Kim Jong-il's Leadership of North Korea (Routledge Contemporary Asia Series)

Kim Jong Il’s Leadership of North Korea

Kim Jong Il came to power after the death of his father Kim Il Sung in 1994. Contrary to expectations, he has succeeded in maintaining enough political stability to remain in power. Kim Jong Il’s Leadership of North Korea is an examination of how political power has been developed, transmitted from father to son, and now operates in North Korea. Using a variety of original North Korean sources as well as South Korean materials Jae-Cheon Lim pieces together the ostensibly contradictory and inconsistent facts into a conceptual coherent framework. This book considers Kim and his leadership through an analytical framework composed of four main elements: (i) Kim as a leader of a totalitarian society; (ii) as a politician; (iii) as a Korean; and (iv) as an individual person. This illuminating account of what constitutes power and how it is used makes an important contribution to the understanding of an opaque and difficult regime. It will be of interest for upper-level undergraduates, postgraduates, and academics interested in North Korean politics, and also those in Political Theory. Jae-Cheon Lim is a researcher at the Institute for Korean Unification Studies, Yonsei University.

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Kim Jong Il’s Leadership of North Korea

Jae-Cheon Lim

First published 2009 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 5RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 29 West 35th Street, New York, NY 10001 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2008. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.”

© 2009 Jae-Cheon Lim Typeset in Times New Roman by Keyword Group Ltd Printed and bound in Great Britain by TJI Digital, Padstow, Cornwall All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data A catalog record has been requested for this book ISBN 0-203-88472-8 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN10 0-415-48195-3 (hbk) ISBN10 0-203-88472-8 (ebk) ISBN13 978-0-415-48195-3 (hbk) ISBN13 978-0-203-88472-0 (ebk)

Contents

Acknowledgments Abbreviations

vi vii

1

Introduction

1

2

Formative period (1942–1964)

10

3

Road to heir (1964–1974)

36

4

Heir (1974–1994)

58

5

Ruler (1994–present)

105

6

Leadership

133

7

Conclusion

173

Notes Bibliography Index

180 209 217

Acknowledgments

This work was originally written as a doctoral dissertation. It could not have been produced without many people’s help. First of all, I would like to express my gratitude to my advisor Dae-Sook Suh. I owe him an immeasurable intellectual debt for his help to my master and doctoral studies at the University of Hawaii for six years. My appreciation also extends to John Wilson, Carolyn Stephenson, James A. Dator and Edward J. Shultz, the members of my dissertation committee. I benefited from their scholarship, advice, and encouragement throughout the research of Kim Jong Il and his leadership. Many thanks to Jeffrey A. Tripp and Kristine Kotecki for reading my book meticulously. I am particularly indebted to Jeffrey and his wife, Sujin Hwang Tripp, for helping me adjust to American life and fueling my research with great food. I appreciate Son Kwang-ju and Ch˘ong Ch'ang-hy˘on whose expertise on Kim Jong Il helped this research. I am also grateful to Haksoon Paik and the employees of t'ongilbu charyo cent'˘o (Archives Center of the Ministry of Unification) who kindly allowed me to copy documents on Kim Jong Il and North Korea. Intellectual discussions with Eundak Kwon, Jungmin Seo, Mooweon Rhee and Mihyang Ahn will remain unforgettable memories, as will my friendships with Sung Jae Lee, Hyuncheol Kim, Chan Lee, Jihye Yeom, Sangyoung Park, Whi Chang, Jih-Un Kim, Hyeonju Son, You-jeong Lee, Joongho Kim, Yongseok Suh, Noa Matsushita, Shunichi Takekawa, and James Rae. I am additionally thankful to several people, including Eun Kook Lee, Yong Ho Kim, Kay-Soon Chang, Bum-Suk Kim, Yongsoon Kim, and Jae-Hong Hwang, at the Institute for Korean Unification Studies, Yonsei University, who discussed many Korean issues with me. I also feel obligated to express my deep gratitude to Jae Shik Sohn at the Graduate Institute of Peace Studies, Kyunghee University, who has been my mentor. At Routledge, when my manuscript was delivered, Stephanie Rogers carefully read it and encouraged publication. I was lucky to have her wise counsel. Sonja van Leeuwen and Leanne Hinves also deserve my appreciation due to their assistance for this publication. In addition, I owe a debt to my brother, sister, sister-in-law, brother-in-law, nephews and nieces for their support. Finally, my wholehearted gratitude goes to my father, mother, and wife Sun-hee whose unconditional love was the driving force for finishing this book. This book is dedicated to them.

Abbreviations

CCP CMAC DC DEL DUF DWU KIA LSWY MSC NDC OD SKLB SSD TRFM

Chinese Communist Party Central Military Affairs Committee Department of Culture Department of External Liaison Department of the United Front Democratic Women’s Union Kaesˇong Industrial Area League of Socialist Working Youth Military Security Command National Defense Commission Operation Department South Korean Liaison Bureau State Security Department Three-Revolution Red Flag Movement

1

Introduction

Purpose After the death of North Korea’s founding leader Kim Il Sung in 1994, his son, Kim Jong Il, began to rule the state. He was little known to the outside world at the time. Experts on North Korea wondered whether Kim had the same power base and personal capacity to govern the state as his father had possessed. After the first leader’s death, the second leader had to deal with the most difficult period in North Korea’s history, the natural disasters and mass starvation of 1995–1998. Many people wondered how long Kim Jong Il could maintain the regime and whether a coup against the new totalitarian leader might soon result from his instatement. However, contrary to expectations, Kim Jong Il has maintained enough political stability that there continue to be no significant signs that his regime will fail. In 2007 it was more than ten years since Kim Il Sung had passed away. The questions that the experts raised ten years ago represented our ignorance about both the man and the state. Rather than simply portraying Kim Jong Il as a despot, we need to critically analyze who he is and what he is about. An objective analysis will most clearly address these questions. This is a study of Kim Jong Il and his leadership. A study of Kim Jong Il is important for three reasons. First, it relates to the length of the leader’s term in North Korea. Unlike in democratic states, when a leader is appointed the head of the state or the general secretary of the party in North Korea, he serves in the position for life. The fact that Kim is a lifelong leader of the state means that his policy endures in the state for a considerably long time. Second, in a totalitarian society without political checks and balances, the leader monopolizes decision-making. Given this highly centralized decision-making system, the leader’s role is more significant than it would be in democratic or authoritarian societies. Decision-making in a totalitarian society arises from the leader. Regardless of their relative triviality or importance, the results of his decisions affect both domestic and international politics. Morally speaking, as the ‘supreme’ leader, he is not only responsible for all the crimes committed by the state but he is also essential to the prosperity and wellbeing of his people. Third, a study of Kim Jong Il will provide an answer to the following question: Why, unlike the Soviet Union and other East European

2 Introduction countries, did North Korea not collapse after the Cold War or even during the economic severity of the mid-1990s? Many specialists on North Korea have raised the question and tried to find an answer. This study will provide a partial answer to the question by discussing the role of Kim Jong Il in upholding the regime. Leadership is a relationship between a leader and his or her followers wherein the leader wields a ‘determining influence’.1 The leader motivates and mobilizes the followers to achieve his or her political goals. It is difficult to imagine that one leader has only one style for his or her activity. The term ‘leadership style’ refers to a distinct and repetitive manner in a leader’s performance. A style represents a leader’s ‘preference’ for a particular way of doing things. A style is also situationdependent. While one leadership style may be good in one situation, another style would be more effective in a different situation.2 It would be fair to say that most leaders have several different approaches. To understand the styles of a particular leader, it is necessary to know the leader’s preferences, behaviors, and social context. In analyzing Kim Jong Il’s leadership, this book answers the following questions: How was he raised and educated? How did he become the successor to Kim Il Sung? What did Kim Jong Il do after he was appointed the heir to his father? What has he done as a ruler since his father’s death? What peculiar features does his leadership have? How is the junior Kim’s leadership different from the senior Kim’s? Several books on Kim Jong Il were published before he succeeded his father, but most of the literature has appeared in the post-Kim Il Sung period. All the books published in North Korea are hagiographical and their primary purpose is to propagandize the greatness of the Dear Leader, Kim Jong Il. The studies made outside of North Korea vary depending upon the author’s perspective, which range from disparaging to complimentary. A common characteristic of most of the literature published outside of North Korea reflects the scant availability of primary sources on Kim, which results from the difficulty in obtaining information from an impermeable totalitarian society. Another common feature of the literature is that the analyses of Kim are partial and fragmentary. Usually journalistic literature is confined to enumerating biographical facts about him. Even academic literature fails to analyze him multi-dimensionally, resulting in superficial interpretations due to the complexity of theoretical application. The lack of information on Kim Jong Il, however, should not be an excuse to perform superficial studies. Even this limited information tells us many things about him. Information sources on Kim Jong Il are broadly classified into four categories in this book. The first category is the information acquired from people who have met Kim Jong Il in person. This includes North Korean high-ranking defectors (Hwang Chang-y˘op and Sin Ky˘ong-wan), Kim Jong Il’s former friends (Kim Ch˘ong-min), South Korean governmental officials and civilians (Kim Dae Jung), American officials (Madeleine Albright), and others.3 Their writings are useful in understanding Kim Jong Il’s public and private lives. The second information category comes from North Korean publications such as Kim Jong Il’s works, Kim Il Sung’s works, newspapers, journals, and other materials. In this category,

Introduction 3 Kim Ch˘ong-il s˘onjip (Kim Jong Il Selected Works) is the most important source. These works have been distributed in North Korea since 1992. The speeches in Kim Jong Il’s Selected Works were published after his staff revised the original transcripts. In spite of these revisions, if we carefully read the speeches, we discover in them what Kim Jong Il was most concerned about. The Nodong sinmun, the official newspaper of the Korean Workers’ Party, is also necessary for grasping Kim’s official activities and policies. The third category of information comes from the official biographies of Kim Jong Il.4 It is difficult to trust these writings as trustworthy descriptions, but they are useful for finding biographical facts about Kim. The fourth category of information encompasses writings on Kim published in South Korea as well as in other countries.5

Analytical framework One of this book’s contributions to studies of Kim Jong Il is to consider his leadership through an analytical framework. Much literature about him has been published, but few sources employed theoretical frameworks to their studies of Kim Jong Il. As mentioned earlier, almost all research on Kim Jong Il faces a limitation in the options for data collection. One way to overcome this limit is to employ a theoretical framework. Theoretical frameworks help a researcher organize limited data more systematically. In this study, the framework also helps to clarify concepts that other researchers have used in North Korean studies and incorporate their research results into this context. Rather than partial or fragmentary analysis, this will be a more comprehensive study of Kim and his leadership through an analytical lens. It would be irresponsible to assume that a single theory could explain the peculiar elements to Kim Jong Il’s leadership. Therefore, in this book I will create a synthetic framework composed of four main elements: (1) Kim as a leader of a totalitarian society; (2) as a politician; (3) as a Korean; and (4) as an individual person. I will piece together information about Kim and bring these ostensibly contradictory and inconsistent facts into a conceptual coherent framework. The four aforementioned elements also represent the main characteristics of this study. First, this will be a research on a ‘leader in a totalitarian society’. The term ‘dictatorship’ has been used to describe both authoritarianism and totalitarianism. Dictatorship repudiates individual freedoms, the sphere of civil society, diversity, tolerance of political opposition, and checks-and-balances of political power, to name a few. While the authoritarian regime permits some kinds of political and economic freedoms so long as the freedom is not judged to threaten the regime,6 the totalitarian regime – an extreme version of dictatorship – almost completely denounces freedom and pluralism. In Plato’s Republic, Socrates argued that the ‘best-run community’ is like a ‘single human being’, thus advocating the unity of a society. He compared the community to a body, where the relationship between the community and its members are similar to a body and its parts.7 His argument is congenial to modern totalitarian theories. In The Origins of Totalitarianism, Hannah Arendt similarly

4 Introduction describes totalitarianism as a system where every person is totally organized as one organic identity and individual differentiation and plural traits are completely destroyed.8 In totalitarian domains, according to Arendt, terror is persistent under political authority. People ‘dwell on horrors’ until totalitarianism achieves its ultimate goal of total domination. Coercive institutions like concentration camps and secret police are essential for the fulfillment of the goal. The public space of the state infiltrates into the people’s private sphere, with secret police constantly inspecting this sphere. The boundary between public and private spaces becomes blurred. Monolithic ideological indoctrination is also instrumental in the totalitarian realm, where only one ideology is allowed to exist. This ideology is repeatedly inculcated through the state’s education system and media. Through ideological indoctrination that disregards genuine facts about reality, totalitarianism consistently forges ‘fictitious realities’ and mobilizes the masses to actualize the realities that might exist in the future.9 The role of a totalitarian leader is vital in a totalitarian society. Unlike other political forms, the totalitarian regime employs political power fully concentrated in the hands of a single leader. All sub-systems of a totalitarian society, including the political party, the secret police, concentration camps, and mass media, become ‘transmission belts’ and exist for the realization of the ‘will of the Leader’. In principle, they ‘assure not only an absolute power monopoly, but unparalleled certainty that all commands will always be carried out’.10 Stalinist totalitarianism was the original political system implanted in North Korea, but the system evolved locally into a variant form by fusing Korean nationalism and cultural values such as Confucianism. In particular, Kim Jong Il’s succession turned North Korea into a ‘dynastic totalitarian’ state, which never existed in Western totalitarian societies. What, then, does the structure of dynastic totalitarianism imply? As a dynastic totalitarian regime, what distinctive characteristics does North Korea have? Furthermore, how is the state similar to previous dynasties in Korea? These questions, and the concept of dynastic totalitarianism in general, will be addressed throughout the book.11 Kim Jong Il was raised in totalitarian North Korea and became the leader of this society. It is certain that this context nurtured his distinctly totalitarian psychology and behavior. While his bureaucratic expertise might be essential for Kim’s policy decisions, the absence of political checks and balances and the longevity of the leader’s hold on power in the society also play a part. Therefore, Kim’s peculiar leadership characteristics should be understood in the context of the totalitarian society. On the other hand, this is a study of a ‘politician’. Being a politician is an important aspect of Kim Jong Il’s identity. While Kim has unique qualities as a ‘leader of a totalitarian society’, he also possesses general traits as a ‘politician’. One characteristic of the politician is that his or her main goal is to gain political power. Kim Jong Il is not an exception to this characterization. He holds the strong will to achieve and maintain power and has revealed it throughout his political career.

Introduction 5 It is evident that his father influenced Kim Jong Il’s desire to be a politician. From his childhood, he wanted to be a politician like his father. The fact that he is Kim Il Sung’s son was certainly an important variable in becoming the heir of the state, but it was not the sole factor. He also succeeded by demonstrating his leadership abilities through his past political performance. Kim Jong Il has been an active player in the totalitarian development of North Korea since he began his political career in the Korean Workers’ Party in 1964. The junior Kim tried to emulate the senior Kim, spearheading his father’s cult of personality and the totality of the chuch’e idea in North Korean society. He has been one of the foremost architects of the transformation of the totalitarian state. Another general characteristic of politicians is that once they seize political power, they want to maintain power as long as possible by any means in a given situation. Kim Jong Il displays this trait as well. It is misleading to consider Kim’s peculiar behavior as irrational and insane. On the contrary, his behavior is conducted as part of a deliberate calculative effort to defend his political domain. He mobilizes his resources to strengthen his power and will most likely continue to do so in the future. In the same vein, recent events such as the North Korean missile tests, the nuclear test, and the economic reforms should be understood as Kim Jong Il’s rational choices to maintain his regime – one which has suffered from an inefficient economy and external security threat. Another of the politician’s features is his ability to be flexible. Even the most dogmatic politician is pragmatic to some degree in certain situations because political reality is fluid and constantly changing. To obtain or maintain his or her position, the politician has to flexibly adapt his or her policy to changing political situations. It is true that Kim Jong Il has been depicted in the North Korean media as a staunch advocate of socialism and the chuch’e idea. His stance appears to be very rigid. However, if we carefully examine his words and behaviors, it is not difficult to uncover his pragmatism as well. He has demonstrated this pragmatic approach clearly since the late 1990s, after North Korean society suffered from the starvation and natural disasters of the mid-1990s. The pragmatic approach will be detailed later. His ideological rigidity and pragmatism are not mutually exclusive. In a sense, the two contradictory features coexist under his efforts to sustain political power. Before the late 1990s, loyalty to his father was the main characteristic of Kim Jong Il’s leadership. He could become his father’s successor because of his loyalty and he strengthened his political position by using his father’s existing authority. However, changes in socio-political situations – the collapse of the Soviet Union, the death of Kim Il Sung, the partial collapse of the North Korean economy, and natural disasters – forced him to be more pragmatic in order to maintain his regime. In other words, his pragmatic policies were imperative measures enacted to prevent total implosion of the regime. The third point in the framework is that this research is about the leader of ‘north’ Korea. I intentionally use the lower-case ‘north’ in this one instance to stress the similar tradition between North and South Korea. For more than half a century, the two Koreas have been divided and their differences have grown

6 Introduction over time. They are currently distinct from each other politically, economically, and culturally. However, at the same time the two Koreas share a ‘Korean’ culture and tradition that existed before the 1945 division. The remnants of Confucianism (including neo-Confucianism) are found in both North and South Korea. The Confucian emphases on hierarchy and strict order contributed to maintaining aristocratic social orders in pre-modern Korean dynasties. In particular, neoConfucianism, which developed during the Chinese Song dynasty, found its way into late Koryˇo Korea (918–1392) and became the state ideology during the Chos˘on dynasty (1392–1910). In Chos˘on Korea, Confucianism not only secured the control of the ruling yangban class, but also affected, as the state religion, the daily life of commoners by regulating people’s customs. Traditional Confucian scholars tried to maintain social order and harmony through ‘proper ritual behavior (ye in Korean; li in Chinese)’ including etiquette and ceremonies.12 They classified members of a society into certain groups – king, subject, sage, commoners, and so on – and demanded that each group behave according to its proper rituals. For example, the king’s proper behavior was different from his subjects’ and the husband’s was different from the wife’s. The Confucian rituals enforced the class society’s hierarchy through daily educational processes. Japanese colonial rule from 1910 to 1945 did not break down the Confucian hierarchy. On the contrary, Japanese rule reinforced social hierarchy. The colonial rule enlarged the modern state apparatus in Korea, including the police and other administrative organizations. Owing to modern technology, the Japanese Government-General of Korea established a more centralized control system than any previous Korean dynasty. Even after liberation, the Soviet occupation of North Korea stripped it of an opportunity to undergo ‘plural’ democracy. Old suppressed commoners took political power for the first time in Korean history through the communist revolution. But, according to Charles K. Armstrong, the North Korean revolution resulted in a new hierarchical society even more rigid than the Japanese colonial one.13 Although the early ‘iconoclastic’ revolution denounced Confucianism, North Korea later restored Confucian values like filial piety, loyalty, and virtue. In addition to Confucianism, nationalism commonly appears in both Koreas. The Japanese colonial experience provided Korean nationalism with a central stage; the colonizing process was accompanied by the birth and development of modern Korean nationalism. This nationalism evolved in the series of turbulent events of the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries in northeast Asia. The first event relating to the rise of Korean nationalism was the collapse of China’s suzerainty over Korea after the First Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895). Middle Kingdom China’s defeat in the war ended its tributary relationship with Korea, giving Korea an opportunity to deflect from Chinese civilization and to have a national autonomy from Chinese intervention. However, rather than achieve a national autonomy, Korea was forced to enter the Japanese sphere of influence after the war. Despite the political failure of Korea in the post-First Sino-Japanese

Introduction 7 War period, the war provided Korean leaders a space to seek an independent national identity. Another event that facilitated the growth of Korean nationalism was the end of Korean monarchy after the 1910 colonization. Traditionally, the object of people’s loyalty had been the Korean king, but, in the post-monarchy period, the abstract notion of the Korean nation replaced the object of ‘king’ as a target of their loyalty. Now, the Korean territory no longer belonged to the king but to the ‘imagined’ nation. During the colonial period, the people struggled to restore Korea’s national identity and its sovereignty rather than the monarchy. They were ready to die for the lofty national cause. The end of Japanese colonial rule meant the restoration of national identity. A new nation-state was supposed to be created on the principles of popular sovereignty and democracy. However, the US arbitrarily divided Korea into two Koreas. For Koreans, this division represented the frustration of their nationstatehood. After the division, unification became the foremost national goal of the two Koreas. Their colonial and division experiences heightened the two Koreas’ suspicions of the neighboring powers’ intentions regarding Korean issues. North Korea, as well as South Korea, has been very sensitive to the intervention of its neighbors. Nationalism has been an essential ideology of the North. In a sense, the chuch’e idea is a product of Kim Il Sung’s nationalist reaction to foreign intervention.14 Although Kim Il Sung hated to use the term nationalist, his political career demonstrates the extent of his nationalist sentiments. Kim Il Sung’s father’s nationalism influenced his own political sentiments as did his military participation against Japan in Manchuria during the Japanese colonial period. In the Sino-Soviet conflict, he held a position opposing the interventions of China and the Soviet Union while also trying to maintain an independent position and pursue national interests. The idea of chuch’e was created on the basis of his experiences. Kim Jong Il was raised in the Confucian and nationalist social environment. While he was growing up, the establishment of chuch’e became an important political issue which influenced young Kim Jong Il’s mentality. Since succeeding his father, Kim Jong Il has actively promoted Confucianism and nationalism to strengthen his power base. He emphasizes Confucian values of ‘loyalty and filial piety’. The North Korean media portrays Kim as the most filial person in the society. Anti-imperialism, specifically anti-Americanism, has been used to justify the failure of his policies. Fourth, and finally, this is a study about the ‘person’ of Kim Jong Il. This book will analyze Kim’s ‘personality’ to further understand him and his leadership styles, because ‘the public world of the leader-as-political-actor is not insulated from the private world of the leader-as-person’.15 Individuals’ personalities are formed through a combination of personal and social situations in his or her context. Personal ‘events and actions take their significance from the meanings they have within the culture in which they occur’.16 In a sense, this research requires a personality analysis to find the meanings hidden in biographical facts about Kim Jong Il.

8 Introduction Given the salient role of the leader in totalitarian North Korea, the leader’s personal preferences are deeply entangled in his public policy. The personality and policy relationship is clear in this society. When the North Korean government establishes public policies, particularly cultural policies, it considers Kim Jong Il’s personal preferences. For example, when the state creates works of art and literature, it does not release them if they do not satisfy Kim Jong Il’s aesthetic preference. The cultural phenomena that do not fit Kim’s preferences are destined to disappear from the society. The integrative analytical framework of the four elements mentioned above – a leader of a totalitarian state, a politician, a Korean, and an individual person – will help us comprehend Kim and his leadership styles multi-dimensionally. The aspect of ‘leader of a totalitarian state’ tries to find an answer to how Kim Jong Il as a totalitarian leader is distinctive in his behavior from non-totalitarian leaders. The ‘Korean’ aspect attempts to provide an answer to how Kim Jong Il as a leader in Korean society is different from Western totalitarian leaders. On the other hand, the aspect of ‘politician’ will help comprehend Kim Jong Il as politician in general. The last aspect of ‘person’ will show Kim Jong Il’s unique character as an individual person. Equipped with the four elements in the analytical framework, this book will examine Kim Jong Il’s behavior and behavioral characteristics more comprehensively. The book will be divided into seven chapters. Chapter 1 is the introduction and Chapter 7 is the conclusion. Chapter 2, ‘Formative period (1942–1964)’, will examine Kim Jong Il’s childhood and adolescence, including his education, family relationships, and important social events. Even though studying the leader’s childhood does not provide exact answers to his adult behaviors, it does offer clues. In the chapter, I will examine Kim’s formative years, what kinds of social events occurred in his childhood and adolescence, and how his family relationships and social events affected him. Chapter 3, ‘Road to heir (1964–1974)’, details the period beginning in April 1964, when Kim Jong Il began his career at the party, and ending in February 1974, when the junior Kim was officially (but secretly) appointed a successor to the senior Kim. This period was preparatory to his becoming the successor. It examines what the North Korean leadership wanted him to accomplish in this period, and what he did in order to satisfy the leadership. Chapter 4, ‘Heir (1974–1994)’, will cover the period between February 1974 and July 1994, when Kim Il Sung passed away. This was a period in which Kim gradually took command of the party, the military, and the secret police as heir through support from the senior Kim. In this chapter, I will discuss how Kim Jong Il secured his hold on these institutions, what the international political situation was during this period, and how the North Korean leadership responded to the end of the Cold War. Chapter 5, ‘Ruler (1994 to present),’ will be concerned with the period from the death of Kim Il Sung to the present. In this chapter, I will examine the significance of Kim Il Sung’s death, what Kim Jong Il has accomplished in the post-Kim Il Sung period, how Kim Jong Il’s policies differ from his father’s, how Kim coped with

Introduction 9 the economic predicament, how he has developed inter-Korean and international relations, and his regime’s survival strategies. In Chapter 6, ‘Leadership’, the characteristics of his leadership will be specifically analyzed. Based on the analysis of the previous chapters, I will address the styles of Kim Jong Il’s leadership in detail. Some of his leadership styles are similar to his father’s and others are different. While some styles appeared from the time he started his career, others became apparent only after his father’s death. New policies in the post-Kim Il Sung period have also displayed Kim Jong Il’s uniqueness.

2

Formative period (1942–1964)

Kim Jong Il spent his childhood and adolescence experiencing the social upheavals that North Korea underwent at the time. These socio-political events – liberation, the Korean War, post-war reconstruction, North Korea’s complicated relations with the Soviet Union and China, the generation of the chuch'e idea, and political struggles among North Korean leaders – affected him in many ways. The fact that he was Kim Il Sung’s son made the young Kim more sensitive to these events than ordinary children in the society. His family life was inextricably entangled in North Korean politics and this situation naturally nurtured his interest in politics during his developmental years.

Birth According to an official North Korean biography, Kim Jong Il was born on ‘February 16, 1942, in a secret camp of anti-Japanese guerrillas on Mt Paekdu as the eldest son of young General Kim Il Sung, who was developing antiJapanese armed struggles, and Madame Kim Ch˘ong-suk, a heroic anti-Japanese woman fighter, who was participating gun in hand in the sacred war of fatherland liberation’.1 However, his birth is as controversial as his political behavior, because the facts surrounding his birth are not as simple as this portrayal implies; there are two contentious matters about his birth. The first is whether he was really born on Mt Paekdu and the other is whether he was really born in 1942. Concerning Kim Jong Il’s birthplace, there are three different views. The first one argues that Kim Jong Il was born on Mt Paekdu, as the official North Korean record says.2 In his memoirs Segi wa tˇoburˇo 8 (With the century 8), Kim Il Sung confirmed the official record.3 The second is that his birthplace was the Voroshilov Camp in Nikolsk of the Russian Maritime Province4 and the third contends that it was the Vyatskoye Camp near Khabarovsk in the province.5 According to Kim Il Sung’s memoirs, to avoid an attack by the Japanese expeditionary forces hunting down Kim Il Sung and his guerrilla fighters, Kim retreated into the Russian Maritime Province in November 1940. He fought against the Japanese in Manchuria from 1932 until 1940 under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Kim and other guerrilla fighters camped in two

Formative period (1942–1964) 11 locations in the Maritime Province: Voroshilov Camp (also called Southern Camp or B Camp) and Vyatskoye Camp in Khabarovsk (also called Northern Camp or A Camp). Kim and his comrades stayed in Voroshilov Camp between November 1940 and July 1942 and then moved to Vyatskoye Camp in Khabarovsk.6 If we assume that Kim Jong Il must have been born at least before 16 February 1942, the third view does not seem to fit with the historical documents. If the North Korean record of Kim’s birthplace is wrong, Kim Jong Il was born in Voroshilov Camp in Nikolsk. Another issue regarding Kim Jong Il’s birth concerns his birth year – the two opposing contentions posit 16 February 1941 against 16 February 1942. A number of experts on North Korea support the latter, which is also supported by the official North Korean record, albeit an unproven one. Kim Il Sung appears to have married Kim Ch˘ong-suk in October 1940, before they entered the Russian Maritime Province.7 After a short stay in Voroshilov Camp, Kim Il Sung went back to Manchuria and conducted guerrilla activities in April and returned to the camp in August 1941. He again stayed in Manchuria from mid-September to mid-November in 1941.8 If Kim Jong Il was born on 16 February 1942, Kim Ch˘ong-suk would have had to have been pregnant around May or June 1941. However, Kim Il Sung was in Manchuria at the time. A remaining point of contention concerns where Kim Ch˘ong-suk was in mid1941. Did Kim Ch˘ong-suk follow her husband? When Kim Il Sung left Voroshilov Camp in April 1941, she remained in the camp and just ‘helped [Kim Il Sung] and other comrades pack up for guerrilla activities in Manchuria’.9 In the official records of the CCP that led anti-Japanese guerrilla activities at the time, Kim Ch˘ong-suk did not conduct any guerrilla activities in 1941.10 She stayed in the Voroshilov Camp. Therefore, if Kim Il Sung’s memoirs are accurate, it would have been biologically impossible for Kim Jong Il to have been born on 16 February 1942. It is more plausible to believe that Kim Jong Il was born on 16 February 1941. In accordance with the viewpoint that this is indeed Kim’s birth date, North Korea celebrated his fortieth birthday in February 1981 and the state again held the fortieth celebration on 16 February 1982,11 which indicated that Kim Jong Il’s birth year was changed around 1981–1982. In conclusion, Kim Jong Il was born in Voroshilov Camp in Nikolsk, not on Mt Paekdu, on 16 February 1941 – not in 1942. Kim Ch˘ong-suk must have been pregnant with Jong Il in 1940 before she went to Russia. Then, why did North Korea ‘factualize’12 his birthplace and birth year? On Kim’s birthday on 16 February 1982, the North Korean media specifically disclosed, for the first time, Kim’s birthplace as being a cabin on Mt Paekdu. For Koreans, Mt Paekdu has an important symbolic connotation. It is the highest mountain on the Korean Peninsula with a number of myths and legends surrounding it. Traditionally, the Koreans had considered the mountain to be a sacred place. Particularly for North Koreans, the fact that Kim was born on the ‘highest sacred’ mountain communicates the symbolic message that he was pre-ordained to be the leader of Korea.

12 Formative period (1942–1964) Besides the connotation, Mt Paekdu was close to places where Kim Il Sung conducted anti-military activities. Kim Il Sung raided towns in Korea near Mt Paekdu in the mid-1930s. Official North Korean documents describe Mt Paekdu as follows: Mt Paekdu is the holy place of the Korean revolution where the young General Kim Il Sung created the anti-Japanese guerrillas, raising aloft the banner of the Juche [chuch'e] idea, and fought the Japanese aggressors. It is the home of the great cause of Juche. The Korean people faithfully inherit the patriotic spirit of revolution which Mt Paekdu symbolizes, and which are correctly carried on by Kim Jong Il at the head of the people. Kim Jong Il lives with this spirit of Mt Paekdu and is walking the road of revolution, overcoming all trials and difficulties with this spiritual power. This spirit illuminates every moment of his life and pervades every area and aspect of his activities and living. Indeed, Mt Paekdu is the source of his life and also the fountain of his energy, and at once it is the starting point and the point of return of all his will and intentions.13 As the state indicates, the fact that Kim Jong Il was born on Mt Paekdu represents Kim Jong Il’s specific legitimation as Kim Il Sung’s successor; only the junior Kim could inherit the revolutionary state created by the senior Kim. In February 1974, Kim Jong Il was secretly appointed the successor of Kim Il Sung during the Eighth Plenum of the Fifth Central Committee of the Korean Workers’ Party. In October 1980, at the time of the Sixth Party Congress, Kim Jong Il was publicly exposed to the North Korean media as the heir. After the Sixth Congress, North Korea strengthened the personality cult of the successor. The ‘factualization’ of his ‘birth place’ should be understood in the context of the political justification of Kim Jong Il’s succession. In contrast, the reason why North Korea factualized his ‘birth year’ is not clear. The state seemed to alter Kim Jong Il’s birth year to better complement Kim Il Sung’s in order to achieve a better rhythm between the two. Kim Il Sung was born on 15 April 1912. 1942 minus 1912 equals ‘30.’ The state usually conducts a large-scale celebration during national holidays every five or ten years. The most important holidays in North Korean society are the two Kims’ birthdays. If Kim Jong Il’s birth year were 1942, North Korea could rejoice in its two leaders’ birthdays every five or ten years. For example, if Kim Il Sung has his seventieth birthday on 14 April 1982, Kim Jong Il has his fortieth on 16 February. By linking the two Kim’s birthdays, the state seemed to try to connect Kim Il Sung’s authority with Kim Jong Il’s.14 Another analysis of this correlation is that the age difference of ‘30’ seems to represent the ideal age gap between generations in North Korea. According to the covenant of the League of Socialist Working Youth (LSWY), Korean youth between the ages of 14 and 30 can be its members.15 At its Sixth Congress, in 1971, the LSWY recommended that youth marry at 30 years of age for men

Formative period (1942–1964) 13 and at 27 for women.16 Revolution does not end with the first generation. The second generation should therefore continue to undertake the revolution, providing leadership from their ranks. In other words, if Kim Il Sung represents the first generation of revolutionaries, Kim Jong Il represents the second. These could be the main reasons for the age change.

Family Kim Jong Il had one brother, Kim P'yˇong-il, and one sister, Kim Kyˇong-hˇui, from the marriage between his father Kim Il Sung and his mother Kim Ch˘ong-suk. Kim P'yˇong-il was born in Vyatskoye Camp near Khabarovsk in 1944 and Kyˇong-hˇui in Pyongyang in 1946. During their childhood, Jong Il was called ‘Yura’ and P'yˇong-il ‘Shura’ in Russian because the two brothers were born in the Russian Maritime Province. He continued to be called ‘Yura’ until his high school days. His Korean name appeared to be fixed as ‘Jong Il’ around the early 1960s.17 Unfortunately, in 1947 when Kim Jong Il was six, three-year-old P'yˇong-il drowned to death in the pond of the official residence of Kim Il Sung.18 His mother also died of complications from a pregnancy in September 1949 when Kim was eight. His father began a second marriage life with Kim Sˇong-ae around 1952–1953.19 Father Activities His father maintained almost absolute influence on Kim Jong Il. For Kim, his father was the ‘Great Sun of the Nation, the Brain of the Revolution, and the Great Suryˇong (supreme leader)’. His father was ‘the Chosen of Heaven’.20 Kim Il Sung was born on 15 April 1912, in Pyongyang, as the eldest son of Kim Hyˇong-jik and Kang Pan-sˇok. He had two younger brothers: Ch'ˇol-chu and Yong-ju. His given name was Kim Sˇong-ju, but during his anti-Japanese guerrilla activities, he changed his name to Kim Il Sung. His father was a nationalist.21 Kim Il Sung’s family was very poor. In his memoirs, he describes their economic situation as follows: Even if the whole family worked hard, we did not have enough porridge. We used to get grains of kaoliang without taking the shell off them. I had hard time in swallowing the grains. [In poverty], we did not even imagine eating fruits or meat. One day I had a sore throat. My grandmother got a piece of pork from a neighbor and let me eat it. As soon as I ate it, the pain of my throat suddenly disappeared. After that, I wished to have sore throat when I really wanted to have pork. When I lived in Man'gyongdae [hometown of Kim], there was no clock in my family. My grandmother always wished to have a clock.22

14 Formative period (1942–1964) Both of Kim Il Sung’s parents were involved with Christianity. Kim Hyˇong-jik went to the Sungsil Middle School, which was an American mission school. His mother’s father, Kang Ton-uk, was a church presbyter. In his memoirs, Kim Il Sung said he used to go to church with his mother. In 1919, Kim’s family moved to Manchuria, but, in March 1923, Kim’s parents sent him back to Pyongyang to study at the school where his mother’s father was the vice principal. In early 1925 he dropped out of school and went back to Manchuria when he heard his father had been arrested by the Japanese police. His father died in 1926 at the age of 32. Kim’s mother died six years later at the age of 40, in July 1932.23 After his father’s death, Kim Il Sung attended two middle schools, Korean Hwasˇong School and Chinese Yuwen Middle School, in Manchuria between 1926 and 1929. At the Yuwen Middle School in Jilin, Kim was involved in the South Manchurian Communist Youth Association in 1929.24 He was arrested and imprisoned in autumn 1929, where he served his sentence for several months.25 This resulted in his expulsion from the Yuwen Middle School.26 Kim was very proud of being involved in the youth movement. He recollected, in his memoirs, that ‘if I could go back to my youth, I would certainly join the youth movement again as in my Jilin days’.27 Kim Il Sung became a member of the CCP in 1931. At the time, Korean communists had to enter the CCP because there was no Korean Communist Party, which had briefly existed between 1925 and 1928. There was the Manchurian Incident in September 1931 during which Japan crafted an alleged Chinese nationalist bombing of a railway in order to legitimize extending its military control over all of Manchuria. After the Manchurian Incident, the CCP ordered the Manchurian Committee to organize anti-Japanese guerrilla groups.28 A number of Korean communists, including Kim Il Sung, joined the guerrilla groups in Manchuria. Kim began his guerrilla activities in Antu in southern Manchuria in April 1932.29 Those guerrilla groups were united into a military group called the Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army in February 1936. In the United Army, Kim undertook the command of the Sixth Division of the Second Directional Army of the First Route Army. By late 1938, Kim had been promoted to the position of commander of the Second Directional Army, taking charge of Jiandao Province. Many of his seniors and comrades were killed by or surrendered to Japanese expeditionary forces. However, Kim remained undefeated, surviving through his resilience and persistence. He adapted well to the harsh conditions of guerrilla life. Accoring to Adrian Buzo, this ‘guerrilla life instilled in him the habits of self-reliance, perseverance, and unremitting struggle’.30 In late 1940 when he escaped to Russia, Kim became the only survivor among the First Route Army’s leadership.31 Until early 1941, most Manchurian guerrillas who survived the forceful Japanese expedition had fled to Russia. During the days of living in the Soviet territory camps, Manchurian guerrilla groups were reorganized into an international military unit under Soviet Far Eastern Command. The guerrilla groups obtained regular military training which included military intelligence, combat training, swimming, skiing, and parachuting, to name a few.32 Korean guerrilla leaders such as Kim Ch'aek and Ch'oe Yong-gˇon chose

Formative period (1942–1964) 15 Kim Il Sung as the leader who would represent Korean communists in the province, implying how highly evaluated Kim’s guerrilla activities in Manchuria must have been. In particular, his senior, Kim Ch'aek, seemed to play a critical role in advancing Kim Il Sung to becoming the leader of liberated Korea.33 His Chinese senior, Zhou Baozhong, also helped Kim lead other Koreans. In a letter to the Russian office of the Far Eastern Command, Zhou commented that Kim was the ‘best military cadre and most excellent figure among Korean comrades’.34 These positive evaluations provided Kim with a chance to meet Andrei A. Zhdanov, a member of the Soviet Politburo, in Moscow in summer 1945 before the Soviet forces had entered the war against Japan.35 Korea was liberated on 15 August 1945 and was divided into two Koreas. While the Soviet forces occupied the North, the US possessed the South. Kim Il Sung and most other Korean guerrillas safely arrived at the harbor of Wˇonsan in the North by boat on 19 September 1945, without engaging in the war against Japan. They arrived in Pyongyang on 22 September. Not until 14 October 1945 did Kim have direct contact with the people of Pyongyang at a public rally called ‘Pyongyang Mass Meeting of Welcome’. In his memoirs, Kim described the day as the ‘happiest moment in his life’.36 After returning to Korea with no political base, Kim Il Sung began to accumulate power under the tutelage of the Soviet occupation forces. The Korean Communist Party was revived in Seoul in September 1945 after liberation. To establish the Communist Party in the North, Kim Il Sung and other communists held a conference in Pyongyang on 10 October 1945.37 After three days of deliberation, they decided to create a North Korean Branch Bureau of the Korean Communist Party, known as the North Korean Communist Party. The bureau independently conducted its activities even though it was nominally under the leadership of the Korean Communist Party. Kim became the first secretary of the bureau on 18 December that same year.38 In August 1946, the North Korean Communist Party merged with the New Democratic Party to become the North Korean Workers’ Party. In the South, the South Korean Workers’ Party was forged from a coalition of the Korean Communist Party, the New Democratic Party, and the People’s Party in November 1946. Kim was elected as chairman of the Korean Workers’ Party in June 1949 when the North Korean Workers’ Party and the South Korean Workers’ Party merged. From the beginning, Kim and his guerrillas were deeply involved in the establishment of the Korean People’s Army, which officially came into effect in April 1948. The army proved to be the primary stronghold of Kim’s political power because no other Korean political groups could challenge Kim in the military.39 Finally, Kim became the premier of the government when the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea declared its new regime in the North on 9 September 1948.40 Epistemological development It is no exaggeration to say that Kim Il Sung’s anti-Japanese activities in Manchuria, his experiences in the Soviet territory and the tutelage of the Soviet occupation’s

16 Formative period (1942–1964) authorities are the most critical elements of the man’s political development. He showed himself to be very perceptive in learning from his past experiences and applying those lessons to specific North Korean situations. In historical hindsight, his military activities under the leadership of the CCP and the Soviet Union dictated his, as well as North Korea’s, futures. Whenever Kim met new challenges, his past experiences reflected in his new policies. The vestiges of his past experiences continue to be present in North Korea. When tracing Kim’s epistemological development, we find the following recurring ideological elements: nationalism, Marxism and Leninism, Maoism, and Stalinism. Among those, nationalism maintains precedence. Although he labeled himself as a communist and proclaimed to hold a negative opinion of nationalism and nationalists, the ideology appeared in every stage of his life. His life’s foremost goal was national liberation and the unification of the Korean Peninsula. Nationalists, his father and his father’s friends, influenced him. One of the important figures who encouraged Kim’s nationalistic attitude was Pan Kyˇong-yu. Pan was sent to Manchuria from the Comintern in order to direct the CCP’s activities in April 1933 and ostensibly advised Kim that the Korean communists should reorganize a Korean Communist Party – that they should not forget Korea. Kim recalled his contact with Pan as being a ‘turning point’ in his life. Kim said that, during his guerrilla activities, he had never discussed Korean revolution as much and as seriously as when he talked with Pan.41 Kim’s nationalist disposition also shone through his guerrilla activities. He was involved in establishing a united front organization, known as Hanin choguk kwangbokhoe (Korean Fatherland Restoration Association) in May 1936.42 The communists in Manchuria created the united front organization to promote antiJapanese activities among Koreans in Manchuria as well as in Korea following the 1 August declaration of the CCP in 1935.43 Kim tried to use the organization to infiltrate the Chinese–Korean border starting in the mid-1930s. Kim’s guerrilla group launched sudden attacks on Poch'ˇonbo and Musan, Korean border towns, in June 193744 and May 193945 respectively. These military campaigns were especially significant because newspapers popularized Kim Il Sung through their coverage of the campaigns. Kim’s chuch'e idea is essentially an extreme version of nationalism. From the mid-1950s, when the Sino-Soviet disputes began, Kim developed the concept as a political doctrine. The nationalist characteristics of the chuch'e idea are well expressed in the policy principles of chaju (self-determination) in foreign affairs, charip (self-reliance) in economics, and chawi (self-defense) in national security. The idea will be explained in detail later on in this book. Another ideological component of Kim’s rule is Marxism and Leninism. In his memoirs, Kim Il Sung began to read the Marxist and Leninist works he had acquired from his middle school. He obtained the knowledge of Marx’s Das Kapital from his comrade, Pak So-sim, in Jilin.46 Marxist and Leninist ideology provided him with the optimistic belief that he could successfully topple Japanese imperialism and establish communism in Korea through the proletariat gaining political power.

Formative period (1942–1964) 17 These ideologies were a driving force allowing Kim to endure arduous guerrilla warfare rife with hunger and cold in Manchuria. The third epistemological component prevalent in Kim’s ideology is Maoism. Kim learned about Maoism when he conducted his guerrilla activities under the CCP. Maoism provided him with specific strategies, including the approach of having a united front, a base area, the mass line, and his new regime’s reform policies. First, Kim Il Sung borrowed his policy of having a united front from Mao. When Kim announced united front principles in Korea at the ‘Pyongyang Mass Meeting of Welcome’ on 14 October 1945, he emphasized that all the people should participate in building an independent democratic state as a way of letting ‘those with strength give strength; letting those with knowledge give knowledge; [and] letting those with money give money’,47 a phrase directly quoted from Mao Zedong’s work.48 The second of Kim’s policies influenced by Maoism was the ‘democratic base’ that he advanced in late 1945 as one of the party’s priorities. The primary objective for this strategy was to ‘transform north Korea into a powerful democratic base for the building of a unified, independent and democratic state’.49 Like the principle of a united front, this strategy was also a direct reflection of his guerrilla experience. From autumn 1932 to November 1935, communists in Manchuria established guerrilla base areas modeled on Mao’s Jiangxi Soviet.50 These base areas were considered an important condition for minimizing the risks inherent in guerrilla warfare. Mao defined base areas as follows: [Base areas] are the strategic bases on which the guerrilla forces rely in performing their strategic tasks and achieving the objective of preserving and expanding themselves and destroying and driving out the enemy. Without such strategic bases, there will be nothing to depend on in carrying out any of our strategic tasks or aim of the war … [G]uerrilla warfare could not last long or grow without base areas. The base areas, indeed, are its rear.51 For Manchurian communists, base areas were spaces whose environment of freedom contrasted with the suppressive atmospheres outside of their boundaries. After liberation, Kim considered the North to be a base for national unification and revolution just as the Manchurian base areas had been for revolution and freedom during the guerrilla warfare. He tried to strengthen the North as quickly as possible to better spread their revolution southward. The strategy of a ‘democratic base’ continues to be one of the North’s underlying policies. This guerrilla mentality was reinforced in 1991 after the collapse of the communist bloc. Kim compared the guerrilla days with the post-Cold War era as follows: We are doing socialist construction in difficult conditions. We continue to have an Arduous March with confidence [as in guerrilla days] … In the past, hundreds of thousands of Japanese soldiers chased us. Today modern imperialist forces, which are too powerful and cruel to be compared

18 Formative period (1942–1964) with the Japanese, intend to kill us. We, in fact, are living in the era of war.52 Until his death in 1994, Kim believed that North Korea embodied a real communist state, besieged by imperialist forces after the collapse of the communist bloc, just as the base areas had been by the Japanese in the 1930s. He constantly invoked the ‘spirit of the guerrilla fighter’ to fight the imperialists and encourage people to endure economic difficulty and hard work.53 Third, Kim reintroduced his experience in the base areas to his new policies after the colonial liberation. During the base areas period, communists established Soviet regimes which later turned into people’s regimes. Under the people’s regime there were a number of mass organizations divided according to age and gender, including the Children’s Corps, Women’s Associations, Communist Youth Leagues, and others. Most of the people under the people’s regime were organized into these groups. The people’s revolutionary regime implemented a variety of new policies such as land reforms, eight-hour limits on daily labor, free education, male–female equality, and so on. The precedents set during the people’s regime and the policies founded became a ‘sprout and prototype’ for the North Korean people’s regime after 1945.54 Mao’s ideology of a new democratic revolution seemed to particularly inspire Kim.55 Fourth, the method for recruiting members for the Korean Workers’ Party was similar to that employed by the CCP. During the Korean War, Kim had a dispute with Hˇo Ka-i, the third ranking official and first secretary of the Korean Workers’ Party, about how to reorganize the party shattered by the war. According to DaeSook Suh, Hˇo insisted that the Korean Workers’ Party be an elite party by restricting its membership like the Bolshevik Party did in the Soviet Union. Kim, however, contended that the party be a mass party with broad popular bases.56 Hˇo was ousted from his position in late 1951. In the dispute concerning the party line, Kim ultimately supported a Chinese-style mass party, rather than the Leninist one, that he had been a member of during his guerrilla days. Lastly, Kim followed Mao’s mass line ideology, one partially related to the debate regarding party membership above. Similar to Mao’s belief that ‘our God is none other than the masses of the Chinese people’,57 Kim emphasized ‘imin wich'ˇon (the masses are Heaven)’.58 Mao specified his definition for a mass line in his article: In all the practical work of our Party, all correct leadership is necessarily ‘from the masses, to the masses’. This means: take the ideas of the masses (scattered and unsystematic ideas) and concentrate them (through study turn them into concentrated and systematic ideas), then go to the masses and propagate and explain these ideas until the masses embrace them as their own, hold fast to them and translate them into action, and test the correctness of these ideas in such action. Then once again concentrate ideas from the masses and once again go to the masses so that the ideas are persevered in and carried through. And so on, over and over again in an endless spiral, with the ideas becoming

Formative period (1942–1964) 19 more correct, more vital and richer each time. Such is the Marxist theory of knowledge.59 From the time that he became the leader of North Korea and for the rest of his life following that, Kim regularly visited all corners of North Korean society and personally met many of his people in order to encourage them to work harder and to produce more effectively. The Ch'ˇollima Movement, which started in late 1956, was an archetype of mass mobilization based on Kim’s mass line. Concerning Stalinism’s impact in North Korea, the role of the Soviet occupation forces was critical, intensively Sovietizing North Korea until the forces left at the end of 1948. At the time, North Korea pictured its future modeled from the Soviet Union. North Korea translated a number of Russian books and journals into Korean and began to send its students to the Soviet Union from 1946. Many North Korean people watched Soviet films as a part of their ideological indoctrination. After liberation, the ‘Soviet wave’ was overwhelming the society.60 While Joseph Stalin was alive, the Red Army represented Korea’s liberator, becoming the patron of Korean independence and democracy.61 This Sovietization continued until the mid-1950s when Stalin died and Nikita Khrushchev assumed power of the Soviet Union. Kim adopted Stalin’s model of economic development, which focused more on heavy industry than on light industry. Like Stalin, Kim effectively employed terror tactics through his secret police and concentration camps in order to stabilize the regime. He claimed to have been very satisfied with the personality cult surrounding him. The Soviet forces promoted the cult to portray Kim as the ‘Korean Stalin’. From Stalin, Kim learned how to win political games through political coalition and purging. He consolidated his political power by pitilessly eradicating other political factions along each step of his political ascent. Even though the Soviet leader died more than half of a century ago, his legacies are still lingering in the North.62 Mother Kim Ch˘ong-suk, Kim Jong Il’s mother, was born in Hoeryˇong of North Hamgyˇong Province on 24 December 1917. Her family were tenant farmers who then moved to Manchuria in 1922. Her father died in 1929 and her mother was killed by Japanese punitive operations in 1932. Her mother’s death was a crucial event that prompted her to join the communist movement. She joined the Children’s Corps in a guerrilla base area where her younger brother, Kim Ki-song was killed in 1933 by Japanese expeditionary forces.63 Kim Il Sung first saw Kim Ch˘ong-suk in Sandaowan in Yanji Province in March 1935 after a communists’ meeting at Dahuangwai, but they did not have an opportunity to talk with each other.64 She became an official guerrilla fighter in September 193565 but did not become a member of Kim Il Sung’s guerrilla unit until April 1936. From that time onward, they conducted guerrilla activities in the same unit.66 At first, Kim Ch˘ong-suk was assigned to a team for cooking

20 Formative period (1942–1964) and repairing. By spring 1937, she worked as an undercover agent in Taoquanli in China’s Changbai County and in Sinp'a, a border town in Korea. In summer of the same year she was arrested in Taoquanli by the police but was released with the help of the town’s people.67 In Kim Il Sung’s memoirs, Kim Ch˘ong-suk is portrayed as a very patient, compassionate, and faithful woman. She was also an excellent marksman. During guerrilla activities, Kim Ch˘ong-suk saved his life at the risk of her own more than once.68 Kim seemed to be charmed by Kim Ch˘ong-suk’s devotion to him. His memoirs contain love stories about the two guerrilla fighters. Kim recalled one as follows: One day in winter I was angry at Kim Ch˘ong-suk unintentionally. She washed my military suit and wore it to dry [quickly]. Even if she did not tell me about it, I heard it from other female comrades’ praising Ch˘ong-suk. I was very surprised to hear her dry it wearing and called her to my office. I was about to cry when I saw her shivering with cold. I was too moved to say a word because even my mother did not do such a thing. The comradeship of Kim Ch˘ong-suk who sacrificed herself was both the revolutionary comradeship for her ‘commander-in-chief ’ and the warm love for the man Kim Il Sung. I said, ‘Don’t do that again’. Then Ch˘ong-suk replied with smile, ‘This isn’t hard at all, if you are safe and comfortable’. Even though I scolded her for doing that, after she left my office, I shed tears by myself. At the time, I was reminded of my mother. The love of Kim Ch˘ong-suk overlapped that of my mother who already passed away. I never forget the face of Kim Ch˘ong-suk shivering with cold but pretending not to.69 Kim Ch˘ong-suk also appeared to have good relationships with other partisans and their descendants. The memoirs about her continued: The unforgettable relationship between Kim Ch˘ong-suk and the members of the Children Corps were formed in a guerrilla base area, Chechangzi in Antu County, where the people suffered from famine [because of the siege of the Japanese punitive forces]. Kim Ch˘ong-suk was a member of a cooking team in the area. Every night children who were close to starvation asked her to give them something to eat … Whenever they came to her, at least once a day, Ch˘ong-suk used to feed them food such as nurungji (scorched rice) or rice cake, which she was supposed to eat. The members of Children Corps did not forget her good behavior for a long time.70

Formative period (1942–1964) 21 After the 1945 liberation, in late November, Kim Ch˘ong-suk arrived at the harbor of Unggi71 in North Hamgy˘ong Province with Kim Jong Il and other partisans. It was said that young guerrilla fighters such as Cho My˘ong-nok and Ch˘on Mun-s˘op carried Kim Jong Il on their backs. Cho is currently the highest ranked person in the military and the first vice-chairman of the National Defense Commission of North Korea. Ch˘on was the Chairman of the National Inspection Committee and died in 1998. They stayed in Ch'˘ongjin near Unggi until late December and entered Pyongyang only after Kim Il Sung became the first secretary of the North Korean Communist Party on 18 December that same year. Kim Il Sung did not have time to meet with his family until after he stabilized the party.72 As a former guerrilla, Kim Ch˘ong-suk was involved in establishing the Pyongyang School for Bereaved Children of Revolutionaries, known as Man'gyongdae school. The school was built in October 1947 in order to educate children who had lost one or more parents to the fight for national liberation.73 Kim Il Sung sent former guerrillas and government officers to Manchuria and domestic regions where the deceased people used to live in order to look for their descendants.74 In North Korea, the school remains a continuing symbol of Kim’s comradeship. Kim Il Sung and Kim Ch˘ong-suk often visited the Man'gy˘ongdae school to take care of the students in the place of their real parents. They were called ‘father’ and ‘mother’ by the school’s students. When Kim Il Sung could not visit the school, Kim Ch˘ong-suk went alone. Instead of their ‘real’ parents throwing birthday parties, the school authority celebrated whenever the students had birthdays.75 The first statue of Kim Il Sung was built in the school in October 1948.76 Later, the school was renamed Man'gy˘ongdae School for Children of Revolutionaries. The Man'gy˘ongdae school is now one of the most prestigious schools for adolescents in North Korea. Most of the school’s graduates become cadres of the party, the military, and the cabinet. They currently occupy key positions in Kim Jong Il’s regime. In other words, they make up the backbone of the regime. Regarding her discipline with Jong Il, Kim Ch˘ong-suk was known to be strict. Sin Kyˇong-wan, a high-ranking North Korean defector, related an episode about Kim Jong Il when he was in elementary school at the Namsan Inmin School: ‘There was one day when Kim Jong Il came back home without the teacher’s permission. Then Kim Ch˘ong-suk whipped Jong Il on the calves. She told young Kim that he should be careful in his behavior because his father is a public official. This episode was widely known at that time’.77 After liberation, the North Korean government mobilized masses into construction sites, factories, and rice fields. Kim Ch˘ong-suk brought Jong Il to those areas.78 She sometimes had her husband accompany Jong Il when he went on field trips.79 She probably wanted to teach Jong Il what Korea was at the time and hoped that Kim Jong Il would become a leader like his father. Kim Ch˘ong-suk was ill when she returned to Korea in 1945. The harsh conditions of her Manchurian guerrilla days had degenerated her health.80 She finally died in September 1949 while delivering a stillborn baby. According to Sin, at Kim Ch˘ong-suk’s funeral, former guerrillas such as Kim Ch'aek, Ch'oe Yong-g˘on, and

22 Formative period (1942–1964) Kim Il swore that, on behalf of the deceased woman, they would raise Jong Il to be a leader who could successfully continue the revolution.81 This did not mean that they had already chosen Jong Il as Kim Il Sung’s successor. The statement made at the funeral simply suggested that they would help Jong Il become a revolutionary like his father and mother had been. The arena of the funeral was a space where the living people not only expressed their sorrow of the dead, but also disclosed their relationship with the dead. The relationship between Kim Ch˘ong-suk and other partisans, which had developed during the guerrilla-fighting period, was based on strong comradeship. At the funeral, their relationship with her was articulated in the statement about her son, Jong Il. There is no doubt that the comradeship became a favorable condition for Kim Jong Il’s growth. It is certain that the death of his mother was a critical event for the young Kim. In an interview with a Russian journalist in February 2002, Kim recalled his mother as follows: Journalist: ‘Who is the most precious and intimate person in the world?’ Kim Jong Il: ‘My mother who I lost in my childhood. She was a revolutionary. Like other mothers, she wished that her son could succeed in everything. But she might not have imagined what I am. I really appreciate her in many respects.82 The extent to which Kim Jong Il missed his mother showed through in several instances since he was chosen to be Kim Il Sung’s successor in 1974. Kim built monuments and statues of his mother in Hoery˘ong, her birthplace, and Sinp'a, the location of her underground activities. He also established a museum for her in Hoery˘ong.83 Sinp’a County was renamed Kim Ch˘ong-suk County in 1981. It is alleged that Kim decided to build Pyongyang Maternity Hospital in 1978 in the hope that no more women would die of pregnancy complications like his mother had.84 The hospital was completed in 1979. Kim Jong Il became the commanderin-chief on his mother’s birthday in 1991.85 The North Korean media portrays Kim Ch˘ong-suk as an object of ‘yearning’, which reflects Kim Jong Il’s emotions: This time [July 2001] when I [Kim] have been to Russia by train, I crossed the Tumen River, which reminds me of deep memories. In going up to the river, there is Hoery˘ong, hometown of my mother, and there is also a ferry where my mother crossed the river to the foreign land in her childhood. Although a lot of people have been to Hoery˘ong to see her statue and birthplace, I haven’t been there and [even] my mother didn’t either.86 Stepmother After his mother passed away, Kim Jong Il developed close relationships with ˘ ol and O Chin-u. Yi took care of Kim like an other young partisans such as Yi Ul-s˘

Formative period (1942–1964) 23 uncle while he was working as the chief of a guard team in Kim Il Sung’s official residence.87 Yi, as a military marshal, eventually became the chief of Kim Jong Il’s guard team and O was appointed the head of Department of National defense. After Kim Ch˘ong-suk died, Kim S˘ong-ae and Hong Ki-y˘on88 undertook her role regarding household affairs. Sometime between 1952 and 1953, Kim Il Sung began a second marriage with Kim S˘ong-ae. There is little information available to the public about Kim S˘ong-ae. She was born in Kangs˘o County in South P'y˘ongan Province in 1928. When Kim Ch˘ong-suk was alive, Kim S˘ong-ae lived in Kim Il Sung’s official residence as a secretary who also helped Kim Ch˘ong-suk take care of household affairs at the residence. Kim Il Sung and Kim S˘ong-ae had one daughter and two sons: Kyong-jin born in 1953, P'yˇong-il in 1954, and Y˘ong-il in 1957.89 The second marriage might have pleased Kim Il Sung, but also appeared to frustrate Jong Il. Kim Jong Il and his sister, Kyˇong-hˇui, did not have friendly relationships with their stepmother. Kim Jong Il could not transition into accepting Kim S˘ong-ae, who had previously been only his mother’s assistant, as his new mother. Additionally, there was only a 13-year age difference between Kim S˘ong-ae and Kim Jong Il. When his mother was alive, Kim S˘ong-ae fulfilled a role similar to that of an older sister or a young aunt. Kim might have thought that Kim S˘ong-ae took his father from him and Kyˇong-hˇui and robbed their deceased mother of her position. Apart from the dynamics of family life, Kim S˘ong-ae also became his most potent political competitor in the 1970s. It was reported that Kim refused to call Kim S˘ong-ae ‘mother’ at first, in spite of his being admonished against this stand by his mother’s friends and former guerrillas. After Kim Il Sung’s younger brother Kim Y˘ong-ju got married in 1953, Kim Jong Il spent much time at his uncle’s house. Kim Jong Il had better relationships with the former guerrillas than with his stepmother. Although he eventually consented to using the term ‘mother’, Kyˇong-hˇui never used the word with their stepmother.90 Sin Kyong-wan’s telling of an episode at Kim Il Sung’s sixtieth birthday party exemplifies the relationship between Kim S˘ong-ae and Kyˇong-hˇui: Kyˇong-hˇui made Kim Il Sung’s 60th birthday party a ‘sea of tears’. The birthday party was bustling with old guerrillas, officials of the Central Committee of the party, generals of the military who bowed to and served liquor for Kim Il Sung in traditional Korean style. It was time for Kim’s family to do that. Suddenly Kyˇong-hˇui burst into cry after bowing and serving. The guests asked, ‘Why are you crying?’ Kyˇong-hˇui answered, ‘Because my mother [Kim Ch˘ong-suk] already passed away without seeing this birthday party’. She wailed by calling her mother. Old female guerrillas began to cry. Male guerrillas such as Ch'oe Yong-g˘on and Kim Il also shed tears. So the birthday party turned into a ‘sea of tears’. Kim Jong Il tried to soothe Kyˇong-hˇui but she left the party indignantly … Kim Kyˇong-hˇui frankly disclosed her complaint to Kim S˘ong-ae at the party.91

24 Formative period (1942–1964)

Childhood Kim Jong Il’s childhood took place in the context of a series of drastic historical events. Three years after he was born, Korea was liberated from Japan and subsequently divided into North and South Korea. He lost his younger brother, P'yˇong-il, in 1947 and his mother, his ‘most precious object’, in 1949. Soon afterwards his father initiated the four-year Korean War in 1950. Living in the Russian Maritime Province from 1941 to 1945, Kim Jong Il learned to speak Russian and befriended local children.92 In Russia, Kim Jong Il saw military paraphernalia such as guns, military suits, soldiers, and military bases. Guerrilla fighters, especially his parents in this role, affected his mental growth. He liked to hear stories about the anti-Japanese struggles from his parents and other guerrillas. Their struggles were heroes’ legends to the young Jong Il. During his childhood, his favorite toy was a wooden gun given to him by the guerrillas as a gift.93 He used to play military games with his friends94 and often played the role of general, like his father. Guns held multiple meanings for Kim Jong Il, reappearing frequently along the stages of his life. In his childhood, the gun was a toy as well as a gift. He also inherited one from his mother at her death.95 In his adolescence, shooting was one of his favorite pastimes and he wanted to be a master marksman like his parents had been. After Kim Jong Il became the commander-in-chief of the state in 1991, he gifted each military base that he visited with a gun. In the mid-1990s, when North Korea underwent an economic disaster, he depended upon the symbol of the ‘gun’ to represent the military power that would sustain the crumbling state. Young Jong Il was a difficult child to deal with. Given several episodes recounted in his hagiographies, he was an intractable boy: [In the Russian Maritime Province] One winter morning, there was mountain snow. Jong Il asked his mother why guerrillas skied … Her son pestered her to teach him how to ski … Her mother told him that he was too young and she would let him know how to ski later. But Jong Il said he would learn it right now. The mother who knew Jong Il’s stubborn characteristic took the son to a skiing ground.96 In 1946, at the age of five, Kim Jong Il began attending Namsan Kindergarten, an institution established to educate the children of high-ranking party and government officials. The following anecdote took place when Kim was in the kindergarten: There were various playthings in the kindergarten. Among them was a toy car which was mechanically driven. Seeing the toy car, the young dear leader [Kim Jong Il] asked his teacher how it came to move of its own accord without being pushed by people. The teacher answered jokingly that there was a small squirrel in it. The boy looked dubious, but said nothing.

Formative period (1942–1964) 25 When the teacher entered the room for the next lesson, she found the toy car taken to pieces. She sternly demanded who had done this. The children remained mute, when unexpectedly the young dear leader stood up and said he had done it … The boy watched his teacher for some time, before he approached her and said he had done so in order to see if there was a baby squirrel in it.97 In Namsan Kindergarten, Kim received special treatment from teachers. The costs for failing to do so were high, as a director and a teacher were expelled for not caring for Jong Il well enough.98 In September 1948, Kim entered Namsan Primary School as an elementary student. Like Namsan Kindergarten, the school was built to instruct the children of top officials.99 The Korean War occurred in 1950 after Kim had finished the second grade. After the war began, Kim Jong Il and Kyˇong-hˇui were evacuated, first to Kanggye and Manp'o in Chagang Province, and then to Jilin in Manchuria, following their uncle Kim Y˘ong-ju’s path. During the war, Hong Ki-y˘on and their nanny Kang Kil-bok brought up Jong Il and Kyˇong-hˇui.100 For the siblings, the retreat to Manchuria was a harsh journey that was possible only at night because US aircraft bombed in the daytime. During the daytime, ‘mountains and fields burned and black smoke filled the air, but as soon as the sun was setting, the roads overflowed with people, cars, and carts forming a huge stream flowing steadily northward’.101 Most of the North Korean people lived in underground shelters to avoid the aircraft bombings during the war.102 In spring 1952, Kim Jong Il and Kyˇong-hˇui returned to Pyongyang.103 In June 1952, they met up with their father in North Py˘ongan Province and stayed with him for some time.104 In November the same year, Kim Jong Il was admitted to the fourth grade at the Man'gy˘ongdae School for Children of Revolutionaries. He lived with the students at the school until the end of the Korean War,105 during which Kim’s relationship with the students at the school began to strengthen. As in Namsan Kindergarten, teachers at the school paid special attention to ‘the son of the premier’. In the middle of the war, a teacher was transferred to another school due to her ‘indolent’ attention to the son. When she left the school, she made some notes for reference on how to treat Kim Jong Il and handed them over to a new teacher. According to the notes, Kim was very interested in what his father was doing. He was very curious, and hated lagging behind other students. The notes also included the foods Kim Jong Il liked.106 In September 1953, after the Korean War, Kim moved back to Samsˇok Primary School and the Fourth Pyongyang Primary School in February 1954.107 The war devastated the state and all of the people were mobilized into post-war reconstruction. An official biography of Kim describes how the state appeared after the Korean War: The sight of Pyongyang was all the more terrible. Not a single house could be seen undamaged. The city was a stretch of debris that extended as far as

26 Formative period (1942–1964) the eye could reach. The only reminders of Pyongyang were the demolished girders of the Taedong Bridge and the surviving walls of Department Store No. 1 […] Immediately after the war, everything was scanty. Owing to the utter destruction of the factories and villages by the US imperialists, food and clothing were in short supply and even pencils were not enough to go round to the schoolchildren […] The people were badly off. Because they were a heroic people, they remained optimistic, smilingly overcoming all hardships. But they lived in leaking makeshift houses and gathered wild greens to meet the shortage of food. They had no change of clothes. Some schoolchildren were barefoot.108 Kim Jong Il’s childhood unfolded in these social circumstances. In his own words, the cruelty of the war remained an unforgettable memory to him.109 In his life, the war was the only event where he experienced both hunger and death. The death of his mother and the ensuing war may have forced Kim to mature at an early age.

Adolescence Middle and high school In September 1954, Kim Jong Il entered the First Pyongyang Middle School. In 1955, he was elected the chairman of the Children’s Union of the school.110 After graduating from middle school, Kim went to the First Pyongyang High School in September 1957 and later moved to Namsan High School in September 1958.111 Kim became the vice-chairman for these schools’ Democratic Youth League branches. He could not occupy the post of chairman because this was reserved for teachers. Kim actively engaged in the activities of the Democratic Youth League.112 According to Kim’s friend who studied in the Namsan High School with him, the young leader organized a political rally that supported the 19 April democratic uprising in South Korea in 1960.113 Given his activities at the Children’s Union and the Democratic Youth League, Kim Jong Il himself appeared to make efforts to become a leader on a par with his father. According to his schoolmates, Kim was not an excellent student grade-wise. His marks remained at the intermediate level in his class. His views on studying reflected his father’s – he studied only for practical purposes. Kim Jong Il hated to read books to acquire ‘knowledge for knowledge’s sake’. He believed, ‘practice was part of knowledge’ and ‘study without practice was of no use’.114 He was

Formative period (1942–1964) 27 interested in what his father was interested in. An episode related by Hwang Chang-y˘op, known as the philosophical architect of the chuch'e idea, reveals Kim Jong Il’s view of studying: In January 1959, I went to Moscow with Kim Il Sung to attend the TwentyFirst Congress of the Soviet Communist Party. At the time Kim Jong Il went with us together … One day Kim Jong Il asked me to go to a Soviet industrial agricultural museum. When we went there, I had hard time in interpreting what he inquired of a guide of the museum because his questions were too technical. I asked to him why he raised such questions. He replied, ‘Because my father is interested in those issues’.115 When Hwang first met Kim Jong Il, his image of Kim was of a ‘smart, curious, and ambitious’ youth.116 Kim was not a student who sat for long periods of time reading books. Instead, he was an active teenager. His schoolmates remembered the teenage Jong Il as being ‘artistic, passionate, and social’.117 How did Kim Jong Il get along with his friends in his adolescent years? Kim Chˇong-min, a North Korean defector who spent some time with Kim Jong Il as a friend, remembers him as follows: Kim Jong Il wanted to join us at play but the security guards [of his father] did not allow it. He sometimes came to us. If he would come, everybody wanted to play with him. However, the guards checked the name list of the children of high-ranking officials. If they were not the children of the officials, they could not join us […] We called Kim as ‘hyˇongnim (elder brother)’ because he was older than other friends. Chi Kyˇong-su’s son, Yim Ch'un-ch'u’s son, Ch'oe Hyˇon’s son, Ch'oe Yong-gˇon’s daughter, Kim Tong-gyu’s son, and Pak Sˇong-ch'ˇol’s son, all of them were younger than Kim Jong Il. We played soccer or swam at the Namsan School. We played hwat'u (Korean card game). Sometimes we went fishing at T'aesˇong Reservoir. While fishing, the security guards helped Kim get bait … We often went to a place for training military dogs. We accompanied Kim when he went hunting. There were special hunting places for Kim Il Sung and Jong Il in Chunggang, Sangwˇon, Chungwi and P'yˇongwˇon. Kim Jong Il drove his car [by himself] and we used a [van or bus]. Kim Jong Il showed off his skill [of shooting]. He gave his gun to us and let us shoot. We had never used a gun. Only after other friends didn’t hit game like roe deer, did he hit it. Kim Jong Il was excellent in shooting. He played soccer well but was not good at volleyball.

28 Formative period (1942–1964) Kim Jong Il played the piano too, but he was no good at singing. While he played the piano, he let us sing songs, especially Sin'galp'a’s Song, which was made to pay tribute to his mother […] The security guards brought food. They had a refrigerator car for food. There were many kinds of food such as bread, candies, etc. […] The security did not allow Kim to eat food made by other houses.118 In Kim Chˇong-min’s recollections, Kim Jong Il was different from other guerrillas’ children in many respects. As the son of the premier, he was well treated materially, and Kim Il Sung’s security detail guarded Kim Jong Il wherever he went. The memoirs also show that the teenage Jong Il still missed his mother very much. Kim was interested in diverse activities – playing piano, cards, soccer, and gunmanship. According to another friend’s recollection, Kim Jong Il also used to invite his friends to his house to have parties and music concerts, watch movies, and drive cars.119 Like ordinary Korean parents, Kim Il Sung paid special attention to Jong Il’s education. In Kim Jong Il’s high school days, Kim Il Sung required teachers to give Jong Il extracurricular lessons. According to Hˇo Tam, former secretary of foreign affairs, when he visited Kim Jong Il’s room there were many books on his bookshelf.120 It is not certain whether he read all of the books but he must have acquired a wealth of knowledge from these teachers’ special attention. Besides the private education, Kim Jong Il received other special favors above what was bestowed on the other children. Kim Yˇong-ju and other former guerrillas cared for Jong Il, who reached puberty without having a ‘real’ mother.121 In his middle and high school years, Kim also traveled to foreign countries. According to Soviet records, Kim Jong Il went to Moscow with his father in 1957 and 1959.122 The special favors that Kim Jong Il received were possible because he was the son of the premier. The former guerrillas under Kim Il Sung may have looked after Kim Jong Il in order to please their highest ranking decisionmaker. The favors were also possible because Kim Jong Il as the son of guerrilla fighters was considered the part of the ‘guerrilla group’. The group of guerrillas included members who were chosen on the basis of strong comradeship. During guerrilla activities, they were ready to sacrifice themselves for the revolution and for their comrades. They were very proud of their role as guerrillas. They believed that they fought against Japanese imperialism to the end even though they did not achieve their goal through their own efforts. The pride resulted in an exclusiveness that rejected ‘out-group’ members. The group of guerrillas put an emphasis on their personal ties. It was more important what people were doing than who they were. Once they held political power of the state, being a former guerrilla or one of their descendants was a deciding factor for

Formative period (1942–1964) 29 social status. Kim shrewdly employed his special relationships with his father and other guerrillas as follows: It was in spring 1960 that Kim Jong Il was about to graduate from the Namsan High School. Kim suggested to Kim Tan that they make a graduation album to keep their memories. Kim Tan skeptically said, ‘That’s good idea, but how do we make an album even without a camera?’ Kim Jong Il retorted, ‘How do you know whether it is impossible without trying this?’ Then, Kim Jong Il called a cadre of the Propaganda and Agitation Department of the party and asked for his help. The following day the department telephoned the Principal [of the high school] Kang Yˇong-gu and told him that ‘we will send a cameramen of the party press and you should hurry to make a graduation album’. Once other friends said, ‘The son of the premier is surely different!’, Kim Jong Il responded, ‘Don’t tease me. Let’s utilize our given situations well’.123 The following series of events during Kim Jong Il’s adolescence in the mid1950s marked a crucial transition period for North Korea: the invention of chuch'e, the political purges, and the Ch'ˇollima Movement. These events seriously affected Kim Jong Il’s epistemological development as well as that of North Korean society. In the adolescence, the chuch'e idea began to be formed, reflecting domestic and international political situations. After Khrushchev took power in the Soviet Union in 1953, the Russian leader promoted the doctrine of ‘peaceful coexistence’ with the West. Kim Il Sung opposed this doctrine and Soviet intervention in North Korean politics. The idea of chuch'e was instituted as a way of escaping from Soviet clout. In 1955, Kim first employed the term chuch'e in order to denounce the revisionist attitude that mimicked Soviet styles and to emphasize ‘creative positions’ that the Korean revolution could take.124 In 1956, when Khrushchev denounced Stalin – whom Kim Il Sung believed to be in the right – relations between the Soviet Union and North Korea became even more strained. Khrushchev blamed Stalin for the cult of personality he encouraged and for the manipulative political purges. Khrushchev’s denunciation of Stalin became an indirect criticism of Kim Il Sung and his practices. These two positions – the peaceful coexistence with the West and the de-Stalinization campaign – prompted Kim to distance North Korea from the Soviet Union. In the mid-1950s, in spite of the political strain between the Soviet Union and North Korea, Soviet economic assistance to the North continued. With the help of the Soviet Union, China and East European countries, Kim successfully completed a three-year (1954–1956) post-war economic reconstruction.125 Ironically, these domestic economic successes allowed him to better direct his state towards chuch'e. In December 1957, Kim Il Sung indirectly condemned the Soviet Union for being revisionist. He indicated that North Korea would shift to chuch'e in foreign affairs on the basis of the principles of ‘complete equality, respect for territorial integrity, national independence, and non-intervention’.126

30 Formative period (1942–1964) Another important event during Kim Jong Il’s adolescence was the purge of party cadres known as the ‘incident of the Yanan faction’.127 Khrushchev’s de-Stalinization campaign encouraged some top-ranking officials from the North to publicly oppose Kim Il Sung. In August 1956, at a plenary meeting of the Central Committee, several prominent party figures – Ch'oe Ch'ang-ik (vice-premier), Pak Ch'ang-ok (vice-premier) and Yun Kong-hˇum (minister of commerce) – criticized Kim Il Sung for overly concentrating power, maintaining a personality cult and relying on an economic policy that depended too heavily on heavy industry.128 All of these challengers, however, were deposed from their posts.129 The purge did not remain simply a domestic issue but became internationalized when the Soviet Union and China intervened. The Soviet Union sent Anastas I. Mikoyan and China sent Peng Dehuai to North Korea immediately after the purge of the Yanan faction.130 Mikoyan was a politburo member of the Soviet Union and Peng was a renowned general who had commanded the Chinese volunteer army and saved Kim during the Korean War. The Chinese army remained in the North throughout the August incident.131 They demanded that Kim restore the purged people. At the request of the Soviet and Chinese delegation, a plenary meeting of the Central Committee was again held in September 1956 and decided to reinstate the ‘factionalists’.132 But it was merely a temporary reinstatement; Kim did not forgive them. After the delegation left, the ‘factionalists’ were secretly ousted from the party again.133 Notwithstanding the eventual success of the purge, the foreign intervention in 1956 represented the most serious threat to Kim Il Sung since the Korean War. The intervention reinforced Kim’s diplomatic positioning away from the Soviet Union and China. The crisis facing his father likely came as a surprise to the junior Kim. Kim Jong Il must have felt resentment against the two powers that ‘dared’ to disgrace the Great Leader’s authority. He later named the August incident the ‘second Arduous March’.134 The third galvanizing event during Kim Jong Il’s teenage years was the Ch'ˇollima Movement, which started at the end of 1956 according to North Korea. After successfully completing the three-year economic plan, Kim Il Sung proposed another five-year (1957–1961) economic plan. In December 1956, at a plenary meeting of the Central Committee, Kim set up a strategy to increase the total industrial production value of 1957 by 21 percent over that of 1956.135 The Presidium of the Central Committee requested 230,000 tons of pig iron to meet the production goal, but the production plan soon faced bureaucratic resistance. Bureaucrats and technicians of the National Planning Commission suggested that, considering the furnace’s estimated production capacity, 190,000 tons was more realistic. They also asserted that the state’s rated capacity of rolled steel was no more than 60,000 tons. However, Kim Il Sung ignored their recommendations. Members of the Presidium of the Central Committee went to the Kim Ch'aek Iron Works and Kim Il Sung himself visited the Kangsˇon Steel Plant to appeal to the workers to produce more pig iron and steel. In 1957, the Kim Ch'aek Iron Works produced 270,000 tons of pig iron and the Kangsˇon Steel Plant churned out 120,000 tons of steel.136 After the production results, Kim Il Sung criticized

Formative period (1942–1964) 31 the bureaucrats and technicians for ‘passivism and conservatism’. Kim himself might have been surprised with the unexpected results. The astonishing increase in productivity strengthened his belief that ‘the creative power of our working class and our people is really inexhaustible’.137 This was the beginning of the Ch'ˇollima Movement and the North Korean mass line. The Ch'ˇollima Movement evolved over time. The 1957 movement was similar to Stakhanovian movements based on individuals competing for production increases. The movement developed into the Ch'ˇollima Team Movement in 1959 based more on collectivism138 and the slogan ‘One for All, All for One’ emerged during the team movement.139 After this Ch'ˇollima Team Movement, all subsequent mass movements in the North were organized and implemented as units of a collective team. The Ch'ˇollima Movement was the most successful movement in North Korean history. According to official documents, the industrial growth rate of the state was 44 percent in 1957, 42 percent in 1958 and 53 percent in 1959.140 The first five-year economic plan achieved its goals in only three and a half years during which the workers achieved seemingly miraculous results. After this precedent, Kim Il Sung appealed ‘to the masses’ whenever he needed to encourage industrial output, in order to mobilize them toward greater productivity. The latter half of the 1950s developed into the ‘golden era’ of North Korean socialism and the mass line rang out like it was Kim’s mantra. Hwang Chang-yˇop described the North Korea of the period as a society where ‘people did not lock their house and there were no thieves. Neighbors helped each other if they were sick’.141 The wave of the Ch'ˇollima Movement also affected Kim Jong Il’s daily life. Like other students at the time, he went out to work at construction sites such as the Yongsˇong Railroad and the embankment of the Taedong River.142 The economic successes during the period furthered his respect for his father’s leadership abilities. His father, who had engaged in guerrilla activities against the Japanese army without suffering a single injury, was now also the leader who orchestrated an economic miracle. The junior Kim trusted and believed that whatever his father did was right. According to his high school friend, the junior Kim referred to the senior Kim as ‘Comrade Premier’ in deference to the man.143 College In September 1960, Kim Jong Il enrolled in the Kim Il Sung University upon his father’s direction144 to study political economics. The university opened in October 1946 to educate ‘cadres for the nation serving the people and building up the people’s state’.145 Until the mid-1950s, the children of high-ranking officials in the North usually went to the Soviet Union to study, but, according to Balazs Szalontai, the North Korean government began to recall most students studying in East European countries to the North from late 1956 in order to protect them from revisionist contamination.146 Considering the political situations, Kim Il Sung did not send Jong Il to Moscow. In keeping with his chuch'e idea, Kim’s son would stay in the North to study.

32 Formative period (1942–1964) The early 1960s became an extension of the 1950s, politically and economically. The ideological conflict with the Soviet Union continued and Kim Il Sung strengthened his position as being independent from the Soviet Union. Kim stabilized his political power and the former guerrillas came out to the center of the North Korean political stage. The Ch'ˇollima Movement overwhelmed the entire society. Kim’s college education was preparation for his entry onto North Korea’s political stage. During his college days, a professor of the Kim Il Sung University assumed exclusive responsibility for the young leader’s education.147 Kim became an official member of the party in July 1961. Kim Yˇong-ju, chief of the Organization Department of the party, appointed Pak Su-dong the chairman of the Party Committee of the university to take care of Kim Jong Il’s political party involvement.148 The Party Committee at the university was composed of two main units: the Faculty Committee and the Student Committee. Although Kim Jong Il was not a cadre of the Student Party Committee, he ultra vires intervened in the university’s party affairs. During his university days, the Party Committee tried to eliminate the university’s Soviet-style education system comprised of ‘dogmatism and revisionism’ in order to replace it with chuch'e education. Some faculty and students who opposed the radical reform of the university education system resisted these changes. According to Sin Kyˇong-wan, several of the university students who opposed the Kim Jong Il-led reform were transferred to another college.149 Kim Il Sung’s concern for his son’s education led to the Political Committee of the party organizing a team composed of prominent scholars whose main task was to teach Kim Jong Il.150 This decision by the Political Committee blurred the distinction between Kim Il Sung’s private and public concerns, thus abusing his political power for his family’s benefit. According to official North Korean documents about Kim Jong Il’s early university days, the man initiated a movement to read 10,000 pages a year – mainly Kim Il Sung’s works.151 Later, Kim Jong Il claimed that he started the 10,000pages-reading movement for the soldiers discharged from the army.152 As in his high school days, Kim joined the construction work for a road near Pyongyang along with other students at the university. He enjoyed watching movies, listening to music, and driving cars, becoming known as a ‘speed demon’ driver. He also began riding horses during his university days.153 Kim Il Sung took Jong Il with him on tours to visit the masses in order to show his son how to deal with the people and what to say to them. Kim Jong Il also followed his father on visits to the People’s Army units from as early on as summer 1962.154 In Kim Jong Il’s college days, Kim Il Sung was already allowing Jong Il to observe high-ranking meetings of the party, the cabinet, and the military.155 The leader’s son accompanied Kim Il Sung on visits to foreign countries. Kim Yong-ju also traveled with Jong Il to the Soviet Union and East European countries in his college days. Besides, Kim Jong Il was sent as a North Korean delegate to the conferences of the World Festival of Youth and Students and the World Federation

Formative period (1942–1964) 33 of Democratic Youth.156 Kim Jong Il represented the youth of his state in those conferences as his father did for the state. The Ch'ˇollima generation Adolescence is many individuals’ most sensitive period. Shocking or traumatic experiences during adolescence may remain with them throughout the rest of their lives. This also helps individuals with shared experiences to develop worldviews with common elements. Individuals with different ‘galvanizing experiences’ in a different time would share different worldviews.157 The ‘galvanizing experience’ from Kim Jong Il’s adolescence was the Ch'ˇollima Movement. It is certain that the chuch'e idea also shaped Kim’s mentality, but gradually and over a longer period of time. The idea, which was first declared as the principle of North Korean policy in the mid-1950s, did not become a systematic idea until the early 1970s.158 Unlike the chuch'e idea, the Ch'ˇollima Movement galvanized Kim Jong Il and his generation from its initiation. Kim Jong Il spent his adolescence in the ‘golden era’ of North Korean socialism because of the movement, to such an extent that his generation is labeled the ‘Ch'ˇollima generation’.159 The Ch'ˇollima generation had two main characteristics. First, the generation was very optimistic about a socialist future, foreseeing in the economic quantum leap of the late 1950s a bright future for North Korean society. The generation believed in a socialist victory over capitalism. Second, the Ch'ˇollima generation was very ideological – a characteristic partially related with the first. Kim Jong Il’s generation had suffered from the Korean War in their childhood and personally knew how disastrous it had been. This experience strengthened their emotional antagonism against the US. At the same time, this generation could contrast how poor they had been in the pre-Ch'ˇollima Movement period with their present condition. Their optimism for socialism and hostility against imperialism made them ideologically oriented towards the former. In other words, the Ch'ˇollima generation became the main advocate of socialism.

Summary Kim Jong Il’s formative period coincided with the North Korean. During his younger years, North Korea was going through the following series of tumultuous events: Korean liberation and division, the Korean War, and the Sino-Soviet dispute. For Koreans, their liberation should have led to the formation of a new unified nation-state, but the 38th parallel division line drawn by external powers frustrated this goal. The division symbolized the beginning of the Cold War in Northeast Asia and became a leading cause of the Korean War. For North Korean leaders, the Korean War was meant not only to communize the whole Korean Peninsula, but also to overcome the national division enforced by the external powers. The war consolidated the Cold War system in northeast Asia and deepened hostility and enmity between North and South Koreans. In the North, anti-American propaganda became a ritual in people’s daily life.

34 Formative period (1942–1964) Before Stalin’s death, North Korea followed a politically pro-Soviet line. However, since the mid-1950s when Kim Il Sung began to politically conflict with Khrushchev, the state developed chuch'e as its national position and opposed demands by the Soviet Union or China to side with either of them. Combined with anti-Americanism, the chuch'e position strengthened nationalism in the North. In the post-war period, Kim Il Sung adopted the Stalinist economic development strategy based on planning and a heavy-industry focus. North Korea succeeded in post-war economic reconstruction owing to other communist countries’ aid and the mass mobilization campaigns represented by the Ch'ˇollima Movement. The success of the post-war construction increased the North Korean people’s optimism for the future of communism. The economic success also provided Kim Il Sung with the material condition conducive to reinforcing his chuch'e line. These socio-political situations played a significant role in forming young Kim Jong Il’s mentality. His antipathy for the US, attachment of chuch'e, optimism for socialism, and myth of mass mobilization campaigns were concerned with his formative social experiences. From childhood, Kim himself was very perceptive to what his father was doing and the political issues surrounding it. His father was a medium connecting politics to Kim Jong Il. For the young man, his father was his primary role model and motivated him to be a politician. Kim Il Sung’s education for Kim Jong Il at home is not publicly known, but the premier probably had little time to pay attention to his son partially because he was stabilizing his power base and partially because he was busy with state affairs. When his mother was alive, she assumed primary responsibility for Kim Jong Il’s education and after she passed away, Kim Jong Il did not have a good relationship with his stepmother. Instead, his mother’s friends, former guerrillas, and his uncle mainly took care of Kim Jong Il. Kim Jong Il’s relationships with former guerrillas were another factor that influenced his mentality. Before his mother died, she was the main storyteller recounting tales to the boy of ‘heroic’ episodes surrounding his father’s and other guerrillas’ activities. These stories became lullabies to Kim Jong Il and their activities were the main subject of his play with other children. Kim learned from his mother and other guerrillas about how guerrillas got along with each other in Manchuria, how small, ill-equipped guerrilla units fought against Japanese troops armed with modern weapons, and how they survived the troops’ attacks and hunger and the cold. Their survival throughout the harsh guerrilla conditions and their victories through tactful combat techniques fascinated young Jong Il. Japan’s atrocities against guerrillas also intensified his animosity toward Japanese imperialism. The guerrilla group engrafted guerrilla mentality – strong comradeship and unity, suspicion of ‘out-group’ members, shrewd manipulation of, and quick accommodation to, external conditions – in Kim’s mind.160 The fact that Kim Jong Il was a son of the premier and part of the guerrilla group became the key factor in his later political success. Throughout these episodes from his childhood, Kim Jong Il was a difficult boy to deal with. In some instances, he was intractable and stubborn and in others he was curious. The teenage Kim Jong Il was not so interested in studying but complied in

Formative period (1942–1964) 35 so far as was necessary for practical purposes. He was a social person with many interests. His artistic temperament began to appear in his diverse personal tastes. As a son of the premier, he received special favors in education and daily life and he fused the special relationships with his father and other guerrillas to achieve his goals. Most importantly of all, Kim Jong Il was ambitious. He wanted to be a leader like his father and this ambition began to be unfolded in his work with the party.

3

Road to heir (1964–1974)

In the period 1964–1974, Kim Jong Il started his career with the party and prepared to become his father’s successor. Kim, with his uncle Kim Yˇong-ju, intensified the cult of Kim Il Sung and highlighted his expertise in the areas of art and literature. The North Korean totalitarian system was almost completed in this period. Until the late 1960s, Kim Yˇong-ju competed with other political contenders for political succession to Kim Il Sung and was viewed as the most likely inheritor of the North Korean leadership. However, in spite of his political advantage, Kim Yˇong-ju unexpectedly retired from the North Korean political arena in the early 1970s because of his poor health. For Kim Jong Il, this development propelled his own political career forward. After Kim Yˇong-ju’s retirement, Kim Jong Il’s stepmother Kim Sˇong-ae briefly rose as a political potentate at the center of North Korean politics and challenged the guerrilla group. Kim Jong Il and other former guerrillas, however, successfully removed her from the North Korean political stage and instated the junior Kim as his father’s successor in February 1974. After graduating from the Kim Il Sung University in March 1964, the junior Kim officially began working at the Organization Department of the Central Committee of the party on 19 June 1964.1 If the party could be described as the most powerful organ of the state, the Organization Department would be the most powerful element within it. The department directly controlled the central party and all party branches of the administration, the military, and the mass organizations. The vice-chiefs of the Organization Department were more powerful than the chiefs of other party departments.2 It was known that Kim Jong Il first worked for the chungang chidokwa (central guidance section) of the Organization Department and soon moved to the chonghap chidokwa (general guidance section). The central guidance section took charge of the affairs relating to the cabinet, the kukka anj˘on powibu (State Security Department), the sahoe anj˘onbu (Ministry of Public Security), and others. The general guidance section controlled the political bureaus of the Department of National Defense and the Railway Office. At the same time, Kim was also involved in the affairs of Kim Il Sung’s security office. After one year of involvement, Kim was transferred to the premier’s secretariat office and in 1966, Kim Jong Il returned to the central guidance section as a leading cadre of the Organization Department3 – a rare rapid promotion. Kim usually dealt with ministerial and

Road to heir (1964–1974) 37 vice-ministerial levels of cadres, all of whom were older and more experienced than he was. Kim later confessed that in the early period of his career he had difficulty dealing with old cadres.4 During his two years in the Organization Department, Kim learned the mechanisms operating within the party and the cabinet. Kim Il Sung himself seemed to be determining what job positions Kim Jong Il would occupy. However, this did not mean that in the mid-1960s he was already considered to be Kim Il Sung’s successor. Kim Jong Il needed to demonstrate his competence in relation to his father and other former guerrillas through successful job performance.

Rules of the game In 1967, three years after Kim Jong Il began to work in the party, an unforgettable purge known as the ‘incident of the Kapsan faction’ occurred. Kapsan is a town in the North Hamgy˘ong Province of North Korea. Most people purged were former members of the Kapsan Operation Committee, an underground organization that was organized for national liberation during the Japanese colonial era. The Kapsan group had its first contact with Kim Il Sung when he was involved in the Korean Fatherland Restoration Association in 1936. Before 1967, there had been the following three major purges in North Korean politics: the 1953 purge against the indigenous faction; Hˇo Ka-i’s death in 1953; and the 1956 purge against the Yanan faction and some Soviet Koreans. After the 1945 liberation, there were four main political factions that competed for power in the North. The first was an indigenous communist group, most of who had stayed in Korea during the Japanese colonial era. The group also included South Korean communists who had come to the North to avoid the South Korean government’s suppression. Pak Hˇon-yˇong, a founding member of the 1925 Korean Communist Party, led the group. The second faction was a group of Soviet Koreans. The Soviet Koreans came to the North with the Soviet occupational forces, but were not well organized into a coherent group. Hˇo Ka-i was the most high-ranking official among the Soviet Koreans. The third group was the Yanan group, made up of the returned revolutionaries who had fought alongside the Chinese communists in Mao’s Yanan. Kim Tu-bong and Ch'oe Ch'ang-ik were the leaders of the group. The Yanan group created the New Democratic Party in 1945. The last group was the guerrilla faction that included ex-guerrillas from Manchuria and their associates; members of the Kapsan group were considered to be the guerrilla group and Kim Il Sung led this guerrilla faction. Among the four, the indigenous group had the strongest popular base and both the Soviet Koreans and guerrilla had few bases in the North after liberation. Under the Soviet occupation, three groups – except for the Yanan group – made up the North Korean Communist Party in October 1945. As mentioned earlier, the North Korean Communist Party and the New Democratic Party of the Yanan group merged into the North Korean Workers’ Party in 1946. This became the Korean Workers’ Party in 1949 when it absorbed the previously separate South Korean Workers’ Party. In the early period, the party had an oligarchic leadership structure.

38 Road to heir (1964–1974) Similar to Stalin’s tactics, political coalitions and purges were important tools employed by Kim Il Sung to eliminate his opponents and to strengthen his political power. From 1952 to 1953, with cooperation from the Yanan and the Soviet Korean group, Kim Il Sung expelled the indigenous faction from the party. It was reported that the group was primarily indicted for the following three crimes: espionage for the US, indiscriminate destruction of democratic forces in the South, and plans to overthrow Kim’s government.5 After the purge of the indigenous group, the Yanan group assisted Kim Il Sung in demoting another challenger, Hˇo Ka-i, from his powerful position as first party secretary to a less important vice-premiership in 1951 after a debate on ‘party membership’. Hˇo allegedly committed suicide in July 1953.6 In August 1956, Kim removed another group, mostly members of the Yanan group and some Soviet Koreans, who criticized Kim’s cult of personality and industrial policy. In practice, Kim achieved a one-man dominated society after the three purges. The Kapsan incident in 1967 was similar to the August incident in 1956 because the people purged in both incidents had demanded that Kim Il Sung reduce the pace of heavy-industry-focused development and invest more economic resources into the light industry that would improve the people’s standard of living. While Kim Il Sung emphasized the ‘speed’ of economic development, the two groups had stressed ‘balanced’ economic development.7 However, the Kapsan incident differed in some ways from the three previous expulsions. While the past three purges arose from direct challenges to Kim Il Sung’s authority, one of the issues in the Kapsan incident concerned the struggle for political succession, specifically as a reaction against Kim Yˇong-ju’s emergence as a political successor that began in the 1950s. In 1959, Kim Yˇong-ju was appointed as chief of the Organization Department of the Central Committee. At the Second Party Conference held in October 1966, the party changed the leadership structure and introduced a secretary system. The position of the chairman of the Central Committee transformed into the position of general secretary and its vice-chairmen became secretaries whose role entailed leading the departments of the Central Committee. During this change, Kim Yˇong-ju was appointed as organization secretary, a position that he occupied on top of being the chief of the Organization Department. Later he was also elected a candidate to the Political Committee of the party.8 The problem with Kim Yˇong-ju as a candidate for succession was that his past career had proved insignificant. In addition to Kim Yˇong-ju, Kim Il Sung had another younger brother named Kim Ch'ˇol-chu. While Kim Ch'ˇol-chu ostensibly died in the 1930s while conducting anti-Japanese activities, Kim Yˇong-ju had no involvement in national liberation activities. Instead, he was like any other person wandering around Manchuria during the Japanese colonial era. Vicepremier Pak Kˇum-ch'ˇol, who had taken control of the organizational affairs of the party, reacted negatively to Kim Yˇong-ju’s emergence in the party and opposed his power concentration in light of his failure to contribute to the national liberation movement.9 Unlike Kim Yˇong-ju, Pak was a founding member of the Kapsan Operation Committee and was directly involved in anti-Japanese activities.

Road to heir (1964–1974) 39 Several other high-ranking officials supported Pak’s position, including Yi Hyo-sun (director of the South Korean Liaison Bureau), Kim To-man (chief of the Propaganda and Agitation Department), Pak Yong-guk (chief of the Department of International Affairs), Hˇo Sˇok-sˇon (chief of the Social Sciences Department of the Academy of Sciences), Ko Hyˇok (vice-premier), and Ha Ang-ch'ˇon (Standing Committee member of the Supreme People’s Assembly).10 The Kapsan group attempted to instate Pak Kˇum-ch'ˇol, who was ranked fourth in the party at the time, as Kim Il Sung’s successor. The group referred to the ‘words’ of Pak Kˇum-ch'ˇol as ‘kyosi’ (instructions), which had equaled only the ‘words’ of Kim Il Sung.11 To improve Pak’s image, Kim To-man, chief of the Propaganda and Agitation Department, commissioned a director to make a film, Ilp'yˇon tansim (An act of sincerity), whose main theme was Pak and his wife’s heroic behavior in the Kapsan Operation Committee.12 Kim To-man also rebuilt Pak’s birthplace.13 In North Korean society, making a biographical film and rebuilding a birthplace should have been honors reserved for Kim Il Sung unless the film-makers had received his explicit permission. Without the leader’s permission, such ‘factional’ behavior was considered to be a challenge to Kim Il Sung’s authority. In February 1967, Kim Il Sung indirectly warned the Kapsan group at a party meeting to stop the activities of ‘individual heroism’ and cautioned party officials not to curry favor with the Kapsan group.14 Despite his warning, the group did not appear to be heeding Kim Il Sung’s instructions and at the Fifteenth Plenum of the Fourth Central Committee in May 1967, all of the Kapsan members were expelled from the party and sent to political camps.15 The Kapsan incident was a watershed in North Korean politics in two ways. The first was that it minimized challenges to Kim Il Sung and facilitated a totalitarian rule devoid of resistance. After the incident, Kim Il Sung made a speech on 25 May about the transition from capitalism to socialism and the dictatorship of the proletariat.16 The reason for the speech was to create an independent theoretical position on transition from capitalism and dictatorship of the proletariat from the Soviet Union and China. Its content was not particularly special but the political impact was significant. After the Kapsan incident, Kim Il Sung’s sycophants manipulated the speech into a political tool for exterminating ‘impure’ factional elements and Kim Il Sung himself tried to establish a monolithic ideological system where ‘all party members are united with one idea and one will’.17 The cult of Kim Il Sung was intensified after the Kapsan incident. Internationally, the Red Guards’ cult of Mao during the Cultural Revolution that began in 1966 influenced the cult of Kim Il Sung as well.18 After the incident, the North Korean people began placing a Kim Il Sung badge on their clothing19 and were forced to quote his instructions in every public meeting.20 The North Korean cult of Kim Il Sung was similar to the Red Guards’ fanatical behavior towards Mao.21 Soon after the purge of the Kapsan group, Kim Yˇong-ju created the Ten Principles for the Monolithic Ideological System. The principles included learning the Great Leader’s revolutionary thought, implementing his instructions and party policies, and struggling against hostile ideological elements, among other things.22 In addition to the cult of Kim Il Sung, the cult of his family was also reinforced.

40 Road to heir (1964–1974) In July 1967, North Korea created a song praising Kim Il Sung’s mother, Kang Pan-sˇok, who was titled ‘Mother of Korea’.23 On 31 July and 4 September the same year, the Nodong sinmun published an article that instated Kang as the ‘mother of all of us’.24 After the Kapsan incident, the term suryˇong (supreme leader) was habitually used with extreme adulation for Kim Il Sung. Originally the term suryˇong was used as a way of describing the leader of a group in Korea. The New Korea (Sinhan minbo), an English–Korean newspaper published in the US during the Japanese colonial era, carried an article on Kim Il Sung’s Pochˇonbo raid in September 1937. The newspaper designated Kim Il Sung as suryˇong.25 At the time, the term did not carry the special meaning that it now does in North Korea. After the 1945 liberation, the term was usually reserved only for Lenin and Stalin. During the Korean War, the North Korean authorities began to adopt the term as an honorific title for Kim.26 The second significance of the Kapsan incident was Kim Jong Il’s emergence into the center of North Korean politics. When the incident occurred, Kim Jong Il played a role in investigating the members of the Kapsan group. After the incident, Kim Chin-gye, a former North Korean agent, listened to an audio tape recording from the Fifteenth Plenum of the Fourth Central Committee, which was released only for party cadres. According to Kim Chin-gye, Kim Jong Il criticized the group members for their ‘factional’ activities at the plenum.27 His investigation of the members was the first official political task assigned to him by his father. Kim Jong Il’s dramatic emergence must have made a strong impression on party cadres. Kim was only 26 years old when the Fifteenth Plenum was held in 1967. After the incident, Kim Jong Il blamed ‘the factionalists’ for several ‘crimes’ at a meeting with the workers of the Propaganda and Agitation Department. First, the Kapsan group was accused of denigrating the Great Leader’s authority and opposing his thoughts. They wrote a biography and manufactured the birthplace of Pak Kˇum-ch'ˇol in order to encourage individual heroism. They also obstructed the propagation of the Great Leader’s revolutionary tradition concerning the antiJapanese guerrilla activities. Second, the factionalists were accused of spreading feudalist Confucian thought. They made people read Chˇong Yak-yong’s Mongmin simsˇo (‘Reflections on fostering the people’), which was published during the Chosˇon dynasty (1392–1910). Third, they were accused of being revisionists who promoted the illusion of capitalism. The ‘anti-revolutionaries’ insisted on introducing the economic theory of value and a semi-currency to encourage the workers’ material motivation. In order to wipe out the remnants of the factionalists, Kim’s conclusion backed his father’s approach to establishing a monolithic ideological system that only followed the Great Leader’s thought and guidance.28 The four purges during and after the Korean War had a great impact on the party and the state. Now that all potential opponents had been eliminated from the party, the Kim Il Sung regime was stabilized. The purges leveled political resistance and ‘silenced’ the North Korean people. In the long term, however, the purges cost North Korea and its people greatly. The intellectual foundations

Road to heir (1964–1974) 41 of the party and the state were undermined.29 Sˇong Hye-rang, Sˇong Hye-rim’s older sister, recalled the social atmosphere during the post-Kapsan purge period as follows: It was my terrible memory that Yi Sˇung-yˇop and Yi Kang-guk [members of the indigenous group] were blamed for being the agents of the U.S [in 1953]. The two persons were the guarantors when my father became a member of the party. The August incident [purge of the Yanan faction] in 1956 expelled my professor Yi Yˇong-p'il, as an anti-party figure, from my research institute. And then the May-25 instruction. I remember [the purge of the Kapsan group] not only as the anti-revisionist struggle, but also as the anti-cultural revolution of radical leftists ousting intellectuals and attacking their works. The North Korean people say that it was good to live in the North until the 1960s. Exactly speaking, before the May-25 instruction, the North was the people’s socialist state. However, after the instruction, a leftist wave, including class struggle, proletariat dictatorship, the cult of suryˇong and the revolutionization of the intellectuals, ran rampant throughout the society. The people looked at each other without saying anything. What I did not understand was the censorship of books. From the May-25 instruction, the nationwide censorship continued until the mid-1970s. It was a tremendously large campaign in which all of the books around the corners of houses and working places were inspected page by page. The criteria of the censorship were the cult of the Great Leader, anti-Japanese revolutionary activities, and class revolution. Censored pages were erased with blank ink or torn apart. A mountainous heap of books were piled in every working place to be sent to paper factories. Most of the books were classics. The areas of music and painting were the same. Foreign music, including Soviet music, was forbidden. Classical music books were burned . . . Since then, oil paintings have disappeared from the North.30 Another cost to the state was that the purges prevented the proper timing of policy change. In China, except for during the Cultural Revolution, political groups with viewpoints that differed from the leadership survived. The groups checked one another. When one political group’s leadership was not successful, another group had the opportunity to implement a different policy by taking over political power from the former group. For example, Mao failed to improve the Chinese economy. After his death, Deng Xiaoping turned China in a more pragmatic direction than Mao’s ideologies had. North Korea did not have the opportunities for policy changes created by shifts in political leadership. There was no alternative group and the state has only one leader faithful to the predecessor.

42 Road to heir (1964–1974) Why did Kim Il Sung pitilessly impose purges upon his opponents? There is no doubt that he learned many political strategies from Stalin but we can also find additional answers from information about his younger days. In his reminiscences, his hatred of factionalism traces back to the Japanese colonial period. He believed that the Chosˇon dynasty was colonized by Japan because members of its ruling class had indulged in factional fighting in order to obtain and maintain their political hegemony rather than making efforts for increasing state power. Kim also believed that the Korean Communist Party – founded in 1925 – was dissolved due to the same reason as the collapse of the dynasty.31 Kim labeled himself and his comrades as ‘new generational communists’ to distinguish themselves from other communists.32 Beside political reasons, Kim Il Sung’s personal experience seemed to enhance his hatred of factionalism. According to Yi Chong-sˇok, during his guerrilla activities, Kim was relegated to the position of teacher in the Children’s Corps when factional leftists accused him of being a Japanese agent.33 That ‘painful’ experience probably intensified his disgust with factionalism. Kim Il Sung’s repeated purges institutionalized this tactic as a foundational political game in the North. This game allowed no second chances. The losers disappeared from the political arena and the winner took all. Kim Il Sung and his successor have frequently employed the purge as a preventive tool against ‘potential’ challengers.

Propaganda and agitation Kim Jong Il’s first career success was his use of propaganda and agitation. His experience in propaganda and agitation became the basis for his future career and the achievement in the ideological sector guaranteed Kim’s political success. In September 1967, at a meeting of the Party Political Committee held to discuss the ideological impact of the Kapsan incident, Kim Il Sung was said to criticize Pak Kˇum-ch'ˇol’s biographical film, An Act of Sincerity. After the meeting, Kim appointed Jong Il the chief of munhwa yesul chidokwa (the guidance section of culture and art) of the Propaganda and Agitation Department of the Central Committee.34 Beside the culture and art section, Kim Jong Il was also in charge of the ch'ulp'an podobu (publication and press section) of the department.35 The Propaganda and Agitation Department was one of two main pillars of the Korean Workers’ Party, along with the Organization Department. Like other communist countries, ideology held an important place in North Korea. From the beginning, North Korea had spent many financial resources on propaganda and agitation.36 The overemphasis on ideology in mass mobilization naturally increased the Propaganda and Agitation Department’s role in the party. The main functions of the department were to produce cultural materials for ideological indoctrination and to educate party members and the people. Kim was well known as a film, music, and theater fanatic since his adolescence. Even when he was working in the Organization Department, he had repeatedly

Road to heir (1964–1974) 43 demonstrated an interest in art and literature. In Kim Jong Il Selected Works vol. 1, from the 29 meetings held before September 1967, 11 of them primarily concerned topics regarding art and literature. The young leader must have reveled in these positions. Two years later in 1969, Kim was promoted to the position of deputy chief of the Propaganda and Agitation Department. As the deputy chief, Kim actually controlled the department, dealing with matters such as the design and issue of party IDs, Kim Il Sung’s portraits, and Kim Il Sung medals.37 Sin Ky˘ong-wan explained the situation in the department as follows: The party ideology secretary was Yang Hyˇong-sˇop, but Yang usually took charge of the areas of education and sciences. He read Kim Jong Il’s face. The chief of the Propaganda and Agitation Department was Kim Kuk-t'ae, son of Kim Ch'aek. Kim Kuk-t'ae replaced Kim To-man [after the Kapsan incident]. Kim Kuk-t'ae was sick and was frequently hospitalized at the time. In practice, the department was in the hands of Kim Jong Il.38 Kim Jong Il was aware that art and literature were powerful instruments in educating people through a dramatic recreation of reality and emotional evocation. Like his father, he believed that under the party’s guidance, art and literature could contribute to revolution. For Kim, a central function of art and literature was as a tool to mobilize people into revolution and construction.39 In the Propaganda and Agitation Department, Kim Jong Il’s main contribution was to establish the monolithic ideological system. Kim strengthened the cult of his father as well as that of his family. He mystified his father’s guerrilla activities by transforming them into revolutionary tradition. According to him, the revolutionary tradition was a ‘revolutionary treasure growing from a revolutionary root’40 and a ‘valuable wealth and eternal basis for ultimate revolutionary victory’,41 which the Great Leader had achieved. The tradition originated from Kim Il Sung’s anti-Japanese activities and later subsumed the histories of the ‘victory’ of the Korean War and post-war socialist revolution and construction. The revolutionary tradition manifested itself in the tradition of chuch'e, which contained not only the Great Leader’s feats but also his revolutionary ideas and popular ways of working.42 Through his work in the department, Kim Jong Il employed a variety of methods to propagate the cult of his father and family. First, Kim designated locations with significance to his family as revolutionary sites. He directed the party to establish national sites in locations such as Lake Samji in Yanggang Province, Huch'ang, and Sinp'a. Lake Samji was a site associated with Kim Il Sung’s armed advance into the Musan area in May 1939. Huch'ang County is related to Kim Hyˇong-jik, his grandfather, and Sinp'a County (later Kim Ch˘ong Suk County) is to his mother. He also renovated other existing sites including Poch'ˇonbo and P'op'yˇong. Poch'ˇonbo is the area that Kim Il Sung and his guerrilla unit raided in June 1937. P'op'yˇong is a ferry point where Kim Il Sung crossed the Amnok River into China in 1925. In addition, Kim Jong Il rebuilt the cabins of Mt Paekdu where his father and other

44 Road to heir (1964–1974) guerrillas briefly stayed in the mid-1930s. After reconstructing these sites, Kim mandated the North Korean people to visit them.43 Second, Kim Jong Il gradually transformed the whole society into a ‘space for the cult’. He changed the nationwide Party History Research Office into the Kim Il Sung Revolutionary History Research Office (later Kim Il Sung Revolutionary Thought Research Office).44 To commemorate Kim Il Sung’s sixtieth birthday in 1972, Kim Jong Il squandered financial resources on the 66-foot-high bronze Kim Il Sung statue on Mansudae Hill in Pyongyang. He also compelled the party to renovate the Man'gyˇongdae site where Kim Il Sung grew up, the Korean Revolutionary Museum in Pyongyang, and all the local sites that Kim Il Sung had visited.45 The third method for educating the people was to massively produce publications about Kim Il Sung. Kim Jong Il forced party propagandists to describe his father as an ideal leader in his father’s biographies and massively published Kim Il Sung (and Selected) Works. In addition, Kim Jong Il reprinted Recollections of Partisans and other partisan-associated records.46 Recollections of Partisans was first printed in the late 1950s. After the Kapsan incident, the sections written by Kapsan factionalists were deleted. Fourth, Kim Jong Il demanded that directors and actors make films about Kim Il Sung’s guerrilla activities and that writers write novels about his father’s feats.47 From the late 1960s to the early 1970s, Kim Jong Il created or restructured the organizations dealing with art and literature: Paekdusan Production (film), the April 15th Literary Production (novels), the Sea-of-Blood Opera Troupe (opera), the Mansudae Art Troupe (theater) and the Mansudae Art Studio (painting).48 These organizations’ main tasks were classified into three parts. First and foremost, they were to portray the Great Leader as a revolutionary genius and the fatherly leader of the people who successfully liberated Korea from Japanese imperialism and who led the socialist construction of a paradise in the North.49 Another task of the cultural organizations was to rewrite the family history of Kim Il Sung.50 The greatness of the Kims traced back to Kim Il Sung’s greatˇ great-grandfather, Kim Ung-u. The family cult included Kim Hyˇong-jik (Kim Il Sung’s father), Kim Hyˇong-kwˇon (his uncle), Kim Ch'ˇol-chu (his younger brother), Kang Pan-sˇok (his mother), Kang Ton-uk (his mother’s father), Kim Ch˘ong-suk (his wife), Kim Ki-jun and Ki-song (Kim Ch˘ong-suk’s brothers), and others. The reason for the family cult was simple. It was originally meant to emphasize the inevitability of Kim Il Sung’s rise to leadership of the state and later to legitimize Kim Jong Il’s succession as one born into and raised by the revolutionary family. The family myth justified that, from the time of his great-great-grandfather, a heroic family lineage had been passed down to Kim Jong Il. The organizations’ third task was to typify revolutionaries loyal to the Great Leader.51 Guerrillas were exemplified as the archetype of loyal revolutionaries in North Korean society. ‘Model workers’ in mass campaigns for production increases were also included in this category. In artistic works, the model citizens were portrayed as symbolic figures of self-sacrifice, who were eager to fulfill what the leader ordered without fail.52 The movies such as Five Guerrilla

Road to heir (1964–1974) 45 Brothers (1968), Rolling Workers (1972), and A Peasant Hero (1975) positively portrayed the revolutionaries.53 The first sector that Kim Jong Il renovated in art and literature was the cinema.54 Why did Kim specifically choose to focus on the cinematic arts? In Kim Jong Il Selected Works vol. 1, Kim explained the reasons as follows: There are no other tools in art and literature as powerful as cinema in educating people in a revolutionary manner. Cinema is the most popular art that can be released to the masses anywhere and anytime. Everybody easily understands the content of motion pictures because they show a reality through vivid scenes. Cinema is comprehensive art, which can contain such other art genres as literature, music, painting, etc. To promote the area of cinema is to develop other art genres. Therefore, as an ideological weapon, it is crucial to produce a highly ideological artistic film for the education of the masses.55 His statement was not unique at all. Other totalitarian leaders such as Stalin and Hitler had been aware of the powerful role played by cinema in mass education and had used it as a vehicle to mobilize the masses.56 Kim’s statement echoed these other leaders’ emphasis on cinema. His political reasons aside, Kim Jong Il’s indulgence in and love of film played a role in his choosing cinema as his primary tool for ideological indoctrination. According to Sin Sang-ok, a South Korean director, Kim is a film fanatic and retains tens of thousands of films from all over the world in his private three-story ˘ storage unit.57 Kim kidnapped Sin Sang-ok and Ch'oe Un-h˘ ui, a South Korean actress, in Hong Kong in 1978 and brought them to Pyongyang. Sin and Ch'oe stayed there from 1978 to 1986 in order to promote North Korean cinema. Kim created a filmmaking organization – Sin Film – for Sin and Ch'oe. While in the North, Sin directed several films and Ch'oe became a leading actress in the films: Secret Envoy Who Does Not Return, Story of Escaping, Story of Ch'unhyang and Salt.58 How did Kim start to reform North Korean filmmaking? Around September 1967, after he had begun working at the culture and art section, Kim Jong Il held a meeting with film workers including those who were involved in making An Act of Sincerity for the Kapsan group. He had the scenario writers, actors, actress, and directors criticize themselves for their participation and he ‘generously’ forgave their previous factional involvement – but only after they had pledged to be loyal to the Great Leader. To make a new style of cult movies, he introduced cuttingedge film facilities from foreign countries and improved the material assistance available to the film-making crew. According to Sin Kyˇong-wan, while directors were making films in the late 1960s and the early 1970s, Kim Jong Il usually stayed in filming locations such as the Korea Filming Studio and Pyongyang Theater.59 Under Kim Jong Il’s guidance, directors completed several feature films – Sea of Blood (1969), Fate of a Self-Defense Corps Man (1970), A Flower Girl (1972) and others – whose topics concerned anti-Japanese activities. The movies were

46 Road to heir (1964–1974) quite successful. The feature film A Flower Girl, which was a part of the Eighteenth World Film Festival, was awarded a special prize and medal.60 According to Tak et al., between 1969 and 1970, Kim Jong Il began to be called ‘Dear Leader’ by men of letters and artists.61 Most importantly, however, was the Great Leader’s evaluation of the Dear Leader’s job performance. It was alleged that Kim Il Sung was moved to tears while watching Sea of Blood.62 At the Fifth Congress of the Party held in November 1970, Kim Il Sung commented on what Kim Jong Il had done in the area of art and literature as follows: Our socialist literature and art are at their zenith. Thanks to the successful implementation on the Party’s policy in this area, all revisionist elements and restorationist tendencies have been removed. Our writers and artists are all busy creating revolutionary literature and art works which are based thoroughly on the working-class line; and workers, farmers and broad sections of other working people are actively participating in literary and artistic activities. Our literature and art have become the literature and art of the Party, of the revolution and of the people in the truest sense of the term and are becoming a powerful means in educating our working people along communist lines.63 After his success in film-making, Kim Jong Il’s focus moved to the opera. North Korean scenario writers adapted revolutionary films – Sea of Blood, Fate of a SelfDefense Corps Man, and A Flower Girl – into revolutionary operas with the same titles. According to his official biography, Kim reformed the North Korean operatic form by introducing stanzas – repeating certain parts of lyrics – and inventing ‘pangch'ang’ (‘offstage singing’). Offstage singing includes offstage solos, duets, and choruses. It is not a part of the cast of the opera, but was introduced to make operas more vivid.64 According Sin Sang-ok, the two elements of stanza and offstage singing are very powerful in entrapping the audience, notwithstanding their crude forms.65 At the time, the introduction of stanzas and offstage singing must have been quite a renovation. Stanzaic songs and offstage singing were first employed in creating Sea of Blood. North Korean operas with stanzas and offstage singing are called ‘Sea of Blood-style operas’ in commemoration of the making of opera by the same name. By early 1972, Kim Il Sung and old former guerrillas were granted previews of the operas in an opera festival opened by Kim Jong Il. There was a rumor that the operas evoked the viewers’ guerrilla-day memories and that all of the viewers were touched.66 It is certain that the success in the area of art and literature guaranteed political success for Kim Jong Il. Later, Kim Jong Il proudly defined the early 1970s as the ‘heyday of the art of opera’.67

Militarism While Kim Jong Il was working in the Propaganda and Agitation Department of the Central Committee, an unexpected event known as the ‘incident

Road to heir (1964–1974) 47 of Kim Ch'ang-bong and Hˇo Pong-hak’ occurred in 1968–1969. The event was partially a by-product of the 1960s militarism and partially a result of a power struggle for political succession. Rising militarism A series of international events in the early 1960s provoked the North Korean leadership toward militarism. The rise of militarism demonstrated how international affairs influenced North Korean domestic politics. The first event was the May 1961 military coup led by General Park Chung Hee in South Korea. Kim Il Sung, threatened by the presence of US troops in the South and the South Korean military government, visited Moscow and Beijing. He signed the ‘Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance’ with Moscow on 6 July 1961. The treaty included a provision for automatic security assistance in a state of war. On 11 July 1961, China and North Korea also signed the ‘Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance’, which also had a similar provision for automatic involvement in the event of war.68 The two treaties contributed to establishing a power balance between the northern allies – the Soviet Union, China, and North Korea – and the southern allies – the US and South Korea on the peninsula. However, the dispute between Kim and Khrushchev soon prompted North Korea to look in different directions. In late 1962, another international incident occurred that Kim Il Sung considered to be a serious security threat. On the opposite side of the globe in Cuba, the Soviets attempt to place nuclear missiles on Cuba was blocked by the Kennedy administration in October 1962. The Soviet backing down in the Cuban missile crisis produced an invisible impact: North Korea no longer believed the Soviet Union to be a reliable ally. In addition, in December the same year, the ongoing South Korea–Japan normalization talks roused North Korea. The North violently opposed the talks by labeling the normalization as a Japanese reinvasion of the Korean Peninsula.69 When Kim Il Sung faced these new international situations in the early 1960s, he sought policy solutions from his past military experiences during the antiJapanese struggle and the Korean War. In other words, his military skills were revived to cope with the new security situation. In late 1962, Kim set up new policy initiatives that would define the future of North Korea. At the Fifth Plenum of the Central Committee held in December 1962, he declared the institution of the doctrine of self-defense. Based on the doctrine, the state adopted the following four military policies, or ‘4-tae kunsa nosˇon (four military lines)’: arming the entire population, fortifying the entire state, training every soldier to become a cadre, and modernizing the entire military sector. Besides the four policies, the plenum put into effect another new policy line of ‘economy–defense parallel development’ wherein Kim would develop the defense industry even at the cost of his people’s standard of living. After the plenum, the party put forth the slogan, ‘arms in one hand and a hammer and sickle in the other’,70 just as they had during the guerrilla activities.

48 Road to heir (1964–1974) In effect, the four military lines were partially related to the ‘democratic base’ strategy that he proposed in 1945 to turn the North into a powerful base for a unified independent state. Two years later, in February 1964, he proposed the strategy of ‘three kinds of revolutionary forces’ – North, South Korean, and international revolutionary forces – against US imperialism to develop his plan for a democratic base. The four military lines were set to strengthen the North Korean revolutionary force as a democratic base. A noteworthy aspect of the new strategy was that, in order to strengthen South Korean revolutionary forces, the South Korean people needed to establish their own revolutionary party and a united front through their own efforts.71 Kim Il Sung was probably aware that it was getting difficult for the Korean Workers’ Party to lead the South Korean revolution. However, this did not mean that he would abandon his leadership to achieve the goal of Korean unification; rather, he used his leadership to create an ‘indigenous’ political party in the South. At the Second Party Conference in October 1966, Kim Il Sung further detailed the four military lines and the economy–defense parallel development policy.72 The militarization trend of the North was particularly strengthened after the party conference. To deal with military affairs, the North Korean leadership re-established the Military Affairs Committee that had been created during the Korean War.73 These extreme military policies negatively affected the economic development in the 1960s. The first seven-year (1961–1967) economic plan that the state was meant to conclude in 1967 had to be extended three more years in order to fulfill its goals. The Kapsan group’s reaction to Kim Il Sung’s military policies in 1967 was based on an attempt to distribute more economic resources into light industries for the improvement of the people’s daily lives. However, Kim did not alter his emphasis on heavy industry and the purge of the Kapsan group accelerated the militarism of the late 1960s. The party poured higher percentages of their budgets into the defense sector. While the defense budgets only required 19 percent of the total budget in 1960, the amount allocated soared to an average 31.1 percent between 1967 and 1969.74 Interestingly, this period coincided with the SinoNorth Korean conflict. While North Korea tried to readjust their relationship with the Soviet Union after Khrushchev’s fall in 1965, Sino-North Korean relations deteriorated in the latter half of the 1960s. During the Cultural Revolution, especially from 1967 onward, the Chinese Red Guards labeled Kim Il Sung a revisionist and North Korea responded by branding China as dogmatic. This aggravated security situation in the latter half of the 1960s was an additional factor in the nation’s vast defense budget spending. The Kim Ch'ang-bong and Hˇo Pong-hak incident The Kim Ch'ang-bong and Hˇo Pong-hak incident broke out in the context of the 1960s’ militarism. Hˇo Pong-hak, who had been the director of the General Political Bureau of the Korean People’s Army, replaced Yi Hyo-sun after the Kapsan incident and took control of South Korean operations. Kim Ch'ang-bong

Road to heir (1964–1974) 49 was the Minister of National Defense. Both Kim and Hˇo were former guerrillas. The Kim/Hˇo incident was similar to the Kapsan incident in that both arose out of resistance to the power concentration in Kim Yˇong-ju’s hands. In other words, they were the outcomes of power struggles for the second-in-command position in North Korean leadership. With the rise of militarism in the 1960s, the military’s power also increased and some generals began to form a military clique.75 Kim and Hˇo were symbolic figures in this military clique. In the late 1960s, they clashed with Kim Yˇong-ju as Kim Il Sung’s possible successor. After the 1967 Kapsan incident, Kim Yˇong-ju expanded his clout as the chief of the Organization Department of the Central Committee into other political sectors and intervened in the personnel affairs of the military. Kim Ch'ang-bong and Hˇo Pong-hak tried to check Kim Yˇong-ju’s power. They cooperated with other military functionaries such as Kim Chˇong-t'ae (second son of Kim Ch'aek), chief of the Special Reconnaissance Bureau of the Korean People’s Army.76 The late 1960s was as politically complicated as the early 1960s had been. The US was directly involved in the Vietnam War at the Gulf of Tonkin Incident in 1964. At the US’s request, two of South Korea’s army divisions were sent to Vietnam between 1965 and 1973. Kim Ch'ang-bong and Hˇo Pong-hak believed that the two states’ involvement in the war – which split their military capabilities – could create a favorable revolutionary situation on the Korean Peninsula. They forged a new plan for South Korean operations, known as Nam-Chosˇon haebang kwa t'ongil chˇollyak kyehoek (Plan for the Liberation of South Korea and Unification), and began its execution in 1968. Although the ostensible goal of the plan was for unification, the main motivation of Kim and Hˇo was to have the political edge over Kim Yˇong-ju after they succeeded in implementing the plan.77 In January 1968, a North Korean commando team infiltrated Seoul to assassinate President Park Chung Hee, but all but one of them was killed. In the same month, North Korea captured the US reconnaissance vessel, Pueblo, due to the reason that it was within North Korean territorial waters. The crew returned to the US after Pyongyang accepted an apology from Washington. In October 1968, 180 military agents invaded South Korean areas like Ulchin and Samch'ˇok. Of these, about 110 were killed and the rest escaped to the North. According to a North Korean defector, Hwang Il-ho, the seizure of the Pueblo and the two military raids were implemented by the Kim/Hˇo group. At first, Kim Il Sung did not know the details of the group’s plan. According to Hwang’s recollection, Kim Il Sung understood the two raids as separate events, not interrelated ones. Not until the enlarged Plenum of the Fourth Party Committee of the Korean People’s Army in January 1969 was the plan specifically disclosed. At the plenum, a party inspection team that Kim Yˇong-ju led revealed the plan.78 After that plenum, Kim Il Sung condemned Kim and Hˇo for being ‘military bureaucrats’ and refusing the party’s leadership over the army,79 but he did not use the term ‘factionalists’ for them. To strengthen the party’s grip over the army after the Kim/Hˇo incident, Kim Il Sung enhanced the general political bureau of the army’s role and sent political commissars to the regimental level of military units.

50 Road to heir (1964–1974) Before the fourth enlarged plenum, the political commissars were placed at the division level of the army. The commissars were party representatives sent to the army in order to check military unit leaders and their power became so strong that if military leaders violated party lines, the commissars could reject and stop military leaders’ orders.80 Even if all ‘military adventurists’ like Kim and Hˇo were purged, militarism still remained an important part of North Korean politics because Kim Il Sung himself was the primary proponent of militarism. In a sense, Kim and Hˇo were simply victims of his militarism which might explain why the leader did not brand them factionalists. Since the 1960s, militarism has been a part of culture in North Korean society and has also been one of the main obstacles impeding economic development. Until the late 1960s, Kim Yˇong-ju had successfully defended his position as his brother’s successor. He eliminated the Kapsan group and the ‘military bureaucrats’ from the political arena step by step. However, his biggest obstacle was not outside challengers, but his poor health. Kim’s health became aggravated from late 1968 to 1970 and he was often hospitalized.81 Kim Yˇong-ju’s misfortune was Kim Jong Il’s fortune; the fruit of the struggle for political succession fell to Kim Jong Il. However, Kim Jong Il himself now faced a potent political challenger – his stepmother.

Competitor Kim S˘ong-ae’s political presence became clear in the mid-1960s. In August 1965, she was introduced to the public as Comrade Kim Il Sung’s wife.82 In November the same year, at the twentieth founding day of the Democratic Women’s Union (DWU), she was designated as ‘Vice Chairman’ Kim S˘ong-ae of the union.83 In 1968, as the First Lady of North Korea, Kim S˘ong-ae ‘independently’ held a public meeting for foreign female delegates.84 Finally, Kim S˘ong-ae took over as chairperson of the DWU in 1969.85 Based on the DWU, Kim S˘ong-ae began to expand her political clout into other political areas. She asked her husband to build a new building for the DWU in the rear of Kim Il Sung Square.86 In particular, after Kim Il Sung announced that the ‘words of Kim S˘ong-ae are the same as mine’ at a meeting of North Korean peasantry in January 1971, she behaved like the number-two figure in North Korean politics.87 On 6 August 1971, the Nodong sinmun featured two separate pictures on the front page of the newspaper. One was a picture of Kim Il Sung talking to the Cambodian king and the other was of Kim S˘ong-ae welcoming the king’s wife.88 On 8 August in the same year, the newspaper published an article with the headline: ‘There was an Artistic Performance of Cambodian Youths for Great Leader Kim Il Sung and his wife Comrade Kim S˘ong-ae.’89 The change of Kim S˘ong-ae’s political status affected the functionaries of the DWU, who were materially and politically treated as well as those belonging to the Central Party. When people held meetings at their workplaces, the branch representatives of the DWU took seats on the presidential podium.90

Road to heir (1964–1974) 51 In addition to Kim Il Sung’s support of Kim S˘ong-ae, Kim Yˇong-ju’s poor health facilitated Kim S˘ong-ae’s political rise. In the early 1970s, Kim Yˇongju’s disease worsened and around 1972 he began to separate himself from party affairs and usually remained in the hospital.91 Kim Yˇong-ju’s retirement created a power vacuum that Kim S˘ong-ae attempted to fill. Like Mao, she distributed her quotations to the people.92 By promoting a campaign for ‘Learning from Madame Kang Pan-sˇok,’ she also began to delete the records of Kim Ch˘ongsuk. She replaced Kim Ch˘ong-suk’s picture on the walls of DWU branches with her own picture – in line with Kang Pan-sˇok’s. The writers who had written about Kim Ch˘ong-suk were expelled to other areas. The measures that she took to eliminate Kim Ch˘ong-suk from North Korean history must have provoked Kim Jong Il. Furthermore, Kim S˘ong-ae tried to check the former guerilla’s political power by cutting down on the special governmental assistance previously available to them. In order to belong in mainstream North Korean society, people must be somehow related to the former guerrillas; Kim S˘ong-ae did not belong to any guerrilla group. From her point of view, the guerrilla group was the biggest obstacle to concentrating her power and she needed to weaken their influence on North Korean politics. To restrain their power, she established her own political group by recruiting her brothers, Kim Sˇong-gap and Sˇong-ho.93 From the former guerrillas’ viewpoint, Kim S˘ong-ae’s measures were no more than a threat to their authority. As shown in the previous purges, the guerrilla group did not allow any challenges to their political realm. After Kim Jong Il became Kim Il Sung’s successor in February 1974, the guerrilla group attacked Kim S˘ong-ae’s group with corruption cases involving her two brothers and purged them at a meeting of the Pyongyang City Party in June.94 After the City Party meeting, Kim S˘ong-ae was once again demoted to no more than Comrade Kim Il Sung’s wife.95 In the end, she yielded to Kim Jong Il. At a speech of 65th International Women’s Day on 8 March 1975, she praised Kim Ch˘ong-suk as an ‘invincible communist revolutionary and remarkable female activist’.96 Her statement denoted that the struggle for political succession came to an end. Kim Jong Il and S˘ong-ae played a zero-sum game for political power. Certainly Kim’s mother-in-law’s ultimate goal was to make her eldest son, P'y˘ong-il, her husband’s successor. Therefore, Kim S˘ong-ae’s downfall also meant that her sons were dropped out of the succession race. Kim S˘ong-ae and her sons, P'y˘ong-il and Y˘ong-il remained ‘kyˇot-kaji’ (the extra branch) while Kim Jong Il and Kyˇonghˇui were ‘wˇon-kaji’ (the main branch). While the ‘extra branch’ represented concubines and their children who could not assume mainstream power positions, the ‘main branch’ symbolized legitimate descendants who could accede to the throne. The position held by the ‘main branch’ completely excluded the ‘extra branch’ from political power. Kim P'y˘ong-il and Y˘ong-il are known to have been placed in foreign countries as diplomats and even in 1994, when Kim Il Sung died, the two brothers could not be members of the national funeral committee for their father.97

52 Road to heir (1964–1974) Kim S˘ong-ae’s weakest point was that she had made too many enemies in too short a period of time. Given her brief political career, she could not win over the former guerrilla veterans. In addition, given her negligible group of supporters, her political base was too weak to break the guerillas’ consolidated power base. She should have learned from her husband how to eliminate political opponents and she needed to have more time to fortify her power base and divide the guerrilla group through a political coalition. But she did not. It was therefore little surprise that she lost the political game.

Succession Kim Jong Il officially became his father’s successor at the Eighth Plenum of the Fifth Central Committee of the Party in February 1974.98 Kim was only 33 years old at the time. In spite of his young age, the North Korean leadership hastened the leadership succession. This hasty appointment resulted from the complicated international and domestic conditions that North Korea had been facing since the mid-1950s: Khrushchev’s de-Stalinization campaign, Lin Biao’s alleged rebellion against Mao Zedong, Kim Yˇong-ju’s physical incapacity, the former guerrillas’ check against the rise of Kim Sˇong-ae, and Kim Il Sung’s physical condition. The first event that prompted Kim Il Sung to consider his political future was Khrushchev’s de-Stalinization campaign after Stalin’s death in 1953. Kim Il Sung must have been surprised because this was the first time in the communist movement’s history that a political successor had challenged his predecessor’s authority. After Lenin passed away in 1924, Stalin tried to consolidate his power based on Lenin’s legacy. He ordered that Lenin’s body should be embalmed and stressed party unity under Lenin’s will. He projected an image of himself as Lenin’s loyal collaborator and backed Lenin’s political principles.99 Khrushchev, on the other hand, strengthened his power base by denouncing his precursor, Stalin. This shocking denouncement induced Kim to seek a loyal successor who would not betray him after his death.100 From the late 1950s until the early 1970s, the North Korean leadership favored Kim Yˇong-ju as the state’s next leader.101 In fact, Kim Il Sung had prepared Kim Yˇong-ju above anybody else as his most probable inheritor. In 1959, Kim Yˇong-ju became the chief of the Organization Department of the Central Committee. Kim Il Sung appointed his brother a candidate member of the Political Committee of the Central Committee at the 1966 Second Party Conference. Kim Yˇong-ju was ranked eighteenth in the party at the time.102 At the Fifth Party Congress in November 1970, Kim Yˇong-ju was promoted to becoming a regular member of the Political Committee as the sixth ranking person. Only former guerrillas ranked higher in party than Kim Yˇong-ju did.103 Given these party ranks, the next leader should have been Kim Yˇong-ju. However, Kim Yˇong-ju’s poor health ultimately prevented him from attaining political power. From the late 1960s, Kim Yˇong-ju suffered from a disease which, according to Sin Kyˇong-wan, caused him to ‘to lose consciousness abruptly’.104 Chˇong Hong-jin, a former South Korean bureaucrat who was involved in preparing

Road to heir (1964–1974) 53 the 4 July North/South Joint Communique in 1972, supported Sin’s account. Chˇong added: To successfully prepare for inter-Korean talks, the powerful figure next to Kim Il Sung had to come [to Seoul]. After analyzing our intelligence [on North Korean politicians], we concluded that the powerful figure was Kim Yˇong-ju . . . On 4 May 1972, at a midnight secret meeting [in Pyongyang], Yi Hu-rak, director of the Korean CIA, insisted that Kim Il Sung send Kim Yˇong-ju to the South. But Kim Il Sung explained that his brother was, in fact, away from governmental affairs due to sickness and wished Yi to understand it.105 Kim Yˇong-ju’s poor health caused Kim Il Sung and old guerrillas to change their succession plan and search for an alternative. Their strongest candidate was Kim Jong Il because he had already been successful in the art and literature sector. In 1970, Kim Jong Il had another chance to demonstrate his abilities in the North Korean leadership. Kim took charge of organizing the Fifth Party Congress in November. At the time, both Kim Yˇong-ju, chief of the Organization Department, and Kim Kuk-t'ae, chief of the Propaganda and Agitation Department, were ailing. Instead of the two chiefs preparing the party congress, Kim Jong Il carried out their duties as the deputy chief of the Propaganda and Agitation Department. The congress was a successful event in which Kim Jong Il demonstrated his organizational skills to his father and other guerrillas. The North Korean leadership began to seriously consider Kim Jong Il as the successor after the congress.106 At a speech of the Sixth Congress of the League of Socialist Working Youth (LSWY) held in June 1971, Kim Il Sung disclosed his concerns for the future of the revolution, emphasizing the need for revolutionary succession: Although the goals of the revolution remain unaltered, the generation has changed and the new generation which has grown up since liberation is already emerging as master of our state and society. Only when the new, rising generation takes over the revolution, can it be carried forward and our sacred revolutionary cause be accomplished.107 Even though Kim Il Sung did not explicitly address leadership succession, he implied that he had succession in his mind at the time. In September 1971, there was an international accident that facilitated the leadership succession in North Korea. Lin Biao, Mao Zedong’s successor, died in an airplane crash in the Mongolian territory. Surprisingly, it was publicly known that Lin had attempted to assassinate his predecessor Mao.108 This issue may have made Kim Il Sung question who could be his most reliable successor. If Khrushchev’s de-Stalinization campaign caused Kim Il Sung to consider his successor while he was alive, Lin’s rebellion caused Kim to choose the most reliable person as his heir. Kim Sˇong-ae’s rise drove the former guerrillas to establish the political succession as quickly as they could. Kim Sˇong-ae’s behavior reminded them of

54 Road to heir (1964–1974) Jiang Qing’s in China and it was rumored that Kim S˘ong-ae would be similar to Jiang Qing.109 For the guerrillas, Kim Sˇong-ae’s checking their power was similar to Jiang’s attack against old Chinese leaders such as Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping. They believed that Kim Sˇong-ae’s rise was due to Kim Yˇong-ju’s absence. They therefore tried to fill the vacuum created by Kim Yˇong-ju’s retirement with a person whom they could better trust. The guerilla group’s exclusivity might have played a key part in hurrying the succession. Another issue regarding the succession was Kim Il Sung’s health; as he aged, a tumor was growing on the back of his neck. Kim and the old guerrillas were concerned about the tumor that could be a serious disease and wanted to resolve political succession before Kim Il Sung’s health worsened.110 Besides Kim Jong Il, the North Korean leadership scrutinized more candidates for political succession by including ‘young’ guerrillas, according to Sin Kyˇong-wan, including Paek Hak-nim, Chˇon Mun-sˇop and second-generation revolutionaries like O kˇuk-yˇol, O Yong-bang, Ch'oe Sang-uk, and Kim Tu-nam. In the end, they concluded that the candidates were not as capable as Kim Jong Il.111 However, it was not realistic to believe that somebody who might have been better than Kim Jong Il could have been appointed Kim Il Sung’s successor in the totalitarian political system. The scrutiny of other candidates was only a formal process crafted because Kim Jong Il was Kim Il Sung’s son. By late 1972, it was likely that Kim Il Sung took some specific measures to determine his succession. At a meeting with the cadres of the LSWY, he complained that many of its cadres were older people aged over 30. He stressed that the LSWY needed to revitalize itself by recruiting younger cadres.112 His statement reflected his successor’s age; he wanted younger cadres to support his successor. In other words, he tried to adjust the age of the LSWY cadres to that of Kim Jong Il. In early 1973, the North Korean media began to disclose specific evidence indicating the political succession. On Kim Jong Il’s birthday on 16 February 1973, the Nodong sinmun carried a feature article extolling the new styles of art and literature which had resulted from Kim Jong Il’s successes. Without specifically designating Kim Jong Il’s name, the article proudly articulated that the ‘Korean people created the immaculate art of the revolutionary era for the first time.’ The new style of Korean films and operas were the ‘art that cannot be seen in Europe’ and ‘represents Asia and the world.’113 Two days later, the newspaper ran another article claiming that the February 16th Art College was established in Kanggye in Chagang Province on Kim’s birthday.114 On 1 June, while he spoke to the officials of Choch'ongyˇon (the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan), Kim Il Sung re-emphasized what he said at the 1971 Congress of the LSWY and added, ‘If we are to carry on the revolution, we must give good training to the people who will take over the revolution and carry it forward.’115 His words implied that he would train Jong Il to succeed him. In mid-1973, an event in China probably facilitated the process of North Korean political succession.116 At the Tenth Party Congress held in August 1973, a politician in his late-thirties named Wang Hongwen became a vice-chairman of the

Road to heir (1964–1974) 55 CCP as the third-ranking person behind Mao and Zhou Enlai. This indicated that the young Wang would lead the party in the future.117 In September 1973, immediately after the CCP congress, the North Korean leadership appointed Kim Jong Il to both the organization and the propaganda and agitation secretary positions at the Seventh Plenum of the Fifth Central Committee of the Korean Workers’ Party. The plenum also allowed Kim to control the Organization and the Propaganda and Agitation Departments.118 Namely, Kim was in charge of four main posts that four separate people were supposed to assume. It was alleged that before the Seventh Plenum, Kim Il Sung had been reluctant to put Kim Jong Il in party leadership positions because his son was too young.119 Given the North Korean leaders’ hasty appointment of the young Kim, the CCP congress must have influenced Kim Il Sung’s decision. The emergence of the young Wang in China facilitated Kim’s decision to position his young son into a leadership position. After the September plenum, the Central Committee’s decision was delivered to all party cells. They pledged their loyalty to the Great Leader and to his inheritor. Finally, between 11 and 13 February 1974, the Eighth Plenum of the Fifth Central Committee elected secretary Kim Jong Il as a member of the Political Committee.120 To be a member of the committee suggested he was his father’s official successor. The 1973 and 1974 appointments were unknown to the public. After the Eighth Plenum, Kim Jong Il was called ‘dang chungang’ (party center) in the North Korean media.121

Loyalty The period between 1964 and 1974 was the most important for Kim Jong Il’s future. The young man worked hard to become a leader like his father. Even though his uncle’s misfortune was fortunate for Kim Jong Il, Kim himself actively unveiled his will to attain power. Unlike the Kim Jong Il described in his official biographies, the real Kim Jong Il was not a modest man. On 16 February 1968, the Nodong sinmun featured an article about the documentary film Man'gyˇongdae. The film’s content regarded the cult of Kim Il Sung’s family. It stressed that Man'gyˇongdae was the ‘hometown of the Koreans’.122 Interestingly, the day on which the article was released was Kim Jong Il’s birthday. At the time, Kim Jong Il was controlling art and literature affairs and he ordered the newspaper to write the article on his birthday. In 1968, he had not yet been appointed the successor. Through the article, Kim Jong Il wanted to indicate that he was legitimately born into the same family into which the Great Leader had been. The article should be understood as Kim Jong Il’s disclosing his will to power. According to Han Chae-man, a North Korean biographer, the successor of the Great Leader had three main tasks. His first was to succeed and develop the Great Leader’s revolutionary ideas. His second one was that the successor had to stick to and improve the revolutionary tradition that the Great Leader had created. His last task was to strengthen the revolutionary forces composed of the Great Leader, the party and the masses.123 In a word, the successor should be unconditionally loyal to his predecessor. When the senior Kim chose the junior

56 Road to heir (1964–1974) Kim as his political inheritor, he regarded loyalty as his successor’s most important qualification. In his memoirs, Kim Il Sung revealed his viewpoint regarding political succession: To select the right successor is a fundamental issue determining the destinies of revolution, construction, nation and people. How numerous are examples of the failures of the revolution and the state [in the international communist movement] are due to wrong successors! After the Russian October Revolution, the main reason that Soviet people succeeded in making their country a global power was that Lenin chose a good successor. Stalin was a faithful comrade and disciple of Lenin. He was loyal to his suryˇong [Lenin] for his whole life. When Stalin was alive, everything was going well in the Soviet Union. However, after Khrushchev took over political power, things began to go wrong. Since then, modern revisionism in the Soviet party came into being and the Soviet people have ideologically been imbued with the revisionism. As the painful lesson of history has shown, the basic requirement of the political successor is to have loyalty and moral responsibility of his suryˇong and the suryˇong’s feats. The faithfulness to the suryˇong cannot exist without the moral responsibility. Fidelity and morality to the suryˇong are the first condition that an inheritor is supposed to retain.124 Kim Jong Il was the person most qualified to satisfy Kim Il Sung’s conditions. It could be easier for the junior Kim to be devoted to the senior Kim than for anyone else in the state because of the two’s father–son relationship. For Kim Jong Il, filial piety equaled loyalty. To be a filial son was to be a faithful disciple. From his childhood, Kim Jong Il had known no respectable leader beyond his father. Since Kim Jong Il had started to work in the party, he had devoted all of his energy to strengthening the cult surrounding his father and his family. He established the revolutionary tradition based on the history revolving around his father’s activities and deleted everything else. He raised his father’s status to the level of a demigod, thus heightening his own standing as well.

Summary During the ten-year period between 1964 and 1974, North Korea was very stable domestically. After the Kapsan incident, there was no significant political challenge to Kim Il Sung’s authority. The state continued to strengthen the cults surrounding Kim Il Sung and his family. During this period, North Korean politicians engaged in a power struggle for the second-ranked position under Kim Il Sung. From the Kapsan incident onward, Kim Jong Il also became partially involved in the power struggle and became accustomed to the rules of political game in the totalitarian state. Kim Y˘ong-ju seemed favored to become Kim Il Sung’s successor, but his poor health forced him to retire from North Korean politics. After Kim Y˘ong-ju’s

Road to heir (1964–1974) 57 retirement, Kim S˘ong-ae appeared as a political potentate and challenged the guerrilla group. The political competition between Kim S˘ong-ae and the former guerrillas with Kim Jong Il came to an end with the latter’s victory. Kim Y˘ong-ju and Kim S˘ong-ae’s disappearance from the political arena provided Kim Jong Il with the conditions favorable to becoming his father’s successor. Kim Jong Il being Kim Il Sung’s son and part of the guerrilla group were necessary factors for his becoming the successor to Kim Il Sung’s regime. However, this was not enough in and of itself. Kim Jong Il also had to demonstrate his loyalty to his father and to the other guerrillas through his successful job performance. He knew what kind of successor the North Korean leadership wanted and he did his best to satisfy their requirements. After starting to work in the party, Kim Jong Il demonstrated his leadership in the areas of propaganda and agitation. He skillfully connected his work with his personal interests for his success. The main focuses of propaganda and agitation concerned Kim Il Sung’s greatness and his guerrilla activities. Numerous propagandist symbols reflecting Kim Il Sung and his family were erected throughout the state. Using topics based around guerrilla activities, Kim Jong Il succeeded in creating new art forms in North Korean art, like the revolutionary operas. Kim Jong Il’s unconditional faithfulness to Kim Il Sung and other guerrillas must have impressed the North Korean leadership, who were looking for a loyal successor. It is no wonder that one of Kim Jong Il’s main leadership characteristics in North Korean propaganda has been Confucian ‘loyalty and filial piety’. In conclusion, Kim Jong Il could become Kim Il Sung’s successor due to the following three factors: his birth, his capabilities, and his luck. First, he was born the eldest son of Kim Il Sung and Kim Ch˘ong-suk. As a son of the Great Leader in this totalitarian society, Kim Jong Il had a political edge over others in the power competition for succession because the Great Leader had the final authority in choosing his heir. The father–son relationship based on filial piety genuinely led to a political relationship based on loyalty. As his father and mother had formerly been guerrillas, Kim Jong Il naturally became a member of the guerrilla group. The guerrilla group was his main power base before and after Kim Jong Il’s succession to his father. Second, he succeeded in showing his capabilities as the future North Korean leader from 1964 to 1974. After observing Kim Jong Il’s work in the party, older North Korean leaders must have been satisfied with his abilities as the future leader of the state. Third, Kim Jong Il was lucky. If Kim Y˘ong-ju had not been sick and not retired from North Korean politics, Kim Jong Il could not have been the successor to his father. For him, his uncle’s unexpected disappearance from the political arena was extremely fortunate.

4

Heir (1974–1994)

From 1974 until 1994, the year he died of a heart attack, Kim Il Sung gradually handed his power over to Kim Jong Il, whose control spread to the party, the military, and other governmental sectors. The junior Kim established his own way of administering North Korean society and transformed it into a highly developed totalitarian one, with the senior Kim’s assistance. The cult of the Kims continued to become stronger and the chuch'e idea overwhelmed society. By the mid-1980s, the leadership succession was almost complete. At the Kim Il Sung Party School’s fortieth anniversary in 1986, Kim Il Sung declared that the ‘issue of revolutionary succession was satisfactorily resolved in our party’.1 From the late-1980s onward, the senior Kim’s main roles as a guardian were to support the junior Kim in domestic politics and represent the state diplomatically. Kim Jong Il took charge of most domestic affairs. In the early 1990s, the junior Kim took over the following military positions that the senior Kim had assumed: commander-inchief of the Korean People’s Army in December 1991 and chairmanship of the National Defense Commission in April 1993.2 It would be fair to say that by the time of Kim Il Sung’s death, Kim Jong Il was able to control the state without his father’s assistance. During this period, the doctrine of ‘self-reliance in economy’ was no longer a viable option. The potential of an economy based on mass mobilization deteriorated. Too focused on heavy industry, the economy failed to enhance people’s standard of living. To make matters worse, the communist bloc’s collapse left North Korea diplomatically and economically isolated. Still, rather than establishing a new political course, the North Korean leadership stuck to the ideologically driven development strategy and increasingly shut the door to the outside world. North Korean nuclear development became a hot issue in international politics during this period.

Monolithic ideological system Kim Jong Il and the chuch'e idea After Kim Jong Il became the heir, his first act was to create the yuil sasang ch'egye (monolithic ideological system) where only the chuch'e idea was allowed to exist

Heir (1974–1994) 59 in the society. The term was used to underscore ideological purity by rejecting ideological pluralism. On 19 February 1974, Kim Jong Il made an epochal speech on his strategic goal called ‘Kimilsungism-ization of the Whole Society’ at a national seminar for party propagandists. During the speech, Kim defined ‘Kimilsungism’ as a system surrounding the ‘idea, theory, and method of chuch'e’ and announced that the Kimilsungism-ization of the whole society was the party’s foremost ideological line. He aimed to make all the people ‘Kimilsungists’ who would be endlessly loyal to the Great Leader.3 By using the term ‘Kimilsungism,’ Kim Jong Il demonstrated his ambition to develop the chuch'e idea into a systematic ideology like Marxism was. The declaration of Kimilsungism suggested that he was to be the ideological as well as political successor of his father. He used Kimilsungism as a weapon for establishing a monolithic ideological system. While Kim Il Sung had made efforts to develop the chuch'e idea before 1974, Kim Jong Il was responsible for the evolution of the idea from then on. Experts on North Korea usually translate the term chuch'e into ‘self-reliance’ (or ‘self-reliant’), but the term implies more than that. Chuch'e is composed of two words: chu and ch'e. Chu literally means master (or owner) and ch'e means body. Chuch'e then denotes the ‘master of one’s own body’. The term is frequently employed with the adjective suffix chˇok (or jˇok). A chuch'ejˇok person is someone who does something his or her own way without depending on others. That person does not expect anyone else to do anything for him or her. The opposite meaning of chuch'ejˇok is to be ‘dependent’ or ‘subservient’. If the term chuch'ejˇok is used along with the state, then a ‘chuch'ejˇok state’ is one that exists by its own efforts. Chuch'ejˇok persons (or states) do not allow intervention and try to be independent of others. The concept of chuch'e is also partially related to identity. For chuch'ejˇok persons, dependence on others means the violation of their free-willed identity. On the national level, a loss of chuch'e is the same as losing national identity, or, in other words, colonization. In North Korea, the idea of chuch'e has been articulated as the opposite concept of sadae (literally ‘serving the bigger or stronger’). North Korea has interpreted the whole of Korean history by using the contrary concepts of chech'e and sadae. Historically, sadae was a primary diplomatic concept of the ruling class during the Chos˘on dynasty, which was forged to justify the tributary relations with China. During the Japanese colonial period, emphasizing independent national identity, some Korean nationalist historians denounced the sadae idea and tried to reinterpret Korean history with the concept of independence. After liberation, along with the development of the chuch'e idea, North Korean historians adopted the nationalists’ view of history and developed it more systematically. Currently North Korea insists that South Korea has had sadae relations with the US just as the Chos˘on had with China and thus lost its independent diplomatic position with the US. In other words, the North is using the concepts of chuch'e and sadae against the South, claiming that it has the only legitimate self-determined government on the peninsula. Broadly speaking, the evolution of the chuch'e idea underwent three stages according to

60 Heir (1974–1994) the development of its content: 1950s to 1972; 1972 to 1986; and 1986 to the present. The Chuch'e idea as policy principle The first developmental stage of the chuch'e idea was from the mid-1950s to 1972, the year Kim Il Sung declared the philosophical concepts of the idea. The chuch'e idea in the first stage was used as the basic principle for his policies. Based on Kim Il Sung’s political needs, the chuch'e’ idea of the 1950s to 1960s gradually subsumed the four main sub-concepts: chuch'e in thought, chaju (selfdetermination) in foreign affairs, charip (self-reliance) in economy and chawi (self-defense) in national defense. The concept of ‘chuch'e in thought’ came first. In December 1955, Kim Il Sung made a speech on ‘Eliminating dogmatism and formalism and establishing juche [chuch'e] in ideological work’, where he mentioned the term chuch'e for the first time. In that speech, adding that Korean situations differed from Soviet ones, Kim blamed a party cadre for recommending that he follow Khrushchev’s policy of peaceful coexistence, a policy that he opposed. He used chuch'e as a concept to counter Soviet hegemony. In other words, the seed of the chuch'e idea was planted during the Soviet–North Korean split.4 In his December speech, Kim continued to complain that Soviet culture was present in all corners of North Korean society, while arguing that ‘our own things’ could not be found. He insisted that the North Korean people study their own ‘things’ and be proficient in them. The people should not mechanically imitate the Soviet Union’s experience but should creatively apply Marxism and Leninism to their specific realities. Kim also tried to link the chuch'e idea with his guerrilla activities. He proudly said that many cadres of the Korean People’s Army were composed of former guerrillas and they could therefore preserve the revolutionary tradition and win the Korean War. In domestic politics, Kim Il Sung employed the concept of chuch'e to eliminate the Soviet culture that had overwhelmed North Korean society since 1945, thus contributing to an awareness of Korean national identity. He also manipulated the idea of chuch'e as a political weapon to purge his political opponents. Kim usually branded his opponents dogmatists or flunkeys.5 In 1956, the Nodong sinmun published an article entitled ‘For the good understanding of “chuch'e”’. In the article, the North Korean authorities raised the slogan ‘Let’s establish chuch'e!’, which meant the people should ‘contribute everything to our revolution’. The article emphasized that the master of the Korean revolution was the Korean people themselves. It was not chuch'ejˇok to depend upon other countries’ experiences without primarily looking to their own. On the basis of Korean revolutionary history and the principles of Marxism–Leninism, party policies should be developed in a creative way.6 The main substance of ‘chuch'e in thought’ at the time was to reclaim Korea in order to apply the principles of Marxism–Leninism to Korean realities in a creative way.

Heir (1974–1994) 61 The concept of chaju (self-determination) in foreign affairs came next. In December 1957, after attending the fortieth anniversary of the Soviet Revolution in Moscow, Kim Il Sung began to use the principles that were confirmed in the anniversary to justify his chaju in diplomatic relations – complete equality, respect for territorial integrity, national independence, and non-intervention.7 In a speech of the fifteenth anniversary of the founding of the Korean People’s Army on 8 February 1963, Kim specifically talked about political chaju. He articulated the idea that a man without chaju could not find or remain on his own path. A politician without it could not work for his people, but would curry favor with others. Eventually he or she would play into the hands of the major powers and become a conspirator by selling out his or her country.8 The third element of charip (self-reliance) in economy was related to his developmental strategy prioritizing the military industry. Policy conflicts with Khrushchev and his intervention in North Korea’s economy created the need for economic charip in the state. At the First Party Conference held in March 1958, Kim Il Sung clarified that economic charip meant to build a self-reliant economy ‘in which we can earn our own living’ as well as ‘support [ourselves]’.9 Later, Kim detailed the relationships between political chaju and economic charip. Without economic charip, political chaju cannot be maintained – only the two together could guarantee national independence. The Korean communists’ primary task was to achieve complete political chaju and economic charip.10 The concept of chawi (self-defense) in national defense was the last policy principle to be introduced into the chuch'e idea. This did not mean that chawi was the least important, but simply denoted that chawi was the final component of the idea. The reduction of Soviet military aid in the early 1960s forced Kim to develop a new military policy. In October 1963, he announced that North Korea needed to establish a policy of chawi in national defense at a speech for the seventh commencement of the Kim Il Sung Military Academy.11 Finally, at a lecture of the Ali Archam Academy of Social Sciences in Indonesia in April 1965, Kim Il Sung internationally declared that his chuch'e idea incorporated the four concepts of chuch'e, chaju, charip and chawi. Kim elaborated that ‘establishing chuch'e’ was the ‘principle of solving for oneself all problems of the revolution and construction in conformity with the existing conditions in one’s country, and mainly by one’s own efforts’. He admitted that the chuch'e idea evolved out of the process of ‘opposition to dogmatism and flunkeyism toward great powers’,12 not during his guerrilla activities as North Korea currently claims, and disclosed the origins of the chuch'e idea as follows: In 1955, therefore, our Party set forth the definite policy of establishing Juche [or chuch'e], and has been persistently waging an energetic ideological struggle to carry it through ever since. The year 1955 marked a turning point in our Party’s consistent struggle against dogmatism. It was also at that time, in fact, that we started our fight against modern revisionism which had emerged within the socialist camp. Our struggle against dogmatism was thus linked with the conflict against modern revisionism.13

62 Heir (1974–1994) Kim Il Sung continued his efforts to develop the idea into a more systematic ideology. In August 1966, the Nodong sinmun carried a long editorial elucidating the following eight detailed creeds for establishing chuch'e: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

Think in one’s own way. Believe in one’s own capacity. Marxism–Leninism is the guiding principle. Do not copy other’s experiences mechanically. Have national pride. A self-sufficient economy is a material basis for chajusˇong (the character of chaju). Respect chajusˇong mutually. Strengthen anti-imperial struggle on the basis of chajusˇong.14

The chuch'e idea as philosophical thought By the early 1970s, the chuch'e idea began to include philosophical elements. Hwang Chang-yˇop played the key role in developing the idea in the 1970s. As Hwang himself implied, he drew his philosophical concepts from Mao’s mass line. According to Hwang, Kim Il Sung’s interview with the Japanese newspaper Mainichi shimbun, in September 1972, was the first publication on chuch'e philosophy.15 In the interview, the idea was defined as follows: In a nutshell, the idea of Juche [chuch'e] means that the masters of the revolution and the work of construction are the popular masses and that they are also the motive force of the revolution and construction. In other words, one is responsible for one’s own destiny and one has also the capacity for hewing out one’s own destiny [. . .] Establishing Juche means adopting the attitude of a master towards the revolution and construction. Since the masters of the revolution and construction are the masses, they should take the responsible attitude of a master towards the revolution and construction. The attitude of a master is expressed in an independent and creative stand.16 In this interview, Kim Il Sung claimed that chajusˇong is vital for mankind. If a person loses chajusˇong, he or she cannot be called a human and is therefore no different from an animal. Kim continued to speak about the concepts of socio-political life and physical life. People are social beings. For mankind, sociopolitical life is therefore more important than physical life. Kim Il Sung also emphasized that all human activity is determined by ideology and it is therefore imperative to revolutionize human ideology in educating people.17 These concepts were further elaborated in the 1980s.

Heir (1974–1994) 63 After Kim Jong Il was appointed his father’s successor, he further developed the chuch'e idea and gave it the new title ‘Kimilsungism’. The term ‘Kimilsungism’ first appeared in the North Korean media in January 1973.18 When Kim declared Kimilsungism in February 1974, he insisted that Kimilsungism was actually created during Kim Il Sung’s anti-Japanese activities, in the early 1930s.19 However, except for its definition – ‘idea, theory, and method of chuch'e,’ Kim Jong Il did not specify what Kimilsungism was. While using it to strengthen domestic indoctrination of the people, Kim Jong Il also promoted the chuch'e idea to the outside world. He established a number of teams, researched the idea in foreign countries, especially the Third World, and began to annually hold international seminars on the idea before or after his father’s birthday. To undertake the idea’s international promotion, Kim founded the Chuch'e sasang yˇon'guso (Research Institute of the Chuch'e Idea) in October 1979.20 Furthermore, Kim Il Sung Works began to be translated into English in 1980.21 At the Sixth Party Congress in October 1980, the party by-laws replaced Marxism and Leninism with the chuch'e idea and became the single ideology of the party.22 In Kim Jong Il Selected Works, Kim Jong Il frequently used the term Kimilsungism until the treatise Chuch'e sasang e taehayˇo (On the chuch'e idea) was published in March 1982. In this treatise, the term ‘Kimilsungismization of the whole society’ was replaced by ‘chuch'e idea-zation of the whole society’.23 After the treatise was published, the term Kimilsungism hardly appeared in his works. It is not clear why he chose to revive the term ‘chuch'e’. ‘On the chuch'e idea’ was a treatise sent to a chuch'e idea seminar held to celebrate Kim Il Sung’s seventieth birthday. According to official North Korean documents, this treatise is the most authoritative document about the chuch'e idea. It consists of the following five parts: the origin of the chuch'e idea, philosophical principles, socio-historical principles, guiding principles, and historical significance. It seems to have been collaboratively written by several North Korean scholars who integrated all of these related concepts into the treatise. Kim Jong Il claimed that the principles of the idea were first created in 1930. The concepts Hwang created were placed in the philosophical and the socio-historical sections. The four policy principles of chuch'e, chaju, charip,and chawi are put into the fourth part of the guiding principles. The Chuch'e idea as semi-religion The third developmental stage of the chuch'e idea began in 1986 when the North Korean government published the essay Chuch'e sasang kyoyang esˇo chegi toenˇun myˇot kaji munje e taehayˇo (On some problems of education in the chuch'e idea) under Kim Jong Il’s name. During this period, the idea became a semi-religious form full of moral precepts. The 1986 essay was significant because it developed the concept of the hyˇongmyˇongjˇok suryˇong kwan (revolutionary view of the leader). According to the essay, the revolutionary view of the leader is based on a collectivist perspective. Any individual has the following two aspects of their

64 Heir (1974–1994) life: the physical and the socio-political one. While the physical life of an individual is finite, the socio-political one is immortal.24 According to the revolutionary view of the leader, revolutionary forces are a collective organism composed of leader, the party and the masses. The leader, the party, and the masses cannot be revolutionary forces if they are separate. As the center of the organism, the leader gives the masses their socio-political life. He integrates their diverse interests into one and commands their creative activities harmoniously. As the vanguard of the masses, the party connects the leader with the masses. The masses can obtain the immortal socio-political life only when they are organizationally linked to the leader through the party. If the leader is the brain of the body, the party is the central nerve. Because the leader, the party and the masses are united into a socio-political organism – they share the same destiny.25 Revolutionary duty and comradeship are underlining principles in the relationships between the leader, the party and the masses. The main object of their revolutionary duty and comradeship is their leader, as the center of the sociopolitical organism. The party and the masses should give unconditional loyalty to their leader.26 The revolutionary view of the leader is analogous with some elements of Christianity. First, its concept of a socio-political organism composed of three forces – the leader, the party and the masses – seems to be drawn from the doctrine of the Trinity in Christianity. The second element in common is the Korean Christian concept of yˇongsaeng (immortality). While the masses are eternally saved by God through Jesus Christ in Christianity, in the chuch'e idea they are saved by the leader through the political party. In other words, Christians are to God what the masses are to the leader according to this political idea. Why then did Kim Jong Il attempt to develop the chuch'e idea into a religious form? In ‘On some problems of education in the chuch'e idea’, Kim partially disclosed the basis for this attempt. Most likely, the 1986 essay was a reflection of the changing international situation in the mid-1980s. After Mikhail Gorvachev took power in the Soviet Union in 1985, he tried to reform the Communist Party and the stagnating Soviet economy. In addition, Chinese reforms beginning in the late 1970s might have added to Kim’s concerns for the future of North Korea: By the way, when some people face temporary predicaments in socialist economic construction, they try to find the causes of the predicaments from socialist economic institutions or management rather than from their ideological and cultural situations or the relationships between the party and the masses [. . .] Social institutions are inseparably related to the ways in which they are managed . . . If people operate socialist institutions through capitalist methods, the socialist institutions will change into capitalist ones. We should operate socialist institutions in collective ways.27

Heir (1974–1994) 65 Kim Jong Il considered the Soviet and Chinese reforms to be threatening to his chuch'e society. To cope with the changing international situations, Kim chose to stick to the way of chuch'e, which meant reinforcing ideological indoctrination by transforming the chuch'e idea into a pseudo-religion based on collectivism. In that political context, the revolutionary view of the leader was meant to strengthen the unity between the leader and his people by resisting external ‘revisionism.’ Ten principles for a monolithic ideological system When he declared Kimilsungism in February 1974, Kim Jong Il also spoke about the ‘Ten Principles for Monolithic Ideological System’ (‘Ten Principles’) that Kim Yˇong-ju had originally created in the aftermath of the Kapsan incident. At the time, Kim complained that the recent efforts to establish a monolithic ideological system had decreased compared with those after the Kapsan incident. People did not care as much about the Ten Principles as the code of conduct. His conclusion was to initiate a campaign to study the Ten Principles.28 Kim Jong Il ordered party officials to rewrite the Ten Principles, which became much longer to include the following rules: 1 Contribute to indoctrinating the whole society by the revolutionary idea of the Great Leader. 2 Admire the Great Leader with one’s loyalty. 3 Make the authority of the Great Leader absolute. 4 Hold faith in the revolutionary idea of the Great Leader and make his instruction creed. 5 Abide by the principle of unconditionality in implementing the instructions of the Great Leader. 6 Strengthen the ideological monolithism and revolutionary unity of the whole party around the Great Leader. 7 Have a communist attitude, revolutionary working methods, and popular working styles by learning from the Great Leader. 8 Cherish the political life that the Great Leader accords and repay his political trust and care as having great political recognition and techniques. 9 Establish a strong organizational discipline by which party, state and military behave like one unit under the monolithic leadership of the Great Leader. 10 Succeed and complete revolutionary achievement, which the Great Leader pioneered, generation to generation.29 Each principle of the Ten Principles contained several sub-principles and specific action plans. Among the Ten Principles, the last directly related to Kim Jong Il with his intention veiled in the sub-principles of the tenth. The sub-principles included the following: to build up the yuilch˘ok chido ch'eje (monolithic guidance system) of the Party Center (Kim Jong Il) in order to establish the monolithic ideological system and complete the revolutionary feat of the Great Leader, to uncompromisingly struggle against impure elements that violate the guidance of

66 Heir (1974–1994) the Party Center, and to advocate the authority of the Party Center and protect him with one’s life.30 The Ten Principles were adopted as the official party line at a meeting of the Central Committee in April 197431 and the document has been the most powerful weapon in regulating people’s daily lives. More influential than the constitution or any other statute of the state, it serves as criteria for people’s daily behavior. The people must memorize all of the main principles as well as the sub-principles and behave according to them all. Before all party meetings begin, participants review the Ten Principles. Most political ‘criminals’ in the North are sent to prison due to breaching the Ten Principles, not criminal law.32

Monolithic guidance system From the mid-1970s onward, the totalitarian transformation of North Korean society fell on Kim Jong Il’s shoulders. He began to establish his own ruling system known as the monolithic guidance system. It was a system in which only Kim Jong Il had the authority to make important decisions which, once decided, were to be implemented absolutely and completely. Under the guidance system, party cadres were supposed to act in perfect order under his leadership.33 The guidance system was designed to transfer Kim Il Sung’s power to Kim Jong Il. Kim Jong Il’s monolithic guidance system was constructed methodically, beginning with the party, continuing with the military, and then expanding into other governmental sectors. The guidance system’s establishment accompanied the party and governmental organizations’ expansion. Kim tried to place people under the complete control of the organizations through the guidance system. Owing to the monolithic guidance system, the North Korean leadership could establish a well-organized totalitarian society similar to what other totalitarian leaders such as Hitler or Stalin might have attempted to establish. The strategy seemed successful until the mid-1990s, when the country suffered from economic disaster. Party In North Korea, the party was the most important organization. To establish the monolithic guidance system, Kim Jong Il first had to establish himself in the party. In February 1974, Kim Jong Il gave some general instructions on party affairs to party cadres at a joint meeting of the Organization and the Propaganda and Agitation Departments. First, high-ranking cadres were to understand what lowranking cadres in local party branches did and were told to maintain tight control over lower party officials. He instructed the cadres, who took charge of local party branches, to be at the branches for 20 days out of each month.34 Second, Kim controlled the flow of information. He regulated the mobility of cadres and the availability of party documents. He forbade the Party Central Committee to issue directives without consent from both him and his father. Only after permission from him and his father did he allow the departments of the

Heir (1974–1994) 67 Central Committee to send party guidance teams and official documents to local party branches.35 Third, he stressed the importance of his father’s instructions. He assured party officials that Kim Il Sung’s instructions should expeditiously be delivered to cadres concerned. At the same time, he told them to keep the Great Leader’s instructions confidential and to refrain from releasing instructions outside the party until Kim Jong Il himself allowed them to be.36 Fourth, he encouraged the officials to employ creativity into their work in party affairs, but he also directed that he would not forgive any ‘ideological creativity’ outside of the revolutionary ideas of the Great Leader. In ideological affairs, only the monolithic ideological system would be tolerated. There was no room for ideas other than the Great Leader’s.37 Fifth, Kim Jong Il warned the party cadres to refrain from entertaining any ‘illusion of . . . individual[ity]’.38 The ‘illusion of . . . individual[ity]’ referred to people who might curry favor with or group around a political figure. They were not allowed to pay respect to any person other than the Great Leader and the Dear Leader. Kim wanted not only to prevent factional incidents such as the Kapsan and the Kim/H˘o incident had been, but also to check his potential rivals. His warning was later codified into a sub-principle of the sixth article of the Ten Principles. The sub-principle instructs, ‘Don’t have illusions of an individual cadre, curry favor with him, or have the cult of the cadre. Party cadres are not supposed to give and take gifts from each other [in order to receive favors]’.39 Organization The Korean Workers’ Party is composed of the following five hierarchical tiers: the central party, the provincial-level, the city-and-county-level, the primary-level branch, and the party cell. In one party cell, party membership varies from 5 to 30 and a primary-level party branch is made up of more than 31 members. The central party is divided broadly into two main institutions: the Central Committee and the Central Auditing Committee. The Central Committee has the following four main organizations: the Politburo and its Standing Committee, the Secretariat, the Military Affairs Committee, and the Inspection Committee.40 Kim Jong Il’s efforts to make the party his own had actually begun when he became a party secretary in September 1973. Since he became the secretary, Kim had reshuffled the organizational structure of the secretariat. In particular, as the chief of the Organization Department, he had divided the department into more precise sections according to their functions.41 The main functions of the Organization Department were to establish the monolithic ideological and guidance systems in both the party and the society. Specifically it controlled the daily life of party members through saenghwal ch'onghwa (assessments of daily life) and dealt with all organizational affairs of the party and personnel affairs of party cadres. The department was and continues to be the most powerful and largest of the departments of the Central Committee. Unlike the other departments, there are several deputy-chiefs in the department.42

68 Heir (1974–1994) For Kim Jong Il, controlling party cadres was the most urgent and important concern because it was impossible to rule the state or the party without it. Kim renovated a section of cadre affairs in the Organization Department and tried to control all party cadres in party branches, the military, the cabinet and the (secret) police. Before he began directing cadre affairs, each department of the Central Committee had some discretion in their cadre affairs – Kim eliminated this responsibility when he reformed the party. He distributed a written directive on the appointment, education, promotion, and dismissal of cadres. Except for the department dealing with economics, he forced the other departments of the Central Committee to create sections of cadre affairs that were supposed to cooperate with the Organization Department.43 He also established these sections in provincial party branches.44 The ultimate power derived from cadre affairs then flowed directly to Kim Jong Il. In order to control party cadres, Kim used the inspection section of the Organization Department along with the section on cadre affairs. The inspection section played a key role in establishing Kim’s monolithic guidance system. The main functions of the inspection section involved rooting out anti-party elements, corruption, and misdemeanors.45 Inspection was a useful tool for purging people who resisted his guidance and for making them obey his orders. After he became the party secretary, inspections targeting all party branches took place in late 1973.46 After resolving the matters of party cadres and inspections, Kim Jong Il sought to control the daily lives of both party cadres and their rank and file. At the provinciallevel and the city-and-county-level party branches, he set up the sections that would take charge of the daily life of party members in industrial factories.47 The creation of the sections made it easy for the Organization Department to regulate party members’ lives at the most basic level. Apart from the expansion of party control, Kim Jong Il set up a new reporting system for improving the promptness of the control. The reporting system was divided into two systems. One was called a ‘three-line and three-day’ system, which meant that briefings were to be held every three days from the three lines – the party, the administration and secret police. The other reporting system was a fast-track communication line going directly to Kim Jong Il though telephone or other communication means in emergency situations.48 Through this reporting system, Kim Jong Il was able to quickly obtain information from any area of North Korean society. The system is vertically structured and the information carried is only available to him. Party life In North Korea, regardless of cadre or rank and file, every party member besides Kim Jong Il is currently mandated to participate in party cell activities. Within a party cell, every member is equal including the secretary. Even a member of the Politburo or the cabinet is controlled by the low-ranking secretary of the party cell.49

Heir (1974–1994) 69 If one becomes a party member, he or she is forced to join a wide variety of activities. First, a member must attend meetings assessing his or her party life. According to a sub-principle of the eighth article of the Ten Principles, all party members must participate in every-other-day and weekly assessment meetings in order to discipline themselves as revolutionaries.50 There are several types of party assessment meetings in North Korea: every-other-day, weekly, every-ten-day, monthly, quarterly, and yearly. The party members working in the art and literature sector must assess their daily party life every other day because they tend to be a more ‘liberal’ group, whereas the peasants hold an assessment meeting every ten days. In general, other party members have a weekly assessment meeting on Saturday mornings with a monthly meeting on the morning of the last Saturday of the month replacing the weekly meeting. While each party cell organizes their own assessment meetings, the primary-level party branch coordinates the quarterly and yearly meetings. In the meeting assessing party life, every participant must criticize themselves in relation to Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il’s instructions and to the Ten Principles. According to a structure called ‘mutual criticism’, after each participant self-criticizes, the other participants follow-up with their own criticism of that person.51 Kim Jong Il, with his father’s support, established this complex assessment system after he became the party secretary. Previously, the party had only conducted the monthly assessment meeting.52 When he had worked in the Propaganda and Agitation Department, Kim had instituted experimental everyother-day and weekly assessment meeting for the art and literature staff. Later, he expanded the revised system to the whole party.53 In addition to the assessment meetings, party members engage in many other activities. According to a sub-principle of the Fourth Principle, all party members must attend classes about the revolutionary ideas of the Great Leader and study them for over two hours a day.54 Classes are regularly held on Saturdays and every Friday party cadres engage in a day of ‘physical’ labor, known as Friday labor. They are also encouraged to attend college classes about the chuch'e idea and party policies for a month out of every year.55 Another way for the party to monitor its members is by updating an ‘assessment paper’ with a detailed review of each member’s party life.56 This assessment paper follows its owner for his or her entire life. In a word, the party can scrutinize its members’ public and private lives through these diverse party activities. They leave little time for the members to consider ‘impure’ thoughts. Interestingly, notwithstanding the party’s omnipresent control over its members, every non-party member is eager to attain party membership because it guarantees its owner social mobility to the upper class and economic benefits. For non-party members, being a member of the party is the ‘ultimate goal in life’.57 Military After Kim Jong Il established the party’s monolithic guidance system, he started to control the military through its party branches. Since the Korean People’s

70 Heir (1974–1994) Army was created in 1948, it had been Kim Il Sung’s primary power base. Most guerrillas had been engaged in founding the army and it was there that Kim Il Sung first established the revolutionary tradition. The military was a main source for recruiting the North Korean elite. Therefore, the military’s power meant that it took Kim Jong Il longer to control it than any other sector. In the latter half of 1974, the Organization Department of the Central Committee under Kim’s guidance began to inspect the army’s party organization. The inspection checked whether the army was following the successor’s monolithic guidance.58 After the inspection, Kim promoted the slogan ‘Kimilsungismization of the Whole Military’ at a meeting with the cadres of the general political bureau of the army on 1 January 1975.59 Riding on Kim Il Sung’s authority, Kim Jong Il attempted to control the military through the ideological weapon of Kimilsungism in order to construct his power base in the military. At the meeting, Kim underscored what the army was for the Great Leader and the party. Now that the Great Leader led his revolution and construction through his successor, the successor’s guidance was instrumental to the Kimilsungismization of the military. The successor’s lines and policies were based on those of the Great Leader. Therefore, to follow the monolithic guidance of the successor was to fulfill the will of the Leader. All military officers and soldiers were to be as faithful to the successor as they had been to the Leader. The army established that important military issues should be reported to the successor and be executed only with his approval. No arbitrary decisions should be made by any other cadre besides the successor.60 Beginning in 1975, a picture of the junior Kim was hung next to the senior Kim’s in the offices of the military. In contrast, it was not until around 1983 that his picture appeared at the offices of the Central Committee and the cabinet;61 it was the military that initiated the cult of Kim Jong Il in North Korea. The only place where a statue of Kim Jong Il is presently standing is in the building of Department of National Defense. This represents the military’s status in North Korean politics.62 Yet it was not easy for Kim to establish his control over the military. At a meeting with high-ranking party cadres in 1977, Kim complained that some military cadres had not voluntarily accepted the party’s control. Quoting Kim Il Sung’s instructions to strengthen the party’s guidance of the military, Kim Jong Il announced that the Central Committee had decided to create a section in the Organization Department to direct the general political bureau of the army.63 Kim Il Sung came forward to help his son take hold of the military. By late 1979, he had replaced some army corps commanders with younger generals to better fit with Kim Jong Il’s age.64 On 31 October, there was a convention for the League of Socialist Working Youth in the military65 and Kim Il Sung called an extended plenum of the Party Committee of the Korean People’s Army in December.66 The consecutive gatherings were likely held to establish Kim Jong Il’s leadership in the military before the 1980 ‘public’ succession. In 1980, when the junior Kim was exposed to the North Korean public as the Great Leader’s successor, soldiers in the military began to write him letters stating a ‘pledge to be loyal’.67

Heir (1974–1994) 71 On 13 April 1985, before Kim Il Sung’s birthday, Kim Jong Il decorated new military generals with orders and pinned the generals’ insignia on their shoulders in a ceremony of military promotion.68 In September the same year, both Kims attended a meeting with the commanders and political commissars of the Korean People’s Army, according to head of Department of National Defense O Chin-u’s report.69 These two events were important because they showed that Kim Jong Il’s monolithic guidance system was established in the military by 1985. Regarding military affairs, Kim Jong Il began to control the flow of information around 1975. He reviewed all military affairs before Kim Il Sung did. In the late 1970s, the successor monopolized briefings to the Great Leader. He alone reported to the Leader about military matters. Beginning in 1982, he made a number of military affairs’ decisions of his own discretion, without consulting the Leader.70 As with the party, Kim also made his reporting system with the military – a threeline one and a fast-track communication line. The three military lines included the general political bureau, the general staff, and the military secret police.71 The general political bureau was a party branch meant to control the life of party members in the military. All military officers were required to be party members. Under the direct control of the bureau, there were political sections in the military corps and division levels. The bureau sent political commissars to each military unit below the division level and regularly reported about high-ranking officials’ party life to Kim. The military’s party life was similar to that of those in the nonmilitary sectors. The general staff watched what high-ranking military generals said and how they behaved. Every general was required to inform the staff of his daily schedule.72 An interesting aspect of this reporting system was the existence of the t'ongbokwa (notification section) in the general political bureau and military units. The notification section’s main duty was to deal with the ‘facts’ around military generals’ public and private lives. It did not make policy suggestions but simply provided the facts themselves without a ‘process’. The section workers directly reported the ‘facts’ to the notification section of the Organization Department of the Central Committee without notifying their military unit commanders or senior political commissars.73 Military generals did not disrupt the information flow of the notification section. In addition to the military, the same notification system was in effect for civilian party branches. It took more than ten years – until 1985 – for Kim Jong Il to establish this guidance system in the military. Nowhere had he had such difficulty in establishing his monolithic guidance system than in the military sector. Kim did not just use the ‘stick’ method to control military officers but also employed the ‘carrot’ approach to win them over. Since 1975, Kim has frequently provided them with such ‘carrots’ as complimentary houses, clothes, and food, among other things.74 South Korean affairs In mid-1975, an inspection team from the Organization Department of the Central Committee began to scrutinize South Korean affairs. The organizations involved

72 Heir (1974–1994) in South Korean affairs at that time were taenam y˘ollakpu (the South Korean Liaison Bureau; SKLB), munhwabu (the Department of Culture; DC) and taeoe ch˘ongbo chosabu (the Department of External Intelligence Inquiries), known as the 35th office. Their main tasks included analyzing information about the South, producing policies for South Korean operations, and training spies to infiltrate the South directly or by way of a third country. Those organizations were under the supervision of Kim Chung-nin, party secretary of South Korean affairs.75 The SKLB, created before the 1950 Korean War, was the oldest organization on South Korean affairs. The DC was set up in 1956 for propaganda directed at the South, the affairs of Koreans in Japan, and external intelligence. In 1963, the North Korean government set up a new policy on unification, known as the policy of first the ‘South Korean revolution’ followed by ‘unification’. In April the same year, the 35th office was developed. At the same time, the General Bureau of South Korean Affairs was created to coordinate the three organizations. However, after the Kim Ch'ang-bong/H˘o Pong-hak incident of 1969, the bureau was dismantled and the three separate organizations were put under the supervision of the party secretary of South Korean affairs.76 The goal of the 1975 inspection was to establish Kim Jong Il’s guidance system over the three organizations. After Kim began to confirm his leadership over the party and the military, he wanted to stretch his authority into South Korean affairs. The inspection was unprecedented in the history of South Korean operations. The three organizations as well as their subsidiary offices were the objects of the inspection. Strictly speaking, the three organizations were outside of Kim Jong Il’s authority because at the time he was only the secretary of Organization and Propaganda and Agitation. The inspection, however, was performed under the rubric of establishing a monolithic guidance system. The inspection team reviewed the viability of movements to be implemented by Kim Il Sung, including establishing an underground party in the South and executing South Korean operations through Europe and Japan.77 The inspection continued from mid-1975 to early 1976. The inspection team looked over the tasks of the three organizations until late 1975 and then they assessed them at meetings which continued until early 1976. It lasted longer than any other inspection being performed up until that time. After a series of assessment meetings, Kim Jong Il concluded that the activities of the organizations for the past thirty years had been complete failures. Kim Il Sung ousted Kim Chung-nin from the party secretary post. The DC was downsized into a research institute on the South and some of its tasks were transferred to other departments of the Central Committee. Kim Chung-nin became the head of the research institute. Ch˘ong Ky˘ong-h˘ui, a female veteran agent, became the new chief of the SKLB.78 After the inspection, Kim Jong Il achieved his political goal of placing the three organizations under his direct supervision and changed the methods of its agent operations. He reduced the number of agents into a group of elite ones. The agents were sent to capitalist societies and to learn how to survive once they infiltrated

Heir (1974–1994) 73 into the South. In other words, Kim attempted to raise seasoned spies who could operate in South Korean society as if they were South Koreans. He also upgraded infiltration equipment such as boats and submarines.79 Later, Kim Jong Il restructured the organizations on South Korean affairs. The DC was revived and was named the t'ongil ch˘ons˘onbu (Department of the United Front; DUF) in 1977. The SKLB was reorganized into sahoe munhwabu (the Department of Social Culture) in the mid-1980s80 and renamed taeoe y˘ollakpu (the Department of External Liaison; DEL) later.81 Currently the DUF assumes the diplomatic and propaganda affairs regarding the South. The DEL organizes the underground activities in South Korea, Japan and other foreign countries. It also runs a school that educates spies. While the DUF focuses on ‘public’ South Korean affairs, the DEL mainly organizes underground spy activities and pro-North Korean groups in South Korea. The 35th office stations its branch offices in foreign countries and its agents retain citizenship in the foreign countries for their activities. The 35th office was involved in a terrorist plan to detonate a Korean Airliner in 1987. Besides the three organizations, the chakch˘onbu (Operation Department; OD) of the Central Committee also undertakes agent operations. Like the DEL, the OD has an agent school. In 1983, during a state visit from South Korean President Chun Doo Hwan to Burma (Myanmar), its agents exploded a bomb in Rangoon (Yangon) and killed some South Korean high-ranking officials. The four organizations are the main institutions carrying out South Korean operations. However, the Department of National Defense and the secret police, conventionally known as the State Security Department, are also partially engaged in South Korean affairs.82 Secret police The expansion of the secret police also accompanied Kim Jong Il’s rise. The best-known secret police forces in North Korea are the State Security Department (SSD) in the civil sector and the powi sary˘ongbu (Military Security Command) in the Korean People’s Army. In 1973, the secret police kukka ch˘ongch'i powibu (State Political Security Department) became an independent institution whose main roles were to stabilize the Kim Il Sung regime and to support the political succession of Kim Jong Il. Before then, the Ministry of Public Security as the national police had assumed this role.83 In 1982, Kim Jong Il placed the State Political Security Department under his direct control and renamed it kukka powibu (State Security Department, literally the same name as the current SSD), which was again changed into kukka anj˘on powibu (SSD, literally State Safety and Security Department) in 1993.84 It is unknown who the chief of the SSD is now. Kim Jong Il himself seems ultimately to be in control. The SSD has its agents in all governmental, party, and mass organizations except the central party. The main operations of the SSD include counterintelligence, information gathering, and ferreting-out of anti-governmental and anti-party suspects.85 A single professional agent of the SSD employs a certain number of non-professional secret agents and receives intelligence from them.

74 Heir (1974–1994) The non-professional agents are rewarded materially or politically in return for their secret activities.86 In order to effect total control over society, the North Korean authorities divide people into the following three classes: a core class loyal to the leader and his party; a wavering class which is opportunistic; and a hostile class which is disloyal. The SSD keeps records on the entire population from birth to death. Members of the hostile class are constantly examined by the SSD. Membership of each class strongly affects people’s prospects for jobs, residences, schools, or even spouses.87 The secret police also control most state concentration camps. In North Korea, prison system is classified into four levels dependent on their harshness and the severity of the punishment. The first one is called a nodong dally˘ondae (labor training center) for people who commit misdemeanors. The second is the nodong kyoyangso (labor education center) for those sentenced over one but under two years. The third is the nodong kyohwaso (labor correction center) for people who are sentenced to more than two years. The last is the kwalliso (known as concentration camps), most of which the SSD manages.88 The concentration camp system in North Korea was imported from Stalin’s Soviet Union. The origin of Soviet camps traced back to the Russian Civil War after the 1917 Russian Revolution. During the civil war, the camps were first established to contain socialists’ enemies. Later, Stalin developed the Soviet camp system. The Soviet camps had three main functions. Originally, they were meant to correct criminals into faithful communists. Another function added later was to economically exploit criminals’ free labor. A third function tried to completely isolate dangerous political criminals from Soviet society.89 North Korean concentration camps have similar functions to Soviet ones. The number of concentration camps in North Korea is not publicly verifiable. Since the 1950s, the North Korean authorities had expelled reactionary elements from the population. Reactionaries with thoughts deemed dangerous were placed in concentration camps secluded deep in the mountains. In the 1950s, counterrevolutionaries were taken from families who had South Korean relatives, as well as people who were landlords, belonged to political factions, or were religious. After the authorities cleaned out the rebellious elements, they targeted those who were not faithful to the Great Leader and his successor. Resident registration, the reissuing of party or resident IDs, and population surveys were also used to fill the camps.90 The Military Security Command (MSC), similar to the SSD, sought out impure anti-revolutionary and anti-party elements within the military and registered military officers’ IDs. In the early period of North Korea, the national police assumed secret policing in the military as well as the civilian sector. In 1968, Kim Il Sung created an independent military secret police called the inmin'gun ch˘ongch'i anj˘on'guk (Military Political Security Bureau). In the mid-1970s, it was renamed the inmin'gun powiguk (Military Security Bureau). In unison with the political succession of Kim Jong Il, the military secret police underwent an organizational change. To educate the agents of the military secret police, Kim Jong Il established

Heir (1974–1994) 75 a secret police school in the mid-1980s. Around the mid-1990s, he again enlarged the military secret police into a newly named MSC.91 Three-Revolution Team Movement In 1975, Kim Jong Il took over the Three-Revolution Team Movement that Kim Il Sung had established in February 1973.92 The three revolutions that it referred to included the ideological, technical, and cultural revolutions. Regarding the monolithic guidance system, the role of the movement was to expand Kim Jong Il’s power base to the masses. Groups known as ‘Three-Revolution Teams’ became devoted supporters of the political succession and played a vital part in delivering Kim Jong Il’s policies directly to the masses. At a meeting with university instructors and students who had been mobilized to help the workers of light industry, held in January 1973, Kim Il Sung confessed that his government was not able to spend money on light industry due to the increased investment in the defense industry it had effected in the 1960s. He continued by saying that even though the government had been investing more money in building well-equipped machinery for the light industry sector from the early 1970s, few of the factories in the sector properly operated the machinery because party cadres and technicians did not know how to use them. Their knowledge of technology was out of date and they did not study hard enough to catch up with new knowledge. In addition, the light industry managers ran their enterprises poorly. They abandoned large stockpiles of material resources in the factory yard and employed an unreasonably large number of employees, thus wasting manpower. To solve these problems in the light industry, Kim Il Sung sent teams composed of university instructors and students with new knowledge of technology to light industry factories for three months, starting in September 1972. At the January meeting, Kim announced that he was satisfied with their activities in the factories.93 This was the origin of the Three-Revolution Team Movement. After the meeting, Kim Il Sung initiated the Three-Revolution Team Movement on the national level on 1 February 1973.94 He held a series of meetings with Three-Revolution Teams for the industrial sector on 10 February95 and for the agricultural sector on 21 February.96 In December the same year, he sent ThreeRevolution Teams into the educational field as well.97 Each Three-Revolution Team was composed of 20 to 50 young loyal zealots with diverse skills to simultaneously carry on the three revolutions.98 For example, a Three-Revolution Team for the light industry consisted of party workers, governmental experts, and students of philosophy, economics, electronics, civil engineering and others. Three-Revolution Teams were not just temporary taskforces; the teams stayed in factories or cooperative farms for a considerable amount of time. For example, the Three-Revolution Teams that were dispatched in 1973 had to reside in their working places for eighteen months in order to carry out their tasks.99 As its name implied, the Three-Revolution Team Movement was established for several purposes. Socially, the movement concerned the generational change.100

76 Heir (1974–1994) Kim Il Sung attempted to replace old cadres with the younger generation in order to speed up economic development. He explained the goal of the movement as follows: As you see, in the past our cadres have done a great deal of work and played an important role. Now, 30 years after liberation, they have grown old and their qualifications cannot keep pace with the rapidly developing conditions. To prevent them from falling behind the developing conditions, our Party established a system of collective study including the Saturday study and Wednesday lecture meeting, as well as a system under which cadres attend regular schools for one month every year. But today the scale of the economy has expanded tremendously and all branches of economic construction need modern science and technology. In these conditions, their knowledge and experience alone cannot promote socialist construction successfully nor vigorously launch the speed campaign called for by the Party. But we cannot remove all the old cadres from their posts or dismiss them. We must value them. Some of the old cadres show signs of conservatism, empiricism, departmentalism, bureaucratism and, worse still, become indolent thinking that they can loaf on the job now that they hold important positions. This is largely due to their poor knowledge, the result of neglect of study. That is why we should not dismiss, but effectively help the old cadres to work well in the future, as in the past, to keep them always at their best.101 While Kim distrusted old cadres, he believed young students to be a ‘revolutionary new generation firmly armed with the [chuch'e] idea’.102 One role of the Three-Revolution Team was to teach old cadres the new knowledge that students had learned through their college educations. He expected that the new generation would gradually replace the old generation without negative impact on the nation’s economic development. Economically, the movement’s purpose involved developing the economy by solving the problems that North Korea faced at that time.103 Through a technical revolution, Kim Il Sung tried to overcome the shortage of manpower. He was very worried about a labor shortage in the North Korean economy.104 In practice, the Three-Revolution Team itself could make up for the labor shortage without a major technical revolution. In the economic sector, the movement was also meant to normalize economic productions in factories and agricultural farms by enhancing the efficiency of business management and saving material resources. Politically, the movement contributed to building Kim Jong Il’s popular base, especially after he had began leading the movement in January 1975.105 The ThreeRevolution Teams played a key part for the ideological revolution not only by spreading the chuch'e idea to the masses, but also by connecting the working fields with the successor by avoiding bureaucratic red tape. He used the teams to wield his clout with the masses. In early 1975, Kim dispatched a group of high-ranking party officials, called the Three-Revolution Guidance Teams, to local parties in order to foster the economic

Heir (1974–1994) 77 construction of 1975. The guidance teams were supposed to supervise local parties and the Three-Revolution Teams that had already been staying in the fields.106 In effect, creating the Three-Revolution Guidance Teams demonstrated ‘excessive’ control. In the short term, this excessive control could facilitate bringing about the Kims’ goals for economic construction. However, it also strengthened the rigidity of the totalitarian system and suppressed individuals’ creativity and motivation to work. In the long term, it ended up worsening the North Korean economic problems that they had sought to solve through the movement. Later Kim Jong Il himself acknowledged the problems of the Three-Revolution Team Movement as follows: A considerable number of party cadres do not like to work with ThreeRevolution Teams and regard them as annoying persons. They do not help the teams’ members willingly. If the party asks the cadres to choose persons who would be in Three-Revolution Teams, some cadres choose sick or incompetent persons and send them to the teams. It is no doubt that the movement is not going well in this condition. Not to have a positive perspective of the movement is an expression of disloyalty of the party and the Great Leader.107 His solution to these problems was not to loosen control. Rather, he reinforced it. Kim Jong Il decided to create organizational sections in the party branches of the provinces, cities and counties to guide the Three-Revolution Teams.108 According to the Nodong sinmun, an average of 108,700 members of ThreeRevolution Teams went to work in fields from 1973 until 1984. Since the start of Three-Revolution Team Movement, 11,600 college students from the teams had entered the party. A total of 35,400 team members were awarded national prizes.109 Notwithstanding the ostensible success, the movement did not save the state’s declining economy. Excess of control The monolithic guidance system was meant to establish Kim Jong Il’s leadership in the state by transferring Kim Il Sung’s authority to Kim Jong Il. To construct his guidance system, Kim Jong Il first sought to control the party. The party was the most important organization in North Korean society. Through a variety of activities, it organized its members’ daily lives so completely that it left them little time to think ‘other impure things’. On the basis of this potency, he gradually expanded his political domain to other governmental sectors. Kim’s methodology for establishing his supervision over each governmental institution is summarized in several points described below. First, he controlled the flow of information into the party and governmental organizations. He demanded that information pass through him. All final decisions came from him. He established his own reporting system that ensured he was informed of all important affairs occurring in his territory.

78 Heir (1974–1994) Second, he paid attention to maintaining a tight hold on party cadres and governmental officials. To control them, he employed the tool of inspection. ‘Whenever a detective gets to digging around in people’s lives, he finds skeletons’. The inspection was instrumental in forcing them to obey his authority. He sent inspection teams from the Organization Department of the Central Committee to every party and governmental organization and reshuffled them. Third, Kim employed terror tactics effectively in fortifying his power base. He established an omnipresent surveillance network composed of the party, the police, and the secret police. The people’s daily activities were overseen by the complex surveillance network. Under the surveillance network, people rarely trusted their neighbors, less because the surveillance network watched everybody everywhere than because they could be both agents and ‘anti-revolutionary elements’ at the same time. Their watchers could have been interchangeable with their enemies at anytime. Concentration camps were also a powerful tool for his totalitarian guidance system. The camps were places where people caught in the surveillance network were sent. If the totalitarian society was isolated from the outside world, going to the camps meant total disappearance from society. Fourth, together with terrorist techniques, Kim Jong Il employed a ‘carrot’ approach to induce the loyalty of cadres and the masses. Every national holiday, Kim presented them with gifts – food, clothes, houses, cars, watches, and so on. He had a personal gift storage, which was used to show his generous giving to some selected cadres and members of the masses.110 The establishment of Kim’s monolithic guidance system was possible only with the full support of his father. Kim Il Sung gave his son full authority and enough time to build up the guidance system. The guidance system led to the expansion of control, which also accompanied the enlargement of such power organizations as the party, the police, and the secret police.111 Whenever Kim Jong Il faced difficulties in his job, he strengthened control by enlarging the power organizations. The North Korean totalitarian system had already been completed before Kim Jong Il became the successor. However, compared with his monolithic guidance system, his father’s system was somewhat ‘crude’. Kim Jong Il updated the system by covering the entire society and extending the power organizations to remote places. Hwang Chang-y˘op described a situation in late-1970s North Korea as follows: When Kim Jong Il increased party organizations without discretion, the voices to criticize his careless measures also followed. As Kim reinforced the control of the secret police, he harshly punished the critics arrested by the police. As an example, in 1948, there was only one party chairman, advisor for propaganda, and statistician in the party committee of the Kim Il Sung University. After Kim Jong Il rose to power, he put one party secretary in each college of the university and there were a total of more than fifty secretaries in the university. In addition, the teams of the police and the secret police stayed in the university.112

Heir (1974–1994) 79

Mass campaigns Notable mass mobilization campaigns guided by Kim Jong Il were the ThreeRevolution Red Flag Movement (TRFM) and the Campaign to Learn from Unassuming Heroes. While the TRFM was a mass campaign to increase industrial production, the Campaign to Learn from Unassuming Heroes was meant to create typical examples of people loyal to the Great Leader and the Dear Leader.

The Three-Revolution Red Flag Movement The Three-Revolution Red Flag Movement (TRFM) began in December 1975.113 Although both the TRFM and the Three-Revolution Team Movement were mass campaigns related to the three revolutions, they differed in their specific purposes. The latter concerned generational change, technological renovation, and the establishment of Kim Jong Il’s guidance system, while the former was a production competition campaign similar to what the Ch'˘ollima Movement had been. The TRFM was essentially a variation of the Ch'˘ollima Movement. Even though the Ch'˘ollima Movement continued to exist, it was losing its dynamic status as a mass mobilization campaign for increasing production. Kim Il Sung wanted Kim Jong Il to reignite the masses’ motivation to work by implementing a new campaign. However, in spite of the similarity between the TRFM and the Ch'˘ollima Movement, they differed on two points. First, the party was responsible for the TRFM, but mass organizations such as the League of Socialist Working Youth and the Federation of Trade Unions initiated the Ch'˘ollima Movement.114 Over time, the TRFM reinforced the party’s control of economic activities. Second, unlike the Ch'˘ollima Movement, whose implementation units were work teams in factories or cooperative farms, a TRFM competition unit could be a factory, an enterprise, or a farm itself, as well as its work teams.115 For his new mass campaign, Kim Jong Il continued his father’s policies from the Ch'˘ollima Movement, ‘to make a model and generalize it’. After Kim chose a working unit for the new movement, he idealized it and other working units emulated the ideal unit. In summer of 1975, before launching the TRFM, Kim Jong Il visited the K˘omd˘ok Mine,116 a symbolic gesture that can be compared to his father going to the Kangsˇon Steel Plant at the start of the Ch'˘ollima Movement in 1956. Kim directed the mine to prepare for the TRFM. Why did Kim Jong Il choose a mine for the campaign? It was because of the urgent need for raw ore in order to continue economic development. Since the 1960s, North Korea had suffered from a shortage of raw materials and fuel in the mining industry. According to Natalia Bazhanova, the average annual growth rate of the North Korean mining industry between 1961 and 1970 was only 7.2 percent. This rate was even lower than that of the light industry, which was 10.9 percent in the same period.117 The shortage of raw ore continued into the 1970s. The mining industry deficiencies hindered the development of the other processing industries

80 Heir (1974–1994) to a considerable extent. The K˘omd˘ok Mine’s production increase for non-ferrous ore was essential at that time.118 The TRFM started in the mine on 1 December 1975. Kim imposed an unreasonably larger production task on the mine than it had had before and provided it with favorable material conditions for achieving this task.119 After the mine reached this incredible goal, he had the party promote nationwide propaganda about the K˘omd˘ok case and raise a new slogan, ‘Ideology, technology and culture according to the demand of chuch'e!’120 Until November 1986, when a convention on the ‘heralds’ of the TRFM was held, it was reported that 2,100 working units gained three-revolution flags and eleven units among them won the flags twice.121 It is unknown to what extent the TRFM contributed to the economic development of the state. As in the Ch'˘ollima Movement, it was successful in the early period of the movement but, as it lasted for a long time, enthusiasm for the movement declined. Kim admitted that a number of working units worked very hard until they were awarded the three-revolution flags, after which they tended to stop the TRFM.122 Since the Ch'˘ollima Movement, a salient characteristic of the North Korean leadership had been to launch mass mobilization campaigns whenever the economy faced a limitation of industrial production, rather than encouraging technological innovation. The great success of the Ch'˘ollima Movement created an illusion that mass mobilization was the panacea to solving economic as well as social problems. Before the 2002 July Economic Improvement Measures into which North Korea introduced several capitalistic economic incentives,123 every North Korean mass campaign for production increases had common features. First, the unit of a campaign was not an individual, but a collective group. Competitors in the campaign were working groups. Therefore, the rewards from each campaign were given to a group, not an individual. For example, the three-revolution flags were awarded to each working group that surpassed the goal of production. Second, material benefits for individuals were very limited in the mass campaign. The party gave ‘superhuman’ workers material prizes such as television sets, refrigerators, watches, and so on. However, the main rewards were political. They were given honorary medals or a party membership certificate.124 Third, production growth in the mass campaign was mainly achieved through the input of increased manual labor, not through technological innovations. It was easy to mobilize the masses to reach production goals in the short term, but the obsession with fulfilling this goal within a short period of time prevented technological innovations. Campaign to Learn from Unassuming Heroes Kim Jong Il also led the Campaign to Learn from Unassuming Heroes. The campaign was meant to find inconspicuous workers who ‘do not seek to gain high posts or honors, but support the structures of the state and the revolution from below by going deeply into reality’. In other words, the unassuming heroes were the people most loyal to the Great Leader and the Dear Leader. They symbolized

Heir (1974–1994) 81 ‘paragons of new human beings of the chuch'e era’.125 Like other mass campaigns, that campaign was also launched to make the masses work harder by learning from unassuming heroes. On 6 October 1979, Kim Il Sung met Paek S˘ol-h˘ui, an unassuming heroine, who bred a new strain of crop after more than ten years of research. The following day, Kim presented her with a party membership card and a doctoral degree and decorated her with a Labor Hero’s gold medal. He also awarded the title of Labor Hero to Kim Sang-ry˘on, another unassuming hero. Kim Sang-ry˘on invented a new strain of rice as a result of several years of research. Paek was introduced as a woman who had sacrificed her youth to the research by not marrying in order to relieve the Great Leader’s concerns.126 From November on, the Nodong sinmun began to carry a series of feature articles called ‘Let’s Learn from Unassuming Heroes’.127 Later, Kim Jong Il compared these unassuming heroes to others upholding the revolutionary tradition. According to his classification of heroes, anti-Japanese guerrillas were the first generation of heroes. The second generation were the heroes of the Korean War. The third generation were those of the Ch'˘ollima Movement. They were considered the heralds of production increases and collective renovation in North Korean society. The fourth generation was the present unassuming heroes struggling for the indoctrination of the whole society through the chuch'e idea.128 The party held a national Hero Convention where the four generations gathered together in September 1988, during a complicated political situation.129 In the same month, Seoul held the Summer Olympics in which communist countries like the Soviet Union and China participated. North Korea did not attend the Olympics and likely felt isolated from the world. The participants in the hero convention were the zealots who supported the totalitarian system. In response to international events at the time, Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il were determined to surmount their international isolation by strengthening domestic unity. Domestically, the hero convention was convened in order to encourage the masses to work harder to save the worsening chuch'e economy. The state finished the second seven-year (1978–1984) economic plan in 1986 only after having extended it two extra years. The third seven-year (1987–1993) plan began in 1987, but did not seem to be easy to implement. In early 1988, Kim Jong Il organized a mass production campaign known as the 200-Day Battle. After the hero convention, he initiated another 200-Day Battle.130

Crisis The heir had been on a fast track to power without difficulty starting in 1974, but met a crisis in 1976. Around July 1976, the honorific term ‘Party Center’ used to describe Kim Jong Il disappeared from the Nodong sinmun. Before then, the term ‘honorable Party Center’ had usually followed the term ‘Great Leader’ in the newspaper. In 1977–1979, the newspaper spoke more ambiguously about Kim Jong Il by using terms such as ‘Party’ or ‘Party Central Committee.’ The term

82 Heir (1974–1994) ‘Party Center’ did not reappear in the newspaper until 1980, the year Kim Jong Il publicly appeared as the successor to his father. Although his crisis did not necessarily continue all the way until 1979, the 1976 omission signaled a problem. One possible explanation for this crisis is that from the time of his rise to power, Kim Jong Il’s policy on party cadres had been too strict and was criticized by other top-ranking cadres. According to North Korean sources, some party officials criticized Kim Jong Il’s cadre policy as being too harsh and argued that it had been losing its popular support.131 In early 1975, Kim admitted a problem in his policy and pointed out that the party had carelessly expelled cadres during the campaign to establish his monolithic ideological system. In particular, a number of old party cadres had to leave the party under the name of ‘cadre revolution’.132 Besides the campaign for the monolithic ideological system, the Three-Revolution Team Movement must have facilitated the trend to discriminate against the old cadres under the cause of generational change. Until 1976, Kim’s ‘radical’ policy was not corrected. The mistakes that he committed in the cadre policy were trivial, however, when compared with the P'anmunj˘om axe murders incident that occurred on the 38th parallel. On 18 August 1976, North Korean security guards axe-murdered two US officers who were pruning a poplar tree blocking observation between two United Nations Command checkpoints in the joint security area.133 It was an unexpected and surprising incident. After two days, Kim Il Sung ordered the Korean People’s Army and other reserved armed forces to prepare for combat. In spite of his belligerent rhetoric, he insisted that he would not attack the ‘imperial’ forces as long as the US forces did not provoke North Korea.134 His tone suggested that the P'anmunj˘om incident was not premeditated. On 21 August, the axe murders incident was muted when Kim Il Sung signed a letter from North Korea expressing regret for the accident.135 According to Sin Ky˘ong-wan, Kim Jong Il masterminded the P'anmunj˘om incident, not his father. Around 1976, Kim Jong Il controlled every piece of information in North Korea. When Kim was notified that the American officers and South Korean workers were pruning the tree, he ordered the North Korean security guards to stop them ‘in certain way’, even though he did not specify to kill them. The murders themselves were a political accident. After the killing occurred, the Department of National Defense became a scapegoat instead of Kim Jong Il. The head and high-ranking officials of the Department were forced to take responsibility for the incident.136 The more serious problem, however, was that the international incident created internal confusion. Once the incident happened, the North Korean authorities mobilized the whole population to prepare for war. The residents living near the 38th parallel line and in Pyongyang, especially the disabled, the elderly and the hostile class, were evacuated to other areas. The SSD organized the evacuation. Kim Jong Il’s brother-in-law Chang S˘ong-t'aek guided an indiscriminate evacuation of Pyongyang. For the three months between late August and mid-November, hundreds of thousands of people were forced to leave their homes. According to Sin, when Kim Il Sung later became aware of the extent

Heir (1974–1994) 83 of the evacuation, he criticized the cadres who had organized it and branded the operation harmful, distancing the masses from the party.137 In this critical situation, had Kim Jong Il not been Kim Il Sung’s son, his status as the successor might have been challenged. Young Kim learned a lesson from his imprudent decision only after paying a tremendous cost. After the incident, Kim Jong Il admitted the evacuation operation had been reckless. When he had meetings with party cadres, he regretted that ‘our party’s mass affairs were set back ten years’.138 In mid-1977, he emphasized the importance of the party’s relationship with those members of the masses who had ‘complicated family backgrounds’. He warned party cadres to avoid dividing the party and the masses.139 The years from 1977 to 1979 were a period during which the speed of political succession was adjusted. Kim Jong Il worked especially hard to revive his reputation with his father and the former guerrillas in this period. It would be fair to say that the P'anmunj˘om crisis resulted from premature succession activities. He was too young to lead the state at the time. Although he had excelled in his performance before the succession, he had been appointed to rule the state before he had developed the competencies and prudence necessary. He had not spent enough time in one position to learn the lasting consequences of his decisions and he rushed to the top position in the party without having developed the broad perspective for coordinating complex issues that he would need.

Sixth Party Congress Kim Jong Il’s first public appearance as the state’s successor took place at the Sixth Congress held in October 1980. A year before the congress was organized, Kim had implied that the party would convene a Sixth Party Congress in 1980. He stressed its significance, saying that it would be the first Party Congress held since his appointment as the organization secretary and it would be a turning point in party history.140 The honorific expressions he used to refer to his father changed into more religious tones in January 1980.141 At a meeting with party cadres specializing in foreign affairs in the same month, Kim Jong Il underscored that party workers’ primary duty was to advocate for the Great Leader and the Party Center’s authority in foreign affairs. While the diplomats needed to be flexible in dealing with some foreign issues, they should remain unfaltering on the issues related to the two Kims’ authorities.142 This series of remarks around early 1980 suggested that Kim Il Sung was ready to reveal the dynastic succession to an international audience through the Sixth Party Congress. Several changes took place at this congress. First, the chuch'e idea replaced Marxism and Leninism and became the single ideology of the party, and the chuch'e-ization of the whole society became a general party line in the preamble of the party by-laws.143 Second, the congress altered several party organizations. It renamed ‘the Political Committee’ into ‘the Politburo’. The number of members in the Politburo increased from eleven to nineteen. The Military Affairs Committee that was established in the mid-1960s became a leading organization in the party.

84 Heir (1974–1994) Third, the second-generation revolutionaries took control of the North Korean leadership. Ten of the nineteen members of the Politburo were old guerrillas. Among the nine non-guerrillas, four persons – Kim Hwan, Y˘on Hy˘ong-muk, O K˘uk-y˘ol and Kang S˘ong-san – were graduates of the Man'gy˘ongdae School for Children of Revolutionaries. Their new membership represented that the young graduates would play a leading role in upholding Kim Jong Il’s political power in the future. The fourth and most important change unveiled at the congress was that it publicly declared the dynastic succession decision. At the congress, Kim Jong Il was elected a standing member of the Politburo, a secretary of the Secretariat, and a member of the Military Affairs Committee of the Central Committee. Except for Kim Il Sung, only Kim Jong Il was a member of the three party-leading organizations. In the Politburo, he was the fourth ranking figure behind Kim Il Sung, Kim Il and O Chin-u. In the secretariat, the junior Kim was next in line following the general secretary, the senior Kim. In the Military Committee, he ranked third behind Kim Il Sung and O Chin-u.144 Given that Kim Il and O Chin-u, former guerrillas, had been Kim Jong Il’s main supporters, the congress showed that Kim Jong Il became the number-two figure in the party. After the congress, North Korea publicly accelerated the cult of Kim Jong Il. As mentioned earlier, his biographical writing was first published in 1982. On 15 February the same year, a day before Kim Jong Il’s birthday, the North Korean government decorated him with a Hero’s gold medal and, for the first time, announced that the junior Kim had been born in ‘a cabin near Mt Paekdu’.145 A day after his birthday, the Nodong sinmun featured an article with the independent headline, ‘Kim Jong Il, Standing Member of the Politburo and Secretary of the Central Committee, Guided the Construction Site of Moranbong Stadium that is in the Final Construction Stage’.146 For ten days in June 1983, Kim Jong Il unofficially visited China as Kim Il Sung’s political successor.147 By 1985, Kim established his monolithic guidance system in the party and all other governmental sectors. Finally, in May 1986 at the Kim Il Sung Party School’s fortieth anniversary, Kim Il Sung proudly declared that the political succession had been satisfactorily resolved.148 Beginning in the mid-1980s, the senior Kim became semi-retired. He retained the role of guardian of his successor in domestic politics and dealt primarily with diplomatic affairs. After the end of the Cold War in December 1991, Kim Jong Il took over the position of commander-in-chief of the Korean People’s Army. According to the North Korean constitution, the president of the state was supposed to be the commander-in-chief and the chairman of the National Defense Commission.149 That Kim Jong Il assumed the position was unconstitutional because Kim Il Sung still remained the president. To correct the violation, the state revised the constitution to separate the presidency from the chairmanship of the commission the following year. The 1992 constitution stipulated that the chairman control the Korean People’s Army.150 Finally, Kim Jong Il became the chairman in April 1993.151 In effect, the succession process that started in 1974 was now complete.

Heir (1974–1994) 85 In a speech at his eightieth birthday party on 15 April 1992, Kim Il Sung addressed the political succession as follows: In the long and strenuous revolutionary struggle, the unity of the party and the people, based on the chuch'e idea, is the core of the honorable revolutionary tradition of our party. Today our party members and workers have been developing the tradition. We have been tightly united, around Comrade Kim Jong Il and the party Central Committee, into a strong revolutionary identity, which is a basic security for the ultimate victory of our revolution. I am very satisfied with this [unity], which is the main evaluation of my eighty-year-old life.152

Dynastic totalitarianism The party’s Sixth Congress demonstrated that the totalitarian regime had transformed into a novel form of government, dynastic totalitarianism. In searching for the origins of totalitarianism, two factors should be considered: the actor (leader) and the social condition. Given Socrates’ remarks in Plato’s Republic, political leaders in ancient Greek city-states must have attempted to establish total control over their whole societies. In Asia, the first Chinese emperor, Qin Shi Hwang, also tried to build up total control over China by burying all books except for the Qin’s and killing scholars who denied his monolithic rule. From ancient to modern times, leaders with a desire for absolute power have reoccurred in both the East and the West. However, in spite of these leaders’ will for power, pre-modern leaders did not succeed in totalizing their realms as much as modern totalitarian leaders have. Considering the degree of total organization and ideological indoctrination of the people, modern totalitarianism is distinctive from pre-modern dictatorship. How have leaders succeeded in generating totalitarianism in modern times? To answer this question, we should take into account the social condition factor in addition to the leader’s will to power. As a part of the social condition, organizational and technological conditions are particularly significant in exploring the birth of modern totalitarianism. Organizational conditions relate to whether the state can totally organize its people within its territory. The expansion of modern state bureaucracy became the organizational basis for totalitarianism. Bureaucracy means a ‘centrally directed, systematically organized and hierarchically structured staff devoted to the regular, routine and efficient carrying out of large-scale administrative tasks according to policies dictated by rulers or directors’.153 The diverse functions of the modern state and the extensive services it provides made the development of bureaucratic experts inevitable. This bureaucracy made it possible for leaders to centralize a ruling system that reached the village level. Especially in the communist state, the growth of the bureaucracy accompanied the appearance of centralized political party. The first politician to set up a party with totalitarian tenets was Lenin. He outlined his political party on the

86 Heir (1974–1994) principles of ‘strict party discipline, total obedience to the will of the leadership, and unquestioning acceptance of the ideological program’.154 As the headquarters of a totalitarian regime, the party played the key role in directing other state bureaucratic institutions. The party was not only the heart of, but also the capillaries of, revolution and construction. The other social condition of totalitarianism concerns technological development. The development of communications and transportation technology makes it possible for the leader’s control to reach every corner of society. Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski emphasized modern technology’s role in the advent of totalitarianism. They believed that the complete monopoly of mass communication was one defining characteristic of totalitarianism that made it differ from earlier forms of dictatorships.155 Once the leader fully controls the media, a fictitious world competes against the real one. Consistent allegations and repeated phrases convince the people to believe the fictitious reality to be true. The media is the main machinery for creating the personality cult of the leader and the ideological indoctrination. The effectiveness of modern media is well described as follows: On the evening of October 2, the ringing of church bells at last proclaims the great event . . . In Rome the masses formed as if by magic into columns singing old wartime songs, wave upon wave of tumultuous cheering roared from the untold multitudes toward the Plalzzo Venzia; when the Duce appeared it was like the scatenarsi di una tempesta (‘unleashing of a tempest’). In clipped, ringing words, Mussolini announced his decision; twenty million people heard him, gathered in the squares of their towns, all over Italy; twenty million people thrilled (so it was claimed) to a sense of their spiritual oneness with this unique man.156 Conclusively, totalitarianism was the combination of the leader’s lasting desire for absolute power and the organizational and technological conditions offered by modern times. While some features of different totalitarian regimes are similar, others differ. As mentioned earlier, Stalinist totalitarian institutions were influential in the North Korean political system and therefore North Korean totalitarianism parallels Stalinist Soviet Russia in several ways. The first common feature between the two totalitarian societies was that both were built on a single ideology. In the two totalitarian realms, ideological pluralism was rejected. While Stalin employed communism for his totalitarian regime, Kim Il Sung created the chuch'e idea, a combination of communism and Mao’s thoughts. This ideological unity became the foremost goal of party propaganda. The second common trait between Stalin and Kim Il Sung was that they both consolidated political power by establishing monolithic guidance systems in the party and the state. Stalin’s Soviet Union and Kim Il Sung’s North Korea developed strong hierarchical political structure in which the leader rose to the top of the political pyramid. Both Stalin and Kim Il Sung denied any political faction within the party, which was a different tactic from what Mao employed in China. Until all political factions in the party completely disappeared, Stalin and Kim Il Sung

Heir (1974–1994) 87 repeatedly wielded the weapon of political purge. The party existed based solely on absolute loyalty to one man. This single-minded ideology and party unity were the material bases for the leader’s dictatorship. The personality cult of the leader became extreme in both societies. Stalin’s cult of personality affected Kim’s. Kim’s cult of personality had originally started in 1946 when the Soviet Union occupied North Korea.157 In other words, the Soviet occupation forces began the cult of Kim Il Sung because Kim was not widely known to the Korean people at the time. Making Kim the ‘Korean Stalin’, the Soviet forces tried to justify their institution of Kim as the leader of the North.158 Third, both Stalin and Kim Il Sung had effectively employed a terror system based on secret police and concentration camps in order to consolidate their power. As mentioned before, the Soviet terror system that Stalin developed affected North Korean. The terror system was unique enough to mark the two regimes as ‘totalitarian’, differing from other communist regimes. The secret police and concentration camps were pivotal means for systematically threatening the people into submission and conformity. They were the secret societies of the totalitarian regimes. In a sense, the secret police and the camps were inseparable as lips and teeth because the secret police’s main function was to catch hostile enemies of the regimes and to send them to concentration camps. The fourth totalitarian feature in common between Stalin’s and Kim Il Sung’s regime was that the centralized economic planning prioritized heavy industry. Economic planning started in Soviet Union after the Russian Bolshevik Revolution and became fully fledged when Stalin launched the First Five-Year Plan in 1928. The main goal of the economic plan was to build up Soviet heavy industry in unison with the collectivization of agriculture.159 The Second Five-Year Plan followed the First Five-Year Plan and both economic plans were quite successful. When the second economic plan ended, the Soviet Union’s economy had increased by at least 70 percent between 1928 and 1937.160 When Kim Il Sung launched his first long-term economic plan, the Three-Year Post-war Reconstruction Plan, in 1953, he adopted the same strategy that Stalin had. Even though Khrushchev later abandoned Stalin’s industrial strategy focusing on heavy industry, Kim stuck to the strategy until his death. Owing to these institutional similarities between Stalin’s Soviet Union and Kim’s North Korea, many experts regard North Korean totalitarianism as a Stalinist one. Despite the similarities, however, North Korea has become more distinct from Stalin’s Soviet Union over time. Unlike Stalin’s totalitarian regime, North Korea evolved into a dynastic totalitarian regime by absorbing Korean political culture, in particular Confucianism. Confucianism was regarded as feudal and was discouraged during the early period of North Korea but was revitalized in the North as the dynastic regime developed. Confucian monarchic characteristics had clearly reappeared after the dynastic political succession. Rule by a single individual has been the most lasting and prevalent form of government among all kinds of political regimes in human history. The enduring political regime ruled by one leader may reflect the human desire to monopolize power. In older ages, the monarch was meant to mediate between

88 Heir (1974–1994) the supernatural and the people by means of myth, force, religion, or tradition. Territory, sovereignty, and the people belonged to the monarch. Monarchical rule was based on the ideas of ‘human inequality, privilege associated with the accident of birth, arbitrary social hierarchy, sacred status, the purity and intelligence of the one against the depravity and incapacity of the many’.161 This political system rejected the idea that human beings are inherently equal and accepted that one man is wiser than collective men. ‘The role of heredity in determining who was to be king’ functioned as a political institution to ‘end disputes and intrigues about leadership’.162 The allegiance of all subjects belonged to the bearer of kingship, which was the central element in maintaining monarch legitimacy. The dynasty is a type of regime that includes the concepts of ‘the materialization of the monarchic form of government’ and ‘the personal representative and carrier of the idea of sovereignty’.163 In a dynasty, political power is inherited by birth into the royal family. Hereditary succession distinguishes the dynasty from other types of political regimes. Dynastic totalitarianism combines the concepts of totalitarianism and dynasty. Here, it signifies a totalitarian regime where political leadership is inherited by hereditary succession based on the subjects’ personal allegiance to a leader. Patrimonial succession changes a non-dynastic totalitarian society into a dynastic one. The leader of a totalitarian regime becomes a monarch of a dynasty and the political practices of the totalitarian leader develop into monarchic rituals over time. In a dynastic totalitarian regime, the cult of personality extends into the cult of family because the political heir is chosen from the ‘first family’ and the first family becomes the royal family as patrimonial succession continues over generations. Episodes in the family members’ daily lives are converted into heroic myths and legends. By his birth alone, the heir of the first family is deemed more competent than any other in the totalitarian domain and his heirship is sacred and cannot be challenged by common people. Human equality does not reach up to the leader and the people under the leader are only equal with each other. In a dynastic totalitarian regime, political legitimacy comes from totalitarian traditions, although the dynastic regime, in principle, claims that the root of legitimacy is the will of the people. The heir of dynastic totalitarianism is the guardian of the totalitarian tradition and conventions and his (or her) foremost goal is to maintain them. The authority of the dynastic leader is supported by the patrimonial subjects and the regime’s staff is recruited on the basis of patrimony. Political positions are mainly filled with personal subjects and their descendants. Past feudal traditions are revived in a dynastic totalitarian regime. The regime borrows from the monarchic traditions which had been repudiated before patrimonial succession because of their ‘ought-to-eliminate’ feudalistic character. Therefore, nationalistic traditions such as national folklores and customs, handed down from generation to generation before the modern dynastic regime was established are revitalized in the regime. Constitutionally, North Korea is not a monarchy but the dynastic totalitarian characteristics mentioned above have appeared in the state after patrimonial succession. The state does not officially claim that they employ feudal Confucian

Heir (1974–1994) 89 values but call those values ‘national traditions’ instead. Some of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il’s political practices have been compared with those of kings in the Chosˇon dynasty. The first analogous characteristic between North Korea and the Chosˇon dynasty is that both of them emphasized hierarchy. Traditional Confucian Korea was based on strong hierarchical human relationships between ruler and subject, father and son, husband and wife, and elder and younger brother. For example, in the Confucian society, the family had a patriarchal structure and the father had absolute authority in the family. The children and mother followed the father’s guidance unconditionally, ideally speaking. When North Koreans refer to Kim Il Sung, they call him ‘ˇobˇoi suryˇong' (‘fatherly Supreme Leader’). Calling Kim ‘ˇobˇoi suryong' denotes that the people should be faithful to him in the same way as the members of a family would be to their father in the Confucian society. In other words, the people should be completely devoted to Kim Il Sung, as Kim Jong Il demonstrates in his commitment to Kim Il Sung in his family. The expectation that the masses be ch'ungsin (loyal subjects) of the two Kims reflects hierarchic values used in pre-modern dynastic Korea. Before dynastic succession, North Korean society usually preferred the term ‘comrade’ in order to highlight the equal relationships between the leader and the masses or among the masses. But, in the dynastic totalitarian regime, the hierarchical relationship between the leader and the masses is taken for granted. The second similar characteristic between the dynastic totalitarian regime and the Chosˇon dynasty is its valuing ‘virtue’. Confucian scholars believed that the king had to demonstrate his sagacious performance in order to affect his subjects. North Korea officially characterizes the two Kims’ leadership as indˇok chˇongch'i (politics of benevolent virtue).164 According to Kim Jong Il, indˇok chˇongch'i means ‘a politics of love and trust’ between the leader and his people.165 The leaders’ benevolent practices are emphasized in national holidays of North Korea, during which the two Kims distribute a ‘gift package’ to the masses that includes food, clothes, and other items. The gift package emphasizes the two leaders’ roles as ‘benevolent fathers’. Kim Jong Il sometimes holds birthday parties for the elderly and sends them birthday cards, which also displays his ‘benevolent virtue’ leadership. The leaders should always be concerned about the lives of the people. Third, a monarchical similarity between North Korea and the old dynasty is the cult of family. In the North, the family cult stems from Kim Jong Il’s ˇ great-great-grandfather, Kim Ung-u. According to a North Korean history book, ˇ Kˇundae Chosˇon yˇoksa (Modern Chosˇon history), Kim Ung-u bravely fought in 1866 as the head of the local people against the US imperialists’ pirate ship, the General Sherman, which had sailed up the Taedong River to Pyongyang. The book also argues that Kim Il Sung’s father, Kim Hyˇong-jik, led a national liberation movement and converted many nationalists to communists from the late 1910s to the mid-1920s.166 Kim Il Sung’s mother, Kang Pan-sˇok, is labeled as the ‘mother of Chosˇon’ and Kim Il Sung’s first wife and Kim Jong Il’s mother, Kim Chˇong-suk, ˇ is described as an ‘invincible revolutionary’. We do not know whether Kim Ung-u

90 Heir (1974–1994) and Hyˇong-jik were heroic leaders against imperialism and whether Kang Pan-sˇok and Kim Chˇong-suk were really ideal models for Korean women. This is simply the official history of the Kims. Mundane stories about Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il’s family members are transformed into ideal legends that are meant to be revered. The cult of the family was not unprecedented in Korean history. In the Chosˇon dynasty, King Sejong (1397–1450) printed a tribute called Songs of Flying Dragons in order to commemorate the founding of the dynasty that his grandfather, Yi Sˇong-gye, established after overthrowing the Koryˇo dynasty (918–1392). Songs of Flying Dragons eulogized the Yi family back to Yi Sˇong-gye’s great-greatgrandfather. The songs ‘praise the Yi ancestors’ virtues and justify their founding of the dynasty with their receipt of the Mandate of Heaven’.167 It is unknown whether North Korea adapted the Kim’s cult from the Songs of Flying Dragons. However, the main purpose of the family cult in both of the regimes was to legitimize the two families’ hereditary succession by advocating their foundations and the royal families’ moral superiority. Another ‘feudal’ feature of North Korea is its recruiting personnel for the totalitarian regime through patrimonial succession. Political leadership is determined by birth. Leaders’ staff is primarily made up of their cronies and relatives who cannot be leaders themselves. The children of former guerrillas are mainly employed to fill in the cadres of the party and the state. They should remain in staff positions according to patrimony and the dynastic regime is maintained by the subjects’ personal allegiance.

North Korean economy In the economic realm, the North Korean leadership’s ultimate goal is to build a self-reliant national economy where the state can make its own living without depending on aid from foreign countries. They believe that economic self-reliance is a precondition for political independence. To achieve this economic goal, Kim Il Sung adopted a developmental strategy that prioritized the ‘development of heavy industry simultaneously with the development of light industry and agriculture’.168 This has become the fundamental economic strategy. Based on this strategy, Kim Il Sung created a three-year (1954–1956) postwar construction plan in 1953 immediately after the Korean War.169 With the help of economic aid from the communist bloc, the state surpassed its three-year economic goals in 1956. Already in 1955, the gross industrial production was 56 percent higher than it had been in the prewar year of 1949 in Table 4.1. Between 1953 and 1955, the Soviet Union gave the North 162 million Soviet rubles in Table 4.2. Eighty percent of total imports were economic aid from the communist bloc in 1954–1956, which accounted for a quarter of annual tax revenues in the period.170 The five-year (1957–1961) economic plan followed the three-year post-war construction plan. During the five-year plan period, Kim Il Sung pushed ahead with the heavy-industry-priority policy notwithstanding the Yanan group’s opposition

Heir (1974–1994) 91 Table 4.1 Economic plans of North Korea Economic plans

Official results

Post-War Construction Plan (1954–1956) Five-Year Economic Plan (1957–1961)

Gross industrial production of 1955: 56% higher than that of 1949a Annual industrial growth rate: 46.3% in 1957–1959; Industrial production of 1960: 3.5 times larger than in 1956b Extended to 1970; Annual industrial growth rate: 18% (original goal); 12.8% (official growth rate)c Annual industrial growth rate: 14% (goal); 16.3% (official growth rate)d Readjustment period (1985–1986); Annual industrial growth rate: 12.1% (goal); 12.2% (official growth rate)e Readjustment period (1994–1996); Annual industrial growth rate: 10% (goal)f ; No official growth rate

First Seven-Year Economic Plan (1961–1967) Six-Year Economic Plan (1971–1976) Second Seven-Year Economic Plan (1978–1984) Third Seven-Year Economic Plan (1987–1993)

Sources: a Kim Il Sung, Report to the Third Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea on the Work of the Central Committee, 23 April 1956, Kim Il Sung Works, Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1982, 10: 169; b Yi Chong-ok, ‘Inmin kyˇ ongje palchˇon che 1-ch'a o kaenyˇon (1957–1961) kyehoek silhaeng ch'onghwa e taehayˇo’ [On the evaluation of the first five-year (1957–1961) economic plan], 22 November 1960, Ch'oego inmin hoeˇui che 2-ki che 8-ch'a hoeˇui esˇo han pogo [Report to the eighth meeting of the Second Supreme People’s Assembly of North Korea], in Dae-Sook Suh (ed.) Pukhan munhˇon yˇon'gu: Kyˇongje palchˇon [Study of North Korean literature: Economic development], Seoul: Kˇuktong munje yˇon'guso, Kyˇongnam taehakkyo, 2004, 5: 247, 251 and 262; c Kukt'o t'ongilwˇ on [Ministry of Unification] (ed.) Chosˇon nodongdang taehoe charyojip [Congresses of the Korean Workers’ Party], Seoul: Kukt'o t'ongilwˇon, 1980, 2: 43 and 3: 98; d Chosˇ on nodongdang taehoe charyojip, 3: 118 and Nodong sinmun, 17 December 1977; e Nodong sinmun, 17 December 1977 and 22 April 1987; f Nodong sinmun, 22 April 1987.

Table 4.2 Soviet economic aid: 1949–1976* (millions of rubles) Period

Amount

1949 1953–1955 1956–1960 1966 1976

47.7 (grant) 162 (grant) 130.5 (grant) 160 (loan) 117 (loan)

Total

617.2

Source: Natalia Bazhanova, Kiro e s˘on Pukhan ky˘ongje [North Korean economy in a crossroad], trans. Yang Chun-yong, Seoul: Han'guk ky˘ongje sinmunsa, 1992, pp. 23 and 41. *This table does not include unofficial Soviet economic assistance and Soviet aid for paying off North Korea’s past debts.

92 Heir (1974–1994) in 1956. The goals of the economic plan were fulfilled in three and a half years. While the heavy-industry-priority policy increased the production of the heavy industry in total industrial production, light industry decreased during the period. The production of the metallurgical and the machine-building industries that had been 15.3 percent in 1953 amounted to 20.6 percent in 1959. The textile industry, which was 25.7 percent in 1953, was lowered to 17.4 percent in 1959. The average rate of industrial growth was annually 46.3 percent in the period from 1957 to 1959. The industrial production of 1960 was 3.5 times larger than in 1956.171 This economic miracle was possible due to two occurrences. The first was the success of mass mobilization, in particular, the Ch'ˇollima Movement. The second was foreign aid. The Soviet Union provided the North with 130.5 million rubles in 1956–1960 (Table 4.2). Despite the economic success, the rapid economic development through the mass movement tired workers out. After all, the government set the year of 1960 as a ‘buffer year’ to correct the side-effects from the rapid development.172 In September 1961, after the two previous economic plans, Kim Il Sung launched a longer seven-year (1961–1967) economic plan at the Fourth Party Congress. The plan laid ambitious goals for increasing North Korea’s industrial production by 3.2 times and agricultural production by 2.4 times what it had been in 1960.173 However, the Soviet–North Korean dispute did not guarantee Soviet aid in the early 1960s.174 A series of unexpected international events of the 1960s, including the Park Chung Hee’s military coup, the Cuban missile crisis and the Japan–South Korea talks, obstructed the seven-year economic plan. The North Korean leadership perceived the events as security threats of the state. As a way of coping with the threats, Kim Il Sung adopted the following two extreme military policies in 1962: the four military lines and the economy–defense parallel-development policy. Even though the Kapsan group reacted to his policies in 1967, he responded to them by strengthening the military policies. The defense budgets that had been only 19 percent of the total budget in 1960 drastically rose to 31.1 percent on average in the period from 1967 to 1969.175 These defenseoriented policies affected his economic plan. The North did not achieve the goals of the seven-year economic plan. The state had to extend the seven-year economic plan to 1970 and the Soviet Union agreed to assist 160 million rubles in 1966 in order to boost North Korean economy (Table 4.2). The original goal for the industrial growth rate had been 18 percent annually, but the official growth rate remained at only 12.8 percent throughout the ten-year period (Table 4.1). After completing the seven-year economic plan, North Korea established a shorter six-year (1971–1976) one. The six-year economic plan lowered the annual industrial growth rate goal to 14 percent (Table 4.1). The international détente of the early 1970s affected the economic plan. North Korea approached Western countries in order to establish the relationships necessary to diversify their trade routes and made 30 international commercial contracts with a value of $500 million with several of them in the early 1970s. However, the aftermath of the 1973 oil crisis inflated the state’s international debt from 300 million rubles in 1975 to

Heir (1974–1994) 93 2 billion in 1976, 60 percent of which was owed to Western countries. Now that North Korea was unable to pay their debts to them, these countries ceased trading with the North.176 The Soviet Union responded by once again rescuing the state with financial aid. In 1976, the Soviet loaned North Korea 117 million rubles for economic construction (Table 4.2) and 400 million rubles for the payment of the past debts.177 After becoming the political successor in 1974, Kim Jong Il began to guide the country’s economic development. The 1973 oil crisis had hindered the state’s economic development by that time. In late 1974 the North’s economic construction had not been as smooth as planned. To overcome this economic predicament, the party decided to initiate a speed campaign, known as the 70-Day Battle.178 The 70-Day Battle was Kim Jong Il’s first economic construction task after his succession and allowed 70 days for achieving the 1974 economic goals. The 70-Day speed campaign seemed to be successful. Kim Il Sung evaluated 1974 as being a ‘year of victory in which our people achieved great deeds and innovation in grand socialist construction’.179 After the 70-Day Battle, Kim Jong Il began another production competition campaign called the Three-Revolution Red Flag Movement, in December 1975. According to North Korea, the six-year plan was completed by late 1976. The average annual rate of industrial growth was officially 16.3 per cent, surpassing the 14 percent goal (Table 4.1). However, this rapid economic development unbalanced the growth in the industrial sectors. To correct this unbalance, the state set 1977 as a ‘year of readjustment for easing the strain created in certain branches of the economy’ before beginning a new economic plan. Transportation, the mining industry, and the energy sector had not kept pace with the growth of other industrial sectors.180 Considering that the three sectors were the basis of other industries, they must have seriously obstructed the overall economic development. In particular, the energy sector, which showed the lowest growth rate among all industrial sectors in the 1960s,181 was worsening in the 1970s. In the mid-1970s, Kim Jong Il admitted that the state’s ability to provide electricity deteriorating, so it sought to save electricity by conducting a mass campaign.182 From 1978 on, the second seven-year (1978–1984) economic plan was launched. According to North Korean authorities, the goals of the plan were achieved as scheduled but the state once again readjusted the period to two more years (1985–1986). Although the North Korean government claimed that its annual industrial growth rate was 12.2 percent in the second seven-year plan (Table 4.1), Bazhanova revealed that the growth rate remained at only two percent in 1980, 1982, and 1984–1985183 owing to the lack of material resources and electricity and the outmoded factory facilities. The official record of the industrial growth rate must have been exaggerated. During the second seven-year plan, what made the deteriorating economy worse were material resources being squandered for non-economic construction. To celebrate Kim Il Sung’s seventieth birthday, Kim Jong Il mobilized the masses and the material resources in order to build the Tower of the Chuch'e Idea, the Arch of Triumph, Kim Il Sung Stadium, and other structures in 1982.

94 Heir (1974–1994) In the mid-1980s, the North Korean economy had weakened to the extent that the government could not provide the people with such basic necessities as soybean paste, salt, toothpaste, and soap.184 To encourage the production of consumption goods, Kim Jong Il kicked off a new campaign known as Campaign for August 3 Consumption Goods Production in 1984. The campaign sought to increase production of consumer goods by using extra resources or recycling articles. However, without changing the heavy-industry-priority policy, it was unrealistic to promote the production of consumer goods. The chronic lack of resources in the light industry sector limited the success of this campaign.185 In addition to domestic economic problems, North Korea suffered from a lack of international hard currency.186 Beginning in the 1970s, the state had experienced a trade deficit where imports always surpassed exports.187 During the second sevenyear plan, the state had to repay the loans that it had borrowed from the Soviet Union, China, and other countries. For example, the state was supposed to repay a debt of more than 400 million rubles to the Soviet Union between 1981 and 1985 but it possessed little hard currency for paying these back.188 To induce investment from capitalist countries, North Korea passed a Law of the Management of Joint Venture, known as Habyˇongpˇop, in 1984. Between 1985 and 1989, 53 foreign firms concluded investment contracts with the state. Twenty-seven of them were firms belonging to Korean businessmen who lived in Japan. The small size of the North Korean market, the absence of market institutions, the party’s intervention in management, and the bureaucratic red tape did not guarantee the firms’ profit.189 In effect, none of these firms were successful in the state. In 1987, North Korea initiated a final economic plan: the third seven-year (1987–1993) plan. During this period, the North Korean people’s living standard became worse than it had been in the previous period. Kim Jong Il acknowledged that there was a problem with the economic construction and worried about what the people were eating and wearing. Even the citizens of Pyongyang were not given daily supplies during this period.190 The state could no longer maintain its economy because of the burden of military defense expenses. In the late 1980s, the North Korean leadership unilaterally reduced the size of military soldiers by 100,000.191 Despite the crumbling economy, Kim Jong Il continued to spend financial resources frivolously. In 1988, South Korea successfully held the Summer Olympics. As its response to the Seoul Olympics, Pyongyang held the 13th World Festival of Youth and Students in 1989. Instead of enhancing North Korea’s international status, the burdensome expenditures associated with the festival dealt the North Korean economy a serious blow. The Youth Festival’s repercussions on the economy were more serious than Kim had expected. In January 1990, Kim condemned the National Planning Commission for having made unrealistic production goals without considering the growth balance among industries.192 In the past, he had repeatedly emphasized ‘speed over balance’ in economic development. His condemnation was proof that high industrial growth rates of past economic plans were actually counterproductive to the overall development of the economy. Belatedly he was aware of how the past development paradigm

Heir (1974–1994) 95 had negative impact on the economy. But Kim did not try to find a ‘new way’ to revive the economy. He still disapproved of the economic reforms that the Soviet Union and China had introduced and regarded them as an abandonment of socialism.193 During the third seven-year plan, it was difficult for the North to obtain economic aid from the Soviet Union, whose economy was also weakening. As of August 1987, North Korean debt to the Soviet Union rose to as much as 1.1 billion rubles.194 The critical blow to the dying North Korean economy came with the end of the Cold War. In 1991, the Soviet Union asked the state to repay its debt in dollars, but North Korea had suffered from a shortage of hard currency and could not comply with the Soviet demand.195 North Korean trade with the Soviet Union had occupied 55.3 percent of its total trade in 1990, but this dramatically dropped to 10.2 percent in 1991. From 1991 on, North Korea depended more heavily on China for trade. Sino-North Korean trade made up only 13.1 percent of the total of North Korea’s trade in 1990, which rose to 30.5 percent in 1991.196 The reduction of trade with the Soviet Union inflicted serious damage to the fragile North Korean economy. In the 1980s, an average of about 3 million tons of oil had been annually imported from both the Soviet Union and China, but North Korea lost much of the Soviet Union’s supply. By 1990, the Soviet Union only exported 410,000 tons to the state and by 1991, only 65,000 tons.197 The lack of oil created a North Korean energy crisis. To escape these economic difficulties and induce foreign investment, North Korea introduced an economic policy reform dealing with the ‘special economic zone’. The North Korean leadership decided to establish a special economic zone in Rajin and Sˇonbong, two northeastern areas of the state, in December 1991. This economic reform was similar to the model of Chinese special economic zones. From the time of the failure of the 1984 Law of the Management of Joint Venture, the state had attempted to draw in foreign investment through the introduction of a new economic policy. The decision to create the special economic zone was a more active measure for coping with the changing international economy. However, owing to the lack of foreign investment, the outcome of the special-economic-zone policy was as bad as the 1984 law had been. After 1991, the North Korean economy fell into a weak enough state that it could not recover on its own. It is not easy to analyze what specifically aggravated the North Korean economy because it resulted from the combination of several persistent aspects of the state’s structure. The first and foremost cause was the natural limitation of a socialist economy. The state established all economic plans and intervened in most economic activities. The economy did not function according to economic principles, but political ones. The state’s excessive control caused the economy to work more rigidly. Collectivism also restrained individuals’ incentives to work and invent. Individual workers were not motivated to save their resources and to innovate technology that would gain more profit than what their economic activities could. The second factor was the distortion of resource distribution. Material resources were mainly distributed into heavy industries related to the defense sector.

96 Heir (1974–1994) Resources for the production of consumer goods were usually in short supply. The third cause was the country’s output-driven management. When the government set economic goals, fulfilling those goals became imperative. The workers paid less attention to economic efficiency because regardless of how many resources they input, the most important focus was to reach the goals set for them. Mass mobilization, not technological invention, was instrumental to accomplishing these goals, but mass mobilization, combined with the output-driven management, only facilitated the drainage of production resources. The fourth cause was the principle of chuch'e. The principle alienated the North Korean economy from the global economy. The North Korean leadership considered international trade as the great powers’ tool for intervention and therefore tried to minimize trade as much as possible. However, the North Korean economy actually depended upon the Soviet and Chinese economic aid. Although this aid was an essential part of their economy, they did not acknowledge publicly. The economic failure showed how vulnerable the chuch'e economy was to the changes occurring in the international political economy. The fifth cause was that too many resources were spent on unnecessary construction, especially structures that paid homage to the cult of Kim Il Sung and his family.

Our-own-style socialism In December 1978, the US and China announced that the two governments would establish diplomatic relations starting in January 1979. This Sino-US diplomatic normalization came as a great shock to North Korea. That same year, South Korea started to engage in indirect commerce with China through Hong Kong and third countries,198 which led to a diplomatic dispute between North Korea and China in 1982.199 After the Sino-US announcement, at a meeting with party cadres on 25 December 1978, Kim Jong Il addressed the changing international situation. He argued that the series of complicated events in the international communist movement implied that the North needed to live according to chuch'e and solve all problems on their own. At the meeting, Kim emphasized the ‘spirit of the guerrilla partisan’ for overcoming domestic as well as international hardships and promoted the strategic slogan: ‘Let’s live in our way!’200 The international situation became much less favorable to North Korea in the mid-1980s. In 1985, Gorbachev began to reform the Soviet Communist Party and the state economy. The North’s two traditional allies – the Soviet Union and China – began to veer from a socialist route. Beginning in 1988, South Korea pursued a new diplomatic policy, called ‘Nordpolitik’ (a nod to West Germany’s Ostpolitik) whose ultimate goal was to establish diplomatic relations with North Korea’s allies. In November 1989, the world witnessed the fall of the Berlin Wall and, in December, George H.W. Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev announced the official end of the Cold War in Malta. In December 1991, Gorbachev’s reforms dismantled the Soviet Union, which had existed for nearly three-quarters of the twentieth century.

Heir (1974–1994) 97 The end of the Cold War provided South Korea with a much more favorable diplomatic environment than it had in the 1980s. Immediately before and after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the South’s Nordpolitik diplomatic strategy worked and Seoul established diplomatic relations with Pyongyang’s former allies.201 North Korea responded to these drastic international changes by refusing any political reforms. Immediately after the end of the Cold War was announced, Kim Jong Il staunchly denounced any possibility of a ‘third way’. For him, the only two ways were to be capitalist or communist. He argued that the so-called third way – that is, social democracy – was actually the capitalist way. Kim suggested that it was rightist opportunism to disclaim the proletariat dictatorship, class struggle, and the struggle against imperialism.202 The North Korean leadership coped with these international changes by taking several measures. First, they resorted to nationalism. International solidarity among communist countries was not viable in the post-Cold War era. The spirit of ‘Let’s live in our way’ turned into the Chosˇon minjok cheil chuˇui (Korea-first idea) in 1986.203 The ‘Korea-first idea’ was aimed at enhancing national pride and promoting awareness of the greatness of chuch'e socialism. Kim Jong Il suggested North Korean socialism’s greatness came from the Great Leader, the Korean Workers’ Party, the chuch'e idea, and it being an ideal socialist society.204 According to his rhetoric, the ‘Korea-first idea’ was not a biological nor an economic concept, but a political one. Korea was great not because of its territorial or economic size, but because of its great chuch'e idea and long history.205 The ‘Korea-first idea’ was incorporated into the concept of urisik sahoejuˇui (our-own-style socialism) in 1990.206 National traditions began to be revitalized in the early 1980s, including the national folklores and customs which had been handed down over generations. In particular, after Kim Jong Il asserted the ‘Korea-first idea,’ the state promoted national traditions and the traditional holidays such as Ch'usˇok (Thanksgiving Day), Sˇol (New Year’s Day), and Tano.207 The North Korean leadership reinforced nationalism by subsuming dynastic history. They reconstructed the tombs of King Tongmyˇong, founder of Koguryˇo in May 1993,208 and King Wang Kˇon, founder of Koryˇo in February 1994.209 The capitals of the two dynasties were located in the North, in Pyongyang (Koguryˇo: 37 bc–668 ad) and in Kaes˘ong (Koryˇo). In October 1994, the state built the tomb of Tan'gun, the mythical founder of Old Chosˇon (4th century bc–108 bc) in Pyongyang.210 Old Chosˇon was the first kingdom of Korea located in Manchuria and a part of the Korean Peninsula. The capital of Old Chosˇon was in Manchuria, not Pyongyang. Before 1994, Tan'gun had been considered a mythological figure. To establish the tomb of Tan'gun was to ‘factualize’ the Tan'gun myth into a quantifiable part of Korean history. The historical factualization was meant to construct the North as the only legitimate successor to the previous dynasties by articulating the fact that the capitals of the three dynasties were in the North. The North Korean regime, which was losing its legitimacy due to a series of economic crises, tried to justify itself through historical fiction. In addition, its unfavorable unification competition with

98 Heir (1974–1994) the South gave the regime cause to rationalize its legitimacy through its common territorial location to the previous dynasties. The second way that the North Korean leadership responded to the transformation of the international political situation was to further strengthen the role of the party. After the end of the Cold War, Kim Jong Il published a treatise on the role of the party at its 45th anniversary in October 1990. In the treatise, he argued that the party’s guidance is the core of socialist revolution; the party had led the revolution in the past and would continue to do so in the future and should be united under one ideology, the chuch'e idea.211 Kim conceived that one of the reasons why the masses in former communist countries opposed their party was that the Communist Party was bureaucratic and authoritarian. The masses would abandon an overly authoritarian party. In contrast, he claimed, the party should serve the masses.212 As a way of reinforcing the party in North Korea, Kim Jong Il held a meeting in May 1991 in which all the secretaries of party cells participated for the first time since the Korean Workers’ Party’s creation.213 Third, the North Korean leadership paid attention to its youth. Kim Jong Il believed that the state’s youth could threaten his regime if they became influenced by ‘decadent’ capitalist culture. After the end of the Cold War, Kim argued that the youth of Eastern European countries opposed their communist regimes because they had been tainted by capitalist culture.214 Another reason why Kim Jong Il was concerned about North Korean youth was because of Kim Il Sung’s experiences. Kim Jong Il knew how important youth could be to social movements – his own father had begun his communist activities in a youth organization. Immediately after the country’s 1945 liberation, there were several anti-communist movements involving young students in Sinˇuiju, Hamhˇung, and Pyongyang. The biggest anti-communist rallies occurred in Sinˇuiju in North Pyˇongan Province in November 1945. Hundreds of students participated in the rallies. Kim Il Sung himself had gone to Sinˇuiju to appease the students.215 Although the rallies did not turn into nationwide resistance, they were a significant threat to his fledgling regime. From that time, Kim Il Sung paid special attention to the state’s youth. After the collapse of the East European countries, North Korea intensified education of the North Korean youth that focused on the chuch'e idea, socialist patriotism, and anti-imperialism. Kim Jong Il held a conference of national youth zealots in April 1990.216 He also designated the 28 August as being the ‘Day of the Youth’ in 1991.217 When the Eighth Congress of the League of Socialist Working Youth (LSWY) was held in February 1993, Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il attended the congress. Of the country’s mass organizations, the LSWY is the most important with its 5 million members.218 All youths between the age of 14 and 30 who are not party members must join the LSWY. After Kim Il Sung’s death in 1994, Kim Jong Il strengthened the youth organization and changed its name to the League of Kimilsung Socialist Youth after his father. In January 1996, he introduced the secretariat system employed by the party to the LSWY.219 The youth organization is the only one in the state named after Kim Il Sung,

Heir (1974–1994) 99 an appropriate reflection on how much focus Kim Jong Il afforded youth in the post-Cold War era. Fourth, the North Korean leadership clamped down on its control of the military forces. Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il believed that the party should never be separated from the military because the revolution can be won only by keeping a firm grasp on the military. Without the military, the party would not be able to maintain the regime and their national identity.220 After the Cold War, Kim Il Sung handed over command of the Korean People’s Army to his son. On 24 December 1991, Kim Jong Il assumed the position of commander-in-chief of the army. On the following day, a meeting was attended by all the political commissars of the companies in the army who proceeded to swear loyalty to the Great Leader and the Dear Leader in the two leaders’ presence.221 On 21 April 1992, four days before the anniversary of the Foundation Day of the army, Kim Il Sung awarded Kim Jong Il with the title ‘marshal’.222 As the commanderin-chief, Kim Jong Il awarded O Chin-u head of Department of National Defense with the same title ‘marshal’ and six other military generals with ‘vice-marshal’ on 24 April. At the same time, Kim promoted 664 military generals.223 On the Foundation Day of the Korean People’s Army on 25 April, a great military parade celebrated the inauguration of the new commander-in-chief. Old former guerrillas, Korean War veterans, all the military forces, as well as reserved forces joined the parade. International guests from 61 countries were also invited. O Chin-u saluted the new commander-in-chief and Kim Jong Il said, at the parade, ‘Bring glory to the people’s heroic military!’224 This was the first time Kim’s voice was heard by an international audience. Fifth, the North Korean leadership was critical of the role that intellectuals played in the former communist countries. Kim Jong Il believed that intellectuals were vulnerable to the infiltration of decadent capitalist culture. He complained that in some communist countries, the intellectuals deceived by the imperialists opposed their party and government. He emphasized that intellectuals should neither accept capitalist ideology nor spread it into society.225 In summary, since the international situation became unfavorable in the 1980s– 1990s, Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il did not sit by idly. They actively reacted to the changes and strengthened their revolutionary forces, including the party, the youth, the military, and the intellectuals. The party intensified its ideological indoctrination of the masses and the chuch'e idea subsumed more nationalistic elements in order to oppose globalization. The government emphasized the moral obligations to the Great Leader and the Dear Leader, the comradeship between the leader and masses, and the sacrifice for revolution. For the two leaders, the only two choices were capitalistic reforms or socialist revolution; there remained no other alternative. They chose to avoid reforming their totalitarian society and to strengthen the chuch'e form of socialism. They tried to put up a ‘net’ to block the ‘mosquitoes’ of external influence,226 causing their reclusive society to become more isolated. However, their failure to adapt the state to the global changes was predestined to incur tremendous costs, particularly after Kim Il Sung’s death in 1994.

100 Heir (1974–1994)

Personal life The number of times that Kim Jong Il has been married is not publicly verifiable. Thus far, there have been three politically important women known to the outside world: Sˇong Hye-rim, Kim Yˇong-suk, and Ko Yˇong-hˇui. Kim Jong Il’s first mistress was Sˇong Hye-rim. According to her sister Sˇong Hye-rang, Sˇong Hye-rim was born five years before Kim in 1936 and met Kim during his high school days. She was a famous film actress in North Korea and was married to Kim’s older friend, Yi P'yˇong, famous novelist Yi Ki-yˇong’s son. Sˇong and Yi had one daughter together. Kim re-established contact with Sˇong when he was working at the Propaganda and Agitation Department in the late 1960s and frequently went to film locations at the time to see her. Sˇong Hye-rang presumed that Kim’s love for her sister, who was mature and warm-hearted, was related to his longing for his mother whom he had lost in his childhood.227 Kim started to live with Sˇong in around 1970 and she had to divorce Yi. Sˇong Hye-rang, who used to live in the Kims’ residence, recollected that Kim and her sister were a good couple with similar artistic tastes. They watched new movies together and her sister gave him advice on his film-making. Sˇong had Kim’s first son, Kim Chˇong-nam, on 10 May 1971. Chˇong-nam attended the international schools in Geneva and Moscow from 1980 until the mid-1980s.228 However, Kim could not make their family life official because he had taken his friend’s wife. According to Sˇong Hye-rang, she and her sister could not lie to Kim Jong Il at home because he would quickly recognize it. Sˇong portrayed Kim’s private life as follows: He loved stylish things, valued knowledge, and appreciated beauty. But it was difficult to satisfy his picky tastes. He was in a good mood whenever he saw elegant things [but] he was infuriated by what was slovenly. He hated what was excessive and looked down upon what was inferior. He disdained a woman of loose morals. If he had been born in an ordinary family, he would have been an artist. His father [Kim Il Sung] who was busy in politics left his son [Jong Il] to himself and did not educate him [at home.] Without his mother’s care or anybody’s interference, only his instincts developed under the environment of limitless power and affluent wealth. Nothing is more harmful to the education of people than power. How difficult it is not to be depraved under those conditions! [Fortunately] he has not lapsed in conduct. Sometimes I used to think about his personality . . . How does his wellcultivated behavior coexist with his uncontrolled violent personality? [. . .] I think what is generous and sympathetic to others is congenital in his personality, but what is violent and picky is acquired. His acquired personality

Heir (1974–1994) 101 was formed by unlimited power, little family education, the absence of a mother and the authoritarian North Korean society.229 Sˇong further commented on Kim Jong Il’s family life: Chˇong-nam was a very healthy and cute son. It is beyond my description to say how much Kim Jong Il loved his son. Young Prince [Kim Jong Il] carried Chˇong-nam on his back when his son could not sleep and soothed his son when he cried [. . .] As the day [on which Chˇong-nam would leave for Geneva for his education] came near, he [Kim Jong Il] was in deep sorrow. He drank and cried like a child [because it was difficult for him to say good-bye to his son]. He said: ‘I know. I know that you [Hye-rim, Hye-rang and their mother] take Chˇongnam away from me’. [. . .] When he could not come to the house, he always told Chˇong-nam not to wait for him and told him the reason why he would not come that day. It was father’s loving voice that suggested he really missed his son.230 While living with Sˇong Hye-rim, Kim married another woman, Kim Yˇongsuk, in 1973. Kim Yˇong-suk had worked in the Central Committee before the marriage. Kim Jong Il and Kim Yˇong-suk have one daughter together named Sˇolsong. Little is known about Kim Yˇong-suk and Sˇol-song, but after Kim’s marriage, Sˇong began to suffer from depression coupled with insomnia. She frequently went to Moscow for mental treatment until her death in 2002.231 Kim’s third mistress was Ko Yˇong-hˇui, a dancer born in Japan in 1953. Kim and Ko had two sons together, Chˇong-ch'ˇol born in 1981 and Chˇong-un in 1983.232 They also had a daughter named Yˇo-jˇong.233 Ko died in 2004. Unlike his father, Kim Jong Il never appeared to the media with any of the ˘ three women. According to Ch'oe Un-h˘ ui, who attended Kim Jong Il’s birthday party and met Sˇong Hae-rim in February 1978, Kim did not like his women to be involved in political activities. In his opinion, a ‘wife is the person who takes care of children and does household work at home’.234 His power struggle with Kim Sˇong-ae seemed to shape his viewpoint on wifely duties. Kim Jong Il works hard to maintain his regime. However, he is not the kind of leader that the North Korean media portrays him as, who works without sleeping or resting. According to Fujimoto Kenji, who worked as a cook for Kim from 1988 to 2001, Kim has more than ten villas around North Korea. When he goes to the villas with his coteries, he enjoys shooting, hunting, horse riding, water skiing, card playing, and mahjong. He is also known to be a ‘speed demon’ when driving cars and motorcycles and he fell from a horse and was hurt in 1992. Fujimoto claims

102 Heir (1974–1994) that Kim is an excellent gourmand.235 He is also competitive. Once he begins playing a game, Kim is only satisfied when he wins. Fujimoto speaks about an episode with Kim that occurred during a jet-ski race. The episode demonstrates an aspect of Kim’s personality: On 12 July 1991, while I was riding a jet-ski on the Amnok River, Kim Jong Il came near and shouted to me, ‘Fujimoto, let’s have a race. Let’s decide who will win the race’. As soon as Kim made a signal, I stepped on the accelerator. During the race, I looked back. I was a little ahead of Kim. The idea that I should not win hit upon me, but his words ‘Let’s decide who will win the race’ made me finish first. ‘Fujimoto won!’ Kim shouted angrily [. . .] To that point, I didn’t think anyone had defeated Kim during a game. Kim stood alone in games. After he lost the jet-ski race, he changed his attitude to me more positively. One month passed. He asked me to have a race again. Upon seeing his jet-ski, I was surprised at its size. He changed his jet-ski into a much bigger one than mine . . . As expected, it was impossible to catch up with him that day.236 Another interesting aspect of Kim Jong Il’s private life is his drinking parties. Kim often holds parties with his confidants, the drinking buddies who are also Kim’s political trustees. Through these drinking parties, the participants are able to form personal bonds with Kim. They also become his accomplices in ‘nonrevolutionary’ acts. It is a great honor to be invited to one of his bacchanalian parties. The feasts usually continue all night long and a musical band and group of beautiful dancers perform. Party companions will sing South Korean and Japanese songs that are otherwise forbidden in the state.237 Ordinary North Korean people do not know that the Dear Leader and his cronies spend time and resources indulging like this. The fact that the leader has such ‘fantastic’ meetings is kept secret. If regular party members are not invited to a party for some time, they might become anxious about whether the Dear Leader no longer trusts them or wonder whether they’ve been kicked out of the chosen group. When they are once again called on to join a party by the leader, they are often so happy that they shed tears.238 They become more loyal to their savior than before. In other words, having parties is an effective political tool for Kim Jong Il’s dealings with his vassals.

Summary For the twenty-year period from 1974 to 1994, Kim Jong Il was heir to his father. His will to absolute power was particularly salient in this period. The totalitarian

Heir (1974–1994) 103 political condition provided a favorable condition where the politician Kim Jong Il actualized his desire for power. During this period, Kim Jong Il’s main goals were to satisfy his father’s expectations and strengthen his own power base. Under his father’s meticulous coordination, Kim gradually established his own guidance system in North Korean politics. He first established his control over the party and then, using the party’s dominant role in the state, expanded his ruling domain to other governmental institutions. When Kim Jong Il’s monolithic guidance system was completed, North Korea had changed into a more developed totalitarian society than before. Kim attempted not only to be his father’s political successor, but also become the ideological successor to his father’s chuch'e idea. He monopolized the authority to develop the idea and forced North Korean scholars to transform the idea to a semi-religious doctrine. However, the period of the successor was not always smooth. In the mid-1970s, Kim Jong Il faced his political crisis and his father, as his political guardian, came to the front of political arena to save him. The 1974 father–son succession created a new type of political regime – dynastic totalitarianism – in the North. The dynastic totalitarian regime was a product of one politician’s inexhaustible desire for power concentration. The politician who had concentrated almost absolute power in his hands wanted to maintain it through his son even after his death. Through the establishment of the new regime, the politician wanted to be respected and to hand down his achievements through dynastic succession in his posthumous period. His son, Kim Jong Il, was the key figure who would maintain the dynastic regime. Given his son’s efforts to strengthen the cult of him, for Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il was the most reliable figure. During this twenty-year period, the state strengthened the cult of Kim Jong Il. The stronger the cults of the two leaders and their family were, the clearer the dynastic characteristics of the state became. The state began to actively promote Confucian values and restored traditions that had existed in old dynasties. During this period, as the communist bloc collapsed in international politics, nationalism and national history were positively reinterpreted by the state. The overemphasis on tradition made the totalitarian society more rigid and impeded its ability to adjust to the external environment. From the late 1980s to the early 1990s, the world went through rapid political changes. Rather than jumping on the bandwagon of the changing political and economic systems, the North Korean leadership reacted to the changes by reinforcing the chuch'e idea in the society, isolating it even more than before. During this period, the North Korean economy declined to the degree that the people began suffering from a shortage of daily necessities. Although the North Korean leadership approved tactical changes such as the Law of the Management of Joint Venture and the introduction of special economic zones in their economic policy from the mid-1980s, without drastic economic reforms the changes could not save the crumbling economy. The tactical economic changes might be an indication of the pragmatic feature of the North Korean leadership, but it was not

104 Heir (1974–1994) clear yet to outsiders at the time. The leadership should have introduced more radical economic policies rather than reacting to international changes so as to revive the economy. The principle of ‘self-reliant economy’ did not allow a rapid turn in their economic policies. After all, Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il missed the timing necessary for saving their economy during this period.

5

Ruler (1994–present)

Kim Il Sung’s death in 1994 transformed North Korea into a hysterical place with the nation’s people expressing uncontrollable sorrow. The elder leader’s death also introduced a new era, one in which Kim Jong Il no longer had his father’s protection backing him. He was left alone to deal with the nation’s crumbling economy and the international pressure to freeze the North Korean nuclear weapons program. During this period, the state also underwent its biggest crisis since the Korean War – mass starvation. Contrary to many North Korean experts’ expectations, however, the state did not collapse. Instead, Kim has successfully mobilized the state’s domestic resources to maintain his regime and manipulated international power relations to reduce external pressures, particularly from the US. To cope with domestic and international challenges, he depends on the authority that his deceased father provides and on the military, whose role has been reinforced in the post-Kim Il Sung era. To improve the weakening economy, he introduced economic reforms similar to the ones China had employed. Diplomatically, he restored friendly relationships with traditional allies like China and Russia and promoted new ones with Western countries in order to escape from international isolation.

Kim Il Sung’s death On 8 July 1994, North Korea announced that the Great Leader Kim Il Sung had died suddenly of heart failure. Kim had suffered from arterial sclerosis for years. According to the North Korean media, the combination of fatigue and heart disease created the conditions favorable for the heart attack on 7 July that took his life the following day.1 Just before his death, Kim Il Sung had maintained a busy schedule. A few days after an eye surgery in May, he held a meeting with Son Wˇon-t'ae, son of Son Chˇong-do.2 He continued to host a number of foreign guests throughout the month of June. On 16 and 17 June, Kim held a series of talks with former US president Jimmy Carter about the North Korean nuclear program.3 Kim also asked Carter to deliver a message proposing an inter-Korean summit to South Korean President Kim Young Sam. Kim Young Sam accepted this proposal immediately. Carter’s visit defused the nuclear tension arising between the US and North Korea.

106 Ruler (1994–present) Beside the busy schedule, Kim Il Sung seemed to suffer from additional stress owing to the deteriorating economy. He visited two cooperative farms on 19 and 21 June4 and then went to a resort at Mt Myohyang where the inter-Korean summit was supposed to be held on 25 July. At the resort, he held meetings with workers from the economic sector on 5 and 6 July.5 His surgery, meetings with foreign guests, visits to local locations, anxiety about the poor economy, and meetings with the economic workers may have put the 82-year-old Kim in an exaggerated state of fatigue and stress, worsening his heart condition. Kim Il Sung’s death represented a seismic event for the North Korean people. When the news of his death was revealed, endless waves of popular condolence streamed forth. In the North Korean media, the people appeared to be in a state of psychological panic over their Great Leader’s death. Due to the continuous popular condolence, the state did not hold a funeral service for Kim until 11 days after his death.6 Interestingly, Kim Jong Il held Kim Il Sung’s wife, Kim Sˇong-ae and her sons and daughter in check after his father’s death.7 On 9 July when the government revealed the list of the 273 state funeral committee members, Kim Sˇong-ae appeared as the 104th person on the list.8 Her daughter, Kyˇong-jin, and sons, P'yˇong-il and Yˇong-il, were not included anywhere on it. Even though the widow was named the fourteenth member at the funeral service on 20 July, there was no evidence that her children participated in the ceremony.9 Based on this, Kim Jong Il must have been worried about a possible challenge from the kyˇot-kaji (‘extra branch’) that Kim Sˇong-ae and her children belonged to. Kim Jong Il did not hasten to replace his father’s legacy with his own. Instead, he ‘piggy-backed’ on his father’s authority in order to consolidate his own power, just as he had done while his father was still alive. Kim extended his father’s political life through a concept called yuhun t'ongch'i (rule by the will of the dead). Yuhun literally means the ‘instructions that a dead person has left’. The state promoted a variety of slogans emphasizing their leader’s immortality, including the following: ‘The Great Leader will be eternal,’ ‘Fatherly Great Leader is with us,’ and ‘Let’s realize what the Great Leader instructed.’ At the same time, the media began to identify Kim Jong Il with the dead Great Leader, insisting that ‘For us, the Great Leader Kim Il Sung is the Dear Leader Kim Jong Il. Comrade Kim Jong Il is the Great Leader.’10 These slogans were likely promoted to lessen the psychological shock that the people were experiencing at the time. The political emphasis on ‘rule by the will of the Great Leader’ implied that Kim Jong Il would stick to the policies his father had advocated. On the 100th day after his father passed away, at a meeting with high-ranking party cadres, Kim revealed his feelings on his father’s death. He claimed that although the Great Leader’s heart had stopped beating, he was still with the people and alive as the sun of the nation. While Tan'gun had been the nation’s founder, the Great Leader was the creator of Korean socialism. Overseas Koreans were calling Korea ‘Kim Il Sung nation’. He added he would not assume Kim Il Sung’s position too hastily, but would embalm his father’s body as Stalin had done with Lenin’s before reorganizing the party and government.11 For one year, Kim had the Kˇumsusan Assembly Hall where his father used to live and work

Ruler (1994–present) 107 remodeled into a tomb called Kˇumsusan Memorial Palace, which opened on 9 July 1995.12 Thus, Kim Il Sung’s body was preserved in a building that he would have spent much of his time as if he were still alive. In spite of the state’s economic difficulties, Kim Jong Il continued to spend tremendous financial resources on his father. After his father’s death, Kim Jong Il observed a traditional Confucian ceremony for the dead. Traditionally, Korean Confucianists practiced one of three types of mourning periods for the dead – the three-month, the one-year, and the three-year periods.13 Kim chose to observe last one for paying tribute to his father, which meant that the mourning period officially lasted until 8 July 1997, three years after Kim Il Sung’s death. On the last day of the mourning period, Kim held a ceremony to complete the Tower of Immortality by unveiling the newly inscribed ‘Great Leader Kim Il Sung is eternally with us’. At the same time, the government began to use a reign-year chuch'e to celebrate Kim Il Sung’s rule like the emperor (or king) of a dynasty might. Kim Il Sung was born in 1912, which was ‘chuch'e 1’. The year 1997 was ‘chuch'e 86’.14 When Kim launched his new regime in September 1998 at the Tenth Supreme People’s Assembly, he ended the assembly by having its members listen to the address that Kim Il Sung had made at the Ninth Supreme People’s Assembly.15 Even four years after his death, Kim Il Sung still reigned over the state with his ‘will’. Kim Il Sung’s death represented the start of a new era – Kim Jong Il’s. However, his father’s death had additional meanings as well. The North Korea before Kim Il Sung’s death differed from the way it has become since. Kim Il Sung’s death marked the beginning of the natural disasters, including floods and drought, and mass starvation that the state endured. The previously tightly meshed governmental institutions of the totalitarian regime began to operate dysfunctionally. Kim Il Sung was lucky because he did not witness these tragedies but his son saw the horrific aftermath of his policies’ failures and the natural disasters.

Arduous March Starvation In July/August 1995, a series of great floods struck North Korea, propelling the North Korean economy into the freefall it had been inching towards. According to a report of the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, the North Korean government estimated that ‘5.2 million people were affected in 145 counties in eight provinces out of the country’s 200 counties in nine provinces . . . 500,000 persons (approximately 100,000 families) were made homeless. Total damage from the floods was estimated by the Government to exceed US$ 15 billion.’16 For the first time, the state asked the international community for food aid.17 The extent that the state compromised its chuch'e by this request was stunning, hinting at the flood’s devastation. For Kim Jong Il, appealing for international aid was his first experience of wounded national pride.

108 Ruler (1994–present) Table 5.1 North Korean grain production: 1989–1999 (unit: metric tons) Year

Grain

1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999

5,482,000* 4,812,000* 4,427,000 4,268,000 3,884,000 4,125,000 3,451,000 3,690,000 3,489,000 3,886,000 4,222,000

Sources: *Han'guk kaebal yˇon'guwˇon, Pukhan kyˇongje chip'yojip [Economic indexes of North Korea], Seoul: Han'guk kaebal yˇon'guwˇon, 1996, p. 87; and T'onggyech'ˇong [Korean National Statistical Office], Nam-Pukhan kyˇongje sahoesang pigyo 2004 [Comparison of North–South Korean socio-economic sectors: 2004], Daejˇon: T'onggyech'ˇong, 2004, p. 48.

Before 1995, the state had suffered damage from cold weather in 1993 and a hailstorm in 1994. Another flood hit in 1996, a drought in 1997, and a hailstorm in 1998. The disasters were the final blows to the fragile economy that crumbled beyond hope of recovery without drastic economic reforms and foreign aid. The production of grain in the North had reached its highest point of 5,482,000 metric tons in 1989 and had decreased to 4,125,000 by 1994. From 1989 on, the production exponentially diminished and in the early 1990s, the people already did not have enough food to eat. Their grain production dropped down to 3,451,000 in 1995 due to the flood. Between 1995 and 1998, the average grain production was only 3,629,000 metric tons and it was not until 1999 that the production restored to the 1994 level (Table 5.1). The 1995 natural disaster halted the state’s food-rationing system. People from urban areas were the main recipients of the rationing system. They brought their rationing cards to a designated location to receive a bimonthly supply of food, a system that caused them to depend completely on their government. Ever since its creation, this system had played important socio-political roles in North Korean society. First, the food-rationing system controlled the people’s mobility. If someone moved to another region without having obtained governmental permission, they would be unable to obtain food in that region. Second, it was used to mobilize the masses to work: ‘Without work, no food rationing.’ The masses needed to obey the forced mass mobilizations in order to obtain their food. Third, the North Korean leadership utilized the rationing system to induce the masses to be loyal. The leadership justified their draconian rule because they offered ‘free’

Ruler (1994–present) 109 rationed food. In particular, special foods rationed out on national holidays were presented as favors from the fatherly leaders.18 According to North Korean defectors, the food-rationing system did not function properly in the early 1990s. Around 1992–1993, local people were not receiving food regularly. By 1995, in most of North Korea except for Pyongyang, the foodrationing system had collapsed.19 The government thus lost an effective tool for controlling its people. The collapse of the food-rationing system led to mass starvation. A significant portion of the population who had relied on the system starved to death. The starvation was unprecedented and pervasive in that it afflicted all classes of society. Even top party cadres were affected in one way or another.20 Until now, this starvation is recurring in that the state has been depending on foreign aid since 1995. According to Hwang Chang-yˇop, about 1.5 million people died of famine in 1995–1996, many of whom had been devoted to the party and its leader.21 In other words, those who believed that the government would distribute food to them died, while those who had saved food through illegal ‘non-socialistic’ behavior survived. There is no doubt that people continued to starve to death in 1997–1998. It was reported that there were between 2 million and 2.5 million missing people from 1995 to early 2001. Among them, 90 percent allegedly died of famine and 10 percent were regarded as defectors.22 A North Korean source recalled this period as follows: In 1994, there was food rationing. We endured the year with the rationed food. After eating it all, everybody became a thief. In 1995, people began to steal resource materials in factories and sold them in black markets to obtain food. Those illegal acts occurred in all places of the society. There were kkotchebi (child-beggars) in 1980s. [But] from 1995, the society was full of child-beggars . . . In 1995 the people went to China to trade [illegally] [. . .] Old people first starved to death from 1995. They died earlier than children. Youths could go somewhere and do something to live. Then children began to die of famine. They suffered from malnutrition in 1994, but the malnutrition was prevalent from 1995. For three years from 1995–7, a tremendous number of people died . . . The people became aware of their reality from 1996. Those who have now survived in the North are party cadres, smugglers, traders, prostitutes, and child-beggars.23 In order to avoid mass starvation and obtain food, a great number of people left their hometowns and wandered around the state. The totalitarian regime could no longer control people’s mobility as strongly as it had and the totalitarian boundaries became porous. For example, hundreds of thousands of people secretly moved into China. While there, the North Koreans began to witness China’s economic

110 Ruler (1994–present) development and discovered the economic successes that the South had achieved. The South had been portrayed to them as a poor and miserable state colonized by the US imperialists. Now they could compare what they had been told about the external world with what they saw for themselves. The exodus to China affected North Korean society in two ways. First, it became impossible for the government to monopolize information about the outside. The people could compare their situation to that of people from other countries. Their society no longer appeared to be paradise. When they recognized this reality, the government’s ideological indoctrination ceased to be effective. Second, the North Koreans who traveled to China smuggled foreign products back into their society. Therefore, China provided the North Korean people with their daily supplies, instead of the people’s own government doing so. In early 1996, Kim Jong Il confessed that the state was experiencing economic difficulties as well as a food shortage. He compared the socio-economic difficulties of the mid-1990s with the Arduous March of Kim Il Sung’s guerrilla days.24 When another flood hit the society in the mid-1996, he criticized local regions for carelessly cutting down trees and stripping the mountains.25 What he did not mention was that the state’s energy crisis had caused the people to use the trees as fuel. Additionally, the trees had been chopped down to make rice paddies on the sides of mountains. The North is mountainous and, unlike the South, does not have vast areas for growing rice. When he was alive, Kim Il Sung had encouraged the peasants to cultivate the mountainous areas in order to produce grains. Before the natural disasters hit the society in the mid-1990s, the peasants had already cut down the trees in mountainous areas for agricultural cultivation. Kim Jong Il’s criticism showed ways that his father’s agricultural policy had failed. At a meeting for the Kim Il Sung University’s fiftieth anniversary in December 1996, Kim appeared anxious, claiming that the ‘food crisis is creating chaos’: Now the reason why the people are loyal to the instructions of the Central Committee is not because of party organizations and workers, but because of my authority. While I was going to the Chˇollima Iron Works, I saw a lot of people walking on the street looking for food. Other local areas were also full of the people drifting around to obtain food. It is said that passenger trains and stations are entirely in confusion with those in need. [. . .] The most urgent problem at this time is the food shortage. If we solve it, our socialism is really the best in the world [. . .] Now it is time to determine who should be responsible for this crisis. We do not need party workers who do not solve these problems [. . .]

Ruler (1994–present) 111 Today, although administrative workers in the cabinet have the main responsibility for the food crisis that is causing chaos, party workers should also assume the responsibility. I don’t know what the cadres of the provinces and cities and counties are doing. [. . .] In particular, we should take critical measures to secure food for the military forces . . . Now we do not provide the military with food properly [. . .] If party workers continue to work like this, we cannot guarantee there will not be an incident like the Sinˇuiju Student Movement in the future [. . .] Now a lot of non-socialistic phenomena are happening.26 In regards to his speech, the crisis was too serious at that stage for the state to supply food to the military. In the North, the military forces had been well treated – they received the best supplies and equipment. In the mid-1990s, however, even the military underwent a shortage of supplies. Once the governmental organizations were no longer functioning, Kim had mobilized the military to control the civilian sector. However, far from protecting civilians, the soldiers had begun robbing and committed crimes to supply their own needs.27 Their illegal activities added to the people’s growing disillusionment with Kim Jong Il’s regime. Kim Jong Il knew his people lived under frightful conditions and his speech demonstrated irresponsibility towards them. As the state’s leader, it was his duty to address his people’s needs. Kim was ultimately responsible for the economic disaster and starvation that existed in the North, but instead of taking charge he sought a scapegoat. Although he had majored in political economics during his university days, he did not demonstrate economic expertise. His knowledge of chuch'e was insufficient for saving the economy and the people’s lives. During the Arduous March of 1995–1998, Kim Jong Il’s policies were blindly devoted to following his father’s. The Arduous March was probably the hardest period in North Korean history since the Korean War. The people were starving to death and losing their faith in communism and the ideological indoctrination of the chuch'e idea was not as effective as it had been. The Kim Jong Il regime’s legitimacy was in danger. Kim Jong Il ideologically emphasized the pulgˇun'gi sasang (red-flag idea) in this period. Traditionally, the red color and a red flag have held special meaning for communists and in North Korean society the term ‘red flag’ appeared frequently; for example, in the Three-Revolution Red Flag Movement. During the Arduous March, a red flag symbolized Kim Jong Il’s faith. The red flag ‘dyed by dark blood of unyielding men’ represented a ‘sign of communists’ noble ideal and hope’. The flag represented their firm belief in unity and victory – while the brave lift the red flag, only cowards raise the white one.28

112 Ruler (1994–present) At the time, Kim hoisted the red flag. He was determined to protect his totalitarian regime against the imperialists by any means. Loyal communists would gather around the flag and the betrayers of the revolution would leave it. In this difficult situation, Kim forced his people to make an extreme choice. In other words, he compelled the people loyal to him to die bravely rather than finding an alternative way of reviving the dying economy and people. Markets Ironically, the people really needed the chuch'e idea to survive during the Arduous March. They needed to rely on themselves to make their living – the dysfunctional government could not be relied on to feed them. During the march, ‘nonsocialistic’ phenomena were prevalent. The people committed such illegal acts as theft, murder, corruption, black marketing, smuggling, prostitution, among others. Of these crimes, the black market’s spread is critical to understanding the transformations taking place in the North Korean economy. The North Korean economy is broadly divided into the public and the private sectors. The public sector is the government’s planned economy which is divided into the first and the second economies. The first economy is a civilian economy that the cabinet manages while the second economy is controlled by the military. The military manages the defense industry. It owns trade firms that are directly engaged in international trade in order to gain hard currency.29 During the economic crisis, the civilian sector almost completely ceased to function but the second economy was partially successful because of the government’s investment in it. In addition to the public and the private economies, a gray area called the ‘party economy’ exists between the two. The party economy is unplanned and, according to Hwang Chang-yˇop, Kim Jong Il personally controls it.30 Kim personally owns a gold mine31 and also deposits slush money in international banks.32 These financial resources could come from the party economy, implying that the party’s financial resources are being spent partially on his private purposes. The private economy is a space where the government allows individual commercial exchange according to the laws of supply and demand. Specifically, private economic activities take place in farmers’ markets. Individuals can grow grains or vegetables in a small place 20–30 square meters around their houses. They are also allowed to sell their surplus agricultural produce in farmers’ markets and raise livestock like pigs, goats, and chickens in their residence. Additionally, housewives, elderly people and people with disabilities can make and sell daily utilities. The government permits these markets because the planned public economy cannot provide all the necessities that the people need. However, they are not supposed to trade ‘factory-made’ products.33 Until the late 1980s, the role of the farmers’ markets was supplementary to state-owned stores. If the people could not find items in the stores, they would go to the markets. The government set prices in the state-owned stores. However, after the state held the 13th World Festival of Youth and Students in Pyongyang in 1989, the people had difficulty finding the items that they needed in

Ruler (1994–present) 113 these stores. The government had spent too many material resources and money preparing for the festival. The shortage of the products in the stores prompted the people to go to the farmers’ markets to find supplies instead. This increasing demand for the markets increased their prevalence. As this was happening, the state-established price system collapsed. When the food-rationing system began crumbling around 1993–1994, the people were already engaged in individual trade.34 A new economic pattern based on the markets naturally occurred – not because of a new policy choice made by their leader but the people themselves created it as a means of survival. During the Arduous March, traders at the farmers’ markets sold almost every product needed by the people. Traders primarily obtained their merchandise from four sources. Their first source was the individual and cooperative farms producing agricultural products and livestock. The second was the products belonging to housewives, elderly people and the disabled. The third was the factory workers who smuggled industrial products out to sell. The last source was China and other countries that smuggled products in.35 While the former two sources were legal, the latter two were not. The farmers’ markets took place every ten days until the early 1990s.36 When the society began suffering from the economic crisis, the people held the markets every day. At first, the increase frequency occurred without permission but they eventually received the government’s tacit acquiescence. In exchange for being allowed to hold the markets every day, the traders paid a market tax to the government.37 At first, when the government cracked down on the illegal daily markets, the tax had been given to governmental officials as a kind of bribe. The bribe soon transformed into a tax once the government admitted the inevitability of the markets. In the extreme economic hardship of the 1990s, political corruption played a positive role in the private economy. To expand private economic activities, the people corrupted party cadres and governmental bureaucrats with bribes. The cadres and the officials needed this money to purchase items from the markets because they also faced a shortage of daily supplies. This chain of corruption contributed to the development of the private economy. Considering the totalitarian system, the farmers’ markets’ expansion represents a kind of people’s economic resistance against governmental control. As the market enlarged, the public space controlled by the government decreased. This economic resistance emerged outside of any organized movement. The main driving force was simply the people’s instinct for survival. The suppressive public space has gradually given way to a private one.

New regime Strong and prosperous state Three years after Kim Il Sung passed away, Kim Jong Il finally took over the general secretary position of the party with the support of representatives from the

114 Ruler (1994–present) Korean People’s Army and each party branch on 8 October 1997.38 However, the selection process was strictly speaking a violation of the party by-laws. According to Article 24 of the by-laws, the ‘plenum’ of the Central Committee is supposed to select the general secretary of the Central Committee.39 Kim did not follow the by-laws. During the Arduous March, Kim mobilized the military to help him maintain the teetering society. The military’s clout was increasing at the time. In spite of the violation of the by-laws, he wanted to be supported by both the civil and the military sectors. The military’s participation in the selection process represented its rising status in North Korean society. In 1998, Kim Jong Il was confident that he would recover from the economic predicament. He encouraged local areas to establish small power plants in order to generate energy. While speaking about the potential for potato farming at a meeting with his staff, he voiced regret at having focused on corn farming in the past without paying attention to potatoes, accentuating that the ‘potato is like rice’.40 Around the end of 1998, the Kim Jong Il regime arose out of the worst of the economic crisis.41 However, he continued to attribute the food crisis to the external military threat and to an economic blockade by the US imperialists. He still advocated developing the military industry in order to better confront the US, claiming that the state needed to produce more ‘bullets’ than ‘candies’.42 By the time the economic situation began to improve, Kim Jong Il was ready to establish a new regime. On 31 August 1998, the state fired a three-staged longrange missile, known as the Taep'odong-1, to celebrate this political change.43 Kim might have wanted to mark the launch of his new regime by firing an intercontinental missile for the first time in Korean history. The missile incident signaled to the outside world that the state had enough offensive capabilities to attack neighboring countries while suggesting internally that the new regime differed from the previous Kim Il Sung one. Kim Jong Il also presented a new political vision of his regime known as the kangsˇong taeguk (strong and prosperous state). The ‘strong and prosperous state’ vision was based on strategic goals that North Korea would work toward after the Arduous March.44 It sought to become a ‘socialist state that has a strong national power and in which everything is prosperous and the people live without envying other countries’.45 Finally, Kim launched his new regime at the Tenth Supreme People’s Assembly held in September 1998.46 On 1 January 1999, Kim promoted the slogan ‘Let’s glorify this year as a great turning point to construct a strong and prosperous state!’ in a Nodong sinmun editorial. The editorial explicated the ‘strong and prosperous state’ as being one that is strong ideologically, militarily, and economically. In an ideologically strong state, the people would be successfully indoctrinated by Kim Jong Il’s ideas – although his ideas were not clearly defined. A militarily strong state would strengthen its military forces, the military industry, and the military–civilian unity. To be a strong both ideologically and militarily, the state should be supported by a strong economy. The editorial referenced urgent economic issues including the need for food, electricity, coal, transportation, light industry, and technological development.47

Ruler (1994–present) 115 At a New Year’s meeting with party cadres on the same day, Kim repeated what the Nodong sinmun editorial had addressed. He maintained that it would be possible for North Korea to become a ‘strong and prosperous state’ in the near future because it was already ideologically and militarily strong. If it should concentrate on reviving and developing the economy, the state would be soon become economically strong as well.48 The vision for a ‘strong and prosperous state’ was presented at the time when Kim launched his new regime. He must have felt that he needed to declare his own ruling vision for the new regime. However, it was not new at all. The only element that differed from his father’s regime was the title. Kim Il Sung Constitution At the Tenth Supreme People’s Assembly, three main agendas were discussed: the revision of the North Korean Constitution, the re-election of Kim Jong Il as the chairman of the National Defense Commission, and the elections for the leaders of each governmental organization.49 The assembly revised the existing constitution, but, given the drastic change of the constitution, it is proper to say that they have created a new one known as the ‘Kim Il Sung Constitution constitutionalizing Great Leader Kim Il Sung’s idea and feat of state-building’.50 It was the first constitution in North Korea to have a preamble, which was in effect a eulogy to Kim Jong Il’s father. While a ‘strong and prosperous state’ was Kim Jong Il’s vision of the new regime, the Kim Il Sung Constitution lists stipulations for his role within it. The new constitution unveils several aspects of his leadership character well. First, the constitution bestowed on the deceased Kim Il Sung eternal presidency. In other words, Kim Jong Il would not take over the presidency from him. Before the Supreme People’s Assembly, the North Korean media had taken it for granted that Kim Jong Il would be elected the president.51 In August, the Nodong sinmun carried articles suggesting that ‘meetings’ held in foreign countries such as Russia, Egypt, and Uganda were supporting Kim for the North Korean presidency.52 In contrast to the media’s propaganda, it was Kim Jong Il himself who chose to decline the presidency, immediately before the assembly was held. Instead, Kim Il Sung was instated as the state’s eternal president. Before Kim Il Sung’s death, his political role had become merely symbolic. He spent his time on foreign diplomatic missions or with his international friends while Kim Jong Il administered the state. The making of the eternal presidency showed that Kim Jong Il felt he could control the state without occupying the position. Given his ‘secret’ leadership style, Kim did not want to hold a position that would entitle outsiders to gather information about him53 – he maintained the mystique that awakened others’ curiosity about him instead. If he were to assume the presidency, he would need to maintain contact with foreigners, thus losing his secrecy. The task of welcoming diplomatic missions was assigned to Kim Yˇong-nam, chairman of the Standing Committee of the Supreme People’s Assembly – a newly created position. According to the constitution, when the

116 Ruler (1994–present) Supreme People’s Assembly does not hold its sessions, its Standing Committee replaces it. The formal head of the state is the chairman of the Standing Committee whose main role is associated with state diplomacy.54 Second, instead of taking on the duty of meeting foreigners, Kim Jong Il’s main constitutional job was to deal with all the military affairs of the state as the chairman of the National Defense Commission.55 Although the commission only undertook military affairs, it was more powerful than any other constitutional organization. At a speech of the Tenth Supreme People’s Assembly, Kim Yˇong-nam described the commission chairmanship as being the ‘highest rank of the state’ responsible for commanding politics, defense and the economy and as being a ‘sacred position’ symbolizing the dignity of the state.56 During the Arduous March, Kim Jong Il had placed the prime minister and the cabinet in charge of economic affairs. His own role mainly concerned military affairs and he controlled the state through the military forces,57 which was later embodied as the strategy of sˇon'gun chˇongch'i (military-first politics). By strengthening the National Defense Commission, Kim demonstrated how he would rule the state in the future. The commission was his organizational base to implement his ‘military-first politics’. Third, the new constitution granted the cabinet larger autonomy by eliminating the presidency and the Central People’s Committee, which had been created in the 1972 constitutional revision. According to the 1972 constitution, the cabinet was only an executive branch.58 In the new constitution, it assumed additional diverse functions. For example, the prime minister of the cabinet could represent the state regarding cabinet affairs.59 Kim Jong Il’s stated in January 1999: The party organizations and party cadres should not intervene in administrative matters. The party should help the cabinet be responsible for all economic affairs. Last year we made a new governmental system where the cabinet is supposed to be the control tower of the economy. The cabinet has the whole responsibility of the economy . . . No organizational unit should handle economic problems without consulting the cabinet. You should establish a strong discipline to obey the decisions of the cabinet. The decisions are the ‘will’ of the party and they are to implement the economic policies of the party.60 This reference demonstrated that Kim recognized the negative results of the party’s past economic interventions. The prime minister’s role in North Korean politics has developed into a more important one over time. Fourth, the new constitution added some notable sections that encouraged ‘varied’ economic activities within the socialist economy. First of all, the constitution expanded the scope of private economic activities. In the 1992 constitutional revision,61 individual economic activities were very restricted. Individuals could grow agricultural products on small plots of land around their houses and sell handmade articles in farmers’ markets.62 According to Article 24 of the new constitution, besides the economic activities of the old constitution,

Ruler (1994–present) 117 individuals could engage in ‘other legal business activities’.63 The article filled the gap between obsolete governmental economic policy and the transforming economic reality. Second, a paragraph was added to Article 33 emphasizing several economic concepts such as cost, price, and profit, which the North Korean government had refused to use as the concepts of a market economy. Third, a collective corporation and the state could become an international trade partner under Article 36, an article added to promote international trade. Fourth, the constitution also added a new section concerning ‘special economic zones’ in Article 37.64 In summary, the new constitution included four main governmental institutions: the Supreme People’s Assembly, the National Defense Commission, the Standing Committee of the Supreme People’s Assembly, and the cabinet. The four institutions are based on the principle of ‘division of labor’, not ‘separation of powers’. The Supreme People’s Assembly has sovereign legislative power that is only symbolic. When the Supreme People’s Assembly does not open sessions, its Standing Committee takes its place. Its chairman takes charge of diplomatic affairs. The National Defense Commission deals with all military affairs. The cabinet is responsible for producing the state’s wealth. All the constitutional organizations are guided by the Korean Workers’ Party. In the chapter on the state’s economy, the new constitution enlarged the realm of private economic activities and introduced the concepts of a market economy. It also allowed collective corporations to be engaged in international trade and prepared the state to face the global economy through the policy of special economic zones. Compared to the 1992 constitution, the economic chapter of the new constitution was more pragmatic.

Inter-Korean summits On 10 April 2000, Pak Chi-wˇon, South Korean Minister of Culture and Tourism, and Song Ho-gy˘ong, North Korean Vice-Chairman of the Korean Asia–Pacific Peace Committee, announced an agreement to hold a North–South summit in Beijing. Even though this had been attempted in 1994, the summit was stillborn due to its initiator Kim Il Sung’s death. Fortunately, the second attempt made headway. Kim Dae Jung, President of South Korea, and Kim Jong Il, Chairman of the North Korean National Defense Commission, held a summit in Pyongyang from 13 to 15 June 2000. The summit was the first time where both leaders of the hostile Koreas had sat face to face to discuss national issues. At the summit, the two heads of state agreed on five points called the ‘North–South Joint Declaration’: 1

2

The South and the North agreed to resolve the question of reunification on their own initiative and through the joint efforts of the Korean people, who are the masters of the country. Acknowledging that there are common elements in the South’s proposal for a confederation and the North’s proposal for a federation of lower stage as

118 Ruler (1994–present)

3

4

5

the formulae for achieving reunification, the South and the North agreed to promote reunification in that direction. The South and the North agreed to promptly resolve humanitarian issues, such as exchanging visits for separated family members and relatives on the occasion of the 15 August National Liberation Day and the question of former long-term prisoners who had refused to renounce communism. The South and the North have agreed to consolidate mutual trust by promoting balanced development of the national economy through economic cooperation and by stimulating cooperation and exchanges in civic, cultural, sports, public health, environmental, and all other fields. The South and the North have agreed to hold a dialogue between relevant authorities in the near future to implement the above agreement expeditiously.65

The first point reconfirmed the 4 July joint communiqué of 1972, the first North– South agreement, which had been made based on three unification principles: chaju (self-determination), p'yˇonghwa (peace), and minjok taedan'gyˇol (great national unity). The first and third principles were again spelled out in the joint declaration. The second point confirmed the similarity between the North Korean and South Korean proposals on unification. Both proposed a transitional stage for moving towards a unified Korea: for North Korea, this entailed a federation and, for South Korea, a confederation. However, there was a major point on which they differed. While the South Korean proposal saw a confederation as being simply a transitional stage,66 the North Korean side considered a federation to be the complete unification system.67 The South ultimately wanted to establish a unification system with a market economy while the North proposed preserving the capitalist and communist identities based on a federal system, even in the final stage of unification. Kim Jong Il insisted on writing down the second point because he feared a German-style unification in which the North would be absorbed by the capitalist South. Notwithstanding the difference between the unification proposals, he sought to emphasize the ‘preservation of the two different systems’ through the second point. The third point complied primarily with the South’s demand. For the South, the issue of South Korean separated families – most of whom had come from the North – was especially urgent because the families’ elder generation was aging. Kim Dae Jung proposed holding events for the families. In return, Kim Jong Il wanted Kim Dae Jung to return the political prisoners held in the South. These former prisoners were North Korean spies or pro-North Korean activists who had refused to renounce communism. The fourth point sought practical benefits for the North and was likely the main reason that Kim Jong Il agreed to participate in the summit. In the late 1990s, Kim had overcome the state’s worst economic situation, for the most part. However, he lacked the economic resources and financial capital necessary to revive the ailing economy. After the Law of the Management of Joint Venture and

Ruler (1994–present) 119 the Rajin–Sˇonbong special economic area failed, foreign firms hesitated to invest in the North. Kim sought aid from the South during the summit. Before the summit, an important shift in inter-Korean relations had occurred. In June 1998, Kim Jong Il allowed Chˇong Chu-yˇong, Chairman of the South Korean Hyundai Group, to begin a tour where South Korean people would travel to Mt K˘umgang in the North. Chˇong had been born near Mt K˘umgang and had attempted to initiate a business relationship with the North from the time he first went to Pyongyang in 1989. He visited the North with 500 bulls and cows – symbolic gifts for Kim Jong Il – in June and finally convinced Kim to approve a contract on the tourism project. After the June visit, Chˇong again went to the North with a herd of bulls and cows in October and persuaded Kim to finalize the project. The tour launched on schedule in November. The number of tourists rapidly increased from 10,554 in 1998 to 148,074 in 1999. At the same time, the Kim Dae Jung Administration augmented governmental aid to the North from $11 million in 1998 to $28 million in 1999.68 The Hyundai Group paid $206 million for the tour until the end of 1999.69 The growing economic incentives had a positive impact in facilitating the North’s economic cooperation with the South. Chˇong succeeded in making one more contract with Kim to establish an industrial zone near Kaesˇong in the North in October 1999. Kim Jong Il must have believed that the development of inter-Korean relations could bring more economic benefits to the North. During the 2000 summit, he disclosed his main motivation for agreeing to the summit as the following: ‘It is OK if we gain “silli (practical benefit or profit)” [from this summit], while the South wants to publicize the summit.’70 In Korean, the term silli is used to describe individual behavior based on cost–benefit calculation. Given his statement, economic incentives were his main motivation for the summit.71 Besides the fact that the North–South summit was the first to occur since the nation had divided, it also became a watershed of inter-Korean relations. Concerning unification, the summit contributed to a shift in the format of interKorean relations. Before the summit, there were several meaningful inter-Korean events and agreements – the 4 July joint communiqué of 1972; the ‘Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation (North–South Basic Agreement)’; and the ‘Joint Declaration of Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula’ in 1991. But those events and agreements had occurred irregularly and intermittently and did not result in any actual improvement in inter-Korean relations. Unlike the previous events, the inter-Korean summit not only guaranteed the continuity of inter-Korean relations, but also expanded the scope of interKorean cooperation and exchanges in the political, social, and cultural sectors. Compared with the results of inter-Korean cooperation in the pre-summit period, those of the post-summit period have been astonishing.72 The summit was also significant in that it helped Pyongyang develop international relations with Western countries. After the summit, Cho Myˇong-nok, first vice-chairman of the National Defense Commission, visited Washington in October 2000. In the same month, Madeleine Albright, US secretary of state, paid a return visit to Pyongyang. In the same year, before and after the summit,

120 Ruler (1994–present) North Korea opened diplomatic relations with four democracies including Italy, Australia, the Philippines, and the United Kingdom.73 Seven years after the first summit, a second one was held in Pyongyang from 2 to 4 October 2007. Kim Jong Il met with South Korean president Rho Moo-hyun, who only had five months left in his presidential term at the time. Reflecting the development of inter-Korean relations over the last seven years, the second agreement made between the two summits was broader and more specific than the first summit agreement had been. It stipulated eight points and detailed corresponding action plans, addressing socio-economic cooperation as well as political and security issues. Kim and Rho confirmed the first point of the 2000 summit agreement on unification principles. Besides this, there were several noteworthy contents in the second summit agreement. The first one regarded political issues. Kim and Rho agreed to respectively amend necessary legal and institutional apparatus in order to move towards unification. Even though they did not specifically mention the National Security Law of the South and the Bylaws of the Korean Workers’ Party of the North, both of which considered the other Korea as the enemy, it is assumed that they would concur on the necessity of eventually revising the law and by-laws. Another important political issue regarded talks and contacts between the two Korea’s parliaments, which would be essential for moving towards either a confederation or a federation.74 The second noteworthy content had to do with security issues. Kim and Rho consented to oppose any form of war and to firmly comply with the obligations of non-aggression. According to the second summit agreement, both sides decided to hold a defense ministerial meeting whose main agendas would include military confidence-building measures and to change an inter-Korean conflicting area in the West Sea (also known as the Yellow Sea) to a joint fishery zone. In addition, the two leaders agreed that they needed to end the existing armistice and to hold a three or four-party summit, composed of states concerned with the Korean War, in order to declare the war’s termination and to build a permanent peace regime in the Korean Peninsula.75 In the economic sector, the second agreement covered a wide range of cooperative matters. It stipulated establishing a ‘West Sea Special Zone for Peace and Cooperation’ encompassing Haeju (a North Korean port city near the DMZ), a joint fishery zone, a new special economic zone, and the Han River estuary. It also claimed that the North and South would expand the current Kaes˘ong Industrial Area, improve the Kaes˘ong–Sin˘uiju railway and the Kaes˘ong–Pyongyang highway for joint use, and construct ship-building complexes in two North Korean cities, Anby˘on and Namp'o, among other things. Compared with the 2000 summit agreement, the second summit agreement between Kim and Rho dealt with more diverse issues.76 The relationship between North and South Korea is very special in several respects. First, in terms of international law, the two Koreas are separate states and each has established its own independent government since 1948. Each government controls its population and territory. Both became members of the

Ruler (1994–present) 121 United Nations in 1991. Second, in spite of the first point, both Koreas believe themselves to be one nation and that the current Korean division is temporary because it was instated by an external power – the US. They believe that two Koreas will inevitably be unified into one in the future. This is clearly stipulated in the 1991 North–South Basic Agreement, which does not define the relationship between the two Koreas as a state-to-state relationship, but a ‘special one constituted temporarily in the process of unification’.77 In inter-Korean relations, the second psychological factor has dominated. The peninsula’s history plays an important role in shaping its people’s psychology. Since ancient times, the Korean Peninsula has been repeatedly unified and divided among political entities. When divided, the entities competed with one another until one swallowed the others’ identity. This historical experience makes Koreans believe that the present division is temporary. The most important duty of most leaders of state is to protect their country’s physical security and enhance its people’s material wealth. The leaders of the two Koreas have the additional duty of winning the competition for political legitimacy by becoming the single legitimate state on the peninsula. The competition between the two Koreas has appeared in both violent and non-violent forms. The 1950 Korean War was an extreme expression of this competition. Another violent expression has been terrorism. North Korean terrorist attacks have only targeted South Koreans. In October 1983 during a state visit by South Korean President Chun Doo Hwan to Burma (Myanmar), Pyongyang exploded a bomb at the Martyr’s Mausoleum at the National Cemetery in Rangoon (Yangon). Some high-ranking officials from the South were killed but Chun survived. The second terrorist attack occurred when North Korean spies detonated a bomb on Korean Airliners (KAL) flight 858 in November 1987. Both of these attacks occurred in the 1980s when international political situations had become threatening to the North. The terrorist attacks did not help Pyongyang, however, only bringing diplomatic isolation upon itself instead.78 After the KAL explosion, the US put the North on the State Department’s terrorist list. There were also non-violent battles for legitimacy. An example would be the 1988 Olympics (South) and the 1989 World Festival of Youth and Students (North). While the success of the Olympics became a critical juncture in South Korean diplomacy, the burdensome expenditures for the festival in the North struck a serious blow to its economy. Another non-violent case was the North’s establishment of the tombs of Tan'gun, King Tongmyˇong, and King Wang Kˇon in the early 1990s. By staking a claim as the successor of previous Korean dynasties, the North attempted to achieve an advantage over the South in the legitimacy competition. Interestingly, while the issue of national unification draws the two Koreas toward each other, the competition for national legitimacy restrains cooperation and exchanges between the two states. Ultimately, the relationship between the two Koreas is a zero-sum game. However, this does not mean that the relationship is always zero-sum because it can be a non-zero-sum game. In other words, North and South Korea can reap mutual benefits by developing their relationship.

122 Ruler (1994–present) The Kaesˇong Industrial Area being developed by South Korean firms is an example. South Korean firms offer capital and technology and North Korea provides cheap labor and land to develop the industrial area.79 The second summit agreement in 2007 also revealed the possibility of non-zero-sum inter-Korean relations. Both sides can reap benefits from the economic development. Yet, the zero-sum relationship in the legitimacy competition restrains non-zerosum cooperation. After the end of the Cold War, the North Korean leadership was suspicious that South Korea would attempt to absorb the North as West Germany had done with East Germany.80 Although Pyongyang and Seoul signed the North– South Basic Agreement and the ‘Joint Declaration of Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula’ in 1991, the two agreements were not implemented in part because of Pyongyang’s fear that the South would seek to absorb the North.81 The second point of the 2000 North–South Joint Declaration also reflects the defensive attitude that Kim Jong Il held against the South’s active unification policy. Kim Jong Il’s suspicion of the South is best exemplified by the recent growth of economic cooperation between the North and China. As of the end of 2004, a total of 300 foreign firms had entered the North, 120 of which were Chinese. While the trade rate between the North and South only amounted to 17.7 percent of total North Korean trade in 2000 and 18.4 percent in 2004, the trade rate between the North and China has exponentially increased from 20.4 percent in 2000 to 36.6 per cent in 2004. This shows that North Korea is leaning more toward China than South Korea. Except for the regions of Kaesˇong and Mt Kˇumgang, the Chinese economy is most heavily influencing the North Korean territory.82 As South Korean president Rho Moo-hyun mentioned, Kim hesitated to facilitate rapid economic cooperation with the South at the second summit in 2007.83 Although the two Koreas have agreed on several inter-Korean issues, as long as the two Koreas remain in a legitimacy competition, this suspicious attitude will continue.

Furtive reforms Even though North Korea has reformed its economy, the governmental officials hesitate to use the term ‘reform’ because it suggests the North is introducing a market economy. Instead, they prefer to employ the term ‘kaesˇon’ (‘improvement’). Historically, North Korean economic reforms underwent three critical junctures: the Habyˇongpˇop (Law of the Management of Joint Venture) in 1984, the Rajin–Sˇonbong special economic zone in 1991, and the July economic reforms in 2002. The Law of the Management of Joint Venture was the first experiment in which North Korea opened its economy to foreign investment. The state passed this law in 1984 and developed related laws which they implemented in 1985. The main goal of the first economic reform was to fill the shortage of hard currency. It was a makeshift measure rather than a strategic economic change. The first experiment ended in failure owing to the absence of institutions related to market economies. Figuratively speaking, the law was a ‘fresh drop of water in a muddy pool’.

Ruler (1994–present) 123 The second juncture came in 1991 with the end of the Cold War. North Korea established the Rajin–Sˇonbong special economic zone in the northeastern part of the state, an adaptation of Chinese economic reforms. The second economic reform also did not come out of systematic economic change. At that time, the North Korean leadership’s attitude toward economic openness was well represented in the concept of ‘drawing the net to block mosquitoes’.84 It meant that the state would open its economy ‘selectively’ within the scope of preserving its chuch'e policy. The goal of the second economic reform was the same as the first one had been: to gain hard currencies, especially dollars. After the Cold War, all of its former allies except China had demanded that the North pay in dollars when conducting international trade. The state tried to resolve the currencies shortage through a limited economic openness rather than by renovating the dysfunctional economy. There are two reasons why the state decided to make the special economic zone in its ‘northeast’ region. First, the region borders China and Russia and is near Japan. By placing the zone there, the state attempted to promote trade with and draw investment from these three countries, leaving open the possibility of others as well. Second, the area is far from the center of North Korean politics in Pyongyang. The North Korean leadership expected the long distance to minimize the negative impact of economic openness on the political center. The second economic reform almost suffered the same fate as the first. However, the South Korean entrepreneur Ch˘ong Chu-y˘ong saved it. In mid-1998, he suggested to Kim Jong Il that his Hyundai Group invest in Mt Kˇumgang, not Rajin–Sˇonbong. Ch˘ong hoped to be a pioneer by creating a tour connecting Mt Kˇumgang in the North to Mt Sˇorak in the South. Although his original plan was not realized, he succeeded in making connections with the totalitarian state. Besides the tour, this period is also noteworthy for Kim sending his governmental officials to Beijing to study the market economy.85 Ch˘ong made another agreement with Kim to build an industrial zone near Kaesˇong in October 1999.86 By this time, the ‘special economic zone’ policy became Kim’s main strategy for economic openness. On 30 January 2000, the Nodong sinmun carried a picture of Kim conducting a guidance tour in Sinˇuiju, a border city near China. In the picture, Kim was looking at a construction miniature of southern Sinˇuiju. It was later revealed that Kim planned to construct a special administrative zone similar to Hong Kong in southern Sinˇuiju.87 The plan was stillborn, however, because Chinese businessman, Yang Bin, who was supposed to administrate southern Sinˇuiju, was arrested for corruption and fraud by the Chinese government in October 2002.88 The 2000 summit became a significant event for expediting Kim’s economic reforms. In January 2001, an editorial in the Nodong sinmun quoted Kim Jong Il as saying, ‘Since we are in the twenty-first century now, we should solve all problems on the basis of new viewpoints and new heights.’ The term ‘new’ in the editorial meant ‘silli’ (practical benefit or profit). The editorial emphasized that ‘we should guarantee silli in economic affairs and be engaged in the affairs to give people silli’.89 The newspaper again maintained that workers should organize

124 Ruler (1994–present) all economic affairs only after calculating silli ‘ten or twenty times’.90 Kim first mentioned the term in the summit and by 2001, it had become a key economic concept in the society. In 2001, Kim Jong Il had opportunities to observe the changing economies of China and Russia. In January, Kim visited Shanghai in order to learn about the Chinese economic reforms. He also took a train tour across Russia for 24 days in July/August and saw how Russia undertook economic transition after the collapse of the Soviet Union. His rare international trips signaled to the outside world that he was making a plan for economic reforms. However, the North Korean government did not yet disclose what the new plan might be. The third juncture of the North Korean economic reforms came in July 2002 with the introduction of capitalistic elements to the overall economic system known as the July Economic Improvement Measures (July Measures). An integral point of the third juncture was the partial collapse of the totalitarian economy and the changing economic reality since the mid-1990s. The planned economy was dysfunctional. Except for the military sector, the civilian economic sector was no less than anarchic compared to the 1980s economy. The people lost motivation to work under the socialist economy. After the economic crisis, illegal farmers’ markets spread all over North Korean society. The markets contributed to the spread of market principles. This new economic reality had been shaping economic principles completely different from those of the socialist economy. Now the government had to adapt itself to the new reality. Kim Jong Il could no longer stick to the tenets of the obsolete chuch'e economy. The third juncture was an inevitable choice of a top decision-maker needing to face a new reality. After the July Measures, one of the most important changes was the expansion of the private economy. Originally, through these measures, the government attempted to prohibit individual trade in illegal farmers’ markets and to make the people use state-owned stores. It forced all traders to return to their previous working places. Still, it was impossible to operate industrial factories due to a chronic resource shortage and the need to give the workers wages. For the government, it was unavoidable to legalize the illegal farmers’ markets. In 2003, the government officially recognized the ‘black’ markets.91 Second, state-owned enterprises became more autonomous with the expansion of the markets. Before the July Measures, the state was supposed to set up production plans and provide resources to the enterprises, which they failed to do, giving them autonomy instead. The shortage of the resources caused the enterprises to look for a way to survive. From management to production to sales, they had to depend upon themselves. After the measures, the enterprises could use some portion of their products without delivering them to the state.92 In other words, they could sell some of their products to the markets, which encouraged the growth of the market economy. The more they produced, the more they could sell. Under the previous planned economy, they simply produced the quota that they were given by the government without regard to efficiency. Now, to save material resources and produce more, they had to pay attention to economic efficiency. They tried to

Ruler (1994–present) 125 maximize ‘practical profit’ through their economic behavior. This did not mean all of the North Korean enterprises had autonomy. The enterprises that produced military equipment still operated under the planned economy with governmental assistance. The third important change was the expansion of the monetary wage system. Before the July Measures, the food-rationing system was the primary source for daily supplies. The government distributed the supplies to the people relatively equally. An individual worker was supposed to receive an average 700 g of grain per day while a soldier or a hard labor worker about 800 g.93 The people did not have a strong motivation to work hard. When the food-rationing system was working well, the monetary wage system was supplementary. After the July Measures, however, the people had to rely upon their monetary wages.94 At the same time, the wages were given in proportion to their working capacity and productivity. The expansion of the wage system not only encouraged them to work harder, but it also developed a monetized economy. Fourth, once the public supply system collapsed, the government linked product prices with those of the markets, which were much higher than the prices set in the public supply system. With the July Measures, average goods prices rose 25 times and the average wage of the workers accordingly increased 18-fold in July 2002. Food costs, which occupied 3.5 percent of household living expenses before the measures, now accounted for 50 percent.95 After the measures, the people suffered from inflation caused by the lack of products and the skyrocketing prices. The third juncture’s impact was very significant. The July Measures have become deeply embedded in people’s daily life and have changed many aspects of the society. First, ‘profit’ became the most important principle of economic behavior. Even the government has leased state-owned stores to private individuals or Chinese firms that can make a profit. Second, some individuals began accumulating wealth through various businesses, thus widening the economic gap between the poor and the rich.96 Third, the government developed a taxation system to garner governmental revenues from individuals’ commercial activities. After the July Measures, Kim Jong Il continued to drive economic reforms. In October/November 2002, a group of high-ranking North Korean officials visited the South for nine days to tour South Korean industrial areas. In 2004, North Korean officials held several investment expositions in Chinese Provinces to induce Chinese capital.97 In January 2006, five years after visiting Shanghai, Kim traveled to the Shenzhen special economic zone in Guangdong Province. In addition to the policies of special economic zones and the July Measures, Kim appears to be adopting a developmental strategy for raising big businesses similar to that of Park Chung Hee. In the 1960s, Park used the strategy to spur rapid industrialization by creating giant conglomerates, known as chaebˇol (i.e. Samsung, Hyundai, and LG), through governmental financing. The conglomerates became the spearheads of Park’s other developmental strategy: export-oriented trade policy. The two strategies have been successful in allowing the South to compete in the global economy and to escape from the status of an underdeveloped state.

126 Ruler (1994–present) Kim Jong Il is emulating Park’s strategy. The North is supporting big businesses that will be able to compete in the global economy as fast as possible. Like a South Korean chaebˇol, a North Korean conglomerate is involved in a variety of businesses including mining, motorbikes, and pharmaceuticals.98 Given the small scale of the domestic market, the main role of the North Korean conglomerates must be to export products to foreign countries. The problem is that the North has few financial sources to actualize Kim’s developmental strategies. To succeed in an export-oriented trade policy, North Korea has to gain financial support from foreign countries as Park did from the US and Japan. Kim’s two meetings with Japanese Prime Minister, Junichiro Koizumi, in September 2002 and May 2004, must have been held for the purpose of gaining economic assistance from Japan. Now, market and planned economies coexist in North Korea. The North Korean economic change became fully fledged from the time of the third juncture. While the changing economic reality pushed the government to reform its economy before the July Measures, the government has led the economic reforms since the measures. In other words, the government initiated the economic reforms and there is no doubt that Kim Jong Il is orchestrating them. Yet, Kim has reformed the economy without touching the political system. It is not certain to what extent Kim Jong Il will introduce the elements of the market economy into the collapsed economy and it is yet unproven how long the planned economy can resist the invasion of the market economy and whether the growth of the market economy will be accompanied by a civil society over time.

Manipulation of danger Since the Korean War, North Korea and the US have been technically in a state of armistice. The experiences of the war and the Cold War put North and South Korea in a security dilemma. The two Koreas have built up strong military capabilities. The North has as many as 1.1 million military troops and the South 681,000. As of 2004, nearly 70 percent of North Korean ground forces and 40 percent of its air forces were forward positioned south of the Pyongyang–Wˇonsan line.99 The South Korean forces are similarly stationed near the demilitarized zone of the 38th parallel. Although the global Cold War has disappeared into history, a Cold War on the Korean Peninsula continues. Since the Korean War, one of the defining characteristics of North Korean diplomacy with the US (and neighboring democratic countries) has been ‘crisis diplomacy’. An international crisis denotes ‘a sequence of interactions between the governments of two or more sovereign states in severe conflict, short of actual war, but involving the perception of a dangerously high probability of war’.100 During the Cold War, the North’s seizure of the Pueblo and the P'anmunjˇom axe murders provoked the US. In the post-Cold War era, its nuclear program has created another crisis as the state challenges the nuclear non-proliferation regime that the US leads. According to Bruce Cumings, Pyongyang’s desire to obtain nuclear weapons is traced back to the Korean War. America’s threat to use atomic bombs

Ruler (1994–present) 127 during the Korean War and its nuclear strategy after the war prompted North Korea to pursue them.101 During the Cold War, the nuclear umbrella of the Soviet Union restrained the North’s nuclear ambition, pressurizing the state to avoid weaponizing plutonium. After the Soviet Union’s collapse, Russia lost its diplomatic leverage to intervene in North Korean nuclear policy. In the Americandominant post-Cold War order, North Korea had to secure its own survival. From Pyongyang’s perspective, the nuclear weapons program was probably the most effective means by which North Korea could secure the Kim Jong Il regime from the perceived US threat. Although Carter’s visit defused the first nuclear crisis of 1993–1994, the crisis was a breathtaking example of crisis diplomacy almost leading to a military conflict.102 For Kim Jong Il, the nuclear weapons card has multiple purposes. First of all, as aforementioned, it can be used to discourage attacks by the US and its allies. Second, the nuclear weapons can be a bargaining chip to start talks with the US and others for diplomatic normalization and economic assistance. Third, North Korean nuclear weapons can offset South Korea’s cutting-edge conventional weapons vis-à-vis North Korea’s outdated conventional weapons. Fourth, states with nuclear weapons have been considered major military powers. Pyongyang might believe that it will be a ‘prestigious’ military power and enhance the legitimacy of the Kim Jong Il regime by retaining the weapons. Fifth, the weapons might tacitly enhance the North Korean bargaining position when it deals with other ‘nonnuclear’ states. North Korea’s ‘crisis diplomacy’ is a strategy that manipulates the danger of a military conflict. The strategy is effective in a situation where all concerned states are entangled in the danger. This is called brinkmanship. In The Strategy of Conflict, Thomas C. Schelling described brinkmanship as follows: The brink is a curved slope that one can stand on with some risk of slipping, the slope gets steeper and the risk of slipping greater as one moves toward the chasm. But the slope and the risk of slipping are rather irregular; neither the person standing there nor onlookers can be quite sure just how great the risk is, or how much it increases when one takes a few more steps downward. One does not, in brinkmanship, frighten the adversary who is roped to him by getting so close to the edge that if one decides to jump one can do so before anyone can stop him. Brinkmanship involves getting onto the slope where one may fall in spite of his own best efforts to save himself, dragging his adversary with him. Brinkmanship is thus the deliberate creation of a recognizable risk of war, a risk that one does not completely control.103 The participants in brinkmanship do not attempt to follow through with a war, but cleverly exploit its potential danger. To achieve the goal of brinkmanship, concerned participants need to employ tactics that include bluffing, intimidation, or cheating in their interactions.

128 Ruler (1994–present) The geopolitical situation in northeast Asia is favorable to brinkmanship. As historians of northeast Asia have observed, the power changes in northeast Asia had drawn Korea into the vortex of the changes since ancient times and, in turn, Korea affected the area in many ways. In the twentieth century, the bipolar Cold War divided Korea into North and South Korea. During the war, the Korean Peninsula acted as a buffer zone where the communist and the democratic blocs collided with each other. The Korean War that the North initiated for national unification expanded into an international one as the US and China became involved in. In the two nuclear crises of 1993–1994 and 2001–present, South Korea, China and Russia have been against the UN sanctions and possible US military action that could ignite a physical clash on the peninsula. If there were a war between North Korea and the US, North Korea would attack US military bases in South Korea or Japan, which would infringe on the sovereignty of the two states. The two US allies would not be able to avoid war. There is no doubt that the peninsula would become the war’s battlefield. China and Russia would not be free from the war either. Massive numbers of North Korean refugees would move into China and Russia. In particular, the war could be a factor that would negatively affect Chinese economic development. In the long term, if North Korea were to be defeated in the war, the two major powers would lose their buffer zone and have to face a unified Korea with the US stationed within. Therefore, China and Russia would have several incentives for intervening in the war. Ironically, Kim Jong Il has adroitly maneuvered the complicated geopolitical situation with his nuclear diplomacy (as well as missile diplomacy).104 By using this provocative diplomacy, he extracts as many political and economic concessions from neighboring countries as he can without weakening his negotiation position. North Korea’s general attitude has been tough and defiant of external pressure.105 The state walked out of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty in 1993 and 2003. It also kicked out the inspectors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Its rhetoric has been belligerent: ‘Economic sanctions mean war;’ ‘We don’t want war, but we don’t fear it either;’ and ‘We will respond to dialogue with dialogue and war with war.’ After declaring that it possesses nuclear weapons in February 2005,106 the North insisted, ‘Our nuclear weapons are means for self-defense. The US is not the only state that has the right of preemptive attack.’ Kim Jong Il’s fundamental viewpoint on international relations is that the current international relations are based on the principle that ‘the stronger preys upon the weaker’.107 Only power can make justice. Invasions and pillaging are imperialism’s characteristics. Imperialists’ ambition cannot be changed regardless of changes in international relations. International aid is a noose for becoming dependent on imperialists.108 Kim believes that nuclear weapons are the single deterrent against other states’ attack on North Korea in the hostile international environment.109 In the US-dominated international system, the ultimate goal of Kim Jong Il’s crisis diplomacy is to gain the US’s security guarantee without undermining Kim’s regime’s stability. It is likely that Kim’s best option is for North Korea to normalize

Ruler (1994–present) 129 diplomatic relations with the US as a nuclear state. This occurred in India and Pakistan. Another alternative for Kim’s position might be that until he is completely satisfied with the US security guarantee, he will not give up the nuclear card.

Survival strategies Kim Il Sung’s death had marked the beginning of the most serious economic difficulties in North Korean history. In spite of predictions by external experts that this would cause the Kim Jong Il regime to collapse, followed by a power struggle for leadership, Kim Jong Il maintained his regime throughout this and other predicaments. The economic difficulties did not lead to the whole system’s collapse. Why does the Kim Jong Il regime not collapse? There are several reasons for its stability. First of all, the North Korean leadership itself has been stable. There seemed to be rare political cases against Kim Jong Il in the mid-1990s,110 which included Hwang Chang-yˇop’s defection in 1997, but these remained isolated incidents that did not ignite any significant resistance to Kim. The party’s topranking officers and the military have remained loyal to Kim and united around him. Thus far, there are no signs of an imminent implosion within the leadership. Second, Kim has upheld many of the suppressive institutions, including the party, the police, the secret police, and the concentration camps in spite of the economy’s partial collapse. Although he reformed some of the economic institutions he did not dismantle the political ones. These totalitarian institutions continue to allow the state to scrutinize the people and nip any sign of political resistance in the bud. The government often publicly executes antirevolutionary figures in order to discourage the masses from staging any organized resistance. The third reason that the Kim Jong Il regime survives results from decades of ideological indoctrination. In the past, totalitarian education had made the people unconditionally obedient to the party and Kim while remaining hostile to the outside world. The past ideological indoctrination played a particularly important role during the Arduous March in the mid-1990s. Although a number of people died during the famine, none of those remaining visibly opposed the regime and most remained in the state. The continuing economic failure, however, is chipping away at the chuch'e propaganda’s effectiveness. Contact with information from the outside world is also gradually changing the people’s ideological orientation. Ideological indoctrination’s importance in maintaining the regime’s stability is weakening. The fourth reason for the regime’s stability is related to geopolitical complications. Since the economic disasters, hundreds of thousands of the North Korean people defected to China, a traditional ally. They could not go to the South directly because huge military forces and landmines block the 38th parallel. Defections to China were less threatening to the Kim Jong Il regime than those to the South. Had the parallel line been porous, many more North Korean people would probably have moved to the South and the massive migration would have facilitated the

130 Ruler (1994–present) collapse of the North’s political system. This geopolitical situation was fortunate for the regime. Besides its stability factors, Kim’s survival strategies also explain his regime’s endurance. Kim Jong Il’s ultimate goal is to preserve his regime and assure political succession to the next generation. In order to accomplish this, he has adopted survival strategies for resisting domestic and international challenges. One of these strategies is to mobilize military forces for risk management, a policy known as ‘military-first politics’. Since the mid-1990s when the party and other governmental organizations did not work well, Kim prioritized the military not only to protect the state from the imperial threat, but also to maintain law and order. Besides national security, the military had to maintain internal security. Military-first politics suggested that the society would be endangered by a breach in his regime’s security. Traditionally the military was the totalitarian regime’s foremost supporter but it did not come forward to maintain the society except during the period of the Korean War. The strategy of military-first politics will be addressed further in Chapter 6. Another of his strategies has been ‘muddling through by jettisoning’. Since the mass starvations, Kim disclaimed responsibility for the society at large. He abandoned what he could not successfully manage. He has food distributed to his priority sectors – the military, the secret police, and the party – and uses the state’s limited resources for defense industries first, dispensing whatever is left to the other industries. Kim has depended on international aid to care for the sectors that governmental distribution does not reach – those less useful to the regime. Whatever the aid cannot cover has fallen to the responsibility of individuals. In other words, he muddles his way through by giving up the less important elements in the society. His third strategy is a pragmatic approach. Externally, Kim opened parts of his territory to induce foreign investment, especially from Chinese and South Korean businesses. Since 2000, he has also begun diplomatic relations with some Western countries. Internally, Kim has introduced some elements of a market economy to revive the economy. His leadership’s pragmatic characteristic should be highlighted to understand the changes in the totalitarian society. Chapter 6 will analyze this part of his leadership. His fourth strategy for survival is to use crisis diplomacy to manipulate the geopolitical situation in northeast Asia. Nuclear weapons and missiles are the main means for this diplomacy. For Kim Jong Il, nuclear weapons are a last resort to protect his regime from external threat. As mentioned above, the weapons are being used for multiple purposes. Until Kim is completely devoid of the threat from the US, his crisis diplomacy will likely continue. Kim Jong Il’s last strategy has focused on reducing the pressure from the US by embracing the South through the principle of national unity and strengthening relations with its traditional allies, China and Russia. By developing the state’s relations with China and Russia – who also want to check US hegemony in northeast Asia – Kim strives to receive security and economic assistance from the two states. For Kim, inter-Korean relations are also useful in limiting the American

Ruler (1994–present) 131 hard-line policy’s effectiveness. Strengthened inter-Korean relations could reduce US foreign policy’s effectiveness because the US needs the South’s cooperation in order for their hard-line policy to succeed. As the North develops its relationship with the South, Kim Jong Il tries to draw the South onto the North’s side and away from the US sphere of influence. Along with the crisis diplomacy, the shrewd diplomatic strategy of using international relations has certainly contributed to the survival of Kim Jong Il’s regime.

Summary North Korea in the post-Kim Il Sung period has differed significantly from the North Korea before his death. Externally, the international tensions caused by the ongoing nuclear crisis have threatened the security of the Kim Jong Il regime. Domestically, the totalitarian system that had remained strong for several decades began to be shaken. During this period, the state underwent its most difficult period since the Korean War. Combined with natural disasters, decades of economic problems caused mass starvation. Millions of the North Korean people starved to death or were displaced while trying to find food. When China and the former Soviet Union began their reforms, the North Korean leadership desperately resisted the reforms and strengthened the ideological education on chuch'e by emphasizing social unity. Ignoring the need for policy changes in the 1980s resulted in the tremendous socioeconomic cost of the 1990s. The mass starvation demonstrated well how the economic policy’s failure and the absence of their timely amendment led to the disaster. However, ironically Kim’s continuing adherence to the chuch'e socialism might prevent the total breakdown of the whole North Korean system. During this period, the state was steadily losing its control over the society. A shortage of economic resources made it difficult to set up or implement economic plans. The state’s food-rationing system collapsed. Unable to continue depending on the state, the people had to develop their own means of survival. The socio-economic reasons – food shortages, the collapse of the rationing system, the malfunctioning economy, the growth of market, and the people’s increased mobility – weakened the state’s control over the people. The state’s ideological indoctrination was no longer as with the people. This period more clearly showed the pragmatic character of Kim Jong Il’s leadership through his reform measures than the previous period. Yet, compared with the urgent North Korean reality in the post-Kim Il Sung period, Kim Jong Il’s response was surprisingly slow and incremental. Until the late 1990s, he did not take drastic measures to change previous economic policies. He waited until after the mass starvation ended and the food situation improved to initiate new economic policies. Since then, Kim Jong Il has gradually approved several limited economic reforms to develop the ailing economy, but they have not resolved the problems yet. The slow response not only represents how strongly reactive the North Korean leadership has been to change, but also how worried Kim Jong Il is about the economic reforms’ potential negative impact to his regime.

132 Ruler (1994–present) Before his father’s death, Kim Jong Il was aware of how much the world had changed through his access to media like CNN or NHK. He knew that South Korea’s economic development had been successful, implying that a market economy was more productive and efficient than a socialist one. Even though his father’s policies failed to improve the people’s living standard, Kim Jong Il did not quickly shift away from them even after his father’s death. As the heir of the dynastic totalitarian regime, it would be difficult for him to overturn his father’s policies because his father’s authority was the basis for his own political legitimacy. Denouncing his father would undermine his own legitimacy. During the Arduous March of 1995–1998, protecting his political legitimacy outweighed saving his people from the starvation through radical economic reforms. Yuhun t'ongch'i (rule by the will of his father), the three-year mourning period for his father, and the Kim Il Sung Constitution have strengthened the dynastic character of the state, but in the post-Kim Il Sung era, Kim Jong Il should have become the father of the state instead of remaining his father’s loyal son.

6

Leadership

Thus far, this book has addressed Kim Jong Il’s development and activities. Some characteristics of Kim’s leadership were discussed in the previous chapters, but not comprehensively enough to understand his peculiar leadership style. In this chapter, I will analyze the salient characteristics of his leadership and their impact on North Korean society in detail. In order to achieve this, some observations and arguments made earlier will be reintroduced in this chapter. Human beings’ words and behaviors are often inconsistent. As a human being, Kim Jong Il’s are hardly coherent at all. In addition, Kim is a long-time leader of a totalitarian state and has had to face continually changing conditions for several decades. The events and circumstances of the 1970s differ from those of the 2000s, demanding that he approach them appropriately. He adapted himself to these different situations in order to maintain his political power. Thus, statements from the 1970s are unlike those of the 2000s, some outright contradicting each other. It is almost impossible for Kim Jong Il’s words and behavior to be neatly organized into one style of leadership. While some of his leadership choices were clearly apparent when he became the successor, others became apparent only once he began ruling the state by himself.

Speed campaign Kim Jong Il and speed A noticeable style of his leadership is its emphasis on ‘speed,’ which materializes in ‘soktojˇon’ (speed campaign or speed battle). Most of Kim’s activities focus on speed, as described in his official biographies, a characteristic which appeared in the early stages of his political career. In other words, the speed campaign is the basic form of his working style. Once he has made up his mind, he focuses on the goal and persistently pushes his original decisions ahead, in spite of some problems that emerge during the process of implementation. He is the kind of person who is most satisfied once his plans are speedily accomplished. Immediately after he became the heir, Kim Jong Il declared the speed campaign to be the ‘basic form of campaign for socialist construction’ at the national seminar of party ideological officials in February 1974. He articulated that ‘the basic

134 Leadership demand of the speed campaign is that the highest quality of work should be guaranteed while all resources should be fully mobilized to carry out a project in the shortest possible amount of time. In other words, the speed campaign should achieve the highest value in the shortest time.’1 Regarding ‘speed’, an official Kim biography specifically describes this working style as follows: It was the time [1984] when the groundwork for the construction of the Namp'o Barrage was almost done. The next stage was to build a structure but the resources for the structure were not provided yet because [workers] had done the groundwork earlier than expected . . . It was a serious circumstance to reduce construction speed. Secretary Kim grasped this circumstance. He said that it was no way to adjust the speed due to the delay of construction resources and equipment. He was confident that he would resolve the problem. He ordered his staff to hold a meeting of enterprise managers working in the construction industry. The staff replied that the managers were in local areas where the construction enterprises were located. It would take a couple of days to assemble them into Pyongyang. There upon, Kim said that it was too slow. The workers of the barrage were anxiously waiting for the resources and equipment. He ordered that the meeting be held at the construction site of the barrage, not Pyongyang, on the following day [. . .] Only after one day, a number of the managers rushed to the construction site. [His order and followers’ execution] were thoroughly consistent and disciplined, which could be seen only in the time of war. The meeting was a great success. After a while, the construction resources and equipment arrived in the site from all over the country. The issue to adjust the construction speed completely came to an end.2 It is no exaggeration to say that speed relates to his personal temperament. Kim Jong Il is an impetuous man whose personality is deeply ingrained into his leadership style. He enjoys speed and spends his free time car racing, horse riding and jet skiing. Another official biography confirms the direct relationship between Kim’s personality and speed as follows: It may be said that the speed campaign was a product of the Secretary’s [Kim Jong Il] deep insight and wisdom and at the same time a reflection of his progressive and passionate temperament [. . .]

Leadership 135 It [speed campaign] reflected the youthful zeal and passion of the Secretary who rejected all negative aspects such as lethargy, lack of tension, senility, stagnation, passivity and conservativeness and who valued rapidity and impetuousness [. . .] The Secretary’s temperament – passionate, quick in action and openhearted – was seen in the fact that he finished his work straight off, no matter what he did. To advance quickly and to develop his work without an interruption was his own style of work and action, and this temperament was faithfully reflected in the speed campaign.3 The principle of speed brought Kim Jong Il to the throne – he was very ambitious from a young age. He needed to demonstrate his successes to his father and the old guerrillas as quickly as he could. Only ‘rapid’ successes in his job could ensure support from the North Korean leadership. In that context, speed was instrumental in his job performance. Around the mid-1960s, there were debates on speed and balance in economic development in the communist bloc as well as in North Korea. In these debates, Kim Il Sung opposed the Soviet’s policy focusing on balance in development. For him, the speedy economic development that started after the Korean War was urgently needed in order to catch up with the developed socialist Soviet economy.4 The 1967 Kapsan incident was partially related to the speed versus balance debates. In June 1967, in explaining the relationship between speed and balance in economic development after the Kapsan incident, Kim Jong Il argued that ‘primary importance should be put on speed . . . In the socialist economy, balance is needed only to ensure the speed of economic development. As a means, economic balance should be subordinate to speed.’5 After the Kapsan group’s downfall, prioritizing speed had remained fixed as an indomitable doctrine of economic development. Before Kim was selected as the political successor, his ‘lightning quick’ way of working was mainly manifested in making films and operas. According to North Korea, the film Fate of a Self-Defense Corps Man was produced in forty days under Kim’s guidance. It took less than two years for him to guide the completion of the five revolutionary operas – Sea of Blood, A Flower Girl, Tell the Story, Forest!, The Song of Mt Kˇumgang, and A True Daughter of the Party – all of which North Korea was proud of. When Sea of Blood was created in 1971, Kim Jong Il ordered a great number of prominent North Korean artists to come to Pyongyang in order to compose songs, develop choreography, write librettos, and draw background paintings. One month after the actors and actresses began to practice, the revolutionary opera, Sea of Blood was staged.6 After his official succession, the speed campaign was applied to economic construction as he took charge of economic affairs. His main role was to mobilize the masses and material resources to achieve the country’s economic goals as rapidly as he could. His personal trait meshed well with the policy needs of his

136 Leadership father, who, as the leader of an underdeveloped country, wanted to develop the North Korean economy into a developed one in a quantum leap. Speedy construction In terms of economic construction, an archetypal case in which Kim Jong Il’s speed campaign was applied was the 70-Day Battle of 1974. The 70-Day Battle was the first mass campaign over which Kim was put in charge after becoming the second in command of North Korean politics. Around 1974, the North Korean economy reached its production limits in the industrial sector due to external and internal problems. Internationally the world suffered from an oil crisis in 1973, which affected the state’s economy. Domestically, by the mid-1970s the state had still not solved economic problems that the state had faced since the 1960s, like the shortage of material resources, inefficient labor management, old factory equipment, and low morale by workers who labored without material incentives. To cope with the limited production, Kim Il Sung decided to organize a ‘short-term’ mass mobilization called the 70-Day Battle and let his son guide it. Before carrying out the battle, Kim Jong Il constructed an action plan as a ‘field commander’ would. First, he developed a central command consisting of party and administration officials to act as general staff. He also established command posts at the provincial level under the central command. Second, he dispatched guidance groups to all provinces, cities, counties and important production units. These guidance groups had arbitrary discretion to mobilize any workforce under their authority, except for students. They were also supposed to lead all the ThreeRevolution Teams working in localities at that time. Third, all production units made daily reports to the central command by way of provincial and county organizations. Through the reports, Kim Jong Il knew how the 70-Day Battle was progressing. Fourth, he also mobilized most white-collar workers and intellectuals into the battle. Fifth, to save time, he made all working units temporarily suspend their daily meetings and participate in the production process. He demanded that party members have a meeting only once every ten days. Sixth, he employed the methods of propaganda and agitation to raise the work morale of the masses in production areas. Newspapers, broadcasts, news agencies and periodicals encouraged the masses to work at a higher speed and with greater enthusiasm. In addition, he sent art troupes to production sites.7 The 70-Day Battle started in October 1974. During the battle, the workers were actively engaged in achieving what they were assigned to do. A Kim biography illustrates a scene of the battle: It happened that because of an unexpected accident three of the heating furnaces at the Kangson Steel Plant were suspended. It was necessary to wait until the furnaces cooled in order to do repair work on them. The thought that production had to be suspended made the workers impatient, but they could not but stand with folded arms with a sad look. But the next moment,

Leadership 137 they vied with each other to jump into the still hot furnaces without saying a word. Some of them were burnt while doing repair work in the furnaces, but they behaved as if nothing had happened. Three-revolution team members and art activists who were there as propagandists also helped in the work to repair the furnaces. When the heating furnaces began to operate in about 48 hours, the heroes shared joy hugging each other and shouting ‘Manse [Hurrah]!’8 When the battle was over, the annual economic goals of 1974 were fulfilled ahead of schedule and surpassed those of 1973 by 117 percent, according to official North Korean documents. A number of workers received ‘political’ compensation. More than 300 workers were awarded the title of ‘Labor Hero’. State decorations were conferred on more than 150,000 workers. The government presented Kim Jong Il with the title ‘Hero of the Republic’ in February 1975.9 Notwithstanding this quantitative success in the short-term economic campaign, the 70-Day Battle revealed patterns similar to ones generated by other North Korean mass campaigns. First, as the party initiated the battle, Kim Jong Il strengthened the intervention of the central party into economic activities rather than giving lower-level governmental officials economic discretion, which denoted that Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il did not trust the lower-level officials and tried to solve economic problems through the central party’s direct control of economic activities. Second, Kim Jong Il did not pay attention to the issue of economic rationality. He only focused on the economic output regardless of the input. Resources were likely wasted due to this goal-oriented leadership. Third, the total mobilization of the masses hindered balanced social development. In particular, as the party indiscriminately mobilized intellectuals to reach its shortterm economic goals, the intellectuals could not concentrate on the research that was essential to long-term social development. Fourth, the battle depended on manual labor, not technological innovation, which related to the second and the third problems. Fifth, the party’s overemphasis on ideological indoctrination decreased the motivation of the masses who had worked very hard with little material compensation. Kim Jong Il was unaware of these problems. It was important for him to fulfill economic goals set by the National Planning Commission. He believed that the economy would improve only if he contributed to carrying out the goals. However, he knew very little about economics. Kim Jong Il continued to organize similar production campaigns such as the 100-Day and the 200-Day Battle. Around mid-1982, North Korea seemed to face another economic quandary similar to the one in 1974. In the early 1980s, the state had completed many construction projects, including Ch'anggwang Street in 1980, the Grand People’s Study House, the Ice Rink and Ch'ˇongryu Restaurant in 1981. Further, Kim Jong Il had directed party and governmental cadres to build a number of edifices including Mansu Street (with 7,000 housing units), the Tower of the Chuch'e Idea, the Arch of Triumph, and Kim Il Sung Stadium in April 1982 to celebrate Kim Il Sung’s seventieth birthday.10 The aftermath of the great construction projects

138 Leadership occurred immediately in May. After Kim Il Sung’s birthday, governmental officials who had assessed North Korean production capacity and resource supplies tried to reduce the speed of industrial production. Adjusting the speed showed the construction projects’ negative effects on the economy. However, Kim Jong Il ignored their recommendations. At a meeting in June, he criticized the officials for arbitrary speed adjustment. Instead of settling the economic problems with economic principles, he initiated another mass campaign, known as the 1980s Speed Creation Movement, to strengthen ideological education.11 Not until 1990, when the North Korean economy no longer had hope of revival, was Kim aware of his speed campaigns’ negative effects. In January 1990, at a meeting with party and cabinet officials, Kim condemned the National Planning Commission, saying: It is important to properly solve the problem of production growth speed and balance . . . The National Planning Commission tends to set the speed too high without considering the balance. The commission always insists that high growth speed, as a socialist economic principle, be maintained. It demands lower-working units sustain unrealistic production speed. If the commission continues to do that, the units cannot fulfill the growth speed. Economic balance would be disrupted. Ultimately the overall economy falls into disorder. Under the cause of high production speed, making unrealistic planning ‘numbers’ is betraying the party, the state and the people.12 Given the grim economic conditions, his reflection came too late. Yet, he did not change his economic policy even after the reflection – Kim’s efforts for speedy construction persisted. He started the 1990s Speed Creation Movement in the 1990s and even now, he still requires speed to achieve his strategic vision of a ‘strong and prosperous state’. Exhaustion Kim’s leadership style underlining speed might help achieve short-term economic goals, but overall it has had more negative impacts on the society than positive ones. Combined with other political factors that impeded the state’s economic development, his ‘speed’ style facilitated the economy’s degeneration. Contrary to his argument, the speed campaign did not guarantee a high quality of work. Because of his impatience, officials were busy fulfilling economic goals in the shortest time with less care for the quality of their work. They were engrossed in quantitative goals to satisfy their leader regardless of how many resources they spent. When they could not achieve the goals, they probably distorted economic statistics. Kim’s speed campaigns also created an imbalance in resource distribution. Kim poured the state’s limited resources into his primary interests at the cost of other necessary areas. For example, in the Namp'o Barrage’s construction, while Kim was mustering construction resources and equipment from all over the state for

Leadership 139 the structure of the barrage, other construction sites had to delay their work. He easily mobilized whatever he wanted. He could achieve the prototype of speed campaign, but others could not. Moreover, Kim’s speed campaigns contributed to exhausting resources and the masses’ motivation to work. Frequent mobilization made the masses respond to it mechanically. Kim himself confessed the negative aspects of mass mobilizations and speed campaigns when he pointed out that workers were idle in the early part of the month and rushed into their monthly quota in the later part, ruining machines and squandering resources.13 Namely, the workers perfunctorily reacted to frequent, speedy mass mobilizations and dissipated material resources without giving any thought to chuch'e.

Director Artistic bent Another salient characteristic of Kim Jong Il’s leadership is his artistic inclination. He does not personally create artistic works but he appreciates them. He is ‘the connoisseur’ of North Korean art, literature, and architecture. He previews most films, plays and operas before releasing them, listens to most songs, and reviews the designs of all grand buildings in North Korean society. He grants the artistic works the ultimate approval, thus they all reflect his aesthetic tastes. His official biographies note many episodes relating to his artistic talent. According to one episode, when he was listening to a song played by an orchestra, Kim promptly pointed out a halftone played by one musician.14 He is also skilled at playing various musical instruments.15 Kim Il Sung commented on his son’s artistic talent saying, ‘He is still insatiable, although he has built up splendid structures, and he constantly creates new things in grandeur.’16 There are more examples of his attachment to art and literature. According to Sin Sang-ok, Kim has a private three-story building in which he keeps tens of thousands of films from all over the world. Hundreds of people work in the building translating and recording foreign films. Kim receives the films from his entourage, whose exclusive task is to purchase them in foreign countries.17 The building is located in a secluded area because it retains films with ‘impure ideologies’ containing sex, violence, love, humor, freedom, and so on. If he opened the place to the public, he believes that people would soon become imbued with these ideological elements. Only those with his permission can access the building. Kim can freely watch the films because he is supposedly immune to the ideologies. Watching the foreign films is one way that Kim survives the ‘boring’ totalitarian society that he and his father have created. Through the films, the ‘philosopher-king’ knows about the ‘shining’ world outside of ‘the cave’. What the people would see, however, would just be ‘the shadows on the wall’. In addition to gratifying his personal tastes, the three-story building is the source of Kim’s knowledge about film. By using the films, he can acquire more knowledge than his staff. He learns new film-making techniques from the advanced foreign

140 Leadership films and teaches the techniques to North Korean film directors. Kim is also said to obtain information for North Korean underground agent activities from spy movies.18 Another case of his attachment to art and literature is shown in North Korean currency. North Korea may be the only state with currency on which the protagonist of a film is drawn.19 The female protagonist of A Flower Girl is drawn on one side of the one-won bill. In addition, Kim’s publications disclose his affection for art and literature. Besides his works on the chuch'e idea, he published written works on many sub-fields of art and literature: On the Art of the Cinema (1973); On the Art of the Opera (1974); On the Art of the Theater (1988); On the Art of the Dance (1990); On the Fine Art (1991); On the Art of the Architecture (1991); and On the Chuch'e Literature (1992). It is not believed that Kim himself wrote the works. However, the works represent not only the degree to which he is interested in art and literature, but also how much he wants to be the authoritative figure in the area. Director Kim has effectively connected his preference for art and literature with his official job.20 When he worked in the Propaganda and Agitation Department in the late 1960s and the early 1970s, he was quite successful in his career. Under the principle of the speed campaign, he guided film and opera directors to produce numerous works. In particular, he initiated a unique genre known as the revolutionary opera, by helping opera directors introduce stanzas and invent ‘offstage singing’ into operas. Those periods were the heyday of the North Korean art and literature and his success in art and literature took him to political power. His artistic bent usually rose to the surface when he visited places where artistic works were being created. He behaved like a director when he visited the locales in which movies, operas, plays, mass games, and grand buildings were being made. ‘Real’ directors only remained moderators. With his vast knowledge of art, literature and architecture, he gave directions to real directors and crews to meet his artistic preferences. Sin Kyˇong-wan, who worked with Kim Jong Il in the Propaganda and Agitation Department in the early 1970s, supports Kim’s ‘director’ character: In 1973 when I was in the same department with Kim Jong Il, I had a hard time [in finding him] whenever I needed to get his approval. It was difficult to know when he came and left his office. One day, when we were making a revolutionary opera, I had to get his endorsement but didn’t know where he was. So I went to a theater. He was engrossed in listening to actors’ singing there. I didn’t talk to him [and waited]. After the singing was done, I reported to him. [He looked back to me and said,] ‘When did you come here? If you came, you should have told me earlier. You wasted your time.’ . . . When I went to a documentary film studio, he was doing a preview of a documentary film. I had the same experience many times.21

Leadership 141 Sin related another story: To choose a singer who would sing a theme song of A Flower Girl, Kim Jong Il let five or six singers sing the song individually. While Kim was listening to their singing, the atmosphere was as serious as a religious ritual. After listening, he told them one by one what was wrong. After this selection process, Kim finally picked a singer for the theme song.22 Official Kim biographies also address other episodes similar to Sin’s recollections. According to North Korea, when revolutionary operas were made, Kim gave crews instructions in musical composition, choreography, production, acting, among others. When the opera Fate of a Self-Defense Corps Man was made, Kim listened to a total of 10,164 tunes to select songs for the opera.23 While this may have been exaggerated, he was nonetheless deeply involved in making of the operas. Another area where his ‘director’ character appears is in mass games. North Korea is famous for mass games. The mass gymnastics and games are a cultural characteristic of the totalitarian society. Kim has made efforts to popularize mass gymnastics. He ordered the party to establish mass gymnastic facilities in Pyongyang as well as other localities. For Kim, gymnastics is important because it trains teenagers to have strong constitutions as well as collective spirit through collective moves. At the same time, gymnastics can be utilized to portray a certain artistic beauty as it is combined with music and painting.24 The gymnastics are applied to mass games that the state holds during national holidays. Whenever the state holds mass games, Kim becomes the general director who finalizes the techniques and content of the games. He determines the main theme of each mass game. Sometimes Kim Jong Il shows off the ‘amazing’ mass games to foreign guests. In 2002 and 2005, North Korea held the mass game extravaganza Arirang in which around 100,000 North Korean people participated. The extravaganza continued for four months in 2002 and two months in 2005. The state invited foreigners to attend it.25 Kim also uses mass extravaganza to deliver his political messages to foreign guests. When Madeleine Albright, US secretary of state, visited North Korea in October 2000, he prepared a mass game for Albright and other American guests. A card section of the mass game created a Taep'odong missile being fired into the sky and portrayed the 1998 missile test. Watching the scene, he revealed his intention to delay a missile test for the time being.26 In addition to art, literature and mass games, architecture is another area where Kim satisfies his aesthetic delight. When he decides to have structures built, he is involved in the whole construction process from design to the completion ceremony. He is very ambitious in making his construction plans. He wants to bequeath to descendants yet to be born the grand edifices of the Korean Workers’ Party that will endure for ‘tens of thousands of years’.27 For purposes of endurance and beauty, he uses classic materials like marble and bronze in building structures.

142 Leadership All the structures he approves are enormous and built upon the principles of the speed campaign. For example, according to North Korea, the Grand People’s Study House with its 100,000 square meters of floor space was completed one year and nine months after its groundbreaking ceremony. The Tower of the Chuch'e Idea is 170 meters tall, 60 meters higher than Cuba’s Jose Marti Tower which was reputed to be the world’s tallest stone tower. Pyongyang’s Arch of Triumph (60 meters) stands taller than Paris’ Arch of Triumph (51 meters).28 If existing structures do not meet his aesthetic taste, he rebuilds them without regard for when they were built. A case in point is the reconstruction of Hyˇongmyˇong yˇolsarˇung (Revolutionaries’ Tombs). Under Kim Il Sung’s plan, the Revolutionaries’ Tombs were established in 1975 primarily to bury anti-Japanese guerrillas who had fought with Kim Il Sung. The Revolutionaries’ Tombs are icons representing the ideal relationship between the Great Leader and the people. It conveys a message that should people sacrifice their lives for the Great Leader and the Dear Leader, their political status as loyal subjects would be eternally commemorated at the Tombs. The area is one of the most important sites for education about the revolutionary tradition. In 1985, Kim Jong Il reconstructed the tombs in much larger scale.29 Cinema society The Soviet tradition of emphasizing art and literature clearly carried over to North Korea. There is no significant apolitical art or literature in North Korean society. Art and literature are meant to be the ideological weapons for revolution and construction, not entertainment. Kim Jong Il is also keenly aware that the art and literature that he loves so dearly are important tools for his totalitarian ruling. For Kim, art and literature are a modus operandi for achieving his ideological purpose. Among the artistic and literary modes, Kim considers cinema to be the most effective vehicle for mass education. In the society, there is an extraordinary mass education method called the ‘yˇonghwa silhyo t'ujaeng’ (film-real-effect struggle). Whenever a new movie is released, the party organizes the masses to view it. After watching it, they discuss the words and behaviors of film protagonists and compare them with their own. The film protagonists become ideal revolutionaries. The masses resolve to live and work like the protagonists. In addition, the party distributes notebooks containing the protagonists’ informative words and the lyrics from the movie’s theme songs. Contests are held to test recitation of the words and the lyrics.30 The ‘film-real-effect struggle’ is a useful tool for mass education. As Kim Jong Il acknowledges, the method is more effective than ‘tens of thousands of educational textbooks’.31 As Sin Sang-ok has suggested: After watching the movie Wˇolmi Island 32 at her working place in spring 1983, Yi Hye-ryˇon, a female worker of a textile factory in east Pyongyang, was very impressed by the heroic death of Yˇong-ok, the female protagonist of

Leadership 143 the movie. Yi was a beautiful woman. By the way, there was a male worker in the same factory who lost his eyesight during his military service. [So far] she had not been interested in the worker but, after watching the movie, she decided to do something valuable for him as Yˇong-ok did in the movie. One day, she proposed to marry him. But he refused it because he did not want her to have such a burden. A few days after she thought about it, she wrote to her party committee for help: ‘I know a young man . . . Comrade Secretary! I would like to receive help from my party organization. I have an obligation to live with him for my life. Only when I live with him, would I proudly say to the heroic warriors of Wˇolmi Island that I am living like them without disgrace’ . . . Finally, with the help of the party committee, Yi made a home with him after they swore in front of the Kim Il Sung Statute at Mansudae Hill.33 As this case shows, cinema can influence the viewer’s emotions and minds. Those who are entranced by a film identify themselves with its protagonists and their realities. Film creates illusion and provides viewers with an ideal haven from their own relatively ‘dismal’ reality. In other words, it can ‘provide an ideal image of a nation and its people, and thereby serve as a blueprint of everyday life’.34 Kim Jong Il recognizes the power of illusion and how to manipulate it. For him, film has been an effective shield for making his people endure the grim realities of laborious work, hunger, and terror. He makes the people believe that the harsh realities of North Korean society could be overcome sometime in the future, just as in the realities portrayed in film. Through the prevalence and power of films, Kim Jong Il makes North Korea a ‘cinema society’ where the people behave and think like film protagonists. The late 1960s and the early 1970s were a time when Kim Jong Il successfully developed the culture of North Korean society. Over time, however, his ubiquitous intervention in all cultural activities has made the culture decadent rather than prosperous. All cultural works are made and remade to please the aesthetic taste of the ‘artist-king’. Cultural vehicles exist for the political purpose of mass education, not for entertainment. A ‘one-man-dominant’ society, the over-politicization of art and literature, and the denial of hedonistic cultural activities has culturally degenerated the society.

Tradition dependence Legitimacy Political legitimacy relates to the ‘rightfulness of rules and rulers, which increases their authority’.35 It encourages the governed to obey the orders of its rulers. All rulers are supposed to have a certain level of political legitimacy in order to gather the support of the governed. In democratic societies, the election is an essential instrument for guaranteeing legitimacy. Even a leader of a totalitarian society

144 Leadership like Kim Jong Il needs to have legitimacy because the governed cannot only be controlled by sheer force. Where does Kim Jong Il find his political legitimacy? His key source of legitimacy is tradition. As Max Weber argued, along with charisma and legality, tradition can be an important source of a political leader’s claim to legitimacy.36 Tradition is a set of visible and invisible things that people ‘believe’ have been handed down from the past. It includes a society’s practices, values, and material objects, among others. As Eric Hobsbawm indicated, the element of time may not be essential in defining something as a tradition because some traditions are invented.37 The most critical aspect in creating a tradition is people’s belief that the tradition was repeated in the past and deserves to be preserved in the present and future. Some traditions continue to survive into the present without interruption. Others that died away in the past are revived by present generations. Certain facts that did not exist or remained myths in the past are factualized as traditions. Kim Jong Il has tried to enhance his authority by portraying himself as the foremost advocate of his father’s revolutionary tradition. Kim Il Sung’s guerrilla activities became sacred tradition for the society. Loyalty to this tradition has been a primary characteristic of Kim Jong Il’s leadership since he started his career. With the hope that his revolutionary tradition would continue after his death, Kim Il Sung believed that the first criterion of his political successor should be fealty towards him and respect for his past activities. Kim Jong Il made concerted efforts to meet his father’s criterion. When he guided the party’s ideological indoctrination, establishing the revolutionary tradition was foremost in his activities. North Korean history was rewritten on the basis of the chuch'e idea. Only Kim Il Sung’s revolutionary tradition was of chuch'e. Other non-chuch'e revolutionary traditions that had nothing to do with his father’s activities were deleted from North Korean history. The main substance of ideological education centered on recollections from Kim Il Sung and other guerrillas. All works in cinema, opera, theatre, and visual arts were required to continue the revolutionary tradition. After the junior Kim became the successor, he was depicted as the Great Leader’s most filial son and loyal subject. To strengthen his authority, he promoted the traditional values of Confucianism – filial piety and loyalty – which had been considered as antediluvian remnants in North Korea’s earlier period. The fatherand-son relationship between the Kims became the prototype for the individual relationships that all North Korean people should aspire to. When the socialist bloc was crumbling in the mid-1980s, Kim Jong Il enlisted nationalism much more explicitly than he had in the past. He proposed the ‘Koreafirst idea’ and ‘our-own-style socialism’. Traditional folklore and customs were revitalized to fill the vacuum created by socialism. He also adopted the dynastic history, which included Old Chosˇon, Koguryˇo, and Koryˇo dynasties that had been denounced earlier as feudal and exploitative in official North Korean history. The tradition-centered characteristic of his leadership style was at its peak when his father passed away. Following the Confucian ritual service, Kim Jong Il

Leadership 145 observed a three-year mourning (1994–1997) period for his father. During that period, he controlled the state under the cause of the ‘will of the dead Great Leader’ without officially taking over his father’s positions. Filial piety and loyalty to the Great Leader were the main ideological values used to influence his people. During the mourning period, millions of North Korean people starved to death or were displaced to escape the starvation. Even during that period, Kim Jong Il repetitively stated that he would implement the instructions of the Great Leader as if his father were still alive. For Kim, preserving the tradition that his father established was contradictory to finding ways to overcome the current economic disaster through reforms. His mentality caused him to choose the former by disregarding the latter. The effort to produce material wealth for the people was secondary to protecting tradition in defending his legitimacy. As Carl J. Friedrich said, ‘Too much tradition ossifies a political order, but equally surely too little tradition undermines and dissolves the community and its order.’38 In North Korea, tradition is overemphasized, ossifying the state. To propose reforms is to betray revolution whereas advocating tradition protects the revolution. Deflecting from tradition is considered ‘liberal’ and should be avoided. What is considered tradition relies upon the subjective selections of the leader, who arbitrarily determines it according to his political objectives. It is true that tradition has buttressed Kim Jong Il’s political legitimacy. His image as the arch-advocate of tradition, however, leaves little room for change. His inflexible traditional image holds back the degree and speed of urgent reforms and damages his legitimacy once he does reform his policies. As a politician, he must cope with constantly changing situations. In some situations, he needs to change his policies. However, his own hesitations, combined with the time that it takes him to convince his staff and people, explains why North Korean reforms has been slow vis-à-vis imperative realities. Kim Jong Il is caught in the trap of tradition that he established. Ironically, his economic reforms have been launched under the name of the ‘will of the dead Great Leader’. Because his image does not leave room for him to be a reformer, he depends on his father’s image. Most of his reform policies, including the Mt Kˇumgang tourism project and the 2000 summit, were implemented under the will of the Great Leader. Although he reforms in reality, he remains merely an executive of his father’s tradition in name. Contents With regard to Kim Jong Il’s leadership, the main contents of tradition may be classified into four categories: the revolutionary tradition, Confucianism, folklore, and dynastic history. Revolutionary tradition The revolutionary tradition refers to Kim Il Sung’s past activities from the mid1920s when he was involved in the socialist youth movement. The tradition

146 Leadership includes his anti-Japanese guerrilla activities as well as his experiences in the Korean War and the post-war socialist construction. The key theme of the tradition is chuch'e. For the North Korean leadership, time is not an important factor in adopting certain practices or values as tradition. Regardless of how long they have or have not existed, all incidents related to Kim Il Sung deserve to be admired and are therefore subsumed as traditional elements. Among the elements included in the revolutionary tradition, Kim Il Sung’s guerrilla activities are core. These activities were the root of Kim Il Sung’s political legitimacy and granted him the title of ‘National Savior’. Being the leader of the chuch'e tradition distinguished him from other factional leaders in power competitions. Kim Il Sung manipulated the accounts of his activities to denounce the fact that Korea was liberated by the Allies’ victory during World War II. He maintained that he liberated Korea by his own military activities. According to North Korea, the guerrilla tradition broadly includes three categories: the creation of the chuch'e idea; Kim’s organizational and military activities; and his way of working.39 However, the categories that encompass the tradition are too ambiguous and broad to be defined. Everything that Kim Il Sung recalled and construed were actually the guerrilla tradition, an indefinite concept that is continually reinterpreted by the leader. After his father’s death, Kim Jong Il monopolized the authority to interpret the concept of tradition. Most of the content of the guerrilla tradition was retrospectively factualized through the lens of chuch'e. For example, the state argues that the chuch'e idea was created during Kim Il Sung’s guerrilla activities, not during the SinoSoviet conflict. Kim’s activities were conducted on the basis of chuch'e. The state deleted most of the role of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) because this would defame Kim’s chuch'e activities. Kim is portrayed as a heroic communist leader independent of the CCP. Other Korean communist leaders who were higher in political rank than Kim are depicted as loyal activists who unconditionally followed Kim’s lines. In the official North Korean documents about the guerrilla activities, it is difficult to decipher how the guerrilla activities were actually conducted. Although Kim Il Sung frankly disclosed some facts about his activities in his memoirs, it is still unclear what he actually did during his guerrilla days. With the guerrilla tradition, Kim Jong Il tried to brainwash the masses into thinking and behaving as if they were guerrillas too. He mystified guerrillas’ activities by transforming their experiences into legends. Whenever the state faces national difficulties or needs to encourage the masses to work, it stresses the spirit of the guerrilla. The guerrilla tradition is deeply imprinted into every fabric of the society. The slogan ‘Produce, study and live the way the anti-Japanese guerrillas did!’ reveals a key characteristic of the society. Confucianism Another traditional component of Kim Jong Il’s leadership is Confucianism. Confucian tradition was discouraged as outdated before the 1970s dynastic

Leadership 147 succession. The following statement made by Kim Il Sung revealed his attitude toward Confucianism: Let me cite an instance. People in our country have a memorial service when someone dies. True, it is impossible to oppose totally the observation of rituals because people are attached to each other. But of what use is it to burn incense and make an offering of rice-cake to the deceased, though it is a different case if bouquets of flowers are placed in his memory? All this manifests the outdated beliefs and practices of the feudal age.40 The hostile attitude of the North Korean leadership toward Confucianism began to change with Kim Jong Il’s political rise. Confucian values like loyalty and filial piety reappreciated when Kim Jong Il became his father’s heir in the early 1970s.41 The father and son succession promoted the Confucian values that ideologically justify patrimonial succession. Kim Jong Il depicted himself as the embodiment of loyalty and filial piety towards the Great Leader. After he became the heir based on being a staunch supporter of the revolutionary tradition, he used the old-fashioned values in order to boost his legitimacy. For a state leader, Confucianism is a useful ideology. One common principle that appears in Confucian relationships, values, and rituals is ‘hierarchy’. The principle of hierarchy helps social members accept the orders of a leader without strong resistance. Traditional Confucian scholars divided personal relationships into specific categories. The ‘Five Relationships’ was a case in point: king and subject; father and son; husband and wife; elder and younger brother; and friend and friend. Each relationship had its own ethical responsibility; that is, loyalty between king and subject and filial piety between father and son. The ‘Five Relationships’ were based on personal hierarchy. The only horizontal relationship was the one between friends, but the emphasis of ‘seniority’ in the Confucian society made even the friend and friend relationship take on a certain sense of hierarchy.42 In a Confucian society, members of a society were assigned to a ‘proper’ place and the hierarchical relationships were consolidated according to ‘proper ritual behavior’. For Kim Jong Il, promoting Confucian values and rituals in North Korean society was promoting the hierarchical relationships between the people, the Great Leader, and the Dear Leader. In a Confucian society, family was the most important social institution. Among the five relationships, three of them were family ones. For Confucian scholars, however, the family and the state were not completely separate and the state became an extension of the family. They believed that ‘loyal subjects are produced from filial families’. The patriarchal structure of the family as embodied in filial piety extended to the patriarchal structure of the state through loyalty. The scholars referred to kings as kunbu (fatherly king) and queens as kungmo (state’s mother).43 Absolute obedience to the father and to the state leader was believed to be within the same context. Confucian scholars also maintained that kings, masters, and fathers are on the same level (kun-sa-bu ilch'e). From this perspective, it is not strange that the North Korean people designated Kim Il Sung as the ‘ˇobˇoi suryong’ (‘fatherly

148 Leadership Supreme Leader’) and that the North Korean leaders claim that their society is a great socialist family. Just as the members of a family are filial towards their father in traditional Korea, so the people are supposed to be loyal to Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il. In traditional Confucian Korea and China, filial piety was directly related to the ritual of mourning. The importance of mourning already appeared in ancient Chinese literature. The Li-chi states: Funeral and sacrificial rites serve to inculcate benevolence and love. By attaining to a feeling of love one can perform the rites of mourning and sacrifice . . . When there is a longing and a making of an offering to the dead, how much more will there be so to the living! Therefore it is said that when the mourning and sacrificial rites are clearly understood, the people are filial.44 Mourning periods ranged from three months to three years in Confucian Korea. The Confucian aspect of mourning was displayed when Kim Jong Il observed a three-year mourning period after his father’s death. Besides the Confucian values and the rituals described above, as mentioned before, North Korea also promotes other Confucian values – in (benevolence; in Chinese, ren) and dˇok (virtue; in Chinese, te) – to underscore Kim Jong Il’s leadership: ‘indˇok chˇongch'i’ (‘politics of benevolent virtue’). Before his father’s death, the terms benevolence and virtue were used to adulate Kim Il Sung. Kim Jong Il began to readopt the leadership characteristics of ‘politics of benevolent virtue’ after his father passed away. Folklore In addition to the revolutionary tradition and Confucianism, another element of tradition that Kim Jong Il paid much attention to was national folklore, which was adopted from Korea’s early history. These national folklore traditions were forbidden in the mid-1960s, when Kim Il Sung ordered the people to stop practicing ‘feudal’ folklore. Although the North Korean authorities officially eliminated the folklore, they seemed to unofficially preserve some more ‘progressive’ forms of folklore.45 Not until 1980 did Kim Jong Il begin to promote national folklore. At a meeting with the party officials and mass organizations, he admitted the need to revitalize traditional folklore. He recollected that Koreans used to bustle around towns during national holidays while they played games such as yut, nˇolttwigi (Korean seesawing), kite flying, and others, but they no longer celebrated traditional games. He told the officials to encourage people to fully enjoy the holidays.46 In 1983, three years after the meeting, Kim ordered his staff to open a store to sell traditional playthings – yut, kites, Chinese chess, tops, and others – in Pyongyang in order to promote traditional game playing.47 After Kim Jong Il asserted the ‘Koreafirst idea’ in 1986, the North Korean government officially allowed the people to

Leadership 149 celebrate traditional holidays. It revitalized Ch'usˇok (Thanksgiving Day) in 1988, Sˇol (New Year’s Day), and Tano in 1989.48 Like with anything else in the totalitarian society, the leader arbitrarily determines what is considered a national tradition. He is the only umpire to determine which ones are decent traditions and which ones are not. Non-traditional elements that do not uplift the ‘Korea-first idea’ are destined to die out. In 1986, Kim criticized wedding fashion trends after watching a modern-style wedding on TV. A young couple that had just finished a wedding ceremony visited the Revolutionary Tombs and presented a bunch of flowers. He disliked the couple’s wedding attire because they wore Western clothes, which he pointed out was not appropriate to the unique Korean tradition because in the past, brides had worn Korean skirts. He worried that the propaganda of wedding fashion might negatively affect people’s cultural life and emphasized that the propaganda should not neglect national traditions.49 The feudal remnants of the 1960s became national treasures in the 1980s. The promotion of traditional folklore concurred with the decline of socialist optimism. The doom of socialism caused the North Korean leadership to fortify its national character. The idea of chuch'e was also reclothed with the ‘Korea-first idea’ and ‘our-own-style socialism.’ Proletarian internationalism was relegated to a simple ‘stuffed specimen’ that no longer worked in reality. Dynastic history After the Cold War, the nationalist character of the totalitarian society was fully fledged. In the early 1990s, the North Korean leadership rewrote dynastic Korean history according to chuch'e themes. The state consecutively constructed the tombs of the founders of three Korean dynasties: King Tongmyˇong, founder of Koguryˇo in May 1993; King Wang Kˇon, founder of Koryˇo in February 1994; and Tan'gun, mythical founder of Old Chosˇon in October 1994. The North Korean leadership finally subsumed the rulers of the Korean dynasties into their chuch'e history. The ancient rulers whom North Korea had once deemed to be exploiters of the ruled were no longer enemies. Instead, they became the heroic ancestors of the chuch'e state. Among the three dynastic founders, the establishment of Tan'gun’s tomb was meant to transform the ‘mythical’ Tan'gun into a ‘historical’ Tan'gun. His tomb is the largest one on the Korean Peninsula. It is 50 meters wide, 22 meters tall, and consists of 1,994 pieces of granite, signifying its completion year of 1994.50 Before the opening ceremony for the Tan'gun’s tomb, North Korean scholars held two academic conferences in October 1993 and 1994. The second conference is most notable. At the second conference, scholars argued that Tan'gun was a real figure and that Pyongyang was the capital of Old Chosˇon. In addition, they claimed Tan'gun had lived around 5,000 years before.51 Before the 1994 ‘factualization’ of Tan'gun, the scholars used to maintain that Old Chosˇon existed in Manchuria and northern Korea around 2000 bc and its center was located in Manchuria. They did not mention Tan'gun in the history of Old Chosˇon.52

150 Leadership Five years after the state ‘factualized’ Tan'gun’s tomb, the North Korean scholars announced a previously unheard of anthropological concept called the ‘Taedonggang munhwa’ (‘Taedong civilization’). The Taedong River runs through Pyongyang. Combining other archaeological factors with the invented fact that Tan'gun had existed 5,000 years before in Pyongyang, the culture of Old Chosˇon was elevated into becoming one of the world’s original civilizations.53 There is no doubt that Kim Jong Il directed the ‘factualization’ of ancient Korean history. Without his direction, the North Korean scholars would not dare distort the historical facts. Why did Kim create such ridiculous distortions? As said before, it was meant to bolster his regime’s legitimacy. Koguryˇo’s capital was Pyongyang and Koryˇo’s was Kaes˘ong. The two capitals are now in the North. In factualizing that the capital of Old Chosˇon, Korea’s first dynasty, was also in Pyongyang, Kim wanted to claim that North Korea was the only legitimate inheritor of previous Korean dynasties, not South Korea. Moreover, he wanted to link the fictitious concept of the Taedong civilization to the ‘Korea-first idea’. Historical precision was less important to him convincing his people of the propaganda.

Military-first politics Purpose ‘Military-first politics’ refers to Kim Jong Il’s peculiar ruling style where the military plays the most significant role in upholding the Kim Jong Il regime. North Korea maintains that ‘military-first politics’ was launched when Kim Jong Il visited a military checkpoint in January of 1995 after Kim Il Sung’s death. The politics was developed during the period of the ‘Arduous March’ of 1995–1998 when the state suffered severe economic disaster.54 In North Korean history, the military has had strong ties to Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il. The military was a stronghold for the guerrillas and it was there that the revolutionary tradition was first established. During the succession process, the military initiated the campaign of the cult of Kim Jong Il in the society. Besides protecting the state from outside invaders, the North Korean military also played an important part in economic activities. The leaders used the military to back up the workforce shortage, because many young men between the ages of 17 and 27 were in the military. In a sense, ‘military-first politics’ can be understood as being an extension of Kim Il Sung’s military-priority policy. However, Kim Jong Il’s ‘military-first politics’ differs from his father’s military policy. The aspect in which his politics is unprecedented is that the military, not the party, plays the leading role in North Korean politics and becomes the foremost significant revolutionary force. This style of politics represents the degree of political urgency in the state. To depend on the military in normal situations means that other ordinary administrative organizations are dysfunctional and the military may be the last resort that the Kim Jong Il regime can organizationally rely on. ‘Bullets’ are more important than ‘candies’ and ‘the military is identical with the party, the state and the people’55 are

Leadership 151 Kim Jong Il’s references describing the characteristics of ‘military-first politics’. In other words, his politics is a program based on the regime adapting itself to exacerbating socio-political situations. When the state was suffering an economic disaster in 1996, Kim Jong Il complained that the party cadres of the civilian sector were losing morale even though cadres in the military were still spirited. The party activists in the civilian sector were not as qualified as those in the military. He insisted that all party workers should be equipped with the ‘spirit of the revolutionary soldier’.56 Traditionally, the party had been the organizer and educator of the whole society, linking the leader with the people. By the mid-1990s, the party organizations of the civilian sector seemed to have lost their grip over the people from the severe economic catastrophe, leading Kim to trust more in the military than in the party. In ‘military-first politics’ Kim Jong Il raised the military to the forefront of revolution and construction in order to secure his crumbling regime. When Kim Il Sung was alive, the role of the military was relatively limited. Except for the Korean War, the North Korean regime did not mobilize the military to maintain its domestic public security. The police mainly took charge of the maintenance of law and order. Under ‘military-first politics,’ the military’s clout over the society was much stronger. Together with the police, the military became a domestic security force and began to crack down on ‘non-socialistic phenomena’ in normal situations. The following statement by a North Korean details the changed role of the military under the new politics: Now [1997–1999] the military is grasping the whole of North Korean society. A number of agricultural farms and industrial factories have been put under the direct control of the military. Military soldiers stand guard watching grains and vegetables in the farms. The peasants are engaged only in farming without harvesting [the military harvests]. In train stations, the soldiers check train tickets and kick child-beggars out of the stations. So everybody is scared when the soldiers control the people.57 During the famine period, the people (including farmers) illegally stole grains and vegetables from the fields and storage in order to relieve their hunger. During harvest periods, there were few crops left to reap for the military. Kim Jong Il ordered the military to monitor the farmers growing crops and forced the military to harvest them. The military took their portion of the harvested crops and then the farmers were given portions of what remained. The differing military roles in the Kim Il Sung and the Kim Jong Il regimes arose because of economic disaster. In other words, Kim Jong Il began his ‘militaryfirst politics’ due to domestic factors, not external threats. After the 1994 Agreed Framework, relations between the US and North Korea had relatively improved.58 Even during the nuclear crisis of 1993–1994, when the two states had almost reached military conflict, the North Korean regime had not mentioned ‘militaryfirst’. In the mid-1990s, internal disorder threatened the regime more than imperial intimidation had.

152 Leadership Over time, ‘military-first politics’ was strengthened by changes in international politics – the ‘axis of evil’ policy of the Bush administration, the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, and the ongoing nuclear confrontation that restarted from 2002. These international changes became additional threats to the Kim Jong Il regime. ‘Military-first politics’ is not just a short-term, emergency statecraft method. It has strategic significance. For example, the regime has to domestically overcome the chronic food shortage and decrease the economic refugees. Internationally, it must resolve the nuclear crisis. Until it has overcome the internal and external threats, it is highly probable that the regime will adhere to the ‘military-first’ strategy. Development With the organizational base provided by the military, Kim Jong Il has managed to rule the economically deprived society. ‘Military-first politics’ has evolved parallel to his efforts to win over the support of the military after his father’s death. In October 1995, before Foundation Day of the Korean Workers’ Party, Kim promoted 20 military generals. In April 1996, he designated Foundation Day (of the Korean People’s Army) a national holiday. In July the same year, the July 27 Armistice Day of the Korean War became a national holiday as Victory Day of the Korean War. In February 1997, six generals were promoted and in April the same year, before Kim Il Sung’s birthday, 123 generals were promoted.59 Besides the promotions of the military generals, the records from his guidance trips more clearly disclose his ruling strategy for ‘military-first politics’. Most of the places that Kim Jong Il visited were military-related places and the artistic events that he enjoyed were mostly held by the military. In particular, his contacts with the military were intensified in 1996–1999 when the economy was in its most dire circumstances.60 His public contacts reveal how much the military sided with him. Given his statement that ‘our experience has clearly shown that “MilitaryFirst Politics” is the most revolutionary and powerful method of socialist politics appropriate to current historical conditions’,61 Kim was confident in the effectiveness of ‘military-first politics’. Over time, to support his new politics, he has developed its organizational base. Organization Three years after his father’s death, Kim Jong Il finally became the general secretary of the Korean Workers’ Party in October 1997. In September 1998, he was re-elected the chairman of the National Defense Commission (NDC) at the Tenth Supreme People’s Assembly. Compared with the Kim Il Sung regime, the new regime was organizationally less dependent on the party. The party’s power in the Kim Jong Il era became relatively weaker than it had been in the Kim Il Sung era. Under Kim Il Sung’s rule, the party decided most policies and the executive organizations implemented the party’s decisions. In the Kim Jong Il era, the party no longer monopolized policy decisions. The military has partially taken over the

Leadership 153 party’s role in policy decisions – the Central Military Affairs Committee (CMAC) of the party is a case in point. Kim Jong Il did not replace some members of the CMAC even after some of its members died. As of 2004, only 12 of the 19 fixed members remained.62 All of the members are aged military generals and the CMAC does not seem to be as active as it used be. The most important organization under the Kim Jong Il regime is the NDC. The commission is composed of one chairman, one first vice-chairman, two vice-chairmen and several commissioners. Currently Kim Jong Il assumes the chairmanship of the NDC. The chairman commands the armed forces and directs overall military-related business. Like the Supreme People’s Assembly, the term for the chairman lasts five years.63 In September 1998 when the Kim Jong Il regime began, the first vice-chairman was Cho Myˇong-nok (Jo Myong Rok) and the two vice-chairmen were Kim Il-ch'ˇol and Yi Yong-mu. Commissioners were ˇ ol, Paek Hak-nim, Chˇon Pyˇong-ho and Kim Yˇong-ch'un, Yˇon Hyˇong-muk, Yi Ul-sˇ 64 Kim Ch'ˇol-man. After five years, when the Eleventh Supreme People’s Assembly was held, Cho Myˇong-nok remained first vice-chairman. Yˇon Hyˇong-muk was promoted to vice-chairman.65 Kim Il-ch'ˇol, who had been a vice-chairman, was relegated ˇ ol, Paek Hak-nim and Kim Ch'ˇol-man dropped out to a commissioner. Yi Ul-sˇ of the NDC. In their place, Ch'oe Yong-su and Paek Se-bong became new commissioners.66 Except for Kim Jong Il, Ch'oe, Chˇon, and Paek are technocrats and the rest are professional military. In other words, the NDC is a hybrid organization that includes both the military and civilians. The organization seems to be the practical headquarters for the Kim Jong Il regime. The NDC’s power in North Korean politics was revealed when Cho Myˇongnok, its first vice-chairman, visited Washington during the Clinton administration in October 2000. According to the North Korean Constitution, Kim Yˇong-nam represents North Korea to foreign states as chairman of the Standing Committee of the Supreme People’s Assembly. However, Kim Jong Il sent military general Cho, not Kim Yˇong-nam, as a high-level emissary to negotiate ‘diplomatic’ issues with Washington including the improvement of their bilateral relations, North Korean missile programs, the 1953 Armistice Agreement, and others. Ideology To ideologically justify his ‘military-first politics’, Kim Jong Il devised a new idea, ‘s˘on'gun’ (‘military-first’) idea. According to the North Korean media, Kim published a treatise on the ‘military-first’ idea in 2003. Kim also needed to create the new idea due to the defection of Hwang Chang-yˇop, the philosophical architect of the chuch'e idea. After Hwang went to the South in 1997, Kim has published no ‘philosophical’ writing on the chuch'e idea. While Hwang stays in the South and develops his own chuch'e idea, it is difficult for Kim to monopolize the idea.67 According to Han S. Park, now Kim uses the chuch'e idea in a more pragmatic way.68 He no longer seems to cherish the idea as an abstract philosophy.

154 Leadership He selectively employs the term chuch'e, emphasizing the concept of ‘in one’s own way’. As Kim Il Sung had stated, chuch'e was the primary principle of his policy in the 1950s–1960s; Kim Jong Il has taken up the term in the same way. In other words, the term chuch'e plays a role as a principle of Kim Jong Il’s policy rather than an abstract philosophical idea. In order to systematically develop the ‘military-first’ idea, Kim held an academic conference on the idea in December 2004. At the conference, North Korean scholars argued that the idea was created on the basis of the chuch'e idea but, at the same time, the idea was original. In the post-Cold War international situation, the military plays the leading role in the anti-imperial struggle instead of the worker because its members have the strongest spirit of revolution. The unique character of the ‘military-first’ idea comes from the concept of ‘military-first-andworker-second.’69 The distinctive difference between the chuch'e idea and the ‘military-first’ idea is that, while the worker is the main revolutionary force in the chuch'e idea, the military is the central force in the ‘military-first’ idea. The idea denies that the military is politically neutral and takes the politicization of the military for granted. From the time the ‘military-first’ idea was forged, it has partially taken over of the role that the chuch'e idea previously played. Like the chuch'e idea, the ‘military-first’ idea tries to indoctrinate the whole society in the Kim Jong Il era. The idea demands that people sacrifice for the leader just as the chuch'e idea had. It idealizes the role of the military, which is supposed to have the ‘revolutionary military spirit’, implying absolute obedience to the leader. The society – and even the party – should emulate the revolutionary spirit of the military.70 The military culture had been deeply rooted in North Korean people’s life since the Korean War but it had not completely overwhelmed the society. Now the state actively promotes the ‘military-first’ idea and facilitates the militarization of nonmilitary sectors by emphasizing the unity of the military and the people. Aiding the military is loyal behavior and a laudable custom under ‘military-first politics’. The media’s propaganda, including ‘uri kundae cheil chuˇui’ (‘our-military-first idea’), contributes to the spread of a military culture in the society. It encourages the young to enter the military and celebrates military families whose members are all in the military. In the ‘military-first’ era, a family is patriotic when it becomes a military family. The duty of a housewife is to raise children to become military soldiers for the commander-in-chief and to support the military politically and materially.71 The military family is portrayed in the media as follows: ‘Those are my sons.’ Kim Yˇong-sun, whose five sons are all serving in the military, is proudly smiling. Only the mother, who sent all her sons to the protection of the fatherland, can make such a smile . . . ‘How happy this mother is [when I see my] sons putting on military attire!’ . . . ‘Even though they are far away from me, they are standing four-square behind our General [Kim Jong Il]. How can I be happier?’ The woman of the era of ‘Military-First Politics’ and the mother of this state are the happiest when their sons and daughters are serving as ch'ongp'okt'an (bullet bomb) [for Kim Jong Il].72

Leadership 155 New military terms were coined under ‘military-first politics’: ‘revolutionary military spirit’, ‘bullet bomb’, ‘chap'ok chˇongsin [suicidal bombing spirit] for the leader’, ‘revolutionary military family’, and ‘il tang paek’ (‘one-to-one hundred: one soldier to one hundred enemies’). In addition, during the ‘military-first’ period, North Korean artists have produced various films, plays, songs, novels, and poems concerned with the military or the unity of the military and the people. The concept of ‘military-first’ is still unsophisticated. However, the fact that Kim forged the idea implies that his ‘military-first politics’ is not just tactical, but he is determined to stick to the strategy for a considerable time. It is not probable that the ‘military-first’ idea will completely replace the chuch'e idea but, if the politics is prolonged, it is possible that the idea will more methodically develop.

Theatrical politics Theatrical performance Since Kim Il Sung’s death in 1994, Kim Jong Il has ruled the state. Unlike his father, Kim has made few public speeches or foreign press appearances. The only known public speech made by Kim Jong Il was at a national seminar of officials doing the party’s ideological work, which was aired on the radio on 19 February 1974.73 Not until 1992 did the public hear his voice at the Foundation Day of the Korean People’s Army ceremony where he said ‘Bring glory to the people’s heroic military!’74 Kim Jong Il is a leader veiled in secrecy. He is keen on controlling information. He considers his ‘words’ to be top secret and believes that carelessly disclosed it could create ‘irrevocable loss’ to the revolution. His instructions must be carefully delivered to party cadres and the people.75 In particular, information about his private life is forbidden and cannot be mentioned in the society. Combined with the impermeable totalitarian society, his confidential style restrains others from getting to know him. Sources of information on Kim are mainly gathered from his works, the North Korean media, his official biographies, and the individuals who have had personal contact with him. Many elements of Kim’s public image as produced by the North Korean media are startlingly contradictory to his private life. His public image is released in a thoroughly orchestrated way. In the media, he is portrayed as the ‘indefatigable’ leader, ‘paragon of a loyalist’ and ‘son of working people’. However, in the private life, he indulges in drinking parties with his confidants. He is an avid consumer of Hennessy cognac.76 He enjoys watching Hollywood movies and drives foreign luxurious cars like Mercedes-Benz. The discrepancy between his public and private behaviors illustrates a peculiar style of Kim Jong Il’s leadership. The extraordinary style of Kim’s leadership will be analyzed using the term ‘theatrical politics’.77 In The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, Erving Goffman used the concept of ‘theatrical performance’ to characterize social interactions among individuals. He emphasized the dramaturgical characteristic of individuals’ interactions: ‘When an

156 Leadership individual appears before others he will have many motives for trying to control the impression they receive of the situation.’ Goffman called the individual’s action ‘performance’, which includes ‘all the activity of a given participant on a given occasion which serves to influence in any way any of the other participants’.78 His theory paid attention to ‘the way in which the individual in ordinary work situations presents himself and his activity to others, the ways in which he guides and controls the impression they form of him, and the kinds of things he may and may not do while sustaining his performance before them’.79 If everyday life assumes a ‘stage’ and the relationships between ‘I’ and ‘others’ are like those between ‘performer’ and ‘audience’, Goffman’s concept of theatrical performance may be more clearly understood. When a performer acts on a stage, he or she represents an imaginary person in a script, not the performer’s real personality. In other words, the performer is, figuratively speaking, wearing a mask and creating a new person through theatricality. If the performance is good enough to evoke a fantasy, the audience believes that the character in front of them is a real one. Goffman’s concept of theatrical performance provides an important theoretical tool in understanding Kim’s peculiar behavior in North Korean society. The North Korean society is the main stage on which Kim Jong Il conducts his theatrical performance. In other words, he is a performer and the audience is the North Korean people. He is not only the ‘creator of a character,’ but also the ‘guider leading the audience to an imaginary world’.80 Kim constantly holds people’s attention by manipulating the totalitarian social conditions. At the same time, he himself is the director of his theatrical performance. He carefully projects ideal images into the public. Background settings The totalitarian setting of North Korean society makes Kim Jong Il’s theatrical performance easier. For his ‘theatrical politics’, it is essential to control the flow of information. The image of Kim Jong Il replicated in the eyes of the North Korean people depends upon his capacity to restrict communicative contacts with the people. The governmental monopoly of the media is a key setting for his theatricality. The government monopolizes the media and censors the real, vivid human images that are disclosed in his ‘backstage’ private life. The media releases only his idealistic images to the public. His official images are simple. He is a leader who is only concerned with revolution and the people. He shares pleasure and sorrow with his people. He energetically works late into the night when others are sleeping and wakes up before them. He is devoted to his father, the Great Leader. These images are repeatedly projected into the public through the media. In order to enhance his theatrics’ reliability, an education system in which the idealistic images could be stably produced and reproduced needed to be established. All of the people in the state are required to join at least one organization that is responsible for its members’ ideological education. In the

Leadership 157 public education system, all children are indoctrinated about the leader from kindergarten onward. Their leader, not their parents, provides them with food, clothes, and housing; he should be the object of their gratitude. Whatever the leader does, it should be great and successful. Owing to the cradle-to-grave education system, the people’s attitude towards the leader is not just based on moral obligation but is deeply emotionally ingrained. Their fanatic applauses to the leader in public spaces, which are sometimes aired on the North Korean broadcasting, is automatic. Their emotional attachment to the Leader is strengthened by the media’s repeated propaganda. North Korea’s isolated social setting is a favorable environment for Kim’s theatrical performance. There are three dimensions to the society’s isolation. First, it is isolated from the outside world. The chuch'e idea has promoted xenophobic sentiment among the people. The hostilities to the US and South Korea and the conflict with the Soviet Union and China prompted the society to close its door to the external world. Before the mid-1990s economic crisis, their international isolation fabricated a fictitious paradise-like world in the North. The North was a utopian society where the people were blessed with material affluence and social welfare because of the two leaders’ graces. The state was able to stick to this fiction by forbidding outside information from permeating into the totalitarian domain. Second, the people within the society are isolated from one another. The party and the secret police constantly watch the people’s words and behaviors in order to eradicate anti-revolutionary and impure elements, which severely restrains contacts between the people. Under this surveillance, the people become theatrical like their leader, especially in public arenas. They cannot express their opinion freely. In public space, they behave only in government-sanctioned ways. The totalitarian system also restricts the people’s mobility. Only those who receive governmental permission can move from one place to another. Along with the restriction on telecommunications, restrained mobility is one reason that it is almost impossible to organize a nationwide resistance movement against the government within the society. Third, the people are isolated from their leader. While the leader knows about the people’s daily life through his intelligence information, the people are only given information about their leader that has been reprocessed by the media. There is little direct contact between Kim Jong Il and the masses except for during his local guidance tours. Even the guidance tours are not arenas where the leader hob-nobs with the masses; they are dramatic presentations to show that he strenuously works for the people. There is a nebulous distance between Kim and the masses. The distance gives the masses a space in which they can do little more than imagine their ideal leader. Without immediate contact, the image of Kim is an imaginative creation manipulated by the media and education. For Kim, it is better to exist in their imagination as an impeccable leader by keeping himself away from the masses than to disillusion them with direct contact. The apparatus of terror also supports the theatrics. Terror plays a vital part in preventing possible disruptions of the other theatrical settings. It makes sure

158 Leadership that the other settings function well, without irregularity. The coercive network of the police, the secret police, and concentration camps reduce the spread of any uncertainty about Kim’s theatrical performance. Abnormal information sources are targeted by the terror network. Anybody who divulges ‘real’ information about the leader could be sent to the concentration camps.81 Terror makes the people ignore or avoid odd information that might otherwise pique their curiosity. Due to this totalitarian setting, it is easier for Kim Jong Il to perform ‘theatrical politics’ than it would be for a leader in an open society. He is able to prevent the people from observing him too closely. In this setting, he can maintain his image for a relatively long time without being discovered by the people. Arts of theatrical politics For ‘theatrical politics’, Kim Jong Il employs varied arts to create and sustain his impression: disguise, dramatization, factualization, legends, and symbolism. These arts are directed to foster his public image. Disguise Public arenas are the main space for Kim Jong Il’s theatrical performance. In these arenas, he wears the ‘mask’ of an ideal leader to disguise his ‘real’ person. The Dear Leader becomes a ‘genius of creation and construction who personifies the Great Leader’s revolutionary thought, theory and remarkable ability of leadership, and a benevolent leader of the people who has inherited the Great Leader’s high communist traits and moral quality and looks kindly after the Korean people with his high virtue’. The leader is also the loyal successor who is ‘guiding towards overall victory of the revolutionary cause of Juche [or chuch'e] initiated and directed by the Great Leader’.82 Following the idealized ‘script’, he acts like the leader working for the benefit of the people. This public image as being infallible does not allow Kim any human temper or impulses. In the public arena, the disciplined performer is supposed to suppress his emotions to his subjects and people regardless of the situational factors. He must conceal any actions that would be inconsistent with the idealized portrayal. The North Korean media rarely airs Kim Jong Il’s real voice and never covers Kim’s participation in public events live because of ‘security’ reasons. Kim takes off this ‘mask’ in his private life, an area free from media coverage. His private life is a non-theatrical space where he once again becomes an ordinary person. In the private sphere, he satisfies the desires, impulses and whims that ˘ he must suppress in the public sphere. Ch'oe Un-h˘ ui disclosed a part of Kim’s private life: Every Friday Kim Jong Il called me to join in drinking parties and watching movies and musicals [. . .]

Leadership 159 Kim Jong Il’s sister [Kim Kyˇong-hˇui] often came to the parties. Soon I got along with them. Sometimes party participants danced disco to the music of a band. Sometimes they gambled, playing games such as black jack. In public places they always sang the chants of Kim Il Sung and revolution. [However,] in the secret parties they enjoyed South Korean popular songs like Tongbaek agassi (Camellia lady). It is another world of the elite that is totally different from ordinary people’s life [. . .] In addition, there is a kind of ‘forced drinking’ known as ipchang chu (a drink before entrance). At entrance, there are cognac and wine glasses for participants on a table. And they fully pour cognac in each glass. A participant gets permission to enter only after emptying the glass.83 Kim indulges in these ‘secret consumption’84 binges without regret in his private life. To gratify his picky tastes, he imports objects for his secret consumption, including Hollywood movies, Japanese electronic appliances, Mercedes-Benzes, expensive furniture, among other things. While the masses consume the products of the chuch'e state, the leader secretly consumes those of non-chuch'e countries. Dramatization Another important method of Kim Jong Il’s theatricality is dramatization. Dramatization is a ‘means of vividly conveying the qualities and attributes claimed by a performer’.85 Dramatization is concerned with the unexpected, sudden happenings on the stage. The effect of dramatization is proportionate to the degree that the audience is attentive to the words and behaviors of the performer. Dramatization is a useful technique for transforming a simple act into a show. Kim Jong Il aptly manipulates the technique of dramatization to give his audience strong impressions. Kim’s secrecy makes dramatic moves ready for a strong impression. On Kim’s local tours, the North Korean media and government never release his tour schedules. He comes out in an unexpected place at an unexpected moment. The media does not show his tour pictures until he has completely finished his tour. This dramatization clearly came into view in the 2000 inter-Korean summit. Before the summit, there was no formal event planned for Kim Jong Il receiving Kim Dae Jung at the Pyongyang airport. Unexpectedly, he appeared at the airport to greet the South Korean president. North Korean officials did not give South Korean partners any hint of the upcoming dramatic appearance. Kim was well aware how much his activity was observed by the outside world and knew that their first encounter was the focus of worldwide attention. The summit itself was dramatic and his coming-out made it more spectacular.86

160 Leadership His media exposure in 2000 was the first since 1992. This exposure was more important because the media could air not only Kim’s dramatic emergence, but also his private discussions with his guests. The impact of the summit was stunning and 94.6 per cent of the South Korean adult population watched the summit on TV. In a survey conducted immediately after the summit, 70 per cent of South Korean respondents conveyed a positive attitude toward the North.87 Kim directed and performed at the summit, a dramatic presentation that was quite successful. However, unlike the South Korean people, the North Korean people did not hear his real voice. As in the past, they were only allowed to watch him on TV with an anchorman commenting and to see his pictures with other South Korean guests in newspapers. Kim did not want his people to hear his voice vividly – he seemed to believe that the direct audio contact would harm his mysterious image in the people’s minds. In order to continue his ‘theatrical politics,’ he did not want to send more than an image to his people. Another dramatic presentation occurred during US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s visit to the state in October 2000. Like at the summit, North Korean negotiators did not specify when she would meet Kim Jong Il. With little information about him, she wondered when their negotiation would start. The meeting schedule with Kim was fixed only after she had already arrived in the state. Kim Jong Il might have thought that his unexpected appearance gave him an edge over Albright in the negotiations. The unexpected meeting and a drastic agreement with Kim caused Albright to think of him in a new light.88 Where there are issues to be resolved, Kim Jong Il tends to settle them in a dramatic atmosphere. To continuously maneuver the dramatization, Kim must remain fairly isolated. Dramatization is useful for making vivid impressions on viewers. However, if viewers become aware of the performer’s repeated dramatic moves, they become less effective and awkward. Factualization Factualization is another of Kim Jong Il’s tools for ‘theatrical politics’. For his political purposes, Kim factualizes certain untrue facts through creating, deleting, adding, and reinterpreting them. Factualization, however, is more than simply lying. It has a powerful epistemological impact on the North Korean people and makes the people believe in the fabricated facts as if they were genuine. The isolated social setting prevents the people from comparing real information with the factualization. Those who know that the information was factualized are either Kim’s active accomplices or are kept silent. Terror and the ubiquitous network of coercive organizations make sure that the factualization’s secrecy is maintained. Chuch'e is the main theme of factualization. The non-chuch'e facts were rerecorded. With regard to the revolutionary tradition, many parts of Kim Il Sung’s activities under the CCP and the Soviet Union were deleted from official North Korean history. The fact that Kim Jong Il was born in the Russian Maritime Province was also removed because it defames the revolutionary successor of

Leadership 161 chuch'e. His birth near Mt Paekdu, the sacred revolutionary site, was rewritten into history. The histories of Tan'gun and the Taedong Civilization were factualized in the same vein. Kim Jong Il’s daily activities are also factualized. They are never described as they actually are but become exaggerated to increase their emotional appeal. Whatever Kim does should be exemplary. An educational document for party rank-and-file, which evaluated the 2000 inter-Korean summit, shows how Kim’s activities are reinterpreted in the state: One aide [of President Kim Dae Jung] said, ‘After signing the North–South Declaration, President Kim Dae Jung told us, ‘the declaration was made not because of me, but honorable Chairman Kim Jong Il. He is very decisive and shrewd even of extremely complicated issues. He must have inherited all the traits of the Great Leader. The Great Leader has the admirable son.’ [. . .] One female aide commented, ‘As soon as I saw the chairman, I was completely enamored of him. He is very social, modest and frank. He deserves to be the leader of the North. As President Kim is too old, after Korean unification, Chairman Kim will be the president of unified Korea and President Kim will be treated as a retired president. Already our [South Korean] ministers seem to try to get the attention of the chairman.’89 After signing the declaration in June 2000, there must have been positive comments made by Kim Dae Jung’s aides about Kim Jong Il’s decision to develop inter-Korean relations. It was also true that the summit contributed to lowering the aides’ negative impressions about Kim Jong Il. However, it is not probable that the aides made such flattering remarks. The educational material reveals how the sycophants of Kim Jong Il distort facts and how Kim basks in the sycophancy. Legends Besides factualization, legends enrich Kim’s ‘theatrical politics’. While factualization demands that people believe certain fabricated facts to be true, a legend is not necessarily meant to be real. A legend is concerned with a fictitious world based on the imagination of the storyteller and the listener. A storyteller creates a legend with his or her imagination and another storyteller develops an original legend into a more interesting one. Many who tell a legend include a variety of ‘paranormal’ incidents such as magic, miracles, and mysteries to deliver the legend to the audience more vividly. Some legends are made based on real events and others are purely the creatures of storytellers’ imagination. Legends include the values of the society where the legend is made and reflect tellers’ hopes and fears. In North Korea, the storytellers of legends about Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il are the literati. They invent the legends concerned with the two leaders. One of their

162 Leadership tasks is to turn leaders’ episodes into heroic legends. Like other literature genres, legends are used for political propaganda. The following reference proves that Kim Jong Il is well aware of the role of legends in propaganda: We have to promote the propaganda of the Great Leader’s legendary stories. In the tragic Japanese colonial era, even though there were few communication methods, people heard about the greatness of the Great Leader through legends and lived in the hope [that the leader would liberate the fatherland in the future]. His revolutionary history of 80 years is fully woven into legends, which will be recorded as our treasure over time. We need to find and propagate more legends of the Great Leader that have been widely known to the people since his anti-Japanese revolutionary activities.90 The North Korean government published books of legends about Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il in 1987 and 1993 respectively. The North Korean storytellers introduced various traditional Korean legendary elements; that is, traditional Korean topography and sinsˇon (Taoist wizards), into the leaders’ stories. They also created the birth legends for the two leaders. The legends concerning Kim Il Sung are mainly related to his anti-Japanese military activities and he always wins the battles against the Japanese army, killing hundreds of Japanese soldiers with a single gunshot. He makes boats out of tree leaves to cross the river and has the power to ‘wrinkle the ground’ and walks four or eight kilometers in one step.91 Speed, a characteristic of Kim Jong Il’s leadership, is perhaps the most vital legend associated with him. Some of his legends emphasize his ability to ‘wrinkle time’, an aspect that differs from his father’s legends. In his legends, corn seeds that Kim Jong Il gives to farmers become full-grown in two months. He builds an International Friendship Exhibition at Mt Myohyang in three days.92 While the legends about Kim Il Sung include the hope that the senior Kim will defeat the Japanese army and liberate the fatherland, those related to Kim Jong Il reflect the goal that the junior Kim will eliminate US imperialists and their puppet South Korean government. Combined with the fact that it is almost impossible for the people to contact Kim Jong Il, the legends buttress his idealized image. The distance between Kim and the people strengthens the people’s imagination of him through the legends. The legends deliver to the people messages that Kim is not an ordinary individual and is far too superior for ordinary people to overcome. He becomes a living legend. Symbolism A great number of symbols also support Kim’s ‘theatrical politics’. Symbols stand for values or concepts and have a psychological effect on the human mind. When a person sees a familiar symbol, he or she immediately recognizes its meaning. The symbol does not need a verbal or written explanation. Kim Jong Il depends on signs to construct symbolic meanings for his words and actions, filling North Korean society with symbols.

Leadership 163 A great number of North Korean symbols surround the cult of the Kims. These include the statues of Kim Il Sung, anti-Japanese revolutionary sites near Mt Paekdu, the tour sites of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il, the Kim Il Sung Flower, and the Kim Jong Il Flower, among other things. Man'gy˘ongdae School for Children of Revolutionaries is a symbol of Kim Il Sung’s comradeship. The Revolutionaries’ Tombs is a symbolic place representing the ideal relationship between the leader and the people. The Tombs is a place of political immortality. When it comes to Kim Jong Il’s personal appearance, the khaki-style suit he wears represents his hardworking nature and frugality. According to Fujimoto, however, the suit is made of luxurious cashmere silk. It was modeled after the uniform of the former East German soldier. Only Kim is allowed to wear it in the society, but sometimes he gives a khaki suit to his staff as a gift.93 The chwegi pap (rice ball) is another symbol of his frugality. The North Korean media frequently propagates that Kim eats rice balls without side dishes during his local tours. The rice ball represents how modest he is during his strenuous work for the people. Additionally, his three-year (1994–1997) mourning period symbolizes the epitome of filial piety and loyalty to the Great Leader. During the Arduous March, Kim emphasized the ‘spirit of the red flag’. The ‘spirit of the red flag’ was meant to uphold the totalitarian chuch'e system even to death during the famine, just as communists had died for the ‘red’ cause (communism) in the past. He also made O Chung-hˇup a model figure. O was a guerrilla who had led a guard unit for Kim Il Sung. As O had done for his father, Kim Jong Il demanded that the people guard him during the crisis period. Reasons The creation of an ideal leader is the main purpose of Kim’s ‘theatrical politics’. His orchestrated public activity is transformed into a show through the arts of the politics. Why does Kim Jong Il create such ‘theatrical politics’? The first and foremost reason is that Kim Jong Il himself cannot be as ideal a leader as the media portrays. The cult of leader in the society creates an overly idealized image that Kim Jong Il cannot fulfill in reality. Even though he is not ideal, he must behave according to the idealized image. The cult forces him to perform theatrically and remain behind the scenes in order to hide his ‘real’ persona. Second, his theatrical performance is related to his secret political emergence. As a way to strengthen the cult of the senior Kim, the junior Kim was able to become the political successor without any public occasion. Even after he was appointed the successor, Kim remained behind the scenes until the 1980 Sixth Party Congress. He relied upon his father’s authority. He raised his political status by elevating his father’s to the level of a demigod. He was never independent of his father. The senior Kim was always raised up and the junior Kim stood behind him as a humble son. Third, Kim Jong Il does not have to show his ‘real’ persona to the public in the totalitarian settings. The totalitarian society does not force him to disclose his real identity through competitive elections or public press conferences, but

164 Leadership only requires him to develop his skills in order to manipulate his image. As long as he has the capacity to maneuver the totalitarian settings, he can dictate people’s impressions of him. He can control the flow of information and recreate the image they have of him into a more favorable one. Whenever he needs to, he either releases the information he wants or filters it if he does not want it released. Fourth, his artistic bent allows him to retain this ‘double’ persona. He does not tolerate the ‘boring’ totalitarian society that he played a role in developing. Because he cannot officially renounce his puritanical society, he needs an exit to gratify his personal tastes. This is a reason why he partakes in ‘secret consumption’ practices that include his drinking festivities, his Hollywood movies and CNN viewing, and expensive foreign products. Fifth, his interest in art and literature provided him the knowledge for theatricality. Most likely he studied propaganda and agitation. According to Sin Kyˇong-wan, when he was working in the Propaganda and Agitation Department, Kim learned effective propaganda methods from other countries’ examples.94 His interest and knowledge in art and literature guide his theatrical performance. Of course, Kim cannot create his ‘theatrical politics’ by himself. His entourage are his accomplices; if Kim is the leading actor, they are the supporting actors. They eliminate all evidence of Kim’s ‘human’ behavior. In exchange for their complicity, they are materially rewarded. Kim gives them such ‘carrots’ as luxurious houses, cars, and other incentives. Terror is also an important ‘stick’ used to force them to keep their mouths shut.

Pragmatism Silli Kim Jong Il is primarily portrayed as a staunch chuch'e dogmatist. A reason that Kim appears rigid is because of his emphasis on loyalty to his father. Advocating for his father’s revolutionary tradition had been his trademark. He must stress tradition because it is the primary source of his legitimacy. Another reason for his unyielding image arises from the state’s past behaviors – the Korean War, the terrorist attacks against the South, the provocative P'anmunj˘om axe murders and Pueblo seizure, the nation’s tough negotiating position with its neighboring states, and other policies. The state’s aggressive image overlaps that of Kim Jong Il. The third reason comes from the negative information about Kim. For outsiders, his words and behaviors are unconventional. Most information about Kim is hard to understand from the perspective of an ‘open’ society. Those who obtain the bizarre information are, at best, critical and, at worst, disgusted. Kim’s image as a loyal follower of chuch'e, the state’s hard-line attitude, and the negative information on him suggest that Kim Jong Il is not a negotiable leader. Kim, however, is a politician. It is almost impossible for a politician to be perfectly dogmatic about a particular political idea in any society. Reality

Leadership 165 constantly changes. A political leader has to adapt to flexible changes in reality in order to grasp or maintain political power. Sometimes a political leader is ideological and sometimes pragmatic. Even the most ideological politician displays pragmatism in some policy areas under certain circumstances. Kim Jong Il is no exception. Kim also shows both ideological and pragmatic leadership styles. Pragmatism refers to a ‘style of action that gets results by adapting to circumstances or by doing whatever it takes without too much concern about fixed rules or principles’.95 If Kim’s words and behaviors are scrutinized, it is not difficult to find pragmatic elements in them. He sometimes values substance over form.96 His pragmatic character appears in the concept of silli ( practical benefit or profit). The concept was publicly unveiled after Kim went through the hardships of the mid-1990s. The first time Kim openly mentioned the term was at the 2000 summit.97 In January 2000, before the summit, the New Year’s Day editorial in the Nodong sinmun discussed the importance of silli in economic activities.98 The North Korean leaders were already using the term around 1999. As mentioned earlier, the notion of silli was forged to rationalize Kim’s economic reforms. The state usually accentuates silli in regards to economic activities. Concerning Kim Jong Il’s leadership, however, the concept materializes in most of his activity. Kim argued, ‘We should move toward silli-first. Silli is significant in both politics and diplomacy, but it is more important in economic affairs.’99 Silli in the economy concerns economic efficiency and profit. Silli in diplomacy denotes pragmatically seeking national interests in international politics. Considering his statement, silli is a code of conduct for his activities. Diplomacy When Kim Il Sung was alive, he was the primary player in the state’s diplomatic affairs. Even after the death of Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il refrained from directly engaging in international politics. Although the Agreed Framework between the US and North Korea was concluded in October 1994, Kim’s pragmatic leadership style was not apparent at the time. Over time, his pragmatic character became clearer in diplomatic negotiations with the outsiders. Some people who contacted Kim in person began to relate that he was open to negotiation. An aide to Kim Dae Jung who sat in the negotiation room of the 2000 summit recalled a compromise between the two leaders: At the summit the agenda that the two leaders debated longest was on a unification proposal. President Kim explained the South’s proposal of unification system to Chairman Kim for a considerable length of time. [However,] Chairman Kim stuck to the North’s proposal of a federation where a central government would have the powers of diplomacy and the military [and two regional governments would have autonomy except for diplomatic and military powers]. Only after President Kim persistently persuaded him, Chairman Kim changed [his attitude] and suggested a revised proposal of a ‘lower-level’ federation. President Kim accepted it because he believed the

166 Leadership proposal of a ‘lower-level’ federation is almost the same with the South’s proposal of a confederation.100 According to this recollection, Kim Jong Il was flexible at the summit. The issue of a unification proposal was one of the most sensitive issues in inter-Korean relations. At the deadlock of the summit, he changed his original position to a more negotiable proposal. Kim probably did not want to drain the other beneficial agendas due to the unification proposal that even he was unsure would be realized in the future. Kim utilized the summit as a bridge to move toward the US. After the summit, Kim began to develop relations with the US, who had previously been North Korea’s archenemy. He sent Cho Myˇong-nok to Washington and invited US President Bill Clinton to Pyongyang in October 2000. In response, Madeleine Albright went to the North to prepare for Clinton’s visit in the same month. Like the 2000 summit, Kim’s meeting with Albright illustrated his pragmatic attitude. At the meeting, Kim agreed that his state would ban missile exports, ‘provided there was compensation’. In addition, he admitted that American forces on the Korean Peninsula played a ‘stabilizing role’ in the post-Cold War era. After the meeting, Albright corroborated ‘Kim Dae Jung’s view that his DPRK counterpart was an intelligent man who knew what he wanted’.101 At the same time, he improved relations with other democratic countries. In 2001, Pyongyang opened diplomatic ties with twelve countries (The Netherlands, Turkey, Belgium, Canada, Spain, Germany, Luxemburg, Greece, Brazil, New Zealand, Kuwait, and Bahrain) and the European Union.102 Given these cases, Kim’s opinion is flexible in his opinion in certain situations without too much attachment to his chuch'e principle. He is ready to negotiate even with his enemy when he thinks he can gain some profit from it. His opinion on American troops implies that he was aware of the changed political situations of northeast Asia and that he wanted to improve diplomatic relations with the US in order to ensure the security of his regime. Another example of his pragmatic character in diplomacy is the North Korea– Japan summit held in Pyongyang in September 2002. At the summit, Kim acknowledged that the state had abducted eleven Japanese civilians to teach Japanese language to North Korean spies. The spies tried to infiltrate into South Korea under the guise of Japanese people or Koreans in Japan. At the summit, he officially apologized to Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi for his ‘radical’ officials’ crime committed ‘without his permission’. In return, Koizumi agreed with Kim that North Korea and Japan would resume talks for diplomatic normalization in October. Koizumi also promised that Japan would provide the North with financial aid after the diplomatic normalization.103 The two leaders had one more summit in May 2004. However, the relations between the two states made little progress due to Japanese domestic criticism of the North’s illegal abductions. The fact that Kim, as the country’s highest ranked decision-maker, admitted the crime of kidnapping might have been a diplomatic debacle. However, his

Leadership 167 admission reflected the degree to which he wanted to improve the two states’ relations by resolving the issue. He needed Japanese economic assistance to revive the devastated North Korean economy, even at the cost of his own morality or public image. The North Korea–Japan agreement demonstrates Kim Jong Il’s pragmatic character. Kim’s pragmatic diplomacy is related to the strategy of his regime survival. Kim wants to ease the tension with hostile neighbors through a pragmatic approach. His final goal is to normalize diplomatic relations with North Korea’s neighbors. At the same time, he expects that friendly relations would lead other countries to assist in the economic reconstruction of the North Korean state. In the post-Cold War era, the changed relations with traditional allies like China and Russia also caused Kim to seek the pragmatic approach ‘by his own efforts’. Economy Besides diplomacy, the economic sector is another area in which Kim’s pragmatic character is pertinent. As aforementioned, his pragmatic approach began to be clear from the late 1990s. With historical hindsight, the reform policies establishing the 1984 Law of the Management of Joint Venture and the 1991 Rajin–Sˇonbong special economic zone could also be considered examples of the pragmatic approach. However, until the late-1990s, it was not easy to identify the approach within the context of policy consistency. Kim’s economic pragmatism evolved coincidently with his efforts to escape from economic devastation. The turning point of his pragmatic approach was the Mt K˘umgang tourism project that started in 1998. From then on, Kim Jong Il has consecutively set up pragmatic policies: the plan of Sinˇuiju Special Administrative Zone, the July Economic Measures in 2002 and the Kaesˇong Industrial Area (KIA). In June 1998, Kim permitted Ch˘ong Chu-y˘ong to conduct the Mt K˘umgang tourism project when Ch˘ong presented him with a herd of cows and bulls. The permission granted for the tourism project was likely a drastic policy change without elaborate preparation. Before Ch˘ong’s visit, Kim still asserted that he would not adopt economic strategies such as the introduction of foreign capital or tourism104 but once he met Ch˘ong, he suddenly agreed to the project. After he granted Ch˘ong permission, an isolationist versus pragmatist dispute on economic reform arose among North Korean party cadres. On 17 September 1998, the Nodong sinmun featured a joint article from the Nodong sinmun and Kˇulloja, the theoretical organ of the party. The article strongly opposed the introduction of foreign capital to develop the economy and advocated establishing a self-reliant economy as in the past. It also blamed the imperialists for inducing the state to adopt ‘reforms’ and ‘opening’.105 It was not publicly known how the dispute played out or who represented the isolationists or pragmatists. What was clear from the newspaper article was that the isolationists were the majority in the party.

168 Leadership Their reaction to economic change implied that the Mt K˘umgang tourism project might have been an isolated economic experiment like the Rajin–Sˇonbong special economic zone. In October, Ch˘ong again went to the North with a herd of bulls and cows and convinced Kim to implement his plan. In spite of the isolationists’ internal opposition, Ch˘ong’s repeated requests, together with the material contributions of cows and bulls, prompted Kim to finalize his pragmatic policy of the tourism project. Before the 1998 dispute, there was already a debate between the isolationists and pragmatists in the mid-1990s. When the state underwent the economic disaster of the mid-1990s, some pragmatic party cadres suggested introducing foreign capital and promoting material incentives of the workers to revitalize the economy.106 Unlike the 1998 dispute, the developmental debate of the mid-1990s came to an end with the victory of the isolationists that Kim supported. The 1998 dispute was different from the previous one because the outsider, Ch˘ong, was unintentionally involved in the debate and backed the pragmatists. The late-1990s success of the tourism project expanded room for the pragmatists. Kim took up more pragmatic policies including the plans for a Sinˇuiju Special Administrative Zone and the KIA. The engagement policy of the Kim Dae Jung administration, known as the Sunshine Policy, was also a favorable external condition for Kim’s pragmatic policies. Although the former plan was stillborn, the latter one was realized. In August 2000, after the summit, Hyundai and North Korea concluded an official agreement to establish the KIA. As of February of 2008, 65 South Korean firms had built factories and were producing their products in the KIA.107 The isolationists’ resistance persisted while pragmatic cadres implemented their reform policies. In late 2001, Kyˇongje yˇon'gu (Economic Research), the economic organ of the party, carried two opposing articles. One advocated a self-reliant socialist national economy by criticizing the material-incentive-focus viewpoint,108 while the other underscored economic rationality and practical profit.109 Both of the articles simultaneously emphasized the importance of silli in economic activities, which indicated that, by 2001, even the isolationists could no longer deny the concept of silli. The July Economic Measures in 2002 contributed to spreading the notion of silli to all economic sectors. After the measures, the more the workers produced, the more they received. Economic efficiency became the most important principle in production and management. Silli became one of main economic tenets for Kim’s ‘strong and prosperous state’.110 Kim Jong Il’s pragmatic approach, however, is limited. It is not meant to transform the North Korean economy into a capitalist one. The state has not yet officially abandoned the food-rationing system or the economic planning. Kim has introduced the elements of a market economy selectively and gradually without shaking up the socialist economic structure. Moreover, his pragmatic approach exists only within the range of his regime’s stability. Kim would not push his pragmatic approach ahead if he thought that it might threaten his regime.

Leadership 169

Decision-making Features of Kim Jong Il’s decision-making There is no question that Kim Jong Il makes all of the most important decisions in the state. His decision-making style has several features. First, he is engrossed with daily routine reports. He reviews all the documents on his desk. Apart from strategic issues, Kim also pays attention to detailed technical matters concerning economy, education, the military, and so on. Hwang Chang-yˇop recalled Kim’s decision-making style as follows: But he reviews all the reports that each party department submits. Nobody but him knows what the contents of the reports are [. . .] The volume of the reports is tremendous, but he allows nobody to review them instead of him. He reads all and then gives some of them enveloped with his signature back to party secretaries like me [. . .] One example is about the housing of his staff. He himself arranges who lives in which apartment. ‘Person A should live on the first floor and person B on the second floor.’ In addition, when he sends gifts to his staff on a national holiday, he himself [specifically] coordinates that ‘this secretary should be given more than that secretary’.111 This decision-making style may force him to accumulate vast knowledge of many areas. To be the master of the state, he should know more than anyone else does at any moment. However, it is probable that he is not able to physically review all the reports in detail. Some that he is interested in are thoroughly read and others are not. Second, Kim does not abide by formal party rules of decision-making. When Kim Il Sung was alive, he used to decide important party decisions through the Central Committee. Since his father’s death, Kim Jong Il does not seem to consider the Central Committee to be as important a decision-making pillar for party policy as his father had. According to the party by-laws, the members of the Central Committee are supposed to be elected during a party congress.112 However, a party congress has not been held since 1980. Kim appoints the members of the Central Committee without holding the congress. When he was elected the general secretary of the Central Committee in 1997, he abused the party by-laws as he involved the military in the election process. Third, Kim Jong Il prefers informal contacts to formal meetings. He convenes fewer formal meetings than his father did. Instead of holding the Politburo or the plenary meeting of the Central Committee, he usually has one-to-one or small group meetings. He directly contacts a party secretary or a chief of the

170 Leadership concerned party department. Interestingly, he likes to consult with his staff ‘over the phone’.113 When he has certain questions on the documents his staff hands in, he often calls to ask about them. When he needs to make ‘complicated’ decisions, he holds small group meetings.114 Sometimes, ‘informal’ means ‘private’. According to Hwang, Kim occasionally decides important personnel matters at drinking parties.115 His drinking parties are held to have fun and to develop participants’ personal bonds with him. At the same time, the festivities seem to be a space where Kim makes informal decisions with his cronies. Fourth, and related to the third feature, his decision-making structure is extremely vertical and narrow. Under Kim Jong Il’s leadership, each department of the party appears not to exchange information with other departments horizontally. Only the concerned bureaucratic entities deal with each issue at hand. His preference for secrecy restrains horizontal participation in decision-making. When a policy was decided in the Politburo or the plenary meeting of the Central Committee during the Kim Il Sung regime, all members of the organizations participated in decision-making, even though it was very ritual process. At least they knew the regime’s plans. In Kim Jong Il’s conspiratorial decision-making process, nobody except for him knows the overall state of affairs. Only he is aware of all North Korean policy matters. His disposition of secrecy shapes this kind of decision-making structure. Fifth, Kim does not completely depend upon one organizational line for his decision-making. He has a multi-reporting system composed of party, administration, military, and secret police lines. Through the reporting system, he places these organizations into a loyalty competition. In other words, he deals with his subjects on the principle of ‘divide-and-compete’, where they compete against and check each other to gain Kim’s attention. For example, before the early 1990s, Kim mainly relied on the SSD for intelligence, but in the mid-1990s, he emphasized the role of the MSC.116 In the late 1990s, the police was the main player in the political purge beyond the powers of the SSD and the MSC.117 The rivalries make the organizations more loyal to him and resulted only in increasing his power as supreme leader. Limits of Kim Jong Il’s decision-making Unlike the leaders of democratic societies, Kim Jong Il is relatively free from law and public opinion in his decision-making. When secrecy is necessary in the decision-making, he can conceal what he needs to conceal. However, like other leaders, he is not totally free from decision-making conditions like available resources, time, information, previous commitments and bureaucratic assistance.118 Every leader has a vision. He or she has to make policy priorities in order to realize the vision and distribute limited resources according to the priorities of the state. Kim also has the vision of a ‘strong and prosperous state’. Under the current economic conditions, Kim has few resources to actualize his vision.

Leadership 171 This resource limitation severely restrains Kim’s options for decision-making. The resource scarcity is a reason why he has become pragmatic. Through a pragmatic approach, he tries to increase resources for his decision-making. Time and information also limit a leader’s decision-making process. In a sense, more time often means more information. While a leader sometimes has enough time and information available to make a decision, he or she often does not have enough time and information for decision-making. Generally a leader does not have enough time to thoroughly examine the reports his or her staff presents, given the volume of reports that the leader has to deal with daily. Kim Jong Il fits this profile. His desire to review every issue in the state curbs his ability to spend enough time mulling over important policies. According to Hwang: For example, in 1996, North Korea produced less than a fifth of the electricity required for that year. All power organizations [including the military and the police] directly requested Kim Jong Il to provide the electricity to those organizations and he approved the requests. The document with Kim’s signature is a legal one, which should be absolutely executed. So the power organizations went to the Department of Electric Industry of the cabinet and threatened the department to receive the electricity. The Department of Electric Industry upset by the bullies of the organizations asked Kim to solve the problem. So Kim told the party secretaries like us to correct the electricity issue. After we investigated the issue, it was revealed that Kim approved as many as 190 counts of electricity-concerned requests the power organizations raised.119 This episode may be a negative case of how Kim’s decision-making affected his staff and people. In this case, Kim just ratified all the requests of the power organizations without considering the effect of his individual decision-making in a broader context. Although all of his decisions may not be like this, Kim did not understand the complexity of his decision in this episode. Regardless of his individual intelligence, the huge number of documents he has to deal with every day is beyond his capacity due to the lack of available time and information. Under the over-centralized decision-making conditions, it would be impossible for him to understand what effect his micro-level decision-making would create at the macro level. Previous commitments are another limit of Kim’s decision-making process. They encompass the commitments or principles of North Korea, the commitments or precedents of Kim Il Sung, and the statements of Kim Jong Il himself. The ideas of chuch'e and socialism are the main principles of the state that confine Kim’s decision-making. His father’s precedents also restrict his decisions and are imposed upon him once his policies are made public. As long as Kim portrays himself as his father’s loyal follower, it may not be difficult to execute the policies his father initiated. But, once he must set up a new policy inconsistent with his father’s, his moves are very restricted. In addition, as Kim Jong Il meets more

172 Leadership outsiders, he makes more agreements with them. The agreements also become his commitments. During the 2000 summit, Kim Jong Il promised to his counterpart Kim Dae Jung that he would pay a return visit to Seoul ‘in proper time’, but he has not committed to his promise so far. From time to time, he has been under pressure to carry out his promise from South Korean governmental officials. One more limit is that Kim has to be assisted by bureaucracy. In the absence of the separation of powers and their checks and balances, the bureaucratic assistance can be a limit of Kim’s decision-making. The bureaucracy is neither unitary nor impersonal. Each bureaucratic organization has its own interests and pursues them. Bureaucrats are able to distort information that is unfavorable to their interests and exaggerate what is favorable. North Korean bureaucrats are no exception. As the case of the Mt Kˇumgang tourism project has shown, there are different groups of bureaucrats with different opinions on North Korean futures. One group includes those who believe that international cooperation and exchange are necessary to resuscitate the economy. They are more pragmatic. The bureaucrats seem to be usually engaged in foreign and economic affairs. Another group includes those emphasizing an independent national economy. They are the isolationists. Generally the people in the military are known to hold negative views of international cooperation and economic reforms. Besides the Mt Kˇumgang tourism project, another policy competition between the two bureaucratic groups was the North’s cancellation of an event where trains would experimentally travel from the North to the South and vice versa on the Kyˇongˇui Railroad and the Tonghae Railroad in May 2006.120 The North agreed with the South to hold the event on 25 May, but suddenly called it off two days before the official event. Just before the cancellation, the North Korean military officers held a meeting with the South’s counterparts in mid-May. At the military meeting, they discussed the issue of redrawing the North–South sea border on the West Seat (or Yellow Sea), but failed to come to an agreement. After the failure of the military meeting, the North Korean military seemed to dissuade Kim Jong Il from engaging in the railway event. Unlike the tourism project, Kim supported the hawkish military’s position at this time. Kim’s inconsistency in decision-making, disclosed in the railway-event case, was partly due to his lack of conviction in the reforms. He is not confident of his reforms and their impact on his regime, as they are not based on his strategic vision of a ‘strong and prosperous state’. In a sense, his reforms are inevitable choices reflecting the grim North Korean reality rather than his voluntarily choosing that they be part of his vision. This lack of confidence in reforms causes such policy inconsistencies. Under these conditions, which policy he chooses depends upon which bureaucratic group better persuades Kim.

7

Conclusion

Kim Jong Il is one of the most extraordinary leaders in Korean history. He is a more powerful, suppressive leader than any king in pre-modern Korean history. Before his father’s death, Kim Jong Il spent twenty years preparing to assume leadership of North Korea. After his father’s death, he has successfully maintained a relatively stable regime throughout internal and external difficulties. There is no clear indication that Kim Jong Il has faced any significant organized resistance. Given that Kim Jong Il still swears to be faithful to his deceased father, Kim Il Sung succeeded in implementing his plan for political succession. Kim Jong Il has demonstrated a strong will to power. He worked hard to become the successor and once he was appointed as the state’s leader, he tried his best to secure the position. Through the personality cult, the Dear Leader was able to portray himself as being as great as the Great Leader had been. Like his father, he has been ruthless towards his ‘potential’ challengers. Political purges have been useful in preventing any organizational resistance. His will to power is revealed well in his control-oriented character. He trusts nobody and personally deals with all important information. Kim Jong Il himself occupies two powerful positions – chief of the party Organization Department and of the SSD. He is not a leader who gives his staff the autonomy for decision-making. Whenever he meets bureaucratic resistance in his decision-making, he tries to overcome it by strengthening his control over the bureaucrats. He has largely expanded the controlprone institutions – the party, the police, the secret police, and concentration camps – in order to scrutinize his people and eliminate impure elements from regime. Kim Jong Il’s childhood differed from his father’s. Kim Il Sung was born to a poor peasant family and spent his childhood and teenage years in poverty. During his guerrilla activities, he lived in a state of ‘war of all against all’ and learned to adapt himself to the harsh reality of survival. While Kim Il Sung was a ‘street-fighter’, Kim Jong Il was a ‘prince’. The junior Kim has not personally experienced that ‘life is hard’. He never worried about poverty except for during the period of the Korean War. The senior Kim did not even finish a middle school education, but his son completed college. Along with his formal higher education, the junior Kim was also privately taught by prominent North Korean scholars.

174 Conclusion Kim Il Sung rose to political power in an era of uncertainty and instability. He became the leader of the state in the post-World War II period under the tutelage of the Soviet Union. When the Soviet occupational forces left the state, he depended on his political genius to stabilize his power base. Like Stalin, he was ingenious in playing political games with his opponents. In North Korea’s early period when various political factions contended for power, he outmaneuvered his political opponents through a series of temporary political coalitions and purges. During the Sino-Soviet conflict, he shrewdly sought national interests using the chuch'e position. While the senior’s path to dictatorship was not easy to predict, the junior’s was relatively steady, although he contended with his stepmother for power. His strongest political patrons were his father and former guerrilla fighters who had fought with his father in Manchuria. By the early 1970s when the junior Kim became the successor, the state was very optimistic about its future. Internationally, the Cold War continued and the international system was relatively stable for North Korea. Domestically the state recovered from the devastation of the Korean War and its people did not suffer from poverty as they later would in the mid-1990s. The people were well organized and mobilized. All of his father’s political opponents were purged in the 1950s and 1960s. Kim Jong Il ascended to power in a relatively stable period. Kim Jong Il’s succession to his father transformed the totalitarian North Korea into a dynastic one. After the succession, past dynastic traditions were revived in the society. The dynastic regime borrowed monarchic traditions that had been repudiated before the succession. National traditions such as folklores and customs, handed down from the past, have been revitalized in the regime. The dynastic totalitarian regime has recruited its personnel through patrimonial succession. The leader’s staff member positions have been filled by the leader’s cronies and relatives. The children of former guerrillas have played pivotal roles in supporting the party and the state. For the most part, Kim Il Sung’s legitimacy emerged from his guerrilla activities. He was mainly portrayed as being the Korean redeemer. Even though he was not successful in the Korean War, his power was protected by the Chinese volunteer army internationally and by successful purges of his political opponents domestically. The economic success during the 1950s and 1960s further supported his legitimacy. As the heir of the dynastic regime, Kim Jong Il’s legitimacy comes from Kim Il Sung. The root of his legitimacy is found in his loyalty to the predecessor. He is the chief legatee of Kim Il Sung’s tradition. The authority of the Dear Leader is transferred from that of the Great Leader. At present, Kim Jong Il’s main organizational base is the military. Under ‘military-first politics’, the military is the prime locus of power and currently plays the most significant role in maintaining the Kim Jong Il regime. He protects his regime from internal and external threats by mobilizing the military. The military are placed as the highest priority in the distribution of economic resources. Compared with his father’s regime, the role of the party has been weakened under Kim Jong Il’s leadership.

Conclusion 175 Speed is Kim Jong Il’s basic working principle. The emphasis on speed in his job performance is related to his impetuous temperament. Once he decides to do something, he rapidly pushes it ahead to the end although he is aware that the speedy process creates some negative side-effects. He is not a person who paces his work utilizing sufficient time, but is only satisfied with his work after finishing it as fast as he can. He mobilizes all necessary resources to complete his plan in the shortest amount of time. Connected with frequent mass mobilizations, this ‘speed’ style has had a negative impact on society, particularly its economic construction. He is artistic. Most artistic works in the society are created to please his aesthetic tastes. He is the director and connoisseur of the society’s cultural development. He guided the creation of several remarkable North Korean films and operas in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Up until now, Kim has been deeply involved in orchestrating the state’s public extravaganzas, including mass games and card sections. He himself censors most North Korean movies, songs, and literature before releasing them. He is a movie maniac. Cinema is not only a means for his personal amusement but is also his main political instrument for ideological indoctrination. He also decides on all of the designs of North Korea’s grand architecture. He is the master of ‘theatrical politics’, as its primary actor and director. His artistic traits help his theatrical performance. He has two ‘personas,’ the public and the private. In the public space, he behaves as a virtuous leader but, in private, he becomes a leader who is more ‘human’ and ‘ordinary’. In situations where he has to be kind, he appears to be so, but when he does not have to be, his irascible impulses are explosive. He knows how to behave differently in different situations. His persuasive power comes from the controlled mass media and education system for image manipulation rather than from personal oratorical power. His general image is usually portrayed as a chuch'e dogmatist, but he is pragmatic at the same time. His pragmatic character has become clear since the late 1990s, after the society underwent the Arduous March. His pragmatic approach has accompanied the North Korean economic reforms domestically and the improved relations with South Korea and Western democratic countries internationally. As long as he can conduct the reforms under his orchestration and he believes that they will not threaten his regime’s stability, he will likely continue to adopt pragmatic policies. While his people live like the Spartans, Kim is not ascetic; as their prince, he lives a luxurious life. To gratify his picky tastes, most of what he uses, watches, and drinks are imported from foreign countries. Even when the society suffered from famine in the mid-1990s, he did not abstain from his extravagance. The analytical framework of the four elements in Chapter I – Kim as leader of a totalitarian state, politician, Korean, and individual person – were instrumental in grasping Kim Jong Il’s traits and his leadership as described above. The four elements are supplementary rather than competing with each other. Each element makes up for what the other elements do not explain about Kim. For example, the overemphasis on the totalitarian Kim Jong Il easily misses the

176 Conclusion pragmatic Kim Jong Il. In contrast, we can find his pragmatic characteristics when examining the politician Kim Jong Il. At the same time, a certain characteristic of Kim Jong Il’s leadership combines more than one element in the framework. For instance, to explain his ‘theatrical politics’, we need to know both his personal preferences and his role as a leader in the totalitarian social setting. As a leader of a totalitarian society, Kim Jong Il does not follow democratic rules of the game. He was raised in totalitarian North Korea. It is difficult to expect Kim to follow democratic rules; that is, checks-and-balances, open competition, majority rule, and protection of political losers and minority. To examine his extraordinary behavior, we need to understand the political mechanisms of totalitarian society. Although it is not easy to accept his behavior as a leader of the totalitarian society, Kim Jong Il as a politician is not completely impossible to figure out. His behavior is similar to other politicians’ in different societies in that most politicians seek political power and want to maintain it as long as they can by any means in a given situation. In addition, while totalitarian Kim Jong Il looks too rigid, politician Kim Jong Il is negotiable as other politicians are. As a Korean, Kim Jong Il differs from Western totalitarian leaders. In particular, the stress on Confucian values in his leadership is an important indicator in illuminating leadership difference between Kim Jong Il and other Western totalitarian leaders. Confucianism is also a critical element in following the transformation of totalitarian North Korea into a dynastic totalitarian regime. The chuch'e idea, an extreme version of Korean nationalism, enables us to probe the mentalities of both Kim Jong Il and the North Korean people. For outsiders, in order to grip North Korea’s unconventional behavior in international relations, it is essential to know the idea of chuch'e. It is necessary to understand North Korea in order to know Kim Jong Il. Simultaneously, examining leader Kim Jong Il helps us probe North Korean politics and the policy of the North Korean government. His manner of interacting with his cronies, his decision-making style, his policy priority, and the relationship between his personal preference and the government’s policy are deeply enmeshed with North Korean politics. Now, Kim Jong Il is in his late sixties. He became the political successor when his father was in his sixties. It is time for him to think about his political future. It is not yet known to the outside world who will be his successor. Just as his father did, he wants the most reliable and loyal figure to succeed his position. Even after his death, he wants to be revered by the North Korean people. His inheritor’s denouncing him and his father after his death, as Khrushchev did after Stalin’s death, would be a nightmare. Kim already disclosed his intentions regarding the future North Korean leadership while he was talking with Madeleine Albright in 2000. During her discussion with Kim in Pyongyang, she heard Kim mention that he was interested in the Swedish and Thai models as North Korean alternative futures. He liked the Swedish model because the Swedish economy, he believed, was basically socialist. He also preferred the Thai model because Thailand has maintained its traditional royal system and national independence from foreign countries.1

Conclusion 177 The combination of the two models might be Kim’s preferred North Korean future. Regarding the governing system, one of the common points between Sweden and Thailand is that their governments are constitutional monarchies. In Thailand, kings played a key part in preserving Thailand’s independence from Western colonial powers in the past. Even until the twenty-first century, the Thai king has had an important role as the mediator arbitrating the conflict among ‘secular’ political factions.2 Another factor we can infer from the Thai model is that Kim does not want intervention by foreign forces. His preference for the Swedish model tells us that Kim believes that even a socialist state operating under a king can develop its economy prosperously. In any system, he must have believed that the Kims should remain in the status of ‘first family’ as long as North Korea survives. It is not certain that he still believes that the two state models can be applied to North Korea. For Kim Jong Il, it may not be difficult to select his political heir. However, the future of the state, not that of the leadership, could differ from his preferred future. In other words, what Kim wants North Korea to be may be different from what the people want the state to be. The destiny of political leadership is not always linked to that of state. Political leadership is an essential part of state, but it is not the state itself. In other words, the collapse of the Kim Jong Il regime does not necessarily mean the collapse of North Korea. Even without the Kim Jong Il regime, as long as North Korea is not absorbed by South Korea (or China), the state would maintain its entity with a different type of political regime. Given the changing reality, North Korea’s future is more unpredictable than the leadership’s. The following socio-political factors will affect its future and challenge Kim Jong Il and his heir. First, the chronic economic disaster will challenge them. The North Korean people are no longer living ‘in a cave’. Since the mid-1990s they have been able to receive information from the outside world. Although the people do not organizationally resist their government, they do not believe in the governmental propaganda as much as they used to. If Kim Jong Il and his heir cannot recover the ailing economy, his regime will lose its legitimacy and the people will turn their backs on the regime. The second challenge is the impact of economic reforms. The economic reforms, particularly the 2002 Economic Measures, are changing the daily life of the North Korean people. The government cannot establish economic planning except for in some ‘strategic’ sectors due to the lack of economic resources. The current economic crisis provides the people more space for private economic activities. Efficiency and profit became the most important values in their economic activities. It is not clear whether the reforms will revive or aggravate the devastated economy. The long-term impacts of the reforms are another challenge that the North Korean leadership has to deal with. Third, the society is undergoing a generational change. Unlike the generation of the 1990s, the generation born in the mid-1950s and 1960s experienced the successes of socialist economic construction and did not worry about hunger.

178 Conclusion The generation who was born in the 1990s suffered horrible starvation. Many members of the generation died from famine and others continue to be malnourished. Scarcity and deprivation haunts them. For the new generation, survival is the most important need. While the older generations are more ideological, the new generation is less political and more pragmatic. The first goal of the new generation is to make enough money to guarantee their survival. The economic reforms are strengthening the pragmatic character of the generation. The younger generation is also sensitive to new culture. Since the mid-1990s, a number of the North Korean people have penetrated into the China–North Korea border areas and they have watched Chinese social changes and obtained information on South Korea. There is no doubt that the new information has had the largest impact on the younger generation. Economic exchanges and cooperation with China and South Korea are facilitating the attitude change of the new generation. Although the generational change is not a factor that will clearly threaten the regime, it will affect the regime’s future policies. Lastly, the ongoing nuclear issue is a challenge. The state has already manufactured nuclear weapons. If the issue cannot be solved in the foreseeable future, the external pressure of the US and neighboring countries, combined with the domestic challenges, will be a serious threat to Kim and his successor. The future of North Korea will depend on how the North Korean leadership copes with the challenges. In a sense, these challenges are inextricably entangled with the basic question of whether North Korea will remain an isolated island within the open world or be open to the world. To improve the current economy, it is essential to expand economic contacts with outsiders, but to maintain the totalitarian regime the state has to keep distanced from them. The dilemma between opening and isolation is what the North Korean leadership has to continue to face in the future. How well the totalitarianism will get along with the open world is an interesting issue to be explored in the future. It is not difficult to evaluate the policy of Kim Jong Il as leader. In policy areas, his leadership career has debased rather than enhanced the people’s living conditions. The state has enervated itself to the extent that it undergoes a yearly chronic food shortage. Millions of the people have suffered from famine. A great number of them died and some are still searching for food in China. The state has to rely on external aid every year. The North can no longer compete with the South for economic development. Of course, that is not entirely his responsibility. His father has a bigger responsibility as the founder of the state. However, it is Kim Jong Il as the incumbent leader that should assume the ultimate responsibility for all the disasters in the state. As the lifelong leader, he still has time to change the course of the totalitarian regime. The past experiences have shown that his father’s policy failed in improving the people’s welfare. Kim should learn from the past. Without providing the minimum daily necessities to his people, how can he be a good leader? Conclusively, this is research on a leader in a totalitarian society. It showed how one leader with the desire for absolute power has changed his society and how he, as the second leader, has altered the totalitarian system into a dynastic one.

Conclusion 179 Through this research, like other scholars who study political leadership, the author also has tried to show that ‘leadership matters’. The former Soviet Union suffered from economic predicaments and North Korea has also undergone severe economic disasters. In a sense, the North Korean economy is much more dire than the Soviet economy of the 1980s. While the Soviet Union collapsed, why does North Korea not collapse? Gorbachev decided to reform the Soviet Union politically and economically, but, in spite of more economic difficulties, Kim has not made such a strategic decision. Although this is not a comparative study between Gorbachev and Kim Jong Il, the author attempted to find a partial but critical answer to the question. Kim Jong Il’s decisions have been crucial.

Notes

1

Introduction

1 Robert C. Tucker, Politics as Leadership, Columbia, MI: University of Missouri Press, 1981, 11. 2 Cynthia D. McCauley, ‘Successful and unsuccessful leadership’, in John Antonakis, Anna T. Cianciolo, and Robert J. Sternberg (eds) The Nature of Leadership, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2004, 204. 3 These people will be explained later. 4 The first official biography of Kim Jong Il was Chos˘on nodongdang chungang wiw˘onhoe tang y˘oksa y˘on'guso [The Party History Institute of the Korean Workers’ Party], Inmin uˇ i chidoja [Leader of the people], vol. 1, Pyongyang: Chosˇon nodongdang ch'ulp'ansa, 1982. 5 Dae-Sook Suh, Hy˘ondae Pukhan u˘ i chidoja: Kim Il-sˇong kwa Kim Chˇong-il [Leaders of ˇ modern North Korea: Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il], Seoul: Ulyu munhwasa, 2000; Yi Ch'an-haeng, Kim Chˇong-il [Kim Jong Il], Seoul: Paeksan s˘odang, 2001; Son Kwang-ju, Kim Chˇong-il lip'ot˘u [Kim Jong Il report], Seoul: Pada puks, 2003; Michael Breen, Kim Jong-Il: North Korea’s Dear Leader, Singapore: John Wiley & Sons, 2004; Bradley K. Martin, Under the Loving Care of the Fatherly Leader: North Korea and the Kim Dynasty, New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2004; and Chˇong Ch'ang-hyˇon, Ky˘ot es˘o pon Kim Ch˘ong-il [Close by Kim Jong Il], Seoul: Kimy˘ongsa, 2000. Chˇong’s book was written at the dictation of Sin Kyˇong-wan. His real name is Pak Pyˇong-yˇop. Sin was a high-ranking North Korean official who defected from the North in the early 1980s. He worked with Kim Jong Il in the same department of the party in the early 1970s. Sin died in 1998. 6 Michael Curtis, Totalitarianism, New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1980, 3–4. 7 Plato, Republic, trans. Robin Waterfield, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993, 159–82. 8 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 2nd edn, San Diego: A Harvest Book, 1979, 438. 9 Ibid., 392 and 441. 10 Ibid., 409. 11 Bruce Cumings analyzes North Korea as a corporate state: Bruce Cumings, ‘The corporate state in North Korea’, in Hagen Koo (ed.) State and Society in Contemporary Korea, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1993, 197–230. 12 Martina Deuchler, The Confucian Transformation of Korea: A Study of Society and Ideology, Cambridge, MA: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1992, 110–11. 13 Charles K. Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, 1945–1950, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003, 6.

Notes 181 14 Dae-Sook Suh, Kim Il Sung: The North Korean Leader, New York: Columbia University Press, 1988, 310. 15 Tucker, Politics as Leadership, 56. 16 Richard Stevens, Erik Erikson: An Introduction, New York: St Martin’s Press, 1983, 104. 2

Formative period (1942–1964)

1 Tak Jin, Kim Gang Il, and Pak Hong Je, Great Leader: Kim Jong Il, Tokyo: Sorinsha, 1985, 1: 9. 2 Yi Ch'an-haeng, Kim Chˇong-il [Kim Jong Il], Seoul: Paeksan s˘odang, 2001. 3 Kim Il Sung, Segi wa t˘obur˘o [With the century], Pyongyang: Chos˘on nodongdang ch'ulp'ansa, 1998, 8: 298. Eight volumes of Kim Il Sung’s memoirs were published from 1992 to 1998. Volumes 6, 7, and 8 were posthumous. The three volumes were the collection of Kim Il Sung’s words spoken during his lifetime. 4 Yi Chong-s˘ok, Saerossˇun hyˇondae Pukhan uˇ i ihae [Understanding of newly written modern North Korea], Seoul: Yˇoksa pip'yˇongsa, 2000, 491. 5 Dae-Sook Suh, Hy˘ondae Pukhan u˘ i chidoja: Kim Il-sˇong kwa Kim Chˇong-il [Leaders ˇ of modern North Korea: Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il], Seoul: Ulyu munhwasa, 2000, 174; and Son Kwang-ju, Kim Chˇong-il lip'ot˘u [Kim Jong Il report], Seoul: Pada puks, 2003, 25. 6 Kim, Segi wa tˇoburˇo, 8: 105–6, 122–6, 156–7 and 233. 7 Ibid., 159 and 169–70. 8 Ibid., 185, 189, 196–7, 199, 202 and 206. 9 Ibid., 159. 10 Yi Ch'an-haeng, Kim Chˇong-il, 90. 11 Son, Kim Chˇong-il lip'ot˘u, 28; and Nodong sinmun, 15 February and 17 February 1982. 12 The author prefers the term ‘factualize’ to ‘fabricate’ because of its epistemological impact on the North Korean people. The people believe that the fabricated fact is real. The fabricated therefore becomes factualized to the people. The North Korean leadership has factualized many historical events for political purposes. The concept of ‘factualization’ will be detailed in Chapter 6. 13 Tak et al., Great Leader, 1: 8–9. 14 Kim T'ae-sˇo, ‘Ch'inaehanˇun chidoja’ Kim Chˇong-il uˇ n nugu in'ga’ [Who is Dear Leader Kim Jong Il?], Sin dong-a, July 1997, 190. 15 Nodong sinmun, 17 May 1964. 16 Chˇon Sang-in, Pukhan kajok chˇongch'aek uˇ i pyˇonhwa [Changes of North Korean family policy], Seoul: Minjok t'ongil yˇon'guwˇon, 1993, 33. 17 Chungang ilbosa, Kim Chˇong-il: Hanbando chˇolban ui sangsogin [Kim Jong Il: The heir of a half of the Korean peninsula], Seoul: Chungang ilbosa, 1994, 52–3. 18 Dae-Sook Suh, Kim Il Sung: The North Korean Leader, New York: Columbia University Press, 1988, 51; and Chˇong Ch'ang-hyˇon, Ky˘ot es˘o pon Kim Ch˘ong-il [Close by Kim Jong Il], Seoul: Kimy˘ongsa, 2000, 74. 19 Sin Kyˇong-wan as quoted in Chˇong, Ky˘ot es˘o pon Kim Ch˘ong-il, 78. 20 Kim Jong Il, ‘Widaehan suryˇongnim uˇ l chal pattˇurˇo mosinˇun kˇot uˇ n uri uˇ i sunggohan immu’ [Our noble duty to admire the Great Leader], 1 January 1980, Kim Chˇongil sˇonjip [Kim Jong Il selected works], Pyongyang: Chosˇon nodongdang ch'ulp'ansa, 1995, 6: 365. 21 Kim Il Sung, Segi wa tˇoburˇo, 1992, 1: 15–130. 22 Ibid., 5. 23 Kim Il Sung, Segi wa tˇoburˇo, 1992, 1: 1–130. Chosˇon uˇ i oˇ mˇoni, Kang Pan-sˇok yˇosa [Madame Kang Pan-sˇok: The mother of Korea], Pyongyang: Kˇullodanch'e ch'ulp'ansa, 1980, 347.

182 Notes 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33

34

35 36 37

38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52

Suh, Kim Il Sung, 7. Kim Il Sung, Segi wa tˇoburˇo, 1992, 1: 345–6. Suh, Kim Il Sung, 7. Kim Il Sung, Segi wa tˇoburˇo, 1993, 4: 100. Yi Chong-s˘ok, Saerossˇun hyˇondae Pukhan uˇ i ihae, 399. Kim Il Sung said that his guerrilla group was created on 25 April 1932. The day became the Foundation Day of the Korean People’s Army in North Korea in 1978. Kim Il Sung, Segi wa tˇoburˇo, 1992, 2: 300. Adrian Buzo, The Guerilla Dynasty: Politics and Leadership in North Korea, Boulder: Westview Press, 1999, 10. Suh, Kim Il Sung, 15–29. Kim Il Sung, Segi wa tˇoburˇo, 1998, 8: 327–38. After Kim Ch'aek died of a heart attack in 1951, Kim Il Sung renamed the city of Sˇongjin to the city of Kim Ch'aek, the Ch'ˇongjin Iron Works to the Kim Ch'aek Iron Works, and the Pyongyang Industrial College to the Kim Ch'aek Industrial College. Kim also established a statue of Kim Ch'aek in the city of Kim Ch'aek. Ibid., 125–55. The measures Kim took indicated how much he owed to Kim Ch'aek. Cited from a letter of Zhou Baozhong to Wang Xinlin. Yi Chong-s˘ok, Saerossˇun hyˇondae Pukhan uˇ i ihae, 403. Wang Xinlin is an assumed name of a Russian officer of the Far Eastern Command who took charge of the Comintern. Kim Il Sung, Segi wa tˇoburˇo, 1998, 8: 51–2. Ibid., 450–4. Ibid., 474, 479 and 484. It was known as ‘Chos˘on kongsandang s˘obuk 5-to tang ch'aegimja mit y˘ols˘ongja taehoe’ [Meeting of representatives and zealots of the Korean Communist Party from five northwest provinces in the North]. That day was later named as the day that the Korean Workers’ Party was founded. Yi Ch'an-haeng, Kim Chˇong-il, 121–5. Suh, Kim Il Sung, 68. Kim Il Sung’s activities of the post-liberation period will be addressed when they are associated with Kim Jong Il. Kim Il Sung’s activities are detailed well in Suh, Kim Il Sung: The North Korean Leader, New York: Columbia University Press, 1988. Pan Kyˇongyu’s real name is Yi Ki-dong. Kim Il Sung, Segi wa tˇoburˇo, 1992, 3: 104. Kim Il Sung, Segi wa tˇoburˇo, 1993, 4: 468. Suh, Kim Il Sung, 35. Kim Il Sung, Segi wa tˇoburˇo, 1995, 6: 149–79. Kim Il Sung, Segi wa tˇoburˇo, 1996, 7: 216–35. Kim Il Sung, Segi wa tˇoburˇo, 1992, 1: 206–19. Kim Il Sung, ‘Every effort for the building of a new, democratic Korea’, 14 October 1945, Kim Il Sung Works, Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1980, 1: 313. Mao Ze-dong, ‘For the mobilization of all the nation’s forces for victory in the war of resistance’, 25 August 1937, Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1965, 2: 26. Kim Il Sung, ‘On the work of the organizations at all levels of the Communist Party of North Korea’, 17 December 1945, Kim Il S˘ong s˘onjip [Kim Il Sung selected works], Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1971, 1: 20–1. Kim Il Sung, Segi wa tˇoburˇo, 1992, 3: 32 and 57. Mao Zedong, ‘Problems of strategy in guerrilla war against Japan’, May 1938, Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, 2: 93–4. Kim Il Sung, Segi wa tˇoburˇo, 1996, 7: 181. From early December 1938 to late March 1939, the Japanese military forces continuously pursued Kim’s guerrilla group but failed to kill him. North Korea called this period the Arduous March.

Notes 183 53 Kim Il Sung, Segi wa tˇoburˇo, 1995, 6: 414. 54 Kim Il Sung, Segi wa tˇoburˇo, 1992, 3: 78–81 and 295. 55 Mao Ze-dong, ‘On new democracy’, January 1940, Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, 2: 339–88. 56 Suh, Kim Il Sung, 123–6; and Kim Il Sung, ‘On eliminating dogmatism and formalism and establishing juche in ideological work’, 28 December 1955, Kim Il S˘ong s˘onjip, 1971, 1: 598–9. 57 Mao Ze-dong, ‘The foolish old man who removed the mountains’, 11 June 1945, Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1967, 3: 272. 58 Kim Il Sung, Segi wa tˇoburˇo, 1992, 3: 2. 59 Mao Ze-dong, ‘Some questions concerning methods of leadership’, 1 June 1943, Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, 3: 119. 60 Pak Kwang-ho, Chˇont'ong: Pukhan sahoe ihae uˇ i yˇolsoe [Tradition: The key to understanding North Korea], Seoul: Han'guk haksul chˇongbo, 2004, 98–125. 61 ‘S˘ut'alin taew˘onsu ege t˘urin˘un p'y˘onji’ [A letter to Generalissimo Stalin], W˘on jaryo ro pon Pukhan: 1945–1988 [Original documents of North Korea: 1945–1988], 44. The letter is found within pyˇolch'aek purok [addendum] of Sin dong-a, January 1989. It was adopted at the First Congress of the Korean Workers’ Party, 28 April 1946. 62 How Kim Il Sung influenced Kim Jong Il will be explained later. 63 Kim Chˇong-suk yˇosa [Madame Kim Chˇong-suk], Pyongyang: Kˇullo tanch'e ch'ulp'ansa, 1980, 7–23. 64 Kim Il Sung, Segi wa tˇoburˇo, 1994, 5: 434; and Segi wa tˇoburˇo, 1998, 8: 159. 65 Kim Chˇong-suk yˇosa, 27. 66 Kim Il Sung, Segi wa tˇoburˇo, 1998, 8: 159. 67 Kim Il Sung, Segi wa tˇoburˇo, 1994, 5: 437–58. 68 Kim Il Sung, Segi wa tˇoburˇo, 1998, 8: 165. 69 Ibid., 167–8. 70 Kim Il Sung, Segi wa tˇoburˇo, 1993, 4: 356. 71 Unggi was renamed S˘onbong. 72 Chˇong, Ky˘ot es˘o pon Kim Ch˘ong-il, 71. 73 Kim Il-s˘ong [Kim Il Sung], ‘Py˘ongyang hy˘ongmy˘ongja yugajok hakw˘on kaew˘onsik es˘o chinsulhan hunsi’ [An opening speech at Pyongyang School for Bereaved Children of Revolutionaries], 12 October 1947, Kim Il S˘ong s˘onjip [Kim Il Sung selected works], Pyongyang: Chosˇon nodongdang ch'ulp'ansa, 1954, 1: 585–6. 74 Kim Il Sung, Segi wa tˇoburˇo, 1992, 1: 182–3. 75 Yi Han-yˇong, Taedonggang royˇol p‘aemilli Sˇoul chamhaeng 14-nyˇon [Royal family of Taedong river sneaking into Seoul for 14 years], Seoul: Dong-a ilbosa, 1996, 103–4. Yi was a nephew of Sˇong Hye-rim, one of Kim’s mistresses. He lived in Kim Jong Il’s residence for years and defected to Seoul in 1982. 76 Chos˘on nodongdang chungang wiw˘onhoe tang y˘oksa y˘on'guso [The Party History Institute of the Korean Workers’ Party], Puryo pulgul u˘ i hy˘ongmy˘ong t'usa Kim Ch˘ong-suk tongji r˘ul hoesang hay˘o [Recollecting invincible Comrade Kim Chˇong-suk], Pyongyang: Chosˇon nodongdang ch'ulp'ansa, 1982, 137. 77 Chˇong, Ky˘ot es˘o pon Kim Ch˘ong-il, 73. 78 Mun My˘ong-ja, ‘Kim Ch˘ong-il u˘ i pomo Kang Kil-bok int'˘obyu: sony˘on Kim Ch˘ong-il u˘ l mal handa’ [Interview with Kim Jong Il’s Nanny Kang Kil-bok], Mal, September 1994, 48. 79 Chˇong, Ky˘ot es˘o pon Kim Ch˘ong-il, 73. 80 Mun My˘ong-ja, ‘Ch'oego inmin hoe˘ui Pu˘uijang Y˘o Y˘on-gu int'˘obyu’ [Interview with Vice-President of the Supreme People’s Assembly, Y˘o Y˘on-gu: Recollections of Kim Il Sung and Kim Chˇong-suk], Mal, September 1994, 45. 81 Chˇong, Ky˘ot es˘o pon Kim Ch˘ong-il, 74.

184 Notes 82 Olga Malicheva, Kim Ch˘ong-il kwa walch'˘u r˘ul [Waltz with Kim Jong Il], trans. Pak ˘ Ch Ch˘ong-min and Im Ul-ch'ul, Seoul: Hanul, 2004, 41. 83 Kim Chae-hwan, Puryo pulgul u˘ i hy˘ongmy˘ong t'usa Kim Ch˘ong-suk tongji hy˘ongmy˘ong hwaltong saj˘okchi [Historical places of invincible Comrade Kim Chˇongsuk], Pyongyang: K˘ums˘ong Press, 1986, 10–53. 84 Yi Ch'an-haeng, Kim Chˇong-il, 141. 85 Nodong sinmun, 25 December 1991. 86 Kang S˘ok-chu, Kim Ch˘ong-il y˘olp'ung [The Kim Jong Il wave], Pyongyang: K˘ulloja, 2004, 79–80. 87 Kim Il Sung, Segi wa tˇoburˇo, 1998, 8: 311–6. 88 Hong Ki-y˘on was the daughter of Hong My˘ong-h˘ui who was vice-premier and a novelist. 89 Son, Kim Chˇong-il lip'ot˘u, 34–5 and 92–3; and Sin Kyˇong-wan as quoted in Chˇong, Ky˘ot es˘o pon Kim Ch˘ong-il, 78. The name P'y˘ong-il is the same as the Kim Jong Il’s deceased younger brother. 90 Ibid., 79–80. 91 Ibid., 80–1. 92 Son, Kim Chˇong-il lip'ot˘u, 31. 93 Kim Il Sung, Segi wa tˇoburˇo, 1998, 8: 302. 94 Ch'oe T˘ok-sin, Man'go u˘ i win Kim Ch˘ong-il [Peerless hero Kim Jong Il], Pyongyang: T'ongil sinbo, 1994, 39. 95 H˘o Tam, Kim Ch˘ong-il wiinsang [Great hero Kim Jong Il], Pyongyang: Chos˘on sinbo, 1996, 36–7. Hˇo was the husband of Kim Chˇong-suk, Kim Il Sung’s relative. 96 O My˘ong-ch˘ol, Ppalchisan u˘ i ad˘ul [The son of partisans], Pyongyang: Pyongyang ch'ulp'ansa, 2003, 25–6. 97 Choe In Su, Kim Jong Il: The People’s Leader, Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1983, 1: 41. 98 Chˇong, Ky˘ot es˘o pon Kim Ch˘ong-il, 72. 99 Ibid., 73. 100 Ibid., 76–7. 101 Choe, Kim Jong Il, 1: 67. 102 Kim Sˇok-hyˇong, Na nˇun Chosˇon nodongdangwˇon io [I am a member of the Korean Workers’ Party], Seoul: Sˇonin, 2001, 375–6. Kim was a North Korean agent, who was arrested in the South in 1962. 103 Chˇong, Ky˘ot es˘o pon Kim Ch˘ong-il, 77. 104 Choe, Kim Jong Il, 1: 70. 105 Ibid., 77. 106 Ibid., 85–7. 107 Chˇong, Ky˘ot es˘o pon Kim Ch˘ong-il, 77. 108 Choe, Kim Jong Il, 1: 119, 123 and 130–1. 109 Ibid., 76–7. 110 Chos˘on nodongdang chungang wiw˘onhoe tang y˘oksa y˘on'guso, Inmin uˇ i chidoja, 1: 198. 111 Chungang ilbosa, Kim Chˇong-il, 54. 112 Tak et al., Great Leader, 1: 37–41. 113 Chungang ilbosa, Kim Chˇong-il, 58–61. In April 1960, there was a political uprising, led by students and urban citizens in the South, which toppled the authoritarian Syngman Rhee regime, the first South Korean government. 114 Choe, Kim Jong Il, 1: 135. 115 Hwang Chang-y˘op, Na n˘un y˘oksa u˘ i chilli r˘ul poatta [I saw the truth of history], Seoul: Hanul, 1999, 126–7. Hwang defected from the North in February 1997. 116 Ibid., 126. 117 Chungang ilbosa, Kim Jong Il, 53.

Notes 185 118 Kim Chˇong-min, ‘Hyˇongnim Kim Chˇong-il, ai ttae put'ˇo chewang iˇotta’ [Elder brother Kim Jong Il was boss since his childhood], Sin dong-a, August 1994, 334–6. Kim defected from North Korea in 1988. 119 Chungang ilbosa, Kim Jong Il, 55. 120 Hˇo, Kim Ch˘ong-il wiinsang, 165–9. 121 Sin Kyˇong-wan as quoted in Chˇong, Ky˘ot es˘o pon Kim Ch˘ong-il, 82–4. 122 Chungang ilbosa, Kim Jong Il, 61. 123 This is Kim Tan’s recollection. Ibid., 56. 124 Kim Il Sung, ‘On eliminating dogmatism and formalism and establishing juche in ideological work’, in Kim Il Sung Selected Works, 1971, 1: 582–606. 125 Kim Il Sung, ‘Report to the Third Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea on the work of the Central Committee’, 23 April 1956, Kim Il Sung Works, 1982, 10: 167–81. Specific data of the aid from ‘fraternal’ communist states are referred in Natalia Bazhanova, Kiro e s˘on Pukhan ky˘ongje [North Korean economy in a crossroads], trans. Yang Chun-yong, Seoul: Han'guk kyˇongje sinmunsa, 1992, 21–3; and Balazs Szalontal, Kim Il Sung in the Khrushchev Era: Soviet-DPRK Relations and the Roots of North Korean Despotism, 1953–1964, Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2005, 45–7. 126 In October 1957, 64 representatives of the Communist and Workers’ parties of the world attended the fortieth anniversary of the Soviet Revolution in Moscow. They held a conference and reaffirmed the relationship between the socialist countries on the principles above. Kim used these principles for his independent foreign policy. Kim Il Sung, ‘Unity of the socialist camp and the new stage of the international communist movement’, 5 December 1957, Kim Il Sung Works, 1982, 11: 347–53. 127 Most purged cadres were those who fought alongside the Chinese communists in Mao’s Yanan during the colonial period. They were called the Yanan group. 128 Suh, Kim Il Sung, 149–52; and Andrei Lankov, Crisis in North Korea: The Failure of De-Stalinization, 1956, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press & Center for Korean Studies, 2005, 121–35. According to Szalontai, North Korea suffered from food shortage in 1955, which also led to the opponents’ criticism of Kim Il Sung’s economic policy. Balazs Szalontai, Kim Il Sung in the Khrushchev Era, 62–70. 129 Nodong sinmun, 5 September 1956. 130 Lankov, Crisis in North Korea, 136–42. 131 The Chinese Volunteer Army was stationed to North Korea from 1950 to 1958. 132 Nodong sinmun, 29 September 1956. 133 Lankov, Crisis in North Korea, 145. 134 Hˇo, Kim Ch˘ong-il wiinsang, 26. According to North Korea, the first Arduous March was from early December 1938 to late March 1939 when Kim Il Sung conducted guerrilla activities during the Japanese colonial era. 135 Kim Il Sung, ‘For a great revolutionary upswing in socialist construction’, 13 December 1956, Kim Il Sung Works, 1982, 10: 346. 136 Kim Il Sung, ‘On some immediate tasks of the City and Country People’s Committees’, 9 August 1958, Kim Il Sung Selected Works, Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1971, 2: 171–5. 137 Ibid., 175. 138 Yi T'ae-sˇop, Kim Il-sˇong lidˇosip yˇon'gu [A study of Kim Il Sung’s leadership], Seoul: Tˇullyˇok, 2001, 181–97. 139 Nodong sinmun, 18 March 1959. 140 Yi Chong-ok, ‘Inmin kyˇongje palchˇon che 1-ch'a o kaenyˇon (1957–61) kyehoek silhaeng ch'onghwa e taehayˇo’ [On the evaluation of the first five-year (1957–61) economic plan], 22 November 1960, Ch'oego inmin hoeˇui che 2-ki che 8-ch'a hoeˇui esˇo han pogo [Report to the Eighth Meeting of the Second Supreme People’s Assembly of North Korea] in Dae-Sook Suh (ed.) Pukhan munhˇon yˇon'gu: Kyˇongje palchˇon [Study

186 Notes

141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150

151 152 153 154 155 156 157

158 159 160

3

of North Korean literature: Economic development], Seoul: Kˇuktong munje yˇon'guso, Kyˇongnam taehakkyo, 2004, 5: 247. Hwang, Na n˘un y˘oksa u˘ i chilli r˘ul poatta, 135–6. Chungang ilbosa, Kim Chˇong-il, 55; and Tak et al., Great Leader, 1: 42. Chungang ilbosa, Kim Chˇong-il, 61–2. Ibid., 57. Kim Il Sung, ‘You must learn and learn to be excellent cadres of the New Korea’, Speech at the meeting to mark the first anniversary of the founding of Kim Il Sung University, 1 October 1947, Kim Il Sung Works, 1980, 3: 386. Szalontai, Kim Il Sung in the Khrushchev Era, 101–2. It was reported that Kim Sin-suk, Kim Il Sung’s relative, took care of Kim Jong Il. Kim Sin-suk was the wife of Yang Hyˇong-sˇop. Chungang ilbosa, Kim Chˇong-il, 65. Chˇong, Ky˘ot es˘o pon Kim Ch˘ong-il, 90–1. Ibid., 94; and Chungang ilbosa, Kim Chˇong-il, 64–5. Chˇong, Ky˘ot es˘o pon Kim Ch˘ong-il, 90. Kim learned philosophy from Hwang Changyˇop, economic theories from Ch'ae Hˇui-jˇong, party history from Chang Sˇong-hwa (older brother of Chang Sˇong-t'aek, brother-in-law of Kim Jong Il), political economy from Kim Kwang-jin, revolution history from Pak Si-hyˇong, and languages from Kim Pyˇong-je. Chungang ilbosa, Kim Chˇong-il, 65–6. Tak et al., Great Leader, 1: 84. Kim Jong Il, ‘Pyˇongyang che-1 kodˇungjunghakkyo rˇul ponbogi hakkyo ro chal kkurilte taehayˇo’ [Making the First Pyongyang High School a model school], 28 April 1984, Kim Chˇong-il sˇonjip, 1998, 8: 59. Chungang ilbosa, Kim Chˇong-il, 30–3 and 63. Choe, Kim Jong Il, 1: 329. Sin Kyˇong-wan as quoted in Chˇong, Ky˘ot es˘o pon Kim Ch˘ong-il, 93. Ibid. James A. Dator, ‘Age-cohort analysis’, in a material presented at a lecture of political science, University of Hawaii, Manoa, Honolulu, 23 October 2002, 1; and William Strauss and Neil Howe, Generations: The History of America’s Future, 1584 to 2069, New York: William Morrow and Company, 1991, 1–40. Hwang, Na n˘un y˘oksa u˘ i chilli r˘ul poatta, 167. Yi Ch'an-haeng, Kim Chˇong-il, 201. Buzo well described these guerrilla characteristics in his book Guerilla Dynasty: Politics and Leadership in North Korea, 1–25, 110–11, 204, and 233–48.

Road to heir (1964–1974)

1 Nodong sinmun, 19 June 1994. 2 Yi Chong-sˇok, Saerossˇun hyˇondae Pukhan uˇ i ihae [Understanding of newly written modern North Korea], Seoul: Yˇoksa pip'yˇongsa, 2000, 264. 3 Sin Kyˇong-wan as quoted in Chˇong Ch'ang-hyˇon, Ky˘ot es˘o pon Kim Ch˘ong-il [Close by Kim Jong Il], Seoul: Kimy˘ongsa, 2000, 98–9. 4 Kim Jong Il, ‘Saram uˇ i maˇum uˇ l umjik ilchul anˇun ilkun i toeˇoya handa’ [You must be workers who can move the hearts of the people], 29 April 1969, Kim Chˇong-il sˇonjip [Kim Jong Il selected works], Pyongyang: Chosˇon nodongdang ch'ulp'ansa, 1992, 1: 453. 5 Dae-Sook Suh, Kim Il Sung: The North Korean Leader, New York: Columbia University Press, 1988, 126–36. According to a recent biography of Pak Hˇon-yˇong, Pak admitted of the three crimes before his death. Yim Kyˇong-sˇok, Ijˇong Pak Hˇon-yˇong iltaegi [A biography of Pak Hˇon-yˇong], Seoul: Yˇoksa pip'yˇongsa, 2004, 473. 6 It is still controversial whether Hˇo Ka-i really committed suicide. Andrei Lankov, From Stalin to Kim Il Sung: The Formation of North Korea, 1945–1960, New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2002, 145–53.

Notes 187 7 Yi T'ae-sˇop, Kim Il-sˇong lidˇosip yˇon'gu [A study of Kim Il Sung’s leadership], Seoul: Tˇullyˇok, 2001, 428–36. 8 Sin Kyˇong-wan as quoted in Chˇong, Ky˘ot es˘o pon Kim Ch˘ong-il, 100. 9 Son Kwang-ju, Kim Chˇong-il lip'ot˘u [Kim Jong Il report], Seoul: Pada puks, 2003, 60–1. 10 Sin Kyˇong-wan as quoted in Chˇong, Ky˘ot es˘o pon Kim Ch˘ong-il, 99–100. 11 Kim Il Sung, ‘On improving party work and implementing the decisions of the party conference’, 17–24 March 1967, Kim Il Sung Works, Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1985, 21: 118–9. 12 Tak Jin, Kim Gang Il, and Pak Hong Je, Great Leader: Kim Jong Il, 2 vols, Tokyo: Sorinsha, 1985, 1: 121–2. 13 Nodong sinmun, 13 October 1966. 14 Kim Il Sung, ‘On improving party work and implementing the decisions of the party conference’, in Kim Il Sung Works, Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1985, 21: 120. 15 Chˇong, Ky˘ot es˘o pon Kim Ch˘ong-il, 100. 16 Kim Il Sung, ‘On the questions of the period of transition from capitalism to socialism and the dictatorship of the proletariat’, 25 May 1967, Kim Il Sung Works, 1985, 21: 222–236. 17 Kim Chin-gye, Choguk [Fatherland: Recollection of a North Korean citizen], Seoul: Hyˇonjang munhak, 1990, 2: 84. Kim Chin-gye, an undercover agent of the North, was sent to the South, but he was arrested in 1970. 18 Hwang Chang-y˘op, Na n˘un y˘oksa u˘ i chilli r˘ul poatta [I saw the truth of history], Seoul: Hanul, 1999, 148–9; and Suh, Kim Il Sung, 197. 19 Hwang, Na n˘un y˘oksa u˘ i chilli r˘ul poatta, 148–9. 20 Kim Chin-gye, Choguk, 2: 85. 21 Philip Short, Mao: A Life, New York: Henry Holt, 1999, 549–51. 22 Yi Ch'an-haeng, Kim Chˇong-il [Kim Jong Il], Seoul: Paeksan s˘odang, 2001, 389–99; and Hwang, Na n˘un y˘oksa u˘ i chilli r˘ul poatta, 173. 23 Kim Jong Il, ‘Pangsong saˇop esˇo chegi toenˇun myˇot kaji munje e taehayˇo’ [On some problems of broadcasting], 30 July 1967, Kim Chˇong-il sˇonjip, 1992, 1: 287. 24 Nodong sinmun, 31 July and 4 September 1967. 25 The New Korea [Sinhanm minbo], 30 September 1937, 2–3. The New Korea was the organ of the Korean National Association [Taehan Kungminhoe]. The association was established in 1909 in San Francisco. Bong-youn Choy, Koreans in America, Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1979, 115. 26 Nodong sinmun, 15 April 1952. 27 Kim Chin-gye, Choguk, 2: 79–84. 28 Kim Jong Il, ‘Pandang panhyˇongmyˇong punjadˇul uˇ i sasang yˇodok uˇ l ppurippaego tang uˇ i yuil sasang ch'egye rˇul seulte taehayˇo’ [On eliminating remnants of anti-party and antirevolutionary factionalists and establishing an monolithic ideological system], 15 June 1967, Kim Chˇong-il sˇonjip, 1992, 1: 230–40. 29 Adrian Buzo, The Guerrilla Dynasty: Politics and Leadership in North Korea, Boulder: Westview Press, 1999, 26. 30 Sˇong Hye-rang, Dˇungnamu chip [House of Wisteria], Seoul: Chisik nara, 2000, 312–4. Sˇong Hye-rim was one of Kim Jong Il’s mistresses. Sˇong Hye-rang was the tutor of Kim Chˇong-nam, the first son of Kim Jong Il, from 1976 to 1996. She defected from North Korea in 1996. 31 Kim Il Sung, Segi wa tˇoburˇo [With the century], Pyongyang: Chos˘on nodongdang ch'ulp'ansa, 1992, 1: 154–5, 195–6, and 240–9. 32 Ibid., 167–9. 33 Yi Chong-sˇok, Saerossˇun hyˇondae Pukhan uˇ i ihae, 400. 34 Sin Kyˇong-wan as quoted in Chˇong, Ky˘ot es˘o pon Kim Ch˘ong-il, 103. 35 Son, Kim Chˇong-il lip'ot˘u, 69.

188 Notes 36 Charles K. Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, 1945–1950, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003, 166–8. 37 Chˇong, Ky˘ot es˘o pon Kim Ch˘ong-il, 106. 38 Sin Kyˇong-wan, ibid., 101. 39 Kim Jong Il, ‘Sahoejuˇui hyˇonsil uˇ l panyˇonghan hyˇongmyˇongjˇok yˇonghwa rˇol tˇo mani ch'angjak haja’ [Let’s make more revolutionary films reflecting socialist reality], 18 June 1970, Kim Chˇong-il sˇonjip, 1993, 2: 99. 40 Kim Jong Il, ‘Chuch'e sasang kyoyang esˇo chegi toenˇun myˇok kaji munje a toehayˇo’ [On some problems of education of the chuch'e idea], 15 July 1986, Kim Chˇong-il sˇonjip, 1998, 8: 445. 41 Kim Jong Il, ‘Tang sep'o rˇul kanghwa haja’ [Let’s strengthen party cells], 10 May 1991, Kim Chˇong-il sˇonjip, 1997, 11: 87. 42 Kim Jong Il, ‘Ch'ˇongsonyˇon tˇul sog esˇo hyˇongmyˇong chˇont'ong kyoyang uˇ l kanghwa halte taehayˇo’ [On strengthening the education of revolutionary tradition among youths], 12 August 1969, Kim Chˇong-il sˇonjip, 1992, 1: 471 and 476–7. 43 Kim Jong Il, ‘Yanggangdo rˇul hˇongmyˇong chˇont'ong kyoyang uˇ i kˇochˇom uˇ ro t'ˇunt'ˇunhi kkurija’ [Let’s establish well Yanggang province as a stronghold of the education of revolutionary tradition], 21 July 1968, ibid., 378–87. 44 Han Chae-man, Kim Chˇong-il: in'gan, sasang, yˇongdo [Kim Jong Il: Man, thought, and leadership], Pyongyang: Pyongyang ch'ulp'ansa, 1994, 93–7. 45 Kim Jong Il, ‘Suryˇongnim uˇ i 60-tol uˇ l minjok ch'oedae uˇ i myˇongjˇol ro majihagi wihayˇo’ [To celebrate the Great Leader’s sixtieth birthday as the biggest national holiday], 29 October 1971, Kim Chˇong-il sˇonjip, 1993, 2: 366–9. 46 Kim Jong Il, ‘Ch'ˇongsonyˇon tˇul sog esˇo hyˇongmyˇong chˇont'ong kyoyang uˇ l kanghwa halte taehayˇo’, 1: 474. 47 Ibid., 475. 48 Tak et al., Great Leader, 1: 168. 49 Kim Jong Il, ‘Munhak yesul chakp'um e tang uˇ i yuil sasang uˇ l kuhyˇon hagi wihan saˇop uˇ l silsok lkke halte taehayˇo’ [On effectively portraying the party’s monolithic idea in art and literature], 16 August 1967, Kim Chˇong-il sˇonjip, 1992, 1: 300–1. 50 Ibid., 302. 51 Kim Jong Il, ‘Munhak yesul chakp'um e tang uˇ i yuil sasang uˇ l kuhyˇon hagi wihan saˇop uˇ l silsok lkke halte taehayˇo’, 1: 302–3. 52 Suk-Young Kim, Revolutionizing the Family: A Comparative Study on the Filmed Propaganda Performances of the People’s Republic of China and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 1966–1976, PhD dissertation, Northwestern University, June 2005, 157. 53 Tak et al., Great Leader, 1: 178–9. 54 Ibid., 303. 55 Kim Jong Il, ‘Hyˇongmyˇongjˇok yˇonghwa ch'angjak esˇo saeroun chˇonhwan uˇ l irˇuk'ija’ [Let’s make a new turning point in producing revolutionary cinema], 26 February 1966, Kim Chˇong-il sˇonjip, 1992, 1: 123. 56 The role of cinema in propaganda in Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany has been well analyzed in Richard Taylor, Film Propaganda: Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany, 2nd edn, New York: I.B. Tauris, 1998. ˘ 57 Ch'oe Un-h˘ ui and Sin Sang-ok, Naere Kim Ch˘ong-il imneda [I am Kim Jong Il], Seoul: Haengrim ch'ulp'an, 1994, 2: 34–37. Naere Kim Ch˘ong-il imneda 1–2 were originally published with the title Kim Ch˘ong-il Wangguk 1–2 [The Kim Jong Il kingdom 1–2], Seoul: Dong-a ilbosa, 1988. After the 1986 escape from the North, Ch'oe and Sin wrote the books. 58 With the film Salt, Ch'oe received an award for the leading actress at the Moscow Film Festival in 1985. Ibid., 85–292. 59 Sin Kyˇong-wan as quoted in Chˇong, Ky˘ot es˘o pon Kim Ch˘ong-il, 103–5.

Notes 189 60 Tak et al., Great Leader, 1: 179. 61 Ibid., 1: 207–9. 62 Kim Jong Il, ‘Purhu uˇ i kojˇonjˇok myˇongjak ‘p'ibada’ rˇul yˇonghwa ro wansˇong hanˇundesˇo nasˇonˇun myˇot kaji munje’ [Some problems on making eternal classic Sea of Blood a film], 27 September 1969, Kim Chˇong-il sˇonjip, 1992, 1: 479. 63 Kim Il Sung, ‘Report to the Fifth Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea on the Work of the Central Committee’, 2 November 1970, Kim Il Sung Works, 1986, 25: 210–11. 64 Tak et al., Great Leader, 1: 192–4. 65 Ch'oe and Sin, Naere Kim Ch˘ong-il imneda, 2: 57. 66 Sin Kyˇong-wan as quoted in Chˇong, Ky˘ot es˘o pon Kim Ch˘ong-il, 105–6. 67 Kim Jong Il, ‘Kagˇuk yesul e taehayˇo’ [On the art of opera], 4–6 September 1974, Kim Chˇong-il sˇonjip, 1994, 4: 290. 68 Wada Haruki, Kita Ch¯osen [North Korea: From guerrilla state to regular military state], trans. Sˇo Tong-man and Nam Ki-jˇong, Seoul: Tolbegae, 2002, 160. 69 Nodong sinmun, 14 December 1962. 70 Ibid., 16 December and 17 December 1962. 71 Kim Il Sung, ‘Let us strengthen the revolutionary forces in every way to achieve the cause of reunification of the country’, 27 February 1964, Kim Il Sung Selected Works, 1971, 4: 84–103. 72 Kim Il Sung, ‘Report to the Conference of the Workers’ Party of Korea’, 5 October 1966, ibid., 369–81. 73 Suh, Kim Il Sung, 215. 74 Kukt'o t'ongilwˇon [Ministry of Unification] (ed.), Chosˇon nodongdang taehoe charyojip [Congresses of the Korean Workers’ Party], Seoul: Kukt'o t'ongilwˇon, 1980, 3: 114. 75 Hwang Il-ho, ‘68-yˇon put'ˇo ch'ujin haettˇon ‘che-2 uˇ i yuk-io’ chakchˇon’ [Operations for a second Korean War implemented from 1968], Wˇolgan chungang, April 1993, 642. Hwang is a North Korean defector. 76 Ibid., 632. 77 Ibid., 632–3. 78 Ibid., 645–6. 79 Kim Il Sung, ‘On some tasks of improving party work’, 3 March 1969, Kim Il Sung Works, 1985, 23: 394–5. 80 Kim Jong Il, ‘Inmin kundae tang chojik kwa chˇongch'i kiwangˇul uˇ i yˇokhal uˇ l nop'ilte taehayˇo’ [On enhancing the role of party organizations and political institutions], 19 January 1969, Kim Chˇong-il sˇonjip, 1992, 1: 415–21. 81 Hwang Il-ho, ‘68-yˇon put'ˇo ch'ujin haettˇon ‘che-2 uˇ i yuk-io’ chakchˇon’, 644. 82 Nodong sinmun, 16, 28, and 29 August 1965. 83 Ibid., 18 November 1965. 84 Ibid., 8 September 1968. 85 Chˇong, Ky˘ot es˘o pon Kim Ch˘ong-il, 111; and Nodong sinmun, 18 November 1972. 86 Son, Kim Chˇong-il lip'ot˘u, 76; and Nodong sinmun, 10 February 1971. 87 Sin Kyˇong-wan as quoted in Chˇong, Ky˘ot es˘o pon Kim Ch˘ong-il, 111. 88 Nodong sinmun, 6 August 1971. 89 Ibid., 8 August 1971. 90 Son, Kim Chˇong-il lip'ot˘u, 76. 91 Hwang Chang-yˇop, Na n˘un y˘oksa u˘ i chilli r˘ul poatta, 168–9 and 172–3; and Son, Kim Chˇong-il lip'ot˘u, 85. 92 Ibid., 77–9; and Sin Kyˇong-wan as quoted in Chˇong, Ky˘ot es˘o pon Kim Ch˘ong-il, 111. 93 Ibid. 94 Ibid.; and Son, Kim Chˇong-il lip'ot˘u, 90. 95 Nodong sinmun, 15 December 1974. 96 Ibid., 3 March 1975. 97 Ibid., 9 July 1994.

190 Notes 98 Han, Kim Chˇong-il, 57. 99 Richard Overy, The Dictators: Hitler’s Germany and Stalin’s Russia, New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2004, 107–16. 100 Kim Il Sung, Segi wa tˇoburˇo, 1998, 8: 308–9. 101 Sin Kyˇong-wan as quoted in Chˇong, Ky˘ot es˘o pon Kim Ch˘ong-il, 99–100. 102 Nodong sinmun, 13 October 1966. 103 Ibid., 14 November 1970. 104 Chˇong, Ky˘ot es˘o pon Kim Ch˘ong-il, 115. 105 Chˇong Hong-jin as quoted in Son, Kim Chˇong-il lip'ot˘u, 85. 106 Sin Kyˇong-wan as quoted in Chˇong, Ky˘ot es˘o pon Kim Ch˘ong-il, 113 and 127–8. 107 Kim Il Sung, ‘Our young people must take over the revolution and carry it forward’, 24 June 1971, Kim Il Sung Works, 1986, 26: 167–8. 108 Short, Mao, 577–9 and 586–99. However, Frederick C. Teiwes argued that Lin Biao never challenged Mao. Frederick C. Teiwes, ‘The paradoxical post-Mao transition: from obeying the leader to “normal politics”’, The China Journal, 34 (1995), 56–7. 109 Son, Kim Chˇong-il lip'ot˘u, 77. 110 Sin Kyˇong-wan as quoted in Chˇong, Ky˘ot es˘o pon Kim Ch˘ong-il, 112–3. The North Korean government prohibited any picture showing Kim Il Sung’s tumor. 111 Ibid., 116. 112 Kim Il Sung, ‘Speech delivered to the newly-appointed officials of the Central Committee of the League of Socialist Working Youth and Chairman of its Provincial Committees’, 16 December 1972, Kim Il Sung Works, 1986, 27: 447–8. 113 Nodong sinmun, 16 February 1973. 114 Ibid., 18 February 1973. 115 Kim Il Sung, ‘On some tasks of the officials of Chongryon’, 1 June 1973, Kim Il Sung Works, 1986, 28: 285. 116 Yi Ch'an-haeng, Kim Chˇong-il, 340. 117 Wang Hongwen, a former textile worker, was promoted to a Central Committee member by Mao Zedong in 1972. Wang was one of the Gang of Four (Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, and Wang Hongwen) during the Cultural Revolution. Short, Mao, 608–10. 118 Sin Kyˇong-wan as quoted in Chˇong, Ky˘ot es˘o pon Kim Ch˘ong-il, 116–19; and Tak Jin, Kim Gang Il, and Pak Hong Je, Great Leader: Kim Jong Il, Tokyo: Sorinsha, 1985, 2: 12. Within the Central Committee of the Korean Workers’ Party, there are the secretariat, each department and other organizations. The secretariat is higher organization than the department. 119 Sin Kyˇong-wan as quoted in Chˇong, Ky˘ot es˘o pon Kim Ch˘ong-il, 115–16. 120 Ibid. 121 Nodong sinmun, 14 February 1974. Before the 1974 plenum, the term dangjungang [party center] was used to designate the Central Committee of the party or Kim Il Sung. 122 Ibid., 16 February 1968. 123 Han, Kim Chˇong-il, 52–4. 124 Kim Il Sung, Segi wa tˇoburˇo, 1998, 8: 308–9.

4

Heir (1974–1994)

1 Nodong sinmun, 1 June 1986. 2 Ibid., 10 April 1993. 3 Kim Jong Il, ‘On sahoe rˇul Kimilsˇong-chuˇui hwa hagi wihan tang sasang saˇop uˇ i tanmyˇonhan myˇot kaji kwaˇop e taehayˇo’ [On some present tasks of party ideological

Notes 191

4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22

23 24 25 26 27 28

affairs to Kimilsungismize the entire society], 19 February 1974, Kim Chˇong-il sˇonjip [Kim Jong Il selected works], Pyongyang: Chosˇon nodongdang ch'ulp'ansa, 1994, 4: 9–15. Kim Il Sung, ‘On eliminating dogmatism and formalism and establishing juche in ideological work’, in Kim Il Sung Selected Works, Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1971, 1: 582–93. Ibid. Nodong sinmun, 21 July 1956. Kim Il Sung, ‘Unity of the socialist camp and the new stage of the international communist movement’, Kim Il Sung Works, Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1982, 11: 347 and 348–53. Kim Il Sung, ‘Our people’s army is an army of the working class, an army of the revolution; class and political education should be continuously strengthened’, 8 February 1963, Kim Il Sung Works, 1984, 17: 86. Kim Il Sung, ‘For the successful fulfillment of the first five-year plan’, 6 March 1958, Kim Il Sung Selected Works, 1971, 2: 105. Kim Il Sung, ‘Our people’s army is an army of the working class, an army of the revolution; class and political education should be continuously strengthened’, Kim Il Sung Works, 1984, 17: 86. Kim Il Sung, ‘Let us develop our people’s army into a revolutionary army and implement the policy of self-reliance in national defense [Excerpt]’, 5 October 1963, Kim Il Sung Works, 1984, 17: 378. Kim Il Sung, ‘On socialist construction in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the South Korean Revolution’, April 14 1965, Kim Il Sung Works, 1984, 19: 257–8 and 259. Ibid., 260. Nodong sinmun, 12 August 1966. Hwang Chang-y˘op, Na n˘un y˘oksa u˘ i chilli r˘ul poatta [I saw the truth of history], Seoul: Hanul, 1999, 136 and 167. Kim Il Sung, ‘On some problems of our party’s juche idea and the government of the republic’s internal and external policies’, 17 September 1972, Kim Il Sung Works, 1986, 27: 319 and 322–3. Ibid., 323 and 328. Nodong sinmun, 4 January 1973. Kim Jong Il, ‘On sahoe rˇul Kimilsˇong-chuˇui hwa hagi wihan tang sasang saˇop uˇ i tangmyˇonhan myˇot kaji kwaˇop e taehayˇo’, 4: 12. Hwang Chang-yˇop, Na n˘un y˘oksa u˘ i chilli r˘ul poatta, 185–7. Kim Il Sung Selected Works began to be translated in English in 1971. Kukt'o t'ongilwˇon [Ministry of Unification] (ed.), Chosˇon nodongdang taehoe charyojip [Congresses of the Korean Workers’ Party], Seoul: Kukt'o t'ongilwˇon, 1988, 4: 133. At the Fifth Supreme People’s Assembly, in September 1972, the North Korean constitution already stipulated the chuch'e idea as the ruling ideology of the state. Nodong sinmun, 28 December 1972. Kim Jong Il, ‘Chuch'e sasang e taehayˇo’ [On the chuch'e idea], 31 March 1982, Kim Chˇong-il sˇonjip, 1996, 7: 144. Kim Jong Il, ‘Chuch'e sasang kyoyang esˇo chegi toenˇun myˇot kaji munje e taehayˇo’ [On some problems of education in the chuch'e idea], 15 July 1986, Kim Chˇong-il sˇonjip, 1998, 8: 447–448 and 452–453. Ibid. Ibid., 450–452. Ibid., 461–462. Kim Jong Il, ‘On sahoe rˇul Kimilsˇong-chuˇui hwa hagi wihan tang sasang saˇop uˇ i tangmyˇonhan myˇot kaji kwaˇop e taehayˇo’, 4: 19–20.

192 Notes 29 Kim Jong Il, ‘Chˇon tang kwa on sahoe e yuil sasang ch'egye rˇul t'ˇunt'ˇunhi seuja’ [Let’s strengthen monolithic ideological system in the party and the society], 14 April 1974, Chuch'e hyˇongmyˇong wiˇop uˇ i wansˇong uˇ l wihayˇo [To complete chuch'e revolutionary feats], Pyongyang: Chosˇon nodongdang ch'ulp'ansa, 1987, 3: 101–24, cited in Appendix 1 of Chˇong Yˇong-ch'ˇol, Kim Chˇong-il ch'eje hyˇongsˇong uˇ i sahoe chˇongch'ijˇok kiwˇon: 1967–1982 [The social and political origins of Kim Jong Il’s regime of North Korea: 1967–1982], August 2001, PhD dissertation, Seoul National University, 308–15. 30 Ibid., 314–15. 31 Sin Ky˘ong-wan, ‘Ky˘ot es˘o pon Kim Chˇong-il 2’ [Close by Kim Jong Il 2], Wˇolgan chungang, July 1991, 446. 32 Hyˇon Sˇong-il, ‘Pukhan sahoe e taehan nodongdang uˇ i t'ongje ch'eje’ [Control system of the Korean Workers’ Party on North Korean society], Pukhan chosa yˇon'gu [Research on North Korea], 1997, 1, 17. Hyˇon is a North Korean defector. 33 Kim Jong Il, ‘Ouri tang ch'ulp'an bodomul uˇ n on sahoe uˇ i Kimilsˇong-chuˇui hwa e ibaji hanˇun wiryˇokhan sasangjˇok mugi ida’ [Our party publications are a powerful ideological weapon to contribute to Kimilsungismization of the whole society], 7 May 1974, Kim Chˇong-il sˇonjip, 1994, 4: 152. 34 Kim Jong Il, ‘Tang saˇop esˇo nalgˇun t'ˇul uˇ l masˇugo saeroun chˇonhwan uˇ l irˇuk'lte taehayˇo’ [On making a new transition and breaking old frames in party affairs], 28 February 1974, ibid., 86–7. 35 Ibid., 88. 36 Ibid., 88–90. 37 Ibid., 92–3. 38 Ibid., 96. 39 Chˇong Yˇong-ch'ˇol, Kim Chˇong-il ch'eje hyˇongsˇong uˇ i sahoe chˇongch'ijˇok kiwˇon, 311. 40 Articles 22–29 and 42 of the 1980 by-law of the Korean Workers’ Party. Kukt'o t'ongilwˇon [Ministry of Unification] (ed.), Chosˇon nodongdang taehoe charyojip, 4: 143. The by-law has not been changed since 1980. 41 Kim Jong Il, ‘Tang saˇop esˇo nalg uˇ n t'ˇul uˇ l masˇugo saeroun chˇonhwas uˇ l irˇuk'lte taehayˇo’, 4: 99–101. 42 Hyˇon, ‘Pukhan sahoe e taehan Nodongdang uˇ i t'ongje ch'eje’, 9. 43 Sin, ‘Ky˘ot es˘o pon Kim Chˇong-il 2’, 440. 44 Kim Jong Il, ‘Hy˘on sigi tang naebu sa˘op es˘o nas˘on˘un my˘ot kaji munje e taehay˘o’ [On some problems of internal party affairs], 22 July 1974, Kim Chˇong-il sˇonjip, 1994, 4: 202. 45 Sin, ‘Ky˘ot es˘o pon Kim Chˇong-il 2’, 440–1; and Hyˇon, ‘Pukhan sahoe e taehan Nodongdang uˇ i t'ongje ch'eje’, 10. 46 Sin, ‘Ky˘ot es˘o pon Kim Chˇong-il 2’, 443. 47 Kim Jong Il, ‘Tang sa˘op u˘ l k˘unbonj˘ok u˘ ro kaes˘on kanghwa hay˘o on sahoe u˘ i Kimils˘ongchu˘ui hwa r˘ul him ikke tag˘uch'ija’ [Let’s spur Kimilsungismization of the whole society by fundamentally improving party affairs], 2 August 1974, Kim Chˇong-il sˇonjip, 1994, 4: 241. 48 Sin, ‘Ky˘ot es˘o pon Kim Chˇong-il 2’, 442. 49 Hyˇon, ‘Pukhan sahoe e taehan Nodongdang uˇ i t'ongje ch'eje’, 18. 50 Chˇong Yˇong-ch'ˇol, Kim Chˇong-il ch'eje hyˇongsˇong uˇ i sahoe chˇongch'ijˇok kiwˇon, 313. 51 Hyˇon, ‘Pukhan sahoe e taehan Nodongdang uˇ i t'ongje ch'eje’, 19–22. 52 Kim Jong Il, ‘Ch˘onbanj˘ok 11-y˘on che u˘ imu kyoyuk u˘ l silsi han˘un tes˘o kyow˘ond˘ul u˘ i ch'aegims˘ong kwa y˘okhal u˘ l nop'ija’ [Let’s enhance the responsibility of teachers in implementing 11-year free national education], 12 July 1973, Kim Chˇong-il sˇonjip, 1994, 3: 413. 53 Kim Jong Il, ‘Ch˘on tang e saeroun tang saenghwal ch'onghwa chedo r˘ul seulte taehay˘o’ [On introducing new assessment system of party life into the whole party], 21 August 1973, ibid., 435.

Notes 193 54 Chˇong Yˇong-ch'ˇol, Kim Chˇong-il ch'eje hyˇongsˇong uˇ i sahoe chˇongch'ijˇok kiwˇon, 310. 55 Hyˇon, ‘Pukhan sahoe e taehan Nodongdang uˇ i t'ongje ch'eje’, 28 and 42. 56 Kim Jong Il, ‘On sahoe rˇul Kimilsˇong-chuˇui hwa hagi wihan tang sasang saˇop uˇ i tangmyˇonhan myˇot kaji kwaˇop e taehayˇo’, 4: 45. 57 Hyˇon, ‘Pukhan sahoe e taehan Nodongdang uˇ i t'ongje ch'eje’, 31. 58 Sin Ky˘ong-wan as quoted in Chˇong Ch'ang-hyˇon, Ky˘ot es˘o pon Kim Ch˘ong-il, 162. 59 Kim Jong Il, ‘Ch˘on kun u˘ l Kimils˘ong-chu˘ui hwa haja’ [Let’s Kimilsungismize the whole military], 1 January 1975, Kim Chˇong-il sˇonjip, 1995, 5: 1–8. 60 Ibid. 61 Ch'oe Chu-hwal, ‘Sillok Chos˘on inmin'gun 1’ [Chronicles of the Korean People’s Army 1], Win, June 1996, 164. Ch'oe was a North Korean defector who had been a military officer in the state. 62 Ibid., 167. 63 Kim Jong Il, ‘Tang kwa sury˘ong egye kk˘ut˘opsi ch'ungsilhan ilkkun i toeja’ [Let’s become workers who are endlessly faithful of the party and the Great Leader], 20 August 1977, Kim Chˇong-il sˇonjip, 1995, 5: 457 and 463–4. 64 Kim Jong Il, ‘Tang sa˘op u˘ l kaes˘on hamy˘o ky˘ongje sa˘op u˘ l milgo nagan˘un tes˘o chegi taen˘un my˘ot kaji munje e toehay˘o’ [On some problems of party and economic affairs], 7 October 1979, Kim Chˇong-il sˇonjip, 1995, 6: 342. 65 Nodong sinmun, 31 October 1979. 66 Ibid., 24 December 1979. 67 Ch'oe Chu-hwal, ‘Sillok Chos˘on inmin'gun 1’, 164. 68 Tak Jin, Kim Gang Il, and Pak Hong Je, Kim Ch˘ong-il chidoja [Great Leader: Kim Jong Il], Tokyo: Tongbangsa, 1992, 3: 332–3. 69 Nodong sinmun, 3 September 1985. 70 Ch'oe Chu-hwal, ‘Sillok Chos˘on inmin'gun 1’, 164–5. 71 Sin, ‘Ky˘ot es˘o pon Kim Chˇong-il 2’, 442. 72 Ch'oe Chu-hwal, ‘Sillok Chos˘on inmin'gun 5’ [Chronicles of the Korean People’s Army 5], Win, November 1996, 186–8. 73 Ibid., 188. 74 Ch'oe Chu-hwal, ‘Sillok Chos˘on inmin'gun 1’, 164. 75 Hwang Il-ho, ‘Kim Ch˘ong-il u˘ i t˘ungjang kwa tae-Nam kongjak u˘ i panghyang ch˘onhwan’ [The emergence of Kim Jong Il and turning of South Korean affairs], Wˇolgan chungang, February 1994, 572–6. 76 H˘o Pong-hak was the director of the General Bureau of South Korean Affairs. Ibid. 77 Sin Ky˘ong-wan as quoted in Chˇong Ch'ang-hyˇon, Ky˘ot es˘o pon Kim Ch˘ong-il, 178–9. 78 Hwang Il-ho, ‘Kim Ch˘ong-il u˘ i t˘ungjang kwa tae-Nam kongjak u˘ i panghyang ch˘onhwan’, 570 and 576–81. 79 Ibid., 583–5. 80 Ibid., 576. 81 Hwang Chang-y˘op, Na n˘un y˘oksa u˘ i chilli r˘ul poatta, 318. 82 Ibid., 318–9. 83 The new name for the Ministry of Public Security is inmin poansˇong [Ministry of People’s Security] now. 84 Chosˇon ilbo, 14 February 2000. Available at: (accessed 14 May 2008). 85 Ibid. 86 Ibid., 1 April 2002. Available at: (accessed 14 May 2008). 87 Ibid., 21 June 2001. Available at: (accessed 14 May 2008). 88 Ibid., 17 September 2004. Available at: (accessed 14 May 2008).

194 Notes 89 Richard Overy, The Dictators: Hitler’s Germany and Stalin’s Russia, New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2004, 595–9. 90 Chosˇon ilbo, 18 March 2002. Available at: (accessed 14 May 2008). 91 Ch'oe Chu-hwal, ‘Pukhan inmin'gun powi sary˘ongbu u˘ i ch'egye mit hwaltong’ [System and sctivities of the Military Security Command of North Korea], Pukhan chosayˇon'gu [Research on North Korea], 1 (1997), 47–54. 92 Tak et al., Great Leader, 2: 156; and Kim Ch'ang-sˇong and Yi Chun-hang, 3-tae hyˇongmyˇong sojo undong kwa kˇu widaehan saenghwallyˇok [Three-Revolution Team Movement and its great vitality], Pyongyang: Sahoe kwohak ch'ulp'ansa, 1984, 48. At the Fifth Party Congress held in November 1970, the three revolutions had become the party’s strategic line for North Korean socialist future. Kim Il Sung, ‘Report to the Fifth Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea on the work of the Central Committee’, 25: 197–258. 93 Kim Il Sung, ‘For enterprising ideological, technical, and cultural revolutions in the light industry sector’, 31 January 1973, Kim Il Sung Works, 1986, 28: 77–119. 94 Kim and Yi, 3-tae hyˇongmyˇong sojo undong kwa kˇu widaehan saenghwallyˇok, 48. 95 Kim Il Sung, ‘On forcefully accomplishing the three revolutions-ideological, technical and cultural-in industry’, 10 February 1973, Kim Il Sung Works, 1986, 28: 124. 96 Kim Il Sung, ‘On pressing ahead with the ideological, technical and cultural revolutions in rural communities’, 21 February 1973, ibid., 145. 97 Kim Il Sung, ‘On sending three-revolution teams to the educational field’, 11 December 1973, ibid., 503. 98 Chos˘on ch˘onsa [An entire Korean history], Pyongyang: Sahoe kwahak paekkwa sajˇon ch'ulp'ansa, 1982, 32: 147. 99 Kim Il Sung, ‘For enterprising ideological, technical, and cultural revolutions in the light industry sector’, 28: 85–6. 100 Chˇong Yˇong-ch'ˇol, Kim Chˇong-il ch'eje hyˇongsˇong uˇ i sahoe chˇongch'ijˇok kiwˇon, 192. 101 Kim Il Sung, ‘Let us promote the building of socialism by vigorously carrying out the three revolutions’, 3 March 1975, Kim Il Sung Works, 1987, 30: 90–1. 102 Kim Il Sung, ‘Let us further advance the ideological, technical and cultural revolutions’, 14 March 1973, Kim Il Sung Works, 1986, 28: 229. 103 Chˇong Yˇong-ch'ˇol, Kim Chˇong-il ch'eje hyˇongsˇong uˇ i sahoe chˇongch'ijˇok kiwˇon, 195. 104 Kim Il Sung, ‘Let us further advance the ideological, technical and cultural revolutions’, 28: 240–1. North Korea had suffered from the shortage of manpower since liberation. Charles K. Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, 1945–1950, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003, 160. 105 Chˇong Yˇong-ch'ˇol, Kim Chˇong-il ch'eje hyˇongsˇong uˇ i sahoe chˇongch'ijˇok kiwˇon, 196–7. 106 Kim Jong Il, ‘Tang sa˘op pangb˘op u˘ l t˘ouk kaes˘on hamy˘o 3-tae hy˘ongmy˘ong u˘ l him itke p˘olly˘o sahoeju˘ui k˘ons˘ol es˘o saeroun angyang u˘ l ir˘uk'ilte taehay˘o’ [On improving party affairs and making a aew turn in socialist construction through three revolutions], 28 January 1975, Kim Chˇong-il sˇonjip, 1995, 5: 47–51. 107 Kim Jong Il, ‘To, si, kun tang wiw˘onhoed˘ul ap e nas˘on˘un kwa˘op’ [Tasks of party committees of provinces, cities and counties], 3 April 1981, Kim Chˇong-il sˇonjip, 1996, 7: 66. 108 Ibid., 67. 109 Nodong sinmun, 25 September 1984. 110 Yi Han-yˇong, Taedonggang royˇol p'aemilli Sˇoul chamhaeng 14-nyˇon, 169. 111 Through his research on the Meiji Restoration, Bernard S. Silberman also confirmed that leadership succession tended to enlarge bureaucratic organizations. Bernard S. Silberman, ‘Bureacratization of the Meiji State: The problem of succession in the Meiji restoration, 1868–1900’, Journal of Asian Studies, 35/3 (1976), 421–30.

Notes 195 112 Hwang Chang-y˘op, Na n˘un y˘oksa u˘ i chilli r˘ul poatta, 184. 113 Tak et al., Great Leader, 2: 167. 114 Kim Jong Il, ‘Ol hae tang sa˘op es˘o t'˘ur˘ojwigo nagaya hal my˘ot kaji chungsimj˘ok kwa˘op e taehay˘o’ [On some important tasks for party affairs in this year], 1 January 1976, Kim Chˇong-il sˇonjip, 1995, 5: 247–8. 115 Chosˇon chungang t'ongsinsa, Chos˘on chungang y˘on'gam 1978 [Korean central year book 1978], Pyongyang: Chosˇon chungang t'ongsinsa, 1978, 268. 116 Tak et al., Great Leader, 2: 169. 117 Natalia Bazhanova, Kiro e s˘on Pukhan ky˘ongje [North Korean economy at a crossroads], trans. Yang Chun-yong, Seoul: Han'guk kyˇongje sinmunsa, 1992, 29. 118 Kim Il Sung, ‘New Year Address’, 1 January 1976, Kim Il Sung Works, 1987, 31: 4. 119 Tak et al., Great Leader, 2: 167–9. 120 Ibid., 176. 121 Nodong sinmun, 19 November 1986. 122 Kim Jong Il, ‘Tang sasang sa˘op u˘ l t˘ouk kaes˘on kanghwa halte taehay˘o’ [On strengthening party ideological affairs], 8 March 1981, Kim Chˇong-il sˇonjip, 1996, 7: 34–5. 123 The 2002 July Economic Improvement Measures will be explained later. 124 Kim Jong Il, ‘3-tae hy˘ongmy˘ong pull˘ungi chaengch'wi undong u˘ l t˘ouk him itke p˘olija’ [Let’s accelerate the Three-Revolution Red Flag Movement], 23 November 1986, Kim Chˇong-il sˇonjip, 1998, 8: 488. 125 Tak et al., Great Leader, 2: 268. 126 Nodong sinmun, 7 and 8 October 1979; and Tak et al., Great Leader, 2: 261–266. 127 Nodong sinmun, 11 November 1979. 128 Kim Jong Il, ‘Modu ta y˘ongungj˘ok u˘ ro salmy˘o t'ujaeng haja’ [Let’s all live and struggle like heroes], 15 May 1988, Kim Chˇong-il sˇonjip, 1997, 9: 266–9. 129 Nodong sinmun, 3 September 1988. 130 Ibid., 5 September 1988. 131 Son, Kim Chˇong-il lip'ot˘u, 118–9; and Yi Chong-s˘ok, Saerossˇun hyˇondae Pukhan uˇ i ihae, 506–7. 132 Kim Jong Il, ‘Tang sa˘op pangb˘op u˘ l t˘ouk kaes˘on hamy˘o 3-tae hy˘ongmy˘ong u˘ l him itke p˘olly˘o sahoeju˘ui k˘ons˘ol es˘o saeroun angyang u˘ l ir˘uk'ilte taehay˘o’, 5: 48. 133 Chuck Down, Over the Line: North Korea’s Negotiating Strategy, Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1999, 151–2. 134 Nodong sinmun, 20 August 1976. 135 Down, Over the Line, 155. 136 Sin Ky˘ong-wan as quoted in Chˇong Ch'ang-hyˇon, Ky˘ot es˘o pon Kim Ch˘ong-il, 201–2. 137 According to Sin, as many as 200,000 residents of Pyongyang were evacuated to other regions. Later, about 70,000 of 200,000 came back to Pyongyang. Ibid., 203–4. 138 Ibid. 139 Kim Jong Il, ‘Tang sa˘op u˘ i kibon u˘ n saram kwa u˘ i sa˘op ida’ [The basic party affair is to work with the masses], 16 August 1977, Kim Chˇong-il sˇonjip, 1995, 5: 458. 140 Kim Jong Il, ‘Tang sa˘op u˘ l kaes˘on hamy˘o ky˘ongje sa˘op u˘ l milgo nagan˘un tes˘o chegidoen˘un tangmy˘onhan my˘ot kaji munje e taehay˘o’ [On some problems in doing economic businesses and improving party affairs], 7 October 1979, Kim Chˇong-il sˇonjip, 1995, 6: 341. 141 His father became the first ‘great’ leader in Korean history. The Great Leader was ‘chosen by Heaven’ and is the ‘destiny of the party and the people’. As stars in the sky shined due to the sun, the people existed due to the Great Leader. Kim Jong Il, ‘Widaehan suryˇongnim uˇ l chal pattˇurˇo mosinˇun kˇot uˇ n uri uˇ sunggo han immu’ [Our noble duty to admire the Great Leader], 1 January 1980, ibid., 365–6. 142 Kim Jong Il, ‘Taeoe sa˘op pumun ilkun t˘ul ap e nas˘on˘un my˘ot kaji kwa˘op e taehay˘o’ [On some tasks of diplomatic cadres], 6 January 1980, ibid., 373–4.

196 Notes 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169

170 171 172

Kukt'o t'ongilwˇon (ed.), Chosˇon nodongdang taehoe charyojip, 4: 133. Ibid., 98. Nodong sinmun, 15 February 1982. Ibid., 16 February 1982. Tak et al., Kim Ch˘ong-il chidoja, 3: 65–88. Nodong sinmun, 1 June 1986. Article 93 of the Chapter 6 of the Constitution. Nodong sinmun, 28 December 1972. Articles 111–116 of the 1992 Constitution. Pukhan yˇon'guso, Pukhan ch'ongnam 1983–1993 [Comprehensive bibliography of North Korea: 1983–1993], Seoul: Pukhan yˇon'guso, 1994, 1080. Nodong sinmun, 10 April 1993. Ibid., 16 April 1992. Eugene Kamenka, Bureaucracy, Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 1989, 157. Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy, revised 2nd edn, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965, 46. Ibid., 4, 17, 22 and 129–47. Ernst Nolte, Three Faces of Fascism: Action Francaise, Italian Fascism, National Socialism, trans. Leila Vennewitz, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966, 267. The first hagiography of Kim Il Sung was published in 1946. Suh, Kim Il Sung, 1; and Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, 171. N.G. Lebedev as quoted in Pak Kil-yong and Kim Kuk-hu, Kim Il-s˘ong oegyo pisa [Stories behind Kim Il Sung’s diplomacy], Seoul: Chungang ilbosa, 1994, 24–5. Lebedev was a major general of the Soviet occupation forces in North Korea. Friedrich and Brzezinski called the First Five-Year Plan as the ‘breakthrough of fullscale totalitarianism in Russia’. Friedrich and Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy, 221–2. Overy, The Dictators, 398. W.M. Spellman, Monarchies 1000–2000, London: Reaktion Books, 2001, 10. Richard Rose, ‘Monarchy, constitutional’, in Seymour Martin Lipset (ed.) Political Philosophy: Theories, Thinkers, and Concepts, Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2001, 442. Robert A. Kann, Dynasty, Politics and Culture: Selected Essays, in Stanley B. Winters (ed.), Boulder: Social Science Monographs, 1991, 48. The term in (in Chinese, jen) means benevolence and dˇok (or tˇok) virtue (in Chinese te). Kim Jong Il, ‘Sahoeju˘ui n˘un kwahak ida’ [Socialism is science], 1 November 1994, Kim Chˇong-il sˇonjip, 1998, 13: 481. Yi Chong-hyˇon, Kˇundae Chosˇon yˇoksa [Modern Chosˇon history], Pyongyang: Sahoe kwahak ch'ulp'ansa, 1984, 18–9 and 431–2. JaHyun Kim Haboush, The Confucian Kingship in Korea: Yˇongjo and the Politics of Sagacity, New York: Columbia University Press, 2001, 22. Kim Il Sung, ‘Everything for the postwar rehabilitation and development of the national economy’, 5 August 1953, Kim Il Sung Selected Works, 1971, 1: 420. Before the three-year (1954–1956) post-war construction plan, there were economic plans in North Korea: two one-year economic plans for 1947 and 1948 and a two-year (1949–1950) economic plan. The second two-year economic plan was stopped due to the Korean War. T'ongilwˇon [Ministry of Unification], ’95 Pukhan kyeyo [Synopsis of North Korea: 1995], Seoul: T'ongilwˇon, 1995, 174–5. Bazhanova, Kiro e s˘on Pukhan ky˘ongje, 24. Yi Chong-ok, ‘Inmin kyˇongje palchˇon che 1-ch'a o kaenyˇon (1957–61) kyehoek silhaeng ch'onghwa e taehayˇo’, 247, 251 and 262. There were some cases of workers’ sabotage to reduce the speed of the mass movement. Szalontai, Kim Il Sung in the Khrushchev Era, 125 and 138.

Notes 197 173 Kukt'o t'ongilwˇon [Ministry of Unification] (ed.), Chosˇon nodongdang taehoe charyojip [Congresses of the Korean Workers’ Party], Seoul: Kukt'o t'ongilwˇon, 1980, 2: 128–141. 174 Bazhanova, Kiro e s˘on Pukhan ky˘ongje, 27. 175 Kukt'o t'ongilwˇon (ed.), Chosˇon nodongdang taehoe charyojip, 3: 114. 176 Haruki Wada, Kita Ch¯osen [North Korea: From guerrilla state to regular military state], trans. Sˇo Tong-man and Nam Ki-jˇong, Tolbegae: Seoul, 2002, 222. 177 Bazhanova, Kiro e s˘on Pukhan ky˘ongje, 41. 178 Kim Jong Il, ‘Chˇon dang i tongwˇon toeyˇo 70-il chˇont'u rˇul him itke pˇollija’ [Let’s do 70-Day Battle by mobilizing the whole party], 9 October 1974, Kim Chˇong-il sˇonjip, 1994, 4: 456–8. 179 Kim Il Sung, ‘New Year address’, 1 January 1975, Kim Il Sung Works, 1987, 30: 2. 180 Kim Il Sung, ‘New Year address’, 1 January 1977, Kim Il Sung Works, 1988, 32: 5–8. 181 The annual growth rate of the electricity sector was only 6.1 percent in the 1960s. Bazhanova, Kiro e s˘on Pukhan ky˘ongje, 29. 182 Kim Jong Il, ‘Tang sa˘op pangb˘op u˘ l t˘ouk kaes˘on hamy˘o 3-tae hy˘ongmy˘ong u˘ l him itke p˘olly˘o sahoeju˘ui k˘ons˘ol es˘o saeroun angyang u˘ l ir˘uk'ilte taehay˘o’, 5: 57. 183 Bazhanova, Kiro e s˘on Pukhan ky˘ongje, 36. 184 Kim Jong Il, ‘Chumindˇul e taehan sangp'um konggˇup saˇop uˇ l kaesˇon hanˇun tesˇo nasˇo nˇun myˇot kaji munje e taehayˇo’ [On some problems in improving to provide the people with daily supplies], 3 August 1984, Kim Chˇong-il sˇonjip, 1998, 8: 138. 185 P'al-sam inmin sobip'um saengsan undong [Campaign for August 3 consumption goods production] started after Kim Jong Il visited an exposition of the products of the light industry in Pyongyang on 3 August 1984. Kim Yˇon-ch'ˇol, Pukhan uˇ i sanˇop hwa wa kyˇongje chˇongch'aek [Industrialization and economic policies of North Korea], Seoul: Yˇoksa pip'yˇongsa, 2001, 332. 186 Kim Jong Il, ‘Hyˇon chˇongse uˇ i yogu e matke tang saˇop esˇo hyˇongmyˇongjˇok chˇonhwan uˇ l irˇuk'ija’ [Let’s take a revolutionary turn in party affairs in the present political situations], 14 January 1983, Kim Chˇong-il sˇonjip, 1996, 7: 350. 187 Han'guk kaebal yˇon'guwˇon, Pukhan kyˇongje chip'yojip [Economic indexes of North Korea], Seoul: Han'guk kaebal yˇon'guwˇon, 1996, 145. 188 Bazhanova, Kiro e s˘on Pukhan ky˘ongje, 36. 189 Kim Se-wˇon, ‘Pukhan uˇ i kaebang kwa habyˇongpˇop’ [Opening of North Korea and Law of the Management of Joint Venture], Pukhan [North Korea], April 1990, 48–54. 190 Kim Jong Il, ‘Ilkundˇul uˇ n hyˇongmyˇongsˇong uˇ l palhwi hayˇo il uˇ l ch'aekimjˇok uˇ ro hayˇoya handa’ [Party workers should be responsible for their tasks], 10 October 1988, Kim Chˇong-il sˇonjip, 1997, 9: 285–9. 191 Tak et al., Kim Ch˘ong-il chidoja, 3: 455. 192 Kim Jong Il, ‘Tang saˇop kwa sahoejuˇui kˇonsˇol esˇo chˇonhwan uˇ l irˇuk'yˇo 1990-nyˇondae rˇul pinnae ija’ [Let’s make a turning point in party affairs and socialist construction in the 1990s], 1 January 1990, Kim Chˇong-il sˇonjip, 1997, 10: 18. The National Planning Commission is an economic institution in the cabinet. It establishes and implements annual economic plan. 193 Kim Jong Il, ‘Tang sasang kyoyang saˇop esˇo nasˇonˇun myˇok kaji kwaˇop e taehayˇo’ [On some tasks of party ideological affairs], 11 January 1990, Kim Chˇong-il sˇonjip, 1997, 10: 33. 194 Bazhanova, Kiro e s˘on Pukhan ky˘ongje, 39. 195 Before 1991, North Korea used to pay back to the Soviet in rubles or in kind. 196 Han'guk kaebal yˇon'guwˇon, Pukhan kyˇongje chip'yojip, 153. 197 Wada, Kita Ch¯osen, 238. 198 Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporaty History, revised edn, New York: Basic Books, 2001, 240.

198 Notes 199 Kim Tong-sˇong, ‘Han-Chung kwan'gye’ [Sino-South Korean relations] in Chˇong Ilyˇong (ed.) Han'guk oegyo pansegi uˇ i chae chomyˇong [Reflection of Korean diplomacy for half a century], Seoul: Nanam, 1993, 328. 200 Kim Jong Il, ‘Tang uˇ i chˇont'uryˇok uˇ l nop'yˇo sahoejuˇui kˇonsˇol esˇo saeroun chˇonhwan uˇ l irˇuk'ija’ [Let’s strengthen the combat capability of the party and effect a fresh turn in socialist construction], 25 December 1978, Kim Chˇong-il sˇonjip, 1995, 6: 203. 201 South Korea established diplomatic relations with Hungary in February 1989, Yugoslavia in December 1989, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria in March 1990, the Soviet Union in October 1990, Albania in August 1991, and finally China in August 1992. Chˇong Kyu-sˇop, Pukhan oegyo uˇ i oˇ je wa onˇul [Yesterday and today of North Korean diplomacy], Seoul: Ilsinsa, 1997, 211–6. 202 Kim Jong Il, ‘Sahoejuˇui uˇ i sasangjˇok kich'o e kwanhan myˇot kaji munje e taehayˇo’ [On some problems of the ideological bases of socialism], 30 May 1990, Kim Chˇong-il sˇonjip, 1997, 10: 106–9. 203 Kim Jong Il, ‘Tang kwa hyˇongmyˇong taeo uˇ i kanghwa palchˇon kwa sahoejuˇui kyˇongje kˇonsˇol uˇ i saeroun angyang uˇ l wihayˇo’ [For the strengthening of the party and revolutionary forces and the new elevation of socialist economic construction], 3 January 1986, Kim Chˇong-il sˇonjip, 1998, 8: 338. 204 Kim Jong Il, ‘Chosˇon minjok cheil chuˇui chˇongsin uˇ l nop'i paryangsik'ija’ [Let’s promote the spirit of ‘Korea-first idea’], 28 December 1989, Kim Chˇong-il sˇonjip, 1997, 9: 444–51. 205 Kim Jong Il, ‘Tang sasang kyoyang saˇop esˇo nasˇonˇun myˇok kaji kwaˇop e taehayˇo’, 10: 35. 206 Kim Jong Il, ‘Uri nara sahoejuˇui nˇun chuch'e sasang uˇ l kuhyˇonhan uri sik sahoejuˇui ida’ [Our country’s socialism is our own style socialism embodied by the chuch'e idea], 27 December 1990, Kim Chˇong-il sˇonjip, 1997, 10: 471–510. 207 Chu Kang-hyˇon, Pukhan uˇ i minjok saenghwal p'ungsˇup [North Korea’s national customs], Seoul: Taedong, 1994, 443–67. 208 Nodong sinmun, 15 May 1993. 209 Ibid., 1 February 1994. 210 Ibid., 12 October 1994. 211 Kim Jong Il, ‘Chosˇon nodongdang uˇ n uri inmin uˇ i modˇun sˇungni uˇ i chojikcha imyˇo hyangdoja ida’ [The Korean Workers’ Party is the organizer and leader of all victories that our people win], 3 October 1990, Kim Chˇong-il sˇonjip, 1997, 10: 237–47. 212 Kim Jong Il, ‘Chuch'e uˇ i tang kˇonsˇol iron uˇ n nodong kyegˇup uˇ i tang kˇonsˇol esˇo t'ˇurˇojwigo nagaya hal chidojˇok chich'im ida’ [The party theory of chuch'e is the guidance for the party of working class], 10 October 1990, ibid., 275–6. 213 Kim Jong Il, ‘Tang sep'o rˇul kanghwa haja’ [Let’s strengthen party cells], 10 May 1991, Kim Chˇong-il sˇonjip, 1997, 11: 81; and Nodong sinmun, 18 May 1991. 214 Kim Jong Il, ‘Tang saˇop uˇ l tˇouk kanghwa hamyˇo sahoejuˇui kˇonsˇol uˇ l him itke tagˇuch'ija’ [Let’s reinforce party affairs and push forward socialist construction], 5 January 1991, Kim Chˇong-il sˇonjip, 1997, 11: 14. 215 Ko T'ae-u, Pukhan hyˇondaesa 101 changmyˇon [101 stories of North Korean history], Seoul: Karam, 2000, 33–6; and Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, 62–4. 216 Nodong sinmun, 9 April 1990. 217 According to North Korea, 28 August was the day when Kim Il Sung created a League of Communist Youths in Manchuria in 1927. Kim Jong Il, ‘Ch'ˇongnyˇondˇul uˇ n tang kwa suryˇong ege kkˇut oˇ psi ch'ungsilhan ch'ˇongnyˇon chˇonwi ka toeja’ [Youths should be faithful young vanguards of the party and the Great Leader], 26 August 1991, Kim Chˇong-il sˇonjip, 1997, 12: 1. 218 Nodong sinmun, 19 February 1993. 219 Ibid., 20 January 1996.

Notes 199 220 Kim Jong Il, ‘Tang saˇop uˇ l tˇouk kanghwa hamyˇo sahoejuˇui kˇonsˇol uˇ l him itke tagˇuch'ija’, 11: 24–5. 221 Nodong sinmun, 25, 26 and 27 December 1991. 222 Ibid., 21 April 1992. 223 Ibid., 24 April 1992. 224 Ibid., 26 April 1992. 225 Kim Jong Il, ‘Hyˇongmyˇong kwa kˇonsˇol esˇo int'eridˇul uˇ i yˇokhal uˇ l tˇouk nop'ija’ [Let’s enhance the role of intellectuals in revolution and construction], 20 September 1990, Kim Chˇong-il sˇonjip, 1997, 10: 197–211. 226 Kim Jong Il, ‘Tang uˇ l kanghwa hago kˇu yˇongdojˇok yˇokhal uˇ l tˇouk nop'ija’ [Let’s strengthen and elevate the role of the party], 9 and 12 June 1989, Kim Chˇong-il sˇonjip, 1997, 9: 355. 227 Sˇong Hye-rang, Dˇungnamu chip [House of Wisteria], Seoul: Chisik nara, 2000, 100, 359–71, 376, 394–403, and 464–6. 228 Ibid., 369–79 and 383. 229 Ibid., 378 and 385–6. 230 Ibid., 370 and 394–5. 231 Ibid., 376 and 394–5; and Sin Ky˘ong-wan as quoted in Chˇong Ch'ang-hyˇon, Ky˘ot es˘o pon Kim Ch˘ong-il, 32–3. 232 Fujimoto Kenji, Kim Chˇong-il uˇ i yorisa [Cook of Kim Jong Il], trans. Sin Hyˇon-ho, Seoul: Wˇolgan Chosˇonsa, 2003, 136–7. 233 Chˇong Sˇong-jang, ‘Kim Chˇong-il sidae Pukhan uˇ i hugye munje’ [The succession issue of North Korea under the Kim Jong Il era], Han'guk chˇongch'i hakhobo [Journal of the Korean political science association], summer 2005, 39: 359. ˘ 234 Ch'oe Un-h˘ ui and Sin Sang-ok, Naere Kim Ch˘ong-il imneda [I am Kim Jong], Seoul: Haengrim, 1994, 1: 95. 235 Fujimoto, Kim Chˇong-il uˇ i yorisa, 97–122. 236 Ibid., 108–9. 237 Ibid., 84–6 and 123–31; and Ch'oe and Sin, Naere Kim Ch˘ong-il imneda, 1: 78–84 and 282–4. 238 Fujimoto, Kim Chˇong-il uˇ i yorisa, 184–9 and 199–201; and Ch'oe and Sin, Naere Kim Ch˘ong-il imneda, 1: 380. 5

Ruler (1994–present)

1 Nodong sinmun, 9 July 1994; and Kim Jong Il, ‘Widaehan suryˇongnim uˇ l yˇongwˇonhi nop'i mosigo suryˇongnim uˇ i wiˇop uˇ l kkˇut kkaji wansˇong haja’ [Let’s venerate the Great Leader and complete his feats to the end], 16 October 1994, Kim Chˇong-il sˇonjip [Kim Jong Il selected works], Pyongyang: Chosˇon nodongdang ch'ulp'ansa, 1998, 13: 423. 2 Ibid.; Hwang Chang-y˘op, Na n˘un y˘oksa u˘ i chilli r˘ul poatta [I saw the truth of history], Seoul: Hanul, 1999, 260; and Nodong sinmun, 27 May 1994. Kim Il Sung met Son Chˇong-do in Jilin in the late 1920s. Son was his father’s friend and a Christian pastor. Son took care of Kim in Jilin. Kim Il Sung, Segi wa tˇoburˇo [With the century], Pyongyang: Chos˘on nodongdang ch'ulp'ansa, 1992, 1: 354–6. 3 Nodong sinmun, 17 and 18 June 1994. 4 Ibid., 21 and 22 June, 1994. 5 Son Kwang-ju, Kim Chˇong-il lip'ot˘u [Kim Jong Il report], Seoul: Pada puks, 2003, 167–9. 6 Nodong sinmun, 20 July 1994. 7 Son, Kim Chˇong-il lip'ot˘u, 92. 8 Nodong sinmun, 9 July 1994. 9 Ibid., 20 July 1994. 10 Ibid., 23 July 1994.

200 Notes 11 Kim Jong Il, ‘Widaehan suryˇongnim uˇ l yˇongwˇonhi nop'i mosigo suryˇongnim uˇ i wiˇop uˇ l kkˇutkkaji wansˇong haja’, 13: 427–9. 12 Nodong sinmun, 9 July 1995. 13 Kˇum Chang-t'ae, Yugyo uˇ i sasang kwa uˇ irye [The Confucian thoughts and rites], Seoul: Yemun sˇowˇon, 2000, 245. 14 Nodong sinmun, 8 July and 10 July 1997. In pre-modern Korea, when a king died, he was given his own reign-title. For example, the fourth king of the Chos˘on dynasty was given the reign-title Sejong. He ascended the throne in 1418, which was Sejong 1. Kim Il Sung’s reign-title Chuch'e was made in the similar context. 15 Ibid., 6 September 1998. 16 UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, United Nations Consolidated UN Interagency Appeal for Flood-related Emergency Humanitarian Assistance to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), April 1996. Available at: (accessed 14 May 2008). 17 The international community including the US, South Korea, Japan, China, and the European Union provided North Korea with economic aids of 288 million in 1995 and 102 million dollars in 1996. Pukhan yˇon'guso, Pukhan ch'ongnam 1993–2002 [Comprehensive bibliography of North Korea: 1993–2002], Seoul: Pukhan yˇon'guso, 2003, 359. 18 Kim Yˇon-ch'ˇol, Pukhan uˇ i sanˇop hwa wa kyˇongje chˇongch'aek [Industrialization and economic policies of North Korea], Seoul: Yˇoksa pip'yˇongsa, 2001, 324–5. 19 Ibid., 330. 20 Han S. Park, North Korea: The Politics of Unconventional Wisdom, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002, 162–3. 21 Hwang Chang-y˘op, Na n˘un y˘oksa u˘ i chilli r˘ul poatta [I saw the truth of history], Seoul: Hanul, 1999, 268–70 and 286. 22 Chosˇon ilbo, 11 September 2002. 23 Choˇun pˇottˇul [Good Friends], Pukhan saramdˇul i malhanˇun Pukhan iyagi [North Korean stories that North Korean people witness], Seoul: Chˇongt'o, 2000, 110. Choˇun pˇottˇul is the name of a humanitarian aid group in the South whose members went to the North and met the people of the country from 1997 to 1999. 24 Kim Jong Il, ‘Munhak yesul pumun esˇo myˇongjak uˇ l tˇo mani ch'angjak haja’ [Let’s create more masterpieces in art and literature], 26 April 1996, Kim Chˇong-il sˇonjip, 2000, 14: 174. 25 Kim Jong Il, ‘Kukt'o kwalli saˇop esˇo saeroun chˇonhwan uˇ l irˇuk'ilte taehayˇo’ [On making a new turn in national territorial management], 11 August 1996, Kim Chˇong-il sˇonjip, 2000, 14: 203–4. 26 Kim Chˇong-il [Kim Jong Il], ‘Kim II Sˇong chonghap taehak ch'angnip 50-tol kinyˇom yˇonsˇolmun’ [A speech of the fiftieth anniversary of the Kim Il Sung University], Wˇolgan Chosˇon, April 1997, 308–12. Hwang Chang-y˘op brought this speech to the South. 27 Choˇun pˇottˇul, Pukhan saramdˇul i malhanˇun Pukhan iyagi, 225–8. 28 Nodong sinmun, 28 August 1995. 29 Ch'oe Chu-hwal, ‘Sillok Chos˘on inmin'gun 3’ [Chronicles of the Korean People’s Army 3], Win, September 1996, 177–83. 30 Hwang Chang-yˇop, Na n˘un y˘oksa u˘ i chilli r˘ul poatta, 288. ˘ 31 Ch'oe Un-h˘ ui and Sin Sang-ok, Naere Kim Ch˘ong-il imneda [I am Kim Jong], Seoul: Haengrim, 1994, 1: 179. 32 Fujimoto Kenji, Kim Chˇong-il uˇ i yorisa [Cook of Kim Jong Il], trans. Sin Hyˇon-ho, Seoul: Wˇolgan Chosˇonsa, 2003, 243. 33 Sahoe kwahak ch'ulp'ansa, Kyˇongje sajˇon [Economic dictionary], Pyongyang: Sahoe kwahak ch'ulp'ansa, 1985, 1: 49–50, 315–6, and 367–8. 34 Choˇun pˇottˇul, Pukhan saramdˇul i malhanˇun Pukhan iyagi, 138–41.

Notes 201 35 36 37 38 39 40

41

42 43

44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63

Ibid., 139–44. Kim Yˇon-ch'ˇol, Pukhan uˇ i sanˇop hwa wa kyˇongje chˇongch'aek, 344. Choˇun pˇottˇul, Pukhan saramdˇul i malhanˇun Pukhan iyagi, 141. Nodong sinmun, 9 October 1997. Kukt'o t'ongilwˇon [Ministry of Unification] (ed.) Chosˇon Nodongdang taehoe charyojip [Congresses of the Korean Workers’ Party], Seoul: Kukt'o t'ongilwˇon, 1980–1988, 4: 143. Kim Jong Il, ‘Chagang-do uˇ i mobˇom uˇ l ttara kyˇongje saˇop kwa inmin saenghwal esˇo saeroun chˇonhwan uˇ l irˇuk'ija’ [Let’s create a new turn in people’s life by following the excellence of Chagang province], 16–21 January, 1 June, 20 and 22 October 1998, ibid., 14: 406–7; and Kim Jong Il, ‘Kamja nongsa esˇo hyˇongmyˇong uˇ l irˇuk'ilte taehayˇo’ [On creating a revolution in potato farming], 1 October 1998, ibid., 14: 428–34. When Kim Il Sung was alive, he promoted the corn farming. Kim Jong Il’s regret was a confession that his father’s chuch'e agricultural policy was wrong. In 1999, the state had a positive economic growth rate for the first time in the 1990s. T'onggyech'ˇong [Korean National Statistical Office], Nam-Pukhan kyˇongje sahoesang pigyo 2004 [Comparison of North–South Korean socio-economic sectors: 2004], Daejˇon: T'onggyech'ˇong, 2004, 66. Kim Jong Il, ‘Chagang-do uˇ i mobˇom uˇ l ttara kyˇongje saˇop kwa inmin saenghwal esˇo saeroun chˇonhwan uˇ l irˇuk'ija’, 14: 392–3 and 400–1. North Korea launched the Taep'odong-1 missile on 31 August but declared it on 5 September. After the missile firing, the North Korean media claimed that it was the first satellite made by its own scientific technology under the guidance of the Dear Leader. Nodong sinmun, 5 September 1998. Ibid., 22 August 1998. Kim Jong Il, ‘Olhae rˇul kangsˇong taeguk kˇonsˇol uˇ i widaehan chˇonhwan uˇ i hae ro pinnae ija’ [Let’s glorify this year as a great turning year to construct a strong and prosperous state], 1 January 1999, Kim Chˇong-il sˇonjip, 2000, 14: 452. Nodong sinmun, 9 September 1998. Ibid., 1 January 1999. Kim Jong Il, ‘Olhae rˇul kangsˇong taeguk kˇonsˇol uˇ i widaehan chˇonhwan uˇ i hae ro pinnae ija’, 14: 454. Nodong sinmun, 6 September 1998. Preamble of Kim Il Sung Constitution. Ibid. Yi Chong-sˇok, Saerossˇun hyˇondae Pukhan uˇ i ihae [Understanding of newly written modern North Korea], Seoul: Yˇoksa pip'yˇongsa, 2000, 291. Nodong sinmun, 11 and 22 August 1998. Yi Chong-s˘ok, Saerossˇun hyˇondae Pukhan uˇ i ihae, 292. Article 111. Nodong sinmun, 6 September 1998. Articles 100–105. Ibid. Ibid. Kim Ch˘ong-il, ‘Kim Il Sˇong chonghap taehak ch'angnip 50-tol kinyˇom yˇonsˇolmun,’ 309. Article 107 of the 1972 constitution. Pukhan yˇon'guso, Pukhan ch'ongnam 1945–1982 [Comprehensive bibliography of North Korea: 1945–1982], Seoul: Pukhan yˇon'guso, 1983, 1756. Articles 117–130 of Kim Il Sung Constitution. Nodong sinmun, 6 September 1998. Kim Jong Il, ‘Olhae rˇul kangsˇong taeguk kˇonsˇol uˇ i widaehan chˇonhwan uˇ i hae ro pinnae ija’, 14: 461. After the 1972 constitutional revision, North Korea again revised the constitution in 1992. Article 24. Pukhan yˇon'guso, Pukhan ch'ongnam 1983–1993, 1074. Article 24 of the new constitution. Nodong sinmun, 6 September 1998.

202 Notes 64 Ibid. 65 Ministry of Unification, South–North Joint Declaration. Available at: (accessed 20 February 2008). 66 T'ongilbu [Ministry of Unification], T'ongil paeksˇo 2005 [Unification white paper 2005], Seoul: T'ongilbu, 2005, 15–16. 67 Nodong sinmun, 1 January 1991. 68 T'ongilbu, T'ongil paeksˇo 2005, 109 and 160. 69 Chosˇon ilbo, 25 January 2000. 70 Ch'oe Wˇon-gi and Chˇong Ch'ang-hyˇon, Nam-Puk chˇongsang hoedam 600-il [InterKorean summit 600 days], Seoul: Kimyˇongsa, 2000, 52. 71 Before and after the summit, with the guarantee of the South Korean government, the Hyundai Group secretly paid 500 million dollars to the North Korean government. Chos˘on ilbo, 26 May 2004. 72 T'ongilbu, T'ongil paeksˇo 2005, 33–170. 73 Chosˇon chungang t'ongsinsa, Chosˇon chungang yˇon'gm 2001 [Korean central yearbook 2001], Pyongyang: Chosˇon chungang t'ongsinsa, 2001, 256. 74 Ministry of Unification, Declaration on the Advancement of South-North Korean Relations, Peace and Prosperity. Available at: (accessed 20 February 2008). 75 Ibid. 76 Ibid. 77 Ministry of Unification, Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation between South and North Korea. Available at: (accessed 20 February 2008). 78 Haruki Wada, Kita Ch¯osen [North Korea: From guerrilla state to regular military state], trans. Sˇo Tong-man and Nam Ki-jˇong, Tolbegae: Seoul, 2002, 169. 79 Eundak Kwon and Jae-Cheon Lim, ‘Crossing the river that divides the Korean Peninsula: An evaluation of the sunshine policy’, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 6 (2006), 129–56. 80 Nodong sinmun, 1 January and 25 June 1991. 81 Young Whan Kihl, ‘Why the Cold War persists in Korea: Inter-Korean and foreign relations’, in David R. McCann (ed.) Korea Briefing: Toward Reunification, Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1997, 51–5. 82 Nam Sˇong-uk, ‘Kyˇongje hyˇolmaeng? Chungguk chabon, Pukhan chˇomnyˇong kasok hwa’ [Economic allies? Chinese capital occupying North Korea], Sin dong-a, December 2005, 232–43. 83 Chos˘on ilbo, 5 October 2007. 84 Kim Jong Il, ‘Tang uˇ l kanghwa hago kˇu yˇongdojˇok yˇokhal uˇ l tˇouk nop'ija’, 9: 355. 85 Chosˇon ilbo, 21 June 2000. 86 The Hyundai and the North concluded an official agreement of a Kaesˇong Industrial Area in August 2000. 87 Nodong sinmun, 30 January 2000. 88 Chosˇon ilbo, 23 September and 8 October 2002. 89 Nodong sinmun, 9 January 2001. 90 Ibid., 16 January 2001. 91 Sˇo Chae-jin, 7-1-choch'i ihu Pukhan uˇ i ch'eje pyˇonhwa: araerobut'ˇo uˇ i sijang sahoejuˇui hwa kaehyˇok [North Korean system change after July 1 measures: Market socialism and refroms from the bottom], Seoul: T'ongil yˇon'guwˇon, 2004, 55–7. 92 Ibid., 69. 93 In reality, the workers are given less than the official amounts. T'ongilwˇon, ’95 Pukhan kyeyo, 289. 94 The North Korean government has not completely eliminated the food-rationing system yet.

Notes 203 95 Chosˇon ilbo, 16 October 2002. 96 Ibid., 17 April 2006. 97 Pak Chong-ch'ˇol, Kim Kuk-sin, Ch'oe Su-yˇong, Hˇo Mun-yˇong and Chˇon Pyˇong-gon, Puk-Chung kwan'gye kanghwa uˇ i yˇonghyang kwa uri uˇ i taeˇungch'aek [Development of Sino-North Korean relations and our response], Seoul: T'ongil yˇon'guwˇon, 2006, 11. 98 Financial Times, 13 March 2006. 99 Ministry of National Defense (MND), 2004 Defense White Paper, Seoul: MND, 2005, 41–3 and 289. 100 Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, and System Structure in International Crises, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977, 6. 101 Bruce Cumings, North Korea: Another Country, New York: The New Press, 2004, 15–26. 102 Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporaty History, revised edn, Basic Books, 2001, 311–26. 103 Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980, 199–200. 104 Kim uses the missile card just like the nuclear card for his crisis diplomacy. 105 North Korean negotiating behavior is examined well in Scott Snyder, Negotiating on the Edge: North Korean Negotiating Behavior, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1999. 106 Nodong sinmun, 11 February 2005. 107 Kim Jong Il, ‘Hyˇon sidae wa ch'ˇongnyˇondˇul uˇ i immu’ [The tasks of the youth in this time], 10 October 1988, Kim Chˇong-il sˇonjip, 1997, 9: 295. 108 Kim Jong Il, ‘Hyˇongmyˇong kwa kˇonsˇol esˇo chuch'esˇong uˇ l kosu halte taehayˇo’ [On keeping to chuch'e and nationality in revolution and construction], 19 June 1997, Kim Chˇong-il sˇonjip, 2000, 14: 329. 109 Fujimoto, Kim Chˇong-il uˇ i yorisa, 153. 110 Hwang Chang-yˇop, Na n˘un y˘oksa u˘ i chilli r˘ul poatta, 271 and 279; and Fujimoto, Kim Chˇong-il uˇ i yorisa, 154–5. 6

Leadership

1 Kim Jong Il, ‘On sahoe rˇul Kimilsˇongjuˇui hwa hagi wihan tang sasang saˇop uˇ i tangmyˇonhan myˇot kaji kwaˇop e taehayˇo’, 19 February 1974, Kim Chˇong-il sˇonjip [Kim Jong Il selected works], Pyongyang: Chosˇon nodongdang ch'ulp'ansa, 4: 32. 2 Han Chae-man, Kim Chˇong-il: in'gan, sasang, yˇongdo [Kim Jong Il: Man, thought, and leadership], Pyongyang: Pyongyang ch'ulp'ansa, 1994, 339–40. 3 Tak Jin, Kim Gang Il, and Pak Hong Je, Great Leader: Kim Jong Il, Tokyo: Sorinsha, 1985, 2: 116 and 117. 4 Han, Kim Chˇong-il, 325–6. An interesting point was that both Kim Il Sung and Park Chung Hee valued ‘speed’ in economic construction at the time. As the leaders of developing states, they needed rapid economic development to escape poverty as well as to enhance their regime legitimacy. 5 Kim Jong Il, ‘Chˇongch'i todˇokjˇok chagˇuk kwa mulchiljˇok chagˇuk e taehan olbarˇun ihae rˇul kajilte taehayˇo’ [On rightly understanding political–moral and material incentives], 13 June 1967, Kim Chˇong-il sˇonjip [Kim Jong Il selected works], Pyongyang: Chosˇon nodongdang ch'ulp'ansa, 1992, 1: 227. 6 Tak et al., Great Leader, 1: 176; and Han, Kim Chˇong-il, 315 and 337. 7 Kim Jong Il, ‘Chˇon tang i tongwˇon toeyˇo 70-il chˇont'u rˇul him itke pˇollija’, Kim Chˇong-il sˇonjip, 1994, 4: 469–83. 8 Tak et al., Great Leader, 2: 129.

204 Notes 9 Ibid., 130–1. 10 Ibid., 313. 11 Tak Jin, Kim Gang Il, and Pak Hong Je, Kim Ch˘ong-il chidoja [Great Leader: Kim Jong Il], Tokyo: Tongbangsa, 1992, 3: 92–102. 12 Kim Jong Il, ‘Tang saˇop kwa sahoejuˇui kˇonsˇol esˇo chˇonhwan uˇ l irˇuk'yˇo 1990-nyˇondae rˇul pinnae ija’ [Let’s make a turning point in party affairs and socialist construction in the 1990s], 1 January 1990, Kim Chˇong-il sˇonjip, 1997, 10: 17–18. 13 Kim Jong Il, ‘Hyˇongmyˇong taeo rˇul t'ˇunt'ˇunhi kkurimyˇo sahoejuˇui kˇonsˇol uˇ l tˇouk him itte tagˇuch'ilte taehayˇo’ [On pushing ahead socialist coonstruction and fortifying revolutionary forces], 10 March 1984, Kim Chˇong-il sˇonjip, 1998, 8: 37–8. 14 Tak et al., Great Leader, 1: 161. 15 Sin Ky˘ong-wan as quoted in Chˇong Ch'ang-hyˇon, Ky˘ot es˘o pon Kim Ch˘ong-il [Close by Kim Jong Il], Seoul: Kimy˘ongsa, 2000, 215. 16 Kim Il Sung’s reference. Hˇo, Kim Ch˘ong-il wiinsang [Great hero Kim Jong Il], Pyongyang: Chos˘on sinbo, 1996, 238. ˘ 17 Ch'oe Un-h˘ ui and Sin Sang-ok, Naere Kim Ch˘ong-il imneda [I am Kim Jong], Seoul: Haengrim, 1994, 2: 34–37. 18 Sin Ky˘ong-wan as quoted in Chˇong Ch'ang-hyˇon, Ky˘ot es˘o pon Kim Ch˘ong-il, 52. 19 Ch'oe and Sin, Naere Kim Ch˘ong-il imneda, 2: 72. 20 Haruki Wada, Kita Ch¯osen [North Korea: From guerrilla state to regular military state], trans. Sˇo Tong-man and Nam Ki-jˇong, Tolbegae: Seoul, 2002, 139–41. 21 Sin Ky˘ong-wan as quoted in Chˇong Ch'ang-hyˇon, Ky˘ot es˘o pon Kim Ch˘ong-il, 22. 22 Ibid., 105. 23 Tak et al., Great Leader, 1: 200. 24 Kim Jong Il, ‘Chiptan ch'ejo rˇul tˇouk palchˇon sik'ilte taehayˇo’ [On developing mass gymnastics], 11 April 1987, Kim Chˇong-il sˇonjip, 1997, 9: 1–17. Kim’s view of gymnastics is similar to Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Government of Poland, trans. Willmoore Kendall, Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1972, 21. 25 In 2002, approximately 20,000 foreigners, including South Koreans, went to the state to watch Arirang. Chos˘on ilbo, 6 October 2005. 26 Madeleine Albright, Madam Secretary, New York: Miramax Books, 2003, 464. 27 Kim Jong Il, ‘Hyˇongmyˇong uˇ i sudo Pyˇongyang uˇ l tˇouk ungjang hwaryˇohan inmin uˇ i tosi ro kˇonsˇol haja’ [Let’s construct Pyongyang, the capital of revolution, as the people’s city], 18 March 1975, Kim Chˇong-il sˇonjip, 1997, 9: 68. 28 Tak et al., Great Leader, 2: 304 and 318–9. 29 Tak et al., Kim Ch˘ong-il chidoja, 3: 267–73. 30 Ch'oe and Sin, Naere Kim Ch˘ong-il imneda, 2: 74. 31 Kim Jong Il, ‘Hyˇon chˇongse uˇ i yogu e matke tang saˇop esˇo hyˇongmyˇongjˇok chˇonhwan uˇ l irˇuk'ija’, [Let’s take a revolutionary turn in party affairs in the present political situations], 14 January 1983, Kim Chˇong-il sˇonjip, 1996, 7: 353. 32 The movie Wˇolmi Island was about North Korean soldiers who died on the Wˇolmi Island near Inch'ˇon during the Korean War. 33 Ch'oe and Sin, Naere Kim Ch˘ong-il imneda, 2: 74–5. 34 Kim, Suk-Young, Revolutionizing the Family: A Comparative Study on the Filmed Propaganda Performances of the People’s Republic of China and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 1966–1976, PhD dissertation, Northwestern University, June 2005, 147. 35 Carl J. Friedrich, Tradition and Authority, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972, 113. 36 Max Weber, The Theory of Social Economic Organization, Talcott Parsons (ed.), trans. A.M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons, New York: The Free Press, 1947, 328. 37 Eric Hobsbawm, ‘Introduction: inventing traditions’, in Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (eds.) The Invention of Tradition, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983, 1–2.

Notes 205 38 Friedrich, Tradition and Authority, 14. 39 Chungang chˇongbobu (KCIA) (ed.), Hyˇongmyˇong chˇont'ong kangjwa [Lectures of revolutionary tradition], Seoul: Chungang chˇongbobu, 1974, 37–40. This book, edited by Chungang chˇongbobu, was originally the lectures of the Kim Il Sung University of the Air. 40 Kim Il Sung, ‘Let us educate and train pupils and students to become loyal reserve forces for the building of socialism and communism’, 14 March 1968, Kim Il Sung Works, Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1985, 22: 40. 41 Pak Kwang-ho, Chˇont'ong: Pukhan sahoe ihae uˇ i yˇolsoe [Tradition: The key to understanding North Korea], Seoul: Han'guk haksul chˇongbo, 2004, 350–3. 42 Julia Ching, Confucianism and Chistianity, Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1977, 96–7. 43 Kˇum Chang-t'ae, Yugyo uˇ i sasang kwa uˇ irye [The Confucian thoughts and rites], Seoul: Yemun sˇowˇon, 2000, 22–6 and 142. 44 Fung Yu-Lan, A History of Chinese Philosophy, vol. 1, trans. Derk Bodde, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952, 354. 45 Chu Kang-hyˇon, Pukhan uˇ i minjok saenghwal p'ungsˇup [North Korea’s national customs], Seoul: Taedong, 447–8. 46 Kim Jong Il, ‘Sahoe munhwa saenghwal uˇ l kaesˇon halte taehayˇo’ [On improving the socio-cultural life], 2 September 1980, Kim Chˇong-il sˇonjip, 1995, 6: 443. 47 Tak et al., Kim Ch˘ong-il chidoja, 3: 229–30. 48 Chu, Pukhan uˇ i minjok saenghwal p'ungsˇup, 1994, 467. 49 Kim Jong Il, ‘Tang kwa hyˇongmyˇong taeo uˇ i kanghwa palchˇon kwa sahoejuˇui kyˇongje kˇonsˇol uˇ i saeroun angyang uˇ l wihayˇo’, [For the strengthening of the party and revolutionary forces and the new elevation of socialist economic construction], 3 January 1986, Kim Chˇong-il sˇonjip, 1998, 8: 339. Currently, North Korean brides wear traditional Korean skirts and bridegrooms wear Western clothes. 50 Nodong sinmun, 12 October 1994. 51 Ibid., 14 October 1993 and 6 October 1994. 52 Son Yˇong-jong and Pak Yˇong-hae, Chosˇon t'ongsa [Entire history of Korea], Pyongyang: Sahoe kwahak ch'ulp'ansa, 1987, 1: 33–8. 53 Yi Sun-jin, ‘Taedonggang munhwa uˇ i kibon naeyong kwa ususˇong e taehayˇo’ [On the basic content and superiority of the Taedong civilization], Chosˇon kogo yˇon'gu [Korean research of anthropology], 1 (1999), 308. Actually all of the issue’s contents relate to the Taedong civilization. 54 Nodong sinmun, 20 January 2003 and 8 November 2001. 55 Kim Jong Il, ‘Olhae e tang saˇop esˇo hyˇongmyˇongjˇok chˇonhwan uˇ l irˇuk'ilte taehayˇo’ [On making a revolutionary turn on this year’s party affairs], 1 January 1997, Kim Chˇong-il sˇonjip, 2000, 14: 267. 56 Kim Chˇong-il [Kim Jong Il], ‘Kim II Sˇong chonghap taehak ch'angnip 50-tol kinyˇom yˇonsˇolmun’ [A speech of the fiftieth anniversary of the Kim Il Sung University], Wˇolgan Chosˇon, April 1997, 307–8. 57 Choˇun pˇottˇul [Good Friends], Pukhan saramdˇul i malhanˇun Pukhan iyagi [North Korean stories that North Korean people witness], Seoul: Chˇongt'o, 2000, 227. 58 Sˇo Po-hyˇok, T'al naengjˇon'gi Puk-Mi kwan'gyesa [History of US–North Korean relarions in the post-Cold War era], Seoul: Sˇonin, 2004, 19. 59 Nodong sinmun, 9 October 1995, 24 April and 26 July 1996, and 10 February and 14 April 1997. 60 Chosˇong chungang t'ongsinsa, Chosˇon chungang yˇon'gam 1995–2002 [Korean central yearbook 1996–2002], Pyongyang: Chosˇong chungang t'ongsinsa. 61 Nodong sinmun, 14 February 2004. 62 Yi Min-yong, Kim Chˇong-Il ch'eje uˇ i Pukhan kundae haebu [An Analysis of the Kim Jong Il regime’s military forces], Seoul: Hwanggˇumal, 2004, 179. 63 The Articles 90 and 101 of the Constitution. Nodong sinmun, 6 September 1998.

206 Notes 64 65 66 67

68 69

70 71 72 73 74 75

76 77

78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90

Ibid. Yˇon died in October 2005. Ibid., 24 October 2005. Ibid., 4 September 2003. After defecting to the South, Hwang Chang-yˇop has criticized the misuse of the chuch'e idea in the North and published his opinions on the idea. Hwang Chang-y˘op, Na n˘un y˘oksa u˘ i chilli r˘ul poatta and Kaein u˘ i saengmy˘ong poda kwijunghan minjok u˘ i saengmy˘ong [Nation’s life more precious than individuals], Seoul: Sidae ch˘ongsin, 1999. Han S. Park, North Korea: The Politics of Unconventional Wisdom, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002, 153. Kim Jong Il published a treatise Sˇon'gun hyˇongmyˇong nosˇon uˇ n uri sidae uˇ i widaehan hyˇongmyˇong nosˇon imyˇo uri hyˇongmyˇong uˇ i paekchˇon paeksˇung uˇ i kich'i ida [Militaryfirst idea is a great revolutionary in our age and is an invincible banner] in 2003. Nodong sinmun, 29 January 2004 and 22 December 2004. Ibid., 18 January 2004. Ibid., 29 January and 8 March 2004. Ibid., 8 March 2004. Tak et al., Great Leader, 2: 19. Nodong sinmun, 26 April 1992. Kim Jong Il, ‘Hy˘on ch˘ongse u˘ i yogu e matke h˘ongmy˘ong y˘ongyang o˘ l t'˘unt'˘unhi kkurimy˘o tang sa˘op u˘ l t˘ouk kaes˘on kanghwa halte taehay˘o’ [Strengthening revolutionary forces by responding to current political situations and improving party affairs], 2 May 1975, Kim Ch˘ong-il s˘onjip, 1995, 5: 127. Michael Breen, Kim Jong-Il: North Korea’s Dear Leader, Singapore: John Wiley & Sons (Asia), 2004, 45. The term ‘theatrical politics’ appears in Noel O’Sullivan’s book, Fascism, as he explicates the stylistic politics of fascism. Noel O’Sullivan, Fascism, London: J.M. Dent & Sons, 1983, 97. O’Sullivan’s concept of theatrical politics is different from mine. To explain the politics, he underlined ritualistic activities such as games, ceremonies, festivals, and spectacles, which were employed by fascists’ popular style of politics. Erving Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, New York: Anchor Books, 1959, 15. Ibid., p. xi. Kim Jong Il, ‘Y˘onghwa yesulron’ [On the art of the cinema], 11 April 1973, Kim Ch˘ong-il s˘onjip, 1994, 3: 216. Sin Ky˘ong-wan as quoted in Ch˘ong Ch'ang-hy˘on, Ky˘ot es˘o pon Kim Ch˘ong-il, 37. Choe In Su, Kim Jong Il: The People’s Leader 1, Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1983, 1: 1 in Introduction. Ch'oe and Sin, Naere Kim Ch˘ong-il imneda, 1: 78–83. Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, 42. Ibid., 31. Kim Jong Il also made an unplanned appearance at the second inter-Korean summit with Rho Moo-hyun on October 2, 2007 when he welcomed Rho at the April 25 Cultural Center [April 25 munhwa hoegwan] in Pyongyang. Ch'oe Wˇon-gi and Chˇong Ch'ang-hyˇon, Nam-Puk chˇongsang hoedam 600-il [InterKorean summit 600 days], Seoul: Kimyˇongsa, 2000, 291. Albright, Madam Secretary, 461–7. ‘Pukhan nodongdang uˇ i Nam-Puk chˇongsang hoedam sˇolmyˇong charyo’ [An educational material of the 2000 inter-Korean summit of the Korean Workers’ Party], Wˇolgan Chosˇon, September 2000, 210–12. Kim Jong Il, ‘Kyˇongae hanˇun suryˇong Kim Il-sˇong tongji uˇ i widaehan oˇ pchˇok uˇ l pinnaeyˇo nagaja’ [Let’s glorify the feat of Great Leader Kim Il Sung], 17 April 1992, Kim Ch˘ong-il s˘onjip, 1998, 13: 53.

Notes 207 91 Sa-ilo munhank ch'angjaktan [April 15 literary production], Paekdusan chˇonsˇoljip [Legends of Mt Paekdu: those of Kim Il Sung], Pyongyang: Munhak yesul chonghap ch'ulp'ansa, 1987, 1: 36, 55, 209 and 212. Kim Tong-gyu republished the book in Seoul in 1996. 92 Sa-ilo munhank ch'angjaktan [April 15 literary production], Paekdusan chˇonsˇoljip [Legends of Mt Paekdu: those of Kim Jong Il], Pyongyang: Munhak yesul chonghap ch'ulp'ansa, 1987, 2: 140, 155 and 158. Kim Tong-gyu republished these books in Seoul in 1996. International Friendship Exhibition was built in one year in order to store the gifts given to Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il from foreign countries. 93 Fujimoto, Kim Chˇong-il uˇ i yorisa, 6. 94 Sin Ky˘ong-wan as quoted in Chˇong Ch'ang-hyˇon, Ky˘ot es˘o pon Kim Ch˘ong-il, 51. 95 James H. Nichols, Jr., ‘Pragmatism’, in Seymour Martin Lipset (ed.) Political Philosophy: Theories, Thinkers, Concepts, Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2001, 145. 96 Ch'oe and Sin, Naere Kim Ch˘ong-il imneda, 1: 36. 97 Ch'oe and Chˇong, Nam-Puk chˇongsang hoedam 600-il, 52. 98 Nodong sinmun, 1 January 2000. 99 Pak Chae-yˇong, ‘Hyˇon sigi kyˇongje saˇop esˇo silli pojang uˇ i chungyosˇong’ [Importance to secure practical benefit in current economic affairs], Kyˇongje yˇon'gu [Economic research], 15 (2001), 15. Kyˇongje yˇon'gu is the economic organ of the Korean Workers’ Party. 100 Ch'oe and Chˇong, Nam-Puk chˇongsang hoedam 600-il, 75. It has not been detailed yet what the ‘lower-level’ federation would be. 101 Albright, Madam Secretary, 465 and 467. 102 Chos˘on chungang t'ongsinsa, Chosˇon chungang yˇon'gam 2001–2002, 256 and 246. As mentioned earlier, in 2000, before and after the inter-Korean summit, North Korea opened diplomatic relations with several democracies including Italy, Australia, the Philippines, and the UK. 103 Chosˇon ilbo, 18 September 2002. 104 Kim Jong Il, ‘Chagang-do uˇ i mobˇom uˇ l ttara kyˇongje saˇop kwa inmin saenghwal esˇo saeroun chˇonhwan uˇ l irˇuk'ija’, 14: 401. 105 Nodong sinmun, 17 September 1998. 106 Yi Ch'ang-hyˇok, ‘Uri tang e uˇ ihan sahoejuˇui kyˇongje chedo uˇ i kosu wa kyˇongje kangguk kˇonsˇol uˇ i sˇongkwajˇok ch'ujin’ [Our party’s protecting the socialist economy and succeeding in establishing a strong economic state], Kyˇongje yˇon'gu [Economic research], 4 (2001), 2–3. 107 T'ongilbu [Ministry of Unification], Tongil paeks˘o 2008 [Unification white paper 2008], Seoul: T'ongilbu, 2008, 30. 108 Yi Ch'ang-hyˇok, ‘Uri tang e uˇ ihan sahoejuˇui kyˇongje chedo uˇ i kosu wa kyˇongje kangguk kˇonsˇol uˇ i sˇongkwajˇok ch'ujin’, 2–4. 109 Pak Chae-yˇong, ‘Hyˇon sigi kyˇongje saˇop esˇo silli pojang uˇ i chungyosˇong’, 15–18. 110 Han Chˇong-min, ‘Widaehan yˇongdoja Kim Chˇong-il tongji kkesˇo palk'isin sahoejuˇui kyˇongje kangguk kˇonsˇol uˇ i wˇonch'ikchˇok munje’ [Dear Leader Kim Jong Il’s principles in order to establish a strong economic state], Kyˇongje yˇon'gu [Economic research], 4 (2002), 2–4. 111 Hwang Chang-y˘op, Na n˘un y˘oksa u˘ i chilli r˘ul poatta [I saw the truth of history], Seoul: Hanul, 1999, 306–7. 112 Article 22. Kukt'o t'ongilwˇon [Ministry of Unification] (ed.) Chosˇon Nodongdang taehoe charyojip [Congresses of the Korean Workers’ Party], Seoul: Kukt'o t'ongilwˇon, 4: 143. 113 Yi Chong-sˇok, Saerossˇun hyˇondae Pukhan uˇ i ihae [Understanding of newly written modern North Korea], Seoul: Yˇoksa pip'yˇongsa, 2000, 271. 114 According to Hwang Chang-yˇop, he and other nuclear-concerned bureaucrats met with Kim Jong Il twice during the nuclear crisis of 1993–4. Kim Yˇon-kwang, ‘Hwang

208 Notes

115 116 117

118 119 120

7

Chang-yˇop uˇ i kodokhan woech'im: pang-Mi donghaeng ch'wijaegi’ [A lonely voice of Hwang Chang-yˇop: A report of his visit to the US], Wˇolgan Chosˇon, December 2003, 248. Hwang Chang-yˇop, Na n˘un y˘oksa u˘ i chilli r˘ul poatta, 184. Ch'oe Chu-hwal, ‘Sillok Chos˘on inmin'gun 5’ [Chronicles of the Korean People’s Army 5], Win, November 1996, 193. After his father’s death, Kim seemed to purge a portion of party and governmental officials. Hwang Il-to, ‘Sukch'ˇong 25,000-myˇong, mujabihan ch'in-Kim Il-sˇong seryˇok chegˇo chakˇop’ [Indiscriminate eradication of pro-Kim Il Sung group: purge of 25,000 persons], Sin dong-a, October 2005, 122–36. This part is based on the argument of Theodore C. Sorensen, Decision-Making in the White House: The Olive Branch or the Arrows, New York: Columbia University Press, 1963, 22–42 and 57–77. Hwang Chang-yˇop, Na n˘un y˘oksa u˘ i chilli r˘ul poatta, 288. After the 2000 summit, the North and South agreed to connect the Kyˇongˇui Railroad in July 2000 and the Tonghae Railroad in August 2002. T'ongilbu, T'ongil paeksˇo 2005, 105.

Conclusion

1 Albright, Madeleine, Madam Secretary, New York: Miramax Books, 2003, 466. 2 Foreign Office of the Public Relations Department, The Thai Monarchy, Bangkok: Paper House Limited Partnership, 19–40 and 90–102.

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Index

Act of Sincerity, 39, 42, 45 Afghanistan, 152 Agreed Framework, 151, 165 Albright, Madeleine, 2, 119, 141, 160, 166, 176 Ali Archam Academy of Social Sciences, 61 Amnok River, 43, 102 Anby˘on, 120 Antu, 14, 20 April 15th Literary Production, 44 Arch of Triumph, 93, 137, 142 Arduous March, 17, 107, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 116, 129, 132, 150, 163, 175; second, 30 Arendt, Hannah, 3, 4 Arirang, 141 Armistice Agreement, 153; Day, 152 Armstrong, Charles K., 6 Asia, 54, 85; northeast, 33, 128, 130, 166 August incident, 30, 38, 41 Australia, 120 Bahrain, 166 Bazhanova, Natalia, 79, 93 Beijing, 47, 117, 123 Belgium, 166 Berlin Wall, 96, 97 Brazil, 166 Brzezinski, Zbigniew K., 86 Burma (Myanmar), 73, 121 Bush, George H. W., 96 Buzo, Adrian, 14 Cambodian king, 50 Campaign for August-3 Consumption Goods Production, 94 Campaign to Learn from Unassuming Heroes, 79, 80

Canada, 166 Carter, Jimmy, 105, 127 Central Auditing Committee, 67 Central Committee, 23, 66, 67, 68, 72, 85, 101, 110; Central Military Affairs Committee (CMAC), 48, 67, 83, 84, 153; fifth, 12, 52, 55; fourth, 39, 40; Inspection Committee, 67; Operation Department, 73; Organization Department, 36, 38, 49, 52, 70, 71, 78; Party, 81; plenary meeting (plenum), 12, 30, 39, 40, 47, 52, 55, 114, 169, 170; Politburo, 67, 68, 83, 84, 169, 170; Political Committee, 32, 38, 42, 52, 55, 83; Presidium, 30; Propaganda and Agitation Department, 42, 46; Secretariat, 67, 84; Standing Committee, 67 Central People’s Committee, 116 chaebˇol, 125, 126 Chagang Province, 25, 54 chaju, 16, 60, 61, 63, 118; chajusˇong, 62 Changbai Country, 20 Ch'anggwang Street, 137 Chang S˘ong-t'aek, 82 charip, 16, 60, 61, 63 chawi, 16, 60, 61, 63 Chechangzi, 20 chwegi pap, 163 Chi Kyˇong-su, 27 Children’s Corps, 18, 19, 20, 42 Children’s Union, 26 China, 10, 86; as North Korea’s ally, 47, 105, 167; Confucian, 148; Cultural Revolution, 39, 41, 48; dispute with North Korea, 7, 30, 34, 39, 48, 96, 157; geopolitical complication, 128, 129, 130; Kim Chˇong-suk’s activity in, 19–20; Kim Jong Il’s

218 Index visit to, 84, 124, 125; normalization with the U.S., 96; North Korea’s collapse and, 177; North Korea’s debt to, 94; North Korea’s economic dependence on, 29, 95, 96, 122; North Korea’s famine and, 109–10, 113, 178; North Korea’s reforms and, 125, 130; power struggle, 41; Red Guards, 39, 48; reforms of, 64, 65, 95, 131; Seoul Olympics, 81; succession in, 54–5; tributary relations with Korea, 6, 59; volunteer army, 30, 174 Chinese Communist Party (CCP), 10, 11, 14, 16, 17, 18, 146, 160; party congress, 54–5 Ch'oe Ch'ang-ik, 30, 37 Ch'oe Hyˇon, 27 Ch'oe Sang-uk, 54 ˘ Ch'oe Un-h˘ ui, 45, 101, 158 Ch'oe Yong-gˇon, 14, 21, 23, 27 Ch'oe Yong-su, 153 Ch'ˇollima generation, 33 Chˇollima Iron Works, 110 Ch'ˇollima Movement, 19, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 79, 80, 81, 92; Team Movement, 31 Cho My˘ong-nok, 21, 119, 153, 166 Chˇong Chu-yˇong, 119, 123, 167, 168 Ch'˘ongjin, 21 Chˇong Hong-jin, 52, 53 Ch˘ong Ky˘ong-h˘ui, 72 Ch'ˇongryu Restaurant, 137 Chˇong Yak-yong, 40 Ch˘on Mun-s˘op, 21, 54 Chˇon Pyˇong-ho, 153 Chos˘on, 6, 40, 42, 59, 89, 90 chuch'e (juche), 5, 10, 12, 31, 32, 33, 58, 85, 98, 111, 112, 123, 124, 129, 131, 140, 158, 159, 163, 164, 166, 175; chuch'ejˇok, 59, 60; decision-making limit, 171; dynastic history, 149; factualization, 160, 161; Hwang Chang-y˘op, 27; idea development, 58–65; isolation, 103, 157; mass campaigns, 80, 81; military-first idea and, 154, 155; nationalism, 7, 16, 34, 96, 97, 99, 149, 174, 176; North Korean economy, 96; origin of, 29, 60, 86; party life, 69; pragmatic use, 153–4; reign year, 107; revolutionary tradition, 43, 144, 146; Sixth Party Congress, 83; Three-Revolution Team Movement, 76 Chun Doo Hwan, 73, 121

Chunggang, 27 Chungwi, 27 Ch'usˇok, 97, 149 Clinton, Bill, 166 Cold War, 2, 8, 33, 84, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 122, 123, 126, 127, 128, 149, 174 Comintern, 16 Communist Youth Leagues, 18 Confucian, 6, 7, 40, 57, 87, 88, 89, 103, 107, 144, 146, 147, 148, 176; Confucianism, 4, 6, 7, 87, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 176 Cuba, 47; missile crisis, 47, 92 Cumings, Bruce, 126 Dahuangwai, 19 Das Kapital, 16 Day of the Youth, 98 Democratic Women’s Union (DWU), 50, 51 Democratic Youth League, 26 Deng Xiaoping, 41, 54 Department of Culture (DC), 72, 73 Department of Electric Industry, 171 Department of External Liaison (DEL), 73 Department of International Affairs, 39 Department of National Defense, 36, 70, 73, 82 Department of Social Culture, 73 Department of the United Front (DUF), 73 dˇok, 148 dynastic totalitarianism, 4, 85, 88, 103 East European countries, 1–2, 29, 31, 98; Kim Jong Il’s travel to, 32 East Germany, 122; soldier, 163 Egypt, 115 Eighteenth World Film Festival, 46 Europe, 54, 72 European Union, 166 factualize, 11, 97, 144, 150, 160, 161; factualization, 12, 97, 149, 150, 158, 160, 161 Fate of a Self-Defense Corps Man, 45, 46, 135, 141 February 16th Art College, 54 Federation of Trade Unions, 79 15 August National Liberation Day, 118 First Pyongyang High School, 26; Middle School, 26 First Sino-Japanese War, 6 Five Guerrilla Brothers, 44–5 Five Relationships, 147

Index 219 Flower Girl, 45, 46, 135, 140, 141 4 July (North/South) Joint Communique, 53, 118, 119 Fourth Pyongyang Primary School, 25 Friedrich, Carl J., 86, 145 Fujimoto Kenji, 101, 102, 163 General Association of Korean Residents in Japan, 54 General Bureau of South Korean Affairs, 72 General Sherman, 89 Geneva, 100, 101 Germany, 166 Goffman, Erving, 155, 156 Gorvachev, Mikhail, 64, 96, 179 Grand People’s Study House, 137, 142 Greece, 166; Greek, 85 Guangdong Province, 125 Gulf of Tonkin Incident, 49 Ha Ang-ch'ˇon, 39 Haeju, 120 Hamhˇung, 98 Han Chae-man, 55 Han River, 120 Hitler, 45, 66 Hobsbawm, Eric, 144 Hoeryˇong, 19, 22 Hˇo Ka-i, 18, 37, 38 Hong Ki-y˘on, 23, 25 Hong Kong, 45, 96, 123 Hˇo Pong-hak, 47, 48, 49 Hˇo Sˇok-sˇon, 39 Hˇo Tam, 28 Huch'ang, 43 100-Day Battle, 137 Hwang Chang-y˘op, 2, 27, 31, 62, 78, 109, 112, 129, 153, 169, 170, 171 Hwang Il-ho, 49 Hwasˇong School, 14 Hyundai Group, 119, 123, 125, 168 imin wichˇon, 18 in, 148 India, 129 indigenous group (faction), 37, 38, 41 indˇok chˇongch'i, 89, 148 Indonesia, 61 inter-Korean summit, 105, 106, 117, 119, 159, 161 International Atomic Energy Agency, 128 International Friendship Exhibition, 162 Iraq, 152

isolationists, 167, 168, 172 Italy, 86, 120 Japan, 15, 72, 73, 94, 101, 123, 126; abduction, 166; agent, 42; army, 31, 162; colonial rule (era), 6, 7, 37, 38, 40, 42, 59, 162; electronic appliances, 159; expeditionary forces, 10, 14, 19; geopolitical complication, 128; Government-General, 6; imperialism, 16, 28, 34, 44; Japan-North Korea summits, 166–7; liberation from, 24; normalization talks with South Korea, 47, 92; police, 14; soldiers, 17; songs, 102 Jiandao, 14 Jiang Qing, 54 Jiangxi Soviet, 17 Jilin, 14, 16, 25 Joint Declaration of Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, 119, 122 Jose Marti Tower, 142 July Economic Improvement Measures, 80, 122, 124–5, 126, 167, 168, 177 Junichiro Koizumi, 126, 166 kaesˇon, 122 Kaes˘ong, 97, 119, 122, 123, 150 Kaes˘ong Industrial Area (KIA), 120, 122, 167, 168 Kaes˘ong-Pyongyang highway, 120 Kaes˘ong-Sin˘uiju railway, 120 Kanggye, 25, 54 Kang Kil-bok, 25 Kang Pan-sˇok, 13, 40, 44, 51, 89, 90 Kangs˘o County, 23 Kangsˇon Steel Plant, 30, 79, 136 Kang S˘ong-san, 84 Kang Ton-uk, 14, 44 Kang Yˇong-gu, 29 Kapsan faction (group), 37, 39, 40, 45, 48, 50, 92, 135; incident, 38, 39, 40, 42, 43, 44, 48, 49, 56, 65, 67, 135; Operation Committee, 37, 38, 39 Khabarovsk, 10, 11, 13 Khrushchev, Nikita, 19, 29, 30, 34, 47, 48, 52, 53, 56, 60, 61, 87, 176 Kim Ch'aek, 14, 15, 21, 43, 49; Iron Works, 30 Kim Ch'ang-bong, 47, 48, 49 Kim Chin-gye, 40 Kim Ch'ˇol-chu, 13, 38, 44 Kim Ch'ˇol-man, 153 Kim Chˇong-ch'ˇol, 101

220 Index Kim Ch˘ong-min, 2, 27, 28 Kim Chˇong-nam, 100, 101 Kim Ch˘ong-suk, 10, 11, 13, 19–22, 23, 44, 51, 57, 89, 90; County, 22, 43 Kim Chˇong-t'ae, 49 Kim Chˇong-un, 101 Kim Chung-nin, 72 Kim Dae Jung, 2, 117, 118, 159, 161, 165, 166, 172; administration, 119, 168 Kim/Hˇo incident, 46–7, 49, 67, 72 Kim Hwan, 84 Kim Hyˇong-jik, 13, 14, 43, 44, 89, 90 Kim Hyˇong-kwˇon, 44 Kim Il, 22, 23, 84 Kim Il-ch'ˇol, 153 Kim Il Sung: childhood, 13–4; Constitution, 115, 132; cult of, 19, 36, 38, 39–40, 41, 43–4, 56, 58, 87, 89–90, 103, 163; death, 105–7; epistemological development, 15–9; Flower, 163; guerrilla experience, 14, 16–8; Kimilsungism, 59, 63, 65, 70; Kim Sˇong-ju, 13; life in the Russian Maritime Province, 14–5; Military Academy, 61; Party School, 58, 84; Revolutionary Thought Research Office, 44; Square, 50; Stadium, 93, 137; statue, 44, 143; University, 31, 32, 36, 78, 110; (Selected) Works, 44, 63 Kim Jong Il: birth, 10–3; cult of, 12, 70, 84, 103, 150, 163, 173; Flower, 163; hobbies, 24, 27, 28, 32, 42, 45, 101–2, 134, 139, 155, 164; life in the Russian Maritime Province, 24; marriage life, 100–1; Party Center, 55, 65, 66, 81, 82, 83; personal traits, 24–5, 26–7, 29, 32, 34–5, 100–2, 134–5, 139, 155, 164, 169–70, 173, 175; political crisis, 81–3; power consolidation, 66–78; relationship with Kim Sˇong-ae, 23, 34, 36, 50–2, 53–4, 56–7, 101, 106; relationship with guerrillas, 21–2, 23, 24, 34–5, 46, 51, 53, 56–7, 174; Selected Works, 3, 43, 45, 63; statue of, 70; visits to foreign countries, 22, 27, 32, 84, 124, 125 Kim Ki-jun, 44 Kim Ki-song, 19, 44 Kim Kuk-t'ae, 43, 53 Kim Kyˇong-hˇui, 13, 23, 25, 51, 159 Kim Ky˘ong-jin, 23, 106 Kim P'yˇong-il, 13, 23, 24, 51, 106 Kim Sang-ry˘on, 81 Kim Sˇol-song, 101

Kim Sˇong-ae, 13, 23, 36, 50–2, 53, 54, 57, 101, 106 Kim Sˇong-gap, 51 Kim Sˇong-ho, 51 Kim Tan, 29 Kim To-man, 39, 43 Kim Tong-gyu, 27 Kim Tu-bong, 37 Kim Tu-nam, 54 ˇ Kim Ung-u, 44, 89 Kim Yˇo-jˇong, 101 Kim Yˇong-ch'un, 153 Kim Y˘ong-il, 23, 51, 106 Kim Yˇong-ju, 13, 23, 25, 28, 32, 36, 38, 39, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 56, 57, 65 Kim Yˇong-nam, 115, 116, 153 Kim Yˇong-suk, 100, 101 Kim Yˇong-sun, 154 Kim Young Sam, 105 kkotchebi, 109 Koguryˇo, 97, 144, 149, 150 Ko Hyˇok, 39 K˘omd˘ok Mine, 79, 80 Korea Filming Studio, 45 Korea-first idea, 97, 144, 148, 149 Korean Airliner, 73, 121 Korean Asia-Pacific Peace Committee, 117 Korean CIA, 53 Korean Communist Party, 14, 15, 16, 37, 42 Korean Fatherland Restoration Association, 16, 37 Korean Peninsula, 11, 16, 33, 47, 49, 97, 120, 121, 122, 126, 128, 149, 166 Korean People’s Army, 32, 60, 82, 114; commander-in-chief of, 58, 84; creation, 15, 69- 70; fifteenth anniversary of its founding, 61; Foundation Day of, 99, 152, 155; Military Security Command, 73; Political Bureau of, 48; Special Reconnaissance Bureau of, 49 Korean Revolutionary Museum, 44 Korean War, 10, 18, 24, 25, 30, 33, 40, 43, 47, 48, 60, 72, 81, 90, 105, 111, 120, 121, 126, 127, 128, 130, 131, 135, 146, 151, 152, 154, 164, 173, 174; veterans, 99 Korean Workers’ Party, 3, 5, 12, 15, 18, 37, 42, 48, 55, 67, 97, 98, 117, 141; bylaws, 83, 114, 120, 169; Foundation Day of, 152 Koryˇo, 6, 90, 97, 144, 149, 150 Ko Yˇong-hˇui, 100, 101

Index 221 Kˇulloja, 167 Kˇumsusan Assembly Hall, 106; Memorial Palace, 107 kunbu, 147 kungmo, 147 kun-sa-bu ilch'e, 147 Kuwait, 166 Kyˇongje yˇon'gu, 168 Kyˇongˇui Railroad, 172 kyosi, 39 kyˇot-kaji, 51, 106 labor correction center, 74; education center, 74; training center, 74 Law of the Management of Joint Venture, 94, 95, 103, 118, 122, 167 League of Kimilsung Socialist Youth, 98 League of Socialist Working Youth (LSWY), 12, 53, 54, 70, 79, 98 Lenin, 40, 52, 56, 85, 106; Leninism, 16, 60, 62, 63, 83; Leninist, 16, 18 LG, 125 Li-chi, 148 Lin Biao, 52, 53 Liu Shaoqi, 54 Luxemburg, 166 Mainichi shimbun, 62 Malta, 96 Manchuria, 7, 10, 11, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 21, 25, 34, 37, 38, 97, 149, 174 Manchurian Committee, 14; Incident, 14 Man'gy˘ongdae, 13, 44; Man'gyˇongdae (film), 55; school, 21, 25, 84, 163 Manp'o, 25 Mansudae Art Studio, 44; Art Troupe, 44; Hill, 44, 143 Mansu Street, 137 Mao Zedong, 17, 18, 37, 39, 41, 51, 52, 53, 55, 62, 86; Maoism, 16, 17 Martyr’s Mausoleum at the National Cemetery, 121 Mark, Karl, 16; Marxism, 16, 59, 60, 62, 63, 83; Marxist, 16, 19 May-25 instruction, 41 Mikoyan, Anastas I., 30 military-first politics, 116, 130, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 174; idea, 153, 154, 155 Military Political Security Bureau, 74 Military Security Bureau, 74 Military Security Command (MSC), 73, 74, 75, 170 Ministry of Public Security, 36, 73

minjok taedan'gyˇol, 118 Modern Chosˇon history, 89 Mongmin simsˇo, 40 monolithic guidance system, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 71, 72, 75, 77, 78, 84, 86, 103 monolithic ideological system, 39, 40, 43, 58, 59, 65, 67, 82 Moranbong Stadium, 84 Moscow, 15, 27, 28, 31, 47, 61, 100, 101 Mt K˘umgang, 119, 122, 123; tourism project, 119, 145, 167, 168, 172 Mt Myohyang, 106, 162 Mt Paekdu, 10, 11, 12, 43, 84, 161, 163 Mt Sˇorak, 123 Musan, 16, 43 Mussolini, Benito, 86 Nam-Chosˇon haebang kwa t'ongil chˇollyak kyehoek, 49 Namp'o, 120; Barrage, 134, 138 Namsan High School, 26, 27, 29; Inmin School, 21; Kindergarten, 24, 25; Primary School, 25 National Defense Commission (NDC), 21, 58, 84, 115, 116, 117, 119, 152, 153; Inspection Committee, 21; Planning Commission, 30, 94, 137, 138 National Security Law, 120 Netherlands, 166 New Democratic Party, 15, 37 New Korea (Sinhan minbo), 40 New Zealand, 166 Nikolsk, 10, 11 Nodong sinmun, 3, 40, 50, 54, 55, 60, 62, 77, 81, 84, 114, 115, 123, 165, 167 nˇolttwigi, 148 Nordpolitik, 96, 97 Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army, 14 North Hamgyˇong Province, 19, 21, 37 North Korea: concentration camps, 74, 78, 173; crisis diplomacy, 126–9, 130–1; dispute with China, 7, 30, 34, 39, 48, 96, 157; dispute with the Soviet Union, 7, 29, 30, 32, 34, 39, 60, 92, 157; economic development, 19, 38, 48, 87, 90–6, 135, 138–9; economic reforms, 122–6, 167–8; external aid to, 29, 90, 91, 92, 93; film-real-effect struggle, 142; food-rationing system, 108, 109, 113, 125, 131, 168; four military lines, 47–8, 92; legitimacy competition, 120–2, 150, 179; mass mobilization, 30–1, 34, 75–7, 79–81, 92, 93, 96, 136–9; militarization, 47–8, 92, 130, 150–5;

222 Index nuclear issue, 105, 127, 128, 129, 130, 152, 178; political succession, 52–7, 58, 83–5, 103, 113–4, 173; post-Kim Jong Il, 176–9; power struggles, 18, 30, 36, 37–42, 48–52, 53–4, 56, 90, 92, 135, 167–8, 174; resistance to international change, 96–9; South Korean operations, 48, 49–50, 71–3, 121; Sovietization, 19; starvation and marketization, 107–13; survival reasons, 129; survival strategies, 130–1; totalitarian characteristics, 3–4, 85–90 North Korean Communist Party, 15, 21, 37 North Korean Workers’ Party, 15, 37 North Py˘ongan Province, 25, 98 North-South Basic Agreement, 119, 121, 122 North-South Joint Declaration, 117, 122, 161 Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, 128 O Chin-u, 22, 84, 99 O Chung-hˇup, 163 offstage singing, 46, 140 O Kˇuk-yˇol, 54, 84 Old Chosˇon, 97, 144, 149, 150 Olympics, 81, 94, 121 On Some Problems of Education in the Chuch'e Idea, 63, 64 On the Art of the Architecture, 140 On the Art of the Cinema, 140 On the Art of the Dance, 140 On the Art of the Opera, 140 On the Art of the Theater, 140 On the chuch'e idea, 63 On the Chuch'e Literature, 140 On the Fine Art, 140 Operation Department (OD), 73 Organization Department, 32, 36, 37, 38, 42, 49, 52, 53, 55, 66, 67, 68, 70, 71, 78, 173 Ostpolitik, 96 our-own-style socialism, 96, 97, 144, 149 O Yong-bang, 54 Paekdusan Production, 44 Paek Hak-nim, 54, 153 Paek Se-bong, 153 Paek S˘ol-h˘ui, 81 Pak Ch'ang-ok, 30 Pak Chi-wˇon, 117 Pak Hˇon-yˇong, 37 Pakistan, 129 Pak Kˇum-ch'ˇol, 38, 39, 40

Pak Sˇong-ch'ˇol, 27 Pak So-sim, 16 Pak Su-dong, 32 Pak Yong-guk, 39 Pan Kyˇong-yu, 16 P'anmunj˘om axe murders, 82, 126, 164 Park Chung Hee, 47, 49, 92, 125, 126 Park, Han S., 153 Party Conference: first, 61; second, 38, 48, 52 Party Congress: fourth, 92; fifth, 46, 52, 53; sixth, 12, 63, 83, 85, 163 Peasant Hero, 45 Peng Dehuai, 30 People’s Party, 15 Philippines, 120 Plato, 3, 85 Poch'ˇonbo, 16, 40, 43 P'op'yˇong, 43 pragmatism, 5, 164, 165, 167; pragmatic, 5, 41, 103, 117, 130, 131, 153, 165, 166, 167, 168, 171, 172, 175, 176, 178; pragmatist, 167, 168 Propaganda and Agitation Department, 29, 39, 40, 42, 43, 46, 53, 55, 66, 69, 100, 140, 164 Pueblo, 49, 126, 164 pulgˇun'gi sasang, 111 p'yˇonghwa, 118 Pyongyang, 13, 14, 15, 21, 25, 26, 32, 44, 45, 49, 53, 82, 89, 94, 97, 98, 109, 112, 117, 119, 121, 122, 123, 126, 127, 134, 135, 141, 142, 148, 149, 150, 166, 176; airport, 159; City Party, 51 Pyongyang Mass Meeting of Welcome, 15, 17; Maternity Hospital, 22; Theater, 45 P'yˇongwˇon, 27 Qin, 85 Railway Office, 36 Rajin and Sˇonbong, 95, 119, 122, 123, 167, 168 Rangoon (Yangon), 73, 121 Recollections of Partisans, 44 ren, 148 Republic, 3, 85 Research Institute of the Chuch'e Idea, 63 Revolutionaries’ Tombs, 142, 149, 163 revolutionary view of the leader, 63 Rho Moo-hyun, 120, 122 Rolling Workers, 45 Rome, 86

Index 223 Russia, 115, 123; as North Korea’s ally, 105, 130, 167; Civil War, 74; geopolitical complication, 128; Kim Il Sung’s escape to, 14; Kim Jong Il’s travel to, 22, 124; Maritime Province, 10, 11, 13, 24, 160; North Korean nuclear issue, 127; (October) Revolution, 56, 74, 87; Stalinist Soviet, 86 sadae, 59 saenghwal ch'onghwa, 67 Salt, 45 Samch'ˇok, 49 Samji, 43 Samsˇok Primary School, 25 Samsung, 125 Sandaowan, 19 Sangwˇon, 27 Schelling, Thomas C., 127 Sea of Blood, 45, 46, 135 Sea-of-Blood Opera Troupe, 44 Secret Envoy Who Does Not Return, 45 Segi wa tˇoburˇo, 10 Sejong, 90 Seoul, 15, 49, 53, 81, 97, 122, 172 70-Day Battle, 93, 136, 137 Shanghai, 124, 125 Shenzhen, 125 Shi Hwang, 85 Shura, 13 silli, 119, 123, 124, 164, 165, 168 Sin Film, 45 Sin'galp'a’s Song, 28 Sin Ky˘ong-wan, 2, 21, 23, 32, 43, 45, 52, 53, 54, 82, 140, 141, 164 Sino-Soviet conflict, 7, 16, 33, 146, 174 Sinp'a, 20, 22, 43 Sin Sang-ok, 45, 46, 139, 142 sinsˇon, 162 Sinˇuiju, 98, 123; Special Administrative Zone, 167, 168; Student Movement, 111 Social Sciences Department of the Academy of Sciences, 39 Socrates, 3, 85 soktojˇon, 133 Sˇol, 97, 149 Son Chˇong-do, 105 Song Ho-gy˘ong, 117 Sˇong Hye-rang, 41, 100, 101 Sˇong Hye-rim, 41, 100, 101 Song of Mt Kˇumgang, 135 Songs of Flying Dragons, 90 Son Wˇon-t'ae, 105

South Korea, 3; absorption unification by, 177; arms race with North Korea, 126, 127; Confucianism, 6; democratic uprising, 26; division of Korea, 24; economic development, 125; geopolitical complication, 128, 129, 130–1; legitimacy competition, 120–2, 150, 178; military coup, 47, 92; nationalism, 7; normalization talks with Japan, 47; North Korea’s famine and, 110, 178; North Korea’s hostility to, 157; North Korea’s improved relations with, 175; North Korea’s terrorism against, 73; post-Cold War diplomacy, 96, 97; sadae, 59; sending to Vietnam, 49; Seoul Olympics, 94; spies’ infiltration into, 166; trade with China, 96; unification proposal, 118 South Korean Liaison Bureau (SKLB), 39, 72, 73 South Korean Workers’ Party, 15, 37 South Manchurian Communist Youth Association, 14 South P'y˘ongan Province, 23 Soviet Union, 10, 16, 160; after Khrushchev, 48; camps, 14, 74; chuch'e and, 60; collapse of 1, 5, 124, 179; Communist Party, 18, 27, 64, 96; defense treaty with North Korea, 47; de-Stalinization campaign, 29, 30, 52, 53; dispute with North Korea, 7, 29, 30, 32, 34, 39, 60, 92, 157; economic aid to North Korea, 29, 92, 93, 96; Far Eastern Command, 14, 15; Five-Year Economic Plans, 87; Kim Il Sung’s recollection of, 56; Kim Jong Il’s travel to, 27, 32; Koreans, 37, 38; military aid, 61; North Korea’s debt to, 91, 95; occupation, 6, 15; occupational forces, 15, 19, 37, 87, 174; Politburo, 15, 30; reforms, 64, 65, 95, 96, 131; Revolution, 61; Seoul Olympics, 81; Stalin’s, 86–7; trade reduction with North Korea, 95; nuclear umbrella, 127 Spain, 166 special economic zone, 95, 103, 117, 119, 122, 123, 125, 167, 168 Speed Creation Movement, 138 Stakhanovian movements, 31 Stalin, 19, 29, 34, 38, 40, 42, 45, 52, 56, 66, 74, 86, 87, 106, 174, 176; Stalinism, 16, 19; Stalinist, 4, 34, 86, 87 State Political Security Department, 73

224 Index State Security Department (SSD), 36, 73, 74, 82, 170, 173 Story of Ch'unhyang, 45 Story of Escaping, 45 strong and prosperous state, 113, 114, 115, 138, 168, 170, 172 Suh, Dae-Sook, 18 Sungsil Middle School, 14 Sunshine Policy, 168 Supreme People’s Assembly: ninth, 107; tenth, 107, 114, 115, 116, 152; eleventh, 153; Standing Committee, 39, 115, 116, 117, 153 suryˇong, 13, 40, 41, 56; oˇ bˇoi, 89, 147 Sweden, 177 Szalontai, Balazs, 31 Taedong Bridge, 26; Civilization, 150, 161; River, 31, 89, 150 Taep'odong, 114, 141 T'aesˇong Reservoir, 27 Tak et al., 46 Tan'gun, 97, 106, 121, 149, 150, 161 Tano, 97, 149 Taoquanli, 20 te, 148 Tell the Story, Forest!, 135 Ten Principles (for Monolithic Ideological System), 39, 65, 66, 67, 69 Thailand, 176, 177 Theatrical Politics, 155, 156, 158, 160, 161, 162, 163, 175, 176 The Origins of Totalitarianism, 3 The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, 155 The Strategy of Conflict, 127 Three-Revolution Red Flag Movement (TRFM), 79, 80, 93, 111 Three-Revolution Team Movement, 75, 77, 79, 82; Guidance Teams, 76, 77; Team(s), 75, 76, 77, 136 35th office, 72, 73 Tongbaek agassi, 159 t'ongbokwa, 71 Tonghae Railroad, 172 Tongmyˇong, 97, 121, 149 Tower of Immortality, 107 Tower of the Chuch'e Idea, 93, 137, 142 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance, 47 True Daughter of the Party, 135 Tumen River, 22

Turkey, 166 200-Day Battle, 81, 137 Uganda, 115 Ulchin, 49 Unggi, 21 United Kingdom, 120 United Nations, 121; Command, 82; Department of Humanitarian Affairs, 107; sanctions, 128 U.S., 38, 40, 41; Agreed Framework, 151, 165; anti-Americanism, 7, 33, 34; Bush administration, 152; Clinton administration, 153; division of Korea, 7, 15, 121; geopolitical complication, 128, 130–1; hostility to, 33, 126, 157; imperialism, 48, 110, 114, 162; improved relations with North Korea, 166; Kennedy administration, 47; Korean War, 25–6; mission school, 14; normalization with China, 96; nuclear issue, 105, 126–7, 128, 129, 130, 151–2, 178; State Department, 121; South Korea’s relations with, 59; troops’ presence in South Korea, 47, 166; Vietnam War, 49 Vietnam, 49; war, 49 Voroshilov Camp, 10, 11 Vyatskoye Camp, 10, 11, 13 Wang Hongwen, 54, 55 Wang Kˇon, 97, 121, 149 Washington, 49, 119, 153, 166 Weber, Max, 144 West Germany, 96, 122 West Sea (Yellow Sea), 120, 172 Wˇolmi Island, 142, 143 Women’s Associations, 18 wˇon-kaji, 51 Wˇonsan, 15, 126 World Federation of Democratic Youth, 32–3 World Festival of Youth and Students, 32, 94, 112, 121 World Film Festival, 46 World War II, 146 Yanan, 37; faction (group), 30, 37, 38, 41, 90 yangban, 6 Yang Bin, 123 Yanggang Province, 43

Index 225 Yang Hyˇong-sˇop, 43 Yanji Province, 19 Yi Chong-sˇok, 42 Yi Hu-rak, 53 Yi Hye-ryˇon, 142 Yi Hyo-sun, 39, 48 Yi Kang-guk, 41 Yi Ki-yˇong, 100 Yim Ch'un-ch'u, 27 Yi P'yˇong, 100 Yi Sˇong-gye, 90 Yi Sˇung-yˇop, 41 ˘ ol, 22, 153 Yi Ul-s˘ Yi Yong-mu, 153

Yi Yˇong-p'il, 41 Yˇong-ok, 142, 143 yˇongsaeng, 64 Yongsˇong Railroad, 31 Y˘on Hy˘ong-muk, 84, 153 yuhun t'ongch'i, 106, 132 Yun Kong-hˇum, 30 Yura, 13 yut, 148 Yuwen Middle School, 14 Zhdanov, Andrei A., 15 Zhou Baozhong, 15 Zhou Enlai, 55