e x t e n d t h e c o n c e p t of distribution b e y o n d material g o o d s to p h e n o m e n a s u c h as p o w e r and opportunity. T h e logic of distribu­ tion treats n o n m a t e r i a l g o o d s as identifiable things or b u n d l e s d i s t r i b u t e d in a static p a t t e r n a m o n g identifiable, separate individuals. T h e reification, i n d i v i d u a l i s m , and pattern orientation a s s u m e d in t h e distributive p a r a d i g m , m o r e o v e r , often o b s c u r e i s s u e s of d o m i n a t i o n and o p p r e s s i o n , w h i c h r e q u i r e a m o r e p r o c e s s - o r i e n t e d and relational c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n . D i s t r i b u t i v e i s s u e s are certainly important, b u t t h e s c o p e o f j u s t i c e e x ­ t e n d s b e y o n d t h e m to i n c l u d e t h e political as such, that is, all a s p e c t s of institutional organization insofar as t h e y are potentially s u b j e c t to c o l l e c ­ tive d e c i s i o n . Rather than a t t e m p t i n g to stretch distribution to c o v e r t h e s e , I a r g u e that t h e c o n c e p t of distribution s h o u l d b e l i m i t e d to m a t e -

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9

rial g o o d s , and that o t h e r i m p o r t a n t a s p e c t s of j u s t i c e i n c l u d e d e c i s i o n ­ m a k i n g p r o c e d u r e s , t h e social division of labor, and culture. O p p r e s s i o n and d o m i n a t i o n , I a r g u e , s h o u l d b e t h e primary t e r m s for c o n c e p t u a l i z i n g injustice. T h e c o n c e p t of o p p r e s s i o n is central to t h e d i s c o u r s e o f t h e c o n t e m ­ porary e m a n c i p a t o r y social m o v e m e n t s w h o s e p e r s p e c t i v e s inspire t h e critical q u e s t i o n s of this book. Yet t h e r e exists n o s u s t a i n e d t h e o r e t i c a l analysis o f t h e c o n c e p t of o p p r e s s i o n as u n d e r s t o o d by t h e s e m o v e m e n t s . C h a p t e r 2 fills this c o n s p i c u o u s gap in social t h e o r y by d e f i n i n g o p p r e s ­ sion. A c t u a l l y a family of c o n c e p t s , o p p r e s s i o n has five a s p e c t s w h i c h I explicate: e x p l o i t a t i o n , marginalization, p o w e r l e s s n e s s , cultural imperial­ ism, a n d v i o l e n c e . D i s t r i b u t i v e injustices m a y c o n t r i b u t e to or result from t h e s e forms of o p p r e s s i o n , b u t n o n e is r e d u c i b l e to distribution and all i n v o l v e social s t r u c t u r e s and relations b e y o n d distribution. O p p r e s s i o n h a p p e n s to social g r o u p s . But p h i l o s o p h y and social t h e o r y typically lack a v i a b l e c o n c e p t o f t h e social g r o u p . N o t a b l y in t h e c o n t e x t of affirmative action d e b a t e , s o m e p h i l o s o p h e r s and p o l i c y m a k e r s e v e n refuse to a c k n o w l e d g e t h e reality o f social g r o u p s , a denial that often r e ­ inforces g r o u p o p p r e s s i o n s . In C h a p t e r 2 I d e v e l o p a specific c o n c e p t o f t h e social g r o u p . W h i l e groups d o not exist apart from i n d i v i d u a l s , t h e y are socially prior to individuals, b e c a u s e p e o p l e ' s i d e n t i t i e s are partly c o n ­ s t i t u t e d b y t h e i r g r o u p affinities. Social g r o u p s reflect w a y s that p e o p l e identify t h e m s e l v e s a n d o t h e r s , w h i c h l e a d t h e m to associate w i t h s o m e p e o p l e m o r e than o t h e r s , and to treat o t h e r s as different. G r o u p s are i d e n ­ tified in relation to o n e another. T h e i r e x i s t e n c e is fluid and often shifting, b u t n e v e r t h e l e s s real. T h e c o n c e p t of j u s t i c e is c o e x t e n s i v e w i t h t h e political. Politics, in H a n ­ nah Pitkin's w o r d s is "the activity t h r o u g h w h i c h relatively large and p e r ­ m a n e n t g r o u p s o f p e o p l e d e t e r m i n e w h a t t h e y will c o l l e c t i v e l y d o , s e t t l e h o w t h e y will l i v e t o g e t h e r , and d e c i d e their future, to w h a t e v e r e x t e n t this is w i t h i n t h e i r p o w e r " (Pitkin, 1 9 8 1 , p. 343). R o b e r t o U n g e r d e f i n e s politics as "struggle o v e r t h e r e s o u r c e s and a r r a n g e m e n t s that s e t t h e basic t e r m s of our practical and passionate relations. P r e e m i n e n t a m o n g t h e s e a r r a n g e m e n t s , " h e o b s e r v e s , "is t h e formative institutional and i m a g i n a t i v e c o n t e x t of social life" ( U n g e r , 1987a, p. 145). Politics in this s e n s e c o n c e r n s all a s p e c t s of institutional organization, p u b l i c action, so­ cial p r a c t i c e s and habits, and cultural m e a n i n g s insofar as t h e y are p o t e n ­ tially s u b j e c t to c o l l e c t i v e e v a l u a t i o n and d e c i s i o n m a k i n g . W h e n p e o p l e say a rule or practice or cultural m e a n i n g is w r o n g and s h o u l d b e c h a n g e d , t h e y are usually m a k i n g a claim a b o u t social j u s t i c e . This is a w i d e r u n d e r ­ s t a n d i n g o f t h e m e a n i n g of politics than that c o m m o n a m o n g m o s t p h i l o s o ­ p h e r s a n d p o l i c y m a k e r s , w h o t e n d to identify politics as t h e activities o f g o v e r n m e n t or formal i n t e r e s t - g r o u p organizations. C h a p t e r 3 takes u p a

10

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Introduction

primary c o n t r i b u t i o n of n e w left social m o v e m e n t s , their c o n t i n u i n g effort to p o l i t i c i z e vast areas of institutional, social, and cultural life in t h e face of forces of welfare state liberalism w h i c h o p e r a t e to d e p o l i t i c i z e p u b l i c life. W i t h m a n y critical theorists and d e m o c r a t i c theorists, I criticize welfare capitalist s o c i e t y for d e p o l i t i c i z i n g t h e p r o c e s s of p u b l i c policy formation. Welfare state practices define policy as t h e p r o v i n c e of e x p e r t s , and c o n ­ fine conflict to bargaining a m o n g i n t e r e s t g r o u p s about t h e distribution of social b e n e f i t s . T h e d i s t r i b u t i v e paradigm of j u s t i c e t e n d s to reflect and reinforce this d e p o l i t i c i z e d p u b l i c life, b y failing to bring issues of d e c i ­ s i o n m a k i n g p o w e r , for e x a m p l e , into explicit p u b l i c d i s c u s s i o n . D e m o ­ cratic d e c i s i o n m a k i n g p r o c e s s e s , I a r g u e , are an important e l e m e n t and c o n d i t i o n of social j u s t i c e . S o m e f e m i n i s t and p o s t m o d e r n writers h a v e s u g g e s t e d that a d e n i a l of d i f f e r e n c e s t r u c t u r e s W e s t e r n reason, w h e r e difference m e a n s particular­ ity, t h e h e t e r o g e n e i t y of t h e b o d y and affectivity, or t h e inexhaustibility of l i n g u i s t i c and social relations w i t h o u t a unitary, undifferentiated origin. This b o o k s e e k s to s h o w h o w s u c h a denial of difference c o n t r i b u t e s to social g r o u p o p p r e s s i o n , and to argue for a politics that r e c o g n i z e s rather than r e p r e s s e s difference. T h u s C h a p t e r 4 a r g u e s that t h e ideal of imparti­ ality, a k e y s t o n e of m o s t m o d e r n moral t h e o r i e s and t h e o r i e s of j u s t i c e , d e n i e s d i f f e r e n c e . T h e ideal of impartiality s u g g e s t s that all moral situa­ tions s h o u l d b e t r e a t e d according to t h e s a m e rules. By c l a i m i n g to pro­ v i d e a s t a n d p o i n t w h i c h all subjects can a d o p t , it d e n i e s t h e difference b e t w e e n s u b j e c t s . B y p o s i t i n g a unified and universal moral p o i n t of v i e w , it g e n e r a t e s a d i c h o t o m y b e t w e e n reason and feeling. U s u a l l y e x p r e s s e d in c o u n t e r f a c t u a l s , t h e ideal of impartiality e x p r e s s e s an impossibility. It s e r v e s at least t w o i d e o l o g i c a l functions, m o r e o v e r . First, claims to impar­ tiality f e e d cultural i m p e r i a l i s m b y allowing t h e particular e x p e r i e n c e and p e r s p e c t i v e of p r i v i l e g e d g r o u p s to parade as universal. S e c o n d , t h e c o n ­ v i c t i o n that bureaucrats and experts can e x e r c i s e their d e c i s i o n m a k i n g p o w e r in an impartial m a n n e r l e g i t i m a t e s authoritarian hierarchy. Impartiality, I also s u g g e s t in C h a p t e r 4, has its political counterpart in t h e ideal of t h e civic p u b l i c . Critical t h e o r y and participatory democratict h e o r y s h a r e w i t h t h e liberal t h e o r y t h e y c h a l l e n g e a t e n d e n c y to s u p p r e s s d i f f e r e n c e b y c o n c e i v i n g t h e polity as universal and unified, This u n i v e r salist ideal of t h e civic p u b l i c has o p e r a t e d to effectively e x c l u d e from c i t i z e n s h i p p e r s o n s identified w i t h t h e b o d y and f e e l i n g — w o m e n , J e w s , Blacks, A m e r i c a n I n d i a n s , and so o n . A c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e w h i c h chal­ l e n g e s i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d d o m i n a t i o n and o p p r e s s i o n s h o u l d offer a vision of a h e t e r o g e n e o u s p u b l i c that a c k n o w l e d g e s and affirms g r o u p differences. O n e c o n s e q u e n c e of t h e ideal of moral reason as impartiality is t h e t h e ­ oretical s e p a r a t i o n of reason from b o d y and feeling. In C h a p t e r 5 I discuss

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11

s o m e i m p l i c a t i o n s of m o d e r n society's denigration of t h e b o d y . In its i d e n ­ tification of s o m e g r o u p s w i t h d e s p i s e d or ugly b o d i e s , rationalistic c u l t u r e c o n t r i b u t e s to t h e o p p r e s s i o n s of cultural i m p e r i a l i s m and v i o l e n c e . T h e cultural logic that h i e r a r c h i z e s b o d i e s according to a " n o r m a t i v e g a z e " locates b o d i e s o n a s i n g l e a e s t h e t i c scale that constructs s o m e kinds of b o d i e s as u g l y , d i s g u s t i n g , or d e g e n e r a t e . U s i n g Kristeva's t h e o r y of t h e abject, I a n a l y z e t h e political i m p o r t a n c e of feelings of b e a u t y and ugli­ n e s s , c l e a n l i n e s s a n d filth, in t h e interactive d y n a m i c s and cultural s t e r e o ­ t y p i n g of racism, s e x i s m , h o m o p h o b i a , a g e i s m , and a b l e i s m . In our s o c i e t y a v e r s i v e or anxious reactions to t h e b o d i l y p r e s e n c e of o t h e r s c o n t r i b u t e to o p p r e s s i o n . S u c h cultural reactions are usually u n ­ c o n s c i o u s , h o w e v e r , often e x h i b i t e d b y l i b e r a l - m i n d e d p e o p l e w h o i n t e n d to treat e v e r y o n e w i t h e q u a l r e s p e c t . B e c a u s e moral t h e o r i e s t e n d to focus o n d e l i b e r a t e action for w h i c h t h e y s e e k m e a n s of justification, t h e y u s u ­ ally d o not b r i n g u n i n t e n d e d social s o u r c e s of o p p r e s s i o n u n d e r j u d g m e n t . A c o n c e p t i o n of justice that fails to n o t i c e and s e e k institutional r e m e d y for t h e s e cultural s o u r c e s o f o p p r e s s i o n , h o w e v e r , is i n a d e q u a t e . I d i s c u s s s o m e r e m e d i e s in p r o c e s s e s of c o n s c i o u s n e s s raising and cultural d e c i s i o n ­ making. S u c h cultural c h a n g e occurs partly w h e n d e s p i s e d groups s e i z e t h e m e a n s of cultural e x p r e s s i o n to r e d e f i n e a p o s i t i v e i m a g e of t h e m s e l v e s . In t h e last t w e n t y years f e m i n i s t s , Black liberation activists, A m e r i c a n Indi­ ans, d i s a b l e d p e o p l e , and o t h e r groups o p p r e s s e d by b e i n g m a r k e d as fearful b o d i e s h a v e a s s e r t e d s u c h i m a g e s of p o s i t i v e difference. S u c h m o v e m e n t s of g r o u p p r i d e h a v e c o m e to c h a l l e n g e an ideal of liberation as t h e e l i m i n a t i o n of g r o u p difference from political and institutional life. In C h a p t e r 6 I a r g u e for p r i n c i p l e s and practices that instead identify libera­ tion w i t h social e q u a l i t y that affirms g r o u p difference and fosters t h e inclu­ sion and participation of all groups in p u b l i c life. T h e p r i n c i p l e o f e q u a l t r e a t m e n t originally arose as a formal g u a r a n t e e of fair i n c l u s i v e t r e a t m e n t . This m e c h a n i c a l interpretation of fairness, h o w e v e r , also s u p p r e s s e s difference. T h e politics of difference s o m e t i m e s i m p l i e s o v e r r i d i n g a p r i n c i p l e of e q u a l t r e a t m e n t w i t h t h e p r i n c i p l e that g r o u p d i f f e r e n c e s s h o u l d b e a c k n o w l e d g e d in p u b l i c policy and in t h e pol­ icies and p r o c e d u r e s of e c o n o m i c institutions, in order to r e d u c e actual or p o t e n t i a l o p p r e s s i o n . U s i n g e x a m p l e s from c o n t e m p o r a r y legal d e b a t e , i n c l u d i n g d e b a t e s about e q u a l i t y and difference in w o m e n ' s liberation, bilingual e d u c a t i o n , a n d A m e r i c a n Indian rights, I argue that s o m e t i m e s r e c o g n i z i n g particular rights for groups is t h e o n l y w a y to p r o m o t e their full participation. S o m e fear that such differential t r e a t m e n t again s t i g m a ­ tizes t h e s e g r o u p s . I s h o w h o w this is true only if w e c o n t i n u e to u n d e r ­ stand difference as o p p o s i t i o n — i d e n t i f y i n g equality w i t h s a m e n e s s and d i f f e r e n c e w i t h d e v i a n c e or d e v a l u a t i o n . R e c o g n i t i o n of g r o u p difference

12

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Introduction

also r e q u i r e s a p r i n c i p l e of political d e c i s i o n m a k i n g that e n c o u r a g e s au­ t o n o m o u s organization of groups w i t h i n a p u b l i c . This entails e s t a b l i s h i n g p r o c e d u r e s for e n s u r i n g that e a c h g r o u p s v o i c e is heard in t h e p u b l i c , t h r o u g h i n s t i t u t i o n s of g r o u p r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . W i t h i n t h e c o n t e x t of a g e n e r a l p r i n c i p l e that p r o m o t e s a t t e n d i n g to g r o u p d i f f e r e n c e s in o r d e r to u n d e r m i n e o p p r e s s i o n , affirmative action p r o g r a m s d o not a p p e a r so extraordinary as c o n t e m p o r a r y rhetoric often m a k e s t h e m s e e m . In C h a p t e r 7 I s u p p o r t affirmative action p r o g r a m s , not on g r o u n d s of c o m p e n s a t i o n for past discrimination, b u t as i m p o r t a n t m e a n s for u n d e r m i n i n g o p p r e s s i o n , e s p e c i a l l y o p p r e s s i o n that results from u n c o n s c i o u s a v e r s i o n s and s t e r e o t y p e s and from t h e a s s u m p t i o n that t h e p o i n t o f v i e w of t h e p r i v i l e g e d is neutral. D i s c u s s i o n of affirmative action, h o w e v e r , t e n d s to exhibit t h e distributive paradigm of j u s t i c e . C o n c e r n e d o n l y w i t h t h e distribution of p o s i t i o n s o f h i g h reward and p r e s ­ t i g e a m o n g g r o u p s , this d i s c u s s i o n t e n d s to p r e s u p p o s e institutions and p r a c t i c e s w h o s e j u s t i c e it d o e s not q u e s t i o n . I e x a m i n e t w o s u c h a s s u m p ­ tions in particular: t h e i d e a that p o s i t i o n s can and s h o u l d b e d i s t r i b u t e d a c c o r d i n g to merit criteria, and t h e hierarchical division of labor that m a k e s s o m e scarce p o s i t i o n s h i g h l y r e w a r d e d and most p o s i t i o n s less desirable. T h e ideal of m e r i t distribution of p o s i t i o n s is an i n s t a n c e of t h e ideal of impartiality. Criteria of merit a s s u m e that t h e r e are o b j e c t i v e m e a s u r e s and p r e d i c t o r s of t e c h n i c a l work p e r f o r m a n c e i n d e p e n d e n t of cultural and n o r m a t i v e attributes. B u t I argue that n o s u c h m e a s u r e s exist; j o b alloca­ tion is i n e v i t a b l y political in t h e s e n s e that it i n v o l v e s specific v a l u e s and n o r m s w h i c h c a n n o t b e separated from i s s u e s of technical c o m p e t e n c e . If m e r i t d i s t r i b u t i o n of scarce positions is i m p o s s i b l e , t h e l e g i t i m a c y of t h o s e p o s i t i o n s t h e m s e l v e s is b r o u g h t into q u e s t i o n . A hierarchical division of labor that s e p a r a t e s task-defining from t a s k - e x e c u t i n g work e n a c t s d o m i ­ nation, and p r o d u c e s or reinforces at least t h r e e forms of o p p r e s s i o n : ex­ ploitation, p o w e r l e s s n e s s , and cultural i m p e r i a l i s m . S o m e of this injustice can b e m i t i g a t e d indirectly b y d e m o c r a t i z i n g w o r k p l a c e s . But t h e division b e t w e e n task-defining and t a s k - e x e c u t i n g work m u s t also b e attacked di­ rectly to e l i m i n a t e t h e p r i v i l e g e s of s p e c i a l i z e d training and e n s u r e that all p e r s o n s h a v e s k i l l - d e v e l o p i n g work. Critics of liberalism and welfare bureaucracy often appeal to t h e ideal of c o m m u n i t y as an alternative vision of social life. C o m m u n i t y r e p r e s e n t s an ideal of s h a r e d p u b l i c life, of m u t u a l recognition and identification. T h e c o n c l u d i n g c h a p t e r argues that t h e ideal of c o m m u n i t y also s u p p r e s s e s d i f f e r e n c e a m o n g s u b j e c t s and g r o u p s . T h e i m p u l s e to c o m m u n i t y often c o i n c i d e s w i t h a d e s i r e to p r e s e r v e i d e n t i t y and in practice e x c l u d e s o t h ­ ers w h o t h r e a t e n that s e n s e of identity. I d e v e l o p a n o t h e r ideal of social relations and politics, w h i c h b e g i n s from o u r p o s i t i v e e x p e r i e n c e of city

Introduction

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13

life. Ideally city life e m b o d i e s four virtues that r e p r e s e n t h e t e r o g e n e i t y rather than unity: social differentiaion w i t h o u t e x c l u s i o n , variety, eroti­ c i s m , and publicity. Far short of t h e ideal, c o n t e m p o r a r y A m e r i c a n cities actually contain m a n y injustices. Capital m o v e m e n t and land u s e d e c i s i o n s p r o d u c e and r e p r o d u c e injustices not w e l l c a p t u r e d by a theory that f o c u s e s primarily o n patterns of e n d - s t a t e distribution. Additional injustices arise from t h e separation of functions and s e g r e g a t i o n of groups p r o d u c e d b y z o n i n g and s u b u r b a n i z a t i o n . Contrary to m a n y d e m o c r a t i c theorists, h o w e v e r , I think that i n c r e a s i n g local a u t o n o m y w o u l d e x a c e r b a t e t h e s e p r o b l e m s . T h e n o r m a t i v e ideal o f city life w o u l d b e b e t t e r realized t h r o u g h m e t r o ­ politan regional g o v e r n m e n t f o u n d e d in representational institutions that b e g i n in n e i g h b o r h o o d a s s e m b l i e s . I e n d t h e book w i t h a short discussion of h o w t h e i s s u e s raised in this book m a y b e e x t e n d e d to c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of international j u s t i c e . In p u r s u i t of a s y s t e m a t i c t h e o r y , m u c h philosophical w r i t i n g a d d r e s s e s an a u d i e n c e m a d e u p abstractly of all reasonable p e r s o n s from t h e point of v i e w of any r e a s o n a b l e p e r s o n . B e c a u s e I u n d e r s t a n d critical t h e o r y as starting from a specific location in a specific s o c i e t y , I can claim in this w r i t i n g to b e n e i t h e r impartial nor c o m p r e h e n s i v e . I claim to speak n e i ­ ther for e v e r y o n e , to e v e r y o n e , nor about e v e r y t h i n g . M y p e r s o n a l political passion b e g i n s w i t h f e m i n i s m , and it is from m y participation in t h e c o n t e m p o r a r y w o m e n ' s m o v e m e n t that I first l e a r n e d to identify o p p r e s s i o n and d e v e l o p social and n o r m a t i v e theoretical reflec­ tion o n it. M y f e m i n i s m , h o w e v e r , has always b e e n s u p p l e m e n t e d by c o m m i t m e n t to and participation in m o v e m e n t s against military i n t e r v e n ­ tion abroad and for s y s t e m a t i c restructuring of t h e social c i r c u m s t a n c e s that k e e p so m a n y p e o p l e p o o r and d i s a d v a n t a g e d at h o m e . T h e interac­ tion of f e m i n i s m w i t h Marxism and participatory d e m o c r a t i c t h e o r y and practice a c c o u n t s for t h e plural u n d e r s t a n d i n g of o p p r e s s i o n and d o m i n a ­ tion I p r e s e n t in t h e s e p a g e s . M y o w n reflections o n t h e politics of difference w e r e i g n i t e d b y d i s c u s ­ sions in t h e w o m e n ' s m o v e m e n t of t h e i m p o r t a n c e and difficulty of ac­ k n o w l e d g i n g d i f f e r e n c e s of class, race, sexuality, a g e , ability, and c u l t u r e a m o n g w o m e n . As w o m e n of color, d i s a b l e d w o m e n , old w o m e n , and o t h e r s i n c r e a s i n g l y v o i c e d t h e i r e x p e r i e n c e s of e x c l u s i o n , invisibility, or s t e r e o t y p i n g b y f e m i n i s t d i s c o u r s e , t h e a s s u m p t i o n that f e m i n i s m i d e n t i ­ fies and s e e k s to c h a n g e t h e c o m m o n position of w o m e n b e c a m e increas­ ingly u n t e n a b l e . I d o not at all think this m e a n s t h e e n d of specifically f e m i n i s t d i s c o u r s e , b e c a u s e I still e x p e r i e n c e , as d o m a n y o t h e r w o m e n , t h e affinity for o t h e r w o m e n w h i c h w e h a v e called s i s t e r h o o d , e v e n across d i f f e r e n c e s . N e v e r t h e l e s s this discussion has c o m p e l l e d m e to m o v e out of

14

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Introduction

a focus specifically o n w o m e n ' s o p p r e s s i o n , to try to u n d e r s t a n d as w e l l t h e social position of o t h e r o p p r e s s e d groups. As a w h i t e , h e t e r o s e x u a l , m i d d l e - c l a s s , a b l e - b o d i e d , not old w o m a n , I c a n n o t claim to speak for radical m o v e m e n t s of Blacks, Latinos, A m e r i c a n Indians, p o o r p e o p l e , l e s b i a n s , old p e o p l e , or t h e d i s a b l e d . But t h e politi­ cal c o m m i t m e n t to social j u s t i c e w h i c h m o t i v a t e s m y philosophical reflec­ tion tells m e that I also cannot speak w i t h o u t t h e m . T h u s w h i l e m y per­ sonal passion b e g i n s w i t h f e m i n i s m , and I reflect o n t h e e x p e r i e n c e and i d e a s of t h e p e a c e , e n v i r o n m e n t a l , and a n t i - i n t e r v e n t i o n m o v e m e n t s in w h i c h I h a v e participated, t h e positions I d e v e l o p in this book e m e r g e from reflection on t h e e x p e r i e n c e and ideas of m o v e m e n t s o f o t h e r o p ­ p r e s s e d g r o u p s , insofar as I can u n d e r s t a n d that e x p e r i e n c e by r e a d i n g and b y talking w i t h p e o p l e in t h e m . T h u s w h i l e I d o not claim h e r e to speak for all r e a s o n a b l e p e r s o n s , I d o aim to speak from m u l t i p l e positions and o n t h e basis of t h e e x p e r i e n c e of several c o n t e m p o r a r y social m o v e ­ ments. P h i l o s o p h e r s a c k n o w l e d g e t h e partiality of t h e a u d i e n c e to w h i c h their a r g u m e n t s are a d d r e s s e d , it s e e m s to m e , often e v e n less than t h e y ac­ k n o w l e d g e t h e particularity of t h e v o i c e of their writing. In this book I m a k e s o m e a s s u m p t i o n s that p e r h a p s not all reasonable p e r s o n s share: that basic e q u a l i t y in life situation for all p e r s o n s is a moral value; that t h e r e are d e e p injustices in our s o c i e t y that can be rectified o n l y by basic institutional c h a n g e s ; that the g r o u p s I h a v e n a m e d are o p p r e s s e d ; that s t r u c t u r e s of d o m i n a t i o n wrongfully p e r v a d e our society. C e r t a i n l y m a n y i n t e l l e c t u a l s and p o l i c y m a k e r s today are s y m p a t h e t i c e n o u g h w i t h t h e s e a s s u m p t i o n s to w a n t to participate in discussion of s o m e of their implica­ tions for c o n c e i v i n g and i m a g i n i n g social j u s t i c e . For t h o s e w h o d o not share o n e or m o r e of t h e s e a s s u m p t i o n s , I h o p e t h e analyses and argu­ m e n t s in this book will n e v e r t h e l e s s stimulate a fruitful political d i a l o g u e .

CHAPTER 1

Displacing the Distributive Paradigm It was in general a mistake to make a fuss about so-called distribution and put the principal stress on it. Any distribu­ tion whatever of the means of consumption is only a conse­ quence of the distribution of the conditions of production themselves. The latter distribution, however, is a feature of the mode of production itself. —Karl Marx

T H O U S A N D S of b u s e s c o n v e r g e on t h e city, and t e n s of t h o u s a n d s of p e o p l e of d i v e r s e colors, a g e s , o c c u p a t i o n s , and life styles swarm o n t o t h e mall around t h e W a s h i n g t o n M o n u m e n t until t h e march b e g i n s . At m i d d a y p e o p l e m o v e into t h e s t r e e t s , c h a n t i n g , singing, w a v i n g w i l d papierm a c h e missiles or effigies of g o v e r n m e n t officials. M a n y carry signs or b a n n e r s o n w h i c h a s i m p l e slogan is inscribed: " P e a c e , Jobs, and Justice." This s c e n e has o c c u r r e d m a n y t i m e s in W a s h i n g t o n , D C , in t h e last d e c a d e , and m a n y m o r e t i m e s in o t h e r U . S . cities. W h a t d o e s "justice m e a n in this slogan? In this c o n t e x t , as in m a n y o t h e r political c o n t e x t s today, I s u g g e s t that social j u s t i c e m e a n s t h e e l i m i n a t i o n of institutional­ i z e d d o m i n a t i o n and o p p r e s s i o n . Any a s p e c t of social organization and practice r e l e v a n t to d o m i n a t i o n and o p p r e s s i o n is in principle s u b j e c t to evaluation by ideals of j u s t i c e . C o n t e m p o r a r y p h i l o s o p h i c a l t h e o r i e s of j u s t i c e , h o w e v e r , d o not c o n ­ c e i v e j u s t i c e so broadly. Instead, philosophical t h e o r i e s of j u s t i c e t e n d to restrict t h e m e a n i n g of social j u s t i c e to t h e morally p r o p e r distribution of benefits and b u r d e n s a m o n g society's m e m b e r s . In this c h a p t e r I define and assess this d i s t r i b u t i v e paradigm. W h i l e distributive issues are crucial to a satisfactory c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e , it is a mistake to r e d u c e social jus­ tice to distribution. I find t w o p r o b l e m s w i t h t h e distributive paradigm. First, it t e n d s to focus t h i n k i n g about social j u s t i c e on t h e allocation of material g o o d s s u c h as t h i n g s , r e s o u r c e s , i n c o m e , and w e a l t h , or o n t h e distribution of social p o s i t i o n s , e s p e c i a l l y j o b s . This focus t e n d s to i g n o r e t h e social structure and institutional c o n t e x t that often h e l p d e t e r m i n e distributive patterns. Of particular i m p o r t a n c e to t h e analyses that follow are i s s u e s of d e c i s i o n ­ m a k i n g p o w e r and p r o c e d u r e s , division of labor, and c u l t u r e .

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O n e m i g h t a g r e e that d e f i n i n g j u s t i c e in t e r m s of distribution t e n d s to bias t h i n k i n g about j u s t i c e toward i s s u e s c o n c e r n i n g w e a l t h , i n c o m e , and o t h e r material g o o d s , and that o t h e r i s s u e s s u c h as d e c i s i o n m a k i n g p o w e r or t h e s t r u c t u r e of t h e division of labor are as important, and y e t argue that d i s t r i b u t i o n n e e d not b e restricted to material g o o d s and r e s o u r c e s . T h e o ­ rists f r e q u e n t l y c o n s i d e r i s s u e s of t h e distribution of s u c h n o n m a t e r i a l g o o d s as p o w e r , o p p o r t u n i t y , or self-respect. But this w i d e n i n g of t h e c o n c e p t of distribution e x h i b i t s t h e s e c o n d p r o b l e m w i t h t h e d i s t r i b u t i v e p a r a d i g m . W h e n m e t a p h o r i c a l l y e x t e n d e d to nonmaterial social g o o d s , t h e c o n c e p t of distribution r e p r e s e n t s t h e m as t h o u g h t h e y w e r e static t h i n g s , i n s t e a d of a function of social relations and p r o c e s s e s . In criticizing d i s t r i b u t i v e l y o r i e n t e d t h e o r i e s I w i s h n e i t h e r to reject d i s t r i b u t i o n as u n i m p o r t a n t nor to offer a n e w p o s i t i v e t h e o r y to replace t h e d i s t r i b u t i v e t h e o r i e s . I w i s h rather to displace talk of j u s t i c e that re­ gards p e r s o n s as primarily p o s s e s s o r s and c o n s u m e r s of g o o d s to a w i d e r c o n t e x t that also i n c l u d e s action, d e c i s i o n s about action, and p r o v i s i o n of t h e m e a n s to d e v e l o p and e x e r c i s e capacities. T h e c o n c e p t of social j u s t i c e i n c l u d e s all a s p e c t s of institutional rules and relations insofar as t h e y are s u b j e c t to p o t e n t i a l c o l l e c t i v e d e c i s i o n . T h e c o n c e p t s of d o m i n a t i o n and o p p r e s s i o n , rather than t h e c o n c e p t of distribution, s h o u l d b e t h e starting p o i n t for a c o n c e p t i o n of social j u s t i c e .

T H E DISTRIBUTIVE PARADIGM

A d i s t r i b u t i v e p a r a d i g m runs t h r o u g h c o n t e m p o r a r y d i s c o u r s e a b o u t j u s rice, s p a n n i n g d i v e r s e i d e o l o g i c a l p o s i t i o n s . By "paradigm" I m e a n a c o n ­ figuration o f e l e m e n t s and practices w h i c h define an inquiry: m e t a p h y s i ­ cal p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s , u n q u e s t i o n e d t e r m i n o l o g y , characteristic q u e s t i o n s , l i n e s of r e a s o n i n g , specific t h e o r i e s and their typical s c o p e and m o d e of application. T h e d i s t r i b u t i v e paradigm defines social j u s t i c e as t h e morally p r o p e r distribution of social b e n e f i t s and b u r d e n s a m o n g society's m e m ­ b e r s . P a r a m o u n t a m o n g t h e s e are w e a l t h , i n c o m e , and o t h e r material re­ s o u r c e s . T h e d i s t r i b u t i v e definition of j u s t i c e often i n c l u d e s , h o w e v e r , n o n m a t e r i a l social g o o d s s u c h as rights, o p p o r t u n i t y , p o w e r , and selfr e s p e c t . W h a t marks t h e distributive paradigm is a t e n d e n c y to c o n c e i v e social j u s t i c e and distribution as c o e x t e n s i v e c o n c e p t s . A r e v i e w of h o w s o m e major theorists d e f i n e j u s t i c e m a k e s a p p a r e n t t h e p r e v a l e n c e of this c o n c e p t u a l identification of justice w i t h distribution. Rawls d e f i n e s a " c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e as p r o v i d i n g in t h e first i n s t a n c e a standard w h e r e b y t h e distributive aspects of t h e basic structure of s o c i e t y are to b e a s s e s s e d " (Rawls, 1 9 7 1 , p. 9). W. G. R u n c i m a n d e f i n e s t h e p r o b ­ l e m of j u s t i c e as "the p r o b l e m of arriving at an ethical criterion b y refer­ e n c e to w h i c h t h e distribution of social g o o d s in s o c i e t i e s m a y b e a s s e s s e d "

The Distributive Paradigm

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( R u n c i m a n , 1978, p. 37). B r u c e A c k e r m a n (1980, p. 25) d e f i n e s t h e p r o b ­ l e m of j u s t i c e initially as that of d e t e r m i n i n g initial e n t i t l e m e n t s of a scarce r e s o u r c e , m a n n a , w h i c h is c o n v e r t i b l e into any social g o o d . W i l l i a m G a l s t o n m a k e s m o r e explicit than m o s t theorists t h e logic of a d i s t r i b u t i v e u n d e r s t a n d i n g of j u s t i c e . Justice, h e says, i n v o l v e s an e n s e m ­ b l e of p o s s e s s i v e relations. In a p o s s e s s i v e relation t h e individual is dis­ tinct from t h e o b j e c t p o s s e s s e d . Justice, h e says, may b e d e f i n e d as right­ ful p o s s e s s i o n (Galston, 1980, p. 5). In s u c h a p o s s e s s i v e m o d e l t h e nature of t h e p o s s e s s i n g s u b j e c t is prior to and i n d e p e n d e n t of t h e g o o d s p o s ­ s e s s e d ; t h e self u n d e r l i e s and is u n c h a n g e d by alternative distributions (cf. S a n d e l , 1982). Justice c o n c e r n s t h e p r o p e r pattern of t h e allocation of e n ­ tities a m o n g s u c h a n t e c e d e n t l y e x i s t i n g individuals. O r as Galston puts it, j u s t i c e is the appropriate assignment of entities to individuals; appropriateness encom­ passes both the relation between some feature of entities and individuals under consideration and the relation between those entities and possible modes of assignment. The domain of entities may include objects, qualities, positions within a system, or even human beings. (Galston, 1980, p. 112) T h e d i s t r i b u t i v e paradigm of j u s t i c e so e n s n a r e s philosophical t h i n k i n g that e v e n critics of t h e d o m i n a n t liberal framework c o n t i n u e to formulate t h e focus of j u s t i c e in e x c l u s i v e l y distributive t e r m s . D a v i d Miller, for e x a m p l e , c l a i m s that liberal c o n c e p t i o n s of j u s t i c e t e n d to reflect t h e p r e ­ vailing social relations, and argues for a m o r e egalitarian c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e than traditional t h e o r i e s p r o p o s e . Yet h e also defines t h e subject m a t t e r of j u s t i c e as "the m a n n e r in w h i c h benefits and b u r d e n s are d i s ­ t r i b u t e d a m o n g p e r s o n s , w h e r e s u c h qualities and relationships can b e i n v e s t i g a t e d " (Miller, 1976, p. 19). E v e n explicitly socialist or Marxist d i s c u s s i o n s of j u s t i c e often fall u n d e r t h e distributive paradigm. In t h e i r d i s c u s s i o n of j u s t i c e u n d e r socialism, for e x a m p l e , E d w a r d N e l l and Onora O'Neill (1980) a s s u m e that t h e primary difference b e t w e e n socialist j u s ­ tice and capitalist liberal j u s t i c e is in t h e i r principles of distribution. Simi­ larly, Kai N i e l s e n (1979; 1985, c h a p . 3) elaborates socialist p r i n c i p l e s of a radical egalitarian j u s t i c e w h i c h h a v e a primarily distributional focus. M i c h a e l W a l z e r (1983) is i n t e r e s t i n g l y a m b i g u o u s in relation to t h e dis­ t r i b u t i v e paradigm. W a l z e r asserts that p h i l o s o p h e r s ' criticisms of t h e in­ j u s t i c e of a social s y s t e m usually a m o u n t to claims that a d o m i n a n t g o o d s h o u l d b e m o r e w i d e l y d i s t r i b u t e d , that is, that m o n o p o l y is unjust. It is m o r e appropriate, h e says, to criticize t h e structure of d o m i n a n c e itself, rather t h a n m e r e l y t h e distribution of t h e d o m i n a n t g o o d . H a v i n g o n e sort of social g o o d — s a y , m o n e y — s h o u l d not g i v e o n e a u t o m a t i c access to o t h e r social g o o d s . If t h e d o m i n a n c e of s o m e g o o d s o v e r a c c e s s to o t h e r g o o d s is b r o k e n , t h e n t h e m o n o p o l y of s o m e g r o u p o v e r a particular g o o d

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m a y not b e unjust (see Walzer, 1983, p p . 1 0 - 1 3 ) . W a l t e r ' s analysis h e r e has r e s o n a n c e s w i t h m y c o n c e r n to focus primarily on t h e social s t r u c t u r e s and p r o c e s s e s that p r o d u c e distributions rather than on t h e distributions. At t h e s a m e t i m e , h o w e v e r , W a l z e r r e p e a t e d l y and u n a m b i g u o u s l y u s e s t h e l a n g u a g e of distribution to d i s c u s s social j u s t i c e , in s o m e t i m e s reifying and strange w a y s . In his c h a p t e r o n t h e family, for e x a m p l e , h e speaks of t h e just distribution of l o v e and affection. M o s t t h e o r i s t s take it as g i v e n , t h e n , that j u s t i c e is about distributions. T h e paradigm a s s u m e s a s i n g l e m o d e l for all analyses of j u s t i c e : all situa­ tions in w h i c h j u s t i c e is at issue are analogous to t h e situation of p e r s o n s d i v i d i n g a stock of g o o d s and c o m p a r i n g t h e size of t h e portions i n d i v i d u ­ als h a v e . S u c h a m o d e l implicitly a s s u m e s that individuals or o t h e r a g e n t s lie as n o d e s , points in t h e social field, a m o n g w h o m larger or s m a l l e r b u n ­ d l e s o f social g o o d s are a s s i g n e d . T h e individuals are externally related to t h e g o o d s t h e y p o s s e s s , and t h e i r o n l y relation to o n e a n o t h e r that matters from t h e p o i n t o f v i e w of t h e paradigm is a c o m p a r i s o n of t h e a m o u n t of g o o d s t h e y p o s s e s s . T h e distributive paradigm thus implicitly a s s u m e s a social atomism, i n a s m u c h as t h e r e is n o internal relation a m o n g p e r s o n s in s o c i e t y r e l e v a n t to c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of justice. T h e d i s t r i b u t i v e paradigm is also pattern o r i e n t e d . It e v a l u a t e s j u s t i c e a c c o r d i n g to t h e e n d - s t a t e pattern of p e r s o n s and g o o d s that a p p e a r o n t h e social field. E v a l u a t i o n of social j u s t i c e i n v o l v e s c o m p a r i n g alternative p a t t e r n s and d e t e r m i n i n g w h i c h is t h e m o s t just. S u c h a p a t t e r n - o r i e n t e d c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n implicitly a s s u m e s a static c o n c e p t i o n of s o c i e t y . I find t w o p r o b l e m s with this distributive paradigm, w h i c h 1 elaborate in t h e next t w o s e c t i o n s . First, it t e n d s to i g n o r e , at t h e s a m e t i m e that it often p r e s u p p o s e s , t h e institutional c o n t e x t that d e t e r m i n e s material dis­ tributions. S e c o n d , w h e n e x t e n d e d to nonmaterial g o o d s and r e s o u r c e s , t h e l o g i c o f distribution m i s r e p r e s e n t s t h e m .

T H E DISTRIBUTIVE PARADIGM PRESUPPOSES A N D O B S C U R E S INSTITUTIONAL C O N T E X T

M o s t t h e o r i z i n g about social j u s t i c e focuses o n t h e distribution of material r e s o u r c e s , i n c o m e , or positions of reward and p r e s t i g e . C o n t e m p o r a r y d e b a t e s a m o n g theorists of j u s t i c e , as Charles Taylor (1985) points out, are i n s p i r e d largely b y t w o practical issues. First, is t h e distribution of w e a l t h and i n c o m e in a d v a n c e d capitalist c o u n t r i e s just, and if not, d o e s j u s t i c e p e r m i t or e v e n r e q u i r e t h e provision of welfare s e r v i c e s and o t h e r redist r i b u t i v e m e a s u r e s ? S e c o n d , is t h e pattern of t h e distribution of positions of h i g h i n c o m e and p r e s t i g e just, and if not, are affirmative action p o l i c i e s just m e a n s to rectify that injustice? Nearly all of t h e writers I c i t e d earlier w h o d e f i n e j u s t i c e in d i s t r i b u t i v e t e r m s identify q u e s t i o n s of t h e e q u a l i t y or i n e q u a l i t y of w e a l t h and i n c o m e as t h e primary q u e s t i o n s of social j u s -

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tice (see also Arthur and Shaw, 1978). T h e y usually s u b s u m e t h e s e c o n d set of q u e s t i o n s , about t h e j u s t i c e of t h e distribution of social p o s i t i o n s , u n d e r t h e q u e s t i o n o f economic distribution, s i n c e "more d e s i r a b l e " posi­ tions usually c o r r e s p o n d to t h o s e that y i e l d h i g h e r i n c o m e or g r e a t e r ac­ c e s s to r e s o u r c e s . A p p l i e d d i s c u s s i o n s of j u s t i c e too usually focus o n t h e distribution of material g o o d s and r e s o u r c e s . D i s c u s s i o n s of j u s t i c e in m e d i c a l care, for e x a m p l e , usually focus o n t h e allocation of m e d i c a l r e s o u r c e s s u c h as treat­ m e n t , s o p h i s t i c a t e d e q u i p m e n t , e x p e n s i v e p r o c e d u r e s , and so o n ( e . g . , D a n i e l s , 1 9 8 5 , e s p . chaps. 3 and 4). Similarly, issues of j u s t i c e e n t e r dis­ c u s s i o n in e n v i r o n m e n t a l e t h i c s largely t h r o u g h c o n s i d e r a t i o n of t h e im­ pact that a l t e r n a t i v e p o l i c i e s m i g h t h a v e o n t h e distribution of natural and social r e s o u r c e s a m o n g individuals and groups ( s e e , e . g . , S i m o n , 1984). As w e shall s e e in detail in C h a p t e r 3, t h e social c o n t e x t of welfure capitalist s o c i e t y h e l p s a c c o u n t for this t e n d e n c y to focus o n t h e distribu­ tion of i n c o m e and o t h e r r e s o u r c e s . Public political d i s p u t e in welfare corporate s o c i e t y is largely restricted to issues of taxation, and t h e alloca­ tion of p u b l i c f u n d s a m o n g c o m p e t i n g social interests. P u b l i c d i s c u s s i o n s of social injustice t e n d to r e v o l v e around inequalities of w e a l t h and in­ c o m e , and t h e e x t e n t to w h i c h t h e state can or s h o u l d m i t i g a t e t h e suffer­ ing of t h e poor. T h e r e are certainly p r e s s i n g reasons for p h i l o s o p h e r s to a t t e n d to t h e s e i s s u e s of t h e distribution of w e a l t h a n d r e s o u r c e s . In a s o c i e t y and w o r l d with vast differences in t h e a m o u n t of material g o o d s to w h i c h individuals h a v e a c c e s s , w h e r e millions starve w h i l e o t h e r s can h a v e a n y t h i n g t h e y w a n t , any c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e m u s t address t h e distribution of material g o o d s . T h e i m m e d i a t e provision of basic material g o o d s for p e o p l e n o w suffering s e v e r e d e p r i v a t i o n m u s t b e a first priority for any program that s e e k s to m a k e t h e w o r l d m o r e just. S u c h a call o b v i o u s l y entails c o n s i d e r ­ ations of distribution and redistribution. But in c o n t e m p o r a r y A m e r i c a n s o c i e t y , m a n y p u b l i c appeals to j u s t i c e d o not c o n c e r n primarily t h e distribution of material g o o d s . C i t i z e n s in a rural M a s s a c h u s e t t s t o w n o r g a n i z e against a d e c i s i o n to site a h u g e hazard­ ous w a s t e t r e a t m e n t plant in their t o w n . T h e i r leaflets c o n v i n c e p e o p l e that state law has treated t h e c o m m u n i t y unjustly by d e n y i n g t h e m t h e o p t i o n of r e j e c t i n g t h e plant (Young, 1983). C i t i z e n s in an O h i o city arc o u t r a g e d at t h e a n n o u n c e m e n t that a major e m p l o y e r is c l o s i n g d o w n its plant. T h e y q u e s t i o n t h e l e g i t i m a c y of t h e p o w e r of private corporate d e c i ­ s i o n m a k e r s to t h r o w half t h e city out of work w i t h o u t w a r n i n g , and w i t h ­ out any n e g o t i a t i o n and consultation w i t h t h e c o m m u n i t y . D i s c u s s i o n of p o s s i b l e c o m p e n s a t i o n m a k e s t h e m snicker; t h e point is not s i m p l y that w e are out of j o b s and thus lack m o n e y , t h e y claim, b u t that n o private party s h o u l d h a v e t h e right to d e c i d e to d e c i m a t e t h e local e c o n o m y . Jus­ tice m a y r e q u i r e that f o r m e r workers and other m e m b e r s of t h e c o m m u -

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nity h a v e t h e option of taking o v e r and o p e r a t i n g t h e plant t h e m s e l v e s ( S c h w e i c k a r t , 1984). T h e s e t w o c a s e s c o n c e r n not so m u c h t h e j u s t i c e of material distributions as t h e j u s t i c e of d e c i s i o n m a k i n g p o w e r and pro­ cedures. Black critics claim that t h e t e l e v i s i o n industry is guilty of gross injustice in its d e p i c t i o n s of Blacks. M o r e often than not, Blacks are r e p r e s e n t e d as c r i m i n a l s , h o o k e r s , m a i d s , s c h e m i n g d e a l e r s , or j i v i n g c o n n i v e r s . Blacks rarely a p p e a r in roles of authority, glamour, or virtue. Arab A m e r i c a n s are o u t r a g e d at t h e d e g r e e to w h i c h t e l e v i s i o n and film p r e s e n t r e c o g n i z a b l e Arabs o n l y as sinister terrorists or g a u d y p r i n c e s , and c o n v e r s e l y that ter­ rorists are a l m o s t always Arab. S u c h outrage at m e d i a s t e r e o t y p i n g i s s u e s in c l a i m s a b o u t t h e injustice not of material distribution, b u t of cultural i m a g e r y and s y m b o l s . In an a g e of b u r g e o n i n g c o m p u t e r t e c h n o l o g y , organizations of clerical w o r k e r s a r g u e that n o p e r s o n s h o u l d have to s p e n d t h e e n t i r e t y of h e r w o r k i n g d a y in front of a c o m p u t e r terminal t y p i n g in a s e t of m i n d l e s s n u m b e r s at m o n i t o r e d h i g h s p e e d s . T h i s claim about injustice c o n c e r n s not t h e distribution of g o o d s , for t h e claim w o u l d still b e m a d e if V D T operators e a r n e d $ 3 0 , 0 0 0 annually. H e r e t h e primary i s s u e s of j u s t i c e c o n c e r n t h e structure of t h e division of labor and a right to m e a n i n g f u l work. T h e r e are m a n y s u c h c l a i m s about j u s t i c e and injustice in o u r s o c i e t y w h i c h are not primarily a b o u t t h e distribution of i n c o m e , r e s o u r c e s , or p o s i t i o n s . A focus o n t h e distribution of material g o o d s and r e s o u r c e s inap­ p r o p r i a t e l y restricts t h e s c o p e of j u s t i c e , b e c a u s e it fails to bring social s t r u c t u r e s and institutional c o n t e x t s u n d e r evaluation. Several writers m a k e this claim a b o u t distributive t h e o r i e s specifically w i t h regard to t h e i r inability to bring capitalist institutions and class relations u n d e r eval­ uation. In his classic paper, for e x a m p l e , A l l e n W o o d (1972) a r g u e s that for Marx j u s t i c e refers o n l y to superstructural juridical relations of distribu­ tion, w h i c h are c o n s t r a i n e d b y t h e u n d e r l y i n g m o d e of p r o d u c t i o n . B e ­ c a u s e t h e y are c o n f i n e d to distribution, p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e c a n n o t b e u s e d to e v a l u a t e t h e social relations of p r o d u c t i o n t h e m s e l v e s (cf. Wolff, 1977, pp. 199-208). O t h e r writers criticize distributive t h e o r i e s of j u s t i c e , e s p e c i a l l y Rawls's, for p r e s u p p o s i n g at t h e s a m e t i m e that t h e y o b s c u r e t h e c o n t e x t of class i n e q u a l i t y that t h e t h e o r i e s are u n a b l e to e v a l u a t e ( M a c p h e r s o n , 1973; N i e l s e n , 1978). A distributive c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e is u n a b l e to bring class relations into v i e w and e v a l u a t e t h e m , E v a n S i m p s o n s u g g e s t s , b e c a u s e its i n d i v i d u a l i s m p r e v e n t s an u n d e r s t a n d i n g of structural p h e ­ n o m e n a , t h e " m a c r o s c o p i c transfer e m e r g i n g from a c o m p l i c a t e d set of individual a c t i o n s " ( S i m p s o n , 1980, p. 497) w h i c h c a n n o t b e u n d e r s t o o d in t e r m s of a n y particular individual actions or acquisitions.

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M a n y w h o m a k e this Marxist criticism of t h e distributive focus of t h e o ­ ries of j u s t i c e c o n c l u d e that j u s t i c e is a c o n c e p t of b o u r g e o i s i d e o l o g y and thus not useful for a socialist n o r m a t i v e analysis. O t h e r s d i s a g r e e , and this d i s p u t e has o c c u p i e d m u c h of t h e Marxist literature o n j u s t i c e . I will a r g u e later that a criticism o f t h e distributive paradigm d o e s not entail a b a n d o n ­ ing or t r a n s c e n d i n g t h e c o n c e p t of j u s t i c e . For t h e m o m e n t I w i s h to focus o n t h e p o i n t o n w h i c h b o t h sides in this d i s p u t e a g r e e , n a m e l y , that p r e ­ d o m i n a n t a p p r o a c h e s to j u s t i c e t e n d to p r e s u p p o s e and uncritically a c c e p t the relations of p r o d u c t i o n that d e f i n e an e c o n o m i c s y s t e m . T h e Marxist analysis o f t h e distributive paradigm p r o v i d e s a fruitful starting p o i n t , b u t it is b o t h too narrow and too general. O n t h e o n e h a n d , capitalist class relations are not t h e o n l y p h e n o m e n a of social structure or institutional c o n t e x t that t h e distributive paradigm fails to e v a l u a t e . S o m e feminists point o u t , for e x a m p l e , that c o n t e m p o r a r y t h e o r i e s of j u s t i c e p r e s u p p o s e family structure, w i t h o u t asking h o w social relations i n v o l v i n g sexuality, i n t i m a c y , childrearing, and h o u s e h o l d labor o u g h t b e s t to b e o r g a n i z e d ( s e e Okin, 1986; P a t e m a n , 1988, p p . 4 1 - 4 3 ) . Like their fore­ bears, c o n t e m p o r a r y liberal theorists of j u s t i c e t e n d to p r e s u m e that t h e units a m o n g w h i c h basic distributions take place are families, a n d that it is as family m e m b e r s , often h e a d s of families, that individuals e n t e r t h e p u b l i c realm w h e r e j u s t i c e o p e r a t e s ( N i c h o l s o n , 1986, c h a p . 4). T h u s t h e y n e g l e c t i s s u e s of j u s t i c e w i t h i n families—for e x a m p l e , t h e i s s u e of w h e t h e r t h e traditional sexual division of labor still p r e s u p p o s e d b y m u c h law and e m p l o y m e n t p o l i c y is just. W h i l e t h e Marxist criticism is too narrow, it is also too v a g u e . T h e claim that t h e d i s t r i b u t i v e paradigm fails to bring class relations u n d e r evalua­ tion is too g e n e r a l to m a k e clear w h a t specific n o n d i s t r i b u t i v e i s s u e s are at stake. W h i l e p r o p e r t y is s o m e t h i n g d i s t r i b u t e d , for e x a m p l e , in t h e form of g o o d s , land, b u i l d i n g s , or shares of stock, t h e legal relations that define e n t i t l e m e n t , p o s s i b l e forms of title, and so on are not g o o d s to b e distrib­ u t e d . T h e legal framework consists of rules defining practices and rights to m a k e d e c i s i o n s about t h e d i s p o s i t i o n of g o o d s . Class d o m i n a t i o n is c e r ­ tainly e n a c t e d b y a g e n t s d e c i d i n g w h e r e to i n v e s t their capital—a distrib­ utive d e c i s i o n ; but t h e social rules, rights, p r o c e d u r e s , and i n f l u e n c e s that structure capitalist d e c i s i o n m a k i n g are not distributed g o o d s . In o r d e r to u n d e r s t a n d and e v a l u a t e t h e institutional framework w i t h i n w h i c h distrib­ utive i s s u e s arise, t h e i d e a s of "class" and " m o d e of p r o d u c t i o n " m u s t b e c o n c r e t i z e d in t e r m s of specific social p r o c e s s e s and relations. In C h a p t e r 7 I p r o v i d e s o m e c o n c r e t i z a t i o n b y a d d r e s s i n g i s s u e s of t h e social division of labor. T h e g e n e r a l criticism I am m a k i n g of t h e p r e d o m i n a n t focus o n t h e distribution of w e a l t h , i n c o m e , and positions is that s u c h a focus i g n o r e s and t e n d s to o b s c u r e t h e institutional c o n t e x t w i t h i n w h i c h t h o s e distribu-

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tions take p l a c e , and w h i c h is often at least partly t h e c a u s e of patterns of d i s t r i b u t i o n of j o b s or w e a l t h . Institutional c o n t e x t s h o u l d b e u n d e r s t o o d in a b r o a d e r s e n s e than " m o d e of p r o d u c t i o n . " It i n c l u d e s any structures or p r a c t i c e s , t h e rules and n o r m s that g u i d e t h e m , and t h e l a n g u a g e and s y m b o l s that m e d i a t e social interactions w i t h i n t h e m , in institutions of state, family, and civil s o c i e t y , as w e l l as t h e w o r k p l a c e . T h e s e are rele­ vant to j u d g m e n t s of j u s t i c e and injustice insofar as t h e y c o n d i t i o n p e o ­ ple's ability to participate in d e t e r m i n i n g t h e i r actions and t h e i r ability to d e v e l o p and e x e r c i s e their capacities. M a n y d i s c u s s i o n s o f social j u s t i c e not o n l y ignore t h e institutional c o n ­ texts w i t h i n w h i c h distributions occur, b u t often p r e s u p p o s e specific insti­ tutional s t r u c t u r e s w h o s e justice t h e y fail to bring u n d e r e v a l u a t i o n . S o m e political t h e o r i e s , for e x a m p l e , t e n d to a s s u m e c e n t r a l i z e d legislative and e x e c u t i v e institutions separated from t h e day-to-day lives of m o s t p e o p l e in t h e s o c i e t y , and state officials w i t h t h e authority to m a k e and e n f o r c e policy d e c i s i o n s . T h e y take for g r a n t e d s u c h institutions of t h e m o d e r n state as b u r e a u c r a c i e s and welfare a g e n c i e s for i m p l e m e n t i n g and enforc­ ing tax s c h e m e s and a d m i n i s t e r i n g s e r v i c e s (sec, e . g . , Rawls, 1971, p p . 2 7 4 - 8 4 ) . Issues o f t h e j u s t organization o f g o v e r n m e n t institutions, and just m e t h o d s of political d e c i s i o n m a k i n g , rarely g e t raised. To take a different kind of e x a m p l e , to w h i c h I will return in C h a p t e r 7, w h e n p h i l o s o p h e r s ask about t h e just p r i n c i p l e s for allocating j o b s and offices a m o n g p e r s o n s , t h e y typically a s s u m e a stratification of such posi­ tions. T h e y a s s u m e a hierarchical division of labor in w h i c h s o m e j o b s and offices carry significant a u t o n o m y , d e c i s i o n m a k i n g p o w e r , authority, in­ c o m e , and a c c e s s to r e s o u r c e s , w h i l e o t h e r s lack m o s t of t h e s e attributes. Rarely d o theorists explicitly ask w h e t h e r s u c h a definition and organiza­ tion of social p o s i t i o n s is just. M a n y o t h e r e x a m p l e s of w a y s in w h i c h t h e o r i z i n g about j u s t i c e fre­ q u e n t l y p r e s u p p o s e s specific structural and institutional b a c k g r o u n d c o n ­ d i t i o n s c o u l d b e c i t e d . In e v e r y c a s e a clear u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e s e back­ g r o u n d c o n d i t i o n s can reveal h o w t h e y affect d i s t r i b u t i o n — w h a t t h e r e is to d i s t r i b u t e , h o w it g e t s d i s t r i b u t e d , w h o d i s t r i b u t e s , and w h a t t h e dis­ t r i b u t i v e o u t c o m e is. W i t h Michael Walzer, m y i n t e n t i o n h e r e is "to shift our a t t e n t i o n from distribution itself to c o n c e p t i o n and creation: t h e n a m ­ ing of t h e g o o d s , t h e g i v i n g of m e a n i n g , and t h e c o l l e c t i v e making" (Walzer, 1983, p. 7). I shall focus m o s t of m y discussion o n t h r e e primary c a t e g o r i e s of n o n d i s t r i b u t i v e i s s u e s that distributive t h e o r i e s t e n d to ig­ nore: d e c i s i o n m a k i n g s t r u c t u r e and p r o c e d u r e s , division o f labor, and culture. D e c i s i o n m a k i n g i s s u e s i n c l u d e not only cjuestions of w h o b y virtue of t h e i r p o s i t i o n s h a v e t h e effective f r e e d o m or authority to m a k e w h a t sorts of d e c i s i o n s , b u t also t h e rules and p r o c e d u r e s according to w h i c h d e c i -

The Distributive Paradigm

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sions are m a d e . D i s c u s s i o n of e c o n o m i c j u s t i c e , for e x a m p l e , often d e e m p h a s i z e s t h e d e c i s i o n m a k i n g structures w h i c h are crucial d e t e r m i n a n t s of e c o n o m i c relations. E c o n o m i c d o m i n a t i o n in our s o c i e t y occurs not s i m p l y or primarily b e c a u s e s o m e p e r s o n s h a v e m o r e w e a l t h and i n c o m e than o t h e r s , as i m p o r t a n t as this is. E c o n o m i c d o m i n a t i o n d e r i v e s at least as m u c h from t h e c o r p o r a t e and legal structures and p r o c e d u r e s that g i v e s o m e p e r s o n s t h e p o w e r to m a k e d e c i s i o n s about i n v e s t m e n t , p r o d u c t i o n , m a r k e t i n g , e m p l o y m e n t , i n t e r e s t rates, and w a g e s that affect m i l l i o n s of o t h e r p e o p l e . N o t all w h o m a k e t h e s e d e c i s i o n s are w e a l t h y or e v e n privi­ l e g e d , b u t t h e d e c i s i o n m a k i n g structure o p e r a t e s to r e p r o d u c e distribu­ t i v e i n e q u a l i t y and t h e unjust constraints o n p e o p l e s lives that in C h a p t e r 2 I n a m e e x p l o i t a t i o n and marginalization. As Carol G o u l d (1988, p p . 1 3 3 34) p o i n t s out, rarely d o t h e o r i e s of j u s t i c e take s u c h structures as an e x ­ plicit focus. In t h e c h a p t e r s that follow I raise several specific i s s u e s of d e c i s i o n m a k i n g structure, and a r g u e for d e m o c r a t i c d e c i s i o n m a k i n g pro­ c e d u r e s as an e l e m e n t and c o n d i t i o n of social j u s t i c e . D i v i s i o n of labor can b e u n d e r s t o o d both distributively and n o n d i s t r i b u t i v e l y . A s a d i s t r i b u t i v e i s s u e , division of labor refers to h o w p r e g i v e n o c c u p a t i o n s , j o b s , or tasks are allocated a m o n g individuals or groups. As a n o n d i s t r i b u t i v e i s s u e , o n t h e o t h e r hand, division o f labor c o n c e r n s t h e definition of t h e o c c u p a t i o n s t h e m s e l v e s . D i v i s i o n of labor as an institu­ tional structure i n v o l v e s t h e range of tasks p e r f o r m e d in a g i v e n p o s i t i o n , t h e definition of t h e nature, m e a n i n g , and value of t h o s e tasks, and t h e relations of c o o p e r a t i o n , conflict, and authority a m o n g p o s i t i o n s . F e m i n i s t claims a b o u t t h e j u s t i c e of a sexual division o f labor, for e x a m p l e , h a v e b e e n p o s e d b o t h d i s t r i b u t i v e l y and n o n d i s t r i b u t i v e l y . O n t h e o n e h a n d , f e m i n i s t s h a v e q u e s t i o n e d t h e j u s t i c e of a pattern of distribution of posi­ tions that finds a small p r o p o r t i o n of w o m e n in t h e m o s t p r e s t i g i o u s j o b s . O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e y have also q u e s t i o n e d t h e c o n s c i o u s or u n c o n ­ scious association of m a n y o c c u p a t i o n s or j o b s with m a s c u l i n e or f e m i n i n e characteristics, s u c h as i n s t r u m e n t a l i t y or affectivity, and this is not itself a d i s t r i b u t i v e i s s u e . In C h a p t e r 2 I will d i s c u s s t h e j u s t i c e of t h e division of labor in t h e c o n t e x t o f exploitation. In C h a p t e r 7 I c o n s i d e r t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t d i v i s i o n of labor in a d v a n c e d industrial s o c i e t i e s , that b e t w e e n task definition and task e x e c u t i o n . C u l t u r e is t h e m o s t g e n e r a l of t h e t h r e e categories of n o n d i s t r i b u t i v e i s s u e s I focus o n . It i n c l u d e s t h e s y m b o l s , i m a g e s , m e a n i n g s , habitual c o m p o r t m e n t s , stories, and so o n t h r o u g h w h i c h p e o p l e e x p r e s s t h e i r e x ­ p e r i e n c e and c o m m u n i c a t e with o n e another. C u l t u r e is u b i q u i t o u s , b u t n e v e r t h e l e s s d e s e r v e s distinct c o n s i d e r a t i o n in d i s c u s s i o n s of social j u s ­ tice. T h e s y m b o l i c m e a n i n g s that p e o p l e attach to o t h e r kinds of p e o p l e and to a c t i o n s , g e s t u r e s , or institutions often significantly affect t h e social s t a n d i n g of p e r s o n s and t h e i r o p p o r t u n i t i e s . In C h a p t e r s 2, 4, 5, and 6 I

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e x p l o r e t h e injustice of t h e cultural i m p e r i a l i s m w h i c h marks and s t e r e o ­ t y p e s s o m e g r o u p s at t h e s a m e t i m e that it s i l e n c e s their self-expression.

OVEREXTENDING THE CONCEPT OF DISTRIBUTION

T h e f o l l o w i n g o b j e c t i o n m i g h t b e m a d e to m y a r g u m e n t t h u s far. It m a y b e true that p h i l o s o p h i c a l d i s c u s s i o n s of j u s t i c e t e n d to e m p h a s i z e t h e distri­ b u t i o n of g o o d s and to i g n o r e institutional i s s u e s of d e c i s i o n m a k i n g struc­ t u r e and c u l t u r e . B u t this is not a n e c e s s a r y c o n s e q u e n c e of t h e distribu­ t i v e definition of j u s t i c e . T h e o r i e s of distributive j u s t i c e can and s h o u l d b e a p p l i e d to i s s u e s o f social organization b e y o n d t h e allocation o f w e a l t h , i n c o m e , and r e s o u r c e s . I n d e e d , this o b j e c t i o n insists, m a n y theorists ex­ plicitly e x t e n d t h e s c o p e of distributive j u s t i c e to such n o n m a t e r i a l g o o d s . R a w l s , for e x a m p l e , regards t h e subject o f j u s t i c e as "the way in w h i c h t h e major social institutions distribute f u n d a m e n t a l rights and d u t i e s " (Rawls, 1 9 7 1 , p . 7), and for h i m this clearly i n c l u d e s rights and d u t i e s r e l a t e d to d e c i s i o n m a k i n g , social p o s i t i o n s , p o w e r , and so on, as w e l l as w e a l t h or i n c o m e . Similarly, D a v i d Miller specifies that "the 'benefits' t h e distribution of w h i c h a c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e e v a l u a t e s s h o u l d b e taken to i n c l u d e i n t a n g i b l e b e n e f i t s s u c h as p r e s t i g e and self-respect" (Miller, 1 9 7 6 , p . 22). William G a l s t o n , finally, insists that "issues o f j u s t i c e i n v o l v e not o n l y t h e distribution of p r o p e r t y or i n c o m e , but also s u c h non-material g o o d s as p r o d u c t i v e tasks, o p p o r t u n i t i e s for d e v e l o p m e n t , c i t i z e n s h i p , au­ thority, h o n o r , a n d so o n " (Galston, 1980, p. 6; cf. p. 116). T h e d i s t r i b u t i v e paradigm of j u s t i c e m a y h a v e a bias toward f o c u s i n g o n easily identifiable distributions, s u c h as distributions of t h i n g s , i n c o m e , and j o b s . Its b e a u t y and simplicity, h o w e v e r , consists in its ability to ac­ c o m m o d a t e any i s s u e of j u s t i c e , i n c l u d i n g t h o s e c o n c e r n i n g c u l t u r e , d e c i ­ s i o n m a k i n g s t r u c t u r e s , and t h e division o f labor. To d o so t h e paradigm s i m p l y f o r m u l a t e s t h e i s s u e in t e r m s of t h e distribution o f s o m e material or n o n m a t e r i a l g o o d a m o n g various a g e n t s . A n y social v a l u e can be t r e a t e d as s o m e t h i n g or a g g r e g a t e of things that s o m e specific a g e n t s p o s s e s s in certain a m o u n t s , and alternative e n d - s t a t e patterns of distribu­ tion of that g o o d a m o n g t h o s e a g e n t s can b e c o m p a r e d . For e x a m p l e , n e o ­ classical e c o n o m i s t s h a v e d e v e l o p e d s o p h i s t i c a t e d s c h e m e s for r e d u c i n g all i n t e n t i o n a l action to a matter of m a x i m i z i n g a utility function in w h i c h t h e utility of all c o n c e i v a b l e g o o d s can b e quantified and c o m p a r e d . B u t this, in m y v i e w , is t h e main p r o b l e m w i t h t h e distributive para­ d i g m : it d o e s not r e c o g n i z e t h e limits to t h e application of a logic of distri­ b u t i o n . D i s t r i b u t i v e theorists of j u s t i c e a g r e e that j u s t i c e is t h e primary n o r m a t i v e c o n c e p t for e v a l u a t i n g all a s p e c t s o f social institutions, but at t h e s a m e t i m e t h e y identify t h e s c o p e of j u s t i c e w i t h distribution. This entails a p p l y i n g a l o g i c of distribution to social g o o d s w h i c h are not m a t e -

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rial things or m e a s u r a b l e quantities. A p p l y i n g a logic of distribution to s u c h g o o d s p r o d u c e s a m i s l e a d i n g c o n c e p t i o n of t h e issues of j u s t i c e in­ v o l v e d . It reifies a s p e c t s of social life that are b e t t e r u n d e r s t o o d as a func­ tion of rules and relations than as t h i n g s . A n d it c o n c e p t u a l i z e s social j u s ­ tice primarily in t e r m s of e n d - s t a t e patterns, rather than focusing o n social p r o c e s s e s . This d i s t r i b u t i v e paradigm i m p l i e s a m i s l e a d i n g or i n c o m p l e t e social o n t o l o g y . But w h y s h o u l d i s s u e s of social o n t o l o g y matter for n o r m a t i v e t h e o r i z ­ ing about j u s t i c e ? A n y n o r m a t i v e claims about s o c i e t y m a k e a s s u m p t i o n s about t h e n a t u r e of s o c i e t y , often o n l y implicitly. N o r m a t i v e j u d g m e n t s of j u s t i c e are about s o m e t h i n g , and w i t h o u t a social o n t o l o g y w e d o not k n o w w h a t t h e y are about. T h e d i s t r i b u t i v e paradigm implicitly a s s u m e s that social j u d g m e n t s are about w h a t individual p e r s o n s h a v e , h o w m u c h t h e y h a v e , and h o w that a m o u n t c o m p a r e s w i t h what o t h e r p e r s o n s h a v e . This focus o n p o s s e s s i o n t e n d s to p r e c l u d e t h i n k i n g about w h a t p e o p l e are d o i n g , a c c o r d i n g to w h a t institutionalized rules, h o w their d o i n g s and hav­ ings are s t r u c t u r e d b y institutionalized relations that c o n s t i t u t e t h e i r posi­ tions, and h o w t h e c o m b i n e d effect of their d o i n g s has r e c u r s i v e effects o n their l i v e s . Before d e v e l o p i n g this a r g u m e n t further, let us look at s o m e e x a m p l e s of t h e application of t h e distributive paradigm to t h r e e n o n material g o o d s f r e q u e n t l y d i s c u s s e d b y theorists of justice: rights, o p p o r ­ tunity, and s e l f - r e s p e c t . I q u o t e d Rawls earlier to t h e effect that j u s t i c e c o n c e r n s t h e distribution of "rights and d u t i e s , " and talk of distributing rights is b y n o m e a n s l i m i t e d to h i m . But w h a t d o e s distributing a right m e a n ? O n e m a y talk a b o u t h a v i n g a right to a d i s t r i b u t i v e share of material things, r e s o u r c e s , or in­ c o m e . But in s u c h c a s e s it is t h e g o o d that is d i s t r i b u t e d , not t h e right. W h a t can it m e a n to d i s t r i b u t e rights that d o not refer to r e s o u r c e s or t h i n g s , like t h e right of free s p e e c h , or t h e right of trial by jury? W e can c o n c e i v e of a s o c i e t y in w h i c h s o m e p e r s o n s are g r a n t e d t h e s e rights w h i l e o t h e r s arc not, but this d o e s not m e a n that s o m e p e o p l e h a v e a certain " a m o u n t " or "portion of a g o o d w h i l e o t h e r s h a v e less. Altering t h e situa­ tion so that e v e r y o n e has t h e s e rights, m o r e o v e r , w o u l d not entail that t h e formerly p r i v i l e g e d g r o u p g i v e s o v e r s o m e of its right of free s p e e c h or trial b y jury to t h e rest of society's m e m b e r s , on analogy w i t h a redistribuion of i n c o m e . Rights are not fruitfully c o n c e i v e d as p o s s e s s i o n s . Rights arc relation­ ships, not things; t h e y are institutionally d e f i n e d rules specifying w h a t p e o p l e can d o in relation to o n e another. Rights refer to d o i n g m o r e than having, to social relationships that e n a b l e or constrain action. Talk of d i s t r i b u t i n g o p p o r t u n i t i e s i n v o l v e s a similar confusion. If by o p ­ p o r t u n i t y w e m e a n "chance," w e can m e a n i n g f u l l y talk of d i s t r i b u t i n g o p ­ p o r t u n i t i e s , of s o m e p e o p l e h a v i n g m o r e o p p o r t u n i t i e s than o t h e r s , w h i l e

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s o m e h a v e n o n e at all. W h e n I g o to t h e carnival I can b u y t h r e e c h a n c e s to knock o v e r t h e k e w p i e doll, and m y friend can b u y six, and s h e will h a v e m o r e c h a n c e s than I. Matters are rather different, h o w e v e r , w i t h o t h e r o p p o r t u n i t i e s . J a m e s N i c k e l (1988, p. 110) defines o p p o r t u n i t i e s as "states of affairs that c o m b i n e t h e a b s e n c e of i n s u p e r a b l e o b s t a c l e s w i t h t h e p r e s ­ e n c e s of m e a n s — i n t e r n a l or e x t e r n a l — t h a t g i v e o n e a c h a n c e of o v e r c o m ­ ing t h e o b s t a c l e s that r e m a i n . " O p p o r t u n i t y in this s e n s e is a c o n d i t i o n of e n a b l e m e n t , w h i c h usually i n v o l v e s a configuration of social rules and so­ cial relations, as w e l l as an individual's s e l f - c o n c e p t i o n and skills. W e m a y m i s l e a d o u r s e l v e s b y t h e fact that in ordinary l a n g u a g e w e talk a b o u t s o m e p e o p l e h a v i n g "fewer o p p o r t u n i t i e s than o t h e r s . W h e n w e talk that w a y , t h e o p p o r t u n i t i e s s o u n d like separable g o o d s that can b e i n c r e a s e d or d e c r e a s e d b y b e i n g g i v e n out or w i t h h e l d , e v e n t h o u g h w e k n o w that o p p o r t u n i t i e s are not allocated. O p p o r t u n i t y is a c o n c e p t o f e n a b l e m e n t rather than p o s s e s s i o n ; it refers to d o i n g m o r e than having. A p e r s o n has o p p o r t u n i t i e s if h e or s h e is not c o n s t r a i n e d from d o i n g t h i n g s , and lives u n d e r t h e e n a b l i n g c o n d i t i o n s for d o i n g t h e m . H a v i n g o p p o r t u ­ n i t i e s in this s e n s e certainly d o e s often entail having material p o s s e s s i o n s , s u c h as food, c l o t h i n g , tools, land, or m a c h i n e s . B e i n g e n a b l e d or c o n ­ s t r a i n e d refers m o r e directly, h o w e v e r , to t h e rules and practices that g o v e r n o n e ' s action, t h e w a y o t h e r p e o p l e treat o n e in t h e c o n t e x t of s p e ­ cific social relations, and t h e b r o a d e r structural possibilities p r o d u c e d b y t h e c o n f l u e n c e of a m u l t i t u d e of actions and practices. It m a k e s n o s e n s e to speak of o p p o r t u n i t i e s as t h e m s e l v e s things p o s s e s s e d . E v a l u a t i n g so­ cial j u s t i c e a c c o r d i n g to w h e t h e r p e r s o n s h a v e o p p o r t u n i t i e s , t h e r e f o r e , m u s t i n v o l v e e v a l u a t i n g n o t a distributive o u t c o m e b u t t h e social struc­ t u r e s that e n a b l e or constrain t h e individuals in relevant situations (cf. S i m p s o n , 1980; R e i m a n , 1987). C o n s i d e r e d u c a t i o n a l o p p o r t u n i t y , for e x a m p l e . P r o v i d i n g e d u c a t i o n a l o p p o r t u n i t y certainly entails allocating specific material r e s o u r c e s — m o n e y , b u i l d i n g s , b o o k s , c o m p u t e r s , and so o n — a n d t h e r e are reasons to think that t h e m o r e r e s o u r c e s , t h e w i d e r t h e o p p o r t u n i t i e s offered to chil­ d r e n in an e d u c a t i o n a l s y s t e m . But e d u c a t i o n is primarily a p r o c e s s taking p l a c e in a c o m p l e x c o n t e x t of social relations. In t h e cultural c o n t e x t of t h e U n i t e d States, m a l e c h i l d r e n and f e m a l e c h i l d r e n , working-class c h i l d r e n and m i d d l e - c l a s s c h i l d r e n , Black c h i l d r e n and w h i t e c h i l d r e n often d o not h a v e e q u a l l y e n a b l i n g e d u c a t i o n a l o p p o r t u n i t i e s e v e n w h e n an e q u i v a l e n t a m o u n t of r e s o u r c e s has b e e n d e v o t e d to their e d u c a t i o n . This d o e s not s h o w that distribution is irrelevant to educational o p p o r t u n i t y , o n l y that o p p o r t u n i t y has a w i d e r s c o p e than distribution. M a n y w r i t e r s o n j u s t i c e , to take a final e x a m p l e , not o n l y regard selfr e s p e c t as a primary g o o d that all p e r s o n s in a s o c i e t y m u s t h a v e if t h e s o c i e t y is to b e just, b u t also talk of distributing self-respect. B u t w h a t can

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it m e a n to d i s t r i b u t e self-respect? Self-respect is not an e n t i t y or m e a s u r ­ a b l e a g g r e g a t e , it c a n n o t b e p a r c e l e d out of s o m e stash, and a b o v e all it c a n n o t b e d e t a c h e d from p e r s o n s as a separable attribute a d h e r i n g to an o t h e r w i s e u n c h a n g e d s u b s t a n c e . Self-respect n a m e s not s o m e p o s s e s s i o n or attribute a p e r s o n has, b u t h e r or his a t t i t u d e toward h e r or his e n t i r e situation and life p r o s p e c t s . W h i l e Rawls d o e s not speak of s e l f - r e s p e c t as s o m e t h i n g itself d i s t r i b u t e d , h e d o e s s u g g e s t that d i s t r i b u t i v e arrange­ m e n t s p r o v i d e t h e b a c k g r o u n d c o n d i t i o n s for self-respect (Rawls, 1 9 7 1 , p p . 1 4 8 - 5 0 ) . It is c e r t a i n l y true that in m a n y c i r c u m s t a n c e s t h e p o s s e s s i o n of certain d i s t r i b u t a b l e material g o o d s may b e a c o n d i t i o n of s e l f - r e s p e c t . S e l f - r e s p e c t , h o w e v e r , also i n v o l v e s m a n y nonmaterial c o n d i t i o n s that c a n n o t b e r e d u c e d to d i s t r i b u t i v e a r r a n g e m e n t s (cf. H o w a r d , 1985). P e o p l e h a v e or lack s e l f - r e s p e c t b e c a u s e of h o w t h e y define t h e m s e l v e s and h o w o t h e r s regard t h e m , b e c a u s e of h o w t h e y s p e n d t h e i r t i m e , b e ­ c a u s e of t h e a m o u n t of a u t o n o m y and d e c i s i o n m a k i n g p o w e r t h e y h a v e in t h e i r activities, and so o n . S o m e of t h e s e factors can b e c o n c e p t u a l i z e d in d i s t r i b u t i v e t e r m s , b u t o t h e r s cannot. Self-respect is at least as m u c h a function of c u l t u r e as it is of g o o d s , for e x a m p l e , and in later c h a p t e r s I shall d i s c u s s s o m e e l e m e n t s of cultural i m p e r i a l i s m that u n d e r m i n e t h e s e l f - r e s p e c t of m a n y p e r s o n s in our society. T h e point h e r e is that n o n e of t h e forms and not all of t h e c o n d i t i o n s of self-respect can m e a n i n g f u l l y b e c o n c e i v e d as g o o d s that individuals p o s s e s s ; t h e y are rather relations and p r o c e s s e s in w h i c h t h e actions of individuals are e m b e d d e d . T h e s e , t h e n , are t h e g e n e r a l p r o b l e m s w i t h e x t e n d i n g t h e c o n c e p t of d i s t r i b u t i o n b e y o n d material g o o d s or m e a s u r a b l e q u a n t i t i e s to n o n material v a l u e s . First, d o i n g so reifies social relations and institutional rules. S o m e t h i n g identifiable and assignable m u s t b e d i s t r i b u t e d . In ac­ c o r d w i t h its i m p l i c i t social o n t o l o g y that g i v e s p r i m a c y to s u b s t a n c e o v e r relations, m o r e o v e r , t h e d i s t r i b u t i v e paradigm t e n d s to c o n c e i v e of indi­ viduals as social a t o m s , logically prior to social relations and institutions. As G a l s t o n m a k e s clear in t h e p a s s a g e I q u o t e d earlier (Galston, 1980, p. 112), c o n c e i v i n g j u s t i c e as a distribution of g o o d s a m o n g individuals in­ v o l v e s analytically separating t h e individuals from t h o s e g o o d s . S u c h an a t o m i s t i c c o n c e p t i o n of t h e individual as a s u b s t a n c e to w h i c h attributes a d h e r e fails to a p p r e c i a t e that individual i d e n t i t i e s and capacities are in m a n y r e s p e c t s t h e m s e l v e s t h e p r o d u c t s of social p r o c e s s e s and relations. S o c i e t i e s d o not s i m p l y d i s t r i b u t e g o o d s to p e r s o n s w h o are w h a t t h e y are apart from s o c i e t y , b u t rather c o n s t i t u t e individuals in t h e i r i d e n t i t i e s and capacities (Sandel, 1982; Taylor, 1985). In t h e distributive logic, h o w e v e r , t h e r e is little room for c o n c e i v i n g p e r s o n s ' e n a b l e m e n t or constraint as a f u n c t i o n of their relations to o n e another. As w e shall s e e in C h a p t e r 2, s u c h an a t o m i s t i c social o n t o l o g y ignores or o b s c u r e s t h e i m p o r t a n c e of social g r o u p s for u n d e r s t a n d i n g i s s u e s of j u s t i c e .

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S e c o n d , t h e distributive paradigm m u s t c o n c e p t u a l i z e all i s s u e s of j u s ­ t i c e in t e r m s of p a t t e r n s . It i m p l i e s a static social o n t o l o g y that i g n o r e s p r o c e s s e s . In t h e d i s t r i b u t i v e paradigm individuals or o t h e r a g e n t s lie as p o i n t s in t h e social field, a m o n g w h o m larger or smaller p a c k e t s of g o o d s are a s s i g n e d . O n e e v a l u a t e s t h e j u s t i c e of t h e pattern by c o m p a r i n g t h e s i z e o f t h e p a c k a g e s individuals h a v e and c o m p a r i n g t h e total pattern to o t h e r p o s s i b l e patterns of a s s i g n m e n t . R o b e r t N o z i c k (1974, c h a p . 7) argues that such a static or e n d - s t a t e a p p r o a c h to j u s t i c e is inappropriately ahistorical. E n d - s t a t e a p p r o a c h e s to j u s t i c e , h e a r g u e s , o p e r a t e as t h o u g h social g o o d s magically a p p e a r and g e t d i s t r i b u t e d . T h e y i g n o r e t h e p r o c e s s e s that c r e a t e t h e g o o d s and pro­ d u c e d i s t r i b u t i v e patterns, w h i c h t h e y find irrelevant for e v a l u a t i n g j u s ­ t i c e . For N o z i c k , o n l y t h e p r o c e s s is relevant to evaluating distributions. If i n d i v i d u a l s b e g i n w i t h h o l d i n g s t h e y are justly e n t i t l e d to, and u n d e r ­ take free e x c h a n g e s , t h e n t h e distributive o u t c o m e s are just, n o m a t t e r w h a t t h e y are. T h i s e n t i t l e m e n t t h e o r y shares w i t h o t h e r t h e o r i e s a p o s s e s s i v e l y individualist social o n t o l o g y . S o c i e t y consists o n l y of individ­ uals w i t h " h o l d i n g s " of social g o o d s w h i c h t h e y a u g m e n t or r e d u c e t h r o u g h i n d i v i d u a l p r o d u c t i o n and contractual e x c h a n g e . T h e t h e o r y d o e s not take i n t o a c c o u n t structural effects of t h e actions of individuals that t h e y c a n n o t f o r e s e e or i n t e n d , and to w h i c h t h e y m i g h t not a g r e e if t h e y c o u l d . N e v e r t h e l e s s , Nozick's criticism of e n d - s t a t e t h e o r i e s for i g n o r i n g social p r o c e s s e s is apt. I m p o r t a n t and c o m p l e x c o n s e q u e n c e s e n s u e w h e n a t h e o r y o f j u s t i c e a d o p t s a narrowly static social o n t o l o g y . A n t h o n y G i d d e n s claims that so­ cial t h e o r y in g e n e r a l has lacked a t e m p o r a l c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n of social relations ( G i d d e n s , 1976, chap, 2; 1984, chaps. 3 and 4). A c t i o n theorists h a v e d e v e l o p e d s o p h i s t i c a t e d a c c o u n t s of social relations from t h e point of v i e w of a c t i n g s u b j e c t s w i t h i n t e n t i o n s , p u r p o s e s , and reasons, b u t t h e y h a v e t e n d e d to abstract from t h e temporal flow of e v e r y d a y life, and in­ s t e a d talk about isolated acts of isolated individuals. For a t h e o r y of j u s ­ t i c e , this m e a n s i g n o r i n g t h e r e l e v a n c e of institutions to j u s t i c e . Struc­ turalism and functionalist social t h e o r i e s , on t h e o t h e r h a n d , p r o v i d e c o n c e p t u a l tools for identifying and e x p l a i n i n g social regularities and l a r g e - s c a l e institutional patterns. B e c a u s e t h e y also abstract from t h e t e m ­ poral flow of e v e r y d a y interaction, h o w e v e r , t h e y t e n d to h y p o s t a t i z e t h e s e regularities and patterns and often fail to c o n n e c t t h e m w i t h ac­ c o u n t s of i n d i v i d u a l action. F o r a t h e o r y of j u s t i c e , this m e a n s separating i n s t i t u t i o n s from c h o i c e and n o r m a t i v e j u d g m e n t . O n l y a social t h e o r y that takes p r o c e s s s e r i o u s l y , G i d d e n s s u g g e s t s , can u n d e r s t a n d t h e rela­ tion b e t w e e n social structures and action. Individuals are not primarily r e c e i v e r s of g o o d s or carriers of p r o p e r t i e s , b u t actors w i t h m e a n i n g s and p u r p o s e s , w h o act w i t h , against, or in relation to o n e another. W e act w i t h

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k n o w l e d g e o f e x i s t i n g institutions, rules, and t h e structural c o n s e q u e n c e s of a m u l t i p l i c i t y of actions, and t h o s e structures are e n a c t e d and r e p r o ­ d u c e d t h r o u g h t h e c o n f l u e n c e of our actions. Social t h e o r y s h o u l d c o n c e p ­ tualize action as a p r o d u c e r and r e p r o d u c e r of structures, w h i c h o n l y exist in action; social action, o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , has t h o s e structures and rela­ t i o n s h i p s as b a c k g r o u n d , m e d i u m , or p u r p o s e . This identification of a w e a k n e s s in traditional social t h e o r y can b e ap­ p l i e d to t h e d i s t r i b u t i v e p a r a d i g m of j u s t i c e . I d i s a g r e e w i t h N o z i c k that e n d - s t a t e patterns are irrelevant to q u e s t i o n s of j u s t i c e . B e c a u s e t h e y in­ hibit t h e ability o f s o m e p e o p l e to live and b e h e a l t h y , or grant s o m e p e o p l e r e s o u r c e s that a l l o w t h e m to c o e r c e o t h e r s , s o m e distributions m u s t c o m e i n t o q u e s t i o n n o m a t t e r h o w t h e y c a m e about. E v a l u a t i n g pat­ t e r n s o f distribution is often an i m p o r t a n t starting p o i n t for q u e s t i o n i n g a b o u t j u s t i c e . For m a n y i s s u e s of social j u s t i c e , h o w e v e r , w h a t is i m p o r ­ tant is not t h e particular pattern of distribution at a particular m o m e n t , b u t rather t h e r e p r o d u c t i o n of a regular distributive pattern o v e r t i m e . For e x a m p l e , u n l e s s o n e b e g i n s w i t h t h e a s s u m p t i o n that all p o s i t i o n s of h i g h status, i n c o m e , and d e c i s i o n m a k i n g p o w e r o u g h t to b e d i s t r i b u t e d in c o m p a r a b l e n u m b e r s to w o m e n and m e n , finding that v e r y f e w t o p c o r p o ­ rate m a n a g e r s are w o m e n m i g h t not i n v o l v e any q u e s t i o n of injustice. It is in t h e c o n t e x t of a social c h a n g e i n v o l v i n g m o r e a c c e p t a n c e of w o m e n in c o r p o r a t e m a n a g e m e n t , and a c o n s i d e r a b l e increase in t h e n u m b e r of w o m e n w h o obtain d e g r e e s in b u s i n e s s , that a q u e s t i o n of injustice b e ­ c o m e s m o s t a p p a r e n t h e r e . E v e n t h o u g h m o r e w o m e n earn d e g r e e s in b u s i n e s s , and i n - h o u s e p o l i c i e s o f s o m e c o m p a n i e s aim to e n c o u r a g e w o m e n ' s careers, a pattern of distribution of managerial p o s i t i o n s that clusters w o m e n at t h e b o t t o m and m e n at t h e t o p persists. A s s u m i n g that j u s t i c e u l t i m a t e l y m e a n s e q u a l i t y for w o m e n , this pattern is p u z z l i n g , dis­ turbing. W e are i n c l i n e d to ask: what's g o i n g o n h e r e ? w h y is this g e n e r a l pattern r e p r o d u c e d e v e n in t h e face of c o n s c i o u s efforts to c h a n g e it? A n ­ s w e r i n g that q u e s t i o n entails evaluation of a matrix o f rules, a t t i t u d e s , i n t e r a c t i o n s , a n d p o l i c i e s as a social p r o c e s s that p r o d u c e s and r e p r o d u c e s that pattern. A n a d e q u a t e c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e m u s t b e a b l e to u n d e r ­ stand a n d e v a l u a t e t h e p r o c e s s e s as w e l l as t h e patterns. O n e m i g h t o b j e c t that this a c c o u n t c o n f u s e s t h e empirical i s s u e of w h a t c a u s e s a particular distribution w i t h t h e n o r m a t i v e i s s u e of w h e t h e r t h e distribution is just. As will b e a p p a r e n t in t h e c h a p t e r s that follow, h o w ­ e v e r , in t h e spirit of critical social t h e o r y I d o not a c c e p t this division b e t w e e n e m p i r i c a l and n o r m a t i v e social theory. W h i l e t h e r e is a d i s t i n c ­ tion b e t w e e n e m p i r i c a l and n o r m a t i v e s t a t e m e n t s and t h e kinds o f r e a s o n s r e q u i r e d for e a c h , n o n o r m a t i v e t h e o r y m e a n t to e v a l u a t e e x i s t i n g s o c i e ­ ties can a v o i d empirical inquiry, and no empirical i n v e s t i g a t i o n of social s t r u c t u r e s a n d relations can avoid n o r m a t i v e j u d g m e n t s . I n q u i r y about

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social j u s t i c e m u s t c o n s i d e r t h e c o n t e x t and c a u s e s of actual distributions in o r d e r to m a k e n o r m a t i v e j u d g m e n t s about institutional rules and re­ lations. T h e p a t t e r n orientation of t h e distributive paradigm, t h e n , t e n d s to l e a d to abstraction from institutional rules and relations and a c o n s e q u e n t failure to b r i n g t h e m i n t o e v a l u a t i o n . For m a n y aspects of social structure and institutional c o n t e x t c a n n o t b e brought into v i e w w i t h o u t e x a m i n i n g social p r o c e s s e s a n d t h e u n i n t e n d e d c u m u l a t i v e c o n s e q u e n c e s of individ­ ual actions. W i t h o u t a m o r e t e m p o r a l approach to social reality, for e x a m ­ p l e , as w e shall s e e in C h a p t e r 2, a t h e o r y of j u s t i c e cannot c o n c e p t u a l i z e e x p l o i t a t i o n , as a social p r o c e s s by w h i c h t h e labor of s o m e unreciprocally s u p p o r t s t h e p r i v i l e g e of o t h e r s .

P R O B L E M S WITH TALK O F DISTRIBUTING P O W E R

I h a v e a r g u e d that regarding s u c h social v a l u e s as rights, o p p o r t u n i t i e s , and s e l f - r e s p e c t as distributable o b s c u r e s t h e institutional and social b a s e s of t h e s e v a l u e s . S o m e theorists of j u s t i c e m i g h t r e s p o n d to m y criticism of t h e d i s t r i b u t i v e p a r a d i g m as follows: W h a t is in q u e s t i o n is i n d e e d not g o o d s , b u t social p o w e r ; t h e distributive paradigm, h o w e v e r , can a c c o m ­ m o d a t e t h e s e i s s u e s by g i v i n g m o r e attention to t h e distribution of p o w e r . C e r t a i n l y I a g r e e that m a n y of t h e i s s u e s I h a v e said are c o n f u s e d or o b ­ s c u r e d b y t h e d i s t r i b u t i v e paradigm c o n c e r n social p o w e r . W h i l e talk of t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of p o w e r is c o m m o n , h o w e v e r , I think this is a particularly clear c a s e of t h e m i s l e a d i n g and u n d e s i r a b l e implications of e x t e n d i n g t h e c o n c e p t of distribution b e y o n d material g o o d s . D i s t r i b u t i o n a l theorists of j u s t i c e d i s a g r e e o n h o w to approach p o w e r . S o m e e x p l i c i t l y e x c l u d e p o w e r from t h e s c o p e of their t h e o r i e s . D a v i d M i l l e r (1976, p. 22), for e x a m p l e , claims that q u e s t i o n s of p o w e r are not q u e s t i o n s of social j u s t i c e p e r s e , b u t c o n c e r n t h e c a u s e s of j u s t i c e and i n j u s t i c e . R o n a l d D w o r k i n (1983) explicitly brackets i s s u e s of p o w e r in his d i s c u s s i o n of e q u a l i t y , and c h o o s e s to c o n s i d e r only i s s u e s of welfare, t h e distribution of g o o d s , s e r v i c e s , i n c o m e , and so o n . O t h e r p h i l o s o p h e r s and political theorists, h o w e v e r , clearly i n c l u d e q u e s t i o n s o f p o w e r w i t h i n t h e s c o p e of t h e c o n c e p t of j u s t i c e . M a n y w o u l d a g r e e that a t h e o r y of j u s t i c e m u s t b e c o n c e r n e d not only w i t h e n d - s t a t e p a t t e r n s , b u t also w i t h t h e institutional relations that p r o d u c e distribu­ tions. T h e i r a p p r o a c h to s u c h q u e s t i o n s takes t h e form of a s s e s s i n g t h e distribution of p o w e r in a s o c i e t y or a specific institutional context. Talk a b o u t p o w e r in t e r m s of distribution is so c o m m o n that it d o e s not warrant special n o t i c e . T h e following p a s s a g e from W i l l i a m C o n n o l l y ' s Terms of Political Discourse is typical:

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When one speaks of a power structure one conveys, first, the idea that power in at least some domains is distributed unequally; second, that those with more power in one domain are likely to have it in several important domains as well; third, that such a distribution is relatively persistent; and fourth (but not neces­ sarily), that there is more than a random connection between the distribution of power and the distribution of income, status, privilege, and wealth in the sys­ tem under scrutiny. (Connolly, 1983, p. 117) C o m m o n t h o u g h it is, b r i n g i n g p o w e r u n d e r t h e logic of distribution, I s u g g e s t , m i s c o n s t r u e s t h e m e a n i n g of p o w e r . C o n c e p t u a l i z i n g p o w e r in d i s t r i b u t i v e t e r m s m e a n s implicitly or explicitly c o n c e i v i n g p o w e r as a kind of stuff p o s s e s s e d b y individual a g e n t s in greater or l e s s e r a m o u n t s . F r o m this p e r s p e c t i v e a p o w e r structure or p o w e r relations will b e d e ­ s c r i b e d as a pattern of t h e distribution of this stuff. T h e r e are a n u m b e r of p r o b l e m s w i t h s u c h a m o d e l of p o w e r . First, r e g a r d i n g p o w e r as a p o s s e s s i o n or attribute of individuals t e n d s to o b s c u r e t h e fact that p o w e r is a relation rather than a t h i n g (Bachrach and Baratz, 1969). W h i l e t h e e x e r c i s e of p o w e r m a y s o m e t i m e s d e p e n d o n t h e p o s s e s s i o n of certain r e s o u r c e s — m o n e y , military e q u i p m e n t , and so o n — s u c h r e s o u r c e s s h o u l d not b e c o n f u s e d w i t h p o w e r itself. T h e p o w e r c o n s i s t s in a relationship b e t w e e n t h e e x e r c i s e r and o t h e r s t h r o u g h w h i c h h e or s h e c o m m u n i c a t e s i n t e n t i o n s and m e e t s w i t h t h e i r a c q u i e s c e n c e . S e c o n d , t h e atomistic bias of distributive paradigms of p o w e r leads to a focus o n particular a g e n t s or roles that h a v e p o w e r , and o n a g e n t s o v e r w h o m t h e s e p o w e r f u l a g e n t s or roles have p o w e r . E v e n w h e n t h e y r e c o g ­ n i z e its relational character, theorists often treat p o w e r as a d y a d i c rela­ tion, o n t h e m o d e l of ruler and subject. This d y a d i c m o d e l i n g of p o w e r m i s s e s t h e larger s t r u c t u r e of a g e n t s and actions that m e d i a t e s b e t w e e n t w o a g e n t s in a p o w e r relation (Wartenburg, 1989, c h a p . 7). O n e a g e n t can h a v e i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d p o w e r o v e r a n o t h e r only if t h e actions o f m a n y third a g e n t s s u p p o r t and e x e c u t e t h e will of t h e powerful. A j u d g e m a y b e said to h a v e p o w e r o v e r a prisoner, b u t o n l y in t h e c o n t e x t of a n e t w o r k of practices e x e c u t e d b y prison w a r d e n s , guards, r e c o r d k e e p e r s , administra­ tors, parole officers, l a w y e r s , and so o n . M a n y p e o p l e m u s t d o t h e i r j o b s for t h e j u d g e ' s p o w e r to b e r e a l i z e d , and m a n y of t h e s e p e o p l e will n e v e r d i r e c t l y interact w i t h e i t h e r t h e j u d g e or t h e prisoner. A distributive u n ­ d e r s t a n d i n g of p o w e r as a p o s s e s s i o n of particular individuals or g r o u p s m i s s e s this s u p p o r t i n g and m e d i a t i n g function of third parties. A d i s t r i b u t i v e u n d e r s t a n d i n g of p o w e r , w h i c h treats p o w e r as s o m e kind of stuff that can b e traded, e x c h a n g e d , and d i s t r i b u t e d , m i s s e s t h e struc­ tural p h e n o m e n a of d o m i n a t i o n (Ilartsock, 1983). By d o m i n a t i o n I m e a n structural or s y s t e m i c p h e n o m e n a w h i c h e x c l u d e p e o p l e from participat­ ing in d e t e r m i n i n g t h e i r actions or t h e c o n d i t i o n s of their actions (cf. War-

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t e n b u r g , 1989, c h a p . 6). D o m i n a t i o n m u s t b e u n d e r s t o o d as structural p r e c i s e l y b e c a u s e t h e constraints that p e o p l e e x p e r i e n c e are usually t h e i n t e n d e d or u n i n t e n d e d product of t h e actions of m a n y p e o p l e , like t h e actions w h i c h e n a b l e t h e j u d g e s p o w e r . In saying that p o w e r and d o m i n a ­ tion h a v e a structural basis, I d o not d e n y that it is individuals w h o are p o w e r f u l and w h o d o m i n a t e . W i t h i n a s y s t e m of d o m i n a t i o n s o m e p e o p l e can b e identified as m o r e powerful and o t h e r s as relatively p o w e r l e s s . N e v e r t h e l e s s a distributive u n d e r s t a n d i n g m i s s e s t h e w a y in w h i c h t h e p o w e r f u l e n a c t and r e p r o d u c e their p o w e r . T h e s t r u c t u r e d o p e r a t i o n of d o m i n a t i o n w h o s e r e s o u r c e s t h e powerful draw u p o n m u s t b e u n d e r s t o o d as a p r o c e s s . A distributive c o n c e p t u a l i z a ­ tion of p o w e r , h o w e v e r , can construct p o w e r relations only as patterns. As T h o m a s W a r t e n b u r g a r g u e s (1989, chap. 9), c o n c e p t u a l i z i n g p o w e r as re­ lational rather than s u b s t a n t i v e , as p r o d u c e d and r e p r o d u c e d t h r o u g h m a n y p e o p l e o u t s i d e t h e i m m e d i a t e p o w e r dyad, brings out t h e d y n a m i c n a t u r e of p o w e r relations as an o n g o i n g p r o c e s s . A distributive u n d e r ­ s t a n d i n g o f p o w e r o b s c u r e s t h e fact that, as F o u c a u l t p u t s it, p o w e r exists o n l y in action (Foucault, 1980, p. 89; cf. Smart, 1983, chap. 5; Sawicki, 1986): What, by contrast, should always be kept in mind is that power, if we do not take too distant a view of it, is not that which makes the difference between those who exclusively possess and retain it, and those who do not have it and submit to it. Power must be analyzed as something that circulates, or rather something which only functions in the form of a chain. It is never localized here or there, never in anybody's hands, never appropriated as a commodity or piece of wealth. Power is employed and exercised through a net-like organization. And not only do individuals circulate between its threads; they are always in the position of simultaneously undergoing and exercising their power. (Foucault, 1980, p. 98) T h e logic of distribution, in contrast, m a k e s p o w e r a m a c h i n e or instru­ m e n t , h e l d in ready and t u r n e d o n at will, i n d e p e n d e n t l y of social pro­ cesses. F i n a l l y , a d i s t r i b u t i v e u n d e r s t a n d i n g of p o w e r t e n d s to c o n c e i v e a sys­ t e m of d o m i n a t i o n as o n e in w h i c h p o w e r , like w e a l t h , is c o n c e n t r a t e d in t h e h a n d s of a few. A s s u m i n g s u c h a c o n d i t i o n is unjust, a redistribution of p o w e r is c a l l e d for, w h i c h will d i s p e r s e and d e c e n t r a l i z e p o w e r so that a f e w i n d i v i d u a l s or g r o u p s n o l o n g e r h a v e all or m o s t of t h e p o w e r . For s o m e s y s t e m s of d o m i n a t i o n s u c h a m o d e l m a y b e appropriate. As I will a r g u e in t h e next t w o c h a p t e r s , h o w e v e r , it is not appropriate for u n d e r ­ s t a n d i n g t h e o p e r a t i o n of d o m i n a t i o n and o p p r e s s i o n in c o n t e m p o r a r y welfare c o r p o r a t e s o c i e t i e s . For t h e s e s o c i e t i e s w i t n e s s t h e ironic situation in w h i c h p o w e r is w i d e l y d i s p e r s e d and diffused, y e t social relations are

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tightly d e f i n e d by d o m i n a t i o n and o p p r e s s i o n . W h e n p o w e r is u n d e r s t o o d as " p r o d u c t i v e , " as a function of d y n a m i c p r o c e s s e s of interaction w i t h i n r e g u l a t e d cultural and d e c i s i o n m a k i n g situations, t h e n it is p o s s i b l e to say that m a n y w i d e l y d i s p e r s e d p e r s o n s are a g e n t s of p o w e r w i t h o u t "having" it, or e v e n b e i n g p r i v i l e g e d . W i t h o u t a structural u n d e r s t a n d i n g of p o w e r and d o m i n a t i o n as p r o c e s s e s rather than patterns of distribution, t h e exis­ t e n c e and n a t u r e of d o m i n a t i o n and o p p r e s s i o n in t h e s e s o c i e t i e s c a n n o t be identified.

D E F I N I N G INJUSTICE AS D O M I N A T I O N A N D OPPRESSION

B e c a u s e d i s t r i b u t i v e m o d e l s of p o w e r , rights, o p p o r t u n i t y , and selfr e s p e c t work so badly, j u s t i c e s h o u l d not b e c o n c e i v e d primarily o n t h e m o d e l of t h e distribution of w e a l t h , i n c o m e , and o t h e r material g o o d s . T h e o r i z i n g a b o u t j u s t i c e s h o u l d explicitly limit t h e c o n c e p t of distribution to material g o o d s , like t h i n g s , natural r e s o u r c e s , or m o n e y . T h e s c o p e of j u s t i c e is w i d e r than d i s t r i b u t i v e issues. T h o u g h t h e r e m a y b e additional n o n d i s t r i b u t i v e i s s u e s of j u s t i c e , m y c o n c e r n s in this book focus o n i s s u e s of d e c i s i o n m a k i n g , division of labor, and culture. Political t h o u g h t of t h e m o d e r n p e r i o d greatly n a r r o w e d t h e s c o p e of j u s t i c e as it had b e e n c o n c e i v e d by a n c i e n t and m e d i e v a l t h o u g h t . A n c i e n t t h o u g h t r e g a r d e d j u s t i c e as t h e v i r t u e of s o c i e t y as a w h o l e , t h e w e l l o r d e r e d n e s s of institutions that foster individual virtue and p r o m o t e hap­ p i n e s s and h a r m o n y a m o n g c i t i z e n s . M o d e r n political t h o u g h t a b a n d o n e d t h e n o t i o n that t h e r e is a natural o r d e r to s o c i e t y that c o r r e s p o n d s to t h e p r o p e r e n d s of h u m a n nature. S e e k i n g to liberate t h e individual to define "his" o w n e n d s , m o d e r n political t h e o r y also restricted t h e s c o p e of j u s t i c e to i s s u e s of distribution and t h e m i n i m a l regulation of action a m o n g s u c h self-defining individuals ( H e l l e r , 1987, chap. 2; cf, M a c l n t y r e , 1 9 8 1 , c h a p . 17). W h i l e I hardly i n t e n d to revert to a full-bodied Platonic c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e , I n e v e r t h e l e s s think it is important to b r o a d e n t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g of j u s t i c e b e y o n d its usual limits in c o n t e m p o r a r y philosophical d i s c o u r s e . A g n e s H e l l e r (1987, c h a p . 5) p r o p o s e s o n e s u c h broader c o n c e p t i o n in w h a t s h e calls an i n c o m p l e t e ethico-political c o n c e p t of j u s t i c e . A c c o r d i n g to h e r c o n c e p t i o n , j u s t i c e n a m e s not principles of distribution, m u c h less s o m e particular d i s t r i b u t i v e pattern. This r e p r e s e n t s too narrow and s u b ­ s t a n t i v e a w a y of reflecting o n j u s t i c e . Instead, j u s t i c e n a m e s t h e p e r s p e c ­ t i v e s , p r i n c i p l e s , and p r o c e d u r e s for e v a l u a t i n g institutional n o r m s and rules. D e v e l o p i n g I l a b e r m a s ' s c o m m u n i c a t i v e e t h i c s , H e l l e r s u g g e s t s that j u s t i c e is primarily t h e virtue of c i t i z e n s h i p , of p e r s o n s d e l i b e r a t i n g a b o u t p r o b l e m s and i s s u e s that confront t h e m c o l l e c t i v e l y in t h e i r institu­ tions and actions, u n d e r c o n d i t i o n s w i t h o u t d o m i n a t i o n or o p p r e s s i o n ,

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w i t h reciprocity and m u t u a l t o l e r a n c e of difference. S h e p r o p o s e s t h e fol­ l o w i n g test o f t h e j u s t i c e of social or political n o r m s : Every valid social and political norm and rule (every law) must meet the condi­ tion that the foreseeable consequences and side effects the general observance of that law (norm) exacts on the satisfaction of the needs of each and every individual would be accepted by everyone concerned, and that the claim of the norm to actualize the universal values of freedom and/or life could be accepted by each and every individual, regardless of the values to which they are commit­ ted. (Heller, 1987, pp. 240-41) In t h e c o u r s e of this book I shall raise s o m e critical q u e s t i o n s about t h e i d e a s of c i t i z e n s h i p , a g r e e m e n t , and universality e m b e d d e d in t h e radi­ cally d e m o c r a t i c ideal w h i c h H a b e r m a s and Heller, along w i t h o t h e r s , e x p r e s s . N e v e r t h e l e s s , I e n d o r s e and follow this g e n e r a l c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e d e r i v e d from a c o n c e p t i o n of c o m m u n i c a t i v e e t h i c s . T h e idea of j u s t i c e h e r e shifts from a focus on distributive patterns to p r o c e d u r a l is­ s u e s o f participation in d e l i b e r a t i o n and d e c i s i o n m a k i n g . For a n o r m to b e j u s t , e v e r y o n e w h o follows it m u s t in p r i n c i p l e h a v e an effective v o i c e in its c o n s i d e r a t i o n and b e a b l e to a g r e e to it w i t h o u t c o e r c i o n . F o r a social c o n d i t i o n to b e just, it m u s t e n a b l e all to m e e t their n e e d s and e x e r c i s e t h e i r f r e e d o m ; t h u s j u s t i c e r e q u i r e s that all b e a b l e to e x p r e s s their n e e d s . As I u n d e r s t a n d it, t h e c o n c e p t of j u s t i c e c o i n c i d e s w i t h t h e c o n c e p t of t h e political. Politics as I d e f i n e d it in t h e I n t r o d u c t i o n i n c l u d e s all a s p e c t s of institutional organization, p u b l i c action, social practices and habits, and cultural m e a n i n g s insofar as t h e y are p o t e n t i a l l y subject to c o l l e c t i v e eval­ uation and d e c i s i o n m a k i n g . Politics in this i n c l u s i v e s e n s e certainly c o n ­ c e r n s t h e p o l i c i e s and actions of g o v e r n m e n t and t h e state, b u t in princi­ p l e can also c o n c e r n rules, practices, and actions in any o t h e r institutional c o n t e x t (cf. M a s o n , 1982, p p . 1 1 - 2 4 ) . T h e s c o p e of j u s t i c e , I h a v e s u g g e s t e d , is m u c h w i d e r than distribution, and c o v e r s e v e r y t h i n g political in this s e n s e . This c o h e r e s w i t h t h e m e a n ­ ing of j u s t i c e c l a i m s of t h e sort m e n t i o n e d at t h e o u t s e t of this chapter. W h e n p e o p l e claim that a particular rule, practice, or cultural m e a n i n g is w r o n g and s h o u l d b e c h a n g e d , t h e y are often m a k i n g a claim a b o u t social injustice. S o m e of t h e s e c l a i m s i n v o l v e distributions, b u t m a n y also refer to o t h e r w a y s in w h i c h social institutions inhibit or liberate p e r s o n s . S o m e w r i t e r s c o n c u r that distribution is too narrow a focus for n o r m a ­ t i v e e v a l u a t i o n of social institutions, b u t claim that g o i n g b e y o n d this d i s ­ t r i b u t i v e focus entails g o i n g b e y o n d t h e n o r m s of j u s t i c e p e r s e . C h a r l e s Taylor (1985), for e x a m p l e , d i s t i n g u i s h e s q u e s t i o n s of d i s t r i b u t i v e j u s t i c e from n o r m a t i v e q u e s t i o n s a b o u t t h e institutional framework of society. N o r m s of j u s t i c e h e l p r e s o l v e d i s p u t e s about e n t i t l e m e n t s and d e s e r t s

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w i t h i n a particular institutional context. T h e y cannot e v a l u a t e that institu­ tional c o n t e x t itself, h o w e v e r , b e c a u s e it e m b o d i e s a certain c o n c e p t i o n of h u m a n n a t u r e and t h e h u m a n g o o d . A c c o r d i n g to Taylor, c o n f u s i o n s arise in t h e o r e t i c a l and political d i s c u s s i o n w h e n n o r m s of distributive j u s t i c e are a p p l i e d across social structures and u s e d to e v a l u a t e basic s t r u c t u r e s . For e x a m p l e , b o t h right and left critics of o u r s o c i e t y c h a r g e it w i t h p e r p e ­ trating i n j u s t i c e s , but a c c o r d i n g to Taylor t h e n o r m a t i v e p e r s p e c t i v e from w h i c h e a c h s i d e speaks i n v o l v e s a project to construct different institu­ tional forms c o r r e s p o n d i n g to specific c o n c e p t i o n s of t h e h u m a n g o o d , a project b e y o n d m e r e l y articulating principles of j u s t i c e . F r o m a s o m e w h a t different p e r s p e c t i v e , Seyla B e n h a b i b (1986, p p . 3 3 0 - 3 6 ) s u g g e s t s that a n o r m a t i v e social t h e o r y w h i c h e v a l u a t e s institu­ tions a c c o r d i n g to w h e t h e r t h e y are free from d o m i n a t i o n , m e e t n e e d s , and p r o v i d e c o n d i t i o n s of e m a n c i p a t i o n entails g o i n g b e y o n d j u s t i c e as u n d e r s t o o d by t h e m o d e r n tradition. B e c a u s e this broader n o r m a t i v e so­ cial t h e o r y entails a critique of c u l t u r e and socialization in addition to cri­ t i q u e s o f formal rights and patterns of distribution, it m e r g e s q u e s t i o n s of j u s t i c e w i t h q u e s t i o n s of t h e g o o d life. I a m s y m p a t h e t i c w i t h b o t h t h e s e d i s c u s s i o n s , as w e l l as w i t h Michael Sandel's (1982) r e l a t e d a r g u m e n t for r e c o g n i z i n g t h e "limits" of j u s t i c e and t h e i m p o r t a n c e of c o n c e p t u a l i z i n g n o r m a t i v e aspects of t h e self in social c o n t e x t s that lie b e y o n d t h o s e limits. B u t w h i l e I share t h e s e writers' g e n ­ eral c r i t i q u e of liberal t h e o r i e s of distributive j u s t i c e , I s e e n o r e a s o n to c o n c l u d e w i t h Taylor and S a n d c l that this c r i t i q u e r e v e a l s t h e limits of t h e c o n c e p t of j u s t i c e w h i c h a n o r m a t i v e social p h i l o s o p h y m u s t t r a n s c e n d . I d i s a g r e e to s o m e e x t e n t , m o r e o v e r , w i t h Taylor's and B e n h a b i b ' s s u g g e s ­ tion that s u c h a w i d e r n o r m a t i v e social p h i l o s o p h y m e r g e s q u e s t i o n s of j u s t i c e w i t h q u e s t i o n s of t h e g o o d life. Like m a n y o t h e r writers c i t e d earlier in this chapter, Taylor a s s u m e s that j u s t i c e and distribution are c o e x t e n s i v e , and therefore that b r o a d e r i s s u e s o f institutional c o n t e x t r e q u i r e o t h e r n o r m a t i v e c o n c e p t s . M a n y Marxist theorists w h o argue that j u s t i c e is a m e r e l y b o u r g e o i s c o n c e p t take a similar position. W h e t h e r n o r m a t i v e theorists w h o focus a t t e n t i o n o n i s s u e s of d e c i s i o n m a k i n g , division of labor, c u l t u r e , and social organiza­ tion b e y o n d t h e distribution of g o o d s call t h e s e i s s u e s of j u s t i c e or not is clearly a m a t t e r of c h o i c e . I can g i v e o n l y pragmatic reasons for m y o w n choice. S i n c e Plato "justice" has e v o k e d t h e w e l l - o r d e r e d s o c i e t y , and it c o n t i n ­ u e s to carry t h o s e r e s o n a n c e s in c o n t e m p o r a r y political d i s c u s s i o n . A p ­ p e a l s to j u s t i c e still h a v e t h e p o w e r to awaken a moral imagination and m o t i v a t e p e o p l e to look at t h e i r s o c i e t y critically, and ask h o w it can b e m a d e m o r e liberating and e n a b l i n g . P h i l o s o p h e r s i n t e r e s t e d in nurturing

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this e m a n c i p a t o r y imagination and e x t e n d i n g it b e y o n d q u e s t i o n s of d i s ­ tribution s h o u l d , I s u g g e s t , lay claim to t h e term j u s t i c e rather than aban­ d o n it. To a certain e x t e n t H e l l e r , Taylor, and B e n h a b i b are right that a p o s t m o d e r n turn to an e n l a r g e d c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e , r e m i n i s c e n t of t h e s c o p e of j u s t i c e in Plato and Aristotle, entails m o r e attention to t h e defini­ tion of e n d s than t h e liberal c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e allows. N e v e r t h e l e s s , q u e s t i o n s o f j u s t i c e d o not m e r g e with q u e s t i o n s of t h e g o o d life. T h e liberal c o m m i t m e n t to individual f r e e d o m , and t h e c o n s e q u e n t plurality of definitions of t h e g o o d , m u s t b e p r e s e r v e d in any r e e n l a r g e d c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e . T h e m o d e r n restriction of t h e c o n c e p t of j u s t i c e to formal and i n s t r u m e n t a l p r i n c i p l e s was m e a n t to p r o m o t e t h e value of individual selfdefinition of e n d s , or "plans of life," as Rawls calls t h e m . In d i s p l a c i n g reflection about j u s t i c e from a primary focus o n distribution to i n c l u d e all institutional and social relations insofar as t h e y are subject to c o l l e c t i v e d e c i s i o n , I d o not m e a n to s u g g e s t that j u s t i c e s h o u l d i n c l u d e all moral n o r m s in its s c o p e . Social j u s t i c e in t h e s e n s e I i n t e n d c o n t i n u e s to refer o n l y to institutional c o n d i t i o n s , and not to t h e p r e f e r e n c e s and w a y s o f l i f e of individuals or g r o u p s . A n y n o r m a t i v e theorist in t h e p o s t m o d e r n world is faced w i t h a di­ l e m m a . O n t h e o n e hand, w e e x p r e s s and justify norms by a p p e a l i n g to certain v a l u e s d e r i v e d from a c o n c e p t i o n of t h e g o o d h u m a n life. In s o m e s e n s e , t h e n , a n y n o r m a t i v e theory implicitly or explicitly r e l i e s o n a c o n ­ c e p t i o n of h u m a n nature (cf, Jaggar, 1983, p p . 1 8 - 2 2 ) . O n t h e o t h e r hand, it w o u l d s e e m that w e s h o u l d reject t h e v e r y idea of a h u m a n nature as m i s l e a d i n g or o p p r e s s i v e . A n y definition of a h u m a n nature is d a n g e r o u s b e c a u s e it t h r e a t e n s to d e v a l u e or e x c l u d e s o m e a c c e p t a b l e individual d e s i r e s , cultural character­ istics, or w a y s o f l i f e . N o r m a t i v e social t h e o r y , h o w e v e r , can rarely avoid m a k i n g implicit or explicit a s s u m p t i o n s about h u m a n b e i n g s in t h e for­ m u l a t i o n of its vision of j u s t institutions. E v e n t h o u g h t h e d i s t r i b u t i v e p a r a d i g m carries an individualist c o n c e p t i o n of s o c i e t y , w h i c h c o n s i d e r s i n d i v i d u a l d e s i r e s and p r e f e r e n c e s private matters o u t s i d e t h e s p h e r e of rational d i s c o u r s e , it a s s u m e s a q u i t e specific c o n c e p t i o n of h u m a n na­ ture. It i m p l i c i t l y d e f i n e s h u m a n b e i n g s as primarily c o n s u m e r s , d e s i r e r s , and p o s s e s s o r s of g o o d s ( H e l l e r , 1987, p p . 1 8 0 - 8 2 ) . C . B. M a c p h e r s o n (1962) a r g u e s that in p r e s u p p o s i n g s u c h a p o s s e s s i v e l y individualist v i e w of h u m a n nature t h e original liberal theorists h y p o s t a t i z e d t h e acquisi­ tive v a l u e s of e m e r g e n t capitalist social relations. C o n t e m p o r a r y capital­ i s m , w h i c h d e p e n d s m o r e u p o n w i d e s p r e a d i n d u l g e n t c o n s u m p t i o n than its p e n n y - p i n c h i n g Protestant ancestor, c o n t i n u e s to p r e s u p p o s e an u n ­ d e r s t a n d i n g of h u m a n b e i n g s as primarily utility m a x i m i z e r s (Taylor, 1985).

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T h e i d e a of h u m a n b e i n g s that g u i d e s n o r m a t i v e social t h e o r i z i n g u n d e r t h e d i s t r i b u t i v e p a r a d i g m is an i m a g e , rather than an explicit t h e o r y of h u m a n n a t u r e . It m a k e s p l a u s i b l e to t h e imagination b o t h t h e static pic­ ture of social relations e n t a i l e d b y this distributive paradigm and t h e n o ­ tion of s e p a r a t e individuals already formed apart from social g o o d s . D i s ­ p l a c i n g t h e d i s t r i b u t i v e paradigm in favor of a w i d e r , p r o c e s s - o r i e n t e d u n d e r s t a n d i n g of s o c i e t y , w h i c h focuses o n p o w e r , d e c i s i o n m a k i n g struc­ tures, and s o o n , l i k e w i s e shifts t h e imagination to different a s s u m p t i o n s a b o u t h u m a n b e i n g s . S u c h an i m a g i n a t i v e shift c o u l d b e as o p p r e s s i v e as c o n s u m e r i s t i m a g e s if it is m a d e too c o n c r e t e . As long as t h e v a l u e s w e appeal to are abstract e n o u g h , h o w e v e r , t h e y will not d e v a l u e or e x c l u d e any particular c u l t u r e or w a y of life. P e r s o n s c e r t a i n l y are p o s s e s s o r s and c o n s u m e r s , and any c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e s h o u l d p r e s u m e t h e v a l u e of m e e t i n g material n e e d s , living in a c o m f o r t a b l e e n v i r o n m e n t , and e x p e r i e n c i n g p l e a s u r e s . A d d i n g an i m a g e of p e o p l e as d o e r s and actors ( M a c p h e r s o n , 1973; B o w l e s and C i n t i s , 1986) h e l p s to displace t h e distributive paradigm. As d o e r s and actors, w e s e e k to p r o m o t e m a n y v a l u e s of social j u s t i c e in addition to fairness in t h e distribution of g o o d s : l e a r n i n g and u s i n g satisfying and e x p a n s i v e skills in socially r e c o g n i z e d s e t t i n g s ; participating in forming and r u n n i n g institu­ tions, and r e c e i v i n g r e c o g n i t i o n for such participation; p l a y i n g and c o m ­ m u n i c a t i n g w i t h o t h e r s , and e x p r e s s i n g o u r e x p e r i e n c e , f e e l i n g s , and per­ s p e c t i v e o n social life in c o n t e x t s w h e r e o t h e r s can listen. Certainly m a n y distributive theorists of j u s t i c e w o u l d r e c o g n i z e and affirm t h e s e v a l u e s . T h e framework of distribution, h o w e v e r , leads to a d e e m p h a s i z i n g of t h e s e v a l u e s and a failure to i n q u i r e a b o u t t h e institutional c o n d i t i o n s that promote them. T h i s , t h e n , is h o w I u n d e r s t a n d t h e c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n j u s t i c e and t h e v a l u e s that c o n s t i t u t e t h e g o o d life. Justice is not identical w i t h t h e c o n ­ c r e t e realization of t h e s e v a l u e s in individual lives; j u s t i c e , that is, is not identical w i t h t h e g o o d life as such. Rather, social j u s t i c e c o n c e r n s t h e d e g r e e to w h i c h a s o c i e t y contains and supports t h e institutional c o n d i ­ tions n e c e s s a r y for t h e realization of t h e s e v a l u e s . T h e v a l u e s c o m p r i s e d in t h e g o o d life can b e r e d u c e d to t w o v e r y g e n e r a l o n e s : (1) d e v e l o p i n g and e x e r c i s i n g o n e ' s capacities and e x p r e s s i n g one's e x p e r i e n c e (cf. G o u l d , 1988, chap. 2; G a l s t o n , p p . 6 1 - 6 9 ) , and (2) participating in d e t e r ­ m i n i n g o n e ' s action and t h e c o n d i t i o n s of one's action (cf. Young, 1979). T h e s e are universalist v a l u e s , in t h e s e n s e that t h e y a s s u m e t h e equal moral w o r t h of all p e r s o n s , and t h u s j u s t i c e r e q u i r e s their p r o m o t i o n for e v e r y o n e . To t h e s e t w o g e n e r a l v a l u e s c o r r e s p o n d t w o social c o n d i t i o n s that d e f i n e injustice: o p p r e s s i o n , t h e institutional constraint o n self-de­ v e l o p m e n t , and d o m i n a t i o n , t h e institutional constraint on s e l f - d e t e r m i ­ nation.

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O p p r e s s i o n c o n s i s t s in s y s t e m a t i c institutional p r o c e s s e s w h i c h p r e v e n t s o m e p e o p l e from l e a r n i n g and u s i n g satisfying and e x p a n s i v e skills in socially r e c o g n i z e d s e t t i n g s , or institutionalized social p r o c e s s e s w h i c h in­ hibit p e o p l e ' s ability to play and c o m m u n i c a t e w i t h o t h e r s or to e x p r e s s t h e i r f e e l i n g s and p e r s p e c t i v e o n social life in contexts w h e r e o t h e r s can listen. W h i l e t h e social c o n d i t i o n s of o p p r e s s i o n often i n c l u d e material d e p r i v a t i o n or m a l d i s t r i b u t i o n , t h e y also i n v o l v e i s s u e s b e y o n d distribu­ tion, as I shall s h o w in C h a p t e r 2. D o m i n a t i o n consists in institutional c o n d i t i o n s w h i c h inhibit or p r e v e n t p e o p l e from participating in d e t e r m i n i n g their actions or t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f t h e i r actions. P e r s o n s live w i t h i n structures of d o m i n a t i o n if o t h e r p e r s o n s or g r o u p s can d e t e r m i n e w i t h o u t reciprocation t h e c o n d i t i o n s of t h e i r ac­ tion, e i t h e r d i r e c t l y or b y virtue of t h e structural c o n s e q u e n c e s of t h e i r actions. T h o r o u g h social and political d e m o c r a c y is t h e o p p o s i t e of d o m i ­ nation. In C h a p t e r 3 I d i s c u s s s o m e of t h e i s s u e s of d e c i s i o n m a k i n g that c o n t e m p o r a r y welfare state politics i g n o r e s , and s h o w h o w i n s u r g e n t so­ cial m o v e m e n t s f r e q u e n t l y a d d r e s s i s s u e s of d o m i n a t i o n rather than distri­ bution. As will b e c o m e clear in t h e c h a p t e r s that follow, I think t h e c o n c e p t s of o p p r e s s i o n a n d d o m i n a t i o n o v e r l a p , b u t t h e r e is n e v e r t h e l e s s reason to d i s t i n g u i s h t h e m . O p p r e s s i o n usually i n c l u d e s or entails d o m i n a t i o n , that is, constraints u p o n o p p r e s s e d p e o p l e to follow rules set b y o t h e r s . B u t e a c h face of o p p r e s s i o n that I shall discuss in C h a p t e r 2 also i n v o l v e s inhi­ b i t i o n s not d i r e c t l y p r o d u c e d b y relations of d o m i n a t i o n . As s h o u l d b e ­ c o m e clear in that chapter, m o r e o v e r , not e v e r y o n e subject to d o m i n a t i o n is also o p p r e s s e d . Hierarchical d e c i s i o n m a k i n g structures s u b j e c t m o s t p e o p l e in o u r s o c i e t y to d o m i n a t i o n in s o m e important a s p e c t of t h e i r l i v e s . M a n y of t h o s e p e o p l e n e v e r t h e l e s s e n j o y significant institutional­ i z e d s u p p o r t for t h e d e v e l o p m e n t and e x e r c i s e of t h e i r capacities and t h e i r ability to e x p r e s s t h e m s e l v e s and b e heard.

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Five Faces of Oppression Someone who does not see a pane of glass does not know that he does not see it. Someone who, being placed differ­ ently, does see it, does not know the other does not see it. When our will finds expression outside ourselves in ac­ tions performed by others, we do not waste our time and our power of attention in examining whether they have con­ sented to this. This is true for all of us. Our attention, given entirely to the success of the undertaking, is not claimed by them as long as they are docile. . . . Rape is a terrible caricature of love from which consent is absent. After rape, oppression is the second horror of human existence. It is a terrible caricature of obedience. —Simone Weil

I HAVE p r o p o s e d an e n a b l i n g c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e . Justice s h o u l d refer not o n l y to d i s t r i b u t i o n , b u t also to t h e institutional c o n d i t i o n s n e c e s s a r y for t h e d e v e l o p m e n t and e x e r c i s e of individual capacities and c o l l e c t i v e c o m ­ m u n i c a t i o n and c o o p e r a t i o n . U n d e r this c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e , injustice refers primarily to t w o forms of disabling constraints, o p p r e s s i o n and d o m i n a t i o n . W h i l e t h e s e constraints i n c l u d e distributive patterns, t h e y also i n v o l v e m a t t e r s w h i c h c a n n o t easily b e assimilated to t h e logic of distribution: d e c i s i o n m a k i n g p r o c e d u r e s , division of labor, and c u l t u r e . M a n y p e o p l e in t h e U n i t e d States w o u l d not c h o o s e t h e t e r m "oppres­ sion" to n a m e injustice in our society. For c o n t e m p o r a r y e m a n c i p a t o r y social m o v e m e n t s , o n t h e o t h e r h a n d — s o c i a l i s t s , radical f e m i n i s t s , A m e r ­ ican I n d i a n activists, Black activists, gay and lesbian a c t i v i s t s — o p p r e s s i o n is a central c a t e g o r y of political d i s c o u r s e . E n t e r i n g t h e political d i s c o u r s e in w h i c h o p p r e s s i o n is a central c a t e g o r y i n v o l v e s a d o p t i n g a g e n e r a l m o d e of a n a l y z i n g and e v a l u a t i n g social structures and practices w h i c h is i n c o m m e n s u r a t e w i t h t h e l a n g u a g e of liberal individualism that d o m i n a t e s political d i s c o u r s e in t h e U n i t e d States. A major political project for t h o s e of us w h o identify w i t h at least o n e of t h e s e m o v e m e n t s m u s t t h u s b e to p e r s u a d e p e o p l e that t h e d i s c o u r s e of o p p r e s s i o n m a k e s s e n s e of m u c h of our social e x p e r i e n c e . W e are ill p r e ­ p a r e d for this task, h o w e v e r , b e c a u s e w e h a v e n o clear a c c o u n t of t h e

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m e a n i n g of o p p r e s s i o n . W h i l e w e find t h e term u s e d often in t h e d i v e r s e p h i l o s o p h i c a l and theoretical literature s p a w n e d b y radical social m o v e ­ m e n t s in t h e U n i t e d States, w e find little direct discussion of t h e m e a n i n g of t h e c o n c e p t as u s e d b y t h e s e m o v e m e n t s . In this c h a p t e r I offer s o m e explication of t h e c o n c e p t of o p p r e s s i o n as I u n d e r s t a n d its u s e b y n e w social m o v e m e n t s in t h e U n i t e d States s i n c e t h e 1960s. M y starting point is reflection o n t h e c o n d i t i o n s of t h e g r o u p s said b y t h e s e m o v e m e n t s to b e o p p r e s s e d : a m o n g o t h e r s w o m e n , Blacks, C h i c a n o s , P u e r t o Ricans and o t h e r S p a n i s h - s p e a k i n g A m e r i c a n s , A m e r i ­ can Indians, J e w s , l e s b i a n s , gay m e n , Arabs, Asians, old p e o p l e , workingclass p e o p l e , and t h e physically and m e n t a l l y disabled. I aim to s y s t e m a ­ tize t h e m e a n i n g of t h e c o n c e p t of o p p r e s s i o n as u s e d b y t h e s e d i v e r s e political m o v e m e n t s , and to p r o v i d e n o r m a t i v e a r g u m e n t to clarify t h e wrongs the term names. O b v i o u s l y t h e a b o v e - n a m e d groups are not o p p r e s s e d to t h e s a m e ex­ t e n t or in t h e s a m e w a y s . In t h e m o s t g e n e r a l s e n s e , all o p p r e s s e d p e o p l e suffer s o m e i n h i b i t i o n of their ability to d e v e l o p and e x e r c i s e their capaci­ ties and e x p r e s s their n e e d s , t h o u g h t s , and feelings. In that abstract s e n s e all o p p r e s s e d p e o p l e face a c o m m o n c o n d i t i o n . B e y o n d that, in any m o r e specific s e n s e , it is not p o s s i b l e to define a single set of criteria that d e ­ scribe t h e c o n d i t i o n of o p p r e s s i o n of t h e a b o v e groups. C o n s e q u e n t l y , a t t e m p t s b y theorists and activists to d i s c o v e r a c o m m o n d e s c r i p t i o n or t h e e s s e n t i a l c a u s e s of t h e o p p r e s s i o n of all t h e s e g r o u p s h a v e f r e q u e n t l y l e d to fruitless d i s p u t e s about w h o s e o p p r e s s i o n is m o r e f u n d a m e n t a l or m o r e grave. T h e c o n t e x t s in w h i c h m e m b e r s of t h e s e g r o u p s u s e t h e t e r m o p p r e s s i o n to d e s c r i b e t h e injustices of their situation s u g g e s t that o p p r e s ­ sion n a m e s in fact a family o f c o n c e p t s and c o n d i t i o n s , w h i c h I d i v i d e into five c a t e g o r i e s : exploitation, marginalization, p o w e r l e s s n e s s , cultural i m ­ p e r i a l i s m , and v i o l e n c e . In this c h a p t e r I e x p l i c a t e e a c h of t h e s e forms of o p p r e s s i o n . E a c h m a y entail or c a u s e distributive injustices, but all i n v o l v e issues o f j u s t i c e b e ­ y o n d d i s t r i b u t i o n . In a c c o r d a n c e w i t h ordinary political u s a g e , I s u g g e s t that o p p r e s s i o n is a c o n d i t i o n o f g r o u p s . T h u s before explicating t h e m e a n ­ ing of o p p r e s s i o n , w e m u s t e x a m i n e t h e c o n c e p t of a social g r o u p .

O P P R E S S I O N AS A STRUCTURAL C O N C E P T

O n e reason that m a n y p e o p l e w o u l d not u s e t h e t e r m o p p r e s s i o n to d e ­ scribe injustice in our s o c i e t y is that t h e y d o not u n d e r s t a n d t h e term in t h e s a m e w a y as d o n e w social m o v e m e n t s . In its traditional u s a g e , o p ­ p r e s s i o n m e a n s t h e e x e r c i s e of tyranny b y a ruling group. T h u s m a n y A m e r i c a n s w o u l d a g r e e w i t h radicals in a p p l y i n g t h e t e r m o p p r e s s i o n to t h e situation of Black S o u t h Africans u n d e r apartheid. O p p r e s s i o n also traditionally carries a strong c o n n o t a t i o n of c o n q u e s t and colonial d o m i n a -

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tion. T h e H e b r e w s w e r e o p p r e s s e d in E g y p t , and m a n y u s e s of t h e t e r m o p p r e s s i o n in t h e W e s t i n v o k e this paradigm. D o m i n a n t political d i s c o u r s e m a y u s e t h e term o p p r e s s i o n to d e s c r i b e s o c i e t i e s o t h e r than our o w n , usually C o m m u n i s t or p u r p o r t e d l y C o m m u ­ nist s o c i e t i e s . W i t h i n this a n t i - C o m m u n i s t rhetoric b o t h tyrannical and colonialist implications of t h e term appear. For t h e a n t i - C o m m u n i s t , C o m m u n i s m d e n o t e s p r e c i s e l y t h e e x e r c i s e of brutal tyranny o v e r a w h o l e p e o p l e b y a f e w rulers, and t h e will to c o n q u e r t h e w o r l d , b r i n g i n g h i t h e r t o i n d e p e n d e n t p e o p l e s u n d e r that tyranny. In d o m i n a n t political d i s c o u r s e it is not l e g i t i m a t e to u s e t h e term o p p r e s s i o n to d e s c r i b e our s o c i e t y , b e c a u s e o p p r e s s i o n is t h e evil p e r p e t r a t e d by t h e O t h e r s . N e w left social m o v e m e n t s of t h e 1960s and 1970s, h o w e v e r , shifted t h e m e a n i n g of t h e c o n c e p t of o p p r e s s i o n . In its n e w usage, o p p r e s s i o n d e s i g ­ n a t e s t h e d i s a d v a n t a g e and injustice s o m e p e o p l e suffer not b e c a u s e a tyrannical p o w e r c o e r c e s t h e m , but b e c a u s e of t h e e v e r y d a y practices of a w e l l - i n t e n t i o n e d liberal society. In this n e w left u s a g e , t h e tyranny of a ruling g r o u p o v e r another, as in South Africa, m u s t certainly b e called o p p r e s s i v e . But o p p r e s s i o n also refers to s y s t e m i c constraints o n g r o u p s that are not n e c e s s a r i l y t h e result of t h e i n t e n t i o n s of a tyrant. O p p r e s s i o n in this s e n s e is structural, rather than t h e result of a f e w p e o p l e ' s c h o i c e s or p o l i c i e s . Its c a u s e s are e m b e d d e d in u n q u e s t i o n e d n o r m s , habits, and s y m b o l s , in t h e a s s u m p t i o n s u n d e r l y i n g institutional rules and t h e c o l l e c ­ tive c o n s e q u e n c e s o f following t h o s e rules. It n a m e s , as Marilyn F r y e puts it, "an e n c l o s i n g s t r u c t u r e of forces and barriers w h i c h t e n d s to t h e i m m o ­ bilization a n d r e d u c t i o n of a g r o u p or category of p e o p l e " (Frye, 1983a, p. 11). In this e x t e n d e d structural s e n s e o p p r e s s i o n refers to t h e vast and d e e p injustices s o m e groups suffer as a c o n s e q u e n c e of often u n c o n s c i o u s a s s u m p t i o n s and reactions of w e l l - m e a n i n g p e o p l e in ordinary interac­ tions, m e d i a and cultural s t e r e o t y p e s , and structural features of b u r e a u ­ cratic h i e r a r c h i e s and market m e c h a n i s m s — i n short, the normal proc­ e s s e s o f e v e r y d a y life. W e c a n n o t e l i m i n a t e this structural o p p r e s s i o n b y g e t t i n g rid of t h e rulers or making s o m e n e w laws, b e c a u s e o p p r e s s i o n s arc s y s t e m a t i c a l l y r e p r o d u c e d in major e c o n o m i c , political, and cultural institutions. T h e s y s t e m i c character o f o p p r e s s i o n i m p l i e s that an o p p r e s s e d g r o u p n e e d not h a v e a correlate o p p r e s s i n g group. W h i l e structural o p p r e s s i o n i n v o l v e s relations a m o n g g r o u p s , t h e s e relations d o not always fit t h e par­ a d i g m o f c o n s c i o u s and intentional o p p r e s s i o n of o n e g r o u p by another. F o u c a u l t (1977) s u g g e s t s that to u n d e r s t a n d t h e m e a n i n g and o p e r a t i o n of p o w e r in m o d e r n s o c i e t y w e m u s t look b e y o n d the m o d e l of p o w e r as " s o v e r e i g n t y , " a d y a d i c relation of ruler and subject, and instead analyze t h e e x e r c i s e of p o w e r as t h e effect of often liberal and " h u m a n e practices of e d u c a t i o n , bureaucratic administration, p r o d u c t i o n and distribution of c o n s u m e r g o o d s , m e d i c i n e , and so on. T h e c o n s c i o u s actions of m a n y indi-

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viduals daily c o n t r i b u t e to m a i n t a i n i n g and r e p r o d u c i n g o p p r e s s i o n , b u t t h o s e p e o p l e are usually s i m p l y d o i n g their j o b s or living their l i v e s , and d o not u n d e r s t a n d t h e m s e l v e s as a g e n t s of o p p r e s s i o n . I d o not m e a n to s u g g e s t that w i t h i n a s y s t e m of o p p r e s s i o n individual p e r s o n s d o not i n t e n t i o n a l l y harm o t h e r s in o p p r e s s e d g r o u p s . T h e raped w o m a n , t h e b e a t e n Black y o u t h , t h e l o c k e d - o u t worker, t h e gay man harrassed o n t h e street, are v i c t i m s of intentional actions b y identifiable a g e n t s . I also d o not m e a n to d e n y that specific groups are beneficiaries of t h e o p p r e s s i o n of o t h e r g r o u p s , and t h u s h a v e an i n t e r e s t in t h e i r c o n t i n ­ u e d o p p r e s s i o n . I n d e e d , for e v e r y o p p r e s s e d g r o u p t h e r e is a g r o u p that is privileged in relation to that g r o u p . T h e c o n c e p t of o p p r e s s i o n has b e e n current a m o n g radicals s i n c e t h e 1960s partly in reaction to Marxist a t t e m p t s to r e d u c e t h e injustices of racism a n d s e x i s m , for e x a m p l e , to t h e effects of class d o m i n a t i o n or b o u r ­ g e o i s i d e o l o g y . Racism, s e x i s m , a g e i s m , h o m o p h o b i a , s o m e social m o v e ­ m e n t s a s s e r t e d , are distinct forms of o p p r e s s i o n w i t h their o w n d y n a m i c s apart from t h e d y n a m i c s of class, e v e n t h o u g h t h e y m a y interact w i t h class o p p r e s s i o n . F r o m often h e a t e d d i s c u s s i o n s a m o n g socialists, f e m i n i s t s , and antiracism activists in t h e last t e n years a c o n s e n s u s is e m e r g i n g that m a n y different g r o u p s m u s t b e said to b e o p p r e s s e d in our s o c i e t y , and that n o s i n g l e form of o p p r e s s i o n can b e a s s i g n e d causal or moral p r i m a c y ( s e e G o t t l i e b , 1987). T h e s a m e discussion has also l e d to t h e r e c o g n i t i o n that g r o u p d i f f e r e n c e s cut across individual lives in a multiplicity of w a y s that can entail p r i v i l e g e and o p p r e s s i o n for t h e s a m e p e r s o n in different r e s p e c t s . O n l y a plural explication of t h e c o n c e p t of o p p r e s s i o n can a d e ­ q u a t e l y c a p t u r e t h e s e insights. A c c o r d i n g l y , I offer b e l o w an explication of five faces of o p p r e s s i o n as a useful s e t of c a t e g o r i e s and distinctions w h i c h I b e l i e v e is c o m p r e h e n s i v e , in t h e s e n s e that it c o v e r s all t h e g r o u p s said by n e w left social m o v e m e n t s to b e o p p r e s s e d and all t h e w a y s t h e y are o p p r e s s e d . I d e r i v e t h e five faces of o p p r e s s i o n from reflection o n t h e c o n d i t i o n of t h e s e groups. B e c a u s e different factors, or c o m b i n a t i o n s of factors, c o n s t i t u t e t h e o p p r e s s i o n of different g r o u p s , m a k i n g t h e i r o p p r e s s i o n irreducible, I b e l i e v e it is not p o s s i b l e to g i v e o n e e s s e n t i a l definition of o p p r e s s i o n . T h e five c a t e g o r i e s articulated in this chapter, h o w e v e r , are a d e q u a t e to d e s c r i b e t h e o p p r e s ­ sion of any g r o u p , as w e l l as its similarities w i t h and differences from t h e o p p r e s s i o n of o t h e r g r o u p s . But first w e m u s t ask w h a t a g r o u p is.

T H E C O N C E P T OF A SOCIAL G R O U P

O p p r e s s i o n refers to structural p h e n o m e n a that i m m o b i l i z e or d i m i n i s h a g r o u p . B u t w h a t is a g r o u p ? O u r ordinary d i s c o u r s e differentiates p e o p l e a c c o r d i n g to social g r o u p s s u c h as w o m e n and m e n , a g e g r o u p s , racial and

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e t h n i c g r o u p s , r e l i g i o u s g r o u p s , and so o n . Social groups of this sort are not s i m p l y c o l l e c t i o n s of p e o p l e , for t h e y are m o r e f u n d a m e n t a l l y inter­ t w i n e d w i t h t h e i d e n t i t i e s of t h e p e o p l e d e s c r i b e d as b e l o n g i n g to t h e m . T h e y are a specific kind of collectivity, w i t h specific c o n s e q u e n c e s for h o w p e o p l e u n d e r s t a n d o n e a n o t h e r and t h e m s e l v e s . Yet n e i t h e r social t h e o r y nor p h i l o s o p h y has a clear and d e v e l o p e d c o n c e p t of t h e social g r o u p (see T u r n e r e t al., 1987). A social g r o u p is a c o l l e c t i v e of p e r s o n s differentiated from at least o n e o t h e r g r o u p b y cultural forms, practices, or w a y of life. M e m b e r s of a g r o u p h a v e a specific affinity w i t h o n e a n o t h e r b e c a u s e of t h e i r similar e x p e r i e n c e or w a y of life, w h i c h p r o m p t s t h e m to associate w i t h o n e an­ o t h e r m o r e than w i t h t h o s e not i d e n t i f i e d w i t h t h e g r o u p , or in a different way. G r o u p s are an e x p r e s s i o n of social relations; a g r o u p exists o n l y in relation to at least o n e o t h e r g r o u p . G r o u p identification arises, that is, in t h e e n c o u n t e r and interaction b e t w e e n social c o l l e c t i v i t i e s that e x p e r i ­ e n c e s o m e d i f f e r e n c e s in t h e i r w a y of life and forms of association, e v e n if t h e y also regard t h e m s e l v e s as b e l o n g i n g to t h e s a m e s o c i e t y . As l o n g as t h e y a s s o c i a t e d s o l e l y a m o n g t h e m s e l v e s , for e x a m p l e , an A m e r i c a n I n d i a n g r o u p t h o u g h t of t h e m s e l v e s o n l y as "the p e o p l e . " T h e e n c o u n t e r w i t h o t h e r A m e r i c a n Indians c r e a t e d an a w a r e n e s s of differ­ e n c e ; t h e o t h e r s w e r e n a m e d as a g r o u p , and t h e first g r o u p c a m e to s e e t h e m s e l v e s as a g r o u p . B u t social groups d o not arise o n l y from an e n c o u n ­ ter b e t w e e n different s o c i e t i e s . Social p r o c e s s e s also differentiate groups w i t h i n a s i n g l e s o c i e t y . T h e sexual division of labor, for e x a m p l e , has c r e ­ a t e d social g r o u p s of w o m e n and m e n in all k n o w n s o c i e t i e s . M e m b e r s of each g e n d e r h a v e a certain affinity w i t h o t h e r s in their g r o u p b e c a u s e of w h a t t h e y d o or e x p e r i e n c e , and differentiate t h e m s e l v e s from t h e o t h e r g e n d e r , e v e n w h e n m e m b e r s of e a c h g e n d e r c o n s i d e r that t h e y h a v e m u c h in c o m m o n w i t h m e m b e r s of t h e other, and c o n s i d e r that t h e y b e ­ l o n g to t h e s a m e society. Political p h i l o s o p h y typically has n o place For a specific c o n c e p t of t h e social g r o u p . W h e n p h i l o s o p h e r s and political theorists discuss g r o u p s , t h e y t e n d to c o n c e i v e t h e m e i t h e r on t h e m o d e l of a g g r e g a t e s or on t h e m o d e l of associations, b o t h of w h i c h are m e t h o d o l o g i c a l l y individualist c o n c e p t s . To arrive at a specific c o n c e p t of t h e social g r o u p it is t h u s useful to contrast social g r o u p s w i t h b o t h a g g r e g a t e s and associations. A n a g g r e g a t e is any classification of p e r s o n s according to s o m e attrib­ u t e . P e r s o n s can b e a g g r e g a t e d according to a n y n u m b e r o f a t t r i b u t e s — e y e color, t h e m a k e of car t h e y d r i v e , t h e street t h e y live o n . S o m e p e o p l e i n t e r p r e t t h e g r o u p s that h a v e e m o t i o n a l and social s a l i e n c e in our s o c i e t y as a g g r e g a t e s , as arbitrary classifications of p e r s o n s a c c o r d i n g to s u c h at­ t r i b u t e s as skin color, genitals, or age. G e o r g e Sher, for e x a m p l e , treats social g r o u p s as a g g r e g a t e s , and u s e s t h e arbitrariness of a g g r e g a t e classifi-

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cation as a r e a s o n not to g i v e special a t t e n t i o n to groups. "There are really as m a n y g r o u p s as t h e r e are c o m b i n a t i o n s of p e o p l e and if w e are g o i n g to ascribe c l a i m s to equal t r e a t m e n t to racial, sexual, and o t h e r g r o u p s w i t h h i g h visibility, it will b e m e r e favoritism not to ascribe similar claims to t h e s e o t h e r g r o u p s as w e l l " (Sher, 1987a, p. 256). But "highly visible" social g r o u p s such as Blacks or w o m e n are different from a g g r e g a t e s , or m e r e " c o m b i n a t i o n s of p e o p l e " (see F r e n c h , 1975; F r i e d m a n and May, 1985; May, 1987, chap. 1). A social g r o u p is d e f i n e d not primarily b y a set of s h a r e d attributes, but b y a s e n s e of identity. W h a t d e f i n e s Black A m e r i c a n s as a social g r o u p is not primarily their skin color; s o m e p e r s o n s w h o s e skin color is fairly light, for e x a m p l e , identify t h e m ­ s e l v e s as Black. T h o u g h s o m e t i m e s o b j e c t i v e attributes are a n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n for classifying o n e s e l f or o t h e r s as b e l o n g i n g to a certain social g r o u p , it is identification w i t h a certain social status, t h e c o m m o n history that social status p r o d u c e s , and self-identification that define t h e g r o u p as a group. Social g r o u p s are not e n t i t i e s that exist apart from individuals, but n e i ­ ther are t h e y m e r e l y arbitrary classifications o f individuals according to attributes w h i c h are external to or accidental to their i d e n t i t i e s . A d m i t t i n g t h e reality of social g r o u p s d o e s not c o m m i t o n e to reifying c o l l e c t i v i t i e s , as s o m e m i g h t argue. G r o u p m e a n i n g s partially c o n s t i t u t e p e o p l e ' s i d e n t i ­ ties in t e r m s of t h e cultural forms, social situation, and history that g r o u p m e m b e r s k n o w as theirs, b e c a u s e t h e s e m e a n i n g s h a v e b e e n e i t h e r forced u p o n t h e m or forged b y t h e m or b o t h (cf. F i s s , 1976). G r o u p s are real not as s u b s t a n c e s , b u t as forms of social relations (cf. May, 1987, p p . 2 2 - 2 3 ) . Moral theorists and political p h i l o s o p h e r s t e n d to e l i d e social g r o u p s m o r e often w i t h associations than with a g g r e g a t e s ( e . g . , F r e n c h , 1975; May, 1 9 8 7 , c h a p . 1). By an association I m e a n a formally o r g a n i z e d institu­ tion, s u c h as a c l u b , corporation, political party, c h u r c h , c o l l e g e , or u n i o n . U n l i k e t h e a g g r e g a t e m o d e l of g r o u p s , t h e association m o d e l r e c o g n i z e s that g r o u p s are d e f i n e d by specific practices and forms of association. N e v ­ e r t h e l e s s it s h a r e s a p r o b l e m w i t h t h e a g g r e g a t e m o d e l . T h e a g g r e g a t e m o d e l conceives the individual as prior to t h e c o l l e c t i v e , b e c a u s e it re­ d u c e s t h e social g r o u p to a m e r e set of attributes attached to individuals. T h e association m o d e l also implicitly c o n c e i v e s t h e individual as o n t o l o g i cally prior to t h e c o l l e c t i v e , as m a k i n g up, or c o n s t i t u t i n g , groups. A contract m o d e l of social relations is appropriate for c o n c e i v i n g associ­ ations, b u t not g r o u p s . Individuals c o n s t i t u t e associations, t h e y c o m e to­ g e t h e r as already f o r m e d p e r s o n s and set t h e m u p , e s t a b l i s h i n g rules, p o s i t i o n s , and offices. T h e relationship of p e r s o n s to associations is usually voluntary, and e v e n w h e n it is not, t h e p e r s o n has n e v e r t h e l e s s usually e n t e r e d t h e association. T h e p e r s o n is prior to t h e association also in that

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t h e person's i d e n t i t y and s e n s e of self are usually regarded as prior to and relatively i n d e p e n d e n t of association m e m b e r s h i p . C r o u p s , o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , c o n s t i t u t e individuals. A p e r s o n s particular s e n s e of history, affinity, and s e p a r a t e n e s s , e v e n t h e person's m o d e of r e a s o n i n g , e v a l u a t i n g , and e x p r e s s i n g feeling, are c o n s t i t u t e d partly b y h e r or his g r o u p affinities. This d o e s not m e a n that p e r s o n s h a v e n o indi­ vidual s t y l e s , or are u n a b l e to t r a n s c e n d or reject a g r o u p identity. N o r d o e s it p r e c l u d e p e r s o n s from h a v i n g m a n y aspects that are i n d e p e n d e n t of t h e s e g r o u p i d e n t i t i e s . T h e social o n t o l o g y u n d e r l y i n g m a n y c o n t e m p o r a r y t h e o r i e s o f j u s t i c e , I p o i n t e d out in t h e last chapter, is m e t h o d o l o g i c a l l y individualist or a t o m ist. It p r e s u m e s that t h e individual is ontologicallv prior to t h e social. This individualist social o n t o l o g y usually g o e s t o g e t h e r w i t h a n o r m a t i v e c o n ­ c e p t i o n of t h e self as i n d e p e n d e n t . T h e a u t h e n t i c self is a u t o n o m o u s , uni­ fied, free, and s e l f - m a d e , s t a n d i n g apart from history and affiliations, c h o o s i n g its life plan e n t i r e l y for itself. O n e of t h e m a i n c o n t r i b u t i o n s of poststructuralist p h i l o s o p h y has b e e n to e x p o s e as illusory this m e t a p h y s i c of a unified self-making subjectivity, w h i c h posits t h e s u b j e c t as an a u t o n o m o u s origin or an u n d e r l y i n g s u b ­ s t a n c e to w h i c h attributes of g e n d e r , nationality, family role, intellectual d i s p o s i t i o n , and so o n m i g h t attach. C o n c e i v i n g t h e subject in this fashion i m p l i e s c o n c e i v i n g c o n s c i o u s n e s s as o u t s i d e of and prior to l a n g u a g e and t h e c o n t e x t of social interaction, w h i c h t h e subject e n t e r s . Several cur­ rents of r e c e n t p h i l o s o p h y c h a l l e n g e this d e e p l y h e l d Cartesian a s s u m p ­ tion. Lacanian p s y c h o a n a l y s i s , for e x a m p l e , and t h e social and p h i l o s o p h i ­ cal t h e o r y i n f l u e n c e d by it, c o n c e i v e t h e self as an a c h i e v e m e n t o f linguis­ tic p o s i t i o n i n g that is always c o n t e x t u a l i z e d in c o n c r e t e relations w i t h o t h e r p e r s o n s , with t h e i r m i x e d identities (Coward and Ellis, 1977). T h e self is a p r o d u c t of social p r o c e s s e s , not their origin. F r o m a rather different p e r s p e c t i v e , H a b e r m a s indicates that a t h e o r y of c o m m u n i c a t i v e action also m u s t c h a l l e n g e t h e " p h i l o s o p h y of c o n s c i o u s ­ n e s s " w h i c h l o c a t e s intentional e g o s as t h e ontological origins o f social relations. A t h e o r y of c o m m u n i c a t i v e action c o n c e i v e s individual i d e n t i t y not as an origin b u t as a p r o d u c t of linguistic and practical interaction ( H a b e r m a s , 1 9 8 7 , p p . 3 - 4 0 ) . As S t e p h e n E p s t e i n d e s c r i b e s it, i d e n t i t y is "a s o c i a l i z e d s e n s e of individuality, an internal organization of selfp e r c e p t i o n c o n c e r n i n g o n e ' s relationship to social c a t e g o r i e s , that also i n c o r p o r a t e s v i e w s of t h e self p e r c e i v e d to b e h e l d b y o t h e r s . I d e n t i t y is c o n s t i t u t e d relationally, t h r o u g h i n v o l v e m e n t w i t h — a n d incorporation of—significant o t h e r s and integration into c o m m u n i t i e s " ( E p s t e i n , 1987, p. 29). G r o u p categorization and n o r m s are major c o n s t i t u e n t s of individ­ ual i d e n t i t y ( s e e T u r n e r e t al., 1987).

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A p e r s o n j o i n s an association, and e v e n if m e m b e r s h i p in it f u n d a m e n ­ tally affects o n e ' s life, o n e d o e s not take that m e m b e r s h i p to d e f i n e o n e ' s v e r y i d e n t i t y , in t h e w a y , for e x a m p l e , b e i n g N a v a h o might. G r o u p affin­ ity, o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , has t h e character of w h a t Martin H e i d e g g e r (1962) calls " t h r o w n n e s s " : o n e finds oneself as a m e m b e r of a g r o u p , w h i c h o n e e x p e r i e n c e s as always already h a v i n g b e e n . For our i d e n t i t i e s are d e f i n e d in relation to h o w o t h e r s identify u s , and t h e y d o so in t e r m s of g r o u p s w h i c h are always already associated w i t h specific attributes, s t e r e o t y p e s , and n o r m s . F r o m t h e t h r o w n n e s s of g r o u p affinity it d o e s not follow that o n e cannot l e a v e g r o u p s and e n t e r n e w o n e s . M a n y w o m e n b e c o m e lesbian after first i d e n t i f y i n g as h e t e r o s e x u a l . A n y o n e w h o lives long e n o u g h b e c o m e s old. T h e s e c a s e s e x e m p l i f y t h r o w n n e s s p r e c i s e l y b e c a u s e s u c h c h a n g e s in g r o u p affinity are e x p e r i e n c e d as transformations in one's i d e n t i t y . N o r d o e s it follow fom t h e t h r o w n n e s s of g r o u p affinity that o n e c a n n o t d e f i n e t h e m e a n i n g of g r o u p i d e n t i t y for oneself; t h o s e w h o identify w i t h a g r o u p can r e d e f i n e t h e m e a n i n g and n o r m s of g r o u p identity. I n d e e d , in C h a p t e r 6 I will s h o w h o w o p p r e s s e d g r o u p s h a v e s o u g h t to confront t h e i r o p ­ p r e s s i o n b y e n g a g i n g in j u s t such redefinition, T h e p r e s e n t p o i n t is only that o n e first finds a g r o u p i d e n t i t y as g i v e n , and t h e n takes it u p in a certain w a y . W h i l e g r o u p s m a y c o m e into b e i n g , t h e y are n e v e r f o u n d e d . G r o u p s , I h a v e said, exist only in relation to o t h e r g r o u p s . A g r o u p m a y b e i d e n t i f i e d b y o u t s i d e r s w i t h o u t t h o s e so identified h a v i n g a n y specific c o n s c i o u s n e s s of t h e m s e l v e s as a g r o u p . S o m e t i m e s a g r o u p c o m e s to exist o n l y b e c a u s e o n e g r o u p e x c l u d e s and labels a c a t e g o r y of p e r s o n s , and t h o s e l a b e l e d c o m e to u n d e r s t a n d t h e m s e l v e s as g r o u p m e m b e r s o n l y s l o w l y , o n t h e basis of t h e i r shared o p p r e s s i o n . In V i c h y F r a n c e , for e x a m ­ p l e , J e w s w h o h a d b e e n so assimilated that t h e y had n o specifically J e w i s h i d e n t i t y w e r e m a r k e d as J e w s b y o t h e r s and g i v e n a specific social status b y t h e m . T h e s e p e o p l e " d i s c o v e r e d " t h e m s e l v e s as J e w s , and t h e n f o r m e d a g r o u p i d e n t i t y and affinity w i t h o n e a n o t h e r (see Sartre, 1948). A p e r ­ son's g r o u p i d e n t i t i e s m a y b e for t h e m o s t part only a b a c k g r o u n d or h o ­ rizon to his or h e r life, b e c o m i n g salient only in specific interactive contexts. A s s u m i n g an a g g r e g a t e m o d e l of g r o u p s , s o m e p e o p l e think that social g r o u p s are i n v i d i o u s fictions, e s s e n t i a l i z i n g arbitrary attributes. F r o m this p o i n t of v i e w p r o b l e m s of p r e j u d i c e , s t e r e o t y p i n g , d i s c r i m i n a t i o n , and e x c l u s i o n exist b e c a u s e s o m e p e o p l e m i s t a k e n l y b e l i e v e that g r o u p i d e n t i ­ fication m a k e s a d i f f e r e n c e to t h e capacities, t e m p e r a m e n t , or v i r t u e s of g r o u p m e m b e r s . This individualist c o n c e p t i o n of p e r s o n s and their rela­ tion to o n e a n o t h e r t e n d s to identify o p p r e s s i o n with g r o u p identification. O p p r e s s i o n , on this v i e w , is s o m e t h i n g that h a p p e n s to p e o p l e w h e n t h e y

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are classified in g r o u p s . B e c a u s e o t h e r s identify t h e m as a g r o u p , t h e y are e x c l u d e d a n d d e s p i s e d . E l i m i n a t i n g o p p r e s s i o n thus r e q u i r e s e l i m i n a t i n g g r o u p s . P e o p l e s h o u l d b e t r e a t e d as individuals, not as m e m b e r s o f g r o u p s , a n d a l l o w e d to form t h e i r lives freely w i t h o u t s t e r e o t y p e s or group norms. This b o o k takes i s s u e w i t h that p o s i t i o n . W h i l e I a g r e e that i n d i v i d u a l s s h o u l d b e free to p u r s u e life plans in t h e i r o w n w a y , it is foolish to d e n y t h e reality of g r o u p s . D e s p i t e t h e m o d e r n m y t h of a d e c l i n e o f parochial a t t a c h m e n t s and a s c r i b e d i d e n t i t i e s , in m o d e r n s o c i e t y g r o u p differentia­ tion r e m a i n s e n d e m i c . As b o t h markets and social administration i n c r e a s e t h e w e b of social i n t e r d e p e n d e n c y on a w o r l d scale, and as m o r e p e o p l e e n c o u n t e r o n e a n o t h e r as strangers in cities and states, p e o p l e retain and r e n e w e t h n i c , locale, a g e , sex, and occupational g r o u p identifications, and form n e w o n e s in t h e p r o c e s s e s of e n c o u n t e r (cf. Ross, 1980, p. 19; R o t h s c h i l d , 1 9 8 1 , p. 130). E v e n w h e n t h e y b e l o n g to o p p r e s s e d g r o u p s , p e o p l e ' s g r o u p identifications are often important to t h e m , and t h e y often feel a special affinity for o t h e r s in t h e i r group. I b e l i e v e that g r o u p differ­ e n t i a t i o n is b o t h an i n e v i t a b l e and a desirable aspect of m o d e r n social p r o c e s s e s . Social j u s t i c e , I shall a r g u e in later chapters, r e q u i r e s not t h e m e l t i n g away o f differences, b u t institutions that p r o m o t e r e p r o d u c t i o n of and r e s p e c t for g r o u p differences w i t h o u t o p p r e s s i o n . T h o u g h s o m e g r o u p s h a v e c o m e to b e f o r m e d out of o p p r e s s i o n , and relations of p r i v i l e g e and o p p r e s s i o n structure t h e interactions b e t w e e n m a n y g r o u p s , g r o u p differentiation is not in itself o p p r e s s i v e . N o t all g r o u p s are o p p r e s s e d . In t h e U n i t e d States R o m a n Catholics are a specific social g r o u p , w i t h distinct practices and affinities w i t h o n e another, b u t t h e y are n o l o n g e r an o p p r e s s e d g r o u p . W h e t h e r a g r o u p is o p p r e s s e d d e p e n d s o n w h e t h e r it is s u b j e c t to o n e or m o r e of t h e five c o n d i t i o n s I shall d i s c u s s b e l o w . T h e v i e w that g r o u p s are fictions d o e s carry an important a n t i d e t e r m i n ist or a n t i e s s e n t i a l i s t intuition. O p p r e s s i o n has often b e e n p e r p e t r a t e d b y a c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n of g r o u p difference in t e r m s of unalterable e s s e n t i a l natures that d e t e r m i n e w h a t g r o u p m e m b e r s d e s e r v e or are c a p a b l e of, and that e x c l u d e g r o u p s so e n t i r e l y from o n e a n o t h e r that t h e y h a v e n o similarities or o v e r l a p p i n g attributes. T o assert that it is p o s s i b l e to h a v e social g r o u p d i f f e r e n c e w i t h o u t o p p r e s s i o n , it is n e c e s s a r y to c o n c e p t u a l ­ ize g r o u p s in a m u c h m o r e relational and fluid fashion. A l t h o u g h social p r o c e s s e s of affinity and differentiation p r o d u c e g r o u p s , t h e y d o not g i v e g r o u p s a s u b s t a n t i v e e s s e n c e . T h e r e is n o c o m m o n n a t u r e that m e m b e r s of a g r o u p share. As a s p e c t s of a p r o c e s s , m o r e o v e r , g r o u p s are fluid; t h e y c o m e i n t o b e i n g and may fade away. H o m o s e x u a l practices h a v e e x i s t e d in m a n y s o c i e t i e s and historical p e r i o d s , for e x a m p l e . G a y

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m e n or l e s b i a n s h a v e b e e n identified as specific groups and so identified t h e m s e l v e s , h o w e v e r , o n l y in t h e t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y (see F e r g u s o n , 1989, c h a p . 9; Altrnan, 1981). Arising from social relations and p r o c e s s e s , finally, g r o u p differences usually cut across o n e another. E s p e c i a l l y in a large, c o m p l e x , and h i g h l y differentiated s o c i e t y , social g r o u p s are not t h e m s e l v e s h o m o g e n e o u s , b u t mirror in t h e i r o w n differentiations m a n y of t h e o t h e r groups in t h e w i d e r s o c i e t y . In A m e r i c a n s o c i e t y today, for e x a m p l e , Blacks are not a s i m p l e , unified g r o u p w i t h a c o m m o n life. L i k e o t h e r racial and e t h n i c g r o u p s , t h e y are differentiated by a g e , g e n d e r , class, sexuality, r e g i o n , and na­ tionality, any of w h i c h in a g i v e n c o n t e x t m a y b e c o m e a salient g r o u p identity. This v i e w of g r o u p differentiation as m u l t i p l e , cross-cutting, fluid, and shifting i m p l i e s a n o t h e r critique of t h e m o d e l of t h e a u t o n o m o u s , unified self. In c o m p l e x , h i g h l y differentiated s o c i e t i e s like our o w n , all p e r s o n s h a v e m u l t i p l e g r o u p identifications. T h e c u l t u r e , p e r s p e c t i v e , and rela­ tions of p r i v i l e g e and o p p r e s s i o n of t h e s e various g r o u p s , m o r e o v e r , m a y not c o h e r e . T h u s individual p e r s o n s , as c o n s t i t u t e d partly b y their g r o u p affinities and relations, c a n n o t b e unified, t h e m s e l v e s are h e t e r o g e n e o u s and not n e c e s s a r i l y c o h e r e n t .

T H E F A C E S O F OPPRESSION

Exploitation T h e central function of Marx's t h e o r y of exploitation is to explain h o w class s t r u c t u r e can exist in t h e a b s e n c e of legally and n o r m a t i v e l y s a n c t i o n e d class d i s t i n c t i o n s . In precapitalist s o c i e t i e s d o m i n a t i o n is overt and a c c o m ­ p l i s h e d t h r o u g h d i r e c t l y political m e a n s . In both slave s o c i e t y and feudal s o c i e t y t h e right to appropriate t h e product of the labor of o t h e r s partly d e f i n e s class p r i v i l e g e , and t h e s e s o c i e t i e s l e g i t i m a t e class distinctions w i t h i d e o l o g i e s of natural superiority and inferiority. Capitalist s o c i e t y , o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , r e m o v e s traditional juridically e n f o r c e d class distinctions and p r o m o t e s a b e l i e f in t h e legal f r e e d o m of p e r s o n s . W o r k e r s freely contract w i t h e m p l o y e r s and r e c e i v e a w a g e ; n o formal m e c h a n i s m s of law or c u s t o m force t h e m to work for that e m p l o y e r or any e m p l o y e r . T h u s t h e m y s t e r y of capitalism arises: w h e n e v e r y o n e is formally f r e e , h o w can t h e r e b e class d o m i n a t i o n ? W h y d o class d i s t i n c ­ tions p e r s i s t b e t w e e n t h e w e a l t h y , w h o o w n t h e m e a n s of p r o d u c t i o n , and t h e m a s s of p e o p l e , w h o work for t h e m ? T h e t h e o r y of exploitation an­ s w e r s this q u e s t i o n . Profit, t h e basis of capitalist p o w e r and w e a l t h , is a m y s t e r y if w e as­ s u m e that in t h e market g o o d s e x c h a n g e at their v a l u e s . T h e labor t h e o r y

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of v a l u e d i s p e l s this m y s t e r y . E v e r y c o m m o d i t y ' s value is a function of t h e labor t i m e n e c e s s a r y for its p r o d u c t i o n . Labor p o w e r is t h e o n e c o m m o d ­ ity w h i c h in t h e p r o c e s s of b e i n g c o n s u m e d p r o d u c e s n e w value. Profit c o m e s from t h e difference b e t w e e n t h e value of t h e labor p e r f o r m e d and t h e v a l u e of t h e capacity to labor w h i c h t h e capitalist p u r c h a s e s . Profit is p o s s i b l e o n l y b e c a u s e t h e o w n e r of capital appropriates any realized sur­ plus value. In r e c e n t years Marxist scholars h a v e e n g a g e d in c o n s i d e r a b l e c o n ­ troversy a b o u t t h e viability of t h e labor theory of v a l u e this a c c o u n t of ex­ ploitation relies o n ( s e e Wolff, 1984, chap. 4). John R o c m e r (1982), for e x a m p l e , d e v e l o p s a t h e o r y of exploitation w h i c h claims to p r e s e r v e t h e theoretical and practical p u r p o s e s of Marx's t h e o r y , b u t w i t h o u t a s s u m i n g a distinction b e t w e e n v a l u e s and prices and w i t h o u t b e i n g restricted to a c o n c e p t of abstract, h o m o g e n e o u s labor. M y p u r p o s e h e r e is not to e n ­ g a g e in t e c h n i c a l e c o n o m i c d i s p u t e s , but to indicate t h e place of a c o n c e p t of e x p l o i t a t i o n in a c o n c e p t i o n of o p p r e s s i o n . Marx's t h e o r y of exploitation lacks an explicitly n o r m a t i v e m e a n i n g , e v e n t h o u g h t h e j u d g m e n t that workers are e x p l o i t e d clearly has n o r m a ­ tive as w e l l as d e s c r i p t i v e p o w e r in that t h e o r y (Buchanan, 1982, c h a p . 3). C. B. M a c p h e r s o n (1973, c h a p . 3) reconstructs this theory of e x p l o i t a t i o n in a m o r e explicitly n o r m a t i v e form. T h e injustice of capitalist s o c i e t y c o n ­ sists in t h e fact that s o m e p e o p l e e x e r c i s e their capacities u n d e r t h e c o n ­ trol, a c c o r d i n g to t h e p u r p o s e s , and for t h e benefit of o t h e r p e o p l e . T h r o u g h private o w n e r s h i p of t h e m e a n s of p r o d u c t i o n , and t h r o u g h mar­ kets that allocate labor a n d t h e ability to b u y g o o d s , capitalism s y s t e m a t i ­ cally transfers t h e p o w e r s of s o m e p e r s o n s to o t h e r s , t h e r e b y a u g m e n t i n g t h e p o w e r of t h e latter. In this p r o c e s s of t h e transfer of p o w e r s , a c c o r d i n g to M a c p h e r s o n , t h e capitalist class acquires and maintains an ability to extract b e n e f i t s from w o r k e r s . N o t o n l y are p o w e r s transferred from work­ ers to capitalists, but also t h e p o w e r s of workers d i m i n i s h b y m o r e than t h e a m o u n t of transfer, b e c a u s e w o r k e r s suffer material d e p r i v a t i o n and a loss of control, and h e n c e arc d e p r i v e d of important e l e m e n t s of selfr e s p e c t . Justice, t h e n , r e q u i r e s e l i m i n a t i n g t h e institutional forms that e n a b l e and e n f o r c e this p r o c e s s of transference and replacing t h e m w i t h institutional forms that e n a b l e all to d e v e l o p and u s e their capacities in a w a y that d o e s not inhibit, b u t rather can e n h a n c e , similar d e v e l o p m e n t and u s e in o t h e r s . T h e central insight e x p r e s s e d in t h e c o n c e p t of exploitation, t h e n , is that this o p p r e s s i o n o c c u r s t h r o u g h a s t e a d y p r o c e s s of t h e transfer of t h e results of t h e labor of o n e social g r o u p to benefit another. T h e i n j u s t i c e of class division d o e s not consist o n l y in t h e distributive fact that s o m e p e o ­ p l e h a v e great w e a l t h w h i l e m o s t p e o p l e h a v e little (cf. B u c h a n a n , 1982, p p . 4 4 - 4 9 ; H o l m s t r o m , 1977). Exploitation e n a c t s a structural relation

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b e t w e e n social g r o u p s . Social rules a b o u t w h a t work is, w h o d o e s w h a t for w h o m , h o w w o r k is c o m p e n s a t e d , and t h e social p r o c e s s b y w h i c h t h e results of w o r k are a p p r o p r i a t e d o p e r a t e to enact relations of p o w e r and inequality. T h e s e relations are p r o d u c e d and r e p r o d u c e d t h r o u g h a s y s ­ t e m a t i c p r o c e s s in w h i c h t h e e n e r g i e s of t h e h a v e - n o t s are c o n t i n u o u s l y e x p e n d e d to maintain and a u g m e n t t h e p o w e r , status, and w e a l t h of t h e haves. M a n y writers h a v e c o g e n t l y a r g u e d that t h e Marxist c o n c e p t of exploita­ tion is too narrow to e n c o m p a s s all forms of d o m i n a t i o n and o p p r e s s i o n ( G i d d e n s , 1 9 8 1 , p. 2 4 2 ; Brittan and Maynard, 1984, p. 9 3 ; M u r p h y , 1985; B o w l e s and G i n t i s , 1986, p p . 2 0 - 2 4 ) . In particular, t h e Marxist c o n c e p t of class l e a v e s i m p o r t a n t p h e n o m e n a of sexual and racial o p p r e s s i o n u n e x ­ p l a i n e d . D o e s this m e a n that sexual and racial o p p r e s s i o n are n o n e x p l o i t a tive, and that w e s h o u l d r e s e r v e w h o l l y distinct c a t e g o r i e s for t h e s e o p ­ p r e s s i o n s ? O r can t h e c o n c e p t of exploitation b e b r o a d e n e d to i n c l u d e o t h e r w a y s in w h i c h t h e labor and e n e r g y e x p e n d i t u r e of o n e g r o u p b e n e ­ fits a n o t h e r , a n d r e p r o d u c e s a relation of d o m i n a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e m ? F e m i n i s t s h a v e had little difficulty s h o w i n g that w o m e n ' s o p p r e s s i o n c o n s i s t s partly in a s y s t e m a t i c and u n r e c i p r o c a t e d transfer of p o w e r s from w o m e n to m e n . W o m e n ' s o p p r e s s i o n consists not m e r e l y in an i n e q u a l i t y of status, p o w e r , and w e a l t h r e s u l t i n g fom m e n ' s e x c l u d i n g t h e m from p r i v i l e g e d activities. T h e f r e e d o m , p o w e r , status, and self-realization of m e n is p o s s i b l e p r e c i s e l y b e c a u s e w o m e n work for t h e m . G e n d e r e x p l o i ­ tation has t w o a s p e c t s , transfer of t h e fruits of material labor to m e n and transfer of n u r t u r i n g and sexual e n e r g i e s to m e n . C h r i s t i n e D e l p h y (1984), for e x a m p l e , d e s c r i b e s marriage as a class re­ lation in w h i c h w o m e n ' s labor benefits m e n w i t h o u t c o m p a r a b l e r e m u n e r ­ ation. S h e m a k e s it clear that t h e exploitation consists not in t h e sort of work that w o m e n d o in t h e h o m e , for this m i g h t i n c l u d e various kinds of tasks, b u t in t h e fact that t h e y perform tasks for s o m e o n e o n w h o m t h e y are d e p e n d e n t . T h u s , for e x a m p l e , in m o s t s y s t e m s of agricultural p r o d u c ­ tion in t h e w o r l d , m e n take to market t h e g o o d s w o m e n h a v e p r o d u c e d , a n d m o r e often than n o t m e n r e c e i v e t h e status and often t h e e n t i r e in­ c o m e from this labor. W i t h t h e c o n c e p t of sex-affective p r o d u c t i o n , A n n F e r g u s o n (1979; 1984; 1 9 8 9 , c h a p . 4) identifies a n o t h e r form of t h e transference of w o m e n ' s e n e r g i e s to m e n . W o m e n p r o v i d e m e n and c h i l d r e n w i t h e m o ­ tional care a n d p r o v i d e m e n w i t h sexual satisfaction, and as a g r o u p re­ c e i v e r e l a t i v e l y little of e i t h e r from m e n (cf. Brittan and M a y n a r d , p p . 1 4 2 - 4 8 ) . T h e g e n d e r socialization of w o m e n makes us t e n d to b e m o r e a t t e n t i v e to interactive d y n a m i c s than m e n , and m a k e s w o m e n g o o d at p r o v i d i n g e m p a t h y and s u p p o r t for p e o p l e ' s feelings and at s m o o t h i n g o v e r i n t e r a c t i v e t e n s i o n s . B o t h m e n and w o m e n look to w o m e n as nurtur-

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ers of their personal l i v e s , and w o m e n f r e q u e n t l y c o m p l a i n that w h e n t h e y look to m e n for e m o t i o n a l support t h e y d o not r e c e i v e it (Easton, 1978). T h e n o r m s of h e t e r o s e x u a l i t y , m o r e o v e r , are o r i e n t e d a r o u n d male p l e a s ­ ure, and c o n s e q u e n t l y m a n y w o m e n r e c e i v e little satisfaction from their sexual interaction w i t h m e n ( G o t t l i e b , 1984). M o s t f e m i n i s t t h e o r i e s of g e n d e r exploitation have c o n c e n t r a t e d o n t h e institutional structure of t h e patriarchal family. R e c e n t l y , h o w e v e r , f e m i ­ nists h a v e b e g u n to e x p l o r e relations of g e n d e r exploitation e n a c t e d in t h e c o n t e m p o r a r y w o r k p l a c e and t h r o u g h t h e state. Carol Brown argues that as m e n h a v e r e m o v e d t h e m s e l v e s from responsibility for c h i l d r e n , m a n y w o m e n h a v e b e c o m e d e p e n d e n t o n t h e state for s u b s i s t e n c e as t h e y c o n ­ t i n u e to b e a r nearly total responsibility for childrearing ( B r o w n , 1981; cf. Boris and Bardaglio, 1983; A. F e r g u s o n , 1984). This c r e a t e s a n e w s y s t e m of t h e e x p l o i t a t i o n of w o m e n ' s d o m e s t i c labor m e d i a t e d by state institu­ tions, w h i c h s h e calls p u b l i c patriarchy. In t w e n t i e t h - c e n t u r y capitalist e c o n o m i e s t h e w o r k p l a c e s that w o m e n h a v e b e e n e n t e r i n g in increasing n u m b e r s s e r v e as a n o t h e r important site of g e n d e r e x p l o i t a t i o n . D a v i d A l e x a n d e r (1987) argues that typically f e m i ­ n i n e j o b s i n v o l v e g e n d e r - b a s e d tasks r e q u i r i n g sexual labor, nurturing, caring for o t h e r s ' b o d i e s , or s m o o t h i n g o v e r workplace t e n s i o n s . In t h e s e w a y s w o m e n ' s e n e r g i e s are e x p e n d e d in j o b s that e n h a n c e t h e status of, p l e a s e , or comfort o t h e r s , usually m e n ; and t h e s e g e n d e r - b a s e d labors o f w a i t r e s s e s , clerical w o r k e r s , n u r s e s , and o t h e r caretakers often g o u n n o ­ ticed and u n d e r c o m p e n s a t e d . To s u m m a r i z e , w o m e n are e x p l o i t e d in t h e Marxist s e n s e to t h e d e g r e e that t h e y are w a g e w o r k e r s . S o m e have argued that w o m e n ' s d o m e s t i c labor also r e p r e s e n t s a form of capitalist class exploitation insofar as it is labor c o v e r e d b y t h e w a g e s a family r e c e i v e s . As a g r o u p , h o w e v e r , w o m e n u n d e r g o specific forms of g e n d e r exploitation in w h i c h their e n e r ­ g i e s and p o w e r are e x p e n d e d , often u n n o t i c e d and u n a c k n o w l e d g e d , u s u ­ ally to b e n e f i t m e n b y r e l e a s i n g t h e m for m o r e important and c r e a t i v e work, e n h a n c i n g their status or t h e e n v i r o n m e n t around t h e m , or p r o v i d ­ ing t h e m w i t h sexual or e m o t i o n a l s e r v i c e . Race is a s t r u c t u r e of o p p r e s s i o n at least as basic as class or g e n d e r . Are t h e r e , t h e n , racially specific forms of exploitation? T h e r e is n o d o u b t that racialized g r o u p s in t h e U n i t e d States, especially Blacks and Latinos, are o p p r e s s e d t h r o u g h capitalist s u p e r e x p l o i t a t i o n resulting from a s e g ­ m e n t e d labor market that t e n d s to r e s e r v e skilled, high-paying, u n i o n i z e d j o b s for w h i t e s . T h e r e is w i d e d i s a g r e e m e n t about w h e t h e r s u c h s u p e r e x ­ ploitation b e n e f i t s w h i t e s as a g r o u p or only benefits t h e capitalist class (see R e i c h , 1981), and I d o not i n t e n d to e n t e r into that d i s p u t e h e r e . H o w e v e r o n e a n s w e r s t h e q u e s t i o n about capitalist s u p e r e x p l o i t a t i o n of racialized g r o u p s , is it p o s s i b l e to c o n c e p t u a l i z e a form of exploitation that

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is racially specific o n analogy w i t h t h e g e n d e r - s p e c i f i c forms just dis­ c u s s e d ? I s u g g e s t that t h e c a t e g o r y of menial labor m i g h t s u p p l y a m e a n s for s u c h c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n . In its derivation "menial" d e s i g n a t e s t h e labor of s e r v a n t s . W h e r e v e r t h e r e is racism, t h e r e is t h e a s s u m p t i o n , m o r e or less e n f o r c e d , that m e m b e r s of t h e o p p r e s s e d racial groups are or o u g h t to b e s e r v a n t s of t h o s e , or s o m e of t h o s e , in t h e p r i v i l e g e d g r o u p . In m o s t w h i t e racist s o c i e t i e s this m e a n s that m a n y w h i t e p e o p l e h a v e dark- or y e l l o w - s k i n n e d d o m e s t i c servants, and in t h e U n i t e d States today t h e r e r e m a i n s significant racial structuring of private h o u s e h o l d s e r v i c e . But in t h e U n i t e d States today m u c h s e r v i c e labor has g o n e public: a n y o n e w h o g o e s to a g o o d h o t e l or a g o o d restaurant can have servants. S e r v a n t s often a t t e n d t h e d a i l y — a n d n i g h t l y — a c t i v i t i e s of b u s i n e s s e x e c u t i v e s , g o v e r n ­ m e n t officials, and o t h e r high-status professionals. In o u r s o c i e t y t h e r e r e m a i n s s t r o n g cultural p r e s s u r e to fill servant j o b s — b e l l h o p , porter, c h a m b e r m a i d , b u s b o y , and so o n — w i t h Black and Latino w o r k e r s . T h e s e j o b s entail a transfer of e n e r g i e s w h e r e b y t h e servers e n h a n c e t h e status of t h e s e r v e d . M e n i a l labor usually refers not o n l y to s e r v i c e , h o w e v e r , b u t also to any s e r v i l e , u n s k i l l e d , l o w - p a y i n g work lacking in a u t o n o m y , in w h i c h a per­ son is s u b j e c t to taking orders from m a n y p e o p l e . M e n i a l work t e n d s to b e auxiliary work, i n s t r u m e n t a l to t h e work of o t h e r s , w h e r e t h o s e o t h e r s r e c e i v e primary r e c o g n i t i o n for d o i n g t h e j o b . Laborers o n a c o n s t r u c t i o n site, for e x a m p l e , are at t h e b e c k and call of w e l d e r s , e l e c t r i c i a n s , c a r p e n ­ ters, and o t h e r skilled w o r k e r s , w h o r e c e i v e recognition for t h e j o b d o n e . In t h e U n i t e d States explicit racial discrimination o n c e r e s e r v e d m e n i a l work for Blacks, C h i c a n o s , A m e r i c a n Indians, and C h i n e s e , and m e n i a l work still t e n d s to b e linked to Black and Latino workers (Symanski, 1985). I offer this category of menial labor as a form of racially specific e x p l o i t a t i o n , as a provisional c a t e g o r y in n e e d of exploration. T h e i n j u s t i c e of exploitation is m o s t f r e q u e n t l y u n d e r s t o o d o n a distrib­ u t i v e m o d e l . For e x a m p l e , t h o u g h h e d o e s not offer an explicit definition of t h e c o n c e p t , b y "exploitation" B r u c e A c k e r m a n s e e m s to m e a n a seri­ o u s l y u n e q u a l distribution of w e a l t h , i n c o m e , and o t h e r r e s o u r c e s that is g r o u p b a s e d and structurally p e r s i s t e n t (Ackerman, 1980, c h a p . 8). John R o e m e r ' s definition of exploitation is narrower and m o r e rigorous: "An a g e n t is e x p l o i t e d w h e n t h e a m o u n t of labor e m b o d i e d in any b u n d l e of g o o d s h e c o u l d r e c e i v e , in a feasible distribution of society's n e t p r o d u c t , is less than t h e labor h e e x p e n d e d " ( R o e m e r , 1982, p. 122). This definition too turns t h e c o n c e p t u a l focus from institutional relations and p r o c e s s e s to distributive outcomes. Jeffrey R e i m a n argues that such a distributive u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f exploi­ tation r e d u c e s t h e injustice of class p r o c e s s e s to a function of t h e i n e q u a l -

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ity of t h e p r o d u c t i v e assets classes o w n . This m i s s e s , according to R e i m a n , t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p of force b e t w e e n capitalists and w o r k e r s , t h e fact that t h e u n e q u a l e x c h a n g e in q u e s t i o n occurs w i t h i n c o e r c i v e structures that g i v e w o r k e r s f e w o p t i o n s ( R e i m a n , 1987; cf. B u c h a n a n , 1982, p p . 4 4 - 4 9 ; H o l m s t r o m , 1977). T h e injustice of exploitation consists in social pro­ c e s s e s that bring about a transfer of e n e r g i e s from o n e g r o u p to a n o t h e r to p r o d u c e u n e q u a l distributions, and in t h e w a y in w h i c h social institu­ tions e n a b l e a f e w to a c c u m u l a t e w h i l e t h e y constrain m a n y m o r e . T h e injustices of e x p l o i t a t i o n cannot b e e l i m i n a t e d by redistribution of g o o d s , for as l o n g as i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d practices and structural relations r e m a i n u n a l t e r e d , t h e p r o c e s s o f transfer will re-create an u n e q u a l distribution o f benefits. B r i n g i n g about j u s t i c e w h e r e t h e r e is exploitation r e q u i r e s re­ organization of institutions and practices of d e c i s i o n m a k i n g , alteration of t h e division of labor, and similar m e a s u r e s of institutional, structural, and cultural c h a n g e .

Marginalization Increasingly in t h e U n i t e d States racial o p p r e s s i o n occurs in t h e form of marginalization rather than exploitation. Marginals are p e o p l e t h e s y s t e m of labor c a n n o t or will not u s e . N o t only in Third W o r l d capitalist c o u n ­ tries, b u t also in m o s t W e s t e r n capitalist s o c i e t i e s , t h e r e is a g r o w i n g u n d e r c l a s s o f p e o p l e p e r m a n e n t l y c o n f i n e d to lives of social marginality, m o s t of w h o m are racially m a r k e d — B l a c k s or Indians in Latin A m e r ­ ica, and Blacks, East Indians, E a s t e r n E u r o p e a n s , or N o r t h Africans in Europe. Marginalization is b y n o m e a n s t h e fate only of racially m a r k e d g r o u p s , h o w e v e r . In t h e U n i t e d States a shamefully large proportion of t h e p o p u ­ lation is marginal: o l d p e o p l e , and increasingly p e o p l e w h o are not v e r y old b u t g e t laid off from their j o b s and c a n n o t find n e w work; y o u n g p e o ­ p l e , e s p e c i a l l y Black or Latino, w h o cannot find first or s e c o n d j o b s ; m a n y s i n g l e m o t h e r s and t h e i r children; o t h e r p e o p l e involuntarily u n e m ­ p l o y e d ; m a n y m e n t a l l y and physically d i s a b l e d p e o p l e ; A m e r i c a n Indians, e s p e c i a l l y t h o s e o n reservations. Marginalization is p e r h a p s t h e m o s t d a n g e r o u s form of o p p r e s s i o n . A w h o l e c a t e g o r y of p e o p l e is e x p e l l e d from useful participation in social life and t h u s p o t e n t i a l l y s u b j e c t e d to s e v e r e material d e p r i v a t i o n and e v e n e x t e r m i n a t i o n . T h e material d e p r i v a t i o n marginalization often c a u s e s is certainly unjust, e s p e c i a l l y in a s o c i e t y w h e r e o t h e r s h a v e p l e n t y . C o n ­ t e m p o r a r y a d v a n c e d capitalist s o c i e t i e s have in principle a c k n o w l e d g e d t h e injustice o f material d e p r i v a t i o n c a u s e d b y marginalization, a n d have taken s o m e s t e p s to a d d r e s s it by p r o v i d i n g welfare p a y m e n t s and ser-

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v i c e s . T h e c o n t i n u a n c e of this welfare state is b y n o m e a n s a s s u r e d , and in m o s t w e l f a r e state s o c i e t i e s , e s p e c i a l l y t h e U n i t e d States, w e l f a r e re­ d i s t r i b u t i o n s d o not e l i m i n a t e large-scale suffering and d e p r i v a t i o n . Material d e p r i v a t i o n , w h i c h can b e a d d r e s s e d b y r e d i s t r i b u t i v e social p o l i c i e s , is not, h o w e v e r , t h e e x t e n t of t h e harm c a u s e d by marginalization. T w o c a t e g o r i e s of injustice b e y o n d distribution are associated w i t h marginality in a d v a n c e d capitalist s o c i e t i e s . First, t h e provision of welfare itself p r o d u c e s n e w injustice by d e p r i v i n g t h o s e d e p e n d e n t o n it of rights and f r e e d o m s that o t h e r s h a v e . S e c o n d , e v e n w h e n material d e p r i v a t i o n is s o m e w h a t m i t i g a t e d b y t h e welfare state, marginalization is unjust b e ­ c a u s e it b l o c k s t h e o p p o r t u n i t y to e x e r c i s e capacities in socially d e f i n e d and r e c o g n i z e d w a y s . I shall e x p l i c a t e e a c h of t h e s e in turn. Liberalism has traditionally a s s e r t e d t h e right of all rational a u t o n o ­ m o u s a g e n t s to equal c i t i z e n s h i p . Early b o u r g e o i s liberalism explicitly e x ­ c l u d e d from c i t i z e n s h i p all t h o s e w h o s e reason w a s q u e s t i o n a b l e or not fully d e v e l o p e d , and all t h o s e not i n d e p e n d e n t ( P a t e m a n , 1988, chap. 3; cf. B o w l e s and Gintis, 1986, c h a p . 2). T h u s p o o r p e o p l e , w o m e n , t h e m a d and t h e f e e b l e m i n d e d , and c h i l d r e n w e r e explicitly e x c l u d e d from c i t i z e n ­ s h i p , and m a n y of t h e s e w e r e h o u s e d in institutions m o d e l e d o n t h e m o d ­ e r n prison: p o o r h o u s e s , i n s a n e a s y l u m s , schools. T o d a y t h e e x c l u s i o n o f d e p e n d e n t p e r s o n s from e q u a l c i t i z e n s h i p rights is o n l y barely h i d d e n b e n e a t h t h e surface. B e c a u s e t h e y d e p e n d o n b u ­ reaucratic institutions for support or s e r v i c e s , t h e old, t h e poor, and t h e m e n t a l l y or physically d i s a b l e d are s u b j e c t to patronizing, p u n i t i v e , d e ­ m e a n i n g , and arbitrary t r e a t m e n t b y t h e policies and p e o p l e a s s o c i a t e d w i t h w e i / a r e bureaucracies. B e i n g a d e p e n d e n t in o u r s o c i e t y i m p l i e s b e i n g l e g i t i m a t e l y subject to t h e often arbitrary and invasive authority of social s e r v i c e p r o v i d e r s and o t h e r p u b l i c and private administrators, w h o e n f o r c e rules w i t h w h i c h t h e marginal m u s t c o m p l y , and o t h e r w i s e e x e r ­ c i s e p o w e r o v e r t h e c o n d i t i o n s of their lives. In m e e t i n g n e e d s o f t h e m a r g i n a l i z e d , often w i t h t h e aid o f social scientific d i s c i p l i n e s , welfare a g e n c i e s also construct t h e n e e d s t h e m s e l v e s . M e d i c a l and social s e r v i c e professionals k n o w w h a t is g o o d for t h o s e t h e y s e r v e , and t h e marginals and d e p e n d e n t s t h e m s e l v e s d o not h a v e t h e right to claim to k n o w w h a t is g o o d for t h e m (Fraser, 1987a; K. F e r g u s o n , 1 9 8 4 , c h a p . 4). D e p e n d ­ e n c y in o u r s o c i e t y thus i m p l i e s , as it has in all liberal s o c i e t i e s , a sufficient warrant to s u s p e n d basic rights to privacy, r e s p e c t , and individual c h o i c e . A l t h o u g h d e p e n d e n c y p r o d u c e s c o n d i t i o n s of injustice in o u r s o c i e t y , d e p e n d e n c y in itself n e e d not b e o p p r e s s i v e . O n e cannot i m a g i n e a soci­ e t y in w h i c h s o m e p e o p l e w o u l d not n e e d to b e d e p e n d e n t o n o t h e r s at least s o m e o f t h e t i m e : c h i l d r e n , sick p e o p l e , w o m e n r e c o v e r i n g from c h i l d b i r t h , o l d p e o p l e w h o h a v e b e c o m e frail, d e p r e s s e d or o t h e r w i s e

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e m o t i o n a l l y n e e d y p e r s o n s , h a v e t h e moral right to d e p e n d on o t h e r s for s u b s i s t e n c e and support. An i m p o r t a n t c o n t r i b u t i o n of feminist moral t h e o r y has b e e n to q u e s ­ tion t h e d e e p l y h e l d a s s u m p t i o n that moral a g e n c y and full c i t i z e n s h i p r e q u i r e that a p e r s o n b e a u t o n o m o u s and i n d e p e n d e n t . F e m i n i s t s h a v e e x p o s e d this a s s u m p t i o n as inappropriately individualistic and d e r i v e d from a specifically m a l e e x p e r i e n c e of social relations, w h i c h v a l u e s c o m ­ p e t i t i o n and solitary a c h i e v e m e n t (see Gilligan, 1982; F r i e d m a n , 1985). F e m a l e e x p e r i e n c e of social relations, arising b o t h from w o m e n ' s typical d o m e s t i c care r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s and from t h e kinds of paid work that m a n y w o m e n d o , t e n d s to r e c o g n i z e d e p e n d e n c e as a basic h u m a n c o n d i t i o n (cf. Hartsock, 1983, c h a p . 10). W h e r e a s on t h e a u t o n o m y m o d e l a just s o c i e t y w o u l d as m u c h as p o s s i b l e g i v e p e o p l e t h e o p p o r t u n i t y to b e i n d e p e n d e n t , t h e f e m i n i s t m o d e l e n v i s i o n s j u s t i c e as according r e s p e c t and participation in d e c i s i o n m a k i n g to t h o s e w h o are d e p e n d e n t as w e l l as to t h o s e w h o are i n d e p e n d e n t ( H e l d , 1987b). D e p e n d e n c y s h o u l d not b e a reason to b e d e p r i v e d of c h o i c e and r e s p e c t , and m u c h of t h e o p p r e s s i o n m a n y margi­ nals e x p e r i e n c e w o u l d b e l e s s e n e d if a less individualistic m o d e l of rights prevailed. Marginalization d o e s not c e a s e to b e o p p r e s s i v e w h e n o n e has s h e l t e r and food. M a n y old p e o p l e , for e x a m p l e , h a v e sufficient m e a n s to live comfortably b u t r e m a i n o p p r e s s e d in their marginal status. E v e n if margi­ nals w e r e p r o v i d e d a comfortable material life within institutions that re­ s p e c t e d t h e i r f r e e d o m and d i g n i t y , injustices of marginality w o u l d remain in t h e form of u s e l e s s n e s s , b o r e d o m , and lack of self-respect. M o s t of o u r society's p r o d u c t i v e and r e c o g n i z e d activities take place in c o n t e x t s of or­ g a n i z e d social c o o p e r a t i o n , and social structures and p r o c e s s e s that c l o s e p e r s o n s o u t of participation in such social c o o p e r a t i o n are unjust. T h u s w h i l e marginalization definitely entails serious issues of d i s t r i b u t i v e j u s ­ t i c e , it also i n v o l v e s t h e d e p r i v a t i o n of cultural, practical, and institution­ alized c o n d i t i o n s for e x e r c i s i n g capacities in a c o n t e x t of r e c o g n i t i o n and interaction. T h e fact of marginalization raises basic structural issues of j u s t i c e , in particular c o n c e r n i n g t h e a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s of a c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n partic­ ipation in p r o d u c t i v e activities of social c o o p e r a t i o n , on t h e o n e h a n d , and a c c e s s to t h e m e a n s of c o n s u m p t i o n , on t h e other. As marginalization is i n c r e a s i n g , w i t h n o sign of a b a t e m e n t , s o m e social policy analysts h a v e i n t r o d u c e d the i d e a of a "social w a g e " as a g u a r a n t e e d socially p r o v i d e d i n c o m e not t i e d to t h e w a g e s y s t e m . Restructuring of p r o d u c t i v e activity to a d d r e s s a right of participation, h o w e v e r , i m p l i e s o r g a n i z i n g s o m e so­ cially p r o d u c t i v e activity o u t s i d e of t h e w a g e s y s t e m (see Offe, 1 9 8 5 , p p . 9 5 - 1 0 0 ) , t h r o u g h p u b l i c works or s e l f - e m p l o y e d c o l l e c t i v e s .

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Powerlessness As I h a v e i n d i c a t e d , t h e Marxist idea of class is important b e c a u s e it h e l p s reveal t h e structure of exploitation: that s o m e p e o p l e h a v e their p o w e r and w e a l t h b e c a u s e t h e y profit from t h e labor of o t h e r s . For this reason I reject t h e claim s o m e m a k e that a traditional class exploitation m o d e l fails to c a p t u r e t h e structure of c o n t e m p o r a r y society. It remains t h e c a s e that t h e labor of m o s t p e o p l e in t h e s o c i e t y a u g m e n t s t h e p o w e r of relatively few. D e s p i t e t h e i r differences from nonprofessional w o r k e r s , m o s t profes­ sional w o r k e r s are still not m e m b e r s of t h e capitalist class. Professional labor e i t h e r i n v o l v e s e x p l o i t a t i v e transfers to capitalists or s u p p l i e s i m p o r ­ tant c o n d i t i o n s for such transfers. Professional workers are in an a m b i g u ­ o u s class p o s i t i o n , it is true, b e c a u s e , as I argue in C h a p t e r 7, t h e y also benefit from t h e exploitation of nonprofessional workers. W h i l e it is false to claim that a division b e t w e e n capitalist and w o r k i n g c l a s s e s n o l o n g e r d e s c r i b e s our s o c i e t y , it is also false to say that class relations h a v e r e m a i n e d u n a l t e r e d s i n c e t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y . A n a d e ­ q u a t e c o n c e p t i o n of o p p r e s s i o n cannot ignore t h e e x p e r i e n c e of social di­ vision r e f l e c t e d in t h e colloquial distinction b e t w e e n t h e " m i d d l e class" and t h e "working class," a division structured b y t h e social division of labor b e t w e e n professionals and nonprofessionals. Professionals are privi­ l e g e d in relation to nonprofessionals, b y virtue of their p o s i t i o n in t h e division of labor and t h e status it carries. N o n p r o f e s s i o n a l s suffer a form of o p p r e s s i o n in addition to exploitation, w h i c h 1 call p o w e r l e s s n e s s . In t h e U n i t e d States, as in o t h e r a d v a n c e d capitalist c o u n t r i e s , m o s t w o r k p l a c e s are not o r g a n i z e d democratically, direct participation in p u b ­ lic p o l i c y d e c i s i o n s is rare, and policy i m p l e m e n t a t i o n is for t h e m o s t part hierarchical, i m p o s i n g rules o n bureaucrats and c i t i z e n s . T h u s m o s t p e o ­ p l e in t h e s e s o c i e t i e s d o not regularly participate in m a k i n g d e c i s i o n s that affect t h e c o n d i t i o n s of t h e i r lives and actions, and in this s e n s e m o s t p e o ­ p l e lack signficant p o w e r . At t h e s a m e t i m e , as I a r g u e d in C h a p t e r 1, d o m i n a t i o n in m o d e r n s o c i e t y is e n a c t e d through t h e w i d e l y d i s p e r s e d p o w e r s of m a n y a g e n t s m e d i a t i n g t h e d e c i s i o n s of o t h e r s . To that e x t e n t m a n y p e o p l e h a v e s o m e p o w e r in relation to o t h e r s , e v e n t h o u g h t h e y lack t h e p o w e r to d e c i d e p o l i c i e s or results. T h e p o w e r l e s s are t h o s e w h o lack authority or p o w e r e v e n in this m e d i a t e d s e n s e , t h o s e o v e r w h o m p o w e r is e x e r c i s e d w i t h o u t their e x e r c i s i n g it; t h e p o w e r l e s s are situated so that t h e y m u s t take orders and rarely h a v e t h e right to g i v e t h e m . P o w e r l e s s ­ n e s s also d e s i g n a t e s a position in t h e division of labor and t h e c o n c o m i t a n t social p o s i t i o n that allows p e r s o n s little o p p o r t u n i t y to d e v e l o p and e x e r ­ c i s e skills. T h e p o w e r l e s s h a v e little or n o work a u t o n o m y , e x e r c i s e little creativity or j u d g m e n t in their work, have n o technical e x p e r t i s e or au­ thority, e x p r e s s t h e m s e l v e s awkwardly, e s p e c i a l l y in p u b l i c or b u r e a u -

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cratic s e t t i n g s , and d o not c o m m a n d r e s p e c t . P o w e r l e s s n e s s n a m e s t h e o p p r e s s i v e situations S e n n c t t and C o b b (1972) d e s c r i b e in their famous s t u d y of w o r k i n g - c l a s s m e n . This p o w e r l e s s status is p e r h a p s b e s t d e s c r i b e d n e g a t i v e l y : t h e p o w e r ­ less lack t h e authority, status, and s e n s e of self that professionals t e n d to h a v e . T h e status p r i v i l e g e of professionals has t h r e e a s p e c t s , t h e lack of w h i c h p r o d u c e s o p p r e s s i o n for nonprofessionals. First, a c q u i r i n g and practicing a profession has an e x p a n s i v e , p r o g r e s ­ sive character. B e i n g professional usually r e q u i r e s a c o l l e g e e d u c a t i o n and t h e acquisition of a s p e c i a l i z e d k n o w l e d g e that entails w o r k i n g with s y m ­ bols and c o n c e p t s . Professionals e x p e r i e n c e progress first in acquiring t h e e x p e r t i s e , and t h e n in t h e c o u r s e of professional a d v a n c e m e n t and rise in status. T h e life of t h e nonprofessional by c o m p a r i s o n is p o w e r l e s s in t h e s e n s e that it lacks this orientation toward t h e p r o g r e s s i v e d e v e l o p m e n t of capacities and a v e n u e s for r e c o g n i t i o n . S e c o n d , w h i l e m a n y professionals have supervisors and c a n n o t directly i n f l u e n c e m a n y d e c i s i o n s or t h e actions of m a n y p e o p l e , m o s t n e v e r t h e ­ less h a v e c o n s i d e r a b l e day-to-day work a u t o n o m y . Professionals usually h a v e s o m e authority o v e r o t h e r s , m o r e o v e r — e i t h e r o v e r workers t h e y s u p e r v i s e , or o v e r auxiliaries, or o v e r c l i e n t s . N o n p r o f e s s i o n a l s , o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , lack a u t o n o m y , and in b o t h their w o r k i n g and their c o n s u m e r c l i e n t l i v e s often stand u n d e r t h e authority of professionals. T h o u g h b a s e d o n a division of labor b e t w e e n "mental" and "manual" work, t h e distinction b e t w e e n " m i d d l e class" and "working class" d e s i g ­ n a t e s a division not only in w o r k i n g life, b u t also in nearly all a s p e c t s of sociaf h'fe. Professionals a n d nonprofessionals b e l o n g to different c u l t u r e s in t h e U n i t e d States. T h e t w o g r o u p s t e n d to live in s e g r e g a t e d n e i g h b o r ­ h o o d s or e v e n different t o w n s , a p r o c e s s itself m e d i a t e d by p l a n n e r s , z o n ­ ing officials, and real e s t a t e p e o p l e . T h e groups t e n d to have different tastes in food, decor, c l o t h e s , m u s i c , and vacations, and often different health and e d u c a t i o n a l n e e d s . M e m b e r s of e a c h g r o u p socialize for t h e m o s t part w i t h o t h e r s in t h e s a m e status g r o u p . W h i l e t h e r e is s o m e interg r o u p m o b i l i t y b e t w e e n g e n e r a t i o n s , for t h e most part t h e c h i l d r e n of professionals b e c o m e professionals and t h e c h i l d r e n of nonprofessionals d o not. T h u s , third, t h e p r i v i l e g e s of t h e professional e x t e n d b e y o n d t h e w o r k p l a c e to a w h o l e way of life. I call this way of life "respectability." To treat p e o p l e w i t h r e s p e c t is to b e p r e p a r e d to listen to w h a t t h e y h a v e to say or to d o w h a t t h e y r e q u e s t b e c a u s e t h e y have s o m e authority, e x p e r ­ tise, or i n f l u e n c e . T h e n o r m s of respectability in our society are associated specifically w i t h professional c u l t u r e . Professional d r e s s , s p e e c h , tastes, d e m e a n o r , all c o n n o t e respectability. G e n e r a l l y professionals e x p e c t and r e c e i v e r e s p e c t from o t h e r s . In restaurants, banks, h o t e l s , real e s t a t e of-

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flees, and m a n y o t h e r s u c h p u b l i c p l a c e s , as w e l l as in t h e m e d i a , profes­ sionals typically r e c e i v e m o r e respectful t r e a t m e n t than nonprofessionals. For this reason n o n p r o f e s s i o n a l s s e e k i n g a loan or a j o b , or to b u y a h o u s e or a car, will often try to look "professional" and " r e s p e c t a b l e " in t h o s e settings. T h e p r i v i l e g e o f this professional respectability appears starkly in t h e d y n a m i c s of racism and s e x i s m . In daily i n t e r c h a n g e w o m e n and m e n of color m u s t p r o v e their respectability. At first t h e y are often not treated by strangers w i t h respectful d i s t a n c e or d e f e r e n c e . O n c e p e o p l e d i s c o v e r that this w o m a n or that P u e r t o Rican man is a c o l l e g e t e a c h e r or a b u s i n e s s e x e c u t i v e , h o w e v e r , t h e y often b e h a v e m o r e respectfully toward h e r or h i m . Working-class w h i t e m e n , o n t h e o t h e r hand, are often t r e a t e d w i t h r e s p e c t until t h e i r working-class status is r e v e a l e d . In C h a p t e r 5 I will e x p l o r e in m o r e detail t h e cultural u n d e r p i n n i n g s of t h e ideal of r e s p e c t ­ ability a n d its o p p r e s s i v e implications. I h a v e d i s c u s s e d several injustices associated w i t h p o w e r l e s s n e s s : in­ hibition in t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of o n e ' s capacities, lack of d e c i s i o n m a k i n g p o w e r in o n e ' s w o r k i n g life, and e x p o s u r e to disrespectful t r e a t m e n t b e ­ c a u s e of t h e status o n e o c c u p i e s . T h e s e injustices h a v e distributional c o n ­ s e q u e n c e s , b u t are m o r e f u n d a m e n t a l l y matters of t h e division of labor. T h e o p p r e s s i o n of p o w e r l e s s n e s s brings into q u e s t i o n t h e division of labor basic to all industrial s o c i e t i e s : t h e social division b e t w e e n t h o s e w h o plan and t h o s e w h o e x e c u t e . I e x a m i n e this division in m o r e detail in C h a p ­ ter 7.

Cultural

Imperialism

E x p l o i t a t i o n , marginalization, and p o w e r l e s s n e s s all refer to relations of p o w e r and o p p r e s s i o n that o c c u r b y virtue of t h e social division of l a b o r — w h o works for w h o m , w h o d o e s not work, and h o w t h e c o n t e n t of work d e f i n e s o n e institutional p o s i t i o n relative to others. T h e s e t h r e e c a t e g o ­ ries refer to structural and institutional relations that d e l i m i t p e o p l e ' s ma­ terial l i v e s , i n c l u d i n g b u t not restricted to t h e resources t h e y h a v e access to and t h e c o n c r e t e o p p o r t u n i t i e s t h e y h a v e or do not h a v e to d e v e l o p and e x e r c i s e their capacities. T h e s e kinds of o p p r e s s i o n are a m a t t e r of c o n ­ c r e t e p o w e r in relation to o t h e r s — o f w h o benefits from w h o m , and w h o is dispensable. R e c e n t theorists of m o v e m e n t s of g r o u p liberation, notably feminist and Black liberation t h e o r i s t s , h a v e also g i v e n p r o m i n e n c e to a rather different form of o p p r e s s i o n , w h i c h following L u g o n e s and S p e l m a n (1983) I shall call cultural i m p e r i a l i s m . To e x p e r i e n c e cultural i m p e r i a l i s m m e a n s to e x p e r i e n c e h o w t h e d o m i n a n t m e a n i n g s of a society r e n d e r t h e particular

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p e r s p e c t i v e of o n e ' s o w n g r o u p invisible at t h e s a m e t i m e as t h e y s t e r e o ­ t y p e o n e ' s g r o u p and mark it out as t h e Other. Cultural i m p e r i a l i s m i n v o l v e s t h e universalization of a d o m i n a n t group's e x p e r i e n c e and c u l t u r e , and its e s t a b l i s h m e n t as t h e n o r m . S o m e g r o u p s h a v e e x c l u s i v e or primary a c c e s s to w h a t N a n c y Fraser (1987b) calls t h e m e a n s o f interpretation and c o m m u n i c a t i o n in a s o c i e t y . As a c o n s e q u e n c e , t h e d o m i n a n t cultural p r o d u c t s of t h e society, that is, t h o s e m o s t w i d e l y d i s s e m i n a t e d , e x p r e s s t h e e x p e r i e n c e , v a l u e s , goals, and a c h i e v e m e n t s of t h e s e groups. Often w i t h o u t noticing t h e y d o so, t h e d o m i n a n t groups project their o w n e x p e r i e n c e as r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of h u ­ m a n i t y as s u c h . Cultural p r o d u c t s also e x p r e s s t h e d o m i n a n t group's per­ s p e c t i v e o n and interpretation of e v e n t s and e l e m e n t s in t h e s o c i e t y , in­ c l u d i n g o t h e r g r o u p s in t h e s o c i e t y , insofar as t h e y attain cultural status at all. A n e n c o u n t e r w i t h o t h e r g r o u p s , h o w e v e r , can c h a l l e n g e t h e d o m i n a n t group's claim to universality. T h e d o m i n a n t g r o u p reinforces its p o s i t i o n by b r i n g i n g t h e o t h e r g r o u p s u n d e r t h e m e a s u r e of its d o m i n a n t n o r m s . C o n s e q u e n t l y , t h e difference of w o m e n from m e n , A m e r i c a n Indians or Africans from E u r o p e a n s , J e w s from Christians, h o m o s e x u a l s from h e t e r ­ o s e x u a l s , w o r k e r s from professionals, b e c o m e s r e c o n s t r u c t e d largely as d e v i a n c e and inferiority. S i n c e o n l y t h e d o m i n a n t group's cultural e x p r e s ­ sions r e c e i v e w i d e d i s s e m i n a t i o n , their cultural e x p r e s s i o n s b e c o m e t h e normal, or t h e universal, and t h e r e b y t h e unremarkable. G i v e n t h e nor­ mality of its o w n cultural e x p r e s s i o n s and i d e n t i t y , t h e d o m i n a n t g r o u p c o n s t r u c t s t h e differences w h i c h s o m e groups exhibit as lack and n e g a t i o n . T h e s e g r o u p s b e c o m e m a r k e d as O t h e r . T h e culturally d o m i n a t e d u n d e r g o a paradoxical o p p r e s s i o n , in that t h e y are b o t h m a r k e d out by s t e r e o t y p e s and at t h e s a m e t i m e r e n d e r e d invisible, As r e m a r k a b l e , d e v i a n t b e i n g s , t h e culturally i m p e r i a l i z e d are s t a m p e d w i t h an e s s e n c e . T h e s t e r e o t y p e s confine t h e m to a nature w h i c h is often a t t a c h e d in s o m e w a y to their b o d i e s , and w h i c h thus cannot easily b e d e n i e d . T h e s e s t e r e o t y p e s so p e r m e a t e t h e society that t h e y are not n o t i c e d as c o n t e s t a b l e . Just as e v e r y o n e k n o w s that t h e earth g o e s a r o u n d t h e s u n , so e v e r y o n e k n o w s that gay p e o p l e are p r o m i s c u o u s , that Indians are alcoholics, and that w o m e n are g o o d w i t h children. W h i t e m a l e s , o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , insofar as t h e y e s c a p e g r o u p marking, can b e individuals. T h o s e living u n d e r cultural i m p e r i a l i s m find t h e m s e l v e s d e f i n e d from t h e o u t s i d e , p o s i t i o n e d , p l a c e d , b y a network of d o m i n a n t m e a n i n g s t h e y e x p e r i e n c e as arising from e l s e w h e r e , from t h o s e w i t h w h o m t h e y d o not identify and w h o d o not identify w i t h t h e m . C o n s e q u e n t l y , t h e d o m i n a n t culture's s t e r e o t y p e d and inferiorized i m a g e s of the group m u s t b e inter­ n a l i z e d by g r o u p m e m b e r s at least to t h e e x t e n t that t h e y are forced to

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react to b e h a v i o r of o t h e r s i n f l u e n c e d b y t h o s e i m a g e s . This c r e a t e s for t h e culturally o p p r e s s e d t h e e x p e r i e n c e that W . E . B . D u Bois called " d o u b l e c o n s c i o u s n e s s " — " t h i s s e n s e of always looking at one's self t h r o u g h t h e e y e s of o t h e r s , of m e a s u r i n g o n e ' s soul b y t h e tape of a w o r l d that looks o n in a m u s e d c o n t e m p t and pity" ( D u Bois, 1969 [ 1 9 0 3 ] , p. 45). D o u b l e c o n ­ s c i o u s n e s s arises w h e n t h e o p p r e s s e d subject refuses to c o i n c i d e w i t h t h e s e d e v a l u e d , objectified, s t e r e o t y p e d visions of herself or himself. W h i l e t h e s u b j e c t d e s i r e s recognition as h u m a n , capable of activity, full of h o p e and possibility, s h e r e c e i v e s from t h e d o m i n a n t c u l t u r e o n l y t h e j u d g m e n t that s h e is different, m a r k e d , or inferior. T h e g r o u p d e f i n e d by t h e d o m i n a n t c u l t u r e as deviant, as a s t e r e o t y p e d O t h e r , is culturally different from t h e d o m i n a n t g r o u p , b e c a u s e t h e status of O t h e r n e s s c r e a t e s specific e x p e r i e n c e s not shared b y t h e d o m i n a n t g r o u p , and b e c a u s e culturally o p p r e s s e d g r o u p s also are often socially s e g ­ r e g a t e d and o c c u p y specific p o s i t i o n s in t h e social division of labor. M e m ­ b e r s of s u c h g r o u p s e x p r e s s their specific g r o u p e x p e r i e n c e s and i n t e r p r e ­ tations of t h e w o r l d to o n e another, d e v e l o p i n g and p e r p e t u a t i n g their o w n c u l t u r e . D o u b l e c o n s c i o u s n e s s , t h e n , occurs b e c a u s e o n e finds o n e ' s b e i n g d e f i n e d b y t w o c u l t u r e s : a d o m i n a n t and a s u b o r d i n a t e c u l t u r e . B e ­ c a u s e t h e y can affirm and r e c o g n i z e o n e a n o t h e r as sharing similar e x p e r i ­ e n c e s and p e r s p e c t i v e s on social life, p e o p l e in culturally i m p e r i a l i z e d g r o u p s can often maintain a s e n s e of positive subjectivity. Cultural i m p e r i a l i s m i n v o l v e s t h e paradox of e x p e r i e n c i n g o n e s e l f as i n v i s i b l e at t h e s a m e t i m e that o n e is marked out as different. T h e invisi­ bility c o m e s about w h e n d o m i n a n t groups fail to r e c o g n i z e t h e p e r s p e c ­ tive e m b o d i e d in their cultural e x p r e s s i o n s as a p e r s p e c t i v e . T h e s e d o m i ­ nant cultural e x p r e s s i o n s often s i m p l y h a v e little place for t h e e x p e r i e n c e of o t h e r g r o u p s , at m o s t only m e n t i o n i n g or referring to t h e m in s t e r e o ­ t y p e d or m a r g i n a l i z e d w a y s . This, t h e n , is t h e injustice of cultural i m p e r i ­ alism: that t h e o p p r e s s e d group's o w n e x p e r i e n c e and interpretation of social life finds little e x p r e s s i o n that t o u c h e s t h e d o m i n a n t c u l t u r e , w h i l e that s a m e c u l t u r e i m p o s e s o n t h e o p p r e s s e d g r o u p its e x p e r i e n c e and in­ t e r p r e t a t i o n of social life. In several of t h e following c h a p t e r s I shall e x p l o r e m o r e fully t h e c o n s e ­ q u e n c e s of cultural i m p e r i a l i s m for t h e theory and practice of social j u s ­ tice. C h a p t e r 4 e x p a n d s o n t h e claim that cultural i m p e r i a l i s m is e n a c t e d partly t h r o u g h t h e ability of a d o m i n a n t group to assert its p e r s p e c t i v e and e x p e r i e n c e as universal or neutral. In t h e s p h e r e of t h e polity, I a r g u e , claim to universality o p e r a t e s politically to e x c l u d e t h o s e u n d e r s t o o d as different. In C h a p t e r 5 I trace t h e operations of cultural i m p e r i a l i s m in n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y scientific classifications of s o m e b o d i e s as d e v i a n t or d e g e n e r a t e . I e x p l o r e h o w t h e devaluation of the b o d i e s of s o m e g r o u p s still c o n d i t i o n s e v e r y d a y interactions a m o n g g r o u p s , d e s p i t e our relative

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s u c c e s s at e x p e l l i n g s u c h b o d i l y evaluation from discursive c o n s c i o u s n e s s . In C h a p t e r 6, finally, I d i s c u s s r e c e n t s t r u g g l e s by t h e culturally o p ­ p r e s s e d to take o v e r definition of t h e m s e l v e s and assert a p o s i t i v e s e n s e of g r o u p difference. T h e r e I argue that j u s t i c e requires us to m a k e a political s p a c e for s u c h d i f f e r e n c e .

Violence Finally, m a n y g r o u p s suffer t h e o p p r e s s i o n of s y s t e m a t i c v o l e n c e . M e m ­ b e r s of s o m e g r o u p s l i v e w i t h t h e k n o w l e d g e that t h e y m u s t fear r a n d o m , u n p r o v o k e d attacks on their p e r s o n s or p r o p e r t y , w h i c h h a v e n o m o t i v e b u t to d a m a g e , h u m i l i a t e , or d e s t r o y t h e p e r s o n . In A m e r i c a n s o c i e t y w o m e n , Blacks, A s i a n s , Arabs, gay m e n , and lesbians live u n d e r s u c h threats of v i o l e n c e , and in at least s o m e regions J e w s , P u e r t o Ricans, C h i c a n o s , and o t h e r S p a n i s h - s p e a k i n g A m e r i c a n s m u s t fear such v i o l e n c e as w e l l . Physical v i o l e n c e against t h e s e g r o u p s is shockingly frequent. R a p e Crisis C e n t e r n e t w o r k s e s t i m a t e that m o r e than o n e - t h i r d of all A m e r i c a n w o m e n e x p e r i e n c e an a t t e m p t e d or successful sexual assault in t h e i r life­ t i m e s . M a n n i n g Marablc (1984, p p . 2 3 8 - 4 1 ) c a t a l o g u e s a large n u m b e r of i n c i d e n t s of racist v i o l e n c e and terror against blacks in t h e U n i t e d States b e t w e e n 1 9 8 0 and 1982. l i e cites d o z e n s of i n c i d e n t s of t h e s e v e r e b e a t ­ ing, killing, or rape of Blacks by p o l i c e officers o n d u t y , in w h i c h t h e p o l i c e i n v o l v e d w e r e a c q u i t t e d of any w r o n g d o i n g . In 1981, m o r e o v e r , t h e r e w e r e at least five h u n d r e d d o c u m e n t e d c a s e s of r a n d o m w h i t e t e e n a g e v i o l e n c e against Blacks. V i o l e n c e against gay m e n and lesbians is not o n l y c o m m o n , b u t has b e e n i n c r e a s i n g in t h e last five years. W h i l e t h e fre­ q u e n c y of physical attack on m e m b e r s of t h e s e and o t h e r racially or s e x u ­ ally m a r k e d g r o u p s is v e r y d i s t u r b i n g , I also i n c l u d e in this c a t e g o r y less s e v e r e i n c i d e n t s of h a r r a s s m e n t , i n t i m i d a t i o n , or ridicule s i m p l y for t h e p u r p o s e of d e g r a d i n g , h u m i l i a t i n g , or s t i g m a t i z i n g g r o u p m e m b e r s . G i v e n t h e f r e q u e n c y of s u c h v i o l e n c e in our s o c i e t y , w h y are t h e o r i e s of j u s t i c e usually s i l e n t about it? I think t h e reason is that theorists d o not typically take s u c h i n c i d e n t s of v i o l e n c e and harrassment as matters of social injustice. N o moral theorist w o u l d d e n y that such acts are v e r y w r o n g . B u t u n l e s s all i m m o r a l i t i e s are injustices, t h e y m i g h t w o n d e r , w h y s h o u l d such acts b e i n t e r p r e t e d as s y m p t o m s of social injustice? Acts of v i o l e n c e or p e t t y h a r r a s s m e n t are c o m m i t t e d by particular i n d i v i d u a l s , often e x t r e m i s t s , d e v i a n t s , or t h e m e n t a l l y u n s o u n d . H o w t h e n can t h e y b e said to i n v o l v e t h e sorts of institutional i s s u e s I h a v e said arc p r o p e r l y t h e s u b j e c t of j u s t i c e ? W h a t m a k e s v i o l e n c e a face of o p p r e s s i o n is less t h e particular acts t h e m s e l v e s , t h o u g h t h e s e are often utterly horrible, than t h e social c o n ­ text s u r r o u n d i n g t h e m , w h i c h m a k e s t h e m p o s s i b l e and e v e n a c c e p t a b l e .

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W h a t m a k e s v i o l e n c e a p h e n o m e n o n of social injustice, and not m e r e l y an individual moral w r o n g , is its s y s t e m i c character, its e x i s t e n c e as a social practice. V i o l e n c e is s y s t e m i c b e c a u s e it is d i r e c t e d at m e m b e r s of a g r o u p s i m p l y b e c a u s e t h e y are m e m b e r s of that g r o u p . Any w o m a n , for e x a m p l e , has a r e a s o n to fear rape. R e g a r d l e s s of w h a t a Black man has d o n e to e s c a p e t h e o p p r e s s i o n s of marginality or p o w e r l e s s n e s s , h e lives k n o w i n g h e is s u b ­ j e c t to attack or harrassment. T h e o p p r e s s i o n of v i o l e n c e consists not only in direct v i c t i m i z a t i o n , b u t in t h e daily k n o w l e d g e shared b y all m e m b e r s of o p p r e s s e d g r o u p s that t h e y are liable to violation, s o l e l y o n a c c o u n t of t h e i r g r o u p i d e n t i t y . Just living u n d e r s u c h a threat of attack o n o n e s e l f or family or friends d e p r i v e s t h e o p p r e s s e d of f r e e d o m and d i g n i t y , and n e e d l e s s l y e x p e n d s their e n e r g y . V i o l e n c e is a social practice. It is a social g i v e n that e v e r y o n e k n o w s h a p p e n s a n d will h a p p e n again. It is always at t h e h o r i z o n of social imagi­ nation, e v e n for t h o s e w h o d o not p e r p e t r a t e it. A c c o r d i n g to t h e prevail­ i n g social logic, s o m e c i r c u m s t a n c e s m a k e s u c h v i o l e n c e m o r e "called for" than o t h e r s . T h e i d e a o f rape will o c c u r to m a n y m e n w h o pick u p a h i t c h ­ h i k i n g w o m a n ; t h e idea of h o u n d i n g or t e a s i n g a gay man o n t h e i r d o r m floor will o c c u r to m a n y straight m a l e c o l l e g e s t u d e n t s . Often several p e r ­ s o n s inflict t h e v i o l e n c e t o g e t h e r , e s p e c i a l l y in all-male g r o u p i n g s . S o m e ­ t i m e s violators s e t out l o o k i n g for p e o p l e to beat u p , rape, or taunt. This r u l e - b o u n d , social, and often p r e m e d i t a t e d character m a k e s v i o l e n c e against g r o u p s a social practice. G r o u p v i o l e n c e a p p r o a c h e s legitimacy, m o r e o v e r , in t h e s e n s e that it is t o l e r a t e d . Often third parties find it unsurprising b e c a u s e it h a p p e n s fre­ q u e n t l y and lies as a c o n s t a n t possibility at t h e horizon of t h e social imagi­ nation. E v e n w h e n t h e y are caught, t h o s e w h o p e r p e t r a t e acts of g r o u p d i r e c t e d v i o l e n c e or h a r r a s s m e n t often r e c e i v e light or n o p u n i s h m e n t . To that e x t e n t s o c i e t y r e n d e r s t h e i r acts a c c e p t a b l e . An i m p o r t a n t a s p e c t of r a n d o m , s y s t e m i c v i o l e n c e is its irrationality. X e n o p h o b i c v i o l e n c e differs from t h e v i o l e n c e of states or ruling-class re­ p r e s s i o n . R e p r e s s i v e v i o l e n c e has a rational, albeit evil, m o t i v e : rulers u s e it as a c o e r c i v e tool to maintain their p o w e r . M a n y a c c o u n t s of racist, sexist, or h o m o p h o b i c v i o l e n c e a t t e m p t to explain its m o t i v a t i o n as a d e ­ sire to m a i n t a i n g r o u p p r i v i l e g e or d o m i n a t i o n . I d o not d o u b t that fear of v i o l e n c e often functions to k e e p o p p r e s s e d groups s u b o r d i n a t e , b u t I d o not think x e n o p h o b i c v i o l e n c e is rationally m o t i v a t e d in t h e w a y that, for e x a m p l e , v i o l e n c e against strikers is. O n t h e contrary, t h e violation of rape, b e a t i n g , killing, and h a r r a s s m e n t of w o m e n , p e o p l e of color, gays, and o t h e r m a r k e d g r o u p s is m o t i v a t e d b y fear or h a t r e d of t h o s e g r o u p s . S o m e t i m e s t h e m o t i v e m a y b e a s i m p l e will to p o w e r , to v i c t i m i z e t h o s e m a r k e d as v u l n e r a b l e b y t h e very social fact

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that t h e y are s u b j e c t to v i o l e n c e . If so, this m o t i v e is s e c o n d a r y in t h e s e n s e that it d e p e n d s o n a social practice of g r o u p v i o l e n c e . V i o l e n c e c a u s i n g fear or h a t r e d of t h e o t h e r at least partly i n v o l v e s i n s e c u r i t i e s o n t h e part of t h e violators; its irrationality s u g g e s t s that u n c o n s c i o u s pro­ c e s s e s are at work. In C h a p t e r 5 I shall discuss t h e logic that m a k e s s o m e g r o u p s f r i g h t e n i n g or hateful b y d e f i n i n g t h e m as ugly and l o a t h s o m e b o d ­ ies. I offer a p s y c h o a n a l y t i c a c c o u n t of t h e fear and hatred of s o m e g r o u p s as b o u n d u p w i t h fears of i d e n t i t y loss. I think such u n c o n s c i o u s fears a c c o u n t at least partly for t h e o p p r e s s i o n I h a v e h e r e c a l l e d v i o l e n c e . It m a y also partly a c c o u n t for cultural i m p e r i a l i s m . Cultural i m p e r i a l i s m , m o r e o v e r , itself i n t e r s e c t s w i t h v i o l e n c e . T h e culturally i m p e r i a l i z e d m a y reject t h e d o m i n a n t m e a n i n g s and a t t e m p t to assert their o w n subjectivity, or t h e fact of their cultural difference m a y p u t t h e lie to t h e d o m i n a n t culture's implicit claim to universality. T h e d i s s o n a n c e g e n e r a t e d b y s u c h a c h a l l e n g e to t h e h e g e m o n i c cultural m e a n i n g s can also b e a s o u r c e of irrational v i o l e n c e . V i o l e n c e is a form of injustice that a distributive u n d e r s t a n d i n g of j u s ­ tice s e e m s ill e q u i p p e d to c a p t u r e . This m a y b e w h y c o n t e m p o r a r y d i s c u s ­ sions of j u s t i c e rarely m e n t i o n it. I h a v e a r g u e d that g r o u p - d i r e c t e d v i o ­ l e n c e is i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d and s y s t e m i c . To t h e d e g r e e that institutions and social practices e n c o u r a g e , tolerate, or e n a b l e t h e perpetration of v i o l e n c e against m e m b e r s o f specific g r o u p s , t h o s e institutions and practices are unjust and s h o u l d b e r e f o r m e d . S u c h reform m a y r e q u i r e t h e r e d i s t r i b u ­ tion of r e s o u r c e s or positions, b u t in large part can c o m e o n l y t h r o u g h a c h a n g e in cultural i m a g e s , s t e r e o t y p e s , and t h e m u n d a n e r e p r o d u c t i o n of relations of d o m i n a n c e and aversion in t h e g e s t u r e s of e v e r y d a y life. I d i s c u s s s t r a t e g i e s for such c h a n g e in C h a p t e r 5.

APPLYING T H E CRITERIA

Social t h e o r i e s that construct o p p r e s s i o n as a unified p h e n o m e n o n usually e i t h e r l e a v e out g r o u p s that e v e n t h e theorists think are o p p r e s s e d , or l e a v e o u t i m p o r t a n t w a y s in w h i c h groups are o p p r e s s e d . Black liberation theorists and f e m i n i s t theorists h a v e a r g u e d p e r s u a s i v e l y , for e x a m p l e , that Marxism's r e d u c t i o n of all o p p r e s s i o n s to class o p p r e s s i o n l e a v e s out m u c h about t h e specific o p p r e s s i o n of Blacks and w o m e n . By pluralizing t h e c a t e g o r y of o p p r e s s i o n in t h e w a y e x p l a i n e d in this chapter, social t h e o r y can avoid t h e e x c l u s i v e and oversimplifying effects of such r e d u c ­ tionism. I h a v e a v o i d e d pluralizing t h e c a t e g o r y in t h e w a y s o m e o t h e r s h a v e d o n e , by c o n s t r u c t i n g an a c c o u n t o f separate s y s t e m s o f o p p r e s s i o n for e a c h o p p r e s s e d g r o u p : racism, s e x i s m , classism, h e t e r o s e x i s m , a g e i s m , and so o n . T h e r e is a d o u b l e p r o b l e m w i t h c o n s i d e r i n g e a c h group's o p -

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p r e s s i o n a unified and distinct structure or s y s t e m . O n t h e o n e h a n d , this w a y of c o n c e i v i n g o p p r e s s i o n fails to a c c o m m o d a t e t h e similarities and o v e r l a p s in t h e o p p r e s s i o n s of different groups. O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , it falsely r e p r e s e n t s t h e situation of all g r o u p m e m b e r s as t h e s a m e . I h a v e arrived at t h e five faces of o p p r e s s i o n — e x p l o i t a t i o n , marginalization, p o w e r l e s s n e s s , cultural i m p e r i a l i s m , and v i o l e n c e — a s t h e b e s t w a y to a v o i d s u c h e x c l u s i o n s and r e d u c t i o n s . T h e y function as criteria for d e ­ t e r m i n i n g w h e t h e r individuals and groups are o p p r e s s e d , rather than as a full t h e o r y of o p p r e s s i o n . I b e l i e v e that t h e s e criteria are o b j e c t i v e . T h e y p r o v i d e a m e a n s of refuting s o m e p e o p l e ' s b e l i e f that their g r o u p is o p ­ p r e s s e d w h e n it is not, as w e l l as a m e a n s o f p e r s u a d i n g o t h e r s that a g r o u p is o p p r e s s e d w h e n t h e y d o u b t it. E a c h criterion can b e o p e r a t i o n a l i z e d ; e a c h can b e a p p l i e d t h r o u g h t h e a s s e s s m e n t of o b s e r v a b l e b e h a v i o r , status r e l a t i o n s h i p s , d i s t r i b u t i o n s , texts and o t h e r cultural artifacts. I h a v e n o i l l u s i o n s that s u c h a s s e s s m e n t s can b e value-neutral. But t h e s e criteria can n e v e r t h e l e s s s e r v e as m e a n s of e v a l u a t i n g claims that a g r o u p is o p p r e s s e d , or adjudicating d i s p u t e s about w h e t h e r or h o w a g r o u p is oppressed. T h e p r e s e n c e of any of t h e s e five c o n d i t i o n s is sufficient for calling a g r o u p o p p r e s s e d . But different g r o u p o p p r e s s i o n s exhibit different c o m b i ­ nations o f t h e s e forms, as d o different individuals in t h e g r o u p s . N e a r l y all, if not all, g r o u p s said by c o n t e m p o r a r y social m o v e m e n t s to b e o p ­ p r e s s e d suffer cultural i m p e r i a l i s m . T h e o t h e r o p p r e s s i o n s t h e y e x p e r i ­ e n c e vary. Working-class p e o p l e are e x p l o i t e d and p o w e r l e s s , for e x a m ­ p l e , but if e m p l o y e d and w h i t e d o not e x p e r i e n c e marginalization and v i o l e n c e . Gay m e n , o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , are not qua gay e x p l o i t e d or p o w ­ e r l e s s , b u t t h e y e x p e r i e n c e s e v e r e cultural i m p e r i a l i s m and v i o l e n c e . Similarly, J e w s and Arabs as g r o u p s are victims of cultural i m p e r i a l i s m and v i o l e n c e , t h o u g h m a n y m e m b e r s of t h e s e groups also suffer exploita­ tion or p o w e r l e s s n e s s . O l d p e o p l e are o p p r e s s e d b y marginalization and cultural i m p e r i a l i s m , and this is also true o f physically and m e n t a l l y dis­ a b l e d p e o p l e . As a g r o u p w o m e n are subject to g e n d e r - b a s e d exploitation, p o w e r l e s s n e s s , cultural i m p e r i a l i s m , and v i o l e n c e . Racism in t h e U n i t e d States c o n d e m n s m a n y Blacks and Latinos to marginalization, and puts m a n y m o r e at risk, e v e n t h o u g h m a n y m e m b e r s of t h e s e g r o u p s e s c a p e that c o n d i t i o n ; m e m b e r s of t h e s e g r o u p s often suffer all five forms of oppression. A p p l y i n g t h e s e five criteria to t h e situation of groups m a k e s it p o s s i b l e to c o m p a r e o p p r e s s i o n s w i t h o u t r e d u c i n g t h e m to a c o m m o n e s s e n c e or c l a i m i n g that o n e is m o r e f u n d a m e n t a l than another. O n e can c o m p a r e t h e w a y s in w h i c h a particular form o f o p p r e s s i o n appears in different g r o u p s . For e x a m p l e , w h i l e t h e o p e r a t i o n s of cultural imperialism are often e x p e ­ r i e n c e d in similar fashion b y different g r o u p s , t h e r e are also important

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d i f f e r e n c e s . O n e can c o m p a r e t h e c o m b i n a t i o n s of o p p r e s s i o n s g r o u p s e x ­ p e r i e n c e , or t h e i n t e n s i t y of t h o s e o p p r e s s i o n s . T h u s w i t h t h e s e criteria o n e can p l a u s i b l y claim that o n e g r o u p is m o r e o p p r e s s e d than a n o t h e r w i t h o u t r e d u c i n g all o p p r e s s i o n s to a s i n g l e scale. W h y are particular groups o p p r e s s e d in t h e w a y t h e y are? Are t h e r e any causal c o n n e c t i o n s a m o n g t h e five forms of o p p r e s s i o n ? Causal or explana­ tory q u e s t i o n s s u c h as t h e s e are b e y o n d t h e s c o p e of this d i s c u s s i o n . W h i l e I think g e n e r a l social t h e o r y has a p l a c e , causal explanation m u s t always b e particular and historical. T h u s an explanatory a c c o u n t of w h y a particular g r o u p is o p p r e s s e d in t h e w a y s that it is m u s t trace t h e history and c u r r e n t s t r u c t u r e of particular social relations. S u c h c o n c r e t e histori­ cal and structural explanations will often s h o w causal c o n n e c t i o n s a m o n g t h e different forms of o p p r e s s i o n e x p e r i e n c e d b y a group. T h e cultural i m p e r i a l i s m in w h i c h w h i t e m e n m a k e stereotypical a s s u m p t i o n s a b o u t and refuse to r e c o g n i z e t h e v a l u e s of Blacks or w o m e n , for e x a m p l e , c o n ­ t r i b u t e s to t h e marginalizaion and p o w e r l e s s n e s s m a n y Blacks and w o m e n suffer. B u t cultural i m p e r i a l i s m d o e s not always h a v e t h e s e effects. S u c c e e d i n g c h a p t e r s will e x p l o r e t h e categories explicated h e r e in different w a y s . C h a p t e r s 4 , 5, and 6 e x p l o r e t h e effects of cultural i m p e ­ rialism. T h o s e c h a p t e r s c o n s t i t u t e an e x t e n d e d a r g u m e n t that m o d e r n p o ­ litical t h e o r y and practice w r o n g l y universalize d o m i n a n t g r o u p p e r s p e c ­ t i v e s , and that attention to and affirmation of social g r o u p differences in t h e polity are t h e b e s t c o r r e c t i v e to such cultural i m p e r i a l i s m . C h a p t e r s 7 and 8 also m a k e u s e of t h e c a t e g o r y of cultural i m p e r i a l i s m , b u t focus m o r e a t t e n t i o n o n social relations of exploitation and p o w e r l e s s n e s s .

CHAPTER

3

Insurgency and the Welfare Capitalist Society Absence of public issues there may well be, but this is not due to any absence of problems or contradictions, antagonis­ tic or otherwise. Impersonal and structural changes have not eliminated problems or issues. Their absence from many discussions is an ideological condition, regulated in the first place by whether or not intellectuals detect and state problems as potential issues for probable publics, and as troubles for a variety of individuals. — C . Wright Mills

F O R CRITICAL THEORY n o r m a t i v e reflection arises from a particular social c o n t e x t , to w h o s e social and political conflicts p h i l o s o p h y a i m s to contrib­ u t e analysis, clarification, and evaluation. Such n o r m a t i v e reflection in a situated social c o n t e x t is not neutral w i t h r e s p e c t to t h o s e conflicts, h o w ­ e v e r , b u t rather looks for t h e u n r e a l i z e d possibilities of e m a n c i p a t i o n la­ t e n t in i n s t i t u t i o n s and a i m e d at b y social m o v e m e n t s in t h o s e conflicts. T h e welfare capitalist s o c i e t y is t h e social c o n t e x t within w h i c h m u c h t h e o r i z i n g a b o u t j u s t i c e takes place. In this c h a p t e r I argue that t h e dis­ t r i b u t i v e p a r a d i g m of j u s t i c e c o r r e s p o n d s to t h e primary formulation of p u b l i c d e b a t e in s u c h s o c i e t i e s . P r o c e s s e s of i n t e r e s t - g r o u p pluralism re­ strict p u b l i c conflict primarily to distribution; issues of t h e organization of p r o d u c t i o n , p u b l i c and private d e c i s i o n m a k i n g structures, and t h e social m e a n i n g s that confer status or reinforce disadvantage g o unraised. This restriction of p u b l i c d e b a t e has led m a n y writers to claim that welfare capitalist s o c i e t y is d e p o l i t i c i z e d . T h r o u g h its welfare orientation it c o n ­ structs c i t i z e n s as c l i e n t - c o n s u m e r s , discouraging their active participa­ tion in p u b l i c life. I argue that t h e distributive paradigm of j u s t i c e func­ tions i d e o l o g i c a l l y to reinforce this depoliticization. T h e h e g e m o n y of welfare capitalist definition of public d e b a t e has not g o n e u n c h a l l e n g e d , h o w e v e r . Since t h e 1960s in m o s t W e s t e r n capitalist c o u n t r i e s i n s u r g e n t social m o v e m e n t s h a v e q u e s t i o n e d t h e welfare state's limitation of p u b l i c d e b a t e to distribution, and s o u g h t to politicize t h e p r o c e s s e s o f o w n e r s h i p and control, d e c i s i o n m a k i n g , cultural p r o d u c t i o n , t h e personal relations of e v e r y d a y life, and t h e a d m i n i s t e r e d life of work and social s e r v i c e . A l t h o u g h t h e p r o c e s s e s of welfare capitalist s o c i e t y

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s o m e t i m e s s u c c e e d in c o n t a i n i n g t h e i n s u r g e n t d e m a n d s of n e w social m o v e m e n t s w i t h i n t h e m a n a g e a b l e limits of i n t e r e s t - g r o u p pluralism, t h e s e m o v e m e n t s often break out b e y o n d t h o s e limits to p r o d u c e v i s i o n s of d e m o c r a t i z e d participatory p u b l i c s . In t h e s e m o v e m e n t s I locate t h e social b a s e of a c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e that s e e k s to r e d u c e and e l i m i n a t e d o m i n a t i o n and o p p r e s s i o n . D e m o c r a c y is b o t h an e l e m e n t and a c o n d i ­ tion of social j u s t i c e .

NORMATIVE PRINCIPLES OF W E L F A R E CAPITALIST SOCIETY

Welfare capitalist institutions t e n d to break d o w n t h e distinction b e t w e e n t h e p u b l i c s p h e r e of state activity and t h e s p h e r e of p r i v a t e - e n t e r p r i s e e c o n o m i c activity. G o v e r n m e n t a s s u m e s o v e r t and w i d e s p r e a d r e s p o n s i ­ bility for m a n a g i n g and distributing t h e benefits of e c o n o m i c p r o c e s s e s . At t h e s a m e t i m e , private institutions such as corporations, u n i o n s , and o t h e r associations b e g i n to r e s e m b l e g o v e r n m e n t in organization, p o w e r , a n d scale. G o v e r n m e n t institutions and a g e n c i e s , in turn, t h e m s e l v e s take o n t h e character of s e m i a u t o n o m o u s corporations (cf. U n g e r , 1974, p p . 1 7 5 76). T h e welfare corporate s o c i e t y e m b o d i e s at least t h r e e i m p o r t a n t princi­ p l e s largely a b s e n t from earlier, m o r e laissez-faire liberal capitalism: (1) t h e p r i n c i p l e that e c o n o m i c activity s h o u l d b e socially or c o l l e c t i v e l y r e g u ­ lated for t h e p u r p o s e s o f m a x i m i z i n g t h e c o l l e c t i v e welfare; (2) t h e princi­ p l e that c i t i z e n s h a v e a right to h a v e s o m e basic n e e d s m e t b y s o c i e t y , a n d that w h e r e private m e c h a n i s m s fail t h e state has an obligation to institute p o l i c i e s d i r e c t e d at m e e t i n g t h o s e n e e d s ; and (3) t h e principle of formal e q u a l i t y and i m p e r s o n a l p r o c e d u r e s , in contrast to m o r e arbitrary and p e r s o n a l i z e d forms of authority and m o r e c o e r c i v e forms o f i n d u c i n g c o o p ­ eration. W h i l e t h e s e p r i n c i p l e s h a v e faced s o m e c h a l l e n g e s , n e v e r t h e l e s s at least as p r i n c i p l e s t h e y e n j o y w i d e a c c e p t a n c e . (1) In an e c o n o m y as c o m p l e x and i n t e r d e p e n d e n t as m o d e r n capitalist e c o n o m i e s h a v e b e c o m e , w h e r e t h e d e c i s i o n of o n e p e r s o n or c o m p a n y can affect t h e activities of so m a n y o t h e r s , it is s h e e r irrationality not to bring e c o n o m i c activities u n d e r s o m e social control. Most W e s t e r n E u r o ­ p e a n c o u n t r i e s e n g a g e in s o m e form of g o v e r n m e n t - a d m i n i s t e r e d e c o ­ n o m i c p l a n n i n g . W h i l e e c o n o m i c coordination and regulation in t h e U n i t e d States is less c e n t r a l i z e d and explicit, t h e r e is c o n s i d e r a b l e a c c e p ­ t a n c e o f g o v e r n m e n t regulation of t h e e c o n o m y . S u c h g o v e r n m e n t regula­ tion and e c o n o m i c coordination in W e s t e r n capitalist c o u n t r i e s is far from " c r e e p i n g socialism," as s o m e maintain, s i n c e its explicit p u r p o s e is t h e p r o m o t i o n of o p t i m u m c o n d i t i o n s for private capital a c c u m u l a t i o n . This regulation of w e l f a r e capitalist s o c i e t y n e v e r t h e l e s s has a p o s i t i v e v a l u e insofar as it affirms t h e e x p e c t a t i o n that e c o n o m i c activity s h o u l d b e u n d e r

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s o m e g e n e r a l p u b l i c control w h e n e v e r c i t i z e n s are so d e p e n d e n t o n t h e e c o n o m i c n e x u s for their l i v e l i h o o d and w e l l - b e i n g . D e s p i t e c o n t e m p o r a r y rhetoric to t h e contrary, t h e primary beneficiary of big g o v e r n m e n t in a d v a n c e d capitalism is private e n t e r p r i s e , w h i c h has b e c o m e inextricably d e p e n d e n t o n g o v e r n m e n t for its c o n t i n u e d welfare. G o v e r n m e n t c r e a t e s institutions and d e v e l o p s policies explicitly a i m e d at p r o m o t i n g t h e l o n g - t e r m i n t e r e s t s of capital a c c u m u l a t i o n . To this e n d federal and s o m e t i m e s local g o v e r n m e n t regulates t h e e c o n o m i c s y s t e m t h r o u g h tax p o l i c y , m o n e t a r y policy, tariffs and import-export trade poli­ c i e s , d e b t s p e n d i n g , farm and corporate s u b s i d i e s , and regulation of its o w n s p e n d i n g l e v e l s . G o v e r n m e n t increasingly takes o n t h e costs and ad­ ministration of e d u c a t i n g and training t h e labor forces n e e d e d by private e n t e r p r i s e , as w e l l as t h e costs o f research and d e v e l o p m e n t . M u c h of transportation and c o m m u n i c a t i o n s infrastructures, as w e l l as o t h e r infra­ s t r u c t u r e s e r v i c e s n e e d e d for efficient p r o d u c t i o n and distribution, are n o w paid for, m a i n t a i n e d , and often a d m i n i s t e r e d b y g o v e r n m e n t a g e n ­ c i e s . G o v e r n m e n t takes m u c h responsibility for s h o u l d e r i n g t h e social costs of p r o d u c t i o n , s u c h as pollution control, w h i c h can d a m a g e t h e profit-making of o t h e r e n t e r p r i s e s . A n d in welfare corporate s o c i e t y gov­ e r n m e n t is a primary c o n s u m e r of t h e p r o d u c t s of private e n t e r p r i s e , in t h e form of military g o o d s , s u p p l i e s to its vast a g e n c i e s and offices, h o u s ­ ing, h i g h w a y , and o t h e r p u b l i c works c o n s t r u c t i o n , and so o n . (2) T h e p r i n c i p l e that t h e state has an obligation to m e e t n e e d s w h e n p r i v a t e m e c h a n i s m s fail is p e r h a p s m o r e controversial than t h e first, b u t is n e v e r t h e l e s s w i d e l y a c c e p t e d in all a d v a n c e d capitalist s o c i e t i e s . Prior to t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f welfare state institutions, t h e only citizen rights w e r e t h e formal political rights of l i b e r a l i s m — p r o t e c t i o n of liberties, rights to d u e p r o c e s s and e q u a l i t y before t h e law, v o t i n g rights, rights to h o l d of­ fice, and so o n . T h e welfare state p r o m u l g a t e s a c o n c e p t i o n of e c o n o m i c rights, or rights of r e c i p i e n c e , as citizen rights. E v e n w h e n austerity is i m p l e m e n t e d a n d t h e political c l i m a t e c h a l l e n g e s social s e r v i c e s that m e e t n e e d s , a verbal c o m m i t m e n t to m e e t i n g s u b s i s t e n c e n e e d s r e m a i n s . T h e G r a m m - R u d m a n b u d g e t balancing bill p a s s e d by t h e U . S . C o n g r e s s in 1 9 8 5 , for e x a m p l e , e x e m p t e d s o m e of t h e m o s t basic i n c o m e s u p p o r t p r o g r a m s , s u c h as AFDC and food s t a m p s , from t h e a u t o m a t i c cuts it au­ thorized. Welfare state activity also o p e r a t e s to benefit private c i t i z e n s , and c o n ­ t r i b u t e s to t h e i r survival and quality o f l i f e . E n t i t l e m e n t p r o g r a m s s u c h as social security, u n e m p l o y m e n t i n s u r a n c e , m e d i c a i d , h o u s i n g support, and direct i n c o m e s u p p o r t s e e k to m e e t s o m e citizen n e e d s . S o m e a s p e c t s of tax p o l i c y d u r i n g t h e past thirty years in t h e U n i t e d States h a v e had t h e effect of r e d i s t r i b u t i n g i n c o m e from t h e m i d d l e and u p p e r c l a s s e s to t h e poor, t h o u g h r e c e n t tax reform has r e v e r s e d this trend. T h e m i d d l e

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classes t h e m s e l v e s h a v e b e n e f i t e d from loans for c o l l e g e s t u d e n t s and h o m e m o r t g a g e tax d e d u c t i o n s . Support for e d u c a t i o n and training, as w e l l as e n f o r c e m e n t of equal o p p o r t u n i t y legislation, c r e a t e s s o m e e m ­ p l o y a b l e w o r k e r s and in a l i m i t e d w a y a i m s to e l i m i n a t e racial and sexual d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . M u n i c i p a l , state, and federal a g e n c i e s , m o r e o v e r , p r o v i d e a h u g e s e c t o r of j o b s , and h a v e b e e n particularly important for e x p a n d i n g professional e m p l o y m e n t o p p o r t u n i t i e s for Blacks, Latinos, A m e r i c a n In­ dians, and w o m e n . Product quality regulation p r o v i d e s s o m e significant l e v e l of c o n s u m e r p r o t e c t i o n . T h e s e t w o a s p e c t s of g o v e r n m e n t activity in welfare corporate s o c i e t y — t h e s u p p o r t of capital a c c u m u l a t i o n and m e e t i n g n e e d s of private citi­ z e n s — r e i n f o r c e e a c h other. E n t i t l e m e n t programs m e e t i n g citizen n e e d s m u s t b e paid for t h r o u g h tax r e v e n u e s , and thus r e q u i r e an e x p a n d i n g e c o n o m y . T h u s u n d e r c o n d i t i o n s of private e n t e r p r i s e social welfare pro­ g r a m s n e e d g o v e r n m e n t regulation of t h e e c o n o m y and infrastructure s u p p o r t . E d u c a t i o n and training programs benefit t h e individuals w i t h i n t h e m as w e l l as t h e corporations and a g e n c i e s that hire t h o s e individuals. (3) T h e welfare capitalist s o c i e t y also a i m s to e m b o d y t h e v a l u e s of for­ mal e q u a l i t y and p r o c e d u r a l i s m as against m o r e arbitrary and p e r s o n a l ­ i z e d forms of authority and m o r e c o e r c i v e forms of i n d u c i n g c o o p e r a t i o n . Large b u r e a u c r a t i c organizations c o n d u c t m o s t c o l l e c t i v e activity in such s o c i e t i e s . B u r e a u c r a c i e s are d i s t i n g u i s h e d from o t h e r forms of social or­ ganization in o p e r a t i n g a c c o r d i n g to i m p e r s o n a l rules that apply in t h e s a m e w a y to all c a s e s . Ideally, p e o p l e w i t h i n t h e m h a v e or lack status, p r i v i l e g e , p o w e r , or a u t o n o m y b y virtue of their position in t h e division of labor, and not by v i r t u e of any personal attributes o f birth, family c o n ­ n e c t i o n , and so o n . A c c o r d i n g to t h e v a l u e s of bureaucratic organization, p o s i t i o n s s h o u l d b e a s s i g n e d a c c o r d i n g to merit. T h e s e a c h i e v e m e n t s of b u r e a u c r a c y are important p o s i t i v e d e v e l o p m e n t s in t h e history of social organization. I say this in s p i t e of t h e n e w forms of d o m i n a t i o n that b u ­ reaucratic organization facilitates, w h i c h I will discuss b e l o w . T h e institutions and practices of t h e welfare state h e l p p r e s e r v e capital­ ist institutions in t w o w a y s . Structurally, t h e s e institutions and practices h e l p c r e a t e favorable c o n d i t i o n s for production and a c c u m u l a t i o n , h e l p p r o v i d e a skilled work force, and t h r o u g h direct g o v e r n m e n t c o n s u m p t i o n and i n c o m e s u p p o r t to private c o n s u m e r s e x p a n d markets for g o o d s . Polit­ ically, welfare state policies s e r v e important l e g i t i m a t i n g functions, by e n c o u r a g i n g p e o p l e ' s a l l e g i a n c e s to t h e s y s t e m to t h e e x t e n t that it d e l i v ­ ers t h e m s o m e t h i n g material, or at least t h e c o n t i n u i n g c r e d i b l e p r o m i s e of s o m e t h i n g material. It is not i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h this g e n e r a l functionalist v i e w of t h e welfare state to find its e m e r g e n c e p r o g r e s s i v e and to recall that m o s t welfare state p o l i c i e s r e s u l t e d from fierce popular struggles against t h e rich and

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p o w e r f u l . T h e i n c o m e s u p p o r t p o l i c i e s that exist in t h e U n i t e d States t o d a y , for e x a m p l e , w o u l d not h a v e c o m e about w i t h o u t mass m o v e m e n t s m a k i n g d e m a n d s o n t h e state and s o c i e t y , often calling for far m o r e radical c h a n g e than t h e y a c h i e v e d . As P i v e n and C l o w a r d (1982) a r g u e , t h e s e p o p u l a r s t r u g g l e s and t h e reforms t h e y b r o u g h t a b o u t significantly re­ d u c e d t h e insulation of e c o n o m i c i s s u e s from political action that had o b ­ t a i n e d in t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y . N o r is it i n c o n s i s t e n t to insist, o n t h e o n e h a n d , that efforts to r e d u c e g o v e r n m e n t - s u p p o r t e d welfare m e a s u r e s s h o u l d b e a c t i v e l y and v i g o r o u s l y o p p o s e d and, on t h e o t h e r h a n d , that t h e form of w e l f a r e capitalist institutions s h o u l d b e a l t e r e d so that t h e y n o l o n g e r s u p p o r t d o m i n a t i o n and o p p r e s s i o n .

T H E DEPOLITICIZATION O F W E L F A H E CAPITALIST SOCIETY

Welfare capitalist s o c i e t y o n t h e w h o l e is m o r e h u m a n e than a capitalist s o c i e t y w h i c h g i v e s l i c e n s e to t h e I n v i s i b l e H a n d , w i t h n o social regula­ tion of i n v e s t m e n t , p r o d u c t quality, or w o r k i n g c o n d i t i o n s , and n o socially s u p p o r t e d p r o v i s i o n s for old, poor, and sick p e o p l e . At t h e s a m e t i m e that m o r e private e c o n o m i c activity c o m e s u n d e r t h e p u r v i e w of p u b l i c p o l i c y , h o w e v e r , t h e p u b l i c b e c o m e s increasingly d e p o l i t i c i z e d ( s e e H a b e r m a s , 1987, p p . 3 4 3 - 5 6 ) . Social conflict and d i s c u s s i o n c o m e to b e r e s t r i c t e d largely to d i s t r i b u t i v e i s s u e s , w h e r e background i s s u e s of t h e organization and goals of p r o d u c t i o n , t h e positions and p r o c e d u r e s of d e c i s i o n m a k i n g , and o t h e r s u c h institutional i s s u e s d o not c o m e into q u e s t i o n . I n t e r e s t g r o u p pluralism functions as t h e v e h i c l e for r e s o l v i n g conflicts about dis­ t r i b u t i o n , a p r o c e s s b o t h unfair and d e p o l i t i c i z e d ( C o h e n and Rogers, 1983, c h a p . 3). A c c o r d i n g to m a n y analysts, N e w D e a l reforms b e g a n to institutionalize class conflict, and this p r o c e s s was c o m p l e t e d b y t h e early 1950s. In this w e l f a r e capitalist s y s t e m capitalists struck a deal w i t h w o r k e r s . B u s i n e s s a n d g o v e r n m e n t w o u l d a c c e d e to d e m a n d s for c o l l e c t i v e bargaining rights, m o r e l e i s u r e t i m e , m o r e pay, social security and u n e m p l o y m e n t b e n e f i t s , and similar m e a s u r e s to i m p r o v e t h e material life and s e c u r i t y of w o r k i n g p e o p l e . In return workers w o u l d forfeit d e m a n d s to r e s t r u c t u r e p r o d u c t i o n , to control t h e goals and d i r e c t i o n of e n t e r p r i s e s or t h e w h o l e e c o n o m y , or to h a v e c o m m u n i t y control o v e r administration of s e r v i c e s . Social conflict h e n c e f o r t h w o u l d b e restricted to c o m p e t i t i o n o v e r distrib­ u t i v e shares of t h e total social product. E v e r y o n e w o u l d a g r e e that e c o ­ n o m i c g r o w t h is t h e primary goal of g o v e r n m e n t and b u s i n e s s activity. In o r d e r to m a k e t h e social p i e w h o s e distribution t h e y w o u l d argue about as large as p o s s i b l e , g o v e r n m e n t and b u s i n e s s w e r e to h a v e t h e authority to d o w h a t e v e r t h e y j u d g e d n e c e s s a r y to p r o m o t e that growth.

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T h i s bargain to limit conflict to distribution, l e a v i n g p r o d u c t i o n and d e c i s i o n m a k i n g s t r u c t u r e s u n q u e s t i o n e d , o c c u r r e d in b o t h private and state sectors. In t h e private sector, after World War II labor u n i o n s i m ­ plicitly a g r e e d to restrict t h e i r d e m a n d s to distributive i s s u e s — p a y , h o u r s , b e n e f i t s , vacation t i m e — a n d not to bring u p i s s u e s like w o r k i n g c o n d i t i o n s , control o v e r p r o d u c t i o n p r o c e s s , or i n v e s t m e n t priorities ( B o w l e s and G i n t i s , 1982; 1986, chap. 2). State regulation of c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g has reinforced this implicit a g r e e m e n t , rarely a l l o w i n g work p r o c e s s and work organization i s s u e s , for e x a m p l e , o n t o t h e b a r g a i n i n g agenda. In federal and state g o v e r n m e n t s , policy i s s u e s are restricted largely to t h e allocation of r e s o u r c e s and t h e provision of social s e r v i c e s , w i t h i n t h e i m p e r a t i v e of fostering corporate e c o n o m i c g r o w t h . Conflict takes place o v e r a narrow r a n g e of distributive issues: D o e s r e d u c i n g t h e deficit re­ q u i r e raising taxes? S h o u l d t h e rich pay a h i g h e r proportion of their in­ c o m e in taxes than o t h e r s ? S h o u l d funds b e appropriated for t h e MX m i s ­ sile or for p u b l i c h o u s i n g and h i g h w a y s ? W h i c h appropriations will g e n e r ­ ate m o r e j o b s ? T h e basic e n d s of g o v e r n m e n t are already g i v e n , w i t h i n t h e e x i s t i n g s t r u c t u r e s of p o w e r , property, and e n t i t l e m e n t s , a n d d o not c o m e u n d e r d i s c u s s i o n . "Policy has always b e e n o r i e n t e d to t h e b e s t w a y to allocate t h e s u r p l u s for individual and c o l l e c t i v e c o n s u m p t i o n rather than t h e m o r e central q u e s t i o n of t h e b e s t way to control t h e p r o c e s s to realize social n e e d s and t h e full p o t e n t i a l i t i e s of h u m a n b e i n g s " (Smith and Judd, 1984, p. 184). T h e restriction of conflict and policy to distributive i s s u e s , w i t h i n an a g r e e d - u p o n g r o w t h i m p e r a t i v e , appears m o s t salient in local politics. An alliance of p u b l i c officials, b u s i n e s s m e n , and bureaucrats effectively o p e r ­ ates in m o s t m u n i c i p a l i t i e s to c h a n n e l e x p r e s s e d citizen i n t e r e s t s into a s y s t e m of l a n d - u s e d e c i s i o n s c o n s t r a i n e d b y t h e i m p e r a t i v e to p r o m o t e i n v e s t m e n t (Elkin, 1987; Logan and M o l o t c h , 1987, c h a p . 3). As I will d i s c u s s in C h a p t e r 8, cities t h e m s e l v e s b e c o m e increasingly s t r i p p e d of state p o w e r s , b e c o m i n g little m o r e than supplicants at t h e welfare state and c o r p o r a t e table. R e s t r i c t i n g conflict and policy discussion to distributive i s s u e s , t h e w e l ­ fare capitalist s o c i e t y d e f i n e s t h e citizen primarily as a c l i e n t - c o n s u m e r . U n l i k e earlier capitalism, w h i c h f u n c t i o n e d o n l o w w a g e s and austerity for t h e w o r k i n g class, welfare state capitalism r e q u i r e s high l e v e l s of c o n ­ s u m p t i o n to k e e p t h e g r o w t h m a c h i n e running. C o r p o r a t e advertising, p o p u l a r c u l t u r e m e d i a , and g o v e r n m e n t policy c o l l u d e to e n c o u r a g e p e o ­ p l e to think of t h e m s e l v e s primarily as c o n s u m e r s , to focus their e n e r g i e s o n t h e g o o d s t h e y w a n t , and to e v a l u a t e their g o v e r n m e n t ' s p e r f o r m a n c e a c c o r d i n g to h o w w e l l it p r o v i d e s t h e m w i t h g o o d s and s e r v i c e s ( H a b e r -

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m a s , 1987, p. 3 5 0 ; Walzer, 1982), S u c h a c l i e n t - c o n s u m e r orientation to­ w a r d c i t i z e n s h i p privatizes t h e c i t i z e n , r e n d e r i n g goals of popular control or participation difficult or m e a n i n g l e s s . In t h e welfare capitalist s o c i e t y , p r o c e s s e s of i n t e r e s t - g r o u p pluralism are t h e v e h i c l e for t h e resolution of policy conflict about distributions. C l i e n t - c o n s u m e r c i t i z e n s and corporate actors organize to p r o m o t e s p e ­ cific i n t e r e s t s in r e c e i v i n g g o v e r n m e n t g o o d s — t h e oil l o b b y , t h e h o m e l e s s a d v o c a t e s , t h e trucking i n t e r e s t s , t h e physician l o b b y , t h e c o n s u m e r ad­ v o c a t e s , and so o n . N e w g o v e r n m e n t programs often create i n t e r e s t g r o u p s w h e r e t h e y did not exist before. T h e political g a m e is d e f i n e d o n analogy w i t h t h e market. Various i n t e r e s t s c o m p e t e w i t h o n e a n o t h e r for p e o p l e ' s loyalties, and t h o s e that amass t h e m o s t m e m b e r s and m o n e y h a v e t h e market a d v a n t a g e in l o b b y i n g for legislation, regulations, and t h e distribution of tax dollars. T h e different interests m u s t v i e w i t h o n e an­ o t h e r for l i m i t e d r e s o u r c e s and t h e attention of legislators and g o v e r n ­ m e n t officials, so s o m e t i m e s t h e i n t e r e s t s ally and bargain w i t h o n e an­ o t h e r for t h e i r m u t u a l advantage. G o v e r n m e n t policy and t h e allocation of r e s o u r c e s , a c c o r d i n g to pluralist t h e o r y , arc t h e o u t c o m e of this p r o c e s s of c o m p e t i t i o n and bargaining a m o n g interest groups. Critics of t h e t h e o r y and practice of i n t e r e s t - g r o u p pluralism a r g u e that t h e s y s t e m p r o m o t e s d i s t r i b u t i v e unfairness. In i n t e r e s t - g r o u p c o m p e t i ­ tion s o m e g r o u p s , e s p e c i a l l y b u s i n e s s , start w i t h greater r e s o u r c e s and o r g a n i z a t i o n , w h i c h e n a b l e t h e m b e t t e r to r e p r e s e n t their interests. T h e o u t c o m e s are t h e r e f o r e often b i a s e d toward t h o s e w i t h t h e s e a d v a n t a g e s . W h i l e I a g r e e w i t h this criticism, I w a n t h e r e to focus on h o w i n t e r e s t g r o u p pluralism also d e p o l i t i c i z e s p u b l i c life. In its p r o c e s s of conflict r e s o l u t i o n , i n t e r e s t - g r o u p pluralism m a k e s n o distinction b e t w e e n t h e assertion of selfish interests and n o r m a t i v e claims to j u s t i c e or right. Public policy d i s p u t e is only a c o m p e t i t i o n a m o n g c l a i m s , and " w i n n i n g " d e p e n d s o n g e t t i n g others on y o u r s i d e , m a k i n g trades a n d alliances w i t h o t h e r s , and m a k i n g effective strategic calcula­ tions a b o u t h o w and to w h o m to m a k e y o u r claims. O n e d o e s not w i n b y p e r s u a d i n g a p u b l i c that o n e ' s claim is just. This strategic c o n c e p t i o n of p o l i c y d i s c u s s i o n fosters political c y n i c i s m : t h o s e w h o m a k e claims of right or j u s t i c e are o n l y saying w h a t t h e y w a n t in c l e v e r rhetoric. This cynical s y s t e m often forces m o v e m e n t s c l a i m i n g j u s t i c e , like t h e civil rights m o v e m e n t or t h e m o v e m e n t for t h e Equal Rights A m e n d m e n t , to identify t h e m s e l v e s as m e r e l y a n o t h e r i n t e r e s t group. T h o s e w h o b e l i e v e in t h e j u s t i c e of e q u a l rights for w o m e n m u s t form p r e s s u r e g r o u p s to g e t w h a t t h e y w a n t , and b e p r e p a r e d to deal and bargain to g e t it. This p r o c e s s that c o l l a p s e s n o r m a t i v e claims t o j u s t i c e into selfish c l a i m s of d e s i r e lacks t h e e l e m e n t of p u b l i c d e l i b e r a t i o n that is a hallmark of t h e political ( A r e n d t , 1958; M i c h e l m a n , 1986; S u n s t e i n , 1988; E l k i n , 1 9 8 7 ,

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c h a p . 7). A p o l i t i c i z e d p u b l i c r e s o l v e s d i s a g r e e m e n t and m a k e s d e c i s i o n s b y l i s t e n i n g to o n e another's claims and reasons, offering q u e s t i o n s and o b j e c t i o n s , and p u t t i n g forth n e w formulations and proposals, until a d e c i ­ sion can b e r e a c h e d . W h e n e a c h a g e n t or organization acts to p r o m o t e its o w n specific inter­ e s t s t h r o u g h g o v e r n m e n t a g e n c y c h a n n e l s that rarely r e c e i v e publicity, m u c h less p u b l i c d i s c u s s i o n , a f r a g m e n t e d public life results. T h e r e is no forum w i t h i n t h e p u b l i c s p h e r e of d i s c u s s i o n and conflict w h e r e p e o p l e can e x a m i n e t h e overall patterns of j u s t i c e or fairness p r o d u c e d b y t h e s e p r o c e s s e s ( H o w e , 1982; Barber, 1984, chap. 3). N o r is it p o s s i b l e to bring t h e basic s t r u c t u r e s , a s s u m p t i o n s , constraints, and d e c i s i o n m a k i n g p r o c e ­ d u r e s p r o d u c i n g t h e d i s t r i b u t i v e patterns into p u b l i c d i s c u s s i o n , b e c a u s e for t h e m o s t part t h e s e are not effectively public. M o r e o v e r , b r i n g i n g t h e m into v i e w r e q u i r e s a m o r e c o m p r e h e n s i v e p e r s p e c t i v e than t h e frag­ m e n t a t i o n of i n t e r e s t - g r o u p pluralism allows, b e c a u s e o n e n e e d s to k n o w t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n t h e d e s i r e s of different interests and t h e c o l l e c ­ t i v e c o n s e q u e n c e s of t h e i r s i m u l t a n e o u s e n a c t m e n t . I n t e r e s t - g r o u p politics effectively locks individual c i t i z e n s o u t of direct participation in p u b l i c d e c i s i o n m a k i n g , and often also k e e p s t h e m i g n o ­ rant of t h e proposals d e l i b e r a t e d and t h e d e c i s i o n s m a d e . C i t i z e n s c a n n o t v o i c e their d e m a n d s or participate in policy discussions e x c e p t as c o n s t i t u ­ e n c i e s o r g a n i z e d a r o u n d s o m e specific g o v e r n m e n t program or i n t e r e s t . S i n c e p o l i c i e s are d i r e c t e d not at p e r s o n s as s u c h , b u t at p e r s o n s consti­ t u t e d p i e c e m e a l as taxpayers, h e a l t h s e r v i c e c o n s u m e r s , parents, work­ ers, r e s i d e n t s of c i t i e s , and so o n , calculations of w h a t m i g h t u l t i m a t e l y b e in a particular individual's self-interest b e c o m e i n c o h e r e n t (Janowitz, 1976, c h a p . 4). U n d e r t h e s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s it is little w o n d e r that c i t i z e n s are often politically apathetic. Finally, and p e r h a p s m o s t importantly, t h e i n t e r e s t - g r o u p structure of d e c i s i o n m a k i n g in welfare capitalist s o c i e t y d e p o l i t i c i z c s b e c a u s e t h e d e ­ c i s i o n s are often m a d e in privacy. I n c r e a s e d p u b l i c regulation of private e c o n o m i c and social activity p r o d u c e s i n t e r e s t - o r i e n t e d g o v e r n m e n t a g e n ­ c i e s that often w o r k in daily partnership w i t h t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of t h o s e p r i v a t e i n t e r e s t s . T h e result is w h a t Alan Wolfe (1977) calls t h e "franchise s t a t e , " t h e carving o u t of g o v e r n m e n t authority for institutionalized inter­ est groups. In this s y s t e m of i n t e r e s t - g r o u p pluralism m o s t p u b l i c policy d e c i s i o n ­ m a k i n g takes p l a c e as part of t h e day-to-day o p e r a t i o n s of t h e s e g o v e r n ­ m e n t a g e n c i e s , w h i c h r e c e i v e w i t h their legislative or e x e c u t i v e creation w i d e p o w e r s to formulate and e n f o r c e regulations. M o s t of t h e s e p o l i c i e s are h a m m e r e d o u t in c o m p l e x and informal n e g o t i a t i n g p r o c e s s e s w i t h i n t h e a g e n c i e s and b e t w e e n t h o s e a g e n c i e s and t h e b u s i n e s s or o t h e r private organizations that h a v e specific i n t e r e s t s at stake in t h e p o l i c i e s and

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e n o u g h p o w e r and i n f l u e n c e to gain access to t h e a g e n c i e s (see L o w i , 1969, e s p . c h a p s . 3 and 4). U s u a l l y t h e s e policy d e c i s i o n s are m a d e in s e m i s e c r e t , a n d thus t h e s u b s t a n t i v e d e c i s i o n s of t h e welfare corporate s o c i e t y are d e p o l i t i c i z e d . In t h e w o r d s of Claus Offe: If politics has to do with the working out of visions about the just order of social life, and the conflict among divergent visions of such order, then it is, given this condition of blocked mediation, only a slight exaggeration to say that we experi­ ence a condition in which politics and the state have become divorced from each other. (Offe, 1984, p. 173) T w o d e c a d e s ago T h e o d o r e L o w i (1969) a r g u e d that this u n c o u p l i n g m e a n t that effectively m u c h g o v e r n m e n t activity is n o l o n g e r subject to t h e rule of law. L e g i s l a t i v e b o d i e s are o n e of t h e f e w forums for t h e p u b l i c d i s c u s s i o n of policy. M o s t active policies e n a c t e d b y g o v e r n m e n t in t h e welfare capitalist s o c i e t y are not laws, h o w e v e r , b u t regulations e s t a b ­ l i s h e d b y a g e n c y d e p a r t m e n t h e a d s , often w i t h o u t any p u b l i c d i s c u s s i o n . O f c o u r s e , legislative action is n e c e s s a r y to create m a n y a g e n c i e s , and their c o n t i n u e d e x i s t e n c e as w e l l as t h e e x t e n t of their activity is d e c i d e d b y b u d g e t a r y action in legislatures. Proposals for n e w a g e n c i e s and pro­ g r a m s , as w e l l as f u n d i n g proposals, h o w e v e r , are w o r k e d out in n e g o t i a ­ tions b e t w e e n a g e n c i e s and their private c o n s t i t u e n c i e s .

T H E IDEOLOGICAL F U N C T I O N O F THE DISTRIBUTIVE PARADIGM

I d e a s f u n c t i o n ideologically, as I u n d e r s t a n d that t e r m , w h e n t h e y r e p r e ­ s e n t t h e institutional c o n t e x t in w h i c h t h e y arise as natural or n e c e s s a r y . T h e y t h e r e b y forestall criticism of relations of d o m i n a t i o n and o p p r e s s i o n , and o b s c u r e p o s s i b l e m o r e e m a n c i p a t o r y social a r r a n g e m e n t s . In t h e c o n ­ text of w e l f a r e capitalist s o c i e t y , t h e distributive paradigm of j u s t i c e func­ tions i d e o l o g i c a l l y in this s e n s e . T h e p r e d o m i n a n c e of a distributive paradigm in c o n t e m p o r a r y p h i l o ­ sophical t h e o r i e s of j u s t i c e can b e a c c o u n t e d for, I s u g g e s t , at least partly b y t h e fact that distributive i s s u e s d o m i n a t e policy discussion in welfare capitalist s o c i e t y (cf. H e l l e r , 1987, p. 155). This theoretical orientation fits c o m f o r t a b l y w i t h our i n t u i t i o n s b e c a u s e to t h e e x t e n t that j u s t i c e is dis­ c u s s e d at all in o u r s o c i e t y , i s s u e s of i n c o m e distribution, r e s o u r c e alloca­ tion, and t h e a w a r d i n g of positions p r e d o m i n a t e . T h e distributive para­ d i g m reflects and s o m e t i m e s justifies welfare capitalist society's t e n t a t i v e and t e n u o u s c o m m i t m e n t to m e e t i n g basic n e e d s and regulating e c o n o m i c activity for t h e c o l l e c t i v e g o o d . T h e p o s s e s s i v e individualist c o n c e p t i o n of h u m a n n a t u r e w h i c h in C h a p t e r 1 1 a r g u e d u n d e r l i e s t h e distributive par­ a d i g m fits t h e social c o n t e x t of welfare capitalist s o c i e t y , w h i c h c o n s t r u c t s c i t i z e n s primarily as c l i e n t - c o n s u m e r s (cf. Taylor, 1985).

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In asserting this I do not m e a n that distributive t h e o r i e s of j u s t i c e n e c ­ essarily mirror or e n d o r s e existing distributions and t h e interests that s u p ­ port t h e m . O n t h e contrary, t h e distributive paradigm d o m i n a t e s c o n t e m ­ porary p h i l o s o p h i c a l d i s c o u r s e partly b e c a u s e m a n y theorists b e l i e v e that t h e r e is c o n s i d e r a b l e distributive injustice in existing welfare capitalist s o c i e t i e s . W i t h i n t h e limits of t h e distributive paradigm, m a n y t h e o r i e s of j u s t i c e argue for p r i n c i p l e s w h o s e application i m p l i e s criticisms of t h e s e social c o n d i t i o n s . O p e r a t i n g w i t h i n t h e confines of distributive issues, i n t e r e s t - g r o u p p l u ­ ralism, as w e h a v e s e e n , p e r p e t u a t e s a d e p o l i t i c i z e d p u b l i c life that frag­ m e n t s social life and privatizes citizens' relationship to t h e state. It dis­ c o u r a g e s p u b l i c d e l i b e r a t i o n about c o l l e c t i v e d e c i s i o n s , e s p e c i a l l y about t h e goals of g o v e r n m e n t , or t h e organization of institutions and relations of p o w e r . T h e d e p o l i t i c i z e d p r o c e s s of policy formation in welfare capital­ ist s o c i e t y t h u s m a k e s it difficult to s e e t h e institutional rules, practices, and social relations that support d o m i n a t i o n and o p p r e s s i o n , m u c h less to challenge them. A similar b l i n d n e s s afflicts t h e distributive paradigm of j u s t i c e , as I ar­ g u e d in C h a p t e r 1. By focusing on distribution, t h e o r i e s of j u s t i c e usually fail to bring i s s u e s of d e c i s i o n m a k i n g p o w e r , division of labor, and c u l t u r e u n d e r e v a l u a t i o n . T h e s e are often m o r e basic than distributions, to t h e e x t e n t that t h e y causally c o n d i t i o n distributions. T h e distributive para­ d i g m implicitly a s s u m e s an atomistic and static social o n t o l o g y , w h e n an o n t o l o g y that i n c l u d e s relations and p r o c e s s e s w o u l d b e t t e r c a p t u r e m a n y a s p e c t s of d o m i n a t i o n and o p p r e s s i o n . T h e d i s t r i b u t i v e paradigm of j u s t i c e d o e s not p r o d u c e t h e d e p o l i t i c i z e d c l i e n t - c o n s u m e r c i t i z e n characteristic of welfare capitalist society. T h e h e ­ g e m o n y of this paradigm, h o w e v e r , reinforces t h e o n e - d i m e n s i o n a l i t y of c o n t e m p o r a r y policy d i s c o u r s e and t h e c o n t a i n m e n t function it s e r v e s , B e c a u s e it reflects t h e p r o c e s s e s of i n t e r e s t - g r o u p pluralism, and h y p o s t a tizes t h e s e as t h e subject m a t t e r of j u s t i c e in general, t h e d i s t r i b u t i v e p a r a d i g m functions to l e g i t i m a t e t h o s e p r o c e s s e s and t h e depoliticization of p u b l i c life t h e y e n c o u r a g e . Insofar as p r e d o m i n a n t a p p r o a c h e s to t h e o ­ rizing about j u s t i c e fail to e v a l u a t e t h e institutional structures that p r o v i d e t h e c o n t e x t and c o n d i t i o n s of distributions, t h e y h e l p forestall criticism of relations of p o w e r and c u l t u r e in welfare capitalist society. To that e x t e n t t h e y reinforce d o m i n a t i o n and o p p r e s s i o n , and block t h e political imagi­ nation from e n v i s i o n i n g m o r e e m a n c i p a t o r y institutions and practices. A critical t h e o r e t i c a l approach to j u s t i c e b e g i n s with t h e insight that any n o r m a t i v e or social t h e o r y is and s h o u l d b e c o n d i t i o n e d b y t h e particular historical and social c o n t e x t in w h i c h it speaks. T h u s m y claim that t h e d i s t r i b u t i v e p a r a d i g m functions ideologically d o e s not a s s u m e that t h e o ­ rizing about j u s t i c e c o u l d b e neutral about or i n d e p e n d e n t of particular

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social c o n d i t i o n s . N e c e s s a r i l y s u r r o u n d e d by already existing institutions and social relations, n o r m a t i v e t h e o r i z i n g can b e e i t h e r s u p p o r t i v e or crit­ ical of t h e m , or in some cases, p e r h a p s , a m i x t u r e o f both. W h i l e welfare capitalist s o c i e t y is less o p p r e s s i v e in s o m e r e s p e c t s than s o m e o t h e r soci­ e t i e s , it n e v e r t h e l e s s contains m a n y structures of d o m i n a t i o n and o p p r e s ­ sion w h i c h political p h i l o s o p h y s h o u l d locate and criticize. S o m e of t h e s e h a v e a s o u r c e in welfare and corporate bureaucracies.

T H E A D M I N I S T E R E D SOCIETY A N D N E W F O R M S O F D O M I N A T I O N

D o m i n a t i o n , as I d e f i n e d it in C h a p t e r 1, consists in institutional c o n d i ­ tions w h i c h inhibit or p r e v e n t p e o p l e from participating in d e t e r m i n i n g their actions or t h e c o n d i t i o n s of their actions. Welfare capitalist s o c i e t y c r e a t e s specifically n e w forms of d o m i n a t i o n . Increasingly t h e activities of e v e r y d a y w o r k and life c o m e u n d e r rationalized bureaucratic control, s u b ­ j e c t i n g p e o p l e to t h e d i s c i p l i n e of authorities and experts in m a n y areas of life. B y b u r e a u c r a c y I m e a n a system that d e f i n e s and o r g a n i z e s social p r o ­ j e c t s as t h e o b j e c t of technical control. Bureaucracy e x t e n d s t h e object of t e c h n i c a l or i n s t r u m e n t a l reason b e y o n d t h e natural world to c o o r d i n a t e d h u m a n action and interaction. Taking t h e e n d s of a c t i o n — w h e t h e r pro­ d u c i n g a b o m b , taking t h e c e n s u s , or b r i n g i n g food to a f a m i n e - s t r i c k e n a r e a — a s g i v e n , bureaucratic reason d e t e r m i n e s t h e m o s t efficient m e a n s to t h e realization of t h o s e e n d s . B e c a u s e t h e definition of e n d s always lies o u t s i d e t h e particular bureaucratic s y s t e m , and t h e s y s t e m of m e a n s is d e v e l o p e d b y a t e c h n i c a l s c i e n c e that claims to b e value-free, bureaucratic organization is largely d e p o l i t i c i z e d — i t s activity is not u n d e r s t o o d as t h e p r o d u c t of v a l u e - l a d e n d e c i s i o n s ( K e a n e , 1984, chap. 2). In t h e p r o g r e s s i v e vision of m a n y n i n e t e e n t h - and early t w e n i e t h - c e n tury social r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s and reformers, b o t h in E a s t e r n and W e s t e r n E u r o p e and in t h e U n i t e d States, bureaucratization was c o n c e i v e d as t h e w a y to e l i m i n a t e d o m i n a t i o n , e s p e c i a l l y class d o m i n a t i o n . T h e formaliza­ tion e m b e d d e d in bureaucracy often has b e e n d e s i g n e d to transform tradi­ tional s y s t e m s of p o w e r in w h i c h o n e a g e n t is arbitrarily a b l e to force a n o t h e r to s u b m i t to t h e dictates of his or h e r will. T h u s c o l l e c t i v i z e d agricultural p r o d u c t i o n r e p l a c e d t h e rule of t h e kosaks, corporate m a n a g e ­ rial s y s t e m s r e p l a c e d t h e rule of t h e o w n e r - b o s s e s , c i t y - m a n a g e r g o v e r n ­ m e n t r e p l a c e d t h e rule of party m a c h i n e patriarchs, and family law and social s e r v i c e a g e n c i e s r e p l a c e d s o m e of t h e rule of t h e husband-father. In traditional forms of rule, rulers e x e r c i s e p o w e r in a c c o r d a n c e w i t h their particular d e s i r e s , v a l u e s , or e n d s . T h e ruler has a right to e x p e c t o b e d i e n c e b e c a u s e h e is s o v e r e i g n , and n e e d g i v e n o o t h e r reason. B u -

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reaucratic administration r e p l a c e s such personal s o v e r e i g n t y w i t h t h e rule of laws and p r o c e d u r e s . For e a c h area of its activity bureaucracy d e v e l o p s formal, explicit rules, i m p e r s o n a l in t h e s e n s e that t h e y m u s t b e f o l l o w e d b y w h o e v e r o c c u p i e s t h e positions or e n g a g e s in t h e activities t h e y d e ­ s c r i b e . T h u s b u r e a u c r a c y i n t r o d u c e s a universalization and standardiza­ tion of social or c o o p e r a t i v e activity. D e f i n i n g a c o o p e r a t i v e project as t h e object of technical control, b u ­ reaucracy d i s c o v e r s t h e o b j e c t i v e l y b e s t way to realize that project, not w i t h a v i e w to s o m e o n e ' s p e r s o n a l e n d s , b u t w i t h a v i e w to t h e e n d s of t h e organization or project itself. In so d o i n g bureaucracy d e v e l o p s a d e t a i l e d d i v i s i o n of labor. It d e f i n e s positions in a hierarchy of authority, w h e r e e a c h p o s i t i o n is b o u n d by rules, and m o v e m e n t b e t w e e n positions is g o v ­ e r n e d by a formal meritocratic s y s t e m . F o r m a l i z i n g c o l l e c t i v e action t h r o u g h explicitly articulated rules and p r o c e d u r e s , h o w e v e r , s e p a r a t e s it from n o r m a t i v e inquiry and c o m m i t ­ m e n t . D e c i s i o n s and actions will b e e v a l u a t e d less a c c o r d i n g to w h e t h e r t h e y are right or j u s t than a c c o r d i n g to t h e i r legal validity, that is, w h e t h e r t h e y are consistent with t h e rules and follow t h e appropriate p r o c e d u r e s . T h i s u n c o u p l i n g of legal rationality from n o r m a t i v e r e a s o n i n g c o n s t i t u t e s t h e m e a n i n g of bureaucratic depoliticization (see H a b e r m a s , 1987, p p . 307-10). A l o n g w i t h bureaucratic administration of c o o p e r a t i v e projects, a n e w u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e m e a n i n g and responsibilities of work d e v e l o p s for t h o s e i n v o l v e d in such administration, n a m e l y , t h e e t h i c of professional­ ism. Professionalization d e p o l i t i c i z e s work activity insofar as it r e m o v e s t h e e n d s of t h e activity from d e t e r m i n a t i o n by t h e individual worker. As work b e c o m e s p r o f e s s i o n a l i z e d workers u n d e r s t a n d t h e m s e l v e s as follow­ ing t h e p r o c e d u r e s of an ethical and scientific d i s c i p l i n e , w h e t h e r m e d i ­ c i n e , library cataloging, or child care, in w h i c h t h e y r e c e i v e formal train­ ing. S t r o n g explicit or implicit rules prohibit professionals from b r i n g i n g t h e i r p e r s o n a l d e s i r e s and c o m m i t m e n t s to t h e j o b , or a l l o w i n g personal f e e l i n g s a b o u t o t h e r s to i n f l u e n c e their p e r f o r m a n c e . Professional w o r k e r s s u b o r d i n a t e t h e i r individual w h i m s or d e s i r e s to the t e a m effort, taking as t h e h i g h e s t v a l u e t h e s m o o t h operation of t h e organization and t h e reali­ zation of its goals. T h e professional e t h i c incorporates a strong n o t i o n of loyalty, b o t h to t h e practioners of one's profession and to o n e ' s orga­ nization. T h e r e are m a n y a d v a n t a g e s to regularized practices of social c o o p e r a ­ tion g u i d e d by formalized rules and p r o c e d u r e s , and to t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of professional d i s c i p l i n e s . W h i l e c h a n g i n g t h e rules is often m o r e difficult in bureaucratic organizations than c h a n g i n g rulers was in traditional s o c i e ­ t i e s , it is still b e t t e r to subject p e r s o n s to formalized regulations w h i c h at

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least in p r i n c i p l e t h e y can k n o w and anticipate than to subject t h e m to t h e often arbitrary and selfish w h i m s of individual rulers. As m a n y s t u d e n t s of t h e welfare c o r p o r a t e s o c i e t y h a v e a r g u e d , h o w e v e r , t h e e x p a n s i o n o f b u ­ reaucratic administration o v e r increasing areas of work and life b r i n g s w i t h it n e w e x p e r i e n c e s of d o m i n a t i o n . Welfare c o r p o r a t e s o c i e t y p r e s e n t s us w i t h t h e irony of a h u g e s y s t e m o f p r o d u c t i o n , distribution, and s e r v i c e provision d e p e n d i n g o n t h e d e ­ tailed c o o p e r a t i o n of millions of p e o p l e m o s t of w h o m h a v e n o part in d e t e r m i n i n g t h e i r actions or t h e c o n d i t i o n s of their actions. M o s t p e o p l e in s u c h s o c i e t i e s are not p o w e r l e s s , in t h e s e n s e that I d e s c r i b e d in C h a p ­ ter 2; m a n y h a v e s o m e a u t o n o m y in their work, s o m e institutionalized authority o v e r o t h e r s , s o m e position that c o m m a n d s a m o d i c u m o f r e ­ s p e c t . E v e n r e l a t i v e l y e n a b l e d p e o p l e , h o w e v e r , are subject to structures of d o m i n a t i o n . T h e y e x p e r i e n c e t h e m s e l v e s as subject to t h e u n r e c i p r o ­ c a t e d authority of o t h e r s . T h e y find their actions c o n s t r a i n e d by structural or b u r e a u c r a t i c i m p e r a t i v e s that often s e e m both to result from n o o n e ' s d e c i s i o n s and to s e r v e t h e i n t e r e s t s of a specific set of a g e n t s . P e o p l e e x p e ­ r i e n c e b u r e a u c r a t i c d o m i n a t i o n not o n l y as workers, b u t also as c l i e n t s and c o n s u m e r s s u b j e c t to rules t h e y have had n o part in making, w h i c h are d e s i g n e d largely to c o n v e n i e n c e t h e p r o v i d e r or a g e n c y rather than t h e consumer. C o r p o r a t e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e w o r k p l a c e s are hierarchically structured, in that m o s t w o r k e r s in t h e m are s u b o r d i n a t e to t h e authority of o t h e r s . If p e o p l e h a v e d e c i s i o n m a k i n g p o w e r , it is generally o v e r others' actions rather than their o w n . This structure of hierarchical authority r e e s t a b ­ l i s h e s t h e p e r s o n a l d o m i n a t i o n that bureaucratic organization was a l l e g e d to h a v e e l i m i n a t e d . For h o w e v e r explicitly a bureaucracy formalizes rules and p r o c e d u r e s , it still c a n n o t e l i m i n a t e individual and s u b j e c t i v e c h o i c e s ( U n g e r , 1 9 7 4 , p p . 1 6 9 - 7 1 ) . H e a d s of divisions and d e p a r t m e n t s , for e x a m ­ p l e , n o r m a l l y h a v e a great deal of discretion in making, i n t e r p r e t i n g , ap­ p l y i n g , and e n f o r c i n g rules according to their particular u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e goals of t h e organization and their c h o i c e of priorities. T h e v e r y u n i v e r s a l i s m and formal characteristics of bureaucratic rules p r o d u c e w i t h i n t h e bureaucracy an e x p e r i e n c e of personal d e p e n d e n c y and n e c e s s a r y s u b m i s s i o n to arbitrary will. T h e formalism, universality, and i m p e r s o n a l i t y of t h e rules are s u p p o s e d to p r o t e c t p e r s o n s from t h e arbitrariness o f w h i m and personal likes and d i s l i k e s — e v e r y o n e is to b e t r e a t e d in t h e s a m e w a y , i m p e r s o n a l l y and impartially, and n o particular v a l u e s s h o u l d e n t e r . But p e o p l e a p p l y i n g t h e i m p e r s o n a l rules m u s t m a k e j u d g m e n t s a b o u t h o w t h e y apply to e a c h particular case. By their very nature, formal and universal rules h a v e n o automatic m e c h a n i s m for their application to particular c a s e s , and in their application t h e d e c i s i o n ­ maker's f e e l i n g s , v a l u e s , and particular p e r c e p t i o n s inevitably enter.

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As I shall d e v e l o p in m o r e detail in C h a p t e r 7, t h e point is not that s u b s t a n t i v e p e r s o n a l v a l u e s e n t e r bureaucratic d e c i s i o n m a k i n g w h e n t h e y o u g h t not to; o n t h e contrary, t h e e n t r a n c e of particular s u b s t a n t i v e v a l u e s into d e c i s i o n s is i n e v i t a b l y and p r o p e r l y part of w h a t d e c i s i o n m a k i n g is about. T h e s c i e n t i s t i c i d e o l o g y of bureaucratic administration, h o w e v e r , p u r p o r t s to r e m o v e all particular v a l u e s from d e c i s i o n s . H o w is this b u ­ reaucratic i d e o l o g y v a l i d a t e d ? G e n e r a l l y t h e j u s t i c e o f hierarchical d e c i ­ s i o n m a k i n g is justified b y t h e claim that any professional w i t h t h e p r o p e r k n o w l e d g e acting impartially w o u l d c o m e to t h e s a m e d e c i s i o n . S i n c e in fact p e r s o n a l j u d g m e n t inevitably e n t e r s m a n y important d e c i s i o n s , h o w ­ e v e r , s u b o r d i n a t e s e x p e r i e n c e t h e m s e l v e s as subject to t h e arbitrary will of a s u p e r i o r o n w h o m t h e y are personally d e p e n d e n t . Life i n s i d e t h e b u r e a u c r a c y thus b e c o m e s a scary f u n h o u s e of "impression m a n a g e m e n t and " p s y c h i n g out" g a m e s . To r e m o v e t h e w i d e latitude of s u b j e c t i v e j u d g m e n t superiors are able to e x e r c i s e w i t h r e s p e c t to s u b o r d i n a t e s , b u ­ reaucracies often institute d e t a i l e d , formalized, "objective" m e t h o d s of s u p e r v i s i o n and s u r v e i l l a n c e . T h e s e o n l y i n c r e a s e t h e s e n s e of d o m i n a ­ tion, h o w e v e r , s i n c e t h e y apply m o r e d e t a i l e d rules m o r e f r e q u e n t l y to t h e b e h a v i o r and p e r f o r m a n c e o f s u b o r d i n a t e s , and s u b j e c t i v e j u d g m e n t i n e v i t a b l y e n t e r s in t h e application of t h e s e rules as w e l l (cf. Lefort, 1986). D o m i n a t i o n in welfare corporate s o c i e t y e x t e n d s b e y o n d t h e w o r k p l a c e to m a n y o t h e r areas o f e v e r y d a y life. In t h e p h e n o m e n o n that H a b e r m a s refers to as t h e "colonization of t h e life world," b o t h g o v e r n m e n t and pri­ v a t e a g e n c i e s s u b j e c t c l i e n t s and c o n s u m e r s to m e s h e s of microauthority. C l i e n t s and c o n s u m e r s s u b m i t to t h e authority of hospitals, s c h o o l s , uni­ v e r s i t i e s , social s e r v i c e a g e n c i e s , g o v e r n m e n t offices, banks, fast-food res­ taurants, and c o u n t l e s s o t h e r institutions. Officials in t h e s e institutions not o n l y p r e s c r i b e m u c h o f t h e b e h a v i o r of c l i e n t s or c o n s u m e r s w i t h i n t h e i n s t i t u t i o n s , but p e r h a p s m o r e importantly, t h r o u g h social scientific, m a n ­ agerial, or m a r k e t i n g d i s c i p l i n e s , t h e y define for t h e client or c o n s u m e r t h e v e r y form and m e a n i n g of t h e n e e d s t h e institutions aim to m e e t ( H a b e r m a s , 1987, p p . 3 6 2 - 6 3 ; cf. Fraser, 1987a; Laclau and Mouffc, 1984, p p . 1 6 1 - 6 3 ) . T h e c o l o n i z a t i o n of t h e life w o r l d m e a n s that life activities formerly s u b j e c t to traditional n o r m s , s p o n t a n e o u s action, or c o l l e c t i v e d e c i s i o n b e c o m e c o m m o d i f i e d or are brought u n d e r t h e control of state i n s t i t u t i o n s , and thus b e c o m e n o r m a l i z e d , u n i v e r s a l i z e d , and standard­ i z e d (cf. K. F e r g u s o n , 1984). P e r s o n s w i t h i n welfare corporate s o c i e t y often d o not c h a l l e n g e t h e s e forms of d o m i n a t i o n and d e p o l i t i c i z a t i o n , partly b e c a u s e t h e y s e e m to b e t h e price of t h e material comfort t h e majority of p e o p l e h a v e . T h o s e w i t h o u t material comfort are e v e n less likely to c h a l l e n g e t h e authority of institutions that d e f i n e their b e h a v i o r and n e e d s , b e c a u s e t h e y are m o r e d e p e n d e n t o n t h e m than o t h e r s . T w o o t h e r p h e n o m e n a l e g i t i m a t e t h e

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structure of welfare corporate s o c i e t y and m a k e it difficult to c h a l l e n g e its forms o f d o m i n a t i o n : t h e i d e o l o g y of e x p e r t i s m , and t h e h o p e of social and career mobility. In w e l f a r e corporate s o c i e t y k n o w l e d g e is p o w e r . D e p o l i t i c i z a t i o n of p u b l i c life s u c c e e d s a p p a r e n t l y b e c a u s e m o s t p e o p l e are c o n v i n c e d that i s s u e s of legislation, p r o d u c t i o n , and p l a n n i n g are too c o m p l e x to b e u n ­ d e r s t o o d e x c e p t by fiscal, legal, and managerial e x p e r t s . In t h e i d e o l o g y of e x p e r t i s m , t h e k n o w l e d g e a b l e and o n l y t h e k n o w l e d g e a b l e h a v e a right to rule, b e c a u s e t h e y are masters of t h e o b j e c t i v e and v a l u e - n e u t r a l disci­ p l i n e a p p l y i n g to t h e area of social life in q u e s t i o n , and thus t h e i r d e c i s i o n s are n e c e s s a r y and correct (Bay, 1 9 8 1 , p p . 6 5 - 6 7 ; cf. H a b e r m a s , 1987, p . 326). R u l e by e x p e r t s c l a i m s to t r a n s c e n d politics, claims not to entail s u b m i s s i o n b y s o m e to t h e will of o t h e r s . W i t h t h e rule of e x p e r t s w e s e e m to w i t n e s s an e n d to i d e o l o g y and a c h i e v e scientific organization in social life. It is t h e r e f o r e difficult for p e o p l e to c h a l l e n g e t h e d o c t o r s , social w o r k e r s , e n g i n e e r s , statisticians, e c o n o m i s t s , j o b analysts, city p l a n n e r s , and t h e myriad of o t h e r e x p e r t s w h o s e j u d g m e n t s d e t e r m i n e their actions or t h e c o n d i t i o n s of t h e i r actions. W i t h i n b u r e a u c r a t i c organizations t h e i d e o l o g y of m e r i t o p e r a t e s in t h e s a m e w a y . A professional acquires t h e right to rule m o r e p e r s o n s as h e or s h e d e v e l o p s g r e a t e r e x p e r t i s e in his or h e r profession, as j u d g e d by t h o s e already d e s i g n a t e d e x p e r t s . C a r e e r i s m is therefore a n o t h e r l e g i t i m a t i n g m e c h a n i s m in welfare corporate s o c i e t y ( H a b e r m a s , 1975, p p . 74—78). W h e n t h e r e is a c o m m i t m e n t to a principle of equal o p p o r t u n i t y , w h e n c h a n n e l s of p r o m o t i o n are clear, and w h e n merit criteria are a p p l i e d i m ­ partially, t h e n p e r s o n s rise in t h e hierarchy o f authority in a m a n n e r c o m ­ m e n s u r a t e w i t h t h e i r e x p e r t i s e . S u b o r d i n a t e s a c c e p t t h e hierarchical s t r u c t u r e a n d t h e authority of their superiors b e c a u s e t h e y t h e m s e l v e s h a v e l e g i t i m a t e h o p e s of rising to positions of greater authority. C a r e e r ­ ism c o n t r i b u t e s to t h e privatization of social life. Rather than c o l l e c t i v e l y c h a l l e n g i n g t h e l e g i t i m a c y of t h e authority of t h e e x p e r t s , p e o p l e o n t h e c a r e e r track h a v e t h e i r o w n a d v a n c e m e n t primarily in view. A n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n for s u c h a d v a n c e m e n t , in fact, is not politicizing t h e d e c i s i o n s of e i t h e r t h e organization or t h e larger public. In C h a p t e r 7 I shall focus o n s h o w i n g t h e ideological character of t h e merit principles that b o t h e x p e r ­ tism and c a r e e r i s m p r e s u p p o s e . I a r g u e d in C h a p t e r 1 that talk of distributing and r e d i s t r i b u t i n g p o w e r m a k e s little s e n s e b e c a u s e p o w e r is not a p o s s e s s i o n to b e d i s t r i b u t e d . This cursory g l a n c e at typical e x p e r i e n c e s of d o m i n a t i o n in welfare c o r p o ­ rate s o c i e t y s h o u l d m a k e clear that t h e p r o b l e m cannot b e d e s c r i b e d as a m o n o p o l y of p o w e r , w h i c h c o u l d b e s o l v e d by redistributing p o w e r . T h e shift from b o s s e s to b u r e a u c r a c i e s entails a diffusion as w e l l as a prolifera­ tion of p o w e r . To b e sure, in c o n t e m p o r a r y bureaucratic hierarchies s o m e

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p e o p l e h a v e m o r e p o w e r than o t h e r s , in t h e s e n s e of authority to g i v e o r d e r s or m a k e d e c i s i o n s . M a n y o t h e r s , I have n o t e d , are p o w e r l e s s . But all p o w e r and d o m i n a t i o n w i t h i n t h e s e large-scale organizations d e p e n d s o n t h e c o o p e r a t i o n of a m u l t i t u d e of different p e o p l e . M o s t p e o p l e in t h e s o c i e t y o u t s i d e of t h e s e organizations also feel t h e d o m i n a t i n g effects of t h e a d m i n i s t e r e d life w o r l d . O n l y a d e m o c r a t i z a t i o n of welfare corporate institutions that i n t r o d u c e s p r o c e d u r e s of c o l l e c t i v e d i s c u s s i o n and d e c i ­ s i o n m a k i n g a b o u t e n d s and m e a n s can bring p e o p l e s o m e control o v e r their action. D e m o c r a t i z a t i o n is less fruitfully c o n c e i v e d as a redistribu­ tion of p o w e r than as a reorganization of d e c i s i o n m a k i n g rules. Later in this c h a p t e r I shall a r g u e that d e m o c r a c y is an c l e m e n t and c o n d i t i o n of social j u s t i c e , not just in g o v e r n m e n t institutions, but in p r i n c i p l e in all institutions.

INSURGENCY A N D THE REPOLITICIZATION OF P U B L I C L I F E

T h e d e p o l i t i c i z a t i o n of welfare capitalist s o c i e t y s u c c e e d s o n l y if certain structural c o n t r a d i c t i o n s can b e c o n t a i n e d . First, t h e r e is a fiscal contra­ d i c t i o n . T h e welfare capitalist s y s t e m relies o n g o v e r n m e n t p r o g r a m s to foster private a c c u m u l a t i o n and maintain high l e v e l s of c o n s u m p t i o n . T h e s e state functions r e q u i r e m a s s i v e state s p e n d i n g , h o w e v e r , and t h e m o n e y m u s t c o m e from s o m e w h e r e . C o m m i t m e n t to m a x i m u m l e v e l s of private a c c u m u l a t i o n clashes with t h e n e e d s of t h e welfare state (Offe, 1984, c h a p . 6; cf. G o u g h , 1979). As t h e fiscal crisis g e n e r a t e d b y this c o n ­ tradiction magnifies, t h e goals of state activity can c o m e m o r e explicitly into q u e s t i o n . S e c o n d , t h e r e is a contradiction i n v o l v e d in b r i n g i n g increasing areas of e v e r y d a y life u n d e r rationalized and d i r e c t e d h u m a n control, and at t h e s a m e t i m e k e e p i n g s u c h control d e p o l i t i c i z e d . S i n c e t h e polity retains for­ mal ideals of d e m o c r a c y , t h e m o r e social s p h e r e s c o m e u n d e r t h e p u r v i e w of state p o l i c y , t h e m o r e likely it is that p e o p l e will d e m a n d m e a n i n g f u l p u b l i c d i s c u s s i o n of such policy ( H a b e r m a s , 1975; 1987, p p . 354—68; Offe, 1984, c h a p . 7). In t h e c o n t e x t of t h e s e contradictions of welfare capitalist s o c i e t y , s i n c e t h e 1960s d i v e r s e i n s u r g e n t c a m p a i g n s and m o v e m e n t s have r e s p o n d e d to t h e d o m i n a t i o n and c o l o n i z a t i o n of a d m i n i s t e r e d life. I take t h e t e r m in­ s u r g e n c y from M i c h a e l Walzer: Insurgency is the demand that bureaucratic services make possible, instead of replacing, local decisionmaking. Or rather it is the acting out of a new dialectic, which denies conventional definitions of good behavior and seeks to make the "helpfulness" of the welfare bureaucracy into the starting point of a new politics of resistance and self-determination. (Walzer, 1982, p. 152)

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I n s u r g e n t c a m p a i g n s and m o v e m e n t s arise within welfare capitalist so­ c i e t y , on t h e fringes of bureaucratic institutions or carving o u t n e w social s p a c e s not d r e a m t of in t h e i r rules. T h e y are often local and s p o n t a n e o u s , t h o u g h not u n o r g a n i z e d , w i t h a s e n s e of l i m i t a t i o n — t h e limits of an act, or a particular goal, or a particular c o n s t i t u e n c y . I n s u r g e n c y often carries w i t h it t h e dramatic spirit of t h e quick strike in t h e b e l l y of t h e b e a s t — w i t c h e s t h r o w i n g d r i e d b l o o d o n p o r n o g r a p h i c m a g a z i n e s , priests s m a s h ­ ing u p t h e n o s e of a T r i d e n t missile. But i n s u r g e n c y also d e s c r i b e s t h e o n g o i n g p u l s e a n d m a s s organization that m a n y writers h a v e referred to as t h e " n e w social m o v e m e n t s . " W h a t is n e w about t h e s e i n s u r g e n t social m o v e m e n t s , according to Jean C o h e n and A n d r e w Arato (1984), is their self-limiting character. U n l i k e Marxist or social d e m o c r a t i c oppositional m o v e m e n t s earlier in this c e n ­ tury, t h e n e w social m o v e m e n t s are particularistic and o r i e n t e d to specific i s s u e s , rather than global. U n l i k e radical political m o v e m e n t s of an earlier t i m e , their aim is usually not to s e i z e and transform state p o w e r ; rather, t h e y s e e k to limit state and corporate p o w e r , to p u s h back t h e b o u n d s of t h e i r c o m m o d i f y i n g and bureaucratizing influence. T h e y s e e k to l o o s e n social life from t h e c o l o n i z i n g i n f l u e n c e of welfare state and corporate b u r e a u c r a c y , to create alternative institutional forms and i n d e p e n d e n t discussion. I n s u r g e n t m o v e m e n t s exploit and e x p a n d t h e s p h e r e of civil s o c i e t y ( H a b e r m a s , 1 9 8 1 ; C o h e n , 1985), t h e s p a c e b e t w e e n individuals and fami­ l i e s , o n t h e o n e hand, and state and large corporate institutions, o n t h e other. Civil s o c i e t y i n v o l v e s , in t h e w o r d s of Maria Markus, "the w h o l e n e t w o r k of t h e voluntary a n d particular (that is, not a l l - e n c o m p a s s i n g ) as­ sociations and organizations, t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e a u t o n o m o u s i n s t r u m e n t s of o p i n i o n formation, articulation, and o p p r e s s i o n w h i c h are distinct b o t h from t h e state and from t h e p r o p e r institutions of e c o n o m y " (Markus, 1 9 8 6 , p. 4 4 1 ) . In t h e U n i t e d States this is a vast field of social life that i n c l u d e s r e l i g i o u s organizations, schools and u n i v e r s i t i e s , m a n y small b u s i n e s s e s , m a n y nonprofit a g e n c i e s and organizations, and a h u g e d i v e r ­ sity of v o l u n t a r y organizations, as w e l l as p u b l i s h i n g and o t h e r m e d i a asso­ c i a t e d w i t h or e x p r e s s i n g t h e p e r s p e c t i v e s of t h o s e organizations. In r e s p o n s e to t h e d o m i n a t i o n e x e r c i s e d o v e r e v e r y d a y life b y welfare and corporate b u r e a u c r a c i e s , t h e p r i n c i p l e of i n s u r g e n t o r g a n i z i n g is not unification, b u t proliferation. C o n t e m p o r a r y i n s u r g e n c i e s are local and h e t e r o g e n e o u s , w i t h l o o s e l y n e t w o r k e d groups, sharing n e w s l e t t e r s or m e e t i n g at c o n f e r e n c e s . Different groups m a y spin off around an i s s u e or c a m p a i g n , and coexist as a m o v e m e n t w i t h o u t t h e unity of a c o m m o n pro­ gram or central organization. T h e m o s t r e c e n t u p s u r g e of t h e p e a c e m o v e ­ m e n t in t h e U n i t e d States, for e x a m p l e , consists of a w i l d array of organi­ zations and affinity g r o u p s w i t h varying i d e n t i t i e s — f e m i n i s t , Christian,

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socialist, e c o l o g i c a l , a n d so o n — s p o n s o r i n g a m i x e d bag o f t a c t i c s — g u e r ­ rilla theater, l e g i s l a t i v e l o b b y i n g , n o n v i o l e n t civil d i s o b e d i e n c e , m a r c h e s , and chain l e t t e r s . S u c h h e t e r o g e n e i t y s o m e t i m e s p r o d u c e s conflict in t h e goals and political p o s i t i o n s of t h e s e m o v e m e n t s . W h i l e t h e s e n e w social m o v e m e n t s often press for specific allocations of state r e s o u r c e s , their main focus, at least at t h e t i m e of t h e i r u p s u r g e and g r o w i n g s t r e n g t h , is not distributive. T h e y focus o n broad i s s u e s of d e c i s i o n m a k i n g p o w e r and political participation. Often t h e y s e e k less to e x p a n d t h e s c o p e of t h e state's welfare s e r v i c e s than to r e s p o n d to t h e invasion of n e a r l y e v e r y area of social life b y b o t h p u b l i c and private b u ­ reaucracies ( H a b e r m a s , 1981; 1 9 8 7 , p p . 392—96). Most focus o n i s s u e s of o p p r e s s i o n and d o m i n a t i o n ; t h e y usually s e e k d e m o c r a t i z a t i o n of institu­ tions and practices, to bring t h e m u n d e r m o r e direct popular control. T h e s e i n s u r g e n t c a m p a i g n s and m o v e m e n t s m a y b e d i v i d e d into t h r e e major c a t e g o r i e s ; (1) t h o s e that c h a l l e n g e d e c i s i o n m a k i n g structures and t h e right of t h e p o w e r f u l to exert their will; (2) t h o s e o r g a n i z i n g a u t o n o ­ m o u s s e r v i c e s ; and (3) m o v e m e n t s of cultural identity. (1) S o m e c o n t e m p o r a r y i n s u r g e n c i e s effectively q u e s t i o n t h e preroga­ t i v e s of g o v e r n m e n t and corporate officials to m a k e d e c i s i o n s affecting a broad p u b l i c a c c o r d i n g to private bureaucratic priorities of profit or efficiency (cf. L u k e , 1987). S i n c e t h e early 1970s t h e e n v i r o n m e n t a l m o v e ­ m e n t has c h a l l e n g e d t h e p r e r o g a t i v e of private c o m p a n i e s to p r o d u c e w h a t e v e r t h e y w i s h h o w e v e r t h e y w i s h . T h e m o v e m e n t has successfully raised t h e c o n s c i o u s n e s s of a broad mass of p e o p l e about e n v i r o n m e n t a l d a n g e r s , and has e v e n s u c c e e d e d to s o m e d e g r e e in w i n n i n g legislation to r e g u l a t e c o r p o r a t e activity and altering corporate practices. In t h e w a k e of n u m e r o u s plant c l o s i n g s in t h e last t e n years, a m o v e m e n t has g r o w n that s e e k s to limit t h e p o w e r of private corporations to sneak out of t o w n w i t h ­ out w a r n i n g . T h o u g h t h e r e w a s a lull in p r o t e s t s of foreign policy after t h e V i e t n a m War, s i n c e t h e early 1980s steady citizen i n s u r g e n c y has q u e s ­ t i o n e d t h e a i m s of t h e U . S . g o v e r n m e n t and its right to m a k e d e c i s i o n s that affect t h e rest o f t h e w o r l d , e s p e c i a l l y Central A m e r i c a and S o u t h Africa. T h e a n t i - n u c l e a r p o w e r m o v e m e n t r e p r e s e n t s , I think, t h e m o s t strik­ ingly successful i n s u r g e n c y m o v e m e n t q u e s t i o n i n g what until t h e n had b e e n taken for g r a n t e d as a. fait accompli. S i n c e t h e E i s e n h o w e r "atoms for p e a c e " initiative in t h e late 1950s, an e n o r m o u s a m o u n t of p u b l i c and private r e s o u r c e s and p l a n n i n g has b e e n d e v o t e d to b u i l d i n g n u c l e a r p o w e r plants. T h e a n t i - n u c l e a r p o w e r m o v e m e n t called i n t o q u e s t i o n t h e e n t i r e framework of e n e r g y u n d e r s t a n d i n g that m o s t e s t a b l i s h m e n t officials h a d b e e n a s s u m i n g , insisting that t h e v e r y i d e a of nuclear p o w e r is a bad social c h o i c e , and staging w e l l - o r g a n i z e d o c c u p a t i o n s of e x i s t i n g and p l a n n e d n u c l e a r s i t e s , s o m e t i m e s i n c l u d i n g t e n s of t h o u s a n d s of p e o -

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p i e . T h e s e p r o t e s t actions p e r f e c t e d t h e t h e o r y and practice of t h e "affinity g r o u p , " w h i c h has b e c o m e a m o d e l of d i s c i p l i n e d d e m o c r a t i c d e ­ c i s i o n m a k i n g for m a n y s u b s e q u e n t protest m o v e m e n t s . T h e affinity g r o u p m o d e l of organization aptly illustrates t h e principle of proliferation as dis­ tinct from unification. Affinity groups are relatively a u t o n o m o u s and dis­ t i n g u i s h e d b y t h e various principles of their affinity, such as political s t a n d p o i n t , g e n d e r , a g e , religion, or n e i g h b o r h o o d , and o n m a n y occa­ sions d o z e n s of distinct affinity g r o u p s h a v e successfully p l a n n e d and s t a g e d j o i n t p r o t e s t actions. S i n c e t h e late 1960s urban social m o v e m e n t s h a v e s p r o u t e d all o v e r t h e U n i t e d States that c h a l l e n g e t h e d e c i s i o n m a k i n g structure of local g o v e r n ­ m e n t . U r b a n social m o v e m e n t s h a v e d e m a n d e d citizen participation in d e v e l o p m e n t p l a n n i n g , and in m a n y cities g e n e r a t e d n e i g h b o r h o o d or­ ganizations a i m i n g at m o r e participatory structures (Clavel, 1986). S o m e urban m o v e m e n t s h a v e directly c h a l l e n g e d t h e a t o m i z i n g forces of inter­ e s t - g r o u p p l u r a l i s m , w h i c h e m p h a s i z e s individual c o n s u m p t i o n , and in­ s t e a d called for c o n s t r u c t i o n of institutions to p r o v i d e for m o r e c o l l e c t i v e c o n s u m p t i o n (Castells, 1983, chap. 32). As t h e p r o t e s t heat p i c k e d u p o n e spring w h e n a v o t e o n aid to t h e N i c a r a g u a n contras was approaching, Jean Kirkpatrick n o t e d in a s p e e c h that foreign p o l i c y c a n n o t b e m a d e by t h e citizenry, b u t m u s t b e d e c i d e d b y t h e e x p e r t s . M o s t of t h e i n s u r g e n c i e s that h a v e c h a l l e n g e d t h e d e c i ­ s i o n m a k i n g p r e r o g a t i v e s of official p o w e r h a v e also s o u g h t to d e m y s t i f y t h e i d e o l o g y of e x p e r t i s m . C o m m u n i t y groups c h a l l e n g i n g t h e d e c i s i o n to construct a hazardous w a s t e t r e a t m e n t plant or a nuclear plant or a n u c l e a r w a s t e disposal s i t e m u s t acquire c o n s i d e r a b l e t e c h n i c a l k n o w l e d g e of w a s t e m a n a g e m e n t , local g e o l o g y , and law in order to c o n d u c t their c a m ­ paign; in t h e p r o c e s s t h e y d i s c o v e r that t h e s e matters can b e u n d e r s t o o d b y ordinary c i t i z e n s , and that e x p e r t s are rarely neutral. P e a c e m o v e m e n t activists h a v e sat o n p a n e l s w i t h nuclear strategy specialists, a p p e a r i n g at least as k n o w l e d g e a b l e and e x p o s i n g d e t e r r e n c e p o l i c i e s as c h o i c e s , not n e c e s s i t i e s . O t h e r p e a c e activists h a v e m a s t e r e d t h e s u p p o s e d l y arcane c o m p l e x i t i e s of t h e e c o n o m i c s y s t e m to c h a l l e n g e t h e claim that military p r o d u c t i o n is e c o n o m i c a l l y beneficial. In t h e p e a c e and Central A m e r i c a solidarity m o v e m e n t s o t h e r kinds of d e m o c r a t i c a l l y run and participatory alternative institutions h a v e arisen that b o t h b y p a s s and c h a l l e n g e official c h a n n e l s of international d i p l o ­ m a c y . T h e m o v e m e n t to g i v e illegal sanctuary to r e f u g e e s from Central A m e r i c a in this c o u n t r y has b e e n p r o s e c u t e d so v i g o r o u s l y by t h e U . S . g o v e r n m e n t not b e c a u s e it r e p r e s e n t s an a n t i - A m e r i c a n e x t r e m i s t r e v o l u ­ tionary m o v e m e n t , but p r e c i s e l y b e c a u s e it has t h e broad participation o f ordinary r e s p e c t a b l e c h u r c h g o i n g citizens w h o h a v e taken it u p o n t h e m -

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s e l v e s to d o s o m e t h i n g directly about policies w h o s e Tightness and legiti­ m a c y t h e y q u e s t i o n . M a n y U . S . and S o v i e t c i t i z e n s h a v e l i k e w i s e r e j e c t e d t h e l e g i t i m a c y of t h e i r g o v e r n m e n t s in s e e k i n g a d i s s o l u t i o n of U . S . - S o v i e t a n t a g o n i s m , d e v e l o p i n g p e o p l e - t o - p e o p l e forms of e x c h a n g e . (2) M u c h c o n t e m p o r a r y i n s u r g e n c y i n c l u d e s efforts to d e c o l o n i z e ser­ v i c e p r o v i s i o n and t h e m e e t i n g of n e e d s t h r o u g h t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of au­ t o n o m o u s organizations of p o l i t i c i z e d self-help (Zola, 1987). Rather than d e m a n d that t h e state p r o v i d e m o r e s e r v i c e s or s u p p o r t p o l i c i e s , t h e s e m o v e m e n t s i n s t e a d h a v e d e t e r m i n e d to d e v e l o p m o r e participatory insti­ tutions to p r o v i d e s e r v i c e s or p r o m o t e political goals marginal to or o u t ­ s i d e t h e authority o f t h e state ( W i t h o r n , 1984). T h e s e a u t o n o m o u s politi­ c i z e d s e l f - h e l p a g e n c i e s s h o u l d not b e identified, h o w e v e r , w i t h efforts o n t h e part of t h e federal g o v e r n m e n t to w i t h d r a w from s e r v i c e p r o v i s i o n , r e t u r n i n g caring functions to family and private charity. At t h e s a m e t i m e that t h e s e i n s u r g e n t a g e n c i e s try to maintain d e m o c r a t i c local control, m a n y of t h e m also d e m a n d access to p u b l i c r e s o u r c e s to s u p p o r t t h e i r activity. T h e w o m e n ' s m o v e m e n t has b e e n a vanguard in such activity, e s t a b l i s h ­ ing h e a l t h s e r v i c e s , rape crisis s e r v i c e s and s h e l t e r s for b a t t e r e d w o m e n . Typically t h e s e b e g a n as c o l l e c t i v e s making d e c i s i o n s d e m o c r a t i c a l l y , w i t h p e r s o n s rotating a m o n g t h e different kinds of j o b s . T h e y s e e k not m e r e l y to m e e t t h e client's n e e d s , b u t to e m p o w e r h e r to d e f i n e and m e e t h e r o w n n e e d s , as w e l l as to bring h e r to s o m e political a w a r e n e s s of t h e s o u r c e s of h e r suffering. As b o t h t h e n e e d for t h e s e s e r v i c e s and t h e s u c ­ c e s s of t h e s e a u t o n o m o u s w o m e n ' s institutions in p r o v i d i n g t h e m b e c a m e a p p a r e n t by t h e m i d 1 9 7 0 s , t h e s e institutions began to join t h e orbit o f t h e welfare state. To r e c e i v e state or federal funding m a n y w e r e r e q u i r e d to d e s i g n a t e official boards of directors and to h a v e certified, p r o f e s s i o n ­ a l i z e d staffs. W h i l e s o m e w o m e n ' s s e r v i c e s have b e c o m e part of t h e b u ­ reaucratic e s t a b l i s h m e n t as a result, m o s t fought to maintain significant a u t o n o m y , m o s t still rely h e a v i l y o n v o l u n t e e r workers w i t h significant participation in d e c i s i o n m a k i n g , and m o s t still identify w i t h a f e m i n i s t m o v e m e n t that p o l i t i c i z e s t h e n e e d s w o m e n bring to t h e s e institutions. Similar kinds of alternative institutions for p o l i t i c i z e d s e l f - h e l p s e r v i c e p r o v i s i o n h a v e m u s h r o o m e d in m a n y Black, Latino, A m e r i c a n I n d i a n , and w h i t e w o r k i n g - c l a s s c o m m u n i t i e s . T h e y often c o m b i n e s e r v i c e p r o v i s i o n w i t h political agitation and direct action protest, i n v o l v i n g t h e participa­ tion of t h o s e s e r v e d ( s e c B o y t e , 1984; B o y t e and R e i s s m a n , 1986). W h i l e h o p i n g to c h a n n e l t h e distribution of g o o d s and s e r v i c e s m o r e toward t h e o p p r e s s e d , t h e s e institutions aim to g o b e y o n d distribution to e m p o w e r p e r s o n s , d e v e l o p t h e i r capacities, and sponsor n e w institutional forms in w h i c h p e o p l e can c o l l e c t i v e l y take s o m e c o n t o l o v e r their e n v i r o n m e n t .

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T h e r e c e n t u n s u c c e s s f u l c a m p a i g n to charter a n e w city of M a n d e l a o u t of t h e p r e d o m i n a n t l y Black s e c t i o n s of B o s t o n exhibits h o w projects for d e m ­ ocratic s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n can e x t e n d far b e y o n d small c o l l e c t i v e s . T e n a n t organizations are self-organized to apprise t e n a n t s of t h e i r rights against landlords and in t h e face of c o n d o m i n i u m and c o o p e r a t i v e c o n v e r ­ sions, and to r e p r e s e n t t e n a n t s in t h e i r relations w i t h p r o p e r t y o w n e r s . In t h e face of rising h o u s i n g c o s t s , a scarcity of h o u s i n g , and c o n s e q u e n t h o m e l e s s n e s s , h o w e v e r , i n s u r g e n c i e s h a v e arisen that s e e k d e m o c r a t i c control o v e r h o u s i n g . T h e m o s t dramatic of t h e s e h a v e b e e n various forms of s q u a t t e r s ' m o v e m e n t s , w h e r e p e o p l e s i m p l y take o v e r a b a n d o n e d b u i l d i n g s a n d r e n o v a t e t h e m to m a k e t h e m livable. M o r e often g r o u p s a c q u i r e b u i l d i n g s legally a n d , often w i t h t h e participation of t h e p e o p l e w h o will l i v e t h e r e , r e n o v a t e t h e m into l o w - c o s t h o u s i n g units; in d o i n g so t h e s e g r o u p s h a v e faced t h e i s s u e of s p e c u l a t i v e resale and h a v e f o u n d i n n o v a t i v e w a y s to form c o o p e r a t i v e s and land trusts to e n s u r e that t h e s e n e w units o f h o u s i n g will not b e out of t h e reach of t h e p e o p l e m o s t in n e e d ( D r e i e r , 1987). M o s t of t h e s e c o o p e r a t i v e h o u s i n g organizations h a v e s o u g h t to institutionalize p r o c e d u r e s of d e m o c r a t i c d e c i s i o n m a k i n g in s o m e t i m e s c o m p l e x organizational forms ( W h i t e , 1982). (3) M a n y social m o v e m e n t s , finally, h a v e f o c u s e d o n politicizing cul­ ture. C u l t u r e is a broad category, and I d o not i n t e n d to g i v e it a p r e c i s e definition h e r e . C u l t u r e refers to all a s p e c t s of social life from t h e p o i n t of v i e w of t h e i r linguistic, s y m b o l i c , affective, and e m b o d i e d n o r m s and p r a c t i c e s . C u l t u r e i n c l u d e s t h e b a c k g r o u n d and m e d i u m of action, t h e u n c o n s c i o u s habits, d e s i r e s , m e a n i n g s , g e s t u r e s , and so o n that p e o p l e g r o w i n t o a n d b r i n g t o t h e i r i n t e r a c t i o n s . Usually c u l t u r e is j u s t t h e r e , a s e t of traditions and m e a n i n g s that c h a n g e , b u t s e l d o m as t h e result of c o n s c i o u s reflection and d e c i s i o n . P o l i t i c i z i n g c u l t u r e , t h e n , m e a n s b r i n g i n g l a n g u a g e , g e s t u r e s , forms of e m b o d i m e n t a n d c o m p o r t m e n t , i m a g e s , interactive c o n v e n t i o n s , and so o n into explicit reflection. Cultural politics q u e s t i o n s certain e v e r y d a y s y m b o l s , p r a c t i c e s , and w a y s of s p e a k i n g , m a k i n g t h e m t h e s u b j e c t of p u b ­ lic d i s c u s s i o n , and explicitly m a t t e r s of c h o i c e and d e c i s i o n . T h e politicization of c u l t u r e s h o u l d b e d i s t i n g u i s h e d from a libertarian i n s i s t e n c e o n t h e right of i n d i v i d u a l s to "do t h e i r o w n thing," h o w e v e r u n c o n v e n t i o n a l . Cul­ tural politics d o e s often c e l e b r a t e s u p p r e s s e d practices and n o v e l e x p r e s ­ s i o n s , e s p e c i a l l y w h e n t h e s e arise from and speak for o p p r e s s e d g r o u p s . B u t cultural politics has primarily a critical function: to ask w h a t practices, habits, a t t i t u d e s , c o m p o r t m e n t s , i m a g e s , s y m b o l s , and so o n c o n t r i b u t e to social d o m i n a t i o n and g r o u p o p p r e s s i o n , and to call for c o l l e c t i v e transfor­ m a t i o n of s u c h practices. Historically t h e welfare state has taken s o m e s t e p s toward c o n s c i o u s p u b l i c d e c i s i o n m a k i n g a b o u t w h e t h e r and h o w to m e e t p e o p l e ' s n e e d s . It

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has t h u s h e l p e d c r e a t e t h e possibility of a m o r e p o l i t i c i z e d approach to m e e t i n g n e e d s , w h i c h welfare capitalist society s u p p r e s s e s . In a similar fashion, t h e c o l o n i z a t i o n of m u c h of e v e r y d a y life by g o v e r n m e n t and cor­ porate b u r e a u c r a c i e s , w h o d e l i b e r a t e l y m a n i p u l a t e m e a n i n g s and s y m b o l s and c o n s c i o u s l y c o n d i t i o n c o n s u m p t i o n c h o i c e s , has h e l p e d c r e a t e t h e c o n d i t i o n s for a p o l i t i c i z e d culture. For o n c e s o m e aspects of c u l t u r e c o m e u n d e r t h e c o n s c i o u s d e l i b e r a t i o n of s o m e p e o p l e , it is not difficult to call for e v e r y o n e to participate in cultural c h o i c e s . In t h e late 1960s a n d early 1970s t h e c o u n t e r c u l t u r e m o v e m e n t m a d e t h e b o d y and its a d o r n m e n t t h e site of struggle: h i p p i e s c h a l l e n g e d "straight" society's n o r m s of respectability, w h i c h r e q u i r e d short, c l i p p e d hair for m e n and little or n o facial hair, as w e l l as tailored angular c l o t h e s . T h e p u n k m o v e m e n t c o n t i n u e d in a different form this c h a l l e n g e to t h e a e s t h e t i c of professional c u l t u r e . B e g i n n i n g in t h e late 1960s food also b e c a m e p o l i t i c i z e d ; t h e "natural foods" m o v e m e n t , w h i c h c h a n g e d e n o r ­ m o u s l y t h e e a t i n g p r a c t i c e s of m i l l i o n s of p e o p l e , asked political q u e s t i o n s about f o o d — q u e s t i o n s a b o u t n u t r i e n t quality, about h o w food is p r o d u c e d and w h e t h e r its p r o d u c t i o n i n v o l v e s potentially harmful p e s t i c i d e s , about t h e a c c e p t a b i l i t y of killing animals for food and w h e t h e r this "small p l a n e t " can afford to f e e d so m u c h grain to animals i n s t e a d of directly to p e o p l e , a b o u t w h e r e food c o m e s from and w h o is e x p l o i t e d in its p r o d u c t i o n . B e ­ s i d e s m a k i n g d e m a n d s o n g o v e r n m e n t for e n v i r o n m e n t a l regulations and o n corporations to e m p l o y p r o d u c t i o n p r o c e s s e s that d o not d a m a g e t h e e n v i r o n m e n t , t h e e n v i r o n m e n t a l m o v e m e n t has q u e s t i o n e d t h e appropri­ a t e n e s s of a p l a s t i c - d e p e n d e n t , t h r o w a w a y c o n s u m e r c u l t u r e . T h o u g h it is m u c h m o r e than a cultural m o v e m e n t , c o n t e m p o r a r y f e m ­ inism r e p r e s e n t s p r o b a b l y t h e m o s t far-reaching m o v e m e n t of cultural politics. Its slogan "the p e r s o n a l is political" s i g n a l e d that n o a s p e c t of e v e r y d a y life w o u l d b e e x e m p t from reflection and potential c r i t i c i s m — l a n g u a g e , j o k e s , s t y l e s of a d v e r t i s i n g , dating practices, d r e s s , n o r m s of c h i l d r e a r i n g , and c o u n t l e s s o t h e r s u p p o s e d l y m u n d a n e and trivial e l e ­ m e n t s of b e h a v i o r a n d c o m p o r t m e n t . Many resist such t h o r o u g h politicization of e v e r y d a y habits, b e c a u s e it s e e m s o n e r o u s to reflect u p o n and d e l i b e r a t e about w h a t p r o n o u n s to u s e or w h e t h e r o n e is i n t e r r u p t i n g o t h e r p e o p l e too m u c h . F e m i n i s t s h a v e n e v e r t h e l e s s s u c c e e d e d in e n ­ c o u r a g i n g such reflection and d i s c u s s i o n and in significantly c h a n g i n g m a n y p e o p l e ' s b e h a v i o r and practices. Sexual and erotic e x p e r i e n c e has b e e n a major focus of feminist cultural p o l i t i c s , of c o u r s e . F e m i n i s t d i s c u s s i o n , s o m e t i m e s a c r i m o n i o u s , has raised f u n d a m e n t a l i s s u e s about w h a t sexual practices and sexual i m a g e r y can b o t h p r o m o t e free e x p r e s s i o n for w o m e n and not c o n t r i b u t e to t h e i r o p p r e s s i o n . T h e gay and lesbian liberation m o v e m e n t s h a v e further politi­ c i z e d sexual and e r o t i c e x p e r i e n c e b y resisting notions of "normal" sexual-

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ity a n d raising i s s u e s of d e c i s i o n m a k i n g rights in matters of l o v e , i n t i m a c y , and e r o t i c i m a g e r y . Finally, t h e r e h a v e e m e r g e d m o v e m e n t s of o p p r e s s e d racial and e t h n i c m i n o r i t i e s , as w e l l as of old p e o p l e , d i s a b l e d p e o p l e , and o t h e r s culturally o p p r e s s e d b y b e i n g d e f i n e d as t h e O t h e r , t h e different and t h e d e v i a n t . T h e s e m o v e m e n t s h a v e p o l i t i c i z e d c u l t u r e b y confronting t h e s t e r e o t y p e s and n o r m s that m a k e s u c h definition a c c e p t a b l e . M a n y groups e x p e r i e n c ­ ing cultural i m p e r i a l i s m h a v e o r g a n i z e d and a s s e r t e d t h e positivity of their specific e x p e r i e n c e and c u l t u r e , rejecting m e l t i n g - p o t ideals of assimila­ tion and u n i t y . P o s t - W o r l d War II e t h n o p o l i t i c s in W e s t e r n capitalist so­ c i e t i e s can b e u n d e r s t o o d at least partly as a reaction to t h e colonization of t h e e v e r y d a y life w o r l d b y welfare state and corporate b u r e a u c r a c i e s . T h e state has b e c o m e too large, i m p e r s o n a l , and u b i q u i t o u s to foster a s e n s e of unity, and at t h e s a m e t i m e o p p r e s s e d g r o u p s often e x p e r i e n c e state poli­ c i e s as b i a s e d against t h e m (Rothschild, 1982, p. 19). As I shall discuss in m o r e detail in t h e c h a p t e r s that follow, politicization of c u l t u r e b y g r o u p s e x p e r i e n c i n g cultural i m p e r i a l i s m i n v o l v e s e x a m i n i n g h o w m e d i a i m a g e s , s p e e c h , m o d e s of c o m p o r t m e n t , and interactive d y n a m i c s c o n t r i b u t e to t h e o p p r e s s i o n that defines s o m e p e o p l e as different and d e v i a n t . B e c a u s e in welfare capitalist s o c i e t y t h e state is largely d e p o l i t i c i z e d , i n s u r g e n t m o v e m e n t s can b e s t c r e a t e and n u r t u r e a u t o n o m o u s publics in t h e s p a c e of civil s o c i e t y ( K e a n e , 1 9 8 4 , p p . 2 2 5 - 5 6 ; 1988, c h a p . 4). T h e s e m o v e m e n t s r e p o l i t i c i z e social life, treating m a n y g i v e n and u n q u e s t i o n e d i n s t i t u t i o n s and practices as alterable, subject to c h o i c e . T h e y g e n e r a t e d i s c u s s i o n s about h o w t h o s e institutions m i g h t b e b e s t o r g a n i z e d and those practices best conducted. As w e shall s e e in C h a p t e r 4, m o d e r n republican t h e o r i z i n g w h i c h d e ­ fines t h e political in t e r m s of a p u b l i c t e n d s to a s s u m e a unitary p u b l i c s p h e r e s t r u c t u r e d b y s i m u l t a n e o u s face-to-face relations (Arendt, 1958; Barber, 1984). It is important to o b s e r v e that p u b l i c life in our s o c i e t y , to t h e d e g r e e that it exists at all, fails to m e e t t h e s e c o n d i t i o n s . P u b l i c d i s c u s ­ sion l e d b y i n s u r g e n t m o v e m e n t s m o s t often occurs not in s o m e s i n g l e a s s e m b l y b u t in a h e t e r o g e n e o u s proliferation of g r o u p s , associations, and f o r u m s , w i t h d i v e r s e p e r s p e c t i v e s and orientations. A s i n g l e p u b l i c dis­ c u s s i o n , m o r e o v e r , facilitated by print and e l e c t r o n i c m e d i a , m a y take p l a c e o v e r m o n t h s or e v e n y e a r s , and i n v o l v e p e r s o n s s e p a r a t e d b y vast s p a c e s w h o n e v e r m e e t o n e another. W h a t m a k e s a d i s c u s s i o n p u b l i c is n e i t h e r u n i t y nor proximity, b u t t h e o p e n n e s s w i t h w h i c h it takes place.

T H E D I A L E C T I C OF RECONTAINMENT VERSUS DEMOCRACY

T h e welfare corporate s o c i e t y , I h a v e a r g u e d , d e p o l i t i c i z e s p u b l i c life b y restricting d i s c u s s i o n to distributive issues in a c o n t e x t of i n t e r e s t - g r o u p

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pluralism w h e r e e a c h g r o u p c o m p e t e s for its share of p u b l i c r e s o u r c e s . D u r i n g t h e 1950s and t h r o u g h m o s t of t h e 1960s this i n t e r e s t - g r o u p struc­ t u r e successfully d e p o l i t i c i z e d m u c h p o l i c y m a k i n g . Protest and criticism w a s fairly easily c h u r n e d into t h e c o g s of t h e welfare capitalist m e c h a n i s m , w h e r e t h e p r o t e s t i n g a g e n t s e i t h e r got a p i e c e of t h e p i e or got lost in t h e w o r k s . T h e s o c i e t y that H e r b e r t M a r c u s e d e s c r i b e d as o n e - d i m e n s i o n a l m o s t l y s u c c e e d e d in a b s o r b i n g any n e g a t i o n s into t h e c o n s u m e r - o r i e n t e d p a s s i v e relation b e t w e e n t h e state and individuals. B y t h e late 1 9 6 0 s , h o w e v e r , urban social m o v e m e n t s of Blacks, C h i c a n o s , a n d P u e r t o Ricans, t h e s t u d e n t and y o u t h m o v e m e n t s , and t h e e m e r g i n g radical f e m i n i s t m o v e m e n t burst t h r o u g h t h e b o u n d s of b u s i ­ n e s s as usual, q u e s t i o n i n g t h e E s t a b l i s h m e n t itself. B a s e d o u t s i d e or o n t h e m a r g i n s of i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d i n t e r e s t - g r o u p pluralism, s u c h i n s u r g e n t social m o v e m e n t s s e e k to repoliticizc social life. T h e y treat m a n y g i v e n and u n q u e s t i o n e d institutions and practices as subject to c h o i c e . T h e radi­ cal m o v e m e n t s of t h e late 1960s w e n t far b e y o n d distributive i s s u e s to c h a l l e n g e f u n d a m e n t a l g i v e n s about t h e organization of p o w e r in e v e r y institution. T h e t h r e a t e n e d E s t a b l i s h m e n t s o m e t i m e s r e s p o n d e d vi­ c i o u s l y (Lader, 1979), b u t m o r e f r e q u e n t l y s o u g h t to r e i n t e g r a t e t h e radi­ cal d e m a n d s , as w e l l as t h e a g e n t s v o i c i n g t h e m , back into t h e pluralist system. Ira K a t z n e l s o n ( 1 9 8 1 , chap. 7) finds that this is just w h a t welfare capital­ ist politics s u c c e e d e d in d o i n g w i t h t h e urban Black liberation m o v e m e n t . That m o v e m e n t had b e g u n to c o n n e c t a diversity of i s s u e s to a s y s t e m of i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d r a c i s m — f r o m e d u c a t i o n , to h o u s i n g , to j o b s , to p o l i c e t r e a t m e n t . Black i d e n t i t y u n i t e d t h e m o v e m e n t across different n e i g h b o r ­ h o o d s and r e g i o n s . T h e s e and o t h e r factors c o m b i n e d to m a k e it p o s s i b l e for that m o v e m e n t to reflect o n and c h a l l e n g e s o m e of t h e basic s t r u c t u r e s of welfare capitalist urban s o c i e t y in a m o r e forceful and f u n d a m e n t a l w a y than had o c c u r r e d in t h e U n i t e d States since t h e 1930s. F e d e r a l and city p o l i c y m a k e r s r e s p o n d e d w i t h p r o g r a m s that b r o u g h t Black leaders into t h e b u s i n e s s of d i s t r i b u t i n g welfare, h o u s i n g , health, and e d u c a t i o n a l s e r v i c e s w i t h i n t h e i r o w n n e i g h b o r h o o d s , o n c e again f r a g m e n t i n g political c o n s c i o u s n e s s and t h e ability of Blacks to act c o l l e c t i v e l y across n e i g h b o r ­ h o o d and regional l i n e s (cf. Elkin, 1987, p. 58). C h a l l e n g e s to institutional structure and d e m a n d s for c h a n g e in d e c i ­ s i o n m a k i n g s t r u c t u r e s h a v e often b e e n r e c h a n n e l e d i n t o distributive solu­ tions b y t h e politics of welfare capitalist society. T h e d e m a n d s of w o m e n a n d n o n w h i t e s for an e n d to institutional racism and s e x i s m filter into a f e e b l e effort to d i s t r i b u t e a f e w m o r e professional j o b s and places in pro­ fessional s c h o o l s to m e m b e r s of t h e s e groups. T h e call for structural alter­ ations in d e c i s i o n s that affect h o u s i n g construction and rent is w h i t t l e d d o w n to a q u e s t i o n of g o v e r n m e n t - s u b s i d i z e d h o u s i n g . D e m a n d s that cor-

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porations b e a c c o u n t a b l e to c o m m u n i t i e s regarding e n v i r o n m e n t a l i s s u e s are m e t w i t h offers of m o n e t a r y c o m p e n s a t i o n . M a n u e l C a s t e l l s tells a story similar to Katznelson's about t h e n e i g h b o r ­ h o o d m o v e m e n t in t h e Mission district of San Francisco in t h e late 1970s. T h e m o v e m e n t b e g a n as a w e l l - o r g a n i z e d and w i d e l y s u p p o r t e d c h a l l e n g e to t h e a s s u m p t i o n s of g o v e r n m e n t and b u s i n e s s about t h e p r o p e r d i r e c t i o n of d e v e l o p m e n t , and t h e right of b u s i n e s s and g o v e r n m e n t institutions to d e t e r m i n e that direction. B u t in t h e e n d it failed to a c h i e v e institutional c h a n g e s or to c h a n g e t h e p a r a m e t e r s of p o w e r , b e c a u s e it was successfully r e a b s o r b e d i n t o t h e i n t e r e s t - g r o u p p r o c e s s (Castells, 1983, c h a p . 13). In a similar fashion m u c h o f t h e m o v e m e n t d u b b e d t h e N e w P o p u l i s m , w h i l e a s s e r t i n g p r i n c i p l e s of p e o p l e ' s p o w e r , local control, and institutional c h a n g e , has b e e n r e a b s o r b e d into t h e distributive orientation o f i n t e r e s t g r o u p politics ( B o g g s , 1987, chap. 4; G o t t d i e n e r , 1985, p p . 1 8 0 - 9 0 ) . T h e last t w o d e c a d e s in t h e U n i t e d States and W e s t e r n E u r o p e h a v e w i t n e s s e d c y c l e s of i n s u r g e n c y and r e c o n t a i n m e n t , in w h i c h i n s u r g e n t m o v e m e n t s break o u t o f t h e i n t e r e s t - g r o u p distributive framework, and are t h e n partially or totally r e a b s o r b e d into t h e i n t e r e s t - g r o u p s y s t e m . T h e 1970s and 1980s saw a t i m e of e c o n o m i c d e c l i n e and r e t r e n c h m e n t in w h i c h t h e c o n t r a d i c t i o n s o f t h e welfare state b e c a m e m o r e apparent, p r o m p t i n g t h e state to cut back o n welfare provision. W h e n t h e b e n e f i t s o f w e l f a r e state p o l i c i e s m u s t b e d e f e n d e d from attack, it is e s p e c i a l l y difficult for i n s u r g e n t m o v e m e n t s to avoid b e i n g r e a b s o r b e d in and re­ inforcing t h e g a m e of i n t e r e s t s c o m p e t i n g for shares in t h e c o n s u m p t i o n p i e . As t h e state itself e x p e r i e n c e s increasing fiscal and e c o n o m i c crisis, p o l i c y m a k e r s are less a b l e or w i l l i n g to p r o m o t e distributive fairness. This not o n l y c a u s e s s e r i o u s d e c l i n e s in t h e standard of living for m a n y , b u t also p r o m p t s q u e s t i o n s a b o u t t h e c o n d i t i o n s of fair distribution, t h e basic s t r u c t u r e of control and d e c i s i o n , and t h e s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f n e e d s and services. M u c h c o n t e m p o r a r y politics, I h a v e s u g g e s t e d , consists in a dialectic b e t w e e n m o v e m e n t s o f i n s u r g e n c y that s e e k d e m o c r a t i z a t i o n , c o l l e c t i v e d e c i s i o n m a k i n g , and grass-roots e m p o w e r m e n t , o n t h e o n e h a n d , and e s ­ t a b l i s h e d institutions and structures that s e e k to reabsorb s u c h d e m a n d s i n t o a d i s t r i b u t i v e framework, o n t h e other. This p r o c e s s of i n s u r g e n c y and r e c o n t a i n m e n t e x h i b i t s a political s t r u g g l e b e t w e e n t h e t w o v i s i o n s of j u s t i c e I articulated in C h a p t e r 1: j u s t i c e as distribution, p r e s u m i n g a c o n ­ s u m e r - o r i e n t e d , p o s s e s s i v e l y individualist c o n c e p t i o n o f p e r s o n s , and j u s ­ tice as e n a b l e m e n t and e m p o w e r m e n t , p r e s u m i n g a m o r e a c t i v e c o n c e p ­ tion of p e r s o n s . T h e s e are not t h e o n l y n o r m a t i v e and political p o s i t i o n s w i t h significant f o l l o w i n g in a d v a n c e d capitalist s o c i e t i e s , b u t t h e y are t w o o f t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t . P h i l o s o p h e r s and theorists of j u s t i c e , I s u g g e s t , c a n n o t b e in-

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different or neutral w i t h r e s p e c t to t h e differing n o r m a t i v e orientations r e f l e c t e d in t h e d i s c o u r s e s of conflicting political actors. M a n y i n s u r g e n t social m o v e m e n t s n a m e injustice as social d o m i n a t i o n and o p p r e s s i o n . T h e y implicitly, and s o m e t i m e s explicitly, reject as i n c o m p l e t e a c o n c e p ­ tion of j u s t i c e that limits n o r m a t i v e political j u d g m e n t to t h e distribution of social b e n e f i t s , and raise f u n d a m e n t a l i s s u e s of d e c i s i o n m a k i n g struc­ t u r e and p r o c e d u r e and of t h e n o r m a t i v e implications of cultural m e a n ­ ings. If t h e y are not to b e irrelevant or s i m p l y to reinforce e x i s t i n g dis­ c o u r s e s , theorists of j u s t i c e m u s t take part in t h e struggle b e t w e e n t h e s e t w o c o n c e p t i o n s of j u s t i c e .

D E M O C R A C Y AS A C O N D I T I O N O F SOCIAL JUSTICE

I h a v e d e f i n e d j u s t i c e as t h e institutionalized c o n d i t i o n s that m a k e it possi­ b l e for all to learn and u s e satisfying skills in socially r e c o g n i z e d s e t t i n g s , to participate in d e c i s i o n m a k i n g , and to e x p r e s s their f e e l i n g s , e x p e r i ­ e n c e , and p e r s p e c t i v e o n social life in c o n t e x t s w h e r e o t h e r s can listen. This u n d e r s t a n d i n g of j u s t i c e specifies a certain range of distributive o u t ­ c o m e s . In particular, j u s t i c e in m o d e r n industrial s o c i e t i e s r e q u i r e s a so­ cietal c o m m i t m e n t to m e e t i n g t h e basic n e e d s of all p e r s o n s w h e t h e r or not t h e y c o n t r i b u t e to t h e social p r o d u c t ( s e e Sterba, 1980, chap. 2; G u t m a n n , 1980, c h a p . 5; Walzer, 1983, chap. 3). If p e r s o n s suffer material d e p r i v a t i o n of basic n e e d s for food, shelter, health care, and so o n , t h e n t h e y c a n n o t p u r s u e lives of satisfying work, social participation, and e x ­ pression. Justice e q u a l l y r e q u i r e s , h o w e v e r , participation in p u b l i c d i s c u s s i o n and p r o c e s s e s of d e m o c r a t i c d e c i s i o n m a k i n g . All p e r s o n s s h o u l d h a v e t h e right and o p p o r t u n i t y to participate in t h e d e l i b e r a t i o n and d e c i s i o n m a k ­ ing of t h e institutions to w h i c h their actions c o n t r i b u t e or w h i c h directly affect t h e i r actions. S u c h d e m o c r a t i c structures s h o u l d regulate d e c i s i o n ­ m a k i n g not o n l y in g o v e r n m e n t institutions, b u t in all institutions of col­ l e c t i v e life, i n c l u d i n g , for e x a m p l e , production and s e r v i c e e n t e r p r i s e s , u n i v e r s i t i e s , and v o l u n t a r y organizations. D e m o c r a c y is b o t h an e l e m e n t and a c o n d i t i o n of social j u s t i c e . If j u s t i c e is d e f i n e d n e g a t i v e l y as t h e e l i m i n a t i o n of structures of d o m i ­ n a t i o n , t h e n j u s t i c e i m p l i e s d e m o c r a t i c d e c i s i o n m a k i n g . D e m o c r a c y is a c o n d i t i o n of f r e e d o m in t h e s e n s e of s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n (Young, 1979; cf. C u n n i n g h a m , 1987, c h a p . 4). T h e social contract tradition of political t h e ­ ory p r o v i d e s t h e major a r g u m e n t for d e m o c r a c y on g r o u n d s of s e l f - d e t e r ­ m i n a t i o n . If all p e r s o n s are of equal moral w o r t h , and n o o n e by nature has g r e a t e r capacity for reason or moral s e n s e , t h e n p e o p l e o u g h t to d e c i d e c o l l e c t i v e l y for t h e m s e l v e s t h e goals and rules that will g u i d e t h e i r action. W h i l e this a r g u m e n t for d e m o c r a c y has n e v e r b e e n e n t i r e l y s u b m e r g e d ,

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and p e r i o d i c a l l y r e e m e r g e s in populist, socialist, or syndicalist w a v e s , in t h e m a i n s t r e a m tradition of m o d e r n political t h e o r y t h e i d e a of a social contract has also b e e n u s e d to justify authoritarian political forms (Patem a n , 1979). In authoritarian contract t h e o r y , w h i l e t h e p e o p l e h a v e a moral right to self-rule, t h e y d e l e g a t e their authority to g o v e r n m e n t officials, w h o , b e c a u s e t h e y are l i m i t e d b y impartial laws, m a k e d e c i s i o n s in t h e p u b l i c interest. In C h a p t e r 4 1 shall argue that t h e ideal of impartial­ ity u s e d to l e g i t i m a t e political authority is i m p o s s i b l e , and c o n s e q u e n t l y that o n l y d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e s s e s are c o n s i s t e n t w i t h j u s t i c e . As an e l e m e n t o f j u s t i c e that m i n i m i z e s d o m i n a t i o n , d e m o c r a c y has b o t h i n s t r u m e n t a l and intrinsic value. I n s t r u m e n t a l l y , participatory pro­ c e s s e s are t h e b e s t w a y for c i t i z e n s to e n s u r e that their o w n n e e d s and i n t e r e s t s will b e v o i c e d and will not b e d o m i n a t e d b y o t h e r i n t e r e s t s . T h e p r o b l e m w i t h i n t e r e s t - g r o u p pluralism is not, as s o m e critics c h a r g e , that p e o p l e p r o m o t e their o w n interests. Rather, t h e n o r m a t i v e d e f e c t s of in­ t e r e s t - g r o u p politics are, first, that t h e privatized form of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n and d e c i s i o n m a k i n g it e n c o u r a g e s d o e s not require t h e s e e x p r e s s i o n s of i n t e r e s t s to appeal to j u s t i c e , and, s e c o n d , that i n e q u a l i t y of r e s o u r c e s , organization, and p o w e r allows s o m e interests to d o m i n a t e w h i l e o t h e r s h a v e little or n o v o i c e . As m a n y d e m o c r a t i c theorists h a v e a r g u e d , d e m o c r a t i c participation has an intrinsic v a l u e o v e r and a b o v e t h e p r o t e c t i o n of i n t e r e s t s , in p r o v i d ­ ing i m p o r t a n t m e a n s for t h e d e v e l o p m e n t and e x e r c i s e of capacities. This a r g u m e n t for t h e intrinsic value of participatory d e m o c r a t i c institutions w a s p u t forward in t h e classical tradition b y R o u s s e a u and J. S . Mill (cf. P a t e m a n , 1970, chap. 3). H a v i n g and e x e r c i s i n g t h e o p p o r t u n i t y to partic­ i p a t e in m a k i n g c o l l e c t i v e d e c i s i o n s that affect o n e ' s actions or t h e c o n d i ­ tions of o n e ' s actions fosters t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of capacities for t h i n k i n g a b o u t o n e ' s o w n n e e d s in relation to t h e n e e d s of o t h e r s , taking an i n t e r e s t in t h e relation o f o t h e r s to social institutions, reasoning and b e i n g articu­ late and p e r s u a s i v e , and so on. O n l y such participation, m o r e o v e r , can g i v e p e r s o n s a s e n s e o f active relation to social institutions and p r o c e s s e s , a s e n s e that social relations are not natural b u t subject to i n v e n t i o n and c h a n g e . T h e v i r t u e s of c i t i z e n s h i p are b e s t cultivated t h r o u g h t h e e x e r c i s e of c i t i z e n s h i p ( C u n n i n g h a m , 1987, chap. 4; E l k i n , 1987, p p . 1 5 0 - 7 0 ; G u t m a n n , 1980, c h a p . 7; Barber, 1984). D e m o c r a c y is also a c o n d i t i o n for a public's arriving at d e c i s i o n s w h o s e s u b s t a n c e and implications b e s t p r o m o t e s u b s t a n t i v e l y just o u t c o m e s , in­ c l u d i n g d i s t r i b u t i v e j u s t i c e . T h e a r g u m e n t for this claim relies o n H a b e r mas's c o n c e p t i o n of c o m m u n i c a t i v e e t h i c s . In t h e a b s e n c e of a p h i l o s o ­ p h e r - k i n g w i t h a c c e s s to t r a n s c e n d e n t n o r m a t i v e v e r i t i e s , t h e o n l y g r o u n d for a claim that a p o l i c y or d e c i s i o n is just is that it has b e e n arrived at b y a p u b l i c w h i c h has truly p r o m o t e d t h e free e x p r e s s i o n of all n e e d s and

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p o i n t s of v i e w . T y r a n n i z e d p u b l i c s , p u b l i c s m a n i p u l a t e d b y officials, and m e d i a p u b l i c s w i t h little access to information and c o m m u n i c a t i o n d o not satisfy this r e q u i r e m e n t . D e l i b e r a t i o n is m o s t likely to arrive at a fair dis­ tribution of r e s o u r c e s , j u s t rules of c o o p e r a t i o n , t h e b e s t and m o s t j u s t division of labor and definition of social p o s i t i o n s , if it i n v o l v e s t h e o p e n participation of all t h o s e affected by t h e d e c i s i o n s . W i t h s u c h participa­ tion, p e o p l e will p e r s u a d e , ideally, o n l y if t h e y p h r a s e their proposals as a p p e a l s to j u s t i c e , b e c a u s e o t h e r s will call t h e m to a c c o u n t if t h e y b e l i e v e t h e i r o w n i n t e r e s t s e n d a n g e r e d . W i t h s u c h participation, p e o p l e will m o s t likely i n t r o d u c e r e l e v a n t information. D e m o c r a t i c d e c i s i o n m a k i n g t e n d s to p r o m o t e j u s t o u t c o m e s , t h e n , b e c a u s e it is m o s t likely to i n t r o d u c e standards of j u s t i c e into d e c i s i o n m a k i n g p r o c e s s e s and b e c a u s e it maxi­ m i z e s t h e social k n o w l e d g e and p e r s p e c t i v e s that c o n t r i b u t e to r e a s o n i n g a b o u t policy. S o m e t h e o r i s t s e x p r e s s s k e p t i c i s m about t h e j u s t i c e of participatory d e ­ m o c r a c y b e c a u s e t h e y d o u b t that d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e d u r e s in fact usually l e a d to just o u t c o m e s . A l l o w i n g all affected p e o p l e to participate in social d e c i s i o n s can result in serious injustices w h e n g r o u p s h a v e conflicting in­ t e r e s t s and differ in n u m b e r s and p r i v i l e g e . A m y G u t m a n n ( 1 9 8 0 , pp, 1 9 1 - 9 7 ) offers t h e e x a m p l e of c o m m u n i t y control of schools, w h e r e in­ c r e a s e d d e m o c r a c y l e d to i n c r e a s e d s e g r e g a t i o n in m a n y cities b e c a u s e t h e materially m o r e p r i v i l e g e d and m o r e articulate w h i t e s w e r e able to p r o m o t e t h e i r p e r c e i v e d i n t e r e s t s against t h e just d e m a n d of Blacks for e q u a l t r e a t m e n t in an i n t e g r a t e d s y s t e m . B e c a u s e of this "paradox of d e ­ m o c r a c y " G u t m a n n a r g u e s that distributive fairness is a n e c e s s a r y c o n ­ d i t i o n for i n s t i t u t i o n s of d e m o c r a t i c participation, and that d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e s s e s m u s t b e l i m i t e d b y p r i n c i p l e s of equal liberty and rough distrib­ utive equality. M a n y similar e x a m p l e s can b e c i t e d of w a y s that grass-roots participa­ tion in d e c i s i o n m a k i n g can lead to unjust and o p p r e s s i v e o u t c o m e s . Tax revolt in t h e U n i t e d States has often b e e n a c c o m p l i s h e d t h r o u g h r e f e r e n ­ d u m , and t h e r e d u c e d g o v e r n m e n t r e v e n u e s that result h a v e c o n t r i b u t e d to i n c r e a s e d exploitation and marginalization. In m a n y cities and r e g i o n s of t h e U n i t e d States today, to take a n o t h e r e x a m p l e , if o n e p u t a g a y rights p r o p o s a l to a direct v o t e it w o u l d b e d e f e a t e d . M o r e o v e r , m u c h e v i d e n c e c o u l d b e offered that in t h e U n i t e d States in t h e last fifty years p o l i c i e s to u n d e r m i n e d o m i n a t i o n and o p p r e s s i o n h a v e b e e n e n a c t e d m o r e fre­ q u e n t l y b y e x e c u t i v e o r d e r and t h e courts than b y legislation, and m o r e f r e q u e n t l y at t h e federal than at t h e state or local l e v e l . Social j u s t i c e to s o m e d e g r e e has b e e n i m p o s e d o n resistant p e o p l e . T h i s o b j e c t i o n to t h e claim that d e m o c r a t i c d e c i s i o n m a k i n g p r o c e s s e s p r o m o t e j u s t i c e m u s t b e taken seriously. T h e first important r e s p o n s e is that d e m o c r a c y m u s t i n d e e d always b e constitutional: t h e rules of t h e

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g a m e m u s t not c h a n g e w i t h e a c h majority's w h i m , b u t rather m u s t b e laid d o w n as constraints o n d e l i b e r a t i o n and o u t c o m e s , and m u s t b e relatively i m m u n e to c h a n g e . S u c h rules s h o u l d spell out basic rights that d e m o c r a t ­ ically arrived at d e c i s i o n s c a n n o t violate, i n c l u d i n g e c o n o m i c as w e l l as civil and political rights (cf. G r e e n , 1985, chap. 10). S e c o n d , t h e o b j e c t i o n t e n d s to e q u a t e d e m o c r a c y and participation w i t h local control. B u t this e q u a t i o n is u n n e c e s s a r y , and in m a n y c a s e s m a y b e u n d e s i r a b l e for p r e c i s e l y t h e reasons t h e objectors raise. P e r m i t t i n g au­ t o n o m o u s local control o v e r t h e u s e of r e s o u r c e s , for e x a m p l e , w h e n re­ s o u r c e s are u n e q u a l l y d i s t r i b u t e d a m o n g locales, is likely to p r o d u c e e x ­ ploitation rather than j u s t i c e . In C h a p t e r 8 I argue against t h e c o m m o n b u t too s i m p l e e q u a t i o n of d e m o c r a t i z a t i o n w i t h decentralization and local autonomy. T h i r d , t h e o b j e c t i o n a s s u m e s that d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e s s e s o c c u r o n l y in i n s t i t u t i o n s that m a k e laws and state policies, w h i l e o t h e r i n s t i t u t i o n s , s u c h as private corporations or t h e bureaucracies that a d m i n i s t e r state p o l i c i e s , r e m a i n u n d e m o c r a t i c . T h e l e v e r a g e of i n e q u a l i t y that allows par­ ticipatory p r o c e s s e s to favor t h e will of t h e stronger, as in G u t m a n n ' s e x ­ a m p l e , is often t r a c e a b l e to t h e authority and p o w e r that s o m e d e r i v e from t h e s e o t h e r institutions. If constitutional d e m o c r a c y restructures all insti­ tutional f o r m s , and not m e r e l y institutions n o w falling u n d e r p u b l i c policy d e c i s i o n s , t h e n p e o p l e are less likely to b e p o w e r l e s s to e x p r e s s their v o i c e in a n y o n e forum. D e m o c r a c y in o n e institution reinforces d e m o c ­ racy in o t h e r s . An e x t e n s i v e redistribution of w e a l t h and a restructuring of control o v e r capital and r e s o u r c e s is a n e c e s s a r y a s p e c t of t h e link b e t w e e n d e m o c r a c y and j u s t i c e . To s u g g e s t that t h e institutionalization of participatory pro­ c e s s e s s h o u l d wait u p o n t h e a c h i e v e m e n t of distributive j u s t i c e , h o w e v e r , as G u t m a n n d o e s , is not o n l y to p o s t p o n e such d e m o c r a t i z a t i o n into an i n d e f i n i t e Utopian future, b u t to m a k e t h e a c h i e v e m e n t of distributive j u s t i c e e q u a l l y unlikely. O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , w e a k e n i n g relations of d o m i ­ nation so that p e r s o n s h a v e g r e a t e r institutionalized o p p o r t u n i t y to partic­ i p a t e in d i s c u s s i o n about and t h e m a k i n g of d e c i s i o n s that affect t h e m itself is a c o n d i t i o n for a c h i e v i n g greater distributive fairness. In c o n t e m p o r a r y welfare capitalist s o c i e t y t h e p a r a m e t e r s of distributive possibilities are fairly fixed; t h u s o n l y c h a l l e n g i n g t h e g i v e n structure and p r o c e d u r e s for m a k i n g d i s t r i b u t i v e d e c i s i o n s can further t h e material e q u a l i t y n e c e s s a r y for fair participation. E c o n o m i c equalization and d e m o c r a t i z a t i o n , that is, foster o n e a n o t h e r and s h o u l d o c c u r t o g e t h e r to p r o m o t e social j u s t i c e . Finally, t h e o b j e c t i o n G u t m a n n raises p r e s u m e s a unified p u b l i c in w h i c h all c i t i z e n s are t h e s a m e qua citizens. In G u t m a n n ' s e x a m p l e , t h e formally e q u a l p r o c e d u r e s allow t h e g r o u p w i t h greater n u m b e r s and re­ s o u r c e s to d o m i n a t e t h e rest. E v e n t h e a c h i e v e m e n t of e c o n o m i c e q u a l i t y

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w o u l d not n e c e s s a r i l y e l i m i n a t e this "paradox of d e m o c r a c y , " h o w e v e r , as l o n g as d i f f e r e n c e s c o n t i n u e d to exist in o t h e r r e s p e c t s b y virtue of w h i c h o n e g r o u p is s t e r e o t y p e d , s i l e n c e d , or marginalized, or differences of e x ­ p e r i e n c e and activities b e t w e e n groups p r o d u c e d p e r c e i v e d conflicts of i n t e r e s t . O n l y if o p p r e s s e d g r o u p s are a b l e to e x p r e s s their i n t e r e s t s and e x p e r i e n c e in t h e p u b l i c o n an e q u a l basis w i t h o t h e r g r o u p s can g r o u p d o m i n a t i o n t h r o u g h formally e q u a l p r o c e s s e s of participation b e a v o i d e d . T h e next t h r e e c h a p t e r s d e v e l o p an e x t e n d e d a r g u m e n t for s u c h a g r o u p differentiated participatory p u b l i c .

CHAPTER 4

The Ideal of Impartiality and the Civic Public A table, and behind this table, which distances them from the two litigants, the "third party," that is, the judges. Their position indicates firstly that they are neutral with respect to each litigant, and secondly this implies that their decision is not already arrived at in advance, that it will be made after an aural investigation of the two parties, on the basis of a certain conception of truth and a certain number of ideas concerning what is just and unjust, and thirdly that they have the authority to enforce their decision. . . . Now this idea that there can be people who are neutral in relation to the two parties, that they can make judgments about them on the basis of ideas of justice which have absolute validity, and that their decisions must be acted upon, I believe that all this is far removed from and quite foreign to the very idea of popular justice. —Michel Foucault

A GROWING BODY of feminist-inspired moral theory has c h a l l e n g e d the p a r a d i g m of moral r e a s o n i n g as d e f i n e d b y t h e d i s c o u r s e of j u s t i c e and rights. In this p a r a d i g m moral r e a s o n i n g consists in a d o p t i n g an impartial and i m p e r s o n a l p o i n t of v i e w o n a situation, d e t a c h e d from any particular i n t e r e s t s at stake, w e i g h i n g all i n t e r e s t s e q u a l l y , and arriving at a c o n c l u ­ sion w h i c h c o n f o r m s to g e n e r a l principles of j u s t i c e and rights, impartially a p p l i e d to t h e c a s e at h a n d . Critics argue that this paradigm d e s c r i b e s not moral r e a s o n i n g as s u c h , b u t t h e specific moral r e a s o n i n g called for in t h e i m p e r s o n a l p u b l i c c o n t e x t s of law, bureaucracy, and t h e regulation of e c o ­ n o m i c c o m p e t i t i o n . This "ethic of rights" c o r r e s p o n d s p o o r l y to t h e social relations typical of family and personal life, w h o s e moral orientation re­ q u i r e s not d e t a c h m e n t from b u t e n g a g e m e n t in and s y m p a t h y w i t h t h e particular parties in a situation; it r e q u i r e s not principles that apply to all p e o p l e in t h e s a m e w a y , b u t a n u a n c e d u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e particulari­ ties of t h e social c o n t e x t , and t h e n e e d s particular p e o p l e h a v e and e x p r e s s w i t h i n it. P h i l o s o p h e r s s h o u l d r e c o g n i z e that t h e paradigm of moral rea­ s o n i n g as t h e impartial application of g e n e r a l principles d e s c r i b e s o n l y a

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r e s t r i c t e d field of moral life, and d e v e l o p moral t h e o r i e s a d e q u a t e to t h e p r i v a t e , p e r s o n a l , and informal c o n t e x t s it ignores (Gilligan, 1982; B l u m , 1980; 1988; F r i e d m a n , 1986; N o d d i n g s , 1984). M o r e r e c e n t l y s o m e f e m i n i s t theorists h a v e b e g u n to q u e s t i o n this o p ­ p o s i t i o n b e t w e e n j u s t i c e and care ( F r i e d m a n , 1987; O k i n , 1989). In this c h a p t e r I e x t e n d this l i n e of a r g u m e n t . T h e feminist critiques of traditional moral t h e o r y retain a distinction b e t w e e n p u b l i c , i m p e r s o n a l institutional roles in w h i c h t h e ideal of impartiality and formal reason a p p l i e s , o n t h e o n e h a n d , and p r i v a t e , personal relations w h i c h h a v e a different moral structure. I n s t e a d of retaining this public/private d i c h o t o m y , t h e s e criti­ c i s m s of an e t h i c of rights s h o u l d l e a d us to q u e s t i o n t h e ideal of impartial­ ity itself, as an appropriate ideal for any c o n c r e t e moral context. I a r g u e that t h e ideal of impartiality in moral t h e o r y e x p r e s s e s a logic of i d e n t i t y that s e e k s to r e d u c e differences to unity. T h e s t a n c e s of d e t a c h ­ m e n t and d i s p a s s i o n that s u p p o s e d l y p r o d u c e impartiality are attained o n l y b y abstracting from t h e particularities of situation, f e e l i n g , affiliation, and p o i n t of v i e w . T h e s e particularities still o p e r a t e , h o w e v e r , in t h e ac­ tual c o n t e x t of action. T h u s t h e ideal of impartiality g e n e r a t e s a d i c h o t o m y b e t w e e n u n i v e r s a l and particular, p u b l i c and private, reason and passion. It is, m o r e o v e r , an i m p o s s i b l e ideal, b e c a u s e t h e particularities of c o n t e x t and affiliation c a n n o t and s h o u l d n o t b e r e m o v e d from moral r e a s o n i n g . F i n a l l y , t h e ideal of impartiality s e r v e s ideological functions. It masks t h e w a y s in w h i c h t h e particular p e r s p e c t i v e s of d o m i n a n t groups claim uni­ versality, and h e l p s justify hierarchical d e c i s i o n m a k i n g structures. T h e ideal of impartial moral reason c o r r e s p o n d s to t h e E n l i g h t e n m e n t ideal o f t h e p u b l i c realm of politics as attaining t h e universality o f a g e n ­ eral will that l e a v e s difference, particularity, and t h e b o d y b e h i n d in t h e private realms of family and civil s o c i e t y . R e c e n t a t t e m p t s to r e v i v e re­ p u b l i c a n t h i n k i n g appeal to t h e ideal of a civic p u b l i c w h i c h t r a n s c e n d s particularities of i n t e r e s t and affiliation to s e e k a c o m m o n good. In C h a p ­ ter 3 I f o l l o w e d this n e w r e p u b l i c a n initiative in criticizing t h e d e p o l i t i ­ c i z e d p u b l i c life of i n t e r e s t - g r o u p pluralism, and a g r e e d w i t h its p r o p o ­ n e n t s that politics s h o u l d i n v o l v e p u b l i c forums of d e l i b e r a t i o n and c o l l e c ­ tive d e c i s i o n m a k i n g . In this chapter, h o w e v e r , I argue that t h e m o d e r n ideal of t h e civic p u b l i c is i n a d e q u a t e . T h e traditional p u b l i c realm of u n i ­ versal c i t i z e n s h i p has o p e r a t e d to e x c l u d e p e r s o n s associated w i t h t h e b o d y and f e e l i n g — e s p e c i a l l y w o m e n , Blacks, A m e r i c a n Indians, and J e w s . M a n y c o n t e m p o r a r y theorists of participatory d e m o c r a c y retain t h e ideal of a c i v i c p u b l i c in w h i c h c i t i z e n s l e a v e b e h i n d their particularity and d i f f e r e n c e s . B e c a u s e s u c h a universalist ideal c o n t i n u e s to t h r e a t e n t h e e x c l u s i o n of s o m e , t h e m e a n i n g of "public" s h o u l d b e transformed to e x ­ hibit t h e positivity of g r o u p differences, passion, and play.

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Chapter 4

P O S T M O D E R N I S T C R I T I Q U E OF THE L O G I C OF IDENTITY

S e v e r a l w r i t e r s s e e k to e x p o s e and d e c o n s t r u c t a logic t h e y find in W e s t ­ e r n p h i l o s o p h i c a l and t h e o r e t i c a l d i s c o u r s e that d e n i e s and r e p r e s s e s dif­ f e r e n c e . O f t e n referred to as p o s t m o d e r n , t h e s e thinkers i n c l u d e T h e o d o r A d o r n o (1973), J a c q u e s D e r r i d a (1977), and L u c e Irigaray (1985). I shall follow A d o r n o in calling this logic t h e logic of identity. For t h e p u r p o s e s o f this e x p o s i t i o n I take t h e critique of t h e logic of i d e n t i t y to r e s o n a t e w i t h D e r r i d a s c r i t i q u e of a m e t a p h y s i c s of p r e s e n c e . T h e logic of i d e n t i t y e x p r e s s e s o n e c o n s t r u c t i o n of t h e m e a n i n g and o p e r a t i o n s of reason: an u r g e to think t h i n g s t o g e t h e r , to r e d u c e t h e m to u n i t y . To g i v e a rational a c c o u n t is to find t h e universal, t h e o n e princi­ p l e , t h e law, c o v e r i n g t h e p h e n o m e n a to b e a c c o u n t e d for. R e a s o n s e e k s e s s e n c e , a s i n g l e formula that classifies c o n c r e t e particulars as i n s i d e or o u t s i d e a c a t e g o r y , s o m e t h i n g c o m m o n to all things that b e l o n g in t h e c a t e g o r y . T h e logic of i d e n t i t y t e n d s to c o n c e p t u a l i z e e n t i t i e s in t e r m s o f s u b s t a n c e rather than p r o c e s s or relation; s u b s t a n c e is t h e self-same e n t i t y that u n d e r l i e s c h a n g e , that can b e identified, c o u n t e d , m e a s u r e d . A n y c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n brings t h e i m p r e s s i o n s and flux of e x p e r i e n c e into an o r d e r that unifies and c o m p a r e s . B u t t h e logic of i d e n t i t y g o e s b e y o n d t h e a t t e m p t to o r d e r and c o m p a r e t h e particulars o f e x p e r i e n c e . It c o n s t r u c t s totalizing s y s t e m s in w h i c h t h e unifying c a t e g o r i e s are t h e m ­ s e l v e s u n i f i e d u n d e r p r i n c i p l e s , w h e r e t h e ideal is to r e d u c e e v e r y t h i n g to o n e first p r i n c i p l e . T h e logic of i d e n t i t y d e n i e s or r e p r e s s e s difference. D i f f e r e n c e , as I u n d e r s t a n d it, n a m e s both t h e play of c o n c r e t e e v e n t s and t h e shift­ i n g differentiation o n w h i c h signification d e p e n d s . R e a s o n , d i s c o u r s e , is always already i n s e r t e d in a plural, h e t e r o g e n e o u s w o r l d that o u t r u n s totalizing c o m p r e h e n s i o n . A n y identifiable s o m e t h i n g p r e s u p p o s e s a s o m e t h i n g e l s e against w h i c h it stands as b a c k g r o u n d , from w h i c h it is differentiated. N o u t t e r a n c e can h a v e m e a n i n g u n l e s s it stands out differ­ e n t i a t e d from another. U n d e r s t o o d as different, e n t i t i e s , e v e n t s , m e a n ­ i n g s , are n e i t h e r identical nor o p p o s e d . T h e y can b e l i k e n e d in certain r e s p e c t s , b u t similarity is n e v e r s a m e n e s s , and t h e similar can b e n o t i c e d o n l y t h r o u g h difference. D i f f e r e n c e , h o w e v e r , is not a b s o l u t e o t h e r n e s s , a c o m p l e t e a b s e n c e of relationship or shared attributes. T h e logic of i d e n t i t y flees from t h e s e n s u o u s particularity of e x p e r i e n c e , w i t h its a m b i g u i t i e s , and s e e k s to g e n e r a t e stable c a t e g o r i e s . T h r o u g h t h e l o g i c of i d e n t i t y t h o u g h t a i m s to m a s t e r that s e n s u o u s h e t e r o g e n e o u s e m ­ b o d i m e n t b y b r i n g i n g t h e o b j e c t fully u n d e r a c o n c e p t . It t h e r e b y d e n i e s t h e d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n t h e o b j e c t and t h e subject; it s e e k s a u n i t y of t h e t h i n k i n g s u b j e c t w i t h t h e o b j e c t t h o u g h t , that t h o u g h t m i g h t grasp, c o m ­ p r e h e n d t h e real. T h r o u g h t h e logic of i d e n t i t y t h o u g h t s e e k s to bring

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e v e r y t h i n g u n d e r control, to e l i m i n a t e u n c e r t a i n t y and u n p r e d i c t a b i l i t y , to spiritualize t h e b o d i l y fact of s e n s u o u s i m m e r s i o n in a w o r l d that o u t ­ runs t h e s u b j e c t , to e l i m i n a t e o t h e r n e s s . T h i s project of r e d u c i n g t h e h e t e r o g e n e i t y of s e n s u o u s particulars to t h e u n i t y of t h o u g h t itself s u b m i t s to a r e l e n t l e s s logic of i d e n t i t y , as t h o u g h t itself, t h e t h i n k i n g subject, m u s t b e r e d u c e d to unity. S u c h a subject is c o n c e i v e d as a p u r e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l origin: it has n o foundation o u t s i d e itself, it is s e l f - g e n e r a t i n g and a u t o n o m o u s . Its p u r e i d e n t i t y of origin e n ­ s u r e s that its r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of reality will b e u n a m b i g u o u s and true. T h e logic of i d e n t i t y also s e e k s to r e d u c e t h e plurality of particular s u b j e c t s , t h e i r bodily, p e r s p e c t i v a l e x p e r i e n c e , to a unity, b y m e a s u r i n g t h e m against t h e u n v a r y i n g standard o f universal reason. T h e irony of t h e logic o f i d e n t i t y is that b y s e e k i n g to r e d u c e t h e differ­ e n t l y similar to t h e s a m e , it turns t h e m e r e l y different into t h e a b s o l u t e l y other. It i n e v i t a b l y g e n e r a t e s d i c h o t o m y i n s t e a d of unity, b e c a u s e t h e m o v e to b r i n g particulars u n d e r a universal c a t e g o r y creates a distinction b e t w e e n i n s i d e and o u t s i d e . S i n c e e a c h particular e n t i t y or situation has b o t h similarities and differences w i t h o t h e r particular e n t i t i e s or situa­ t i o n s , and t h e y are n e i t h e r c o m p l e t e l y identical nor a b s o l u t e l y other, t h e u r g e to b r i n g t h e m into u n i t y u n d e r a category or p r i n c i p l e n e c e s s a r i l y entails e x p e l l i n g s o m e of t h e p r o p e r t i e s of t h e e n t i t i e s or situations. B e ­ c a u s e t h e totalizing m o v e m e n t always l e a v e s a r e m a i n d e r , t h e project of r e d u c i n g particulars to a unity m u s t fail. N o t satisfied t h e n to a d m i t defeat in t h e face of difference, t h e logic of i d e n t i t y s h o v e s difference into dic h o t o m o u s hierarchical o p p o s i t i o n s : e s s e n c e / a c c i d e n t , g o o d / b a d , normal/ deviant. D i f f e r e n c e , as t h e r e l a t e d n e s s of things w i t h m o r e or less similarity in a m u l t i p l i c i t y of p o s s i b l e r e s p e c t s , h e r e c o n g e a l s as t h e binary o p p o s i t i o n a/not-a. In e v e r y c a s e t h e u n i t y o f t h e p o s i t i v e c a t e g o r y is a c h i e v e d o n l y at t h e e x p e n s e of an e x p e l l e d , u n a c c o u n t e d for chaotic realm of t h e acci­ d e n t a l . In t h e history of W e s t e r n t h o u g h t this logic of i d e n t i t y has c r e a t e d a vast n u m b e r of s u c h m u t u a l l y e x c l u s i v e o p p o s i t i o n s that structure w h o l e philosophies: subject/object, mind/body, nature/culture. T h e s e dichoto­ m i e s in W e s t e r n d i s c o u r s e are s t r u c t u r e d b y t h e d i c h o t o m y g o o d / b a d , p u r e / i m p u r e . T h e first side of t h e d i c h o t o m y is e l e v a t e d o v e r t h e s e c o n d b e c a u s e it d e s i g n a t e s t h e unified, t h e self-identical, w h e r e a s t h e s e c o n d s i d e lies o u t s i d e t h e unified as t h e chaotic, u n f o r m e d , transforming, that a l w a y s t h r e a t e n s to cross t h e b o r d e r and break u p t h e unity of t h e g o o d .

T H E I D E A L O F IMPARTIALITY AS D E N Y I N G D I F F E R E N C E

M o d e r n e t h i c s e s t a b l i s h e s impartiality as t h e hallmark of moral reason. This c o n c e p t i o n of moral reason a s s u m e s that in order for t h e a g e n t to

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e s c a p e e g o i s m , and attain objectivity, h e or s h e m u s t adopt a universal p o i n t of v i e w that is t h e s a m e for all rational a g e n t s (see Darwall, 1983, chap. 1). T h e ideal of impartiality is t h e result of this search for a u n i v e r ­ sal, o b j e c t i v e "moral point of v i e w . " Its c o n c e p t i o n of reason e x p r e s s e s t h e logic of i d e n t i t y . H o w d o e s t h e moral theorist or rational a g e n t arrive at t h e moral p o i n t of v i e w ? By abstracting from all t h e particularities of t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s o n w h i c h moral reason reflects. T h e impartial r e a s o n e r is d e t a c h e d : reason abstracts from t h e particular e x p e r i e n c e s and histories that c o n s t i t u t e a situation. T h e impartial r e a s o n e r m u s t also b e dispassionate, abstracting from f e e l i n g s , d e s i r e s , i n t e r e s t s , and c o m m i t m e n t s that h e or s h e m a y h a v e r e g a r d i n g t h e situation, or that o t h e r s m a y have. T h e impartial rea­ s o n e r is, finally, a universal reasoner. T h e moral point of v i e w abstracts from t h e partiality of affiliation, of social or g r o u p p e r s p e c t i v e , that c o n s t i ­ t u t e s c o n c r e t e s u b j e c t s (cf. Darwall, 1983, pp. 1 3 3 - 4 3 ) . Impartial reason a i m s to adopt a point of v i e w o u t s i d e c o n c r e t e situa­ tions o f action, a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l "view from n o w h e r e " that carries t h e p e r s p e c t i v e , a t t r i b u t e s , character, and i n t e r e s t s of n o particular subject or set of s u b j e c t s . This ideal of t h e impartial t r a n s c e n d e n t a l s u b j e c t d e n i e s or r e p r e s s e s difference in t h r e e w a y s . First, it d e n i e s t h e particularity of situations. T h e r e a s o n i n g subject, e m p t i e d of all its particularity, treats all situations a c c o r d i n g to t h e s a m e moral rules, and t h e m o r e t h e rules can b e r e d u c e d to a s i n g l e rule or p r i n c i p l e , t h e m o r e this impartiality and universality will b e g u a r a n t e e d . W h a t e v e r h e r or his particular situation, any s u b j e c t can r e a s o n from this universal point of v i e w a c c o r d i n g to uni­ versal p r i n c i p l e s that apply to all moral situations in t h e s a m e way. S e c o n d , in its r e q u i r e m e n t of dispassion, impartiality s e e k s to m a s t e r or e l i m i n a t e h e t e r o g e n e i t y in t h e form of feeling. O n l y b y e x p e l l i n g d e s i r e or affectivity from reason can impartiality a c h i e v e its unity. T h e c o n s t r u c t of an impartial p o i n t of v i e w is arrived at b y abstracting from t h e c o n c r e t e particularity of t h e p e r s o n in situation. This requires abstracting from t h e particularity of b o d i l y b e i n g , its n e e d s and inclinations, and from t h e feel­ i n g s that attach to t h e e x p e r i e n c e d particularity of things and e v e n t s . N o r ­ m a t i v e reason is d e f i n e d as impartial, and reason defines t h e unity of t h e moral s u b j e c t , b o t h in t h e s e n s e that it k n o w s t h e universal principles of morality and in t h e s e n s e that it is w h a t all moral subjects h a v e in c o m m o n in t h e s a m e way. This reason thus stands o p p o s e d to d e s i r e and affectivity as w h a t differentiate and particularize p e r s o n s . Third, t h e m o s t important w a y that t h e ideal of impartiality r e d u c e s particularity to unity is in r e d u c i n g t h e plurality of moral s u b j e c t s to o n e s u b j e c t i v i t y . In its r e q u i r e m e n t of universality, the ideal of impartial rea­ son is s u p p o s e d to r e p r e s e n t a point of v i e w that any and all rational s u b ­ j e c t s can a d o p t , p r e c i s e l y b y abstracting from t h e situational particulari-

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ties that i n d i v i d u a l i z e t h e m . T h e impartial moral j u d g e , m o r e o v e r , ideally s h o u l d treat all p e r s o n s alike, a c c o r d i n g to t h e s a m e p r i n c i p l e s , impar­ tially a p p l i e d . In its will to r e d u c e plurality to unity, impartiality s e e k s o n e t r a n s c e n ­ d e n t a l moral subjectivity. Impartial reason j u d g e s from a point of v i e w o u t s i d e of t h e particular p e r s p e c t i v e s of p e r s o n s i n v o l v e d in i n t e r a c t i o n , a b l e to totalize t h e s e p e r s p e c t i v e s into a w h o l e , or a g e n e r a l will. F r o m this p o i n t of v i e w of a solitary t r a n s c e n d e n t g o d , t h e moral r e a s o n e r si­ l e n t l y d e d u c e s its j u d g m e n t from w e i g h i n g t h e e v i d e n c e and conflicting c l a i m s , and a p p l y i n g to t h e m universal principles. B e c a u s e it already takes all p e r s p e c t i v e s into a c c o u n t , t h e impartial s u b j e c t n e e d a c k n o w l ­ e d g e no s u b j e c t s o t h e r than itself to w h o s e interests, o p i n i o n s , and d e s i r e s it s h o u l d a t t e n d . This m o n o l o g i c a l character of philosophical p r e s e n t a t i o n s of moral rea­ s o n i n g holds e v e n a m o n g t h o s e w h o make an effort not to i g n o r e t h e p l u ­ rality of moral s u b j e c t s . Rawls, for e x a m p l e , criticizes utilitarianism on t h e g r o u n d s that it d o e s not r e c o g n i z e t h e plurality of moral s u b j e c t s . T h r o u g h its c o n c e p t i o n of t h e impartial spectator, utilitarianism s e e k s to o r g a n i z e t h e d e s i r e s of all p e r s o n s into o n e c o h e r e n t s y s t e m of d e s i r e , and t h e r e b y to m a k e t h e p r i n c i p l e of c h o i c e for a s o c i e t y t h e s a m e as that for i n d i v i d u ­ als (Rawls, 1 9 7 1 , p p . 2 6 - 2 7 ) . Rawls asserts that his "original position" pro­ v i d e s a b e t t e r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of impartiality, b e c a u s e it defines impartial­ ity from t h e s t a n d p o i n t of t h e litigants t h e m s e l v e s . It is t h e y w h o m u s t c h o o s e their c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e o n c e and for all in an original p o s i t i o n of e q u a l i t y " (Rawls, 1 9 7 1 , p. 190). W h i l e Rawls insists o n t h e plurality of s e l v e s as a n e c e s s a r y starting p o i n t for a c o n c e p t i o n o f j u s t i c e , t h e r e a s o n i n g of t h e original p o s i t i o n is n e v e r t h e l e s s m o n o l o g i c a l . H e interprets the p r o c e s s of c h o o s i n g princi­ p l e s as a bargaining g a m e in w h i c h individuals all reason privately in t e r m s o f t h e i r o w n i n t e r e s t s . This bargaining g a m e m o d e l d o e s p r e s u m e a plural­ ity of s e l v e s ; e a c h s u b j e c t reasons in t e r m s o f its o w n interests a l o n e w i t h full k n o w l e d g e that t h e r e is a plurality of o t h e r s d o i n g t h e s a m e w i t h w h o m it m u s t c o m e to a g r e e m e n t . T h e constraints on r e a s o n i n g that Rawls b u i l d s into this original p o s i t i o n in o r d e r to m a k e it a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of impartiality, h o w e v e r , rule out not only any difference a m o n g partici­ pants in t h e original p o s i t i o n , b u t also any d i s c u s s i o n a m o n g t h e m . T h e veil of i g n o r a n c e r e m o v e s any differentiating characteristics a m o n g indi­ viduals, a n d t h u s e n s u r e s that all will reason from identical a s s u m p t i o n s and t h e s a m e universal point of view. T h e r e q u i r e m e n t that participants in t h e original position b e m u t u a l l y d i s i n t e r e s t e d p r e c l u d e s any of t h e participants from l i s t e n i n g to o t h e r s ' e x p r e s s i o n of t h e i r d e s i r e s and inter­ ests and b e i n g i n f l u e n c e d by t h e m . T h e bargaining g a m e m o d e l rules out g e n u i n e d i s c u s s i o n and interaction a m o n g participants in t h e original posi-

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tion. To e n s u r e that t h e y h a v e as little o p p o r t u n i t y for interaction as possi­ b l e , Rawls e v e n s u g g e s t s that w e i m a g i n e a courier m e d i a t i n g b e t w e e n t h e m c o l l e c t i n g proposals, a n n o u n c i n g t h e m , and informing t h e m w h e n t h e y h a v e c o m e to a g r e e m e n t (Rawls, 1 9 7 1 , p. 139; cf. Young, 1981). S t e p h e n D a r w a l l is explicit that t h e c o n d i t i o n s of impartiality r e d u c e t h e plurality o f s e l v e s and p o i n t s o f v i e w that obtains in actual social life to t h e unity o f o n e rational agent. H e p r e s u m e s a thicker veil of i g n o r a n c e than Rawls's, o n e that forbids not only k n o w l e d g e of one's p r e f e r e n c e s b u t also m o t i v a t i o n by t h e m : " S u p p o s e that t h o s e b e h i n d our thicker veil are b o t h ignorant o f any p r e f e r e n c e s t h e y m a y h a v e that are not c o m m o n to a n y rational a g e n t as s u c h and h e n c e i m m u n e to t h e i r m o t i v e force. This m e a n s t h e r e is in effect o n l y o n e c h o o s e r b e h i n d t h e veil: an arbitrary rational a g e n t " (Darwall, 1983, p. 231).

T H E IMPOSSIBILITY O F IMPARTIALITY

Moral reason that s e e k s impartiality tries to r e d u c e t h e plurality of moral s u b j e c t s and situations to a unity b y d e m a n d i n g that moral j u d g m e n t b e d e t a c h e d , d i s p a s s i o n a t e , and universal. But as I h a v e already s u g g e s t e d , s u c h an u r g e to totalization n e c e s s a r i l y fails. R e d u c i n g differences to unity m e a n s b r i n g i n g t h e m u n d e r a universal category, w h i c h r e q u i r e s e x p e l ­ l i n g t h o s e a s p e c t s o f t h e different t h i n g s that d o not fit into t h e c a t e g o r y . D i f f e r e n c e thus b e c o m e s a hierarchical o p p o s i t i o n b e t w e e n w h a t lies in­ s i d e and w h a t lies o u t s i d e t h e category, valuing m o r e w h a t lies i n s i d e than w h a t lies o u t s i d e . T h e strategy of philosophical d i s c o u r s e w h i c h D e r r i d a calls d e c o n struction, and A d o r n o calls n e g a t i v e dialectic, e x p o s e s t h e failure of rea­ son's claim to r e d u c e difference to unity. T h o m a s N a g e l in effect d e ­ c o n s t r u c t s impartial reason's claim to totality. T h e a t t e m p t to adopt an impartial and universal p e r s p e c t i v e o n reality l e a v e s b e h i n d t h e particular p e r s p e c t i v e s from w h i c h it b e g i n s , and reconstructs t h e m as m e r e appear­ a n c e s as o p p o s e d to t h e reality that o b j e c t i v e reason a p p r e h e n d s . T h e e x p e r i e n c e o f t h e s e a p p e a r a n c e s , h o w e v e r , is itself part of reality. If rea­ son s e e k s to k n o w t h e w h o l e of reality, t h e n , it m u s t a p p r e h e n d all t h e particular p e r s p e c t i v e s from t h e i r particular points of v i e w . T h e impartial­ ity and t h e r e f o r e o b j e c t i v i t y of reason, h o w e v e r , d e p e n d s o n its d e t a c h i n g itself from particulars and e x c l u d i n g t h e m from its account of t h e truth. So r e a s o n c a n n o t k n o w t h e w h o l e and cannot b e unified ( N a g e l , 1986, p p . 26-27). L i k e o t h e r i n s t a n c e s of t h e logic o f identity, t h e d e s i r e to c o n s t r u c t an impartial moral reason results not in unity, b u t in d i c h o t o m y . In e v e r y d a y moral life, prior to t h e totalizing m o v e s of universal r e a s o n , t h e r e are only situated c o n t e x t s of action, w i t h all their particularities of history, affilia-

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tion, and p r e c o n c e i v e d value. T h e ideal of impartiality reconstructs this moral c o n t e x t into an o p p o s i t i o n b e t w e e n its formally impartial a s p e c t s and t h o s e of its a s p e c t s that are merely partial and particular. Impartial r e a s o n , as w e h a v e s e e n , also g e n e r a t e s a d i c h o t o m y b e t w e e n r e a s o n and f e e l i n g . B e c a u s e of their particularity, f e e l i n g , inclination, n e e d s , and d e s i r e are e x p e l l e d fom t h e universality of moral reason. D i s passion r e q u i r e s that o n e abstract from t h e personal pull of d e s i r e , c o m ­ m i t m e n t , care, in relation to a moral situation and regard it i m p e r s o n a l l y . F e e l i n g and c o m m i t m e n t are t h e r e b y e x p e l l e d from moral reason; all feel­ ings and d e s i r e s are d e v a l u e d , b e c o m e e q u a l l y irrational, e q u a l l y irrele­ vant to moral j u d g m e n t ( S p r a e g e n s , 1 9 8 1 , p p . 2 5 0 - 5 6 ) . T h i s drive to unity fails, h o w e v e r . F e e l i n g s , d e s i r e s , and c o m m i t m e n t s d o not c e a s e to exist and m o t i v a t e just b e c a u s e t h e y h a v e b e e n e x c l u d e d from t h e definition of moral reason. T h e y lurk as inarticulate s h a d o w s , b e l y i n g t h e claim to c o m ­ p r e h e n s i v e n e s s of universalist reason. In its project of r e d u c i n g t h e plurality of s u b j e c t s to o n e universal p o i n t of v i e w , t h e ideal of impartiality g e n e r a t e s a n o t h e r d i c h o t o m y , b e t w e e n a g e n e r a l will and particular i n t e r e s t s . T h e plurality of subjects is not in fact e l i m i n a t e d , b u t o n l y e x p e l l e d from t h e moral realm; t h e c o n c r e t e inter­ e s t s , n e e d s , and d e s i r e s of p e r s o n s and t h e f e e l i n g s that differentiate t h e m from o n e a n o t h e r b e c o m e m e r e l y private, s u b j e c t i v e . In m o d e r n political t h e o r y this d i c h o t o m y appears as that b e t w e e n a p u b l i c authority that r e p ­ r e s e n t s t h e g e n e r a l interest, on t h e o n e hand, and private individuals w i t h their o w n private d e s i r e s , u n s h a r e a b l e and i n c o m m u n i c a b l e . W e shall e x ­ plore this d i c h o t o m y further in t h e next s e c t i o n . T h e ideal of impartiality e x p r e s s e s in fact an impossibility, a fiction. N o o n e can adopt a p o i n t of v i e w that is c o m p l e t e l y i m p e r s o n a l and dispas­ s i o n a t e , c o m p l e t e l y s e p a r a t e d from any particular c o n t e x t and c o m m i t ­ m e n t s . In s e e k i n g s u c h a notion of moral reason p h i l o s o p h y is Utopian; as N a g e l e x p r e s s e s it, t h e impartial v i e w is a v i e w from n o w h e r e . P h i l o s o ­ p h e r s typically d e p i c t this Utopia through stories, m y t h s , or t h o u g h t ex­ p e r i m e n t s . H e r e ' s Nagel's: Suppose all the news feeding sensory data to my brain were cut but I were somehow kept breathing and nourished and conscious. And suppose auditory and visual experiences could be produced in me not by sound and light but by direct stimulation of the nerves, so that I could be fed information in words and images about what was going on in the world, what other people saw and heard, and so forth. There I would have a conception of the world without having any perspective on it. (Nagel, 1986, p. 63) B r u c e A c k e r m a n ' s imagination also has a rather science-fiction cast. T o think o u r s e l v e s into an impartial point of v i e w from w h i c h w e can formu­ late an ideal o f j u s t i c e , h e has us i m a g i n e that w e are o n a s p a c e s h i p that

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has just l a n d e d o n a p l a n e t on w h i c h a s u b s t a n c e , mana, can b e c o n v e r t e d into a n y t h i n g a n y b o d y m i g h t want. P r e s u m a b l y w e bring w i t h o u r s e l v e s n o histories and particular h o p e s , n o g r o u p affiliations or religions, and a l t h o u g h A c k e r m a n refers to his characters with g e n d e r e d p r o n o u n s , g e n ­ d e r difference a p p e a r s to have n o effect on their e x p e r i e n c e or point of v i e w . T h e j o b of t h e s e n e w l v arrived earthlings is to discuss h o w to distrib­ u t e mana, h o w to construct a just s o c i e t y for t h e m s e l v e s . A c k e r m a n e n ­ s u r e s t h e impartiality of t h e r e a s o n i n g this d i a l o g u e p r o d u c e s by b u i l d i n g in a C o m m a n d e r w h o s e r v e s as dialogic u m p i r e ; s h e d e c i d e s — f r o m an impartial p o i n t of v i e w , of c o u r s e — w h e n s p e a k e r s are breaking t h e only rule that g u i d e s their d i s c u s s i o n , n a m e l y , that no o n e can g i v e as a reason that his or h e r p e r s o n or ideas are b e t t e r than a n y o n e else's. To g e t impar­ tiality out of t h e d i a l o g u e , A c k e r m a n has to build it into its g r o u n d rules. Rawls p r e s e n t s us w i t h not so flashy a fiction, but t h e original p o s i t i o n w h i c h h e c o n s t r u c t s as t h e point of v i e w of impartiality is just as Utopian, e s p e c i a l l y in its provision of t h e veil of ignorance. T h e veil separates e a c h from any k n o w l e d g e of or c o n n e c t i o n w i t h a particular history, set of g r o u p affiliations, or set of c o m m i t m e n t s , and t h e r e q u i r e m e n t of m u t u a l d i s i n ­ t e r e s t e d n e s s e n s u r e s that n o n e will d e v e l o p a m o n g t h e m as t h e y talk. Darwall's "thicker" veil, w h i c h I referred to earlier, is e v e n m o r e c o u n t e r factual. T h e ideal of impartiality is an idealist fiction. It is i m p o s s i b l e to adopt an u n s i t u a t e d moral p o i n t of view, and if a point of v i e w is s i t u a t e d , t h e n it cannot b e universal, it cannot stand apart from and u n d e r s t a n d all p o i n t s of v i e w . It is i m p o s s i b l e to reason about s u b s t a n t i v e moral i s s u e s w i t h o u t u n d e r s t a n d i n g their s u b s t a n c e , w h i c h always p r e s u p p o s e s s o m e particular social and historical context; and o n e has n o m o t i v e for making moral j u d g ­ m e n t s and r e s o l v i n g moral d i l e m m a s unless t h e o u t c o m e matters, u n l e s s o n e has a particular a n d passionate interest in t h e o u t c o m e . As Bernard W i l l i a m s p o i n t s out, t h e difference b e t w e e n factual or scientific reflection and practical or moral reflection is p r e c i s e l y that t h e former is i m p e r s o n a l w h i l e t h e latter is not: Practical deliberation is in every case first-personal, and the first person is not derivative or naturally replaced by anyone. The action I decide on will be mine, and its being mine means not just that it will be arrived at by this deliberation, but that it will involve changes in the world of which I shall be empirically the cause, and of whieh these desires and this deliberation itself will be, in some part, the cause. (Williams, 1985, p. 68) S o m e w r i t e r s w h o a g r e e w i t h this critique of t h e d i c h o t o m y b e t w e e n reason and f e e l i n g , g e n e r a l and particular, g e n e r a t e d by t h e traditional ideal of impartiality in moral t h e o r y s u g g e s t that rather than think of i m ­ partiality as a v i e w from n o w h e r e , o n e can arrive at t h e s a m e results by

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t h i n k i n g of t h e v i e w from e v e r y w h e r e . Susan Okin, for e x a m p l e , r e c o n ­ structs Hawls's idea of t h e original position as a r e a s o n i n g p r o c e s s that takes a c c o u n t of all t h e particular positions and p e r s p e c t i v e s in t h e s o c i e t y in o r d e r to arrive at t h e just o u t c o m e . U n l i k e a m o r e universalist Kantian a p p r o a c h , s h e s u g g e s t s , this idea of taking t h e point of v i e w of e v e r y o n e d o e s not o p p o s e reason to f e e l i n g or e x c l u d e particularity. I n d e e d , it d e ­ p e n d s o n t h e ability of t h e moral r e a s o n e r to b e s y m p a t h e t i c w i t h e v e r y particular position and p o i n t of v i e w (Okin, 1989; cf. S u n s t e i n , 1988). T h i s m o v e to particularize impartiality retains a totalizing u r g e , h o w ­ e v e r , and is n o m o r e p o s s i b l e than its m o r e universalistic counterpart. T h e idea r e m a i n s that one subject, t h e impartial reasoner, can adopt t h e point of v i e w of e v e r y o n e . This c o n s t r u c t i o n of a particularist notion of imparti­ ality a s s u m e s that from m y particular p e r s p e c t i v e , w i t h m y particular his­ tory and e x p e r i e n c e , I can n e v e r t h e l e s s e m p a t h i z e w i t h t h e f e e l i n g s and p e r s p e c t i v e s of o t h e r s differently situated. This a s s u m p t i o n d e n i e s t h e difference a m o n g s u b j e c t s . To b e sure, s u b j e c t s arc not o p a q u e to o n e a n o t h e r , their difference is not a b s o l u t e . But e s p e c i a l l y w h e n class, race, e t h n i c i t y , g e n d e r , sexuality, and age define different social locations, o n e s u b j e c t c a n n o t fully e m p a t h i z e w i t h a n o t h e r in a different social location, adopt h e r p o i n t of v i e w ; if that w e r e possible t h e n t h e social locations w o u l d not b e different (cf. F r i e d m a n , 1989, p p . 6 4 9 - 5 3 ) . S o m e m i g h t o b j e c t that by r e j e c t i n g t h e universality of t h e ideal of i m ­ partiality I am r e j e c t i n g t h e v e r y possibility of moral reflection itself. S u c h an o b j e c t i o n rests o n an identification of reflection w i t h impartiality, and this is t h e v e r y identification I d e n y . Moral reason certainly d o c s r e q u i r e reflection, an ability to take s o m e d i s t a n c e from one's i m m e d i a t e im­ p u l s e s , i n t u i t i o n s , d e s i r e s , and i n t e r e s t s in order to c o n s i d e r their relation to t h e d e m a n d s o f o t h e r s , their c o n s e q u e n c e s if acted u p o n , and so o n . T h i s p r o c e s s of reflection, h o w e v e r , d o e s not require that o n e adopt a p o i n t of v i e w e m p t i e d of particularity, a point of v i e w that is t h e s a m e for e v e r y o n e ; i n d e e d , it is hard to s e e h o w such a universal point of v i e w c o u l d aid reflection that leads to action at all (Williams, 1985, p p . 6 3 - 6 9 , 1 1 0 - 1 1 ; cf. W a l z e r , 1987, p p . 4 8 - 5 6 ) . O n e m i g h t also o b j e c t that by r e j e c t i n g t h e universality of t h e ideal of impartiality I t h e r e b y d e n y t h e universality of moral c o m m i t m e n t , ex­ p r e s s e d in the a s s u m p t i o n that all p e r s o n s are of equal moral w o r t h . H e r e it is n e c e s s a r y to d i s t i n g u i s h b e t w e e n m e a n i n g s of universality. U n i v e r s a l ­ ity in t h e s e n s e of t h e participation and inclusion of e v e r y o n e in moral and social life d o e s not i m p l y universality in t h e s e n s e of t h e a d o p t i o n of a g e n e r a l p o i n t of v i e w that l e a v e s b e h i n d particular affiliations, f e e l i n g s , c o m m i t m e n t s , and d e s i r e s . I n d e e d , as I shall argue in t h e next s e c t i o n , u n i v e r s a l i t y as g e n e r a l i t y has often o p e r a t e d p r e c i s e l y to inhibit universal i n c l u s i o n and participation (cf. Young, 1989).

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T h e moral t h e o r y that p r o m o t e s t h e ideal of impartiality b e g i n s w i t h an inappropriate d i c h o t o m y : e i t h e r e g o i s m or impartiality ( s e e Darwall, 1983, c h a p . 1). E i t h e r an a g e n t reasons o n l y selfishly, c o n s i d e r i n g o n l y w h a t will b e s t p r o m o t e his or h e r o w n selfish desires and goals, or h e or s h e r e a s o n s from an impartial, g e n e r a l p o i n t of v i e w that has n o particular d e s i r e s or i n t e r e s t s in view. T h e t h e o r y of impartial reason w r o n g l y i d e n t i ­ fies partiality w i t h selfishness, and c o n s t r u c t s its counterfactual universalist abstraction in o r d e r to m o v e t h e subject b e y o n d e g o i s m . B u t t h e r e is a n o t h e r w a y t h e subject m o v e s b e y o n d e g o i s m : t h e e n c o u n t e r w i t h o t h e r p e o p l e . A "moral p o i n t of v i e w " arises not from a l o n e l y self-legislating r e a s o n , but from t h e c o n c r e t e e n c o u n t e r w i t h others, w h o d e m a n d that t h e i r n e e d s , d e s i r e s , and p e r s p e c t i v e s b e r e c o g n i z e d (cf. L e v i n a s , 1969; D e r r i d a , 1978). As I h a v e a r g u e d , t h e t h e o r y of impartiality a s s u m e s a m o n o l o g i c moral reason, a s i n g l e subject a t t e m p t i n g to get out of its m y ­ o p i c p o i n t of v i e w . If o n e a s s u m e s instead that moral reason is dialogic, t h e p r o d u c t of d i s c u s s i o n a m o n g differently situated subjects all of w h o m d e ­ sire r e c o g n i t i o n and a c k n o w l e d g m e n t from t h e others, t h e n t h e r e is n o n e e d for a universal p o i n t oi view to pull p e o p l e o u t o f e g o i s m . A selfish p e r s o n w h o refuses to listen to t h e e x p r e s s i o n of t h e n e e d s of o t h e r s will not h i m s e l f b e l i s t e n e d to. T h e alternative to a moral t h e o r y f o u n d e d o n t h e a s s u m p t i o n of i m p a r ­ tial reason, t h e n , is a c o m m u n i c a t i v e e t h i c s . H a b e r m a s has g o n e further than any o t h e r c o n t e m p o r a r y thinker in elaborating t h e project of a moral r e a s o n that r e c o g n i z e s t h e plurality of subjects. H e insists that s u b j e c t i v i t y is a p r o d u c t of c o m m u n i c a t i v e interaction. Moral rationality s h o u l d b e u n d e r s t o o d as dialogic, t h e p r o d u c t of t h e interaction of a plurality o f s u b ­ j e c t s u n d e r c o n d i t i o n s of equal p o w e r that d o not s u p p r e s s t h e i n t e r e s t s of any. Yet e v e n H a b e r m a s s e e m s u n w i l l i n g to a b a n d o n a s t a n d p o i n t of u n i v e r ­ sal n o r m a t i v e reason that t r a n s c e n d s particularist p e r s p e c t i v e s . As S e y l a B e n h a b i b ( 1 9 8 6 , p p . 3 2 7 - 5 1 ) a r g u e s , h e vacillates b e t w e e n p r i v i l e g i n g t h e neutral and impartial standpoint of t h e "generalized o t h e r " and w h a t s h e calls t h e s t a n d p o i n t of t h e " c o n c r e t e other." Like t h e t h e o r i e s o f Rawls and A c k e r m a n , o n e strain of H a b e r m a s ' s t h e o r y relies o n an a priori c o n c e p ­ tion of moral reason. N o r m a t i v e reason m u s t b e rationally r e c o n s t r u c t e d as c o n s t i t u t e d b y subjects w h o b e g i n w i t h a c o m m i t m e n t to d i s c u r s i v e u n d e r s t a n d i n g and to b e i n g p e r s u a d e d b y t h e force of t h e s t r o n g e r argu­ m e n t . This initial shared m o t i v e to reach c o n s e n s u s , c o u p l e d w i t h t h e a s s u m p t i o n of a discussion situation free from d o m i n a t i o n , a c c o u n t s for h o w moral n o r m s can b e g e n e r a l and b i n d i n g . Like t h e t h e o r i e s of Rawls and A c k e r m a n , this strain in H a b e r m a s ' s t h e o r y relies on counterfactuals w h i c h build in an impartial starting p o i n t in o r d e r to g e t universality out of t h e moral d i a l o g u e .

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H a b e r m a s ' s c o n c e p t i o n of dialogic reason finds valid only t h e e x p r e s ­ sion of g e n e r a l i z a b l e i n t e r e s t s , a term w h o s e m e a n i n g is e q u i v o c a l . S o m e ­ t i m e s it seems to mean only those i n t e r e s t s that are universal, w h i c h e v e r y o n e shares a n d e v e r y o n e a g r e e s to r e s p e c t for e v e r y o n e e l s e . This i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of g e n e r a l i z a b l e i n t e r e s t s y i e l d s a d i c h o t o m y b e t w e e n uni­ versal and particular, p u b l i c and private, as n e e d s and i n t e r e s t s w h i c h m a y not b e s h a r e a b l e , b e c a u s e t h e y d e r i v e from a person's particular his­ tory and affiliations, d r o p out. A n o t h e r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of g e n e r a l i z a b l e interests, as B e n h a b i b a r g u e s , d e r i v e s from t h e insight that an e m a n c i p a t o r y politics i n v o l v e s t h e e x p r e s ­ sion and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of n e e d s . In a d e m o c r a t i c discussion w h e r e partic­ ipants e x p r e s s t h e i r n e e d s , n o o n e speaks from an impartial point of view, nor d o e s a n y o n e appeal to a g e n e r a l interest. S i n c e h a v i n g their n e e d s m e t d e p e n d s on t h e actions of o t h e r s in t h e polity, p e o p l e are forced, in H a n ­ nah Pitkin's w o r d s , to acknowledge the power of others and appeal to their standards, even as we try to get them to acknowledge our power and standards. We are forced to find or create a common language of purposes and aspirations, not merely to clothe our private outlook in public disguise, but to become aware ourselves of its public meaning. We are forced . . . to transform "I want" into "I am en­ titled to," a claim that becomes negotiable by public standards. (Pitkin, 1981, p. 347) In this m o v e from an e x p r e s s i o n of d e s i r e to a claim of j u s t i c e , d i a l o g u e participants d o not bracket t h e i r particular situations and adopt a u n i v e r ­ sal and s h a r e d standpoint. T h e y only m o v e from self-regarding n e e d to r e c o g n i t i o n of t h e claims of o t h e r s . O n this interpretation, t h o s e claims are n o r m a t i v e l y valid w h i c h are g e n e r a l i z a b l e in t h e s e n s e that t h e y can b e r e c o g n i z e d w i t h o u t violating t h e rights of o t h e r s or s u b j e c t i n g t h e m to d o m i n a t i o n . I n t e r e s t s g e n e r a l i z a b l e in this s e n s e m a y n e v e r t h e l e s s b e par­ ticular, t i e d to t h e situation and n e e d s of a particular g r o u p and t h u s not shared by everyone.

T H E L O G I C OF IDENTITY IN THE I D E A L OF THE C I V I C P U B L I C

T h e d i c h o t o m y b e t w e e n reason and d e s i r e also appears in m o d e r n politi­ cal t h e o r y in t h e distinction b e t w e e n t h e universal, p u b l i c realm of s o v e r ­ e i g n t y and t h e state, o n t h e o n e hand, and t h e particular, private realm of n e e d s and d e s i r e s , o n t h e other. M o d e r n n o r m a t i v e political t h e o r y and political practice aim to e m b o d y impartiality in t h e p u b l i c realm of t h e state. Like impartial moral r e a s o n , this p u b l i c realm attains its g e n e r a l i t y o n l y b y t h e e x c l u s i o n of particularity, d e s i r e , feeling, and t h o s e a s p e c t s of life a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e b o d y . In m o d e r n political theory and practice t h e

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c i v i c p u b l i c a s s o c i a t e d w i t h this realm a c h i e v e s a unity in particular by t h e e x c l u s i o n of w o m e n and o t h e r s associated w i t h nature and t h e b o d y . Richard S e n n e t t (1974) and o t h e r s h a v e d e s c r i b e d t h e d e v e l o p i n g urban c e n t e r s o f t h e e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y as e n g e n d e r i n g a u n i q u e p u b l i c life. As c o m m e r c e i n c r e a s e d and m o r e p e o p l e c a m e into t h e city, t h e s p a c e o f t h e city itself w a s c h a n g e d to m a k e for m o r e o p e n n e s s , vast b o u l e v a r d s w h e r e p e o p l e fom different classes m i n g l e d in t h e s a m e s p a c e s ( B e r m a n , 1982). A c c o r d i n g to H a b e r m a s , o n e of t h e functions of this p u b l i c life of t h e m i d e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y w a s to p r o v i d e a critical s p a c e w h e r e p e o p l e d i s c u s s e d and c r i t i c i z e d t h e affairs of the state in n e w s p a p e r s , c o f f e e h o u s e s , and o t h e r forums ( H a b e r m a s , 1974). W h i l e d o m i n a t e d b y b o u r g e o i s m e n , p u b l i c d i s c u s s i o n in t h e c o f f e e h o u s e s a d m i t t e d m e n of any class on e q u a l t e r m s . T h r o u g h t h e institution of t h e salons, m o r e o v e r , as w e l l as t h e t h e a t e r and r e a d i n g s o c i e t i e s , aristocratic and b o u r g e o i s w o m e n partici­ p a t e d and s o m e t i m e s took t h e lead in such p u b l i c d i s c u s s i o n ( L a n d e s , 1988, pt. 2). P u b l i c life in this p e r i o d appears to have b e e n w i l d , playful, and sexy. T h e t h e a t e r w a s a social c e n t e r , a forum w h e r e wit and satire c h a l l e n g e d t h e state and p r e d o m i n a n t m o r e s . This u n b r i d l e d p u b l i c m i x e d s e x e s and classes to s o m e d e g r e e , m i x e d serious d i s c o u r s e w i t h play, and m i x e d t h e a e s t h e t i c w i t h t h e political. It did not survive republican p h i l o s o p h y . T h e i d e a of t h e universalist state that e x p r e s s e s an impartial p o i n t of v i e w tran­ s c e n d i n g any particular interests w a s in part a reaction to this differenti­ a t e d p u b l i c . T h e r e p u b l i c a n s g r o u n d e d their universalist state in t h e idea of t h e c i v i c p u b l i c w h i c h political t h e o r y and practice institutionalized by t h e e n d o f t h e e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y in E u r o p e and t h e U n i t e d States to s u p p r e s s t h e p o p u l a r and linguistic h e t e r o g e n e i t y of t h e urban public. C i v i c institutionalization r e o r d e r e d social life on a strict division of p u b l i c and p r i v a t e . R o u s s e a u ' s political p h i l o s o p h y is t h e paradigm o f this ideal of t h e c i v i c p u b l i c . R o u s s e a u d e v e l o p s his c o n c e p t i o n of politics in reaction to his ex­ p e r i e n c e o f t h e urban p u b l i c of t h e e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y (Ellison, 1985), as w e l l as in reaction to t h e p r e m i s e s and c o n c l u s i o n s of t h e atomistic and individualist t h e o r y of t h e state e x p r e s s e d by H o b b e s . T h e civic p u b l i c e x p r e s s e s t h e universal and impartial point of v i e w of reason, s t a n d i n g o p p o s e d to and e x p e l l i n g d e s i r e , s e n t i m e n t , and t h e particularity of n e e d s and i n t e r e s t s , F r o m t h e narrow p r e m i s e s of individual d e s i r e and w a n t w e c a n n o t arrive at a strong e n o u g h n o r m a t i v e c o n c e p t i o n of social relations. T h e difference b e t w e e n atomistic e g o i s m and civil s o c i e t y d o e s not consist s i m p l y in t h e fact that t h e infinity of individual a p p e t i t e has b e e n c u r b e d b y laws e n f o r c e d b y threat of p u n i s h m e n t . Rather, reason brings p e o p l e t o g e t h e r to r e c o g n i z e c o m m o n i n t e r e s t s and a general will.

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For R o u s s e a u t h e s o v e r e i g n p e o p l e e m b o d i e s t h e universal point of v i e w of t h e c o l l e c t i v e interest and e q u a l c i t i z e n s h i p . In their pursuit of individual i n t e r e s t s p e o p l e h a v e a particularist orientation. N o r m a t i v e reason reveals an impartial point of view, h o w e v e r , that all rational per­ s o n s can a d o p t , w h i c h e x p r e s s e s a g e n e r a l will not r e d u c i b l e to an a g g r e ­ g a t e of particular i n t e r e s t s . To participate in t h e g e n e r a l will as a c i t i z e n is to e x p r e s s h u m a n nobility and g e n u i n e f r e e d o m . S u c h rational c o m m i t ­ m e n t to c o l l e c t i v i t y is not c o m p a t i b l e w i t h personal satisfaction, h o w e v e r , and for R o u s s e a u this is t h e tragedy of t h e h u m a n c o n d i t i o n (Shklar, 1969, c h a p . 5). R o u s s e a u c o n c e i v e d this p u b l i c realm as unified and h o m o g e n e o u s , and i n d e e d s u g g e s t e d m e t h o d s of fostering c o m m i t m e n t to s u c h unity t h r o u g h c i v i c c e l e b r a t i o n s . W h i l e t h e purity, unity, and g e n e r a l i t y of this p u b l i c realm r e q u i r e t r a n s c e n d i n g and r e p r e s s i n g t h e partiality and differentia­ tion of n e e d , d e s i r e , and affectivity, R o u s s e a u hardly b e l i e v e d that h u m a n life can or s h o u l d b e w i t h o u t e m o t i o n and t h e satisfaction of n e e d and d e s i r e . Man's particular nature as a f e e l i n g , needful b e i n g finds e x p r e s s i o n in t h e private realm of d o m e s t i c life, o v e r w h i c h w o m e n are t h e p r o p e r moral guardians. R e c e n t f e m i n i s t analyses of t h e d i c h o t o m y b e t w e e n p u b l i c and private in m o d e r n political t h e o r y i m p l y that t h e ideal of t h e civic public as impar­ tial and universal is itself s u s p e c t . M o d e r n political theorists and politi­ cians p r o c l a i m e d t h e impartiality and generality of t h e p u b l i c and at t h e s a m e t i m e q u i t e c o n s c i o u s l y found it fitting that s o m e p e r s o n s , n a m e l y , w o m e n , n o n w h i t e s , and s o m e t i m e s t h o s e w i t h o u t property, s h o u l d b e ex­ c l u d e d from participation in that public. If this was not just a mistake, it s u g g e s t s that t h e ideal of t h e civic p u b l i c as e x p r e s s i n g t h e g e n e r a l inter­ e s t , t h e impartial point of v i e w of reason, itself results in e x c l u s i o n . By a s s u m i n g that reason stands o p p o s e d to d e s i r e , affectivity, and t h e b o d y , this c o n c e p t i o n of t h e civic p u b l i c e x c l u d e s bodily and affective a s p e c t s of h u m a n e x i s t e n c e . In practice this a s s u m p t i o n forces h o m o g e n e i t y u p o n t h e c i v i c p u b l i c , e x c l u d i n g from t h e p u b l i c t h o s e individuals and g r o u p s that d o not fit t h e m o d e l of t h e rational citizen c a p a b l e of t r a n s c e n d i n g b o d y and s e n t i m e n t . T h i s e x c l u s i o n has a twofold basis: t h e t e n d e n c y to o p p o s e reason and d e s i r e , and t h e association of t h e s e traits w i t h kinds of persons. In t h e social s c h e m e e x p o u n d e d b y R o u s s e a u , and H e g e l after h i m , w o m e n m u s t b e e x c l u d e d from t h e p u b l i c realm of c i t i z e n s h i p b e c a u s e t h e y are t h e caretakers of affectivity, d e s i r e , and t h e b o d y . A l l o w i n g ap­ p e a l s to d e s i r e s and b o d i l y n e e d s to m o v e p u b l i c d e b a t e s w o u l d u n d e r ­ m i n e p u b l i c d e l i b e r a t i o n by f r a g m e n t i n g its unity. E v e n w i t h i n t h e d o ­ m e s t i c r e a l m , m o r e o v e r , w o m e n m u s t be d o m i n a t e d . T h e i r d a n g e r o u s ,

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h e t e r o g e n e o u s sexuality m u s t b e kept c h a s t e and c o n f i n e d to marriage. E n f o r c i n g chastity o n w o m e n will k e e p e a c h family a separated unity, p r e ­ v e n t i n g t h e c h a o s and b l o o d m i n g l i n g that w o u l d b e p r o d u c e d b y illegiti­ m a t e c h i l d r e n . O n l y t h e n can w o m e n b e t h e p r o p e r caretakers of m e n ' s d e s i r e , b y t e m p e r i n g its p o t e n t i a l l y d i s r u p t i v e i m p u l s e s t h r o u g h moral e d u c a t i o n . M e n ' s d e s i r e for w o m e n itself t h r e a t e n s to shatter and d i s p e r s e t h e universal rational realm of t h e p u b l i c , as w e l l as to disrupt t h e neat d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e p u b l i c and t h e private. As guardians of t h e private r e a l m of n e e d , d e s i r e , and affectivity, w o m e n m u s t e n s u r e that m e n ' s i m ­ p u l s e s d o not r e m o v e t h e m from t h e universality of reason. T h e moral n e a t n e s s of t h e f e m a l e - t e n d e d h e a r t h , m o r e o v e r , will t e m p e r t h e p o s s e s ­ s i v e l y individualistic i m p u l s e s of t h e particularistic realm of b u s i n e s s and c o m m e r c e , w h i c h like sexuality constantly t h r e a t e n s to e x p l o d e t h e unity o f s o c i e t y ( s e e O k i n , 1978, pt. 3 ; L a n g e , 1979; E l s h t a i n , 1 9 8 1 , c h a p . 4; P a t e m a n , 1 9 8 8 , c h a p . 4). T h e b o u r g e o i s w o r l d i n s t i t u t e d a moral division of labor b e t w e e n reason a n d s e n t i m e n t , identifying m a s c u l i n i t y w i t h reason and f e m i n i n i t y w i t h s e n t i m e n t a n d d e s i r e ( G l e n n o n , 1979; L l o y d , 1984). T h e s p h e r e of family and p e r s o n a l life is as m u c h a m o d e r n creation as t h e m o d e r n realm of state and law, a n d c o m e s about as part of t h e s a m e p r o c e s s ( N i c h o l s o n , 1 9 8 6 , c h a p . 4; cf. Okin, 1981). T h e impartiality and rationality of t h e state d e p e n d on c o n t a i n i n g n e e d and d e s i r e in t h e private realm of t h e family. T h e p u b l i c realm of c i t i z e n s a c h i e v e s u n i t y and universality o n l y b y defin­ ing t h e civil i n d i v i d u a l in o p p o s i t i o n to t h e disorder of w o m a n l y nature, w h i c h e m b r a c e s f e e l i n g , sexuality, birth and d e a t h , t h e attributes that c o n c r e t e l y d i s t i n g u i s h p e r s o n s from o n e another. T h e universal c i t i z e n is d i s e m b o d i e d , d i s p a s s i o n a t e (male) reason ( P a t e m a n , 1986; 1988, chaps. T h e universal c i t i z e n is also w h i t e and b o u r g e o i s . W o m e n h a v e not b e e n t h e o n l y p e r s o n s e x c l u d e d from participation in t h e m o d e r n civic p u b l i c . In E u r o p e until r e c e n t l y in m a n y nations both J e w s and w o r k i n g class p e o p l e w e r e e x c l u d e d from c i t i z e n s h i p . In t h e U n i t e d States t h e d e s i g n e r s of t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n specifically restricted t h e access of t h e labor­ ing class to t h e rational p u b l i c , and of c o u r s e e x c l u d e d slaves and Indians from participation in t h e civic p u b l i c as w e l l . G e o r g e M o s s e (1985) and Ronald Takaki (1979) e x p o s e t h e structure of s u c h e x c l u s i o n in b o u r g e o i s r e p u b l i c a n life in E u r o p e and t h e U n i t e d States r e s p e c t i v e l y . T h e w h i t e m a l e b o u r g e o i s i e c o n c e i v e d republican virtue as "respectability." T h e " r e s p e c t a b l e " m a n w a s rational, restrained, and c h a s t e , u n y i e l d i n g to pas­ sion, s e n t i m e n t a l a t t a c h m e n t s , or t h e d e s i r e for luxury. T h e r e s p e c t a b l e m a n s h o u l d b e straight, d i s p a s s i o n a t e , r u l e - b o u n d . T h e bodily, sexual, u n c e r t a i n , d i s o r d e r l y a s p e c t s of e x i s t e n c e in t h e s e cultural i m a g e s w e r e

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a n d are i d e n t i f i e d w i t h w o m e n , h o m o s e x u a l s , Blacks, Indians, J e w s , and Orientals. T h e i d e a of t h e unified nation w h i c h d e v e l o p e d in E u r o p e in t h e n i n e ­ t e e n t h c e n t u r y , M o s s e a r g u e s , d e p e n d e d p r e c i s e l y on o p p o s i n g m a n l y v i r t u e to t h e h e t e r o g e n e i t y and u n c e r t a i n t y of t h e b o d y , and associating d e s p i s e d g r o u p s w i t h t h e b o d y , s e t t i n g t h e m o u t s i d e t h e h o m o g e n e i t y of t h e nation (cf A n d e r s o n , 1983). Takaki s h o w s that early A m e r i c a n r e p u b ­ licans w e r e q u i t e explicit about t h e n e e d for t h e h o m o g e n e i t y of c i t i z e n s , a n e e d w h i c h from t h e earliest days of t h e r e p u b l i c i n v o l v e d t h e relation­ ship of t h e w h i t e r e p u b l i c a n s to t h e Black and Indian p e o p l e s (cf. I l e r z o g , 1985). T h e s e r e p u b l i c a n fathers, s u c h as Jefferson, identified t h e R e d and Black p e o p l e in t h e i r territories w i t h w i l d nature and passions, j u s t as t h e y feared that w o m e n o u t s i d e t h e d o m e s t i c realm w e r e w a n t o n and avari­ c i o u s . T h e y d e f i n e d moral, c i v i l i z e d republican life in o p p o s i t i o n to this b a c k w a r d - l o o k i n g , u n c u l t i v a t e d d e s i r e t h e y identified w i t h w o m e n and n o n w h i t e s . M o s t i m p o r t a n t , t h e y explicitly justified t h e restriction of citi­ z e n s h i p to w h i t e m e n o n t h e g r o u n d s that t h e unity of t h e nation d e ­ p e n d e d o n h o m o g e n e i t y and d i s p a s s i o n a t e reason. To s u m m a r i z e , t h e ideal of n o r m a t i v e reason, moral s e n s e , stands o p ­ p o s e d to d e s i r e and affectivity. Impartial civilized reason characterizes t h e v i r t u e of t h e r e p u b l i c a n man w h o rises a b o v e passion and d e s i r e . I n s t e a d of c u t t i n g b o u r g e o i s m a n e n t i r e l y off from t h e b o d y and affectivity, h o w ­ e v e r , t h e c u l t u r e of t h e rational p u b l i c confines t h e m to t h e d o m e s t i c s p h e r e , w h i c h also c o n f i n e s w o m e n ' s passions and p r o v i d e s e m o t i o n a l sol­ a c e to m e n and c h i l d r e n . I n d e e d , w i t h i n this d o m e s t i c realm s e n t i m e n t s can flower, and e a c h individual can r e c o g n i z e and affirm his particularity. P r e c i s e l y b e c a u s e t h e virtues of impartiality and universality define t h e civic p u b l i c , that p u b l i c m u s t e x c l u d e h u m a n particularity. M o d e r n nor­ m a t i v e reason and its political e x p r e s s i o n in t h e i d e a of t h e c i v i c p u b l i c , t h e n , attain u n i t y and c o h e r e n c e t h r o u g h t h e e x p u l s i o n and c o n f i n e m e n t of e v e r y t h i n g that w o u l d t h r e a t e n to i n v a d e t h e polity w i t h differentiation: t h e specificity of w o m e n ' s b o d i e s and d e s i r e , differences of race and cul­ ture, t h e variability a n d h e t e r o g e n e i t y of n e e d s , t h e goals and d e s i r e s of i n d i v i d u a l s , t h e a m b i g u i t y and c h a n g e a b i l i t y of feeling.

IDEOLOGICAL F U N C T I O N S O F THE I D E A L OF IMPARTIALITY

O n e m i g h t o b j e c t that I h a v e asked too m u c h of impartiality. Impartial­ ity in its s t r o n g e s t s e n s e is i m p o s s i b l e , this o b j e c t i o n a d m i t s ; real moral a g e n t s are particular and cannot s i m p l y bracket t h e i r particular histo­ ries and affiliations, nor t h e substantial practical i n t e r e s t s at stake in a d e c i s i o n . Impartiality s h o u l d b e u n d e r s t o o d as a r e g u l a t i v e ideal of rea-

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s o n , this o b j e c t i o n c l a i m s — u n r e a l i z a b l e , b u t n e v e r t h e l e s s important as an a i m . N o t o n l y is impartiality i m p o s s i b l e , h o w e v e r , but c o m m i t m e n t to t h e ideal has a d v e r s e ideological c o n s e q u e n c e s . To reiterate t h e definition of i d e o l o g y g i v e n in C h a p t e r 3, an idea functions ideologically w h e n b e l i e f in it h e l p s r e p r o d u c e relations of d o m i n a t i o n or o p p r e s s i o n b y justifying t h e m or b y o b s c u r i n g p o s s i b l e m o r e e m a n c i p a t o r y social relations. W i d e ­ s p r e a d c o m m i t m e n t to t h e ideal of impartiality s e r v e s at least t h r e e i d e o ­ logical f u n c t i o n s . It s u p p o r t s t h e idea of t h e neutral state, w h i c h in turn p r o v i d e s s o m e g r o u n d for t h e distributive paradigm of j u s t i c e . It legiti­ m a t e s b u r e a u c r a t i c authority and hierarchical d e c i s i o n m a k i n g p r o c e s s e s , d e f u s i n g calls for d e m o c r a t i c d e c i s i o n m a k i n g . A n d finally, it reinforces o p p r e s s i o n b y h y p o s t a t i z i n g t h e point of v i e w of p r i v i l e g e d g r o u p s into a universal p o s i t i o n . I n s t e a d of impartiality, I argue, w e s h o u l d s e e k p u b l i c fairness, in a c o n t e x t of h e t e r o g e n e i t y and partial d i s c o u r s e . Impartiality d e s i g n a t e s a p o i n t of v i e w that any rational p e r s o n can a d o p t , a d e t a c h e d a n d universal point of v i e w that takes all particular p o i n t s of v i e w e q u a l l y into account. If o n e is impartial in t h e m a k i n g of a moral or political d e c i s i o n , t h e n that d e c i s i o n will b e t h e right o n e , t h e b e s t , t h e o n e w h i c h d o e s in fact r e p r e s e n t t h e i n t e r e s t s of e v e r y ­ o n e affected as m u c h as p o s s i b l e . T h e d e c i s i o n arrived at b y t h e impartial d e c i s i o n m a k e r is o n e all t h o s e affected w o u l d h a v e arrived at if t h e y had d i s c u s s e d it u n d e r c i r c u m s t a n c e s of mutual r e s p e c t and e q u a l p o w e r . S o p r o v i d e d w e find impartial d e c i s i o n m a k e r s , t h e r e is n o n e e d for d i s ­ cussion. T h e i d e a o f t h e impartial d e c i s i o n m a k e r functions in our s o c i e t y to legit­ i m a t e an u n d e m o c r a t i c , authoritarian structure of d e c i s i o n m a k i n g . In m o d e r n liberal s o c i e t y t h e rule of s o m e p e o p l e o v e r o t h e r s , their p o w e r to m a k e d e c i s i o n s that affect t h e actions and c o n d i t i o n s of action of o t h e r s , c a n n o t b e justified on t h e g r o u n d s that s o m e p e o p l e arc s i m p l y b e t t e r than o t h e r s . If all p e o p l e are equal in their capacity for reason, e m p a t h y , and creativity, and if all p e o p l e are of e q u a l w o r t h , it s e e m s to follow that d e c i s i o n s a b o u t t h e rules and p o l i c i e s g u i d i n g their c o o p e r a t i v e life s h o u l d b e m a d e b y t h e m c o l l e c t i v e l y : s o v e r e i g n t y s h o u l d rest w i t h t h e p e o p l e . In t h e m y t h of t h e social contract, t h e p e o p l e d e l e g a t e their authority to g o v e r n m e n t officials, w h o are c h a r g e d w i t h making d e c i s i o n s impartially, l o o k i n g o n l y to t h e g e n e r a l interest, and not favoring any particular inter­ e s t s . A u t o n o m y is c o n s i s t e n t w i t h hierarchical authority p r o v i d e d t h e au­ thorities act from impartial rationality. T h u s a different a s p e c t of t h e d i c h o t o m y b e t w e e n t h e p u b l i c realm of t h e state and t h e private realm of partial i n t e r e s t s e m e r g e s . T h e state stands a b o v e s o c i e t y , apart and d e t a c h e d , o v e r s e e i n g and r e f e r e e i n g t h e c o m p e t i t i o n and conflict that arises in individuals' private pursuit of their

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private gain. T h u s L o c k e , for e x a m p l e , explicitly u s e s t h e m e t a p h o r of an u m p i r e to d e s c r i b e t h e function of g o v e r n m e n t . T h e state impartially officiates o v e r t h e activities of t h e c o m p e t i t i v e a c c u m u l a t i v e e c o n o m y , and c i t i z e n s o w e a l l e g i a n c e and o b e d i e n c e to this state p r e c i s e l y b e c a u s e it s u p p o s e d l y s t a n d s impartially apart from any particular i n t e r e s t s (Patem a n , 1979, p p . 7 0 - 7 1 ) . H e g e l ' s political p h i l o s o p h y p r o v i d e s t h e m o s t t h o r o u g h and explicit a c c o u n t of t h e state as e x p r e s s i n g impartiality and universality as against t h e particularity of d e s i r e and interest. For H e g e l t h e liberal a c c o u n t of social relations as b a s e d o n t h e liberty of self-defining individuals to pur­ s u e t h e i r o w n e n d s p r o p e r l y d e s c r i b e s o n l y o n e aspect of social life, t h e s p h e r e of civil s o c i e t y . As a m e m b e r of civil society, t h e individual p u r s u e s private e n d s for h i m s e l f and his family, in association w i t h o t h e r s w h o h a v e similar particular i n t e r e s t s . T h e s e particular i n t e r e s t s w i t h i n civil s o c i e t y m a y conflict, but transactions of e x c h a n g e p r o d u c e m u c h h a r m o n y and satisfaction. C o n c e i v e d as a m e m b e r of t h e state, o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e individual is n o t a locus of particular d e s i r e , but t h e bearer of u n i v e r ­ sally articulated rights and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s . T h e point of v i e w of t h e state and law t r a n s c e n d s all particular i n t e r e s t s , to e x p r e s s t h e universal and rational spirit of h u m a n i t y . State laws and action e x p r e s s t h e g e n e r a l will, t h e i n t e r e s t s of t h e w h o l e s o c i e t y ( s e e P c l c z y n s k i , 1971, p p . 1 - 2 9 ; W a l t o n , 1983). But t h e p u r s u i t of t h e g e n e r a l interest is not c o m p a t i b l e w i t h t h e pur­ suit of particular i n t e r e s t s in t h e s a m e p e r s o n . T h u s t h e r e m u s t b e a d i s ­ tinct class of c i t i z e n s w h o are not i n v o l v e d in t h e pursuit of private i n t e r e s t in market s o c i e t y , w h o s e j o b it is to maintain t h e p u b l i c g o o d and t h e universal point of v i e w of t h e state. T h e s e bureaucrats will b e c h o s e n by o b j e c t i v e e x a m i n a t i o n that identifies t h o s e best qualified to p e r c e i v e and institute t h e g e n e r a l i n t e r e s t , and t h e y will b e s u p p o r t e d from state funds to e n s u r e t h e i r impartiality. B e i n g e n t i r e l y i n d e p e n d e n t of civil s o c i e t y , t h e b u r e a u c r a c y r e p r e s e n t s for H e g e l t h e social instantiation of moral r u l e s . W i t h o u t participating in t h e i r formation, all c i t i z e n s can b e confi­ d e n t that t h e laws and p o l i c i e s set d o w n by t h e bureaucracy e x p r e s s their o b j e c t i v e f r e e d o m , t h e fulfillment of their universality as c i t i z e n s , and t h u s t h e y h a v e an a b s o l u t e d u t y to o b e y t h e m (see P a t e m a n , 1 9 7 9 , p p . 109-10; Buchanan, 1982, pp. 6-10). T h e rule of g o v e r n m e n t officials in our s o c i e t y is l e g i t i m a t e d b y an i d e ­ o l o g y of impartiality. W e g i v e n o m a n d a t e to t h e legislators w e e l e c t p r e ­ c i s e l y so that t h e y can m a k e laws impartially, t h e laws that will reflect t h e g e n e r a l interest. T h e s e laws are t h e m s e l v e s impartial; t h e y s h o u l d apply to all in t h e s a m e way. W i t h w i s e laws arrived at by legislators looking to t h e g e n e r a l i n t e r e s t , e x e c u t o r s and j u d g e s n e e d only apply t h e m impar­ tially to particular c a s e s for j u s t i c e to b e e n s u r e d .

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A c c o r d i n g to this i m a g e of t h e state, g o v e r n m e n t administrators, j u d g e s , and bureaucrats arc s u p p o s e d to b e t h e experts in impartial d e c i ­ s i o n m a k i n g . U n l i k e t h o s e of o t h e r p e o p l e , their j o b s d o not i n v o l v e i m ­ m e r s i o n in particular activities w i t h particular e n d s ; rather their j o b s are to stand apart, regard t h e w h o l e of t h e diversity of i n t e r e s t s and a i m s , and m a k e d e c i s i o n s . P e o p l e affected by d e c i s i o n s m u s t s o m e t i m e s p r o v i d e in­ formation to t h e j u d g e s and bureaucrats at hearings and trials. But it is u p to t h e authority to d e c i d e t h e o u t c o m e , b e c a u s e only t h e authority is i m ­ partial and r e p r e s e n t s t h e general interest. T u r n i n g o v e r d e c i s i o n s to a p o p u l a r a s s e m b l y of p e o p l e d i s c u s s i n g their various n e e d s and i n t e r e s t s is p o s i t i v e l y a bad idea, b e c a u s e it w o u l d create irresolvable conflict. For p e o p l e in civil s o c i e t y are partial, c o m m i t t e d to p r o m o t i n g their o w n selfi n t e r e s t or t h e particular aims of t h e organizations and g r o u p s w i t h w h i c h t h e y are affiliated, and t h e s e are in i n e v i t a b l e conflict. B e c a u s e d e m o ­ cratic d e c i s i o n m a k i n g c a n n o t work, t h e state m u s t s e r v e as a neutral arbi­ trator. T h e i d e a of t h e neutral state that stands a b o v e t h e particular i n t e r e s t s and conflicts of civil s o c i e t y is, h o w e v e r , a m y t h . Marxist critiques of t h e liberal state also apply to this i m a g e of t h e state as t h e u m p i r e in i n t e r e s t g r o u p c o m p e t i t i o n . If t h e r e are significant differences of p o w e r , re­ s o u r c e s , a c c e s s to p u b l i c i t y , and so o n a m o n g different classes, g r o u p s , or i n t e r e s t s , d e c i s i o n m a k i n g p r o c e d u r e s that are impartial in t h e s e n s e of a l l o w i n g e q u a l formal o p p o r t u n i t y to all to press their i n t e r e s t s will usually y i e l d o u t c o m e s in t h e i n t e r e s t s of t h e m o r e powerful. Impartiality is j u s t as i m p o s s i b l e for bureaucratic d e c i s i o n m a k e r s , m o r e o v e r , as it is for o t h e r moral a g e n t s . It is s i m p l y not p o s s i b l e for flesh-and-blood d e c i s i o n m a k e r s , w h e t h e r in g o v e r n m e n t or not, to adopt t h e s t a n d p o i n t of t r a n s c e n d e n t a l reason w h e n t h e y m a k e d e c i s i o n s , di­ v o r c i n g t h e m s e l v e s from t h e g r o u p affiliations and c o m m i t m e n t s that c o n ­ s t i t u t e their i d e n t i t i e s and g i v e t h e m a p e r s p e c t i v e o n social life. But it d o e s not follow from t h e particularity of their histories and i n t e r e s t s that p e o p l e are o n l y self-regarding, u n a b l e and u n w i l l i n g to c o n s i d e r o t h e r i n t e r e s t s and p o i n t s o f v i e w . T h e pluralist i d e o l o g y that d e f i n e s e c o n o m i c and social i n t e r e s t s as p u r e l y self-regarding and t h e state as impartial, h o w e v e r , e n c o u r a g e s t h i n k i n g in only self-regarding t e r m s . E a c h is s u p ­ p o s e d to p r e s s his or h e r o w n i n t e r e s t s , and t h e impartial state will s e e to it that fairness is d o n e . I h a v e already a r g u e d that b e i n g fair d o e s not r e q u i r e s t e p p i n g o u t of o n e ' s skin. T h e history and c o m m i t m e n t s of a p e r ­ s o n or g r o u p are n e v e r t h e l e s s partial, precisely because they never do c o m p r e h e n d all r e l e v a n t points of v i e w from t h e o u t s i d e . Legislators, gov­ e r n m e n t administrators, and o t h e r g o v e r n m e n t officials, m o r e o v e r , u s u ­ ally d e v e l o p a partial v i e w o f social life and a set of particular i n t e r e s t s that

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d e r i v e from their g o v e r n m e n t c o n t e x t ; g o v e r n m e n t d o e s not in fact tran­ s c e n d civil s o c i e t y and v i e w it as a w h o l e ( N o e d l i n g e r , 1981). T h e m y t h of t h e neutral state s e r v e s an ideological function insofar as it h e l p s a c c o u n t for t h e distributive paradigm of j u s t i c e . M o s t d i s c u s s i o n s of j u s t i c e a s s u m e , implicitly or explicitly, that j u s t i c e is " d i s p e n s e d " by an a u t h o r i t y , and that this authority is impartial. Most d i s c u s s i o n s of social j u s t i c e also a s s u m e that issues of j u s t i c e c o n c e r n s o l e l y or primarily t h e p r i n c i p l e s b y w h i c h g o v e r n m e n t policy s h o u l d b e g u i d e d . If reflection o n j u s t i c e a s s u m e s t h e state as a realm of impartial d e c i s i o n m a k i n g that tran­ s c e n d s and c o m p r e h e n d s all partial i n t e r e s t s , p e r s p e c t i v e s , and c o m m i t ­ m e n t s , t h e n t h e o n l y significant i s s u e s of j u s t i c e are distributive. If w e a s s u m e t h e distributors are impartial and thus take all i n t e r e s t s in t h e s o c i e t y i n t o a c c o u n t , t h e n t h e r e is n o reason to make an explicit issue of t h e just organization of d e c i s i o n m a k i n g p o w e r . T h e ideal of impartiality, I h a v e a r g u e d , l e g i t i m a t e s bureaucratic a u ­ thority. T h i s is true of authority in t h e private corporation or organization as m u c h as in g o v e r n m e n t . T h e r e too authority is justified not on aristo­ cratic g r o u n d s , b u t on t h e g r o u n d s of a n e c e s s i t y of separating managerial tasks from o t h e r s , m a k i n g m a n a g e r s o v e r s e e t h e different and partial p e r ­ s p e c t i v e s o n t h e organization. H a v i n g risen in t h e hierarchy of an organi­ zation b e c a u s e his, a n d o n c e in a w h i l e her, i n t e l l i g e n c e , creativity, and hard work d e m o n s t r a t e d his or h e r merit, t h e m a n a g e r s task is to s u p e r ­ v i s e s u b o r d i n a t e s in a "professional" manner, w h i c h m e a n s taking a point of v i e w of o b j e c t i v e and impartial reason in making d e c i s i o n s . R u l e s of a corporation or a g e n c y s h o u l d t h e m s e l v e s b e impartial and formal, and t h e administrator s h o u l d apply t h e m impartially. T h e administrator's d e c i ­ sions s h o u l d reflect t h e i n t e r e s t s of t h e organization as a w h o l e . B u r e a u ­ cratic hierarchy is just b e c a u s e positions are a s s i g n e d impartially accord­ ing to merit. As l o n g as d e c i s i o n m a k e r s strive for impartiality, d e m o c r a c y is u n n e c e s s a r y ; their d e c i s i o n s will b e s t s e r v e t h e i n t e r e s t s of all. T h e ideal of impartiality thus h e l p s l e g i t i m a t e t h e hierarchical organization of m o s t w o r k p l a c e s , and t h e idea of merit allocation of its positions. In C h a p t e r 7 I shall c h a l l e n g e this m y t h of merit, w h i c h a s s u m e s t h e possibility of norm a t i v e l y and culturally impartial standards of evaluation. I n s i s t e n c e o n t h e ideal of impartiality in t h e face of its i m p o s s i b i l i t y functions to mask t h e i n e v i t a b l e partiality of p e r s p e c t i v e from w h i c h moral d e l i b e r a t i o n actually takes place. T h e situated a s s u m p t i o n s and c o m m i t ­ m e n t s that d e r i v e from particular histories, e x p e r i e n c e s , and affiliations rush to fill t h e v a c u u m c r e a t e d b y counterfactual abstraction; b u t n o w t h e y are a s s e r t e d as " o b j e c t i v e " a s s u m p t i o n s about h u m a n nature or moral p s y ­ c h o l o g y . T h e ideal of impartiality g e n e r a t e s a p r o p e n s i t y to u n i v e r s a l i z e t h e particular.

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W h e r e social g r o u p differences exist, and s o m e g r o u p s are p r i v i l e g e d w h i l e o t h e r s are o p p r e s s e d , this p r o p e n s i t y to universalize t h e particular reinforces that o p p r e s s i o n . T h e s t a n d p o i n t of t h e p r i v i l e g e d , their particu­ lar e x p e r i e n c e and standards, is c o n s t r u c t e d as normal and neutral. If s o m e groups e x p e r i e n c e differs from this neutral e x p e r i e n c e , or t h e y d o not m e a s u r e u p to t h o s e standards, their difference is c o n s t r u c t e d as d e v i ­ a n c e and inferiority. N o t only are t h e e x p e r i e n c e and v a l u e s of t h e o p ­ p r e s s e d t h e r e b y i g n o r e d and s i l e n c e d , but t h e y b e c o m e d i s a d v a n t a g e d b y t h e i r situated i d e n t i t i e s . It is not n e c e s s a r y for t h e p r i v i l e g e d to b e self­ ishly p u r s u i n g t h e i r o w n i n t e r e s t s at t h e e x p e n s e of o t h e r s to m a k e this situation unjust. T h e i r partial m a n n e r of c o n s t r u c t i n g t h e n e e d s and inter­ ests of o t h e r s , or of u n i n t e n t i o n a l l y ignoring t h e m , suffices. If o p p r e s s e d g r o u p s c h a l l e n g e t h e a l l e g e d neutrality of prevailing a s s u m p t i o n s and pol­ icies and e x p r e s s t h e i r o w n e x p e r i e n c e and p e r s p e c t i v e s , their claims are h e a r d as t h o s e of b i a s e d , selfish special interests that d e v i a t e from t h e impartial g e n e r a l interest. C o m m i t m e n t to an ideal of impartiality t h u s m a k e s it difficult to e x p o s e t h e partiality of t h e s u p p o s e d l y general stand­ point, and to claim a v o i c e for t h e o p p r e s s e d . T h e ideal of impartiality l e g i t i m a t e s hierarchical d e c i s i o n m a k i n g and a l l o w s t h e s t a n d p o i n t of t h e p r i v i l e g e d to appear as universal. T h e c o m b i ­ nation of t h e s e functions often leads to c o n c r e t e d e c i s i o n s that p e r p e t u a t e t h e o p p r e s s i o n and d i s a d v a n t a g e of s o m e groups and t h e p r i v i l e g e of o t h ­ ers. P o s i t i o n s of d e c i s i o n m a k i n g authority are usually o c c u p i e d b y m e m ­ b e r s of p r i v i l e g e d g r o u p s — w h i t e A n g l o n o m i n a l l y h e t e r o s e x u a l m e n — f o r a c c e s s to such p o s i t i o n s is part of their p r i v i l e g e . Based on a s s u m p t i o n s and standards t h e y claim as neutral and impartial, their authoritative d e c i ­ sions often s i l e n c e , i g n o r e , and r e n d e r d e v i a n t t h e abilities, n e e d s , and n o r m s of o t h e r s . T h e r e m e d y for t h e d o m i n a t i o n and o p p r e s s i o n that e n ­ s u e s is to d i s m a n t l e t h e hierarchy. If n o r m a t i v e reason is dialogic, j u s t n o r m s are m o s t likely to arise from t h e real interaction of p e o p l e w i t h different p o i n t s of v i e w w h o are drawn out of t h e m s e l v e s b y b e i n g forced to confront and listen to o t h e r s . Just d e c i s i o n m a k i n g structures m u s t thus b e d e m o c r a t i c , e n s u r i n g a v o i c e and v o t e to all t h e particular groups in­ v o l v e d in and affected b y t h e d e c i s i o n s .

PARTICIPATORY D E M O C R A C Y A N D THE I D E A OF A H E T E R O G E N E O U S P U B L I C

If w e g i v e u p t h e ideal of impartiality, t h e r e remains no moral justification for u n d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e s s e s of d e c i s i o n m a k i n g c o n c e r n i n g c o l l e c t i v e ac­ tion. I n s t e a d o f a fictional contract, w e require real participatory struc­ t u r e s in w h i c h actual p e o p l e , w i t h their geographical, e t h n i c , g e n d e r , and o c c u p a t i o n a l differences, assert t h e i r p e r s p e c t i v e s on social issues w i t h i n institutions that e n c o u r a g e t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of their distinct v o i c e s .

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T h e o r e t i c a l d i s c u s s i o n o f j u s t i c e , t h e n , r e q u i r e s theoretical d i s c u s s i o n of participatory d e m o c r a c y . As Carole P a t e m a n (1986) points out, h o w e v e r , m a n y c o n t e m p o r a r y theorists of participatory d e m o c r a c y are n o less c o m ­ m i t t e d to t h e ideal of t h e civic p u b l i c than their classical forebears. T h i s ideal of t h e civic p u b l i c , I h a v e a r g u e d , e x c l u d e s w o m e n and o t h e r g r o u p s d e f i n e d as different, b e c a u s e its rational and universal status d e ­ rives o n l y from its o p p o s i t i o n to affectivity, particularity, and t h e b o d y . R e p u b l i c a n t h e o r i s t s i n s i s t e d o n t h e unity of t h e civic public: insofar as h e is a c i t i z e n e v e r y m a n l e a v e s b e h i n d his particularity and difference, to adopt a universal s t a n d p o i n t identical for all c i t i z e n s , t h e standpoint of t h e c o m m o n g o o d or g e n e r a l will. In practice republican politicians e n f o r c e d h o m o g e n e i t y by e x c l u d i n g from c i t i z e n s h i p all t h o s e d e f i n e d as different, and associated w i t h t h e b o d y , d e s i r e , or n e e d i n f l u e n c e s that m i g h t v e e r c i t i z e n s away from t h e s t a n d p o i n t of p u r e reason. T w o c o n t e m p o r a r y t h e ­ orists of participatory d e m o c r a c y , B e n j a m i n Barber and Jiirgen H a b e r ­ m a s , retain i m p o r t a n t features of t h e universalist ideal of t h e civic p u b l i c , though both ambiguously. Barber (1984) a r g u e s fiercely against c o n t e m p o r a r y political theorists w h o c o n s t r u c t a m o d e l of political d i s c o u r s e purified of affective d i m e n ­ sions. Ritual, m y t h , passion, e m o t i o n a l e x p r e s s i o n , and p o e t i c d i s c o u r s e h a v e political m e a n i n g , h e argues, as m u c h as rational a r g u m e n t a t i o n . T h u s Barber d o c s not fear t h e disruption of t h e unity and t h e rationality of t h e p u b l i c by d e s i r e and t h e b o d y , as a n u m b e r of republican theorists a p p e a r to d o . In his c o n c e p t of strong d e m o c r a c y h e retains, h o w e v e r , a c o n c e p t i o n of t h e c i v i c p u b l i c as d e f i n e d by unity and universality, as o p ­ p o s e d to g r o u p affinity and particular n e e d and interest. H e d i s t i n g u i s h e s clearly b e t w e e n t h e p u b l i c realm of c i t i z e n s h i p and civic activity, o n t h e o n e h a n d , and a private realm of particular i d e n t i t i e s , roles, affiliations, and i n t e r e s t s . S t r o n g d e m o c r a c y , h e c l a i m s , regrets any division in t h e p u b l i c , w h i c h ideally e x p r e s s e s a c o m m o n will and c o m m o n j u d g m e n t of all t h e citizenry. C i t i z e n s h i p by no m e a n s e x h a u s t s p e o p l e ' s social i d e n t i ­ t i e s , b u t it takes moral priority o v e r all o t h e r social activities in strong d e m o c r a c y . T h e pursuit of particular i n t e r e s t s , t h e p r e s s i n g of t h e claims of particular g r o u p s , all m u s t take place w i t h i n a framework of c o m m u n i t y and c o m m o n vision e s t a b l i s h e d by t h e public realm. T h u s Barber's vision of participatory d e m o c r a c y c o n t i n u e s to rely on a strong o p p o s i t i o n b e ­ t w e e n t h e p u b l i c s p h e r e of c i t i z e n s h i p and t h e private s p h e r e of particular i n t e r e s t and affiliation. T h e p r o c e s s of participatory d e m o c r a c y for h i m r e q u i r e s t h e s u b m e r g i n g of social differences, w h i c h I have a r g u e d t e n d s to lead to p r i v i l e g e for s o m e g r o u p s w h o s e v o i c e and p e r s p e c t i v e d o m i ­ nate the allegedly c o m m o n public. H a b e r m a s ' s t h e o r y of c o m m u n i c a t i v e action is m o r e a m b i g u o u s than Barber's as regards t h e d e g r e e to w h i c h it retains t h e republican l e g a c y of

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u n i t y and u n i v e r s a l i s m in its definition of t h e p u b l i c as a realm of reason o p p o s e d to a private realm of d e s i r e and feeling. As I a r g u e d earlier, t h e m a i n t e n d e n c i e s of a t h e o r y of c o m m u n i c a t i v e action aim at a g e n u i n e l y i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e and c o n t e x t u a l participatory d e m o c r a c y . W i t h o u t t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l p o i n t of v i e w of impartiality, t h e rationality of n o r m s can b e g r o u n d e d o n l y b y u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h e m as t h e o u t c o m e of d i s c u s s i o n i n c l u d i n g all t h o s e w h o will b e b o u n d b y t h e m . As I d i s c u s s e d earlier, o n e p o s s i b l e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of c o m m u n i c a t i v e e t h i c s is that n o r m a t i v e c l a i m s are t h e o u t c o m e of t h e e x p r e s s i o n of n e e d s , feelings, and d e s i r e s w h i c h i n d i v i d u a l s claim to h a v e m e t and r e c o g n i z e d b y o t h e r s u n d e r c o n d i t i o n s w h e r e all h a v e an equal v o i c e in t h e e x p r e s s i o n o f their n e e d s and d e s i r e s . This interpretation t h u s t e n d s to collapse t h e distinction b e t w e e n p u b l i c reason and a private realm of d e s i r e , n e e d , and feeling. A strong strain of Kantian u n i v e r s a l i s m remains in H a b e r m a s , h o w e v e r , w h i c h u n d e r m i n e s this m o v e to a radically pluralist participatory politics of n e e d interpretation. H a b e r m a s retains v e s t i g e s of a d i c h o t o m y b e t w e e n reason and affectivity. H e rather firmly separates d i s c o u r s e about f e e l i n g s from d i s c o u r s e about n o r m s . His m o d e l of language itself, m o r e o v e r , re­ lies h e a v i l y o n a paradigm of d i s c u r s i v e a r g u m e n t a t i o n , d e e m p h a s i z i n g t h e m e t a p h o r i c a l , rhetorical, playful, e m b o d i e d aspects of s p e e c h that are an i m p o r t a n t a s p e c t of its c o m m u n i c a t i v e effect ( s e e Young, 1987; cf. K e a n e , 1 9 8 4 , p p . 1 6 9 - 7 2 ) . D e s p i t e t h e possibilities of a c o m m u n i c a t i v e e t h i c s , H a b e r m a s h i m s e l f retains a c o m m i t m e n t to t h e "moral p o i n t of v i e w " as that of a " g e n e r a l i z e d other," in w h i c h t h e r e a s o n i n g s u b j e c t abstracts from h e r or his o w n c o n c r e t e c o n t e x t s of n e e d , d e s i r e , and c o m ­ m i t m e n t and regards o t h e r s also from this general standpoint. In that form h e retains a d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n a p u b l i c realm of rights and p r i n c i p l e s and a private realm of c o n t e x t u a l i z e d n e e d ( B e n h a b i b , 1986, p p . 3 4 8 - 5 1 ) . Fi­ nally, t h e claim that participants in d i a l o g u e implicitly aim at c o n s e n s u s is r e m i n i s c e n t o f t h e ideal unity of t h e civic public. As w e saw in C h a p t e r 3, m a n y writers assert that welfare corporate s o c i e t y is d e p o l i t i c i z e d through t h e institutionalization of i n t e r e s t - g r o u p pluralism. Just as Barber calls for a strong d e m o c r a t i c p u b l i c , m a n y of t h e s e writers also call for a reinstitution of a civic p u b l i c in w h i c h c i t i z e n s t r a n s c e n d their particular c o n t e x t s , n e e d s , and interests to a d d r e s s t h e c o m m o n g o o d . I h a v e b e e n arguing, h o w e v e r , that such a d e s i r e for polit­ ical u n i t y will s u p p r e s s difference, and t e n d to e x c l u d e s o m e v o i c e s and p e r s p e c t i v e s from t h e p u b l i c , b e c a u s e their greater p r i v i l e g e and d o m i ­ nant p o s i t i o n allows s o m e groups to articulate t h e " c o m m o n g o o d " in t e r m s i n f l u e n c e d b y their particular p e r s p e c t i v e and interests. C o n t r a r y to Barber's a c c o u n t , for e x a m p l e , t h e p r o b l e m w i t h interestg r o u p pluralism is not that it is plural and particular, b u t that it is privat­ i z e d . It institutionalizes and e n c o u r a g e s an egoist, self-regarding v i e w of

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t h e political p r o c e s s ; each party e n t e r s t h e political c o m p e t i t i o n for scarce g o o d s and p r i v i l e g e s o n l y in o r d e r to m a x i m i z e its o w n gain, and n e e d not listen to or r e s p o n d to t h e claims of o t h e r s for their o w n sake. T h u s inter­ e s t - g r o u p pluralism allows little s p a c e for claims that s o m e parties h a v e a r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to a t t e n d to t h e claims of o t h e r s b e c a u s e t h e y are n e e d y or o p p r e s s e d . T h e p r o c e s s e s and often t h e o u t c o m e s of i n t e r e s t - g r o u p bar­ gaining, m o r e o v e r , take place largely in private; t h e y are n e i t h e r r e v e a l e d nor d i s c u s s e d in a forum that g e n u i n e l y i n c l u d e s all t h o s e p o t e n t i a l l y af­ fected by the decisions. T h e repoliticization o f p u b l i c life d o e s not require t h e creation of a uni­ fied p u b l i c realm in w h i c h c i t i z e n s leave b e h i n d their particular g r o u p affiliations, h i s t o r i e s , and n e e d s to discuss a mythical " c o m m o n g o o d . " In a s o c i e t y differentiated b y social g r o u p s , o c c u p a t i o n s , political p o s i t i o n s , d i f f e r e n c e s of p r i v i l e g e and o p p r e s s i o n , regions, and so o n , t h e p e r c e p t i o n of a n y t h i n g like a c o m m o n g o o d can o n l y b e an o u t c o m e of p u b l i c interac­ tion that e x p r e s s e s rather than s u b m e r g e s particularities. T h o s e s e e k i n g t h e d e m o c r a t i z a t i o n of politics in our society, in m y v i e w , s h o u l d r e c o n c e p t u a l i z e t h e m e a n i n g of p u b l i c and private and their relation, to break d e c i s i v e l y w i t h t h e tradition o f E n l i g h t e n m e n t r e p u b l i c a n i s m . W h i l e t h e r e are g o o d t h e o r e t i c a l and practical reasons to maintain a distinction b e t w e e n p u b l i c and private, this distinction s h o u l d not b e c o n s t r u c t e d as a hierarchical o p p o s i t i o n c o r r e s p o n d i n g to o p p o s i t i o n s b e t w e e n reason and f e e l i n g , m a s c u l i n e and f e m i n i n e , universal and particular. T h e primary m e a n i n g of p u b l i c is w h a t is o p e n and a c c e s s i b l e . T h e p u b ­ lic is in p r i n c i p l e not exclusionary. W h i l e g e n e r a l in that s e n s e , this c o n ­ c e p t i o n of a p u b l i c d o e s not i m p l y h o m o g e n e i t y or t h e a d o p t i o n of s o m e g e n e r a l or universal s t a n d p o i n t . I n d e e d , in o p e n and a c c e s s i b l e public s p a c e s and f o r u m s , o n e s h o u l d e x p e c t to e n c o u n t e r and hear from t h o s e w h o are different, w h o s e social p e r s p e c t i v e s , e x p e r i e n c e , and affiliations are different. To p r o m o t e a politics of inclusion, t h e n , participatory d e m o ­ crats m u s t p r o m o t e t h e ideal of a h e t e r o g e n e o u s public, in w h i c h p e r s o n s stand forth w i t h t h e i r differences a c k n o w l e d g e d and r e s p e c t e d , t h o u g h p e r h a p s not c o m p l e t e l y u n d e r s t o o d , b y others. T h e private, as H a n n a h A r e n d t (1958, p p . 5 8 - 6 7 ) points out, is e t y m o logically related to d e p r i v a t i o n . T h e private, as traditionally c o n c e i v e d , is w h a t s h o u l d b e h i d d e n from v i e w , or w h a t cannot b e b r o u g h t to view. It is c o n n e c t e d w i h s h a m e and i n c o m p l e t e n e s s . As A r e n d t points out, this n o t i o n of t h e private i m p l i e s t h e e x c l u s i o n of b o d i l y and affective a s p e c t s of h u m a n life from t h e public. I n s t e a d of d e f i n i n g t h e private as w h a t t h e public e x c l u d e s , I s u g g e s t , t h e private s h o u l d b e d e f i n e d , as in o n e strain of liberal t h e o r y , as that a s p e c t of his or h e r life and activity that any p e r s o n has a right to e x c l u d e o t h e r s from. T h e private in this s e n s e is not what p u b l i c institutions e x -

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e l u d e , b u t w h a t t h e individual c h o o s e s to w i t h d r a w from p u b l i c v i e w . W i t h t h e g r o w t h of b o t h state and nonstate b u r e a u c r a c i e s , t h e p r o t e c t i o n of p r i v a c y has b e c o m e a b u r n i n g p u b l i c issue. In welfare capitalist s o c i e t y , t h e d e f e n s e of personal privacy has b e c o m e not m e r e l y a m a t t e r of k e e p ­ ing t h e state o u t of certain affairs, b u t of calling for p o s i t i v e state regula­ tion to e n s u r e that b o t h its o w n a g e n c i e s and n o n s t a t e organizations, s u c h as c o r p o r a t i o n s , r e s p e c t t h e claims of individuals to privacy. T h i s m a n n e r of formulating t h e c o n c e p t s of p u b l i c and private, w h i c h is i n s p i r e d b y f e m i n i s t confrontations w i t h traditional political t h e o r y , d o e s not d e n y t h e i r distinction. It d o e s d e n y , h o w e v e r , a social division b e ­ t w e e n p u b l i c and private s p h e r e s , e a c h w i t h different kinds of institutions, a c t i v i t i e s , and h u m a n attributes. T h e c o n c e p t of a h e t e r o g e n e o u s p u b l i c i m p l i e s t w o political principles: (a) n o p e r s o n s , actions, or a s p e c t s of a p e r s o n ' s life s h o u l d b e forced i n t o privacy; and (b) n o social institutions or p r a c t i c e s s h o u l d b e e x c l u d e d a priori from b e i n g a p r o p e r s u b j e c t for p u b ­ lic d i s c u s s i o n and e x p r e s s i o n . T h e m o d e r n c o n c e p t i o n of t h e public, I h a v e a r g u e d , c r e a t e s a c o n c e p ­ tion of c i t i z e n s h i p w h i c h e x c l u d e s from p u b l i c attention m o s t particular a s p e c t s of p e r s o n s . P u b l i c life is s u p p o s e d to b e "blind' to sex, race, a g e , and so o n , and all p e r s o n s are s u p p o s e d to e n t e r t h e p u b l i c and its d i s c u s ­ sion o n identical t e r m s . This c o n c e p t i o n of t h e p u b l i c has r e s u l t e d in t h e e x c l u s i o n of p e r s o n s and a s p e c t s of p e r s o n s from p u b l i c life. O u r s is still a s o c i e t y that forces p e r s o n s or aspects of p e r s o n s into pri­ vacy. R e p r e s s i o n of h o m o s e x u a l i t y is p e r h a p s t h e m o s t striking e x a m p l e . In t h e U n i t e d States today m o s t p e o p l e s e e m to h o l d t h e liberal v i e w that p e r s o n s h a v e a right to b e gay as l o n g as t h e y k e e p their activities private. C a l l i n g a t t e n t i o n in p u b l i c to t h e fact that o n e is gay, m a k i n g p u b l i c dis­ plays of gay affection, or e v e n p u b l i c l y asserting gay n e e d s and rights, p r o v o k e s ridicule and fear in m a n y p e o p l e . O u r s o c i e t y is o n l y b e g i n n i n g to c h a n g e t h e practice of k e e p i n g t h e physically and m e n t a l l y d i s a b l e d o u t of p u b l i c v i e w . For a l m o s t a c e n t u r y " r e s p e c t a b l e " w o m e n h a v e had access to p u b l i c s p a c e s and p u b l i c e x p r e s s i o n , b u t prevailing n o r m s still p r e s s u r e us to privatize t h e m o s t o b v i o u s manifestations of our f e m a l e n e s s — m e n ­ struation, p r e g n a n c y , l a c t a t i o n — t o k e e p t h e s e o u t of p u b l i c s p e e c h , p u b ­ lic v i e w , and p u b l i c c o n s i d e r a t i o n . By e x t e n s i o n , c h i l d r e n s h o u l d b e k e p t out of p u b l i c v i e w , and of c o u r s e t h e i r v o i c e s s h o u l d not r e c e i v e p u b l i c expression. T h e f e m i n i s t slogan "the personal is political" e x p r e s s e s t h e p r i n c i p l e that n o social p r a c t i c e s or activities s h o u l d b e e x c l u d e d as i m p r o p e r s u b ­ j e c t s for p u b l i c d i s c u s s i o n , e x p r e s s i o n , or c o l l e c t i v e c h o i c e . T h e c o n t e m ­ porary w o m e n ' s m o v e m e n t has m a d e p u b l i c i s s u e s out of m a n y practices c l a i m e d to b e t o o trivial or private for p u b l i c discussion: t h e m e a n i n g of p r o n o u n s , d o m e s t i c v i o l e n c e against w o m e n , t h e practice of m e n ' s o p e n -

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ing doors for w o m e n , t h e sexual assault of w o m e n and c h i l d r e n , t h e sexual division of h o u s e w o r k , and so o n . Socialist and p o p u l i s t politics call for m a k i n g p u b l i c i s s u e s o u t o f m a n y actions and activities d e e m e d p r o p e r l y private, s u c h as h o w individuals and e n t e r p r i s e s i n v e s t t h e i r m o n e y , w h a t t h e y p r o d u c e , and h o w t h e y p r o d u c e it. Welfare corporate s o c i e t y allows m a n y large institutions w h o s e actions h a v e an e n o r m o u s impact on m a n y p e o p l e to define t h e i r activity as private, and thus g i v e s t h e m t h e right to e x c l u d e o t h e r s . Par­ ticipatory d e m o c r a t s i n t e r e s t e d in u n d e r m i n i n g e c o n o m i c a l l y c a u s e d o p ­ p r e s s i o n s s u c h as e x p l o i t a t i o n and marginalization usually call for b r i n g i n g s o m e or all of t h e activities of s u c h institutions u n d e r t h e p u r v i e w of p u b l i c democratic decisions. T h e s e e x a m p l e s s h o w that p u b l i c and private do not easily c o r r e s p o n d to institutional s p h e r e s , s u c h as work v e r s u s family, or state v e r s u s e c o n ­ o m y . In d e m o c r a t i c politics, w h e r e t h e line of privacy s h o u l d b e d r a w n itself b e c o m e s a p u b l i c i s s u e ( C u n n i n g h a m , 1987, p. 120). T h e p u r p o s e of p r o t e c t i n g privacy is to p r e s e r v e liberties of individual action, o p p o r t u ­ nity, and participation. T h e claim o f a n y institution o r c o l l e c t i v e to pri­ vacy, to t h e right to e x c l u d e o t h e r s , can b e justified o n l y o n g r o u n d s of e n a b l i n g a justified range of individual privacy. As I s u g g e s t e d at t h e b e g i n n i n g of this chapter, c h a l l e n g i n g t h e tradi­ tional o p p o s i t i o n b e t w e e n p u b l i c and private that aligns it w i t h o p p o s i ­ tions b e t w e e n universality and particularity, reason and affectivity, i m ­ p l i e s c h a l l e n g i n g a c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e that o p p o s e s it to care. A t h e o r y that limits j u s t i c e to formal and universal principles that define a c o n t e x t in w h i c h e a c h p e r s o n can p u r s u e h e r or his personal e n d s w i t h o u t h i n d e r ­ ing t h e ability of o t h e r s to p u r s u e theirs entails not m e r e l y too l i m i t e d a c o n c e p t i o n of social life, as M i c h a e l S a n d e l (1982) s u g g e s t s , b u t t o o l i m ­ i t e d a c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e . As a v i r t u e , j u s t i c e c a n n o t stand o p p o s e d to p e r s o n a l n e e d , f e e l i n g , and d e s i r e , b u t n a m e s t h e institutional c o n d i t i o n s that e n a b l e p e o p l e to m e e t their n e e d s and e x p r e s s their d e s i r e s . N e e d s can b e e x p r e s s e d in t h e i r particularity in a h e t e r o g e n e o u s p u b l i c . In C h a p t e r 6 I shall d e v e l o p in more detail principles of p u b l i c life that at­ t e n d to and affirm difference. B u t first, in C h a p t e r 5, I shall e x p l o r e fur­ t h e r t h e d y n a m i c s of i d e n t i t y that c o n t r i b u t e to a fear of difference and its c o n s t r u c t i o n as a b s o l u t e o t h e r n e s s .

CHAPTER 5

The Scaling of Bodies and the Politics of Identity Racism and homophobia are real conditions of all our lives in this place and time. I urge each one of us here to reach down into that deep place of knowledge inside herself and touch that terror and loathing of any difference that lives there. See whose face it wears. Then the personal as the political can begin to illuminate all our choices. —Audre Lorde

My body was given back to me sprawled out, distorted, recolored, clad in mourning in that white winter day. The Negro is ugly, the Negro is animal, the Negro is bad, the Negro is mean, the Negro is ugly; look, a nigger, it's cold, the nigger is shivering, because he is cold, the little boy is trembling because he is afraid of the nigger, the nigger is shivering with cold, that cold goes through your bones, the handsome little boy is trembling because he thinks that the nigger is quivering with rage, the little white boy throws himself into his mother's arms; Momma, the nigger's going to eat me up. All round me the white man. above the sky tears at its navel, tine earth rasps under my feet, and there is a white song, a white song. All this whiteness that burns me. . . . I sit down at the fire and I become aware of my uniform. I had not seen it. It is indeed ugly. I stop there, for who can tell me what beauty is? (Fanon, 1967, p. 114) R A C I S M , as w e l l as o t h e r group o p p r e s s i o n s , s h o u l d b e t h o u g h t of not as a s i n g l e s t r u c t u r e , b u t in t e r m s of several forms of o p p r e s s i o n that in t h e U n i t e d States c o n d i t i o n t h e lives of m o s t or all Blacks, Latinos, Asians, A m e r i c a n I n d i a n s , and S e m i t i c p e o p l e s . T h e o p p r e s s i o n s e x p e r i e n c e d b y m a n y m e m b e r s of t h e s e groups are certainly c o n d i t i o n e d b y t h e specific s t r u c t u r e s and i m p e r a t i v e s of A m e r i c a n c a p i t a l i s m — s t r u c t u r e s of exploi­ tation, s e g r e g a t e d division of labor, and marginalization. Racism, like s e x i s m , is a c o n v e n i e n t m e a n s of d i v i d i n g workers from o n e a n o t h e r and l e g i t i m a t i n g t h e s u p e r e x p l o i t a t i o n and marginalization of s o m e . C l e a r l y e x p e r i e n c e s like that e v o k e d b y F a n o n a b o v e , h o w e v e r , c a n n o t b e re­ d u c e d to capitalist p r o c e s s e s or e n c o m p a s s e d w i t h i n t h e s t r u c t u r e s of o p ­ p r e s s i o n j u s t m e n t i o n e d . T h e y b e l o n g instead to t h e g e n e r a l forms of

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o p p r e s s i o n I h a v e c a l l e d cultural imperialism and v i o l e n c e . Cultural i m ­ p e r i a l i s m consists in a group's b e i n g invisible at t h e s a m e t i m e that it is m a r k e d o u t and s t e r e o t y p e d . Culturally imperialist groups project t h e i r o w n v a l u e s , e x p e r i e n c e , and p e r s p e c t i v e as n o r m a t i v e and universal. Vic­ t i m s o f cultural i m p e r i a l i s m are t h e r e b y r e n d e r e d invisible as s u b j e c t s , as p e r s o n s w i t h t h e i r o w n p e r s p e c t i v e and group-specific e x p e r i e n c e and in­ t e r e s t s . At t h e s a m e t i m e t h e y are m a r k e d out, frozen i n t o a b e i n g m a r k e d as O t h e r , d e v i a n t in relation to t h e d o m i n a n t n o r m . T h e d o m i n a n t g r o u p s n e e d not n o t i c e t h e i r o w n g r o u p b e i n g at all; t h e y o c c u p y an u n m a r k e d , neutral, a p p a r e n t l y universal p o s i t i o n . But v i c t i m s of cultural i m p e r i a l i s m c a n n o t forget t h e i r g r o u p i d e n t i t y b e c a u s e t h e b e h a v i o r and reactions of o t h e r s call t h e m back to it. T h e F a n o n p a s s a g e e v o k e s a particular and crucially important a s p e c t of t h e o p p r e s s i o n o f cultural i m p e r i a l i s m : t h e g r o u p - c o n n e c t e d e x p e r i e n c e o f b e i n g r e g a r d e d b y o t h e r s w i t h aversion. In p r i n c i p l e , cultural imperial­ ism n e e d not b e s t r u c t u r e d b y t h e interactive d y n a m i c s of a v e r s i o n , b u t at least in s u p p o s e d l y liberal and tolerant c o n t e m p o r a r y s o c i e t i e s , s u c h reac­ tions o f a v e r s i o n d e e p l y structure t h e o p p r e s s i o n of all culturally imperiali z e d g r o u p s . M u c h o f t h e o p p r e s s i v e e x p e r i e n c e of cultural i m p e r i a l i s m o c c u r s in m u n d a n e c o n t e x t s o f i n t e r a c t i o n — i n t h e g e s t u r e s , s p e e c h , t o n e of v o i c e , m o v e m e n t , and reactions of o t h e r s (cf. Brittan and M a y n a r d , 1 9 8 4 , p p . 6 - 1 3 ) . P u l s e s of attraction and aversion m o d u l a t e all interac­ tions, w i t h specific c o n s e q u e n c e s for e x p e r i e n c e of t h e b o d y . W h e n t h e d o m i n a n t c u l t u r e d e f i n e s s o m e g r o u p s as different, as t h e O t h e r , t h e m e m b e r s of t h o s e g r o u p s are i m p r i s o n e d in their b o d i e s . D o m i n a n t dis­ c o u r s e d e f i n e s t h e m in t e r m s of b o d i l y characteristics, a n d constructs t h o s e b o d i e s as ugly, dirty, defiled, i m p u r e , c o n t a m i n a t e d , or sick. T h o s e w h o e x p e r i e n c e s u c h an e p i d e r m a l i z i n g of their w o r l d (Slaughter, 1982), m o r e o v e r , d i s c o v e r t h e i r status b y m e a n s of t h e e m b o d i e d b e h a v i o r of o t h e r s : in their g e s t u r e s , a certain n e r v o u s n e s s that t h e y exhibit, t h e i r a v o i d a n c e of e y e c o n t a c t , t h e d i s t a n c e t h e y k e e p . T h e e x p e r i e n c e of racial o p p r e s s i o n entails in part e x i s t i n g as a g r o u p d e f i n e d as h a v i n g u g l y b o d i e s , and b e i n g feared, a v o i d e d , or h a t e d o n that a c c o u n t . Racialized g r o u p s , m o r e o v e r , are b y n o m e a n s t h e o n l y o n e s d e f i n e d as ugly or fearful b o d i e s . W o m e n ' s o p p r e s s i o n , like t h e o p p r e s ­ sion o f Blacks, e x h i b i t s all t h e five forms d e s c r i b e d in C h a p t e r 2. T h e sexual division of labor at h o m e and in t h e w o r k p l a c e p r o d u c e s g e n d e r specific forms of exploitation and p o w e r l e s s n e s s . W o m e n ' s o p p r e s s i o n , h o w e v e r , is also clearly s t r u c t u r e d b y t h e interactive d y n a m i c s of d e s i r e , t h e p u l s e s of attraction and a v e r s i o n , and p e o p l e ' s e x p e r i e n c e of b o d i e s and e m b o d i m e n t . W h i l e a certain cultural s p a c e is r e s e r v e d for r e v e r i n g f e m i n i n e b e a u t y and desirability, in part that very c a m e o ideal r e n d e r s m o s t w o m e n drab, ugly, l o a t h s o m e , or fearful b o d i e s . O l d p e o p l e , gay

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m e n and l e s b i a n s , d i s a b l e d p e o p l e and fat p e o p l e also o c c u p y as groups t h e p o s i t i o n of ugly, fearful, or l o a t h s o m e b o d i e s . T h e interactive d y n a m ­ ics and cultural s t e r e o t y p e s that define g r o u p s as t h e ugly o t h e r h a v e m u c h to d o w i t h t h e o p p r e s s i v e harrassment and physical v i o l e n c e that e n d a n g e r s t h e p e a c e and b o d i e s of m o s t m e m b e r s of most of t h e s e g r o u p s . T h i s c h a p t e r e x p l o r e s t h e construction of ugly b o d i e s and t h e implica­ tions of u n c o n s c i o u s fears and aversions for t h e o p p r e s s i o n of d e s p i s e d g r o u p s . I e x p a n d t h e s u g g e s t i o n m a d e in t h e last c h a p t e r that racist and sexist e x c l u s i o n s from t h e p u b l i c h a v e a s o u r c e in t h e structure of m o d e r n r e a s o n and its s e l f - m a d e o p p o s i t i o n to d e s i r e , b o d y , and affectivity. M o d ­ ern p h i l o s o p h y and s c i e n c e e s t a b l i s h e d unifying, controlling reason in o p ­ p o s i t i o n to and m a s t e r y o v e r t h e b o d y , and t h e n identified s o m e g r o u p s w i t h r e a s o n and o t h e r s w i t h t h e b o d y . T h e objectification and overt d o m i n a t i o n of d e s p i s e d b o d i e s that o b ­ t a i n e d in t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y , h o w e v e r , has r e c e d e d in o u r o w n t i m e , and a d i s c u r s i v e c o m m i t m e n t to equality for all has e m e r g e d . Racism, s e x i s m , h o m o p h o b i a , a g e i s m , and a b l e i s m , I argue, h a v e not d i s a p p e a r e d w i t h that c o m m i t m e n t , b u t have g o n e u n d e r g r o u n d , d w e l l i n g in e v e r y d a y habits and cultural m e a n i n g s of w h i c h p e o p l e are for t h e most part u n ­ aware. T h r o u g h Kristeva's c a t e g o r y of t h e abject, I explore h o w t h e habit­ ual and u n c o n s c i o u s fears and aversions that c o n t i n u e to define s o m e g r o u p s as d e s p i s e d and ugly b o d i e s m o d u l a t e w i t h anxieties o v e r loss of i d e n t i t y . O u r s o c i e t y e n a c t s t h e o p p r e s s i o n of cultural i m p e r i a l i s m to a large d e g r e e t h r o u g h feelings and reactions, and in that r e s p e c t o p p r e s ­ sion is b e y o n d t h e reach of law and policy to r e m e d y . T h e analysis in this c h a p t e r raises q u e s t i o n s for moral t h e o r y , about w h e t h e r and h o w moral j u d g m e n t s can b e m a d e about u n i n t e n d e d b e h a v ­ ior. If u n c o n s c i o u s b e h a v i o r and practices r e p r o d u c e o p p r e s s i o n , t h e y m u s t b e morally c o n d e m n a b l e . I argue that moral t h e o r y m u s t in s u c h c a s e s d i s t i n g u i s h b e t w e e n b l a m i n g and h o l d i n g r e s p o n s i b l e t h e p e r p e ­ trators. T h e d i s s o l u t i o n of cultural i m p e r i a l i s m t h u s requires a cultural r e v o l u ­ tion w h i c h also entails a r e v o l u t i o n in subjectivity. Rather than s e e k i n g a w h o l e n e s s of t h e self, w e w h o are t h e subjects of this plural and c o m p l e x s o c i e t y s h o u l d affirm t h e o t h e r n e s s within o u r s e l v e s , a c k n o w l e d g i n g that as s u b j e c t s w e are h e t e r o g e n e o u s and m u l t i p l e in our affiliations and d e ­ sires. Social m o v e m e n t practices of c o n s c i o u s n e s s raising, I n o t e , offer b e g i n n i n g m o d e l s of m e t h o d s of r e v o l u t i o n i z i n g t h e subject.

T H E SCALING O F B O D I E S IN M O D E R N D I S C O U R S E

In C h a p t e r 4 I s u g g e s t e d that t h e claim of m o d e r n reason to universality and neutrality, and its o p p o s i t i o n to affectivity and t h e b o d y , leads to t h e d e v a l u a t i o n and e x c l u s i o n of s o m e groups. H e r e I will e x p l o r e t h e m e a n -

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ing of this p r o c e s s at greater l e n g t h . M o d e r n racism, s e x i s m , h o m o p h o b i a , a g e i s m , and a b l e i s m are not s u p e r s t i t i o u s carry-overs from t h e Dark A g e s that clash w i t h E n l i g h t e n m e n t reason. O n t h e contrary, m o d e r n scientific and p h i l o s o p h i c a l d i s c o u r s e explicitly p r o p o u n d and l e g i t i m a t e formal t h e ­ ories of race, sex, a g e , and national superiority. N i n e t e e n t h - and early t w e n t i e t h - c e n t u r y scientific, a e s t h e t i c , and moral c u l t u r e explicitly c o n ­ s t r u c t e d s o m e g r o u p s as ugly or d e g e n e r a t e b o d i e s , in contrast to t h e p u ­ rity and r e s p e c t a b i l i t y of neutral, rational subjects. Critical t h e o r e t i c a l a c c o u n t s of i n s t r u m e n t a l reason, p o s t m o d e r n i s t cri­ t i q u e s of h u m a n i s m and of t h e Cartesian subject, and f e m i n i s t c r i t i q u e s of t h e d i s e m b o d i e d c o l d n e s s of m o d e r n reason all c o n v e r g e o n a similar proj­ e c t of p u n c t u r i n g t h e authority of m o d e r n scientific reason. M o d e r n sci­ e n c e and p h i l o s o p h y c o n s t r u c t a specific account of t h e subject as k n o w e r , as a s e l f - p r e s e n t origin s t a n d i n g o u t s i d e of and o p p o s e d to o b j e c t s of k n o w l e d g e — a u t o n o m o u s , neutral, abstract, and purified of particularity. T h e y c o n s t r u c t this m o d e r n subjectivity b y fleeing from material reality, from t h e b o d y ' s s e n s u o u s c o n t i n u i t y w i t h flowing, living t h i n g s , to c r e a t e a purified abstract idea of formal reason, d i s e m b o d i e d and t r a n s c e n d e n t . W i t h all its a n i m a t i o n r e m o v e d and p l a c e d in that abstract t r a n s c e n d e n t s u b j e c t , n a t u r e is frozen into d i s c r e t e , inert, solid o b j e c t s , e a c h identifia­ b l e as o n e a n d t h e s a m e thing, w h i c h can b e c o u n t e d , m e a s u r e d , p o s ­ s e s s e d , a c c u m u l a t e d , and traded ( M e r c h a n t , 1978; K o v e l , 1970, c h a p . 5; Irigaray, 1 9 8 5 , p p . 2 6 - 2 8 , 41). A n i m p o r t a n t e l e m e n t of t h e d i s c o u r s e of m o d e r n reason is t h e revival of visual m e t a p h o r s to d e s c r i b e k n o w l e d g e . In t h e logic of i d e n t i t y I dis­ c u s s e d in C h a p t e r 4, rational t h o u g h t is d e f i n e d as infallible vision; o n l y w h a t is s e e n clearly is real, and to s e e it clearly m a k e s it real. O n e s e e s not w i t h t h e fallible s e n s e s , b u t w i t h t h e mind's e y e , a vision s t a n d i n g o u t s i d e all, s u r v e y i n g like a p r o u d and watchful lord. This s u b j e c t s e e k s to k n o w a T r u t h as p u r e signifier that c o m p l e t e l y and accurately mirrors reality. T h e k n o w i n g s u b j e c t is a gazer, an o b s e r v e r w h o stands a b o v e , o u t s i d e of, t h e o b j e c t of k n o w l e d g e . In t h e visual m e t a p h o r t h e subject stands in t h e i m m e d i a t e p r e s e n c e of reality w i t h o u t a n y i n v o l v e m e n t w i t h it. T h e s e n s e of t o u c h , b y c o m p a r i s o n , i n v o l v e s t h e p e r c e i v e r w i t h t h e p e r c e i v e d ; o n e c a n n o t t o u c h s o m e t h i n g w i t h o u t b e i n g t o u c h e d . Sight, h o w e v e r , is d i s ­ t a n c e d , and c o n c e i v e d as unidirectional; t h e gazer is p u r e originating fo­ c u s i n g a g e n c y and t h e o b j e c t is a p a s s i v e b e i n g - s e e n (Irigaray, 1985, p p . 133-51). T h e g a z e of m o d e r n scientific r e a s o n , m o r e o v e r , is a n o r m a l i z i n g g a z e (Foucault, 1977; W e s t , 1982). It is a g a z e that a s s e s s e s its o b j e c t a c c o r d i n g to s o m e hierarchical standard, T h e rational subject d o e s not m e r e l y o b ­ s e r v e , p a s s i n g from o n e sight to a n o t h e r like a tourist. In a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e logic of i d e n t i t y t h e scientific subject m e a s u r e s o b j e c t s a c c o r d i n g to s c a l e s that r e d u c e t h e plurality of attributes to unity. F o r c e d to l i n e u p o n

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calibrations that m e a s u r e d e g r e e s of s o m e g e n e r a l attribute, s o m e of t h e particulars are d e v a l u e d , d e f i n e d as d e v i a n t in relation to t h e n o r m . F o u c a u l t s u m m a r i z e s five o p e r a t i o n s that this normalizing g a z e brings into play: c o m p a r i s o n , differentiation, hierarchization, h o m o g e n i z a t i o n , and e x c l u s i o n . N o r m a l i z i n g reason refers individual actions to a whole that is at once a field of comparison, a space of differentiation and the principle of a rule to be followed. It differentiates individuals from one another, in terms of the following overall rule: that the rule be made to function as a minimal threshold, as an average to be respected or an optimum towards which one must move. It measures in quantitative terms and hierarchies in terms of value the abilities, the level, the "nature" of individu­ als. It introduces, through this "value-giving" measure, the constraint of confor­ mity that must be achieved. Lastly, it traces the limit that will define difference in relation to all other differences, the external frontier of the abnormal. (Fou­ cault, 1977, pp. 182-83) M u c h r e c e n t scholarship has r e v e a l e d t h e w h i t e , b o u r g e o i s , m a l e , E u ­ r o p e a n b i a s e s that h a v e a t t a c h e d to t h e e x p r e s s i o n of t h e i d e a of t h e ra­ tional s u b j e c t in m o d e r n discourse. In thinly v e i l e d m e t a p h o r s o f rape, t h e f o u n d e r s of m o d e r n s c i e n c e construct nature as t h e f e m a l e m a s t e r e d and c o n t r o l l e d b y t h e (masculine) investigator. T h e virtues of t h e scientist b e ­ c o m e also t h e v i r t u e s of m a s c u l i n i t y — d i s e m b o d i e d d e t a c h m e n t , careful m e a s u r e m e n t and t h e manipulation of i n s t r u m e n t s , c o m p r e h e n s i v e g e n ­ eralizing a n d r e a s o n i n g , authoritative s p e e c h b a c k e d b y e v i d e n c e (Keller, 1985; M e r c h a n t , 1978). The a t t r i b u t e s o f t h e k n o w i n g subject and n o r m a t i v e gazer b e c o m e at­ t a c h e d j u s t as c l o s e l y to class and race, Class position arises not from tradi­ tion or family, b u t from s u p e r i o r i n t e l l i g e n c e , k n o w l e d g e , and rational­ ity. R e a s o n itself shifts in m e a n i n g . Its mission is n o longer, as it w a s w i t h t h e a n c i e n t s , to c o n t e m p l a t e t h e e t e r n i t y of t h e h e a v e n s and t h e s u b t l e t y of t h e soul, b u t rather to figure out t h e workings of nature in o r d e r to direct its p r o c e s s e s to p r o d u c t i v e e n d s . " I n t e l l i g e n c e " and "rationality" n o w m e a n primarily t h e activity of strategic and calculative thinking, ab­ straction from particulars to formulate g e n e r a l laws of o p e r a t i o n , logical organization of s y s t e m s , t h e d e v e l o p m e n t and m a s t e r y of formalized and t e c h n i c a l l a n g u a g e , and t h e d e s i g n i n g of s y s t e m s of surveillance and su­ p e r v i s i o n . N a t u r e and t h e b o d y are objects of such m a n i p u l a t i o n and o b ­ s e r v a t i o n . As I shall discuss further in C h a p t e r 7, m o r e o v e r , this reason/ b o d y d i c h o t o m y also structures t h e modern division b e t w e e n "mental" and "material" labor. F r o m t h e d a w n of m o d e r n i n s t r u m e n t a l reason t h e i d e a of w h i t e n e s s has b e e n associated w i t h reason purified of a n y material b o d y , w h i l e b o d y has b e e n identified w i t h blackness (Kovel, 1 9 7 0 , chaps. 5 - 7 ) . This identification e n a b l e s p e o p l e w h o claim w h i t e n e s s for t h e m -

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s e l v e s to p u t t h e m s e l v e s in t h e p o s i t i o n of t h e subject, and to identify p e o p l e of color w i t h t h e o b j e c t of k n o w l e d g e (cf. Said, 1978, p p . 3 1 - 4 9 ) . It is i m p o r t a n t not to c o n s t r u e a c c o u n t s s u c h as t h e s e as c l a i m i n g e i t h e r that class, race, g e n d e r , and o t h e r o p p r e s s i o n s are g r o u n d e d in or c a u s e d b y scientific r e a s o n or that scientific reason simply reflects t h e social rela­ tions of d o m i n a t i o n . Scientific and p h i l o s o p h i c reason e x p r e s s a v i e w of s u b j e c t i v i t y and o b j e c t i v i t y that has c o m e to h a v e e n o r m o u s i n f l u e n c e and r e p e r c u s s i o n s in m o d e r n W e s t e r n c u l t u r e . T h e association of this reason w i t h a w h i t e , m a l e b o u r g e o i s i e arises and persists in t h e c o n t e x t of a soci­ e t y s t r u c t u r e d by hierarchical relations of class, race, g e n d e r , and n a t i o n ­ ality w h i c h h a v e an i n d e p e n d e n t d y n a m i c . W i t h o u t d o u b t an association of abstract reason w i t h m a s c u l i n i t y and w h i t e n e s s d i d e m e r g e , b u t q u i t e p o s s i b l y it c a m e about t h r o u g h a set of fateful historical a c c i d e n t s . T h o s e articulating and following t h e c o d e s of m o d e r n reason w e r e w h i t e b o u r g e o i s m e n . In articulating their visual m e t a p h o r s of reason t h e y s p o k e for t h e m s e l v e s , unmindful that t h e r e m i g h t b e o t h e r p o s i t i o n s to articulate. As this m o d e r n d e t a c h e d and o b j e c ­ tifying reason a s s u m e d t h e m e a n i n g of h u m a n i t y and s u b j e c t i v i t y , and a c q u i r e d the authoritative p o s i t i o n o f t r u t h - s e e i n g , p r i v i l e g e d g r o u p s as­ s u m e d t h e p r i v i l e g e of that authoritative subject of k n o w l e d g e . G r o u p s t h e y d e f i n e d as different t h e r e b y slid into t h e p o s i t i o n of o b j e c t s corre­ lated w i t h t h e subject's distancing and m a s t e r i n g gaze. T h e i m p o s i t i o n of scientific reason's d i c h o t o m y b e t w e e n subject and o b j e c t o n hierarchical relations of race, g e n d e r , class, and nationality, h o w e v e r , has d e e p and a b i d i n g c o n s e q u e n c e s for t h e structuring o f privi­ l e g e and o p p r e s s i o n . T h e p r i v i l e g e d groups lose their particularity; in as­ s u m i n g t h e p o s i t i o n of t h e scientific subject t h e y b e c o m e d i s e m b o d i e d , t r a n s c e n d i n g particularity and materiality, a g e n t s of a universal v i e w from n o w h e r e . T h e o p p r e s s e d g r o u p s , on t h e o t h e r hand, are locked in their o b j e c t i f i e d b o d i e s , b l i n d , d u m b , and p a s s i v e . T h e n o r m a l i z i n g g a z e of sci­ e n c e f o c u s e d o n t h e objectified b o d i e s of w o m e n , Blacks, J e w s , h o m o ­ sexuals, old p e o p l e , t h e m a d and f e e b l e - m i n d e d . F r o m its o b s e r v a t i o n s e m e r g e d t h e o r i e s of sexual, racial, a g e , and m e n t a l or moral superiority. T h e s e are b y n o m e a n s t h e first d i s c o u r s e s to l e g i t i m a t e t h e rule of t h e rich, or m e n , or E u r o p e a n s . As F o u c a u l t argues, h o w e v e r , late e i g h t ­ e e n t h - and early n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y d i s c o u r s e instituted an e p i s t e m o l o g i ­ cal break that found a t h e o r e t i c a l e x p r e s s i o n in t h e " s c i e n c e s of man" (Foucault, 1970). In this episteme b o d i e s are b o t h naturalized, that is, c o n c e i v e d as s u b j e c t to d e t e r m i n i s t i c scientific laws, and n o r m a l i z e d , that is, subject to e v a l u a t i o n in relation to a teleological hierarchy of t h e g o o d . T h e naturalizing t h e o r i e s w e r e biological or physiological, and explicitly a s s o c i a t e d w i t h a e s t h e t i c standards of beautiful b o d i e s and moral stan­ dards of u p s t a n d i n g character.

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In t h e d e v e l o p i n g s c i e n c e s of natural history, p h r e n o l o g y , p h y s i o g ­ n o m y , e t h n o g r a p h y , and m e d i c i n e , t h e g a z e of t h e scientific o b s e r v e r w a s a p p l i e d to b o d i e s , w e i g h i n g , m e a s u r i n g , and classifying t h e m a c c o r d i n g to a n o r m a t i v e hierarchy. N i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y theorists of race explicitly as­ s u m e d w h i t e E u r o p e a n b o d y t y p e s and facial features as t h e n o r m , t h e p e r f e c t i o n of h u m a n form, in relation to w h i c h o t h e r b o d y t y p e s w e r e e i t h e r d e g e n e r a t e or less d e v e l o p e d . B r i n g i n g t h e s e n o r m s into t h e d i s ­ c o u r s e of s c i e n c e , h o w e v e r , naturalized t h e m , g a v e t h e assertions of s u p e ­ riority an additional authority as truths of nature. In n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y biological and m e d i c a l s c h e m e s w h i t e m a l e b o u r g e o i s E u r o p e a n b o d i e s are t h e "best" b o d y t y p e s by nature, and their natural superiority d e t e r ­ m i n e s directly t h e intellectual, a e s t h e t i c , and moral superiority of p e r s o n s in this g r o u p o v e r all o t h e r t y p e s (West, 1982, chap. 2). In t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y in E u r o p e and t h e U n i t e d States t h e normal­ i z i n g g a z e of s c i e n c e e n d o w e d t h e a e s t h e t i c scaling of b o d i e s w i t h t h e a u t h o r i t a t i v e n e s s of o b j e c t i v e truth. All b o d i e s can b e l o c a t e d o n a s i n g l e scale w h o s e a p e x is t h e strong and beautiful y o u t h and w h o s e nadir is t h e d e g e n e r a t e . T h e scale m e a s u r e d at least t h r e e crucial attributes: physical h e a l t h , moral s o u n d n e s s , and m e n t a l balance. T h e d e g e n e r a t e is p h y s i ­ cally w e a k , frail, d i s e a s e d . O r t h e d e g e n e r a t e is m e n t a l l y i m b a l a n c e d : rav­ ing, irrational or c h i l d l i k e in m e n t a l simplicity. But m o s t i m p o r t a n t , moral i m p r o p r i e t y is a sign o f d e g e n e r a c y , and a c a u s e of physical or m e n t a l d i s e a s e . Moral d e g e n e r a c y usually m e a n s sexual i n d u l g e n c e or d e v i a n t sexual b e h a v i o r , t h o u g h it also refers to i n d u l g e n c e in o t h e r physical p l e a s u r e s . T h u s t h e h o m o s e x u a l and t h e prostitute are primary d e g e n e r ­ ates, w h o s e sexual b e h a v i o r p r o d u c e s physical and m e n t a l d i s e a s e . In scientific d i s c o u r s e about t h e normal and t h e d e v i a n t , t h e h e a l t h y a n d t h e d e g e n e r a t e , it w a s crucial that any form of d e g e n e r a c y , w h e t h e r p h y s i c a l , m e n t a l , or moral, m a k e itself manifest in physical signs identifi­ a b l e b y t h e scientific g a z e . D e g e n e r a c y was t h o u g h t to appear on t h e sur­ face of t h e b o d y , w h o s e b e a u t y or u g l i n e s s w a s o b j e c t i v e l y m e a s u r a b l e a c c o r d i n g to d e t a i l e d characteristics of facial features, d e g r e e and kind of hair, skin color and c o m p l e x i o n , s h a p e of h e a d , location of e y e s , and struc­ t u r e of t h e g e n i t a l s , b u t t o c k s , h i p s , c h e s t , and breasts ( G i l m a n , 1985, p p . 6 4 - 7 0 , 1 5 6 - 5 8 , 1 9 1 - 9 4 ) . T h e prostitute, t h e h o m o s e x u a l , t h e criminal, are all e a s y to identify b e c a u s e of t h e physical s y m p t o m s of u g l i n e s s and d e ­ g e n e r a c y t h e y exhibit. T h e n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y ideal of b e a u t y was primarily an ideal of m a n l y v i r t u e ( M o s s e , 1985, p p . 3 1 , 7 6 - 8 0 ) , of t h e strong, self-controlled rational m a n d i s t a n c e d from sexuality, e m o t i o n , and all e l s e disorderly and dis­ turbing. E v e n w h i t e b o u r g e o i s m e n are capable o f d i s e a s e a n d d e v i a n c e , e s p e c i a l l y if t h e y g i v e t h e m s e l v e s o v e r to sexual i m p u l s e . M a n l y m e n m u s t t h e r e f o r e vigilantly d e f e n d their health and b e a u t y t h r o u g h disci­ p l i n e and chastity (cf. Takaki, 1979, chap. 2). In m u c h n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y

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scientific d i s c o u r s e , h o w e v e r , w h o l e groups of p e o p l e are essentially and irrevocably d e g e n e r a t e : Blacks, J e w s , h o m o s e x u a l s , p o o r and w o r k i n g p e o p l e , and w o m e n . As a g r o u p w o m e n are physically d e l i c a t e and w e a k d u e to t h e specific c o n s t i t u t i o n o f their b o d i e s , t h e o p e r a t i o n of their r e p r o d u c t i v e and sexual parts. B e c a u s e of their ovaries and u t e r u s w o m e n are s u b j e c t to m a d n e s s , irrationality, a n d c h i l d l i k e stupidity, and t h e y h a v e greater t e n d e n c i e s toward sexual l i c e n t i o u s n e s s than m e n . B e a u t y in w o m e n , like b e a u t y in m e n , is a d i s e m b o d i e d , d e s e x u a l i z e d , unfleshy a e s t h e t i c : light-colored hair a n d skin, and s l e n d e r n e s s . W o m e n of a certain class w h o are m a i n ­ t a i n e d u n d e r t h e d i s c i p l i n e d rule of r e s p e c t a b l e and rational m e n can b e s a v e d from t h e insanity, d e g e n e r a c y , and v i c e to w h i c h all w o m e n are prone. W o m e n are e s s e n t i a l l y identified w i t h sexuality, as are t h e o t h e r g r o u p s scientifically classified as e s s e n t i a l l y d e g e n e r a t e : Blacks, J e w s , h o m o s e x u ­ als, in s o m e p l a c e s and t i m e s w o r k i n g p e o p l e , and "criminal e l e m e n t s . " A striking a s p e c t of n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y d i s c o u r s e and i c o n o g r a p h y is t h e i n t e r c h a n g e a b i l i t y o f t h e s e c a t e g o r i e s : J e w s and h o m o s e x u a l s are c a l l e d black and often d e p i c t e d as black, and all d e g e n e r a t e m a l e s are said to b e e f f e m i n a t e . M e d i c a l s c i e n c e o c c u p i e s itself w i t h classifying t h e b o d i l y fea­ t u r e s of m e m b e r s of all t h e s e g r o u p s , d i s s e c t i n g their c o r p s e s , often w i t h particular a t t e n t i o n to their sexual parts. T h e sexualization of racism in particular associates b o t h m e n and w o m e n of d e g e n e r a t e races w i t h unbri­ d l e d sexuality. But scientists s h o w particular fascination w i t h Black, J e w ­ ish, and Arab w o m e n (Gilman, 1985, chap. 3). T h e m e d i c a l i z a t i o n of difference brings about a strange and fearful logic. O n t h e o n e h a n d , t h e normal/abnormal distinction is a p u r e g o o d / b a d e x c l u s i v e o p p o s i t i o n . O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , since t h e s e o p p o s i t e s are l o c a t e d o n o n e and t h e s a m e scale, it is easy to slide from o n e to t h e other, t h e b o r d e r is p e r m e a b l e . T h e normal and t h e abnormal are distinct na­ t u r e s , m e n and w o m e n , w h i t e and black, b u t it is p o s s i b l e to g e t sick, to lose moral v i g i l a n c e , and to d e g e n e r a t e . N i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y moral and m e d i c a l texts are full o f m a l e fears o f b e c o m i n g e f f e m i n a t e ( M o s s e , 1985, c h a p . 2). In this c o n t e x t a n e w d i s c o u r s e about aging d e v e l o p s . O n l y in t h e n i n e ­ t e e n t h c e n t u r y d o e s t h e r e e m e r g e a g e n e r a l cultural and m e d i c a l associa­ tion b e t w e e n old age and d i s e a s e , d e g e n e r a c y , and d e a t h . Traditional pa­ triarchal s o c i e t y m o r e often r e v e r e d t h e old m a n , and s o m e t i m e s e v e n t h e o l d w o m a n , as an e m b l e m of s t r e n g t h , e n d u r a n c e , and w i s d o m . N o w o l d age c o m e s i n c r e a s i n g l y to b e associated w i t h frailty, i n c o n t i n e n c e , s e n i l ­ ity, and m a d n e s s ( C o l e , 1986). W h i l e s u c h associations d o not originate in t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y (witness King Lear), o n c e again t h e n o r m a l i z i n g d i s c o u r s e of s c i e n c e and m e d i c i n e e n d o w s such associations w i t h t h e au­ thority of o b j e c t i v e truth. T h e d e g e n e r a c y of a g e , like that of race, is s u p -

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p o s e d l y a p p a r e n t in t h e o b j e c t i v e u g l i n e s s of old p e o p l e , e s p e c i a l l y old women. M o d e r n scientific reason thus g e n e r a t e d t h e o r i e s of h u m a n physical, moral, and a e s t h e t i c superiority, w h i c h p r e s u m e d t h e y o u n g w h i t e b o u r ­ g e o i s m a n as t h e n o r m . T h e unifying structure of that r e a s o n , w h i c h p r e ­ s u m e d a k n o w i n g subject purified of s e n s u o u s i m m e r s i o n in things, m a d e p o s s i b l e t h e objectification of o t h e r groups, and their p l a c e m e n t u n d e r a normalizing gaze.

C O N S C I O U S A C C E F I A N C E , U N C O N S C I O U S AVERSION

S o far I h a v e a d d r e s s e d t h e q u e s t i o n of h o w s o m e groups b e c o m e ugly and fearful b o d i e s b y r e v i e w i n g t h e construction of t h e o r i e s of racial, sexual, and m e n t a l superiority g e n e r a t e d b y n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y scientific reason. M a n y of t h e w r i t e r s I h a v e c i t e d s u g g e s t that t h e s e n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y s t r u c t u r e s c o n d i t i o n t h e i d e o l o g y and p s y c h o l o g y of g r o u p - b a s e d fears and p r e j u d i c e s in c o n t e m p o r a r y W e s t e r n capitalist societies. C o r n e l W e s t as­ serts, for e x a m p l e , that t h e racist c o n s e q u e n c e s of E n l i g h t e n m e n t c o n c e p ­ tions of reason and s c i e n c e ' c o n t i n u e to h a u n t t h e m o d e r n W e s t : o n t h e n o n - d i s c u r s i v e l e v e l , in g h e t t o streets, and o n t h e d i s c u r s i v e l e v e l , in m e t h o d o l o g i c a l a s s u m p t i o n s in t h e disciplines of t h e h u m a n i t i e s " (West, 1 9 8 2 , p. 48). B u t can w e a s s u m e such an e a s y c o n t i n u i t y b e t w e e n t h e racist, sexist, h o m o p h o b i c , a n d ageist i d e o l o g i e s of t h e past and t h e c o n t e m p o r a r y so­ cial situation of E u r o p e and N o r t h A m e r i c a ? M a n y w o u l d argue that c o n ­ d i t i o n s have so c h a n g e d as to r e n d e r t h e s e n i n e t e e n t h - and early t w e n t i ­ e t h - c e n t u r y t h e o r i e s and i d e o l o g i e s m e r e historical curiosities, w i t h n o r e l a t i o n s h i p to c o n t e m p o r a r y t h o u g h t s , feelings, and behavior. Rational d i s c u s s i o n and social m o v e m e n t s d i s c r e d i t e d t h e s e tracts of n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y scientific reason. After m u c h bitter struggle and not a f e w set­ backs, legal and social rules n o w e x p r e s s c o m m i t m e n t to e q u a l i t y a m o n g g r o u p s , to t h e p r i n c i p l e that all p e r s o n s d e s e r v e equal r e s p e c t and c o n s i d ­ e r a t i o n , w h a t e v e r t h e i r race, g e n d e r , religion, a g e , or e t h n i c i d e n t i ­ fication. T h o s e of us w h o a r g u e that racism, s e x i s m , h o m o p h o b i a , a g e i s m , and a b l e i s m are d e e p structures in c o n t e m p o r a r y social relations cannot dis­ m i s s as illusory t h e c o m m o n c o n v i c t i o n that i d e o l o g i e s of natural inferior­ ity a n d g r o u p d o m i n a t i o n no l o n g e r e x e r c i s e significant i n f l u e n c e in our s o c i e t y . N o r can w e plausibly regard t h e aversions and s t e r e o t y p e s w e claim p e r p e t u a t e o p p r e s s i o n today as s i m p l e , t h o u g h p e r h a p s w e a k e n e d , e x t e n s i o n s o f t h e g r o s s e r x e n o p h o b i a o f t h e past. M a n y p e o p l e d e n y c l a i m s that ours is a racist, sexist, ageist, ableist, h e t e r o s e x i s t s o c i e t y , p r e c i s e l y b e c a u s e t h e y identify t h e s e "isms" with scientifically l e g i t i m a t e d t h e o r i e s

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of g r o u p inferiority and socially s a n c t i o n e d e x c l u s i o n , d o m i n a t i o n , and d e n i g r a t i o n . To b e clear and p e r s u a s i v e in our claims about c o n t e m p o ­ rary g r o u p o p p r e s s i o n and its r e p r o d u c t i o n , w e m u s t affirm that explicit and d i s c u r s i v e l y f o c u s e d racism and s e x i s m h a v e lost c o n s i d e r a b l e legiti­ macy. W e m u s t identify a different social manifestation of t h e s e forms of g r o u p o p p r e s s i o n c o r r e s p o n d i n g to specific c o n t e m p o r a r y c i r c u m s t a n c e s , n e w forms w h i c h h a v e b o t h c o n t i n u i t i e s and d i s c o n t i n u i t i e s w i t h past structures. T o formulate such an a c c o u n t of c o n t e m p o r a r y manifestations of g r o u p o p p p r e s s i o n I a d o p t t h e t h r e e - l e v e l e d t h e o r y of s u b j e c t i v i t y that A n t h o n y G i d d e n s (1984) p r o p o s e s for u n d e r s t a n d i n g social relations and t h e i r re­ p r o d u c t i o n in action and social structures. Action and interaction, says G i d d e n s , i n v o l v e d i s c u r s i v e c o n s c i o u s n e s s , practical c o n s c i o u s n e s s , and a basic s e c u r i t y s y s t e m . D i s c u r s i v e c o n s c i o u s n e s s refers to t h o s e a s p e c t s of action and situation w h i c h are e i t h e r v e r b a l i z e d , f o u n d e d on explicit ver­ bal formula, or easily v e r b a l i z a b l e . Practical c o n s c i o u s n e s s , o n t h e o t h e r hand, refers to t h o s e a s p e c t s o f action and situation w h i c h i n v o l v e often c o m p l e x reflexive m o n i t o r i n g of t h e relation of t h e subject's b o d y to t h o s e of o t h e r s u b j e c t s and t h e s u r r o u n d i n g e n v i r o n m e n t , b u t w h i c h are o n t h e fringe of c o n s c i o u s n e s s , rather than t h e focus of d i s c u r s i v e a t t e n t i o n (cf. B o u r d i e u , 1977). Practical c o n s c i o u s n e s s is t h e habitual, r o u t i n i z e d back­ g r o u n d a w a r e n e s s that e n a b l e s p e r s o n s to a c c o m p l i s h f o c u s e d , i m m e d i ­ ately p u r p o s i v e action. For e x a m p l e , t h e action of driving to t h e g r o c e r y s t o r e and b u y i n g g o o d s o n m y s h o p p i n g list i n v o l v e s a h i g h l y c o m p l e x set of actions at t h e l e v e l of practical c o n s c i o u s n e s s , s u c h as driving t h e car itself and m a n e u v e r i n g t h e cart in t h e grocery store, w h e r e I h a v e ac­ q u i r e d a habitual s e n s e of t h e s p a c e in relation to t h e i t e m s I s e e k . "Basic s e c u r i t y s y s t e m " for G i d d e n s d e s i g n a t e s t h e basic l e v e l of i d e n ­ tity security and s e n s e of a u t o n o m y r e q u i r e d for any c o h e r e n t action in social c o n t e x t s ; o n e m i g h t call it t h e subject's ontological integrity. Psyc h o t i c s are t h o s e for w h o m a basic security s y s t e m has b r o k e n d o w n or n e v e r b e e n f o r m e d . G i d d e n s ' s t h e o r y of structuration a s s u m e s that social s t r u c t u r e s exist o n l y in their e n a c t m e n t t h r o u g h reflexively m o n i t o r e d ac­ tion, t h e a g g r e g a t e effects of that action, and t h e u n i n t e n d e d c o n s e ­ q u e n c e s of action. A c t i o n , in its turn, i n v o l v e s t h e socially situated body in a d y n a m i c of trust a n d anxiety in relation to its e n v i r o n m e n t , and e s p e ­ cially in relation to o t h e r actors: The prevalence of tact, trust or ontological security is achieved and sustained by a bewildering range of skills which agents deploy in the production and repro­ duction of interaction. Such skills are founded first and foremost in the normatively regulated control of what might seem . . . to be the tiniest, most insignif­ icant details of bodily movement and expression. (Giddens, 1984, p. 79)

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W h a t p s y c h o a n a l y s i s refers to as u n c o n s c i o u s e x p e r i e n c e and m o t i v a ­ tion occurs at t h e l e v e l of this basic security s y s t e m . In t h e p e r s o n a l i t y d e v e l o p m e n t of e a c h individual, s o m e e x p e r i e n c e s are r e p r e s s e d in t h e p r o c e s s of c o n t r u c t i n g a basic s e n s e of c o m p e t e n c e and a u t o n o m y . A n i n d e p e n d e n t u n c o n s c i o u s "language" results from t h e splitting of this e x ­ p e r i e n t i a l material off from t h e self's identity: it e m e r g e s in b o d i l y b e h a v ­ ior and r e a c t i o n s , i n c l u d i n g g e s t u r e s , t o n e of v o i c e , and e v e n , as F r e u d f o u n d , certain forms of s p e e c h or s y m b o l i z a t i o n t h e m s e l v e s . In e v e r y d a y action and i n t e r a c t i o n , t h e s u b j e c t reacts, introjects, and r e o r i e n t s itself in o r d e r to maintain or reinstate its basic security s y s t e m . Racism, s e x i s m , h o m o p h o b i a , a g e i s m , and a b l e i s m , I s u g g e s t , h a v e re­ c e d e d from t h e l e v e l that G i d d e n s refers to as discursive c o n s c i o u s n e s s . M o s t p e o p l e in our s o c i e t y do not c o n s c i o u s l y b e l i e v e that s o m e g r o u p s are b e t t e r than o t h e r s and for this reason d e s e r v e different social benefits ( s e e H o c h s c h i l d , 1988, p p . 7 5 - 7 6 ) . Public law in W e s t e r n capitalist s o c i e ­ t i e s , as w e l l as t h e explicit p o l i c i e s of corporations and o t h e r large institu­ t i o n s , has b e c o m e c o m m i t t e d to formal e q u a l i t y and e q u a l o p p o r t u n i t y for all g r o u p s . Explicit discrimination and e x c l u s i o n are f o r b i d d e n b y t h e for­ mal rules of our s o c i e t y for m o s t groups in m o s t situations. C o m m i t m e n t to formal e q u a l i t y for all p e r s o n s t e n d s also to s u p p o r t a p u b l i c e t i q u e t t e that d i s a p p r o v e s of s p e e c h and b e h a v i o r calling attention in p u b l i c s e t t i n g s to a person's sex, race, sexual orientation, class status, r e l i g i o n , and t h e like. In a fine restaurant waiters are s u p p o s e d to b e def­ e r e n t i a l to all p a t r o n s — w h e t h e r Black or w h i t e , trucker or s u r g e o n — a s t h o u g h t h e y w e r e aristocrats; o n t h e s u p e r m a r k e t l i n e , o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , n o b o d y g e t s special p r i v i l e g e s . Public e t i q u e t t e d e m a n d s that w e relate to p e o p l e as individuals o n l y , according e v e r y o n e t h e s a m e r e s p e c t and cour­ t e s i e s . C a l l i n g a t t e n t i o n to a person's b e i n g Black, or J e w i s h , or Arab, or old, or h a n d i c a p p e d , or rich, or poor, in public settings is in distinctly p o o r taste, as is b e h a v i n g toward s o m e p e o p l e w i t h o b v i o u s c o n d e s c e n ­ s i o n , w h i l e d e f e r r i n g to o t h e r s . C o n t e m p o r a r y social e t i q u e t t e r e m a i n s m o r e a m b i g u o u s about calling attention to a w o m a n ' s femininity, b u t t h e w o m e n ' s m o v e m e n t has h e l p e d c r e a t e social t r e n d s that m a k e it p o o r taste to b e h a v e in deferential or patronizing w a y s to w o m e n as w e l l . T h e ideal p r o m o t e d b y c u r r e n t social e t i q u e t t e is that t h e s e g r o u p differences s h o u l d not m a t t e r in our e v e r y d a y e n c o u n t e r s w i t h o n e another, that e s ­ p e c i a l l y in formal and i m p e r s o n a l d e a l i n g s , b u t m o r e g e n e r a l l y in all n o n familiar s e t t i n g s and situations, w e s h o u l d ignore facts of sex, race, e t h n i c ­ ity, class, p h y s i c a l ability, and age. T h e s e personal facts are s u p p o s e d to m a k e n o difference to h o w w e treat o n e another. I s h o u l d not e x a g g e r a t e t h e d e g r e e to w h i c h beliefs about t h e inferior­ ity, d e g e n e r a c y , or m a l i g n a n c y of s o m e groups h a v e r e c e d e d from c o n ­ s c i o u s n e s s . T h e r e c o n t i n u e to b e individuals and groups w h o are c o m m i t -

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t e d sexists and racists, t h o u g h in t h e d o m i n a n t liberal c o n t e x t t h e y m u s t often b e careful a b o u t h o w t h e y m a k e their claims if t h e y w i s h to b e heard. T h e o r i e s of racial and sexual inferiority, m o r e o v e r , c o n t i n u e to surface in o u r i n t e l l e c t u a l c u l t u r e , as in J e n s e n ' s t h e o r y of IQ differential. T h e y t o o , h o w e v e r , are o n t h e d e f e n s i v e and g e n e r a l l y fail to a c h i e v e w i d e a c c e p ­ t a n c e . But a l t h o u g h p u b l i c e t i q u e t t e m a y forbid d i s c u r s i v e l y c o n s c i o u s racism and s e x i s m , in t h e privacy of t h e living r o o m or locker room p e o p l e are often m o r e frank about t h e i r p r e j u d i c e s and p r e f e r e n c e s . Self-con­ s c i o u s racism, s e x i s m , h o m o p h o b i a , a g e i s m , and a b l e i s m are f u e l e d b y u n c o n s c i o u s m e a n i n g s and reactions that take place at t h e l e v e l s G i d d e n s calls practical c o n s c i o u s n e s s and t h e basic security s y s t e m . In a s o c i e t y c o m m i t t e d to formal e q u a l i t y for all groups, t h e s e u n c o n s c i o u s reactions are m o r e w i d e s p r e a d than d i s c u r s i v e p r e j u d i c e and d e v a l u a t i o n , and d o not n e e d t h e latter to r e p r o d u c e relations of p r i v i l e g e and o p p r e s s i o n . J u d g m e n t s of b e a u t y or u g l i n e s s , attraction or aversion, c l e v e r n e s s or stu­ pidity, c o m p e t e n c e or i n e p t n e s s , and so o n are m a d e u n c o n s c i o u s l y in i n t e r a c t i v e c o n t e x t s a n d in g e n e r a l i z e d m e d i a c u l t u r e , and t h e s e j u d g ­ m e n t s often mark, s t e r e o t y p e , d e v a l u e , or d e g r a d e s o m e g r o u p s . G r o u p differences, I a r g u e d in C h a p t e r 2, are not "natural' facts. T h e y are m a d e and c o n s t a n t l y r e m a d e in social interactions in w h i c h p e o p l e identify t h e m s e l v e s and o n e another. As long as g r o u p differences m a t t e r for t h e identification of self and o t h e r s — a s t h e y certainly d o in o u r soci­ e t y — i t is i m p o s s i b l e t o ignore t h o s e differences in e v e r y d a y e n c o u n t e r s . In m y interactions a person's sex, race, and a g e affect m y b e h a v i o r toward that p e r s o n , and w h e n a person's class status, o c c u p a t i o n , sexual orienta­ tion, or o t h e r forms o f social status are k n o w n or s u s p e c t e d , t h e s e also affect behavior. W h i t e p e o p l e t e n d to b e n e r v o u s around Black p e o p l e , m e n n e r v o u s a r o u n d w o m e n , e s p e c i a l l y in p u b l i c settings. In social inter­ action t h e socially s u p e r i o r g r o u p often avoids b e i n g c l o s e to t h e l o w e r status g r o u p , a v o i d s e y e contact, d o e s not k e e p t h e b o d y o p e n . A Black man walks i n t o a large r o o m at a b u s i n e s s c o n v e n t i o n and finds that t h e n o i s e l e v e l r e d u c e s , not to a h u s h , but definitely r e d u c e s . A w o m a n at a real e s t a t e office w i t h h e r h u s b a n d finds t h e d e a l e r p e r s i s ­ t e n t l y failing to a d d r e s s h e r or to look at her, e v e n w h e n s h e speaks to h i m directly. A w o m a n e x e c u t i v e is a n n o y e d that h e r m a l e boss usually t o u c h e s h e r w h e n t h e y talk, p u t t i n g his h a n d on h e r e l b o w , his arm a r o u n d h e r s h o u l d e r , in g e s t u r e s of p o w e r and fatherliness. An e i g h t y y e a r - o l d m a n w h o s e h e a r i n g is as g o o d as a t w e n t y - v e a r - o l d ' s finds that m a n y p e o p l e s h o u t at h i m w h e n t h e y speak, u s i n g babylike short s e n ­ t e n c e s t h e y m i g h t also u s e to speak to a p r e s c h o o l e r (Vesperi, 1985, p p . 50-59). M e m b e r s of o p p r e s s e d g r o u p s f r e q u e n t l y e x p e r i e n c e s u c h a v o i d a n c e , a v e r s i o n , e x p r e s s i o n s of n e r v o u s n e s s , c o n d e s c e n s i o n , and s t e r e o t y p i n g .

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For t h e m s u c h behavior, i n d e e d t h e w h o l e e n c o u n t e r , often painfully fills t h e i r d i s c u r s i v e c o n s c i o u s n e s s . S u c h b e h a v i o r throws t h e m back o n t o their g r o u p i d e n t i t y , making t h e m feel n o t i c e d , m a r k e d , or c o n v e r s e l y i n v i s i b l e , not taken seriously, or w o r s e , d e m e a n e d . T h o s e e x h i b i t i n g s u c h behavior, h o w e v e r , are rarely c o n s c i o u s o f their actions or h o w t h e y m a k e t h e o t h e r s feel. Many p e o p l e are q u i t e c o n ­ s c i o u s l y c o m m i t t e d to e q u a l i t y and r e s p e c t for w o m e n , p e o p l e of color, gays and l e s b i a n s , and d i s a b l e d p e o p l e , and n e v e r t h e l e s s in their b o d i e s and f e e l i n g h a v e reactions of aversion or a v o i d a n c e toward m e m b e r s of t h o s e g r o u p s . P e o p l e s u p p r e s s s u c h reactions from their d i s c u r s i v e c o n ­ s c i o u s n e s s for s e v e r a l reasons. First, as I will discuss in a later s e c t i o n , t h e s e e n c o u n t e r s and t h e reactions t h e y p r o v o k e threaten to s o m e d e g r e e t h e s t r u c t u r e of t h e i r basic security s y s t e m . S e c o n d , our c u l t u r e c o n t i n u e s to separate reason from t h e b o d y and affectivity, and therefore to i g n o r e and d e v a l u e t h e significance of b o d i l y reactions and feelings. Finally, t h e liberal i m p e r a t i v e that differences s h o u l d m a k e no difference puts a sanc­ tion of s i l e n c e o n t h o s e t h i n g s w h i c h at t h e l e v e l of practical c o n s c i o u s n e s s p e o p l e "know" a b o u t t h e significance of g r o u p differences. G r o u p s o p p r e s s e d b y structures of cultural imperialism that mark t h e m as t h e O t h e r s , as different, thus not o n l y suffer t h e h u m i l i a t i o n of a v e r s i v e , a v o i d i n g , or c o n d e s c e n d i n g behavior, b u t m u s t usually e x p e r i e n c e that b e h a v i o r in s i l e n c e , u n a b l e to c h e c k their p e r c e p t i o n s against t h o s e o f o t h e r s . T h e d o m i n a n t social e t i q u e t t e often finds it i n d e c o r o u s and tact­ less to point out racial, sexual, age, or ableist difference in p u b l i c and i m p e r s o n a l s e t t i n g s and e n c o u n t e r s . T h e discomfort and a n g e r of t h e o p ­ p r e s s e d at this b e h a v i o r of o t h e r s toward t h e m m u s t therefore remain u n s p o k e n if t h e y e x p e c t to b e i n c l u d e d in t h o s e p u b l i c c o n t e x t s , and not d i s t u r b t h e r o u t i n e s b y calling attention to forms of interaction. W h e n t h e m o r e b o l d of us d o c o m p l a i n of t h e s e m u n d a n e signs of s y s t e m a t i c o p p r e s ­ sion, w e are a c c u s e d o f b e i n g picky, o v e r r e a c t i n g , making s o m e t h i n g out of n o t h i n g , or o f c o m p l e t e l y m i s p e r c e i v i n g t h e situation. T h e c o u r a g e to bring to d i s c u r s i v e c o n s c i o u s n e s s b e h a v i o r and reactions occurring at t h e l e v e l o f practical c o n s c i o u s n e s s is m e t w i t h denial and powerful g e s t u r e s of s i l e n c i n g , w h i c h can m a k e o p p r e s s e d p e o p l e feel slightly crazy. U n c o n s c i o u s racism, s e x i s m , h o m o p h o b i a , a g e i s m , and a b l e i s m o c c u r not o n l y in b o d i l y reactions and f e e l i n g s and their e x p r e s s i o n in behavior, b u t also in j u d g m e n t s about p e o p l e or policies. W h e n p u b l i c morality is c o m m i t t e d to p r i n c i p l e s of e q u a l t r e a t m e n t and t h e equal w o r t h of all p e r s o n s , p u b l i c morality r e q u i r e s that j u d g m e n t s about t h e superiority or inferiority of p e r s o n s b e m a d e o n an individual basis according to i n d i v i d ­ ual c o m p e t e n c e s . As I will d i s c u s s further in C h a p t e r 7, h o w e v e r , fears, a v e r s i o n s , and d e v a l u a t i o n s of g r o u p s m a r k e d as different often u n c o n ­ s c i o u s l y e n t e r t h e s e j u d g m e n t s of c o m p e t e n c e . T h r o u g h a p h e n o m e n o n

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that Adrian P i p e r (1988) calls h i g h e r - o r d e r discrimination, p e o p l e fre­ q u e n t l y disparage attributes that in another p e r s o n w o u l d b e c o n s i d e r e d p r a i s e w o r t h y , b e c a u s e t h e y are a t t a c h e d to m e m b e r s of certain g r o u p s . A s s e r t i v e n e s s and i n d e p e n d e n t t h i n k i n g m a y b e r e g a r d e d as signs of g o o d character, of s o m e o n e y o u w o u l d w a n t o n your t e a m , b u t w h e n found in a w o m a n t h e y can b e c o m e s t r i d e n c y or inability to c o o p e r a t e . A w o m a n m a y value g e n t l e n e s s and s o f t s p o k e n n e s s in a m a n , b u t find t h e s e attri­ b u t e s in a gay man signs of s e c r e t i v e n e s s and a lack of integrity. A v e r s i o n to or d e v a l u a t i o n of certain g r o u p s is d i s p l a c e d o n t o a j u d g m e n t of charac­ t e r or c o m p e t e n c e s u p p o s e d l y u n c o n n e c t e d w i t h g r o u p attributes. B e ­ c a u s e t h e j u d g e r r e c o g n i z e s and s i n c e r e l y b e l i e v e s that p e o p l e s h o u l d not b e d e v a l u e d or a v o i d e d s i m p l y b e c a u s e of g r o u p m e m b e r s h i p , t h e j u d g e r d e n i e s that t h e s e j u d g m e n t s of c o m p e t e n c e h a v e a racist, sexist, or h o m o ­ p h o b i c basis. Similar p r o c e s s e s of d i s p l a c e m e n t often o c c u r in p u b l i c policy j u d g ­ m e n t s and t h e reasons g i v e n for t h e m . Since law and policy are formally c o m m i t t e d to e q u a l i t y , assertions of race or g e n d e r p r i v i l e g e c o m e c o d e d a n d u n d e r rubrics o t h e r than t h e assertion of racial or sexual superiority ( O m i and W i n a n t , 1983). Affirmative action d i s c u s s i o n is an important l o c u s of c o v e r t or u n c o n s c i o u s racism and s e x i s m . Charles L a w r e n c e (1987) a r g u e s that u n c o n s c i o u s racism u n d e r l i e s m a n y p u b l i c policy d e c i ­ sions w h e r e race is not explicitly at stake and t h e p o l i c y m a k e r s h a v e n o racist i n t e n t i o n s . In t h e late 1970s, for e x a m p l e , t h e city of M e m p h i s e r e c t e d a wall b e t w e e n t h e w h i t e and Black s e c t i o n s of t h e city; city officials' m o t i v e s w e r e to p r e s e r v e o r d e r and protect property. In m a n y cities t h e r e are s t r u g g l e s o v e r t h e location and character of p u b l i c h o u s ­ ing, in w h i c h t h e w h i t e participants d o not discuss race and m a y not think in t e r m s of race. L a w r e n c e a r g u e s that in cases s u c h as t h e s e u n c o n s c i o u s racism has a p o w e r f u l effect, and that o n e tests t h e p r e s e n c e of racism b y l o o k i n g at t h e cultural m e a n i n g of issues and d e c i s i o n s ; walls m e a n separa­ tion, p u b l i c h o u s i n g m e a n s p o o r Black g h e t t o s , in t h e cultural vocabulary of t h e s o c i e t y . T h e cultural m e a n i n g of AIDS in c o n t e m p o r a r y A m e r i c a as­ s o c i a t e s it w i t h gay m e n and gay life style, d e s p i t e v i g o r o u s efforts o n t h e part of m a n y p e o p l e to break this association; c o n s e q u e n t l y m u c h d i s c u s ­ sion about AIDS policy m a y i n v o l v e h o m o p h o b i a , e v e n w h e n t h e d i s c u s s ­ ants d o not m e n t i o n gay m e n . U n c o n s c i o u s racism, s e x i s m , h o m o p h o b i a , a g e i s m , and a b l e i s m are often at work, I h a v e s u g g e s t e d , in social interactions and p o l i c y m a k i n g . A final area w h e r e t h e s e a v e r s i o n s , fears, and d e v a l u a t i o n s are at work is t h e m a s s e n t e r t a i n m e n t m e d i a — m o v i e s , t e l e v i s i o n , m a g a z i n e s and t h e i r a d v e r t i s e m e n t s , and so forth. H o w is it p o s s i b l e , for e x a m p l e , for a s o c i e t y to p r o c l a i m in its formal rules and p u b l i c institutions that w o m e n are as c o m p e t e n t as m e n and s h o u l d b e c o n s i d e r e d on their m e r i t s for profes-

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sional j o b s , w h e n that s a m e s o c i e t y m a s s - p r o d u c e s and d i s t r i b u t e s slick m a g a z i n e s and m o v i e s d e p i c t i n g t h e a b u s e and degradation of w o m e n in i m a g e s i n t e n d e d to b e sexually arousing? T h e r e is n o contradiction h e r e if reality and reason are b o a r d e d off from fantasy and d e s i r e . T h e function of mass e n t e r t a i n m e n t m e d i a in our s o c i e t y appears to b e to e x p r e s s unbri­ d l e d fantasy; so f e e l i n g s , d e s i r e s , fears, aversions, and attractions are e x ­ p r e s s e d in t h e p r o d u c t s of mass c u l t u r e w h e n t h e y appear n o w h e r e e l s e . Racist, sexist, h o m o p h o b i c , ageist, and ableist s t e r e o t y p e s proliferate in t h e s e m e d i a , often in stark c a t e g o r i e s of t h e g l a m o u r o u s l y beautiful and t h e g r o t e s q u e l y ugly, t h e c o m f o r t i n g g o o d g u y and t h e t h r e a t e n i n g evil o n e . If p o l i t i c i z i n g a g e n t s call attention to such s t e r e o t y p e s and d e v a l u a ­ tions as e v i d e n c e of d e e p and harmful o p p r e s s i o n of t h e groups s t e r e o ­ t y p e d and d e g r a d e d , t h e y are often m e t w i t h t h e r e s p o n s e that t h e y s h o u l d not take t h e s e i m a g e s seriously, b e c a u s e their v i e w e r s d o not; t h e s e are o n l y h a r m l e s s fantasies, and e v e r y o n e k n o w s t h e y h a v e n o rela­ t i o n s h i p to reality. O n c e m o r e reason is separated from t h e b o d y and d e ­ sire, and rational s e l v e s d e n y a t t a c h m e n t to their b o d i e s and d e s i r e s .

BEHAVIORAL N O R M S OF RESPECTABILITY

I h a v e c o n s i d e r e d h o w t h e d i s c o u r s e of m o d e r n reason c r e a t e d t h e natu­ ralized c a t e g o r i e s of d e v i a n t , deficient, and d i s e a s e d w o m e n , Blacks, J e w s , h o m o s e x u a l s , and o l d p e o p l e . T h e constitution of m o d e r n scientific reason itself s a n c t i o n e d t h e objectification of groups e x p e l l e d from t h e p r i v i l e g e d s u b j e c t position o c c u p i e d b y t h e w h i t e male b o u r g e o i s , bring­ i n g t h e m u n d e r t h e scrutiny o f a gaze that m e a s u r e d , w e i g h e d , and classi­ fied their b o d i l y attributes a c c o r d i n g to a standard of w h i t e male y o u t h f u l n e s s . M o d e r n racism, m i s o g y n y , and h o m o p h o b i a , h o w e v e r , are not o n l y g r o u n d e d in t h e d i s c o u r s e of s c i e n c e and p h i l o s o p h y . N o r m a l i z i n g r e a s o n , t h e reason o f a s u b j e c t purified of b o d y and c h a n g e , a reason that m a s t e r s and controls t h e o b j e c t s fixed b y its m e a s u r i n g g a z e , e n t e r s e v e r y ­ d a y life in w h a t G e o r g e M o s s e calls t h e ideal of respectability that d o m i ­ n a t e d n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y b o u r g e o i s morality. I am not c o n c e r n e d h e r e w i t h t h e c a u s e s o f t h e s e n o r m s of r e s p e c t a b i l i t y — w i t h h o w , for e x a m p l e , t h e ideal of r e s p e c t a b i l i t y was c o n n e c t e d w i t h t h e d e v e l o p m e n t industrial capitalism. I shall d e s c r i b e only s o m e of t h e c o n t e n t and significance of t h o s e n o r m s , to s h o w h o w t h e y structure racism, s e x i s m , h o m o p h o b i a , and a g e i s m . R e s p e c t a b i l i t y consists in c o n f o r m i n g to n o r m s that r e p r e s s sexuality, b o d i l y functions, and e m o t i o n a l e x p r e s s i o n . It is linked to an idea of order: t h e r e s p e c t a b l e p e r s o n is c h a s t e , m o d e s t , d o e s not e x p r e s s lustful d e s i r e s , p a s s i o n , s p o n t a n e i t y , or e x u b e r a n c e , is frugal, clean, g e n t l y s p o k e n , and w e l l m a n n e r e d . T h e o r d e r l i n e s s of respectability m e a n s things are u n d e r control, e v e r y t h i n g in its p l a c e , not crossing t h e borders.

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R e s p e c t a b l e b e h a v i o r is p r e o c c u p i e d with c l e a n l i n e s s and p r o p r i e t y , m e t i c u l o u s rules of d e c e n c y . R u l e s g o v e r n m i n u t e aspects o f e v e r y d a y b e h a v i o r c o n c e r n i n g b o d i l y function and t h e a r r a n g e m e n t of t h e e n v i r o n ­ m e n t . T h e b o d y s h o u l d b e c l e a n in all r e s p e c t s , and c l e a n e d of its a s p e c t s that b e t o k e n its f l e s h i n e s s — f l u i d s , dirt, s m e l l s . T h e e n v i r o n m e n t in w h i c h r e s p e c t a b l e p e o p l e d w e l l m u s t also b e clean, purified: n o dirt, n o dust, n o g a r b a g e , and all signs of b o d i l y f u n c t i o n — e a t i n g , e x c r e t i n g , sex, birth­ i n g — s h o u l d b e h i d d e n b e h i n d c l o s e d doors. B o u r g e o i s morality c r e a t e d a s p h e r e of individual privacy, w h e r e t h e r e s p e c t a b l e individual w o u l d b e a l o n e w i t h his or h e r b o d y , taking care, b r i n g i n g it u n d e r control and m a k i n g it ready for p u b l i c view. R e s p e c t a b l e b e h a v i o r i n v o l v e s k e e p i n g t h e b o d y c o v e r e d and not e x h i b i t i n g its functions: so strict n o r m s g o v e r n h o w to eat, silently, w i t h n o b e l c h i n g , b u r p i n g , or farting. S p e e c h is also g o v e r n e d b y rules of d e c e n c y : s o m e w o r d s are clean and r e s p e c t a b l e , o t h ­ ers dirty, and m a n y , e s p e c i a l l y t h o s e relating to t h e b o d y or sexuality, s h o u l d not b e m e n t i o n e d in r e s p e c t a b l e c o m p a n y . M a n y b o u r g e o i s rules of d e c o r u m — s u c h as t h e s e g o v e r n i n g m o d e s of a d d r e s s , g e s t u r e s of re­ s p e c t , w h e r e to sit, or h o w to sip b r a n d y — d o not apply directly to b o d i l y f u n c t i o n s . But all m a n n e r s c o m e to b e associated with b o d i l y d e c e n c y , restraint, and c l e a n l i n e s s . As I d i s c u s s e d in C h a p t e r 4 , g e n d e r polarization was a crucial a s p e c t of t h e o r d e r l i n e s s of b o u r g e o i s respectability. M o d e r n b o u r g e o i s s o c i e t y c r e ­ a t e d a c o m p l e m e n t a r y o p p o s i t i o n of g e n d e r s m u c h s t r o n g e r than had e x ­ i s t e d before: w o m e n are identified with t h e b o d y and sexuality, e s p e c i a l l y as e m o t i o n , w h i l e m e n stand o n t h e side of d i s e m b o d i e d reason. T h e b o u r ­ g e o i s i d e o l o g y of g e n d e r in t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y allocated e a c h g e n d e r its p r o p e r physical a n d social s p h e r e , t h e s p h e r e of politics and c o m m e r c e for m e n , t h e s p h e r e of h o m e and family for w o m e n . As morally inferior, t i e d to maternal instinct and t h e particularity of love, w o m e n c o u l d not attain t h e h e i g h t s of d i s c i p l i n e , virtue, and self-control r e q u i r e d of re­ s p e c t a b l e m e n . But w o m e n t o o w e r e to o b s e r v e strict c o d e s of propriety m a n y of w h i c h attached to t h e b o d y and sexuality. T h e c o d e s of b o u r g e o i s respectability m a d e masculinity and f e m i n i n i t y m u t u a l l y e x c l u s i v e and yet c o m p l e m e n t a r y o p p o s i t e s . As s u c h , g e n d e r d i c h o t o m y is ruled b y a logic of i d e n t i t y that d e n i e s or r e p r e s s e s differ­ e n c e , in t h e s e n s e of plurality, h e t e r o g e n e i t y , t h e i n c o m m e n s u r a b i l i t y of e x p e r i e n c e s that c a n n o t b e b r o u g h t u n d e r a c o m m o n m e a s u r e . T h e strict d i m o r p h i s m and c o m p l e m e n t a r i t y of masculinity and f e m i n i n i t y bring re­ s p e c t a b l e w o m e n u n d e r control, in t h e paternal care o f r e s p e c t a b l e m e n . T h e s e m e n are t h e s u b j e c t s , and their w o m e n reflect and reinforce t h e m in l o v e , s e r v i c e , and n u r t u r a n c e . W i t h w o m a n s e r v i n g as man's h e l p m e e t a n d c o m p l e m e n t , w o r k i n g as guardian o v e r his bodily, sexual, and e m o ­ tional n e e d s and at t h e s a m e t i m e e x e m p t i n g h i m from association w i t h her, t h e s o c i e t y is orderly.

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B o u r g e o i s g e n d e r polarization r e p r e s e n t s a denial of difference b e c a u s e in t h e r e s p e c t a b l e c o u p l e t h e r e was o n l y o n e subjectivity. M o s s e s h o w s h o w t h e v i r t u e s of r e s p e c t a b i l i t y w e r e primarily virtues of m a n l i n e s s . T h e p r i m a r y v i r t u e of m a n l i n e s s is s e l f - m a s t e r y — t h e ability to restrain t h e e x p r e s s i o n of p a s s i o n , d e s i r e , sexuality, b o d i l y n e e d , i m p l u s e . Self-mas­ tery r e q u i r e s d i s c i p l i n e and v i g i l a n c e , and o n l y h e w h o a c h i e v e s t h e m is truly rational, c o m p e t e n t , and d e s e r v i n g of positions of authority; o n l y t h e m a n w h o p r o p e r l y d i s c i p l i n e s h i m s e l f s h o u l d b e in t h e p o s i t i o n to disci­ p l i n e o t h e r s . This m a n is truly i n d e p e n d e n t and a u t o n o m o u s : t h e r e is n o t h i n g a b o u t his b e h a v i o r that overflows, g e t s away from h i m ; h e is c o m ­ p l e t e l y t h e a u t h o r and origin of his action. M o s s e a r g u e s that in t h e n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y ideal of r e s p e c t a b l e m a n l y virtue lay a h o m o e r o t i c i s m that l e g i t i m a t e d b o n d s of a t t a c h m e n t a m o n g m e n b y r e p r e s s i n g sexual definition of t h o s e b o n d s . As I already n o t e d , t h e w h i t e m a l e y o u t h e x p r e s s e d t h e ideal of a passionate, b u t d e s e x u a l i z e d , b e a u t y . T h e w h i t e m a l e b o u r g e o i s unity and universality w h i c h i m ­ plicitly d e f i n e d t h e i d e a of t h e p u b l i c in t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y r e a c h e d its m o s t arrogant d e v e l o p m e n t in nationalism. In nationalism sexuality w a s s u b l i m a t e d into l o v e of nation and e m p i r e . Nationalist s e n t i m e n t s and loyalty w e r e p u r s u e d in a h o m o e r o t i c b r o t h e r h o o d that e x c l u d e d w o m e n , t h e refined c l u b s a n d fields o f t h e soldier, s t a t e s m a n , and E m p i r e b u r e a u ­ crat. This nationalism c o n t r i b u t e d b o t h materially and ideologically to t h e racialization of n o n w h i t e p e o p l e s , to their c o n f i n e m e n t o u t s i d e t h e b o r d e r of r e s p e c t a b i l i t y (cf. A n d e r s o n , 1983). To b e r e s p e c t a b l e m e a n s to b e l o n g to a "civilized" p e o p l e , w h o s e m a n n e r s and morals are m o r e "advanced" than t h o s e of "savage" or backward p e o p l e s . In this s c h e m a p e o p l e of color are naturally e m b o d i e d , amoral, e x p r e s s i v e , u n d i s c i p l i n e d , u n c l e a n , lack­ ing in self-control. I h a v e s u g g e s t e d that it is a mistake to c o n s t r u e t h e racism, s e x i s m , c l a s s i s m , h o m o p h o b i a , a g e i s m , and a b l e i s m o f c o n t e m p o r a r y W e s t e r n in­ dustrial s o c i e t i e s as s i m p l y c o n t i n u o u s w i t h their n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y p r e d e c e s s o r s . A n a c c o u n t of t h e s e c o n t e m p o r a r y p r i v i l e g e s and o p p r e s ­ sions m u s t p r o c e e d as m u c h from t h e historical differences as from t h e c o n t i n u i t i e s . O n e major difference is that racism, s e x i s m , h o m o p h o b i a , a g e i s m , and a b l e i s m are n o l o n g e r for t h e m o s t part d i s c u r s i v e l y c o n ­ s c i o u s , b u t exist in behavior, i m a g e s , and attitudes primarily at t h e l e v e l of practical c o n s c i o u s n e s s and t h e basic security s y s t e m . Similarly, o n e can ask to w h a t d e g r e e c o n t e m p o r a r y s o c i e t y retains t h e cult of m a n l y v i r t u e and r e s p e c t a b i l i t y , w h i c h i n h e r e n t l y e x c l u d e s w o m e n , n o n w h i t e s , and h o m o s e x u a l s from t h e rational p u b l i c b e c a u s e t h e s e groups are associ­ a t e d w i t h sexuality and t h e body. A d i s c o n t i n u i t y s e e m s o b v i o u s : w h e r e a s Victorian morality r e p r e s s e d and d e v a l u e d sexual e x p r e s s i o n , at least for r e s p e c t a b l e p e o p l e , c o n t e m -

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porary W e s t e r n a d v a n c e d industrial s o c i e t i e s allow, if not i n d e e d glorify, sexual e x p r e s s i o n , for just about e v e r y o n e . W e can a g r e e w i t h M a r c u s e ( 1 9 6 4 , c h a p . 3) that in m a n y ways this m o d e r n sexuality is repressively d e s u b l i m a t e d , a p e r f o r m a n c e - o r i e n t e d , a c c u m u l a t i o n - p r o m o t i n g superfi­ cial sexuality, b u t t h e r e s e e m s no d o u b t that in gentrified c o n s u m e r soci­ e t y sex is raw, not s u b l i m a t e d . T h e sexualization of s o c i e t y has e n t a i l e d a b l u r r i n g of t h e b o r d e r b e t w e e n t y p e s of p e r s o n s w h o are r e s p e c t a b l e and t h o s e w h o are not. As t h e b o d i e s of w h i t e m e n are increasingly and o p e n l y s e x u a l i z e d t h e stigma of e m b o d i e d sexuality n o l o n g e r attaches so c o m ­ p l e t e l y to w o m e n , Blacks, and h o m o s e x u a l s . S i m u l t a n e o u s l y it b e c o m e s p o s s i b l e to a d m i t for t h e s e formerly d e s p i s e d groups a level of rational­ ity d e n i e d t h e m before. T h e d i c h o t o m i e s b e t w e e n reason and t h e b o d y , s e l f - d i s c i p l i n e and sexual e x p r e s s i o n , cool d e t a c h m e n t and affectivity, n o l o n g e r so clearly m a p o n t o a distinction b e t w e e n g r o u p s , but e n t e r into t h e c o m p o s i t i o n of e v e r y o n e ' s life. T h e o p p r e s s i o n of p o w e r l e s s n e s s d e r i v e s in part from an ideal of re­ spectability w h i c h c o n t e m p o r a r y s o c i e t y retains in t h e virtues and b e h a v ­ ior of t h e "professional.'' It is paradigmatically in t h e office, or at b u s i n e s s m e e t i n g s , that p e r s o n s in c o n t e m p o r a r y society follow t h e rules of d e c o ­ rum typical of b o u r g e o i s respectability, and in t h e s e settings p e o p l e eval­ u a t e o n e a n o t h e r a c c o r d i n g to t h o s e rules. W h e r e a s in t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y r e s p e c t a b i l i t y a t t a c h e d to a single g r o u p or class, w h o s e d u t y it w a s to e x h i b i t its v i r t u e s in all a s p e c t s of their lives, today t h e c o d e of r e s p e c t a b i l i t y has b e e n n a r r o w e d to p u b l i c institutions and practices of b u s i n e s s . In p r i n c i p l e , m o r e o v e r , a n y o n e can b e r e s p e c t a b l e , t h o u g h w e shall s e e b e l o w h o w g r o u p difference u n d e r m i n e s this principle. T h e n o r m s of "professional" c o m p o r t m e n t entail r e p r e s s i o n of t h e b o d y ' s p h y s i c a l i t y and e x p r e s s i v e n e s s . It g o e s w i t h o u t saying that r e s p e c t ­ able, professional n o r m s r e q u i r e e l i m i n a t i n g or c o v e r i n g all b o d i l y odors, b e i n g c l e a n and "clean-cut." In d r e s s , professional m e n follow t h e basic form of n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y r e s p e c t a b l e m a l e dress. T h e "business suit" is straight and angular, w i t h n o frills or d e c o r a t i o n , in fabric of fine w e a v e a n d d u r a b l e w e i g h t , in drab colors revealingly referred to as "neutral." S i n c e w o m e n ' s c l o t h e s h a v e in m o d e r n W e s t e r n s o c i e t y b e e n so different from m e n ' s , w i t h m o r e color, fabric, and decoration, t h e age of t h e busi­ n e s s w o m a n has c r e a t e d a m b i g u i t i e s and variations in professional dress. T h e c o d e for t h e truly professional w o m a n ' s d r e s s , h o w e v e r , s e e m s to h a v e s e t t l e d o n a f e m a l e v e r s i o n of t h e b u s i n e s s suit, w i t h a s i m p l e k n e e l e n g t h skirt i n s t e a d of pants, and p e r m i t t i n g m o r e colorful b l o u s e s than t h e shirts a p p r o p r i a t e w i t h t h e m a l e b u s i n e s s suit. Professional b e h a v i o r , w h i c h in this s o c i e t y signifies rationality and aut h o r i t a t i v e n e s s , r e q u i r e s specific w a y s of sitting, standing, walking, and s p e a k i n g — n a m e l y , w i t h o u t u n d u e e x p r e s s i o n . Professional c o m p o r t m e n t

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entails an affable c h e e r , b u t w i t h o u t e x c i t e m e n t or d e m o n s t r a t i v e n e s s . In s p e a k i n g o n e s h o u l d k e e p o n e ' s v o i c e steady, certainly not g i g g l i n g or e x p r e s s i n g s a d n e s s , anger, d i s a p p o i n t m e n t , or uncertainty. O n e s h o u l d speak firmly, w i t h o u t hesitation or a m b i g u i t y , and slang, dialect, and ac­ c e n t s h o u l d b e a b s e n t from one's s p e e c h . It is inappropriate to s p e a k excit­ e d l y or to e m b e l l i s h one's s p e e c h w i t h broad g e s t u r e s . In t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y n o r m s of respectability m o s t g u i d e d t h e b e ­ havior of a particular g r o u p , w h i t e b o u r g e o i s m e n , w i t h a c o m p l e m e n t a r y s e t of n o r m s for t h e w o m e n u n d e r their rule. Blacks, J e w s , w o m e n , h o m o ­ s e x u a l s , and working-class p e o p l e all t e n d e d to b e associated w i t h t h e u n r u l y h e t e r o g e n e i t y of t h e b o d y and affectivity, and therefore w e r e re­ g a r d e d as o u t s i d e t h e c u l t u r e of respectability. In c o n t e m p o r a r y s o c i e t y , I h a v e s u g g e s t e d , t h e d i c h o t o m y b e t w e e n reason and t h e b o d y is n o l o n g e r so firmly t i e d to groups. In principle all groups are said to b e b o t h rational and b o d i l y . I h a v e a r g u e d , h o w e v e r , that racist, sexist, and h e t e r osexist reactions of aversion of n e r v o u s n e s s still mark o u t t h e b o d i l y b e i n g of s o m e g r o u p s , b u t that such marking s o m e t i m e s d o e s not appear at t h e l e v e l of d i s c u r s i v e c o n s c i o u s n e s s . W h i l e certain groups are n o l o n g e r ex­ c l u d e d from formal o p p o r t u n i t y to participate in r e s p e c t e d professions, n e v e r t h e l e s s t h e situation of groups v i c t i m i z e d b y cultural i m p e r i a l i s m i m p e d e s their successful a t t a i n m e n t of professional equality. D e s p i t e t h e claim that professional c o m p o r t m e n t is neutral, it is in fact t h e p r o d u c t of socialization into a particular culture. W h i t e A n g l o h e t e r o ­ sexual m i d d l e - c l a s s m e n are m o s t socialized into this c u l t u r e , w h e r e a s w o m e n , Blacks, Latinos, p o o r and working-class p e o p l e , gay m e n and l e s ­ bians, t e n d to e x h i b i t cultural habits that d e v i a t e from or conflict w i t h professional c u l t u r e . T h e reasons for t h e s e differences are m u l t i p l e . T h e s e g r o u p s p r o m o t e a p o s i t i v e c u l t u r e a m o n g t h e m s e l v e s that has m o r e "col­ orful" or e x p r e s s i v e styles than are d e e m e d appropriate in straight profes­ sional c u l t u r e . T h e socializing a g e n t s o f professional c u l t u r e , m o r e o v e r , particularly t e a c h e r s , often g i v e m o r e r e i n f o r c e m e n t to w h i t e m i d d l e class m e n in d e v e l o p i n g a d i s c i p l i n e d , articulate, rational c o m p o r t m e n t than to m e m b e r s of o t h e r g r o u p s , b e c a u s e d o m i n a n t cultural i m a g e r y c o n ­ t i n u e s to identify t h e m as t h e paradigm professionals. "Assimilation" into t h e d o m i n a n t c u l t u r e , a c c e p t a n c e into t h e rosters of relative p r i v i l e g e , r e q u i r e s that m e m b e r s of formerly e x c l u d e d g r o u p s a d o p t professional p o s t u r e s and s u p p r e s s t h e e x p r e s s i v e n e s s of their b o d ­ ies. T h u s e m e r g e s for all w h o h a v e not lost t h e i m p u l s e s o f l i f e and e x p r e s ­ sion a n e w kind of distinction b e t w e e n p u b l i c and private, in b o d i l y b e h a v ­ ior. M y p u b l i c self is m y b e h a v i o r in bureaucratic institutions, sitting, s t a n d i n g , w a l k i n g correctly," m a n a g i n g m y i m p r e s s i o n . M y "private" b e ­ havior is relaxed, m o r e e x p r e s s i v e in t h e b o d y , at h o m e w i t h m y family or socializing w i t h m e m b e r s of t h e g r o u p w i t h w h i c h I identify.

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T h e l i v e d distinction b e t w e e n p u b l i c , r e s p e c t a b l e c o m p o r t m e n t s and p r i v a t e , m o r e casual c o m p o r t m e n t s i n t e r s e c t s with t h e interactive d y n a m ­ ics of racism, s e x i s m , h o m o p h o b i a , a g e i s m , and a b l e i s m . In "private" set­ t i n g s , w h e r e p e o p l e are m o r e relaxed, t h e y m a y e x p r e s s d e v a l u i n g j u d g ­ m e n t s a b o u t m e m b e r s of o t h e r g r o u p s that t h e y r e p r e s s in "public" s e t t i n g s of formal rules and bureaucratic impersonality. For w o m e n , d i s a b l e d p e o p l e , Blacks, Latinos, gay m e n , l e s b i a n s , a n d o t h e r s that c o n t i n u e to b e m a r k e d out as t h e O t h e r , h o w e v e r , t h e r e re­ m a i n s a n o t h e r o b s t a c l e to respectability. E v e n if t h e y successfully ex­ hibit t h e n o r m s of respectability, their physical p r e s e n c e c o n t i n u e s to b e m a r k e d , s o m e t h i n g o t h e r s take n o t e of, and, I h a v e a r g u e d , often e v o k e s u n c o n s c i o u s r e a c t i o n s of n e r v o u s n e s s or aversion in others. In b e i n g thus c h a i n e d to their b o d i l y b e i n g t h e y c a n n o t b e fully and u n - s e l f - c o n s c i o u s l y r e s p e c t a b l e a n d professional, and t h e y are not so c o n s i d e r e d . U p o n first m e e t i n g s o m e o n e t h e y m u s t "prove" t h r o u g h their professional c o m p o r t ­ m e n t that t h e y are r e s p e c t a b l e , and their lives are constantly d o g g e d b y s u c h trials, w h i c h , t h o u g h surely not a b s e n t from t h e lives of w h i t e m e n , are less regular.

X E N O P H O B I A A N D ABJECTION

In his study of w h i t e racism, Joel K o v e l (1970) d i s t i n g u i s h e s t h r e e ideal t y p e s : d o m i n a t i v e racism, a v e r s i v e racism, and m e t a r a c i s m . D o m i n a t i v e racism i n v o l v e s direct m a s t e r y that has its m o s t o b v i o u s manifestations in e n s l a v e m e n t and o t h e r forms of forced labor, race status rules that privi­ l e g e w h i t e s , and g e n o c i d e . W h e r e a s s u c h d o m i n a t i o n usually entails fre­ q u e n t , often daily and i n t i m a t e association b e t w e e n m e m b e r s of racial g r o u p s , a v e r s i v e racism is a racism of a v o i d a n c e and separation. F r o m w h a t K o v e l calls m e t a r a c i s m , finally, almost all traces of a c o m m i t m e n t to race superiority h a v e b e e n r e m o v e d , and only t h e g r i n d i n g p r o c e s s e s of a w h i t e - d o m i n a t e d e c o n o m y and t e c h n o l o g y a c c o u n t for t h e c o n t i n u e d mis­ e r y of m a n y p e o p l e of color. W h i l e a c c o r d i n g to K o v e l all t h r e e t y p e s of racism exist in c o n t e m p o ­ rary A m e r i c a n s o c i e t y , h e thinks t h e y n e v e r t h e l e s s c o r r e s p o n d roughly to s t a g e s in t h e history of w h i t e racism, e s p e c i a l l y in t h e U n i t e d States. T h e n i n t e e n t h c e n t u r y , e s p e c i a l l y in t h e S o u t h , saw d o m i n a t i v e racism as t h e primary form, w i t h strong strains of a v e r s i v e racism a m o n g t h e liberal N o r t h e r n b o u r g e o i s i e w h o c l a i m e d to b e free of racism. In t h e c o n t e m p o ­ rary U n i t e d States, racism takes primarily t h e form of a v e r s i v e racism, w i t h t h e i n c r e a s i n g significance of metaracism, T h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n d o m i n a t i v e and a v e r s i v e racism can b e m a p p e d o n t o t h e shift I h a v e o u t l i n e d from d i s c u r s i v e c o n s c i o u s n e s s to practical c o n s c i o u s n e s s and basic security s y s t e m . In n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y

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racist c u l t u r e , along w i t h s e x i s m and h e t e r o s e x i s m , explicit t h e o r i e s of s u p e r i o r b o d i e s and character w e r e e x p r e s s e d , and Blacks, J e w s , w o m e n , h o m o s e x u a l s , and w o r k i n g p e o p l e w e r e c o n s t r u c t e d as h a v i n g d e g e n e r a t e or inferior n a t u r e s that justified their d o m i n a t i o n by w h i t e b o u r g e o i s m e n . In c o n t e m p o r a r y s o c i e t y t h e s e o p p r e s s i o n s exist less in t h e form of o v e r t d o m i n a t i o n than as a v o i d a n c e s , a v e r s i o n s , and separations e n a c t e d b y t h e p r i v i l e g e d in relation to t h e o p p r e s s e d . Kovel's project is to g i v e a p s y c h o d y n a m i c account of racism. H e s u g ­ g e s t s that d o m i n a t i v e racism and a v e r s i v e racism i n v o l v e different i s s u e s and p r o c e s s e s in t h e u n c o n s c i o u s of w h i t e W e s t e r n culture. D o m i n a t i v e racism, h e s u g g e s t s , i n v o l v e s primarily oedipal issues of sexual object and c o n q u e s t , and t h e issues of c o m p e t i t i o n and aggression p l a y e d out (for m e n ) in t h e o e d i p a l drama. T h e explicit p r e o c c u p a t i o n w i t h genitals and sexuality in n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y racist d i s c o u r s e is a s y m p t o m of this o e d i ­ pal p s y c h e , A v e r s i v e racism, o n t h e o t h e r hand, digs m o r e d e e p l y into a p r e o e d i p a l , anal m o m e n t of f u n d a m e n t a l fantasies of dirt and pollution. K o v e l finds this racism m o r e c o n s o n a n t w i t h t h e spirit of m o d e r n capitalist and i n s t r u m e n t a l rationality. M o d e r n scientific c o n s c i o u s n e s s s e e k s to re­ d u c e t h e self to p u r e m i n d abstracted from sensuality and material i m m e r ­ sion in n a t u r e . S u c h an u r g e for purity in t h e c o n t e x t of p o w e r c r e a t e s s o m e g r o u p s as s c a p e g o a t s , r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of t h e e x p e l l e d b o d y s t a n d i n g o v e r against t h e purified and abstracted subject. O p p r e s s i o n in c o n t e m p o r a r y s o c i e t y as structured by reactions of aver­ sion, I h a v e s u g g e s t e d , is not l i m i t e d to racism, b u t also d e s c r i b e s an a s p e c t of s e x i s m , h o m o p h o b i a , a g e i s m , and a b l e i s m . Blacks, Latinos, Asians, gays and lesbians, old p e o p l e , d i s a b l e d p e o p l e and often p o o r p e o ­ p l e , e x p e r i e n c e n e r v o u s n e s s or avoidance from others, e v e n from t h o s e w h o s e d i s c u r s i v e c o n s c i o u s n e s s a i m s to treat t h e m w i t h r e s p e c t as e q u a l s . T h i s d o e s not m e a n that all t h e s e g r o u p o p p r e s s i o n s are t h e s a m e . E a c h o p p r e s s e d g r o u p has a specific i d e n t i t y and history that c a n n o t b e r e d u c e d to a n y other. In C h a p t e r 2 I explicated five aspects of o p p r e s s i o n , various c o m b i n a t i o n s and i n s t a n c e s of w h i c h a particular o p p r e s s e d g r o u p m a y e x p e r i e n c e , b u t n o n e of w h i c h is a n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n of o p p r e s s i o n . O n e f u n c t i o n of s u c h a plural m o d e l of o p p r e s s i o n is to avoid r e d u c t i o n i s m in d i s c u s s i n g g r o u p o p p r e s s i o n . I b e l i e v e that all t h e groups n a m e d a b o v e o c c u p y a similar status as d e s p i s e d , ugly, or fearful b o d i e s , as a crucial e l e m e n t of their o p p r e s s i o n . B e l o w I offer an a c c o u n t of that status, w h i c h I think a p p l i e s in similar w a y s to all t h e s e groups. This a c c o u n t r e p r e s e n t s o n l y o n e slice, if y o u will, of t h e o p p r e s s i o n s of racism, s e x i s m , h o m o p h o ­ bia, a g e i s m , and a b l e i s m . W i t h t h e c o n c e p t of t h e abject, Julia Kristeva offers a m e a n s of u n d e r ­ s t a n d i n g b e h a v i o r and interactions that e x p r e s s g r o u p - b a s e d fear or loath­ i n g w h i c h is similar to Kovel's a c c o u n t of a v e r s i v e racism, t h o u g h not so

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t h o r o u g h l y F r e u d i a n . In Powers of Horror (19S2), as in m u c h of h e r o t h e r work, Kristeva quarrels w i t h t h e e m p h a s i s of F r e u d i a n psychoanalysis o n e g o d e v e l o p m e n t , t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of t h e capacity for s y m b o l i z a t i o n and r e p r e s e n t a t i o n that signals t h e e m e r g e n c e of an identical self o v e r against w h i c h stand o b j e c t s , r e p r e s e n t a b l e , definable, d e s i r e d , and m a n i p u l a b l e . In Kristeva's v i e w p s y c h o a n a l y t i c t h e o r y has paid too little attention to p r e o e d i p a l p r o c e s s e s of drive organization in w h i c h t h e figure of t h e m o t h e r s t r u c t u r e s affect, as o p p o s e d to t h e o e d i p a l e p i s o d e structured b y t h e l a w - g i v i n g father. In o t h e r w r i t i n g s Kristeva i n t r o d u c e s a distinction b e t w e e n t h e s y m ­ b o l i c and t h e s e m i o t i c as t w o i r r e d u c i b l e , h e t e r o g e n e o u s aspects of lan­ g u a g e (Kristeva, 1977). T h e s y m b o l i c is t h e capacity to signify, to m a k e o n e e l e m e n t stand for an a b s e n t other, t h e possibility of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , s e n s e , logic. S y m b o l i c capacity d e p e n d s on certain r e p r e s s i o n s , o n t h e o p p o s i t i o n b e t w e e n c o n s c i o u s and u n c o n s c i o u s association. T h e s e m i o t i c , on t h e o t h e r h a n d , is t h e h e t e r o g e n e o u s , bodily, material, n o n s e n s i c a l a s p e c t of s p e e c h always p r e s e n t w i t h , b u t not integrated into, its significa­ tion: g e s t u r e , t o n e of v o i c e , t h e musicality of s p e e c h , a r r a n g e m e n t of w o r d s , t h e material aspects of all l a n g u a g e that are e x p r e s s i v e , affective w i t h o u t h a v i n g definable significance. T h e s p e a k i n g self always carries a l o n g this s h a d o w , its s p i l l e d - o v e r b o d y e x p r e s s e d in c o m p o r t m e n t and excitation. In t h e idea of t h e abject Kristeva locates o n e m o d e of such self-baggage. A b j e c t i o n d o e s not p r o d u c e a s u b j e c t in relation to o b j e c t s — t h e e g o — b u t rather t h e m o m e n t of separation, t h e b o r d e r b e t w e e n t h e "I" and t h e other, b e f o r e an "I" is f o r m e d , that m a k e s p o s s i b l e t h e relation b e t w e e n t h e e g o and its o b j e c t s . Before d e s i r e — t h e m o v e m e n t out from a self to t h e o b j e c t s on w h i c h it is d i r e c t e d — t h e r e is bare w a n t , lack, loss and b r e a c h that is u n r e p r e s e n t a b l e , that exists only as affect. A b j e c t i o n is t h e f e e l i n g of loathing and disgust t h e subject has in e n ­ c o u n t e r i n g certain matter, i m a g e s , and f a n t a s i e s — t h e horrible, to w h i c h it can o n l y r e s p o n d w i t h a v e r s i o n , with n a u s e a and distraction. T h e abject is at t h e s a m e t i m e fascinating; it draws t h e subject in o r d e r to repel it. T h e abject is m e a n i n g l e s s , r e p u l s i v e in an irrational, u n r e p r e s e n t a b l e w a y . Kristeva claims that abjection arises from t h e primal r e p r e s s i o n in w h i c h t h e infant s t r u g g l e s to separate from t h e mother's b o d y that nour­ i s h e s and comforts, from t h e reluctant struggle to establish a separate cor­ poreal s c h e m a , in t e n s i o n and c o n t i n u i t y w i t h t h e mother's b o d y w h i c h it s e e k s to incorporate. For t h e s u b j e c t to e n t e r l a n g u a g e , to b e c o m e a self, it m u s t separate from its joyful c o n t i n u i t y w i t h t h e m o t h e r ' s b o d y and acquire a s e n s e of a b o r d e r b e t w e e n itself and t h e other. In t h e primal fluidity of maternal jouissance t h e infant introjects t h e Other. T h u s t h e b o r d e r of separation

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can b e e s t a b l i s h e d o n l y b y e x p e l l i n g , rejecting, t h e m o t h e r , w h i c h is o n l y t h e n d i s t i n g u i s h e d from t h e infant itself; t h e e x p u l s i o n that c r e a t e s t h e b o r d e r b e t w e e n i n s i d e and o u t s i d e is an e x p u l s i o n of itself. T h e infant s t r u g g l e s w i t h its o w n drives in relation to t h e O t h e r , to attain a s e n s e of b o d y control, b u t t h e s t r u g g l e is reluctant, and t h e separation e x p e r i ­ e n c e d as a loss, a w o u n d , a w a n t . T h e m o m e n t of separation can o n l y b e "a v i o l e n t , c l u m s y b r e a k i n g away, w i t h t h e c o n s t a n t risk of falling back u n d e r t h e s w a y of a p o w e r as s e c u r e as it is shifting" (Kristeva, 1982, p . 13). T h e e x p e l l e d self turns into a l o a t h s o m e m e n a c e b e c a u s e it t h r e a t e n s to r e e n t e r , to o b l i t e r a t e t h e b o r d e r e s t a b l i s h e d b e t w e e n it and t h e s e p a r a t e d self. T h e separation is t e n u o u s , t h e subject feels it as a loss and y e a r n s for, w h i l e r e j e c t i n g , a r e e n c l o s u r e by t h e Other. T h e d e f e n s e of t h e s e p a r a t e d self, t h e m e a n s o f k e e p i n g t h e b o r d e r firm, is aversion from t h e O t h e r , r e p u l s i o n , for fear of disintegration. A b j e c t i o n is e x p r e s s e d in reactions of disgust to b o d y e x c r e t i o n s — m a t ­ ter e x p e l l e d from t h e body's i n s i d e s : b l o o d , p u s , sweat, e x c r e m e n t , u r i n e , v o m i t , m e n s t r u a l fluid, and t h e s m e l l s associated w i t h e a c h of t h e s e . T h e p r o c e s s of life itself consists in t h e e x p u l s i o n outward of w h a t is in m e , in o r d e r to sustain and p r o t e c t m y life. I react to t h e e x p e l l e d w i t h d i s g u s t b e c a u s e t h e b o r d e r of m y s e l f m u s t b e k e p t in place. T h e abject m u s t not t o u c h m e , for I fear that it will o o z e t h r o u g h , obliterating t h e b o r d e r b e ­ t w e e n i n s i d e and o u t s i d e n e c e s s a r y for m y life, w h i c h arises in t h e p r o c e s s of e x p u l s i o n . If b y a c c i d e n t or force I c o m e to t o u c h t h e abject matter, I react again w i t h t h e reflex of e x p e l l i n g w h a t is i n s i d e m e : nausea. A b j e c t i o n , t h e n , Kristeva says, is prior to t h e e m e r g e n c e of a s u b j e c t in o p p o s i t i o n to an o b j e c t , and makes p o s s i b l e that distinction. T h e m o v e ­ m e n t of a b j e c t i o n m a k e s signification p o s s i b l e by creating a b e i n g c a p a b l e of d i v i d i n g , r e p e a t i n g , separating. T h e abject, as distinct from t h e object, d o e s not stand o p p o s e d to t h e subject, at a d i s t a n c e , definable. T h e abject is o t h e r than t h e subject, b u t is o n l y j u s t t h e o t h e r s i d e of t h e border. S o t h e abject is not o p p o s e d to and facing t h e subject, b u t next to it, t o o c l o s e for comfort: The "unconscious" contents remain here excluded but in a strange fashion; not radically enough to allow for a secure differentiation between subject and ob­ ject, and yet clearly enough for a defensive position to be established—one that implies a refusal but also a sublimating elaboration. (Kristeva, 1982, p. 7) T h e abject p r o v o k e s fear and loathing b e c a u s e it e x p o s e s t h e b o r d e r b e t w e e n self and o t h e r as c o n s t i t u t e d and fragile, and t h r e a t e n s to d i s s o l v e t h e s u b j e c t b y d i s s o l v i n g t h e border. P h o b i a is t h e n a m e of this fear, an irrational d r e a d that latches o n t o a material to w h i c h it is d r a w n in horri­ fied fascination. U n l i k e fear of an object, to w h i c h o n e reacts w i t h at-

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t e m p t s at control, d e f e n s e , and c o u n t e r a c t i o n , p h o b i c fear of t h e abject is a p a r a l y z i n g and v e r t i g i n o u s dread of t h e u n n a m e a b l e . At t h e s a m e t i m e t h e a b j e c t is fascinating, b r i n g i n g out an o b s e s s e d attraction. A b j e c t i o n , Kristeva says, is a peculiar e x p e r i e n c e of a m b i g u i t y . ' B e ­ c a u s e , w h i l e r e l e a s i n g a h o l d , it d o e s not radically cut off t h e s u b j e c t from w h a t t h r e a t e n s i t — o n t h e contrary, abjection a c k n o w l e d g e s it to b e in p e r p e t u a l d a n g e r " (Kristeva, 1982, p. 9). T h e abject arises p o t e n t i a l l y in " w h a t e v e r disturbs i d e n t i t y , s y s t e m , order. W h a t d o e s n o t r e s p e c t bor­ d e r s , p o s i t i o n s , r u l e s " (Kristeva, 1982, p. 4). A n y b o r d e r a m b i g u i t y m a y b e c o m e for t h e s u b j e c t a threat to its o w n borders. Separation b e t w e e n self and O t h e r is t h e p r o d u c t of a v i o l e n t break from a prior c o n t i n u i t y . As c o n s t r u c t e d , t h e b o r d e r is fragile, b e c a u s e t h e self e x p e r i e n c e s this s e p a ­ ration as a loss and lack w i t h o u t n a m e or r e f e r e n c e . T h e s u b j e c t reacts to this abject w i t h l o a t h i n g as t h e m e a n s of restoring t h e b o r d e r separating self and other. T h i s a c c o u n t of t h e m e a n i n g of t h e abject e n h a n c e s , I s u g g e s t , an u n ­ d e r s t a n d i n g of a b o d y a e s t h e t i c that defines s o m e g r o u p s as ugly or fear­ s o m e and p r o d u c e s a v e r s i v e reactions in relation to m e m b e r s of t h o s e g r o u p s . R a c i s m , s e x i s m , h o m o p h o b i a , a g e i s m , and a b l e i s m , are partly s t r u c t u r e d b y a b j e c t i o n , an involuntary, u n c o n s c i o u s j u d g m e n t of u g l i n e s s and loathing. This a c c o u n t d o e s not explain h o w s o m e g r o u p s b e c o m e culturally d e f i n e d as u g l y and d e s p i s e d b o d i e s . T h e s y m b o l i c association of s o m e p e o p l e and g r o u p s w i t h d e a t h and d e g e n e r a c y m u s t in e v e r y c a s e b e e x p l a i n e d socially and historically, and is historically variable. E v e n if a b j e c t i o n is a result of any subject's c o n s t r u c t i o n , n o t h i n g in t h e s u b ­ ject's formation m a k e s g r o u p loathing n e c e s s a r y . T h e association b e t w e e n g r o u p s and abject m a t t e r is socially c o n s t r u c t e d ; o n c e t h e link is m a d e , h o w e v e r , t h e t h e o r y of abjection d e s c r i b e s h o w t h e s e associations lock i n t o t h e subject's i d e n t i t i e s and anxieties. As t h e y r e p r e s e n t w h a t lies j u s t b e y o n d t h e b o r d e r s of t h e self, t h e subject reacts w i t h fear, n e r v o u s ­ n e s s , and a v e r s i o n to m e m b e r s o f t h e s e groups b e c a u s e t h e y r e p r e s e n t a threat to i d e n t i t y itself, a threat to w h a t G i d d e n s calls t h e "basic security system." X e n o p h o b i a as abjection is p r e s e n t t h r o u g h o u t t h e history of m o d e r n c o n s c i o u s n e s s , s t r u c t u r e d b y a m e d i c a l i z e d reason that d e f i n e s s o m e b o d ­ i e s as d e g e n e r a t e . T h e role of a b j e c t i o n may i n c r e a s e , h o w e v e r , w i t h t h e shift from a d i s c u r s i v e c o n s c i o u s n e s s of g r o u p superiority to s u c h g r o u p s u p e r i o r i t y l i v e d primarily at t h e l e v e l s of practical c o n s c i o u s n e s s a n d t h e basic security s y s t e m . W h e n racism, s e x i s m , h e t e r o s e x i s m , a g e i s m , and a b l e i s m , exist at l e v e l o f d i s c u r s i v e c o n s c i o u s n e s s , t h e d e s p i s e d groups are objectified. entific, m e d i c a l , moral, and legal d i s c o u r s e construct t h e s e g r o u p s as j e c t s , h a v i n g t h e i r o w n specific nature and attributes, different from

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o v e r against t h e n a m i n g subject, w h o controls, m a n i p u l a t e s , and d o m i ­ n a t e s t h e m . W h e n t h e s e g r o u p - b a s e d claims of superiority and inferiority r e c e d e from d i s c u r s i v e c o n s c i o u s n e s s , h o w e v e r , t h e s e groups no l o n g e r face a d o m i n a n t s u b j e c t as clearly identifiable objects different from and o p p o s e d to itself. W o m e n , Blacks, h o m o s e x u a l s , t h e m a d , and t h e f e e ­ b l e m i n d e d b e c o m e m o r e difficult to n a m e as t h e O t h e r s , identifiable crea­ t u r e s w i t h d e g e n e r a t e and inferior natures. In x e n o p h o b i c s u b j e c t i v i t y t h e y r e c e d e to a m u r k y affect w i t h o u t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . T h e r e p r e s s i o n of s e x i s m , racism, h e t e r o s e x i s m , a g e i s m , and a b l e i s m from d i s c u r s i v e c o n s c i o u s n e s s e n h a n c e s an a m b i g u i t y characteristic of t h e m o v e m e n t of abjection. In m a n y s o c i e t i e s t h e r e exists a b r o a d - b a s e d c o m ­ m i t m e n t to p r i n c i p l e s of e q u a l r e s p e c t and e q u a l t r e a t m e n t for all p e r s o n s , w h a t e v e r t h e i r g r o u p identification. At t h e s a m e t i m e , t h e r o u t i n e s of practical c o n s c i o u s n e s s , forms of identification, interactive behavior, rules of d e f e r e n c e , and so o n clearly differentiate g r o u p s , p r i v i l e g i n g s o m e o v e r o t h e r s . T h e r e exists a d i s s o n a n c e b e t w e e n t h e g r o u p - b l i n d egalitar­ ian truisms of d i s c u r s i v e c o n s c i o u s n e s s and t h e g r o u p - f o c u s e d r o u t i n e s of practical c o n s c i o u s n e s s . This d i s s o n a n c e c r e a t e s t h e sort of b o r d e r crisis ripe for t h e a p p e a r a n c e of t h e abject. Today t h e O t h e r is not so different from m e as to b e an object; discur­ sive c o n s c i o u s n e s s asserts that Blacks, w o m e n , h o m o s e x u a l s , and d i s a b l e d p e o p l e are like m e . B u t at t h e level of practical c o n s c i o u s n e s s t h e y are affectively m a r k e d as different. In this situation, t h o s e in t h e d e s p i s e d g r o u p s t h r e a t e n to cross o v e r t h e b o r d e r of t h e subject's i d e n t i t y b e c a u s e d i s c u r s i v e c o n s c i o u s n e s s will not n a m e t h e m as c o m p l e t e l y different (cf. F r y c , 1 9 8 3 b , p p . 1 1 4 - 1 5 ) . T h e face-to-face p r e s e n c e of t h e s e o t h e r s , w h o d o not act as t h o u g h t h e y have their o w n "place," a status to w h i c h t h e y are c o n f i n e d , thus t h r e a t e n s a s p e c t s of m y basic security s y s t e m , m y basic s e n s e of i d e n t i t y , and I m u s t turn away w i t h disgust and r e v u l s i o n . H o m o p h o b i a is t h e paradigm of s u c h b o r d e r anxiety. T h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of t h e idea of race, its c o n n e c t i o n w i t h physical attributes and l i n e a g e , still m a k e s it p o s s i b l e for a w h i t e p e r s o n to k n o w that s h e is not Black or Asian. B u t as h o m o s e x u a l i t y has b e c o m e increasingly d e o b j e c t i f i e d , no specific characteristics, n o physical, g e n e t i c , m e n t a l , or moral "character," marks off h o m o s e x u a l s from h e t e r o s e x u a l s . It thus b e c o m e s increasingly difficult to assert any difference b e t w e e n h o m o s e x u a l s and h e t e r o s e x u a l s e x c e p t t h e i r c h o i c e of sexual partners. H o m o p h o b i a is o n e of t h e d e e p e s t fears of difference p r e c i s e l y b e c a u s e t h e b o r d e r b e t w e e n gay and straight is c o n ­ s t r u c t e d as t h e m o s t p e r m e a b l e ; a n y o n e at all can b e c o m e gay, e s p e c i a l l y m e , so t h e o n l y w a y to d e f e n d m y i d e n t i t y is to turn away w i t h irrational disgust. T h u s w e can u n d e r s t a n d w h y p e o p l e w h o h a v e fairly successfully e l i m i n a t e d t h e s y m p t o m s of racism and s e x i s m n e v e r t h e l e s s often e x h i b i t deep homophobia.

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A g e i s m and a b l e i s m also exhibit t h e b o r d e r anxiety of t h e abject. For in c o n f r o n t i n g o l d or d i s a b l e d p e o p l e I confront m y o w n death. Kristeva b e ­ l i e v e s that t h e abject is c o n n e c t e d w i t h d e a t h , t h e disintegration of t h e s u b j e c t . T h e a v e r s i o n and n e r v o u s n e s s that old and d i s a b l e d p e o p l e e v o k e , t h e s e n s e o f t h e i r b e i n g ugly, arises from t h e cultural c o n n e c t i o n of t h e s e g r o u p s w i t h d e a t h . T h o m a s C o l e (1986) s h o w s that prior to t h e n i n e ­ t e e n t h c e n t u r y o l d a g e w a s not linked to death; i n d e e d , just t h e o p p o s i t e w a s t h e case. In a t i m e w h e n d e a t h m i g h t c o m e to p e r s o n s at any a g e , and o f t e n took c h i l d r e n and y o u n g adults, old age r e p r e s e n t e d a t r i u m p h o v e r d e a t h , a sign of virtue. D u r i n g this t i m e of patriarchal family d o m i n a t i o n , o l d p e o p l e w e r e h i g h l y r e g a r d e d and v e n e r a t e d . N o w , w h e n it has b e ­ c o m e i n c r e a s i n g l y likely that p e o p l e will live to b e old, old a g e has b e c o m e a s s o c i a t e d w i t h d e g e n e r a c y and d e a t h . At a t i m e w h e n m o s t p e o p l e can e x p e c t to b e old, old p e o p l e p r o d u c e a b o r d e r anxiety like that structuring h o m o p h o b i a . I c a n n o t d e n y that t h e old p e r s o n will b e myself, b u t that m e a n s m y d e a t h , so I avert m y g a z e from t h e old p e r s o n , or treat h e r as a c h i l d , and w a n t to l e a v e h e r p r e s e n c e as soon as p o s s i b l e . M y relation to d i s a b l e d p e o p l e has a similar structure. T h e only difference b e t w e e n m y ­ self and t h e w h e e l c h a i r - b o u n d p e r s o n is m y g o o d luck. E n c o u n t e r w i t h t h e d i s a b l e d p e r s o n again p r o d u c e s t h e a m b i g u i t y of r e c o g n i z i n g that t h e p e r s o n w h o m I project as so different, so other, is n e v e r t h e l e s s like m e . T h e story I h a v e told is related from t h e p o i n t of v i e w of p r i v i l e g e d groups w h o e x p e r i e n c e a b j e c t i o n in e n c o u n t e r i n g Blacks, Latinos, Asians, J e w s , gays, l e s b i a n s , old p e o p l e , d i s a b l e d p e o p l e , w o m e n . But w h a t about t h e s u b j e c t i v i t y of m e m b e r s of t h e s e groups t h e m s e l v e s ? It w o u l d b e a m i s t a k e to think that this a c c o u n t of abjection p r e s u m e s that, for e x a m p l e , Blacks c o n s t r u c t w h i t e p e o p l e as an a b j e c t e d O t h e r , and so on. For cul­ tural i m p e r i a l i s m consists p r e c i s e l y in t h e fact that t h e subject p o i n t of v i e w for any subject, w h a t e v e r his or h e r specific g r o u p m e m b e r s h i p , is i d e n t i f i e d w i t h that of p r i v i l e g e d groups. T h e form of cultural i m p e r i a l i s m in t h e m o d e r n W e s t p r o v i d e s and insists o n only o n e subject p o s i t i o n , that o f t h e unified, d i s e m b o d i e d reason i d e n t i f i e d w i t h w h i t e b o u r g e o i s m e n . W i t h i n t h e unifying logic of m o d e r n reason and respectability, t h e s u b j e c ­ tivity of m e m b e r s of culturally i m p e r i a l i z e d g r o u p s t e n d s to stand in t h e s a m e p o s i t i o n as that of t h e p r i v i l e g e d groups. F r o m that s u p p o s e d l y n e u ­ tral s u b j e c t p o s i t i o n all t h e s e d e s p i s e d and d e v i a n t groups are e x p e r i e n c e d as t h e a b j e c t e d O t h e r . M e m b e r s o f culturally i m p e r i a l i z e d g r o u p s , that is, t h e m s e l v e s often exhibit s y m p t o m s of fear, a v e r s i o n , or d e v a l u a t i o n toward m e m b e r s of t h e i r o w n g r o u p s and o t h e r o p p r e s s e d g r o u p s . Blacks, for e x a m p l e , not i n f r e q u e n t l y h a v e racist reactions to o t h e r Blacks, as t h e differentiation b e t w e e n " l i g h t - s k i n n e d " and "dark-skinned" Blacks exhibits. Gay m e n and l e s b i a n s t h e m s e l v e s exhibit h o m o p h o b i a , old p e o p l e d e n i g r a t e t h e

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a g e d , and w o m e n are s o m e t i m e s sexist. Insofar as m e m b e r s of t h e s e g r o u p s a s s u m e t h e position of subjects within t h e d o m i n a n t c u l t u r e , that is, t h e y e x p e r i e n c e m e m b e r s of their o w n g r o u p abjectly. E v e n m o r e c o m m o n l y , m e m b e r s of culturally i m p e r i a l i z e d g r o u p s fear and d e s p i s e m e m b e r s of o t h e r o p p r e s s e d groups: Latinos are s o m e t i m e s racist toward Blacks and v i c e versa, b o t h are often d e e p l y h o m o p h o b i c , and so o n . E v e n w h e n t h e y d o not strictly a s s u m e t h e d o m i n a n t subject p o s i t i o n as their o w n p o i n t of v i e w , m e m b e r s of t h e s e g r o u p s n e v e r t h e l e s s internalize t h e cultural k n o w l e d g e that d o m i n a n t groups fear and loathe t h e m , and to that e x t e n t a s s u m e t h e p o s i t i o n of t h e d o m i n a n t subjectivity toward t h e m ­ s e l v e s and o t h e r m e m b e r s of t h e groups w i t h w h i c h t h e y identify. But m e m b e r s o f culturally i m p e r i a l i z e d groups also live a subjectivity differ­ e n t from t h e d o m i n a n t subject position, o n e d e r i v e d from t h e i r p o s i t i v e identification and social n e t w o r k s w i t h o t h e r s in their g r o u p . T h e dialectic b e t w e e n t h e s e t w o s u b j e c t i v i t i e s — t h e point of v i e w of t h e d o m i n a n t cul­ t u r e w h i c h d e f i n e s t h e m as u g l y and f e a r s o m e , and t h e p o i n t of v i e w of t h e o p p r e s s e d w h o e x p e r i e n c e t h e m s e l v e s as ordinary, c o m p a n i o n a t e , and h u m o r o u s — r e p r e s e n t s w h a t I referred to in C h a p t e r 2 as d o u b l e c o n ­ s c i o u s n e s s . In this r e s p e c t culturally i m p e r i a l i z e d groups l i v e a subjectiv­ ity different from that l i v e d b y p r i v i l e g e d g r o u p s , an e x p e r i e n c e of t h e m ­ s e l v e s as split, d i v i d e d , of their s u b j e c t i v i t y as fragile and plural. A w a y out of culturally d e f i n e d racism, s e x i s m , h o m o p h o b i a , a g e i s m , and a b l e i s m , I s u g g e s t in t h e final s e c t i o n of this chapter, is to p u s h all subjects to an u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e m s e l v e s as plural, shifting, h e t e r o g e n e o u s . B u t first I shall e x a m i n e t h e i s s u e of responsibility for o p p r e s s i o n that this analysis raises.

M O R A L RESPONSIBILITY A N D U N I N T E N D E D ACTION

I h a v e a r g u e d that o p p r e s s i o n persists in our s o c i e t y partly t h r o u g h in­ t e r a c t i v e habits, u n c o n s c i o u s a s s u m p t i o n s and s t e r e o t y p e s , and g r o u p r e l a t e d f e e l i n g s of n e r v o u s n e s s or aversion. G r o u p o p p r e s s i o n s are e n a c t e d in this s o c i e t y not primarily in official laws and policies b u t in informal, often u n n o t i c e d and u n r e f i e c t i v e s p e e c h , b o d i l y reactions to o t h e r s , c o n v e n t i o n a l practices of e v e r y d a y interaction and e v a l u a t i o n , a e s ­ t h e t i c j u d g m e n t s , and t h e j o k e s , i m a g e s , and s t e r e o t y p e s p e r v a d i n g t h e mass media. T h e o p p r e s s i o n of cultural i m p e r i a l i s m in our s o c i e t y partly i n v o l v e s d e f i n i n g s o m e g r o u p s as O t h e r , specially m a r k e d , l o c k e d in t h e i r b o d i e s . E v e n w h e n d i s c u r s i v e reason n o l o n g e r defines w o m e n or p e o p l e of color as h a v i n g a specific n a t u r e different from m e n or w h i t e p e o p l e , affective and s y m b o l i c associations still tie t h e s e groups to a certain k i n d of b o d y .

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T h e p r e s u m p t i o n of u n c o n s c i o u s fears and aversions also h e l p s to a c c o u n t for t h e v i o l e n c e that v i c t i m i z e s t h e s e g r o u p s , as w e l l as t h e d e g r e e to w h i c h it is a c c e p t e d b y others. I a r g u e d in C h a p t e r 2 that this form of v i o l e n c e differs from o t h e r forms of g r o u p - r e l a t e d v i o l e n c e — f o r e x a m p l e , warfare or r e p r e s s i v e v i o l e n c e — t h o u g h t h e s e forms m a y b e i n t e r t w i n e d . Warfare and r e p r e s s i o n h a v e rational o b j e c t i v e s : to defeat a formally d e ­ fined e n e m y , or to p r e v e n t a s u b j u g a t e d g r o u p from c h a l l e n g i n g , w e a k e n ­ ing, or o v e r t u r n i n g authority structures. T h e v i o l e n c e of rape, r a n d o m b e a t i n g , t h e h a r r a s s m e n t of threats, taunts, display of p i c t u r e s and s y m ­ b o l s , and so o n , is irrational in t h e s e n s e that it is not explicitly i n s t r u m e n ­ tal to an e n d . It is p e r f o r m e d for its o w n sake, for sport or out of r a n d o m frustration, and has as its object o n l y t h e humiliation and d e g r a d a t i o n of its v i c t i m s . A n a c c o u n t of racism, s e x i s m , and h o m o p h o b i a that i n c l u d e s an u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e d e e p threats to i d e n t i t y that difference p o s e s for m a n y p e o p l e h e l p s a c c o u n t not o n l y for s u c h acts t h e m s e l v e s , b u t for a social c l i m a t e that m a k e s t h e m institutional possibilities. N o r m a t i v e social p h i l o s o p h y and political t h e o r y rarely focus o n s u c h p h e n o m e n a . T h e d i c h o t o m y b e t w e e n reason and affectivity w h i c h struc­ t u r e s m o d e r n n o r m a t i v e p h i l o s o p h y h e r e appears in w h a t n o r m a t i v e phi­ l o s o p h y and political t h e o r y take as t h e p r o p e r subjects of inquiry. T y p i ­ cally, political t h e o r y is about laws, policies, t h e large-scale distribution of social g o o d s , c o u n t a b l e q u a n t i t i e s like v o t e s and taxes; it is not about b o d ­ ily r e a c t i o n s , c o m p o r t m e n t s , and feelings. To t h e e x t e n t that n o r m a t i v e p h i l o s o p h y i g n o r e s t h e s e a s p e c t s of o p p r e s s i o n e n a c t e d in practical c o n ­ s c i o u s n e s s a n d t h e u n c o n s c i o u s , h o w e v e r , it c o n t r i b u t e s not o n l y little to e n d i n g o p p r e s s i o n , but also s o m e t h i n g to t h e s i l e n c i n g o f t h e o p p r e s s e d . If c o n t e m p o r a r y o p p r e s s i o n is e n a c t e d t h r o u g h a b o d y a e s t h e t i c , t h r o u g h n e r v o u s n e s s and a v o i d a n c e m o t i v a t e d b y threats to t h e basic s e c u r i t y sys­ t e m , and t h r o u g h i m a g e s and s t e r e o t y p e s that s i m u l t a n e o u s l y f e e d such b e h a v i o r , l e g i t i m a t e it, and allay t h e fears it e x p r e s s e s , t h e n n o r m a t i v e reflection o n j u s t i c e s h o u l d i n c l u d e attention to such p h e n o m e n a . M a n y moral p h i l o s o p h e r s w o u l d find it o d d to i n c l u d e g e s t u r e s , infor­ mal r e m a r k s , j u d g m e n t s of u g l i n e s s , and feelings of discomfort u n d e r t h e rubric of i s s u e s of j u s t i c e . T h e y m i g h t h a v e difficulty r e g a r d i n g t h e m as moral p h e n o m e n a at all, that is, as p h e n o m e n a appropriately s u b j e c t to moral j u d g m e n t . For t h e d o m i n a n t paradigm of moral t h e o r y t e n d s to restrict t h e s c o p e of moral j u d g m e n t to d e l i b e r a t e action. Implicitly or explicitly, m a n y moral theorists direct their attention to i n t e n d e d or vol­ untary action, w h e r e t h e actor k n o w s w h a t h e or s h e is d o i n g and c o u l d h a v e d o n e o t h e r w i s e . O n e of t h e m a i n aims of moral t h e o r y is to d i s c o v e r p r i n c i p l e s and m a x i m s that justify action or form obligations. S u c h an aim i m p l i c i t l y c o n c e i v e s moral life as c o n s c i o u s , d e l i b e r a t e , a rational w e i g h -

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ing of a l t e r n a t i v e s . M u c h moral t h e o r i z i n g is d e v o t e d to d i s c u s s i o n of di­ l e m m a s and hard c a s e s , w h e r e alternatives are explicit, and t h e q u e s t i o n is w h i c h o n e to c h o o s e . W i t h i n this paradigm it is often r e g a r d e d as inap­ p r o p r i a t e to s u b m i t habits, f e e l i n g s , or u n c o n s c i o u s reactions to n o r m a t i v e j u d g m e n t , b e c a u s e t h e s u b j e c t s h a v i n g t h e m are not aware of their b e h a v ­ ior, a n d t h u s h a v e not i n t e n d e d or c h o s e n it. T h e implicit a s s u m p t i o n that o n l y intentional actions s h o u l d b e subject to moral or political j u d g m e n t p e r h a p s u n d e r l i e s a r e s p o n s e m e m b e r s of o p p r e s s e d g r o u p s often e n c o u n t e r w h e n t h e y e x p r e s s a n g e r or indignation at a n o t h e r person's ordinary u n t h i n k i n g behavior. A w o m a n c o m p l a i n s of a m a l e c o l l e a g u e ' s g u i d i n g her b y t h e e l b o w out of t h e board r o o m , or a w h e e l c h a i r - b o u n d p e r s o n e x p r e s s e s indignation about not b e i n g ad­ d r e s s e d directly, w h i l e matters relevant to him are referred to his a b l e b o d i e d c o m p a n i o n . T h e r e s p o n s e f r e q u e n t l y heard to s u c h c o m p l a i n t s is, "Oh, h e didn't m e a n a n y t h i n g b y it." S u c h a r e s p o n s e i m p l i e s that t h e a n g e r and moral j u d g m e n t of t h e w o m a n or t h e w h e e l c h a i r - b o u n d p e r s o n are m i s p l a c e d , that t h e y d o not h a v e t h e right to c o m p l a i n of or c o n d e m n a n o t h e r p e r s o n ' s b e h a v i o r if that p e r s o n i n t e n d s to b e c o u r t e o u s and respectful. A c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e that starts from t h e c o n c e p t of o p p r e s s i o n m u s t break w i t h s u c h a limitation of moral and political j u d g m e n t to discur­ s i v e l y c o n s c i o u s and i n t e n d e d action. If u n c o n s c i o u s reactions, habits, and s t e r e o t y p e s r e p r o d u c e t h e o p p r e s s i o n of s o m e groups, t h e n t h e y s h o u l d b e j u d g e d unjust, and t h e r e f o r e s h o u l d b e c h a n g e d . Robert A d a m s (1985) a r g u e s that e v e r y d a y moral intuitions i n c l u d e moral j u d g m e n t s about p e o ­ ple's u n i n t e n d e d or involuntary behavior. We j u d g e p e o p l e morally w r o n g w h o are unjustly angry at o t h e r s , or w h o are self-righteous or u n ­ grateful. Larry M a y (1990) argues that it m a k e s s e n s e to c o n d e m n p e o p l e morally for b e i n g i n s e n s i t i v e , for b e i n g u n a b l e or unwilling to u n d e r s t a n d a n d s y m p a t h i z e w i t h t h e w a y actions, social practices, and so o n appear from a different social p o s i t i o n . If social p h i l o s o p h y a s s u m e s that i n t e n d e d and d e l i b e r a t e action is t h e p r i m a r y focus of moral j u d g m e n t , it risks ignoring or e v e n e x c u s i n g s o m e of t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t s o u r c e s of o p p r e s s i o n . O n l y moral j u d g m e n t that e x t e n d s to habitual interaction, b o d i l y reactions, u n t h i n k i n g s p e e c h , feel­ ings, and s y m b o l i c associations can capture m u c h about s u c h o p p r e s s i o n . In t h e essay I referred to earlier, C h a r l e s L a w r e n c e (1987) m a k e s a similar a r g u m e n t for legal t h e o r y . T h e d o m i n a n t m o d e l of responsibility in legal j u d g m e n t r e q u i r e s that b e h a v i o r and action w h i c h litigants claim is w r o n g and for w h i c h t h e y s e e k legal r e m e d y b e i n t e n d e d — t h a t p e o p l e k n o w w h a t t h e y are d o i n g and w h y . L a w r e n c e cites several c a s e s in w h i c h litigants a r g u e d that a certain action or policy w a s racist, b u t courts found

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against t h e m , o n t h e g r o u n d s that t h e perpetrators did not h a v e race in m i n d in t h e i r actions. S u c h an i n t e n t i o n a l m o d e l of fault or r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , L a w r e n c e a r g u e s , is m u c h t o o narrow, and s h o u l d b e b r o a d e n e d to in­ c l u d e actions and p o l i c i e s w h o s e social m e a n i n g s associate t h e m w i t h race, e v e n w h e n race is not w h a t t h e a g e n t s or p o l i c y m a k e r s had in m i n d . M y claim that u n i n t e n d e d actions and u n c o n s c i o u s reactions s h o u l d b e s u b j e c t to moral j u d g m e n t n e v e r t h e l e s s p o s e s a p u z z l e for moral t h e o r y . S h o u l d u n i n t e n d e d actions b e j u d g e d in t h e s a m e w a y as i n t e n d e d ac­ t i o n s ? E v e r y d a y i n t u i t i o n s t e n d to e x c u s e p e o p l e for u n i n t e n d e d actions; e v e n t h o u g h s o m e o n e has d o n e s o m e t h i n g harmful, w e often claim t h e p e r s o n s h o u l d not b e c o n d e m n e d , b e c a u s e s h e didn't m e a n it. C o n ­ v e r s e l y , e v e r y d a y moral j u d g m e n t is often i n c l i n e d to g i v e p e o p l e moral credit for g o o d i n t e n t i o n s . I m a g i n e a w h i t e p e r s o n c o m m i t t e d to social e q u a l i t y for p e o p l e of color w h o e n t e r s political s t r u g g l e to a d v a n c e s u c h e q u a l i t y , and w h o n e v e r t h e l e s s s o m e t i m e s has a v e r s i v e reactions to p e o ­ p l e of color, m a k e s t h o u g h t l e s s , i n s e n s i t i v e remarks about and to t h e m , a n d so o n . Isn't s u c h a p e r s o n less to b e c o n d e m n e d morally than o n e w h o insists that t h e r e is n o t h i n g left for p o l i c y to d o , or that all p r o p o s e d poli­ c i e s are inappropriate? To take a c c o u n t of s u c h intuitions w e can d i s t i n g u i s h b e t w e e n b l a m i n g p e o p l e and h o l d i n g t h e m r e s p o n s i b l e (cf. B l u m , 1 9 8 0 , p. 189; C a l h o u n , 1989; Card, 1989). It is inappropriate to b l a m e p e o p l e for actions t h e y are u n a w a r e of a n d d o not i n t e n d . P e o p l e and institutions n e v e r t h e l e s s can and s h o u l d b e h e l d r e s p o n s i b l e for u n c o n s c i o u s and u n i n t e n d e d b e h a v i o r , a c t i o n s , or attitudes that c o n t r i b u t e to o p p r e s s i o n . To b l a m e an a g e n t m e a n s to m a k e that a g e n t liable to p u n i s h m e n t . I m e a n p u n i s h m e n t in a broad s e n s e , i n c l u d i n g not only i m p r i s o n m e n t and fines, but also b e i n g m a d e to d o s o m e t h i n g in restitution, e x c l u s i o n from associations, r e m o v a l of p r i v i l e g e s , p u b l i c c e n s u r e , and social ostracism. B l a m e is a backwardl o o k i n g c o n c e p t . Calling on a g e n t s to take r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for their actions, h a b i t s , f e e l i n g s , a t t i t u d e s , i m a g e s , and a s s o c i a t i o n s , o n t h e o t h e r hand, is forward-looking; it asks t h e p e r s o n "from h e r e o n o u t " to s u b m i t s u c h u n c o n s c i o u s b e h a v i o r to reflection, to w o r k to c h a n g e habits and attitudes. A distinction b e t w e e n b l a m e and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y is important for legal and institutional c o n t e x t s as w e l l (cf. L a w r e n c e , 1 9 8 7 , pp, 3 2 5 - 2 6 ) . In c o n f o r m i t y w i t h its p r o p e n s i t y to tie fault to i n t e n t i o n , legal j u d g m e n t too often identifies liability w i t h b l a m e for a d a m a g e w h i c h m u s t b e " m a d e w h o l e . " Social c h a n g e to break t h e c y c l e of e x c l u s i o n and d i s a d v a n t a g e that w o m e n , p e o p l e of color, d i s a b l e d p e o p l e , gay m e n and l e s b i a n s , old p e o p l e , and o t h e r s suffer will not b e a i d e d b y t h e l a w u n l e s s courts are w i l l i n g to r e q u i r e forward-looking r e m e d i e s of institutions w h o s e u n c o n ­ scious and u n i n t e n d e d actions c o n t r i b u t e to that d i s a d v a n t a g e .

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Chapter 5

JUSTICE A N D C U L T U R A L REVOLUTION

S a y i n g that certain habitual and u n c o n s c i o u s actions, m a n n e r s , forms of r e s p o n s e , w a y s of s p e a k i n g , and so on s h o u l d b e j u d g e d unjust m e a n s that t h e p e o p l e w h o perform t h e s e actions s h o u l d b e a s k e d to take r e s p o n s i b i l ­ ity, to bring to their d i s c u r s i v e a w a r e n e s s t h e m e a n i n g and i m p l i c a t i o n s of t h e s e habitual actions. But w h y c o n s i d e r this an i s s u e of social j u s t i c e rather than s i m p l y of individual moral action? In C h a p t e r 1 I a r g u e d that injustice s h o u l d b e d e f i n e d primarily in t e r m s of o p p r e s s i o n and d o m i n a ­ tion. T h e s c o p e of j u s t i c e , I a r g u e d , is not l i m i t e d to distribution, b u t i n c l u d e s all social p r o c e s s e s that s u p p o r t or u n d e r m i n e o p p r e s s i o n , in­ c l u d i n g c u l t u r e . T h e behavior, c o m p o r t m e n t s , i m a g e s , and s t e r e o t y p e s that c o n t r i b u t e to t h e o p p r e s s i o n of b o d i l y marked groups are p e r v a s i v e , s y s t e m i c , m u t u a l l y g e n e r a t i n g , and m u t u a l l y reinforcing. T h e y are e l e ­ m e n t s of d o m i n a n t cultural practices that lie as t h e normal b a c k g r o u n d of our liberal d e m o c r a t i c s o c i e t y . O n l y c h a n g i n g t h e cultural habits t h e m ­ s e l v e s will c h a n g e t h e o p p r e s s i o n s t h e y p r o d u c e and reinforce, b u t c h a n g e in cultural habits can o c c u r only if individuals b e c o m e aware of and c h a n g e their i n d i v i d u a l habits. This is cultural revolution. C u l t u r e is to a significant d e g r e e a m a t t e r of social c h o i c e ; w e can c h o o s e to c h a n g e t h e e l e m e n t s of c u l t u r e and to c r e a t e n e w o n e s . S o m e ­ t i m e s s u c h c h a n g e can b e facilitated b y p a s s i n g laws or e s t a b l i s h i n g poli­ c i e s . Nicaragua has a law against t h e u s e of w o m e n ' s b o d i e s for a d v e r t i s i n g c o m m o d i t i e s . A glossy m a g a z i n e can establish a policy of h a v i n g m o r e articles, p h o t o g r a p h s , and a d v e r t i s e m e n t s that d e p i c t Blacks in ordinary life activities. M o s t cultural c h a n g e c a n n o t occur, h o w e v e r , b y edict. O n e c a n n o t pass a law r e g u l a t i n g t h e appropriate distance p e o p l e o u g h t to stand from o n e a n o t h e r , or w h e t h e r and h o w t h e y s h o u l d t o u c h . Similarly, in m o s t situations o n e d o e s not w i s h formally to regulate t h e e x p r e s s i o n of fantasy, j o k e s , a n d so o n , b e c a u s e t h e d a n g e r s to liberty are too great. W h i l e a e s t h e t i c j u d g m e n t always carries implicit rules, and t h e project of r e v a l u i n g s o m e p e o p l e ' s b o d i e s i n v o l v e s c h a n g i n g t h o s e rules, a e s t h e t i c j u d g m e n t c a n n o t b e formally r e g u l a t e d . T h e injunction to "be just" in s u c h m a t t e r s a m o u n t s to n o m o r e and n o less than a call to bring t h e s e p h e n o m e n a of practical c o n s c i o u s n e s s and u n c o n s c i o u s n e s s u n d e r d i s c u s ­ sion, that is, to politicize t h e m . T h e r e q u i r e m e n t s of j u s t i c e , t h e n , c o n ­ c e r n less t h e m a k i n g of cultural rules than p r o v i d i n g institutional m e a n s for fostering p o l i t i c i z e d cultural d i s c u s s i o n , and making forums and m e d i a available for alternative cultural e x p e r i m e n t and play. Cultural r e v o l u t i o n that confronts and u n d e r m i n e s t h e fears and aver­ s i o n s that s t r u c t u r e u n c o n s c i o u s b e h a v i o r entails a revolution in t h e s u b ­ j e c t itself. Kristeva's notion of t h e subject in p r o c e s s s u g g e s t s that t h e s u b j e c t is always split, h e t e r o g e n e o u s (Kristeva, 1977; cf. S m i t h , 1988,

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p p . 1 1 7 - 2 3 ) . T h e m o n o l o g i c c u l t u r e of r e s p e c t a b l e rationality, h o w e v e r , e n c o u r a g e s t h e s u b j e c t to d e s i r e a unified self, solid, c o h e r e n t , i n t e g r a t e d . M u c h p o p u l a r p s y c h o l o g y in our s o c i e t y p r o m o t e s this i m a g e of t h e au­ t h e n t i c , h e a l t h y s u b j e c t as unified. W e enjoin o u r s e l v e s to g e t o u r s e l v e s "together"; c o n t r a d i c t i o n or plurality in our s e n s e of self w e find reproacha b l e , a state to b e o v e r c o m e . But if, as I h a v e s u g g e s t e d , o p p r e s s i v e fears and a v e r s i o n s toward o t h e r s h a v e a source in fears of identity loss, t h e n s u c h an u r g e to unity m a y b e part of t h e p r o b l e m . For p e o p l e to b e c o m e c o m f o r t a b l e around o t h e r s w h o m t h e y p e r c e i v e as different, it m a y b e n e c e s s a r y for t h e m to b e c o m e m o r e comfortable w i t h t h e h e t e r o g e n e i t y w i t h i n t h e m s e l v e s . T h e varying and contradictory social c o n t e x t s in w h i c h w e live and interact, along w i t h t h e multiplicity of our o w n g r o u p m e m ­ b e r s h i p s and t h e m u l t i p l e i d e n t i t i e s of o t h e r s w i t h w h o m w e interact, m a k e t h e h e t e r o g e n e i t y of t h e subject inevitable. T h e q u e s t i o n is w h e t h e r to r e p r e s s or to affirm it. Cultural r e v o l u t i o n that c h a l l e n g e s t h e association of s o m e g r o u p s w i t h abject b o d i e s also i n v o l v e s t h e politicization of t h e s e g r o u p definitions. D e s p i s e d and o p p r e s s e d groups c h a l l e n g e cultural i m p e r i a l i s m w h e n t h e y q u e s t i o n t h e d o m i n a n t n o r m s of v i r t u e , b e a u t y , and rationality, p u t t i n g forward t h e i r o w n p o s i t i v e definition of t h e m s e l v e s as a g r o u p and t h e r e b y pluralizing n o r m s . In C h a p t e r 6 I will discuss m o r e e x t e n s i v e l y t h e m e a n ­ ing and i m p l i c a t i o n s of this politics of asserting p o s i t i v e group difference. T h e p r o c e s s of p o l i t i c i z i n g habits, f e e l i n g s , and e x p r e s s i o n s of fantasy and d e s i r e that can foster cultural revolution entails a kind of social t h e r ­ apy. E n g a g i n g in s u c h therapy t h r o u g h strictly p s y c h o a n a l y t i c m e t h o d s on a m a s s scale w o u l d i n d e e d b e a m a s s i v e u n d e r t a k i n g hard to i m a g i n e . I think s o m e cultural c h a n g e toward t h e s e e n d s can b e realistically u n d e r ­ t a k e n , h o w e v e r , in t h e p r o c e s s e s of politicized personal d i s c u s s i o n that social m o v e m e n t s h a v e c o m e to call " c o n s c i o u s n e s s raising." T h e p h r a s e " c o n s c i o u s n e s s raising" was u s e d by t h e w o m e n ' s m o v e ­ m e n t in t h e late 1960s to d e s c r i b e a p r o c e s s in w h i c h w o m e n share their e x p e r i e n c e s of frustration, u n h a p p i n e s s , and anxiety, and find c o m m o n patterns of o p p r e s s i o n structuring t h e s e very personal stories. T h e y found that "the p e r s o n a l is political," that w h a t was originally e x p e r i e n c e d as a private, p e r s o n a l p r o b l e m in fact has political d i m e n s i o n s , as e x h i b i t i n g an a s p e c t of p o w e r relations b e t w e e n m e n and w o m e n . T h e Black liberation m o v e m e n t of t h e late 1960s similarly strove t h r o u g h personal d i s c u s s i o n to d i s p l a c e o p p r e s s e d p e o p l e ' s d e p r e s s i o n and self-deprecation o n t o social s o u r c e s . A s p e c t s of social life that appear as g i v e n and natural c o m e into q u e s t i o n and a p p e a r as social c o n s t r u c t i o n s and therefore as c h a n g e a b l e . T h e p r o c e s s by w h i c h an o p p r e s s e d g r o u p c o m e s to define and articulate t h e social c o n d i t i o n s of its o p p r e s s i o n , and to politicize c u l t u r e by c o n ­ fronting t h e cultural i m p e r i a l i s m that has d e n i g r a t e d or s i l e n c e d its s p e -

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cific g r o u p e x p e r i e n c e , is a n e c e s s a r y and crucial s t e p in confronting and reducing oppression. A n o t h e r form of c o n s c i o u s n e s s raising i n v o l v e s making t h e p r i v i l e g e d aware of h o w their habitual actions, reactions, i m a g e s , and s t e r e o t y p e s c o n t r i b u t e to o p p r e s s i o n . Again, m y o w n e x p e r i e n c e w i t h this g r o u p proc­ e s s of p o l i t i c i z i n g c u l t u r e d e r i v e s from t h e w o m e n ' s m o v e m e n t . By t h e late 1 9 7 0 s , t h e s o u l - s e a r c h i n g g e n e r a t e d by angry accusations that t h e w o m e n ' s m o v e m e n t w a s racist had e n g e n d e r e d forms of discussion c o n ­ c r e t e l y a d d r e s s i n g w o m e n ' s e x p e r i e n c e s of g r o u p differences and s e e k i n g to c h a n g e relations of g r o u p p r i v i l e g e and o p p r e s s i o n a m o n g w o m e n . W o m e n ' s g r o u p s p r o v i d e d t h e structure for i n t e n s i v e , often e m o t i o n l a d e n d i s c u s s i o n s d e s i g n e d to bring to the discursive c o n s c i o u s n e s s of t h e participants t h e f e e l i n g s , reactions, s t e r e o t y p e s , and a s s u m p t i o n s t h e y had about w o m e n of o t h e r g r o u p s , as w e l l as the w a y s their b e h a v i o r to­ w a r d t h e s e w o m e n m i g h t participate in and r e p r o d u c e relations of privi­ l e g e and o p p r e s s i o n b e t w e e n t h e m . S u c h g r o u p p r o c e s s e s can b e g e n e r a l ­ i z e d to any social setting. Institutionalized c o n s c i o u s n e s s - r a i s i n g policies can take m a n y forms, of w h i c h I will g i v e just t w o e x a m p l e s . In r e c e n t years s o m e e n l i g h t e n e d corporations, m o t i v a t e d in part also b y a d e s i r e to stave off conflict and lawsuits, have instituted c o n s c i o u s ­ n e s s - r a i s i n g w o r k s h o p s for m a l e m a n a g e r s and o t h e r m a l e e m p l o y e e s on i s s u e s of sexual harrassment. T h e very c o n c e p t of sexual harrassment re­ s u l t e d from feminist c o n s c i o u s n e s s raising a m o n g w o m e n n o l o n g e r will­ ing to a c c e p t as i n e v i t a b l e and individual behavior t h e y f o u n d a n n o y i n g , h u m i l i a t i n g , or c o e r c i v e . Bringing m e n to b e able to identify b e h a v i o r that w o m e n c o l l e c t i v e l y j u d g e a n n o y i n g , humiliating, or c o e r c i v e , h o w e v e r , and e x p l a i n i n g w h y w o m e n find it s o , has b e e n n o easy task. Differential p r i v i l e g e of m e m b e r s of different racial groups is p e r p e t u ­ a t e d in part b y t h e p r o c e s s of schooling. If rny account of u n c o n s c i o u s a v e r s i o n as a typical d y n a m i c of racism is at all accurate, m a n y if not m o s t t e a c h e r s u n c o n s c i o u s l y b e h a v e differently toward Blacks or Latinos than t h e y b e h a v e toward w h i t e s . A school s y s t e m c o m m i t t e d to racial j u s t i c e can d i s t r i b u t e literature d e s c r i b i n g p r o c e s s e s of u n c o n s c i o u s differential t r e a t m e n t , and c o n d u c t w o r k s h o p s in w h i c h teachers reflect o n and dis­ c u s s their o w n b e h a v i o r and attitudes toward s t u d e n t s of different races. C o n s c i o u s n e s s raising about h o m o p h o b i a m a y b e t h e m o s t important and p r o d u c t i v e strategy for such a revolution of t h e subject. As I h a v e said, h o m o p h o b i a m a y b e o n e of t h e strongest e x p e r i e n c e s of abjection b e c a u s e sexual i d e n t i t y is m o r e a m b i g u o u s than o t h e r g r o u p i d e n t i t i e s . T h e b o r d e r b e t w e e n attraction to p e r s o n s of t h e o t h e r sex and attraction to t h o s e o f t h e s a m e sex is fluid. At t h e s a m e t i m e , h o m o p h o b i a is d e e p l y w r a p p e d u p w i t h i s s u e s of g e n d e r identity, for in this society g e n d e r i d e n ­ tity c o n t i n u e s to b e h e t c r o s e x i s t : t h e g e n d e r s are c o n s i d e r e d m u t u a l l y

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e x c l u s i v e o p p o s i t e s that c o m p l e m e n t and c o m p l e t e o n e another. O r d e r t h u s d e p e n d s o n t h e u n a m b i g u o u s settling of t h e g e n d e r s : m e n m u s t b e m e n and w o m e n m u s t b e w o m e n . H o m o s e x u a l i t y p r o d u c e s a special anxi­ e t y , t h e n , b e c a u s e it s e e m s to u n s e t t l e this g e n d e r order. B e c a u s e g e n d e r i d e n t i t y is a c o r e of e v e r y o n e ' s identity, h o m o p h o b i a s e e m s to g o to t h e c o r e of i d e n t i t y . T h u s c o n f r o n t i n g h o m o p h o b i a i n v o l v e s confronting t h e v e r y d e s i r e to h a v e a unified, orderly identity, and t h e d e p e n d e n c e of such a unified i d e n t i t y o n t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of a b o r d e r that e x c l u d e s a s p e c t s of s u b j e c t i v ­ ity o n e refuses to face. If t h r o u g h c o n s c i o u s n e s s raising o n e a c c e p t s t h e possibility that o n e m i g h t b e c o m e different, b e different, in sexual o r i e n ­ tation, I s u g g e s t , this l o o s e n s t h e e x c l u s i o n of o t h e r s d e f i n e d as different from o n e ' s s e l f - c o n c e p t i o n in o t h e r w a y s . Efforts to u n d e r m i n e t h e o p ­ p r e s s i o n s of racism, s e x i s m , h e t e r o s e x i s m , a g e i s m , and a b l e i s m m u t u a l l y reinforce o n e a n o t h e r not o n l y b e c a u s e t h e s e g r o u p s h a v e s o m e c o m m o n i n t e r e s t s and certain p e r s o n s or institutions t e n d to r e p r o d u c e t h e o p p r e s ­ sion of t h e m all. T h e r e are m o r e direct c o n n e c t i o n s a m o n g t h e s e o p p r e s ­ sions in t h e s t r u c t u r e of i d e n t i t y and self-protection. Just as n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y s t e r e o t y p i n g of t h e s e groups t e n d e d to assimilate t h e m to o n e another, e s p e c i a l l y t h r o u g h the m e d i a t i o n of sexual i m a g e s , so c o n t e m p o ­ rary d i s c o u r s e can h e l p s u b v e r t o n e g r o u p - b a s e d fear by breaking d o w n another. A strategy of c o n s c i o u s n e s s raising p r e s u m e s that t h o s e participating already u n d e r s t a n d s o m e t h i n g about h o w interactive d y n a m i c s and cul­ tural i m a g e r y p e r p e t u a t e o p p r e s s i o n , and are c o m m i t t e d to social j u s t i c e e n o u g h to w a n t to c h a n g e t h e m . S u c h activity c a n n o t take place in t h e abstract. P e o p l e will b e m o t i v a t e d to reflect on t h e m s e l v e s and their rela­ tions w i t h o t h e r s o n l y in c o n c r e t e social c i r c u m s t a n c e s of c o o p e r a t i o n w h e r e t h e y r e c o g n i z e p r o b l e m s — t h e political g r o u p in w h i c h gays and l e s b i a n s v o i c e dissatisfaction, t h e c o m p a n y that n e v e r s e e m s to p r o m o t e w o m e n and t h e r e f o r e l o s e s t h e m , t h e school or n e i g h b o r h o o d w i t h racial conflict. T h e r e is a s t e p in politicizing c u l t u r e prior to t h e t h e r a p e u t i c , n a m e l y , t h e affirmation of a p o s i t i v e identity b y t h o s e e x p e r i e n c i n g cultural i m ­ p e r i a l i s m . A s s u m p t i o n s of t h e universality of t h e p e r s p e c t i v e and e x p e ­ r i e n c e of t h e p r i v i l e g e d arc d i s l o d g e d w h e n t h e o p p r e s s e d t h e m s e l v e s e x p o s e t h o s e a s s u m p t i o n s by e x p r e s s i n g t h e p o s i t i v e difference of their e x p e r i e n c e . By c r e a t i n g their o w n cultural i m a g e s t h e y shake up r e c e i v e d s t e r e o t y p e s a b o u t t h e m . H a v i n g f o r m e d a positive self-identity t h r o u g h organization and p u b l i c cultural e x p r e s s i o n , t h o s e o p p r e s s e d b y cultural i m p e r i a l i s m can t h e n confront t h e d o m i n a n t culture w i t h d e m a n d s for rec­ o g n i t i o n of t h e i r specificity. I shall discuss s o m e of t h e implications of this p r o c e s s in t h e next chapter.

CHAPTER 6

Social Movements and the Politics of Difference The idea that I think we need today in order to make deci­ sions in political matters cannot be the idea of a totality, or of the unity, of a body. It can only be the idea of a multiplic­ ity or a diversity. . . . To state that one must draw a critique of political judgment means today to do a politics of opinions that at the same time is a politics of Ideas . . . in which jus­ tice is not placed under a rule of convergence but rather a rule of divergence. I believe that this is the theme that one finds constantly in present day writing under the name "minority." —Jean-Francois Lyotard

T H E R E WAS o n c e a t i m e of caste and class, w h e n tradition d e c r e e d that e a c h g r o u p had its p l a c e , and that s o m e are born to rule and o t h e r s to s e r v e . In this t i m e of darkness, law and social n o r m s d e f i n e d rights, privi­ l e g e s , and obligations differently for different g r o u p s , d i s t i n g u i s h e d b y characteristics of sex, race, religion, class, or o c c u p a t i o n . Social i n e q u a l i t y w a s justified b y c h u r c h and state on t h e g r o u n d s that p e o p l e h a v e different n a t u r e s , and s o m e natures are b e t t e r than others. T h e n o n e day E n l i g h t e n m e n t d a w n e d , h e r a l d i n g a r e v o l u t i o n a r y c o n ­ c e p t i o n o f h u m a n i t y and society. All p e o p l e are e q u a l , t h e r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s d e c l a r e d , i n a s m u c h as all h a v e a capacity for reason and moral s e n s e . L a w and politics s h o u l d therefore grant to e v e r y o n e equal political and civil rights. W i t h t h e s e b o l d ideas t h e battle lines of m o d e r n political struggle w e r e drawn. For o v e r t w o h u n d r e d years since t h o s e v o i c e s of R e a s o n first rang out, t h e forces of light h a v e s t r u g g l e d for liberty and political e q u a l i t y against t h e dark forces of irrational p r e j u d i c e , arbitrary m e t a p h y s i c s , and t h e c r u m b l i n g t o w e r s of patriarchal c h u r c h , state, and family. In t h e N e w World w e had a h e a d start in this fight, since t h e A m e r i c a n War of I n d e ­ p e n d e n c e w a s fought o n t h e s e E n l i g h t e n m e n t p r i n c i p l e s , and o u r C o n ­ stitution s t o o d for liberty and equality. S o w e did not h a v e to t h r o w off t h e y o k e s of class and religious p r i v i l e g e , as did our Old World c o m r a d e s . Yet t h e U n i t e d States had its o w n oligarchic horrors in t h e form of slavery and t h e e x c l u s i o n of w o m e n from p u b l i c life. In protracted and bitter struggles

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t h e s e bastions of p r i v i l e g e b a s e d o n g r o u p difference b e g a n to g i v e w a y , finally to t o p p l e in t h e 1960s. T o d a y in our s o c i e t y a f e w v e s t i g e s o f p r e j u d i c e and discrimination re­ m a i n , b u t w e are w o r k i n g o n t h e m , and h a v e nearly realized t h e d r e a m t h o s e E n l i g h t e n m e n t fathers d a r e d to p r o p o u n d . T h e state and law s h o u l d e x p r e s s rights o n l y in universal t e r m s a p p l i e d e q u a l l y to all, and differ­ e n c e s a m o n g p e r s o n s and groups s h o u l d b e a p u r e l y accidental and private matter. W e s e e k a s o c i e t y in w h i c h differences of race, sex, religion, and e t h n i c i t y n o l o n g e r m a k e a difference to p e o p l e ' s rights and o p p o r t u n i t i e s . P e o p l e s h o u l d b e t r e a t e d as individuals, not as m e m b e r s o f g r o u p s ; t h e i r life o p t i o n s and rewards s h o u l d b e b a s e d solely o n t h e i r individual a c h i e v e m e n t . All p e r s o n s s h o u l d h a v e t h e liberty to b e and d o a n y t h i n g t h e y w a n t , to c h o o s e t h e i r o w n lives and not b e h a m p e r e d b y traditional e x p e c t a t i o n s and s t e r e o t y p e s . W e tell e a c h o t h e r this story and m a k e our c h i l d r e n perform it for o u r sacred h o l i d a y s — T h a n k s g i v i n g D a y , t h e F o u r t h of July, M e m o r i a l D a y , Lincoln's Birthday. W e h a v e c o n s t r u c t e d Martin L u t h e r King D a y to fit t h e narrative so w e l l that w e h a v e already forgotten that it took a fight to g e t it i n c l u d e d in t h e c a n o n year. T h e r e is m u c h truth to this story. E n ­ l i g h t e n m e n t ideals of liberty and political equality did and d o inspire m o v e m e n t s against o p p r e s s i o n and d o m i n a t i o n , w h o s e s u c c e s s has c r e ­ a t e d social v a l u e s and institutions w e w o u l d not w a n t to l o s e . A p e o p l e c o u l d d o w o r s e than tell this story after big meals and occasionally call u p o n o n e a n o t h e r to live up to it. T h e v e r y w o r t h i n e s s of t h e narrative, h o w e v e r , and t h e a c h i e v e m e n t of political e q u a l i t y that it r e c o u n t s , n o w inspires n e w h e r e t i c s . In r e c e n t years t h e ideal of liberation as t h e e l i m i n a t i o n of g r o u p difference has b e e n c h a l l e n g e d by m o v e m e n t s o f t h e o p p r e s s e d . T h e very s u c c e s s of political m o v e m e n t s against differential p r i v i l e g e and for political e q u a l i t y has g e n ­ e r a t e d m o v e m e n t s of g r o u p specificity and cultural pride. In this c h a p t e r I criticize an ideal of j u s t i c e that defines liberation as t h e t r a n s c e n d e n c e of g r o u p difference, w h i c h I refer to as an ideal of assimila­ tion. T h i s ideal usually p r o m o t e s e q u a l t r e a t m e n t as a primary p r i n c i p l e o f j u s t i c e . R e c e n t social m o v e m e n t s of o p p r e s s e d g r o u p s c h a l l e n g e this ideal. M a n y in t h e s e m o v e m e n t s argue that a p o s i t i v e self-definition of g r o u p d i f f e r e n c e is in fact m o r e liberatory. I e n d o r s e this politics of difference, and argue that at stake is t h e m e a n ­ ing of social d i f f e r e n c e itself. Traditional politics that e x c l u d e s or d e v a l u e s s o m e p e r s o n s o n a c c o u n t of their g r o u p attributes a s s u m e s an essentialist m e a n i n g of difference; it d e f i n e s g r o u p s as h a v i n g different natures. An egalitarian politics of difference, o n t h e o t h e r hand, d e f i n e s difference m o r e fluidly and relationally as t h e product of social p r o c e s s e s . An e m a n c i p a t o r y politics that affirms g r o u p difference i n v o l v e s a r e c o n -

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c e p t i o n of t h e m e a n i n g of equality. T h e assimilationist ideal a s s u m e s that e q u a l social status for all p e r s o n s r e q u i r e s treating e v e r y o n e according to t h e s a m e p r i n c i p l e s , rules, and standards. A politics of difference a r g u e s , o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , that e q u a l i t y as t h e participation and inclusion of all g r o u p s s o m e t i m e s r e q u i r e s different t r e a t m e n t for o p p r e s s e d or disadvan­ t a g e d g r o u p s . To p r o m o t e social justice, I a r g u e , social policy s h o u l d s o m e t i m e s accord special t r e a t m e n t to groups. I e x p l o r e p r e g n a n c y and birthing rights for w o r k e r s , bilingual-bicultural rights, and A m e r i c a n In­ dian rights as t h r e e c a s e s of s u c h special t r e a t m e n t . Finally, I e x p a n d t h e i d e a o f a h e t e r o g e n e o u s p u b l i c h e r e b y arguing for a p r i n c i p l e of r e p r e s e n ­ tation for o p p r e s s e d g r o u p s in d e m o c r a t i c d e c i s i o n m a k i n g b o d i e s .

C O M P E T I N G PARADIGMS OF LIBERATION

In "On Racism and S e x i s m , " Richard Wasserstrom (1980a) d e v e l o p s a classic s t a t e m e n t of t h e ideal of liberation from g r o u p - b a s e d o p p r e s s i o n as i n v o l v i n g t h e e l i m i n a t i o n of g r o u p - b a s e d difference itself. A truly nonracist, n o n s e x i s t s o c i e t y , h e s u g g e s t s , w o u l d b e o n e in w h i c h t h e race or sex of an individual w o u l d b e t h e functional e q u i v a l e n t of e y e color in our s o c i e t y today. W h i l e physiological differences in skin color or genitals w o u l d r e m a i n , t h e y w o u l d h a v e n o significance for a person's s e n s e of i d e n t i t y or h o w o t h e r s regard h i m or her. N o political rights or obligations w o u l d b e c o n n e c t e d to race or sex, and n o important institutional b e n e f i t s w o u l d b e associated w i t h either. P e o p l e w o u l d s e e n o reason to c o n s i d e r race or g e n d e r in p o l i c y or e v e r y d a y interactions. In s u c h a s o c i e t y , social g r o u p d i f f e r e n c e s w o u l d h a v e c e a s e d to exist. W a s s e r s t r o m contrasts this ideal of assimilation w i t h an ideal of d i v e r ­ sity m u c h like t h e o n e I will a r g u e for, w h i c h h e a g r e e s is c o m p e l l i n g . H e offers t h r e e primary reasons, h o w e v e r , for c h o o s i n g t h e assimilationist ideal of liberation o v e r t h e ideal of diversity. First, t h e assimilationist ideal e x p o s e s t h e arbitrariness of g r o u p - b a s e d social distinctions w h i c h are t h o u g h t natural and n e c e s s a r y . By i m a g i n i n g a s o c i e t y in w h i c h race and sex h a v e n o social significance, o n e s e e s m o r e clearly h o w p e r v a s i v e l y t h e s e g r o u p c a t e g o r i e s u n n e c e s s a r i l y limit possibilities for s o m e in exist­ ing s o c i e t y . S e c o n d , t h e assimilationist ideal p r e s e n t s a clear and u n ­ a m b i g u o u s standard of e q u a l i t y and j u s t i c e . A c c o r d i n g to s u c h a standard, a n y g r o u p - r e l a t e d differentiation or discrimination is s u s p e c t . W h e n e v e r laws or r u l e s , t h e division of labor, or o t h e r social practices allocate b e n e ­ fits differently a c c o r d i n g to g r o u p m e m b e r s h i p , this is a sign of injustice. T h e p r i n c i p l e o f j u s t i c e is s i m p l e : treat e v e r y o n e according to t h e s a m e p r i n c i p l e s , rules, and standards. Third, t h e assimilationist ideal maxi­ m i z e s c h o i c e . In a s o c i e t y w h e r e differences m a k e n o social difference p e o p l e can d e v e l o p t h e m s e l v e s as individuals, u n c o n s t r a i n e d b y g r o u p n o r m s and e x p e c t a t i o n s .

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T h e r e is n o q u e s t i o n that t h e ideal of liberation as t h e e l i m i n a t i o n of g r o u p d i f f e r e n c e has b e e n e n o r m o u s l y important in t h e history of e m a n c i ­ patory politics. T h e ideal of universal h u m a n i t y that d e n i e s natural differ­ e n c e s has b e e n a crucial historical d e v e l o p m e n t in t h e s t r u g g l e against e x c l u s i o n and status differentiation. It has m a d e p o s s i b l e t h e assertion of t h e e q u a l moral w o r t h of all p e r s o n s , and t h u s t h e right of all to participate and b e i n c l u d e d in all institutions a n d positions of p o w e r and p r i v i l e g e . T h e assimilationist ideal retains significant rhetorical p o w e r in t h e face of c o n t i n u e d beliefs in t h e essentially different and inferior n a t u r e s of w o m e n , Blacks, a n d o t h e r groups. T h e p o w e r of this assimilationist ideal has inspired t h e struggle of o p ­ p r e s s e d g r o u p s and t h e supporters against t h e e x c l u s i o n and d e n i g r a t i o n of t h e s e g r o u p s , and c o n t i n u e s to inspire m a n y . Periodically in A m e r i c a n history, h o w e v e r , m o v e m e n t s of t h e o p p r e s s e d have q u e s t i o n e d a n d re­ j e c t e d this "path to b e l o n g i n g " (Karst, 1986). I n s t e a d t h e y h a v e s e e n selforganization a n d t h e assertion o f a p o s i t i v e g r o u p cultural i d e n t i t y as a b e t t e r strategy for a c h i e v i n g p o w e r a n d participation in d o m i n a n t institu­ tions. R e c e n t d e c a d e s h a v e w i t n e s s e d a r e s u r g e n c e o f this "politics of dif­ f e r e n c e " not o n l y a m o n g racial and e t h n i c g r o u p s , but also a m o n g w o m e n , gay m e n and l e s b i a n s , o l d p e o p l e , and t h e disabled. N o t l o n g after t h e passage of t h e Civil Rights Act a n d t h e Voting Rights Act, m a n y w h i t e and Black supporters of t h e Black civil rights m o v e m e n t w e r e s u r p r i s e d , c o n f u s e d , and a n g e r e d b y t h e e m e r g e n c e of t h e Black P o w e r m o v e m e n t . Black P o w e r a d v o c a t e s criticized t h e integrationist goal and reliance on t h e support of w h i t e liberals that characterized t h e civil rights m o v e m e n t . T h e y e n c o u r a g e d Blacks to break their alliance w i t h w h i t e s and assert t h e specificity of their o w n c u l t u r e , political organ­ ization, a n d goals. I n s t e a d of integration, t h e y e n c o u r a g e d Blacks to s e e k e c o n o m i c a n d political e m p o w e r m e n t in their separate n e i g h b o r h o o d s ( C a r m i c h a e l a n d H a m i l t o n , 1967; B a y e s , 1982, chap. 3 ; Ladcr, 1979, c h a p . 5; O m i a n d W i n a n t , 1 9 8 6 , chap. 6). S i n c e t h e late 1960s m a n y Blacks h a v e c l a i m e d that t h e integration s u c c e s s e s of t h e civil rights m o v e ­ m e n t h a v e had t h e effect of d i s m a n t l i n g t h e b a s e s of Black-organized s o ­ cial and e c o n o m i c institutions at least as m u c h as t h e y h a v e l e s s e n e d B l a c k - w h i t e a n i m o s i t y and o p e n e d doors of o p p o r t u n i t y (Cruse, 1987). W h i l e s o m e individual Blacks m a y b e b e t t e r off than t h e y w o u l d h a v e b e e n if t h e s e c h a n g e s had n o t o c c u r r e d , as a g r o u p , Blacks are n o b e t t e r off a n d m a y b e w o r s e off b e c a u s e t h e Blacks w h o h a v e s u c c e e d e d in as­ s i m i l a t i n g into t h e A m e r i c a n m i d d l e class n o l o n g e r associate as c l o s e l y w i t h lower-class Blacks (cf. W i l s o n , 1978). W h i l e m u c h Black politics has q u e s t i o n e d t h e ideal of assimilation in e c o n o m i c and political t e r m s , t h e past t w e n t y years h a v e also s e e n t h e assertion and c e l e b r a t i o n by Blacks of a distinct Afro-American c u l t u r e , b o t h as a r e c o v e r y and revaluation of an Afro-American history a n d in t h e

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c r e a t i o n of n e w cultural forms. T h e slogan "Black is beautiful" p i e r c e d American consciousness, deeply unsettling the received body aesthetic w h i c h I a r g u e d in C h a p t e r 5 c o n t i n u e s to b e a powerful r e p r o d u c e r of racism. Afro-American hairstyles p r o n o u n c e d t h e m s e l v e s differently styl­ ish, not l e s s stylish. L i n g u i s t i c theorists asserted that Black E n g l i s h is E n g l i s h differently c o n s t r u c t e d , not bad E n g l i s h , and Black p o e t s and n o v e l i s t s e x p l o i t e d and e x p l o r e d its particular n u a n c e s . In t h e late 1960s R e d P o w e r c a m e fast o n t h e h e e l s of Black P o w e r . T h e A m e r i c a n Indian M o v e m e n t and o t h e r radical organizations of A m e r i c a n I n d i a n s r e j e c t e d p e r h a p s e v e n m o r e v e h e m e n t l y than Blacks t h e goal of assimilation w h i c h has d o m i n a t e d w h i t e - I n d i a n relations for m o s t o f t h e t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y . T h e y a s s e r t e d a right to s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t o n Indian lands and fought to gain and maintain a d o m i n a n t Indian v o i c e in t h e B u ­ reau of Indian Affairs. A m e r i c a n Indians h a v e sought to r e c o v e r and p r e ­ s e r v e their l a n g u a g e , rituals, and crafts, and this r e n e w a l of p r i d e in tradi­ tional c u l t u r e has also fostered a separatist political m o v e m e n t . T h e d e s i r e to p u r s u e land rights claims and to fight for control o v e r r e s o u r c e s on r e s e r v a t i o n s arises from w h a t has b e c o m e a fierce c o m m i t m e n t to tribal s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n , t h e d e s i r e to d e v e l o p and maintain Indian political and e c o n o m i c b a s e s in b u t not of w h i t e s o c i e t y (Deloria and L y t l e , 1983; Ortiz, 1 9 8 4 , pt. 3; C o r n e l l , 1988, pt. 2). T h e s e are b u t t w o e x a m p l e s of a w i d e s p r e a d t e n d e n c y in t h e politics of t h e 1 9 7 0 s and 1980s for o p p r e s s e d , d i s a d v a n t a g e d , or specially m a r k e d g r o u p s to o r g a n i z e a u t o n o m o u s l y and assert a p o s i t i v e s e n s e of t h e i r cul­ tural and e x p e r i e n t i a l specificity. M a n y S p a n i s h - s p e a k i n g A m e r i c a n s h a v e r e j e c t e d t h e traditional a s s u m p t i o n that full participation in A m e r i c a n so­ c i e t y r e q u i r e s linguistic and cultural assimilation. In t h e last t w e n t y years m a n y h a v e d e v e l o p e d a r e n e w e d i n t e r e s t and pride in their P u e r t o Rican, C h i c a n o , M e x i c a n , or o t h e r Latin A m e r i c a n heritage. T h e y h a v e a s s e r t e d t h e right to maintain t h e i r specific c u l t u r e and speak their l a n g u a g e and still r e c e i v e t h e b e n e f i t s of c i t i z e n s h i p , s u c h as v o t i n g rights, d e c e n t e d u ­ c a t i o n , and j o b o p p o r t u n i t i e s . M a n y J e w i s h A m e r i c a n s h a v e similarly r e j e c t e d t h e ideal of assimilation, i n s t e a d asserting t h e specificity and p o s ­ i t i v e m e a n i n g of J e w i s h i d e n t i t y , often insisting p u b l i c l y that Christian c u l t u r e c e a s e to b e taken as t h e n o r m . S i n c e t h e late 1960s t h e b l o s s o m i n g of gay cultural e x p r e s s i o n , gay or­ g a n i z a t i o n , and t h e p u b l i c p r e s e n c e of gays in m a r c h e s and o t h e r forums h a v e radically a l t e r e d t h e e n v i r o n m e n t in w h i c h y o u n g p e o p l e c o m e to sexual i d e n t i t y , and c h a n g e d m a n y p e o p l e ' s p e r c e p t i o n s of h o m o s e x u a l i t y . Early gay rights a d v o c a c y had a distinctly assimilationist and universalist o r i e n t a t i o n . T h e goal w a s to r e m o v e t h e stigma of b e i n g h o m o s e x u a l , to p r e v e n t institutional discrimination, and to a c h i e v e societal r e c o g n i t i o n that gay p e o p l e are "no different" from a n y o n e e l s e . T h e v e r y p r o c e s s of

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political organization against discrimination and p o l i c e h a r a s s m e n t and for t h e a c h i e v e m e n t of civil rights, h o w e v e r , fostered t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of gay and l e s b i a n c o m m u n i t i e s and cultural e x p r e s s i o n , w h i c h b y t h e m i d 1970s f l o w e r e d in m e e t i n g p l a c e s , organizations, literature, m u s i c , and m a s s i v e s t r e e t c e l e b r a t i o n s ( A h m a n , 1982; D ' E m i l i o , 1983; E p s t e i n , 1987). T o d a y m o s t gay and lesbian liberation a d v o c a t e s s e e k n o t m e r e l y civil rights, b u t t h e affirmation of gay m e n and lesbians as social groups w i t h specific e x p e r i e n c e s and p e r s p e c t i v e s . Refusing to a c c e p t t h e d o m i n a n t culture's definition of h e a l t h y sexuality and r e s p e c t a b l e family life and social practices, gay and lesbian liberation m o v e m e n t s h a v e p r o u d l y c r e ­ ated and d i s p l a y e d a d i s t i n c t i v e self-definition and culture. For gay m e n and l e s b i a n s t h e a n a l o g u e to racial integration is t h e typical liberal ap­ proach to sexuality, w h i c h tolerates any b e h a v i o r as long as it is kept pri­ vate. G a y pride asserts that sexual i d e n t i t y is a m a t t e r of c u l t u r e and poli­ tics, and not m e r e l y "behavior" to b e tolerated or forbidden. T h e w o m e n ' s m o v e m e n t has also g e n e r a t e d its o w n v e r s i o n s of a politics of difference. H u m a n i s t f e m i n i s m , w h i c h p r e d o m i n a t e d in t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y and in t h e c o n t e m p o r a r y w o m e n ' s m o v e m e n t until t h e late 1970s, finds in any assertion of difference b e t w e e n w o m e n and m e n only a l e g a c y of f e m a l e o p p r e s s i o n and an i d e o l o g y to l e g i t i m a t e c o n t i n u e d e x c l u s i o n o f w o m e n from socially v a l u e d h u m a n activity. H u m a n i s t f e m i n i s m is thus a n a l o g o u s to an ideal of assimilation in identifying sexual e q u a l i t y w i t h g e n d e r b l i n d n e s s , w i t h m e a s u r i n g w o m e n and m e n according to t h e s a m e standards and treating t h e m in t h e s a m e w a y . I n d e e d , for m a n y f e m i n i s t s , a n d r o g y n y n a m e s t h e ideal of sexual l i b e r a t i o n — a s o c i e t y in w h i c h g e n d e r d i f f e r e n c e itself w o u l d b e e l i m i n a t e d . G i v e n t h e strength and plausibility of this vision of sexual e q u a l i t y , it w a s confusing w h e n feminists too b e g a n taking t h e turn to difference, asserting t h e positivity and specificity of f e m a l e e x p e r i e n c e and v a l u e s ( s e e Young, 1985; M i l e s , 1985). F e m i n i s t separatism w a s t h e earliest e x p r e s s i o n of s u c h g y n o c e n t r i c f e m i n i s m . F e m i n i s t separatism r e j e c t e d w h o l l y or partly t h e goal of e n t e r ­ ing t h e m a l e - d o m i n a t e d w o r l d , b e c a u s e it requires p l a y i n g according to rules that m e n h a v e m a d e and that h a v e b e e n u s e d against w o m e n , and b e c a u s e trying to m e a s u r e up to m a l e - d e f i n e d standards inevitably in­ v o l v e s a c c o m m o d a t i n g or p l e a s i n g t h e m e n w h o c o n t i n u e to d o m i n a t e so­ cially v a l u e d institutions and activities. Separatism p r o m o t e d t h e e m p o w ­ e r m e n t of w o m e n t h r o u g h self-organization, t h e creation of separate and safe s p a c e s w h e r e w o m e n c o u l d share and analyze their e x p e r i e n c e s , v o i c e t h e i r anger, play w i t h and create b o n d s w i t h o n e another, and d e ­ v e l o p n e w and b e t t e r institutions and practices. Most e l e m e n t s of the contemporary women's m o v e m e n t have been separatist to s o m e d e g r e e . Separatists s e e k i n g to live as m u c h of their l i v e s as p o s s i b l e in w o m e n - o n l y institutions w e r e largely r e s p o n s i b l e for t h e

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c r e a t i o n of t h e w o m e n ' s c u l t u r e that burst forth all o v e r t h e U n i t e d States b y t h e m i d 1 9 7 0 s , and c o n t i n u e s to claim t h e loyalty o f millions of w o m e n — - i n t h e form of m u s i c , p o e t r y , spirituality, literature, c e l e b r a ­ tions, festivals, and d a n c e s (see Jaggar, 1983, p p . 2 7 5 - 8 6 ) . W h e t h e r d r a w ­ ing o n i m a g e s of A m a z o n i a n grandeur, r e c o v e r i n g and r e v a l u i n g tradi­ tional w o m e n ' s arts, like q u i l t i n g and w e a v i n g , or i n v e n t i n g n e w rituals b a s e d o n m e d i e v a l witchcraft, t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of such e x p r e s s i o n s of w o m e n ' s c u l t u r e g a v e m a n y feminists i m a g e s of a f e m a l e - c e n t e r e d b e a u t y and s t r e n g t h e n t i r e l y o u t s i d e capitalist patriarchal definitions o f f e m i n i n e p u l c h r i t u d e . T h e separatist i m p u l s e also fostered t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of t h e m a n y a u t o n o m o u s w o m e n ' s institutions and s e r v i c e s that h a v e c o n c r e t e l y i m p r o v e d t h e l i v e s of m a n y w o m e n , w h e t h e r feminists or n o t — s u c h as health clinics, b a t t e r e d w o m e n ' s s h e l t e r s , rape crisis c e n t e r s , and w o m e n ' s c o f f e e h o u s e s and bookstores. B e g i n n i n g in t h e late 1970s m u c h feminist t h e o r y and political analysis also took a turn a w a y from h u m a n i s t f e m i n i s m , to q u e s t i o n t h e a s s u m p t i o n that traditional f e m a l e activity e x p r e s s e s primarily t h e victimization of w o m e n and t h e distortion of their h u m a n potential and that t h e goal of w o m e n ' s liberation is t h e participation of w o m e n as e q u a l s in p u b l i c insti­ t u t i o n s n o w d o m i n a t e d b y m e n . Instead of u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h e activities and v a l u e s a s s o c i a t e d with traditional f e m i n i n i t y as largely distortions and i n h i b i t i o n s of w o m e n ' s truly h u m a n p o t e n t i a l i t i e s , this g y n o c e n t r i c analy­ sis s o u g h t to r e v a l u e t h e caring, nurturing, and c o o p e r a t i v e approach to social relations t h e y found associated w i t h f e m i n i n e socialization, and s o u g h t in w o m e n ' s specific e x p e r i e n c e s t h e b a s e s for an a t t i t u d e toward t h e b o d y and nature h e a l t h i e r than that p r e d o m i n a n t in m a l e - d o m i n a t e d W e s t e r n capitalist c u t u r e . N o n e of t h e social m o v e m e n t s asserting p o s i t i v e g r o u p specificity is in fact a unity. All h a v e g r o u p differences within t h e m . T h e Black m o v e ­ m e n t , for e x a m p l e , i n c l u d e s m i d d l e - c l a s s Blacks and working-class Blacks, gays and straight p e o p l e , m e n and w o m e n , and so it is w i t h any o t h e r g r o u p . T h e implications of g r o u p differences within a social g r o u p h a v e b e e n m o s t s y s t e m a t i c a l l y d i s c u s s e d in t h e w o m e n ' s m o v e m e n t . F e m i n i s t c o n f e r e n c e s and p u b l i c a t i o n s h a v e g e n e r a t e d particularly fruit­ ful, t h o u g h often e m o t i o n a l l y w r e n c h i n g , discussions of t h e o p p r e s s i o n of racial and e t h n i c b l i n d n e s s and t h e i m p o r t a n c e of a t t e n d i n g to g r o u p dif­ f e r e n c e s a m o n g w o m e n (Bulkin, Pratt, and S m i t h , 1984). F r o m s u c h d i s ­ c u s s i o n s e m e r g e d p r i n c i p l e d efforts to p r o v i d e a u t o n o m o u s l y o r g a n i z e d f o r u m s for Black w o m e n , Latinas, J e w i s h w o m e n , l e s b i a n s , differently a b l e d w o m e n , o l d w o m e n , and a n y o t h e r w o m e n w h o s e e reason for c l a i m ­ ing that t h e y h a v e as a g r o u p a distinctive v o i c e that m i g h t b e s i l e n c e d in a g e n e r a l f e m i n i s t d i s c o u r s e . T h o s e d i s c u s s i o n s , along with t h e practices f e m i n i s t s i n s t i t u t e d to structure d i s c u s s i o n and interaction a m o n g differ-

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e n t l y identifying g r o u p s of w o m e n , offer s o m e b e g i n n i n g m o d e l s for t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of a h e t e r o g e n e o u s public. E a c h of t h e o t h e r social m o v e ­ m e n t s has also g e n e r a t e d discussion of g r o u p differences that cut across t h e i r i d e n t i t i e s , l e a d i n g to o t h e r possibilities of coalition and alliance.

EMANCIPATION THROUGH THE POLITICS O F D I F F E R E N C E

I m p l i c i t in e m a n c i p a t o r y m o v e m e n t s asserting a p o s i t i v e s e n s e of g r o u p difference is a different ideal of liberation, w h i c h m i g h t b e called d e m o ­ cratic cultural pluralism (cf. Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, p p . 1 6 6 - 7 1 ; C u n ­ n i n g h a m , 1987, p p . 1 8 6 - 9 9 ; N i c k e l , 1987). In this vision t h e g o o d s o c i e t y d o e s not e l i m i n a t e or t r a n s c e n d g r o u p difference. Kather, t h e r e is e q u a l ­ ity a m o n g socially and culturally differentiated g r o u p s , w h o m u t u a l l y re­ s p e c t o n e a n o t h e r and affirm o n e a n o t h e r in their differences. W h a t are t h e reasons for r e j e c t i n g t h e assimilationist ideal and p r o m o t i n g a politics of difference? As 1 d i s c u s s e d in C h a p t e r 2, s o m e d e n y t h e reality of social g r o u p s . For t h e m , g r o u p difference is an invidious fiction p r o d u c e d and p e r p e t u a t e d in o r d e r to p r e s e r v e t h e p r i v i l e g e of t h e few. O t h e r s , such as W a s s e r s t r o m , m a y a g r e e that social groups d o n o w exist and h a v e real social c o n ­ s e q u e n c e s for t h e w a y p e o p l e identify t h e m s e l v e s and o n e another, b u t assert that s u c h social g r o u p differences are u n d e s i r a b l e . T h e assimilation­ ist ideal i n v o l v e s d e n y i n g c i t h e r t h e reality or t h e desirability of social groups. T h o s e p r o m o t i n g a politics of difference d o u b t that a s o c i e t y w i t h o u t g r o u p d i f f e r e n c e s is e i t h e r p o s s i b l e or desirable. Contrary to t h e a s s u m p ­ tion of m o d e r n i z a t i o n t h e o r y , i n c r e a s e d urbanization and t h e e x t e n s i o n of e q u a l formal rights to all groups has not l e d to a d e c l i n e in particularist affiliations. If a n y t h i n g , t h e urban c o n c e n t r a t i o n and interactions a m o n g g r o u p s that m o d e r n i z i n g social p r o c e s s e s i n t r o d u c e t e n d to reinforce g r o u p solidarity and differentiation (Rothschild, 1 9 8 1 ; Ross, 1980; F i s ­ c h e r , 1982). A t t a c h m e n t to specific traditions, practices, l a n g u a g e , and o t h e r culturally specific forms is a crucial a s p e c t of social e x i s t e n c e . P e o p l e d o not usually g i v e up their social g r o u p identifications, e v e n w h e n t h e y are o p p r e s s e d . W h e t h e r e l i m i n a t i n g social g r o u p difference is p o s s i b l e or d e s i r a b l e in t h e l o n g run, h o w e v e r , is an a c a d e m i c issue. Today and for t h e f o r e s e e a b l e future s o c i e t i e s are certainly structured b y groups, and s o m e are privi­ l e g e d w h i l e o t h e r s are o p p r e s s e d . N e w social m o v e m e n t s of g r o u p s p e c i ­ ficity d o not d e n y t h e official story's claim that t h e ideal of liberation as e l i m i n a t i n g d i f f e r e n c e and treating e v e r y o n e t h e s a m e has b r o u g h t signifi­ cant i m p r o v e m e n t in t h e status of e x c l u d e d groups. Its main quarrel is w i t h t h e story's c o n c l u s i o n , n a m e l y , that s i n c e w e h a v e a c h i e v e d formal

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e q u a l i t y , o n l y v e s t i g e s and h o l d o v e r s of differential p r i v i l e g e r e m a i n , w h i c h will d i e o u t w i t h t h e c o n t i n u e d p e r s i s t e n t assertion of an ideal of social relations that m a k e differences irrelevant to a p e r s o n s life pros­ p e c t s . T h e a c h i e v e m e n t of formal e q u a l i t y d o e s not e l i m i n a t e social differ­ e n c e s , and rhetorical c o m m i t m e n t to t h e s a m e n e s s of p e r s o n s m a k e s it i m p o s s i b l e e v e n to n a m e h o w t h o s e differences p r e s e n t l y structure privi­ l e g e and o p p r e s s i o n . T h o u g h in m a n y r e s p e c t s t h e law is n o w blind to g r o u p differences, s o m e g r o u p s c o n t i n u e to b e m a r k e d as deviant, as t h e Other. In e v e r y d a y i n t e r a c t i o n s , i m a g e s , and d e c i s i o n s , a s s u m p t i o n s about w o m e n , Blacks, H i s p a n i c s , gay m e n and lesbians, old p e o p l e , and o t h e r m a r k e d g r o u p s c o n t i n u e to justify e x c l u s i o n , a v o i d a n c e , paternalism, and authoritarian t r e a t m e n t . C o n t i n u e d racist, sexist, h o m o p h o b i c , ageist, and ableist insti­ t u t i o n s and b e h a v i o r c r e a t e particular c i r c u m s t a n c e s for t h e s e g r o u p s , usually d i s a d v a n t a g i n g t h e m in their o p p o r t u n i t y to d e v e l o p their capaci­ ties. Finally, in part b e c a u s e t h e y h a v e b e e n s e g r e g a t e d from o n e an­ other, and in part b e c a u s e t h e y h a v e particular histories and traditions, t h e r e are cultural differences a m o n g social g r o u p s — d i f f e r e n c e s in lan­ g u a g e , s t y l e of living, b o d y c o m p o r t m e n t and g e s t u r e s , v a l u e s , and p e r ­ spectives on society. T o d a y in A m e r i c a n s o c i e t y , as in m a n y o t h e r s o c i e t i e s , t h e r e is w i d e ­ s p r e a d a g r e e m e n t that no p e r s o n s h o u l d b e e x c l u d e d from political and e c o n o m i c activities b e c a u s e of ascribed characteristics. G r o u p differences n e v e r t h e l e s s c o n t i n u e to exist, and certain groups c o n t i n u e to b e privi­ l e g e d . U n d e r t h e s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s , insisting that e q u a l i t y and liberation entail i g n o r i n g difference has o p p r e s s i v e c o n s e q u e n c e s in t h r e e r e s p e c t s . First, b l i n d n e s s to difference d i s a d v a n t a g e s groups w h o s e e x p e r i e n c e , c u l t u r e , and socialized capacities differ from t h o s e of p r i v i l e g e d g r o u p s . T h e strategy o f assimilation aims to bring formerly e x c l u d e d g r o u p s into t h e m a i n s t r e a m . S o assimilation always i m p l i e s c o m i n g into t h e g a m e after it is already b e g u n , after t h e rules and standards h a v e already b e e n set, and h a v i n g to p r o v e o n e s e l f a c c o r d i n g to t h o s e rules and standards. In t h e assimilationist strategy, t h e p r i v i l e g e d groups implicitly d e f i n e t h e stan­ dards a c c o r d i n g to w h i c h all will b e m e a s u r e d . B e c a u s e their p r i v i l e g e i n v o l v e s not r e c o g n i z i n g t h e s e standards as culturally and e x p e r i e n t i a l l y specific, t h e ideal of a c o m m o n h u m a n i t y in w h i c h all can participate w i t h ­ o u t regard to race, g e n d e r , religion, or sexuality p o s e s as neutral and uni­ versal. T h e real differences b e t w e e n o p p r e s s e d groups and t h e d o m i n a n t n o r m , h o w e v e r , t e n d to p u t t h e m at a disadvantage in m e a s u r i n g up to t h e s e standards, and for that reason assimilationist p o l i c i e s p e r p e t u a t e t h e i r d i s a d v a n t a g e . Later in this chapter and in C h a p t e r 7 1 shall g i v e e x a m p l e s of facially neutral standards that o p e r a t e to d i s a d v a n t a g e or e x ­ c l u d e t h o s e already d i s a d v a n t a g e d .

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S e c o n d , t h e ideal of a universal h u m a n i t y w i t h o u t social g r o u p differ­ e n c e s a l l o w s p r i v i l e g e d groups to ignore t h e i r o w n g r o u p specificity. B l i n d n e s s to d i f f e r e n c e p e r p e t u a t e s cultural i m p e r i a l i s m b y a l l o w i n g n o r m s e x p r e s s i n g t h e point of v i e w and e x p e r i e n c e of p r i v i l e g e d g r o u p s to a p p e a r neutral and universal. T h e assimilationist ideal p r e s u m e s that t h e r e is a h u m a n i t y in g e n e r a l , an u n s i t u a t e d group-neutral h u m a n capac­ ity for self-making that left to itself w o u l d m a k e individuality flower, t h u s g u a r a n t e e i n g that e a c h individual will b e different. As I a r g u e d in C h a p t e r 4, b e c a u s e t h e r e is n o such u n s i t u a t e d group-neutral p o i n t of view, t h e situation and e x p e r i e n c e of d o m i n a n t groups t e n d to define t h e n o r m s of s u c h a h u m a n i t y in g e n e r a l . Against such a s u p p o s e d l y neutral h u m a n i s t ideal, o n l y t h e o p p r e s s e d g r o u p s c o m e to b e m a r k e d w i t h particularity; t h e y , and not t h e p r i v i l e g e d g r o u p s , are m a r k e d , objectified as t h e O t h ­ ers. T h u s , third, this denigration of groups that d e v i a t e from an a l l e g e d l y neutral standard often p r o d u c e s an internalized devaluation by m e m b e r s o f t h o s e g r o u p s t h e m s e l v e s . W h e n t h e r e is an ideal of g e n e r a l h u m a n standards a c c o r d i n g to w h i c h e v e r y o n e s h o u l d b e e v a l u a t e d e q u a l l y , t h e n P u e r t o Ricans or C h i n e s e A m e r i c a n s are a s h a m e d of their a c c e n t s or t h e i r p a r e n t s , Black c h i l d r e n d e s p i s e t h e f e m a l e - d o m i n a t e d kith and kin n e t w o r k s of t h e i r n e i g h b o r h o o d s , and feminists s e e k to root o u t t h e i r t e n ­ d e n c y to cry, or to feel c o m p a s s i o n for a frustrated stranger. T h e aspira­ tion to assimilate h e l p s p r o d u c e t h e self-loathing and d o u b l e c o n s c i o u s ­ n e s s characteristic of o p p r e s s i o n . T h e goal of assimilation h o l d s u p to p e o p l e a d e m a n d that t h e y "fit," b e like t h e m a i n s t r e a m , in behavior, v a l u e s , and goals. At t h e s a m e t i m e , as long as g r o u p differences exist, g r o u p m e m b e r s will b e m a r k e d as different—as Black, J e w i s h , g a y — a n d t h u s as u n a b l e s i m p l y to fit. W h e n participation is taken to i m p l y assimila­ tion t h e o p p r e s s e d p e r s o n is c a u g h t in an irresolvable d i l e m m a : to partici­ p a t e m e a n s to a c c e p t and adopt an i d e n t i t y o n e is not, and to try to partici­ p a t e m e a n s to b e r e m i n d e d by o n e s e l f and o t h e r s of t h e i d e n t i t y o n e is. A m o r e s u b t l e analysis of t h e assimilationist ideal m i g h t d i s t i n g u i s h b e ­ t w e e n a conformist and a transformational ideal of assimilation. In t h e conformist ideal, status q u o institutions and n o r m s are a s s u m e d as g i v e n , and d i s a d v a n t a g e d g r o u p s w h o differ from t h o s e n o r m s are e x p e c t e d to c o n f o r m to t h e m . A transformational ideal of assimilation, o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , r e c o g n i z e s that institutions as g i v e n e x p r e s s t h e i n t e r e s t s and per­ s p e c t i v e of t h e d o m i n a n t g r o u p s . A c h i e v i n g assimilation therefore re­ q u i r e s altering m a n y institutions and practices in a c c o r d a n c e w i t h neutral rules that truly d o not d i s a d v a n t a g e or stigmatize any p e r s o n , so that g r o u p m e m b e r s h i p really is irrelevant to h o w p e r s o n s are treated. W a s serstrom's ideal fits a transformational assimilation, as d o e s t h e g r o u p neutral ideal a d v o c a t e d by s o m e f e m i n i s t s ( T a u b and W i l l i a m s , 1987). U n -

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like t h e conformist assimilationist, t h e transformational assimilationist m a y allow that g r o u p - s p e c i f i c p o l i c i e s , s u c h as affirmative action, are n e c ­ essary and a p p r o p r i a t e m e a n s for transforming institutions to fit t h e a s s i m ­ ilationist ideal. W h e t h e r conformist or transformational, h o w e v e r , t h e as­ similationist ideal still d e n i e s that g r o u p difference can b e p o s i t i v e and d e s i r a b l e ; t h u s any form o f t h e ideal o f assimilation c o n s t r u c t s g r o u p dif­ f e r e n c e as a liability or d i s a d v a n t a g e . U n d e r t h e s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s , a politics that asserts t h e positivity of g r o u p d i f f e r e n c e is liberating and e m p o w e r i n g . In t h e act of r e c l a i m i n g t h e i d e n ­ tity t h e d o m i n a n t c u l t u r e has taught t h e m to d e s p i s e (Cliff, 1980), and affirming it as an i d e n t i t y to c e l e b r a t e , t h e o p p r e s s e d r e m o v e d o u b l e c o n ­ s c i o u s n e s s . I am j u s t w h a t t h e y say I a m — a J e w b o y , a c o l o r e d girl, a fag, a d y k e , or a h a g — a n d p r o u d of it. N o l o n g e r d o e s o n e h a v e t h e i m p o s s i b l e project of trying to b e c o m e s o m e t h i n g o n e is not u n d e r c i r c u m s t a n c e s w h e r e t h e v e r y trying r e m i n d s o n e of w h o o n e is. This politics asserts that o p p r e s s e d g r o u p s h a v e distinct c u l t u r e s , e x p e r i e n c e s , and p e r s p e c t i v e s o n social life w i t h h u m a n l y p o s i t i v e m e a n i n g , s o m e of w h i c h m a y e v e n b e s u p e r i o r to t h e c u l t u r e and p e r s p e c t i v e s of m a i n s t r e a m s o c i e t y . T h e rejec­ tion and d e v a l u a t i o n of o n e ' s c u l t u r e and p e r s p e c t i v e s h o u l d not b e a c o n ­ d i t i o n of full participation in social life. A s s e r t i n g t h e v a l u e and specificity of t h e culture and attributes of o p ­ p r e s s e d g r o u p s , m o r e o v e r , results in a relativizing of t h e d o m i n a n t cul­ t u r e . W h e n f e m i n i s t s assert t h e validity of f e m i n i n e sensitivity and t h e p o s i t i v e v a l u e of nurturing behavior, w h e n gays d e s c r i b e t h e p r e j u d i c e of h e t e r o s e x u a l s as h o m o p h o b i c and their o w n sexuality as p o s i t i v e and selfdeveioping, when Blacks affirm a d i s t i n c t Afro-American tradition, t h e n t h e d o m i n a n t c u l t u r e is forced to d i s c o v e r itself for the first t i m e as s p e ­ cific: as A n g l o , E u r o p e a n , Christian, m a s c u l i n e , straight. In a political s t r u g g l e w h e r e o p p r e s s e d g r o u p s insist on t h e p o s i t i v e value of t h e i r s p e ­ cific c u l t u r e and e x p e r i e n c e , it b e c o m e s increasingly difficult for d o m i n a n t g r o u p s to p a r a d e t h e i r n o r m s as neutral and universal, and to construct t h e v a l u e s and b e h a v i o r of t h e o p p r e s s e d as deviant, p e r v e r t e d , or infe­ rior. By p u n c t u r i n g t h e universalist claim to unity that e x p e l s s o m e g r o u p s and turns t h e m into t h e O t h e r , t h e assertion of p o s i t i v e g r o u p specificity i n t r o d u c e s t h e possibility of u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h e relation b e t w e e n groups as m e r e l y difference, instead of e x c l u s i o n , o p p o s i t i o n , or d o m i n a n c e . T h e politics of difference also p r o m o t e s a notion of g r o u p solidarity against t h e i n d i v i d u a l i s m of liberal h u m a n i s m . Liberal h u m a n i s m treats e a c h p e r s o n as an individual, i g n o r i n g differences of race, sex, religion, and e t h n i c i t y . E a c h p e r s o n s h o u l d b e e v a l u a t e d only a c c o r d i n g to h e r or his individual efforts and a c h i e v e m e n t s . W i t h t h e institutionalization of formal e q u l i t y s o m e m e m b e r s of formerly e x c l u d e d groups h a v e i n d e e d s u c c e e d e d , b y m a i n s t r e a m standards. Structural patterns of g r o u p privi-

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l e g e and o p p r e s s i o n n e v e r t h e l e s s remain. W h e n political leaders of o p ­ p r e s s e d g r o u p s reject assimilation t h e y are often affirming g r o u p solidar­ ity. W h e r e t h e d o m i n a n t c u l t u r e refuses to s e e a n y t h i n g but t h e a c h i e v e ­ m e n t of a u t o n o m o u s individuals, t h e o p p r e s s e d assert that w e shall not s e p a r a t e from t h e p e o p l e w i t h w h o m w e identify in o r d e r to "make it" in a w h i t e A n g l o m a l e w o r l d . T h e politics of difference insists on liberation of t h e w h o l e g r o u p of Blacks, w o m e n , A m e r i c a n Indians, and that this can b e a c c o m p l i s h e d o n l y t h r o u g h basic institutional c h a n g e s . T h e s e c h a n g e s m u s t i n c l u d e g r o u p r e p r e s e n t a t i o n in p o l i c y m a k i n g and an e l i m i n a t i o n of t h e h i e r a r c h y of rewards that forces e v e r y o n e to c o m p e t e for scarce posi­ tions at t h e top. T h u s t h e assertion o f a p o s i t i v e s e n s e of g r o u p difference p r o v i d e s a s t a n d p o i n t from w h i c h to criticize prevailing institutions and n o r m s . Black A m e r i c a n s find in their traditional c o m m u n i t i e s , w h i c h refer to their m e m b e r s as "brother" and "sister," a s e n s e of solidarity a b s e n t from t h e calculating i n d i v i d u a l i s m of w h i t e professional capitalist society. F e m i ­ nists find in t h e traditional f e m a l e v a l u e s of nurturing a c h a l l e n g e to a militarist w o r l d - v i e w , and lesbians find in their relationships a confronta­ tion w i t h t h e a s s u m p t i o n of c o m p l e m e n t a r y g e n d e r roles in sexual rela­ t i o n s h i p s . F r o m their e x p e r i e n c e of a c u l t u r e tied to t h e land A m e r i c a n I n d i a n s formulate a critique of t h e instrumental rationality of E u r o p e a n c u l t u r e that r e s u l t s in pollution and ecological d e s t r u c t i o n . H a v i n g re­ v e a l e d t h e specificity of t h e d o m i n a n t n o r m s w h i c h claim universality and neutrality, social m o v e m e n t s of t h e o p p r e s s e d are in a position to inquire h o w t h e d o m i n a n t institutions m u s t b e c h a n g e d so that t h e y will n o l o n g e r r e p r o d u c e t h e patterns of p r i v i l e g e and o p p r e s s i o n . F r o m t h e assertion of p o s i t i v e difference t h e self-organization of o p ­ p r e s s e d g r o u p s follows. Both liberal h u m a n i s t and leftist political organi­ zations and m o v e m e n t s h a v e f o u n d it difficult to a c c e p t this p r i n c i p l e of g r o u p a u t o n o m y . In a h u m a n i s t e m a n c i p a t o r y politics, if a g r o u p is subject to injustice, t h e n all t h o s e i n t e r e s t e d in a just s o c i e t y s h o u l d u n i t e to c o m ­ bat t h e p o w e r s that p e r p e t u a t e that injustice. If m a n y g r o u p s are subject to injustice, m o r e o v e r , t h e n t h e y s h o u l d u n i t e to work for a just society. T h e politics of d i f f e r e n c e is certainly not against coalition, nor d o e s it hold that, for e x a m p l e , w h i t e s s h o u l d not work against racial injustice or m e n against sexist injustice. This politics of g r o u p assertion, h o w e v e r , takes as a basic p r i n c i p l e that m e m b e r s of o p p r e s s e d groups n e e d separate organi­ zations that e x c l u d e o t h e r s , e s p e c i a l l y t h o s e from m o r e p r i v i l e g e d groups. S e p a r a t e organization is p r o b a b l y n e c e s s a r y in order for t h e s e groups to d i s c o v e r and reinforce t h e positivity of their specific e x p e r i e n c e , to col­ lapse and e l i m i n a t e d o u b l e c o n s c i o u s n e s s . In discussions w i t h i n a u t o n o ­ m o u s organizations, g r o u p m e m b e r s can d e t e r m i n e their specific n e e d s and i n t e r e s t s . Separation and self-organization risk creating p r e s s u r e s to-

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w a r d h o m o g e n i z a t i o n of t h e g r o u p s t h e m s e l v e s , creating n e w p r i v i l e g e s and e x c l u s i o n s , a p r o b l e m I shall d i s c u s s in C h a p t e r 8. B u t c o n t e m p o r a r y e m a n c i p a t o r y social m o v e m e n t s h a v e f o u n d g r o u p a u t o n o m y an important v e h i c l e for e m p o w e r m e n t and t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of a group-specific v o i c e and p e r s p e c t i v e . Integration into t h e full life of t h e s o c i e t y s h o u l d not h a v e to i m p l y assimilation to d o m i n a n t n o r m s and a b a n d o n m e n t of g r o u p affiliation and c u l t u r e ( E d l e y , 1986; cf. M c G a r y , 1983). If t h e only alternative to t h e o p p r e s s i v e e x c l u s i o n of s o m e groups d e f i n e d as O t h e r by d o m i n a n t i d e o l o ­ g i e s is t h e assertion that t h e y are t h e s a m e as e v e r y b o d y e l s e , t h e n t h e y will c o n t i n u e to b e e x c l u d e d b e c a u s e t h e y arc not t h e s a m e . S o m e m i g h t o b j e c t to t h e w a y I h a v e drawn t h e distinction b e t w e e n an assimilationist ideal of liberation and a radical d e m o c r a t i c pluralism. T h e y m i g h t claim that I h a v e not painted t h e ideal of a s o c i e t y that t r a n s c e n d s g r o u p d i f f e r e n c e s fairly, r e p r e s e n t i n g it as h o m o g e n e o u s and conformist. T h e free s o c i e t y e n v i s a g e d by liberalism, t h e y m i g h t say, is certainly plu­ ralistic. In it p e r s o n s can affiliate w i t h w h o m e v e r t h e y c h o o s e ; liberty e n ­ c o u r a g e s a proliferation o f l i f e s t y l e s , activities, and associations. W h i l e I h a v e n o quarrel w i t h social diversity in this s e n s e , this vision of liberal pluralism d o e s not t o u c h o n t h e primary issues that g i v e rise to t h e politics of difference. T h e vision of liberation as t h e t r a n s c e n d e n c e of g r o u p differ­ e n c e s e e k s to abolish t h e p u b l i c and political significance of g r o u p differ­ e n c e , w h i l e retaining and p r o m o t i n g b o t h individual and g r o u p diversity in private, or nonpolitical, social c o n t e x t s . In C h a p t e r 4 I a r g u e d that this w a y of d i s t i n g u i s h i n g p u b l i c and private s p h e r e s , w h e r e t h e p u b l i c r e p r e ­ s e n t s universal c i t i z e n s h i p and t h e private individual differences, t e n d s to result in g r o u p e x c l u s i o n from t h e public. Radical d e m o c r a t i c pluralism a c k n o w l e d g e s and affirms t h e public and political significance of social g r o u p d i f f e r e n c e s as a m e a n s of e n s u r i n g t h e participation and inclusion of e v e r y o n e in social and political institutions.

RECLAIMING THE M E A N I N G OF D I F F E R E N C E

M a n y p e o p l e i n s i d e and o u t s i d e t h e m o v e m e n t s I h a v e d i s c u s s e d find t h e rejection of t h e liberal h u m a n i s t ideal and t h e assertion of a p o s i t i v e s e n s e of g r o u p difference b o t h c o n f u s i n g and controversial. T h e y fear that any a d m i s s i o n by o p p r e s s e d groups that t h e y are different from t h e d o m i n a n t g r o u p s risks justifying a n e w t h e s u b o r d i n a t i o n , special marking, and ex­ c l u s i o n of t h o s e g r o u p s . S i n c e calls for a return of w o m e n to t h e k i t c h e n , Blacks to s e r v a n t roles and separate s c h o o l s , and d i s a b l e d p e o p l e to nurs­ ing h o m e s are not a b s e n t from c o n t e m p o r a r y politics, t h e d a n g e r is real. It m a y b e t r u e that t h e assimilationist ideal that treats e v e r y o n e t h e s a m e and a p p l i e s t h e s a m e standards to all p e r p e t u a t e s d i s a d v a n t a g e b e c a u s e

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real g r o u p differences r e m a i n that m a k e it unfair to c o m p a r e t h e u n e q u a l s . But this is far preferable to a r e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of separate and u n e q u a l s p h e r e s for different g r o u p s justified on t h e basis of g r o u p difference. S i n c e t h o s e asserting g r o u p specificity certainly w i s h to affirm t h e lib­ eral h u m a n i s t p r i n c i p l e that all p e r s o n s are of equal moral w o r t h , t h e y a p p e a r to b e faced w i t h a d i l e m m a . A n a l y z i n g W . E . B . D u Bois's argu­ m e n t s for cultural pluralism, Bernard Boxill p o s e s t h e d i l e m m a this way: "On t h e o n e h a n d , w e m u s t o v e r c o m e segregation b e c a u s e it d e n i e s t h e i d e a of h u m a n b r o t h e r h o o d ; o n t h e o t h e r hand, to o v e r c o m e s e g r e g a t i o n w e m u s t s e l f - s e g r e g a t e and therefore also d e n y t h e idea of h u m a n brother­ h o o d " (Boxill, 1 9 8 4 , p. 174). Martha M i n o w finds a d i l e m m a of difference facing any w h o s e e k to p r o m o t e j u s t i c e for currently o p p r e s s e d or disad­ v a n t a g e d groups. Formally neutral rules and p o l i c i e s that i g n o r e g r o u p d i f f e r e n c e s often p e r p e t u a t e t h e disadvantage of t h o s e w h o s e difference is d e f i n e d as d e v i a n t ; but focusing o n difference risks recreating t h e stigma that difference has carried in t h e past ( M i n o w , 1987, p p . 1 2 - 1 3 ; cf. M i n o w , 1985; 1990). T h e s e d i l e m m a s are g e n u i n e , and exhibit t h e risks of c o l l e c t i v e life, w h e r e t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s of o n e ' s claims, actions, and policies may not turn out as o n e i n t e n d e d b e c a u s e o t h e r s h a v e u n d e r s t o o d t h e m differently or t u r n e d t h e m to different e n d s . S i n c e i g n o r i n g g r o u p differences in p u b ­ lic policy d o e s not m e a n that p e o p l e ignore t h e m in e v e r y d a y life and interaction, h o w e v e r , o p p r e s s i o n c o n t i n u e s e v e n w h e n law and policy d e ­ clare that all are e q u a l . T h u s I think for m a n y groups and in m a n y c i r c u m ­ s t a n c e s it is m o r e e m p o w e r i n g to affirm and a c k n o w l e d g e in political life t h e g r o u p differences that already exist in social life. O n e is m o r e likely to avoid t h e d i l e m m a of difference in d o i n g this if t h e m e a n i n g of difference itself b e c o m e s a terrain of political struggle. Social m o v e m e n t s asserting t h e p o s i t i v i t y of g r o u p difference h a v e e s t a b l i s h e d this terrain, offering an e m a n c i p a t o r y m e a n i n g of difference to replace t h e old exclusionary meaning. T h e o p p r e s s i v e m e a n i n g of g r o u p difference d e f i n e s it as a b s o l u t e o t h ­ e r n e s s , mutual e x c l u s i o n , categorical o p p o s i t i o n . This essentialist m e a n ­ ing of difference s u b m i t s to t h e logic of identity. O n e g r o u p o c c u p i e s t h e p o s i t i o n of a n o r m , against w h i c h all o t h e r s are m e a s u r e d . T h e a t t e m p t to r e d u c e all p e r s o n s to t h e unity of a c o m m o n m e a s u r e constructs as d e v i a n t t h o s e w h o s e attributes differ from t h e group-specific attributes implicitly p r e s u m e d in t h e n o r m . T h e drive to unify t h e particularity and multiplic­ ity of practices, cultural s y m b o l s , and w a y s of relating in clear and distinct c a t e g o r i e s turns difference into e x c l u s i o n . T h u s I e x p l o r e d in t h e p r e v i o u s t w o c h a p t e r s h o w t h e appropriation of a universal subject p o s i t i o n by socially p r i v i l e g e d groups forces t h o s e t h e y d e f i n e as different o u t s i d e t h e definition of full h u m a n i t y and c i t i z e n s h i p .

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T h e a t t e m p t to m e a s u r e all against s o m e universal standard g e n e r a t e s a logic of difference as hierarchical d i c h o t o m y — m a s c u l i n e / f e m i n i n e , civi­ l i z e d / s a v a g e , and so o n . T h e s e c o n d t e r m is d e f i n e d n e g a t i v e l y as a lack of t h e truly h u m a n qualities; at t h e s a m e t i m e it is d e f i n e d as t h e c o m p l e ­ m e n t to t h e v a l u e d t e r m , t h e o b j e c t correlating w i t h its subject, that w h i c h brings it to c o m p l e t i o n , w h o l e n e s s , and identity. By l o v i n g and affirming h i m , a w o m a n s e r v e s as a mirror to a man, h o l d i n g u p his virtues for h i m to s e e (Irigaray, 1985). By carrying t h e w h i t e man's b u r d e n to t a m e and e d u c a t e t h e savage p e o p l e s , t h e civilized will realize universal h u m a n i t y . T h e e x o t i c orientals are t h e r e to k n o w and master, to b e t h e c o m p l e t i o n of reason's p r o g r e s s in history, w h i c h s e e k s t h e unity of t h e w o r l d (Said, 1978). In e v e r y c a s e t h e v a l u e d t e r m a c h i e v e s its value by its d e t e r m i n a t e l y n e g a t i v e relation to t h e Other. In t h e objectifying i d e o l o g i e s of racism, s e x i s m , a n t i - S e m i t i s m , and h o m o p h o b i a , o n l y t h e o p p r e s s e d and e x c l u d e d groups are d e f i n e d as dif­ ferent. W h e r e a s t h e p r i v i l e g e d groups arc neutral and exhibit free and m a l l e a b l e subjectivity, t h e e x c l u d e d g r o u p s are marked w i t h an e s s e n c e , i m p r i s o n e d in a g i v e n set of possibilities. By virtue of t h e characteristics t h e g r o u p is a l l e g e d to h a v e by nature, t h e i d e o l o g i e s a l l e g e that g r o u p m e m b e r s h a v e specific dispositions that suit t h e m for s o m e activities and not o t h e r s . D i f f e r e n c e in t h e s e i d e o l o g i e s always m e a n s exclusionary o p ­ p o s i t i o n to a n o r m . T h e r e are rational m e n , and t h e n t h e r e are w o m e n ; t h e r e are c i v i l i z e d m e n , and t h e n t h e r e are w i l d and savage p e o p l e s . T h e marking of difference always i m p l i e s a g o o d / b a d o p p o s i t i o n ; it is always a d e v a l u a t i o n , t h e n a m i n g of an inferiority in relation to a superior standard of h u m a n i t y . D i f f e r e n c e h e r e always m e a n s a b s o l u t e o t h e r n e s s ; t h e g r o u p m a r k e d as different has n o c o m m o n nature w i t h t h e normal or neutral o n e s . T h e categorical o p p o s i t i o n of g r o u p s e s s e n t i a l i z e s t h e m , r e p r e s s i n g t h e differ­ e n c e s w i t h i n g r o u p s . In this w a y t h e definition of difference as e x c l u s i o n and o p p o s i t i o n actually d e n i e s difference. This e s s e n t i a l i z i n g categoriza­ tion also d e n i e s difference in that its universalizing n o r m s p r e c l u d e r e c o g ­ n i z i n g and affirming a group's specificity in its o w n t e r m s . E s s e n t i a l i z i n g difference e x p r e s s e s a fear of specificity, and a fear of m a k i n g p e r m e a b l e t h e categorical b o r d e r b e t w e e n o n e s e l f and t h e o t h e r s . T h i s fear, I a r g u e d in t h e p r e v i o u s chapter, is not m e r e l y intellectual, and d o e s not d e r i v e o n l y from t h e i n s t r u m e n t a l d e s i r e to d e f e n d p r i v i l e g e , t h o u g h that m a y b e a large e l e m e n t . It w e l l s from t h e d e p t h s of t h e W e s t ­ e r n subject's s e n s e of i d e n t i t y , e s p e c i a l l y , b u t not only, in t h e subjectivity of p r i v i l e g e d groups. T h e fear may increase, m o r e o v e r , as a clear e s s e n tialism of difference w a n e s , as b e l i e f in a specifically f e m a l e , Black, or h o m o s e x u a l n a t u r e b e c o m e s less t e n a b l e .

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T h e politics of difference confronts this fear, and aims for an u n d e r ­ s t a n d i n g of g r o u p difference as i n d e e d a m b i g u o u s , relational, shifting, w i t h o u t clear b o r d e r s that k e e p p e o p l e straight—as e n t a i l i n g n e i t h e r a m o r p h o u s u n i t y nor p u r e individuality. By asserting a p o s i t i v e m e a n i n g for t h e i r o w n i d e n t i t y , o p p r e s s e d groups s e e k to s e i z e t h e p o w e r of n a m ­ ing d i f f e r e n c e itself, and e x p l o d e t h e implicit definition of difference as d e v i a n c e in relation to a n o r m , w h i c h f r e e z e s s o m e g r o u p s into a selfe n c l o s e d nature. D i f f e r e n c e n o w c o m e s to m e a n not o t h e r n e s s , e x c l u s i v e o p p o s i t i o n , but specificity, variation, h e t e r o g e n e i t y . D i f f e r e n c e n a m e s re­ lations of similarity and dissimilarity that can b e r e d u c e d to n e i t h e r c o e x ­ t e n s i v e i d e n t i t y nor n o n o v e r l a p p i n g o t h e r n e s s . T h e alternative to an e s s e n t i a l i z i n g , stigmatizing m e a n i n g of difference as o p p o s i t i o n is an u n d e r s t a n d i n g of difference as specificity, variation. In this logic, as Martha M i n o w (1985; 1987; 1990) s u g g e s t s , g r o u p differences s h o u l d b e c o n c e i v e d as relational rather than defined by s u b s t a n t i v e cate­ g o r i e s and attributes. A relational u n d e r s t a n d i n g of difference relativizes t h e p r e v i o u s l y universal position of p r i v i l e g e d groups, w h i c h allows o n l y t h e o p p r e s s e d to b e m a r k e d as different. W h e n g r o u p difference appears as a function of c o m p a r i s o n b e t w e e n groups, w h i t e s arc j u s t as specific as Blacks or L a t i n o s , m e n j u s t as specific as w o m e n , a b l e - b o d i e d p e o p l e just as specific as d i s a b l e d p e o p l e . D i f f e r e n c e thus e m e r g e s not as a d e s c r i p ­ tion of t h e attributes of a g r o u p , but as a function of t h e relations b e t w e e n g r o u p s and t h e interaction of groups w i t h institutions (cf. L i t t l e t o n , 1987). In this relational u n d e r s t a n d i n g , t h e m e a n i n g of difference also b e ­ c o m e s c o n t e x t u a l i z e d (cf. Scott, 1988). G r o u p differences will b e m o r e or less salient d e p e n d i n g o n t h e g r o u p s c o m p a r e d , t h e p u r p o s e s of t h e c o m ­ parison, and t h e p o i n t of v i e w of t h e c o m p a r e r s . Such c o n t e x t u a l i z e d u n ­ d e r s t a n d i n g s of difference u n d e r m i n e essentialist a s s u m p t i o n s . For e x a m ­ p l e , in t h e c o n t e x t of athletics, health care, social s e r v i c e support, and so o n , w h e e l c h a i r - b o u n d p e o p l e are different from o t h e r s , b u t t h e y are not different in m a n y o t h e r r e s p e c t s . Traditional t r e a t m e n t of t h e d i s a b l e d e n t a i l e d e x c l u s i o n and s e g r e g a t i o n b e c a u s e t h e differences b e t w e e n t h e d i s a b l e d and t h e a b l e - b o d i e d w e r e c o n c e p t u a l i z e d as e x t e n d i n g to all or m o s t capacities. In g e n e r a l , t h e n , a relational u n d e r s t a n d i n g of group difference rejects e x c l u s i o n . D i f f e r e n c e n o l o n g e r i m p l i e s that groups lie o u t s i d e o n e an­ other. To say that t h e r e are differences a m o n g groups d o e s not i m p l y that t h e r e are not o v e r l a p p i n g e x p e r i e n c e s , or that t w o groups h a v e n o t h i n g in c o m m o n . T h e a s s u m p t i o n that real differences in affinity, c u l t u r e , or priv­ i l e g e i m p l y o p p o s i t i o n a l categorization m u s t b e c h a l l e n g e d . Different g r o u p s are always similar in s o m e r e s p e c t s , and always p o t e n t i a l l y share s o m e a t t r i b u t e s , e x p e r i e n c e s , and goals.

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S u c h a relational u n d e r s t a n d i n g of difference entails revising t h e m e a n ­ i n g of g r o u p i d e n t i t y as w e l l . In asserting t h e positive difference of their e x p e r i e n c e , c u l t u r e , and social p e r s p e c t i v e , social m o v e m e n t s of groups that h a v e e x p e r i e n c e d cultural i m p e r i a l i s m d e n y that t h e y h a v e a c o m m o n i d e n t i t y , a set of fixed attributes that clearly mark w h o b e l o n g s and w h o doesn't. Rather, w h a t m a k e s a g r o u p a g r o u p is a social p r o c e s s of interac­ tion and differentiation in w h i c h s o m e p e o p l e c o m e to h a v e a particular affinity (Haraway, 1985) for o t h e r s . M y "affinity g r o u p " in a g i v e n social situation c o m p r i s e s t h o s e p e o p l e w i t h w h o m I feel t h e m o s t comfortable, w h o are m o r e familiar. Affinity n a m e s t h e m a n n e r of sharing a s s u m p t i o n s , affective b o n d i n g , and n e t w o r k i n g that recognizably differentiates groups from o n e another, b u t not according to s o m e c o m m o n nature. T h e sali­ e n c e of a particular person's g r o u p affinities m a y shift a c c o r d i n g to t h e social situation or a c c o r d i n g to c h a n g e s in h e r or his life. M e m b e r s h i p in a social g r o u p is a function not of satisfying s o m e o b j e c t i v e criteria, but o f a s u b j e c t i v e affirmation o f affinity w i t h that g r o u p , t h e affirmation of that affinity b y o t h e r m e m b e r s of t h e g r o u p , and t h e attribution of m e m b e r ­ s h i p in that g r o u p b y p e r s o n s identifying w i t h o t h e r groups. G r o u p i d e n ­ tity is c o n s t r u c t e d from a flowing p r o c e s s in w h i c h individuals identify t h e m s e l v e s and o t h e r s in t e r m s of g r o u p s , and thus g r o u p i d e n t i t y itself flows and shifts w i t h c h a n g e s in social p r o c e s s . G r o u p s e x p e r i e n c i n g cultural i m p e r i a l i s m h a v e found t h e m s e l v e s o b ­ jectified and m a r k e d w i t h a d e v a l u e d e s s e n c e from t h e o u t s i d e , b y a d o m ­ inant c u l t u r e t h e y are e x c l u d e d from making. T h e assertion of a p o s i t i v e s e n s e of g r o u p difference b y t h e s e groups is e m a n c i p a t o r y b e c a u s e it re­ c l a i m s t h e definition o f t h e g r o u p b y t h e g r o u p , as a creation and c o n s t r u c ­ tion, rather than a g i v e n e s s e n c e . To b e sure, it is difficult to articulate p o s i t i v e e l e m e n t s of g r o u p affinity w i t h o u t e s s e n t i a l i z i n g t h e m , and t h e s e m o v e m e n t s d o not always s u c c e e d in d o i n g so (cf. Sartre, 1948, p. 85; E p s t e i n , 1987). But t h e y are d e v e l o p i n g a language to d e s c r i b e their simi­ lar social situation and relations to o n e another, and their similar p e r c e p ­ tions and p e r s p e c t i v e s o n social life. T h e s e m o v e m e n t s e n g a g e in t h e pro­ j e c t of cultural r e v o l u t i o n I r e c o m m e n d e d in t h e last chapter, insofar as t h e y take c u l t u r e as in part a m a t t e r of c o l l e c t i v e c h o i c e . W h i l e their ideas of w o m e n ' s c u l t u r e , Afro-American c u l t u r e , and A m e r i c a n Indian c u l t u r e rely o n past cultural e x p r e s s i o n s , to a significant d e g r e e t h e s e m o v e m e n t s h a v e s e l f - c o n s c i o u s l y c o n s t r u c t e d t h e c u l t u r e that t h e y claim defines t h e d i s t i n c t i v e n e s s of t h e i r g r o u p s . C o n t e x t u a l i z i n g b o t h t h e m e a n i n g of difference and i d e n t i t y t h u s allows t h e a c k n o w l e d g m e n t of difference w i t h i n affinity groups. In o u r c o m p l e x , plural s o c i e t y , e v e r y social g r o u p has g r o u p differences cutting across it, w h i c h are p o t e n t i a l s o u r c e s o f w i s d o m , e x c i t e m e n t , conflict, and o p p r e s -

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sion. C a y m e n , for e x a m p l e , m a y b e Black, rich, h o m e l e s s , or old, and t h e s e d i f f e r e n c e s p r o d u c e different identifications and potential conflicts a m o n g gay m e n , as w e l l as affinities with s o m e straight m e n .

R E S P E C T I N G D I F F E R E N C E IN POLICY

A goal of social j u s t i c e , I will a s s u m e , is social equality. E q u a l i t y refers not primarily to t h e distribution of social g o o d s , t h o u g h distributions are cer­ tainly e n t a i l e d b y social equality. It refers primarily to t h e full participa­ tion and inclusion of e v e r y o n e in a society's major institutions, and t h e socially s u p p o r t e d s u b s t a n t i v e o p p o r t u n i t y for all to d e v e l o p and e x e r c i s e t h e i r capacities and realize t h e i r c h o i c e s . A m e r i c a n s o c i e t y has e n a c t e d formal legal e q u a l i t y for m e m b e r s of all groups, with t h e i m p o r t a n t and s h a m e f u l e x c e p t i o n of gay m e n and lesbians. B u t for m a n y g r o u p s social e q u a l i t y is barely on t h e horizon. T h o s e s e e k i n g social e q u a l i t y d i s a g r e e a b o u t w h e t h e r g r o u p - n e u t r a l or g r o u p - c o n s c i o u s policies b e s t suit that goal, and their d i s a g r e e m e n t often turns on w h e t h e r t h e y h o l d an assimila­ tionist or culturally pluralist ideal. In this section I argue for t h e j u s t i c e of g r o u p - c o n s c i o u s social p o l i c i e s , and discuss t h r e e c o n t e x t s in w h i c h s u c h p o l i c i e s are at i s s u e in t h e U n i t e d States today: w o m e n ' s e q u a l i t y in t h e w o r k p l a c e , l a n g u a g e rights of n o n - E n g l i s h speakers, and A m e r i c a n Indian rights. A n o t h e r c a t e g o r y of g r o u p - c o n s c i o u s policies, n a m e l y , affirmative a c t i o n , I will d i s c u s s in C h a p t e r 7. T h e i s s u e of formally equal v e r s u s g r o u p - c o n s c i o u s policies arises pri­ marily in t h e c o n t e x t of w o r k p l a c e relations and access to political p o w e r . I h a v e already d i s c u s s e d o n e of t h e primary reasons for preferring g r o u p c o n s c i o u s to neutral policies: policies that are universally formulated and t h u s b l i n d to d i f f e r e n c e s of race, c u l t u r e , g e n d e r , age, or disability often p e r p e t u a t e rather than u n d e r m i n e o p p r e s s i o n . U n i v e r s a l l y formulated standards or n o r m s , for e x a m p l e , according to w h i c h all c o m p e t i t o r s for social positions are e v a l u a t e d , often p r e s u m e as t h e norm capacities, val­ u e s , and c o g n i t i v e and behavioral styles typical of d o m i n a n t g r o u p s , t h u s d i s a d v a n t a g i n g o t h e r s . Racist, sexist, h o m o p h o b i c , ageist, and ableist a v e r s i o n s and s t e r e o t y p e s , m o r e o v e r , c o n t i n u e to d e v a l u e or r e n d e r invis­ i b l e s o m e p e o p l e , often disadvantaging t h e m in e c o n o m i c and political i n t e r a c t i o n s . P o l i c i e s that take n o t i c e of t h e specific situation of o p p r e s s e d g r o u p s can offset t h e s e d i s a d v a n t a g e s . It m i g h t b e o b j e c t e d that w h e n facially neutral standards or policies d i s a d v a n t a g e a g r o u p , t h e standards or policies s h o u l d s i m p l y b e restruc­ t u r e d so as to b e g e n u i n e l y neutral, rather than replaced b y g r o u p - c o n ­ scious p o l i c i e s . For s o m e situations this m a y b e appropriate, b u t in m a n y t h e g r o u p - r e l a t e d differences allow no neutral formulation. L a n g u a g e pol-

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icy m i g h t b e c i t e d as paradigmatic h e r e , b u t as I will d i s c u s s shortly, s o m e g e n d e r i s s u e s m a y b e as w e l l . M o r e i m p o r t a n t , h o w e v e r , s o m e of t h e disadvantages that o p p r e s s e d g r o u p s suffer can b e r e m e d i e d in policy o n l y b y an affirmative a c k n o w l ­ e d g m e n t of t h e group's specificity. T h e o p p r e s s i o n s of cultural imperial­ ism that s t e r e o t y p e a g r o u p and s i m u l t a n e o u s l y r e n d e r its o w n e x p e r i e n c e i n v i s i b l e can b e r e m e d i e d o n l y by explicit attention to and e x p r e s s i o n of that group's specificity. For e x a m p l e , r e m o v i n g o p p r e s s i v e s t e r e o t y p e s of Blacks, L a t i n o s , Indians, Arabs, and Asians and portraying t h e m in t h e s a m e roles as w h i t e s will not e l i m i n a t e racism from t e l e v i s i o n p r o g r a m ­ m i n g . P o s i t i v e and i n t e r e s t i n g portrayals of p e o p l e of color in situations and w a y s o f l i f e that d e r i v e from their o w n s e l f - p e r c e p t i o n s are also n e c e s ­ sary, as w e l l as a great deal m o r e p o s i t i v e p r e s e n c e of all t h e s e g r o u p s than c u r r e n t l y exists. T h e s e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s p r o d u c e a s e c o n d reason for t h e j u s t i c e of g r o u p c o n s c i o u s p o l i c i e s , in addition to their function in c o u n t e r a c t i n g o p p r e s ­ sion and d i s a d v a n t a g e . G r o u p - c o n s c i o u s p o l i c i e s are s o m e t i m e s n e c e s s a r y in o r d e r to affirm t h e solidarity of g r o u p s , to allow t h e m to affirm their g r o u p affinities w i t h o u t suffering d i s a d v a n t a g e in t h e w i d e r s o c i e t y . S o m e g r o u p - c o n s c i o u s p o l i c i e s are c o n s i s t e n t w i t h an assimilationist ideal in w h i c h g r o u p difference has n o social significance, as long as such p o l i c i e s are u n d e r s t o o d as m e a n s to that e n d , and thus as t e m p o r a r y d i v e r ­ g e n c e s from g r o u p - n e u t r a l n o r m s . M a n y p e o p l e look u p o n affirmative ac­ tion p o l i c i e s in this w a y , and as I shall discuss shortly, p e o p l e typically u n d e r s t a n d bilingual e d u c a t i o n in this way. A culturally pluralist d e m o ­ cratic ideal, h o w e v e r , s u p p o r t s g r o u p - c o n s c i o u s policies not o n l y as m e a n s to t h e e n d of e q u a l i t y , but also as intrinsic to the ideal of social e q u a l i t y itself. G r o u p s c a n n o t b e socially e q u a l u n l e s s their specific e x p e r i e n c e , c u l t u r e , and social c o n t r i b u t i o n s are publicly affirmed and r e c o g n i z e d . T h e d i l e m m a o f difference e x p o s e s t h e risks i n v o l v e d both in a t t e n d i n g to and in i g n o r i n g differences. T h e d a n g e r in affirming difference is that t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of g r o u p - c o n s c i o u s p o l i c i e s will reinstate stigma and e x c l u s i o n . In t h e past, g r o u p - c o n s c i o u s policies w e r e u s e d to separate t h o s e d e f i n e d as different and e x c l u d e t h e m from access to t h e rights and p r i v i l e g e s e n j o y e d b y d o m i n a n t groups, A crucial principle of d e m o c r a t i c cultural pluralism, t h e n , is that group-specific rights and p o l i c i e s s h o u l d stand t o g e t h e r w i t h g e n e r a l civic and political rights of participation and inclusion. G r o u p - c o n s c i o u s p o l i c i e s c a n n o t b e u s e d to justify e x c l u s i o n of or d i s c r i m i n a t i o n against m e m b e r s of a g r o u p in t h e e x e r c i s e of g e n e r a l political and civil rights. A d e m o c r a t i c cultural pluralism thus r e q u i r e s a dual s y s t e m o f rights: a g e n e r a l s y s t e m o f rights w h i c h are t h e s a m e for all, and a m o r e specific s y s t e m of g r o u p - c o n s c i o u s policies and rights (cf. W o l gast, 1980, c h a p . 2) In t h e w o r d s of K e n n e t h Karst:

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When the promise of equal citizenship is fulfilled, the paths to belonging are opened in two directions for members of cultural minorities. As full members of the larger society, they have the option to participate to whatever degree they choose. They also may look inward, seeking solidarity within their cultural group, without being penalized for that choice. (Karst, 1986, p. 337) If "cultural m i n o r i t y " is i n t e r p r e t e d to m e a n any g r o u p subject to cultural i m p e r i a l i s m , t h e n this s t a t e m e n t applies to w o m e n , o l d p e o p l e , d i s a b l e d p e o p l e , gay m e n and lesbians, and working-class p e o p l e as m u c h as it a p p l i e s to e t h n i c or national g r o u p s . I will n o w briefly c o n s i d e r t h r e e c a s e s in w h i c h g r o u p - s p e c i f i c p o l i c i e s are n e c e s s a r y to support social equality: w o m e n , Latinos, and A m e r i c a n Indians. (1) Are w o m e n ' s i n t e r e s t s b e s t p r o m o t e d through g e n d e r - n e u t r a l or g r o u p - c o n s c i o u s rules and p o l i c i e s ? This q u e s t i o n has b e e n fiercely d e ­ b a t e d b y f e m i n i s t s in r e c e n t years. T h e resulting literature raises crucial q u e s t i o n s about d o m i n a n t m o d e l s of law and policy that take e q u a l i t y to m e a n s a m e n e s s , and offers s o m e s u b t l e analyses of t h e m e a n i n g of e q u a l ­ ity that d o not a s s u m e i d e n t i t y (see Vogel, 1990). M o s t of this discussion has f o c u s e d o n t h e q u e s t i o n of p r e g n a n c y and childbirth rights in t h e workplace. A d v o c a t e s of an equal t r e a t m e n t approach to p r e g n a n c y a r g u e that w o m e n ' s i n t e r e s t s are b e s t s e r v e d b y vigorously p r e s s i n g for t h e i n c l u s i o n of p r e g n a n c y l e a v e s and b e n e f i t s w i t h i n g e n d e r - n e u t r a l l e a v e and benefit p o l i c i e s r e l e v a n t to any physical c o n d i t i o n that r e n d e r s m e n or w o m e n u n a b l e to work. T h e history of p r o t e c t i v e legislation s h o w s that w o m e n c a n n o t trust e m p l o y e r s and courts not to u s e special classification as an e x c u s e for e x c l u d i n g and disadvantaging w o m e n , and w e are b e s t pro­ t e c t e d from s u c h e x c l u s i o n by neutral policies (Williams, 1983). E v e n s u c h p r o p o n e n t s of equal t r e a t m e n t , h o w e v e r , agree that g e n d e r - n e u t r a l p o l i c i e s that take m a l e lives as t h e n o r m will disadvantage w o m e n . T h e a n s w e r , a c c o r d i n g to N a d i n e Taub and W e n d y W i l l i a m s , is a m o d e l of e q u a l i t y in t h e w o r k p l a c e that r e c o g n i z e s and a c c o m m o d a t e s t h e specific n e e d s of all w o r k e r s ; s u c h a m o d e l r e q u i r e s significant restructuring of m o s t w o r k p l a c e policy ( T a u b and W i l l i a m s , 1986). In m y v i e w an e q u a l t r e a t m e n t approach to p r e g n a n c y and childbirth is i n a d e q u a t e b e c a u s e it e i t h e r i m p l i e s that w o m e n d o not h a v e any right to l e a v e and j o b s e c u r i t y w h e n h a v i n g b a b i e s , or assimilates s u c h g u a r a n t e e s u n d e r t h e s u p p o s e d l y g e n d e r - n e u t r a l category of "disability." S u c h assim­ ilation is u n a c c e p t a b l e b e c a u s e p r e g n a n c y and childbirth arc usually nor­ mal c o n d i t i o n s of normal w o m e n , b e c a u s e p r e g n a n c y and childbirth t h e m ­ s e l v e s c o u n t as socially n e c e s s a r y work, and b e c a u s e t h e y h a v e u n i q u e and variable characteristics and n e e d s (Scales, 1981; Littleton, 1987). Assimi­ lating p r e g n a n c y and childbirth to disability t e n d s to s t i g m a t i z e t h e s e

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p r o c e s s e s as " u n h e a l t h y . " It s u g g e s t s , m o r e o v e r , that t h e primary or o n l y reason that a w o m a n has a right to l e a v e and j o b s e c u r i t y is that s h e is p h y s i c a l l y u n a b l e to work at h e r j o b , or that d o i n g so w o u l d b e m o r e diffi­ cult than w h e n s h e is not p r e g n a n t and r e c o v e r i n g from childbirth. W h i l e t h e s e are i m p o r t a n t c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , a n o t h e r reason is that s h e o u g h t to h a v e t h e t i m e to establish b r e a s t - f e e d i n g and d e v e l o p a r e l a t i o n s h i p and r o u t i n e w i t h h e r child, if s h e c h o o s e s . At i s s u e is m o r e than e l i m i n a t i n g t h e d i s a d v a n t a g e w o m e n suffer b e c a u s e of m a l e m o d e l s of u n i n t e r r u p t e d work. It is also a q u e s t i o n of e s t a b l i s h i n g and confirming p o s i t i v e p u b l i c r e c o g n i t i o n of t h e social contribution of childbearing. S u c h r e c o g n i t i o n can and s h o u l d b e g i v e n w i t h o u t e i t h e r r e d u c i n g w o m e n to c h i l d b e a r e r s or s u g g e s t i n g that all w o m e n o u g h t to b e a r children and are lacking if t h e y d o not. F e m i n i s t s w h o depart from a g e n d e r - n e u t r a l m o d e l of w o m e n ' s rights g e n e r a l l y restrict this d e p a r t u r e to t h e biological situation of childbirth. M o s t d e m a n d that parental l e a v e from a j o b , for e x a m p l e , s h o u l d b e g e n ­ d e r - n e u t r a l , in o r d e r not to p e r p e t u a t e t h e c o n n e c t i o n of w o m e n w i t h t h e care of c h i l d r e n , and in o r d e r not to p e n a l i z e those m e n w h o c h o o s e m o r e than a v e r a g e c h i l d r e a r i n g responsibilities. I m y s e l f a g r e e w i t h g e n d e r neutral p o l i c y o n this i s s u e . R e s t r i c t i n g t h e i s s u e of g r o u p - c o n s c i o u s policies for w o m e n to c h i l d ­ birth, h o w e v e r , a v o i d s s o m e of t h e hardest q u e s t i o n s i n v o l v e d in p r o m o t ­ ing w o m e n ' s e q u a l i t y in t h e w o r k p l a c e . W o m e n suffer w o r k p l a c e disad­ v a n t a g e not o n l y or e v e n primarily b e c a u s e of their birthing capacity, but b e c a u s e t h e i r g e n d e r socialization and i d e n t i t y orients t h e d e s i r e s , t e m ­ p e r a m e n t s , and capacities of m a n y w o m e n toward certain activities and a w a y from o t h e r s , b e c a u s e m a n y m e n regard w o m e n in inappropriately sexual t e r m s , and b e c a u s e w o m e n ' s c l o t h e s , c o m p o r t m e n t , v o i c e s , and so o n s o m e t i m e s disrupt t h e d i s e m b o d i e d ideal of masculinist bureaucracy. D i f f e r e n c e s b e t w e e n w o m e n and m e n are not only biological, but also socially g e n d e r e d . S u c h g e n d e r differences are m u l t i p l e , variable, and d o not r e d u c e m e n and w o m e n to s e g r e g a t i n g e s s e n c e s . P e r h a p s s u c h differ­ e n c e s s h o u l d not exist, b u t w i t h o u t d o u b t t h e y d o now. I g n o r i n g t h e s e d i f f e r e n c e s s o m e t i m e s d i s a d v a n t a g e s w o m e n in p u b l i c s e t t i n g s w h e r e m a s c u l i n e n o r m s and s t y l e s p r e d o m i n a t e . In a m o d e l s h e calls "equality as a c c e p t a n c e , " C h r i s t i n e Littleton argues for a g e n d e r - c o n s c i o u s approach to policy d i r e c t e d at r e n d e r i n g f e m i n ­ i n e l y g e n d e r e d cultural attributes c o s t l e s s for w o m e n . This m o d e l b e g i n s w i t h t h e a s s u m p t i o n of structured social g e n d e r differences—for e x a m p l e , g e n d e r - d o m i n a t e d occupational c a t e g o r i e s , w o m a n - d o m i n a t e d childrear­ ing and o t h e r family m e m b e r caretaking, and g e n d e r differences in t h e sports p e o p l e w i s h to p u r s u e . N o n e of t h e s e are e s s e n c e s ; it is not as t h o u g h all m e n or all w o m e n follow t h e g e n d e r e d patterns, b u t t h e pat-

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terns are identifiable and apply broadly to m a n y p e o p l e ' s lives. Littleton s m o d e l of e q u a l i t y as a c c e p t a n c e s u p p o r t s policies w h i c h not only will not d i s a d v a n t a g e w o m e n w h o e n g a g e in traditionally f e m i n i n e activity or b e ­ havior, but w h i c h v a l u e t h e f e m i n i n e as m u c h as t h e m a s c u l i n e : The focus of equality as acceptance, therefore, is not on the question of whether women are different, but rather on the question of how the social fact of gender asymmetry can be dealt with so as to create some symmetry in the lived-out experience of all members of the community. I do not think it matters so much whether differences are "natural" or not; they are built into our structures and selves in either event. As social facts, differences are created by the interaction of person with person or person with institution; they inhere in the relationship, not in the person. On this view, the function of equality is to make gender differences, perceived or actual, costless relative to each other, so that anyone may follow a male, female, or androgynous lifestyle according to their natural inclination or choice without being punished for following a female lifestyle or rewarded for following a male one. (Littleton, 1987, p. 1297) T h e a c c e p t a n c e m o d e l of e q u a l i t y , t h e n , p u b l i c l y a c k n o w l e d g e s cultur­ ally b a s e d g e n d e r differences, and takes steps to e n s u r e that t h e s e differ­ e n c e s d o not d i s a d v a n t a g e . T h o u g h Littleton d o e s not e m p h a s i z e it, this m o d e l i m p l i e s , first, that g e n d e r differences m u s t not b e u s e d implicitly or explicitly as a basis for e x c l u d i n g p e r s o n s from institutions, p o s i t i o n s , or o p p o r t u n i t i e s . That is, g e n e r a l rights to equal o p p o r t u n i t y , as w e l l as o t h e r civil and political rights, m u s t obtain. O v e r and a b o v e this, e q u a l i t y as a c c e p t a n c e explicitly r e v a l u e s f e m i n i n e l y c o d e d activity and b e h a v i o r as t h e e q u a l of m a s c u l i n e - c o d e d activity. C o m p a r a b l e w o r t h p o l i c i e s are a w i d e l y d i s c u s s e d strategy for r e v a l u i n g t h e culturally f e m i n i n e . S c h e m e s of equal pay for work of c o m p a r a b l e w o r t h r e q u i r e that p r e d o m i n a n t l y m a l e and p r e d o m i n a n t l y f e m a l e j o b s h a v e similar w a g e structures if t h e y i n v o l v e similar d e g r e e s of skill, diffi­ culty, stress, and so o n . T h e p r o b l e m in i m p l e m e n t i n g t h e s e p o l i c i e s , of c o u r s e , lies in d e s i g n i n g m e t h o d s of c o m p a r i n g different j o b s . M o s t s c h e m e s of c o m p a r i s o n still c h o o s e to m i n i m i z e sex differences b y u s i n g s u p p o s e d l y g e n d e r - n e u t r a l criteria, such as educational a t t a i n m e n t , s p e e d of work, w h e t h e r t h e work i n v o l v e s manipulation of s y m b o l s , p l e a s a n t n e s s of work c o n d i t i o n s , d e c i s i o n m a k i n g ability, and so on. S o m e writers h a v e s u g g e s t e d , h o w e v e r , that standard classifications of j o b traits may b e sys­ t e m a t i c a l l y b i a s e d to k e e p specific kinds of tasks i n v o l v e d in m a n y f e m a l e d o m i n a t e d o c c u p a t i o n s h i d d e n (Beatty and Beatty, 1 9 8 1 ; T r e i m a n and H a r t m a n , 1 9 8 1 , p. 81), M a n y f e m a l e - d o m i n a t e d o c c u p a t i o n s i n v o l v e g e n ­ d e r - s p e c i f i c k i n d s of l a b o r — s u c h as nurturing, s m o o t h i n g o v e r social rela­ tions, or t h e e x h i b i t i o n of s e x u a l i t y — w h i c h m o s t task o b s e r v a t i o n ignores (Alexander, 1987). A fair a s s e s s m e n t of t h e skills and c o m p l e x i t y of m a n y

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f e m a l e - d o m i n a t e d j o b s m a y therefore i n v o l v e p a y i n g explicit attention to g e n d e r d i f f e r e n c e s rather than a p p l y i n g g e n d e r - b l i n d c a t e g o r i e s of c o m ­ parison (cf. L i t t l e t o n , 1987, p. 1312). L i t t l e t o n offers sports as a n o t h e r area of revaluation. An "equality as a c c e p t a n c e " a p p r o a c h , s h e s u g g e s t s , w o u l d support an equal division of r e s o u r c e s b e t w e e n m a l e and f e m a l e programs rather than d i v i d e u p t h e available sports b u d g e t p e r capita (Littleton, 1987, p. 1313). If t h e dispar­ ities in n u m b e r s of p e o p l e i n v o l v e d w e r e too great, I d o not think this proposal w o u l d b e fair, but I a g r e e w i t h t h e g e n e r a l principle L i t t l e t o n is a i m i n g at. W o m e n w h o w i s h to participate in athletic activities s h o u l d not b e d i s a d v a n t a g e d b e c a u s e t h e r e are not m o r e w o m e n w h o currently w i s h to; t h e y s h o u l d h a v e as m a n y w e l l - p a i d c o a c h e s , for e x a m p l e , as d o m e n , their locker room facilities s h o u l d b e as g o o d , and t h e y s h o u l d h a v e access to all t h e e q u i p m e n t t h e y n e e d to excel. M o r e importantly, f e m i n i n e l y s t e r e o t y p e d sports, s u c h as s y n c h r o n i z e d s w i m m i n g or field h o c k e y , s h o u l d r e c e i v e a l e v e l of support c o m p a r a b l e to m o r e m a s c u l i n e sports like football or baseball. (2) In N o v e m b e r 1986 t h e majority of v o t e r s in California s u p p o r t e d a r e f e r e n d u m d e c l a r i n g E n g l i s h t h e official l a n g u a g e of that state. T h e ram­ ifications of this policy are not clear, but it m e a n s at least that state institu­ tions h a v e n o obligation to print ballots and o t h e r g o v e r n m e n t literature or p r o v i d e s e r v i c e s in a n y l a n g u a g e o t h e r than E n g l i s h . T h e California s u c c e s s has s p u r r e d a national m o v e m e n t to d e c l a r e E n g l i s h t h e official l a n g u a g e of t h e U n i t e d States, as w e l l as m a n y additional local m o v e ­ m e n t s , e s p e c i a l l y in regions w i t h fast-growing p o p u l a t i o n s of p e o p l e w h o s e first l a n g u a g e is not E n g l i s h . In w i n t e r 1989, for e x a m p l e , an E n g ­ lish-only proposal w e n t before t h e legislature of Suffolk C o u n t y , L o n g Island, that e v e n s o m e English-first a d v o c a t e s t h o u g h t w a s too strong. N o t o n l y w o u l d it h a v e m a d e E n g l i s h t h e official l a n g u a g e of Suffolk C o u n t y , b u t it w o u l d h a v e forbidden p u b l i c s e r v i c e p r o v i d e r s from speak­ ing to c l i e n t s in a n y l a n g u a g e o t h e r than E n g l i s h (Schmitt, 1989). M a n y E n g l i s h - o n l y a d v o c a t e s justify their position as a n o t h e r of m a n y m e a s u r e s that s h o u l d b e taken to cut t h e costs o f g o v e r n m e n t . But t h e m o v e m e n t s primary appeal is to a n o r m a t i v e ideal of t h e u n i t y of t h e polity. As a nation, t h e U n i t e d States w a s f o u n d e d by E n g l i s h speakers; n o n - E n g l i s h s p e a k e r s are not "real" A m e r i c a n s , no m a t t e r h o w m a n y g e n ­ erations t h e y can trace o n A m e r i c a n soil. A polity cannot sustain itself w i t h o u t significant c o m m o n a l i t y and mutual identification a m o n g its citi­ z e n s , this a r g u m e n t g o e s , and a c o m m o n l a n g u a g e is o n e of t h e m o s t i m ­ portant of s u c h unifying forces. Linguistic and cultural pluralism leads to conflict, d i v i s i v e n e s s , factionalism, and u l t i m a t e l y disintegration. G i v i n g p u b l i c p r e f e r e n c e to E n g l i s h s u p p o r t s this unity and e n c o u r a g e s n o n - E n g ­ lish s p e a k e r s to assimilate m o r e quickly.

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T h e r e are at least t h r e e a r g u m e n t s against this appeal to t h e unity of a s i n g l e h a r m o n i o u s polity. First, it is s i m p l y unrealistic. F r o m its b e g i n ­ n i n g s t h e U n i t e d States has always harbored sizeable linguistic and cul­ tural m i n o r i t i e s . Its history of i m p e r i a l i s m and annexation and its i m m i ­ gration policy h a v e r e s u l t e d in m o r e . In t h e past t w e n t y - f i v e years U . S . military and foreign policy has l e d to a h u g e influx of Latin A m e r i c a n s and Asians. S o m e e s t i m a t e , m o r e o v e r , that by t h e year 2 0 0 0 H i s p a n i c and Asian p o p u l a t i o n s in t h e U n i t e d States will h a v e i n c r e a s e d b y 8 4 and 103 p e r c e n t r e s p e c t i v e l y (Sears and H u d d y , 1987). M a n y individuals b e l o n g ­ ing to cultural m i n o r i t i e s c h o o s e to assimilate, as do s o m e w h o l e groups. But m a n y d o not. E v e n w i t h o u t official support for their d o i n g so and with c o n s i d e r a b l e p r e s s u r e s against it, m a n y groups h a v e retained distinct lin­ guistic and cultural i d e n t i t i e s , e v e n s o m e w h o s e m e m b e r s h a v e l i v e d in t h e U n i t e d States for several g e n e r a t i o n s . Spanish s p e a k e r s m a y b e t h e m o s t salient h e r e b e c a u s e their relative n u m b e r s are large, and b e c a u s e their c o n n e c t i o n s w i t h P u e r t o Rico, M e x i c o , or o t h e r parts of Latin A m e r ­ ica r e m a i n strong. G i v e n t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n of m a n y linguistic and cultural m i n o r i t i e s to maintain a specific i d e n t i t y e v e n as t h e y claim rights to t h e full b e n e f i t s of A m e r i c a n c i t i z e n s h i p , a d e t e r m i n a t i o n w h i c h s e e m s to b e i n c r e a s i n g , t h e d e s i r e of t h e E n g l i s h - o n l y m o v e m e n t to c r e a t e unity t h r o u g h e n f o r c e d l a n g u a g e policy is s i m p l y silly. S e c o n d , as I h a v e already a r g u e d at several points, this n o r m of t h e h o m o g e n e o u s p u b l i c is o p p r e s s i v e . N o t only d o e s it put u n a s s i m i l a t e d p e r s o n s and g r o u p s at a s e v e r e d i s a d v a n t a g e in t h e c o m p e t i t i o n for scarce p o s i t i o n s and r e s o u r c e s , but it r e q u i r e s that p e r s o n s transform their s e n s e of i d e n t i t y in o r d e r to assimilate. Self-annihilation is an u n r e a s o n a b l e and unjust r e q u i r e m e n t of c i t i z e n s h i p . T h e fiction, p o e t r y , and s o n g s of A m e r ­ ican cultural m i n o r i t i e s brim o v e r w i t h t h e pain and loss such d e m a n d s inflict, d o c u m e n t i n g h o w t h o r o u g h l y assimilationist v a l u e s violate basic r e s p e c t for p e r s o n s , T h u s , third, t h e n o r m a t i v e ideal of t h e h o m o g e n e o u s p u b l i c d o c s not s u c c e e d in its s t a t e d aim of creating a h a r m o n i o u s nation, In group-differ­ e n t i a t e d s o c i e t i e s conflict, factionalism, d i v i s i v e n e s s , civil warfare, d o often o c c u r b e t w e e n g r o u p s . T h e primary c a u s e of such conflict, h o w e v e r , is not g r o u p difference p e r s e , but rather t h e relations of d o m i n a t i o n and o p p r e s s i o n b e t w e e n g r o u p s that p r o d u c e r e s e n t m e n t , hostility, and resis­ t a n c e a m o n g t h e o p p r e s s e d . Placing a n o r m a t i v e value o n h o m o g e n e i t y o n l y e x a c e r b a t e s division and conflict, b e c a u s e it g i v e s m e m b e r s of t h e d o m i n a n t groups reason to adopt a stance of self-righteous intractability. I a r g u e d in C h a p t e r 4 that a just polity m u s t e m b r a c e t h e ideal of a h e t e r o g e n e o u s p u b l i c . G r o u p differences of g e n d e r , a g e , and sexuality s h o u l d not b e i g n o r e d , b u t publicly a c k n o w l e d g e d and a c c e p t e d . E v e n m o r e so s h o u l d g r o u p differences of nation or ethnicity b e a c c e p t e d . In

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t h e t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y t h e ideal state is c o m p o s e d of a plurality of nations or cultural g r o u p s , w i t h a d e g r e e of self-determination and a u t o n o m y c o m p a t i b l e w i t h f e d e r a t e d equal rights and obligations o f c i t i z e n s h i p . M a n y states o f t h e w o r l d e m b r a c e this ideal, t h o u g h t h e y often realize it o n l y v e r y i m p e r f e c t l y (see Ortiz, 1984, pt. 2). E n g l i s h - o n l y a d v o c a t e s often look w i t h fear at t h e large and rapidly g r o w i n g cultural m i n o r i t i e s in t h e U n i t e d States, e s p e c i a l l y t h e S p a n i s h - s p e a k i n g minority, and argue that o n l y e n f o r c i n g t h e p r i m a c y of E n g l i s h can p r e v e n t us from b e c o m i n g a culturally plural s o c i e t y like Canada. S u c h a r g u m e n t s s t u b b o r n l y refuse to s e e that w e already are. T h e difference b e t w e e n an assimilationist and a culturally pluralist ideal b e c o m e s particularly salient in educational policy. Bilingual e d u c a t i o n is h i g h l y controversial in t h e U n i t e d States today, partly b e c a u s e o f t h e dif­ f e r e n t cultural m e a n i n g s g i v e n to it. In 1 9 7 4 t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t r u l e d that t h e state has an obligation to r e m e d y t h e E n g l i s h - l a n g u a g e d e f i c i e n c y of its s t u d e n t s so t h e y will h a v e equal o p p o r t u n i t y to learn all subjects; b u t t h e C o u r t did n o t specify h o w this s h o u l d b e d o n e . T h e Bilingual E d u c a ­ tion Act, p a s s e d in 1 9 7 8 and a m e n d e d several t i m e s , s e t s a s i d e federal funds for u s e b y school s y s t e m s to d e v e l o p bilingual e d u c a t i o n programs (see M i n o w , 1985; K l e v e n , 1989). E v e n so, in 1 9 8 0 , 77 p e r c e n t of H i s ­ p a n i c c h i l d r e n in t h e U n i t e d States r e c e i v e d no form of special program­ m i n g c o r r e s p o n d i n g to their linguistic n e e d s (Bastian, 1986, p. 46). In 1 9 8 6 in Texas, 8 0 p e r c e n t of school districts w e r e found out of c o m p l i a n c e w i t h a s t a t e - m a n d a t e d bilingual e d u c a t i o n program (Canter, 1987). T h e r e are several different m o d e l s of l a n g u a g e support programs. S o m e , like E n g l i s h as a S e c o n d L a n g u a g e , provide n o instruction in t h e s t u d e n t ' s n a t i v e l a n g u a g e , and are often not taught b y p e r s o n s w h o can s p e a k t h e s t u d e n t ' s language. O t h e r s , called i m m e r s i o n p r o g r a m s , in­ v o l v e E n g l i s h - l a n g u a g e instruction primarily, b u t are t a u g h t b y bilingual instructors w h o m t h e s t u d e n t can q u e s t i o n in his or h e r n a t i v e l a n g u a g e . Transitional bilingual e d u c a t i o n programs i n v o l v e g e n u i n e l y bilingual in­ struction, w i t h t h e proportions of E n g l i s h and native l a n g u a g e c h a n g i n g as t h e s t u d e n t p r o g r e s s e s . Transitional p r o g r a m s instruct s t u d e n t s in s u c h s u b j e c t s as m a t h , s c i e n c e and history in their native l a n g u a g e at t h e s a m e t i m e that t h e y d e v e l o p E n g l i s h - l a n g u a g e skills; t h e y aim to i n c r e a s e t h e a m o u n t of t i m e of instruction in E n g l i s h . All t h e s e p r o g r a m s are assimilationist in intent. T h e y s e e k to i n c r e a s e E n g l i s h proficiency to t h e p o i n t w h e r e n a t i v e - l a n g u a g e instruction is u n ­ n e c e s s a r y ; n o n e has t h e goal of m a i n t a i n i n g and d e v e l o p i n g proficiency in t h e native l a n g u a g e . T h e vast majority of programs for s t u d e n t s w i t h l i m ­ i t e d E n g l i s h proficiency in t h e U n i t e d States take o n e of t h e s e forms. T h e u s e of transitional bilingual p r o g r a m s instead of E S L or i m m e r s i o n pro­ g r a m s is h o t l y d e b a t e d . T h e majority of A m e r i c a n s s u p p o r t special lan-

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g u a g e p r o g r a m s for s t u d e n t s w i t h l i m i t e d E n g l i s h , in o r d e r to h e l p t h e m learn E n g l i s h ; b u t t h e m o r e p r o g r a m s instruct in a n a t i v e l a n g u a g e , e s p e ­ cially w h e n t h e y instruct in s u b j e c t s like m a t h o r s c i e n c e , t h e m o r e t h e y are c o n s i d e r e d b y E n g l i s h s p e a k e r s to b e unfair c o d d l i n g and a w a s t e of taxpayer dollars (Sears and H u d d y , 1987). Transitional bilingual e d u c a ­ tional p r o g r a m s , o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , are usually preferred b y linguistic minorities. A n o t h e r m o d e l of bilingual e d u c a t i o n is rarely practiced in t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , and is hardly o n t h e p u b l i c agenda; bilingual-bicultural m a i n t e ­ n a n c e p r o g r a m s . T h e s e a i m to reinforce k n o w l e d g e of t h e s t u d e n t s ' native l a n g u a g e and c u l t u r e , at t h e s a m e t i m e that t h e y train t h e m to b e profi­ c i e n t in t h e d o m i n a n t l a n g u a g e , E n g l i s h . F e w a d v o c a t e s of cultural plural­ ism and g r o u p a u t o n o m y in t h e U n i t e d States w o u l d d e n y that proficiency in E n g l i s h is a n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n for full participation in A m e r i c a n soci­ ety. T h e i s s u e is o n l y w h e t h e r linguistic minorities are r e c o g n i z e d as full participants in t h e i r specificity, w i t h social support for t h e m a i n t e n a n c e of t h e i r l a n g u a g e and c u l t u r e . O n l y bilingual-bicultural m a i n t e n a n c e pro­ g r a m s can both e n s u r e t h e possibility of t h e full inclusion and participation of m e m b e r s of linguistic m i n o r i t i e s in all society's institutions and at t h e s a m e t i m e p r e s e r v e and affirm t h e i r group-specific i d e n t i t y (cf. N i c k e l , 1987, p . 119). (3) A m e r i c a n Indians are t h e m o s t invisible o p p r e s s e d g r o u p in t h e U n i t e d States. N u m b e r i n g just o v e r o n e m i l l i o n , t h e y are too small a pro­ portion of m o s t regional p o p u l a t i o n s to organize influential p r e s s u r e g r o u p s or t h r e a t e n major disruptions of t h e lives of w h i t e society. F e d e r a l and state policy often can safely i g n o r e Indian interests and d e s i r e s . M a n y I n d i a n s l i v e o n r e s e r v a t i o n s , w h e r e n o n - I n d i a n s h a v e little contact w i t h t h e m . E v e n in cities Indians often form t h e i r o w n support s y s t e m s and n e t w o r k s , m i n g l i n g little w i t h n o n - I n d i a n s (Cornell, 1988, p p . 1 3 2 - 3 7 ) . W h e t h e r o n or off t h e r e s e r v a t i o n , Indians suffer t h e m o s t serious margi­ nalization and d e p r i v a t i o n of any social g r o u p ; b y e v e r y m e a s u r e — i n ­ c o m e , u n e m p l o y m e n t rates, infant mortality, and so o n — I n d i a n s are t h e poorest Americans. At t h e s a m e t i m e , Indians are t h e m o s t legally differentiated p e o p l e in t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , t h e only g r o u p granted formally special status and rights b y t h e federal g o v e r n m e n t . Indians r e p r e s e n t t h e arcfoe-difference that from t h e b e g i n n i n g s u b v e r t s t h e claim to origin, to a N e w W o r l d , that f o u n d s t h e m y t h of A m e r i c a as t h e h o m e of E n g l i s h - s p e a k i n g farmers, traders, and i n v e n t o r s . A g e n t s of t h e U . S . g o v e r n m e n t h a v e p o i s o n e d , b u r n e d , l o o t e d , tricked, r e l o c a t e d , and confined Indians m a n y t i m e s o v e r , in p e r s i s t e n t l y g e n o c i d a l p o l i c i e s , a t t e m p t i n g to p u r g e this differ­ e n c e w i t h i n . Legal history and t h e string of federal treaties, h o w e v e r , also testify to a b e g r u d g i n g a c k n o w l e d g m e n t of t h e Indian p e o p l e s as i n d e -

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p e n d e n t political e n t i t i e s w i t h w h i c h t h e g o v e r n m e n t m u s t n e g o t i a t e . U n t i l t h e t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y t h e special legal status of Indians w a s c o n c e p ­ tualized a l m o s t e n t i r e l y as a relation of w a r d s h i p and d e p e n d e n c e b e ­ t w e e n an inferior savage p e o p l e and a superior civilized s o v e r e i g n , and t h e s h a d o w of this c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n darkens e v e n r e c e n t legal d e c i s i o n s ( W i l l i a m s , 1987). As w i t h w o m e n , Blacks, and t h e f e e b l e m i n d e d , Indian d i f f e r e n c e w a s codified in n o r m a l i z i n g law as an inferior infantile n a t u r e that justified less than full c i t i z e n s h i p . At t h e turn of t h e c e n t u r y p o l i c y m a k e r s a s s u m e d that an e n d to this p o s i t i o n of t u t e l a g e and w a r d s h i p i m p l i e d assimilation to t h e d o m i n a n t c u l t u r e . T h u s t h e land reallocation policies of t h e late 1800s w e r e in­ t e n d e d to e n c o u r a g e Indians to v a l u e private property and t h e virtues of y e o m a n h u s b a n d r y . In t h e 1920s, w h e n C o n g r e s s v o t e d to grant Indians full U . S . c i t i z e n s h i p , federal policy forced assimilation b y forbidding In­ dian c h i l d r e n to speak their native l a n g u a g e in t h e boarding s c h o o l s to w h i c h t h e y w e r e transported, s o m e t i m e s t h o u s a n d s of m i l e s from h o m e . D u r i n g t h e s a m e p e r i o d Indians w e r e p r o h i b i t e d from practicing m a n y of their traditional religious rites. In t h e 1930s t h e Indian Reorganization Act e l i m i n a t e d and r e v e r s e d m a n y of t h e s e p o l i c i e s , c r e a t i n g t h e c o n t e m p o r a r y s y s t e m of federally rec­ o g n i z e d tribal g o v e r n m e n t s . B u t in t h e 1950s t h e p e n d u l u m s w u n g back w i t h t h e effort by C o n g r e s s to t e r m i n a t e t h e federal relationship w i t h tribes, w i t h d r a w i n g all r e c o g n i t i o n of Indians as distinct p e o p l e s , and o n c e again a t t e m p t i n g to force Indians to assimilate into w h i t e s o c i e t y . This brutal s e e s a w history of U . S . - I n d i a n relations c a u s e d Indians to c h a n g e and adapt their v a l u e s , practices, and institutions and e v e n their identi­ ties. M a n y distinct Indian i d e n t i t i e s h a v e d i s a p p e a r e d , as Indian groups m e r g e d or r e o r g a n i z e d their relations w i t h o n e another u n d e r t h e o p p r e s ­ sion of w h i t e p o l i c i e s . T h r o u g h o u t this history, h o w e v e r , assimilation w a s not a live o p t i o n for t h e Indians. W h i l e m a n y individuals m a y h a v e left their g r o u p s and successfully i n t e g r a t e d into t h e d o m i n a n t w h i t e c u l t u r e , I n d i a n s as g r o u p s p e r s i s t e n t l y p r e s e r v e d their differences from w h i t e soci­ e t y against t h e fiercest o p p o s i t i o n . M a n y Indians today find m u c h fault w i h t h e p r e s e n t organization of t h e tribes, t h e definition of their role, and their legal r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h t h e U . S . g o v e r n m e n t , but f e w w o u l d p r o p o s e t h e e l i m i n a t i o n of t h e tribal s y s t e m that formally r e c o g n i z e s specific i n d e ­ p e n d e n t l y d e f i n e d Indian g r o u p s and g u a r a n t e e s t h e m specific rights in d e f i n i n g and r u n n i n g tribal affairs. T h e c a s e of A m e r i c a n Indians e s p e c i a l l y e x e m p l i f i e s t h e a r g u m e n t s of this c h a p t e r b e c a u s e it is p e r h a p s clearest h e r e that j u s t i c e toward g r o u p s r e q u i r e s special rights, and that an assimilationist ideal a m o u n t s to g e n o ­ c i d e . S u c h special rights, h o w e v e r , s h o u l d not justify e x c l u s i o n from full

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participation in t h e A m e r i c a n d r e a m of liberty, e q u a l o p p o r t u n i t y , and t h e like. T h e j u s t i c e of r e c o g n i z i n g both specific n e e d s of a g r o u p and rights of full participation and inclusion in t h e polity has clear p r e c e d e n c e in U . S . ­ Indian law. Indians are t h e o n l y g r o u p to h a v e w h a t almost a m o u n t s to a dual c i t i z e n s h i p : as m e m b e r s of a tribe t h e y h a v e specific political, legal, and c o l l e c t i v e rights, and as U . S . c i t i z e n s t h e y have all t h e civil and polit­ ical rights of o t h e r c i t i z e n s ( D e l o r i a and L y t i c , 1984, p p . 3 - 4 ) . R e c o g n i z e d Indian tribes h a v e specific rights to jurisdictional and territorial s o v e r ­ e i g n t y , and m a n y specific religious, cultural, and g a m i n g rights ( s e e Pevar, 1983). M a n y Indians b e l i e v e this s y s t e m of particular rights r e m a i n s too m u c h at t h e d i s c r e t i o n of t h e federal g o v e r n m e n t , and s o m e have taken their claims for g r e a t e r s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n to international judicial b o d i e s (Ortiz, 1 9 8 4 , p p . 3 2 - 4 6 ) . Justice in t h e form of u n a m b i g u o u s r e c o g n i t i o n of A m e r i c a n Indian g r o u p s as full and e q u a l m e m b e r s of A m e r i c a n s o c i e t y r e q u i r e s , in m y v i e w , that t h e U . S . g o v e r n m e n t relinquish t h e a b s o l u t e p o w e r to alter or e l i m i n a t e Indian rights. E v e n in t h e a b s e n c e of full j u s t i c e t h e c a s e of Indians p r o v i d e s an i m p o r ­ tant e x a m p l e of t h e c o m b i n a t i o n of g e n e r a l rights and particular rights w h i c h , I h a v e a r g u e d , is n e c e s s a r y for t h e e q u a l i t y of m a n y o p p r e s s e d or d i s a d v a n t a g e d groups. T h e s y s t e m of tribal rights, and their relation to g e n e r a l rights, is certainly c o m p l e x , and t h e r e is often d i s a g r e e m e n t about t h e m e a n i n g and implications of t h e s e rights. M a n y Indians b e l i e v e , m o r e o v e r , that t h e i r rights, e s p e c i a l l y territorial rights to m a k e d e c i s i o n s a b o u t land, water, and r e s o u r c e s , are not sufficiently r e c o g n i z e d and e n ­ forced b e c a u s e e c o n o m i c interests profit from ignoring t h e m . I d o not w i s h to a r g u e that this s y s t e m of particular rights, or t h e bureaucratic form it takes, s h o u l d e x t e n d to o t h e r o p p r e s s e d or d i s a d v a n t a g e d social g r o u p s . T h e specificity of e a c h g r o u p requires a specific set of rights for e a c h , and for s o m e a m o r e c o m p r e h e n s i v e s y s t e m than for o t h e r s . T h e c a s e of A m e r ­ ican Indians, h o w e v e r , illustrates t h e fact that t h e r e is a p r e c e d e n t for a s y s t e m of particular rights that a g r o u p w a n t s for reasons of j u s t i c e , n a m e l y , b e c a u s e t h e y e n f o r c e t h e group's a u t o n o m y and p r o t e c t its inter­ ests as an o p p r e s s e d minority.

THF. H E T E R O G E N E O U S P U B L I C A N D C R O U P REPRESENTATION

I h a v e a r g u e d that participatory d e m o c r a c y is an e l e m e n t and c o n d i t i o n of social j u s t i c e . C o n t e m p o r a r y participatory d e m o c r a t i c t h e o r y , h o w e v e r , inherits from r e p u b l i c a n i s m a c o m m i t m e n t to a unified p u b l i c that in prac­ tice t e n d s to e x c l u d e or s i l e n c e s o m e groups. W h e r e s o m e g r o u p s are materially p r i v i l e g e d and e x e r c i s e cultural i m p e r i a l i s m , formally d e m o -

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cratic p r o c e s s e s often e l e v a t e t h e particular e x p e r i e n c e s and p e r s p e c t i v e s of t h e p r i v i l e g e d g r o u p s , s i l e n c i n g or denigrating t h o s e of o p p r e s s e d groups. In h e r s t u d y of t h e f u n c t i o n i n g of a N e w E n g l a n d t o w n m e e t i n g g o v e r n ­ m e n t , for e x a m p l e , Jane M a n s b r i d g e d e m o n s t r a t e s that w o m e n , Blacks, w o r k i n g - c l a s s p e o p l e , and p o o r p e o p l e t e n d to participate less and h a v e their i n t e r e s t s r e p r e s e n t e d less than w h i t e s , middle-class professionals, and m e n . W h i t e m i d d l e - c l a s s m e n a s s u m e authority m o r e than o t h e r s , and t h e y are m o r e p r a c t i c e d at s p e a k i n g p e r s u a s i v e l y ; m o t h e r s and old p e o p l e find it m o r e difficult than o t h e r s to get to m e e t i n g s ( M a n s b r i d g e , 1980, c h a p . 9). In C h a p t e r 3 I c i t e d A m y G u t m a n n ' s e x a m p l e of h o w in­ c r e a s i n g d e m o c r a c y in s o m e school s y s t e m s l e d to i n c r e a s e d s e g r e g a t i o n b e c a u s e t h e m o r e n u m e r o u s , materially p r i v i l e g e d , and articulate w h i t e s w e r e a b l e to p r o m o t e t h e i r p e r c e i v e d interests against Blacks j u s t d e ­ m a n d for e q u a l t r e a t m e n t in an i n t e g r a t e d s y s t e m ( G u t m a n n , 1980, p p . 191-202). In t h e s e and similar c a s e s , t h e g r o u p differences of p r i v i l e g e and o p ­ p r e s s i o n that exist in s o c i e t y h a v e an effect o n the p u b l i c , e v e n t h o u g h t h e p u b l i c claims to b e blind to difference. Traditionally political t h e o r y and practice h a v e r e s p o n d e d to e v i d e n c e of s u c h bias b y a t t e m p t i n g y e t o n c e again to i n s t i t u t e a g e n u i n e l y universal p u b l i c . S u c h a p u r e p e r s p e c t i v e that t r a n s c e n d s t h e particularity of social position and c o n s e q u e n t partial v i s i o n , I a r g u e d in C h a p t e r 4 , is i m p o s s i b l e . If t h e unified p u b l i c d o e s not t r a n s c e n d g r o u p differences and often a l l o w s t h e p e r s p e c t i v e and interests of p r i v i l e g e d g r o u p s to d o m i n a t e , t h e n a d e m o c r a t i c p u b l i c can c o u n t e r a c t this bias only by acknowledging and giving voice to the g r o u p differences w i t h i n it. I assert, t h e n , t h e following principle: a d e m o c r a t i c p u b l i c s h o u l d pro­ v i d e m e c h a n i s m s for t h e effective r e c o g n i t i o n and r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of t h e distinct v o i c e s and p e r s p e c t i v e s of t h o s e of its c o n s t i t u e n t g r o u p s that are o p p r e s s e d or d i s a d v a n t a g e d . S u c h g r o u p r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i m p l i e s institu­ tional m e c h a n i s m s and p u b l i c r e s o u r c e s s u p p o r t i n g (1) self-organization of g r o u p m e m b e r s so that t h e y a c h i e v e c o l l e c t i v e e m p o w e r m e n t and a re­ flective u n d e r s t a n d i n g of their c o l l e c t i v e e x p e r i e n c e and i n t e r e s t s in t h e c o n t e x t of t h e society; (2) g r o u p analysis and g r o u p g e n e r a t i o n of policy p r o p o s a l s in institutionalized c o n t e x t s w h e r e d e c i s i o n m a k e r s are o b l i g e d to s h o w that t h e i r d e l i b e r a t i o n s h a v e taken g r o u p p e r s p e c t i v e s into c o n ­ sideration; and (3) g r o u p v e t o p o w e r regarding specific p o l i c i e s that affect a g r o u p directly, s u c h as r e p r o d u c t i v e rights policy for w o m e n , or land u s e p o l i c y for I n d i a n reservations. Specific r e p r e s e n t a t i o n for o p p r e s s e d groups in t h e d e c i s i o n m a k i n g p r o c e d u r e s of a d e m o c r a t i c p u b l i c p r o m o t e s j u s t i c e b e t t e r than a h o m o g e ­ n e o u s p u b l i c in several w a y s , b o t h procedural and substantial (cf. B e i t z ,

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1 9 8 8 , p p . 1 6 8 - 6 9 ) . First, it b e t t e r assures procedural fairness in s e t t i n g t h e p u b l i c a g e n d a and hearing o p i n i o n s about its i t e m s . Social and e c o ­ n o m i c p r i v i l e g e m e a n s , a m o n g o t h e r things, that t h e groups w h i c h h a v e it b e h a v e as t h o u g h t h e y h a v e a right to speak and b e heard, that o t h e r s treat t h e m as t h o u g h t h e y h a v e that right, and that t h e y h a v e t h e material, personal, and organizational r e s o u r c e s that e n a b l e t h e m to speak and b e heard. As a result, policy i s s u e s are often d e f i n e d by t h e a s s u m p t i o n s and priorities of t h e p r i v i l e g e d . Specific r e p r e s e n t a t i o n for o p p r e s s e d g r o u p s i n t e r r u p t s this p r o c e s s , b e c a u s e it g i v e s v o i c e to t h e a s s u m p t i o n s and pri­ orities of o t h e r g r o u p s . S e c o n d , b e c a u s e it assures a v o i c e for t h e o p p r e s s e d as w e l l as t h e priv­ i l e g e d , g r o u p r e p r e s e n t a t i o n b e t t e r assures that all n e e d s and i n t e r e s t s in t h e p u b l i c will b e r e c o g n i z e d in d e m o c r a t i c d e l i b e r a t i o n s . T h e p r i v i l e g e d usually are not i n c l i n e d to protect or a d v a n c e t h e i n t e r e s t s of t h e o p ­ p r e s s e d , partly b e c a u s e their social position p r e v e n t s t h e m from u n d e r ­ s t a n d i n g t h o s e i n t e r e s t s , and partly b e c a u s e to s o m e d e g r e e their privi­ l e g e d e p e n d s o n t h e c o n t i n u e d o p p r e s s i o n of o t h e r s . W h i l e different g r o u p s m a y share m a n y n e e d s , m o r e o v e r , their difference usually entails s o m e special n e e d s w h i c h t h e individual groups t h e m s e l v e s can b e s t ex­ p r e s s . If w e c o n s i d e r just d e m o c r a t i c d e c i s i o n m a k i n g as a politics of n e e d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , as I h a v e already s u g g e s t e d , t h e n d e m o c r a t i c institutions s h o u l d facilitate t h e p u b l i c e x p r e s s i o n of t h e n e e d s of t h o s e w h o t e n d to b e socially m a r g i n a l i z e d or s i l e n c e d b y cultural i m p e r i a l i s m . G r o u p r e p r e ­ s e n t a t i o n in t h e p u b l i c facilitates s u c h e x p r e s s i o n . In t h e p r e v i o u s s e c t i o n I a r g u e d for t h e assertion of a p o s i t i v e s e n s e of d i f f e r e n c e b y o p p r e s s e d g r o u p s , and for a principle of special rights for t h o s e g r o u p s . I d i s c u s s e d t h e r e t h e l e g i t i m a t e fears of m a n y in e m a n c i p a ­ tory social m o v e m e n t s that a b a n d o n i n g g r o u p - b l i n d policies and a d o p t i n g g r o u p - s p e c i f i c o n e s will r e s t i g m a t i z e t h e groups and justify n e w exclu­ sions. G r o u p r e p r e s e n t a t i o n can h e l p protect against such a c o n s e q u e n c e . If o p p r e s s e d and d i s a d v a n t a g e d groups can self-organize in t h e p u b l i c and h a v e a specific v o i c e to p r e s e n t their interpretation of t h e m e a n i n g of and reasons for group-differentiated p o l i c i e s , t h e n such policies are m o r e likely to work for than against t h e m . G r o u p r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , third, e n c o u r a g e s t h e e x p r e s s i o n of individual and g r o u p n e e d s and i n t e r e s t s in t e r m s that appeal to j u s t i c e , that trans­ form an "I w a n t " into an "I am e n t i t l e d to," in H a n n a h Pitkin's w o r d s . In C h a p t e r 4 I a r g u e d that publicity itself e n c o u r a g e s this transformation b e c a u s e a c o n d i t i o n of t h e p u b l i c is that p e o p l e call o n e a n o t h e r to ac­ c o u n t . G r o u p r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a d d s to such accountability b e c a u s e it s e r v e s as an a n t i d o t e to s e l f - d e c e i v i n g self-interest m a s k e d as an impartial or g e n ­ eral i n t e r e s t . U n l e s s confronted w i t h different p e r s p e c t i v e s o n social rela­ tions and e v e n t s , different v a l u e s and l a n g u a g e , m o s t p e o p l e t e n d to assert

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their p e r s p e c t i v e as universal. W h e n social p r i v i l e g e allows s o m e g r o u p p e r s p e c t i v e s to d o m i n a t e a p u b l i c w h i l e o t h e r s are silent, s u c h universal­ izing of t h e particular will b e reaffirmed by m a n y others. T h u s t h e test of w h e t h e r a claim u p o n t h e p u b l i c is just or m e r e l y an e x p r e s s i o n of selfi n t e r e s t is b e s t m a d e w h e n t h o s e making it m u s t confront t h e o p i n i o n of o t h e r s w h o h a v e explicitly different, t h o u g h not necessarily conflicting, e x p e r i e n c e s , priorities, and n e e d s (cf. S u n s t e i n , 1988, p. 1588). As a p e r ­ son of social p r i v i l e g e , I am m o r e likely to g o o u t s i d e m y s e l f and h a v e regard for social j u s t i c e w h e n I m u s t listen to t h e v o i c e of t h o s e m y privi­ l e g e o t h e r w i s e t e n d s to s i l e n c e . F i n a l l y , g r o u p r e p r e s e n t a t i o n p r o m o t e s just o u t c o m e s b e c a u s e it maxi­ m i z e s t h e social k n o w l e d g e e x p r e s s e d in d i s c u s s i o n , and t h u s furthers practical w i s d o m . G r o u p differences are manifest not o n l y in different n e e d s , i n t e r e s t s , and goals, b u t also in different social locations and e x p e ­ r i e n c e s . P e o p l e in different g r o u p s often k n o w about s o m e w h a t different i n s t i t u t i o n s , e v e n t s , practices, and social relations, and often h a v e differ­ ing p e r c e p t i o n s of t h e s a m e institutions, relations, or e v e n t s . For this rea­ son m e m b e r s of s o m e groups are s o m e t i m e s in a b e t t e r p o s i t i o n than m e m b e r s of o t h e r s to u n d e r s t a n d and anticipate t h e p r o b a b l e c o n s e ­ q u e n c e s of i m p l e m e n t i n g particular social policies. A p u b l i c that m a k e s u s e of all s u c h social k n o w l e d g e in its differentiated plurality is most likely to m a k e j u s t and w i s e d e c i s i o n s . I s h o u l d allay several p o s s i b l e m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g s of what this p r i n c i p l e of g r o u p r e p r e s e n t a t i o n m e a n s and i m p l i e s . First, t h e p r i n c i p l e calls for specific r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of social groups, not interest g r o u p s or i d e o l o g i c a l g r o u p s . B y an i n t e r e s t g r o u p I m e a n any a g g r e g a t e or association of per­ sons w h o s e e k a particular goal, or d e s i r e t h e s a m e policy, or are similarly situated w i t h r e s p e c t to s o m e social effect—for e x a m p l e , t h e y are all re­ c i p i e n t s of acid rain c a u s e d by O h i o s m o k e s t a c k s . Social g r o u p s usually share s o m e i n t e r e s t s , b u t shared interests are not sufficient to c o n s t i t u t e a social g r o u p . A social g r o u p is a c o l l e c t i v e of p e o p l e w h o h a v e affinity w i t h o n e a n o t h e r b e c a u s e of a set of practices or way o f l i f e ; t h e y differen­ tiate t h e m s e l v e s from or are differentiated b y at least o n e o t h e r g r o u p a c c o r d i n g to t h e s e cultural forms. B y an i d e o l o g i c a l g r o u p I m e a n a c o l l e c t i v e of p e r s o n s w i t h shared p o ­ litical b e l i e f s . N a z i s , socialists, f e m i n i s t s , Christian D e m o c r a t s , and antiabortionists are ideological groups. T h e situation of social g r o u p s m a y fos­ ter t h e formation of i d e o l o g i c a l g r o u p s , and u n d e r s o m e c i r c u m s t a n c e s an i d e o l o g i c a l g r o u p m a y b e c o m e a social g r o u p . Shared political or moral b e l i e f s , e v e n w h e n t h e y are d e e p l y and passionately h e l d , h o w e v e r , d o not t h e m s e l v e s c o n s t i t u t e a social g r o u p . A d e m o c r a t i c polity s h o u l d p e r m i t t h e e x p r e s s i o n of all i n t e r e s t s and o p i n i o n s , b u t this d o e s not i m p l y specific r e p r e s e n t a t i o n for any of t h e m .

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A d e m o c r a t i c p u b l i c m a y w i s h to p r o v i d e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n for certain kinds of i n t e r e s t s or political orientations; m o s t parliamentary s y s t e m s , for ex­ a m p l e , g i v e proportional r e p r e s e n t a t i o n to political parties a c c o r d i n g to t h e n u m b e r of v o t e s t h e y poll. T h e principle of g r o u p r e p r e s e n t a t i o n that I am arguing for h e r e , h o w e v e r , refers only to social groups. S e c o n d , it is i m p o r t a n t to r e m e m b e r that t h e p r i n c i p l e calls for specific r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o n l y of o p p r e s s e d or d i s a d v a n t a g e d groups. P r i v i l e g e d g r o u p s are already r e p r e s e n t e d , in t h e s e n s e that their v o i c e , e x p e r i e n c e , v a l u e s , and priorities are already heard and a c t e d u p o n . T h e faces of o p ­ p r e s s i o n e x p l i c a t e d in C h a p t e r 2 p r o v i d e at least b e g i n n i n g criteria for d e t e r m i n i n g w h e t h e r a g r o u p is o p p r e s s e d and therefore d e s e r v e s r e p r e ­ s e n t a t i o n . O n c e w e are clear that t h e principle of g r o u p r e p r e s e n t a t i o n refers o n l y to o p p r e s s e d social g r o u p s , t h e n t h e fear of an u n w o r k a b l e proliferation of g r o u p r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s h o u l d dissipate. T h i r d , w h i l e I certainly i n t e n d this principle to apply to r e p r e s e n t a t i v e b o d i e s in g o v e r n m e n t institutions, its application is by n o m e a n s re­ stricted to that s p h e r e . In earlier c h a p t e r s I have a r g u e d that social j u s t i c e r e q u i r e s a far w i d e r institutionalization of d e m o c r a c y than c u r r e n t l y o b ­ tains in A m e r i c a n s o c i e t y . P e r s o n s s h o u l d h a v e t h e right to participate in m a k i n g t h e rules and p o l i c i e s of any institution w i t h authority o v e r their actions. T h e p r i n c i p l e of g r o u p r e p r e s e n t a t i o n applies to all such d e m o c r a ­ t i z e d p u b l i c s . It s h o u l d apply, for e x a m p l e , to d e c i s i o n m a k i n g b o d i e s f o r m e d b y o p p r e s s e d g r o u p s that aim to d e v e l o p policy proposals for a h e t e r o g e n e o u s public. O p p r e s s e d g r o u p s within t h e s e g r o u p s s h o u l d h a v e specific r e p r e s e n t a t i o n in s u c h a u t o n o m o u s forums. T h e Black c a u c u s s h o u l d g i v e specific r e p r e s e n t a t i o n to w o m e n , for e x a m p l e , and t h e w o m e n ' s c a u c u s to Blacks. This p r i n c i p l e of g r o u p r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , finally, d o e s not n e c e s s a r i l y i m p l y proportional r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , in t h e m a n n e r of s o m e r e c e n t d i s c u s ­ sions of g r o u p r e p r e s e n t a t i o n (see Bell, 1987, chap. 3; B e i t z , 1 9 8 8 , p. 163). Insofar as it r e l i e s o n t h e p r i n c i p l e of "one p e r s o n o n e v o t e , " propor­ tional r e p r e s e n t a t i o n retains t h e a s s u m p t i o n that it is primarily individuals w h o m u s t b e r e p r e s e n t e d in d e c i s i o n m a k i n g b o d i e s . Certainly t h e y m u s t , and various forms of proportional r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , i n c l u d i n g proportional r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of g r o u p s or parties, m a y s o m e t i m e s b e an i m p o r t a n t v e h i ­ cle for r e p r e s e n t i n g individuals equally. W i t h t h e p r i n c i p l e I a r g u e for h e r e , h o w e v e r , I am c o n c e r n e d w i t h t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f g r o u p e x p e r i ­ e n c e , p e r s p e c t i v e s , a n d interests. Proportional r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of g r o u p m e m b e r s m a y s o m e t i m e s b e too little or too m u c h to a c c o m p l i s h that aim. A s y s t e m o f proportional g r o u p r e p r e s e n t a t i o n in state and federal g o v e r n ­ m e n t in t h e U n i t e d States m i g h t result in no seats for A m e r i c a n Indians, for e x a m p l e . G i v e n t h e specific c i r c u m s t a n c e s and d e e p o p p r e s s i o n of In­ dians as a g r o u p , h o w e v e r , t h e p r i n c i p l e w o u l d certainly r e q u i r e that t h e y

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h a v e a specific v o i c e . Allocating strictly half of all places to w o m e n , o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , m i g h t b e m o r e than is n e c e s s a r y to g i v e w o m e n ' s p e r s p e c t i v e s an e m p o w e r e d v o i c e , and m i g h t m a k e it m o r e difficult for o t h e r g r o u p s to be represented. A p r i n c i p l e of g r o u p r e p r e s e n t a t i o n has b e e n implicitly and s o m e t i m e s explicitly a s s e r t e d in several c o n t e m p o r a r y social m o v e m e n t s s t r u g g l i n g against o p p r e s s i o n and d o m i n a t i o n . In r e s p o n s e to t h e a n g e r and criticism that w o m e n , Blacks, gays and lesbians, A m e r i c a n Indians, and o t h e r s h a v e l e v e l e d against traditionally unitary radical groups and labor u n i o n s , m a n y of t h e m h a v e i m p l e m e n t e d s o m e form of g r o u p r e p r e s e n t a t i o n in t h e i r d e c i s i o n m a k i n g b o d i e s . S o m e political organizations, u n i o n s , and feminist g r o u p s h a v e formal c a u c u s e s for Blacks, Latinos, w o m e n , gay m e n and l e s b i a n s , d i s a b l e d p e o p l e , and old p e o p l e , w h o s e p e r s p e c t i v e s m i g h t b e s i l e n c e d w i t h o u t explicit r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . F r e q u e n t l y t h e s e organizations h a v e p r o c e d u r e s for g i v i n g t h e c a u c u s e s a v o i c e in o r g a n i z a t i o n - w i d e dis­ c u s s i o n and c a u c u s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n in d e c i s i o n m a k i n g . S o m e organizations also r e q u i r e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of m e m b e r s of d i s a d v a n t a g e d g r o u p s in lead­ ership bodies. At t h e h e i g h t of efforts to o c c u p y n u c l e a r p o w e r construction sites, for e x a m p l e , m a n y a n t i - n u c l e a r p o w e r actions and organizations r e s p o n d e d to criticisms b y feminists or p e o p l e of color that t h e m o v e m e n t w a s d o m i ­ n a t e d b y straight w h i t e m e n . Social g r o u p affinity groups f o r m e d and w e r e g e n e r a l l y e n c o u r a g e d , p r o v i d i n g solidarity and r e p r e s e n t a t i o n to formerly i n v i s i b l e g r o u p s . T h e National W o m e n ' s S t u d i e s Association, to take an­ o t h e r e x a m p l e , has a c o m p l e x and effective s y s t e m of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n for g r o u p c a u c u s e s in its d e c i s i o n m a k i n g b o d i e s . T h e i d e a of a R a i n b o w Coalition e x p r e s s e d a h e t e r o g e n e o u s p u b l i c w i t h forms of g r o u p r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . T h e traditional coalition c o r r e s p o n d e d to t h e idea of a unified p u b l i c that t r a n s c e n d s particular differences of experi­ e n c e and c o n c e r n s . In traditional coalitions d i v e r s e groups work t o g e t h e r for specific e n d s w h i c h t h e y a g r e e i n t e r e s t or affect t h e m all in a similar w a y , and t h e y g e n e r a l l y a g r e e that t h e differences of p e r s p e c t i v e , inter­ e s t s , or o p i n i o n a m o n g t h e m will not surface in t h e p u b l i c s t a t e m e n t s and actions of t h e coalition. T h i s form ideally suits welfare state i n t e r e s t - g r o u p politics. In a R a i n b o w Coalition, b y contrast, e a c h of t h e c o n s t i t u e n t g r o u p s affirms t h e p r e s e n c e of t h e o t h e r s as w e l l as t h e specificity of their e x p e r i e n c e and p e r s p e c t i v e o n social i s s u e s (Collins, 1986). In t h e Rain­ b o w p u b l i c Blacks d o not s i m p l y tolerate t h e participation of gays, labor activists d o not g r u d g i n g l y work a l o n g s i d e p e a c e m o v e m e n t v e t e r a n s , and n o n e of t h e s e paternalistically c o n c e d e to feminist participation. Ideally, a R a i n b o w Coalition affirms t h e p r e s e n c e and supports t h e claims of e a c h of t h e o p p r e s s e d groups or political m o v e m e n t s c o n s t i t u t i n g it, and arrives at a political program not b y v o i c i n g s o m e "principles of unity" that h i d e

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d i f f e r e n c e , b u t rather b y a l l o w i n g e a c h c o n s t i t u e n c y to a n a l y z e e c o n o m i c and social i s s u e s from t h e p e r s p e c t i v e of its e x p e r i e n c e . This i m p l i e s that e a c h g r o u p m a i n t a i n s significant a u t o n o m y , and requires provision for g r o u p r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . Unfortunately, t h e p r o m i s e of t h e J e s s e Jackson c a m p a i g n to l a u n c h a v i a b l e grassroots organization e x p r e s s i n g t h e s e Rain­ b o w C o a l i t i o n ideals has not b e e n fulfilled. A p r i n c i p l e of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n for o p p r e s s e d or d i s a d v a n t a g e d g r o u p s has b e e n i m p l e m e n t e d m o s t f r e q u e n t l y in organizations and m o v e m e n t s that c h a l l e n g e politics as usual in welfare capitalist society. S o m e m o r e m a i n ­ s t r e a m organizations, h o w e v e r , also h a v e i m p l e m e n t e d this p r i n c i p l e in s o m e form. T h e National D e m o c r a t i c Party has had rules r e q u i r i n g r e p r e ­ s e n t a t i o n of w o m e n and p e o p l e of color as d e l e g a t e s , and m a n y state D e m ­ ocratic parties h a v e had similar rules. M a n y nonprofit a g e n c i e s call for r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of specific g r o u p s , s u c h as w o m e n , Blacks, Latinos, and d i s a b l e d p e o p l e , o n their boards of directors. In a program that s o m e of t h e m call "valuing difference," s o m e corporations h a v e i n s t i t u t e d l i m i t e d r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of o p p r e s s e d social groups in corporate d i s c u s s i o n s . O n e can i m a g i n e s u c h a p r i n c i p l e of g r o u p r e p r e s e n t a t i o n e x t e n d e d to o t h e r political c o n t e x t s . Social j u s t i c e w o u l d b e e n h a n c e d in m a n y A m e r i c a n c i t i e s , for e x a m p l e , if a c i t y w i d e school c o m m i t t e e formally and explicitly r e p r e s e n t e d Blacks, H i s p a n i c s , w o m e n , gay m e n and l e s b i a n s , p o o r and w o r k i n g - c l a s s p e o p l e , d i s a b l e d p e o p l e , and s t u d e n t s . S o m e m i g h t o b j e c t that i m p l e m e n t i n g a p r i n c i p l e of g r o u p r e p r e s e n t a ­ tion in g o v e r n i n g b o d i e s w o u l d e x a c e r b a t e conflict and d i v i s i v e n e s s in p u b l i c life, r e n d e r i n g d e c i s i o n s e v e n m o r e difficult to reach. E s p e c i a l l y if g r o u p s h a v e v e t o p o w e r o v e r p o l i c i e s that f u n d a m e n t a l l y and u n i q u e l y affect m e m b e r s of t h e i r g r o u p , it s e e m s likely, it m i g h t b e c l a i m e d , that d e c i s i o n m a k i n g w o u l d b e stalled. This o b j e c t i o n p r e s u p p o s e s that g r o u p d i f f e r e n c e s i m p l y e s s e n t i a l conflicts of interest. But this is not so; groups m a y h a v e differing p e r s p e c t i v e s o n i s s u e s , b u t t h e s e are often c o m p a t i b l e and e n r i c h e v e r y o n e ' s u n d e r s t a n d i n g w h e n t h e y are e x p r e s s e d . To t h e e x t e n t that g r o u p differences p r o d u c e or reflect conflict, m o r e o v e r , g r o u p r e p r e s e n t a t i o n w o u l d not n e c e s s a r i l y i n c r e a s e s u c h conflict and m i g h t d e ­ c r e a s e it. If t h e i r differences bring groups into conflict, a j u s t s o c i e t y s h o u l d bring s u c h differences into t h e o p e n for d i s c u s s i o n . Insofar as s t r u c t u r e d relations of p r i v i l e g e and o p p r e s s i o n are t h e s o u r c e of t h e c o n ­ flict, m o r e o v e r , g r o u p r e p r e s e n t a t i o n can c h a n g e t h o s e relations b y e q u a l ­ izing t h e ability of g r o u p s to speak and b e heard. T h u s g r o u p r e p r e s e n t a ­ tion s h o u l d m i t i g a t e , t h o u g h not e l i m i n a t e , certain kinds of conflict. If, finally, t h e a l t e r n a t i v e to stalled d e c i s i o n m a k i n g is a unified p u b l i c that makes decisions ostensibly e m b o d y i n g the general interest which system­ atically i g n o r e , s u p p r e s s , or conflict w i t h t h e interests of particular g r o u p s , t h e n stalled d e c i s i o n m a k i n g may s o m e t i m e s b e just.

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A s e c o n d o b j e c t i o n m i g h t b e that t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of this principle can n e v e r g e t started. For to i m p l e m e n t it a p u b l i c m u s t b e c o n s t i t u t e d to d e c i d e w h i c h g r o u p s , if any, d e s e r v e specific r e p r e s e n t a t i o n in d e c i s i o n ­ m a k i n g p r o c e d u r e s . W h a t principles will g u i d e t h e c o m p o s i t i o n of such a "constitutional c o n v e n t i o n ' ? W h o shall d e c i d e w h a t groups s h o u l d r e c e i v e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , and by w h a t p r o c e d u r e s shall this d e c i s i o n b e m a d e ? If o p p r e s s e d g r o u p s are not r e p r e s e n t e d at this f o u n d i n g c o n v e n t i o n , t h e n h o w will their r e p r e s e n t a t i o n b e e n s u r e d at all? A n d if t h e y are repre­ s e n t e d , t h e n w h y is i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of t h e principle n e c e s s a r y ? T h e s e q u e s t i o n s p o s e a paradox of political origins w h i c h is not specific to this proposal, and w h i c h n o philosophical a r g u m e n t can r e s o l v e . N o p r o g r a m or s e t of p r i n c i p l e s can found a politics, b e c a u s e politics d o e s not h a v e a b e g i n n i n g , an original p o s i t i o n . It is always a p r o c e s s in w h i c h w e are already e n g a g e d . N o r m a t i v e principles s u c h as t h o s e I h a v e p r o p o s e d in this c h a p t e r can s e r v e as proposals in this o n g o i n g political discussion, and m e a n s of e n v i s i o n i n g alternative institutional forms, but t h e y cannot found a polity. In actual political situations application of any n o r m a t i v e p r i n c i p l e will b e rough and ready, and always subject to c h a l l e n g e and r e v i s i o n . If d e m o c r a t i c publics in A m e r i c a n s o c i e t y accept this principle of g r o u p r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , as I h a v e s u g g e s t e d a f e w h a v e , t h e y also are likely to n a m e c a n d i d a t e s for g r o u p s w i t h i n t h e m that d e s e r v e specific r e p r e s e n ­ tation. S u c h an o p e n i n g m i g h t s e n s i t i z e t h e p u b l i c to t h e n e e d for o t h e r g r o u p s to b e r e p r e s e n t e d . But if it d o e s not, t h e s e groups will have to p e t i t i o n w i t h a r g u m e n t s that m a y or may not b e p e r s u a s i v e . I s e e n o prac­ tical w a y out of this p r o b l e m of origin, but that d o e s not stand as a reason to reject this or any o t h e r n o r m a t i v e principle. O n e m i g h t ask h o w t h e idea of a h e t e r o g e n e o u s p u b l i c w h i c h e n c o u r ­ a g e s self-organization of g r o u p s and g r o u p r e p r e s e n t a t i o n in d e c i s i o n m a k ­ ing differs from t h e i n t e r e s t - g r o u p pluralism I criticized in C h a p t e r 3. I n t e r e s t - g r o u p pluralism, I s u g g e s t , o p e r a t e s p r e c i s e l y to forestall t h e e m e r g e n c e of p u b l i c d i s c u s s i o n and d e c i s i o n m a k i n g . Each i n t e r e s t g r o u p p r o m o t e s its o w n specific interest as t h o r o u g h l y and forcefully as it can, and n e e d not c o n s i d e r t h e o t h e r interests c o m p e t i n g in t h e political mar­ k e t p l a c e e x c e p t strategically, as potential allies or adversaries in its o w n pursuit. T h e rules of i n t e r e s t - g r o u p pluralism d o not r e q u i r e justifying o n e ' s i n t e r e s t as right, or c o m p a t i b l e w i t h social justice. A h e t e r o g e n e o u s p u b l i c , h o w e v e r , is a public, w h e r e participants discuss t o g e t h e r t h e is­ s u e s b e f o r e t h e m and c o m e to a d e c i s i o n according to principles of j u s t i c e . G r o u p r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , I h a v e a r g u e d , nurtures s u c h p u b l i c i t y by calling for c l a i m a n t s to justify their d e m a n d s before o t h e r s w h o explicitly stand in different social locations. I m p l e m e n t i n g p r i n c i p l e s of g r o u p r e p r e s e n t a t i o n in national and local politics in t h e U n i t e d States, or in r e s t r u c t u r e d d e m o c r a t i c p u b l i c s w i t h i n

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particular institutions s u c h as factories, offices, u n i v e r s i t i e s , c h u r c h e s , and social s e r v i c e a g e n c i e s , w o u l d o b v i o u s l y require creative t h i n k i n g and flexibility. T h e r e are n o m o d e l s to follow. E u r o p e a n m o d e l s of c o n s o c i a tional d e m o c r a t i c institutions, for e x a m p l e , c a n n o t b e r e m o v e d from t h e c o n t e x t s in w h i c h t h e y h a v e e v o l v e d , and e v e n within t h e m it is not clear that t h e y c o n s t i t u t e m o d e l s of participatory d e m o c r a c y . Reports of e x p e r i ­ m e n t s w i t h institutionalized self-organization a m o n g w o m e n , i n d i g e n o u s p e o p l e s , w o r k e r s , p e a s a n t s , and s t u d e n t s in c o n t e m p o r a r y Nicaragua offer an e x a m p l e c l o s e r to t h e c o n c e p t i o n I am advocating (Ruchwarger, 1987). Social j u s t i c e e n t a i l s d e m o c r a c y . P e r s o n s s h o u l d b e i n v o l v e d in c o l l e c ­ t i v e d i s c u s s i o n and d e c i s i o n m a k i n g in all t h e settings that d e p e n d o n t h e i r c o m m i t m e n t , action, and o b e d i e n c e to r u l e s — w o r k p l a c e s , s c h o o l s , n e i g h b o r h o o d s , and so o n . W h e n s u c h institutions p r i v i l e g e s o m e groups o v e r o t h e r s , actual d e m o c r a c y r e q u i r e s g r o u p r e p r e s e n t a t i o n for t h e dis­ a d v a n t a g e d . N o t o n l y d o just p r o c e d u r e s r e q u i r e g r o u p r e p r e s e n t a t i o n in o r d e r to e n s u r e that o p p r e s s e d or d i s a d v a n t a g e d groups h a v e a v o i c e , b u t such r e p r e s e n t a t i o n is also t h e b e s t m e a n s to p r o m o t e just o u t c o m e s of t h e deliberative process. I h a v e a r g u e d that t h e ideal of t h e just s o c i e t y as e l i m i n a t i n g g r o u p d i f f e r e n c e s is both unrealistic and u n d e s i r a b l e . Instead j u s t i c e in a g r o u p differentiated s o c i e t y d e m a n d s social e q u a l i t y of groups, and m u t u a l re­ c o g n i t i o n and affirmation of g r o u p differences. A t t e n d i n g to g r o u p - s p e ­ cific n e e d s and p r o v i d i n g for g r o u p r e p r e s e n t a t i o n both p r o m o t e s that social equality and p r o v i d e s t h e r e c o g n i t i o n that u n d e r m i n e s cultural i m ­ perialism.

CHAPTER

7

Affirmative Action and the Myth of Merit We have no words to speak about our oppression, our dis­ tress, our bitterness, and our revolt against the exhaustion, the stupidity, the monotony, the lack of meaning of our work and of our life, against the contempt in which our work is held; against the despotic hierarchy of the factory; against a society in which w e remain the underdogs and in which goods and enjoyments that are considered normal by other classes are denied to us and are parceled out to us only re­ luctantly, as though we were asking for a privilege. We have no words to say what it is and how it feels to be workers, to be held in suspicion, to be ordered around by people who have more and who pretend to know more and who compel us to work according to rules they set and for purposes that are theirs, not ours. And we have no words to say all this because the ruling class has monopolized not only the power of decision-making and of material wealth; they have also monopolized culture and language. —Andre Gorz

I N J U S T I C E , I h a v e a r g u e d , s h o u l d b e d e f i n e d primarily in t e r m s of t h e c o n c e p t s o f o p p r e s s i o n and d o m i n a t i o n , rather than distribution. Racism and s e x i s m are major forms of o p p r e s s i o n in our society. Philosophical d i s c u s s i o n of racial and g e n d e r injustice t e n d s to b e largely restricted to i s s u e s o f e q u a l o p p o r t u n i t y , with a major focus on t h e q u e s t i o n o f w h e t h e r affirmative action programs that g i v e p r e f e r e n c e to w o m e n or p e o p l e of color in o r d e r to e q u a l i z e their o p p o r t u n i t i e s are just. In this c h a p t e r I s u g g e s t that affirmative action p r o g r a m s c h a l l e n g e p r i n c i p l e s of liberal e q u a l i t y m o r e directly than m a n y p r o p o n e n t s are will­ ing to a d m i t , and that m a k i n g this c h a l l e n g e explicit s t r e n g t h e n s t h e case for t h e s e p r o g r a m s . In particular, affirmative action c h a l l e n g e s t h e pri­ m a c y of a p r i n c i p l e of n o n d i s c r i m i n a t i o n and t h e c o n v i c t i o n that p e r s o n s s h o u l d b e t r e a t e d o n l y as individuals and not as m e m b e r s of groups. T h e e q u a l o p p o r t u n i t y d i s c u s s i o n o f w h i c h t h e affirmative action d e b a t e is a part, h o w e v e r , r e p r e s e n t s a very narrow m o d e o f thinking a b o u t racial and g e n d e r j u s t i c e . I a r g u e that affirmative action d e b a t e is an i n s t a n c e of t h e

The Myth of Merit

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application of t h e d i s t r i b u t i v e paradigm of justice. It defines racial and g e n d e r j u s t i c e in t e r m s of t h e distribution of p r i v i l e g e d positions a m o n g g r o u p s , and fails to bring into q u e s t i o n i s s u e s of institutional organization and d e c i s i o n m a k i n g p o w e r . T h e bulk of this c h a p t e r f o c u s e s o n and criticizes t w o a s s u m p t i o n s about institutional organization that often u n d e r l i e d i s c u s s i o n s of equal o p p o r t u ­ nity, a s s u m p t i o n s w h o s e j u s t i c e is not q u e s t i o n e d . P h i l o s o p h e r s and poli­ c y m a k e r s usually a s s u m e as g i v e n , and t h u s as not unjust, a hierarchical division of labor w i t h scarce positions of h i g h i n c o m e , p o w e r , and p r e s t i g e at t h e t o p , and less p r i v i l e g e d positions at t h e b o t t o m . T h e y also a s s u m e that t h e s e p o s i t i o n s s h o u l d b e d i s t r i b u t e d according to merit, by m e a s u r ­ ing t h e individual t e c h n i c a l c o m p e t e n c e of p e r s o n s and awarding t h e m o s t c o m p e t i t i v e p o s i t i o n s to t h o s e j u d g e d m o s t qualified a c c o r d i n g to impar­ tial m e a s u r e s of s u c h c o m p e t e n c e . I q u e s t i o n b o t h t h e s e a s s u m p t i o n s . For t h e merit p r i n c i p l e to apply it m u s t b e p o s s i b l e to identify, m e a ­ s u r e , c o m p a r e , and rank individual p e r f o r m a n c e of j o b - r e l a t e d tasks u s i n g criteria that are n o r m a t i v e l y and culturally neutral. For m o s t j o b s , h o w ­ e v e r , this is not p o s s i b l e , and m o s t criteria of evaluation u s e d in our soci­ e t y , i n c l u d i n g e d u c a t i o n a l c r e d e n t i a l s and standardized testing, h a v e nor­ m a t i v e and cultural c o n t e n t . S i n c e impartial, v a l u e - n e u t r a l , scientific m e a s u r e s of m e r i t d o not exist, I argue that a major i s s u e of j u s t i c e m u s t b e w h o d e c i d e s w h a t are t h e appropriate qualifications for a g i v e n posi­ tion, h o w t h e y will b e a s s e s s e d , and w h e t h e r particular individuals h a v e them. If o b j e c t i v e , v a l u e - n e u t r a l m e r i t e v a l u a t i o n is difficult or i m p o s s i b l e , t h e l e g i t i m a c y of a hierarchical division of labor is called seriously into q u e s t i o n . I d o not argue that any division a m o n g tasks and functions is w r o n g , but o n l y t h e division b e t w e e n task d e s i g n and task e x e c u t i o n , w h i c h a p p e a r s in t h e social class division b e t w e e n professional and n o n ­ professional j o b s . This division allows o n l y relatively f e w to d e v e l o p and e x e r c i s e their capacities. It s u b j e c t s m o s t p e o p l e to structures of d o m i ­ nation and m a n y to t h e o p p r e s s i o n s of exploitation, p o w e r l e s s n e s s , and cultural i m p e r i a l i s m . D e v e l o p m e n t of w o r k p l a c e d e m o c r a c y can d o m u c h to r e m e d y this injustice, but a w o r k p l a c e d e m o c r a c y that retains t h e g i v e n d i v i s i o n of labor is not e n o u g h . Relations of k n o w l e d g e , a u t o n o m y , and c o o p e r a t i o n m u s t t h e m c l v e s b e restructured in t h e definition of tasks in o r d e r to r e d u c e or u n d e r m i n e o p p r e s s i o n .

AFFIRMATIVE A C T I O N A N D THE PRINCIPLE OF NONDISCRIMINATION

M y p u r p o s e in this s e c t i o n is not to e n g a g e in a t h o r o u g h justification of e d u c a t i o n a l and e m p l o y m e n t p o l i c i e s that specially a t t e n d to e x c l u d e d or d i s a d v a n t a g e d g r o u p s and prefer m e m b e r s of t h o s e g r o u p s s o m e of t h e

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t i m e . Rather, I w i s h to put this m u c h - d i s c u s s e d issue of j u s t i c e and g r o u p difference in t h e c o n t e x t of t h e a r g u m e n t s I h a v e m a d e in p r e v i o u s c h a p ­ ters. T h u s m y d i s c u s s i o n will b e restricted largely to c o n s i d e r i n g h o w af­ firmative action p o l i c i e s violate a p r i n c i p l e of equal t r e a t m e n t , and to il­ lustrating h o w m u c h affirmative action discussion p r e s u m e s a distributive p a r a d i g m of social j u s t i c e . M o s t affirmative action p o l i c i e s m a n d a t e d or u p h e l d b y t h e courts h a v e b e e n justified as c o m p e n s a t i o n for past discriminatory practices. In traditional legal t e r m s , s u c h a justification is least controversial w h e n re­ d r e s s benefits t h e actual p e r s o n s w h o h a v e suffered d i s c r i m i n a t i o n , as w h e n a court o r d e r s preferential p r o m o t i o n p r o c e d u r e s for t h o s e w h o w e r e wrongfully s e g r e g a t e d into race- or g e n d e r - s p e c i f i c j o b c a t e g o r i e s . B u t w h e r e t h e y h a v e found e v i d e n c e of intentional past discrimination c o u r t s h a v e often o r d e r e d or u p h e l d an affirmative action r e m e d y e v e n t h o u g h t h e individuals b e n e f i t i n g are not t h e s a m e as t h o s e d i s c r i m i n a t e d against. Justifying affirmative action policies as redress or c o m p e n s a t i o n for past discrimination is fairly uncontroversial, b u t such a justification also t e n d s to restrict p e r m i s s i b l e p r o g r a m s to a v e r y narrow range. S o m e writers and litigants a t t e m p t to justify affirmative action policies as c o m p e n s a t i o n or r e d r e s s for a history of g e n e r a l societal discrimination against w o m e n or Blacks ( s e e Boxill, 1 9 8 4 , p p . 1 4 8 - 6 7 ) . S u c h a r g u m e n t s are w e a k b e c a u s e , as I will a r g u e shortly, t h e y r e n d e r t h e c o n c e p t o f discrimination unacc e p t a b l y v a g u e . A r g u m e n t s that affirmative action p o l i c i e s c o u n t e r a c t t h e c u r r e n t b i a s e s and p r e j u d i c e s of d e c i s i o n m a k e r s are m o r e c o m p e l l i n g . Al­ t h o u g h explicitly discriminatory policies are n o l o n g e r legal, and m a n y institutions h a v e in g o o d faith e l i m i n a t e d explicitly discriminatory prac­ t i c e s , w o m e n and p e o p l e of color c o n t i n u e to b e subject to often u n c o n ­ scious s t e r e o t y p e s , reactions, and e x p e c t a t i o n s of d e c i s i o n m a k e r s , w h o c o n t i n u e to b e w h i t e or m a l e , and usually b o t h . Affirmative action p r o c e ­ d u r e s are a n e c e s s a r y and just m e a n s of c o m b a t i n g s u c h a s s u m p t i o n s and p e r c e p t i o n s , w h i c h persist in e x c l u d i n g and disadvantaging w o m e n and p e o p l e of color ( D a v i d s o n , 1976; c i t e d in F u l l i n w i d e r , 1980, p p . 151— 52). R o b e r t F u l l i n w i d e r s u g g e s t s that this r e a s o n i n g c r e a t e s a d i l e m m a . O n this a r g u m e n t , h e says, "if w e d o not u s e preferential hiring, w e p e r m i t d i s c r i m i n a t i o n to exist. But preferential hiring is also discrimination. T h u s , if w e u s e preferential hiring, w e also p e r m i t discrimination to exist. T h e d i l e m m a is that w h a t e v e r w e d o , w e p e r m i t discrimination" (Fullin­ w i d e r , 1 9 8 0 , p . 156). P r o p o n e n t s of broad affirmative action p o l i c i e s often find t h e m s e l v e s in this d i l e m m a b e c a u s e t h e y share w i t h their o p p o n e n t s t h e c o n v i c t i o n that t h e primary principle of j u s t i c e at stake is a p r i n c i p l e o f n o n d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . F u l l i n w i d e r ' s formulation of t h e d i l e m m a also re-

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lies o n an e q u i v o c a t i o n on t h e t e r m discrimination; in t h e first u s e it m e a n s u n c o n s c i o u s biases, p r e j u d i c e s , and a s s u m p t i o n s that d i s a d v a n t a g e w o m e n or p e o p l e of color, and in t h e s e c o n d it m e a n s c o n s c i o u s pref­ e r e n t i a l practices that favor g r o u p m e m b e r s on g r o u n d s o f their g r o u p m e m b e r s h i p . T h e d i l e m m a disappears, I s u g g e s t , if p r o p o n e n t s of affirma­ t i v e action a b a n d o n t h e a s s u m p t i o n that nondiscrimination is a p a r a m o u n t p r i n c i p l e of j u s t i c e , and stop a s s u m i n g that racial and sexual injustice m u s t c o m e u n d e r t h e c o n c e p t of discrimination. T h o s e w h o o p p o s e affirmative action policies usually d o so on t h e g r o u n d s that t h e y d i s c r i m i n a t e . For t h e m a principle of equal t r e a t m e n t , a p r i n c i p l e of n o n d i s c r i m i n a t i o n , has a b s o l u t e moral primacy. O n this c o n c e p t i o n of social j u s t i c e , p o l i c i e s that are g r o u p blind and apply t h e s a m e formal rules to e v e r y o n e are b o t h n e c e s s a r y and sufficient for social j u s t i c e . S i n c e affirmative action p o l i c i e s violate this p r i n c i p l e of equal t r e a t m e n t , t h e y are w r o n g (see, e . g . , R e y n o l d s , 1986). S u p p o r t e r s of affirmative action p o l i c i e s w o u l d b e less o n t h e d e f e n s i v e , I s u g g e s t , if t h e y p o s i t i v e l y a c k n o w l e d g e d that t h e s e policies d i s c r i m i n a t e , i n s t e a d of trying to a r g u e that t h e y are an e x t e n s i o n o f or c o m p a t i b l e with a p r i n c i p l e of n o n d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . W e s h o u l d , m o r e o v e r , d e n y t h e a s s u m p t i o n , w i d e l y h e l d by b o t h p r o p o n e n t s and o p p o n e n t s of affirmative action, that d i s c r i m ­ ination is t h e o n l y or primary w r o n g that groups suffer. O p p r e s s i o n , not d i s c r i m i n a t i o n , is t h e primary c o n c e p t for n a m i n g g r o u p - r e l a t e d injustice. W h i l e d i s c r i m i n a t o r y p o l i c i e s s o m e t i m e s c a u s e or reinforce o p p r e s s i o n , o p p r e s s i o n i n v o l v e s m a n y actions, practices, and structures that h a v e lit­ tle to d o w i t h preferring or e x c l u d i n g m e m b e r s of groups in t h e a w a r d i n g of b e n e f i t s . In C h a p t e r 6 I a r g u e d against an assimilationist ideal that e q u a t e s social e q u a l i t y w i t h t h e e l i m i n a t i o n or t r a n s c e n d e n c e of group differences. Tak­ ing a p r i n c i p l e of equal t r e a t m e n t , or n o n d i s c r i m i n a t i o n , as an a b s o l u t e or primary p r i n c i p l e of j u s t i c e a s s u m e s such an ideal of equality as s a m e n e s s . I h a v e a r g u e d that equal t r e a t m e n t s h o u l d not r e c e i v e s u c h primacy. E q u a l i t y , d e f i n e d as t h e participation and inclusion of all g r o u p s in institu­ tions and positions, is sometimes b e t t e r s e r v e d by differential t r e a t m e n t . This a r g u m e n t shifts t h e c o n t e x t for d i s c u s s i n g t h e j u s t i c e of affirmative action p o l i c i e s that favor m e m b e r s of o p p r e s s e d or d i s a d v a n t a g e d groups. N o l o n g e r n e e d affirmative action b e s e e n as an e x c e p t i o n to t h e o t h e r w i s e o p e r a t i v e p r i n c i p l e of n o n d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . I n s t e a d , it b e c o m e s o n e of m a n y g r o u p - c o n s c i o u s p o l i c i e s i n s t r u m e n t a l in u n d e r m i n i n g o p p r e s s i o n . C o n s i d e r i n g discrimination t h e only or primary injustice that w o m e n or p e o p l e of color suffer in A m e r i c a n s o c i e t y focuses attention o n t h e w r o n g i s s u e s . D i s c r i m i n a t i o n is primarily an a g e n t - o r i e n t e d , fault-oriented c o n ­ c e p t . T h u s it t e n d s to focus attention o n t h e perpetrator and a particular action or policy, rather than on v i c t i m s and their situation (see F r e e m a n ,

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1982). I d e n t i f y i n g g r o u p - b a s e d injustice w i t h discrimination t e n d s to p u t t h e o n u s o n t h e v i c t i m s to p r o v e a harm is d o n e , case by case. As a c o n c e p t o f fault, m o r e o v e r , discrimination t e n d s to p r e s e n t t h e injustice g r o u p s suffer as aberrant, t h e e x c e p t i o n rather than t h e rule. N o w that law and p u b l i c s e n t i m e n t a g r e e that specific discrimination w h i c h e x c l u d e s or d i s a d v a n t a g e s w o m e n or p e o p l e of color is w r o n g , p e o ­ p l e h a v e c o m e to think of t h e normal c o n d i t i o n as t h e a b s e n c e of discrimi­ nation (Fitzpatrick, 1987). S i n c e explicit discrimination against w o m e n and p e o p l e of color has d e c r e a s e d , t h e e q u a t i o n of g r o u p - b a s e d injustice w i t h d i s c r i m i n a t i o n leads p e o p l e to a s s u m e that injustices against t h e s e g r o u p s h a v e also b e e n e l i m i n a t e d . T h e c o n c e p t of d i s c r i m i n a t i o n , I s u g g e s t , s h o u l d b e restricted to t h e explicit e x c l u s i o n or p r e f e r e n c e of s o m e p e o p l e in t h e distribution of b e n ­ efits, t h e t r e a t m e n t t h e y r e c e i v e , or t h e positions t h e y o c c u p y , on account of t h e i r social g r o u p m e m b e r s h i p . Ironically, w h e n discrimination in this s e n s e b e c o m e s illegal and socially u n a c c e p t a b l e , it b e c o m e s very difficult to p r o v e that it takes place. P e o p l e easily retreat into a p p e a l s to qualifica­ tions, or into a s s e r t i n g p r e f e r e n c e s for kinds of character and c o m p o r t ­ m e n t , i n s t e a d of for g r o u p s . Many legal theorists have a r g u e d for a results test rather than an i n t e n t test of discrimination; that is, a policy or practice s h o u l d b e found discriminatory if it results in a disproportionate e x c l u s i o n of w o m e n or p e o p l e of color, w h a t e v e r t h e i n t e n t of its makers. T h e "dis­ parate i m p a c t " d o c t r i n e articulated b y t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t in 1971 in t h e G r i g g s c a s e s u g g e s t s s u c h a b r o a d e n e d m e a n i n g of discrimination. In re­ c e n t y e a r s , h o w e v e r , n e i t h e r courts nor t h e general p u b l i c h a v e a p p e a r e d w i l l i n g to a c c e p t s u c h an e x p a n d e d c o n c e p t of discrimination. I a g r e e that t h e moral focus s h o u l d b e o n victims and results, rather than p e r p e t r a t o r s and i n t e n t s . But it c o n f u s e s issues to b r i n g s u c h a focus o n results u n d e r t h e c o n c e p t of discrimination. A m u c h b e t t e r strategy for a d d r e s s i n g t h e injustice suffered by d i s a d v a n t a g e d groups is to restrict t h e c o n c e p t of d i s c r i m i n a t i o n to intentional and explicitly formulated p o l i c i e s of e x c l u s i o n or p r e f e r e n c e , and to argue that discrimination is not t h e only or n e c e s s a r i l y t h e primary w r o n g that w o m e n and p e o p l e of color suffer. As g r o u p s , t h e primary w r o n g w e suffer is o p p r e s s i o n . In C h a p t e r 2 I a r g u e d that o p p r e s s i o n s h o u l d not n e c e s s a r i l y b e u n d e r ­ stood as p e r p e t r a t e d b y particular o p p r e s s i n g a g e n t s . W h i l e m a n y individ­ uals c o n t r i b u t e to o p p r e s s i o n , and particular groups of p e o p l e are privi­ l e g e d b e c a u s e of t h e o p p r e s s i o n of o t h e r g r o u p s , o n e m i s s e s t h e m u n d a n e and s y s t e m a t i c character of o p p r e s s i o n if o n e a s s u m e s that particular o p ­ p r e s s o r s can and s h o u l d always b e identified and b l a m e d . In its focus on i n d i v i d u a l a g e n t s , t h e c o n c e p t of discrimination o b s c u r e s and e v e n t e n d s to d e n y t h e structural and institutional framework of o p p r e s s i o n . If o n e f o c u s e s o n d i s c r i m i n a t i o n as t h e primary w r o n g groups suffer, t h e n t h e

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m o r e p r o f o u n d w r o n g s of exploitation, marginalization, p o w e r l e s s n e s s , cultural i m p e r i a l i s m , and v i o l e n c e that w e still suffer g o u n d i s c u s s e d and u n a d d r e s s e d . O n e m i s s e s h o w t h e w e i g h t of society's institutions and p e o ­ ple's a s s u m p t i o n s , habits, and b e h a v i o r toward o t h e r s arc d i r e c t e d at re­ p r o d u c i n g t h e material and ideological c o n d i t i o n s that m a k e life e a s i e r for, p r o v i d e g r e a t e r real o p p o r t u n i t i e s to, and establish t h e priority of t h e p o i n t of v i e w of w h i t e h e t e r o s e x u a l m e n . A focus o n o p p r e s s i o n rather than discrimination as t h e primary w r o n g that w o m e n , p e o p l e of color, and o t h e r groups suffer allows us to a d m i t that affirmative action p o l i c i e s are i n d e e d discriminatory (see S u m n e r , 1987). T h e y call for c o n s c i o u s l y and explicitly preferring m e m b e r s of par­ ticular g r o u p s on a c c o u n t of their g r o u p m e m b e r s h i p . D i s c r i m i n a t i o n in this s e n s e m a y or m a y not b e w r o n g , d e p e n d i n g on its p u r p o s e . An allm a l e c l u b of city officials and b u s i n e s s p e o p l e is w r o n g , for e x a m p l e , b e ­ c a u s e it reinforces and a u g m e n t s n e t w o r k s of p r i v i l e g e a m o n g m e n that exist e v e n in its a b s e n c e . It is not w r o n g to found an a l l - w o m e n ' s profes­ sional association, on t h e o t h e r hand, to counteract t h e isolation and strains that m a n y professional w o m e n e x p e r i e n c e as a result of b e i n g less than w e l c o m e m i n o r i t i e s in their fields. If differentiation of g r o u p s reinforces u n d e s i r a b l e s t e r e o t y p e s about their m e m b e r s , e x c l u d e s t h e m , s e g r e g a t e s t h e m , or p u t s t h e m in subordi­ nate p o s i t i o n s , t h e n it is w r o n g ( R h o d e , 1989, chap. 10; cf. Colker, 1986). M o s t historical d i s c r i m i n a t i o n s h a v e b e e n w r o n g not b e c a u s e t h e y distin­ g u i s h e d p e o p l e a c c o r d i n g to g r o u p attributes, but b e c a u s e t h e y a i m e d at or r e s u l t e d in formally and explicitly restricting t h e actions and o p p o r t u n i ­ ties of g r o u p m e m b e r s . T h e y h a v e b e e n w r o n g , that is, b e c a u s e t h e y h a v e c o n t r i b u t e d to and h e l p e d e n f o r c e o p p r e s s i o n . If discrimination s e r v e s t h e p u r p o s e of u n d e r m i n i n g t h e o p p r e s s i o n of a group, it may b e not only p e r m i t t e d , b u t morally r e q u i r e d . Institutions and policies too often h a v e differential a d v e r s e impact on formerly e x c l u d e d or s e g r e g a t e d groups, e v e n t h o u g h this m a y not b e i n t e n d e d . Bias against w o m e n , p e o p l e of color, disabled p e o p l e , and gays and lesbians is e m b e d d e d in institutions, e i t h e r b e c a u s e t h e y are d e s i g n e d w i t h t h e lives and p e r s p e c t i v e s of t h e p r i v i l e g e d in m i n d , or b e c a u s e their structure still reflects t h e subordination that formal rules have o u t l a w e d . Explicit p o l i c i e s of e x c l u s i o n , s e g r e g a t i o n , and s u b o r d i n a t i o n , finally, h a v e left a d e e p l e g a c y of group-differentiated capacities, c u l t u r e , and socialization that c o n t i n u e to p r i v i l e g e w h i t e m e n in t h e c o m p e t i t i o n for t h e m o s t r e w a r d e d social positions. M u c h of this difference in capacity or p r e f e r e n c e s h o u l d b e c o n c e i v e d s i m p l y as difference rather than inferior­ ity, b u t as I will discuss shortly, merit standards often translate difference into hierarchy. O p p r e s s i o n t h u s r e m a i n s an o n g o i n g p r o c e s s r e p r o d u c e d b y m a n y rules, practices, actions, and i m a g e s .

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T h u s t h e primary a r g u m e n t for policies that c o n s c i o u s l y aim to i n c r e a s e t h e participation and i n c l u s i o n of w o m e n , Blacks, Latinos, or d i s a b l e d p e o p l e in s c h o o l s and offices and in positions of high reward and authority is that t h e s e p o l i c i e s i n t e r v e n e in t h e p r o c e s s e s of o p p r e s s i o n ( H a w k e s w o r t h , 1 9 8 4 , p p . 3 4 3 - 4 4 ; L i v i n g s t o n , 1979, chaps. 1 - 3 ; F u l l i n w i d e r , 1 9 8 0 , p p . 1 5 1 - 5 2 ; 1986, p p . 1 8 3 - 8 4 ; Boxill, 1984, chap. 7; W a s s e r s t r o m , 1 9 8 0 b ; 1986; R h o d e , 1989, chap. 10; S u m n e r , 1987). This p o s i t i v e inter­ v e n t i o n has s e v e r a l d i m e n s i o n s . T h r o u g h strong affirmative action poli­ c i e s an institution a n n o u n c e s its a c c e p t a n c e of formerly e x c l u d e d groups. Affirmative action p o l i c i e s also c o u n t e r t h e particular g r o u p - r e l a t e d biases of i n s t i t u t i o n s and d e c i s i o n m a k e r s w h i c h p u t w o m e n and p e o p l e of color at a d i s a d v a n t a g e . Finally, inclusion and participation of w o m e n , p e o p l e of color, d i s a b l e d p e o p l e , and so o n in institutions and positions carries t h e a d v a n t a g e s of g r o u p r e p r e s e n t a t i o n in d e c i s i o n m a k i n g b o d i e s . B e ­ c a u s e of t h e i r differing e x p e r i e n c e s , c u l t u r e s , v a l u e s , and interactive s t y l e s , p e o p l e from different groups often bring u n i q u e p e r s p e c t i v e s to a c o l l e c t i v e e n d e a v o r , s u p p l e m e n t i n g t h o s e of others. T h e primary p u r p o s e of affirmative action p o l i c i e s , t h e n , is n e i t h e r to c o m p e n s a t e for past dis­ c r i m i n a t i o n nor to m a k e u p for s u p p o s e d d e f i c i e n c i e s of formerly e x c l u d e d g r o u p s . I n s t e a d , t h e primary p u r p o s e of affirmative action is to mitigate t h e i n f l u e n c e of c u r r e n t biases and b l i n d n e s s e s of institutions and d e c i ­ sionmakers.

AFFIRMATIVE A C T I O N D I S C U S S I O N A N D THE DISTRIBUTIVE PARADIGM

In C h a p t e r 1 I a r g u e d that a distributive paradigm d o m i n a t e s p h i l o s o p h i ­ cal and p o l i c y d i s c u s s i o n s of social j u s t i c e . W h i l e d i s t r i b u t i v e i s s u e s are i m p o r t a n t c o n c e r n s of social j u s t i c e , an approach that f o c u s e s s o l e l y o n d i s t r i b u t i o n t e n d s to o b s c u r e q u e s t i o n s of t h e j u s t i c e of social institutions at least as i m p o r t a n t as distributions. T h e o r i e s of j u s t i c e that focus on d i s ­ tribution t e n d to a s s u m e t h e institutional structures w h i c h p r o d u c e distri­ b u t i o n s as g i v e n b a c k g r o u n d c o n d i t i o n s w h o s e j u s t i c e is not b r o u g h t into q u e s t i o n . Insofar as this paradigm of j u s t i c e limits evaluation to distribu­ tion, i g n o r i n g and o b s c u r i n g q u e s t i o n s of t h e j u s t i c e o f institutional organ­ ization, it s e r v e s an ideological function; it implicitly s u p p o r t s t h e institu­ tional relations it a s s u m e s as g i v e n . Both p h i l o s o p h i c a l and policy d i s c u s s i o n s of affirmative action exhibit t h e d i s t r i b u t i v e p a r a d i g m of social j u s t i c e . Richard W a s s e r s t r o m is repre­ s e n t a t i v e of t h o s e w h o c o n c e p t u a l i z e affirmative action as an issue of dis­ tributive justice: There is, at present, a maldistribution of power and authority along racial and sexual lines that is part of the social structure. Within the major political and

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social institutions, such as the university, the bench, and the bar, the state and federal executive branches, and the corporate world, the great majority of positions are held by those who are white and male. One thing to be said for programs of preferential treatment is that by their operation they directly alter the composition of these institutions by increasing the number of nonwhites and women who in fact fill these positions of power and authority. This is desirable in itself because it is a redistribution of positions in a way that creates a new social reality—one which more nearly resembles the one captured by the con­ ception of the good society. . . . To the degree that the present distribution of services and goods is unfair to members of these groups, the distributional change is justifiable simply because it is now a more just distribution. (Wasserstrom, 1980b, p. 56) W h e r e affirmative action programs are in place t h e y d o i n d e e d h a v e s o m e s u c c e s s in r e d i s t r i b u t i n g d e s i r a b l e positions a m o n g w o m e n and p e o ­ p l e of color w h o o t h e r w i s e probably w o u l d not get t h e m . W h i l e s o m e w o u l d argue that p r o c e d u r e s of formally equal t r e a t m e n t s h o u l d not b e v i o l a t e d in o r d e r to p r o d u c e m o r e just patterns in t h e distribution of posi­ tions, I a g r e e w i t h W a s s e r s t r o m that t h e goal of a c h i e v i n g greater j u s t i c e l e g i t i m a t e s preferential t r e a t m e n t . E v e n if strong affirmative action pro­ g r a m s e x i s t e d in m o s t institutions, h o w e v e r , t h e y w o u l d h a v e o n l y a m i n o r effect in altering t h e basic structure of g r o u p p r i v i l e g e and o p p r e s s i o n in t h e U n i t e d States. S i n c e t h e s e programs r e q u i r e that racially or sexually p r e f e r r e d c a n d i d a t e s b e qualified, and i n d e e d often h i g h l y qualified, t h e y d o n o t h i n g d i r e c t l y to i n c r e a s e o p p o r t u n i t i e s for Blacks, Latinos, or w o m e n w h o s e social e n v i r o n m e n t and lack of r e s o u r c e s m a k e g e t t i n g qualified nearly i m p o s s i b l e for t h e m . C h a n g e in t h e overall social patterns of racial and g e n d e r stratification in our s o c i e t y w o u l d r e q u i r e major c h a n g e s in t h e s t r u c t u r e of t h e e c o n o m y , t h e p r o c e s s of j o b allocation, t h e character of t h e social d i v i s i o n of labor, and access to s c h o o l i n g and train­ ing (cf. W i l s o n , 1978; 1986; L i v i n g s t o n , 1979, chap. 11; H o c h s c h i l d , 1988). I n t e r s e c t i n g t h e o p p r e s s i o n s of race and g e n d e r are t h e o p p r e s s i o n s of class. In t h e past t w e n t y years d e b a t e about affirmative action p o l i c i e s has o c c u p i e d a great deal o f t h e attention of p o l i c y m a k e r s , policy analysts, c o u r t s , u n i o n s , a n d professional associations. This d e b a t e is important b e ­ c a u s e it raises f u n d a m e n t a l i s s u e s of principle. So m u c h e n e r g y i n v e s t e d in t h e i s s u e of affirmative action, h o w e v e r , m e a n s e n e r g y d e f l e c t e d from o t h e r a s p e c t s of racial or g e n d e r j u s t i c e , and from i m a g i n i n g o t h e r policy proposals that m i g h t u n d e r m i n e racial and sexual o p p r e s s i o n . Affirmative action is o n e of t h e f e w policy proposals o n t h e social a g e n d a in t h e U n i t e d States that a d d r e s s i s s u e s of sexual and racial o p p r e s s i o n . I s u g g e s t that o n e reason it is so m u c h d i s c u s s e d , e v e n t h o u g h m o r e rarely s u p p o r t e d , is

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that it is a "safer" proposal for a d d r e s s i n g g r o u p inequality than o t h e r s that might be voiced. T h e t e r m s of t h e affirmative action d e b a t e d e f i n e a set of a s s u m p t i o n s that a c c e p t t h e basic structure of t h e division of labor and t h e basic p r o c e s s of allocating p o s i t i o n s . In their d e b a t e , b o t h p r o p o n e n t s and o p p o n e n t s of affirmative action a s s u m e as a prima facie principle that social positions s h o u l d b e d i s t r i b u t e d to t h e "most qualified," d i s a g r e e i n g only o n w h e t h e r it is j u s t to o v e r r i d e that principle. Both sides a s s u m e as g i v e n a hierarchical d i v i s i o n of labor in w h i c h s o m e f e w p e o p l e are w i n n e r s in t h e c o m p e t i t i o n for scarce desirable p o s i t i o n s , and m o s t p e o p l e m u s t s e t t l e for p o s i t i o n s of little reward, or n o positions at all. W i t h o u t this division of labor, t h e stakes that m a k e t h e affirmative action d e b a t e so bitter w o u l d not b e so high. S o m e participants in t h e affirmative action d e b a t e m a y in o t h e r c o n t e x t s not a c c e p t t h e s e a s s u m p t i o n s ; b u t t h e t e r m s of t h e d e b a t e itself p r e s u m e t h e m . B e c a u s e t h e affirmative action issue is restricted to t h e distribution and redistribution of p o s i t i o n s , broader structural q u e s ­ tions a b o u t j u s t i c e in t h e definition of positions and h o w a d m i s s i o n to t h e m is d e t e r m i n e d rarely g e t raised in public. To t h e d e g r e e that t h e affirma­ tive action d e b a t e limits p u b l i c attention to t h e relatively narrow and su­ perficial i s s u e of t h e redistribution of positions within an already g i v e n framework, that d e b a t e s e r v e s t h e function of s u p p o r t i n g t h e structural status q u o . T h e r e m a i n d e r of this c h a p t e r e x a m i n e s in detail t w o a s s u m p t i o n s about institutional structure that usually u n d e r l i e affirmative action d e b a t e : t h e a s s u m p t i o n that p o s i t i o n s s h o u l d b e d i s t r i b u t e d to t h e m o s t qualified, and t h e a s s u m p t i o n that a hierarchical division o f labor is just.

T H E MYTH OF MERIT

A w i d e l y h e l d p r i n c i p l e of j u s t i c e in our society is that positions and rewards s h o u l d b e d i s t r i b u t e d according to individual merit. T h e merit p r i n c i p l e h o l d s that positions s h o u l d b e a w a r d e d to t h e m o s t qualified i n d i v i d u a l s , that is, to t h o s e w h o h a v e t h e g r e a t e s t a p t i t u d e and skill for p e r f o r m i n g t h e tasks t h o s e positions require. This principle is central to l e g i t i m a t i n g a hierarchical division of labor in a liberal d e m o c r a t i c s o c i e t y w h i c h a s s u m e s t h e e q u a l moral and political w o r t h of all p e r s o n s . A s s u m ­ ing as g i v e n a structural division b e t w e e n scarce highly r e w a r d e d posi­ tions and m o r e plentiful less r e w a r d e d positions, the m e r i t principle as­ serts that this division of labor is just w h e n n o g r o u p r e c e i v e s p r i v i l e g e d p o s i t i o n s b y birth or right, or by v i r t u e of arbitrary characteristics such as race, e t h n i c i t y , or sex. T h e unjust hierarchy o f caste is to b e r e p l a c e d by a "natural" hierarchy of i n t e l l e c t and skill.

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Just h o w this p r i n c i p l e o f merit s h o u l d b e i n t e r p r e t e d , and w h e t h e r it s h o u l d function as t h e p r i n c i p l e of t h e distribution of positions and re­ w a r d s , is t h e s u b j e c t of s o m e c o n t r o v e r s y . Rawls, for e x a m p l e , a r g u e s that u s i n g natural talents as a criterion for awarding positions can b e c o n s i d ­ e r e d j u s t as arbitrary as a w a r d i n g t h e m according to race or sex, b e c a u s e a p e r s o n is just as little r e s p o n s i b l e for his or h e r talents as for his or h e r race (Rawls, 1 9 7 1 , p p . 1 0 1 - 4 ; cf. Sandel, 1982, p p . 7 2 - 8 2 ) . T h u s m a n y a r g u e that effort and a c h i e v e m e n t s h o u l d b e a large part of m e r i t criteria ( e . g . , N i e l s e n , 1985, p p . 1 0 4 - 1 2 ) . M a n y a r g u e , further, that a p r i n c i p l e of m e r i t distribution s h o u l d apply only after basic n e e d s are m e t for e v e r y o n e (Sterba, 1980, p p . 4 7 - 6 2 ; N i e l s e n , 1985, c h a p . 6; G a l s t o n , 1980, p p . 1 6 2 - 7 0 , 1 9 7 - 2 0 0 ) . O t h e r s q u e s t i o n w h e t h e r a p r i n c i p l e of m e r i t has any moral force, arguing that claims about efficiency or p r o d u c t i v i t y can­ not s u p p o r t claims of right or d e s e r t (see D a n i e l s , 1978). In his t h o r o u g h and thoughtful s t u d y of t h e conflict o f v a l u e s h e p e r ­ c e i v e s in t h e goals of e q u a l o p p o r t u n i t y , James Fishkin defines t h e merit p r i n c i p l e as e n t a i l i n g " w i d e s p r e a d procedural fairness in t h e evaluation o f qualifications for p o s i t i o n s " (Fishkin, 1983, p. 22). Procedural fairness re­ q u i r e s that t h e p r o c e s s e s of evaluation "approach t h e m o d e l of an impar­ tial c o m p e t i t i o n . " Qualifications are "criteria that are j o b r e l a t e d in that t h e y fairly can b e i n t e r p r e t e d as indicators of c o m p e t e n c e or m o t i v a t i o n for an individual's p e r f o r m a n c e in a g i v e n position." E d u c a t i o n , j o b his­ tory, fairly a d m i n i s t e r e d test results, or o t h e r t o k e n s of ability or effort, says F i s h k i n , can all b e u s e d to assess qualifications. A fair a s s e s s m e n t of an individual's qualifications m u s t rest on that person's o w n past or p r e s ­ e n t actual p e r f o r m a n c e of relevant tasks; d e t e r m i n a t i o n of qualifications c a n n o t rest o n statistical i n f e r e n c e s (Fishkin, 1983, p p . 2 3 - 2 4 ) . U s e of a p r i n c i p l e of m e r i t to allocate scarce and desirable p o s i t i o n s in a j o b hierarchy, and in t h e educational institutions that train p e o p l e for t h o s e j o b s , is j u s t o n l y if several c o n d i t i o n s are m e t . First, qualifications m u s t b e d e f i n e d in t e r m s of technical skills and c o m p e t e n c e , i n d e p e n d ­ e n t l y o f and neutral w i t h r e s p e c t to v a l u e s and culture. By technical c o m ­ p e t e n c e I m e a n c o m p e t e n c e at p r o d u c i n g specified results. If merit crite­ ria d o not d i s t i n g u i s h b e t w e e n technical skills and n o r m a t i v e or cultural a t t r i b u t e s , t h e r e is n o w a y to separate b e i n g a "good" w o r k e r of a certain sort from b e i n g t h e sort kind of p e r s o n — w i t h t h e right b a c k g r o u n d , w a y of life, and so o n . S e c o n d , to justify differential j o b p r i v i l e g e t h e p u r e l y t e c h n i c a l skills and c o m p e t e n c e s m u s t b e "job related," in that t h e y o p e r ­ ate as p r e d i c t o r s for e x c e l l e n t p e r f o r m a n c e in the p o s i t i o n . T h i r d , for m e r i t criteria to b e a p p l i e d justly, p e r f o r m a n c e and c o m p e t e n c e m u s t b e j u d g e d individually. In o r d e r to say that o n e individual is m o r e qualified than another, finally, t h e p e r f o r m a n c e s and p r e d i c t e d p e r f o r m a n c e s o f

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i n d i v i d u a l s m u s t b e c o m p a r e d and ranked according to m e a s u r e s w h i c h are i n d e p e n d e n t of and neutral with r e s p e c t to v a l u e s and c u l t u r e . P r o p o n e n t s of a merit p r i n c i p l e rarely d o u b t that t h e s e c o n d i t i o n s can b e m e t . F i s h k i n , for e x a m p l e , finds it o b v i o u s that t h e technical c o m p e ­ t e n c e of individuals can b e m e a s u r e d and p r e d i c t e d apart from v a l u e s , p u r p o s e s , and cultural n o r m s . "It is hard to b e l i e v e , " h e says, "in a m o d ­ e r n industrial s o c i e t y , with a c o m p l e x differentiation of tasks that qualifi­ cations that are p e r f o r m a n c e related c o u l d not b e d e f i n e d so as to predict b e t t e r p e r f o r m a n c e s " (Fishkin, 1983, p. 56). It m a y b e hard to b e l i e v e , b u t in fact s u c h n o r m a t i v e l y and culturally neutral m e a s u r e s of individual p e r f o r m a n c e d o not exist for m o s t j o b s . T h e i d e a of merit criteria that are o b j e c t i v e and u n b i a s e d w i t h r e s p e c t to personal attributes is a version of t h e ideal of impartiality, and is just as i m p o s s i b l e . First, m o s t j o b s arc too c o m p l e x and m u l t i f a c e t e d to allow for a p r e c i s e identification of their tasks and thus m e a s u r e m e n t of l e v e l s of perform­ a n c e of t h o s e tasks. P r e c i s e , value-neutral, task-specific m e a s u r e s of j o b p e r f o r m a n c e are p o s s i b l e o n l y for j o b s w i t h a l i m i t e d n u m b e r of d e f i n a b l e functions e a c h of w h i c h is a fairly straightforward identifiable task, requir­ i n g little verbal skill, imagination, or j u d g m e n t (Fallon, 1980). D a t a e n t r y w o r k or quality control sorting m a y satisfy t h e s e r e q u i r e m e n t s , b u t a great m a n y j o b s d o not. A travel agent, for e x a m p l e , m u s t k e e p records, c o m ­ m u n i c a t e effectively o n t h e t e l e p h o n e and through e v e r - c h a n g i n g c o m ­ p u t e r n e t w o r k s of information, and study and k e e p at h a n d o p t i o n s in tour p a c k a g e s for m a n y p l a c e s . S e r v i c e s e c t o r work, a vastly e x p a n d i n g portion of j o b s , in g e n e r a l can rarely b e e v a l u a t e d in t e r m s of t h e criteria of pro­ d u c t i v i t y and efficiency a p p l i e d to industrial p r o d u c t i o n , b e c a u s e it m a k e s m u c h less s e n s e to c o u n t s e r v i c e s r e n d e r e d than i t e m s that c o m e off t h e assembly line. S e c o n d , in c o m p l e x industrial and office organizations, it is often not p o s s i b l e to identify t h e c o n t r i b u t i o n that each individual m a k e s , p r e c i s e l y b e c a u s e t h e w o r k e r s c o o p e r a t e in p r o d u c i n g an o u t c o m e or product. T h e p e r f o r m a n c e o f a t e a m , d e p a r t m e n t , or firm m a y b e m e a s u r a b l e , b u t this is of little u s e in justifying t h e position or l e v e l of reward of any particular t e a m m e m b e r s (cf. Offe, 1976, p p . 5 4 - 5 7 ; Collins, 1979, p. 31). T h i r d , a great m a n y j o b s require w i d e discretion in w h a t t h e w o r k e r d o e s and h o w b e s t to d o it. In m a n y j o b s t h e w o r k e r s role is m o r e n e g a t i v e than p o s i t i v e ; h e or s h e o v e r s e e s a p r o c e s s and i n t e r v e n e s to p r e v e n t s o m e t h i n g from g o i n g w r o n g . In a u t o m a t e d p r o c e s s e s , from individual m a c h i n e s to e n t i r e factories, for e x a m p l e , workers routinely c o n t r i b u t e little to t h e actual m a k i n g of things, b u t t h e y m u s t b e vigilant in t e n d i n g t h e m a c h i n e s to m a k e s u r e t h e p r o c e s s g o e s as it s h o u l d . T h e n e g a t i v e role i n c r e a s e s w o r k e r d i s c r e t i o n about w h e t h e r , w h e n , and h o w often to inter­ v e n e . P e r h a p s t h e r e is o n e easily identifiable and m e a s u r a b l e w a y to per-

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form m a n y p o s i t i v e actions. But t h e r e are m a n y w a y s of p r e v e n t i n g a pro­ c e s s from g o i n g w r o n g , and it is not usually p o s s i b l e to m e a s u r e a worker's p r o d u c t i v i t y l e v e l in t e r m s o f t h e costs that w o u l d h a v e b e e n incurred if s h e or h e had not i n t e r v e n e d , or t h e costs that w o u l d h a v e b e e n s a v e d if s h e or h e had i n t e r v e n e d differently (Offe, 1976, p. 56). Finally, t h e division of labor in m o s t large organizations m e a n s that t h o s e e v a l u a t i n g a worker's p e r f o r m a n c e often are not familiar w i t h t h e actual work p r o c e s s . M o d e r n organizational hierarchies are w h a t Claus Offe calls task d i s c o n t i n u o u s hierarchies (Offe, 1976, p p . 2 5 - 2 8 ) . In a task c o n t i n u o u s hierarchy, like that e x e m p l i f i e d by m e d i e v a l guild p r o d u c t i o n , s u p e r i o r s d o t h e s a m e kind of work as their s u b o r d i n a t e s , b u t w i t h a g r e a t e r d e g r e e of skill and c o m p e t e n c e . In t h e task d i s c o n t i n u o u s hierar­ c h i e s of c o n t e m p o r a r y organizations, j o b ladders are highly s e g r e g a t e d . S u p e r i o r s d o not d o t h e s a m e kind of work as s u b o r d i n a t e s , and m a y n e v e r h a v e d o n e that sort o f work. T h u s t h e superior is often not c o m p e t e n t to e v a l u a t e t h e t e c h n i c a l work p e r f o r m a n c e itself, and m u s t rely o n evaluat­ ing w o r k e r s ' a t t i t u d e s , their c o m p l i a n c e w i t h t h e rules, their s e l f - p r e s e n ­ tation, their c o o p e r a t i v e n e s s — t h a t is, their social comportment. W h i l e t h e s e four i m p e d i m e n t s to a n o r m a t i v e l y and culturally neutral definition and a s s e s s m e n t of j o b p e r f o r m a n c e o c c u r in m a n y t y p e s of work, t h e y are m o s t a p p a r e n t in professional and managerial work. T h e s e t y p e s of work usually i n v o l v e a w i d e diversity of skills and tasks. Most or all of t h e s e tasks rely o n t h e u s e of j u d g m e n t , discretion, imagination, and v e r ­ bal acuity, and n o n e of t h e s e qualities is p r e c i s e l y m e a s u r a b l e a c c o r d i n g to s o m e o b j e c t i v e , v a l u e - n e u t r a l scale. T h e a c h i e v e m e n t of professional and managerial o b j e c t i v e s usually i n v o l v e s a c o m p l e x series of social relation­ s h i p s and d e p e n d e n c i e s , to t h e e x t e n t that it is often u n r e a s o n a b l e to hold professionals r e s p o n s i b l e for not m e e t i n g o b j e c t i v e s (Rausch, 1985, p p . 9 7 - 1 0 3 ) . Professional and managerial j o b s , finally, often are e v a l u a t e d not o n l y b y superiors in a task d i s c o n t i n u o u s hierarchy, but b y clients w h o are e v e n less aware of t h e nature of t h e j o b s and t h e skills r e q u i r e d , and w h o are thus not in a p o s i t i o n to apply criteria of technical p e r f o r m a n c e that are n o r m a t i v e l y and culturally neutral. If professional and managerial positions are e v e n less liable to v a l u e neutral a s s e s s m e n t than o t h e r j o b s , t h e n this creates a particular p r o b l e m for t h e l e g i t i m a t i o n of a hierarchical division of labor. S i n c e t h e s e are t h e m o s t scarce and m o s t r e w a r d e d positions, and thus t h e positions for w h i c h t h e r e is t h e g r e a t e s t c o m p e t i t i o n , it is t h e s e for w h i c h v a l u e - n e u t r a l m e r i t criteria are m o s t n e e d e d . For t h e s e positions it is not e n o u g h that d e c i ­ s i o n m a k e r s b e a b l e to justify t h e claim that t h e person c h o s e n can d o t h e j o b ; t h e y m u s t also justify t h e claim that out of all c a n d i d a t e s this o n e can d o t h e j o b b e s t . For such c o m p a r a t i v e claims u n d e r c i r c u m s t a n c e s of stiff c o m p e t i t i o n to b e l e g i t i m a t e , it m u s t b e p o s s i b l e p r e c i s e l y to d e f i n e and

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m e a s u r e t h e t e c h n i c a l c o m p e t e n c e of individuals. But this r e q u i r e m e n t is least p r e s e n t in t h o s e j o b s for w h i c h it is m o s t n e e d e d (cf. Fallon, 1980, p. 8 4 9 ; W a s s e r s t r o m , 1 9 8 0 b , p. 68). E v e n t h o u g h t h e m e r i t principle r e q u i r e s impartial t e c h n i c a l definition of qualifications, t h e criteria actually u s e d to d e t e r m i n e qualifications t e n d to e m b o d y or i n c l u d e particular v a l u e s , n o r m s , and cultural a t t r i b u t e s — such as w h e t h e r t h o s e b e i n g e v a l u a t e d b e h a v e according to certain social n o r m s , w h e t h e r t h e y p r o m o t e specifically d e f i n e d organizational goals, and w h e t h e r t h e y d e m o n s t r a t e g e n e r a l l y v a l u e d social c o m p e t e n c e s and characteristics. Factory workers are often e v a l u a t e d for their punctuality, o b e d i e n c e , loyalty, and p o s i t i v e attitude; professional w o r k e r s may b e e v a l u a t e d for t h e i r a r t i c u l a t e n e s s , a u t h o r i t a t i v e n e s s , and ability to work effectively in groups. Let m e e m p h a s i z e that u s i n g criteria such as t h e s e is not necessarily inappropriate; t h e point is that t h e y are n o r m a t i v e and cultural rather than neutrally scientific. That is, t h e y c o n c e r n w h e t h e r t h e p e r s o n e v a l u a t e d s u p p o r t s and i n t e r n a l i z e s specific v a l u e s , follows implicit or explicit social rules of b e h a v i o r , s u p p o r t s social p u r p o s e s , or exhibits specific traits of character, b e h a v i o r , or t e m p e r a m e n t that t h e evaluators find desirable. U s e of n o r m a t i v e a n d cultural criteria in addition to and i n t e r t w i n e d w i t h e v a l u a t i o n of t e c h n i c a l c o m p e t e n c e is for t h e m o s t part u n a v o i d a b l e . E x p e r t s in managerial p e r f o r m a n c e evaluation make n o s e c r e t of t h e fact that s y s t e m s of merit evaluation d o not impartially m e a s u r e technical p r o d u c t i v i t y . O n e writer about j o b p e r f o r m a n c e defines an e v a l u a t i o n cri­ t e r i o n as "a b e h a v i o r , or s e t of b e h a v i o r s , that m a n a g e m e n t v a l u e s e n o u g h to w a n t to b e able to d e s c r i b e it, predict it (select for it), and/or control it." T h e c h o i c e of criteria, this writer a d m i t s , is e n t i r e l y a " s u b j e c t i v e " j u d g ­ m e n t m a n a g e m e n t m a k e s , t h e result of c o n s e n s u s a m o n g m a n a g e r s or b e t w e e n m a n a g e r s and e m p l o y e e s (Blumfield, 1976, p p . 6 - 7 ; cf. Sher, 1 9 8 7 b , p. 199). O n e s t u d y of p e r f o r m a n c e evaluation practices finds that evaluators of professional or managerial p e r f o r m a n c e c o m m o n l y rely on a s s e s s m e n t of broadly d e f i n e d traits s u c h as l e a d e r s h i p , initiative, c o o p e r a t i o n , j u d g ­ m e n t , creativity, and d e p e n d a b i l i t y , rather than on m o r e specific b e h a v ­ ior and p e r f o r m a n c e o u t c o m e s ( D e v r i e , et al., 1980, p. 20). T h e authors of this s t u d y regard a s s e s s m e n t by personality or character traits as an infe­ rior form of e v a l u a t i o n , b e c a u s e s u c h traits can only b e v a g u e l y d e f i n e d and t h e j u d g m e n t that s o m e o n e exhibits t h e m s e e m s tied to t h e evaluat­ ors' p u r p o s e s and p r e f e r e n c e s . T h e y r e c o m m e n d m a n a g e m e n t by o b j e c ­ t i v e s as t h e m o s t o b j e c t i v e or value-neutral s y s t e m of e v a l u a t i o n . H e r e m a n a g e r s ' p e r f o r m a n c e is e v a l u a t e d according to w h e t h e r and to w h a t e x t e n t t h e y m e e t o b j e c t i v e s p r e v i o u s l y d e f i n e d by s u p e r v i s o r s or by e m ­ p l o y e e s a n d s u p e r v i s o r s t o g e t h e r . W h i l e s u r e l y m o r e o b j e c t i v e than as-

T h e M y t h of M e r i t

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s e s s m e n t of character traits, m a n a g e m e n t by o b j e c t i v e s is hardly v a l u e neutral, s i n c e v a l u e s are usually built into t h e definition of o b j e c t i v e s . Kausch ( 1 9 8 5 , c h a p . 6) c l a i m s , m o r e o v e r , that m a n a g e m e n t b y o b j e c t i v e s has lost favor b e c a u s e m a n a g e r s arc often u n a b l e to m e e t o b j e c t i v e s for r e a s o n s b e y o n d t h e i r control. H e claims that p e r f o r m a n c e evaluation is i n e v i t a b l y s u b j e c t i v e and v a l u e - l a d e n , and for that reason r e c o m m e n d s u s e of p e e r ratings and ratings b y several supervisors instead of o n l y o n e . If m e r i t e v a l u a t i o n is i n e v i t a b l y s u b j e c t i v e and d e p e n d s on t h e j u d g ­ m e n t of e v a l u a t o r s , t h e n merit evaluation will justify hierarchy o n l y if t h e evaluators are impartial in t h e strong s e n s e of not b e i n g i n f l u e n c e d b y t h e social p e r s p e c t i v e of a particular g r o u p or c u l t u r e . I have a r g u e d in C h a p ­ ter 4 that s u c h an impartial s t a n d p o i n t in t h e p u b l i c is a fiction. It is e q u a l l y so in individual institutions. T h e conviction that evaluators can and s h o u l d b e neutral w i t h r e s p e c t to g r o u p s , ways of life, and cultural n o r m s in t h e a s s e s s m e n t of p e r f o r m a n c e and c o m p e t e n c e masks their ac­ tual s i t u a t c d n e s s and partiality. As I shall discuss further in t h e n e x t s e c ­ tion, m o r e o v e r , s u c h impartial, o b j e c t i v e m e t h o d s of evaluation are i m ­ p o s s i b l e e v e n w i t h quantified m e a s u r e s and standardized tests. W i t h i n t h e hierarchical division of labor, evaluators of merit are usually s u p e r o r d i n a t e to t h o s e t h e y e v a l u a t e , o c c u p y i n g positions of relative priv­ i l e g e . T h e i r criteria of evaluation often e m p h a s i z e n o r m s of conformity w h i c h c o n t r i b u t e to t h e s m o o t h m a i n t e n a n c e and r e p r o d u c t i o n of t h e ex­ isting relations of p r i v i l e g e , hierarchy, and subordination, rather than neutrally e v a l u a t i n g only technical c o m p e t e n c e and p e r f o r m a n c e . T h e h i e r a r c h i e s of p r i v i l e g e in our s o c i e t y are clearly structured b y race, g e n ­ der, and o t h e r g r o u p differences, m o r e o v e r , so evaluators are m o s t often w h i t e h e t e r o s e x u a l a b l e - b o d i e d m e n , and t h o s e t h e y e v a l u a t e from o t h e r groups. At least t w o s o u r c e s of g r o u p - r e l a t e d disadvantage affect m e m b e r s of s u b o r d i n a t e d g r o u p s , e v e n w h e n their evaluators b e l i e v e t h e y are b e i n g impartial. As I a r g u e d in C h a p t e r 4, t h e ideal of impartiality e n c o u r a g e s t h e univcrsalization of t h e particular. Criteria of evaluation necessarily carry n o r m a t i v e and cultural implications and so often will not b e g r o u p neutral. T h e s e criteria often carry a s s u m p t i o n s about w a y s of life, styles of b e h a v i o r , and v a l u e s that d e r i v e from and reflect t h e e x p e r i e n c e of t h e p r i v i l e g e d g r o u p s w h o d e s i g n and i m p l e m e n t t h e m . S i n c e t h e i d e o l o g y of impartiality l e a d s evaluators to d e n y t h e particularity of t h e s e standards, g r o u p s w i t h different e x p e r i e n c e s , v a l u e s , and w a y s of life are e v a l u a t e d as falling short. For e x a m p l e , in C h a p t e r 6 I d i s c u s s e d feminist a r g u m e n t s that m a n y s u p p o s e d l y neutral and u n q u e s t i o n e d n o r m s of t h e corporate w o r k p l a c e implicitly a s s u m e male socialization and a m a l e life s t y l e . To take a n o t h e r e x a m p l e , an e m p l o y e e w h o d o e s not look a w h i t e m a l e e m ­ p l o y e r in t h e e y e may b e p e r c e i v e d as shifty or d i s h o n e s t ; b u t t h e e m -

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p l o y e e m a y h a v e b e e n raised in a culture w h e r e averting t h e e y e s is a sign of d e f e r e n c e . S e c o n d , as I a r g u e d in C h a p t e r 5, e v e r y d a y j u d g m e n t of and interaction w i t h w o m e n , p e o p l e of color, gay m e n and lesbians, d i s a b l e d p e o p l e , and old p e o p l e is often i n f l u e n c e d b y u n c o n s c i o u s aversions and d e v a l u a t i o n s . T h u s e v a l u a t o r s , e s p e c i a l l y t h o s e b e l o n g i n g to groups d e f i n e d as neutral, often carry u n c o n s c i o u s biases and p r e j u d i c e s against specially m a r k e d g r o u p s . A n u m b e r o f s t u d i e s h a v e s h o w n , for e x a m p l e , that m a n y w h i t e s rate black j o b c a n d i d a t e s m o r e n e g a t i v e l y than w h i t e s w i t h identical c r e ­ d e n t i a l s ( M c C o n o h a y , 1986). Similar s t u d i e s have s h o w n that t h e s a m e r e s u m e r e c e i v e s a significantly l o w e r rating w h e n it has a w o m a n ' s n a m e than w h e n it has a man's ( R h o d e , 1988, p. 1220).

E D U C A T I O N A N D TESTING AS PERFORMANCE PROXIES

I h a v e a r g u e d that t h e merit principle's r e q u i r e m e n t of n o r m a t i v e l y and culturally neutral m e a s u r e s of individual j o b p e r f o r m a n c e usually c a n n o t b e m e t . T h e m a i n t e n a n c e of a hierarchical division of labor w i t h scarce p r i v i l e g e d p o s i t i o n s at t h e t o p will b e just, h o w e v e r , only if t h o s e p o s i t i o n s are filled a c c o r d i n g to n o r m a t i v e l y and culturally neutral criteria of t e c h n i ­ cal c o m p e t e n c e . T h e p r e s s u r e is o n , t h e n , to find p e r f o r m a n c e p r o x i e s — m e a s u r e s of individual c o m p e t e n c e and a c h i e v e m e n t that can s u b s t i t u t e for p e r f o r m a n c e m e a s u r e s , and that are i n d e p e n d e n t of and neutral w i t h r e s p e c t to v a l u e s and c u l t u r e . Educational credentials and s t a n d a r d i z e d test results function in o u r s o c i e t y as t h e primary proxies for direct a s s e s s ­ m e n t and p r e d i c t i o n of j o b p e r f o r m a n c e . D e s p i t e beliefs to t h e contrary, h o w e v e r , e d u c a t i o n a l a t t a i n m e n t and test results are no m o r e neutral than m o r e direct e v a l u a t i o n s of p e r f o r m a n c e . In a liberal d e m o c r a t i c s o c i e t y , e d u c a t i o n is u n d e r s t o o d as t h e m e a n s of p r o v i d i n g e q u a l o p p o r t u n i t y for all groups. But t h e r e is n o e v i d e n c e that e d u c a t i o n e q u a l i z e s . D e s p i t e educators' b e m o a n i n g t h e fact for several d e c a d e s , t h e s y s t e m of e d u c a t i o n s t u b b o r n l y r e p r o d u c e s class, race, and g e n d e r h i e r a r c h i e s (Gintis and B o w l e s , 1986, chap. 4). E d u c a t o r s mistak­ e n l y b e l i e v e t h e y h a v e p r o d u c e d equal educational o p p o r t u n i t y w h e n n o o n e is barred from f o l l o w i n g a c o u r s e of s t u d y b e c a u s e of race or g e n d e r , and w h e n in p r i n c i p l e all s t u d e n t s follow t h e s a m e c u r r i c u l u m and are m e a s u r e d a c c o r d i n g to t h e s a m e standards. S c h o o l s d o not a t t e n d e n o u g h to differential l e a r n i n g n e e d s , and place responsibility o n p a r e n t s and s t u ­ d e n t s w h e n s t u d e n t s d o not a c h i e v e (Bastian et al., 1 9 8 6 , p p . 2 6 - 3 1 ) . S c h o o l s c o n t i n u e to b e racially s e g r e g a t e d in m a n y regions of t h e U n i t e d States. E v e n w h e n t h e y d o not actively reinforce g e n d e r and racial s t e r e o ­ t y p i n g , s c h o o l s g e n e r a l l y d o very little to confront cultural i m a g e s of ap­ propriate p u r s u i t s for girls and b o y s , or to m a k e visible t h e a c h i e v e m e n t s

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of w o m e n and p e o p l e of color. S e r i o u s racial and g e n d e r differentiation persists in m a t h and s c i e n c e s t u d y and a c h i e v e m e n t in j u n i o r h i g h and h i g h s c h o o l , t h e subjects most n e e d e d for t h e pursuit o f p r i v i l e g e d and lucrative careers in a h i g h - t e c h society. E l e a n o r Orr (1987) argues that a c o h e r e n t s e p a r a t e dialect of Black E n g l i s h leads s o m e c h i l d r e n s y s t e m a t i ­ cally to mistranslate instruction in s c i e n c e and m a t h e m a t i c s , a c c o u n t i n g at least partly for t h e p o o r e r p e r f o r m a n c e and lesser i n t e r e s t of Black chil­ d r e n in t h e s e s u b j e c t s . Similar a r g u m e n t s h a v e b e e n m a d e about g e n d e r bias in t h e c u l t u r e of math and s c i e n c e . M o n e y c o n t i n u e s to b e a major discriminator. M i d d l e - and u p p e r - c l a s s c h i l d r e n h a v e b e t t e r s c h o o l s than p o o r and working-class c h i l d r e n . T h u s t h e y are b e t t e r p r e p a r e d to c o m p e t e for c o l l e g e a d m i s s i o n . If b y c h a n c e p o o r and working-class c h i l d r e n qualify for c o l l e g e , t h e y often cannot pay for it, or for t h e p o s t g r a d u a t e training that can lead t h e m to positions of privilege. A c c o r d i n g to Randall Collins (1979, p p . 1 9 - 2 1 ) , s t u d i e s s h o w little cor­ relation b e t w e e n e d u c a t i o n a l a t t a i n m e n t and j o b p e r f o r m a n c e or o c c u ­ pational s u c c e s s . M u c h of w h a t schools teach is not technical skills, b u t cultural v a l u e s and social n o r m s s u c h as o b e d i e n c e , a t t e n t i v e n e s s , and d e f e r e n c e to authority. S t u d e n t s are often g r a d e d according to h o w w e l l t h e y h a v e i n t e r n a l i z e d t h e s e v a l u e s and n o r m s rather than h o w w e l l t h e y are a b l e to perform certain tasks. E d u c a t i o n a l a c h i e v e m e n t has n e v e r t h e l e s s b e c o m e a major criterion of j o b qualifications. As o n e m i g h t p r e d i c t , this has led directly to a c r e d e n ­ tial inflation. O n c e a h i g h school d i p l o m a b e c a m e g e n u i n e l y attainable for t h e majority of p e o p l e , a c o l l e g e d e g r e e b e c a m e a sine qua non for m a n y j o b s . As state s u p p o r t b e g i n s to m a k e c o m m u n i t y c o l l e g e and state foury e a r c o l l e g e d e g r e e s w i d e l y available, t h e s e too b e c o m e relatively deval­ u e d . O n e m u s t c o m e from a "better school" or h a v e an a d v a n c e d d e g r e e to "get a h e a d . " T h e p r o m i s e of e d u c a t i o n as a ticket to t h e t o p of t h e division of labor is not fulfilled b e c a u s e t h e hierarchical s y s t e m p e r m i t s o n l y relatively f e w positions of p r i v i l e g e , and t h e c r c d e n t i a l i n g s y s t e m functions as g a t e k e e p e r to t h e s e p o s i t i o n s . In g o o d faith p e o p l e p u r s u e s p e c i a l i z e d training and acquire c r e d e n t i a l s , o n l y to find n o room at t h e t o p b e c a u s e so m a n y o t h e r s h a v e d o n e t h e s a m e . T h e y take j o b s for w h i c h t h e y are o v e r q u a l i f i e d , t h e r e b y raising t h e formal standards for t h o s e posi­ t i o n s , and t h e spiral c o n t i n u e s (Burris, 1983). S t a n d a r d i z e d t e s t i n g is t h e m o s t important of p e r f o r m a n c e proxies, u s e d not o n l y to identify t h e m o s t qualified j o b c a n d i d a t e s , but also t h r o u g h o u t t h e e d u c a t i o n a l s y s t e m to identify a c h i e v e m e n t and a p t i t u d e that will admit individuals to p r i v i l e g e d educational programs. Standard­ i z e d t e s t s , it was h o p e d , w o u l d p r o v i d e t h e n o r m a t i v e l y and culturally neutral, o b j e c t i v e m e a s u r e s of individual technical or c o g n i t i v e cornpc-

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t e n c e . S t a n d a r d i z e d tests appear to c o m p l y w i t h t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s of m e r i t e v a l u a t i o n b e c a u s e t h e y are usually procedurally fair. T h e y are blind to race, sex, and e t h n i c i t y . T h e y are "objective" in t h e s e n s e that w h e n t h e y are u s e d to e v a l u a t e individuals w e can b e sure that all h a v e b e e n e v a l u a t e d a c c o r d i n g to t h e s a m e criteria, and in t h e s e n s e that for a g i v e n individual any scorer will c o m e u p w i t h t h e s a m e score. By q u a n ­ tifying test a n s w e r s and relying on c o m p l e x statistical t e c h n i q u e s , tests also a p p e a r a b l e to m e a s u r e individual skill p r e c i s e l y and to c o m p a r e and rank i n d i v i d u a l s , p r o v i d i n g an o b j e c t i v e a s s e s s m e n t of t h e m o s t and least qualified. After W o r l d War II, and d u r i n g t h e 1950s and 1960s, e m p l o y e r s i n ­ c r e a s i n g l y r e l i e d o n s t a n d a r d i z e d tests as v e h i c l e s for awarding positions, p r o m o t i o n s , pay i n c r e a s e s , and so on. T h e y a p p e a r e d to d o so o n t h e faith that t h e tests told t h e m w h o c o u l d d o t h e b e s t j o b , for rarely d i d e m p l o y ­ ers perform a j o b analysis to d e t e r m i n e t h e p r e d i c t i v e validity of t h e tests, and rarely d i d t h e y h a v e empirical e v i d e n c e that t h e tests in fact i m p r o v e d their s e l e c t i o n p r o c e s s . Often t h e y u s e d g e n e r a l i z e d i n t e l l i g e n c e or apti­ t u d e tests w i t h o u t m a k i n g any a t t e m p t to correlate t h e m w i t h actual j o b c o n t e n t (Wigdor, 1982). A s e r i e s of court c h a l l e n g e s c l a i m i n g that s u c h u s e of tests had t h e effect of e x c l u d i n g p e o p l e of color and s o m e t i m e s w o m e n l e d t h e E q u a l E m p l o y ­ m e n t O p p o r t u n i t y C o m m i s s i o n to specify that w h e n test u s e has a dispa­ rate i m p a c t on a g r o u p , e m p l o y e r s m u s t b e a b l e to p r o v e that t h e tests are fair and u n b i a s e d m e a s u r e s of job-specific skills. Most e m p l o y m e n t tests h a v e b e e n u n a b l e to m e e t such stringent g u i d e l i n e s (Fallon, 1980; W i g dor, 1982). C o n s e q u e n t l y , m a n y e m p l o y e r s today rely on tests a great deal less than before. E m p l o y e r tests that r e m a i n , h o w e v e r , for t h e m o s t part still a p p e a r to b e d e v e l o p e d and u s e d w i t h o u t specific relation to actual j o b c o n t e n t ( F r i e d m a n and W i l l i a m s , 1982). M a n y e m p l o y e r s c o n t i n u e to u s e "broad-band" tests that c o v e r m a n y g e n e r a l i z e d skills. T h e federal g o v e r n m e n t , for e x a m p l e , u s e s t h e s a m e test for all its d i v e r s e civil s e r v i c e p o s i t i o n s ( F r i e d m a n and W i l l i a m s , 1982). If w e c a n n o t obtain n o r m a t i v e l y and culturally neutral a s s e s s m e n t s of i n d i v i d u a l p e r f o r m a n c e , t h e n it is not surprising that e m p l o y e r s are u s u ­ ally u n a b l e to s h o w that tests are j o b specific. If o n e cannot m e a s u r e per­ f o r m a n c e o n t h e j o b , m o r e o v e r , t h e n it s h o u l d b e e v e n m o r e difficult to d e v e l o p d e m o n s t r a t e d p r e d i c t o r s of s u c h p e r f o r m a n c e . In t h e last t w o d e c a d e s u s e of standardized tests for certification pur­ p o s e s and in t h e e d u c a t i o n a l s y s t e m has i n c r e a s e d . S i n c e t h e late 1960s t h e claim of s t a n d a r d i z e d tests to n o r m a t i v e and cultural neutrality has b e e n s e r i o u s l y c h a l l e n g e d . After t w o d e c a d e s of d e b a t e , e x p e r t s s e e m to a g r e e that t h e original h o p e for o b j e c t i v e m e a s u r e s of technical and c o g n i ­ tive c o m p e t e n c e i n d e p e n d e n t of and neutral w i t h r e s p e c t to v a l u e s ,

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n o r m s , and c u l t u r e c a n n o t b e s u s t a i n e d . Standardized tests i n e v i t a b l y re­ flect v a l u e c h o i c e s and cultural m e a n i n g s (VVigdor, 1982; S h e p a r d , 1982; T i t t l e , 1982). For o n e thing, tests t h e m s e l v e s h a v e a culture. T e s t s reward certain p e r s o n a l or cultural styles, such as c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s , t h e ability to work w e l l a l o n e , t h e ability to work quickly, and a p e n c h a n t for abstraction ( W i g d o r and Garner, 1982, p p . 4 0 , 2 0 9 - 1 0 ) . W h a t e v e r t h e skills a test is i n t e n d e d to m e a s u r e , test takers with t h e s e test-taking skills and t e m p e r a ­ m e n t h a v e an a d v a n t a g e . W h a t e v e r t h e i r specific c o n t e n t or p u r p o s e , m o s t tests draw on a rela­ t i v e l y r e s t r i c t e d s e t of a p t i t u d e s and skills, notably c o m p u t a t i o n , d e d u c ­ t i v e i n f e r e n c e , and analogical reasoning. M a n y of t h e skills and a c h i e v e ­ m e n t s that c o n t r i b u t e to t h e ability to learn and perform c o m p l i c a t e d j o b s are s i m p l y not a m e n a b l e to packaging in short q u e s t i o n s with y e s - o r - n o a n s w e r s ( W i g d o r and Garner, 1982, p p . 2 0 9 - 1 1 ; Strenio, 1 9 8 1 , p p . 1 8 9 91). T h e p r o c e s s of test formulation thus reflects a d e facto greater valua­ tion of t h e skills t h e t e s t s can identify o v e r t h o s e t h e y cannot. E m p l o y e r s and school officials h a v e put so m u c h w e i g h t o n tests b e ­ c a u s e t h e y s e e m to offer a m e a n s of satisfying t w o of t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s of m e r i t e v a l u a t i o n i d e n t i f i e d in t h e p r e v i o u s s e c t i o n — a p r e c i s e m e a s u r e of t h e c o m p e t e n c e of e a c h individual, and a c o m p a r i s o n and ranking of all i n d i v i d u a l s . T e s t s appear to satisfy t h e merit principle's d e m a n d that per­ s o n s b e r e w a r d e d a c c o r d i n g to their o w n individual a c h i e v e m e n t . B e c a u s e t h e y are u n i v e r s a l i z e d and standardized, h o w e v e r , t h e individuality of test results is illusory. T h r o u g h t h e p r o c e s s that F o u c a u l t calls normaliza­ tion, t e s t s p r o d u c e t h e r e c o n s t i t u t e d individuality of a "case" or "score": The examination combines the techniques of an observing hierarchy and those of a normalizing judgment. It is a normalizing gaze, a surveillance that makes it possible to quantify, to classify and to punish. It establishes over individuals a visibility through which one differentiates them and judges them. That is why, in all the mechanisms of discipline, the examination is highly ritualized. In it arc combined the ceremony of power and the form of the experiment, the deploy­ ment of force and the establishment of truth. At the heart of the procedure of discipline, it manifests the subjection of those who are perceived as objects and the objectification of those who are subjected. (Foucault, 1977, pp. 184-85) T h e n o r m a l i z i n g s y s t e m of standardized tests r e c o n s t i t u t e s individual qualities as i n s t a n c e s of abstractly and universally d e f i n e d attributes (cf. L e v o n t i n , R o s e , and K a m i n , 1 9 8 4 , p p . 9 2 - 9 3 ) . This n o r m a l i z i n g p r o c e s s of r e d u c i n g all i n d i v i d u a l s to a c o m m o n m e a s u r e necessarily reconstructs difference as d e v i a n c e or d e v a l u a t i o n . W h a t in p r e t e s t e d particularity is s i m p l y a d i f f e r e n c e in kind of skill or t h e m o d e of its e x p r e s s i o n b e c o m e s t h e p r e s e n c e of m o r e or less skill w h e n its m e a s u r e m e n t is s t a n d a r d i z e d

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a c c o r d i n g to a s i n g l e criterion and scale. S i n c e t h e n o r m a l i z i n g m e a s u r e s h a v e m o s t often b e e n c o n s t r u c t e d b y w h i t e m i d d l e - c l a s s m e n u n c o n ­ s c i o u s l y o p e r a t i n g w i t h w h i t e m a l e m i d d l e - c l a s s styles and m e a n i n g s as t h e n o r m , t h e skills and c o m p e t e n c e s of w o m e n , Blacks, Latinos, and poor and w o r k i n g - c l a s s p e o p l e often s h o w u p as lower. T h e r e is little d o u b t that m a n y tests have e x h i b i t e d and c o n t i n u e to e x h i b i t results differentiated by class, race, g e n d e r , or all t h r e e (Strenio, 1 9 8 1 , p p . 9, 3 7 - 3 8 ; W i g d o r and Garner, 1982, p p . 1 9 5 - 9 6 ; S h e p a r d , 1982). A r e c e n t court c a s e in N e w York State, for e x a m p l e , found that w h e n R e g e n t s scholarships are d i s t r i b u t e d solely according to SAT s c o r e s , f e m a l e s r e c e i v e a significantly l o w e r proportion than w h e n g r a d e s are u s e d as w e l l . In r e s p o n s e to criticism that standardized tests h a v e b e e n b i a s e d against s o m e g r o u p s , test theorists and d e v e l o p e r s h a v e a t t e m p t e d to arrive at m e t h o d s of e l i m i n a t i n g bias. This research has y i e l d e d i m p o r ­ tant and refined m e t h o d s for identifying t h e p r e s e n c e of test bias, b u t r e s e a r c h e r s h a v e c o n c l u d e d that t h e r e is n o technical m e t h o d for p r e v e n t ­ ing bias and for e n s u r i n g that a test is fair to all takers. Test d e v e l o p m e n t i n e v i t a b l y e m p l o y s w o r d s , p h r a s e s , and s y m b o l s w h o s e m e a n i n g m a y b e u n d e r s t o o d in culturally varying w a y s . Test formulation i n v o l v e s a multi­ t u d e o f j u d g m e n t s and c h o i c e s , any o n e of w h i c h can h a v e culturally s p e ­ cific i m p l i c a t i o n s . S t u d e n t s of test bias a p p e a r to c o n c l u d e that test makers and users m u s t r e c o g n i z e t h e i n e v i t a b l e n o r m a t i v e and c u l t u r e specificity of s t a n d a r i z e d t e s t s ( S h e p a r d , 1982). N o r m s , v a l u e s , and p u r p o s e s i n f l u e n c e d e c i s i o n s about test c o n t e n t , format, t h e w e i g h t i n g of i t e m s and s e c t i o n s , statistical m e t h o d s u s e d for scoring, a n d so o n . I a r g u e in t h e next s e c t i o n that this d o e s not necessarily i m p l y that t e s t s are bad m e t h o d s of evaluation. T h e important point is that s t a n d a r d i z e d t e s t s c a n n o t b e said to p r o v i d e p r e c i s e quantitative individ­ ual m e a s u r e s o f t e c h n i c a l or c o g n i t i v e c o m p e t e n c e i n d e p e n d e n t of and neutral w i t h r e s p e c t to v a l u e s and culture.

T H E POLITICS O F QUALIFICATIONS

M e r i t d i s t r i b u t i o n of positions of reward and p r i v i l e g e can l e g i t i m a t e a social hierarchy o n l y if criteria for d e t e r m i n i n g p e o p l e ' s qualifications as­ s e s s t h e i r skills and c o m p e t e n c e s and not w h e t h e r t h e y b e l o n g to a certain g r o u p , b e h a v e in certain w a y s , or conform to t h e evaluator's p r e f e r e n c e s and p u r p o s e s . I have a r g u e d , h o w e v e r , that in fact t h e criteria u s e d for e v a l u a t i n g and ranking individual qualifications are usually v a l u e - l a d e n , as w e l l as n o r m a t i v e l y and culturally specific. P r o m this a r g u m e n t I draw t h e c o n c l u s i o n that practices of certifying p e o p l e ' s qualifications, and ranking t h o s e qualifications, are always politi­ cal (cf. W a l z e r , 1983, p p . 1 4 0 - 4 3 ) . As I d e f i n e d t h e term in t h e I n t r o d u c -

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tion, all a s p e c t s of institutional structure, p u b l i c action, social practices and habits, and cultural m e a n i n g s are political insofar as t h e y are p o t e n ­ tially s u b j e c t to c o l l e c t i v e d i s c u s s i o n and d e c i s i o n m a k i n g . T h e rules and p o l i c i e s of any institution s e r v e particular e n d s , e m b o d y particular v a l u e s a n d m e a n i n g s , and h a v e identifiable c o n s e q u e n c e s for t h e actions a n d sit­ uation of t h e p e r s o n s w i t h i n or r e l a t e d to t h o s e institutions. All of t h e s e t h i n g s are o p e n to c h a l l e n g e , and politics is t h e p r o c e s s of s t r u g g l e and d e l i b e r a t i o n about s u c h rules and p o l i c i e s , t h e e n d s t h e y s e r v e , and t h e v a l u e s t h e y e m b o d y . T h e i d e o l o g y of m e r i t s e e k s to d e p o l i t i c i z e t h e e s t a b ­ l i s h m e n t of criteria and standards for allocating positions and a w a r d i n g b e n e f i t s . C o n t r o v e r s y about s c h o o l i n g , c r e d e n t i a l s , t e s t s , and a d m i s s i o n s and e m p l o y m e n t p o l i c i e s s h o u l d b e sufficient to s h o w that this d e p o l i t i c i z i n g effort fails. E s p e c i a l l y in a s o c i e t y w h e r e m o s t p e o p l e d e p e n d o n c o l l e c t i v e institutions to p r o v i d e t h e m w i t h work and l i v e l i h o o d , t h e rules and p o l i c i e s that d e t e r m i n e and apply qualifications are i n e v i t a b l y politi­ cal. O n c e w e u n d e r s t a n d merit evaluation as political, t h e n i m p o r t a n t q u e s t i o n s of j u s t i c e arise b e y o n d distribution, q u e s t i o n s about w h o s h o u l d d e c i d e on qualifications and b y w h a t n o r m s and principles. Affirmative action and equal o p p o r t u n i t y discussion rarely q u e s t i o n t h e j u s t i c e of c u r r e n t p r a c t i c e s in our s o c i e t y w h i c h m a n d a t e that m a n a g e r s , administrators, social scientific e x p e r t s , and t h o s e w h o "lead t h e field" in p r o f e s s i o n s s h o u l d d e t e r m i n e criteria of qualification and w h o is qualified. A n d t h e p o w e r of t h e qualification makers is a w e s o m e : t h e y d e c i d e t h e fate of all t h e less p o w e r f u l w h o d o not m a k e t h o s e d e c i s i o n s , as w e l l as t h e fate of t h e i r professional c o l l e a g u e s . Professions are s e l f - c r e d e n t i a l i n g o n g r o u n d s o f e x p e r t i s e . A c c o r d i n g to t h e i d e o l o g y o f merit, tfie "best d o c ­ tors s h o u l d d e c i d e w h a t c o u n t s as g o o d d o c t o r i n g and w h o m e e t s t h o s e standards, b e c a u s e t h e y a b o v e all o t h e r s h a v e t h e technical c o m p e t e n c e to d e f i n e a n d identify g o o d p e r f o r m a n c e . B e c a u s e of their e x p e r t i s e manag­ ers and administrators s h o u l d d e c i d e t h e qualifications for e n t r y i n t o and a d v a n c e m e n t in t h e hierarchy of j o b s u n d e r t h e i r jurisdiction. B o s s e s le­ g i t i m a t e l y m a k e criteria and s e l e c t i o n d e c i s i o n s b e c a u s e their h a v i n g at­ tained t h e i r p o s i t i o n s d e m o n s t r a t e s their c o m p e t e n c e to m a n a g e . Safe­ guards m u s t b e p u t o n t h e b o s s e s , h o w e v e r , to p r e v e n t their personal p r e j u d i c e s and p r e f e r e n c e s from influencing their d e c i s i o n s , and for this reason b o s s e s s h o u l d c o n s u l t w i t h appropriate experts in t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of criteria and t h e i r application to individuals. T h e s e experts are t h e s c i e n ­ tists w i t h t h e k n o w - h o w to d e v e l o p o b j e c t i v e , impartial, and s t a n d a r d i z e d criteria for m e a s u r i n g p e r f o r m a n c e and potential p e r f o r m a n c e . This situa­ tion illustrates t h e claim I m a d e in C h a p t e r 4 that t h e ideal of impartiality l e g i t i m a t e s hierarchy. T h e a l l e g e d scientificity of merit evaluation s u p p o s ­ e d l y justifies a hierarchical d e c i s i o n m a k i n g p r o c e s s ; k n o w l e d g e justifies power.

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This justification of hierarchical d e c i s o n m a k i n g p o w e r is p r o b l e m a t i c . If cultural and n o r m a t i v e criteria differentiate individuals m o r e than o b j e c ­ t i v e l y m e a s u r e d c o m p e t e n c e , t h e n their status d e p e n d s on their p l e a s i n g their e v a l u a t o r s , on m a n a g i n g i m p r e s s i o n s (cf. K. F e r g u s o n , 1984, p p . 1 0 6 - 8 ) . T h e organization and its m a n a g e r s take as a primary goal t h e af­ firmation and r e p r o d u c t i o n of t h e organization's social relations and sys­ t e m of p o w e r . That is, t h e s y s t e m of p e r f o r m a n c e evaluation w i t h i n such a hierarchy s u p p o r t s and r e p r o d u c e s relations of d o m i n a t i o n (Offe, 1976, p p . 9 5 - 1 2 5 ; C o l l i n s , 1 9 7 9 , chap. 2). In p r i n c i p l e this hierarchy and s y s t e m of d o m i n a t i o n is little different from t h e traditional status hierarchies that application of a m e r i t principle was s u p p o s e d to e l i m i n a t e . A class of powerful p e o p l e e s t a b l i s h e s norma­ tive criteria, s o m e of w h i c h h a v e t h e function of affirming its o w n p o w e r and reinforcing t h e organizational s y s t e m that m a k e s it p o s s i b l e . To oc­ c u p y p o s i t i o n s w i t h i n t h e hierarchy t h e y c h o o s e p e r s o n s w h o h a v e certain status c r e d e n t i a l s (instead of corning from t h e "right" family, t h e y w e n t to t h e "right" school), and p e r s o n s w h o b y nature or training exhibit t h e p r e f e r r e d behavioral and t e m p e r a m e n t a l characteristics. In contrast to t h e merit i d e o l o g y , I claim that d e c i s i o n s that establish and apply criteria of qualification s h o u l d b e m a d e democratically. In C h a p t e r 3 I a r g u e d that d e m o c r a t i c d e c i s i o n m a k i n g p r o c e d u r e s are a n e c ­ e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n of social j u s t i c e , b o t h as a m e a n s to s c l f - d c v c l o p m e n t and t h e m i n i m i z a t i o n of d o m i n a t i o n and as t h e b e s t w a y to arrive at substan­ t i v e l y just d e c i s i o n s . S i n c e t h e filling of j o b s and offices f u n d a m e n t a l l y affects t h e fate of individuals and s o c i e t i e s , d e m o c r a t i c d e c i s i o n m a k i n g a b o u t t h e s e matters is a crucial c o n d i t i o n o f social justice. In C h a p t e r 3 I also a c k n o w l e d g e d that d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e d u r e s alone are often insufficient to e n s u r e just d e c i s i o n s ; thus d e m o c r a c y m u s t b e consti­ tutional, l i m i t e d b y rules that define basic rights and n o r m s . Democraticd e c i s i o n s about criteria for j o b qualifications and about w h o is qualified s h o u l d b e l i m i t e d b y fairness. As I u n d e r s t a n d it, fairness in such d e c i s i o n s i n c l u d e s t h e following: (1) Criteria for qualifications s h o u l d b e explicit and p u b l i c , a l o n g w i t h t h e v a l u e s and p u r p o s e s t h e y s e r v e . (2) Criteria s h o u l d n o t e x c l u d e any social g r o u p s from c o n s i d e r a t i o n for p o s i t i o n s , e i t h e r e x ­ plicitly or implicitly. (3) All c a n d i d a t e s for positions s h o u l d b e g i v e n thor­ o u g h c o n s i d e r a t i o n , a c c o r d i n g to formal p r o c e d u r e s w h i c h are p u b l i c l y a n n o u n c e d . (4) P e o p l e w i t h particular g r o u p affinities, social p o s i t i o n s , or personal attributes m a y b e preferred, but o n l y to u n d e r m i n e o p p r e s s i o n or c o m p e n s a t e for d i s a d v a n t a g e , and n e v e r to reinforce p r i v i l e g e . Just w h o s h o u l d b e i n c l u d e d in t h e p u b l i c e n t i t l e d to d e l i b e r a t e about and d e t e r m i n e t h e criteria of qualification for particular positions m u s t vary w i t h t h e kind of p o s i t i o n . Later in this c h a p t e r I will a r g u e that all major w o r k p l a c e d e c i s i o n s s h o u l d b e m a d e democratically; in accord w i t h

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s u c h a p r i n c i p l e , c e r t a i n l y t h o s e w h o work in an institution s h o u l d partici­ p a t e in d e c i s i o n s about t h e criteria of qualification for positions a n d w h o is qualified. D o e s this m e a n that e v e r y e m p l o y e e in a multinational corpor­ ation m u s t participate in w r i t i n g t h e j o b d e s c r i p t i o n and m a k i n g t h e hir­ ing d e c i s i o n s for e v e r y o t h e r e m p l o y e e in t h e corporation? O b v i o u s l y it c a n n o t m e a n this; p r i n c i p l e s and p r o c e d u r e s of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n m u s t b e w o r k e d out in this d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e s s as in all o t h e r s , and d e c i s i o n s of g e n e r a l policy are m o r e important than particular applications. It d o e s m e a n , h o w e v e r , that p e e r s and c o - w o r k e r s s h o u l d h a v e a significant v o i c e in d e t e r m i n i n g t h e criteria of qualification for t h e kinds of j o b s t h e y d o , a n d in d e c i d i n g w h o their p e e r s and c o - w o r k e r s will b e . A primary privi­ l e g e that n o w d i s t i n g u i s h e s professionals from nonprofessionals is that t h e f o r m e r often participate in t h e s e d e c i s i o n s , w h i l e t h e latter rarely d o so. E v e n m a n y professionals, h o w e v e r , d o not h a v e t h e right to d e t e r m i n e t h e qualifications their c o - w o r k e r s s h o u l d have; w h i l e their j o b m a y in­ c l u d e d e f i n i n g and e v a l u a t i n g t h e qualifications of their s u b o r d i n a t e s , their o w n qualifications and t h o s e of their p e e r s are d e f i n e d and e v a l u a t e d b y s u p e r i o r s . W h e r e relations of s u p e r o r d i n a t i o n and s u b o r d i n a t i o n re­ main in a d e m o c r a t i c w o r k p l a c e , s u b o r d i n a t e s s h o u l d also h a v e a v o i c e in d e t e r m i n i n g t h e qualifications their b o s s e s s h o u l d have. In m a n y situations c o - w o r k e r s are not t h e o n l y p e r s o n s w h o s h o u l d c o n ­ s t i t u t e t h e p u b l i c that d e c i d e s o n qualifications for hiring, p r o m o t i o n , and so forth. As I will d i s c u s s shortly, a d e m o c r a t i c w o r k p l a c e s h o u l d define its g e n e r a l j o b s t r u c t u r e and division of labor w i t h t h e r e p r e s e n t e d participa­ tion of all t h e w o r k e r s ; this definition w o u l d i n c l u d e at least g e n e r a l princi­ p l e s and g u i d e l i n e s for t h e qualifications o f e a c h kind o f position. W o r k e r s in t h e affected w o r k p l a c e , m o r e o v e r , are not always t h e o n l y p e r s o n s w h o s h o u l d h a v e a right to participate in defining qualifications for p o s i t i o n s . M i n i m i z i n g d o m i n a t i o n in such a way as to allow p e r s o n s to participate in d e c i s i o n s that affect their actions and t h e c o n d i t i o n s of their actions s o m e t i m e s m e a n s o t h e r s too s h o u l d h a v e a role in d e t e r m i n i n g qualifications. C o n s u m e r s or clients particularly affected b y t h e work p e r ­ f o r m e d in a p o s i t i o n s h o u l d also h a v e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . Parents of c h i l d r e n w h o a t t e n d a day-care c e n t e r , for e x a m p l e , or c o n s u m e r m e m b e r s of a h e a l t h m a i n t e n a n c e organization, s h o u l d h a v e a v o i c e in d e t e r m i n i n g t h e qualifications at least of t h o s e positions w i t h significant p o w e r , authority, or e x p e r t i s e . O c c u p a t i o n a l positions that i n v o l v e broad social p o w e r and authority, or significant control o v e r important k n o w l e d g e and e x p e r t i s e , m a y r e q u i r e that c i t i z e n s of t h e general c o m m u n i t y t h e y s e r v e and affect h a v e a r e p r e s e n t e d v o i c e in d e t e r m i n i n g t h e criteria for filling t h e m (cf. G r e e n , 1985, p p . 19.3-99; G o u l d , 1988, chap. 10). Finally, in a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e principle that all social groups in a soci­ e t y s h o u l d h a v e t h e o p p o r t u n i t y to participate in all institutions and posi-

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tions e q u a l l y , d e c i s i o n m a k i n g b o d i e s that d e t e r m i n e qualifications for p o s i t i o n s s h o u l d also i n c l u d e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of groups o p p r e s s e d or dis­ a d v a n t a g e d in t h e s o c i e t y at large, as w e l l as social groups that suffer o p ­ p r e s s i o n or d i s a d v a n t a g e w i t h i n t h e particular institution or profession in w h i c h t h e p o s i t i o n is d e f i n e d . H o w s h o u l d qualifications b e d e f i n e d ? D e m o c r a c y i m p l i e s that d e c i ­ s i o n m a k e r s can d e f i n e qualifications a n y w a y t h e y c h o o s e , w i t h i n t h e c o n ­ straints of fairness set out a b o v e , after serious d e l i b e r a t i o n and a r g u m e n t , a c c o r d i n g to w h a t e v e r v a l u e s and p u r p o s e s t h e y d e e m appropriate. T h e y m u s t , h o w e v e r , m a k e t h o s e v a l u e s and p u r p o s e s explicit, b o t h to t h e m ­ s e l v e s and o t h e r s , and b e a b l e to s h o w h o w t h e criteria t h e y arrive at p r o m o t e t h e m . T h e y m a y if t h e y c h o o s e d e v e l o p tests or o t h e r formalized e v a l u a t i o n p r o c e d u r e s for a s s e s s i n g and ranking t h e qualifications of per­ s o n s a c c o r d i n g to t h o s e criteria. P r e s u m a b l y in any division o f labor s o m e p o s i t i o n s will h a v e m o r e applicants than can b e a c c e p t e d . D e v e l o p i n g w a y s of ranking in o r d e r to e l i m i n a t e s o m e applicants is not w r o n g , as l o n g as t h e v a l u e s and p u r p o s e s of t h e criteria are explicit, and always o p e n to c h a l l e n g e and r e v i s i o n . R e p r e s e n t a t i o n of g r o u p s w h o e x p e r i e n c e cultural i m p e r i a l i s m is crucial b o t h in e s t a b l i s h i n g j o b goals and in e s t a b l i s h i n g e v a l u a t i o n p r o c e d u r e s , h o w e v e r , to e n s u r e that their particular experi­ e n c e s , c u l t u r e , and v a l u e s are not e x c l u d e d or d i s a d v a n t a g e d . If n o nor­ m a t i v e l y and culturally neutral criteria for a s s e s s i n g qualifications exist, s u c h social g r o u p r e p r e s e n t a t i o n is t h e only m e a n s of m a k i n g e v a l u a t i o n fair, b e c a u s e it b a l a n c e s v a l u e s , priorities, and k n o w l e d g e .

O P P R E S S I O N A N D T H E SOCIAL DIVISION OF LABOR

J o h n L i v i n g s t o n (1979, p p . 1 2 2 - 2 4 ) argues that in t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y t h e d o c t r i n e of e q u a l o p p o r t u n i t y had a m o r e radical and d e m o c r a t i c m e a n i n g than it d o e s now. T h e n it m e a n t that t h e r e w e r e n o barriers to material and social i m p r o v e m e n t to t h o s e w h o w o u l d work hard and d e ­ v e l o p t h e i r skills. E q u a l o p p o r t u n i t y m e a n t e v e r y b o d y w h o w o r k e d hard c o u l d b e s o m e b o d y . H o m e s t e a d and e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l o p p o r t u n i t i e s at t h e t i m e m a d e t h e claim p l a u s i b l e , at least for w h i t e m e n . Social m o b i l i t y w a s not so e a s y as t h e Horatio A l g e r m y t h portrayed it, but t h e r e w e r e multi­ p l e a v e n u e s for social a d v a n c e m e n t or at least for e s t a b l i s h i n g a comforta­ b l e living. Today t h e r e are f e w s u c h tracks of mobility, and h o p p i n g o n t o t h e train has b e c o m e m u c h m o r e difficult. W h e n t h e vast majority of p e o p l e must look to w a g e or salary e m p l o y m e n t to obtain a l i v e l i h o o d , g e t t i n g ahead m e a n s g e t t i n g a h i g h - s t a t u s j o b , and m o v i n g u p a bureaucratically defined c a r e e r ladder. Today e q u a l o p p o r t u n i t y has c o m e to m e a n o n l y that n o o n e is barred from e n t e r i n g t h e c o m p e t i t i o n for a relatively f e w p r i v i l e g e d

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p o s i t i o n s . T h e r e r e m a i n s t h e s h a d o w o f a rhetoric w h i c h s u g g e s t s that actual o p p o r t u n i t i e s are available to a n y o n e w h o works hard, but it d o e s not fully o b s c u r e t h e certainty that m o s t p e o p l e are b o u n d to b e losers. For t h e c o m p e t i t i o n is g e t t i n g stiffer. A c c o r d i n g to W a g m a n and F o l b r e (1988), t h e p r o p o r t i o n o f professional and managerial j o b s in t h e total labor force has r e m a i n e d stable at about 3 0 p e r c e n t d u r i n g t h e last t e n y e a r s . D u r i n g t h e s a m e p e r i o d l e v e l s of e d u c a t i o n h a v e risen, t h u s in­ c r e a s i n g t h e c o m p e t i t i o n for t h e s e j o b s . C u r r e n t social t r e n d s , m o r e o v e r , indicate a d e c l i n e in t h e n u m b e r of l o w - l e v e l professional and high-skilled n o n p r o f e s s i o n a l j o b s . Increasingly, j o b structure in t h e U n i t e d States is d i v i d e d b e t w e e n p r e s t i g e positions for w h i c h certification is difficult and costly to a c q u i r e , and a vast array of low-skill, l o w - w a g e , l o w - m o b i l i t y p o s i t i o n s that carry little a u t o n o m y and creativity (see Bastian et al., 1986, pp. 52-55). A s s u m i n g a division b e t w e e n scarce highly r e w a r d e d p o s i t i o n s and m o r e plentiful less d e s i r a b l e p o s i t i o n s as g i v e n , t h e merit p r i n c i p l e asserts that this division of labor is just w h e n n o g r o u p r e c e i v e s p r i v i l e g e d posi­ tions by birth or right, b u t t h e s e p o s i t i o n s are instead a w a r d e d a c c o r d i n g to d e m o n s t r a t e d individual a c h i e v e m e n t of technical c o m p e t e n c e m e a ­ s u r e d by n o r m a t i v e l y and culturally neutral criteria. If, as I h a v e a r g u e d , t h e s e p o s i t i o n s are not and cannot b e a w a r d e d in this way, t h e n t h e legiti­ m a c y of a hierarchical division of labor in a society c o m m i t t e d to t h e e q u a l moral w o r t h of all p e r s o n s c o m e s seriously into q u e s t i o n . D i s c u s s i o n s of equal o p p o r t u n i t y and affirmative action t e n d to p r e ­ s u m e as a social g i v e n this hierarchical division of labor in w h i c h relatively f e w are w i n n e r s and m o s t are losers ( s e e , e . g . , Sher, 1988, p. 117). As w e saw earlier, t h e s e d i s c u s s i o n s usually a s s u m e a distributive p a r a d i g m of j u s t i c e . T h e y ask w h a t principles are appropriate for e n s u r i n g fairness in t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of p o s i t i o n s , w h e r e t h e nature of t h e positions and t h e i r relation to o n e a n o t h e r is already g i v e n . A m o r e radical approach is to ask about t h e j u s t i c e of this division of labor itself. Is a division of labor w i t h scarce d e s i r a b l e p o s i t i o n s and m o r e plentiful positions of little reward it­ self j u s t ? H o w s h o u l d tasks and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s b e defined in t h e social division o f labor, and h o w s h o u l d positions b e related to o n e a n o t h e r ? W h o s h o u l d d e c i d e t h e division of labor, and by what p r o c e d u r e s ? D e c i ­ sions a b o u t t h e s e q u e s t i o n s d e t e r m i n e a great deal about t h e distribution of g o o d s in a s o c i e t y . O n c e t h e division of labor is in place, e n f o r c e d and r e p r o d u c e d by authority and c r e d c n t i a l i n g , redistribution o f g o o d s d o e s not a p p r e c i a b l y alter t h e p r o c e s s that p r o d u c e s that distributive pattern. M o s t s o c i e t i e s in t h e w o r l d today h a v e a hierarchical division of labor that d i s t i n g u i s h e s b e t w e e n professional and nonprofessional work, or work that is task d e f i n i n g and work that is task e x e c u t i n g . This division is unjust, I shall a r g u e , b e c a u s e it i n v o l v e s b o t h d o m i n a t i o n and o p p r e s s i o n .

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First, h o w e v e r , I shall n o t e a s p e c t s of t h e division of labor that 1 am not h e r e criticizing, w h i c h m o s t d i s c u s s i o n s of inequality in t h e w o r k p l a c e t e n d to focus o n . First, I am not criticizing specialization as such. By s p e ­ cialization I m e a n t h e d e v e l o p m e n t and consolidation of particular t e c h n i ­ cal, artisan, social, or organizational skills for t h e a c c o m p l i s h i n g of special­ ized e n d s , and t h e allocation of s u c h s p e c i a l i z e d work to p e r s o n s trained in t h o s e skills. Specialization in this s e n s e usually has distinct a d v a n t a g e s b o t h for a c c o m p l i s h i n g c o l l e c t i v e e n d s and for t h e individuals w h o d e ­ v e l o p their capacities and e x e r c i s e t h e s e skills. M y a r g u m e n t is not against a horizontal division of labor, b u t against a hierarchical division. But I w i s h to d i s t i n g u i s h t h e specialization of tasks from t h e d e t a i l e d division of labor typical of m o d e r n factory p r o d u c t i o n . T h e latter c r e a t e s m i n u t e and r e p e t i t i v e mini-tasks that r e q u i r e little or n o skill, that are not visibly tied to a practical o u t c o m e , that are easily m o n i t o r e d and a u t o m a t e d , and that d o not usually e n h a n c e a person's g e n e r a l skills and capacities. I d o w i s h to criticize this d e t a i l e d division of labor. S e c o n d , m y criticism d o e s not e x t e n d to all hierarchies of authority in t h e w o r k p l a c e . Often t h e r e are g o o d reasons for e s t a b l i s h i n g s u p e r v i s o r y and l e a d e r s h i p roles in a c o l l e c t i v e e n d e a v o r , and for c o o r d i n a t i n g largescale o p e r a t i o n s t h r o u g h a chain of authority. M y d i s c u s s i o n i m p l i e s that t h e r e s h o u l d b e u p p e r and l o w e r limits to such authority, but I d o not w i s h to claim that all s u p e r v i s o r y and hierarchical d e c i s i o n m a k i n g structures are w r o n g . Finally, I am not arguing against differential pay. Justice d o e s not re­ q u i r e e q u a l i n c o m e for all workers, and t h e r e are often g o o d reasons for p a y i n g different w o r k e r s and different o c c u p a t i o n s differently. As m a n y p e o p l e h a v e d i s c u s s e d , t h e s e reasons i n c l u d e rewarding hard work and extra effort, c o m p e n s a t i n g t h e sacrifice that m a y b e i n v o l v e d in acquiring s p e c i a l i z e d skills, p r o v i d i n g i n c e n t i v e s to perform o t h e r w i s e less desirable w o r k , and r e w a r d i n g b e t t e r than a v e r a g e productivity. I b e l i e v e that t h e h u g e i n c o m e differentials typical in A m e r i c a n s o c i e t y , e s p e c i a l l y insofar as t h e y are t i e d to t h e structural division b e t w e e n task-defining and taske x e c u t i n g work, are w r o n g . But m y a r g u m e n t about t h e injustice of this structural division of labor d o e s not i m p l y a n y t h i n g about differential pay per se. T h e division w i t h w h i c h I am c o n c e r n e d is that b e t w e e n , in Philip G r e e n ' s w o r d s , "those w h o plan their o w n or other's work r o u t i n e s , h o w ­ e v e r carried out; and t h o s e w h o follow r o u t i n e s that h a v e b e e n p l a n n e d for t h e m " ( G r e e n , 1985, p. 81). R o b e r t o U n g c r calls this a distinction b e ­ t w e e n task definition and task e x e c u t i o n , " b e t w e e n t h e j o b s that allow for t h e o p e n e x e r c i s e of r e c o n s t r u c t i v e practical i n t e l l i g e n c e and t h e j o b s that are s u p p o s e d to i n v o l v e t h e routinized e x e r c i s e of a w e l l d e f i n e d task play­ ing a l i m i t e d role in a plan that practical i n t e l l i g e n c e has d e v i s e d " (Unger,

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1 9 8 7 b , p. 76). In m a n y e n t e r p r i s e s t h e division of labor is so c o n s t r u c t e d that s o m e p o s i t i o n s are both t h e s e in different r e s p e c t s , w h i l e s o m e are o n l y o n e or t h e other. T h e justification for this division b e t w e e n task definition and task e x e c u t i o n is that t h e task d e s i g n e r s have an e x p e r t i s e that e q u i p s t h e m to d e s i g n and organize. To a significant d e g r e e , t h e n , t h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n task d e s i g n and task e x e c u t i o n c o r r e s p o n d s to t h e di­ v i s i o n b e t w e e n professional and nonprofessional workers. In m u c h of t h e d i s c u s s i o n that follows I will refer to t h e t w o kinds of divisions inter­ c h a n g e a b l y , but I will also indicate w a y s in w h i c h professional workers s o m e t i m e s t e n d to fall o n t h e t a s k - e x e c u t i o n side of t h e division. T h e division b e t w e e n professional and nonprofessional w o r k e r s is a basic class division in a d v a n c e d industrial s o c i e t i e s . To b e sure, m o s t pro­ fessional and managerial workers in capitalist s o c i e t y d o not b e l o n g to t h e capitalist class, t h e major o w n e r s of t h e m e a n s of p r o d u c t i o n . M o s t profes­ sional and managerial w o r k e r s are salaried e m p l o y e e s , and to s o m e e x t e n t for that reason e x p e r i e n c e t h e s a m e structural exploitation as t h e w o r k i n g class and a similar d e p e n d e n c e o n t h e o w n e r s ' p l e a s u r e for a c o n t i n u e d l i v e l i h o o d . O w n e r s h i p of capital, h o w e v e r , is not t h e only important p r o p ­ erty right in o u r s o c i e t y . Professional and managerial workers h a v e a class p r i v i l e g e in t h e p r o p e r t y rights of position. C o n t r o l o v e r capital is o n l y a special c a s e of p r o p e r t y rights. M o r e broadly, p r o p e r t y s h o u l d b e u n d e r s t o o d as a cluster of e n t i t l e m e n t s that g i v e s p e o p l e social p o w e r , e i t h e r as "control o v e r t h e physical c o m m o d i ­ ties and t h e material p r o d u c t s of labor, c o m m a n d o v e r labor itself, [or] t h e p o w e r to d i s p o s e of n o n m a t e r i a l rights" ( U n g e r , 1 9 8 7 b , p. 131). Taskd e f i n i n g p o s i t i o n s t e n d to b e w h a t W a l z e r (1983, p p . 1 0 - 1 3 ) calls "domi­ nant" g o o d s ; t h e y bring w i t h t h e m e n t i t l e m e n t s to high i n c o m e , p r e s t i g e , a c c e s s to r e s o u r c e s , and authority o v e r and benefit from t h e labor of taskexecuting workers. T h o u g h t h e r e is a hierarchy of professions, t h e p r o p e r t i e d basis of t h e s e p o s i t i o n s r e m a i n s a crucial d e t e r m i n a n t of class division and class struggle in o u r s o c i e t y ; social conflict to a large d e g r e e c o n c e r n s access to t h e ex­ c l u s i v e professional positions that carry e n t i t l e m e n t s to g o o d s and social p o w e r (cf. C o l l i n s , 1979, p p . 5 3 - 5 4 ) . T h e division b e t w e e n professionals and n o n p r o f e s s i o n a l s s h o u l d b e c o n s i d e r e d a class division b e c a u s e of sev­ eral features that m a k e t h e division s y s t e m a t i c , a distinction of social g r o u p s r e p r o d u c e d o v e r t i m e . A major structural p r i v i l e g e of t h e profes­ sional class consists in r e g u l a t i n g e n t r a n c e to its ranks, t h e r e b y maintain­ ing e x c l u s i v i t y in its k n o w l e d g e and w a y of life. For t h e m o s t part t h e division b e t w e e n professionals and nonprofessionals is m a i n t a i n e d across g e n e r a t i o n s , w i t h t h e c h i l d r e n of professionals h a v i n g a distinct a d v a n t a g e in a d m i t t a n c e to t h e professional class. Professionals s h o u l d b e c o n s i d e r e d a s t r u c t u r e d class, finally, b e c a u s e "the mass of p e o p l e h a v e effectively

r e m o v e d from t h e possibility of any rational i n t e r v e n t i o n in t h e d e t e r m i ­ nation o f p o l i c i e s affecting t h e practices o f that class" ( G r e e n , 1985, p p . 8 3 - 8 4 ) . T h e division of labor b e t w e e n task division and task e x e c u t i o n e n a c t s d o m i n a t i o n ; as e x h i b i t e d in a social class division b e t w e e n profes­ sional and nonprofessional w o r k e r s , it e n a c t s o p p r e s s i o n m o s t particularly in t h e form of exploitation, p o w e r l e s s n e s s , and cultural i m p e r i a l i s m . D o m i n a t i o n , as I d e f i n e d it in C h a p t e r 1, consists in p e r s o n s having to p e r f o r m actions w h o s e rules and goals t h e y h a v e not participated in d e t e r ­ m i n i n g , u n d e r institutionalized c o n d i t i o n s t h e y h a v e not had a part in d e c i d i n g . In t h e typical hierarchically structured organization, m a n y e m ­ p l o y e e s h a v e little or n o part in d e c i d i n g their o w n responsibilities and t h e c o n s t r a i n t s o n their action, e v e n w h e n t h e y h a v e a role in d e c i d i n g t h e a c t i o n s o f o t h e r s . Prima facie, j u s t i c e i m p l i e s f r e e d o m , in t h e s e n s e of s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n , t h e ability of p e o p l e to d e c i d e w h a t t h e y will do and w h y . In c o l l e c t i v e activity s u c h f r e e d o m cannot b e a u t o n o m o u s and selfc o n t a i n e d , but rather i m p l i e s a right of participation in d e c i s i o n m a k i n g (see G o u l d , 1988, c h a p . 4; Young, 1979). O n e a s p e c t of t h e division b e t w e e n task definition and task e x e c u t i o n is t h e organizational t e n d e n c y to separate major d e c i s i o n m a k i n g p o w e r o v e r t h e o p e r a t i o n s of an e n t i r e e n t e r p r i s e from all t h e p e r s o n s and positions that carry o u t its e n d s . Organizations typically h a v e c e n t r a l i z e d p l a n n i n g o p e r a t i o n s run b y a relatively few individuals in top administrative and managerial p o s i t i o n s w h o d e c i d e w h a t will be p r o d u c e d or a c c o m p l i s h e d , h o w t h e organization's division of labor will b e structured to a c c o m p l i s h it, h o w t h e p r o d u c t i o n p r o c e s s will b e s t r u c t u r e d , and w h a t t h e pay scales and relations of superiority and s u b o r d i n a t i o n will b e a m o n g t h e p o s i t i o n s . Typically t h e s e basic task-defining d e c i s i o n s are e x e c u t e d in a d e s c e n d i n g chain of c o m m a n d in w h i c h those in t h e m i d d l e e x e c u t e t h e d e s i g n s of their s u p e r i o r s but also d e s i g n plans e x e c u t e d by their s u b o r d i n a t e s , and t h o s e at t h e b o t t o m o n l y e x e c u t e tasks d e s i g n e d by their s u p e r i o r s . Such a centralization of basic d e c i s i o n s and strict d e s c e n d i n g hierarchy of au­ thority m e a n s that all but t h o s e in t h e t o p positions are subject to varying degrees of domination. In C h a p t e r 2 I d e f i n e d exploitation broadly as any relationship in w h i c h t h e results of t h e e n e r g i e s of o n e group systematically benefit a n o t h e r w i t h o u t reciprocation. T h e division b e t w e e n professionals and nonprofes­ sionals e n a c t s exploitation in this s e n s e . P r e m o d e r n laboring c l a s s e s f r e e d aristocrats for t h e "higher" pursuits of art, priesthood, literature, and state­ craft b y p r o v i d i n g for all their material w a n t s and n e e d s . In a similar fash­ ion, today's w o r k i n g class a u g m e n t s t h e luxury and w o r k i n g c o n d i t i o n s o f professionals. T h e "material" work of n o n p r o f e s s i o n a l s — t a k i n g t h e tolls, c l e a n i n g t h e office, t y p i n g t h e reports, b u i l d i n g t h e p l a n e s — f r e e s t h e professionals and m a n a g e r s for t h e "higher" work of t h i n k i n g , d e s i g n -

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ing a n d calculating, talking to o n e a n o t h e r or to clients, making d e c i s i o n s , w r i t i n g r e p o r t s , p l a n n i n g , and c o o r d i n a t i n g and s u p e r v i s i n g c o m p l e x pro­ d u c t i v e activities. Professionals are usually t h e o n e s w h o directly benefit from t h e m e n i a l labor w h i c h , as I d i s c u s s e d in C h a p t e r 2, t e n d s to b e race- and g e n d e r - s p e c i f i c . This relationship of professionals to n o n p r o f e s ­ sionals is e x p l o i t a t i v e b e c a u s e t h e professionals usually g e t paid m o r e , get m o r e r e c o g n i t i o n , and h a v e greater p o w e r and authority, e v e n t h o u g h t h e work of s o m e n o n p r o f e s s i o n a l s directly e n a b l e s their work. Often t h e work of t h e n o n p r o f e s s i o n a l s is invisible, and its contribution to e n a b l i n g t h e w o r k of t h e professionals u n n o t i c e d . T h i s class division m a y also c o n t r i b u t e to t h e exploitation of n o n p r o f e s ­ sionals in t h e m o r e r e s t r i c t e d Marxist s e n s e of t h e appropriation of t h e v a l u e of w h a t t h o s e nonprofessional w o r k e r s p r o d u c e . I d o not h e r e w i s h to e n t e r t h e c o n t r o v e r s y about this Marxist t h e o r y of exploitation, a b o u t h o w o n e d i s t i n g u i s h e s p r o d u c t i v e from u n p r o d u c t i v e labor, and so o n . So I will o n l y s u g g e s t , w i t h o u t d e f e n d i n g t h e m , t w o sorts of claims o n e m i g h t m a k e a b o u t h o w t h e division b e t w e e n task definition and task e x e c u t i o n c o n t r i b u t e s to w o r k i n g - c l a s s e x p l o i t a t i o n . T h e j o b of m a n y professionals a n d m a n a g e r s is specifically to d e s i g n p r o d u c t i o n p r o c e s s e s and w o r k rela­ tions that will m a x i m i z e t h e productivity of nonprofessional w o r k e r s , in t h e narrow s e n s e o f i n c r e a s i n g profit (Poulantzas, 1978, p p . 2 3 6 - 4 1 ) . Re­ m o v i n g d e s i g n d e c i s i o n s and a u t o n o m y as m u c h as p o s s i b l e from t h e w o r k p r o c e s s , m a k i n g t h e latter o n l y t h e e x e c u t i o n of tasks d i r e c t e d by o t h e r s , c h e a p e n s labor, m a k e s it a m e n a b l e to a u t o m a t i o n , and t i g h t e n s control o v e r w o r k e r s — a l l of w h i c h c o n t r i b u t e to i n c r e a s e d exploitation. If o n e a c c e p t s t h e Marxist distinction b e t w e e n p r o d u c t i v e and u n p r o ­ d u c t i v e labor, m o r e o v e r , o n e can a r g u e that m u c h of t h e work of profes­ sionals and m a n a g e r s is not p r o d u c t i v e in t h e s e n s e of c o n t r i b u t i n g di­ rectly to n e w v a l u e in t h e e c o n o m y . G i v e n that professionals n e v e r t h e l e s s are paid m o r e than n o n p r o f e s s i o n a l s w h o s e work is p r o d u c t i v e in this nar­ row s e n s e , and r e c e i v e o t h e r material b e n e f i t s , o n e can a r g u e that their b e n e f i t s are t h e result of an appropriation of t h e surplus v a l u e p r o d u c e d by n o n p r o f e s s i o n a l s (cf. C o l l i n s , 1979, p p . 6 4 - 7 0 ) . D e f e n d i n g this claim entails criticizing t h e d o m i n a n t b e l i e f that professionals r e c e i v e greater b e n e f i t s than n o n p r o f e s s i o n a l s b e c a u s e t h e y c o n t r i b u t e m o r e to t h e social p r o d u c t . H i g h e r i n c o m e s are d u e to professionals social p o w e r and cul­ tural v a l u e , not usually to their social productivity. T h e i m p e r a t i v e to deskill labor associated w i t h t h e division b e t w e e n task-defining and t a s k - e x e c u t i n g w o r k p r o d u c e s t h e o p p r e s s i o n o f p o w e r ­ l e s s n e s s in m a n y w o r k e r s . As I e x p l i c a t e d it in C h a p t e r 2, p o w e r l e s s n e s s is t h e situation o f h a v i n g little or n o authority or a u t o n o m y in m o s t a s p e c t s of o n e ' s life, e s p e c i a l l y o n e ' s work. As a c o n c e p t , p o w e r l e s s n e s s o v e r l a p s w i t h d o m i n a t i o n , b u t is not c o e x t e n s i v e with it. All w h o d o not participate

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in d e c i d i n g t h e rules and c h o o s i n g t h e authorities that o r d e r their actions and t h e c o n d i t i o n s of t h e i r actions e x p e r i e n c e d o m i n a t i o n . This i n c l u d e s all w h o are p o w e r l e s s . M a n y w h o e x p e r i e n c e d o m i n a t i o n n e v e r t h e l e s s e x e r c i s e c o n s i d e r a b l e initiative, authority, and creativity in their work, and this is w h a t d i s t i n g u i s h e s t h e m from t h o s e subject to t h e o p p r e s s i o n of p o w e r l e s s n e s s . Work organization d i v i d e s a manufacturing or s e r v i c e activity into a "professional" a s p e c t , e x e r c i s i n g t h e technical k n o w l e d g e , creativity, and organizational skill n e e d e d for t h e activity, o n t h e o n e h a n d , and routin i z e d o p e r a t i o n s of e x e c u t i o n , o n t h e other. This deskilling p r o c e s s is n e ­ c e s s i t a t e d b y t h e goal of m e c h a n i z i n g work as m u c h as p o s s i b l e , in o r d e r to r e d u c e labor c o s t s , m a x i m i z e unit productivity, and m a k e m o n i t o r i n g of work p e r f o r m a n c e easier. O n e of t h e primary j o b s of task-defining organ­ izational professionals b e c o m e s figuring o u t h o w to structure t h e routin i z e d a u t o m a t e d w o r k u s i n g t h e f e w e s t w o r k e r s , in a d e t a i l e d division of u n s k i l l e d tasks (Braverman, 1 9 7 4 , c s p . pts. 1 and 2). As I p o i n t e d out earlier, o n l y t h e m o s t r o u t i n i z e d , m i n u t e , r e p e t i t i v e j o b s arc clearly s u b ­ j e c t to o b j e c t i v e , quantifiable, and n o r m a t i v e l y neutral m e a s u r e s of pro­ ductivity. This is b e c a u s e t h e skill, j u d g m e n t , and creativity t h e total tasks r e q u i r e h a v e b e e n r e m o v e d and located in a separate managerial function. J u s t i c e entails that all p e r s o n s h a v e t h e o p p o r t u n i t y to d e v e l o p and ex­ e r c i s e skills in socially r e c o g n i z e d settings. Performing a u t o m a t e d , routi­ n i z e d , and d e t a i l e d s p e c i a l i z e d tasks, h o w e v e r , d o e s not usually d e v e l o p a p e r s o n ' s capacity m u c h , and s o m e t i m e s d e a d e n s a m b i t i o n or t h e ability to d e v e l o p capacities. S o m e unskilled j o b s allow for m o b i l i t y into m o r e skilled j o b s . Often t h e m o r e c o m p l e x j o b r e q u i r e s special training, h o w ­ e v e r , and b u i l d s v e r y little on skills acquired in t h e p r e v i o u s j o b . I d o not w i s h to e x a g g e r a t e t h e p r e v a l e n c e of unskilled work a m o n g n o n p r o f e s s i o n ­ als; m a n y nonprofessional o c c u p a t i o n s i n v o l v e significant skill and room for d e v e l o p i n g e x c e l l e n c e . As I will discuss shortly, m u c h nonprofessional w o r k that d o e s i n v o l v e t h e d e v e l o p m e n t and e x e r c i s e of capacities is n e v ­ e r t h e l e s s d e v a l u e d b y cultural n o r m s that v a l u e o c c u p a t i o n s a c c o r d i n g to t h e d e g r e e that t h e y i n v o l v e abstract rationality r e m o v e d from practice. T h e structural division b e t w e c e n task-defining and t a s k - e x e c u t i n g work, m o r e o v e r , p u t s p r e s s u r e o n t h e s e skilled nonprofessional o c c u p a t i o n s to p r o f e s s i o n a l i z e — t h a t is, to formalize their skills, c r e a t e t e c h n i q u e s and t h e o r i e s for their d i s s e m i n a t i o n , d e v e l o p professional s c h o o l s of certifica­ tion, and separate off t h e s e technical aspects of t h e work from m o r e rou­ t i n e s u p p o r t tasks. T h e d e s k i l l i n g i m p e r a t i v e a i m s to increase t h e ratio of r o u t i n i z e d j o b s to t h e m o r e skilled, c r e a t i v e , and a u t o n o m o u s j o b s that c o m e to b e d e f i n e d as professional and r e s e r v e d for t h o s e w h o h a v e acquired c r e d e n t i a l s . I p o i n t e d o u t earlier that t h e j o b structure of A m e r i c a n s o c i e t y is increas­ i n g l y p o l a r i z e d b e t w e e n s u c h professional work and u n s k i l l e d , r o u t i n i z e d

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work. T h e c r e a t i o n of a h u g e class of unskilled, r o u t i n i z e d j o b s is unjust, b e c a u s e it c o n d e m n s a large portion of t h e p o p u l a t i o n to a situation in w h i c h t h e y c a n n o t d e v e l o p and e x e r c i s e their capacities. T h e s e low-skill j o b s t e n d to b e d e a d - e n d , offering no paths to a d v a n c e m e n t and j o b d e v e l ­ o p m e n t . M o b i l i t y from t h e nonprofessional to t h e professional class is nearly i m p o s s i b l e w i t h o u t costly and t i m e - c o n s u m i n g schooling. N o n p r o f e s s i o n a l s are also p o w e r l e s s in t h e s e n s e that t h e y are subordi­ n a t e s and e x e r c i s e little w o r k p l a c e a u t o n o m y and d e c i s i o n m a k i n g p o w e r . N o n p r o f e s s i o n a l s w h o e x e c u t e tasks d e s i g n e d by o t h e r s are s u b j e c t to d o m i n a t i o n by professionals and m a n a g e r s , w h o s e right to rule t h e m is l e g i t i m a t e d by t h e e x p e r t i s e t h e y are c l a i m e d to have (Poulantzas, 1978, p p . 2 4 0 - 4 2 ) . N o n p r o f e s s i o n a l w o r k e r s typically m u s t follow o r d e r s and h a v e little o p p o r t u n i t y to g i v e t h e m . T h e y m u s t d o t h e j o b s a s s i g n e d in t h e w a y t h e y arc a s s i g n e d , often at a p a c e r e g u l a t e d by superiors or m a c h i n e s . If t h e y find t h e j o b irrationally d e f i n e d t h e y usually h a v e little o p p o r t u ­ nity to c o m p l a i n or s u g g e s t c h a n g e s . As I d i s c u s s e d earlier, m a n y w o r k e r s h a v e c o n s i d e r a b l e d i s c r e t i o n about h o w and w h e t h e r to i n t e r v e n e to p r e ­ v e n t t h i n g s from g o i n g w r o n g , b u t t h e i r d e c i s i o n m a k i n g authority usually e x t e n d s o n l y to t h e details of their a s s i g n e d tasks. As e x e c u t i n g tasks d e ­ s i g n e d by o t h e r s , s u b j e c t to direct s u p e r v i s i o n and often p e r s o n a l d o m i n a ­ tion b y o t h e r s , n o n p r o f e s s i o n a l s daily m u s t c o m p o r t t h e m s e l v e s as o b e d i ­ e n t s u b o r d i n a t e s , a s t a n c e that usually d i m i n i s h e s a s e n s e of self. T h e division b e t w e e n professional and nonprofessional labor, finally, e n a c t s a cultural i m p e r i a l i s m that posits s o m e kinds of work as intrinsically s u p e r i o r to and m o r e v a l u a b l e than o t h e r s . T h r o u g h t h e operation of w h a t Alison Jaggar (1983, p p . 4 0 - 4 2 ) caffs "normative d u a l i s m , " work is v a l u e d a c c o r d i n g to a hierarchy that d i s t i n g u i s h e s " i n t e l l i g e n c e " from t h e b o d y . T h e d o m i n a n t c u l t u r e implicitly o p e r a t e s w i t h a narrow m e a n i n g of "intel­ l i g e n c e " as t h e e x e r c i s e of abstract calculative and verbal technical skills, in d i s c o u r s e and activities r e m o v e d from t h e c o n c r e t e n e s s of s e n s u o u s t h i n g s . P r o f e s s i o n a l i z i n g an activity m e a n s creating a theoretical disci­ p l i n e for t h e formal e x p r e s s i o n and rationalization of its p r o c e d u r e s . This rationalizing p r o c e s s abstracts from t h e e n g a g e d practice of t h e activity, and splits off t h e abstracted formal e l e m e n t s from t h e material e m b o d i e d elements. T h e n o r m s that m e a s u r e all work against t h e narrow standard of calcula­ tive and t e c h n i c a l rationality locate o c c u p a t i o n s o n a s i n g l e scale of intelli­ g e n c e . But d o e s it really take m o r e i n t e l l i g e n c e to b e a doctor than a librarian? To b e a sales r e p r e s e n t a t i v e than a p l u m b e r ? T h e cultural m e a n ­ ings of w o r k unjustly v i c t i m i z e s o m e p e o p l e b e c a u s e of t h e work t h e y c h o o s e or are tracked into, w h i l e t h e y reward o t h e r s e n t i r e l y out of pro­ portion to t h e i r c o n t r i b u t i o n to t h e social product. Playing w i t h , disciplin­ ing, and t e a c h i n g y o u n g c h i l d r e n w e l l certainly r e q u i r e s a s u b t l e intelli­ g e n c e , w h o s e characteristics are very different from t h o s e m a n i f e s t e d in

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s p e c u l a t i n g w e l l o n t h e stock market. F i g u r i n g o u t h o w to m o v e bulky furniture a r o u n d c o r n e r s and d o w n stairs w i t h o u t breaking, d e n t i n g , or s c r a t c h i n g a n y t h i n g often requires a d m i r a b l e i n g e n u i t y , b u t in forms rather different from t h o s e e x h i b i t e d in w r i t i n g c o m p u t e r p r o g r a m s . This cultural i m p e r i a l i s m e x t e n d s b e y o n d nonprofessionals to s o m e profes­ s i o n s . S o m e professions, w h i c h t e n d to b e d o m i n a t e d b y w o m e n , are c o n ­ s i d e r e d of l o w e r v a l u e b y t h e p r e v a i l i n g standard of i n t e l l i g e n c e ; their work is c o n s i d e r e d less "scientific," and t h e y are often s e e n as tied to t h e b o d y and n e e d : t e a c h i n g y o u n g c h i l d r e n , social work, nursing. T h e c u r r e n t hierarchical division of labor t e n d s to i g n o r e i n t e l l i g e n c e and skill that h a v e different and in s o m e w a y s i n c o m p a r a b l e forms. Intelli­ g e n c e t e s t s , and m o s t o t h e r standardized tests, p r e s u m e a narrow defini­ tion of i n t e l l i g e n c e as abstract rationality, r e d u c i n g all skills and c o g n i t i v e s t y l e s to a c o m m o n m e a s u r e that d e v a l u e s s o m e skills w h i c h m i g h t b y a n o t h e r m e a s u r e b e called s i m p l y different. Yet t h e naturalness of a s i n g l e scale for t h e a s s e s s m e n t of i n t e l l i g e n c e , and t h e hierarchical valuation of o c c u p a t i o n s it i m p l i e s , g o e s a l m o s t e n t i r e l y u n c h a l l e n g e d . As I d i s c u s s e d in C h a p t e r 5, this n o r m a t i v e hierarchy o f occupational i n t e l l i g e n c e c o n t a i n s a w h i t e m a l e bias. T h e work of abstract rationality is c o d e d as appropriate for w h i t e m e n , w h i l e work that i n v o l v e s caring for t h e b o d y or e m o t i o n s is c o d e d for w o m e n , and t h e "menial" work of s e r v i n g and b e i n g servile is c o d e d for n o n w h i t e s . In this w a y t h e cultural i m p e r i a l i s m s that s t r u c t u r e racism and s e x i s m m o d u l a t e w i t h a cultural i m p e r i a l i s m that s t r u c t u r e s class difference. Its injustice consists in ac­ c o r d i n g h i g h p r e s t i g e to s o m e work and l o w p r e s t i g e to o t h e r work. Pres­ t i g e , w h i c h is e n t i r e l y a cultural and s y m b o l i c construct, t h e n p e r m i t s differential material reward and p r i v i l e g e . T h e division b e t w e e n professionals and nonprofessionals l e a d s to a g e n ­ eral cultural valuation of s o m e kinds o f p e o p l e as " r e s p e c t a b l e " b e c a u s e of t h e kind of work t h e y d o , and o t h e r s as less r e s p e c t a b l e . T h e n e e d s , e x p e ­ r i e n c e , life s t y l e , and i n t e r e s t s of t h e class of r e s p e c t a b l e professionals c o m e to d o m i n a t e m a n y a s p e c t s of social life b e y o n d t h e w o r k p l a c e — i n ­ c l u d i n g social policy and m e d i a imagery. N e w s p a p e r s , t e l e v i s i o n , a d v e r ­ tising, p o p u l a r m a g a z i n e s and n o v e l s , far m o r e often d e p i c t t h e lives and p r o b l e m s of m i d d l e - c l a s s professionals than t h o s e of working-class n o n ­ professionals, r e n d e r i n g t h e p o w e r l e s s invisible and d e p r i v i n g t h e m of a cultural v o i c e .

T H E D E M O C R A T I C D I V I S I O N OF LABOR

F r o m t h e d i s c u s s i o n in t h e p r e v i o u s s e c t i o n I draw t h e c o n c l u s i o n that social j u s t i c e r e q u i r e s d e m o c r a c y in t h e w o r k p l a c e and an u n d e r m i n i n g o f t h e d i v i s i o n b e t w e e n task definition and task e x e c u t i o n . T h e r e are m a n y

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t h e o r i e s and m o d e l s of w o r k p l a c e d e m o c r a c y (see, e . g . , Schweickart, 1980; P a t e m a n , 1970; M a s o n , 1982; B e r n s t e i n , 1980; G o u l d , 1988). T h o u g h less c o m m o n , s o m e r e c e n t writings, w h i c h I h a v e c i t e d in this c h a p t e r , g i v e d e t a i l e d proposals for a structured work life that m i n i m i z e s a class division b e t w e e n task-defining and t a s k - e x e c u t i n g work ( s e e G r e e n , 1985, p p . 7 9 - 9 4 ; C o l l i n s , 1979, 2 0 0 - 2 1 0 ) . I shall n e i t h e r r e p r o ­ d u c e nor e v a l u a t e t h e s e t h e o r i e s and m o d e l s h e r e . N o r will I offer a n o t h e r m o d e l of t h e d e m o c r a t i c division of labor. To c o n c l u d e this c h a p t e r I will o n l y n o t e s o m e g e n e r a l p a r a m e t e r s for a just w o r k p l a c e organization. W o r k p l a c e d e m o c r a c y is a n e c e s s a r y e l e m e n t in just social organization, for t h e s a m e r e a s o n s that g o v e r n m e n t s h o u l d b e d e m o c r a t i c (see G o u l d , c h a p . 9). As m a n y writers p o i n t out, m o r e o v e r , d e m o c r a t i c g o v e r n m e n t a n d d e m o c r a t i c w o r k p l a c e s are m u t u a l l y reinforcing. Participation in d e ­ c i s i o n m a k i n g in t h e w o r k p l a c e c o n t r i b u t e s to t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of an inter­ e s t in and capacity for participation in d e c i s i o n m a k i n g in t h e city and t h e state ( s e e , e . g . , P a t e m a n , 1970, c h a p . 3; M a s o n , chap. 4). W o r k p l a c e d e ­ m o c r a c y has at least t w o n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n s : (a) e m p l o y e e s of an e n t e r ­ p r i s e m u s t participate in t h e basic d e c i s i o n s of t h e e n t e r p r i s e as a w h o l e , and (b) t h e y m u s t participate in t h e specific d e c i s i o n s that c o n c e r n t h e i r i m m e d i a t e work situation. T h e s e c o n d i t i o n s in turn limit t h e u p p e r and l o w e r r e a c h e s of p o w e r . T h e first c o n d i t i o n i m p l i e s that t h e r e are n o t o p e x e c u t i v e s w i t h initiating and final authority o v e r t h e o p e r a t i o n s of t h e e n t e r p r i s e . I n s t e a d , basic d e c i s i o n s about t h e e n t e r p r i s e s h o u l d b e m a d e b y a d e m o c r a t i c a l l y e l e c t e d and r e p r e s e n t a t i v e legislature a c c o u n t a b l e to t h o s e w h o e l e c t e d t h e m . S u c h basic d e c i s i o n s m i g h t i n c l u d e w h a t will b e p r o d u c e d , or w h a t s e r v i c e s will b e p r o v i d e d ; t h e basic plan and organiza­ tion of t h e p r o d u c t i o n or s e r v i c e provision p r o c e s s e s , i n c l u d i n g t h e basic s t r u c t u r e o f t h e division of labor; t h e basic w a g e and profit-sharing struc­ ture; t h e capital i n v e s t m e n t strategy; t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of bylaws and basic rights of w o r k e r s w i t h i n t h e e n t e r p r i s e , as w e l l as p r o c e d u r e s for p r o t e c t i n g t h o s e rights and adjudicating d i s p u t e s ; and t h e basic rules for hiring and p r o m o t i o n , as w e l l as p r o c e d u r e s for c h o o s i n g e l e c t e d officials. As I n o t e d in C h a p t e r 2, t h e c o m m u n i t y in w h i c h a w o r k p l a c e is l o c a t e d is d i r e c t l y affected b y at least s o m e of its activities, such as its capital re­ i n v e s t m e n t p l a n s , its d i s c h a r g e of p o l l u t i o n , and e v e n its c h i l d - c a r e pol­ icy. T h u s t h e c o m m u n i t y d e s e r v e s s o m e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n in at least t h o s e d e c i s i o n s that significantly affect life o u t s i d e t h e e n t e r p r i s e . W h e r e e n t e r ­ p r i s e s are not e m p l o y e e - o w n e d , m o r e o v e r , s h a r e h o l d e r s also d e s e r v e s o m e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . At t h e l e v e l of t h e g e n e r a l e n t e r p r i s e - g o v e r n i n g b o d y , t h e p r i n c i p l e of g r o u p r e p r e s e n t a t i o n I a r g u e d for in C h a p t e r 6 s h o u l d o p e r a t e . Socially o p p r e s s e d or d i s a d v a n t a g e d g r o u p s , such as w o m e n , racial m i n o r i t i e s , and d i s a b l e d p e o p l e , s h o u l d r e c e i v e specific r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . In t h e c o n t e x t of a particular e n t e r p r i s e , m o r e o v e r , o t h e r

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g r o u p s m i g h t b e p o t e n t i a l l y d i s a d v a n t a g e d — s u c h as e n t r y - l e v e l w o r k e r s , or t h o s e d o i n g a particular task. W o r k p l a c e d e m o c r a c y is less than c o m p l e t e , h o w e v e r , if it o n l y i n ­ v o l v e s participation in t o p - l e v e l d e c i s i o n s t h r o u g h a s y s t e m of r e p r e s e n t a ­ tion. It is at least as i m p o r t a n t that workers s h o u l d participate in d e c i s i o n s a b o u t t h e i r o w n i m m e d i a t e work c o n t e x t and e n v i r o n m e n t — t h e i r o w n speciality, d e p a r t m e n t , work t e a m , work site, and so o n . This d o e s not rule o u t m a n a g e r s or s u p e r v i s o r s , b u t it m e a n s s o m e d e c i s i o n s m u s t b e m a d e j o i n t l y b y m a n a g e r s and w o r k e r s , that limits are s e t on managerial p o w e r , a n d that such p o w e r m u s t o p e r a t e a l o n g s i d e c o n s i d e r a b l e individ­ ual and t e a m a u t o n o m y . As I d i s c u s s e d earlier, workers s h o u l d d e c i d e democratically t h e qualifi­ cations for j o b s and w h o is qualified for t h e m . This d o e s not i m p l y that all w o r k e r s s h o u l d participate in d e c i d i n g e v e r y a p p o i n t m e n t . It d o e s m e a n , h o w e v e r , that as a rule t h e r e s h o u l d b e d e m o c r a t i c a l l y e l e c t e d "search c o m m i t t e e s , " e s p e c i a l l y for positions of greater than a v e r a g e pay, p o w e r , or e x p e r t i s e . E v e n if n o t h i n g e l s e in w o r k p l a c e structure and t h e division of labor c h a n g e s , w o r k p l a c e d e m o c r a c y along t h e lines I h a v e d e s c r i b e d can greatly r e d u c e t h e o p p r e s s i o n of p o w e r l e s s n e s s that c u r r e n t l y results fom t h e division b e t w e e n professionals w h o d e f i n e m u c h about t h e i r o w n and other's w o r k and w o r k e r s w h o o n l y e x e c u t e tasks d e f i n e d b y o t h e r s . If j o b d e f i n i t i o n s w e r e to r e m a i n m o r e or less as t h e y are, i n c l u d i n g a distinction b e t w e e n t e c h n i c a l e x p e r t s and administrators, on t h e o n e h a n d , and less skilled p r o d u c t i o n , clerical, and s e r v i c e w o r k e r s , o n t h e other, d e m o c r a t i c d e c i s i o n m a k i n g in t h e w o r k p l a c e w o u l d r e d u c e t h e d o m i n a t i o n and subor­ d i n a t i o n o f t h e latter. E v e n if t h e s e less skilled workers c o n t i n u e d to per­ form r o u t i n e and rote tasks, m o r e o v e r , their h a v i n g t h e right and o p p o r t u ­ nity to participate in major w o r k p l a c e d e c i s i o n s c o u l d m a k e their w o r k i n g life m o r e i n t e r e s t i n g and s k i l l - d e v e l o p i n g . T h e d i v i s i o n b e t w e e n task-defining and t a s k - e x e c u t i n g work, b e t w e e n a professional and a nonprofessional class, I have a r g u e d , itself t e n d s to p r o d u c e and r e p r o d u c e o p p r e s s i o n . This division is so e n t r e n c h e d in m o d ­ e r n i n d u s t r y that e v e n t h e s y s t e m of w o r k e r s ' c o o p e r a t i v e s w i d e l y re­ g a r d e d as t h e m o s t successful e x a m p l e of workers' d e m o c r a c y in t h e w o r l d — M o n d r a g o n , in t h e B a s q u e region of S p a i n — r e t a i n s a solid divi­ sion b e t w e e n a professional and managerial stratum of e x p e r t s and n o n ­ professional w o r k e r s ( s e e H a c k e r , 1989, chaps. 5 and 7). As l o n g as s u c h a class division r e m a i n s , t h e r e is an i n h e r e n t t e n d e n c y for t h e professional class to m o n o p o l i z e k n o w l e d g e , to d i s e m p o w e r o t h e r s b y d e s k i l l i n g their work, a n d to stand in a p r i v i l e g e d relation o f exploitation and cultural i m p e r i a l i s m to t h e o t h e r s .

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A d e m o c r a t i c division of labor n e e d not, and probably s h o u l d not, e l i m ­ inate specialization. U n d e r m i n i n g t h e class division b e t w e e n professional and n o n p r o f e s s i o n a l w o r k e r s thus m e a n s t h e following. First, t h e special p r i v i l e g e a s s o c i a t e d w i t h professional work s o l e l y o n g r o u n d s of status or p r e s t i g e , in t h e form of pay, a u t o n o m y , work rules, or a c c e s s to r e s o u r c e s , is w r o n g . S e c o n d , m o b i l i t y from less skilled to m o r e skilled work s h o u l d b e available to a n y o n e . T h e r e s h o u l d b e n o s u c h t h i n g as a " d e a d - e n d " j o b , a l t h o u g h r e m a i n i n g in o n e j o b s h o u l d not carry stigma either. Skill d e v e l ­ o p m e n t o n t h e j o b and t h e o p p o r t u n i t y to rise through j o b l e v e l s s h o u l d b e m u c h m o r e w i d e s p r e a d than t h e y are in typical work structures in ad­ v a n c e d industrial s o c i e t i e s . Professional and managerial w o r k e r s , m o r e ­ o v e r , s h o u l d b e g i n their w o r k i n g lives w i t h h a n d s - o n e x p e r i e n c e of line p r o d u c t i o n or s e r v i c e d e l i v e r y (cf. C o l l i n s , 1979, 2 0 0 - 2 0 1 ) . M u c h g o o d m i g h t c o m e from a s s i g n i n g professional and managerial w o r k e r s m o d e s t p r o d u c t i o n or m a i n t e n a n c e tasks. W h e r e l o n g - t e r m s c h o o l i n g is r e q u i r e d to d e v e l o p s p e c i a l i z e d skills, s u c h s c h o o l i n g s h o u l d b e available free of c h a r g e , and as m u c h as p o s s i b l e s h o u l d b e available to all w h o w a n t it (cf. G r e e n , 1 9 8 5 , p p . 8 7 - 8 9 ) . P e r s o n s w i t h s p e c i a l i z e d technical skills or s p e ­ c i a l i z e d forms of k n o w l e d g e , finally, m u s t b e a c c o u n t a b l e to w o r k e r s and the community. Specialized knowledge, which experts should present and d i s s e m i n a t e , is i n d i s p e n s a b l e for d e c i s i o n m a k i n g , b u t e x p e r t s cannot claim authority to m a k e t h e d e c i s i o n s o n g r o u n d s of their e x p e r t i s e (cf. G r e e n , 1985; G o u l d , 1988, chap. 10). D e c i s i o n s about t h e u s e s of t e c h n o l ­ o g y , t h e organization and d i s s e m i n a t i o n of information, t h e p l a n n i n g o f b u i l d i n g s and c i t i e s , and so o n s h o u l d b e m a d e by d e m o c r a t i c h e t e r o g e ­ n e o u s p u b l i c s in w o r k p l a c e , n e i g h b o r h o o d , and region. T h e c o n c l u d i n g c h a p t e r of this book a r g u e s , a m o n g o t h e r t h i n g s , for t h e i m p o r t a n c e of regional g o v e r n m e n t in p r o m o t i n g j u s t i c e b e t w e e n w o r k p l a c e s and neighborhoods.

CHAPTER

8

City Life and Difference The tolerance, the room for great differences among neigh­ bors—differences that often go far deeper than differences in color—which are possible and normal in intensely urban life, but which are so foreign to suburbs and pseudosuburbs, are possible and normal only when streets of .great cities have built-in equipment allowing strangers to dwell in peace together on civilized but essentially dignified and reserved terms. —Jane Jacobs

O N E I M P O R T A N T P U R P O S E of critical n o r m a t i v e t h e o r y is to offer an alterna­ t i v e vision of social relations w h i c h , in t h e w o r d s of M a r c u s e , " c o n c e p t u a l ­ i z e s t h e stuff o f w h i c h t h e e x p e r i e n c e d w o r l d consists . . . w i t h a v i e w to its p o s s i b i l i t i e s , in t h e light of their actual limitation, s u p p r e s s i o n , and d e n i a l " ( M a r c u s e , 1964, p . 7). S u c h a p o s i t i v e n o r m a t i v e v i s i o n can i n s p i r e h o p e a n d i m a g i n a t i o n that m o t i v a t e action for social c h a n g e . It also pro­ v i d e s s o m e of t h e reflective d i s t a n c e n e c e s s a r y for t h e criticism of e x i s t i n g social c i r c u m s t a n c e s . M a n y p h i l o s o p h e r s and political theorists criticize welfare capitalist so­ c i e t y for b e i n g atomistic, d e p o l i t i c i z e d , fostering self-regarding i n t e r e s t g r o u p pluralism and b u r e a u c r a t i c d o m i n a t i o n . T h e m o s t c o m m o n alterna­ t i v e v i s i o n offered b y s u c h critics is an ideal of c o m m u n i t y . S p u r r e d b y a p p e a l s to c o m m u n i t y as an alternative to liberal i n d i v i d u a l i s m m a d e by M i c h a e l S a n d e l , Alasdair M a c l n t y r e , and o t h e r s , in r e c e n t years political t h e o r i s t s h a v e d e b a t e d t h e v i r t u e s and v i c e s of c o m m u n i t a r i a n i s m as o p ­ p o s e d to liberalism ( G u t m a n n , 1985; H i r s c h , 1986; Wallach, 1987; B u ­ c h a n a n , 1989). M a n y socialists, anarchists, feminists, and o t h e r s critical of welfare capitalist s o c i e t y formulate t h e i r vision of a s o c i e t y free from d o m ­ ination and o p p r e s s i o n in t e r m s of an ideal of c o m m u n i t y . M u c h of this d i s c u s s i o n w o u l d lead us to think that liberal i n d i v i d u a l i s m and c o m m u n i ­ tarianism e x h a u s t t h e possibilities for c o n c e i v i n g social relations. It s h o u l d b e clear from t h e p r e c e d i n g c h a p t e r s that I share m a n y of t h e c o m m u n i t a r i a n criticisms o f welfare capitalist liberal d e m o c r a t i c t h e o r y a n d s o c i e t y . I shall a r g u e in this chapter, h o w e v e r , that t h e ideal of c o m ­ m u n i t y fails to offer an appropriate alternative vision of a d e m o c r a t i c pol-

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ity. T h e ideal of c o m m u n i t y e x e m p l i f i e s t h e logic of i d e n t i t y I a n a l y z e d in C h a p t e r 4. This ideal e x p r e s s e s a d e s i r e for t h e fusion of s u b j e c t s w i t h o n e a n o t h e r w h i c h in practice o p e r a t e s to e x c l u d e t h o s e w i t h w h o m t h e g r o u p d o e s n o t identify. T h e ideal of c o m m u n i t y d e n i e s and r e p r e s s e s social dif­ f e r e n c e , t h e fact that t h e polity c a n n o t b e t h o u g h t of as a u n i t y in w h i c h all participants share a c o m m o n e x p e r i e n c e and c o m m o n v a l u e s . In its privi­ l e g i n g of face-to-face relations, m o r e o v e r , t h e ideal of c o m m u n i t y d e n i e s d i f f e r e n c e in t h e form of t h e t e m p o r a l and spatial d i s t a n c i n g that charac­ t e r i z e s social p r o c e s s . As an a l t e r n a t i v e to t h e ideal of c o m m u n i t y , I d e v e l o p in this c h a p t e r an ideal of city life as a vision of social relations affirming g r o u p difference. As a n o r m a t i v e ideal, city life instantiates social relations of difference w i t h ­ out e x c l u s i o n . Different g r o u p s d w e l l in t h e city a l o n g s i d e o n e another, of n e c e s s i t y interacting in city s p a c e s . If city politics is to b e d e m o c r a t i c and not d o m i n a t e d b y t h e p o i n t of v i e w of o n e g r o u p , it m u s t b e a politics that takes a c c o u n t of and p r o v i d e s v o i c e for t h e different groups that d w e l l t o g e t h e r in t h e c i t y w i t h o u t forming a c o m m u n i t y . C i t y life as an o p e n n e s s to u n a s s i m i l a t e d o t h e r n e s s , h o w e v e r , r e p r e ­ s e n t s o n l y an u n r e a l i z e d social ideal. M a n y social injustices exist in today's c i t i e s . C i t i e s and t h e p e o p l e in t h e m are relatively p o w e r l e s s before t h e d o m i n a t i o n of c o r p o r a t e capital and state bureaucracy. Privatized d e c i ­ s i o n m a k i n g p r o c e s s e s in cities and t o w n s r e p r o d u c e and e x a c e r b a t e i n ­ e q u a l i t i e s a n d o p p r e s s i o n s . T h e y also p r o d u c e or reinforce s e g r e g a t i o n s a n d e x c l u s i o n s w i t h i n cities and b e t w e e n cities and t o w n s , w h i c h c o n t r i b ­ u t e to e x p l o i t a t i o n , marginalization, and cultural imperialism. M a n y d e m o c r a t i c theorists r e s p o n d to t h e s e ills of city life b y calls for t h e c r e a t i o n of d e c e n t r a l i z e d a u t o n o m o u s c o m m u n i t i e s w h e r e p e o p l e e x ­ e r c i s e local control o v e r their l i v e s and n e i g h b o r h o o d s o n a h u m a n scale. S u c h calls for local a u t o n o m y , I a r g u e in c o n c l u s i o n , r e p r o d u c e t h e p r o b ­ l e m s of e x c l u s i o n that t h e ideal of c o m m u n i t y p o s e s . I offer a c o n c e p t u a l d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n a u t o n o m y and e m p o w e r m e n t , and s k e t c h out s o m e p a r a m e t e r s of d e m o c r a t i c e m p o w e r m e n t in large-scale regional g o v e r n ­ ment.

T H E OPPOSITION BETWEEN INDIVIDUALISM A N D COMMUNITY

Critics of liberalism f r e q u e n t l y i n v o k e a c o n c e p t i o n of c o m m u n i t y as an a l t e r n a t i v e to t h e i n d i v i d u a l i s m and abstract formalism t h e y attribute to liberalism (cf. Wolff, 1968, chap. 5; Bay, 1 9 8 1 , chap. 5). T h e y reject t h e i m a g e of p e r s o n s as separate and self-contained a t o m s , e a c h w i t h t h e s a m e formal rights, rights to k e e p o t h e r s out, separate. For s u c h w r i t e r s , t h e ideal of c o m m u n i t y e v o k e s t h e a b s e n c e of t h e s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d c o m p e t i t i v e ­ n e s s of m o d e r n s o c i e t y . In this ideal, critics of liberalism find an alterna-

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t i v e to t h e abstract, formal m e t h o d o l o g y of liberalism. Existing in c o m m u ­ nity w i t h o t h e r s entails m o r e than m e r e l y r e s p e c t i n g their rights; it entails a t t e n d i n g to and sharing in t h e particularity of their n e e d s and i n t e r e s t s . In his rightly c e l e b r a t e d critique of Rawls, for e x a m p l e , M i c h a e l S a n d e l (1982) a r g u e s that liberalism's e m p h a s i s on t h e primacy of j u s t i c e p r e s u p ­ p o s e s a c o n c e p t i o n of t h e self as an a n t e c e d e n t unity e x i s t i n g prior to its d e s i r e s and goals, w h o l e u n t o itself, s e p a r a t e d and b o u n d e d . This is an unreal and i n c o h e r e n t c o n c e p t i o n of t h e self, h e argues. It w o u l d b e b e t t e r r e p l a c e d b y a c o n c e p t i o n of t h e self as t h e p r o d u c t of an i d e n t i t y it shares w i t h o t h e r s , of v a l u e s and goals that are not external and w i l l e d , as liberal­ ism w o u l d h a v e it, b u t c o n s t i t u t i v e of t h e self. This c o n s t i t u t i v e c o n c e p ­ tion of t h e self is e x p r e s s e d b y t h e c o n c e p t of c o m m u n i t y , B e n j a m i n Barber (1984) also u s e s t h e idea of c o m m u n i t y to e v o k e a v i s i o n of social life that d o e s not c o n c e i v e t h e p e r s o n as an atomistic, s e p a ­ rated individual. Liberal political theory r e p r e s e n t s individuals as o c c u p y ­ ing private and separate s p a c e s , as p r o p e l l e d only by their o w n private d e s i r e s . This is a c o n s u m e r - o r i e n t e d c o n c e p t i o n of h u m a n nature, in w h i c h social and political relations can b e u n d e r s t o o d only as g o o d s instru­ m e n t a l to t h e a c h i e v e m e n t of individual d e s i r e s , and not as intrinsic g o o d s . T h i s a t o m i s t i c c o n c e p t i o n g e n e r a t e s a political t h e o r y that p r e ­ s u m e s conflict and c o m p e t i t i o n as characteristic m o d e s of interaction. L i k e S a n d e l , B a r b e r a p p e a l s to an ideal of c o m m u n i t y to i n v o k e a c o n c e p ­ tion of t h e p e r s o n as socially c o n s t i t u t e d , actively o r i e n t e d toward affirm­ ing relations of mutuality, rather than o r i e n t e d solely toward satisfying p r i v a t e n e e d s and d e s i r e s (cf. A c k e l s b e r g , 1988). As earlier c h a p t e r s in this book indicate, I share t h e s e c r i t i q u e s of liber­ alism. Liberal social o n t o l o g y , I h a v e a r g u e d , has n o place for a c o n c e p t of social g r o u p s . I h a v e c h a r a c t e r i z e d a social g r o u p as t h e relational o u t c o m e of i n t e r a c t i o n s , m e a n i n g s , and affinities according to w h i c h p e o p l e i d e n ­ tify o n e a n o t h e r . T h e self is i n d e e d a p r o d u c t of social relations in pro­ found a n d often contradictory w a y s . A person's social g r o u p i d e n t i t i e s , m o r e o v e r , are in s o m e m e a n i n g f u l s e n s e shared w i t h o t h e r s of t h e g r o u p . I h a v e also criticized liberalism's c o n s u m e r - o r i e n t e d p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s a b o u t h u m a n nature, and a g r e e with Barber that t h e s e l e a d to an instru­ m e n t a l i s t u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e function of politics. W i t h Barber and o t h e r n e w r e p u b l i c a n t h e o r i s t s , I too reject t h e privatization oi politics in liberal pluralist p r o c e s s e s , and call for t h e institution of d e m o c r a t i c publics. I think, h o w e v e r , that all t h e s e criticisms of liberalism can and s h o u l d b e m a d e w i t h o u t e m b r a c i n g c o m m u n i t y as a political ideal. T o o often c o n t e m p o r a r y d i s c u s s i o n of t h e s e i s s u e s sets u p an e x h a u s t i v e d i c h o t o m y b e t w e e n i n d i v i d u a l i s m and c o m m u n i t y . C o m m u n i t y appears in t h e o p p o s i t i o n s i n d i v i d u a l i s m / c o m m u n i t y , separated self/shared self, p r i v a t e / p u b l i c . B u t like m o s t such t e r m s , individualism and c o m m u n i t y h a v e a c o m m o n l o g i c u n d e r l y i n g their polarity, w h i c h m a k e s it p o s s i b l e for

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t h e m to d e f i n e e a c h o t h e r n e g a t i v e l y . E a c h entails a d e n i a l of difference a n d a d e s i r e to bring m u l t i p l i c i t y and h e t e r o g e n e i t y into unity, t h o u g h in o p p o s i n g w a y s . Liberal individualism d e n i e s difference by p o s i t i n g t h e self as a solid, self-sufficient unity, not d e f i n e d by a n y t h i n g or a n y o n e o t h e r than itself. Its formalistic e t h i c of rights also d e n i e s difference b y b r i n g i n g all s u c h s e p a r a t e d individuals u n d e r a c o m m o n m e a s u r e of rights. P r o p o n e n t s of c o m m u n i t y , o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , d e n y d i f f e r e n c e b y p o s i t i n g fusion rather than separation as t h e social ideal. T h e y c o n c e i v e t h e social s u b j e c t as a relation of u n i t y or m u t u a l i t y c o m p o s e d b y identifi­ cation and s y m m e t r y a m o n g individuals w i t h i n a totality. C o m m u n i t a r i a n ism r e p r e s e n t s an u r g e to s e e p e r s o n s in unity with o n e a n o t h e r in a shared w h o l e . For m a n y w r i t e r s , t h e rejection of individualism logically entails t h e assertion of c o m m u n i t y , and c o n v e r s e l y any rejection of c o m m u n i t y e n ­ tails that o n e n e c e s s a r i l y s u p p o r t s individualism. In t h e i r d i s c u s s i o n of a d e b a t e b e t w e e n Jean Elshtain and Barbara E h r e n r e i c h , for e x a m p l e , H a r r y B o y t e and Sara E v a n s (1984) claim that E h r e n r e i c h promotes indi­ v i d u a l i s m b e c a u s e s h e rejects t h e appeal to c o m m u n i t y that E l s h t a i n m a k e s . R e c e n t a c c o u n t s of t h e d e b a t e a m o n g political theorists g e n e r a t e d b y c o m m u n i t a r i a n c r i t i q u e s of Rawls all c o u c h that d e b a t e in t e r m s of a d i c h o t o m y b e t w e e n liberal individualism and c o m m u n i t y , s u g g e s t i n g that t h e s e t w o c a t e g o r i e s are i n d e e d m u t u a l l y e x c l u s i v e and exhaust all p o s s i ­ b l e social o n t o l o g i e s and c o n c e p t i o n s of t h e self (see H i r s c h , 1986; W a l lach, 1987; C o r n e l l , 1987), T h u s e v e n w h e n t h e discussants r e c o g n i z e t h e totalizing and circular character of this d e b a t e , and s e e k to take a p o s i t i o n o u t s i d e its t e r m s , t h e y t e n d to slide into affirming o n e or t h e o t h e r " s i d e " of t h e d i c h o t o m y b e c a u s e that d i c h o t o m y , like t h e d i c h o t o m y a / n o t - a , is c o n c e i v e d as e x h a u s t i n g all logical possibilities.

T H E ROUSSEAUIST D R E A M

T h e ideal of c o m m u n i t y s u b m i t s to t h e logic of i d e n t i t y I d i s c u s s e d in C h a p t e r 4. It e x p r e s s e s an u r g e to unity, t h e unity of s u b j e c t s w i t h o n e a n o t h e r . T h e ideal of c o m m u n i t y e x p r e s s e s a l o n g i n g for h a r m o n y a m o n g p e r s o n s , for c o n s e n s u s and m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g , for w h a t F o u c a u l t calls t h e R o u s s e a u i s t d r e a m of a transparent society, visible and legible in each of its parts, the dream of there no longer existing any zones of darkness, zones established by the privileges of royal power or the prerogative of some corporation, zones ol disorder. It was the dream that each individual, whatever position he occupied, might be able to see the whole of society, that men's hearts should communicate, their vision be unobstructed by obstacles, and that the opinion of all reign over each. (Fou­ cault, 1980, p. 152)

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W h e t h e r e x p r e s s e d as shared t h e o n e h a n d , or as relations community denies, devalues, s u b j e c t s , and s e e k s to d i s s o l v e self-enclosed whole.

subjectivity or c o m m o n c o n s c i o u s n e s s , o n of m u t u a l i t y and reciprocity, t h e ideal o f or r e p r e s s e s t h e ontological difference of social inexhaustibility into t h e comfort of a

S a n d e l is explicit a b o u t d e f i n i n g c o m m u n i t y as shared subjectivity. T h e d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n his o w n c o n s t i t u t i v e m e a n i n g of c o m m u n i t y and t h e i n s t r u m e n t a l and s e n t i m e n t a l m e a n i n g s h e finds in Rawls is p r e c i s e l y that in c o n s t i t u t i v e c o m m u n i t y subjects share a c o m m o n s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g (Sandel, 1 9 8 2 , p p . 6 2 - 6 3 , 173). H e is also explicit about social transpar­ e n c y as t h e m e a n i n g and goal of c o m m u n i t y : And in so far as our constitutive self-understandings comprehend a wider sub­ ject than the individual alone, whether a family or tribe or city or class or nation or people, to this extent they define a community in the constitutive sense. And what marks such a community is not merely a spirit of benevolence, or the prevalence of communitarian values, or even certain shared final ends' alone, but a common vocabulary of discourse and a background of implicit practices and understandings within which the opacity of the participants is reduced if never finally dissolved. In so far as justice depends for its pre-eminence on the separatedness or boundedness of persons in the cognitive sense, its priority would diminish as that opacity faded and this community deepened. (Sandel, 1982, pp. 172-73) B a r b e r also takes s h a r e d subjectivity as t h e m e a n i n g of c o m m u n i t y . T h r o u g h political participation individuals confront o n e a n o t h e r and ad­ j u s t t h e i r w a n t s and d e s i r e s , creating a " c o m m o n o r d e r i n g of individual n e e d s and w a n t s into a s i n g l e vision of t h e future in w h i c h all can share." S t r o n g d e m o c r a c y s e e k s to reach a "creative c o n s e n s u s " w h i c h t h r o u g h c o m m o n talk a n d c o m m o n work creates a " c o m m o n c o n s c i o u s n e s s and political j u d g m e n t " (Barber, 1 9 8 4 , p. 224). S o m e t h e o r i s t s of c o m m u n i t y , on t h e o t h e r h a n d , r e p l a c e c o m m o n n e s s in t h e m e a n i n g of c o m m u n i t y w i t h m u t u a l i t y and reciprocity, t h e r e c o g n i ­ tion b y e a c h individual of t h e individuality of all t h e o t h e r s (see C o r n e l l , 1987). S e y l a B e n h a b i b , for e x a m p l e , regards a standpoint that e m p h a s i z e s t h e c o m m o n n e s s of p e r s o n s as that of an e t h i c of rights and j u s t i c e of t h e sort that Rawls r e p r e s e n t s , w h i c h s h e calls t h e standpoint of t h e "general­ i z e d o t h e r . " Moral t h e o r y m u s t also e x p r e s s a c o m p l e m e n t a r y p o i n t of v i e w w h i c h B e n h a b i b calls t h e standpoint of t h e "concrete other." B e n h a ­ b i b refers to this as a vision of a c o m m u n i t y of n e e d s and solidarity, in c o n ­ trast to t h e c o m m u n i t y of rights and e n t i t l e m e n t s e n v i s a g e d b y liberalism: The standpoint of the "concrete other," by contrast, requires us to view each and every rational being as an individual with a concrete history, identity, and affective-emotional constitution. In assuming this standpoint, we abstract from

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what constitutes our commonality and seek to understand the distinctiveness of the other. We seek to comprehend the needs of the other, their motivations, what they search for, and what they desire. Our relation to the other is gov­ erned by the norm of complementary reciprocity: each is entitled to expect and to assume from the other forms of behavior through which the other feels recog­ nized and confirmed as a concrete, individual being with specific needs, talents, and capacities. . . . The moral categories that accompany such interactions are those of responsibility, bonding, and sharing. The corresponding moral feelings are those of love, care, sympathy, and solidarity, and the vision of community is one of needs and solidarity. (Benhabib, 1986, p. 341) D e s p i t e t h e a p p a r e n t d i v e r g e n c e of Sandel's and Barber's l a n g u a g e of s h a r e d s u b j e c t i v i t y and B e n h a b i b ' s l a n g u a g e of c o m p l e m e n t a r y r e c i p ­ rocity, I think all t h r e e e x p r e s s a similar ideal of social relations as t h e copresence of subjects (cf. D e r r i d a , 1976, p p . 1 3 7 - 3 9 ) . W h e t h e r e x ­ p r e s s e d as c o m m o n c o n s c i o u s n e s s or as m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g , t h e ideal is o n e of t h e t r a n s p a r e n c y of s u b j e c t s to o n e another. In this ideal e a c h u n d e r s t a n d s t h e o t h e r s and r e c o g n i z e s t h e o t h e r s in t h e s a m e w a y that t h e y u n d e r s t a n d t h e m s e l v e s , and all r e c o g n i z e that t h e o t h e r s u n d e r s t a n d t h e m as t h e y u n d e r s t a n d t h e m s e l v e s . This ideal thus s u b m i t s to w h a t D e r ­ rida calls t h e m e t a p h y s i c s of p r e s e n c e , w h i c h s e e k s t o collapse t h e t e m p o ­ ral difference i n h e r e n t in l a n g u a g e and e x p e r i e n c e into a totality that can b e c o m p r e h e n d e d in o n e v i e w . This ideal of c o m m u n i t y d e n i e s t h e o n t o ­ logical difference w i t h i n and b e t w e e n subjects. In c o m m u n i t y p e r s o n s c e a s e to b e other, o p a q u e , not u n d e r s t o o d , and i n s t e a d b e c o m e m u t u a l l y s y m p a t h e t i c , u n d e r s t a n d i n g o n e a n o t h e r as t h e y u n d e r s t a n d t h e m s e l v e s , fused. S u c h an ideal of t h e t r a n s p a r e n c y of s u b ­ j e c t s to o n e a n o t h e r d e n i e s t h e difference, or basic a s y m m e t r y , of s u b ­ j e c t s . A s H e g e l first b r o u g h t out and Sartre's analysis d e e p e n e d , p e r s o n s n e c e s s a r i l y t r a n s c e n d o n e a n o t h e r b e c a u s e subjectivity is negativity. T h e r e g a r d of t h e o t h e r is always objectifying. O t h e r p e r s o n s n e v e r s e e t h e w o r l d from m y p e r s p e c t i v e , and in w i t n e s s i n g t h e other's o b j e c t i v e grasp of m y b o d y , a c t i o n s , a n d w o r d s , I am always faced w i t h an e x p e r i e n c e of m y s e l f different from t h e o n e I h a v e . T h i s m u t u a l i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e t r a n s c e n d e n c e , of c o u r s e , m a k e s sharing b e t w e e n us p o s s i b l e , a fact that Sartre n o t i c e s less than H e g e l . T h e shar­ ing, h o w e v e r , is n e v e r c o m p l e t e m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g and reciprocity. Sharing, m o r e o v e r , is fragile. At t h e next m o m e n t t h e o t h e r p e r s o n m a y u n d e r s t a n d m y w o r d s differently from t h e w a y I m e a n t t h e m , or carry m y actions to c o n s e q u e n c e s I d o not i n t e n d . T h e s a m e difference that m a k e s s h a r i n g b e t w e e n u s p o s s i b l e also m a k e s m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g , r e j e c t i o n , w i t h d r a w a l , and conflict always p o s s i b l e c o n d i t i o n s of social b e i n g . B e c a u s e t h e s u b j e c t is not a u n i t y , it cannot b e p r e s e n t to itself, k n o w itself. I d o not always k n o w w h a t I m e a n , n e e d , w a n t , d e s i r e , b e c a u s e

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m e a n i n g s , n e e d s , and d e s i r e s d o not arise from an origin in s o m e transpar­ e n t e g o . Often I e x p r e s s m y d e s i r e in g e s t u r e or t o n e of v o i c e , w i t h o u t m e a n i n g to d o so. C o n s c i o u s n e s s , s p e e c h , e x p r e s s i v e n e s s , are p o s s i b l e o n l y if t h e subject always surpasses itself, and is thus n e c e s s a r i l y u n a b l e to c o m p r e h e n d itself. S u b j e c t s all h a v e m u l t i p l e d e s i r e s that d o not c o h e r e ; t h e y attach layers of m e a n i n g s to o b j e c t s w i t h o u t always b e i n g aware of e a c h layer or t h e c o n n e c t i o n s b e t w e e n t h e m . C o n s e q u e n t l y , any individ­ ual s u b j e c t is a play of difference that cannot b e c o m p l e t e l y c o m p r e ­ hended. If t h e subject is h e t e r o g e n e o u s p r o c e s s , n e v e r fully p r e s e n t to itself, t h e n it follows that s u b j e c t s cannot m a k e t h e m s e l v e s transparent, w h o l l y p r e s e n t to o n e another. C o n s e q u e n t l y t h e subject also e l u d e s s y m p a t h e t i c c o m p r e h e n s i o n b y o t h e r s . I cannot u n d e r s t a n d o t h e r s as t h e y u n d e r s t a n d t h e m s e l v e s , b e c a u s e t h e y d o not c o m p l e t e l y u n d e r s t a n d t h e m s e l v e s . In­ d e e d , b e c a u s e t h e m e a n i n g s and d e s i r e s t h e y e x p r e s s m a y o u t r u n their o w n a w a r e n e s s or i n t e n t i o n , I m a y u n d e r s t a n d their w o r d s or actions m o r e fully than t h e y . T h e i d e a ] o f c o m m u n i t y e x p r e s s e s a d e s i r e for socia] w h o l e n e s s , symme­ try, a s e c u r i t y and solid i d e n t i t y w h i c h is objectified b e c a u s e affirmed b y o t h e r s u n a m b i g u o u s l y . This is an u n d e r s t a n d a b l e d r e a m , b u t a d r e a m n e v e r t h e l e s s , a n d , as I shall n o w argue, o n e w i t h serious political c o n s e ­ quences.

PRIVILEGING F A C E - T O - F A C E RELATIONS

T h e ideal of c o m m u n i t y as a p u r e c o p r e s e n c e of subjects to o n e a n o t h e r r e c e i v e s political e x p r e s s i o n in a vision of political life that p r i v i l e g e s local face-to-face direct d e m o c r a c y . Critics of welfare capitalist s o c i e t y repeat­ e d l y i n v o k e s u c h a m o d e l of small g r o u p relations as a political ideal. T h e anarchist tradition e x p r e s s e s t h e s e v a l u e s m o s t systematically, b u t t h e y retain t h e i r form in o t h e r political soils as w e l l . This m o d e l of politics as f o u n d e d in face-to-facc relations p o s e s as t h e alternative to t h e i m p e r s o n ­ ality, a l i e n a t i o n , c o m m o d i f i c a t i o n , and bureaucratization of g o v e r n a n c e in existing mass societies: The incarnation of this project is the immediate, indeed unmediated, commu­ nity that enters so profoundly into the fashioning of our humanity. This is the community in which we genuinely encounter each other, the public world that is only a bare step above our private world, in short, our towns, neighborhoods, and municipalities. (Bookchin, 1982, p. 267; cf. Manicas, 1974, pp. 246-50; Bay, 1981, chaps. S a n d 6; Taylor, 1982, pp. 27-28) S e v e r a l p r o b l e m s arise w h e n a c o m m u n i t y that p r i v i l e g e s face-to-face relations is taken as t h e ideal of t h e polity. T h e ideal p r e s u m e s a m y t h of

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u n m e d i a t e d social relations, and w r o n g l y identifies m e d i a t i o n w i t h aliena­ tion. It d e n i e s d i f f e r e n c e in t h e s e n s e of t e m p o r a l and spatial distancing. It i m p l i e s a m o d e l o f t h e g o o d s o c i e t y as c o n s i s t i n g o f d e c e n t r a l i z e d small units w h i c h is b o t h unrealistic and politically u n d e s i r a b l e , and w h i c h a v o i d s t h e political q u e s t i o n of just relations a m o n g s u c h d e c e n t r a l i z e d communities. As t h e a b o v e q u o t a t i o n i n d i c a t e s , theorists of c o m m u n i t y p r i v i l e g e faceto-face relations b e c a u s e t h e y c o n c e i v e t h e m as immediate. I m m e d i a c y is b e t t e r than m e d i a t i o n b e c a u s e i m m e d i a t e relations h a v e t h e purity and s e c u r i t y l o n g e d for in t h e R o u s s e a u i s t d r e a m : w e are transparent to o n e a n o t h e r , p u r e l y c o p r e s e n t in t h e s a m e t i m e and space, c l o s e e n o u g h to t o u c h , and n o t h i n g c o m e s b e t w e e n us to obstruct our vision of o n e an­ other. T h i s ideal of t h e i m m e d i a t e c o p r e s e n c e of subjects, h o w e v e r , is a m e t a ­ physical illusion. E v e n a face-to-face relation b e t w e e n t w o p e o p l e is m e d i ­ a t e d b y v o i c e and g e s t u r e , spacing and temporality. As s o o n as a third p e r s o n e n t e r s t h e interaction t h e possibility arises of t h e relation b e t w e e n t h e first t w o b e i n g m e d i a t e d t h r o u g h t h e third, and so o n . T h e m e d i a t i o n of relations a m o n g p e r s o n s b y t h e s p e e c h and actions of o t h e r p e r s o n s is a f u n d a m e n t a l c o n d i t i o n of sociality. T h e r i c h n e s s , creativity, diversity, and p o t e n t i a l of a s o c i e t y e x p a n d w i t h g r o w t h in t h e s c o p e and m e a n s of its m e d i a , linking p e r s o n s across t i m e and distance. T h e greater t h e t i m e and d i s t a n c e , h o w e v e r , t h e greater t h e n u m b e r o f p e r s o n s w h o stand b e t w e e n other persons. I am not a r g u i n g that t h e r e is n o difference b e t w e e n small g r o u p s in w h i c h p e r s o n s relate to o n e a n o t h e r face-to-face and o t h e r social relations, nor am I d e n y i n g a u n i q u e value to s u c h face-to-face groups. Just as t h e i n t i m a c y of living w i t h a f e w o t h e r s in t h e s a m e h o u s e h o l d has u n i q u e d i m e n s i o n s that are h u m a n l y v a l u a b l e , so existing w i t h o t h e r s in c o m m u ­ n i t i e s of m u t u a l regard has specific characteristics of w a r m t h and sharing that are h u m a n l y valuable. T h e r e is no q u e s t i o n e i t h e r that bureaucrat i z e d capitalist patriarchal s o c i e t y d i s c o u r a g e s and destroys such c o m m u ­ n i t i e s o f m u t u a l f r i e n d s h i p , just as it p r e s s u r e s and fragments families. A vision o f t h e g o o d s o c i e t y s u r e l y s h o u l d i n c l u d e institutional a r r a n g e m e n t s that n u r t u r e t h e specific e x p e r i e n c e of m u t u a l friendship w h i c h o n l y rela­ t i v e l y small g r o u p s interacting in a plurality of c o n t e x t s can p r o d u c e . But r e c o g n i z i n g t h e v a l u e and specificity of such face-to-face relations is differ­ e n t from p r i v i l e g i n g t h e m and p o s i t i n g t h e m as a m o d e l for t h e institu­ tional relations of a w h o l e s o c i e t y . In m y v i e w , a m o d e l of t h e g o o d s o c i e t y as c o m p o s e d of d e c e n t r a l i z e d , e c o n o m i c a l l y self-sufficient face-to-face c o m m u n i t i e s f u n c t i o n i n g as a u ­ t o n o m o u s political e n t i t i e s d o e s not purify politics, as its p r o p o n e n t s think, b u t rather a v o i d s politics. First, it is w i l d l y Utopian. To bring it into

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b e i n g w o u l d r e q u i r e d i s m a n t l i n g t h e urban character of m o d e r n s o c i e t y , a gargantuan o v e r h a u l of living s p a c e , w o r k p l a c e s , places of trade and c o m m e r c e . A m o d e l of a transformed s o c i e t y m u s t b e g i n from t h e material s t r u c t u r e s that are g i v e n to us at this t i m e in history, and in t h e U n i t e d States t h o s e are large-scale industry and urban c e n t e r s . M o r e i m p o r t a n t , h o w e v e r , this m o d e l of t h e g o o d s o c i e t y as usually articulated l e a v e s c o m p l e t e l y u n a d d r e s s e d t h e q u e s t i o n of h o w s u c h small c o m m u n i t i e s relate to o n e another. F r e q u e n t l y t h e ideal projects a l e v e l of self-sufficiency and d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n w h i c h s u g g e s t s that p r o p o n e n t s e n ­ v i s i o n f e w relations a m o n g t h e s e c o m m u n i t i e s e x c e p t occasional friendly visits. S u r e l y it is unrealistic, h o w e v e r , to a s s u m e that s u c h d e c e n t r a l i z e d c o m m u n i t i e s n e e d not e n g a g e in e x t e n s i v e relations of e x c h a n g e of re­ s o u r c e s , g o o d s , and c u l t u r e . P r o p o n e n t s f r e q u e n t l y p r i v i l e g e face-to-face relations in reaction to t h e alienation a n d d o m i n a t i o n p r o d u c e d b y h u g e , faceless b u r e a u c r a c i e s and c o r p o r a t i o n s , w h o s e actions and d e c i s i o n s affect m o s t p e o p l e , b u t are o u t of t h e i r control. A p p e a l s to c o m m u n i t y e n v i s i o n m o r e local and direct control. A m o r e participatory d e m o c r a t i c s o c i e t y s h o u l d i n d e e d e n c o u r ­ a g e a c t i v e p u b l i c s at t h e local l e v e l s of n e i g h b o r h o o d and w o r k p l a c e . But t h e i m p o r t a n t political q u e s t i o n is h o w relations a m o n g t h e s e locales can b e o r g a n i z e d so as to foster j u s t i c e and m i n i m i z e d o m i n a t i o n and o p p r e s ­ sion. I n v o k i n g a mystical ideal of c o m m u n i t y d o e s not address this q u e s ­ tion, b u t rather o b s c u r e s it. Politics m u s t b e c o n c e i v e d as a relationship of strangers w h o d o not u n d e r s t a n d o n e a n o t h e r in a s u b j e c t i v e and i m m e d i ­ a t e s e n s e , relating across t i m e and d i s t a n c e .

U N D E S I R A B L E POLITICAL C O N S E Q U E N C E S O F THE I D E A L O F COMMUNITY

I h a v e a r g u e d that t h e ideal of c o m m u n i t y d e n i e s t h e difference b e t w e e n s u b j e c t s and t h e social differentiation of t e m p o r a l and spatial distancing. T h e m o s t s e r i o u s political c o n s e q u e n c e of t h e d e s i r e for c o m m u n i t y , or for c o p r e s e n c e and m u t u a l identification w i t h o t h e r s , is that it often o p e r a t e s to e x c l u d e or o p p r e s s t h o s e e x p e r i e n c e d as different, C o m m i t m e n t to an ideal of c o m m u n i t y t e n d s to value and enforce h o m o g e n e i t y (cf. H i r s c h , 1986). In ordinary s p e e c h in t h e U n i t e d States, t h e term c o m m u n i t y refers to t h e p e o p l e w i t h w h o m o n e identifies in a specific locale. It refers to n e i g h ­ b o r h o o d , c h u r c h , schools. It also carries c o n n o t a t i o n s of e t h n i c i t y , race, and o t h e r g r o u p identifications. For m o s t p e o p l e , insofar as t h e y c o n s i d e r t h e m s e l v e s m e m b e r s of c o m m u n i t i e s at all, a c o m m u n i t y is a g r o u p that shares a specific h e r i t a g e , a c o m m o n self-identification, a c o m m o n c u l t u r e and s e t of n o r m s . As I a r g u e d in C h a p t e r 5, self-identification as a m e m b e r of s u c h a c o m m u n i t y also often occurs as an oppositional differentiation

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from o t h e r g r o u p s , w h o are feared, d e s p i s e d , or at b e s t d e v a l u e d . P e r s o n s f e e l a s e n s e of m u t u a l identification o n l y w i t h s o m e p e r s o n s , feel in c o m ­ m u n i t y o n l y w i t h t h o s e , and fear t h e difference o t h e r s confront t h e m w i t h b e c a u s e t h e y identify w i t h a different c u l t u r e , history, and p o i n t of v i e w o n t h e w o r l d . T h e ideal of c o m m u n i t y , I s u g g e s t , validates and reinforces t h e fear and a v e r s i o n s o m e social groups exhibit toward o t h e r s . If c o m m u ­ nity is a p o s i t i v e n o r m , that is, if existing t o g e t h e r w i t h o t h e r s in relations of m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g and reciprocity is t h e goal, t h e n it is u n d e r s t a n d ­ a b l e that w e e x c l u d e and avoid t h o s e w i t h w h o m w e d o n o t or c a n n o t identify. Richard S e n n e t t ( 1 9 7 0 , chap. 2) d i s c u s s e s h o w a "myth of c o m m u n i t y " o p e r a t e s p e r p e t u a l l y in A m e r i c a n society to p r o d u c e and implicitly legiti­ m a t e racist and classist b e h a v i o r and policy. In m a n y t o w n s , s u b u r b s , and n e i g h b o r h o o d s p e o p l e d o h a v e an i m a g e of their locale as o n e in w h i c h p e o p l e all k n o w o n e another, h a v e t h e s a m e v a l u e s and life style, and r e l a t e w i t h f e e l i n g s of m u t u a l i t y and l o v e . In m o d e r n A m e r i c a n s o c i e t y s u c h an i m a g e is a l m o s t always false; w h i l e t h e r e m a y b e a d o m i n a n t g r o u p w i t h a distinct set of v a l u e s and life style, w i t h i n any locale o n e can usually find d e v i a n t individuals and groups. Yet t h e m y t h of c o m m u n i t y o p e r a t e s strongly to p r o d u c e d e f e n s i v e exclusionary behavior: p r e s s u r i n g t h e Black family that b u y s a h o u s e on t h e block to l e a v e , b e a t i n g u p t h e Black y o u t h s w h o c o m e i n t o "our" n e i g h b o r h o o d , z o n i n g against t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of multiunit dwellings. T h e e x c l u s i o n a r y c o n s e q u e n c e s of v a l u i n g c o m m u n i t y , m o r e o v e r , are not r e s t r i c t e d to b i g o t s and c o n s e r v a t i v e s . M a n y radical political organiza­ tions f o u n d e r o n t h e d e s i r e for c o m m u n i t y . T o o often p e o p l e in g r o u p s w o r k i n g for social c h a n g e take m u t u a l friendship to b e a goal of t h e g r o u p , and t h u s j u d g e t h e m s e l v e s w a n t i n g as a group w h e n t h e y d o not a c h i e v e s u c h c o m m o n a l i t y ( s e e M a n s b r i d g e , 1980, chap. 2 1 ; B r e i n e s , 1982, e s p . c h a p . 4). S u c h a d e s i r e for c o m m u n i t y often c h a n n e l s e n e r g y away from t h e political goals of t h e g r o u p , and also p r o d u c e s a c l i q u e a t m o s p h e r e w h i c h k e e p s g r o u p s small and turns p o t e n t i a l m e m b e r s away. M u t u a l identification as an implicit g r o u p ideal can r e p r o d u c e a h o m o g e n e i t y that usually conflicts w i t h t h e organization's stated c o m m i t m e n t to diversity. In r e c e n t years m o s t socialist and feminist organizations, for e x a m p l e , h a v e t a k e n racial, class, a g e , and sexual diversity as an i m p o r t a n t criterion a c c o r d i n g to w h i c h t h e s u c c e s s of political organizations s h o u l d b e e v a l u ­ a t e d . To t h e d e g r e e that t h e y take m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g and identifica­ tion as a goal, t h e y m a y b e d e f l e c t e d from this goal of diversity. T h e e x c l u s i o n a r y implications of a d e s i r e for face-to-face relations of m u t u a l identification and sharing p r e s e n t a p r o b l e m for m o v e m e n t s as­ s e r t i n g p o s i t i v e g r o u p difference, w h i c h I d e s c r i b e d in C h a p t e r 6. I ar­ g u e d t h e r e that t h e effort of o p p r e s s e d g r o u p s to reclaim t h e i r g r o u p i d e n -

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tity, and to form w i t h o n e a n o t h e r b o n d s of positive cultural affirmation a r o u n d t h e i r g r o u p specificity, c o n s t i t u t e s an important r e s i s t a n c e to t h e o p p r e s s i o n of cultural i m p e r i a l i s m . It shifts t h e m e a n i n g of difference from o t h e r n e s s and e x c l u s i o n to variation and specificity, and forces d o m i ­ nant g r o u p s to a c k n o w l e d g e t h e i r o w n g r o u p specificity. But d o e s not such affirmation o f g r o u p i d e n t i t y itself e x p r e s s an ideal of c o m m u n i t y , and is it not s u b j e c t to e x c l u s i o n a r y i m p u l s e s ? S o m e social m o v e m e n t s asserting p o s i t i v e g r o u p difference h a v e found t h r o u g h painful confrontation that an u r g e to unity and m u t u a l identifica­ tion d o e s i n d e e d h a v e exclusionary implications. F e m i n i s t efforts to c r e ­ ate w o m e n ' s s p a c e s and w o m e n ' s c u l t u r e , for e x a m p l e , h a v e often as­ s u m e d t h e p e r s p e c t i v e of o n l y a particular s u b g r o u p of w o m e n — w h i t e , or m i d d l e class, or l e s b i a n , or s t r a i g h t — t h u s implicitly e x c l u d i n g or r e n d e r ­ ing i n v i s i b l e t h o s e w o m e n a m o n g t h e m w i t h differing identifications and e x p e r i e n c e s ( S p e l m a n , 1988; P h e l a n , 1987). Similar p r o b l e m s arise for any m o v e m e n t of g r o u p identification, b e c a u s e in our s o c i e t y m o s t p e o p l e h a v e m u l t i p l e g r o u p identifications, and thus g r o u p d i f f e r e n c e s c u t across e v e r y social g r o u p . T h e s e a r g u m e n t s against c o m m u n i t y are not a r g u m e n t s against t h e p o ­ litical project of c o n s t r u c t i n g and affirming a p o s i t i v e g r o u p i d e n t i t y and relations of g r o u p solidarity, as a m e a n s of confronting cultural imperial­ ism and d i s c o v e r i n g things about o n e s e l f and o t h e r s w i t h w h o m o n e feels affinity. C r i t i q u e of t h e ideal of c o m m u n i t y , h o w e v e r , reveals that e v e n in s u c h g r o u p - s p e c i f i c c o n t e x t s affinity cannot m e a n t h e t r a n s p a r e n c y of s e l v e s to o n e another. If in their zeal to affirm a p o s i t i v e m e a n i n g of g r o u p specificity p e o p l e s e e k or try to enforce a strong s e n s e of m u t u a l identifi­ cation, t h e y are likely to r e p r o d u c e e x c l u s i o n s similar to t h o s e t h e y c o n ­ front. T h o s e affirming t h e specificity of a g r o u p affinity s h o u l d at t h e s a m e t i m e r e c o g n i z e and affirm t h e g r o u p and individual differences w i t h i n t h e group.

CITY L I F E AS A NORMATIVE I D E A L

A p p e a l s to c o m m u n i t y are usually antiurban. M u c h sociological literature d i a g n o s e s m o d e r n history as a m o v e m e n t to t h e d a n g e r o u s b u r e a u c r a t i z e d Gesellschaft from t h e m a n a g e a b l e and safe Gemeinschaft, nostalgically re­ c o n s t r u c t e d as a world of lost origins (Stein, 1960; N i s b e t , 1953). M a n y o t h e r s follow R o u s s e a u in r o m a n t i c i z i n g t h e ancient polis and t h e m e d i e ­ val Swiss Burger, d e p l o r i n g t h e c o m m e r c e , disorder, and u n m a n a g e a b l e m a s s character of t h e m o d e r n city (Ellison, 1985; cf. S e n n e t t , 1 9 7 4 , chaps. 7 - 1 0 ) . T h r o u g h o u t t h e m o d e r n p e r i o d , t h e city has often b e e n d e c r i e d as e m b o d y i n g i m m o r a l i t y , artificiality, disorder, and d a n g e r — a s t h e site of

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t r e a s o n o u s c o n s p i r a c i e s , illicit sex, c r i m e , d e v i a n c e , and d i s e a s e ( M o s s e , 1 9 8 5 , p p . 3 2 - 3 3 , 1 3 7 - 3 8 ; O i l m a n , 1985, p. 214). T h e typical i m a g e of t h e m o d e r n city finds it e x p r e s s i n g all t h e d i s v a l u e s that a reinstantiation of community would eliminate. Yet urbanity is t h e h o r i z o n of t h e m o d e r n , not to m e n t i o n t h e p o s t m o d ­ e r n , c o n d i t i o n . C o n t e m p o r a r y political t h e o r y m u s t a c c e p t urbanity as a material g i v e n for t h o s e w h o live in a d v a n c e d industrial s o c i e t i e s . U r b a n relations d e f i n e t h e lives not o n l y of t h o s e w h o l i v e in t h e h u g e m e t r o p o ­ lises, b u t also of t h o s e w h o l i v e in s u b u r b s and large t o w n s . O u r social life is s t r u c t u r e d b y vast n e t w o r k s of t e m p o r a l and spatial m e d i a t i o n a m o n g p e r s o n s , so that n e a r l y e v e r y o n e d e p e n d s o n t h e activities of s e e n and u n s e e n strangers w h o m e d i a t e b e t w e e n o n e s e l f and one's associates, b e ­ t w e e n o n e s e l f a n d o n e ' s objects of d e s i r e . U r b a n i t e s find t h e m s e l v e s relat­ ing g e o g r a p h i c a l l y to i n c r e a s i n g l y large r e g i o n s , thinking little of traveling s e v e n t y m i l e s to w o r k or an hour's drive for an e v e n i n g ' s e n t e r t a i n m e n t . M o s t p e o p l e f r e q u e n t l y and casually e n c o u n t e r strangers in t h e i r daily activities. T h e material s u r r o u n d i n g s and structures available to us d e f i n e and p r e s u p p o s e urban relationships. T h e v e r y size of p o p u l a t i o n s in our s o c i e t y and m o s t o t h e r nations of t h e w o r l d , c o u p l e d w i t h a c o n t i n u i n g s e n s e of national or e t h n i c i d e n t i t y w i t h millions of o t h e r p e o p l e , s u p p o r t s t h e c o n c l u s i o n that a vision of d i s m a n t l i n g t h e city is h o p e l e s s l y Utopian. Starting from t h e g i v e n of m o d e r n urban life is not s i m p l y n e c e s s a r y , m o r e o v e r ; it is d e s i r a b l e . E v e n for m a n y of t h o s e w h o d e c r y t h e aliena­ tion, b u r e a u c r a t i z a t i o n , and mass character of capitalist patriarchal soci­ e t y , city life e x e r t s a p o w e r f u l attraction. M o d e r n literature, art, and film h a v e c e l e b r a t e d city life, its e n e r g y , cultural diversity, t e c h n o l o g i c a l c o m ­ plexity, and t h e m u l t i p l i c i t y of its activities. E v e n m a n y of t h e m o s t s t a u n c h p r o p o n e n t s of d e c e n t r a l i z e d c o m m u n i t y l o v e to s h o w visiting friends a r o u n d t h e B o s t o n or San F r a n c i s c o or N e w York in or near w h i c h t h e y live, c l i m b i n g u p t o w e r s to s e e t h e glitter of lights and s a m p l i n g t h e fare at t h e b e s t e t h n i c restaurants. I p r o p o s e to c o n s t r u c t a n o r m a t i v e ideal of city life as an alternative to b o t h t h e ideal of c o m m u n i t y and t h e liberal individualism it criticizes as asocial. B y "city life" I m e a n a form of social relations w h i c h I d e f i n e as t h e b e i n g t o g e t h e r of strangers. In t h e city p e r s o n s and g r o u p s interact within s p a c e s and i n s t i t u t i o n s t h e y all e x p e r i e n c e t h e m s e l v e s as b e l o n g i n g to, b u t w i t h o u t t h o s e i n t e r a c t i o n s d i s s o l v i n g into unity or c o m m o n n e s s . C i t y life is c o m p o s e d of c l u s t e r s of p e o p l e w i t h affinities—families, social g r o u p n e t w o r k s , v o l u n t a r y associations, n e i g h b o r h o o d n e t w o r k s , a vast array of small " c o m m u n i t i e s . " City d w e l l e r s f r e q u e n t l y v e n t u r e b e y o n d s u c h fa­ miliar e n c l a v e s , h o w e v e r , to t h e m o r e o p e n p u b l i c of politics, c o m m e r c e , and festival, w h e r e strangers m e e t and interact (cf. Lofland, 1973). City

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d w e l l i n g situates o n e ' s o w n i d e n t i t y and activity in relation to a h o r i z o n of a vast variety of o t h e r activity, and t h e a w a r e n e s s that this u n k n o w n , unfa­ miliar activity affects t h e c o n d i t i o n s of o n e ' s o w n . C i t y life is a vast, e v e n infinite, e c o n o m i c n e t w o r k of p r o d u c t i o n , distri­ b u t i o n , transportation, e x c h a n g e , c o m m u n i c a t i o n , s e r v i c e provision, and a m u s e m e n t . C i t y d w e l l e r s d e p e n d o n t h e m e d i a t i o n of t h o u s a n d s of o t h e r p e o p l e a n d vast organizational r e s o u r c e s in order to a c c o m p l i s h their indi­ v i d u a l e n d s . C i t y d w e l l e r s are thus t o g e t h e r , b o u n d to o n e a n o t h e r , in w h a t s h o u l d b e a n d s o m e t i m e s is a s i n g l e polity. T h e i r b e i n g t o g e t h e r entails s o m e c o m m o n p r o b l e m s and c o m m o n i n t e r e s t s , b u t t h e y d o not c r e a t e a c o m m u n i t y of shared final e n d s , of mutual identification and reciprocity. A n o r m a t i v e ideal of city life m u s t b e g i n w i t h our g i v e n e x p e r i e n c e of c i t i e s , and look t h e r e for t h e virtues of this form of social relations. D e f i n ­ i n g an ideal as u n r e a l i z e d possibilities of t h e actual, I extrapolate from that e x p e r i e n c e four such v i r t u e s . (1) Social differentiation without exclusion. City life in urban m a s s soci­ e t y is not i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h s u p p o r t i v e social n e t w o r k s and subcultural c o m m u n i t i e s . I n d e e d , for m a n y it is their n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n . In t h e city social g r o u p differences flourish. M o d e r n i z a t i o n t h e o r y p r e d i c t e d a d e ­ c l i n e in local, e t h n i c , and o t h e r group affiliations as universalist state insti­ t u t i o n s t o u c h p e o p l e ' s lives m o r e directly and as p e o p l e e n c o u n t e r m a n y o t h e r s w i t h identifications and life styles different from their o w n . T h e r e is c o n s i d e r a b l e e v i d e n c e , h o w e v e r , that g r o u p differences are often re­ i n f o r c e d b y city life, and that t h e city e v e n e n c o u r a g e s t h e formation of n e w social g r o u p affinities (Fischer, 1982, p p . 2 0 6 - 3 0 ; Rothschild, 1981). D e v i a n t or m i n o r i t y g r o u p s find in t h e city b o t h a c o v e r of a n o n y m i t y and a critical m a s s unavailable in t h e smaller t o w n . It is hard to i m a g i n e t h e formation of g a y or lesbian g r o u p affinities, for e x a m p l e , w i t h o u t t h e c o n ­ d i t i o n s of t h e m o d e r n city ( D ' E m i l i o , 1983). W h i l e city d w e l l i n g as o p ­ p o s e d to rural life has c h a n g e d t h e lives and s e l f - c o n c e p t s of C h i c a n o s , to take a n o t h e r e x a m p l e , city life e n c o u r a g e s g r o u p identification and a d e ­ sire for cultural nationalism at t h e s a m e t i m e that it m a y d i s s o l v e s o m e traditional p r a c t i c e s or p r o m o t e assimilation to A n g l o l a n g u a g e and v a l u e s (Jankowski, 1986). In actual cities m a n y p e o p l e e x p r e s s v i o l e n t a v e r s i o n s to m e m b e r s of g r o u p s w i t h w h i c h t h e y d o not identify. M o r e than t h o s e w h o l i v e in small t o w n s , h o w e v e r , t h e y t e n d to r e c o g n i z e social g r o u p d i f f e r e n c e as a g i v e n , s o m e t h i n g t h e y m u s t live w i t h (Fischer, 1 9 8 2 , p p . 206-40). In t h e ideal of city life f r e e d o m l e a d s to g r o u p differentiation, to t h e formation of affinity g r o u p s , b u t this social and spatial differentiation of g r o u p s is w i t h o u t e x c l u s i o n . T h e urban ideal e x p r e s s e s difference as I d e ­ fined it in C h a p t e r 6, a s i d e - b y - s i d e particularity n e i t h e r r e d u c i b l e to

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i d e n t i t y nor c o m p l e t e l y other. In this ideal g r o u p s d o not stand in rela­ tions of i n c l u s i o n and e x c l u s i o n , b u t overlap and i n t e r m i n g l e w i t h o u t b e ­ c o m i n g h o m o g e n e o u s . T h o u g h city life as w e n o w e x p e r i e n c e it has m a n y b o r d e r s and e x c l u s i o n s , e v e n our actual e x p e r i e n c e of t h e city also g i v e s hints of w h a t differentiation w i t h o u t e x c l u s i o n can b e . M a n y c i t y n e i g h ­ b o r h o o d s h a v e a distinct e t h n i c i d e n t i t y , but m e m b e r s of o t h e r g r o u p s also d w e l l in t h e m . In t h e g o o d city o n e crosses from o n e distinct n e i g h b o r ­ h o o d to a n o t h e r w i t h o u t k n o w i n g p r e c i s e l y w h e r e o n e e n d e d and t h e o t h e r b e g a n . In t h e n o r m a t i v e ideal of city life, b o r d e r s are o p e n and undecidable. (2) Variety. T h e interfusion of g r o u p s in t h e city occurs partly b e c a u s e of t h e m u l t i u s e differentiation of social space. W h a t m a k e s urban s p a c e s i n t e r e s t i n g , draws p e o p l e out in p u b l i c to t h e m , g i v e s p e o p l e p l e a s u r e and e x c i t e m e n t , is t h e diversity of activities t h e y support. W h e n s t o r e s , res­ taurants, bars, c l u b s , parks, and offices are sprinkled a m o n g r e s i d e n c e s , p e o p l e h a v e a n e i g h b o r l y f e e l i n g about their n e i g h b o r h o o d , t h e y g o out and e n c o u n t e r o n e a n o t h e r o n t h e s t r e e t s and chat. T h e y h a v e a s e n s e of t h e i r n e i g h b o r h o o d as a "spot" or "place," b e c a u s e of that bar's d i s t i n c t i v e c l i e n t e l e , or t h e c i t y w i d e r e p u t a t i o n of t h e pizza at that restaurant. B o t h b u s i n e s s p e o p l e and r e s i d e n t s t e n d to h a v e m o r e c o m m i t m e n t to and care for s u c h n e i g h b o r h o o d s than t h e y d o for s i n g l e - u s e n e i g h b o r h o o d s . M u l t i ­ functional s t r e e t s , parks, and n e i g h b o r h o o d s are also m u c h safer than sin­ g l e - u s e f u n c t i o n a l i z e d s p a c e s b e c a u s e p e o p l e are out on t h e s t r e e t s d u r i n g m o s t h o u r s , a n d h a v e c o m m i t m e n t to t h e place (Jacobs, 1 9 6 1 , chap. 8; S e n n e t t , 1970, c h a p . 4; cf. W h y t e , 1988, chaps. 9, 2 2 - 2 5 ) . (3) Eroticism. C i t y life also instantiates difference as t h e erotic, in t h e w i d e s e n s e o f an attraction to t h e other, t h e p l e a s u r e and e x c i t e m e n t of b e i n g d r a w n o u t of o n e ' s s e c u r e routine to e n c o u n t e r t h e n o v e l , strange, and surprising (cf. B a r t h e s , 1986). T h e erotic d i m e n s i o n of t h e city has always b e e n an a s p e c t of its fearfulness, for it h o l d s out t h e possibility that o n e will l o s e o n e ' s i d e n t i t y , will fall. But w e also take p l e a s u r e in b e i n g o p e n to and i n t e r e s t e d in p e o p l e w e e x p e r i e n c e as different. W e s p e n d a S u n d a y afternoon walking t h r o u g h C h i n a t o w n , or c h e c k i n g out this w e e k ' s e c c e n t r i c players in t h e park. W e look for restaurants, s t o r e s , and c l u b s w i t h s o m e t h i n g n e w for u s , a n e w e t h n i c food, a different a t m o ­ s p h e r e , a different c r o w d of p e o p l e . W e walk t h r o u g h s e c t i o n s of t h e city that w e e x p e r i e n c e as h a v i n g u n i q u e characters w h i c h are not ours, w h e r e p e o p l e from d i v e r s e p l a c e s m i n g l e and t h e n g o h o m e . T h e e r o t i c attraction h e r e is p r e c i s e l y t h e o b v e r s e of c o m m u n i t y . In t h e ideal of c o m m u n i t y p e o p l e feel affirmed b e c a u s e t h o s e w i t h w h o m t h e y share e x p e r i e n c e s , p e r c e p t i o n s , and goals r e c o g n i z e and are r e c o g n i z e d b y t h e m ; o n e s e e s o n e s e l f r e f l e c t e d in t h e o t h e r s . T h e r e is a n o t h e r kind of p l e a s u r e , h o w e v e r , in c o m i n g to e n c o u n t e r a subjectivity, a set o f m e a n -

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ings, that is different, unfamiliar. O n e takes p l e a s u r e in b e i n g d r a w n out of o n e s e l f to u n d e r s t a n d that t h e r e are o t h e r m e a n i n g s , p r a c t i c e s , p e r ­ s p e c t i v e s o n t h e city, a n d that o n e c o u l d learn or e x p e r i e n c e s o m e t h i n g m o r e and different b y interacting w i t h t h e m . T h e city's e r o t i c i s m also d e r i v e s from t h e a e s t h e t i c s of its material b e i n g : t h e bright and c o l o r e d lights, t h e g r a n d e u r of its b u i l d i n g s , t h e j u x t a p o s i t i o n of a r c h i t e c t u r e of different t i m e s , s t y l e s , and p u r p o s e s . City s p a c e offers d e l i g h t s and surprises. Walk around t h e corner, or o v e r a f e w b l o c k s , and y o u e n c o u n t e r a different spatial m o o d , a n e w play of sight and s o u n d , and n e w i n t e r a c t i v e m o v e m e n t . T h e erotic m e a n i n g of t h e city arises from its social and spatial inexhaustibility. A place of m a n y p l a c e s , t h e city folds o v e r o n itself in so m a n y layers and relationships that it is i n c o m p r e h e n s i b l e . O n e c a n n o t "take it in," o n e n e v e r feels as t h o u g h t h e r e is n o t h i n g n e w and i n t e r e s t i n g to e x p l o r e , n o n e w and i n t e r e s t i n g p e o p l e to m e e t . (4) Publicity. Political theorists w h o extol t h e value of c o m m u n i t y often c o n s t r u e t h e p u b l i c as a realm of unity and m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g , b u t this d o e s not c o h e r e with our actual e x p e r i e n c e of p u b l i c s p a c e s . B e c a u s e by definition a p u b l i c s p a c e is a place a c c e s s i b l e to a n y o n e , w h e r e a n y o n e can participate and w i t n e s s , in e n t e r i n g t h e p u b l i c o n e always risks e n c o u n t e r w i t h t h o s e w h o are different, t h o s e w h o identify w i t h different g r o u p s and h a v e different o p i n i o n s or different forms o f l i f e . T h e g r o u p diversity of t h e city is m o s t often apparent in p u b l i c spaces. This h e l p s a c c o u n t for their vitality and e x c i t e m e n t . C i t i e s p r o v i d e important p u b l i c s p a c e s — s t r e e t s , parks, and p l a z a s — w h e r e p e o p l e stand and sit t o g e t h e r , interact and m i n g l e , or s i m p l y w i t n e s s o n e another, w i t h o u t b e c o m i n g unified in a c o m m u n i t y of "shared final e n d s . " Politics, t h e critical activity of raising i s s u e s and d e c i d i n g h o w institu­ tional and social relations s h o u l d b e o r g a n i z e d , crucially d e p e n d s o n t h e e x i s t e n c e o f s p a c e s and forums to w h i c h e v e r y o n e has a c c e s s . In such p u b ­ lic s p a c e s p e o p l e e n c o u n t e r o t h e r p e o p l e , m e a n i n g s , e x p r e s s i o n s , i s s u e s , w h i c h t h e y m a y not u n d e r s t a n d or w i t h w h i c h t h e y d o not identify. T h e force of p u b l i c d e m o n s t r a t i o n s , for e x a m p l e , often consists in b r i n g i n g to p e o p l e w h o pass t h r o u g h p u b l i c s p a c e s t h o s e i s s u e s , d e m a n d s , and p e o p l e t h e y m i g h t o t h e r w i s e avoid. As a n o r m a t i v e ideal city life p r o v i d e s p u b l i c p l a c e s and forums w h e r e a n y o n e can speak and a n y o n e can listen. B e c a u s e city life is a b e i n g t o g e t h e r of strangers, d i v e r s e and o v e r l a p ­ p i n g n e i g h b o r s , social j u s t i c e cannot i s s u e from t h e institution of an E n ­ l i g h t e n m e n t universal p u b l i c . O n t h e contrary, social j u s t i c e in t h e city r e q u i r e s t h e realization of a politics of difference. This politics lays d o w n institutional and ideological m e a n s for r e c o g n i z i n g and affirming d i v e r s e social g r o u p s b y g i v i n g political r e p r e s e n t a t i o n to t h e s e g r o u p s , and c e l e ­ brating t h e i r d i s t i n c t i v e characteristics and cultures. In t h e u n o p p r e s s i v e

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city p e o p l e o p e n to u n a s s i m i l a t e d o t h e r n e s s . W e all h a v e our familiar rela­ tions and affinities, t h e p e o p l e to w h o m w e feel close and w i t h w h o m w c share daily life. T h e s e familial and social g r o u p s o p e n o n t o a p u b l i c in w h i c h all participate, and that p u b l i c m u s t b e o p e n and a c c e s s i b l e to all. C o n t r a r y to t h e c o m m u n i t a r i a n tradition, h o w e v e r , that p u b l i c c a n n o t b e c o n c e i v e d as a unity t r a n s c e n d i n g g r o u p differences, nor as entailing c o m ­ p l e t e m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g . In p u b l i c life t h e differences r e m a i n unas­ s i m i l a t e d , but e a c h participating g r o u p a c k n o w l e d g e s and is o p e n to lis­ t e n i n g to t h e o t h e r s . T h e p u b l i c is h e t e r o g e n e o u s , plural, and playful, a p l a c e w h e r e p e o p l e w i t n e s s and appreciate d i v e r s e cultural e x p r e s s i o n s that t h e y d o not share and d o not fully u n d e r s t a n d .

C I T I E S A N D SOCIAL INJUSTICE

An ideal can inspire action for social c h a n g e o n l y if it arises from possibili­ ties s u g g e s t e d b y actual e x p e r i e n c e . T h e ideals of city life I h a v e p r o p o s e d are r e a l i z e d i n c i d e n t a l l y and i n t e r m i t t e n t l y in s o m e cities today. T h e r e is n o d o u b t , h o w e v e r , that m a n y large cities in t h e U n i t e d States today are sites of d e c a y , p o v e r t y , and c r i m e . T h e r e is just as little d o u b t that t h e s m a l l e r t o w n s and s u b u r b s to w h i c h m a n y p e o p l e e s c a p e from t h e s e ills are s t r u n g a l o n g c o n g e s t e d h i g h w a y s , are h o m o g e n e o u s , s e g r e g a t e d , and p r i v a t i z e d . In e i t h e r case, an ideal of city life as eroticized p u b l i c vitality w h e r e differences are affirmed in o p e n n e s s m i g h t s e e m laughably Uto­ pian. F o r o n city streets today t h e d e p t h of social injustice is apparent: h o m e l e s s p e o p l e l y i n g in d o o r w a y s , rape in parks, and c o l d - b l o o d e d racist m u r d e r are t h e realities of city life. In C h a p t e r 1 I a r g u e d that a critical t h e o r y of social j u s t i c e m u s t c o n ­ s i d e r not o n l y d i s t r i b u t i v e p a t t e r n s , but also t h e p r o c e s s e s and relation­ ships that p r o d u c e and r e p r o d u c e t h o s e patterns. W h i l e i s s u e s of t h e dis­ t r i b u t i o n of g o o d s and r e s o u r c e s are central to reflections on social j u s t i c e , i s s u e s of d e c i s i o n m a k i n g p o w e r and p r o c e s s e s , t h e division of labor, and c u l t u r e are just as i m p o r t a n t . N o w h e r e is this a r g u m e n t b e t t e r illustrated t h a n in t h e c o n t e x t of social injustice in t h e city. I n e q u a l i t i e s of distribu­ tion can b e read o n t h e face of b u i l d i n g s , n e i g h b o r h o o d s , and t o w n s . M o s t cities h a v e t o o m a n y places w h e r e e v e r y o n e w o u l d a g r e e n o o n e s h o u l d h a v e to live. T h e s e m a y b e a stone's t h r o w from o p u l e n t corporate h e a d ­ quarters or luxury c o n d o m i n i u m s . T h e correct principles and m e t h o d s of distribution m a y b e a subject of c o n t r o v e r s y , but as t h e y w a n d e r t h r o u g h A m e r i c a n city s t r e e t s f e w w o u l d d e n y that s o m e t h i n g is w r o n g w i t h exist­ ing d i s t r i b u t i o n s . T h e social s t r u c t u r e s , p r o c e s s e s , and relationships that p r o d u c e and re­ p r o d u c e t h e s e d i s t r i b u t i o n s , h o w e v e r , are not so visible o n t h e surface of o u r cities. Yet n o r m a t i v e t h e o r y m u s t identify and e v a l u a t e t h e m as w e l l

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as their o u t c o m e s . In this s e c t i o n I shall discuss t h r e e a s p e c t s of t h e s e p r o c e s s e s that c o n t r i b u t e to d o m i n a t i o n and o p p r e s s i o n : (a) c e n t r a l i z e d c o r p o r a t e and b u r e a u c r a t i c d o m i n a t i o n of cities; (b) d e c i s i o n m a k i n g struc­ t u r e s in m u n i c i p a l i t i e s and their h i d d e n m e c h a n i s m s of redistribution; and (c) p r o c e s s e s of s e g r e g a t i o n and e x c l u s i o n , b o t h within cities and b e t w e e n cities and s u b u r b s . (a) C o r p o r a t e and city p o w e r o n c e c o i n c i d e d . F i r m s started in a city and e x p l o i t e d t h e labor of t h e city's p o p u l a t i o n , and t h e city g r e w and pros­ p e r e d w i t h t h e s u c c e s s of its major firms. Industrial m a g n a t e s r u l e d t h e c i t i e s , e i t h e r directly as city officials, or m o r e indirectly as b e h i n d - t h e s c e n e s framers of city policy. H a v i n g a self-serving paternal a t t i t u d e to­ w a r d t h e s e c i t i e s , t h e ruling families e n g a g e d in p h i l a n t h r o p i c projects, b u i l d i n g m u s e u m s , libraries, parks, plazas, and statues as gifts to t h e p u b ­ lic and m o n u m e n t s to t h e i r w e a l t h and e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l i n g e n u i t y . T h e captains of industry often ruled ruthlessly, k e e p i n g t h e majority o f p e o p l e in squalor and i g n o r a n c e , b u t t h e y had a s e n s e of place, w e r e t i e d e c o n o m ­ ically, socially, a n d politically to o n e or a f e w cities. T o d a y c o r p o r a t e capital is h o m e l e s s . T h e e n t e r p r i s e s that rule t h e w o r l d e c o n o m y are larger than m a n y cities, s o m e larger than m a n y n a t i o n s , w i t h b r a n c h e s d o t t i n g t h e g l o b e , and n o c e n t e r . M e r g e r s , interlocking direc­ t o r s h i p s , h o l d i n g c o m p a n i e s , and t h e d i s p e r s i o n of o w n e r s h i p t h r o u g h s e ­ curities and stock market s p e c u l a t i o n m e a n that political and e c o n o m i c p o w e r is d i s l o d g e d from p l a c e . Fast as a satellite signal, capital travels from o n e e n d of a c o n t i n e n t to t h e other, from o n e e n d of t h e w o r l d to t h e other. Its d i r e c t i o n d e p e n d s o n t h e pull of profit, and its directors rarely c o n s i d e r h o w its m o v e m e n t m a y affect local e c o n o m i e s . M u n i c i p a l i t i e s are d e p e n d e n t o n this flighty capital for t h e h e a l t h of t h e i r e c o n o m i c infrastructure. T h e y m u s t sell b o n d s o n t h e o p e n market to raise f u n d s for p u b l i c works. B e c a u s e t h e r e are n o national or state p o l i c i e s for e n c o u r a g i n g i n v e s t m e n t in particular cities or r e g i o n s that n e e d r e s o u r c e s and i n d u s t r y for their e c o n o m i c health, cities m u s t c o m ­ p e t e w i t h o n e a n o t h e r to p r o v i d e an attractive " i n v e s t m e n t c l i m a t e " (cf. E l k i n , 1 9 8 7 , p p . 3 0 - 3 1 ) . T h e y d e p e n d o n private capital for h o u s i n g , of­ fice, and c o m m e r c i a l s p a c e , p r o d u c t i o n facilities, p u b l i c w o r k s , and w i t h all this, of c o u r s e , j o b s . T h e i r p u b l i c funds d e p e n d o n taxing t h e private i n v e s t o r s d o i n g b u s i n e s s w i t h i n their b o r d e r s . W h e r e cities o n c e at least c o u l d h o l d t h e carrot of lordly p o w e r and p r e s t i g e before c o r p o r a t e d e c i ­ s i o n m a k e r s , today cities are r e d u c e d to l o w l y supplicants, w i t h little lev­ e r a g e for bargaining. C i t i e s are also relatively p o w e r l e s s b e f o r e t h e state. Gerald F r u g (1980) relates h o w A m e r i c a n liberalism has always b e e n h o s t i l e to a distinct and i n d e p e n d e n t legal status for cities, and h o w gradually t h e law has r e m o v e d

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m o s t of t h e p o w e r s cities o n c e had. C i t i e s today h a v e only t h o s e p o w e r s d e l e g a t e d to t h e m b y state g o v e r n m e n t s , and t h e s e are usually rigorously l i m i t e d b y judicial interpretation. W h a t d e c i s i o n m a k i n g authority cities h a v e is r e s t r i c t e d to matters d e e m e d e n t i r e l y local, and t h e s e are increas­ i n g l y few. State laws not only r e g u l a t e t h e kind and a m o u n t of taxes cities can l e v y , t h e y also restrict t h e p o w e r s of cities to b o r r o w m o n e y . C i t i e s are l i m i t e d in t h e kind of laws t h e y can pass, w h i c h are g e n e r a l l y re­ stricted to "welfare i m p r o v i n g regulatory s e r v i c e s " (cf. E l k i n , 1987, p p . 21-31). N o t o n l y are city legal p o w e r s restricted and r e g u l a t e d b y t h e state, but cities h a v e b e c o m e increasingly d e p e n d e n t o n state and federal g o v e r n ­ m e n t for o p e r a t i n g funds to p r o v i d e their s e r v i c e s , and increasingly c o m e u n d e r t h e authority of state and federal g o v e r n m e n t in t h e administration of s e r v i c e s . H e a l t h , h o u s i n g , and welfare s e r v i c e s a d m i n i s t e r e d at t h e city l e v e l are usually r e g u l a t e d b y state and federal b u r e a u c r a c i e s , and cities d e p e n d o n state and federal grants for t h e i r c o n t i n u e d o p e r a t i o n . M a n y local s e r v i c e s , "such as e d u c a t i o n , transportation and health care, are pro­ v i d e d not b y cities b u t b y special districts or p u b l i c authorities o r g a n i z e d to c u t across city b o u n d a r i e s and o v e r w h i c h cities have no control" (Frug, 1 9 8 0 , p. 1065). T h e " n e w f e d e r a l i s m " of t h e past d e c a d e has not signifi­ cantly a l t e r e d t h e city's financial d e p e n d e n c e o n larger bureaucratic e n t i ­ ties. It has s o m e w h a t i n c r e a s e d cities' administrative r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s , often w h i l e r e d u c i n g t h e r e s o u r c e s w i t h w h i c h t h e y can administer. T h e d o m i n a t i o n of c e n t r a l i z e d b u r e a u c r a c i e s , w h e t h e r p u b l i c or pri­ vate, o v e r m u n i c i p a l e c o n o m i e s t e n d s to dissociate l i v e d or e x p e r i e n c e d s p a c e from t h e c o m m o d i f i e d s p a c e of abstract planning and calculation ( G o t t d i n g e r , 1 9 8 5 , p p . 2 9 0 - 9 7 ; Castells, 1983, chap. 31). Capitalist b u ­ reaucratic rationality fosters bird's-eye p l a n n i n g w h i c h e n c o m p a s s e s vast r e g i o n s i n c l u d i n g h u g e m e t r o p o l i t a n areas, or e v e n several states to­ g e t h e r . F r o m this s k y t o p v i s i o n , i n v e s t o r s and p l a n n i n g bureaucrats d e t e r m i n e t h e p l a c e m e n t and d e s i g n of h i g h w a y s , factories, s h o p p i n g fa­ cilities, offices, a n d parks. T h e y d e c i d e t h e m o s t rational and efficient i n v e s t m e n t from t h e p o i n t of v i e w of their portfolio and t h e i r c e n t r a l i z e d office o p e r a t i o n s , b u t not n e c e s s a r i l y from t h e point of v i e w of t h e locales in w h i c h t h e y i n v e s t . T o o often this bureaucratic rationality and efficiency results in a d e a d e n i n g separation of functions, w i t h o p p r e s s i v e c o n s e ­ q u e n c e s that I will discuss shortly. It also often results in abrupt d i s i n v e s t ­ m e n t in o n e r e g i o n and m a s s i v e disruptive s p e c u l a t i o n in another, e a c h w i t h significant c o n s e q u e n c e s for t h e welfare of p e o p l e in t h o s e locales. T h e realization of t h e d e s i g n e r s ' plans creates an abstract s p a c e of efficiency and Cartesian rationality that often c o m e s to d o m i n a t e and dis­ place t h e l i v e d s p a c e of h u m a n m o v e m e n t and interaction:

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What tends to disappear is the meaning of places for people. Each place, each city, will receive its social meaning from its location in the hierarchy of a net­ work whose control and rhythm will escape from each place and, even more, from the people in each place. Furthermore, people will be shifted according to the continuous restructuring of an increasingly specialized space. . . . The new space of a world capitalist system, combining the informational and the indus­ trial modes of development, is a space of variable geometry, formed by locations hierarchically ordered in a continuously changing network of flows: flows of capital, labor, elements of production, commodities, information, decisions, and signals. The new urban meaning of the dominant class is the absence of any meaning based on experience. The abstraction of production tends to become total. The new source of power relies on the control of the entire network of information. Space is dissolved into flows: cities become shadows that explode and disappear according to decisions that their dwellers will always ignore. The outer experience is cut off from the inner experience. The new tendential urban meaning is the spatial and cultural separation of people from their production and from their history. (Castells, 1983, p. 314) (b) T h o u g h city and t o w n g o v e r n m e n t s are s e r i o u s l y c o n s t r a i n e d b y t h e d o m i n a t i o n of state and corporate i m p e r a t i v e s , t h e y n e v e r t h e l e s s d o make d e c i s i o n s , e s p e c i a l l y about land u s e and z o n i n g . D e c i s i o n m a k i n g struc­ tures and p r o c e s s e s at t h e local l e v e l , h o w e v e r , often t e n d to c r e a t e and e x a c e r b a t e injustice. In C h a p t e r 3 I d i s c u s s e d h o w policy formation in welfare capitalist soci­ e t y t e n d s to b e d e p o l i t i c i z e d and o p e r a t e s t h r o u g h a relatively c l o s e d c l u b of i n t e r e s t - g r o u p bargainers. S u c h depoliticization is p e r h a p s e v e n m o r e typical at t h e m u n i c i p a l l e v e l than at state or national l e v e l s . S t e p h e n Elkin a r g u e s that in m o s t cities land u s e d e c i s i o n s , t h e local d e c i s i o n s that m o s t affect t h e spatial e n v i r o n m e n t of t h e city and its e c o n o m i c life, are a s e m i p r i v a t e p r o c e s s i n v o l v i n g a triangle of capitalist d e v e l o p e r s , city b u ­ reaucrats, and e l e c t e d city officials. T h e a s s u m p t i o n s and i n t e r e s t s of t h e s e g r o u p s s e t t h e basic p a r a m e t e r s for such d e c i s i o n s , w h i c h are rou­ t i n e , usually u n q u e s t i o n e d and rarely publicly d i s c u s s e d . This routine f r a m e w o r k , Elkin a r g u e s , is usually biased toward g r o w t h and d o w n t o w n d e v e l o p m e n t , e m p h a s i z i n g big, flashy, visible projects. T h e empirical re­ cord s h o w s , h o w e v e r , that land u s e d e c i s i o n m a k i n g b i a s e d in t h e s e w a y s c o n t r i b u t e s to i n c r e a s i n g i n e q u a l i t i e s (see E l k i n , 1987, c h a p . 5; cf. Logan and M o l o t c h , 1987, chaps. 3 and 4). W i t h t h e basic r e s o u r c e s and institutional structure already g i v e n , in­ t e r e s t g r o u p s in t h e city v i e for and bargain o v e r t h e distributive effects of city p r o j e c t s . B e c a u s e s o m e interests are b e t t e r able to organize than o t h ­ ers, h a v e e a s i e r access to t h e major d e c i s i o n m a k e r s and their information, and so o n , this political p r o c e s s usually e i t h e r r e p r o d u c e s initial distribu-

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tions or i n c r e a s e s i n e q u a l i t i e s ( H a r v e y , 1973, p p . 7 3 - 7 9 ; E l k i n , 1987, p p . 93-102). T h e framework of privatized land u s e d e c i s i o n m a k i n g a c c o r d i n g to u n ­ q u e s t i o n e d r o u t i n e s , c o u p l e d w i t h i n t e r e s t - g r o u p bargaining o v e r t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s of a p p l y i n g t h e framework, illustrates o n e of several "hid­ d e n m e c h a n i s m s " that D a v i d H a r v e y (1973, e s p . chap. 3) a r g u e s p r o d u c e and r e p r o d u c e social i n e q u a l i t i e s and o p p r e s s i o n in cities. Policies to i m ­ p r o v e t h e lives and o p p o r t u n i t i e s of t h e poor, t h e m a r g i n a l i z e d , or t h o s e o t h e r w i s e d i s a d v a n t a g e d will h a v e little effect u n l e s s t h e s e h i d d e n m e c h a ­ n i s m s are u n d e r s t o o d a n d r e s t r u c t u r e d . T w o o t h e r s u c h m e c h a n i s m s that H a r v e y c i t e s are location and adaptability. T h e location of land u s e projects often has serious redistributional i m ­ pact o n r e s i d e n t s of a city. S o m e , usually t h e p o o r and u n o r g a n i z e d , are d i s p l a c e d by projects. T h e location of p r o d u c t i o n facilities, p u b l i c ser­ v i c e s , transportation facilities, h o u s i n g , and s h o p p i n g areas affects differ­ e n t s e c t o r s of t h e p o p u l a t i o n differently. Proximity to o n e facility m a y b e n e f i t s o m e , b y g i v i n g t h e m e a s i e r or less costly a c c e s s to a g o o d or activity. Proximity to a n o t h e r kind of facility, o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , m a y dis­ a d v a n t a g e s o m e b y i m p o s i n g i n c o n v e n i e n c e s such as dirt, n o i s e , or e n v i ­ r o n m e n t a l danger. A l t h o u g h a person's o w n material situation m a y r e m a i n c o n s t a n t , his or h e r life o p p o r t u n i t i e s m a y n e v e r t h e l e s s c h a n g e signifi­ cantly b e c a u s e of s u r r o u n d i n g c h a n g e s ( H a r v e y , 1973, p p . 5 6 - 6 3 ) . T h e l o s s e s c a u s e d b y u r b a n c h a n g e s m a y i n v o l v e not only m o n e t a r y b u r d e n s , i n c o n v e n i e n c e , and loss of a c c e s s to r e s o u r c e s and s e r v i c e s , b u t also t h e loss of t h e v e r y e n v i r o n m e n t that h e l p s d e f i n e a person's s e n s e of self or a group's s p a c e and c u l t u r e (Elkin, 1 9 8 7 , p. 90). A n o t h e r h i d d e n m e c h a n i s m of redistribution, according to H a r v e y , is t h e different adaptability of groups: s o m e g r o u p s are b e t t e r a b l e than o t h ­ ers to adjust to c h a n g e in t h e urban e n v i r o n m e n t . T h u s o n e group's adjust­ m e n t often lags b e h i n d another's, usually increasing i n e q u a l i t y b e t w e e n t h e m . S o m e t i m e s t h e disparity is c a u s e d by differences in initial l e v e l s of material r e s o u r c e s . Just as often, h o w e v e r , t h e differences in ability to adjust h a v e t h e i r s o u r c e s in c u l t u r e or life style ( H a r v e y , 1973, p p . 62—64). P o v e r t y , e x p l o i t a t i o n , marginalization, and cultural i m p e r i a l i s m often d e ­ t e r m i n e that t h o s e less a b l e to adapt to urban c h a n g e s are m o r e often r e q u i r e d to do so (Elkin, 1987, p. 86). (c) I h a v e already n o t e d h o w bureaucratic rationality i m p o s e s an ab­ stract s p a c e of o r d e r a n d function o v e r t h e l i v e d space of m u l t i u s e interac­ tion. T h e t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y has s e e n a s t e a d y increase in t h e functionalization and s e g r e g a t i o n of urban space. T h e earliest separation was t h e creation of residential districts spatially s e p a r a t e d from manufacturing, retail, e n t e r t a i n m e n t , c o m m e r c e , and g o v e r n m e n t . R e c e n t d e c a d e s , h o w ­ e v e r , h a v e s e e n a rapid i n c r e a s e in t h e spatial s e g r e g a t i o n of e a c h of t h e s e

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o t h e r functions from o n e another. E a c h sort of activity occurs in its o w n w a l l e d e n c l a v e s , distinctly cut off from t h e o t h e r s . T h e separation of functions in urban s p a c e r e d u c e s t h e vitality of cities, m a k i n g city life m o r e b o r i n g , m e a n i n g l e s s , and d a n g e r o u s . D o w n t o w n districts b u s t l i n g w i t h p e o p l e in the day hours b e c o m e e e r i l y d e s e r t e d at night, w h e n p e o p l e s w a r m to t h e indoor s h o p p i n g mall, w h i c h , d e s p i t e t h e b e s t efforts of d e s i g n e r s , is b o r i n g and frenetic. R e s i d e n t i a l n e i g h b o r ­ h o o d s find f e w p e o p l e o n t h e s t r e e t s e i t h e r day or night, b e c a u s e t h e r e is n o w h e r e to g o and not m u c h to look at w i t h o u t a p p e a r i n g to e n c r o a c h on t h e privacy of o t h e r s . This separation of functions a u g m e n t s o p p r e s s i o n and d o m i n a t i o n in several w a y s . T h e territorial separation of w o r k p l a c e s from residential c o m m u n i t i e s d i v i d e s t h e i n t e r e s t of w o r k i n g p e o p l e b e t w e e n t h e s h o p floor, o n t h e o n e h a n d , and c o n s u m e r and n e i g h b o r h o o d c o n c e r n s , o n t h e other. W h i l e corporate and state bureaucrats construct their b i r d ' s - e y e v i e w of c i t i e s a n d r e g i o n s , c i t i z e n s are u n a b l e to e n g a g e in significant col­ l e c t i v e action o n t h e s a m e scale, b e c a u s e t h e separation of h o m e and work p r e v e n t s t h e m from c o n s t r u c t i n g a larger p a t t e r n . Territorial separation of r e s i d e n c e s from s h o p p i n g c e n t e r s , manufactur­ ing, p u b l i c plazas, and so o n has specific d a m a g i n g c o n s e q u e n c e s for t h e l i v e s o f w o m e n , e s p e c i a l l y m o t h e r s . A full-time h o m e m a k e r and m o t h e r w h o l i v e s in a central city a p a r t m e n t w i t h i n walking d i s t a n c e o f stores, restaurants, offices, parks, and social s e r v i c e s has a life v e r y different from that of t h e w o m a n w h o s p e n d s h e r day in a suburban h o u s e s u r r o u n d e d for m i l e s b y o n l y h o u s e s and s c h o o l s . T h e separation of urban functions forces h o m e m a k i n g w o m e n into isolation and b o r e d o m . It also m a k e s their w o r k — s h o p p i n g , o c c u p y i n g c h i l d r e n , taking t h e m to activities, g o i n g to d o c t o r s , d e n t i s t s , i n s u r a n c e a g e n t s , and so o n — m o r e difficult and t i m e c o n s u m i n g . To t h e d e g r e e that t h e y retain primary responsibility for chil­ d r e n and o t h e r d e p e n d e n t family m e m b e r s , w o r k i n g w o m e n too suffer from t h e spatial separation of urban functions, w h i c h often limits their w o r k o p p o r t u n i t i e s to t h e f e w usually l o w - p a y i n g clerical and s e r v i c e j o b s c l o s e to r e s i d e n t i a l locations, or e l s e forces t h e m t o traverse large spans of city s p a c e e a c h day in a triangle or square, from h o m e to child care to work to g r o c e r y s t o r e to child care to h o m e ( H a y d e n , 1983, p p . 4 9 - 5 9 ) . T h e separation o f functions and t h e c o n s e q u e n t n e e d for transportation to g e t to j o b s and s e r v i c e s also c o n t r i b u t e s directly to t h e i n c r e a s e d marginality of o l d p e o p l e , p o o r p e o p l e , d i s a b l e d p e o p l e , and o t h e r s w h o b e c a u s e of life situation as w e l l as l i m i t e d access to r e s o u r c e s are less able to m o v e i n d e p e n d e n t l y in w i d e areas. O n e a s p e c t of t h e n o r m a t i v e ideal of city life, I h a v e said, is a social differentiation w i t h o u t e x c l u s i o n . G r o u p s will differentiate b y affinities,

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b u t t h e b o r d e r s will b e u n d e c i d a b l e , and t h e r e will b e m u c h o v e r l a p and i n t e r m i n g l i n g . O n e of t h e m o s t disturbing a s p e c t s of c o n t e m p o r a r y urban life is t h e d e p t h a n d f r e q u e n c y of a v e r s i v e b e h a v i o r w h i c h occurs w i t h i n it. G r o u p s e g r e g a t i o n is p r o d u c e d b y a v e r s i v e p e r c e p t i o n s that d e p r e c a t e s o m e g r o u p s , d e f i n i n g t h e m as e n t i r e l y other, to b e s h u n n e d and a v o i d e d . B a n k s , real e s t a t e firms, city officials, n e w s p a p e r s , and r e s i d e n t s all pro­ m o t e an i m a g e of n e i g h b o r h o o d s as places w h e r e o n l y certain kinds of p e o p l e b e l o n g and o t h e r s d o not, d e e p l y reinforcing a v e r s i v e racism and t h e m e c h a n i s m b y w h i c h s o m e g r o u p s are c o n s t r u c t e d as t h e d e p i s e d O t h ­ ers. Z o n i n g regulation e n f o r c e s class s e g r e g a t i o n , and to a large d e g r e e racial s e g r e g a t i o n as w e l l , by, for e x a m p l e , e x c l u d i n g multifamily d w e l l ­ ings from p r o s p e r o u s n e i g h b o r h o o d s and e v e n from e n t i r e m u n i c i p a l i t i e s . T h e s e g r o u p e x c l u s i o n s p r o d u c e t h e c o n d i t i o n s for harrassment of or v i o ­ l e n c e against any p e r s o n s found w h e r e t h e y d o not "belong." T h e m y t h of n e i g h b o r h o o d c o m m u n i t y , of c o m m o n v a l u e s and life style, I h a v e ar­ g u e d , fuels s u c h e x c l u s i o n s . T h e separation p e r h a p s m o s t far r e a c h i n g in its effect o n social j u s t i c e is t h e legal s e p a r a t i o n of m u n i c i p a l i t i e s t h e m s e l v e s . W h i l e social a n d e c o ­ n o m i c p r o c e s s e s h a v e nearly o b l i t e r a t e d any distinction b e t w e e n urban and rural life, and corporate and bureaucratic p l a n n i n g e n c o m p a s s e s h u g e m e t r o p o l i t a n r e g i o n s , t h e s e s a m e r e g i o n s i n c l u d e scores of legally distinct m u n i c i p a l i t i e s , w i t h their o w n local g o v e r n m e n t s , o r d i n a n c e s , and p u b l i c s e r v i c e s . To avoid t h e u g l i n e s s , c o m p l e x i t y , and dangers of c o n t e m p o r a r y city life, and often to a v o i d h a v i n g to interact w i t h certain kinds of p e o p l e , m a n y p e o p l e s e e k c o m m u n i t y in t h e suburbs and small t o w n s o u t s i d e t h e city. T h e town's s m a l l n e s s and t h e fact that it is legally a u t o n o m o u s to m a k e its o w n o r d i n a n c e s w i t h i n t h e limits of state and federal regulation p r o d u c e t h e illusion of local control. In fact t h e separation of t o w n s r e n ­ d e r s t h e m p o w e r l e s s against corporate and bureaucratic d o m i n a t i o n . T h e legal and social separation of city and s u b u r b s , m o r e o v e r , c o n t r i b ­ u t e s to social injustice. A direct relation of exploitation exists b e t w e e n m o s t large A m e r i c a n cities and t h e i r suburbs. R e s i d e n t s of t h e s u b u r b s w o r k in t h e city, u s e t h e city's s e r v i c e s , and e n j o y its life b u t , e x c e p t in t h o s e rare c a s e s w h e r e t h e r e is a city i n c o m e or sales tax, pay n o taxes to t h e city. S u b u r b a n m u n i c i p a l i t i e s usually benefit from their p r o x i m i t y to t h e city, b u t t h e i r legal a u t o n o m y e n s u r e s that t h e y pay little or n o t h i n g for t h e s e b e n e f i t s ( L o w i , 1969, p. 197; H a r v e y , 1973, p. 94). B y m e a n s of their legal a u t o n o m y , s o m e m u n i c i p a l i t i e s e x c l u d e certain kinds of p e o p l e and certain kinds of activities from their borders. B e c a u s e local g o v e r n m e n t s g e n e r a t e funds to pay for local s e r v i c e s b y taxing resi­ d e n t s , s o m e t o w n s and cities h a v e far b e t t e r schools and s e r v i c e s than o t h e r s . B e c a u s e e a c h m u n i c i p a l i t y runs its o w n s c h o o l s , p o l i c e , fire d e -

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p a r t m e n t , and o t h e r p u b l i c s e r v i c e s , t h e r e is often an unjust and ineffi­ c i e n t i m b a l a n c e in t h e d e n s i t y and quality of s e r v i c e s a m o n g different areas. In t h e c o n t e x t of a large-scale and i n t e r d e p e n d e n t e c o n o m i c s y s t e m u n d e r t h e control of private capital, " a u t o n o m y b e c o m e s a l e a d w e i g h t for t h e majority of c i t i e s , w i t h o n l y t h e m o s t affluent t o w n s a b l e to create p r i v i l e g e from t h e i r formal i n d e p e n d e n c e . T h e political a u t o n o m y of p l a c e s , as w e l l as the p l a n n i n g p o w e r this entails, r e p r o d u c e s and exagger­ ates t h e i n e q u a l i t i e s b e t w e e n p l a c e s rather than l e v e l i n g t h e m " (Logan and M o l o t c h , 1 9 8 7 , p. 152). T h e s e injustices h a v e t h e i r primary s o u r c e in t h e structural organiza­ tion of d e c i s i o n m a k i n g . W h i l e all of t h e p r o b l e m s of city life I h a v e dis­ c u s s e d in this s e c t i o n i n v o l v e distributive i s s u e s , the full e x t e n t of o p p r e s ­ sion a n d d o m i n a t i o n t h e y i n v o l v e can b e u n d e r s t o o d only b y c o n s i d e r i n g c u l t u r e and d e c i s i o n m a k i n g s t r u c t u r e s as t h e y affect city g e o g r a p h y , activ­ ities, and distributions.

E M P O W E R M E N T WITHOUT AUTONOMY

I h a v e a g r e e d w i t h m a n y participatory d e m o c r a t i c theorists that d e m o c r a ­ tization of g o v e r n m e n t a l and corporate d e c i s i o n m a k i n g is n e c e s s a r y to u n d e r m i n e d o m i n a t i o n and o p p r e s s i o n . M a n y theorists of participatory d e m o c r a c y identify s u c h d e m o c r a t i z a t i o n w i t h t h e d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n o f urban d e c i s i o n m a k i n g and t h e creation of small a u t o n o m o u s local c o m m u ­ n i t i e s . In this c o n c l u d i n g s e c t i o n I shall c h a l l e n g e this m o d e l of d e m o c ­ racy, and argue instead that social j u s t i c e i n v o l v i n g equality a m o n g groups w h o r e c o g n i z e and affirm o n e a n o t h e r in their specificity can b e s t b e real­ i z e d in o u r society t h r o u g h large regional governments with mechanisms for r e p r e s e n t i n g i m m e d i a t e n e i g h b o r h o o d s and t o w n s . To s o l v e t h e p r o b l e m s of t h e d o m i n a t i o n of cities b y state and corporate b u r e a u c r a c i e s , G e r a l d F r u g (1980) r e c o m m e n d s legal, e c o n o m i c , and so­ cial reforms that w o u l d v e s t in m u n i c i p a l i t i e s a u t o n o m o u s local control o v e r most o f t h e activity within their borders. D e c e n t r a l i z i n g p o w e r and g i v i n g real p o w e r to cities r e q u i r e s , in his v i e w , t h e m u n i c i p a l i z a t i o n of control o v e r e c o n o m i c e n t e r p r i s e ; t h e split b e t w e e n private and p u b l i c c o r p o r a t e p o w e r s h o u l d b e t r a n s c e n d e d , and cities s h o u l d h a v e real a u t o n ­ o m o u s control o v e r t h e major p r o d u c t i v e , financial, and c o m m e r c i a l enti­ ties w i t h i n their borders. As a first s t e p , F r u g recommends that control o v e r b a n k i n g and i n s u r a n c e institutions b e t u r n e d o v e r to c i t i e s , w h i c h t h e r e b y w o u l d gain real p o w e r o v e r i n v e s t m e n t d e c i s i o n s and t h e d i r e c ­ tion of b u i l d i n g and d e v e l o p m e n t , as well as r e v e n u e s o u r c e s in profitm a k i n g institutions. T h e p u r p o s e of s u c h e c o n o m i c control, h o w e v e r , is to d e c e n t r a l i z e state p o w e r , and c r e a t e a u t o n o m o u s political e n t i t i e s inter-

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m e d i a t e b e t w e e n t h e individual and t h e state, w h i c h p r o v i d e individuals t h e o p p o r t u n i t y for g e n u i n e participation and s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n . Murray B o o k c h i n , to take a n o t h e r e x a m p l e , also calls for t h e m u n i c i p a l ­ ization of e c o n o m i c activity and t h e creation of small, d e c e n t r a l i z e d , au­ t o n o m o u s local c o m m u n i t i e s , w h e r e p e o p l e e x p e r i e n c e t h e rewards of cit­ i z e n s h i p t h r o u g h face-to-face interaction, d i s c u s s i o n , and d e c i s i o n m a k i n g . T h e t e n d e n c y toward urban sprawl, corporate internationalism, and polit­ ical centralization and bureaucratization s h o u l d b e r e v e r s e d . Municipal p o w e r s h o u l d b e institutionalized in a s y s t e m of small-scale organic c o m ­ m u n i t i e s l i n k e d o n l y by c o n f e d e r a t i v e a g r e e m e n t s , o v e r w h i c h no central state p o w e r is s o v e r e i g n (Bookchin, 1987, p p . 2 4 5 - 7 0 ) . S o m e o t h e r writ­ ers d o not call for c o m p l e t e l y a b o l i s h i n g t h e state, but n e v e r t h e l e s s take d e c e n t r a l i z e d local a u t o n o m y as a priority ( e . g . , S u n s t e i n , 1989, p p . 2 4 26; E l k i n , 1987, c h a p . 7). T h e r e is m u c h c o m p e l l i n g about such visions, w h i c h are c o m m o n a m o n g d e m o c r a t i c theorists critical of t h e hierarchy, e x p e r t i s m , and b u ­ reaucracy of c o n t e m p o r a r y a d v a n c e d industrial society. D e m o c r a t i z a t i o n r e q u i r e s t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f grass-roots institutions of local d i s c u s s i o n and d e c i s i o n m a k i n g . S u c h d e m o c r a t i z a t i o n is m e a n i n g l e s s u n l e s s t h e d e c i ­ sions i n c l u d e participation in e c o n o m i c p o w e r . I n v e s t m e n t and land u s e will often c a u s e or reinforce o p p r e s s i o n w h e n t h e y are d o m i n a t e d b y pri­ vate c o r p o r a t e i n t e r e s t s ( s e e E l k i n , 1987, p p . 1 7 4 - 8 0 ) . N e v e r t h e l e s s , I w i s h to q u e s t i o n t h e c o m m o n identification o f d e m o c r a c y with d e c e n t r a l ­ i z e d p o w e r v e s t e d in a u t o n o m o u s local c o m m u n i t i e s . It is n e c e s s a r y to d i s t i n g u i s h local e m p o w e r m e n t from local a u t o n o m y . W r i t e r s w h o call for t h e creation of d e c e n t r a l i z e d m u n i c i p a l units with legal and e c o n o m i c a u t o n o m y rarely define p r e c i s e l y w h a t t h e y m e a n by a u t o n o m y . For t h e sake o f this d i s c u s s i o n I will g i v e it t h e f o l l o w i n g strong m e a n i n g : An a g e n t , w h e t h e r individual or c o l l e c t i v e , is a u t o n o m o u s to t h e d e g r e e that it has s o l e and final authority to d e c i d e o n specific i s s u e s and a c t i o n s , and n o o t h e r a g e n t has t h e right to interfere. A u t o n o m y i m p l i e s s o v e r e i g n t y . A vision of d e c e n t r a l i z e d d e m o c r a c y c o m p o s e d of small m u ­ nicipalities e x e r c i s i n g a u t o n o m o u s local control, t h e n , w o u l d m e a n at least p r i m a facie that c i t i z e n s in e a c h m u n i c i p a l i t y d e c i d e their form of g o v e r n ­ m e n t , w h a t their rules and laws are, h o w their land and e c o n o m i c re­ s o u r c e s will b e u s e d and i n v e s t e d , t h e character and e x t e n t of their p u b l i c s e r v i c e s , and so o n . T h e r e are serious p r o b l e m s , h o w e v e r , with this vision o f d e c e n t r a l i z e d d e m o c r a c y , w h i c h e n g a g e t h e d e e p e s t issues of social j u s t i c e . I h a v e al­ r e a d y d i s c u s s e d h o w t h e e x i s t i n g a u t o n o m y of municipal z o n i n g functions in m a n y m u n i c i p a l i t i e s to e x c l u d e l o w - i n c o m e p e o p l e as w e l l as t h e j o b s t h e y m i g h t w i s h to h a v e c l o s e to h o m e . T h e a u t o n o m o u s c h o i c e b y m a n y m u n i c i p a l i t i e s not to run p u b l i c transportation s y s t e m s also e x c l u d e s or

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•

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isolates p o o r and old p e o p l e . T h e a u t o n o m o u s c h o i c e s of suburban c o m ­ m u n i t i e s a l l o w t h o s e c o m m u n i t i e s to exploit t h e benefits of t h e city w i t h ­ out p r o v i d i n g a n y t h i n g in return. If t h e w h o l e s o c i e t y w e r e to b e o r g a n i z e d as a confederation of a u t o n o ­ m o u s m u n i c i p a l i t i e s , w h a t w o u l d p r e v e n t t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of large-scale i n e q u a l i t y and injustice a m o n g c o m m u n i t i e s , and t h e r e b y t h e o p p r e s s i o n of individuals w h o d o n o t live in t h e m o r e p r i v i l e g e d or m o r e powerful c o m m u n i t i e s ? C a n an a d e q u a t e l e v e l of social and welfare s e r v i c e s b e g u a r a n t e e d for all individuals, for e x a m p l e , if o n e increases local a u t o n ­ o m y (cf. F r a n k e l , 1987, p p . 34—49)? G r e a t e r local a u t o n o m y w o u l d b e likely to p r o d u c e e v e n m o r e e x a g g e r a t e d forms of t h e i n e q u i t i e s that cur­ rent d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n p r o d u c e s : t h e c o n c e n t r a t i o n of n e e d y p e o p l e in t h o s e locales that p r o v i d e t h e m o r e e x t e n s i v e social and welfare s e r v i c e s , p u t t i n g an i n c r e a s e d b u r d e n o n t h e m w h i c h their p r o d u c t i v e and r e s o u r c e b a s e c a n n o t m e e t , w h i l e o t h e r m u n i c i p a l i t i e s turn their backs o n w h a t t h e y d o n o t c o n s i d e r their p r o b l e m . W h a t , m o r e o v e r , is to p r e v e n t the e c o n o m i c exploitation o f o n e municipality by another? II o n e m u n i c i p a l ­ ity has a large s o u r c e of w a t e r in an o t h e r w i s e arid farming district, and t h e o t h e r s h a v e n o t h i n g that municipality wants in return for u s e of t h e water, t h e y are likely to pay dearly, b o t h in m o n e y and in political i n d e ­ pendence. T h e p r o b l e m s of a t o m i s m are t h e s a m e w h e t h e r t h e a t o m s are i n d i v i d u ­ als, h o u s e h o l d s , or cities. At least s i n c e H o b b e s it has b e e n clear that w i t h o u t a s o v e r e i g n authority to m e d i a t e and r e g u l a t e relations b e t w e e n a g e n t s , t h e r e is n o t h i n g to p r e v e n t d o m i n a t i o n , exploitation, and o p p r e s ­ sion. B o o k c h i n ' s s u g g e s t i o n that a s e t of marketlike contracts or c o n f e d e r ative a g r e e m e n t s can p r e v e n t s u c h d o m i n a t i o n and o p p r e s s i o n p r e s u m e s s o m e t h i n g e v e n less true of m u n i c i p a l i t i e s than of individuals: that t h e y arc e q u a l in p o w e r , capacity, and r e s o u r c e s . W h e r e t h e r e are d i v e r s e and u n e q u a l n e i g h b o r h o o d s , t o w n s , and cities, w h o s e r e s i d e n t s m o v e in and out of o n e another's locales and interact in c o m p l e x w e b s o f e x c h a n g e , o n l y a s o v e r e i g n authority w h o s e jurisdiction i n c l u d e s t h e m all can m e d i ­ a t e their relations justly. I d o not m e a n to s u g g e s t that t h e r e is n o r o o m at all for local a u t o n o m y as I h a v e d e f i n e d it. C e r t a i n l y t h e r e is reason for a w i d e latitude of individ­ ual a u t o n o m y — a s p h e r e o f d e c i s i o n s w h i c h individuals h a v e t h e sole right to m a k e , w i t h o u t i n t e r f e r e n c e from o t h e r a g e n t s , i n c l u d i n g state author­ ity. T h e r e is also reason for c o l l e c t i v i t i e s to h a v e s u c h a u t o n o m y o v e r a certain range of d e c i s i o n s and activities. C l u b s , p r o d u c t i o n facilities, stores, political parties, n e i g h b o r h o o d c o m m i t t e e s , and t o w n s all s h o u l d h a v e a u t o n o m y o v e r certain actions. For b o t h individuals and collectivi­ ties o n e s h o u l d apply a m o d i f i e d Millian test. A g e n t s , w h e t h e r individual or c o l l e c t i v e , h a v e t h e right to sole authority o v e r their actions only if t h e

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actions and their c o n s e q u e n c e s (a) do not harm o t h e r s , (b) d o not inhibit t h e ability of i n d i v i d u a l s to d e v e l o p and e x e r c i s e their capacities w i t h i n t h e limits of m u t u a l r e s p e c t and c o o p e r a t i o n , and (c) d o n o t d e t e r m i n e c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h o t h e r a g e n t s are c o m p e l l e d to act. T h e s e c o n d i ­ tions m a k e t h e limits of a u t o n o m y narrow i n d e e d — n a r r o w e r , I s u g g e s t , for c o l l e c t i v i t i e s than for individuals. For t h e actions of c o l l e c t i v e a g e n t s are m o r e likely to affect o t h e r a g e n t s in t h e s e w a y s than are t h e actions of individuals. T h e r a n g e o f a u t o n o m o u s action defined by t h e s e c o n d i t i o n s is n e c e s ­ sarily m u c h n a r r o w e r than t h e range our current legal s y s t e m grants to private corporations and m u n i c i p a l i t i e s . It is also m u c h narrower than that r e c o m m e n d e d or i m p l i e d by m o s t theorists of d e c e n t r a l i z e d d e m o c r a c y . S u c h limitation of a u t o n o m y n e e d not b e a limitation of f r e e d o m or p o w e r , h o w e v e r , p r o v i d e d t h e b o d i e s r e g u l a t i n g t h e actions of i n d i v i d u a l s and c o l l e c t i v i t i e s are d e m o c r a t i c and participatory. T h e p r i n c i p l e is s i m p l e : w h e r e v e r actions affect a plurality of a g e n t s in t h e w a y s I h a v e s p e c i f i e d , all t h o s e a g e n t s s h o u l d participate in d e c i d i n g t h e actions and their c o n ­ ditions. T h e w r i t e r s I h a v e referred to call for decentralization and local a u t o n ­ o m y as a m e a n s of c o u n t e r a c t i n g hierarchical d o m i n a t i o n , alienation, and p o w e r l e s s n e s s . But it is d e m o c r a t i z a t i o n that confronts t h o s e p r o b l e m s , and d e m o c r a t i z a t i o n d o e s not entail decentralization into small units of a u t o n o m o u s local control. G o v e r n m e n t a l authority s h o u l d b e c o m e m o r e e m p o w e r i n g but also m o r e e n c o m p a s s i n g than municipal g o v e r n m e n t is now. A u t o n o m y is a c l o s e d c o n c e p t , w h i c h e m p h a s i z e s primarily e x c l u s i o n , t h e right to k e e p o t h e r s out and to p r e v e n t t h e m from interfering in d e c i ­ sions and actions. A u t o n o m y refers to privacy, in just t h e s e n s e that cor­ porations are private in o u r current legal s y s t e m . It s h o u l d b e distin­ g u i s h e d from empowerment, w h i c h I define as participation of an a g e n t in d e c i s i o n m a k i n g t h r o u g h an effective v o i c e and v o t e . Justice r e q u i r e s that e a c h p e r s o n s h o u l d h a v e t h e institutionalized m e a n s to participate effec­ t i v e l y in t h e d e c i s i o n s that affect h e r or his action and t h e c o n d i t i o n s of that action. E m p o w e r m e n t is an o p e n c o n c e p t , a c o n c e p t of p u b l i c i t y rather than privacy. A g e n t s w h o are e m p o w e r e d w i t h a v o i c e to discuss e n d s a n d m e a n s of c o l l e c t i v e life, and w h o h a v e institutionalized m e a n s of participating in t h o s e d e c i s i o n s , w h e t h e r directly or t h r o u g h r e p r e s e n t a ­ t i v e s , o p e n t o g e t h e r o n t o a set of p u b l i c s w h e r e n o n e has a u t o n o m y . E m p o w e r m e n t m e a n s , at m i n i m u m , e x p a n d i n g t h e range of d e c i s i o n s that are m a d e t h r o u g h d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e s s e s . E v e n if n o t h i n g e l s e c h a n g e d about t h e A m e r i c a n political s y s t e m , for e x a m p l e , e x t e n s i v e d e ­ mocratization w o u l d o c c u r if t h e regulations and policies c u r r e n t l y m a d e b y e x e c u t i v e g o v e r n m e n t a l authority w e r e o p e n e d to d e m o c r a t i c partici-

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pation. If t h e u s e of major capital r e s o u r c e s , to take a different e x a m p l e , w e r e d e c i d e d t h r o u g h d i s c u s s i o n and d e m o c r a t i c d e c i s i o n m a k i n g , this w o u l d r e p r e s e n t a major c h a n g e in p o w e r relations. D i s m a n t l i n g t h e b u r e a u c r a t i c hierarchies of g o v e r n m e n t a l and c o r p o ­ rate p o w e r and b r i n g i n g d e c i s i o n s s u c h as t h e s e u n d e r d e m o c r a t i c control, h o w e v e r , d o e s also m e a n that participation m u s t b e c o m e m o r e i m m e d i ­ ate, a c c e s s i b l e , and local. T h e o r i s t s of d e c e n t r a l i z e d local d e m o c r a c y are right in t h e i r c o n v i c t i o n that d e m o c r a t i c participation m e a n s that author­ ity c a n n o t b e c o n c e n t r a t e d in a c e n t e r , far away from t h e majority of p e o ­ p l e w h o are affected b y it. It d o e s m e a n that t h e r e m u s t b e local institu­ tions, right w h e r e p e o p l e live and work, t h r o u g h w h i c h t h e y participate in t h e m a k i n g of regulations. T h u s , along w i t h m a n y o t h e r theorists of par­ ticipatory d e m o c r a c y , I i m a g i n e n e i g h b o r h o o d a s s e m b l i e s as a basic unit of d e m o c r a t i c participation (cf. E l k i n , 1987, p. 176; Bay, 1 9 8 1 , p p . 1 5 2 60; Jacobs, chap. 21), w h i c h m i g h t b e c o m p o s e d of r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s from w o r k p l a c e s , block c o u n c i l s , local c h u r c h e s and c l u b s , and so o n as w e l l as i n d i v i d u a l s . D e s p i t e m y earlier criticism of his c o m m u n i t a r i a n i s m , I find Barber's proposals about t h e role and f u n c t i o n i n g of s u c h a s s e m b l i e s very g o o d (Barber, 1 9 8 4 , p p . 2 6 9 - 7 2 ) . T h e i r p u r p o s e is to d e t e r m i n e local pri­ orities and policy o p i n i o n s w h i c h their r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s s h o u l d v o i c e and d e f e n d in regional a s s e m b l i e s . T h e jurisdiction of n e i g h b o r h o o d a s s e m ­ blies m i g h t c o r r e s p o n d to existing municipalities, and t h e r e m i g h t b e s e v ­ eral in large m e t r o p o l i t a n areas. B u t in s u c h a s c h e m e of r e s t r u c t u r e d d e m o c r a c y m u n i c i p a l i t i e s as w e n o w k n o w t h e m w o u l d c e a s e to h a v e sov­ e r e i g n authority. In o r d e r to s o l v e t h e p r o b l e m s of cities I identified in t h e p r e v i o u s s e c ­ tion, t h e l o w e s t l e v e l of g o v e r n m e n t a l p o w e r s h o u l d b e regional (Lowi, 1 9 6 9 , c h a p s . 9 and 10; H a r v e y , 1973, p p . 1 1 0 - 1 1 ) . I c o n c e i v e a r e g i o n as b o t h an e c o n o m i c unit and a territory that p e o p l e identify as their living s p a c e . A r e g i o n is t h e s p a c e across w h i c h p e o p l e c o m m o n l y travel to work, s h o p , play, visit their friends, and take t h e c h i l d r e n o n errands, t h e span of a d a y trip. It is t h e range of t e l e v i s i o n and radio transmission. T h e e x p a n s e of a r e g i o n t h u s varies w i t h c u l t u r e , g e o g r a p h y , e c o n o m i c b a s e , and primary m o d e s of transportation. R e g i o n s usually h a v e a city or c l u s ­ ter of c i t i e s as a focus of their activity and identity, b u t i n c l u d e less d e n s e l y p o p u l a t e d s u b u r b a n and rural areas. W h i l e hardly e c o n o m i c a l l y self-sufficient, r e g i o n s n e v e r t h e l e s s c o u n t as units of e c o n o m i c i n t e r d e ­ p e n d e n c e , t h e g e o g r a p h i c a l territory in w h i c h p e o p l e b o t h l i v e and work, in w h i c h major distribution occurs, m u c h of it of p r o d u c t s m a d e in t h e region. N o t e v e n regional g o v e r n m e n t s s h o u l d h a v e c o m p l e t e a u t o n o m y , b u t their p o w e r w o u l d b e e x t e n s i v e , m a t c h i n g or e x c e e d i n g t h e p r e s e n t p o w ­ ers of local m u n i c i p a l i t i e s ; p o w e r s of legislation, regulation, and taxation,

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significant control o v e r land u s e and capital i n v e s t m e n t , and control o v e r t h e d e s i g n and administration of p u b l i c s e r v i c e s . S u c h regional g o v e r n ­ m e n t s h o u l d b e c o m p o s e d of r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s from n e i g h b o r h o o d a s s e m ­ b l i e s , w h i c h h o l d t h o s e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s a c c o u n t a b l e . N e i g h b o r h o o d s and w o r k p l a c e s w o u l d h a v e c o n s i d e r a b l e p o w e r s of i m p l e m e n t i n g regional policy and a d m i n i s t e r i n g p u b l i c s e r v i c e s . At t h e l e v e l of regional g o v e r n ­ m e n t , finally, t h e s y s t e m of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n for o p p r e s s e d g r o u p s that I r e c o m m e n d e d in C h a p t e r 7 w o u l d o p e r a t e , W o r k p l a c e s , n e i g h b o r h o o d a s s e m b l i e s , and o t h e r c o l l e c t i v e s m i g h t c h o o s e to h a v e g r o u p - b a s e d cau­ c u s e s , b u t at t h e regional l e v e l g r o u p r e p r e s e n t a t i o n w o u l d b e g u a r a n t e e d b y right. T h e s e p r o v i s i o n s of local participation in t h e discussion and i m ­ p l e m e n t a t i o n of p o l i c y w o u l d e m p o w e r individuals and social g r o u p s at t h e s a m e t i m e that policy w o u l d r e g u l a t e p e r h a p s millions of p e o p l e in a wide jurisdiction. T h i s d i s c u s s i o n of t h e l e v e l s and forms of g o v e r n m e n t raises t h e q u e s ­ tion of w h e t h e r state and federal g o v e r n m e n t as t h e y currently exist in t h e U n i t e d States are appropriate forms. M a n y m e t r o p o l i t a n regions n o w spill into s e v e r a l states, and t h e fact that a r e g i o n is ruled b y different state laws often l e a d s to c o n t r a d i c t i o n and irrationality. It w o u l d take us t o o far afield to c o n s i d e r this q u e s t i o n of t h e role or a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s of state and na­ tional g o v e r n m e n t . T h e a r g u m e n t s I h a v e m a d e about t h e d a n g e r s of au­ t o n o m y w o u l d s e e m to indicate, h o w e v e r , that several l e v e l s of g o v e r n ­ m e n t are n e c e s s a r y to c o o r d i n a t e social relations and p r o m o t e j u s t i c e . N e v e r t h e l e s s , j u s t i c e m i g h t r e q u i r e a f u n d a m e n t a l reorganization of state and national g o v e r n m e n t . B e s i d e s m a k i n g rules and laws, t h e primary functions o f regional g o v ­ e r n m e n t w o u l d b e p l a n n i n g and t h e provision of s e r v i c e s . O n l y regionally s c a l e d p l a n n i n g and s e r v i c e provision can solve t h e p r o b l e m s of d o m i n a ­ tion and o p p r e s s i o n w h i c h typify urban life today. Democratized regional-level investment decisionmaking would end c o r p o r a t e m o n o p o l y of t h e p r o d u c t i v e capital of t h e region. W i t h control o v e r m a n y i n v e s t m e n t d e c i s i o n s , r e g i o n s could plan to m e e t their i n d u s ­ trial, c o m m e r c i a l , h o u s i n g , transportation, and recreational d e v e l o p m e n t n e e d s , not w i t h an e y e to private profit for a b s e n t e e o w n e r s , but w i t h an e y e to w h a t is n e e d e d and useful. In d e m o c r a t i z e d regional p l a n n i n g m a n y d i s a g r e e m e n t s and conflicts w o u l d often n o d o u b t occur a m o n g d i v e r s e s e c t o r s , g r o u p s , and i n t e r e s t s about h o w b e s t to u s e large capital re­ s o u r c e s , a n d t h e d e c i s i o n s w o u l d p e r h a p s not always b e t h e w i s e s t or m o s t rational. B u t it is u n l i k e l y that w h e n a r e g i o n already has five h u g e s h o p ­ p i n g malls, a d e m o c r a t i c p u b l i c w o u l d d e c i d e to construct a n o t h e r right across t h e h i g h w a y from o n e of t h e m , w i t h t h e primary p u r p o s e of draw­ ing b u s i n e s s away from it. N o r w o u l d d e m o c r a t i c i n v e s t m e n t p l a n n i n g b e likely to result in t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of additional luxury office s p a c e in a city

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w i t h a s u r p l u s of offices. Broad d e m o c r a t i c p l a n n i n g is m o r e likely to re­ sult in rational and just distributive d e c i s i o n s , that is, than h u n d r e d s of a u t o n o m o u s p u b l i c and private units a t t e m p t i n g to m a x i m i z e t h e i r per­ ceived interests. R e g i o n a l - l e v e l s e r v i c e provision can solve m a n y of t h e p r o b l e m s of in­ j u s t i c e that I h a v e identified as currently e n d e m i c to urban life. A primary task of regional g o v e r n m e n t w o u l d b e to p r o v i d e regionally (and p e r h a p s nationally) s t a n d a r d i z e d s e r v i c e s m a n y of w h i c h are n o w paid for and run b y i n d i v i d u a l m u n i c i p a l i t i e s : s c h o o l s , libraries, fire and p o l i c e p r o t e c t i o n , h e a l t h and welfare s e r v i c e s , h i g h w a y s , transportation, sanitation, and so o n . As I m e n t i o n e d earlier, w h i l e standards and policy w o u l d b e r e g i o n ­ ally b a s e d , t h e y w o u l d b e a d m i n i s t e r e d locally. Regional standardization of s e r v i c e s w o u l d build o n a t r e n d already e x e m p l i f i e d in our s o c i e t y b y p u b l i c transportation s y s t e m s and h e a l t h m a i n t e n a n c e organizations. Re­ gionally run p u b l i c s e r v i c e s m a x i m i z e efficiency in t h o s e s y s t e m s . It is silly and artificial for fifteen small m u n i c i p a l i t i e s to maintain t h e i r o w n fire d e p a r t m e n t s w h e n e a c h u s e s its t h r e e trucks only t w i c e a year. B u t t h e major b e n e f i t of regionally b a s e d p u b l i c s e r v i c e s is that t h e y b e s t p r o m o t e j u s t i c e . R e g i o n a l l y s t a n d a r d i z e d and regionally financed s c h o o l s , for e x ­ a m p l e , w o u l d r e d u c e t h e motivation for "white flight" and t h e resultant d e g r a d a t i o n of schools in t h e i n n e r city. S u c h regionally a d m i n i s t e r e d s c h o o l s s h o u l d g o t o g e t h e r w i t h school c o u n c i l s that seriously e m p o w e r p a r e n t s a n d t e a c h e r s to m a k e policy for their o w n schools ( s e e Bastian e t al., 1986, c h a p . 6). R e g i o n a l d e m o c r a t i c a l l y d e v e l o p e d and a d m i n i s t e r e d transportation s e r v i c e s w o u l d r e d u c e t h e isolation of certain p o p u l a t i o n s , a n d t h e r e b y r e d u c e their marginah'zation. R e g i o n a l p l a n n i n g and s e r v i c e provision w o u l d h a v e to a t t e n d to t h e p r o b l e m s of structural injustice that H a r v e y (1973) discusses: t h e fact that t h e location of facilities and s e r v i c e s can a d v a n t a g e s o m e and d i s a d v a n t a g e o t h e r s ; t h e fact that s o m e groups m a y b e b e t t e r a b l e to adapt to urban c h a n g e than o t h e r s ; and t h e fact that s o m e groups m a y h a v e m o r e p o w e r and i n f l u e n c e than o t h e r s . W i t h traditional forms of i n t e r e s t - g r o u p bar­ g a i n i n g a n d b r o k e r i n g t h e r e is n o reason to think that regional policies w o u l d fare any b e t t e r in c o u n t e r i n g structural injustices than current city p o l i c i e s . B u t w i t h r e s t r u c t u r e d p r o c e s s e s of d e m o c r a t i c participation that i n c l u d e p r o v i s i o n for t h e effective and specific r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of o p ­ p r e s s e d and d i s a d v a n t a g e d g r o u p s , s u c h injustices w o u l d b e m u c h less likely to b e r e p r o d u c e d as a matter of course. T o c o n c l u d e , c o n s i d e r s o m e p r i n c i p l e s that regional r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o u g h t to follow. First, r e g i o n s s h o u l d p r o m o t e liberty. Major capital in­ v e s t m e n t d e c i s i o n s , d e v e l o p m e n t , c o n s t r u c t i o n , and p l a n n i n g d e c i s i o n s , I h a v e said, s h o u l d b e p u b l i c , d e m o c r a t i c , participatory, and regional in s c o p e . T h i s d o e s not p r e c l u d e any and all m a n n e r of "private e n t e r -

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p r i s e " — i n d i v i d u a l s and c o l l e c t i v e s e n g a g i n g in a diversity of activities of t h e i r c h o o s i n g for e n d s t h e y privately d e t e r m i n e . G o v e r n m e n t at w h a t ­ e v e r l e v e l — w h e t h e r regional, state, or n a t i o n a l — s h o u l d p r o t e c t and e n ­ c o u r a g e t h e liberty of individuals and c o l l e c t i v e s to d o w h a t t h e y c h o o s e w i t h i n t h e limits of regulation and p l a n n i n g d e c i s i o n s . I n d i v i d u a l s and c o l l e c t i v e s s h o u l d not o n l y b e able to d o w h a t t h e y w a n t , b u t t h e y s h o u l d b e a b l e to d o it where t h e y w a n t , as l o n g as their activity d o e s n o t harm o t h e r a g e n t s or inhibit t h e i r ability to d e v e l o p and e x e r c i s e their capaci­ ties. T h i s m e a n s a reformation in t h e m e a n i n g and function of z o n i n g (cf. H a y d e n , 1983, p p . 1 7 7 - 8 2 ; S e n n e t t , 1970, chap. 4). T h e ideal of differen­ t i a t e d city life m e a n s in principle that p e o p l e s h o u l d not h a v e p o w e r or authority to e x c l u d e p e r s o n s or activities from p u b l i c territory. P e o p l e s h o u l d b e a b l e to set up a store or a restaurant, build w h a t e v e r d w e l l i n g t h e y w i s h , s e t up a p r o d u c t i o n facility, m a k e a park, o p e r a t e a religious c e n t e r or c o u n s e l i n g s e r v i c e for any p o p u l a t i o n , w i t h o u t z o n i n g regula­ tions that limit their location c h o i c e s . Potential n e i g h b o r s m u s t b e free to d i s c o u r a g e t h e m , but t h e y m u s t not h a v e t h e authority of law to e x c l u d e u n w a n t e d activities or c o n s t r u c t i o n s . S e c o n d , as a m a t t e r of p r i n c i p l e , regional p l a n n i n g d e c i s i o n s s h o u l d b e a i m e d at m i n i m i z i n g s e g r e g a t i o n and functionalization, and fostering a d i v e r s i t y of g r o u p s and activities a l o n g s i d e of and i n t e r s p e r s e d w i t h o n e another. F o s t e r i n g m u l t i u s e n e i g h b o r h o o d s m a x i m i z e s c o n v e n i e n t a c c e s s to g o o d s , s e r v i c e s , and p u b l i c s p a c e s for r e s i d e n t s , and t h e r e b y m i n i m i z e s s o m e of t h e o p p r e s s i o n s of marginalization. F o s t e r i n g diversity of s p a c e and land u s e , m o r e o v e r , rather than t h e functionalization of s p a c e , t e n d s to m a k e any facility m o r e attractive and h u m a n . A p r o d u c t i o n facility situ­ a t e d n e a r r e s i d e n c e s , a day-care c e n t e r , and a p u b l i c park is m o r e likely to r e g u l a t e its p o l l u t i n g effects and m a k e its b u i l d i n g m o d e r a t e l y attrac­ t i v e than o n e out of sight in a suburban industrial park, w h i c h invisibly e n d a n g e r s t h e h e a l t h of n e a r b y r e s i d e n t s . R e g i o n a l l y b a s e d p u b l i c policy, p l a n n i n g , and s e r v i c e provision, finally, s h o u l d b e c o m m i t t e d to fostering p u b l i c s p a c e s — a s s e m b l y halls, i n d o o r and o u t d o o r plazas, w i d e s i d e w a l k s , recreation facilities and parks. S u c h s p a c e s s h o u l d b e o p e n to all activities, e x c e p t p e r h a p s s e l l i n g t h i n g s , and c l o s e d to v e h i c u l a r traffic. T h e r e m u s t b e easy access to t h e i r u s e , w i t h p e r m i t s r e q u i r e d o n l y for t h e sake of safety and fairness, so that, for e x a m ­ p l e , o n e g r o u p d o e s not d o m i n a t e a w h o l e park or plaza day after day, S p e e c h m a k i n g , sign-carrying, and o t h e r m o d e s of e x p r e s s i o n s h o u l d b e p o s s i b l e at any t i m e , w i t h o u t a p e r m i t , as s h o u l d t h e a s s e m b l y of small groups. In this c h a p t e r I h a v e criticized a p r e d o m i n a n t t e n d e n c y in participatory d e m o c r a t i c t h e o r y to d e n y or think away social difference by appeal to an

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ideal of c o m m u n i t y . I h a v e tried to fill out t h e implications of a politics of difference b y e n v i s i o n i n g an ideal of city life as a b e i n g t o g e t h e r of strang­ ers in o p e n n e s s to g r o u p difference. This ideal cannot b e i m p l e m e n t e d as s u c h . Social c h a n g e arises from politics, not p h i l o s o p h y . Ideals are a cru­ cial s t e p in e m a n c i p a t o r y politics, h o w e v e r , b e c a u s e t h e y d i s l o d g e our a s s u m p t i o n that w h a t is g i v e n is n e c e s s a r y . T h e y offer s t a n d p o i n t s from w h i c h to criticize t h e g i v e n , and inspiration for i m a g i n i n g alternatives.

EPILOGUE

International Justice

I S H A L L C L O S E w i t h an o p e n i n g .

B e c a u s e I c o n c e i v e critical t h e o r y as historically a n d socially situated, I h a v e r e s t r i c t e d d i s c u s s i o n of social j u s t i c e in this book to W e s t e r n w e l f a r e capitalist s o c i e t i e s , particularly t h e U n i t e d States. P r e c i s e l y t h e p o s i t i o n of t h e U n i t e d States in relation to t h e rest of t h e w o r l d , h o w e v e r , o b l i g e s a n y t h e o r i s t of social j u s t i c e t o ask a b o u t justice in t h e rest of t h e w o r l d , b o t h b e t w e e n a n d w i t h i n c o u n t r i e s . For t h e U n i t e d States o c c u p i e s a posi­ tion of p r i v i l e g e in relation t o m u c h o p p r e s s i o n in t h e w o r l d , a n d actions o r i g i n a t i n g w i t h state or private institutions in t h e U n i t e d States c o n t r i b ­ u t e t o m u c h of that o p p r e s s i o n . T h e p r i n c i p l e s , c a t e g o r i e s , a n d a r g u m e n t s I h a v e d e v e l o p e d in t h e p r e ­ c e d i n g c h a p t e r s c a n n o t b e s i m p l y e x t e n d e d or a p p l i e d t o t h e c o n t e x t of international relations, or to i s s u e s of j u s t i c e w i t h i n m a n y c o u n t r i e s of t h e S o u t h e r n o r E a s t e r n H e m i s p h e r e s . M a n y of t h e s e p r i n c i p l e s , c a t e g o r i e s , a n d a r g u m e n t s , h o w e v e r , are also n o t irrelevant to u n d e r s t a n d i n g social j u s t i c e in t h e s e parts of t h e w o r l d . I s s u e s similar to t h o s e I h a v e d i s c u s s e d in t h e c o n t e x t of t h e U n i t e d States arise in o t h e r parts of t h e w o r l d , w i t h i n a n d b e t w e e n nations. T r e a t i n g t h e m appropriately in relation to t h o s e o t h e r c o n t e x t s m i g h t r e q u i r e modifications in t h e formulation of t h e is­ s u e s , p r i n c i p l e s , c a t e g o r i e s , or a r g u m e n t s . In t h e s e f e w c l o s i n g p a g e s I e x p l o r e w a y s in w h i c h t h e i s s u e s of this book m a y b e e x t e n d e d to an inter­ national c o n t e x t , a n d t o c o n t e x t s of j u s t i c e in s o c i e t i e s o t h e r than W e s t e r n w e l f a r e capitalist s o c i e t i e s . O n c e again, this is m e a n t as an o p e n i n g , t o raise q u e s t i o n s for further research, rather than any definitive s t a t e m e n t a b o u t international j u s t i c e . N o r m a t i v e t h e o r i z i n g about international j u s t i c e is in its infancy, at least a m o n g A n g l o - A m e r i c a n writers. T h e literature o n international j u s ­ t i c e that has e m e r g e d s o far, h o w e v e r , t e n d s to fall w i t h i n t h e distributive p a r a d i g m of j u s t i c e . In his e x c e l l e n t book o n international morality, for e x a m p l e , C h a r l e s B e i t z (1979) c o n c e n t r a t e s m o s t of his d i s c u s s i o n of j u s ­ t i c e o n i s s u e s of t h e distribution of w e a l t h a n d r e s o u r c e s a m o n g nations, a n d particularly w h e t h e r redistribution of r e s o u r c e s from rich to poor na­ tions is morally r e q u i r e d , D i s t r i b u t i v e i s s u e s are p e r h a p s e v e n m o r e i m ­ p o r t a n t in a w o r l d c o n t e x t than in t h e c o n t e x t of s i n g l e s o c i e t i e s , e s p e c i a l l y r e l a t i v e l y affluent W e s t e r n welfare states. T h e vast i n e q u a l i t i e s in living standards b e t w e e n nations, o w i n g to u n e q u a l access to r e s o u r c e s , t h e l e g -

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acy of c o l o n i a l i s m , and t h e c u r r e n t ravages of international trade, finance, and e x p l o i t a t i v e i n v e s t m e n t , r e p r e s e n t a gross distributive injustice. T h e criticism I h a v e v o i c e d of a focus o n distributive i s s u e s , h o w e v e r , a p p l i e s w i t h p e r h a p s m o r e force in this context. W i t h o u t analysis of t h e institutional relations that structure t h e d e c i s i o n m a k i n g p o w e r b e h i n d d i s t r i b u t i o n s , and w i t h o u t an evaluation of t h e j u s t i c e of t h o s e d e c i s i o n ­ m a k i n g s t r u c t u r e s , moral theorists fail to t o u c h important i s s u e s of inter­ national j u s t i c e . T h e division of labor and c u l t u r e also s u p p l y i m p o r t a n t c a t e g o r i e s for c o n c e p t u a l i z i n g relations a m o n g nations in t e r m s of j u s t i c e that c a n n o t b e r e d u c e d to distribution. M y claim that injustice s h o u l d b e u n d e r s t o o d in terms of t h e c a t e g o r i e s of d o m i n a t i o n and o p p r e s s i o n h o l d s , I think, for any social c o n t e x t in t h e w o r l d today, as w e l l as for relations a m o n g nations or states. D o m i n a t i o n as I h a v e d e f i n e d it, as a lack of participation in d e t e r m i n i n g o n e ' s actions and t h e c o n d i t i o n s of o n e ' s actions, applies as w e l l to W e s t e r n E u r o p e and N o r t h A m e r i c a as to t h e rest of t h e world. B u t t h e c o n t e x t - b o u n d charac­ ter of t h e t h e o r i z i n g in this book b e g i n s to e m e r g e w h e n w e i n q u i r e about o p p r e s s i o n in c o n t e x t s o t h e r than W e s t e r n s o c i e t i e s . T h e five criteria of o p p r e s s i o n that I h a v e d e v e l o p e d m a y b e useful starting points for asking w h a t o p p r e s s i o n m e a n s in Asia, Latin A m e r i c a , or Africa, b u t serious revi­ sion of s o m e of t h e s e criteria, or e v e n their w h o l e s a l e r e p l a c e m e n t , m a y b e r e q u i r e d . T h e c a t e g o r i e s of exploitation and cultural i m p e r i a l i s m m a y stand m o r e or less as I h a v e d e f i n e d t h e m . B u t marginalization, p o w e r ­ l e s s n e s s , and v i o l e n c e m u s t b e r e t h o u g h t , and p e r h a p s r e c o m b i n e d . T h e r e m a y b e n e e d for additional c a t e g o r i e s to d e s c r i b e o p p r e s s i o n in these contexts. In C h a p t e r 2 I c l a i m e d that o p p r e s s i o n in t h e U n i t e d States is structural and s y s t e m i c , and that t h e m o d e l of an identifiable o p p r e s s o r g r o u p corre­ s p o n d i n g to e a c h o p p r e s s e d g r o u p d o e s not hold. W h i l e o p p r e s s i o n in o t h e r parts of t h e w o r l d is also structural and s y s t e m i c , in m a n y s o c i e t i e s it is e a s i e r to identify o p p r e s s o r groups. This fact a l o n e alters t h e m e a n i n g of o p p r e s s i o n in t h o s e c o n t e x t s , and m a y r e q u i r e c h a n g i n g t h e c a t e g o r i e s of o p p r e s s i o n and their relationships, T h e social g r o u p structures in s u c h s o c i e t i e s also p r o d u c e specific social relationships that r e q u i r e their o w n analysis in t e r m s of o p p r e s s i o n . T h e criteria I have d e v e l o p e d b y t h i n k i n g t h r o u g h t h e e x p e r i e n c e of o p p r e s s e d groups in t h e U n i t e d States h a v e n o r e f e r e n c e , for e x a m p l e , to t h e specific e x p e r i e n c e of peasants, a major and usually o p p r e s s e d social g r o u p in t h e S o u t h e r n H e m i s p h e r e . T h e five faces of o p p r e s s i o n I h a v e e x p l i c a t e d m a y apply m o r e easily to relations a m o n g nations in t h e total world context, and e s p e c i a l l y relations b e t w e e n a d v a n c e d industrial s o c i e t i e s and t h e rest of t h e w o r l d . M y d i s c u s s i o n in C h a p t e r 3 of t h e depoliticization of policy in welfare capitalist s o c i e t y is certainly t h e m o s t c o n t e x t - b o u n d in t h e book. For m e

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it n e v e r t h e l e s s raises i n t e r e s t i n g q u e s t i o n s about j u s t i c e , politics, and so­ cial m o v e m e n t s in t h e international context. Is t h e r e an a n a l o g u e to w e l ­ farism in t h e international c o n t e x t , w h i c h focuses p e o p l e ' s efforts o n redis­ tribution w h i l e l e a v i n g t h e basic structures u n t o u c h e d ? To m e t h e a n s w e r is fairly clear. T h e s y s t e m of "foreign aid" b y w h i c h rich c o u n t r i e s grant r e s o u r c e s to p o o r e r c o u n t r i e s s e r v e s just this function. D o e s t h e interna­ tional political and e c o n o m i c s y s t e m d e p o l i t i c i z c conflict, try to contain it w i t h i n s u c h d i s t r i b u t i v e i s s u e s , and m a k e policy formation t h e p r o v i n c e of e x p e r t s ? W h i l e I a m i n c l i n e d to think that international relations are m o r e p o l i t i c i z e d than t h e normal w o r k i n g s of state policy formation in welfare capitalist s o c i e t i e s , state officials t h e w o r l d o v e r exhibit a clear t e n d e n c y to look on international conflict as s o m e t h i n g to b e " m a n a g e d " in private c l o s e d - d o o r n e g o t i a t i o n s . Is t h e r e , t h e n , in international politics s o m e ­ t h i n g like an international civil s o c i e t y that repoliticizes p u b l i c life o u t s i d e or at t h e margins of t h e s e official state activities? I think t h e r e is, and that i n v e s t i g a t i o n of marginal international e c o n o m i c n e t w o r k s , t h e interna­ tional p e a c e m o v e m e n t , international p e o p l e - t o - p e o p l e organizations of material and cultural solidarity, and international m o v e m e n t s of w o m e n , p e o p l e of color, and o t h e r g r o u p s can reveal a p r o m i s i n g u n d e r s i d e to t h e future of international relations. T h e i s s u e s of t h e politics of difference I h a v e a n a l y z e d are certainly i m p o r t a n t in c o n t e x t s o t h e r than W e s t e r n welfare capitalism. W o r k i n g t h r o u g h social and political relations that affirm a p o s i t i v e s e n s e of g r o u p d i f f e r e n c e and g i v e specific r e p r e s e n t a t i o n to o p p r e s s e d groups m a y be t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t political a g e n d u m in t h e w o r l d today. W e s t e r n welfare capitalist s o c i e t i e s are b y n o m e a n s t h e o n l y s o c i e t i e s that h a v e p r o m o t e d an ideal of universal c i t i z e n s h i p that t r a n s c e n d s g r o u p d i f f e r e n c e s . State socialist s o c i e t i e s h a v e a l o n g tradition of this unifying u r g e , as d o m a n y o t h e r nation-states in Asia, Africa, and Latin A m e r i c a . In m o s t c a s e s this universalist ideal allows s o m e groups to d e f i n e t h e n o r m and a p p e a r neutral; that is, in m o s t cases t h e ideal of social u n i t y tran­ s c e n d i n g differences r e p r o d u c e s cultural imperialist relations of p r i v i l e g e and o p p r e s s i o n , and o t h e r relations of o p p r e s s i o n as w e l l . Social m o v e ­ m e n t s all o v e r t h e w o r l d increasingly c h a l l e n g e this unifying standard, a s s e r t i n g p o s i t i v e i m a g e s of g r o u p specificity (Rothschild, 1 9 8 1 ; Ross, 1980). M o v e m e n t s of e t h n i c m i n o r i t i e s in t h e S o v i e t U n i o n , Yugoslavia, S p a i n , a n d India, just to m e n t i o n a few, e x p o s e t h e ideal of a neutral citi­ z e n s h i p t r a n s c e n d i n g difference as naive at best. W o m e n ' s m o v e m e n t s all o v e r t h e w o r l d also c h a l l e n g e t h e a s s u m p t i o n of a g e n d e r - n e u t r a l c i t i z e n ­ ship. W e are w i t n e s s i n g t h e w o r l d w i d e b r e a k u p of s u c h nationalist and state-fostered unities. At t h e s a m e t i m e , major m o v e m e n t s are u n d e r w a y toward g r e a t e r in­ ternational federation, b r e a k i n g d o w n t h e e x c l u s i o n s and separations that

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h i t h e r t o h a v e d e f i n e d state s o v e r e i g n t y and a u t o n o m y . T h e pan-African m o v e m e n t has taken s t e p s toward greater e c o n o m i c interaction and c o o p ­ eration a m o n g African states u n d e r a c o m m o n g o v e r n a n c e structure. T h e E u r o p e a n E c o n o m i c C o m m u n i t y is o n t h e brink of a historical b r e a k d o w n of t h e separation of t w e l v e E u r o p e a n states. G r o u p difference is t h e s o u r c e of s o m e of t h e m o s t v i o l e n t conflict and r e p r e s s i o n in t h e w o r l d today. An essentialist and absolutist u n d e r s t a n d ­ ing of social g r o u p difference is often m o r e p r o n o u n c e d and d e a d l y in p l a c e s o u t s i d e of relatively tolerant W e s t e r n capitalist s o c i e t i e s . Sexual, e t h n i c , and national g r o u p s are often u n d e r s t o o d as e n t i r e l y o t h e r and o p p o s e d , sharing n o attributes w i t h t h e defining g r o u p , locked in d e s p i s e d b o d i e s and fixed n a t u r e s . W o r l d historical and e c o n o m i c c o n d i t i o n s at t h e s a m e t i m e bring t h e s e g r o u p s into n e c e s s a r y interaction. P r e s e n t l y in m a n y parts of t h e w o r l d this c o m b i n a t i o n of n e c e s s a r y interaction and ab­ s o l u t e o p p o s i t i o n fuels horrible v i o l e n c e . I cannot p r e t e n d to u n d e r s t a n d t h e c o m p l e x i t i e s of t h e c a u s e s of s u c h v i o l e n c e and conflict in L e b a n o n , India, I n d o n e s i a , and m a n y o t h e r p l a c e s . Certainly t h e s e situations are t i e d u p w i t h i s s u e s of e c o n o m i c d o m i n a t i o n and exploitation, b o t h w i t h i n and b e t w e e n states. I h a v e m e n t i o n e d t h r e e kinds of social and political situations i n v o l v i n g d i f f e r e n c e in various parts o f t h e w o r l d . First, t h e r e is t h e r e s u r g e n c e of e t h n i c i t y w i t h i n states that had c l a i m e d to t r a n s c e n d s u c h d i f f e r e n c e s as politically irrelevant. S e c o n d , separate nations and states are creating in­ stitutions that bring t h e m into greater contact and interaction, w i t h o u t g i v i n g u p t h e i r differences. Third, in m a n y places in t h e w o r l d g r o u p d i f f e r e n c e c o n t i n u e s to b e u n d e r s t o o d as a b s o l u t e o t h e r n e s s , w i t h d o m i ­ nation a n d v i o l e n c e t h e result. An ideal of politics as d e l i b e r a t i o n in a h e t e r o g e n e o u s p u b l i c w h i c h affirms g r o u p differences and g i v e s specific r e p r e s e n t a t i o n to o p p r e s s e d groups is, I b e l i e v e , i m m e d i a t e l y r e l e v a n t to e a c h of t h e s e situations. An ideal of c o m m u n i t y as shared final e n d s and m u t u a l identification is e v e n m o r e a b s u r d in t h e s e c o n t e x t s than in t h e c o n t e x t of a n y city in t h e U n i t e d States. At t h e s a m e t i m e , t h e interfusion and i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e of g r o u p s is too t h o r o u g h to m a k e separation and c o m p l e t e g r o u p a u t o n o m y a realistic o p t i o n . O n l y p s y c h o l o g i c a l disposi­ t i o n s , cultural e x p r e s s i o n s , a n d political institutions a b l e to l o o s e n b u t not d i s s o l v e b o r d e r s , m a k e t h e m p e r m e a b l e and u n d e c i d a b l e , at t h e s a m e t i m e that t h e y c r e a t e g u a r a n t e e s of g r o u p self-definition and r e p r e s e n t a ­ tion in t h e p u b l i c , can h o l d t h e h o p e of a m o r e peaceful and just future for the world.

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Index

Abject, category of, 124 Abjection, and border anxiety: defined, 124; prejudice and, 141-48; theory of, 11 Ableism, abjection and, 147-48 Acceptance, consciousness of, 130^36 Ackerman, Bruce, 17, 52, 103-4 Adams, Robert, 150 Administered society, domination in, 76— 81 Aesthetic judgment, cultural bias and, 152 Affectivity: discursive consciousness and, 134—36; impartiality and, 100; reason and, 118-19. See also Subjectivity Affinity: insurgency and, 84; politics of dif­ ference and, 172-73 Affirmative action: assimilationist ideal and, 173-74; as compensation, 194; distribu­ tive paradigm and, 12, 198-200; hierar­ chical division of labor and, 215-16; lib­ eral equality and, 192-93; nondiscrimina­ tion principle and, 193-98; politics of qualifications and, 211-12; social groups and, 9-10; unconscious racism/sexism and, 135 Afro-American culture, emergence of, 1 5 9 60 Ageism, abjection and, 147-48; scaling of bodies and, 129-30 Aggregate model of groups, 4 3 - 4 8 Alexander, David, 51 Ambiguity, abjection and, 145—46 American Indian Movement (AIM), 160 American Indians, 160, 181-83 Anti-nuclear power movement: group dif­ ferences in, 188; as insurgency, 8 3 - 8 4 Arendt, Hannah, 119-20 Assimilation; American Indian Movement and, 182-83; behavioral norms of respect­ ability and, 140-41; cultural pluralism and, 177-81; equal treatment and, 1 9 5 96; ideal of, 158-63, 168-69; politics of difference and, 157-58, 164-66; role of, in policy making, 173-74 Association model of groups, 4 3 ^ 8

Authority, ideal of impartiality and, 115-16 Autonomy: empowerment of city life and, 248-55; impartiality and, 112-16; insur­ gency and, 83-84, 88; marginalization and, 54-55; politics of difference and, 167-68; professionalization of work and, 221 Aversion: cultural imperialism and, 123-24; myth of merit and, 206; oppression and, 142; unconscious, 130-36, 148-49 Aversive racism, 1 4 1 ^ 2 Barber, Benjamin, 117-18, 228, 230 "Basic security system:" defined, 131-32, prejudices and, 133, 138-39 Beauty, white bourgeois ideal of, 128-30 Behavior: exclusionary, 235-36, 238-39; norms of respectability and, 136-41; pro­ fessional standards of, 139-41 Beitz, Charles, 257-58 Benhabib, Seyla, 35, 106-7, 230-31 Bilingual-bicultural maintenance programs, 181 Bilingual Education Act, 180 Bilingualism, unity vs. pluralism in, 178-81 Black English, legitimation of, 160, 207 Black liberation movement, 8 9 - 9 0 Black Power movement, 159-60 Blame, vs. responsiblity, 151 Blaming the victim syndrome, myth of merit and, 196 Bodies, scaling of, 11; abjection and, 14448; conscious acceptance/unconscious aversion, 130-36; cultural revolution and, 152-55; dichotomy with reason and, 1 3 9 ^ 1 ; discursive consciousness and, 134-36; ideal of civic public and, 111; in­ surgency movements and, 87-88; mod­ ern context of, 124-30; norms of respecta­ bility and, 137-41; politics of identity and, 122-55; professionalization of work and, 139-40, 221-22; white bourgeois bias in, 127-30 Bookchin, Murray, 249-50

278

•

Index

Bourgeois bias: ideal of civic public and, 110-11; norms of respectability and, 137-11; scaling of bodies and, 127-30; sexuality and, 138-39 Boxill, Bernard, 169 "Broad-band testing," limits of, 208 Brown, Carol, 51 Bureaucracy: democratization of, 252-55; distributive paradigm of justice and, 22; domination of, in administered society, 7 6 - 8 1 ; ideal of impartiality in, 113-16; impact of, on city life, 24.3-44; insur­ gency against, 8 1 - 8 8 ; in welfare capitalist society, 6 9 - 7 0 Bureau of Indian Affairs, 160 Capital accumulation: as goal of welfare cap­ italist society, 68-69; insurgency and, 81-82; professionalization of work and, 217-18 Capitalism. See also Welfare capitalist societyCare, justice and, 97 Careerism, 8 0 - 8 1 Castells, Manuel, 90 Central America solidarity movements, 8 4 85 Central planning, decisionmaking power and, 6 7 - 6 8 , 218 Chastity: enforcement of, on women, 1 0 9 10; white bourgeois ideaf of, 128-30 Citizenship: duality of, for American Indi­ ans, 183; ideal of civic public and, 1 1 0 11, 120-21; ideal of impartiality and, 97; international aspects of, 259; justice and, 3 3 - 3 4 ; marginalization and, 54-55; par­ ticipatory democracy and, 117-18 City life: ideal of, 13; civic public ideal and, 108; defined, 237; difference and, 2 2 6 56; empowerment without autonomy in, 248-55; eroticism in, 239-10; exclusion lacking in, 238-39; necessity of, 237-38; as normative ideal, 236—11; power of state and, 242-43; publicity in, 240-41; social injustice and, 241—18; variety in, 239 Civic public, ideal of, 10-11; ideal of impar­ tiality and, 9 6 - 1 2 1 ; insurgency and, 8 2 83; logic of identity and, 107-11; partici­ patory democracy and decisionmaking, 117-21

Civil Rights Act, 159 Class structure: distributive paradigm of justice and, 20-21; exploitation and, 4 8 53, 49-50; history of, 15(3—57; institution­ alization of, 70-71; marginalization and, 53-55; oppression and, 42; powerless­ ness and, 56-58; professionalization of work and, 217-22; scaling of bodies and, 126-27 Cole, Thomas, 147 Collective action, domination in admini­ stered society and, 7 7 - 8 1 "Common good," myth of, 118-19 Communicative ethics: democracy and, 9 2 94; ideal of impartiality and, 106-7; jus­ tice and, 33-34; participatory democracy and, 117-18; theory of, 4 5 - 1 6 Community, ideal of, 12-13, 226-27; indi­ vidualism and, 227-29; international as­ pects of, 260; mutuality and reciprocity in, 230-31; political consequences of, 233-36; privileging of facc-to-face rela­ tions, 232-34; Rousseauist dream of, 229-32. See also City life, ideal of Community control of schools, 9 3 - 9 5 Comparable worth policies, gender neu­ trality vs. group consciousness in, 1 7 7 78 "Concrete other," 106-7 Confederative agreements, 250-51 Connoffy, Wimam, 3 0 - 3 1 Consciousness raising, 11; cultural revolu­ tion and, 153-55 Constitutionality of democracy, 9 2 - 9 3 Consumer: ideal of community and, 2 2 8 29; marginalization and, 54-55; role of in welfare capitalist society, 7 1 - 7 2 Contract model of social relations, 4 4 - 4 5 Copresence of subjects, ideal of community and, 231, 233-34 Corporations, rootlessness of, 2 4 2 - 4 3 Credential inflation, 207-8 Critical theory, 5 - 8 Cultural identity: distributive paradigm of justice and, 23-24; educational attain­ ment and, 207-8; emergence of, 157; in­ surgency and, 83-84; justice and, 1 5 2 55; and oppression, 11; pluralism vs. unity in, 163-68, 178-81; politicization of, 86-88, 153-55; revitalization through, 166-67

Index Cultural imperialism: abjection and, 1 4 7 48; dynamics of aversion and, 123-24; oppression and, 5 8 - 6 1 , 64; politics of dif­ ference and, 165-68, 172-73; profession­ alization of work and, 140-41, 221-22; racism and, 122-23; standardized testing as, 209; unintended action and, 148-51; violence and, 63 Darwall, Stephen, 102 Decisionmaking: in administered society, 7 8 - 8 1 ; affirmative action and, 194-95; cul­ tural, 11; democratization of. 9 1 - 9 5 , 116-21, 248-55; distributive paradigm of justice and, 10, 19-20, 22-23; impartial­ ity and, 112-16; insurgency and, 83-84; interest-group structure of, 72-74; as nonmaterial good, 24; oppressed group rep­ resentation in, 184-91; politics of qualifi­ cations and, 213-14; power of city life and, 243-45; professionalization of work and, 213-14, 218, 221; regionalization of government and, 254-55; task definition and execution classification, 218 Deconstruction, impossiblity of impartiality and, 102 Delphy, Christine, 50 Democracy: as condition for social justice, 91-95; cultural pluralism in, 163-68; in division of labor, 222-25; heterogeneity and, 116-21; intrinsic value of, 92-95; justice and, 190-91; vs. recontainment, 88-91 Democratic Party, group representation in, 189 Dependency, marginalization and, 5 4 - 5 5 Depoliticization, 70, 80 Deskillinization, professionalization of work and, 2 1 9 - 2 1 Dialogic reason, 107 Dichotomy, impossibility of impartiality and, 102-3 Difference, politics of, 13-14; city life and, 226-56; critical theory and, 7-8; denial of, 10, 99-102; emancipation through, 163-68; gender polarization and, 137-38; Giddens' three-level strategy and, 1 3 3 36; groups and, 47-48; ideal of commu­ nity and, 235-36; vs. impartiality, 9 9 107; international aspects of, 259; justice and, 3 - 5 , logic of identity and, 98-99;

• 279

medicalization of, 129-30; participatory democracy and, 118-19; positive images of, 11, 185-86; reclaiming meaning of, 168-73; role of, in policy making, 1 7 3 83; social movements and, 156-91; stereo­ types and, 197; vs. unity, 97 Discursive consciousness: defined, 131; of oppressed groups, 133-34; prejudice and, 132; unintended action and, 1 5 0 51; xenophobia and, 145-46 "Disparate impact" doctrine, 196 Displacement, policy making and, 134-35 Distributive paradigm of justice, 15-38; af­ firmative action and, 198-200; city life and, 241-48; defined, 16-18; depoliticiza­ tion process and, 70-71; domination and oppression as injustice, 33-38; ideologi­ cal function of, 74-76; institutional con­ text of, 18-24; limits of, 8 - 9 , 24-30; power distribution and, 3 0 - 3 3 Diversity, ideal of, 158-63. See also Differ­ ence, politics of Division of labor: affirmative action and, 199-200; democratic division, 222-25; d e ­ politicization of, 70-71; distributive para­ digm of justice and, 20-24; myth of merit and, 203-4; oppression and, 214-22; professional/nonprofessional, 57-58; reason and sentiment and, 110-11; sexual and ra­ cial exploitation in, 50-53. See also Pro­ fessionalization of work; Task definition and execution Dominant goods, 217 Domination: in administered society, 7 6 81; defined, 38; democratic decisionmak­ ing and, 91-95; distribution of power and, 31—33, 56-58; injustice as, 9 - 1 0 , 33-38; institutional context of, 38; insur­ gency as response to, 82-83; politics of qualifications and, 212-13; professionali­ zation of work and, 218 Dominative racism, 141-42 Double consciousness: abjection and, 148; cultural imperialism and, 6 0 - 6 1 ; politics of difference and, 165-66 Du Bois, W . E . B . , 60, 169 Dworkin, Ronald, 30 Dyadic modeling of power, 31 Economic activity: educational opportunity and, 207; international aspects of, 2 5 9 -

280

•

Index

Economic activity (cont): 60; municipalization of, 249; planning of, in welfare capitalist society, 6 7 - 6 8 Education: equal opportunity as distribu­ tive justice, 26; as performance proxy, 206-10; privilege and, 154. See also Cre­ dential inflation Ehrenreich, Barbara, 229 Elderly, marginalization of, 5 3 - 5 5 Elkin, Stephen, 2 4 4 - 4 5 Elshtain, Jean, 229 Emancipation through difference, 163-68 Employment testing, 208. See also Stan­ dardized testing Empowerment, autonomy without, 248-55 Enablement, opportunity as, 26 End-state patterns of distributive para­ digm, 2 8 - 2 9 , 3 2 English as Second Language (ESL), 180-81 Enlightenment: history of, 156-57; impar­ tial mora] reason and, 97; racist conse­ quences of, 130-31 Entitlement, 68-69; property as, 217 Environmental movements, 83 Epstein, Stephen, 45 Equal Employment Opportunity Commis­ sion, 208 Equality: acceptance model of, 176-78; vs. affirmative action, 195-96; discursive con­ sciousness and, 132; politics of difference and, 11-12, 173-74; in welfare capitalist society, 6 9 - 7 0 Equal opportunity: affirmative action and, 192-93; distributive paradigm and, 2 5 26; hierarchical division of labor and, 215-16; history of, 214-15; politics of qualifications and, 211-12. See also So­ cial mobility Eroticism, in city life, 239-40 "Ethic of rights," 9 6 - 9 7 Ethnicity, resurgence of, 260 Ethnopolitics, development of, 88 Etiquette, discursive consciousness and, 132 European Economic Community, 260 Exclusionary behavior: ideal of community and, 235-36; lack of, in city life, 238-39 Expertism: foreign policy and, 84; politics of qualifications and, 211-12; in welfare capitalist society, 80-81. See also Creden­ tial inflation; Professionalization of work

Exploitation: distributive paradigm of jus­ tice and, 23; local government control and, 94-95; as oppression, 4 8 - 5 3 ; pro­ fessionalization of work and, 218-19; segregation of city and suburbs and, 247-^8 Face-to-face relations, in community, 2 3 2 34 Family structure, distributive paradigm of justice and, 21 Fault, discrimination as, 196. See also Blame Feeling, vs. reason, 102-3 Femininity, bourgeois norms of respectabil­ ity and, 137-38 Feminism: critical theory and, 8; cultural imperialism and, 58-61; cultural specific­ ity and, 8 7 - 8 8 , 161-62; gender neutral vs. group conscious policy making and, 175-78; ideal of civic public, 109-10; marginalization theory and, 55; oppres­ sion and, 13; paradigm of moral reason­ ing and, 96-97; "personal is political" slo­ gan, 120-21; as politicized self-help, 8 5 86; racism and, 154-55. See also Sexism; Women Feminist separatism, 161-62 Ferguson, Ann, 5 0 - 5 1 Fishkin, James, 201 Foreign aid, depoliticization of, 2 5 9 Foreign policy, expertism and, 84 Foucault, Michel, 32, 229-30 Freudian analysis, critics of, 143 Frug, Gerald, 242-43, 248-55 Frye, Marilyn, 41 Fullinwider, Robert, 194-95 Functions, separation of, in city life, 244— 48 Galston, William, 17, 24, 27 Gay movement. See Homosexuality; Lesbi­ anism Gender-neutral vs. group conscious policy making, 175-78 Gender socialization, 5 0 - 5 1 "Generalized other", 106-7 Giddens, Anthony, 28, 131-32 Goods, allocation of: distributive paradigm and, 15-16; justice theories focused on, 19; marginal deprivation of, 5 3 - 5 5

Index Government institutions: corporate aspects of, 6 7 - 6 8 ; distributive paradigm of jus­ tice and, 22; economic regulation by, 6 7 70; gender exploitation and, 51-52; group representation in, 189-90; ideal of impartiality in, 113-16; impact on city life of, 242-43; regionalization of, 2 5 2 55. See also Local government Gramm-Rudman bill, 68 Grass-roots institutions: decisionmaking by, 9 2 - 9 3 ; economic empowerment and, 249 Green, Philip, 216 Groups: affinity in, 46-48; affirmative ac­ tion and, 9-10; consciousness of, in pol­ icy making, 173-83; cultural revolution and, 153-55; defined, 186; heterogene­ ous public and, 183-91; ideal of commu­ nity and, 235-36; ideal of impartiality and, 115-16; liberal humanism and, 1 6 8 69; oppression and, 3 - 5 , 42—48; positiv­ ity of, 165-67; representation of, in pol­ icy making, 185-91; social groups vs. in­ terest or ideological groups, 186-87; spec­ ificity of, 157-58, 182-83; violence to­ wards, 62—63 Gutmann, Amy, 93-95, 184 Gynocentric feminism, 161-62 Habermas, Jurgen, 7 - 8 ; civic public ideal and, 117-18; colonization of the life world concept, 79; communicative ethics of, 3 3 - 3 4 , 4 5 - 4 6 , 9 2 - 9 4 ; on ideal of im­ partiality, 106-7 Harvey, David, 245 Health, white bourgeois bias towards, 1 2 7 30 Hegel, Georg Freidrich, 113, 231 Heidegger, Martin, 46 Heller, Agnes, 3 3 Heterogeneity; of feeling, impartiality and, 100; group representation and, 183-91; ideal of, 179-81; participatory democracy and, 116-21 subjectivity and, 2 3 1 - 3 2 "Hidden mechanisms" of redistribution, 244-45 Hierarchical organization: affirmative action and, 193; decisionmaking in, 56-58, 112— 16; domination of, in administered soci­ ety, 7 8 - 8 1 ; in education, 206-7; imparti­ ality and, 112-16; increased competition

• 281

in, 215-16; myth of merit and, 203-6; pol­ itics of qualifications and, 212-13; power­ lessness and, 56-58 Higher-order discrimination, 135 Hispanic minorities: bilingual policy mak­ ing and, 177-81; cultural specificity o f 160 Homoeroticism, in bourgeois respectabil­ ity, 138-39 Homophobia: abjection and, 146^47; con­ sciousness raising about, 154-55 Homosexuality: abjection and, 146-47; con­ sciousness raising about, 154-55; cultural specificity of, 160-61 Human nature, justice and, 3 5 - 3 7 Ideals, genesis of, 6 - 8 Identity, logic of: civic public ideal and, 107-11; group differences and, 43-46, 160-73; ideal of community and, 229-32; impartiality and, 97; postmodernist cri­ tique of, 98-99; scaling of bodies and, 122-55 Ideological group, defined, 186 Ideology: defined, 112-16; distributive par­ adigm and, 74—76; ideal of impartiality and, 111-16 Immersion language programs, 180-81 Impartiality, ideal of, 10-11; civic public and, 9 6 - 1 2 1 ; denial of difference and, 99-102; ideological function of, 111-16; impossibility of, 102-7; myth of merit and, 12, 2 0 5 - 6 Income distribution: distributive paradigm of justice and, 19-22; division of labor and oppression linked to, 216-17. See also Goods allocation of; Wealth, distribu­ tion of Income supports, in welfare capitalist soci­ ety, 70 Indian Reorganization Act, 182 Individualism: affirmative action and, 1 9 2 93; distributive paradigm of justice and, 35-36, 74-76; groups and, 45-48; ideal of community and, 226-29; myth of merit and, 200-206; politics of difference and, 166-67 Injustice; in city life, 241—48; domination and oppression defined as, 33-40; segre­ gation of city and suburbs and, 247-48; violence as, 6 1 - 6 2

282

•

Index

Institutional context: affirmative action and, 197-98; distributive paradigm of justice and, 18-24, 'M-35 Insurgency: rccontaiiirnent and, 90-91; repoliticization with, 8 1 - 8 8 Intelligence tests: cultural biases in, 1 2 6 27; testing for, normative biases in, 222 Interest groups: defined, 186; ideology and distributive paradigm, 75-76; participa­ tory democracy and, 118-19; regionalization of government and, 254-55; role of, in welfare capitalist society, 72-74 Irrationality of violence, 6 2 - 6 3 Jensen's theory of IQ differential, 133 Jewish Americans, cultural specificity of, 160 Job allocation: distributive paradigm of jus­ tice and, 22; gender neutral vs. group conscious policies and, 177-78; myth of merit and, 12, 201-3. See also Task defi­ nition and execution Justice: care and, 97, cultural revolution and, 152-55; democratic decisionmaking and, 91-95, 190-91; ethico-political con­ cept of, 33—34; international aspects of, 257-58; politics of, 9-10; theory of, 3 - 5 ; transfer of power and, 49-50; unin­ tended action and, 149-51. See also Dis­ tributive paradigm of justice; Injustice Karst, Kenneth, 173-74 Katznclson, Ira, 89 Kirkpatrick, Jean, 84 Knowledge, visual metaphors for, 125-30 Kovel, Joel, 141—48 Kristeva, Julia, 142-48, 152-53 Labor theory of value, exploitation and, 48-49 Labor unions, depoliticization of, 7 0 - 7 1 Land use policies: American Indians and, 182; in city life, 244-45 Language support programs, 180-81 Lawrence, Charles, 135, 150-51 Legal theory, unintended action and, 1 5 0 -

51 Lesbianism; cultural expression and, 1 6 0 61; homophobia and, 146, 154-55, 164; repoliticizalion and, 87-88; separatist im­ pulse and, 162-63

Liberal humanism, politics of difference and, 166-67 Liberalism, individualism and, 228 Liberation, paradigms of, 158-63 Liberty, regionalization of government and, 254-55 Littleton, Christine, 176-78 Livingston, John, 214 Local government; autonomy in, 227; de­ mocracy and, 94-95; insurgency against, 84; minority representation in, 183. See also Government institutions Locke, John, 113 Lowi, Theodore, 74 Lyotard, Jean-Francois, 3—4 Macpherson, C. B., 36, 49 Managerial work: increased competition for, 215-16; task analysis and, 2 0 3 - 0 Mansbridge, Jane, 184 Marcuse, Herbert, 6-8, 89 Marginalization: as criterion for oppression, 64; distributive paradigm of justice and, 23; as oppression, 5 3 - 5 5 Markus, Maria, 82 Marriage, exploitation in, 50 Marxism: distributive paradigm of justice and, 20-21; exploitation and, 48-53; professionalization of work and, 219 Masculinity, norms of respectability and, 137-38 Mass media, racism and sexism in, 135-36; stereotyping by, 20 Mathematics, gender/racial bias in, 207 May, Larry, 150 Menial labor, exploitation and, 52 Mental balance, white bourgeois bias to­ wards, 127-30 Merit, myth of, 200-206; expertism and, 80-81; ideal of impartiality and, 12; op­ pression and division of labor, 214-22; polities of qualifications and, 210-14; value-neutral evaluation and, 193 Metaraeisin, 141—J2 Mill, John Stuart, 9 2 Miller, David, 17, 24, 30 Minorities: cultural politics in, 8 5 - 8 6 , 88; ideal of civic public and, 111; importance of, in city life, 238-39; oppression of, 40; scaling of bodies and, 129-30. See also specific minorities

Index Minow, Martha, 169 Modernism, critical theory and, 8. See also Postmodernism Moral judgments: higher-order discrimina­ tion and, 134-35; impartiality and, 1 0 5 6; logic of identity and, 100-102; para­ digm of, 96-97; unintended action and, 148—51; white bourgeois bias towards, 127-30 "Moral point of view," 100-102, 106 Mosse, George, 336 Nagel, Thomas, 1 0 2 - 3 Nationalism, cultural aspects of, 138 National Women's Studies Association, 188 N e e d s assessment, in welfare capitalist society, 67—70 Neighborhoods, 9 0 - 9 1 ; empowerment of, 252; variety in, 239 Nell, Edward, 17 Nickel, James, 26 Nielsen, Kai, 17 Nondiscrimination, affirmative action and, 193-98 Nonmaterial goods, distributive paradigm of justice and, 2 4 - 3 0 Normalization of testing, 2 0 9 - 1 0 Normative concepts: behavior and respecta­ bility, 136-41; city life and, 236-41; of culture, 5 9 - 6 1 ; distributive paradigm and, 24—30; ideal of civic public and, 111; of justice, 4 - 5 , 34-35; moral respon­ sibility and unintended action, 149-51; reflection, 5 - 6 ; scaling of bodies and, 11, 125-30; of welfare capitalist society, 6 7 70 "Normative dualism," professionalization of work and, 221 Nozick, Robert, 28 Oedipal psyche, racism and, 142 Offe, Clans, 74 Okin, Susan, 105 O'Neill, Onora, 17 Oppression: affirmative action and, 197-99; assimilation and, 159-63, 166; aversion and, 142; criteria for, 6 3 - 6 4 ; cultural im­ perialism and, 58—61; discrimination and, 195-96; defined, 38; division of labor and, 214—22; exploitation and, 4 8 -

• 283

53; group differences and, 160-71, 1 8 6 91; heterogeneous public and, 184; homo­ geneity as, 179-81; as injustice, 33-38; institutional context of, 38; international aspects of, 258-60; marginalization as, 53-55; political context of, 3 9 - 4 2 ; as pow­ erlessness, 56-58; privilege and, 127-28; scaling of bodies and, 123-24; social groups and, 9-10, 42—48; task definition and execution as, 224-25; unintended ac­ tion and, 148-51; violence and, 6 1 - 6 3 . See also Domination Otherness: aversion and, 143-44; cultural imperialism and, 60-61; group difference and, 160-71; ideal of impartiality and, 106-7; international aspects of, 260. See also Difference, politics of Pan-African movement, 260 Paradigm: defined, 16; of liberation, 1 5 8 63 "Paradox of democracy,"' 92-93 Participation, in decisionmaking, 9 1 - 9 5 , 248-55; marginalization and, 54-55; rcpoliticization and, 83; Participatory democracy, 117-21; justice of, 92-93, 190-91 Particularist affiliation, emergence of, 163— 64; vs. impartiality, 103-5 "Path to belonging" of assimilation, 159 Pay scales, division of labor and, 216 Peace movement, 84—85 Peer review, politics of qualifications and, 213 Performance evaluation: educational attain­ ment and, 207—8; myth of merit and, 203-5 Performance proxies, education and testing as, 206-10 "Philosophy of consciousness," 4 5 - 4 6 Phobia, abjection and aversion and, 1 4 4 45 Piper, Adrian, 135 Pitkin, Hannah, 9, 107, 18.5-86 Platonic theory of justice, 33, 3 5 - 3 6 Pluralism: ideal of impartiality and, 114— 16; of self, 101-2 Policy making: affirmative action and, 1 9 7 98; depoliticization of, 10, 258-59; differ­ ence and, 173-83; powerlessness and, 56-58; power of cities in, 2 4 4 - 4 5

284

•

Index

Politics: city life and, 240—11; culture and, 86; defined, 9-10; group representation and, 190-91; ideal of, 12-13; ideal of com­ munity and, 233-36; justice and, 9 - 1 0 ; moral responsibility and unintended action, 149-51; scope of justice and, 3 4 35 Positivism, political theory and, 3 Postmodernism: critical theory and, 8; logic of identity and, 98-99; scaling of bodies and, 124-30; theory of justice and, 35-36 Power: in administered society, 7 6 - 8 1 ; in city life, 248-55; distributive paradigm of justice and, 3 0 - 3 3 ; of expertism, 80-81; exploitation and, 49; insurgency and, 8 3 84; oppression and, 41-42; politics of qualifications and, 211-12; recontain­ ment vs. democracy and, 8 9 - 9 1 Powerlessness: of cities, 242—13; oppres­ sion and, 5 6 - 5 8 ; professionalization of work and, 219-20; respectability and, 139-10 Powers of Horror, 143 Practical consciousness: abjection and, 146; defined, 131; prejudice and, 133, 138-39 Pregnancy and childbirth rights, gender neutral vs. group conscious policy mak­ ing and, 175-78 Prejudice, history of, 156-57 Privacy: autonomy as, 251; morality and, 137; participatory democracy and, 1 1 9 20 Privilege: heterogeneous public and, 184; schooling and, 154; structuring of, 127— 28 Procedural fairness, myth of merit and, 201-2 Production: marginalization and, 54-55; pri­ vate ownership of, 49; sex-affective, 5 0 51 Professionalization of work: behavioral norms of respectability and, 139-40; class structure and, 217; domination of, in ad­ ministered society, 77-81; increased com­ petition in, 215-16; politics of qualifica­ tions and, 211-12; powerlessness and, 56-58; task analysis and, 2 0 3 - 6 Profit, exploitation and, 48—19 Property, as entitlement, 217 Proportional representation, 187-88 Public, defined, 119-20

Publicity, in city life, 240-41 Public life, repoliticization of, 8 1 - 8 8 Public patriarchy, 51 Public space, in city life, 240—11 Qualifications: defined, 201; merit and, 204-5; peer review of, 224-25; politics of, 210-14 Racism: abjection and, 141—18; cultural im­ perialism and, 5 8 - 6 1 ; discursive con­ sciousness and, 132-33; exploitation and, 50-53; professionalism and, 57-58; role of in policy making, 135; violence and, 61-62; in welfare capitalist society, 1 2 2 23. See also Aversive racism; Dominative racism; Metaracism Rainbow Coalition, 188-89 Rationality, cultural biases in, 126-27. See also Reason Rawls, John: distributive paradigm of jus­ tice and, 16-17, 20-21; on impartiality, 104; "rights and duties" concept, 24-25; on self-respect, 27; on utilitarianism, 101-2 Reason: behavioral norms of respectability and, 136-41; scaling of bodies and, 124— 30, 139-41 Reciprocity, ideal of community and, 2 3 0 31 Recontainment vs. democracy, 8 8 - 9 1 Red Power (American Indian Movement), 160 Reductionism, political theory and, 3 Regional government, importance of, 2 5 2 55 Reiman, Jeffrey, 5 2 - 5 3 Relational understanding of difference, 171-73 Representation, equality of, with hetero­ genous groups, 185-91 Respectability: behavioral norms of, 1 3 6 41; ideal of, 136; oppression and, 57-58; powerlessness and, 139-40 Responsibility vs. blame, 151 Rightful possession, justice as, 17 Rights: distributive paradigm and, 25; ethic of, 96-97; marginalization and, 54-55; tribal rights of American Indians, 183 Roemer, John, 49, 52

Index Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 92, 108-9, 229-32 Runciman, W. C , 16-17 Sandel, Michael, 35, 228, 230 Sartre, Jean-Paul, 231 Science, gender/racial bias in, 207 Segregated residential patterns, 57, 245-48 Self, plurality of, 101-2 Self-determination: of American Indians, 183; democratic decisionmaking and, 9 1 95; ideal of community and, 234-36; sepa­ ration a n d , 1 4 3 - 4 4 Self-esteem: distributive paradigm of jus­ tice and, 26-27; politics of difference and, 165-66 Self-organization: by groups, 184; hetero­ genous public and, 190-91; politicization of, 85-86; politics of difference and, 1 5 9 60, 167-68 Semiotic capacity, 143 Sennett, Richard, 108, 235 Services: exploitation and, 5 2 - 5 3 ; regionali­ zation of, 2 5 3 - 5 5 Sexism: discursive consciousness and, 1 3 2 33; exploitation and, 5 0 - 5 1 ; professionali­ zation of work and, 5 7 - 5 8 ; role of in pol­ icy making, 135; violence and, 6 1 - 6 2 Sexuality, repression of, in bourgeois men­ tality, 138-39 Sharing, community as, 231-32 Situation, particularity of, 100 Social cooperation, domination of, in wel­ fare capitalist society, 7 8 - 8 1 Social groups. See Groups Social justice. See Justice Social mobility: division of labor and, 2 1 4 15; professionalization of work and, 221 Social movements of 1960s and 1970s: con­ cept of oppression in, 7, 41^12; as insur­ gency, 8 2 - 8 3 ; group specificity and, 1 6 2 63 Social ontology, 45 Social reality, critical theory and, 6 Social relations: group dynamics and, 4 2 48; ideal of, 12-13; power and, 31 Social theory: defined, 5; distributive para­ digm of justice and, 2 8 - 3 0 Sovereignty: individualism and, 107-8; op­ pression and, 4 1 - 4 2 Spatial segregation and functionalization, urban, 245^18

• 285

Specialization, division of labor and, 216, 225 Specificity, meaning of difference and, 171-73 Sports, gender neutral vs. group conscious policy making and, 178 Standardized testing, myth of merit and, 207-10 Stereotypes: cultural imperialism and, 5 9 61; distributive paradigm of justice and, 20 Subjectivity: community as shared, 2 3 0 32; cultural imperialism and, 124; impar­ tiality and, 100-101; scaling of bodies and, 125-30; three-level theory of, 1 3 1 36 Supervisory roles, division of labor and, 216 Symbolic capacity, 143 Systemic aspects of oppression, 4 1 - 4 2 Systemic violence, 62 Task analysis: of managerial and profes­ sional work, 203-6; myth of merit, 2 0 1 2; task definition and execution, 12, 193, 216-22, 224-25; task design, myth of merit and, 193 Task discontinuous hierarchies, 203 Taube, Nadine, 175 Tax policy, 6 8 - 6 9 Taylor, Charles, 18-19, 3 4 - 3 5 Tenant organizations, 86 Terms of Political Discourse, 3 0 - 3 1 Testing, as performance proxy, 2 0 6 - 1 0 "Thrownness," 46 Transitional bilingual programs, 180-81 Unger, Roberto, 9, 216-17 Unintended action, moral responsibility and, 148-51 Unity: vs. cultural identity, 178-81; vs. dif­ ference, 97; group specificity and, 162; impartiality and, 100-101; logic of iden­ tity and, 99 Universality: of civic public, 10-11; of cul­ tural norms, 5 9 - 6 1 ; domination of, in ad­ ministered society, 77-81; ideal of impar­ tiality and, 100-102; participatory democ­ racy and, 118-19; vs. particularity, 1 0 3 5; politics of difference and, 165-68; of theory of justice, 4 - 5

286

•

Index

Urban social movements, 84; recontain­ ment vs. democracy in, 89. See also City life Utilitarianism, impartiality and, 101-2 Utopianism, of impartiality, 103-4 Value-neutral evaluation and myth of merit, 202 Value systems, distributive paradigm of jus­ tice and, 3 7 - 3 8 Variety, of city life, 239 Violence; oppression as, 61—64; racism and, 122-23 Voting Rights Act, 159 Walzer, Michael, 6-7, 17-18, 81 Wartenburg, Thomas, 32 Wasserstrom, Hichard, 158-59, 198-99 Wealth, distribution of: democratic deci­ sionmaking and, 94-95; distributive para­ digm of justice and, 19-22 Welfare capitalist society: depoliticization of, 70-74; distributive paradigm of jus­ tice and, 66-67; domination in, 76-81; ex­ ploitation and, 48-49; insurgency and repolitidzation in, 81-88; marginalization

and, 53-55; normative principles of, 6 7 70; recontainment vs. democracy in, 8 8 91 West, Cornel, 130-31 Williams, Bernard, 104-5 Williams, Wendy, 175 Women: exclusion of, from civic public ideal, 109-10; oppression of, 5 0 - 5 1 ; spa­ tial separation and funclionalization and, 246; white bourgeois ideal of, 129-30. See aho Feminism Wood, Allen, 20 Worker discretion, negative and positive roles in, 2 0 2 - 3 Workplace democracy: division of labor and, 223—25; gender neutral vs. group conscious policy making in, 175-76; myth of merit and, 193; politics of qualifi­ cations and, 212—13; powerlessness and, 56-58 Xenophobia, as abjection, 141—48 Zoning: autonomy of, 249-50; group segre­ gation with, 246-47; impact on city life of 2 4 4 - 4 5