Laws of Freedom : A study of Kant's method of applying the categorical imperative in the Metaphysik der Sitten

LAWS OF FREEDOM A Study o f Kant*s M e t h o d o f A p p l y i n g the C a t e g o r i c a l I m p e r a t i v e i n t h e Metapnysik der Sitten

By M A R Y

NEW BARNES

&

J.

GREGOR

Y O R K NOBLE,

INC.

C O N T E N T S

\ Foreword Preface Bibliographical N o t e Chapter I II

Kant's C o n c e p t i o n o f a 'Metaphysic o f Morals' T h e Divisions o f M o r a l Philosophy .

HI

T h e Universal Principle o f L a w

IV

T h e Principles o f A c q u i r e d R i g h t

V VI VH VIQ

.

.

T h e N o t i o n and C o n t e n t o f Tugendlehre . Pure Practical R e a s o n and the Ends o f A c t i o n . Perfect and Imperfect D u t y

.

.

.

.

T h e N a t u r e o f Perfect Duties to Oneself

DC

Perfect Duties to O n e s e l f as a M o r a l B e i n g w i t h an A n i m a l N a t u r e . . . . .

X

Perfect Duties to O n e s e l f M e r e l y as a M o r a l Being . . . . .

XI XH

Imperfect Duties to Oneself

.

Duties o f Virtue to O t h e r M e n Conclusion .

.

• .

vii»

F O R E W O R D I f w e are to understand Kant's moral philosophy w e must k n o w some­ thing o f his Metaphysic of Morals; for it is there that the formal prin­ ciples expounded in the Groundwork and in the Critique of Practical Reason are applied, first to the sphere o f l a w and politics (in The Doctrine of Law), and secondly to the sphere o f ethics proper (in The Doctrine of Virtue), W i t h o u t a study o f this w o r k w e are in danger o f misunder­ standing, not only the methods b y w h i c h Kant- sought to a p p l y his formal principles, but even the nature o f the principles themselves and their bearing upon human freedom. It is strange that this all-important topic—so far as I have been able to discover—has never yet had a b o o k devoted entirely to itself in any language. T h e interpretation o f Kant's moral philosophy, and indeed o f his o w n moral attitude, has suffered . grievously from this lack o f a scholarly introduction to a w o r k which, although it is easy in some respects, is extraordinarily difficult in others. T h e absence o f any usable English translation, especially for The Doctrine of Virtue, has made the position in this country, and perhaps also in America, even more unhappy. 5

Mrs Gregor's commentary is therefore the w o r k of a pioneer, and it is all the more valuable because she has also supplied us w i t h a n e w translation. A l t h o u g h she has not been able to examine Kant's legal and political doctrines in detail—this w o u l d require a b o o k to itself—she has given us enough to s h o w h o w they fit into his system o f moral philosophy as a w h o l e . It is o n l y against this w i d e r background that his ethical doctrines (in the narrower sense) can be understood. These ethical doctrines she has e x p o u n d e d w i t h great acuteness and has at­ tempted to analyse the method b y w h i c h Kant seeks to m o v e from his purely formal principles to their particular applications—that is, to. the discussion and classification o f particular moral virtues. This analysis seems to m e one o f the outstanding merits o f her b o o k . S o m e puzzles m a y remain unsolved, but at the v e r y least she has helped to make things easier for her successors, and w h i c h o f us can hope to do m o r e ? •. There was a t i m e - ^ i f I m a y lapse into autobiography—when, even after having acquired some k n o w l e d g e o f Kant's theoretical philosophy b y writing Kant's Metaphysic of Experience, I still despaired o f being able to understand his Metaphysic of Morals;and during that period a w o r k o f this kind w o u l d have saved m e a great deal o f labour and misix

understanding. I hope tha*-Mrs Gregor's b o o k w i l l n o w p e r f o r m this office for others, as it is w e l l qualified to d o ; and it is in this h o p e that I commend it to all students o f K a n t and t o all students o f moral philosophy. This is one o f the f e w books w h i c h n o critic o f Kant's ethics can afford to neglect. H . J. P A T O N

19 February 1962

x

PREFACE^ In his Preface to the Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten Kant tells us that this w o r k is a treatise preUminary to the Metaphysik der Sitten w h i c h he w i l l some day write. A s the tide o f the Grundlegung implies, its purpose is to lay the foundation for the projected Metaphysik der Sitten, to investigate the supreme principle o f morality, from which, in the subsequent w o r k , 'the w h o l e system' o f duties w i l l be derived. It w a s not until 1797, t w e l v e years after the Grundlegung, that K a n t was finally able to fulfil his promise. S o far as the great majority o f his students and critics are ^concerned, he m i g h t as w e l l n o t have written t h e Metaphysik der Siften at all. ' W h i l e the Grundlegung and, to a lesser extent, the Kritik der praktischen Vernunft are w i d e l y studied, Kant's third major w o r k in moral philo­ sophy is almost completely ignored. A t first glance w e m i g h t regard this omission as a rather unfortunate, y e t not too serious one. Since the Grundlegung is logically prior to the Metaphysik der Sitten w e should be able to understand and evaluate the earlier w o r k apart from the later one. B u t in fact the neglect o f the Metaphysik der Sitten has left us w i t h a distorted v i e w o f Kant's moral philosophy as a w h o l e , Had the p r o g r a m m e o f Kantian studies included, from the beginning, due attention to the Metaphysik der Sitten, the v i e w that Kant's position implies, for example, that the consequences, ends and circumstances o f our actions are morally irrelevant, or that the test o f a m a x i m ' s morality is its freedom frpm logical contradiction w h e n regarded as universal l a w , could never have taken root. A s the situation stands, the c o m m o n practice o f Kant's critics is to construct their o w n versions o f a meta­ physic o f morals: in other w o r d s to decide, according to their under­ standing o f Kant's 'formalism', h o w he ought to h a v e applied the categorical imperative. Since their conception o f Kant's formalism rules out, in advance, the possibility o f criterk for systematicaUj^applying the supreme moral principle, they imagine K a n t attempting, w i t h o u t further ado, to conceive various m a x i m s o f action as universal l a w . B y censuring the results o f such a procedure they g i v e the illusion o f an easy victory over Kant. B u t it is only an illusion. W h a t they have censured is not Kant's application o f the supreme m o r a l principle, but „ rather the product o f t h e i r ' o w n imagination. T h e Metaphysik der Sitten is not a head-long plunge f r o m the supreme xi ' 1

lii

—

PREFACE

moral principle to specific duties. It is, rather, a systematic application o f this principle, a procedure w h i c h implies' a patient search for criteria through which duties can be derived, step b y step, f r o m the categorical imperative. M y purpose in this commentary is only t o set forth, in so far as I understand it, the method b y w h i c h K a n t applies his,supreme moral principle. I have, for the most part, stopped short o f any attempt to evaluate Kant's basic assumptions and procedure, other than f r o m the point o f v i e w o f his self-consistency—consistency w i t h i n the Metaphysik der Sitten itself and b e t w e e n it and his earlier writings in moral philosophy. For at this preliminary stage, w h e n the c o n t e n T b f the Metaphysik der Sitten is as yet largely urifamiliar, to m i x evaluation with exposition w o u l d only confuse matters. A g o o d deal remains to be done toward understanding o f Kant's applied m o r a l philosophy before it is time for criticism o f it. M y h o p e is that this prehrninary exposition o f Kant's method will lead students o f K a n t to undertake their o w n research o n the problems w h i c h I have n o t been able to solve. T h e Metaphysik der Sitten, admittedly, presents special difficulties which may have been, to some extent, responsible for its neglect. B y the time circumstances permitted K a n t to issue his l o n g - a w a i t e d metaphysic o f morals he w a s 73 and, in v i e w o f all that remained to be done, time was running short. T h e w r i t i n g o f the Metaphysik der Sitten is often hurried, and this evident haste, c o m b i n e d w i t h Kant's habitual tendency to assume that the reader grasps the full significance o f every term, more than cancels out the 'popular' nature o f his subject-matter. T h e purpose o f the Metaphysik der Sitten is to supply criteria for deter­ mining w h i c h o f our maxims could qualify for g i v i n g universal l a w , and Kant formulates carefully the w i d e r criteria o f juridical and ethical duty. From these, h o w e v e r , he plunges directly into discussions o f specific duties, leaving the reader to abstract from these discussions the subordinate principles operative in them. N o d o u b t these principles are, to Kant, so obvious that o n l y the most casual reference to t h e m is necessary: they are something w h i c h he left behind l o n g a g o and w h i c h , he assumes, must be equally evident to his reader. B u t a m o r e syste­ matic exposition o f the system might-have made the w o r k m o r e readily, and hence more w i d e l y , appreciated. It is in order to emphasize the full significance o f Kant's t e r m 'laws o f freedom' that I have used the phrase as the title o f this c o m m e n t a r y . That moral laws are laws o f freedom is the theme o f the Metaphysik der Sitten in both'its parts. Freedom, for K a n t , is the p o w e r o f pure reason to be practical, and the categorical imperative is the l a w o f pure

PREFACE

practical reason's functioning. Hence the categorical imperative is called the l a w o f freedom. T h i s m u c h is <^lcar from the Grundlegung. In a general w a y it is also clear that particular moral laws, in so far as they are derived from the categorical imperative, w i l l be laws o f free­ d o m . B u t unless the reader grasps the full import o f this term—that' moral laws set forth the conditions under w h i c h m a n can realize his freedom both in his external actions and in his interior attitude o f w i l l — b o t h the structure and the content o f the Metaphysik der Sitten will be unintelhgible to him. I f I m a y suit Kant's.words to m y o w n purpose: ' T h e simplicity o f this l a w [the categorical imperative], in comparison w i t h the great and manifold consequences w h i c h can be d r a w n from it, must at first seem astonishing.' B u t w i t h o u t the concept o f freedom— o f 'inner' and 'outer' freedom—as the organizing principle o f applied moral philosophy, the reader's astonishment turns to bewilderment. It is difficult to a c k n o w l e d g e adequately the help w h i c h I have re­ ceived from Professor H . J. Paton in writing this b o o k . Like every student o f Kant in the English-speaking w o r l d , I a m indebted to him for the scholarship w i t h w h i c h he has, in Kant's Metaphysic of Experience and The Categorical Imperative, cleared a w a y traditional misunder­ standings o f Kant's theoretical and moral philosophy and so revealed Kant's thought as w o r t h y o f our most serious attention. In a more personal w a y , h o w e v e r , it was Professor Paton w h o , during m y gradu­ ate studies at the University o f T o r o n t o , suggested Kant's applied moral philosophy as a subject calling for study and initiated m y research in the field. If,'during the w r i t i n g o f this b o o k , I t o o k unfair advantage o f his sense o f rdsponsibhity for m y predicament, his o w n generosity and patience are to blame. Professor Paton's advice and criticism have been responsible for the r e m o v a l o f m a n y obscurities and errors from this commentary; those w h i c h remain are m y o w n responsibility. I wish also to thank the Trustees o f the Susan Stebbing Studentship in Bedford College, University o f L o n d o n , for financial assistance in, completing this b o o k , and the editor o f The Philosophical Quarterly for permission to use, as m y first chapter, the substance o f an article w h i c h w a s originally published in that journal. M.J.GREGOR

I

NOTE Unless otherwise indicated, references to Kant's w o r k s are to the edition issued b y the R o y a l Prussian A c a d e m y in Berlin. T h e volumes o f the A c a d e m y edition w h i c h contain the principal w o r k s cited are as follows:

Anthropologic in pragmatischer Hinsicht . . Das Ende aller Dinge . . . . Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten . . Kritik der praktischen Vernunft . . . . Kritik der reinen Vernunft (2nd ed., 1787—cited as Kritik der Urteilskraft Metaphysik der Sitten . . . . . Metaphysiche Anfangsgmnde der Naturwissenschaft Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft

. .

. * .

. . . 'B') .

. . .

. . .

Uber den Gemeinspruch: Das mag in der Theorie rifhtig sein, taugt aber nicht fur die Praxis Uber ein vermeintes Recht aus Menschenliebe zu lugen Zum ewigen Frieden . . . . .

. .

\ .

Vol. VII VIII I V V Ill V VI IV VI VIE

. VHI . VQI

In references to Kant's Handschriftlicher Nachlass the v o l u m e number o f the A c a d e m y edition follows the citation, as, e.g.: H.N. (23), p . 401. It should be noted that the Nachlass volumes o f the A c a d e m y edition bear t w o numbers, one referring to the v o l u m e o f the A c a d e m y edition as a w h o l e (Vols. 14-23), and the other to the v o l u m e Vvdthin the Nachlass series (Vols. 1-10). M o s t o f m y Nachlass references are to v o l u m e 23 o f the A c a d e m y edition, w h i c h contains K a n t ' s notes for the Metaphysik der Sitten. T h e citation Vorlesung refers to a series o f lectures on ethics delivered b y K a n t about 1780^-1. T h e lecture notes o f Kant's students w e r e edited b y P a u l M e n z e r in 1924, under the tide Eine Vorlesung Kants uber Ethik. In quoting f r o m the Grundlegung and f r o m the Kritik der reinen Vernunft I have relied heavily o n the transla­ tions b y H . J. Paton and N o r m a n K e m p Smith respectively.

xv

' M E T A P H Y S I C

OF.

M O R A L S '

It is difficult to c o n c e i v e a c o n t e m p o r a r y m o r a l p h i l o s o p h e r issuing a w o r k u n d e r the title The Metaphysic

of Morals.

Even one w h o does

n o t share t o d a y ' s a n t i p a t h y t o w a r d m e t a p h y s i c s m i g h t w e l l hesitate t o c o u p l e it w i t h m o r a l p n i l o s o p h y . W h i l e the t e r m s ' m e t a p h y s i c s ' a n d ' m o r a l s ' , t a k e n e a c h b y itself, c o n v e y s o m e m e a n i n g , the*ir u n i o n i n a ' m e t a p h y s i c o f m o r a l s ' m i g h t s e e m d e s i g n e d t o o b s c u r e rather t h a n t o clarify

the

author's

intentions.

Indeed,

the p h r a s e

'metaphysic

of

m o r a l s ' m a y s e e m t o c a r r y n o s i g n i f i c a n c e at all. B u t K a n t , i n e n t i t l i n g t h e t h i r d o f his m a j o r w o r k s i n m o r a l p h i l o ­ s o p h y Die Metaphysik

der Sitten,

intends t h e r e b y t o g i v e his r e a d e r s

s o m e i n d i c a t i o n o f its c o n t e n t s . B y u s i n g the t e r m ' m e t a p h y s i c s ' h e a t t e m p t s t o c i r c u m s c r i b e a c e r t a i n area w i t h i n m o r a l p h i l o s o p h y as a w h o l e ; a n d , a l t h o u g h w e m a y find t h a t the b o u n d a r i e s o f this a r e a fluctuate,

h e sets f o r t h c l e a r l y t h e g e n e r a l p r i n c i p l e s a c c o r d i n g to w h i c h

t h e y are d r a w n . T h e title Metaphysic

of Morals, i n o t h e r w o r d s , indicates

t h e n a t u r e a n d l i m i t s o f this w o r k . T h e n a t u r e o f t h e p r o j e c t w h i c h K a n t has set h i m s e l f d e t e r m i n e s t h e t y p e o f q u e s t i o n w h i c h m u s t b e raised w i t h i n this w o r k as w e l l as t h e sort o f p r o b l e m w h i c h , a l t h o u g h n o less i n t e r e s t i n g a n d v i t a l i n itself, m u s t b e e x c l u d e d as l y i n g b e y o n d the scope o f metaphysics. Unless w e try to grasp the ground-plan o f the Metaphysic

of Morals w e m a y e n d b y r e p r o a c h i n g K a n t for, in effect,

failing t o d o w h a t t h e n a t u r e o f t h e w o r k p r e v e n t s h i m f r o m d o i n g . S i n c e t h e k e y - w o r d i n t h e difficulty is ' m e t a p h y s i c s ' , a n a t t e m p t t o clarify K a n t ' s c o n c e p t i o n o f a m e t a p h y s i c o f m o r a l s s h o u l d b e g i n b y situating the p r o b l e m w i t h i n t h e c o n t e x t o f his v i e w s o n m e t a p h y s i c s i n g e n e r a l . H o w is it t h a t K a n t , w h o c l a i m e d t o h a v e d e s t r o y e d t h e foundations o f metaphysics, c o u l d not o n l y regard the v e r y w o r k in w h i c h this c l a i m is fulfilled as ' m e t a p h y s i c s ' , b u t e v e n g o o n t o f o r ­ m u l a t e the ' m e t a p h y s i c a l first p r i n c i p l e s ' o f b o t h n a t u r e a n d m o r a l s ? C l e a r l y h e m u s t b e u s i n g the t e r m i n t w o q u i t e different, a l t h o u g h n o t unrelated, senses; a n d it is i m p o r t a n t t o u n d e r s t a n d n o t o n l y the d i s ­ t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n these t w o b u t also their r e l a t i o n . I n c o n s i d e r i n g t h e r o l e o f t h e Critique 2

I

of Pure Reason

i n relation t o

tAWS

2

OF F R E E D O M

metaphysics w e tend to stress the negative bearing o f this w o r k upon traditional metaphysics and to neglect Kant's claim that his analysis o f human knowledge, in destroying the pseudo-science o f traditional metaphysics, first establishes metaphysics as a science. In the first Critique Kant is attempting to do for metaphysics what mathematicians and physicists have already done for their respective branches o f k n o w ­ ledge: namely, to introduce a n e w method which will transform it from a mere 'groping about' into a science. In both mathematics and physics the new method was an implicit recognition o f the more active role of the mind in a given field o f k n o w l e d g e . In philosophy too, Kant argues, w e should try a n e w method, assuming that certain characteristics hitherto attributed to objects are, rather, introduced into objects by the cognitive powers o f the subject. Should our analysis o f what is contributed b y the mind in constituting an object o f knowledge reveal that one element is sensibility w i t h its forms, w e shall have to reject trie claims o f traditional metaphysics to knowledge o f super­ sensible objects—freedom, the soul and G o d . B u t the analysis itself will give us a n e w kind o f metaphysics, a system o f the cognitive principles that make experience possible and so make objects o f e x ­ perience possible. Traditional metaphysics was a b o d y o f a priori synthetic propositions about supersensible objects. Kantian metaphysics is a system o f thp/ a priori concepts and principles w h i c h make objects o f experience possible. Both consist in a priori synthetic propositions about objects. But whereas traditional metaphysics enunciated such propositions about supersensible objects, Kantian metaphysics reflects upon the source o f a priori synthetic propositions in the functioning o f the human mind and claims to establish, b y this method, a set o f a priori synthetic pro­ positions about all possible objects o f human experience or—what is the same thing—about objects as phenomena or appearances. But Kant's theoretical metaphysics, in refuting the claims o f tradi­ tional metaphysics to knowledge o f supersensible objects, leaves r o o m beyond experience for supersensible objects whose existence or non­ existence can never be known. A n d he holds that practical reason can attain, on the basis o f moral exigencies, a rational belief in these super1

2

3

1

On mathematics, cf. KJ.r.V., B xv ff. and B 741: on physics, B xii-xiv. Mathematics, Kant explains, became a science when mathematicians ceased merely trying to read off the properties of figures and began to demonstrate by construct­ ing their concepts.. The transformation of physics took place when mere observa­ tion of nature was replaced by controlled experiment. Ibid., Bxvff. Ibid., B xxii-xxiii. 8

8

sensible objects. O n c e our a priori synthetic propositions asserting the freedom o f the will, the immortality o f the soul and the existence o f G o d are recognized as expressions o f moral faith rather than theoretical knowledge, a critique o f practical reason can investigate the source o f these propositions in the functioning o f pure practical reason and deter­ mine the conditions under which supersensible objects can become objects o f rational belief. If Kant regards his Critique of Pure Reason as the framework o f a metaphysics o f theoretical reason? it w o u l d be logical to conclude that the Critique of Practical Reason is the framework o f a metaphysics o f practical reason or, since it is morally-practical reason that is in question, a metaphysic o f morals. This conclusion, however, w o u l d not be entirely correct. W e must, for the moment, make free use o f terms w h i c h will later require close scrutiny. In the Grundlegung K a n t identifies a metaphysic o f morals w i t h 'pure moral philosophy'. However, pure moral philo­ sophy is then divided into a critique o f practical reason on the one hand, and a metaphysic o f morals on the other. In general terms, Kant holds that the pure or rational part o f philosophy deals w i t h propositions enunciated a priori. T h e empirical part derives its propositions from experience. T h e pure part o f moral philosophy will, therefore, deal with a priori propositions o f pure practical reason. B u t it can 'deal w i t h ' these propositions in t w o ways, one o f which will lead to a metaphysic o f morals, the other to a critique o f practical reason. In either case the starting point w i l l be the a priori practical propo-, sition which Kant calls the supreme principle o f morality: act only according to that m a x i m through w h i c h y o u can, at the same time, will that it should become a universal l a w . Although this principle does not, in itself, prescribe any specific actions as duties, Kant believes that because it is the ultimate criterion o f right and g o o d action w e can derive from it moral laws stating what our duties are. In so far as pure moral philosophy first determines the supreme moral principle and then derives^ from it certain duties, it will be a metaphysic o f morals in the narrower sense. Although Kant uses 'pure ethics' as a generic term covering both a metaphysic o f morals and a critique o f practical reason, it is a metaphysic o f morals that w e w o u l d call 'ethics' in ordinary usage. 4

5

6

7

4

6

6

' Gr., 391. y Ibid., 388. Ibid., 421. In the present context I am using 'ethics' as equivalent to 'moral philosophy'." Within the Metaphysik der Sitten ethics is the second division of moral philosophy. When we enter into the analysis proper of this work I shall use 'ethics' in this narrower sense, as distoguished fFom philosophy of Law. 7

LAWS OF F R E E D O M

4

The concern which a critique o f practical reason has with the supreme moral principle, while o f utmost importance to ethics, is not strictly an ethical one. T h e principle is, Kant maintains, an a priori synthetic proposition, connecting an action w i t h the will independently of all experience o f inclination; and w e must, accordingly, inquire into its possibility. A critique o f the p o w e r w h i c h asserts the supreme moral principle and, on the basis o f this principle, postulates the freedom o f the will, the existence o f G o d and the immortality o f the soul as con­ ditions o f action in accordance w i t h it, is, Kant maintains, the in­ dispensable foundation for a metaphysic o f morals. B u t it is not itself a metaphysic o f morals according to his customary usage o f the t e r m A metaphysic o f morals in the narrower sense has to do with the moral laws to which a being capable o f free choice is subject. Thus when Kant asserts, in the Metaphysik der Sitten, that the object o f practi­ cal philosophy in general is 'the act o f free choice', or 'the freedom o f the will', he explains^ that the concern w h i c h a metaphysic o f morals has with freedom is. with its l a w s . T h e fact that laws o f freedom are a priori principles o f practical reason makes the science w h i c h investi­ gates them metaphysics, 'a system o f k n o w l e d g e a priori from mere concepts'. A metaphysic o f morals can, then, be defined as a system o f the a priori concepts and principles o f practical knowledge or—since all human action takes place in accordance w i t h practical k n o w l e d g e — a system o f the a priori principles o f human action, or moral laws. 8

9

1 0

11

With this definition, however, our difficulties properly begin. A metaphysic o f morals investigates the a priori principles o f practical reason. B u t the term 'a priori principle' involves an ambiguity which leads Kant into some confusion regarding the scope o f this science. T h e difficulty originates in his failure to observe, in practice, the distinction which he draws between 'pure k n o w l e d g e ' and 'a priori k n o w l e d g e ' . Pure knowledge is knowledge w h i c h is independent o f all sense experience regarding both the content o f the concepts and the connection asserted between them. For example, the proposition expressing the supreme principle o f morality: a rational being as such will act in accordance with the principle o f autonomy, is pure knowledge be­ cause, first, our concepts o f a rational being and o f the principle o f autonomy are, in Kant's view, derived from reflection upon the activity o f reason itself and not from sensuous experience, and secondly, the connection o f these concepts is made b y reason a priori and inde12

8 1 2

9

1 0

1 1

Gr., 391. MJ.S., 216 and 218 n. Ibid., 214. Ibid., 216. The basis for this distinction is given in KJ.r.V.B 3. Compare, however, B25.

K A N T S C O N C E P T I O N OF A

M E T A P H Y S I C OF MORALS

5

pendently o f sensuous experience. 'Pure knowledge', in other words, has t w o characteristics: first, that the matter o f the subject- and predi­ cate-concepts originates in the mind itself and not in sensuous experi­ ence, and secondly, that our knowledge o f the connection o f these concepts is not learned from experience. Pure knowledge is therefore to be distinguished from knowledge in which an a priori connection is made between concepts containing empirical elements. For example, the moral law prohibiting suicide asserts an a priori connection between the will o f a mortal finite being and actions intended arbitrarily to destroy his o w n life. W e cannot learn from experience that men ought hot arbitrarily to destroy their lives. But the concepts thus connected contain elements drawn from sensuous experience; it is from experience that w e learn certain char­ acteristics o f men implied in this l a w : the facts that they are mortal and that their lives can be shortened artificially..Such moral laws are a priori knowledge because the connection o f subject- and predicateconcepts is made b y reason independendy o f experience. T h e y are not, however, pure knowledge because the matter o f the concepts is, in part, given in sensuous experience. Kant, however, often uses the term 'pure k n o w l e d g e ' loosely, as equivalent to a priori k n o w l e d g e ; and this lack o f precision leads to some confusion in his account o f a metaphysic o f morals. A meta­ physic o f morals is the 'pure' part o f moral philosophy. This could mean, on the one hand, that a metaphysic o f morals will contain only pure concepts and admit no empirical elements whatsoever. O n the. other hand, it could mean merely that it will investigate moral laws which, as such, are universal and necessary! propositions and hence given a priori, while yet admitting empirical concepts regarding man. The distinction is clearly a crucial one, and it may seem surprising that in his frequendy recurring demands for pure moral philosophy Kant should h a v e failed to clarify its concept. The explanation lies in the preoccupations w h i c h he brings to his discussions o f pure moral philosophy. His primary concern is always to distinguish moral laws, pfcd priori principles o f reason, from mere generalizations based upon experience. Mere precepts derived from experience can always admit exceptions; and unless moral laws are distinguished from these and presented in all their strictness, our mclinations contrary to duty will lead us to cast doubts upon the universal validity o f moral laws as well. A 'popular' moral philosophy which never considers the source o f its

6

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propositions is not only confused intellectually; it is also, Kant insists, dangerous to morality. Accordingly, he stresses the necessity o f tracing moral laws to their source in pure practical reason, and emphasizes their rational origin b y treating them, in the first instance, as laws valid not merely for men but for rational beings in general; for in this way he can avoid the least suspicion that moral laws are based u p o n something pertaining to man's sensuous nature, e.g. his desire for happiness. But however forcefully Kant may argue for the necessity o f a meta­ physic o f morals or the pure part o f moral philosophy, he pays but slight attention to the subsidiary question o f the limits o f this science. It would have been sufficient for his purposes to show that moral laws are a priori principles. But in his anxiety to separate moral laws from empirically-learned precepts he appears, at times, to g o further and to exclude from a metaphysic o f morals all empirical elements whatso­ ever, thereby making it pure k n o w l e d g e in the stricter sense. In so doing he tends to overlook the fact that a metaphysic o f morals, after having investigated the supreme moral principle, must derive from this principle moral laws enjoining specific duties. A s to the type o f knowledge contained in these laws, his position is far from clear and consistent. 13

14

15

Thus Kant's conception o f a metaphysic o f morals must be pieced together on the basis o f his perfunctory and not altogether consistent remarks on the subject. T h e difficulty is further increased b y his attempt to carry over into practical philosophy his division o f theo­ retical philosophy into its pure and empirical parts. In v i e w o f these complexities it is advisable to consider separately the t w o works in which the nature o f a metaphysic o f morals is formally discussed: that is, the Grundlegung and thzMetaphysik der Sitten.

In the Grundlegung Kant regards^ metaphysic o f morals as pure k n o w ­ ledge in the proper sense o f the term^In both theoretical and practical knowledge, he tells us, our first concern must be to separate the pure from the empirical part 'in order to^know h o w much pure reason can accomplish in both cases, and from^what source it can b y itself draw its own a priori teaching'. The task o f a metaphysic o f morals is 'to examine the Idea and law o f a possible pure w i l l ' , i.e. a will that can 16

1 3 15

Gr., 4ii. Ibid., 391-2.

1 4

Ibid., 410 n and 412. Ibid., 3 88-9. 1 8

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7

determine itself to action through motives originating in pure practical reason itself. N o w our concept o f a pure will and o f the principle o f its activity is not derived b y abstraction from sense experience. It is formed, rather, through the reflection o f pure practical reason upon its o w n activity. A n d i f the study o f a possible pure will and its l a w con­ stitutes 'a separate inquiry, as pure practical philosophy or . . . as meta­ physic o f morals', then a metaphysic o f morals will be limited to pure knowledge. A t first glance, then, it might appear that a metaphysic o f morals is limited to a study o f the supreme principle o f morality. In this case w e should expect to find a second division o f moral philosophy in which the supreme moral principle, which proceeds immediately from pure practical reason as a l a w for rational beings in general, is applied to man. W e should expect, further, that the laws w h i c h are the subjectmatter o f applied moral philosophy will contain k n o w l e d g e derived from sensuous experience of'human nature. A n d indeed, Kant does refer to an empirical part o f moral philosophy w h i c h determines for the human will, in so far as it is affected b y nature, 'laws according to which everything ought to happen, h u t y e t w i t h recognition o f the conditions under w h i c h this often does not happen'. Again, he sug­ gests a distinction between pure and applied moral philosophy c o m ­ parable to the mstinction between pure and applied logic and pure and applied mathematics. Such a distinction, he asserts, reminds us that w e must derive "moral laws from man's rationality, and this is the w o r k o f a metaphysic o f morals. B u t from these laws for rational beings in general w e can then derive practical rules for human c o n d u c t . H o w e v e r these references to empirical or;applied ethics, ambiguous when taken in their wider context, do not really fulfil our expecta­ tions. In the first place the 'practical rules for human conduct' which Kant has in mind are not such moral laws as those prohibiting suicide, lying, etc. T h e question o f such laws is not explicidy raised. B u t from Kant's example o f 'thou shalt not He' as a l a w valid for rational beings in general, and from the fact that the only division made is that b e 17

18

19

20

21

22

17

1 8

1 9

2 0

Gr., 390. Ibid. Ibid., 387. Ibid., 410 n. Kant's comparison of applied ethics with applied logic-does not indicate that he is here thinking of a division of ethics which applies the moral law in order to • determine human duties; Tor in K.d.r.V. B 77 his 'applied logic* is not really logic, but rather a 'logical anthropology' parallel to the 'moral anthropology' which he regards as applied ethics. The comparison with mathematics might be more hope­ ful ; but the passage is, at best, still ambiguous. ^ Or., 389. ^ 2 1

2 2

LAWS OF F R E E D O M

8

tween pure and applied ethics, it w o u l d seem that such laws are to be included under laws for rational beings in general and regarded as pure knowledge. In the second place, the question must be raised, whether Kant's 'empirical ethics' is really ethics at all. Applied or empirical ethics is, for Kant, practical or moral anthro­ pology', a discipline which, assuming that w e k n o w what our duties are, studies 'only the subjective conditions w h i c h hinder or help the following o f the laws of the first [i.e. o f pure ethics] in human nature'. Knowledge o f these conditions is essential to us in our moral selfdiscipline as well as in the moral education o f others. N o r can w e dis,pense with it in deciding h o w to fulfil our duty in a given situation; for this w e require 'a judgment sharpened b y experience'. But the fact that moral anthropology is o f use to us in fulfilling the moral l a w and imparting it to others does not make it a part o f ethics. Moral anthro­ pology must be distinguished from that part o f ethics w h i c h applies moral laws to certain types o f situation and thereby determines duties for men under these circumstances. N o matter h o w much empirical knowledge these rules may contain, they are still a priori moral prin- ' ciples. But the precepts derived from moral anthropology are 'based upon experience'. They do not prescribe duties: they seem rather to be hypothetical imperatives prescribing, under the assumption that w e k n o w our duties and want to fulfil them, the means b y which w e can use nature most effectively to this end. M o r a l anthropology is, then, not ethics but rather a sort o f psychology, a study o f the natural causes which can be made to contribute toward the development o f moral dispositions and toward making our actions in fulfilment o f dutyeasier and more effective. W h y should Kant regard this science as a division o f moral philosophy? 23

24

The difficulty in situating moral anthropology within Kant's division o f theoretical and practical philosophy is that this division presupposes an unbridgeable gulf betwee&mature and freedom, whereas moral anthropology assumes the possieility o f co-operation between them. The so-called 'practical' or technical precepts w h i c h follow upon a theoretical science are not a par\ofj>ractical philosophy because the possibility o f producing certain effects in accordance w i t h the prin­ ciples o f the science depends entirely\ipon our k n o w l e d g e o f nature. Kant apparendy does not think that this is the case w i t h the precepts o f moral anthropology, presumably because the natural means they 26

23

2 5

2 4

M.d.S., 217. Ibid. Cf. KJ.U., 172-3 and M.d.S., 217.

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prescribe are not adequate to the end they envisage. T h e end, a will in a state o f readiness effectively to carry out the commands o f pure practical reason, is possible only according! to freedom, and the natural means prescribed consist only in removing natural obstacles and culti­ vating such natural feelings as will usually assist us to carry out actions in fulfilment o f duty. Thus Kant tells us that while there is, properly speaking, no technical part o f moral philosophy comparable to the technical part o f theoretical philosophy, w e can, if w e wish, describe the readiness o f the will to translate into action the commands o f pure practical reason as a kind o f 'art'. 26

The peculiar w a y in which moral anthropology is fitted into ethics accounts for Kant's assertion that whereas physics has its pure and its empirical part, it is the pure part o f ethics that is properly called 'moral philosophy ( M o w / ) ' . Moral philosophy is properly a study o f a priori moral laws and rules, so that it has no part parallel to empirical physics, the laws of which are learned from experience. T h e gap in the schema is filled by a science w h i c h is not ethics, not a study o f 'laws o f freedom', but rather a b o d y o f empirically-learned psychological laws which yet have a unique connection with freedom. 27

The Grundlegung, then, makes no reference to what w e w o u l d pro­ perly call applied moral rules. B y its failure to mark any division within Moral it mamtains, b y implication, that a metaphysic o f morals deals not only with the supreme moral principle but also with what would properly be called applied moral laws, such as the law prohibiting lying. These, however, it regards as laws, not specifically for men, but for rational beings in general. T h e y are among the principles o f morality which 'are to be found completely a priori, free from everything'em­ pirical, simply in pure rational concepts', and which are the object o f a metaphysic o f morals. Kant recognizes that the Grundlegung, an in­ vestigation o f the supreme moral principle, is not a complete meta­ physic o f morals. He promises to issue later a metaphysic o f morals in which he will g o on to apply this principle 'to the whole system'. But the reason he gives for issuing the Grundlegung separately, as a treatise prehminary to the Metaphysik der Sitten, is not that applied moral laws contain empirical elements and are therefore a different type o f k n o w ­ ledge from the supreme moral principle. O n the contrary, he explains that it is only the different styles appropriate to the. t w o that induces him to present them separately. ". *• 28

29

26

28

M.d.S., 217-8. Ibid., 410.

2 7

2 9

Gr., 388. Ibid., 391-2.

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LAWS OF F R E E D O M 30

N o w if Kant holds that a metaphysic o f morals is pure ethics, and if a metaphysic o f morals deals, in part, with laws o f the type studied in the Metaphysik der Sitten, he would logically be forced to hold that all the concepts necessary for formulating these applied moral laws are derived without recourse to sensuous experience, merely from our pure concept o f a finite rational being. W h e n w e consider that these laws extend to such matters as the exercise o f our various animal instincts and powers, the conclusion that they are pure knowledge must be disturbing to any but the most confirmed rationalist. Before attri­ buting this conclusion to Kant, w e should w e i g h t w o considerations. The first, w e have already noted, is that Kant's primary concern in defining pure moral philosophy is not so much w i t h the type o f con­ cept found in moral laws as with the a priori nature o f these laws. When allowance is made for the confusion between the 'pure' and the a priori', there is evidence sufficient to establish that he sometimes thinks o f a metaphysic o f morals as genuinely pure knowledge, but not that this is his reflectively adopted conviction. T h e second considera­ tion is that at the time o f the Grundlegung Kant's attention is so focused upon the task at hand that he casts only a casual glance at the more remote prospect o f a complete metaphysic o f morals. T h e Grundle­ gung is, he recognizes, only one part o f a metaphysic o f morals. B u t it is the part o f the project that he has actually carried out, and his descriptions o f the knowledge contained in a metaphysic o f morals are, for the most part, accurate accounts o f that contained in the 31

l

3 0

While the evidence cited above establishes that Kant regards a metaphysic of morals as pure knowledge, many of the texts regarding the 'purity' of this science do not, in fact, prove this. In contrasting pure ethics with empirical ethics, the contrast which he has in mind is, as a rule, not that between moral laws which are pure rational principles and moral rules which assume empirical knowledge of man. It is rather the contrast between a priori moral principles and empiricallylearned psychological laws. In arguing that pure ethics contains nothing empirical Kant's point is primarily that morallawsynust be presented in all their strictness, as unconditioned commands, and not adcommodated to human nature with its motives of sensuous origin. { "While Kant seems to hold that ouxVx>ncept of a finite rational- being, like that of a rational being as such, can be denved^from reason's reflection upon its own activity, it is difficult to know how much he would include in this pure con­ cept. On the theoretical side frnitude seems rs imply an element of passivity in knowledge, or sensibility in general. The practical equivalent of sensibility appears to be inclination toward the objects of needs and wants arising from our frnitude. But there is no indication that Kant regards our knowledge of the particular senses as contained in our concept of sensibility in general, nor is there any evi­ dence that he thinks we can deduce from the notion of inclination in general such specific inclinations as those for self-preservation, sex and nourishment. 8 1

(

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22

Grundlegung. O n l y in the Metaphysik der Sitten, in the actual process o f applying the supreme moral principle, does he suggest that another type o f knowledge is required for this second part o f a metaphysic o f morals. In the Metaphysik der Sitten, as in the Grundlegung, Kant's discussions o f a metaphysic o f morals ate concerned primarily w i t h the source o f moral laws in pure practical reason and only secondarily w i t h the type of concept contained in these laws. A t first glance the situation appears to show little improvement over the Grundlegung. A metaphysic o f morals is still described as 'pure moral philosophy', and occasional passages could be cited as evidence that he still thinks o f it is pure knowledge in the proper sense o f the t e r m . B u t there is other evidence to show that, despite these continuing hesitations, he recognizes the presence o f empirical elements in a metaphysic o f morals and that, in his descriptions o f this w o r k as pure moral philosophy, the term 'pure' means only 'a priori'. T h e Metaphysik der Sitten, he suggests, is a type o f metaphysics different from that o f the Grundlegung. 83

The Metaphysik der Sitten, Kant tells us, follows upon the Kritik der praktischen Vernunft just as the already published Metaphysische Anfangsgriinde der Naturwissenschaft follows upon the Kritik der reinen Vernunft: the Metaphysical First Principles of Rechtslehre and Tugendlehre are 'counterparts' to the Metaphysical First Principles of Natural Science. * The parallel is again drawn w i t h reference to the need for principles applying the universal moral laws to human nature and the universal laws o f nature to objects o f experience. A l t h o u g h Kant tells us little about the kind o f knowledge contained in a metaphysic o f morals, he provides sufficient clues for us to connect the metaphysics o f practical reason with the more fully developed notion of.its theoretical counter­ part, and justifies our drawing upon the broad outline o f a metaphysic 3

35

3 2

The examples o£ duties obtained by applying the supreme moral principle are not really an integral part of the Grundlegung. ' Cf. M.d.S., 375 and 217. The latter text, which asserts that 'we shall often have to take as our object the particular nature of man, which is known only through experience, in order to show in it the consequences of the universal moral principles,' could easily be mistaken for an explicit recognition of empirical know­ ledge in a metaphysic of morals. If it is taken in its context, however, and com­ pared withV>., 412, it appears to imply, on the contrary,- an exclusion of empirical elements; for the 'universal moral principles' seem, to be what we have called applied moral laws, and their application to empirical knowledge of man seems to he outside a metaphysic of morals, as an appHcation of it to anthropology. • M.d.S., 205. Ibid., 216. 3 3

3 6

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LAWS OF F R E E D O M

o f nature in order to develop the concept o f a metaphysic o f morals. Kant distinguishes t w o kinds o f metaphysics o f nature: the 'trans­ cendental part' and the 'metaphysics o f corporeal and thinking nature'. The transcendental part sets forth the system o f a priori concepts and principles which make possible our experience o f objects in general. Kant regards his first Critique as the framework o f such a system. Because the elements o f knowledge w i t h w h i c h it deals are conditions o f the possibility o f our knowing any object whatsoever, they have no special reference to this or that type o f object w h i c h may be given to the senses. T h e transcendental part o f a metaphysic o f nature con­ tains, by definition, only pure concepts and principles together with the pure forms o f intuition; and this implies that, being unable to draw upon sensuous experience, it must be altogether ^determinate regarding objects o f sensuous experience. T h e second division o f a meta­ physic o f nature contains, on the other hand, w h a t can be k n o w n a priori regarding one or the other type o f object o f e x p e r i e n c e corporeal nature or thinking nature. It must, therefore, admit a certain minimal empirical knowledge, namely, that w h i c h is necessary to give us the concept o f an object o f outer or inner sense in general. 36

37

The point o f interest to us in this division is that in order to deter­ mine the a priori principles relating to a specific kind o f object as dis­ tinguished from objects in general, a metaphysic o f nature must admit an empirical concept: matter as characterized b y its most fundamental predicate, motion—or, for the metaphysics o f thinking nature, the empirical representation 'I think'. Since these concepts are o f a posteriori origin, this type o f metaphysics cannot be pure knowledge. W i t h the help o f these empirical concepts it will obviously be able to say a good deal more about the laws o f nature than will the trans­ cendental part. B u t the question naturally arises: h o w , i f it contains empirical.elements, can this science be metaphysics? H o w is it to be distinguished from empiricd^rysics? 38

3 8

The necessity of elaborating the notion of a metaphysic of nature and at the same time selecting from it only what is relevant to its practical counterpart will, I hope, excuse the oversimplification WHKant's thought in the following paragaphs. \ M.AJ.N., 469-70; KJ.r.V. B 873 ff. \ However, Kant continues, there can be no metaphysics of thinking nature; for metaphysical knowledge must be able to construct concepts relating to the mere possibility of the object, in order to proceed without further recourse to experi­ ence. It therefore needs the pure form of space, whereas the empirical representa­ tion 'I think' is in the form of time only. Cf. M.AJ.N., 470-r. 37

t

8 8

I

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I T h e w a y in which Kant poses the question is significant. ' H o w , ' he / asks, 'can I hope to have knowledge a priori (and therefore a metaphysics) o f objects in so far as they are given to our senses, that is, given in an a posteriori manner?' T h e essential characteristic o f this type o f meta­ physics is n o w located in the a priori character o f its propositions rather than in the purity o f its concepts, and Kant's answer to the question specifies further the sense in 'which metaphysical propositions must be a priori. W e take nothing more from experience, he explains, than what is needed to give us an object o f outer or inner sense. In a metaphysical treatment o f these objects w e must 'entirely dispense w i t h all empirical principles which profess to add to these concepts any more special experience with a v i e w to our passing further judgments upon the objects'. A metaphysic o f corporeal nature admits the empirical concept, matter, but in such a w a y that 'except for what is contained in this concept no other empirical principle is used for the knowledge o f matter'. Given this one empirical concept, a metaphysic o f cor­ poreal nature will proceed to construct, in the pure form o f space, the intuition corresponding to this concept and so determine a priori, through mathematical principles, the most fundamental laws o f matter. As metaphysics, it is limited to such laws o f matter as can be determined b y reason w o r k i n g upon the concept o f an object o f outer sense with only the categories and the forms o f intuition. It cannot deal with any o f the more detailed laws o f nature which w o u l d have to be learned from experience. Although these more detailed laws, as laws, contain an a priori element, they are nevertheless 'learned from e x ­ perience' in so far as observation o f a temporal sequence o f events is required before the l a w can be formulated. Metaphysics formulates a priori propositions, not merely in the sense in which any l a w is an a priori proposition, but in the sense that no further experience is re­ quired for them beyond the experience o f matter in motion. 39

40

41

42

If w e apply Kant's discussion o f a metaphysic o f nature to moral philosophy, w e obtain the t w o divisions o f a metaphysic o f morals foreshadowed in t i e Grundlegung and assumed, for the most part, in the Metaphysik der Sitten: a 'transcendental part' which deals w i t h the supreme moral principle as a l a w for rational beings in general, even as its theoretical Counterpart deals w i m the principles relating to objects o f experience in general; and a part, corresponding to the metaphysics o f corporeal nature, w h i c h has to do w i t h such laws o f human conduct 8

* K.d.r.V., B 875. Italics mine. *° Ibid., B 876. Ibid. « M.AJ.N., 4 1

470.

LAWS

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OF F R E E D O M

as can be determined by applying the supreme moral principle to a limited amount o f empirical k n o w l e d g e concerning man. T h e minimal empirical elements admissible in a metaphysic o f morals must be more extensive than those admitted in a metaphysic o f nature. In theoretical knowledge Kant has at his disposal not only the categories o f the understanding but also the forms o f intuition, so that he can proceed further with fewer empirical elements. In practical metaphysics the minimal a posteriori elements are characterized more vaguely as what pertains to 'men considered simply as m e n ' , and include man's various instincts, inclinations and powers, his relation to animate and inanimate objects, etc. In distinction from what pertains to men as such, a meta­ physic o f morals cannot admit k n o w l e d g e o f the contingent circum­ stances and conditions in which m e n m a y find themselves. It will, therefore, determine moral laws valid for every man merely b y virtue o f his human nature. It cannot consider the special forms which these laws will take in reference to individual m e n or classes o f men. It can determine, for example, the duties o f respect which every man has to every other man as such: it cannot determine the duties o f respect which the y o u n g have to the old, the learned to the ignorant, etc. For the rules enjoining such duties are n o t 'principles o f obligation o f men as such to one a n o t h e r . . . but only rules modified according to the differences o f the subjects' to w h o m the laws are applied in cases met with in experience. :

43

44

But moral laws ought to serve as guides in action, and action takes place under just such contingent circumstances as have been excluded from a metaphysic o f morals. R e c o g n i z i n g this, Kant envisages an 'appendix' to the metaphysic o f morals in w h i c h a further application o f moral laws is to be made. "While moral concepts have their source in pure reason, he argues, they l o o k to their application in concrete cases, and for this application experience is required. T h e final, most concrete application o f the l a w in moral action is made b y judgment, and moral philosophy cannot, o f course, descend to individual j u d g ­ ments o f right and wrong, gbod_and evil, in particular cases. B u t it ought not to stop with the universal principles o f duty for men as such. It ought also to 'schematize^ these principles, as it were, and t3

MJ.S., 468. Ibid. Kant makes the same point again With specific reference to Rechtslehre, suggesting that the application of metaphysical first principles of Law to particu­ lar cases be made in notes to the text, in order that we may clearly distinguish what is metaphysics from what is merely 'empirical practice of Law'. Cf. M.d.S., 205-6. 4 4

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4 5

A l l o w them as ready for morally-practical use . However, this /adaptation o f the universal moral principles cannot take place within ' a metaphysic o f morals itself. T h e 'schematization' o f moral laws is necessary to the completeness o f our exposition o f the system, but it cannot be an integral part o f the system itself. W h i l e a comparison o f practical with theoretical metaphysics pro­ vides the principle according to which Kant selects the empirical ele­ ments admissible in the Metaphysik der Sitten, there is a significant difference in the reasons w h i c h he gives for limiting the amount o f empirical knowledge in the t w o . His reason for excluding from a metaphysic o f morals such moral rules as w o u l d require further empirical knowledge is not so much that these rules fall short o f the a. priori requirements o f metaphysical propositions, but rather that they are not capable o f being systematically classified. G n c e w e begin to consider the innumerable circumstances and conditions i n which m e n may happen to find themselves, he argues, w e can never be sure o f the completeness o f our enumeration o f duties; for they' w i l l have to be classified o n merely empirical grounds. A metaphysic 6 f morals, on the other hand, will limit empirical elements and thereby be able to give an a priori, and hence exhaustive, enumeration o f the duties o f m e n qua men. In Kant's v i e w the a priori and the ideal o f systematic totality i n a science are closely related; for he holds that a science cannot achieve the status o f a system until w e have grasped the Idea o f that science and are thereby in a position to give, merely on the basis o f that Idea and without further recourse to experience, an exhaustive account o f the scope and divisions o f the science. In both a metaphysic o f nature and a metaphysic o f morals the systematic totality o f our knowledge is said to follow from the fact that it is metaphysics, i.e. from the limitation o f empirical concepts in it. B u t Kant's reason for excluding further empirical elements from theoretical metaphysics is that meta­ physical knowledge differs in kind from the rest o f our knowledge o f nature. It is a priori k n o w l e d g e in the sense described above and can46

46

M.d.S., 468-9. * This view does not imply that the content of the science can be deduced .a priori from principles of reason. Even metaphysics must, when it wishes to say something about a specific type of object, admit a concept of sensuous origin; and because, the empirical elements in metaphysics are strictly limited, so too are the propositions of metaphysics limited to the most universal and ^determinate laws In'order to obtain more" detailed laws we must descend to the empirical part of science, where sensuous experience is as essential a component in know­ ledge as are the a priori principles of the mind. 4 6

I<5

L A W S OF F R E E D O M

not, like empirical physics, learn its laws from observation o f events in nature. In a metaphysic o f morals, on the other hand, the essential consideration that limits empirical elements is rather the systematic totality that can be achieved through this restriction. This difference stems from a failure in the parallel between theoreti­ cal and practical knowledge in their lower reaches—the same failure that caused such difficulty in the Grundlegung regarding the 'pure' and the 'empirical' parts o f philosophy. B e l o w the metaphysics o f nature there is empirical physics, the laws o f which are, in a sense, learned from or grounded upon observation o f events in nature. B u t a moral law, and equally a moral rule prescribing an 'ought' relating to particular circumstances, cannot, Kant holds, be derived from observation o f the actual conduct o f m e n . There is, in other words, no empirical part o f moral philosophy comparable to the empirical part o f natural science. Moral rules referring to contingent circumstances, like the laws o f empirical physics, require 'more special experience' for their for­ mulation. B u t there is not the radical difference between moral laws and moral rules that exijts between the a priori propositions o f the metaphysic o f nature and the empirically-learned propositions o f e m ­ pirical physics. T h e distinction between a metaphysic o f morals and the rest; of moral philosophy on the basis o f their empirical content appears to be only a quantitative rather than a qualitative one, and Kant's reason for separating off metaphysical first principles is the relatively weak consideration o f the advantages to be achieved in terms o f syste­ matic completeness. 47

48

The distinction to be drawn within moral philosophy proper is, therefore, only the distinction between a metaphysic o f morals and its appendix. A metaphysics o f nature, too, should have an appendix in which the universal first principles o f corporeal nature are adapted and made ready for application to objects o f experience. B u t this appendix is a link between the metaphysics o f nature and empirical physics. Beyond the appendix to a metaphysic o f morals there is no moral philosophy properly speakingT^trt only, on the one hand, moral anthropology, and on the other tha sphere o f j u d g m e n t applying the 'schematized' moral rules to concrete situations. If w e consider j u d g ­ ment as the w o r k o f a court applyingrjtiadical laws in particular cases, 4 7

In M.AJ.N, 475 ff., the consideration ofsystematic completeness is put for­ ward as a second reason for separating metaphysical first principles from empirical physics. Cf. the discussion in M.d.S., 214 ff., of the different methods of formulating laws of nature and moral laws. 4 8

K A N T ' S C O N C E P T I O N OF A ' M E T A P H Y S I C

MORALS'

17

men, since the judge must detennine right according to the laws o f a given country, w e shall have the positive study of Law following upon IRechtslehre. If w e consider the individual's judgment applying ethical laws in concrete situations, w e shall have casuistry following upon Tugendlehre. B u t the metaphysical first principles o f L a w and ethics, together with an appendix adapting them for further application, comprise the whole o f moral philosophy properly speaking. Together they determine, in so far as is possible b y reason, the duties incumbent upon men as such and the special forms which such duties will take with reference to men in certain types o f circumstances. 49

50

W i t h this w e return to the position o f the Grundlegung, that a meta­ physic o f morals or the 'pure' part o f moral philosophy is, in fact, the whole o f moral philosophy. B u t it is a return w i t h a difference. For, despite some persistent hesitations, Kant n o w recognizes in principle that the 'pure' part contains t w o divisions, only one o f which is pure knowledge in the stricter sense. T h e other admits «such empirical knowledge o f man as is needed to' obtain, from the supreme moral principle, those duties which all men have merely b y virtue o f their human nature. Such applied moral laws cannot be obtained b y generali­ zation from experience: they are, like the supreme principle o f morality above them and the 'schematized' moral rules b e l o w them, a priori principles. B u t they differ from the law for rational beings in general by. the fact that they presuppose concepts o f sensuous origin, and^from the 'schematized' moral rules b y the fact that they cannot »admit 'particular experience' o f contingent circumstances and conditions. These three types o f moral principle,, taken together, w o u l d give a complete exposition o f a metaphysic o f morals. B u t the supreme moral principle has been dealt w i t h in the Grundlegung, and moral rules are only an appendix to the system o f human duties. W h i l e the Metaphysik der Sitten both refers back to the Grundlegung and takes note o f a further appHcation o f moral laws, it is essentially a system o f the duties which all men have merely in so far as they are men.

49

M.d.S., 205-6 and 229. Casuistry, Kant explains, 'is neither a science nor a part of a science', but only practice in the exercise of moral judgment. In order to provide some train­ ing in judgment for the ultimate appHcation of moral laws, he appends 'casuistical questions' to many of the discussions of duties in the, Tugendlehre. B0

CHAPTER n

THE

DIVISIONS

OF M O R A L

PHILOSOPHY

Whether w e study Kant's writings in chronological or systematic order, the Metaphysik der Sitten follows the Grundlegung and the Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft. B y the time w e come to the Metaphysik der Sitten, 'Kantian moral philosophy' and 'Kantian ethics' may have become so identified in our thinking as to cause us difficulty in adjusting to the notion that Kant's ethics is only one division o f his moral philosophy. Viewing the t w o earlier writings in retrospect, w e find little reason for this confusion. Since bothjuridical l a w and ethical law must be derived from the supreme principle o f morality, the Grundlegung is concerned implicitly with the foundation for both L a w and ethics and the Kritik investigates the source in pure practical reason o f both juridical and ethical law. Y e t , because Kant's emphasis in these earlier works is on the autonomous imposition o f duty in morally g o o d action, it is difficult to perform, there, the abstraction from questions o f motive which would present the categorical imperative as the undifferentiated principle o f both juridical and ethical law. The difficulty is not a fortuitous one. It is, rather, inherent in the t w o ­ fold aspect under which w e must v i e w the categorical imperative itself. While the moral law is the ratio cognoscendi o f freedom, freedom, Kant has explained, is the ratio essendi o f the moral l a w . That is to say, w e know our o w n freedom only indirectly, in so far as it is implied in our immediate consciousness o f a categorical imperative; but the ground o f the possibility o f a categorical imperative is our capacity for free choice. In the order o f cognition the moral law first presents itself in our consciousness as a distmctively^thical command, to do our duty for the sake o f duty; and it is from thii command that w e k n o w our o w n freedom 'upon which all moral laws and concepts are based'. Hence the Grundlegung and the second Crafip^, both o f which begin w i t h our ordinary moral consciousness anfcL b y analysing its implications, arrive at the supreme moral principle operative in it, are, from the first, dealing with the categorical imperative as the criterion o f the morally good as well as o f right and w r o n g . I f the question o f merely right or 1

2

1

2

K.d.p.V., 4«.i M.d.S'., 239; cf. also 221.

18

/

THE D I V I S I O N S Oh M O R A L P H I L O S O P H Y

IO

/legal actions and their principle is raised, it is merely b y w a y of contrast with morally good actions. In the Metaphysik der Sitten the perspective has changed. From the supreme moral principle Kant proposes to develop t w o systems o f duties: L a w , the system o f those duties which can be fulfilled inde­ pendently o f our motive in acting and hence independently o f the moral value o f our actions; and ethics, the system o f those duties which arise from the moral necessity o f developing a virtuous attitude, of will. N o w in order to determine laws for these t w o aspects o f human conduct Kant must presuppose what the investigations o f the Grundle­ gung and the second Critique have revealed about the nature o f man: namely, the fact o f his freedom. T h e categorical imperative as a dis-r tinctively ethical command is the presupposition o f applied 'moral philosophy as a whole. B u t from the supreme moral principle Kant must then abstract the criterion o f legally right, as distinguished from morally good, action and so develop the first principle o f laws which express the conditions o f such freedom as can be realize°d independendy o f the agent's motive. Proceeding from L a w to ethics—from the abstract to the concrete—he must then take up again considerations o f the motive and, from the categorical imperative as a distinctively ethical principle, develop laws expressing the conditions o f freedom in the interior attitude o f will itself. T h e categorical imperative as a specifically ethical principle is, in short, the culminating point, as well as the presupposition, o f the Metaphysik der Sitten. A n d while w e must bring to this w o r k the concepts and principle w h i c h w e have learned from the earlier writings, w e must strip them o f their distinctively ethical associations before w e can hope to understand the over-all argument o f Kant's applied moral philosophy. Here the Metaphysik der Sitten itself provides some help. Its t w o divi­ sions, Rechtslehre or Doctrine of Law and Tugendlehre or Doctrine of Virtue, are preceded b y a general introduction in w h i c h Kant first reaffirms the conclusions o f the earlier works, w i t h due regard for their potentially juridical aspects, and then, in 'universal practical philoso­ phy', deals w i t h the basis in man's rationality of'concepts common to both divisions^ o f moral philosophy'. B y indicating the principles according to which L a w and ethics are to be developed f r o % the 3

3

Kant'.s 'universal practical philosophy' is of a different nature from the propae­ deutic to Wolffian philosophy which is criticized in Gr., 390-1. Since the concepts which Kant defines in his chapter of this title are derived from the notion of free­ dom or of a pure will, his own universal practical philosophy does not come under the criticism levelled against Wolff. •'

20

LAWS OF F R E E D O M

supreme moral principle, Kant at one stroke establishes the continuity between his pure and applied moral philosophy and introduces the dis­ tinctive content o f the latter. Then, by, the definitions which comprise universal practical philosophy, he attempts to correct the inevitable ethical bias o f our moral concepts. W e r e he to omit this latter step and pass dkectly from the Grundlegung to the metaphysical first principles o f Law, our natural tendency to equate the k e y concepts o f moral philosophy—freedom, law, duty, obligation etc.—with our already ethical notions o f these would lead us to regard the juridical use o f such terms as merely equivocal. If, for- example, w e were to regard 'obli­ gation' as the necessitation imposed on our choice b y pure practical reason, w e should fail to see h o w compulsion b y other men through threats o f punishment can also, under certain circumstances, be obli­ gation. The fault would he with our definition, which is a definition not o f obligation as such but o f one particular kind o f obligation. B u t in order ;o avoid this sort o f misunderstanding w e need the notion o f obligation as such, prior to its qualification as legal or ethical obliga­ tion. Hence the value of-'universal practical philosophy' with its de­ finitions o f the undifferentiated moral concepts on which first juridical and then ethical notions are to be built. Although our present study is concerned primarily with the Tugendlehre, w e shall find that the sharply restricted field which Kant assigns to ethics as its proper subject-matter forces us to consider, h o w e v e r briefly, the most fundamental principles o f his philosophy o f L a w as well. Following his o w n logical order o f exposition w e shall, before entering into the first division o f moral philosophy, provide ourselves with a plan o f the whole and devote this preliminary chapter to out­ lining the concepts b y which the t w o divisions o f moral philosophy, arising in the undifferentiated principle o f moral philosophy in general, are distinguished from each other.

The purpose o f the Grundlegung, Kknt tells us, is to investigate the supreme principle o f morality and/thus to lay the foundation for a complete metaphysic o f morals. Since the Grundlegung investigates the criterion b y which w e judge the mo^aTvalue o f actions and so for­ mulates the principle on which a moraTNagent m a y be thought to act in so far as his action is morally gOod, \l could be called ethics in the narrower sense. But it is not ethics in the sense in which the Tugendlehre is ethics; it is not, in other words, the system o f our ethical duties.

THE D I V I S I O N S OF MORAL P H I L O S O P H Y

f

21

Morally good action can be action in fulfilment o f a juridical duty or o f an ethical duty, and the Grundlegung, which is concerned only with the formal element o f any moral action, does not profess to tell us h o w the t w o types o f law are to be derived from the formal principle o f moral action as such. O n the other hand, Kant's analysis o f this prin­ ciple make? certain points which are relevant to the subsequent deri­ vation o f Law and ethics from it. The first point, indicated b y the brief examples o f duties included in the Grundlegung, is that all moral laws and hence all duties are to be derived mtirnately from the supreme moral principle, the categorical imperative: act only on that maxim through w h i c h y o u can, at the same time, will that it should become a universal law. T]ie second point: is that this supreme moral principle, upon analysis, turns out tq be'the 'law o f freedom', the principle expressing the condition o f free or rational action. These t w o considerations, taken together, determine the character o f Kant's applied moral philosophy. L a w and ethics must consist o f laws expressing, each in its o w n terms, the conditions o f free action and prescribing actions o f this sort. Let us examine each o f these points in turn. Although the scope o f the Grundlegung, as Kant explicitly states, excludes the application o f the supreme moral principle, he never­ theless introduces into it, b y w a y o f illustration, examples o f the four types or classes o f duty obtained b y applying the supreme moral principle: abstaining from suicide and from making false promises, and promoting our o w n perfection and the happiness o f other men. These are some o f the duties 'whose derivation from the one principle cited is easily seen. W e must be able to will that a m a x i m o f our action become a universal l a w ' . From one point o f v i e w Kant's decision to include these examples has proved unfortunate. In; v i e w o f the purpose and scope o f the Grundlegung he could not provide adequate criteria for determining which o f our maxims could be willed as universal law and thus left his examples open to the wildest misihterpretations. O n the other hand, his insistence that all our duties are to be derived from the categorical imperative reinforces the essential line o f continuity b&tween his pure and applied moral philosophy: the assumption that the 4

5

6

* Gr., 392. The four types or classes of duties which Kant recognizes are perfect duties to oneself and others and imperfect duties to oneself and others. Gr., 422-3. His recog­ nition of perfect duties to oneself is, he notes, a departure from the commonly accepted division of duties. Gr., 423-4. 5

6

LAWS OF F R E E D O M

22

categorical i m p e r a t i v e , ^ the criterion o f morally good action, is at the same time the criterion o f right and w r o n g action. Our ordinary moral judgments, Kant argues, show that w e locate the moral value o f an action in its m o t i v e : w e refuse, for example, to attribute moral value to actions done from motives o f self-interest or iimmediate inclination, even though such actions are objectively in conformity with duty. Such actions, w e judge, w o u l d be morally good only i f they were done from a motive o f duty, and b y analysing the concept o f action done from a motive o f duty w e find that this is action determined through the thought that it is in conformity with universal law, or action upon the principle expressed in the categorical imperative. R i g h t actions are, accordingly, actions which are object­ ively in accordance with universal law. Thus in his derivation of specific duties Kant claims that b y applying the categorical imperative he has determined that suicide and making false promises are w r o n g actions, and that developing our talents and helping others in need are right actions. W e k n o w that the first t w o actions are w r o n g because w e find that the principles o f these actions, their maxims, cannot be willed as universal laws, and that the second t w o are right because w e cannot will as universal laws maxims o f neglecting our talents and the needs o f other men. A t the same time that the categorical imperative states what morally good action is, it states implicitly what consitutes right action, and particular moral laws derived from it are, in part, assertions that certain actions or maxims are right or w r o n g . 7

8

9

So far as L a w is concerned, the importance o f this conclusion is selfevident, for in L a w the categorical imperative functions as the prin­ ciple o f right action in abstraction from considerations o f moral g o o d ­ ness. The fact that ethical laws arise within the context o f moral g o o d ­ ness may tend to obscure the issue o f the ethically right and w r o n g . 7

On the role of the categorical imperative as the criterion of right and wrong as well as of good and evil, cf. H. LPaton's 'The Aim and Structure of Kant's Grundlegung'; The Philosophical Quafkri^vol. 8 (no. 31), April, 1958, pp. 112-30. The article is a review of A . R . C . Duncarys book, Practical Reason and Morality, in which it is alleged that the categorical imperative is not properly a prescriptive principle but only a principle descriptive^ of the functioning of pure practical reason, and that Kant is, accordingly, rrrisfiaj^en^ believing that he can obtain duties from the categorical imperative. \ Gr., 397-8. \ More precisely, because we cannot will th^t everyone should perform such actions as suicide and making false promises, it is our duty to reject the maxims of such actions; and because we cannot will it as universal law that men should have maxims of indifference toward their perfection and the happiness of others, it is our duty to include these objects among our aims or purposes. 8

9

THE D I V I S I O N S OF MORAL P H I L O S O P H Y

23

Y e t i f ethical duties are to be derived from the categorical imperative, w e must be able to speak merely o f the objective conformity o f con­ duct with ethical laws, without regard for the motive which must always accompany the law. A n action is rignt, Kant explains, when it is pflichtmdssig or in accordance with duty, and the duty itself, he continues, 'may be according to its content or source o f any kind whatsoever'. Further complications arise, in the question o f the ethically right, from Kant's v i e w that ethical laws d o not require us to perform specific actions (as do juridical Laws), but only to adopt certain aims or purposes. Hence i f w e use 'right' to qualify actions, and i f our duty according to ethical laws consists not in performing determinate actions but rather in having certain ends, then 'right' and duty are not on the same plane, so t o speak. Ethical laws refer t o actions pnly 'in a general w a y ' — i n so far as our adoption of an end implies that w e must do something toward that end—and so it is only 'in a general w a y ' that w e can say a priori or o n the basis o f moral laws what sort o f actions are ethically right. B u t w e can consider merely the* conformity w i t h law o f the interior act o f adopting an end, and so speak o f the tightness or legality o f adopting certain aims in abstraction from the morality o f taking up these ends. I f w e make the happiness o f a friend our end merely on the basis o f immediate inclination, then our adoption o f this purpose is merely right or legal and not morally g o o d . T h e categorical imperative, as the first principle o f all duty, is the ultimate criterion not only o f what is juridically legal but also o f what is ethically right. B u t in the one case laws refer to actions and in the other to the adoption o f aims or purposes; hence in the first case our duty will consist in actions—in the second, in purposes. 10

11

;

If w e are to obtain from the supreme moral principle more specific criteria o f the juridically and ethically right, w e rnust, however, v i e w this principle not merely as a statement o f the essence o f right and w r o n g but as a command to perform right actions and to refrain from w r o n g actions. Kant distinguishes t w o ways in w h i c h w e can be con­ scious o f a law. W e can have 'mere theoretical k n o w l e d g e o f a possible' determination o f choice, i.e. o f a practical rule', or o n the other hand w e can be conscious, together with the law, o f constraint upon our will 1 0

M.d.S., 223-4. Duties which consist in the adoption of ends are, in Kant's terrhinology, 'duties of virtue'. Because the law enjoining them prescribes only the adoption of certain maxims and not precise actions, they are 'imperfect duties'. On the distinction between perfect and imperfect duty, cf. below, Ch. VII. 1 1

24

LAWS OF FREEDOM 12

to act in accordance with the l a w . Moral laws, although w e can treat them abstractly as statements o f what is right and w r o n g , are in fact practical propositions which look to the determination o f choice; and in relation to an imperfectly rational will, w h i c h does not spontaneously determine choice in conformity with the law, they are imperatives or commands. When w e speak o f moral laws as 'commands' w e indicate that the relation between the will and the law is one o f obligation or con­ straint upon the will through the l a w . W e tend to say, too, that 'the law commands' a certain action. B u t in fact it is not the law that commands. It is the legislator, the lawgiver, w h o constrains us to perform what is stated in the law, and he exercises this constraint through our motives. The primary reference here is obviously to the legislative authority o f the State, which connects with the l a w sanctions designed to arouse in us, should other motives be wanting, fear o f punishment and thereby influence us to act in accordance with the law. 5ut w e can also speak, by analogy, o f pure practical reason as the interior legislator which connects with the l a w the thought o f duty and thereby constrains us, through motives o f non-sensuous origin, to act in accordance with the law. Legislation o f the type enacted b y State authorities w e shall call, with Kant, 'outer' or 'juridical' legislation; that which is proper to pure practical reason, o n the other hand, is 'inner' or 'ethical' legislation. T h e fundamental distinction between the two is in the kind o f constraint which the legislator is capable o f exer­ cising in each case. In juridical legislation the only type o f constraint available to the legislator is compulsion through the feelings o f aversion that are part o f our sensuous nature. In ethical legislation pure practical reason has only the thought o f duty with which to exercise necessitation on choice. 13

It is by considering the categorical imperative as the principle o f laws accompanied b y the one or the^other type o f constraint that w e deter­ mine the nature o f juridical and ethical laws. T h e categorical impera­ tive, according to the Grundlegung, istthe 'law o f freedom'. In order to obtain subordinate principles for a p p m n g ; the supreme moral prin12

MAS., 218. Cf. Vorlesung, 19: 'Obligation is not merely^a necessity of the action but also a necessitation, a making necessary (Notwendigmjchung) of the action; hence obligatio is necessitate and not necessitas'. Cf. also the distinction between laws and imperatives in M.d.S., 222 and 223. Kant there defines obligation as 'the necessity of a free action under a categorical imperative of reason'. But because the relation of an imperfectly rational will to a principle of reason is one of constraint, the necessity of the action is also a necessitation on the will of the subject. 13

I

THE D I V I S I O N S OF MORAL P H I L O S O P H Y

2$

pple—criteria for determirung what sort of maxims could be willed 'as universal l a w — w e must ask, first in what sense the categorical i m ­ perative can be called the 'law o f freedom', and secondly, what kind o f freedom is possible through the one or the other type o f constraint. Apart from moral considerations, w e have a negative concept o f freedom w h i c h arises from theoretical reason's reflection upon neces­ sity. But this theoretical concept o f a will which is not determined b y anything outside itself is altogether negative, empty and problematic/ In order to give content to the Idea o f freedom and at the same time to establish, sufficiently for practical purposes, the reality o f our freedom, w e must turn to our consciousness o f duty. Analysing this, Kant finds that it implies consciousness o f an unconditional command, a^ c o m ­ mand to act in a certain w a y regardless o f whether w e experience any inclination for the results of the action: the determination o f our choice through a categorical imperative is to be independent o f motives o f . sensuous origin. But since there is no determination o f choice without a motive, a categorical imperative must, as a principle o f action, pro­ vide a motive. As a command to act rationally or in such a way that w e could will everyone to act, it has nothing with which to determine choice except the thought o f the rationality o f the action; and sinceit is unconditionally necessary that w e act upon a categorical impera­ tive, w e must suppose that w e are capable o f determining ourselves to action merely through the thought that the action is valid for everyone or that its maxim could serve as a universal law. W h e n w e determine our choice through a categorical imperative, pure reason becomes practical; in other words, practical reason determines itself to action through the principle o f its o w n activity, that o f the mere rationality of the action. A n d thus consciousness o f a categorical imperative estab­ lishes the positive concept o f freedom, that o f practical reason (or will)\ determined to action, not b y something outside itself, but rather by the principle o f its o w n functioning. Hence the positive concept o f freedom, Kant concludes, is that o f the power o f practical reason to act upon a self-imposed law or, in other words, the concept o f moralautonomy. 14

T h e supreme moral principle, then, expresses the essence o f free or rational action; and because all moral laws are derived from this principle, they must state the conditions under which human conduct is in keeping with man's nature as a free agent. M o r a l laws, Kant explains, 'command for everyone, without taking his inclinations into 1 4

M.d.S., 214.

LAWS OF F R E E D O M

26

consideration, merely because and in so far as he is free and has practical reason'. They are imperatives for men, not as rational agents w h o happen to desire some end, but simply as rational or free agents. T h e negative implications o f this are immediately evident: neither juridical nor ethical laws can be based upon the desire for happiness which pertains to man's sensuous nature. B o t h are laws o f freedom, pre­ scribing essentially the conditions o f rational or universally valid action rather than the means for attaining happiness. In order to obtain the positive implications o f this position, however, w e must consider more closely the difference between juridical and ethical legislation. 15

In any legislation, Kant explains, w e can distinguish t w o things: a law and a motive which connects a determining ground o f choice with the thought o f the law in the subject. In distinguishing the t w o divisions o f moral philosophy from each other, the element o f con­ straint accompanying the law is the more basic consideration, since it determines the kind o f freedom o f which the law itself expresses a condition. A l l moral laws are principles o f pure practical reason, expressing the w a y in which a free or rational agent as such will act. But it is only in ethics that w e consider pure practical reason as itself legislative, as providing not only the norm for conduct but also the constraint accompanying this n o r m . Necessitation b y State authori­ ties can realize outer freedom, and hence juridical laws will be the con­ ditions o f freedom in our external actions. O n l y the self-constraint of pure practical reason can realize inner freedom, o f w h i c h ethical laws will therefore be the conditions. 16

17

If juridical legislation can employ only natural means o f constraint, motives of sensuous origin, it cannot concern itself w i t h the interior determination o f choice through a motive: this w o u l d be inconsistent with the nature o f a free moral agent. A s Kant puts it, no outer legis­ lation, not even a divine one, could 'include the motive in the law itself' or make it a part o f our duty to determine our choice through the motive of duty. Since there can be n o action without a motive, and since juridical legislation is concersed that certain actions be c o m ­ mitted or omitted, it supplies a possible motive, fear o f punishment, which should be effective i f other mocives are wanting. B u t it is neces­ sarily indifferent to the motives fron^which w e act. A n d since the moral goodness o f our actions lies in their motives, the duties enjoined by juridical legislation must be actions v^hich are morally necessary independendy o f our attitude o f will. 18

15

M.d.S., 216; cf. also 222.

1 6

Ibid., 218.

1 7

H N . f o ) , 377.

1 8

M.d.S., 219

THE D I V I S I O N S OF M O R A L P H I L O S O P H Y

27

(Quite apart from our obligation to virtue, it is morally necessary that each o f us, as a free agent, be able to express his freedom outwardly. y/hzt constitutes man's moral title to express his freedom in external actions, and what, precisely, is implied in this n\oral title are questions which w e must examine more closely in the following chapter. But in a prehminary w a y w e can describe outer freedom as that absence of compulsion which allows the subject o f the law to act in pursuit of his o w n ends, whatever these may be, so long as, in his actions, he leaves a like freedom open to eyery other subject o f the law. This is the sort o f freedom which can be realized through the restraining power of legal sanctions and without reference to the subject's virtue or lack of virtue. Juridical laws are commands to bring our maxims o f external action into conformity with a universal l a w o f outer freedom, to act externally as a free or rational agent w o u l d act, regardless o f whether w e have adopted the rationality o f actions as our formal maxim in so acting. Ethical laws, on the other hand, are those which arise in the inner legislation o f pure practical reason, as cpnditions o f inner freedom. They aim at realizing a condition in which our p o w e r o f choice is free from the influence o f sensuous mclination as such and open to that o f pure practical reason with its motive o f duty, l ^ o w , Kant argues, what leads us to act contrary to pure practical reason is the ends which w e adopt on the basis o f our sensuous desires. Hence pure practical reason, in order to weaken the influence o f these desires on our choice, must subordinate our subjective ends to its system o f pure rational ends. Obligatory ends are duties o f inner'freedom because the moral neces­ sity o f adopting these ends arises from that o f realizing a virtuous attitude o f will. Laws enjoining the adoption o f objectively valid ends or, as Kant calls them, 'duties o f virtue', are the proper subject-matter o f ethics because they arise in that legislation w h i c h is concerned with the goodness o f our conduct and hence with our moral attitude o f will. T o define the sphere o f juridical law it is not sufficient, then, to say that juridical duties consist in external actions. For compulsion to certain external actions, while logically possible, might be morally impossible. W e must rather say that juridical duties consist in external actions to the commission or omission o f which w e can be compelled ~ by other men consistently with our moral title to express our freedom outwardly. It is, o f course, true that L a w is concerned only with external actions, but it is not this that distinguishes it essentially from ethics. Obedience to ethical laws will involve external actions, since,

LAWS OF F R E E D O M

28

in prescribing the adoption o f certain ends, ethical laws prescribe, impHcidy and in a general way, action toward these ends. The fact that juridical laws are concerned only with external actions is, rather, a consequence o f the fundamental distinction between L a w and ethics: that the former is hmited to a study o f what is morally possible through outer legislation, whereas the latter has to do with that freedom which is possible only through inner legislation. • O n their material side, or as systems o f duties, then, Law and ethics are distinguished from each other in that the juridical concept o f duty is co-extensive with that of external action in conformity with uni­ versal laws of outer freedom, whereas ethical duties consist in obligatory ends. Even from this tentative description o f the content o f L a w and ethics it is clear that the notion o f ends is oneCcjf the key concepts in Kant's derivation o f duties. Although L a w can make no attempt to bring our aims or purposes under moral laws, since external constraint to the interior act o f choice itself is impossible, the freedom with which it is concerned is the freedom o f each subject o f the law to act in pursuit of his given ends. A n d ethics, as the system of duties possible only through inner legislation, has as its proper task that o f instituting within our will the system o f pure practical reason's objective ends. While the formal principle o f duty, as expounded in the Grundlegung, abstracts altogether from ends, human action is essentially purposive, and the application o f this principle is to be made through the notion o f ends. So far we have considered L a w and ethics as systems o f duties. But if we look at ethics, not from the point o f v i e w o f the special duties it prescribes, but rather from that o f the obligation proper to it, then ethics must have to do with all our duties. Because every moral law is derived from the supreme moral principle, w h i c h merely expresses the law o f pure practical reasons functioning, every moral l a w is accompanied b y the constraint o f pure practical reason. Whether the law arises in juridical legislation rqrdirectly in ethical legislation, it is a principle o f pure practical reason, and morally legislative reason in every case constrains us to fulfil the dAty from the thought o f duty. Our juridical duties, accompanied b y etnicai obligation to fulfil them without regard for the possibility ofxexteWal compulsion, remain juridical duties because the moral necessityvof the actions is independent of our inner attitude o f will and compulsiori b y others remains morally possible. B y this they are distinguished from directly ethical duties; but v

19

1 9

M.4.S., 219-20.

THE D I V I S I O N S OF MORAL P H I L O S O P H Y

29

inner legislation makes them 'indirectly ethical'. Ethics, as Kant puts iti takes up juridical duties, in so far as they are duties, into the position of motives in its o w n legislation. Choice must be lawful in its form: this is the first condition o f all obligation. B u t the type o f constraint contained in the notions o f outer and inner legislation, respectively, makes it morally necessary for us either to act upon a material maxim which could, in fact, become a universal law, or to make it our formal maxim to act in such a way that our maxim could become a universal law. Hence w e can distin­ guish t w o principles o f legislation. T h e principle o f legal obligation, so act that your m a x i m could become a universal law, is a principle for external actions alone: that o f ethical obligation, make it your maxim so to act as i f y o u were giving universal law through that maxim, is a principle for willing as w e l l . Since the principle o f legal obligation says nothing about the motive determining our power o f choice, Kant explains, it submits our choice to the will o f other men. T h e principle of ethical obligation, on the other hand, makes the thought o f duty itself the motive which should determine choice to action in accord­ ance with universal law. If w e repay a debt in order to avoid punish­ ment w e are acting upon a maxim which could, in fact, serve as a universal law for external relations among men, and our action upon this maxim o f self-interest satisfies the requirements o f juridical legis­ lation. B u t ethical legislation adds to the juridical l a w requiring us to repay our debts the command to determine ourselves to this action merely through the thought o f its lawfulness. According to ethical legislation our duty consists not merely in acting consistently with universal law, but in willing lawful actions simply;because they are lawful. 20

21

This principle o f ethical obligation is not a new principle o f duty. In itself its prescribes no duties, but only that in fulfilling any duty (whether juridical or ethical) w e determine our choice through the 2 0

Ibid. The poii^t is well put in M.d.S., 214, where Kant, discussing laws of outer and of inner freedom, notes that as we say in theoretical philosophy that 'only objects of outer sense are in space, but all objects, whether of outer or inner sense, are in time, because the representations of both, as representations, belong to inner sense: so too, whether freedom is regarded in the outer or in the inner exercise of choice, its laws, as pure practical laws of reason for free choice as such, must at the same time be the inner determining ground of choice—although they need not always be regarded in this manner.' •;• Cf. H.N.(23), 379. Cf. also ibid., 392: 'that, the maxim, of my action (its sub­ jective principle) be adequate for giving universal law (as an objective principle) is not the same as the principle that it is itself a duty to have this maxim.' 2 1

JO

LAWS OF F R E E D O M

motive o f duty. While it does, indeed, 'widen' our concept o f duty to include, in addition to what is specified in the juridical or ethical law, the determination o f choice to the action or the end through the thought of duty, it adds nothing to the matter o f the l a w but has to do only with 'what is formal' in the determination o f choice, i.e. w i t h the w a y in which w e determine ourselves to fulfil our d u t y . Y e t it is this formal requirement o f ethical obligation that leads from Law to ethics. For in so far as the principle o f choice itself is the rational vaKdity of our action, then it is not merely our actions but also o u r ends that must be adopted on the basis o f their rational validity. The, first principle o f ethical duty commands us merely to adopt ourjmds on the basis ot their objective validity, and from this command w e derive the system of"obligatory ends or duties ot v i r t u e . The categorical imperative is the principle ot ail moral laws, whether juridical or ethical. B u t in L a w w e regard it as the l a w o f another's rational will, whereas in ethics (in its formal aspect) w e regard it as the law o f our o w n will and then g o on to obtain from it the system o f duties to which, so regarded, it gives rise. W e can n o w express, in somewhat more technical terms, the relationship between the Grundle­ gung and the Metaphysik der Sitten which w e mentioned earlier. In the Grundlegung, as an analysis o f the formal element present in every morally good action, w e are considering the categorical imperative as the law o f our o w n will, although w e are not attempting to derive ' from it any system o f duties. Hence, between the Grundlegung and the Rechtslehre and Tugendlehre, w e must abstract the principle o f all moral laws from the notion o f ethical obligation w h i c h accompanies it, and regard the categorical imperative merely as the l a w o f rational will assuch. It is this procedure which gives us 'universal practical philo­ sophy,' which is thus logically prior to both L a w and ethics. In this preparatory discipline We examine the idea o f l a w as such, together with such derivative notions as obligation, duty, right and w r o n g as such. Then, b y considering the abstracTibrmal principle o f action more concretely, as the law o f another's rational will, w e obtain the Doctrine of Law. And finally, b y restoring to this\principle the ethical obligation from which w e prescinded, w e argue tSKa^eategorical imperative re22

23

24

22

M.d.S., 383. \ Cf. H.N.(23), 376: 'All principles of duty loojt either merely to duty which may also be the motive of the action, or they look to d\ ty as the motive, so that .the necessitating ground must be in ourselves. The ibrmer look to juridical duties: the latter to duties of virtue.' M.d.S., 389. 2 3

2i

J

/

T H E D I V I S I O N S OF MORAL P H I L O S O P H Y

31

/girding our ends and so obtain from it the Doctrine o f Virtue. / The problem o f h o w w e are to obtain these t w o systems o f duties from the supreme moral principle is the essential problem of the Metaphysik der Sitten. In this prehminary sketch o f Kant's procedure w e have insisted strongly upon the fact that it is the categorical imperative, viewed in relation to different aspects o f choice, that gives rise to these t w o systems o f duties. This may seem to be labouring the obvious. Y e t in outlining the respective spheres o f L a w and ethics, w e cannot insist too strongly o n this obvious fact. W i t h regard to ethics, more speci­ fically, Kant has insisted throughout the Grundlegung and the second Kritik that whileJ:here,.is nonaction without an end, a morally good action must be determined, not through the end w h i c h w e hope to achieve b y means o f the action, but rather by the formal principle expressed in thexategorical imperative. T h e fact that his primary concern in these works is t o seek out and establish the supreme moral principle relegates the matter o f moral action to a position o f secondary importance. In the Tugendlehre, on the other hand, Kant's interest lies primarily with the ends o f moral action; he is going to s h o w that pure practical reason prescribes, in addition to the formal deterrnining ground o f choice, also a material one, a system o f pure rational ends. T h e Tugendlehre does not reverse the position o f the earlier works: it rather continues and completes what was begun in them. But it is essential to keep in mind that Kant will argue to the first principle o f ethical duties on the basis o f the formal principle o f morally g o o d action as such. The formal principle o f action is the first principle o f all duty as such, and it is only because the nature o f human action is such that pure practical reason cannot determine actions without also determining ends that w e can obtain from the formal principle o f action a cate­ gorical imperative regarding ends. 25

The necessity o f viewing particular juridical laws as derivations from the categorical imperative, as well as the difficulties in so doing, is perhaps more obvious. L a w is independent o f ethics in the sense that it has no need o f ethical obligation in determining its duties. B u t it cannot be independent o f the supreme moral principle; for i f its laws were not derived from the categorical imperative, then the constraint exercised in juridical legislation w o u l d not be legal obligation but mere arbitrary violence. Juridical laws are, Kant holds, principles o f pure practical reason, but more directly they are expressions o f the will o f Cf. e.g. Gr., 399-400, 416, 441 ff: K.d.p.V., 21 fF/34-35, 62.

32

L A W S OF F R E E D O M 26

another person and, in the case o f merely positive or statutory l a w s , •• o f the arbitrary will o f another? In this case the connection o f juridical laws with the categorical imperative is an indirect one. It is, in other ' words, not immediately evident that these laws are moral laws. More specifically, Kant's analysis o f the supreme moral principle concludes that the notion o f moral autonomy is the foundation o f all moral concepts. M a n is represented, through the categorical impera­ tive, as an agent w h o can and ought to determine every free action according to a priori principles o f practical reason, and any rule o f c o n ­ duct which can be called 'moral' must have its source in the practical activity o f his pure reason. B u t the same man, living in civil society, finds his conduct subject to statutory laws expressing the arbitrary will of other men w h o can compel him b y force to actions which are in themselves morally indifferent. This looks, on the surface, like a mere heteronomous imposition o f another's will upon his power o f choice. But in this case the legal structure o f a society w o u l d be a mere fact, without moral significance. I f there is to be any moral philosophy regarding the laws o f the State, and hence any criticism o f existing laws by comparing them with the Idea o f L a w as such, w e must be able to show the source o f such laws in the notion o f freedom. Taking a step into political philosophy, w e must establish the authority o f the State to impose its arbitrary will upon the choice o f its citizens, b y showing that this imposition is essential to the realization o f outer freedom. Otherwise there can be only a positivistic study o f the laws o f a given country at a given time. In our brief study o f the 'metaphysical first principles o f L a w ' w e shall try to trace the juridical development o f the basic moral concepts and show h o w Kant derives the legal structure o f the State from the nature o f man as a moral agent. O u r interest in Kant's philosophy o f Law is only subsidiary to the main purpose o f this study, an analysis o f the Tugendlehre. B u t it must n o w be clear, from the principles o f division which Kant has laid d o w n , that a discussion o f the fundamental principles o f his philosophy o f L a w i s - a n indispensable prerequisite to a study o f his ethics. Ethics, as the sysjem o f duties according to laws which cannot be promulgated exterrmlly, has as its proper subjectmatter only those duties which consist W - t l i e pursuit o f certain ends. Although it is concerned indirectly w i t h all o u r duties, it does not establish the principles o f such duties as car) be enjoined b y externally 8 8

MJ.S., 224. On the two senses in which Kant uses the term 'positive law', cf. • below, p. 34, n. 3.

THE D I V I S I O N S OF MORAL P H I L O S O P H Y

33

given laws: the investigation o f these duties is the w o r k o f philosophy ofjLaw, and ethics, assuming the conclusions o f this study, merely adds to/juridical laws its o w n kind o f obligation. In requiring that the actions commanded b y juridical laws be done merelyl for the sake o f their rationality, it assumes that juridical laws are, in fact, based on prin­ ciples o f pure practical reason. It is philosophy o f L a w that investigates the source o f juridical laws in pure practical reason. W e r e w e to begin direcdy with the Tugendlehre, w e should have to omit from our study the entire field o f relations o f justice among men.

CHAPTER m

THE

UNIVERSAL

PRINCIPLE OF L A W

If the aim o f a metaphysic o f morals in general is t o investigate the a priori principles o f practical reason, that o f a metaphysic o f L a w is to study the a priori principles o f w h a t K a n t calls juridically-practical reason'. Kant distinguishes sharply b e t w e e n 'empirical' k n o w l e d g e o f R i g h t or L a w and a priori k n o w l e d g e o f the principles underlying any giving o f positive l a w . T h e empirical study o f positive L a w seeks to k n o w w h a t is in conformity w i t h the l a w s o f a g i v e n country at a given time: the w o r k o f the l a w y e r or o f the historian o f L a w is t o discover quid sit iuris, i.e. 'what the laws i n a certain place or at a certain time say or h a v e said'. A metaphysic o f L a w , o n the other hand, must seek out the a priori principles o f reason according t o w h i c h w e can, so to speak, j u d g e the lawfulness o f any positive l a w . T h e question ' w h a t is L a w ? ' Kant suggests, m a y p r o v e as embarrassing t o the l a w y e r as the question ' w h a t is truth?' t o the logician; for, as an authority o n positive L a w , h e can reply only w i t h tautologies o r b y enumerating the positive laws o f some country. I f he wishes to define L a w as such, according to its rational concept, he must turn t o metaphysical k n o w ­ ledge. For it is o n l y a metaphysic o f L a w that can state the essence o£ L a w and i n so doing provide us w i t h the universal criterion for deciding whether any positive l a w is i n accordance w i t h m o r a l principles. 1

2

3

4

1

Although Kant does not here define the term juridically-practical reason', he seems to mean by it reason regarded merely as providing the norm for external conduct, and not also as exercising constraint upon the power of choice of those who are subject to the law. When the term 'Right' is capitalized, it is intended as a translation of the German term Recht, i.e. Law. ® Kant uses the term 'positive law* in two different ways. A t times, as in the present context, it means merely any law which has, in fact, been promulgated through juridical legislation. Whenjtjgused in this sense 'positive law' can include both 'natural laws', i.e. those which can be known a priori through reason alone, and merely, statutory laws; A t other times 'positive law' is contrasted with 'natural law'. Unless we qualify 'positive law' as 'merely positive' or 'arbitrary', the term is to be understood in the wider sense which it has in the present context. O n these two usages of the term, cf. M.d.S., 229 and 227. • * M.d.S., 229-30. Kant distinguishes between iurisscientia, systematic knowledge of the principles underlying all positive laws, and iurisprudentia, knowledge of positive'laws and of how to apply them in particular cases. The Rechtslehre is, 2

34

THE

UNIVERSAL

P R I N C I P L E L A W

35

It was suggested, in the preceding chapter, that while Kant's v i e w s o n the nature o f the supreme moral principle require him to locate the end o f juridical laws in the realization o f the citizens' freedom rather than their happiness, the fact that juri dicU laws arise in outer legislation implies that the freedom at w h i c h they aim must be 'outer freedom* rather than moral a u t o n o m y . Clearly, a definition o f outer freedom is the first and most essential task o f a metaphysic o f L a w . B u t Kant does not begin his Rechtslehre b y defining outer freedom. Unlike the m a t h e ­ matician, the philosopher, he holds, cannot b e g i n w i t h 'definitions: h e must rather develop t h e m from his analysis o f the subject-matter. Hence Kant first attempts to determine the object o f L a w , that w i t h w h i c h L a w is concerned. F r o m this he can g o o n to formulate t h e 'universal principle o f L a w ' , the principle expressing the formal e l e ­ ment w h i c h must be present in e v e r y positive l a w (in so far as this is a just l a w ) , and finally arrive at the notion o f a ' l a w o f outer freedom* and so o f 'outer freedom' itself. Kant's definition o f L a w is as important for. w h a t it excludes f r o m the sphere o f juridical l a w s ' a s for w h a t it designates as their o b j e c t ; and even t h o u g h w e h a v e already noted, in principle, the n e g a t i v e implications o f his basic assumption, w e can profitably follow his argument for the sake o f its m o r e specific applications. T h e moral c o n ­ cept o f L a w , he holds, contains three elements. First, L a w has to d o only w i t h the relations o f one person to another in so far as their actions, as physical events in time, can have an influx on one another. B y this K a n t excludes f r o m the scope o f L a w all actions w h i c h affect only oneself, even t h o u g h it is conceivable that some o f these actions could be prevented t h r o u g h outer legislation. Certain actions affecting only oneself are morally impossible, but the g r o u n d o f their impossi­ bility lies in man's obligation to moral integrity and virtue; and since virtue, as an interior attitude o f will, lies b e y o n d the scope o f o u t e r legislation, juridical l a w s o u g h t not to prohibit actions o f this sort: T h o u g h such violations o f duty to oneself m a y i n v o l v e external actions, jivridical laws o u g h t not to prohibit these actions except- in so far as they might, at the same time, have injurious effects o n other people. T h e object o f L a w , as that w h i c h is fully external in o u r actions affecting others, can be realized independently o f our m o r a l integrity and perfection. 1

strictly speaking, iurisscientia and not iurisprudentia. Recognizing the inaccuracy, however, we shall find it more convenient to refer to the Rechtslehre as 'juris­ prudence'.

36

LAWS

OF FREEDOM

Secondly, K a n t continues, a m o n g those external actions w h i c h affect others, L a w is not concerned w i t h the relation b e t w e e n the act o f choice o f one person and the mere needs and wishes o f another person, It is not the business o f juridical laws, in other w o r d s , to pre­ scribe as duties acts o f benevolence to others. This assertion follows logically from Kant's v i e w o f the relation b e t w e e n the supreme prin­ ciple q f morality and the ends to be realized t h r o u g h o u r actions. Against the utilitarians he maintains that the supreme moral principle is not based u p o n an end (happiness): w e d o not first determine the object t o be realized and then prescribe as duty actions w h i c h w i l l promote that object. O n the contrary, it is a formal principle w h i c h abstracts altogether from ends. This is n o t to deny that w e have a d u t y o f striving to realize certain states o f affairs, including the happiness o f other men. B u t this duty enters m o r a l philosophy o n l y w h e n the question o f ends i n the sense o f objects o f choice is raised, in ethics. The moral necessity o f benevolent actions follows f r o m the moral necessity o f adopting such ends as w e could w i l l everyone t o have, and obligatory ends, i n turn, are secondary t o and derivative f r o m the formal principle o f action accompanied b y ethical legislation. F r o m the nature o f the supreme moral principle, together w i t h the fact that outer legislation cannot extend t o o u r adoption o f ends, it follows that in so far as an action is necessary or impossible according to juridical laws it is so b y virtue o f its f o r m and n o t b y reason o f its relation t o the happiness o f the subjects. W h i l e K a n t holds that it is legitimate for the State to secure the well-being o f its citizens to the extent necessary to make them content t o remain w i t h i n it, such legislation is o n l y in the nature o f a means to an end. It is a means to the preservation o f civil society and so to the realization o f the State's essential purpose. This purpose, outer freedom, can be realized independently o f the citizens' benevolence t o w a r d one another, just as it can be realized independently 5

6

6

•." In Kant's terms, the relation with which Law is concerned is not that between the Willkiir of one. person and the Wunsch of another,, but rather between the Willkiir of each. O n this distinction, cf. M.d.S., 213. Willkiir or the power of choice is the appetitive power in so faxas its act is accompanied by consciousness of our power to realize its object. Iriffie absence of this consciousness the act of the appetitive power is a mere wish. Here Kant means that if another person merely wishes for something, the relation of my action to his wish is not the con­ cern of Law. If, however, he wills the object and acts externally to obtain it, then, in so far as his action is consistent with the freedom of others, Law is concerned that my action should not interfere with his. ' Cf. tyber den Gemeinspruch, 298-9.

THE U N I V E R S A L P R I N C I P L E OF L A W

37

o f their v i r t u e ; for the freedom o f one person is consistent w i t h i n ­ difference on the part o f others to his needs and wants. T h e third element in the notion o f L a w puts f o r w a r d Kant's positive v i e w o n the principle o f juridical laws.! H a v i n g denied that the nature o f L a w is to p r o m o t e the virtue or the w e l l - b e i n g o f the citizens, he n o w argues that its nature is to express the n o t i o n o f freedom in the" external relations o f m e n . L a w , he explains, concerns 'only the

form

o f the relation o f the reciprocal acts o f choice m e r e l y in so far as they are regarded as free, and w h e t h e r the action o f the o n c c a n

harmonize' 7

w i t h the freedom o f the other according to a universal l a w ' . L a w is n o t concerned w i t h the matter o f our volitions, i.e. w i t h the ends w i n c h w e are striving to realize t h r o u g h our actions. If, for example, t w o m e n enter into a contract, it is not concerned w i t h w h a t each hopes

to

achieve t h r o u g h the agreement. Its concern is limited to' the question o f w h e t h e r the exercise o f free choice o n the part o f each is consistent w i t h the freedom o f the other.

8

7

M.d.S., 231. Kant's usage of the terms Willkiir and freie Willkiir presents a problem for the translator. According to the definition given in M.d.S., 213, JVillkiir is a generic term for the appetitive power as such, which is found.in both man and the lower animals. In the lower animals the appetitive power can be determined only through objects of sensuous impulse; it is synonymous with arbitrium brutum. In man the appetitive power can be determined by pure reason and is called freie Willkiir. This does not, however, imply that freie Willkiir is synonymous with moral choice. It is because we are immediately conscious of a categorical imperative—which, as a command to determine our choice indepen­ dently of the inclinations, implies our ability so to determine it—that we are justified in regarding the human Willkiir as free, i.e. as not determined by sensuous impulses but only influenced by them. However, our exercise of choice may or may not be in accordance with principles of pure practical reason; we may allow motives of sensuous origin, rather than a pure rational motive, to determine our choice. Hence the human Willkiir can be described as a 'power of appetition accord­ ing to concepts, in so far as the ground which determines it to action is found in itself and not in the object', a 'power to act or to refrain from acting, as one pleases'. The human power of choice is, then, the appetitive power in so far as it is deter­ mined by reason and can be determined by pure reason. It should, strictly speak­ ing, be called freie Willkiir or 'free choice', but Kant usually refers to it simply as Willkiir or 'choice'. Unless otherwise indicated I'shall, in this study, use the term 'choice' of 'power of choice' to designate the human appetitive power in general. I shall use this term, in other words, as equivalent to Willkiir in Kant's ordinary usage of the term. Even apart from the question of morally good choice, human choice as such already implies a relative freedom, a nonnietermiriation by i m ­ mediate sensuous impulse. It is the outward expression of tMs rdative freedpm that Law aims to realize. But the ground for man's moral title to outer freedom lies in his capacity for morally autonomous choice. , Ibid., 230. O n the nature of Law, cf. Dber den Gemeinspruch, 289 fF. and 302. The text of the Metaphysik der Sitten referred to defines Law, in summary, as 'the totality of the conditions, under which the choice of one can harmonize with die,. choice of the other according to a universal law of freedom.' ;

8

38

LAWS

OF

FREEDOM

Man's capacity for morally autonomous choice is the basis o f his moral title to freedom in his relations w i t h other m e n , and w e cannot justify outer freedom, as a moral concept, w i t h o u t deriving it from this moral capacity. B u t the fact that juridical l a w s arise in outer legis­ lation, as w e have seen, immediately excludes m o r a l a u t o n o m y itself as their end: external laws cannot a i m at that freedom which'consists in absolute independence from motives o f sensuous origin. B u t h u m a n action as such is free in another sense—in the relative sense that it is not determined b y the immediate sensuous impulse o f the m o m e n t ; ana it is here that w e must begin building our concept o f outer freedom. In the Grundlegung, as an investigation o f the formal m a x i m o f morality, Kant located the difference b e t w e e n h u m a n action and animal b e ­ haviour in the fact that human action is action u p o n a m a x i m or sub­ jective principle o f action. Here, w h e r e his a i m is to apply this purely formal principle, Kant"identifies action u p o n a m a x i m w i t h purposive action. In acting upon a m a x i m , m a n rises a b o v e the impulse o f the moment; but, as the Metaphysik der Sitten points out, he does this b y directing his action to an end. It is because a n y h u m a n action as such is purposive that any human action expresses at least a relative freedom— hot necessarily freedom from the influence o f sensuous desire as such, since one's adoption o f an end itself m a y be based o n desire for the object which he takes as his end, but at least freedom from determina­ tion b y immediate sensuous impulse. 1

Juridical laws, K a n t has argued, are concerned o n l y w i t h 'the form o f the reciprocal acts o f choice m e r e l y in so far as they are regarded as free'. A n d since free action as such, so far as external laws are concerned, is action toward an end w h i c h the agent himself has set, the aim o f juridical law is t o insure that each subject's pursuit o f his o w n ends (whatever they m a y be) leaves every other subject o f the l a w free to pursue his o w n ends. Put negatively, the a i m o f juridical l a w is to pre­ vent me from compelling y o u to p e r f o r m actions w h i c h are means, not to your o w n ends, but merely to mine, and vice versa. A n d it accomplishes this aim b y compelling each o f us to limit his external actions to those w h i c h are formaUy^consistent w i t h a universal l a w for the external relations o f m e n or w h i c h , so far as their external aspects are concerned, have the f o r m o f free or universally valid actions. But. w e cannot pass directly f r o m the fact that h u m a n action is purposive to the assertion that each m a n o u g h t to be a l l o w e d to pursue his o w n ends; nor does K a n t m a k e any such direct transition. In

THE UNIVERSAL PRINCIPLE QF LAW

39

determining the a i m o f juridical l a w he assumes an argument from the Grundlegung w h i c h b o t h justifies and clarifies the 'universal principle o f L a w ' w h i c h he is about t o formulate. A l t h o u g h L a w comprise? rules only for external actions and not for t f t inner, determination o f choice itself, it is man's nature as a free moral agent that establishes his title to outer freedom; and Kant's passage from the formula o f uni­ versal l a w to the formula o f humanity as an end-in-itself shows h o w he obtains the criterion for determining w h i c h m a x i m s o f action could qualify as a universal l a w g o v e r n i n g the external relations o f m e n . Although, as he explains, these t w o formulations o f the categorical imperative are 'at b b t t o m one and the same', the formula o f the e n d in-itself seems already t o be, in one sense, an application o f the supreme moral principle, in so far as it takes into consideration the objects o f our • actions and tells us something about -the sort o f m a x i m s w h i c h could be willed as universal l a w . This formula, it w i l l b e recalled, is the i m ­ perative: so act as to use humanity in y o u r s e l f and others never as a mere means but always, at the same time, as an end i n itself. 9

10

F r o m the fact that juridical l a w s arise in outer legislation, it follows, Kant has repeatedly asserted, that they must be mdifferent to ends. It m i g h t seem, therefore, that the first principle o f L a w has n o connection w i t h the formulation o f the categorical imperative w h i c h deals e x ­ plicitly w i t h ends. B u t K a n t explains that w i t h i n this formula w e can distinguish t w o c o m m a n d s : the negative c o m m a n d n o t to use persons merely as means to o u r subjective ends and the positive command t o promote the essential ends o f humanity, m o r e specifically, our o w n • perfection and the happiness o f o t h e r s . It is the positive c o m m a n d that has to do' w i t h w h a t w e w o u l d normally call 'ends', i.e. objects or states o f affairs w h i c h w e intend to bring into being through, o u r actions. This c o m m a n d w i l l be the concern o f ethics exclusively. B u t the negative c o m m a n d is o f the utmost importance for L a w . 11

A s in the formula o f universal law, w e can here again distinguish a c o m m a n d to d o right actions and a c o m m a n d t o d o morally g o o d actions. R i g h t actions, according to the negative aspect o f the. end-initself formula, will be such actions as are consistent w i t h the status o f ourselves and others as n o t mere means t o our subjective ends; M o r a l l y g o o d actions w i l l be those i n w h i c h the notion o f humanity serves, i n •Gr., 437-8. 1 1

10

Ibid.,

429.

0

This distinction is implicit in the examples of duties obtained by applying the" formula of the end-in-itself, Gr., 429-30. It becomes explicit in the Tugendlehre; cf. below, p. 83 if. »

40

LAWS

OF

FREEDOM

some sense, as the end o f our w i l l in determining us to right actions. W e need not, at the m o m e n t , consider w h a t it means to describe as an 'end' something that already exists. Just as it is ethical legislation that attaches the motive o f duty to the universal imperative o f duty, so t o o it is ethical legislation that commands us t o refrain f r o m using persons as there means out o f reverence for personality and thus leads us to take humanity as our o w n end. F r o m this formulation o f the categorical imperative L a w takes only w h a t refers to right actions and, in so far as jurisprudence is concerned only w i t h the relations o f m e n to one another^ considers only 'humanity in the person o f others' as an endm-itself. T o regard this imperative as a juridical principle is to r e m o v e from it all that pertains to 'ends' in the p r i m a r y and positive sense o f the term, to the interior determination o f choice itself, and to actions in so far as they affect only ourselves. W e are then left w i t h the notion ofThe humanity o f others as an 'end' in the sense o f a mere Umiting condition upon our actions affecting them, or as 'the first hmiting condition o f everyone's freedom o f a c t i o n ' . 12

Justifying his contention that the formulas o f universal l a w and o f the end-in-itself are at b o t t o m one and the same, K a n t argues that to say m y m a x i m regarding the use o f means to an end must be hmited to the condition o f its universal validity for e v e r y o n e is t o say that m y m a x i m must have as its foundation the subject o f all ends, regarded never as a mere means but rather as the highest limiting condition in m y use o f all m e a n s . In other w o r d s , to say that m y material m a x i m must be submitted t o the test o f g i v i n g universal l a w t h r o u g h it is t o say that m y use o f persons as means t o m y ends must be a use to w h i c h they could give their rational consent. N o w e v e r y man, as the subject o f pure practical reason, has rational grounds for regarding his existence as an end-in-itself and for requiring o f others that they use h i m , n o t as a mere means to their ends, but in such a w a y that he can, in being used as a means, at the same time pursue his o w n e n d s . T h e implied limitation upon our actions is, therefore, that the other person 'must always be able t o contain in riimself the end o f the a c t i o n ' . M y maxim o f action involving the use^ofother m e n as means to m y ends can qualify as a universal l a w o n l y w h e n all other men—including those I use—can g i v e their rational consent t o the action, or w h e n they can, in serving as means to m y ends, still pursue their o w n ends. W h e n t w o men, each o f his o w n free choice, enter into a contract, each is, presumably,, using the other as a means t o his ends; but in so far as 13

14

15

»Gr., 43Q-I.

1 3

Ibid., 437-8.

" Ibid., 429.

1 5

Ibid., 430.

THE U N I V E R S A L PRINCIPLE OF L A W

41

the relationship is a just one, each party to the agreement, while serving as a means to the other's ends, is also pursuing his o w n ends. T h e action o f each serves, at the same time, his o w n ends and those o f the other. If, o n the other hand, the first person forces the second into the agree­ ment or misrepresents the nature o f it, the action o f the second serves only the ends o f the first and the reciprocal acts o f choice leave only the first party free. T h e rrLaxirn o f the first party could not, therefore, b e c o m e a universal l a w o f outer freedom, since his exercise o f free choice is inconsistent w i t h freedom as a universal condition. H a v i n g analysed the three elements in the concept o f L a w , Kant is prepared to formulate the 'universal principle o f L a w ' as a definition o f w h a t is juridically right o r in conformity w i t h the Idea o f L a w : any •action is right if, according t o its m a x i m , the freedom o f choice o f any person can co-exist w i t h the freedom o f every other person according to a universal l a w . H a v i n g examined the nature o f the universal l a w in question w e m i g h t paraphrase this principle: a juridically right action is an action in conformity w i t h laws w h i c h restrict each person's actions in pursuit o f his ends to the condition that these .actions leave all the other subjects o f the l a w free to pursue'their o w n ends. T h e situation given to jurisprudence is that o f a number o f m e n , each pursuing his subjective ends through actions w h i c h , because o f his proximity t o others, will affect them. Each, as the subject o f pure practical reason, has the moral t i t l e to express his freedom o u t w a r d l y , i.e. to act i n pursuit o f his o w n ends. This is the sense i n w h i c h K a n t asserts that L a w , in order to determine duties, begins with the ends that everyone h a s . 1 6

17

18

1 8

M.d.S., 230. Since juridical laws require that certain actions take place, they must require that we have certain maxims, because.human action is action upon a maxim. They do not require that we adopt the formal maxim of lawfulness but only that the material maxims which we have be such that we can act upon them without violating the freedom of others. Because our maxims are maxims of action-toward-an-end, while Kant's principle of division between Law and ethics requires a distinction between external actions and the ends to which they are intended, it is difficult to speak accurately about our maxims. Thus when I speak of the 'form of an action' I mean, in reality, the form of a maxim in so far as the maxim is regarded merely as the source of an external action, and without reference to the end toward which the action is directed in the maxim. On Kant's terminology in this matter, cf. below, p. 81, note 13. A moral title, authorization, or faculty (Befugnis) is the moral possibility of doing anything that is permissible or not contrary to some duty. Cf. M.d.S., 222 and H.N.fa), 250. Kant describes it as a facultas moralis, and it might be regarded as a 'right' in a wider sense than the strictly juridical meaning, of a legal title to exercise compulsion on others through the power of the State (facultas juridicd). Cf. also M.d.S., 383. ' M.d.S., 382. 1 7

.

t

1 8

42

LAWS

OF

FREEDOM

As the system o f duties according t o outer legislation it cannot c o n ­ cern itself w i t h what these ends m a y b e : it cannot, that is to say, consider what ends m e n ought to have. B u t its most fundamental premise is that every m a n is morally entitled to pursue his o w n ends, free from compulsion b y others; and the fact that this title belongs to every subject o f the l a w already implies a limitation o n the actions o f each: namely, that his pursuit o f ends must leave a similar freedom open to every other. T h e notion o f outer freedom, as the freedom o f m e n in society, already contains the notion o f a reciprocal hmitation u p o n everyone's exercise o f free choice. Hence, K a n t maintains, L a w is merely the hmitation o f freedom through the formal condition o f its thorough-going consistency w i t h itself. Juridical laws have to do only w i t h 'the formal condition o f outer freedom', i.e. w i t h w h e t h e r one person's exercise o f freedom is consistent w i t h freedom as a universal condition. 19

Kant has formulated the universal principle o f L a w as a definition o f actions which are formally consistent w i t h L a w . B u t this principle is also a c o m m a n d : act externally so that y o u r exercise o f free choice could harmonize w i t h the freedom o f e v e r y o n e according to a uni­ versal l a w . T o formulate the principle as a c o m m a n d is to call attention to the constraint a c c o m p a n y i n g it, and K a n t n o w turns to the problem o f the relation between outer freedom and the constraint accompanying juridical laws. This c o m m a n d , he reminds us, implies nothing about our m o t i v e s : it does not reqirke^us to m a k e the principle itself our formal m a x i m in acting. It is the c o m m a n d to realize outer freedom, and another person can be free ' e v e n t h o u g h his freedom be mdifferent to me, or even t h o u g h I m i g h t w i s h i n m y heart to violate it,, so long as I only d o it n o injury t h r o u g h m y external actions'. Since this principle is merely the c o m m a n d to bring o u r external actions into conformity w i t h principles o f reason, it is clear that each subject o f the l a w must be conscious o f constraint b y his o w n reason to obey the law. B u t jurisprudence makes n o appeal t o the subjects' consciousness o f their obligation. It cannot require that they limit their exercise o f freedom merely because^it^is rational to d o so. T h e first principle o f L a w says ' o n l y that freedom is h m i t e d in its Idea, and that it may also be actively limited b y others'. 2 0

B u t since the notion o f outer freedom, as absence o f compulsion b y others, may still seem to be i n conflict w i t h the possibility o f its being 'actively limited b y others', K a n t goes o n to analyse m o r e closely the 1 9

C£ M.d.S.-, 396.

2 0

Ibid., 231.

/

THE

UNIVERSAL

PRINCIPLE

OF

LAW

43

/relation between outer freedom and the compulsion w h i c h a c c o m ­ panies juridical laws. T h e notion o f L a w , as the condition o f outer freedom, he argues, contains analytically the notion o f authority to compel. I f m y actions are right or consistent w i t h outer freedom, then any action on the part o f others w h i c h interferes w i t h m y lawful pursuit o f ends is w r o n g or contrary to outer f r e e d o m . A n d i f the compulsion w h i c h others try to exercise\upon m e is checked b y .a contrary c o m ­ pulsion o n them, this counter-compulsion is in accordance w i t h outer freedom and therefore right. A s 'an obstacle to an obstacle' to freedom, it promotes outer f r e e d o m . T h e fact that men m a y try t o violate one another's freedom, or are at least tempted to d o so, presupposes, p f course, that they are imperfectly rational beings. B u t given this assumption, Kant argues, moral tide to c o m p e l is contained analytically in the concept o f outer freedom, and so o f L a w as the totality o f the conditions under w h i c h outer freedom is possible. T h e compulsion accompanying juridical laws is in no w a y a Irindrance to freedom: o n the contrary, it is the necessary condition o f outer freedom. In a state . o f ' l a w l e s s freedom', a state o f nature characterized b y absence o f the State's over-riding authority, m y ability to express m y freedom out­ w a r d l y w o u l d be a matter o f chance. It w o u l d depend u p o n a merely contingent h a r m o n y o f m y act o f choice w i t h that o f m y neighbour. In such a state, freedom w o u l d be essentially 'in collision w i t h itself', since there w o u l d be n o principle to guarantee that m y attempts to • express m y freedom o u t w a r d l y w i l l not be checked at every point b y others' actions. T h e freedom o f imperfectly rational beings can be only a freedom under laws accompanied b y constraint; and since, in this context, n o reference can be made to the self-constraint o f pure practical reason, the possibility o f external compulsion according t o universal l a w is the condition o f freedom. Kant suggests another form o f the universal principle o f L a w w h i c h makes this point m o r e explicit: an imperfectly rational being, in so far as he is o u t w a r d l y free, is subject to external constraint in accordance w i t h universal l a w . . 21

22

v

2 3

T h e notion o f L a w , then, contains analytically the notion o f auth-' ority to compel. M o r e o v e r L a w can, in fact, be defined as moral authority to c o m p e l . In the definition o f L a w , K a n t explains, w e ought not to include t w o elements: obligation according to a l a w and the authority o f the legislator" to exercise compulsion according to the l a w . W e o u g h t to omit the notion o f obligation and locate L a w i m m e d i ­ ately in the possibility o f universal reciprocal compulsion, rather than 2 1

M.d.S., 230.

2 2

Ibid., 231.

2 3

Ibid., 396.

_

•

44

L A W S OF F R E E D O M

mediately through the corresponding obligation. In this w a y , he adds, our concept o f L a w will be a pure juridical concept, that o f 'strict Law* unmixed w i t h ethical precepts.* In saying this Kant is n o t deny­ ing his earlier assertion that L a w is a moral concept only in so far as it has regard to a corresponding obligation o n the part o f the subjects. Under certain conditions constraint f r o m w i t h o u t constitutes obliga­ tion, and these conditions are the consistency o f compulsion w i t h outer freedom. Hence in the definition o f L a w as the possibility o f universal reciprocal compulsion or as moral authority to c o m p e l there is already contained the notion o f legal obligation, and this is the only type o f obligation w i t h w h i c h jurisprudence can concern itself. T r u e , w e are * conscious that the actions enjoined b y juridical laws are duties and that w e ought to perform them without regard for the compulsion that can be brought to bear o n us. B u t this consciousness o f our ethical obligation to juridical duties is precisely w h a t K a n t intends to exclude from the notion o f L a w b y defining it merely as the possibility o f uni­ versal reciprocal compulsion. So far as legal obligation is concerned, itj w o u l d be redundant to include within the definition o f L a w both moral authority to compel and obligation according t o the l a w . A n d „ where strict L a w is concerned, the fact that w e are also under ethical obligation to fulfil our juridical duties is not relevant. In our definition o f L a w w e have already laid d o w n the conditions under w h i c h neces­ sitation from without is obligation, and this necessitation is the only type o f obligation that jurisprudence can consider. T h e corollary o f this definition o f strict L a w is that R i g h t can extend only so far as does the possibility o f compulsion. T h e principle **of juridical laws is that o f justice; but L a w cannot fulfil completely "the ideal o f justice w h i c h reason, apart f r o m the external f r a m e w o r k o f Law, conceives. U n d e r the heading 'equivocal R i g h t ' K a n t mentions cases from both civil and criminal l a w in, w h i c h our v i e w o f w h a t would be just according to the 'court o f conscience' must differ from the decision that w o u l d have to be g i v e n in a court o f l a w . W e regard it as a matter o f justice and not o f benevolence, t<j> take Kant's most striking example, that a man ought not t o take the life o f an innocent nerson in order to save his o w n . W e d f o l d that since he has n o right to kill the other person, he should be punished for doing so. B u t , Kant 24

25

2 6

2 4

2 6

M.d.S., 232.'

230.

Ibid., 234-6. In addition to the so-called 'right of necessity', Kant includes under 'equivocal right' matters of equity in which, he maintains, the necessary conditions for a court to determine what is due to each subject of the law are lacking.

T H E U N I V E R S A L P R I N C I P L E OF L A W

45

argues, the possibihty o f compulsion could not extend to a case in w h i c h a man in mortal clanger can save himself only b y killing another person. T h e severest sanction w h i c h could be attached to such a l a w — the penalty o f death (should the action be discovered)—could not out­ w e i g h his fear o f the certain death that w o u l d f o l l o w from his obedi­ ence to the law. Hence reason's allegation o f what is right or according to principles o f justice belongs t o 'equivocal R i g h t ' , for reason deter­ mines it without taking into consideration the f r a m e w o r k within w h i c h L a w must be defined. W e are, indeed, under obligation to refrain from killing an innocent person even at the cost o f our o w n life, but the obligation is ethical rather than l e g a l . 27

T h r o u g h o u t his discussion o f L a w , Kant takes pains to emphasize its purely external character. It is difficult, he realizes, t o philosophize about moral laws in complete abstraction from all that is proper to ethics. Indeed, it cannot be otherwise in v i e w o f the rational origin o f moral laws as such. M o r a l philosophy, he remarks, is usually regarded as a treatise o n duties and n o t also o n rights, and the reason is that ' w e k n o w our o w n freedom (from w h i c h all moral laws, and therefore all rights as well as duties, originate) only through the m o r a l imperative, w h i c h is a proposition enjoining d u t y ' . Subsequendy w e can develop from the moral imperative, the concept ©fa right or p o w e r to imppse legal obligation o n others; b u t duty is the more fundamental concept. W h e t h e r w e regard jurisprudence as a system o f rights or as a system o f juridical duties is mdifferent in itself, since a juridical duty is simply an action w h i c h w e can b e legally compelled t o perform. B u t the notion o f duty, as the matter o f obligation, is so closely connected in our consciousness w i t h ethical obligation that it is better t o speak in 28

2 7

From this it follows that our perfect duties toward others, our duties accord­ ing to principles of justice, cannot be treated exhaustively in Rechtslehre. In Vorle­ sung, 42, Kant describes equity as jus late dictum, in contrast with strict Right as jus stride dictum. Ethics, he notes, is separated from strict jus, not from jus as such. Our duties according to principles of equity would not belong to the proper subject-matter of ethics, which consists in obligatory ends; yet they would.per-, tain to ethics because the possibility-of external compulsion is lacking. ~ ' M.d.S., 239; cf. also 379. In H.N.(2i), 259, Kant gives a further reason for regarding Rechtslehre as a treatise on rights rather than duties. In reply to the question, whether it is a mistake for political science to say more about the rights of the citizens than about their duties, he answers that this procedure is correct. For the citizens, as such, are subject to the compulsion of the law, and the-man who'wishes to exercise this' compulsion upon another must only prove his right, since the other is, by nature, free. The duty of the pther cannot be presupposed; it must, rather, be derived from Law or the subjection of the citizens to the com­ pulsion of externally given laws. 2 8

v

46

LAWS

OF

FREEDOM

terms o f rights rather than o f duties, and so to remind ourselves that Law has nothing to do w i t h virtue and its requirements. Law, as w e have seen, has n o concern w i t h o u r moral disposition o r ' attitude o f will. W h e n the principle o f L a w c o m m a n d s that each subject o f the l a w be left free to pursue his o w n ends, it is n o t at all concerned w i t h w h a t these ends m a y be or w i t h whether the pursuit o f them is morally g o o d o r bad. F r o m its point o f v i e w , for example, the miser must b e left free to pursue the t h o r o u g h l y i m m o r a l ends o f his avarice, so l o n g as his actions t o w a r d these ends d o not violate the freedom o f others. B y connecting penalties w i t h actions contrary to the freedom o f others the legislator makes it imprudent for the miser • to use certain means t o his ends, e.g. stealing o r failing t o fulfil his contracts. O n the assumption that all m e n naturally desire their o w n happiness, the legislator makes use o f their inclinations t o w a r d this end in order to counteract the influence o f their desires for particular ends. But he does not, and cannot, alter the ends themselves. O n the con­ trary, he guarantees the freedom o f the miser to pursue his avarice through actions consistent w i t h the freedom o f others. Jurisprudence, in short, is concerned neither w i t h the moral disposition o f the subject whose actions it restrains nor w i t h that o f the subject w h o s e rights it thereby determines. T h e one can o b e y the l a w m e r e l y f r o m fear o f its sanctions; the other can use his freedom to seek w h a t ends he will, and the requirements o f L a w are thereby satisfied. O u t e r freedom is a strictly juridical concept h a v i n g to do only w i t h m e n ' s external actions. Their attitude o f will is the object o f laws o f inner freedom, w h i c h is an exclusively ethical concept. But just because L a w is independent o f ethics, it is equally important to stress the ground o f juridical concepts in the n o t i o n o f m o r a l auto­ nomy. Thus, in describing a strict right as c o m p l e t e l y external, K a n t reminds us that w h i l e n o appeal can be made to o u r consciousness o f our obligation corresponding to the right, the right is ' g r o u n d e d upon' our consciousness o f obligation according to the l a w . T h e moral title o f others to c o m p e l us through the p o w e r o f the State, their rights according t o the law, are based u p o n our consciousness o f obligation toward them, w h i c h is, ia~tuhi, based u p o n our recognition o f the presence o f pure practical reason w i t h i n us and o f our obligation toward our o w n personality. T h e 'right o f h u m a n i t y w i t h i n o u r o w n person is, Kant maintains, the first condition o f all duty and the foundation o f all obligation. MJ.S., 232. 2 9

29

THE

U N I V E R S A L P R I N C I P L E OF L A W

47

For Kant, the term 'right' has its primary reference within the c o n ­ text o f property, w h e r e one person's right to an object is a limitation o n the moral title o f others to use that object, or an obligation on their part to refrain from using it. N o w our 'personality' o r 'humanity', i.e. our possession o f pure practical reason, is the g r o u n d o n w h i c h w e must rationally regard our existence as an end-in-itself. O u r moral tide to make use o f our o w n person is limited b y our personality, and w e can, b y analogy, refer to the obligation imposed upon o u r free choice b y the 'Idea o f our personality' as 'the right o f humanity in our own
31

3 2

T h e right o f humanity i n o u r o w n person is the immediate ground o f a class o f duties—perfect duties to ourselves—which, Kant holds, are the highest-of all our duties. T h o u g h their striking resemblance t o ' juridical duties earns them the title 'inner juridical duties', they belong properly to ethics. B u t the right o f humanity in our o w n person is, a t . the same time, the ultimate g r o u n d o f o u r juridical duties. For i f w e consider w h a t a categorical imperative as such enjoins, w e find that the right o f humanity in the person o f other m e n is, in a sense, based u p o n the right o f humanity in our o w n person. T h a t w h i c h constitutes us persons is our freedom, and the principle o f freedom is that o f objec­ tively valid action. I f b y virtue o f our personality w e can claim to, be treated b y others as not mere means to their subjective ends, then, since o u r personality lies in our capacity to act in accordance w i t h universal 3 0

H.N.(23), 390-1. > On the distinction between a person or subject whose addons can be imputed to him, and a thing which is not capable of responsibility, cf. M.d.S., 223. ** M.d.S., 417-8. 3 1

48

laws

of

freedom

law, w e ought also b y virtue o f our personality t o treat others as ends in themselves. W h i l e their right to b e so treated comes from thenpossession o f pure practical reason, there can b e n o right w i t h o u t a corresponding obligation; and this obligation proceeds from our o w n personality. In the preceding paragraphs the t e r m 'right' has been used in a loose, even metaphorical sense. T o say that personality is the limiting c o n ­ dition o f action is, so far, only t o describe the rational relations o f m e n to themselves and one another. T o add that rights can b e described i n terms o f the corresponding obligation is t o add the n o t i o n o f necessi­ tation or constraint. In order t o give the 'right o f h u m a n i t y i n the person o f others' a properly juridical meaning w e should have to add, further, that L a w makes each man's m o r a l title n o t to serve as a mere means to the ends o f others a legal title t o i n v o k e the p o w e r o f the State in defence o f his f r e e d o m . A n d this legal right to outer freedom, which is implicit i n the universal principle o f L a w , is, K a n t holds, the inherent right w h i c h every m a n under juridical laws o r within civil society has merely b y virtue o f his h u m a n i t y o r personality. Individual men can acquire, through their juridical acts, rights w i t h respect to particular things; but these rights b e l o n g t o t h e m qua individual m e n w h o have performed certain actions. In contrast w i t h these acquired rights, 'freedom (independence f r o m the necessitating w i l l o f another), in so far as i t can co-eydst w i t h the freedom o f e v e r y m a n according to a universal l a w , is the one original right b e l o n g i n g t o every m a n merely b y virtue o f his h u m a n i t y ' . 1

33

34

i

3 5

36

3 3

O n the derivation o f our title t o c o m p e l others f r o m o u r o w n personality and our obligation t o w a r d o u r o w n h u m a n i t y , cf. further H.N.fa), 392. T h e s e passages f r o m Kant's preliminary n o t e s t o t h e Metaphysik der Sitten are o f special importance because t h e y deal explicitly w i t h w h a t L a w takes l a r g e l y for granted. T h e y are also i m p o r t a n t f o r the l i g h t w h i c h t h e y t h r o w o n t h e nature o f o u r perfect duties t o w a r d ourselves. O n this class o f duties, cf. b e l o w , Chapter VIII. O n the various senses o f t h e t e r m Recht a n d their relation t o o n e another, cf. H.N.(23), 262. M.d.S., 237. Cf. also HJV.(23), 341. ' O u t e r f r e e d o m is i n d e p e n d e n c e o f a m a n from the choice o f another, b e i n g a l l o w e d t o a c t n o t m e r e l y a c c o r d i n g t o t h e other's ends b u t at t h e same time a c c o r d i n g j ^ h i s o w n ends, i.e. b e i n g a l l o w e d n o t tolserve as a m e r e means t o another's ends o r n o t t o b e c o m p e l l e d b y another s o toj serve'."Cf. also Zum ewigen Frieden, 350: ' . . . m y outer (juridical) f r e e d o m is to b e explained as t h e title t o o b e y n o o t h e r external l a w s than t h o s e t o w h i c h I could have g i v e n m y assent'. O n t h e basis o f Kant's passage f r o m t h e formula o f universal l a w t o that o f the end-in-itself, it is clear that these definitions o f o u t e r f r e e d o m are m e r e l y different w a y s o f expressing that g i v e n i n t h e Metaphysik der 3 4

3 5

Sitten. 8 6

•

Justifying his assertion that f r e e d o m is t h e ' o n e ' inherent right o f m a n , K a n t

the

universal

principle

of

l a w

49

B u t our inherent right to outer freedom, like the universal principle o f L a w w h i c h defines it, is formal and empty. L a w , as Kant points out, is only the f o r m o f the relation o f bur acts o f choice in so far as w e are outwardly free. A s the universal principle o f L a w can acquire content and meaning o n l y b y e m b o d y i n g itself in particular juridical laws, so outer freedom must express itself in our p o w e r o f choice over external objects. From one point o f v i e w , our right t o outer freedom might be described as a right to acquire rights in general; and Kant, in the tradition o f his time, regards property as the expression par excellence o f acquired right. In concluding our study o f Kant's philosophy o f Law w e must, therefore, touch briefly o n his theory o f property.

explains that the 'inherent rights' t o equality under the l a w , t o b e one's o w n master, etc., are m e r e l y the right t o f r e e d o m considered in different relations or f r o m

different points o f v i e w . M.d.S., 238; cf. also Uber den Gcmeinspruch,^^ if.

CHAPTER IV

THE

PRINCIPLES

OF A C Q U I R E D

RIGHT

/ A n acquired right, in d i s t m c d o r j ^ e n r ^ n inherent right, is one w h i c h does not belong to m e n merely b y virtue o f their humanity. It is a right which presupposes o n the part o f the subject a juridical act, an act o f choice b y w h i c h he interdicts others, consistently w i t h their freedom, from performing certain actions w h i c h , but for his act o f choice, w o u l d be mdifferent to his o w n freedom. A n y right to an external object must be acquired. T h e only right w h i c h belongs to m e n merely b y virtue o f their personality is the right t o outer f r e e d o m . Y e t , K a n t argues, the title to acquire objects o f choice as such is contained in the inherent right to freedoml T o deny to a n y o n e the possibility o f c o m i n g into legal possession o f objects o f choice w o u l d be to deny his inherent right o f outer freedom. 1

2

T h e argument establishing this connection employs concepts w h i c h must be developed at some length. B u t the analogy w h i c h K a n t draws between the inherent right o f outer freedom and possession o f external objects on the one hand, and the empirical consciousness o f our o w n existence and experience o f objects outside us in space o n the other hand, indicates the fundamental position w h i c h property holds in his philosophy o f L a w . In his refutation o f idealism K a n t argues that since w e cannot perceive time itself, w e can determine the temporal order o f our perceptions only b y reference to something permanent outside ourselves. Consciousness o f our o w n existence in time is, at the same time, consciousness o f the condition o f the possibility o f this, namely, immediate consciousness o f the existence o f objects external to us. Analogously, he asserts, w e could n o j j b & . x o n s d o u s o f - o u r inherent right to the use o f our o w n person w e r e w e n o t conscious o f o u r right to use external objects. ' A c c o r d i n g l y w e must regard our right t o use^external objects as the condition o f the possibility o f the inner use o f pur choice, and therefore the right w i t h regard to external objects must be assumed a priori'. O u t e r freedom is embodied and realized in the relations o f men's wills w i t h reference to object! o f choice. T o 3

x 2

M.d.S., 237; cf. also if.N.(23), 219-20. H.N.(23), 220. Ibid., 311; cf. also 309-10. 3

/

THE PRINCIPLES OF ACQUIRED RIGHT

5i

/the mere e m p t y form o f outer freedom w e must add its matter, objects o f choice as such, and determine w h a t follows f r o m the universal principle o f L a w regarding our acts o f choice exercised upon objects. B y extending the universal principle o f L a w into the relations o f men's wills regarding external objects o f choice w e obtain the principle w h i c h Kant calls 'the |uridical postulate o f practical reason'. This principle, together w i t h the c o m m a n d t o enter into"civil society w h i c h follows immediately f r o m it, is the last o f the metaphysical first prin­ ciples o f L a w w h i c h the limited purpose o f this w o r k permits us t o study. B u t Kant's Rechtslehre b y n o means ends here. Natural L a w , i.e. the: docjrine_ofLthose-prineiples o f justice w H c h c ^ b e , k n o w n a priori by reason, is divided into Private L a w and Public L a w ; and alithough w e cannot enter into the latter, Kant's analysis o f civil and international society is, in m a n y respects, the most interesting part o f his philosophy o f L a w . In order to s h o w h o w Kant's notion o f m o r a l autonomy w o r k s into the concept o f legal obligation w e must say something about the 'collective will', the realization o f - w h i c h constitutes civil society; b u t w e cannot g o into the complexities o f his political philosophy and our treatment o f the p r o b l e m must, unfortunately, raise m o r e difficulties than it solves. W e cannot e v e n deal adequately w i t h the first problem to be studied, the right t o property as such. F o r K a n t ' s analysis o f the juridical postulate o f practical reason is, in fact, a critique o f juridicallypractical reason, and, w i t h o u r limited interest i n the Rechtslehre, w e cannot give due w e i g h t t o the Critical structure o f the argument. 4

5

Kant's argument begins w i t h a definition o f the legally 'Mine^ in general as that w i t h . w h i c h I a m so connected that the use w h i c h another person makes o f it, w i t h o u t m y consent, is a w r o n g o r injustice to m e l Possession, he adds, is the subjective condition o f our use o f anything. In other w o r d s , the use w h i c h another person makes o f something is w r o n g i f that w h i c h he uses is not, according t o juridical principles, in his possession b u t rather in mine. N o w the. first principle o f juris­ prudence has already established that another person's use o f me as a mere means .to-his-subjective ends—his use o f m y person without the possibility o f m y rational consent—is a violation -of-my- outer-freedom or an unjustice t o m e . B u t so far as w e k n o w , at this stage o f the 6

4

N a t u r a l L a w is contrasted w i t h positive o r statutory L a w , w h i c h can b e k n o w n ' o n l y t h r o u g h t h e declaration o f the legislator's w i l l . dfi. M.d.S., 237. / In addition t o the Rechtslehre, the principal sources f o r Kant's political p h i l o ­ s o p h y are t h e s e c o n d part o f h i s essay Uber den Gemeinspruch: Das mag in der

Theorie richtig sein, taugt aber nichtftir die Praxis and Zumewigen Frieden. M.d.S., 245. 6

52

LAWS OF FREEDOM

argument, an injustice to m e can be only an act o f physical violence to m y person. T h e notion o f freedom itself says n o t h i n g about m y relation to any external object o f choice. Let us call m y inherent right to free­ dom or m y 'possession' o f m y o w n person the 'inner M i n e ' . T h e problem n o w is to see whether, and h o w , the relation expressed in the concept o f that w h i c h is legally ' M i n e ' can be extencled b e y o n d m y o w n person to include external objects o f choice, i.e. whether there can also be an 'outer M i n e ' . T o establish the possibility o f legal possession o f objects external to m y s e l f will be to establish the possibility o f such a connection between m y choice and the object that the use w h i c h another makes o f the object, without m y consent, w i l l be an injustice to me. T h e question is whether something o f the inviolability o f the person, expressed in the notion o f outer freedom, can be, so to speak, extended into external objects o f choice. If I am to be in legal possession o f objects as distinguished from m y legal possession o f m y o w n person, this possession must be a possession independent o f m y physical connection w i t h the object or m y possession o f it in space and time. T o assert that someone w h o disturbs m e in m y merely physical possession o f an object does m e an injustice, K a n t argues, is to assert nothing b e y o n d m y inherent right to freedom: for the object is so connected w i t h m e that the w r o n g lies merely in the other's use o f m y person in, e.g. wresting an apple from m y hand or forcing m e to leave the plot o f land w h e r e I a m sitting. I f w e are to g o beyond the notion o f inherent right and assert that an injustice is done to me through another's use o f the object itself, the w r o n g must he in the effect o f his action upon m e through the object, independently o f any physical connection w i t h the object o n m y part. T h e . o b j e c t must, in other w o r d s , be connected w i t h m y w i l l in. a real but n o n physical w a y . T h e relation must b e s u c K that another person's physical possession o f the object w i l l be w r o n g because the object is in m y possession even though I a m physically separated from it. 7

8

Kant is not, o f course, saying that, w e must be physically separated from an object in order to be in legal possession o f it. His point is, rather, that since right is a relation o f wills, legal p o s s e s s i o n " ^ an object must be a relation o f wills in w h i c h ^ n e person, merely through his act o f choice, prohibits others from using the object u p o n w h i c h he has exercised his choice. T h e relation w h i c h constitutes legal possession 7

O n m e distinction b e t w e e n the 'inner M i n e ' a n d the 'outer M i n e ' , cf. M.d.S., 248 and 250, and H . N . f o ) , 212, 256 and 334. 8

M.d.S., 247-8.

•

;

THE PRINCIPLES OF ACQUIRED RIG^T

53

is directly a relation o f the choice o f one person t o the choice o f other p e n and, through the m e d i u m o f this, to the object. Legal possession o f an object is 'intelligible' or 'noumenal' possession o f it, i.e. a c o n ­ nection o f choice w i t h the object independently o f conditions o f space and t i m e , and accordingly w e relinquish possession o f an object, not by separating ourselves from it in space and time, but only b y willing to possess it n o longer. It is true that, in order to c o m e into legal possession o f an object or acquire it, w e must establish some physical connection w i t h it b y , e.g. o c c u p y i n g a piece o f land or signing a contract. This initial connection w i t h the object under conditions o f space and time is necessary for t w o reasons: first, it is b y this that w e declare our will to other m e n or make k n o w n to them the relation w h i c h w e choose to establish, and secondly, the necessity o f appre­ hending the object physically limits our field o f choice regarding o b ­ jects—otherwise w e could choose to make all external objects our o w n and so abrogate, rather than merely limit, the freedom o f other m e n . B u t once w e have acquired an object, o u r legal possession o f it is inde­ pendent o f our physical connection w i t h it. Physical, possession, K a n t holds, is only the appearance in•• space and time o f the~^mtettigible possession w h i c h constitutes, our right to the o b j e c t . 9

10

(

11

12

13

S o far w e have spoken o f objects o f choice as, primarily, corporeal objects or things. It should be added that K a n t understands property in a v e r y w i d e sense, d^tmguishing, a m o n g potential objects o f pos­ session, three classes: corporeal objects, the acts o f choice o f other persons, and other persons themselves. T h e concept o f possessionwaries* w i t h the nature o f the object. W e cannot possess another person's act o f choice in the same w a y that w e possess a corporeal thing ;d)ut w e • can have it in our p o w e r t o determine h i m to fulfil a promise he has made. A n d , Kant holds, w e can possess another person after the manner o f a thing, although the other's personahty prevents us f r o m using h i m as a thing. A l t h o u g h K a n t invests his progression f r o m ' R i g h t in a thing' ('real R i g h t ' ) and 'personal R i g h t ' to 'personal R i g h t o f a real kind' w i t h a sort o f Hegelian l o g i c , his attempt to rationalize the views o f his day must appear to us singularly unsuccessful. H o w e v e r , the fact 1 4

9

H.N.(23), 227, 281.

1 1

H.N.(23), 217.

1 2

1 0

M.d.S., 245-6 and 249; H.N.(23), 217.

Ibid., 278.

1 3

Ibid., 235; M.d.S.,•-252-3.

1 4

T h e terms w h i c h K a n t uses- for the three bodies o f l a w h a v i n g t o d o w i t h possession o f these three types o f object are, r e s p e c t i v e l y , ^ Sachenrecht (ius in re, 1

ius re ale), das persdhnliche Recht (ius personate) and das dingliche Art persdhnlichen Recht (ius realiter personate). T h e s e three types o f object are said t o b e the 'outer M i n e ' according t o the categories o f substance, causality and reciprocity.

54

LAWS OF FREEDOM

that he includes under property not only the b o d y o f L a w dealing w i t h material objects and contracts but even the L a w o f domestic society indicates the scope and importance o f property in his philosophy o f Law. Kant insists that, despite the analogous manner in w h i c h 'possession' is applied to these three classes o f objects, the notion o f legal possession in each case implies independence from conditions o f space and time. It has already been pointed out that w e cannot claim a right to a thing merely because it is in our physical p o w e r t o use that t h i n g : w e must be able to say that it is in our possession even t h o u g h it is separated f r o m us in space. As for contracts, Kant argues that i f w e are in legal posses­ sion o f another person's choice, or have the right to make h i m perforin some service or g i v e us some object w h i c h he has promised us, our possession o f his act o f choice must be independent o f conditions o f time. Unless w e can say that his choice is in our p o w e r , not merely at the moment w h e n he actually fulfils his promise but even w h e n the tirne for fulfilling it is not y e t at hand, then, having promised to d o something, he could refuse to d o it because w e w o u l d have n o control over his choice. T h e notion o f a contract w o u l d be meaningless w e r e not the relation o f wills defined in it independent o f t i m e . Finally, Kant holds, in saying that a wife is in the legal possession o f her hus­ band, children o f their parents, and servants o f a family, w e i m p l y that the subject o f the right in each case has control o v e r the person w h o is the object o f his choice even w h e n that person is not in his presence: i f the wife, child or servant runs a w a y , for example, he can force her to return to his h o u s e . Thejmpoxtant*point is''that in each case a chstmction,must4>e the object 1 5

16

-

in the sense o f our physical ability-to tise it and our p o w e r o v e r the object in the sense o f our right to use it? In so far as our physical posses­ sion o f it is just, it must be the manifestation o f our legal possession o f it. Bearing in mind, h o w e v e r , that the term 'object o f choice' includes these three classes, w e shall find it m o r e convenient to continue speaking in terms o f corporeal objects of things. Granting that legal possession is possession independently o f c o n 'ditions o f space and time, Kant's prtfbl^m n o w is to s h o w that the notion o f outer freedom compels us logically t o posit the possibility o f legal possession o f external objects. F r o m the fact that the notion o f an 'outer M i n e ' depends upon that o f n o u m e n a l possession, it follows that theoretical reason cannot demonstrate its objective reality. B u t i f 1 5

H.N.(23), 231,

1 6

' C £ M.d.S., 247-8.

.

THE PRINCIPLES OF ACQUIREu KlC^ii

55

w e can sh o w that pure, practical reason, in c o m m a n d i n g us to act According to the universal principle o f L a w , must also c o m m a n d us to make it possible for e v e r y o n e to realize legal possession, w e shall have established, sufficiently for practical or moral purposes, the objective reality o f an 'outer M i n e ' and o f the intelligible possession on w h i c h it rests. 17

T h e crux o f Kant's argument is that since our freedom o f choice is limited o n l y b y the condition o f its formal consistency with the freedom o f other m e n , it cannot be limited b y conditions o f space and time, b y objects as such, or b y any principle other than that o f its c o n ­ sistency w i t h universal l a w . W e cannot, he maintains, deny to free choice the possibility o f an 'outer M i n e ' w i t h o u t d e n y i n g its inherent right to outer freedom; for outer freedom is the tide to do a^s one chooses, subject o n l y to the hmitation that one's choice permits a similar exercise o f freedom o n the part o f e v e r y other. W e cannot, therefore, according to juridical principles, limit possession to physical possession o f objects, since this w o u l d be to m a k e the exercise o f free­ d o m dependent upon conditions o f space and time and not merely upon the formal condition o f its consistency w i t h the freedom o f e v e r y ­ one. T h e notion o f a l a w o f freedom w h i c h w o u l d h m i t possession to physical possession and so m a k e the exterrlal use o f our freedom d e ­ pendent upon things is, K a n t asserts, a contradiction. B y virtue o f the fact that w e are discussing the relation o f choice to objects in terms o f L a w , w e must consider the relation as one o f wills and, i f w e d e n y the moral possibility o f an 'outer M i n e ' , do so n o t o n the grounds that J

t

18

v

1 7

Kant's distinction b e t w e e n analytic and synthetic juridical propositions is difficult t o f o l l o w . A l l propositions o f inherent right are said t o b e analytic; that is t o say, the title t o c o m p e l asserted i n t h e m is contained analytically in the n o t i o n o f choice that is o u t w a r d l y free. Since outer freedom is i n d e p e n d e n c e o f choice from e v e r y t h i n g e x c e p t the c o n d i t i o n o f its formal consistency w i t h the f r e e d o m o f others, propositions regarding o u r title t o use and s o t o possess objects o f choice as such (in abstraction f r o m conditions o f space a n d time) seem t o be analytic i n the sense that as s o o n as free choice is b r o u g h t i n t o relation w i t h objects o f choice it f o l l o w s that o u r use o f objects cannot, according t o juridical principles, be m a d e d e p e n d e n t u p o n o u r physical c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e m . T h e n o t i o n o f o u t w a r d l y free choice in relation t o objects implies a title t o establish ove r them' a p o w e r w h i c h is i n d e p e n d e n t o f o u r physical c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e m , in so far as this is consistent w i t h the f r e e d o m o f others. B u t i n order for this title t o be realized in objects o f experience, t h e c o n d i t i o n under w h i c h s u c h p o w e r will be consistent w i t h the f r e e d o m o f others, i.e. the existence o f a collective w i l l o r civil society, is necessary. A c c o r d i n g l y , propositions o f acquired right, i.e. o f right w i t h regard to objects o f experience, are synthetic. Cf. H . N . (23),. 215, 219-20

and 293-4. 18

H . N . ( 2 3 ) , 288-9.

;

56

LAWS OF FREEDOM

possession is an empirical concept but rather o n the grounds that the relation o f wills defined b y the 'outer M i n e ' is inconsistent w i t h free­ d o m according to universal law. But, Kant continues, it is not inconsistent w i t h outer freedom. O n the contrary, the possibility o f an 'outer M i n e ' in objects o f choice as such follows from outer freedom as soon as w e bring the notipn o f freedom into relation w i t h objects o f choice as such. T h e proposition that any object o f choice can be acquired is a t a u t o l o g y . A n object o f choice, as distinguished from an object o f mere wish, is one w h i c h • it is in our physical p o w e r to use; and since w e are considering the' relation o f choice to objects in abstraction f r o m conditions o f space and time, an object o f choice is simply that w h i c h is u s e f u l . N o w posses­ sion is the subjective condition o f use. A c c o r d i n g l y i f pure practical reason, according to a universal l a w , absolutely and unconditionally - forbade the possession o f objects o f choice, it w o u l d deprive us o f all use o f the useful. It w o u l d deny that there are, according to practical principles, objects o f choice and m a k e t h e m all res nullius usus. Were pure practical reason to. issue a prohibition against our possession o f objects distinct from ourselves, freedom w o u l d be 'in contradiction with itself', for it w o u l d deprive itself o f any external exercise. Since any use which w e might make o f objects w o u l d be w r o n g , it w o u l d be permissible for anyone to interfere w i t h our use o f objects and therefore with our use o f our o w n person. For w h e r e L a w is concerned, i n ­ telligible possession is the ground o f physical possession, and i f the possession o f objects were impossible according to juridical principles, then even our physical possession o f objects w o u l d be w r o n g , and anyone could rightly interfere w i t h our outer f r e e d o m . 19

20

21

22

The possibility o f intelligible possession o f objects o f choice is, then, contained in the notion o f outer freedom as the independence o f choice from the choice o f others and from things, i.e. from everything except the condition o f its formal consistency w i t h the freedom o f others; and this merely legal possession is the g r o u n d for the outer M i n e and Thine among objects o f experience. B u t the principle that an outer Mine and Thine is possible is not sufficient, K a n t adds, to distinguish the Mine from the T h i n e . In order tp-ap^ly the notion o f intelligible | possession to objects o f experience—in order, that is to say, to acquire a right to any particular object—we must presuppose the condition 23

19

2 0

'-J£IV.(23), 278. Ibid., 212, 217 and 222. M.d.S., 246 and H.N.(23), 230, 286 and 293.

2 1

2 2

H.N.(23), 309-10.

•

23

Ibid., 214.

,

THE PRINCIPLES OF ACQUIRED RJ^HT

57

/under w h i c h the choice o f others w i l l be in agreement w i t h our o w n . / I f I appropriate a particular object and exclude others from the use o f it, I a m hunting their freedom o f action; and i f m y prohibition u p o n their use o f the object is to be consistent w i t h freedom under universal law, they must be able to g i v e their rational consent to m y limitation o f their freedom. This they can d o only i f they are assured that I, in turn, w i l l agree to the hmitation o f m y freedom involved in their appropriation o f objects. Neither o f us is bound to respect the other's claim to the exclusive use o f an object unless each admits, in'practice, a reciprocal hmitation o n his o w n freedom: otherwise the relation w o u l d be contrary to our inherent right o f equality. A s imperfectly rational beings, w e give each other this assurance b y g i v i n g over the use o f force to an authority w h i c h w i l l guarantee our possession o f objects and, in case o f dispute, determine -what belongs to each o f us. Thus the c o m m a n d to act in such a w a y that anyone can realize the 'outer His' is at the same time a c o m m a n d to enter into civil s o c i e t y . 24

T h e legislative authority w h o s e existence constitutes civil society must, Kant argues, e m b o d y the Idea o f a collective w i l l ; and with this thesis w e are at the core o f his political philosophy. B u t our approach to the subject must be one o f specialized interest. K a n t ' s positing o f the collective will is, a m o n g other things, his" answer to the problem o f h o w w e can be subject to moral constraint t h r o u g h another person's contingent act o f choice, and it is from this aspect that w e shall approach the matter. O u r purpose is o n l y to clarify the implications o f 'obliga­ tion through the w i l l o f another' or, to use a phrase w h i c h Kant does not ordinarily use, 'legal obligation'. T h e principle w h i c h c o m m a n d s us to make it possible for anyone'to realize the 'outer His', K a n t tells us, is a 'permissive l a w ' o f pure practical reason. A l t h o u g h his discussions o f the;nature o f permissive laws usually occur in specialized contexts, he explains i n general terms that a permissive l a w is a hmitation u p o n a p r o h i b i t i o n . If w e admit, beyond prohibitions and c o m m a n d s , permissive laws g i v i n g us a legal title to perform actions w h i c h are morally mdifferent, it is because the actions in question are not always morally mdifferent. I f they were, 25

28

2 5

* M.d.S., 255-6. Ibid., 247. Zum ewigen Friedeti, 347.11. According t o H.iV.(23),385, a lex permissiua has ...

26

t o d o w i t h s o m e t h i n g that is permissible i n the state o f nature b u t forbidden b y positive'law. H o w e v e r , the discussion o f permissive l a w s i n the Metaphysik der Sitten envisages a w i d e r use o f the t e r m , and the n o t i o n o f permissive l a w is f o u n d w i t h i n ethics as w e l l as L a w . O n permissive laws, Gf. b e l o w , p . 100 ff.

LAWS^OF FREEDOM

58

27

there w o u l d b e n o need for a l a w w i t h regard t o t h e m . A permissive law states the conditions under w h i c h a general prohibition does n o t apply, and the permission t o prohibit others from interfering w i t h o u r exclusive use o f an object is a limitation u p o n the prohibition, contained in the inherent right o f freedom, against interfering w i t h the freedom o f activity o f others. T h e principle o f acquired right, K a n t argues, widens the scope o f freedom 'because it limits the Hmitation o f freedom itself'. T h e universal principle o f L a w forbids us to interfere w i t h the actions o f others so long as their actions leave a similar freedom open t o us. I f w e consider the legal relation o f m e n merely according to their inherent right o f outer freedom, each is limited in his actions o n l y through the status o f others as persons. B u t , K a n t has argued, w e can­ not leave the legal relations o f m e n at this, since in denying the possi­ bility o f merely legal possession w e w o u l d be asserting that our physical possession o f objects does not c o m e under l a w s o f freedom, thus g i v i n g others the title to interfere w i t h o u r physical use o f objects and so with the freedom o f our person. Y e t , w h i l e the inherent right o f free­ dom, itself implies the possibility o f legal possession o f objects, the realization o f this possibility extends the p o w e r o f choice b e y o n d i n ­ herent right. A t the same time that it grounds our physical possession o f objects, i t . g i v e s us the title t o prohibit others f r o m using objects physically separated from us and so t o interdict others from actions w h i c h are indifferent to the freedom o f our person. Hence, along w i t h this permissive l a w expanding o u r freedom, there must b e g i v e n the condition w h i c h will extend the universal principle o f L a w into this n e w relation o f wills. This condition, the existence o f a collective w i l l , is necessary in order to make the relations o f men's wills regarding objects a relation o f right o n the o n e hand and obligation o n the other. 28

29

Kant's definition o f obligation as such, 'the necessity o f a free action 27

M.d.S., 223.

2

2 8

H.N.(23), 239.

* J[d.d.S., 255-6; cf. also H.N.fa), 236. A r i g h t presupposes R i g h t , 'a principle o f the f o r m w h i c h precedes the matter o f c h o i e e ^ F o r m a l R i g h t is 'the deterrninability' o f another's choice t h r o u g h m i n e , a n d v i c e - v e r s a , a c c o r d i n g t o l a w s o f freedom. B u t this does n o t take place i n the o u t e r M i n e and T h i n e i f o n e w i l l a l o n e determines the other, because then o n e o f t h e t w o w o u l d n o t b e free. H e n c e i n the concept o f t h e synthetic M i n e and T h i n e there is c o n t a i n e d t h e Idea o f c h o i c e that is united o r t o b e united . . . w h i c h is t h e a priori c o n d i t i o n u n d e r w h i c h something external can b e acquired.' ' T h e status juridicus is the relation o f c h o i c e t o t h e choice o f another t h r o u g h w h i c h e v e r y o n e is capable o f certain rights'.

Ibid.,-239.

I

THE PRINCIPLES

OF A C Q U I R E D

RIGHT

59

f under a categorical imperative o f reason', contains t w o implications that require h i m to posit a collective will as the source o f the obligation corresponding to acquired right. Under a categorical imperative there is reciprocity o f obligation: in other w o r d s , the limitation that I place on the actions o f others in relation to myself implies a like restriction o f m y actions in relation to them. Secondly, in asserting that the action . to w h i c h w e are obligated is necessary according to a principle^ o f pure practical reason, Kant is i m p l y i n g that all obligation must mtimately be self-imposed. O u r actual will m a y be in conflict w i t h our rational will and, w h e n the self-constraint o f our reason proves ineffective, others m a y constrain us f r o m without to d o w h a t reason requires o f us. B u t the constraint w h i c h they exercise o n us, in so far as it is o b l i g a ­ tion and not mere violence, must be an o u t w a r d reduplication o f the inner constraint o f pure practical reason. M e r e force does not constitute legal obligation: it is, rather, because the act is morally necessary i n itself that w e can be m o r a l l y compelled b y others to perform i t . 3 0

T o an acquired right—a right w h i c h I w o u l d not have apart f r o m a certain act o f choice—there corresponds a contingent obligation—an obligation w h i c h others w o u l d not have aoart f r o m m y act o f choice. Hence, K a n t maintains, m y declaration this object is mine' m u s t e m b o d y a categorical i m p e r a t i v e , since o n l y in this w a y is there the reciprocity o f obligation w h i c h makes m y exercise o f freedom f o r m a l l y consistent w i t h their freedom and enables t h e m to 'contain in t h e m ­ selves' the end o f m y action affecting t h e m . Because it is m o r a l l y necessary that e v e r y o n e be able to acquire rights, they give their rational consent to the restriction w h i c h m y declaration places u p o n their freedom in so far as it remains open to them, in turn, to e x p a n d their freedom b y h m i t i n g mine. M o r e concretely; the constraint e x e r ­ cised upon others in protection o f m y possessions constitutes obligation u p o n them only in so far as it is accompanied b y a guarantee that I consider myself bound to refrain from the use o f their property; arid w e give each other this assurance b y renouncing the private use o f compulsion and entrusting it to some person or persons w h o w i l l use it in the form o f sanctions accompanying laws b m d i n g equally u p o n every subject o f the l a w . B y virtue o f this, m y declaration can be regarded as proceeding f r o m a 'collective w i l l ' w h i c h contains i n i t s e i f 31

32

3 3

3

^ F o r the definition o f o b l i g a t i o n as such, cf. M.d.S., 222. For a discussion o f the relation b e t w e e n c o m p u l s i o n f r o m w i t h o u t a n d rational self-constraint, cf.

Vorlesung, 38ff. M.d.S., 253; H.N.(23), 287. 31

3 2

M.d.S., 255.

3 3

Ibid., 256.

*

1

LAWS~OF FREEDOM

60

the rational wills o f all those w h o could be affected b y m y choice. Thus, in mamtaining that w e must be able to give our rational c o n ­ sent to another's act o f choice i f this is to result in an acquired right, Kant insists that it is 'the Idea o f a collective w i l l ' ascribed to the legislator that enables him to impose o b l i g a t i o n . A p a r t from this, his will w o u l d be, like m y o w n , a m e r e l y one-sided, private or indi­ vidual w i l l ; and w i t h regard to a contingent obligation, an individual will, in exercising compulsion o n others, w o u l d violate their inherent right o f freedom. T h e w i l l w h i c h imposes obligation must be neither m y o w n will to the exclusion o f others', nor/ the w i l l o f every other to the exclusion o f m y o w n . It must rather be a w i l l w h i c h includes the wiUs o f all those whose freedom is affected/in order that the obligation can be self imposed in every case. ' W i t l y r e g a r d to possession o f a thing outside me, I can, according to laws o f freedom, use n o compulsion upon others except in so far as all others w i t h w h o m I can enter into this relation are in agreement w i t h m e . T h a t is to say, I can exercise c o m p u l s i o n o n l y through the w i l l o f all o f t h e m united w i t h m y o w n , for then I c o m p e l each o f them t h r o u g h h i s o w n wihV according to laws o f f r e e d o m ' . In practical terms, the Idea o f a collective w i l l as the source o f legal / obligation implies a duty, on the part o f the legislator, to g i v e his l a w s in such a w a y that he can regard e v e r y subject o f the l a w as his c o legislator. T h e laws, Kant holds, need n o t be consistent w i t h the actual wills o f the subjects o f the law. L a w s can be just e v e n t h o u g h the sub­ j e c t s , i f consulted about them, w o u l d n o t agree w i t h the declared w i l l o f the legislator. B u t i f the l a w is such that e v e n one subject could not /possibly give his consent to it—as, for e x a m p l e , a certain portion o f the subjects could not give their consent to a l a w estabhshing hereditary privileges—then the l a w w o u l d be an unjust o n e . L a w s themselves, Kant points out, can be despotic; it is o n l y in accordance w i t h the Idea o f a collective w i l l embodied in the legislator that civil freedom, w h i c h is the ratio essendi o f the State, can be attained. 34

1

35

36

O n e ought n o t to j u m p from these premises regarding the nature o f eivjl society to any specific conclusions regarding Kant's v i e w s o n problems w h i c h m a y arise w i t h i n an actual civil society, e.g. the problem o f obedience to an unjust l a w , o f the moral title o f the citizens to o v e r t h r o w a despotic g o v e r n m e n t . W h i l e K a n t holds firmly that the ideal f o r m o f the State is that w h i c h most nearly manifests the Idea o f a State or civil society as such, i.e. the republican form o f g o v e r n H.N.(23), 347. Ibid., 277. Cf. Uber den Gemeinspruch, 297. 3 4

36

3 6

/

THE PRINCIPLES OF ACQUIRED RIGHT

6l

p e n t , he is willing to temporize w i t h forms o f civil society w h i c h fall short o f the ideal. It is only in a civil society jthat L a w as such exists, and even a tyranny can be better than the state o f nature, w h i c h is b y definition devoid o f justice. A l l such problems, h o w e v e r , belong to a study o f Kant's political philosophy in its o w n right. W e must remain on the level o f the Idea and rational origin o f the State. W h a t e v e r the historical origin o f states m a y be, the rational basis o f "the State, lies in the fact that the right to property, in w h i c h outer freedom expresses itself, depends upon civil society. Since it is m o r a l l y necessary to realize outer freedom, w e have a duty, to w h i c h w e can be compelled b y others, to enter into civil s o c i e t y ; and what distinguishes civil society from the state o f nature is the existence o f a general will, w h i c h ' K a n t describes as a 'collective' and 'authoritative' tMachthahender)' w i l l . If the first o f these notes brings out the possibility o f autonomous imposition o f the l a w o n the part o f every subject, w h i c h is essential t o the concept o f obligation as such, the second characteristic is that w h i c h makes the obligation .distinctively legal obligation. Kant's v i e w s o n the relation o f moral and legal obligation present certain difficulties. A m o n g external laws—those laws for w h i c h outer legislation is possible—he distinguishes between natural laws, 'obligation to w h i c h can be k n o w n a priori through reason, even w i t h o u t outer legislation', and positive laws, ' w h i c h w i t h o u t outer legislation are not binding (and therefore, w i t h o u t outer legislation, w o u l d n o t be l a w s ) ' . T h i s contrast between natural external laws and positive laws might seem to i m p l y that the a priori principles o f acquired right are bmding e v e n apart from juridical legislation. B u t the principles examined in the p r e - • ceding paragraphs indicate a different interpretation: while it can b e k n o w n a priori that natural external laws w o u l d be bmding in a n y civil society, yet, the obligation accompanying such laws proceeds from civil authority and presupposes its existence. This interpretation is confirmed b y Kant's definition o f the legislator as the author o f obligation according to the law. I f the legislator is the author of" the law as well, he explains, then the l a w is an arbitrary, statutory or m e r e l y positive l a w . F r o m this it follows that, in the case o f natural external laws, the legislator is still the author o f the obligation a c c o m p a n y i n g . the l a w or that, w i t h o u t his. legislation, the l a w w o u l d not; be binding. In a, state o f nature there is, b y definition, no legal obligation in the full sense o f the term. B u t K a n t seems to hold, further, that until the possibility o f external constraint through juridical legislation exists, ™-M.d.S., 256. Ibid. Ibid., 224. *°Ibid., 227. .•' * • 37

38

39

;

4 0

3 8

39

(52

LAWS OF FREEDOM

our o w n reason does not constrain us t o o b e y the l a w which, w e k n o w a priori, w o u l d be binding within any civil society. The relation between legal and moral obligation is a c o m p l e x one. In the Vorksung Kant^ argues that an internal obligation corresponds t o every external one. Mere compulsion b y others, as w e have seen, is not obligation: rather, the legitimacy o f the compulsion flows from the obligation. B u t this, apparently, does n o t mean that obligation 'pre­ cedes the possibility o f external compulsion in accordance w i t h uni­ versal law. A l t h o u g h the t w o c o m e into being at the same time, the possibility o f such compulsion seems t o b e logically prior, in matters o f contingent right, t o the obligation, since the framework o f external compulsion is the condition o f the equality essential t o such obligation. T o a right t o an object, K a n t explains, there corresponds a contingent obligation which, because it proceeds f r o m a universal rule o f external juridical relations, implies equal obligation o n the part o f every subject o f the l a w ; and from this it follows that 'I a m , therefore, n o t under obligation to leave undisturbed the possessions o f others unless e v e r y other assures m e that h e w i l l act according t o the same principle in regard t o m y possessions'. H e asserts, further, that in constructing a civil constitution, p o w e r necessarily precedes right. Unless the legis­ lator- can assure m e o f m y right, 'the l a w has n o binding p o w e r for me, i.e. the legislator has n o r i g h t ' . Before the existence o f civil society or in abstraction from it there is, indeed, 'provisional possession' o f objects, w h i c h is a 'physical possession o f the object w i t h a juridical presumption', i.e. w i t h the presumption that u p o n entry into civil society the possession, will b e c o m e a legal right t o the o b j e c t . B u t i f Law, the possibility o f universal reciprocal compulsion, is the formal 41

42

43

44

4 1

4 2

Vorksung, 41.

M.d.S., 256. Kant's a r g u m e n t that c o n t i n g e n t o b l i g a t i o n is possible o n l y under a collective and authoritai^-" ...II is, perhaps, best s u m m a r i z e d i n this passage. I a m under obligation to refrain f r o m using the p r o p e r t y o f others, h e argues, o n l y in s o far as they g i v e m e a like assurance r e g a r d i n g m y property, because this assurance 'is already contained i n the c o n c e p t o f outer juridical o b l i g a t i o n , o n account o f the universality, a n d h e n c e t o o the reciprocity, o f o b l i g a t i o n under a universal rule'. N o one-sided w i l l , he-continues, can serve as a l a w o f c o m p u l s i o n with regard t o a contingent o r outer possession, because this w o u l d violate free­ d o m according t o universal l a w . ' H e n c e i t is o n l y a w i l l b i n d i n g u p o n e v e r y o n e , consequently a collective o r general (comrrrc3r)4ind authoritative w i l l that c a n extend this assurance t o e v e r y o n e ' . Cf. also Ibid., 307. . H.N.(i9), 602, R e f l e c t i o n N o . " 8074. M.d.S., 256-7. I n a state o f nature o u r 'juridical d u t y ' w i t h regard t o t h e provisional M i n e and T h i n e , w h i c h K a n t m e n t i o n s i n M.d.S., 213, seems t o b e our duty, to leave the state o f nature rather t h a n a d u t y t o respect the choice o f others regarding objects. 4 3

u

THE PRINCIPLES OF ACQUIRED RIGHT

/

*

63

condition o f rights, it is also the formal condition o f the obligation corresponding to rights. " / If all moral laws are derived from the supreme principle o f morality, the cardinal concept o f Kant's jurisprudence, as w e l l as o f his ethics, must be that o f moral autonomy. T h e juridical implications o f this concept are summarized in the remark w h i c h follows the definition o f 'personahty' as 'the freedom o f a rational being under moral l a w s ' : 'From this it follows that a person is subject to n o other Jaws than those w h i c h he (either alone or, at least, together w i t h others) gives h i m ­ self.' Kant's positing o f the collective w i l l as the source o f legal obligation is merely a consequence o f the fact that the subject o f m o r a l l y legislative reason is at the same time the subject o f externally g i v e n laws. His inclusion o f the rational will o f every subject o f the l a w in the will o f the legislator is not an introduction o f distinctively ethical'concepts into jurisprudence: the legislator does not constrain the subjects by appealing to their consciousness o f duty, but rather by natural means. B u t while legal obligation is independent o f ethjcal obligation, constraint b y other m e n is legal obligation o n l y in so far as ethical obligation comes over and above it. Hence, in defining the conditions under w h i c h constraint from without is morally possible or consistent w i t h outer freedom, K a n t is implicitly laying d o w n the conditions under w h i c h constraint w i l l be imposed not m e r e l y b y other m e n b u t by our o w n pure practical reason as well. G i v e n Kant's basic concept o f moral autonomy, the existence o f a collective w i l l is merely the \ condition w h i c h makes juridical laws moral laws or principles of; pure practical reason. 45

46

M.d.S., 223.

CHAPTER V THE

NOTION AND OF

CONTENT

TUGENDLEHRE

In ancient times, Kant tells us, 'ethics' was synonymous with moral philosophy in general. But subsequently it was found more convenient to restrict this name to the part o f moral philosophy w h i c h deals with duties according to laws which cannot be given in outer legislation. In German, this part o f moral philosophy is called Tugendlehre or the doctrine o f virtue, and it is this terminology that Kant adopts. Virtue is an acquired power o f self-constraint through the motive o f duty.-' The mere capacity so to constrain our inclinations opposed to duty belongs to us merely b y virtue o f our personality. In so far as we are free or have a pure reason that can be practical, w e are always capable o f determining choice independently o f our inclinations. B u t if we are to lead a morally g o o d life, this bare capacity for overcoming the' influence o f our desires upon choice is not enough. W e must be able effectively to exercise this power at the moment w h e n the in­ clinations g o out to something contrary to duty, and for this w e need an acquired strength o f moral purpose. Ethics, as the doctrine o f duties which cannot be enjoined by externally given laws, is properly called the doctrine o f virtue, since the notion o f duty implies constraint of inclination through the law and the nature o f ethical law is, b y definition, such that only self-constraint can accompany it. In et virtue must take the place o f the constraint through sanctions accompanies juridical l a w . 1

3

4

Because ethics is concerned w i t h what is possible only through moral self-constraint it must, in so far as it is a system o f duties, deal with laws enjoining the pursuit o f certain ends. For, Kant argues, 'there is no other determination o f choice which according to its very concept cannot be subject to constraint through the will o f another b y natural means except determination to an end'. ThiTcloes not imply that the deter5

1

M.d.S., 378.

3

*Ibid., 394.

Ibid., 380 and 397.

6

* Ibid., 383.

Ibid., 381. For reasons w h i c h w i l l b e c o m e clear in the f o l l o w i n g paragraphs, I have here translated Kant's phrase 'physisch nicht g e z w u n g e n werden z u konnen' as 'cannot be constrained b y natural means.' Kant points out that i f another person appeals to our consciousness o f duty in order t o induce us to fulfil a legal obligation to h i m , h e is n o t exercising constraint through natural

'

'64

I THE NOTION AND CONTENT OF TUGENDLEHRE 65 mination o f choice to an action is a different interior act from its deter­ mination to an end. O n the contrary, Kant's argument from the formal principle o f action to the categorical imperative o f ends will turn upon the fact that the determination o f choice to an action 15 the setting o f an end. All Kant means here is that one aspect o f choice, the end through which it is determined, cannot be subject to constraint through sanctions. Another person can compel me, he maintains, to perform an action which is not in accordance with m y ends bu£ only a means to his ends; he cannot, however, compel me to make his ends my o w n . The State can compel me to refrain from stealing; it cannot compel me to make the security o f property the end on account o f which I refrain from stealing. 6

It is the contradiction which Kant finds between external constraint and setting an end that determines his conception o f ethics, the system o f duties for which only inner legislation is possible, and so it is of some importance to determine exactly where the contradiction lies. A little reflection shows that there are t w o ways in which external constraint to fulfil our juridical duties might be brought to bear on us. If a policeman happens to be present he may be able, b y sheer physical force, to prevent us from stealing. B u t the constraint exercised in juridical legislation is not o f this type. It is not an absolute, physical constraint but rather a relative constraint which makes it imprudent for us to steal yet still leaves us free to do so. In attaching sanctions to the law prohibiting stealing the intention o f the legislator is to influence our choice in the matter b y w o r k i n g upon our natural aversion'to the sanctions. N o w it is clear that absolute, physical constraint to setting an end is • impossible. But, Kant holds, this is true with regard to any action properly so called. If w e are compelled b y sheer force to do something, what results is not our action, properly speaking, for it does not pro­ ceed from our choice and is not imputable to us. In so far as constraint is moral or consistent with free choice, it can be only a relative or 'comparative' constraint w h i c h may influence our choice but still leaves us free. ' N o other necessitation is consistent with freedom e x c e p t practical necessitation through motives. These motives can be either ^ v

means; w h a t is in question in such a case is n o t really constraint b y another, but rather self-constraint through the m o t i v e o f duty. Cf. M.d.S., 23 2 T h e security o f property and, m o r e ultimately, the realization o f outer freedom do not seem to be ends in the primary sense o f the term, the sense in which ethical laws enjoin the pursuit o f ends. B u t i f w e wish to take an example from Law, Kant's philosophy o f Law requires us t o take 'end' in the sense cited above. v

6

6

^

-

LAWS OF FREEDOM

66 7

pragmatic or moral'. O n l y such relative compulsion from without can be consistent with the definition of free choice as that which is influenced, but not determined, b y pathological motives' or motives o f sensuous origin. If constraint from without, i.e. constraint through motives o f sensuous origin, is to be consistent with free or human action it must leave the interior act o f choice itself free. Although w e may say loosely that in exercising a right I 'determine' the choice o f another person, I do not literally determine it. B y invoking the power o f the State I merely influence his choice to the due action. 8

Kant's assertion that external compulsion is possible with regard to our external actions but not w i t h regard to our ends does not, then, mean that w e can be compelled b y sheer force to perform or omit certain actions but not to adopt certain ends. It is, o f course, true that when the relative constraint exercised in juridical legislation proves ineffective w e can be compelled absolutely to fulfil our juridical duties: a judge can prevent us from stealing b y putting us into prison or compel us to repay a debt b y having our wages withheld. B u t to take contraint in this absolute sense w o u l d be to separate off the overt physical movement from the act o f choice whence it proceeds and, since this sort o f constraint cannot enter into the act o f choice itself, to reduce the object o f Law to mere physical movements rather than human actions. T h e fundamental meaning o f Kant's assertion is, rather, that w e can be compelled relatively, i.e. influenced, through motives o f fear to perform or refrain from certain external actions, but not to adopt ends. W h e n the State requires us to repay our debts, it is because actions o f this sort are essential to just relations among men. B u t while the State, through the sanctions w h i c h it attaches to its laws can in­ fluence us to repay a debt, it cannot constrain us to make the end o f the action our o w n end in performing the action. If w e obey the law from pathological motives, the action is, for us, only a means to a further end—the end o f avoiding sanctions which w o u l d impair or destroy our happiness. But the consideration o f what is logically possible through external compulsion does not exhaust Kant's meaning. His argument must also be taken in terms o f moral possibihtyTi-e. o f consistency between the state of freedom which it is the nature o f these laws to bring about and the constraint used to realize this condition. It is, Kant maintains, logically impossible for us to be compelled b y other men to adopt thenends. But even were it logically possible, it would still be morally 7

Vorksung' 35-6.

8

M.d.S., 213.

;

THE NOTION AND CONTENT OF TUGEN&LEHRE

6j

impossible. For constraint b y others must, by definition,, be constraint p r o u g h motives o f sensuous origin and, since the moral goodness of an action lies in its pure rational motive, duties to which w e can be compelled by others must be actions whose moral necessity-lies in some principle other than that o f our moral attitude o f will. N o w Kant's most fundamental conviction is that moral laws are laws o f freedom, laws whose nature it is to exoress the conditions o f freedom. Hence moral laws which can be accompanied by external constraint must be conditions o f that freedom w h i c h can be realized independendy of our moral attitude o f will. This freedom is, as w e have seen, the freedom which characterizes human or rational action as such—freedom to act as a human agent or to act in pursuit o f one's o w n ends, whatever they may be. Freedom in the positive sense is a normative concept. This is apparent in the distinction which Kant draws between 'outer freedom' and the amoral 'lawless freedom', the ability to do whatever w e please, which has to be brought under laws. A law must always abrogate to some extent freedom in the latter sense; for under moral laws choice is n o longer arbitrary but rather made morally necessary (or impossible) through l a w . B u t w h e n the constraint which accompanies a law is constraint b y others, the law cannot extend to our ends; our choice o f ends must be left 'free', i.e. arbitrary or lawless. For i f moral laws re­ strict our 'lawless freedom' only in order to realize freedom in the normative sense, then laws which arise in outer legislation cannot refer to our inner determination o f choice—whether b y its formal determining g r o u n d ^the_thought o f duty) or b y its materiaj_determining ground (the end)—smcethTheecToni to be realized in the act o f . choice itself i r f r e e d o m from the influence o f our inclinations as such. 9

10

This is not to assert that it is morally impossible to bring under laws our ability to set whatever ends w e please. O n the contrary, our choice of ends, like our lawless freedom to act as w e please, must be brought under laws if freedom in our attitude of will itself is to be realized. But the laws relating to^our choice o f ends must be laws o f inner freedom accompanied only b y the self-constraint o f pure practical reason. There is, Kant maintains, no contradiction within the concept o f an end which it is a duty to have, no inconsistency between the freedom implied in setting an end and the constraint implied in the concept o f 9

A state o f ' l a w l e s s freedom', it will be recalled, is not'really a state o f freedom at all, since it is o n l y contingent that in it w e can express our freedom outwardly. 10

Cf. M.d.S., 214.

1

LAWS OF FREEDOM

68

duty. The only contradiction isj)etween this manifestation o f freedom and constraint from without. Self-constraint to ends js_morally possible because it is consistent with, and essential to, o u r f r e c d o m to determine choice independently o f our inclinations. If outer freedom is inde­ pendence fromlinjust compulsion b y other men, inner freedom is independence from unjust constraint b y our inclinations, which are to be regarded, analogously, as unjust aggressors against our moral disposition. A s constraint from without is implied in the concept o f the outer freedom o f imperfectly rational beings, so moral self-con­ straint is implied in the notion o f their inner f r e e d o m . A s juridical laws arise in cuite^ legislation, as conditions o f outer freedoni,_so.ethical laws enjoining the pursuit o f certain ends arise in i"fflyj«Tgi$tefi j i cohdIHons o f inner freedom. 11

12

13

n 1

a<:

14

This argument regarding the relation o f constraint to the adoption o f ends establishes only the possibility o f obligatory ends, not their objective reality. A t the same time it indicates the line which Kant's argument in the Tugendlehre must take. Rechtslehre, Kant tells us, begins with the ends which everyone has and proceeds from this to the m a x i m which everyone ought to have. Its premise, in other words, is that everyone is entitledjo prcsue whatever, ends he may have, and its task is t o : determine the condition under which_ everyone jcanjiq^ so. Its concern is that the maxims o f each—which may well be maxims based on desire for certain ends—be formally consistent with everyone's pursuit o f ends. Ethics takes the opposite course. Because it is con­ cerned with the morality o f our acts o f choice, it canriot~begin w i t h our subjective ends and argue from these to our duty. Rechtslehre can do~thtrbecause its concept o f duty is that o f merely right actions, and the maxims o f merely legal actions can be based on desire for the results o f the actions. But the ethical concept o f duty is that o f choice determined b y the thought o f duty. Hence it must begin w i t h the formal maxim o f morality arid argue from this to ends. Such ends, adopted on the basis o f their rational validity for everyone rather than on thebasirof onrdesire "forTherri™" will" be ends "of pure practical reason or objective ends which it is a duty for us to h a v e . 15

1 1

M.d.S., 381-2.

1 8

T h e notion o f constraint implies reluctance t o d o that to w h i c h w e are c o n ­ strained and, Kant maintains, j n a n m u s t a l w a y s b e constrained by_ his inclinations to violate the moral law. ' F o r ^ e j e J T n o j r i a n J a 3 g g r a d e d g s j i i o t j t o feel in himself ar^opposition- t o t h i s violation and a scorn o f hims^lf7Ioji_accountof w h i c h E e rnysLexereise a-eonstraint uponJiimself'. Cf. M.d.S., 379 n. and 380. 13

M.d.S. 396. t

1 4

Ibid., 383 and 406.'

1 8

Ibid., 382.

THE NOTION AND CONTENT OF TUGENDLEHRE

69

/But before w e follow Kant's argument from the categorical impera­ tive for actions to the categorical imperative for our aims or purposes, we should elaborate further the notions o f virtue and obligatory ends which he has already introduced. In so far as ethics is a system o f duties, it deals with ethical laws prescribing ends or the matter o f our maxims. Because only virtue can lead us to fulfil such dudes, a duty which consists in having a certain aim or purpose is properly called a Tugendpflicht or duty o f virtue, and Tugendlehre is the doctrine o f duties o f virtue (doctrina offitiorum virtutis). The term Tugendpflicht, it should be noted, is a technical one. N o t every action which proceeds from a virtuous attitude o f will is the fulfilment o f a duty o f virtue because not every ethical obligation (obligatio ethicd) has as its matter a duty o f virtue (pjficium ethica s. virtutis). Kant has distinguished t w o elements in every legislation: a law and a motive dete^rrnining choice according to the* l a w . T h e obligation proper to ethical legislation, self-constraint through the motive o f duty, extends over all our duties;, w e are under ethical obligation to fulfil our juridical duties, not from a motive o f aversion to legal sanctions, but rather from a virtuous attitude o f will. Should external constraint to our juridical duty be lacking o n some occasion, ethical legislation requires us to fulfil this duty as a mani­ festation o f virtue. A n d when, as is normally the case, external con­ straint can be brought to bear on us, w e are under ethical obligation to obey the law without regard for the possibility o f such compulsion, merely from the strength o f our moral attitude o f will. B u t i f the law itself is juridical, the fact that it is thus 'taken up' into ethics does not make the duty enjoined b y the law a duty o f virtue; even within ethics, it remains a juridical duty. Juridical laws, as conditions o f outer freedom, are mdifferent to ends, whereas duties of virtue consist in the adoption o f certain ends. 16

17

18

19

20

O n l y when the law arises in ethical legislation, as a condition o f inner freedom, does it prescribe a duty o f virtue. Q u r inner freedom, Kant explains, stands in inverse ratio to our susceptibility to constraint from without, and the highest degree o f inner freedom is inability t o resist the constraint o f pure practical reason. Since virtue is itself the highest and unconditioned end o f a moral will, the relation between virtue and obligatory ends might be described as one o f reciprocity or interaction. O n the one hand it is only virtue that can lead us to go beyond that to which others" can compel us and to fulfil our duties of 21

18

19

17

M.d.S., 381. Ibid., 410 and 383. Ibid., 219-20; cf. also 394 and 410.

13

2 0

Ibid., 218; cf. above, p. 26. Ibid., 410. Ibid., 382 n. 21

7

LAWS OF FREEDOM

o

virtue. O n the other hand, it-is the fulfilment o f these duties that strengthens our moral attitude o f will; for, as- Kant explains, since it is our desire for the objects of inclination-- that leads us to act contrary to the law, pure practical reason can counteract the influence o f the inclinations only by positing its o w n ends and subordinating the ends which everyone has (those which g o to make up our happiness) to the objective ends which everyone ought to h a v e . Ethics on its formal side, as the doctrine o f virtue, is, therefore wider than ethics on its material side, as the doctrine o f duties o f virtue, since, in its former aspect, it deals with the ethical obligation which accom­ panies both juridical and ethical laws. But, from both points o f view, it is concerned directly with pur moral dispositions or intentions and only mdirectly with our actions. The concern which it has with our maxims differs somewhat in the case o f juridical duties and duties o f virtue, and w e shall have to examine this difference at some length in the following chapter. But in both cases the concern which ethics has with our actions is only a mediate and indirect one. Ethical laws make it our duty to have maxims o f promoting certain ends, and in so far as maxims are principles o f action w e shall, in fulfilling our duties o f vir­ tue, act to bring about these ends. But ethical laws have to do directly and immediately with our aims or purposes, and only through the medium o f these with our actions. This point is o f cardinal importance in Kant's ethical doctrine: it is the basis for his distinction between perfect and imperfect duties, and the implication o f this doctrine is that beyond laws o f the juridical type there are no laws prescribing determinate actions as duties. W i t h regard to the ethical obligation that accompanies juridical laws, the proper concern o f ethics is, again, only jstfftb our moral attitude o f will. W h e n ethics takes up a juridical law into its o w n legislation it is only the 'principle o f the intention', i.e. the resolution to. fulfil our duty from a motive o f duty, that is ethical: the l a w for the action itself is juridical. Ethics is, normally, not concerned with our actions in fulfilment o f our juridical duties because these are the proper object o f juridical legislation. T h e proper concern which ethics has with juridical duties is only in making the thought o f duty, o f the lawfulness o f thej^ction to be performed, our motive in acting. 22

23

In our study o f particular duties w e shall have to consider the various virtues. For, although virtue according to its form is only one—the strength of our purpose to fulfil every duty from a motive o f duty— 2 2

M.d.S.', 389.

2 3

Cf. H.N.(23), 382; cf. also Voresung, 89-90.

THE NOTION AND CONTENT OF TUGENDLEHRE

71

w ^ c a n consider this purpose in relation to the various objects o f moral choice or in relation to the various inclinations which must be brought upder control, and so speak o f many virtues. Although Kant's dis­ cussion o f virtue under its formal aspect is necessarily in the most abstract terms, his remarks concerning virtue as such and the 'inner freedom' which is at once its foundation and effect indicate the lines along which his ethical doctrine will develop. In v i e w o f the widely accepted caricature o f Kant's notion o f the morally good man, w e should note particularly the stress which he places upon, the element of spontaneity in moral action. W h e r e moral choice is bounded by laws the virtuous man will, o f course, strive scrupulously to make his conduct consistent with every l a w . But Kant insists upon the import­ ance o f the morally permissible, o f action which is neither commanded nor prohibited b y any moral law. A n d the man w h o fills this area of the morally mdifferent with commands and prohibitions manifests, according to Kant, an attitude which is the antithesis o f the inner freedom implied in virtue. The breadth o f this field o f the morally mdifferent seems to fluctuate with Kant's t w o possible" views o f 'im­ perfect duty' and the 'latitude' which it permits. B u t his insistence upon it, together with his general remarks on virtue as such, enables us to ek'minate from the concept o f virtue certain moral attitudes which are not, in fact, virtue. 24

25

26

It would be a grave mistake, Kant warns us, to regard virtue as some­ thing mechanical, a habit o f acting in accordance w i t h the law. If w e are talking about morally good, and not merely right, actions, the concept o f a habit o f such actions contains, in fact, a contradiction. T o the degree that our lawful actions become quasi-mechanical, their moral value chminishes; and it is not difficult to conceive a habit of, e.g. benevolence which w o u l d be without moral value because the actions would be performed without reference to the law as our motive. Virtue is not merely a facility or aptitude in determining choice to lawful actions, but a readiness so to determine choice 'through the thought o f the. l a w ' . Virtue is 'always beginning anew' in the sense that our facility in determining choice in accordance with the law 27

24

M.d.S., 395, 406 and 410.

2 5

.

.

Cf. the discussion o f the 'warning' (praemotiens) function o f conscience in M.d.S., 440. Kant draws a sharp distinction b e t w e e n a delicate conscience, which is responsive to everything that really pertains to duty and, o n the other hand, a 'fantastically virtuous' attitude', w h i c h refuses to regard anything as morally indifferent and invents duties w h e r e there are none. 28

Ibid., 409.

2 7

Ibid., 407.

72

LAWS OF FREEDOM

must, in so far as it is virtue, always be •accompanied b y a striving to purify our moral motive. Virtue can never become a mere repetition of lawful actions without thereby ceasing to be virtue. In rejecting the notion o f virtue as a habit o f g o o d actions acquired through repetition o f such actions, Kant makes another characteristic point: namely, that such a habit, 'like any other mechanism o f technic­ ally-practical reason, is neither equipped for every case nor adequately secured against the changes which n e w circumstances can bring about'. As a general rule, benevolent actions are in accordance with duty. But there are circumstances in which a claim upon our bene­ volence would conflict with the stronger claims o f justice or, perhaps, with our duty to ourselves; and in such a case it w o u l d be contrary to duty to perform the benevolent action. I f our benevolence is, as it were, a blind habit rather than the virtue o f benevolence, w e shall not be prepared for circumstances o f this sort. A habit is something rigid. Virtue must be flexible and adaptable—not in the sense that w e can ever depart from the moral law, but rather because action takes place under varying circumstances and w e cannot determine, apart from these circumstances, what our duty will be. There are certain universal principles o f duty which can and must be determined a priori, and the morally good man will be equipped w i t h a knowledge o f these and with a firm resolution to act in accordance w i t h them. But w e cannot determine a priori what our duty will be under the countless situations in which w e shall be called upon to act. T h e ultimate application o f moral laws is the w o r k o f judgment, not o f reason; and if, in the Grundlegung, Kant tends to neglect the role o f judgment in moral ac­ tion, the Metaphysik der Sitten makes up for this neglect. W e ought, Kant there maintains, to conceive various sorts o f possible situations and decide h o w the moral law is to be applied to them—not in order that we may have detailed moral rules ready for every possible situation but rather in order to train our j u d g m e n t so that, as circumstances arise, we shall be able correctly to determine what our duty is. Virtue is the firm resolution t o fulfil every duty^njd for this reason it must be the source o f spontaneous and enlightened action, not a natural mech­ anism. 28

29

As we have both a negative and a positive concept o f free choice, so w e can distinguish a negative and a positive aspect in the state o f inner freedom. As the negative concept o f free choice is that o f a will not determined b y motives o f sensuous origin, so the negative p r e 28

M.d.S., 383-4, 405-6 and 407.

2 9

Ibid., 383-4.

THE NOTION AND CONTENT OF TUGENDLEHRE

73

upposition o f virtue is what Kant calls, borrowing a technical term of the Stoics, 'moral a p a t h y ' . 'Apathy,' he tells us, is generally used in the sense o f lack of feeling and hence indifference to objects of choice. In 'moral apathy', too, motives o f sensuous origin have lost their in­ fluence on choice, but in qualifying this state o f calm as 'moral' w e indicate that the influence of;these has been weakened through the development o f a feeling o f non-sensuous origin, i.e. reverence for the law. Moral apathy is not ^difference, but it is freedom from the inner commotion o f an undisdplined mind. ' T h e true strength o f virtue', Kant explains, 'is the mind in a state o f repose, with a firm and con­ sidered resolution' to act in accordance with the law. 'This is c h e l a t e of health in the moral l i f e ' . Those feelings, which involve a disturb­ ance o f our mental equilibrium, even w h e n they are aroused by the thought o f the good, are only an illusory and transient strength which is, in reality, a weakness in our use o f reason. 'Moral, enthusiasm' is one o f the attitudes which belong to the pathology o f the moral life. Kant adds that the classical opinion that a man can be 'too virtuous' arises from a confusion o f such attitudes with virtue; for i f w e are indeed talking about virtue, then to say that a man can be too virtuous is like saying that a circle can be too round or a straight line too straight. 30

31

32

But as the positive concept o f free choice signifies, over and above the non-determination o f choice by motives o f sensuous origin;, the power o f determining choice through a pure rational motive, so too virtue implies, over and above the prohibition against being ruled by the affective side o f our nature, the positive command to rule over it. In connection with the duty o f self-mastery Kant mentions t w o opponents o f inner freedom which he calls the Affekten and the Leidenschaften. N o English equivalent seems to exist which w o u l d express the meaning that Kant assigns to these terms. T h e y are not simply feelings and mcHnations. A n Affekt, Kant explains, is a feeling (e.g. anger) which precedes deliberation or reflection and makes this dimcult or impossible. A Leidenschaft, on the other hand, is a sensuous , appetite which has become a permanent mclination. Whereas anger is sudden and transient, a propensity to e.g. hatred is o f a more permanent 30

M.d.S., 408-9. Ibid., 409. It should be noted that, in die Metaphysik der Sitten, 'moral feeling' is sometimes identified with reverence for the law (as in 464), while at other times it is described as the capacity to feel pleasure or pain merely in the consciousness that our action is consistent or inconsistent with the law (as in 399). & ™M.d.S., 433 n. 31

74

LAWS OF FREEDOM

character. Because it remains after the mental disturbance has subsided, we have opportunity, in this state o f calm, to brood upon the pro­ pensity and root it deeply in our mind,, and w e are, therefore, more likely to adopt it into oar maxims. Hence the Leidenschaften are more closely related to vice man are the Affekten. The duty o f self-master)' contains the command \o tame the latter and to rule over the former, and hence to eHminate them qua Affekten and Leidenschaften. But these qualities are to be distinguished from feelings and in­ clinations in general. As Kant works out the implications o f the command to master our feelings and inclinations, it means that the sensuous appetitive side o f our nature is not to be suppressed altogether, but rather to be brought under the control o f pure practical reason. He distinguishes, in general, between feelings and inclinations which precede our deliberation about duty and tend to confuse it, and those which follow upon our determination o f what constitutes our duty and can help us to act more effectively in fulfilling it. As our moral attitude gathers strength, w e gradually free ourselves from the un­ controlled uprising o f the former, while at the same time w e develop and put to use such affective capacities as can assist us in carrying out our moral purposes. Feelings and inclinations o f the second type, culti­ vated and controlled b y pure practical reason, are entirely consistent with inner freedom. 33

34

If inner freedom requires mastery o f the feelings and inclinations and therefore eliminates 'moral enthusiasm', as specious virtue, it also excludes what might be called an excessive concern with duty, 'fan­ tastic virtue'. T h e fantastically virtuous man, Kant tells us, is one w h o regards nothing as morally indifferent, 'whether I eat meat or fish, drink beer or wine', and w h o 'strews his path w i t h duty at every step, as with man traps'. Fantastic virtue is 'a micrology which, if one admits it into the doctrine o f virtue, turns the sovereignty o f virtue into a tyranny'. The truly virtuous man is one w h o , w i t h a firm resolution to do all that the law commands, realizes that the l a w does not concern itself with such matters and, in them, gives his inclinations free play. 35

Because virtue is the strength o f pure practical reason in ruling over the inclinations, it is only for imperfectly rational beings that ethics is Tugendlehre. A n d because man's mclinatfens arise from the non-moral 33

O n the distinction between Affekten and Leidenschaften cf. M.d.S., 408-9 and

Vorlesung, 183. T h e Anthropologic contains a m o r e detailed account o f these, together with a further discussion o f 'apathy'. 34

Cf. below, p. 162 ff., p. 173 ff. and p. 197 ff.

3 5

M.d.S., 409.

THE NOTION AND CONTENT OF TUGENDLEHRE

J$

part o f his nature, human morality, even in its highest stages, is always virtue and never holiness'. Although the inclinations may be brought piore and more under the control o f reason, the fact that they are, in their origin, independent o f morality, implies tfciat there is no necessary connection between the law o f their functioning and the moral law and that they may, at any time, g o out to objects contrary to the moral law. Kant has little sympathy with those moralists w h o , fmding the notions o f virtue and duty htimihating, substitute for them concepts that are proper to a holy will. H e reminds them that the relation of our sensuously affected will to the moral law is one o f subjection and con­ straint, and that they do morality no service in bidding men to act out o f love, rather than reverence, for the l a w . O n the contrary, they deprive moral action o f its essence, the motive o f duty. Human morality is always only virtue. B u t because virtue is the power o f self-constraint through a law proceeding from our o w n reason, it is the manifestation o f the absolute and unconditioned good, a good w i l l . 36

37

38

In our brief study o f Kant's philosophy o f L a w w e saw h o w the first principle o f juridical law is derived from the supreme principle o f morality. T h e first principle o f ethical law, too, must be a form o f the categorical imperative, i.e. o f the command to make our behaviour consistent with universal law. B u t the derivation o f ethical laws from the supreme moral principle must, in one respect, be a more compli­ cated process than the derivation o f juridical laws. Juridical laws, like the supreme moral principle itself, abstract from ends: ethical laws, on the other hand, enjoin as duties the adoption o f certain ends. H o w can the supreme principle o f morality, which locates duty in a formal maxim determined independendy o f our ends, lead to ethical laws prescribing.the pursuit o f obligatory ends? This is the basic problem • o f the Tugendlehre, to which w e must n o w turn our attention.

36

M.d.S., 383 and 409.

8 7

K.d.p.V., 84 ff.

38

M.d.S., 396-7 and 405.

CHAPTER VI PURE

PRACTICAL THE ENDS

OF

REASON

AND

ACTION

Despite its appearance o f novelty, the ethics o f the Tugendlehre—'the system of the ends o f pure practical reason'—is no departure from the position which Kant established in his earlier ethical writings. In the second Critique he outlined his position on the relation o f ends to moral action so clearly that it would be difficult to mistake his meaning. N o w it is indeed undeniable that every volition must have an object and therefore a matter; but it does not follow that the matter is the determining.principle and condition o f the maxim. . . . T h e mere form o f law, which hmits the matter, must also be a reason for adding this matter to the will, not for presupposing it. Yet misunderstandings, which began in Kant's o w n time, have flourished to the present day. According to Garve, Kant held that the morally good man must give up his o w n happiness as his end. T h e fact that Kant replied to this criticism, exclaiming any such v i e w and e x ­ plaining at length his view on the relation between duty and happiness, failed to impress his critics. Reiterating Garve's view, some o f them have improved on it to the point o f mamtaining that for Kant morally good action excludes any end. 1

It is true that in the Grundlegung Kant's attention is focused on the form of p u r m a x i m s rather than onjhejr_irj^teXjjor^ends. Given his view that the form or the maxim determines its morality, this is not unnatural in a w o r k devoted to isolating and investigating the ultimate criterion o f morality. But both the Grundlegung and the Critique of Practical Reason contain discussions o f the relation between ends and principles o f action, and itTis tnes^drsaTssfons that enable Kant to make the'cfuclal transition from the first principle o f all duty to the first principle o f ethics in one brief chapter ©£t&e Tugendlehre. A categorical imperative for our ends follows immediately from a categorical i m ­ perative for our actions, when w e connect the latter w i t h ethical legis­ lation and the purposive nature o f human action. Hence w e w o u l d be well advised to give our attention briefly to these earlier discussions. A n y maxim o f action, Kant has always maintained, is purposive: an KJ.p.V., 34. 1

76

/

PURE PRACTICAL REASON AND THE ENDS OF ACTION 7 7

(

•

l^l^M.essentially'.a.means,.to

a n . e n d - In their search for the criterion of morality, most moral philosophers begin with the end. They try to determine what objects are ' g o o d ' and then prescribe as.moral laws actions toward those ends. B u t in so doing, Kant argues, they are forced to the conclusion that there is nothing g o o d in itself, that the goodness o f anything is conditioned by its relation to something beyond itself; and this in turn subverts the concept o f duty, since it implies that all o f reason's commands are bmding only on the supposition that w e have adopted as our ends certain objects o f desire w h i c h the actions in question will realize. If w e begin b y asking what objects are good, Kant argues, the good must be the object o f practical reason in its function o f serving the inclinations. Moral philosophers assume, either tacidy or expliridy, that the good is not merely the object o f our appetitive powers but the object o f these powers determined according to a principle o f reason. T h e y assume this in regarding our judgments o f g o o d and evil as objec­ tive judgments, to be distinguished'from the individual's merely sub­ jective judgments o f what is pleasant or unpleasant. 'Pleasant' indicates merely the relation o f an object to sensuous mclination, 'good' the relation of an object to a rational wilL In so far as the g o o d is objective, it cannot be equated simply w i t h the pleasant. It must, rather, refer to actions which are the rational means to satisfying our inclinations. W h a t w e call good will thus have a degree o f objective vaUdity. B u t it will not be g o o d in itself; it'will derive its goodness from something outside itself—from its relation, according to reason, to the pleasant. N o w practical reason can serve the inclinations o n t w o levels. In so. far as w e want to satisfy some particular desire, practical reason, accord­ ing to a principle o f skill, determines our choice to the appropriate means for satisfying that desire. Here, as Kant notes, the term 'good' does not apply to the end at all; since ' g o o d ' means merely 'useful', the poisoner's prescription for killing his victim and the physician's prescription for curing his patient'are equally good, providing both serve the agent's end equally w e l l . As finite rational beings, however, 2

3

1

2

O n the f o l l o w i n g discussion o f 'the good', cf. K.d.p.V., 58-65. For a more detailed discussion o f the three senses o f 'good' corresponding t o principles o f skill, prudence, and morality,-cf. H . J. Paton: 'Kants' Idea of >the Good', In c

Defence of Reason, pp. 157-77. 3

Gr., 415. O n principles o f skill and prudence, cf. ibid., 414 ff. Kant is here v i e w i n g these principles specifically as imperatives, i.e. as objective principles o f practical reason t o w h i c h the m a x i m or subjective* principle o f an imperfectly rational agent m a y or m a y n o t conform.

LAWS" OF F R E E D O M

78

we seek not merely the satisfaction of,this or. that desire but an ideal state of satisfaction which w e call happiness. W i t h regard to our happiness, reason's function is not merely that o f prescribing the means to given ends; it must also determine the composition o f the end itself. For, while everyone wishes for happiness, the concept o f happiness is a vague and, in itself, empty one, the content o f which is supplied by the individual's inclinations. Kant's writings seem to contain t w o c o n ­ cepts of happiness: that o f a m a x i m u m o f pleasure accompanying our whole existence and that o f an integration o f our subjective ends, among which pleasure is only o n e . B u t in either case reason must determine, on the basis o f the individual's temperament, the content of the end. I f happiness is conceived as a m a x i m u m o f pleasurable feeling, reason must determine h o w the satisfaction o f any particular desire will affect our satisfaction with our existence as a w h o l e ; and i f happiness is taken as a systematic integration o f our subjective ends, reason must determine which o f these ends can be integrated into a system and which must be sacrificed as incompatible with the w h o l e . Hence in principles o f prudence, having to d o w i t h our pursuit o f happiness, it is not merely the action but also the end that is the w o r k of reason and therefore good. B u t the goodness o f the end, like that of the action aimed at it, is only a conditioned goodness. A n action according to a prudential principle is rationally necessary only in so far as w e consider the end an element in our happiness, and the compre­ hensive end o f happiness itself is rationally necessary only in v i e w o f our sensuous nature. In both skill and prudence, where the end is dictated ultimately b y our sensuous nature, an action is rationally necessary, not in itself, but only in relation to an inclination or to the sum-total o f the inclinations. 4

5

6

7

N o w Kant's most fundamental conviction is that the moral necessity of an action expressed in the concept o f duty is an unconditional necessity: an action which w e call duty is rationally necessary in itself and not merely b y the relation o f its results to Our inclinations. Granting the conclusion that principles o f reason^based o n desire for some end * In K.d.U., 430, Kant refers t o our n o t i o n o f happiness as an 'Idea' because it is not abstracted f r o m experience o f our inclinations but rather implies a totality never attained i n experience. It is, h o w e v e r , an 'Idea o f the imagination' because it is an ideal, projected b y reason, o f a total satisfaction o f the desires. Cf. also Gr., 399• . O n the first v i e w o f happiness, cf. K.d.p.V., 22; o n the second v i e w , Gr., 405 5

and 418, Religion, 58. KJ.p.V., 61. K.d.r.V. A 800. 6

7

/

PURE PRACTICAL REASON AND THE ENDS OF ACTION

79

fare all conditioned principles, the unconditioned necessity of dutv implies that the principle prescribing duty rr\ust be a merely formal principle o f action. For an action to have unconditioned rational necessity, reason must be practical or determine action by itself or without reference to anything beyond itself (the inclinations); and in this case the only principle reason can use in determining action is the principle o f the rationality o f the action or its validity, for everyone. Thus the concept o f duty implies that the moral g o o d must be derived from the moral law, not presupposed by it. The first-principle o f duty, in short, must be a formal principle which abstracts altogether from ends. Kant has not, o f course, denied that the morally determined will must seek to produce some effect beyond the action itself; on the con­ trary, he has maintained that all human action is purposive. N o r has he said that the results o f an action are irrelevant in questions o f duty; he makes it quite clear that in deciding whether w e can will a ma-rim as universallaw-we-must^consider the: immediate residtToi^e-aetion. He has merely maintained that, in deciding what constitutes our duty, w e must not take into account our desire for the results o f the action and that, in doing our duty, w e must not make our desire for these results the condition under which w e will act in conformity with duty. If the first principle o f duty is a formal one,, then it follows, as Kant re­ plied to Garve, that tins principle says nothing at all about our ends. It neither commands nor forbids the adoption of any end, but' merely sets a limiting condition o n our actions, that is, on the means b y which w e pursue whatever ends w e m a y have. Thus it is clear that the principle of duty does not forbid us to have our o w n happiness as our end. In so far as w e are finite and so have needs and wants, our reason must include among its ends that ideal state o f satisfaction that w e call happiness. It is only w h e n the'prudential good comes into conflict with the moral g o o d — w h e n our material maxim, based On desire for an end, conflicts with the formal maxim o f morality—that w e must abandon that particular means to the end o f our happiness. But in so far as the t w o are in harmony, the prudential good is taken up into the 8

9

10

8

Cf. b e l o w , p p . 146-7.

9

This reply comprises Part I o f Kant's w o r k : Uber den Gemeiiispruch: das mag

in der Theorie richtig sein, taugt aber'nichtfur die Praxis, f 1 0

In saying that a finite rational Kant is referring not so m u c h to practical reason o f a finite being, refuse', namely to try to secure the

being must have his o w n happiness as an end, natural necessity as to rational necessity. T h e h e maintains, has 'an office w h i c h it cannot agent's happiness. K.d.p.V., 61.

LAWS OF FREEDOM

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moral good. The man w h o pursues his o w n happiness subject to the over-riding condition of morality is, in fact, Vvilling his material maxim through the formal maxim o f lawfulness, and his morally permissible actions in pursuit o f his happiness are, accordingly, morally good actions. So far as the ends o f action are concerned, the preceding discussion comes to a primarily negative conclusion: that the end is not what de­ termines the morality o f the action. Having thus cleared the ground in his earlier writings, Kant can n o w , in the Tugendlehre, turn his attention in a positive w a y to ends and explore the consequences o f the fact that 'every volition must have . . . a matter' and that 'the mere form o f law . . . must be a reason for adding this matter to the will. . . .' If human action is essentially purposive, then the ends o f moral choice, though secondary to and derivative from its form, are an intrinsic element in moral action, and it remains for Kant to derive these ends from the practical activity o f pure reason. In the Grjmdkgttng and the second Critique, Kant has been treating the categorical imperative as the undifferentiated first principle o f ail duty as such. In the Metaphysltra^r'Sitterr, he treats lTHrsTas the prin­ ciple o f duties which can be enjoined b y outer legislation and then as the principle o f duties which are possible only by ethical legislation. His principle o f division in the latter w o r k thus forces him to dis­ tinguish sharply, for purposes o f analysis, between that in our purposive maxim which pertains to the action and that which pertains to the purpose embodied in the action, and to v i e w the categorical imperative first as a principle merely for actions and then as a principle for our adoption o f ends. In either case, all that hejias said about the relation of ends and duty remains true: the categorical imperative is a formal principle which abstracts from any particular end. As the first principle of Law, it commands that our exercise o f outer freedom be consistent with the freedom o f everyone under universal l a w ; as the first principle of ethics, it commands that our maxims o f realizing ends be such that they could qualify for giving universal law. In the first case, the cate­ gorical imperative prescribes the form o f our actions affecting the freedom o f other men; in the second, the form o f our aims or purposes. 11

-

But while juridical laws abstract altogether from our ends, laws de­ rived from the first principle o f ethics enjoin as duty the adoption o f certain specific ends. In ethics, as in L a w , w e are to submit our given 1 1

O n the relation o f material and formal m a x i m in morally g o o d action, cf. below, p. 89 ff.

PURE PRACTICAL REASON AND THE ENDS OF ACTION 8l maxims o f action-toward-an-end to the 'touchstone*"of the categorical / Imperative. But L a w is concerned with our maxims only in so far as ' actions are means to ends, whereas ethics has to d o with the ends to which actions are directed. Hence juridical |aws merely forbid us t o employ certain means o f achieving whatever 'ends w e have or to reject certain o f our m a x i m s ; but by submitting our given maxims o f e n d s to the first principle o f ethical law, w e obtain laws prescribing the pursuit o f certain specific ends. If, for example, w e find that our maxim of ^difference to the development of our natural powers could not serve as law for beings capable o f rational action, it follows that w e have a duty o f mcluding our natural perfection a m o n g our ends. The laws governing our actions and those governing our purposes are, then, indeed derived from the same principle, the categorical i m ­ perative. B u t because this principle is taken in reference to different aspects o f choice, juridical laws and ethical laws differ in nature. Since juridical laws abstract altogether from our ends, they are essentially negative and Umiting principles which merely restrict our exercise o f freedom. As Kant notes, it is the obligatory ends enjoined b y ethical laws that first command us to adbpt maxims rather than merely to reject certain o f our maxims o f self-love. W i t h o u t an end, there is no maxim. Hence, apart from obligatory ends, w e have only laws for actions which regard our purposes as given and prescribe the limiting condition on our actions in pursuit o f those ends. It is true that, so far as juridical laws are concerned, the end to which the action is a means may be o f any kind whatsoever: it m a y be the natural end o f the agent's happiness or an obligatory end prescribed b y ethical law. T h e categorical imperative, v i e w e d as the principle o f the action only, sets the limiting condition o n the means to any end. B u t apart from obligatory ends, all our maxims w o u l d be maxims o f self-love. If w e include among our maxims some which are n o t self-seeking ones, it 12

13

14

1 2

M.d.S., 389. A l t h o u g h juridical laws m a y c o m m a n d , as w e l l as prohibit, actions, they remain limiting and negative principles: the actions c o m m a n d e d are those w h i c h are necessary t o prevent infringements o f .outer freedom. W h e n Kant is. distinguishing, w i t h i n our maxim-<>f-action-toward-an-end between what is subject to laws for actions and what is subject t o laws for ends, he speaks o f our 'maxims o f actions' and o f our 'maxims o f ends'. This does n o t imply that w e have t w o kinds o f maxims. It is o n l y a convenient w a y o f specifying the element in our m a x i m w i t h w h i c h the one or the other principle is concerned. For the same reason, I shall s o m e t i m e s refer, i n this discussion, t o the 'form o f an action' or to the 'form o f an end', although it w o u l d be m o r e accurate to speak o f the form o f a m a x i m . • M.d.S., 389. This distinction provides the g r o u n d for the distinction between perfect and imperfect duty, strict and w i d e obligation, the subject o f Chapter VLT. 1 3

?

1 4

7

LAWS OF FREEDOM

82

is because w e have gone beyond our duty according to the formal principle o f action and adopted obligatory "ends. Were w e to stop with the principle o f action, then, w e might de­ scribe the morally good man simply as one w h o restricts his actions in pursuit o f his happiness through the thought' that he must be able to will their maxims as universal law. T o make this description accur­ ate, w e should clarify t w o points. T h e first is that laws having to do merely with the form o f our maxims o f action are not limited to juri­ dical laws. There are laws regarding our use o f our o w n person w h i c h could be called quasi-juridical since they limit our actions through 'the right o f humanity in our o w n person'. Secondly, Kant assumes that, apart from obligatory ends, all our maxims will be based on self-love. He implies that even w h e n w e make the happiness o f others our end on the basis o f our benevolent mclinations w e are, ultimately, seeking the satisfaction o f our mclinations. If w e happen to find in ourselves altruistic mclinations, our concept o f our o w n happiness, as the in­ tegral satisfaction o f our mclinations, will include the satisfaction o f these mclinations; should w e find n o such impulses in ourselves, then our treatment o f others w i l l be limited to strict justice. Apart from ethical laws, Kant holds, all our ends can be subsumed under the abstract concept o f our o w n happiness, and our duty is only to limit our pursuit o f happiness through the rights o f others and the integrity o f our o w n person. 15

16

The role o f ethical legislation in relation to juridical duty is the bridge which leads from the 'limiting' first principle o f L a w t o the 'expanding' first principle o f ethics. Juridical duties, w e have seen, can be fulfilled independently o f our motives, and only ethical legislation, which attaches the motive o f duty to juridical laws, concerns the 'inner act o f choice itself'. W i t h o u t the concept o f ethical obligation, w e could never g o beyond the concept o f freedom in our external actions and enter the sphere o f inner freedom, freedom in the determination o f choice itself. B u t it is essential to remember that the concept o f ethical obligation belongs stricdy to the formal side o f ethics. W h i l e it is the 17

1 5

O n these laws, w h i c h enjoin perfect duties t o oneself, cf. Chapter Vffl. T o avoid complicating this discussion unnecessanly, I have treated the distinction as one between ethical laws and juridical laws in the strict sense. Qualifications necessitated b y perfect duties t o oneself are discussed under that heading. 1 8

1 7

Gr., 398 and 389.'Cf. also H . J . Paton: The Categorical Imperative, pp. 53-5.

M.d.S., 383 and 394-5. A l t h o u g h the universal requirement o f determining choice to every action through the t h o u g h t o f duty can be called an 'ethical duty', it is not a 'duty o f virtue', i.e. an obligatory end.

PURE PRACTICAL REASON AND THE END£ OF ACTION 83 / b r i d g e which takes us from juridical duties (officio debiti) to duties o f I virtue (officia virtutis), in itself it prescribes n o 'offices o f virtue'. Laws derived from the formal principle o f action, even w h e n accompanied by the self-constraint o f pure practical reason, remain limiting principles which prescribe no end. Ethical legislation indeed 'widens' our concept o f duty beyond the notion o f ' w h a t is due' b y right, but this widening is only on the formal side; ethical legislation does not require us to d o anything more than is stated in the law, but only t o determine our choice to it through the thought o f duty. This point can, perhaps, be seen more clearly i f w e recall that any law, whether juridical or ethical, can be conceived in abstraction from its legislation. I f w e are considering merely the objective conformity o f our maxims with duty, w e can say that a maxim o f promoting others' happiness from friendly mclination is legal, even as fulfilling a contract from self-interest is legal. B u t in neither case has the cor^orrnity o f our maxim w i t h duty any moral value. In order t o give o u r act o f choice moral value w e need not determine it to anything -beyond fulfilling the contract or adopting others' happiness as our end: w e need only d e ­ termine it in a certain w a y — b y the thought o f the universal validity o f our action or purpose. T h e principle o f ethical obligation, make it your m a x i m so to act that y o u can regard: yourself as giving universal law through your maxim, is not itself a n e w principle o f duty. It is merely the principle o f morally good choice as such. Although Kant insists strongly on his distinction between laws for actions and laws for the maxims o f actions—that is, laws prescribing ends—his language tends at times to obscure this distinction. He asserts repeatedly that ethics requires us to make L a w o r the rights o f others our end in observing juridical l a w s . B u t such assertions are not i n ­ consistent w i t h this distinction; for, apparendy, it is n o t the principle o f action, even w h e n accompanied b y ethical obligation, that pre­ scribes right or justice as our end. Kant, w e must recall, uses the term 'end' in t w o different senses. In its primary meaning the term 'end' means the intended results o r 18

19

1 8

M.d.S., 390-1. A s Kant puts it i n ibid., 389, ethics requires us t o regard the principle o f d u t y as 'the l a w o f our o w n will, not o f another's will'. It is one thing t o act o n a m a x i m w h i c h could, i n fact, serve as a universal l a w o f outer freedom, and quite another thing t o m a k e the thought o f our m a x i m ' s universal validity our formal m a x i m i n so acting. M.d.S., 390-91. W h i l e merely right actions are n o t meritorious, Kant remarks, it is meritorious to make the rightfulness o f actions our m a x i m ; 'for w e thereby make the right o f humanity . . . our end and w i d e n our concept o f duty 1 9

beyond what is due (offidum debiti)'.

,

8

LAWS OF FREEDOM

4

effects of an action, the state o f affairs w e are striving to bring about by our action. However, Kantrincludes under 'end' not only the effects we are striving to bring about but also that which serves merely as a hmiting condition on our actions. In the formula o f humanity as an end-in-itself he regards humanity as an end in both a negative and a positive w a y and expresses this distinction b y saying that w e ought not to use persons as mere means and, further, that w e ought to make our o w n humanity and the subjective ends o f others our ends. If w e act to bring about a state o f affairs that will satisfy another's desires, that person's happiness is our end in the primary meaning o f 'end'. I f w e merely limit our actions so as hot to interfere w i t h his pursuit o f his o w n ends, the other person is the 'end' o f our will only in the negative' sense o f a ground for refraining from certain actions. A n end, Kant notes, is 'that which serves as an objective ground for the self-deter­ mination o f choice'. O u r action must have an object, and the deter­ mination o f choice to an action will have reference to some reason for acting with regard to this object. W h e n the objects o f our actions are other persons, their personality is the ground for our refraining from reducing them to mere means to our subjective ends and their rational will to realize their o w n happiness is the ground for our making their subjective ends our own. There is sufficient analogy between the w a y in which choice is determined w i t h reference to the object in the t w o cases to justify Kant's mduding both under the term 'end'. But in the one case w e are striving to bring something into being, in the other, merely limiting our actions b y the thought that persons cannot be disposed o f as mere means. 20

21

22

N o w the formal principle o f action abstracts from ends. But, as w e shall see, the essentially purposive nature o f human action means that when w e regard this principle as the l a w o f our o w n will, our maxim is brought under the first principle o f ethical law, which is a J 0

In discussing the formula o f humanity as an e n d i n itself i n Gr., 427-9, Kant is concerned primarily w i t h rational nature as an e n d i n the limiting sense. It is in the second and fourth examples o f duties derived f r o m this formula that h e distinguishes b e t w e e n ends in the sense o f limiting conditions o f actions and ends in the sense o f objects or the matter o f choice. Gr., 427. Cf. also H.N.fa), 389, w h e r e Kant distinguishes b e t w e e n the e n d , which is the objective determining g ^ o m d ^ r M i o i c e , and the m o t i v e (elater animi), which is its subjective deterniining ground. Although I think that the f o l l o w i n g v i e w is m o r e i n accordance w i t h Kant's statements, the texts are often ambiguous. It could be argued that t o adopt 'right' as one's end is nothing m o r e than t o act o u t o f reverence for the law, so that ethical obligation does, i n fact, i m p o s e this end. Cf. H.N.fa), 258 and 260. 8 1

2 2

PURE PRACTICAL REASON AND THE ENDS OF ACTION 85 corrimancl to adopt as our end the system of pure practical reason's ends or the highest good. N o w if there is no determination o f choice without an end, even our decision to refrain from acting requires an end in a formal and hmiting sense. Hence the highest good, as a completely rational state o f affairs, includes ends in both the senses mentioned above: our striving to promote the obligatory ends o f others' happiness and our o w n perfection assumes that w e are not violating others' rights or the integrity o f our o w n person. Thus in fulfilling a juridical duty w e take the preservation o f right or justice as o u r end, and in observing certain ethical prohibitions w e take as our end the integrity o f our o w n humanity. In such a case the duty itself is derived from the formal principle o f action: the principle o f ethical l a w concerns only our intention in performing (or omitting) the action. Therefore its direction o f our will to the formal structure o f the highest go6d is not yet a duty o f virtue properly speaking; it belongs only to the formal aspect o f duty o f virtue. O n l y in the case o f an ethical law, which is derived direcdy from the first principle o f ethics and prescribes an end in the positive sense, have w e a real duty o f virtue. Ethics, as a system o f duties, is primarily a treatise on ends in the positive sense. But, it seems, the fundamental direction o f our will to the highest good, involved in our adoption o f duty as our motive in fulfilling a juridical law, takes place under the first principle o f ethical l a w . The first principle o f juridical law remains, in itself, a l a w for actions alone, mdifferent to our ends, whether 'end' be taken in the formal, or in the material sense. 23

24

25

The problem n o w is to see the necessity for positing obligatory ends. O n the basis o f the earlier writings, w e are to assume the 'fact o f rea­ s o n ' o f a categorical imperative for our actions, that is, of the uncon­ ditional necessity o f certain actions. This first principle o f all duty is a principle for actions which, in itself, says nothing about the agent's ends. B u t human action is purposive, and i f the categorical imperative is to be the principle o f an action in its entirety—of the act o f choice itself, as well as .of the exercise o f outer freedom proceeding from it—. then pure practical reason must determine the form o f our aims as well as o f our actions. Kant's argument t o obligatory ends is, essentially, an elaboration o f his remark, in the second Critique,-that while the moral law is itself mdifferent to ends, reverence for the l a w leads to the duty of promoting the summutn bonumP 26

2 8

28

Cf. below, p . 115 ff.

K.d.p.V., 31

2 4

M.d.S., 396-8.

" ibid, 2 I 3

2 5

Ibid., 395.

LAWS OF FREEDOM

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Kant begins his argument by defining an 'end' as 'an object o f free choice, the thought o f which determines the p o w e r o f choice to an action b y which the object is produced'. W e shall have to consider, in due course, the consistency o f this definition, which maintains that the end determines choice to an action, w i t h Kant's v i e w that in moral action choice must be determined b y the thought o f the form o f the action. B u t the point to be noted n o w is the intrinsic connection asserted between ends and human action as such. A n end is not some­ thing that.comes over and above our determination o f choice to an action: w e do not first decide, to act and then find an end for the action. Human action as such is essentially purposive, and our deter28

29

v mination o f choice to any action is the setting o f an end. Kant n o w reminds us that the setting o f any end is an act o f freedom, v/ not an operation o f nature, and that, as an act o f freedom, it comes under objective principles o f practical reason. W e have noticed the sharp distinction which he draws between the behaviour o f brute animals and free or human action. Depending on the context o f the discussion and the immediate purpose he has in mind, Kant expresses this distinction in different terms. Whereas animal behaviour is a blind response to the impulse o f the moment, human behaviour is (according , to the Grundlegung) action on a m a x i m or subjective principle o f action or (according to the Metaphysik der Sitten) action toward an end. Kant here suggests that these are merely t w o ways o f saying the same thing. T o determine choice according to a m a x i m is to set an end, and vice versa. N o w if adopting a maxim is equivalent to setting an end and if, as the Grundlegung explains, all our maxims are subject to objective principles o f practical reason, then our adoption o f any end conies under objective practical principles, and it remains for Kant only to correlate the different ways in which w e set ends with the different types o f objective practical principles. A maxim is our subjective principle o f action, the principle by which w e actually determine our choice. A n objective principle o f practical reason is the principle on which w e w o u l d necessarily act i f reason were in full control o f our choice. B u t since our power o f choice is affected by sensuous impulses, our maxim does not necessarily coincide with 30

31

28

MJ.S., 3 84-5; cf. also 381.

2 9

Kant has already indicated, in K.d.p.V., 109-10, that if the end contains in itself the conformity o f our w i l l w i t h the l a w ^ w e can then say that in morally g o o d action the end is the determining principle o f choice, w i t h o u t denying that the formal principle o f duty is our sufficient m o t i v e . 80

M.d.S., 385.

3 1

Gr., 412.

PURE PRACTICAL REASON AND THE ENL^S OF ACTION 87 the principle on which a fully rational agent w o u l d act, so that in relation to our choice objective practical principles are imperatives or commands. Imperatives, however, can be either conditioned or cate­ gorical. Conditioned imperatives (such as the principles o f skill and prudence discussed earlier) prescribe actions as rationally necessary on the assumption that w e have the ends to which the actions are the rational means. Categorical imperatives, on the other hand, prescribe actions as rationally necessary in themselves, quite apart from the relation o f their results to our mclinations. In the case o f coYiditioned imperatives, it is not the end itself that is rationally necessary; the end is considered to be given o n the basis o f our mclinations, and the principle o f reason concerns only the action, as the means to the e n d . In order for an end to be rationally necessary in itself, it would have to be an end of pure practical reason and hence an end prescribed b y a categorical imperative. 32

33

W i t h this background, Kant's argument moves swiftly to its con­ clusion. W e r e there n o ends of pure practical reason, he argues, then 'all ends of practical reason w o u l d be valid only as means to other ends, and a categorical imperative w o u l d be impossible—which destroys all moral philosophy'. W i t h o u t an end there can be n o action. A n d if, in order for an action to become rationally necessary, w e had to pre­ suppose an end given o n the basis o f our mclinations, then n o action w o u l d be necessary in itself. Its necessity would be contingent upon our having some end o f mclination. If an action is to be rationally necessary in itself and independendy o f our mclinations, then, because jaction is essentially purposive,' the end must be necessary in itself and inde­ pendently o f our inclinations. B u t pur consciousness o f duty implies that there is a categorical imperative prescribing actions as rationally necessary in themselves, and there must accordingly be ends o f pure practical reason and hence a categorical imperative commanding us to adopt ends merely o n the basis o f then rational validity. I f choice is subject to a categorical imperative regarding actions, it is also subiect to a categorical imperative regarding ends, and our capacity, to 34

3 2

For a discussion o f ends in relation to hypothetical or conditioned imperatives, cf. Gr., 414-6. S o far as the relation o f ends and categorical imperatives is c o n ­ cerned, the conclusion o f this passage is a negative one—that categorical impera­ tives, unlike conditioned o n e s d o n o t presuppose the end. This implies that, i f the end is n o t presupposed b y the principle o f reason, it must b e derived f r o m the principle. B u t since the Grundlegung is concerned only w i t h t h e supreme moral principle, it is left for the Metaphysik der Sitten t o draw o u t the implication. r

33

M.d.S., 385.

3i

Ibid.

LAWS OF FREEDOM

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determine ourselves to action independently o f our inclinations is at the same time a capacity to "set ends without reference to our mclina­ tions. It is essential for Kant simultaneously to maintain the purely formal character o f the supreme moral principle and to connect our maxims of action embodying this principle intrinsically with ends o f pure practical reason. In more technical terms, he maintains the purely formal character o f the first principle o f duty b y insisting that the connection between this principle and the ends o f pure practical reason is a synthetic connection, and then he connects obligatory ends essentially with our maxims o f moral action b y offering a 'transcendental deduction' in which the nature of human action itself is the 'third term' connecting the principle o f action and the principle o f ends. That the connection is. a synthetic one is already implicit in Kant's position that the supreme moral principle abstracts altogether from ends. It is reaffirmed in his outline o f the steps by which w e pass from the first principle o f L a w to the first principle, o f ethics. Finally, he states that the first principle o f ethics: act according to a m a x i m o f ends w h i c h it can be a universal law for everyone to have, is an a priori synthetic proposition which, as such, cannot be proved but w h i c h can be justified by a transcendental deduction tracing it to the practical activity o f pure reason. The point o f this deduction is that it is the nature o f human action itself, and not any ^sufficiency on the part o f the formal principle o f 35

36

8 5

MJ.s., 396. In the Grundlegung the supreme moral principle was said t o be synthetic and the concept o f freedom was the third term in w h i c h the will o f a rational being is connected w i t h action necessary according to the principle o f autonomy. In the Tugendlehre Kant seems t o b e saying that, o n the basis o f the argument in the earlier moral writings, w e are t o include the presupposition o f freedom in the subject-concept o f our propositions and that the supreme moral principle thereby becomes analytic. In other w o r d s , because w e n o w include more in the subject-concept (which is n o longer the concept o f a rational being as such but rather that o f free choice), the proposition w h i c h was before synthetic n o w becomes analytic. It is an analytic proposition that free choice is subject t o the formal principle o f action. If w e n o w differentiate freedom into outer and inner freedom, the first principle o f L a w — n a m e l y , that the will w h i c h is o u t ­ wardly free is subject t o external constraint—is analytic, because the notion o f constraint from without is contained i n the n o t i o n o f the outer freedom o f imperfectly rational beings. S o t o o , the proposition that the w i l l w h i c h is inwardly free is subject t o the self-constraint o f pure practical reason according t o the formal principle o f action is analytic. B u t because*fhis principle o f action abstracts f r o m ends, the connection between the w i l l subject t o this principle and obligatory ends is a synthetic one. H u m a n action itself is the third term in w h i c h the subject- and predicate-concepts are connected and the transcendental deduction o f this principle is an analysis o f the nature o f h u m a n action. 38

M.d.S., 395.

PURE PRACTICAL REASON AND THE ENDS OF ACTION

89

duty as a motive, that requires pure practical reason to posit ends. T h e mere thought o f the-form o f an action, of its consistency with law, is sufficient to determine choice. This must be so if choice is free and hence capable o f producing moral action. F r o p the point o f view o f the determiriing ground o f choice, w e need not presuppose any particular end. Y e t pure practical reason, in so far as it is practical or capable o f determining action, is a power o f ends. For it to be indifferent to ends or to take no interest in them would be a contradiction, because there can be no maxim and so nb human action without "an end. W e r e pure practical reason mdifferent t o ends, Kant tells us, it w o u l d not deter­ mine the maxims o f actions and would, therefore, not be practical. If it determines actions through the thought o f their universal vakdity it must, in so doing, set ends according to the principle o f their validity for everyone. ' W h a t , in the relation o f man to himself and others* can be an end is an end for practical reason; for it is, as such, a p o w e r o f ends . . , ' B u t pure practical reason sets ends, not because it is in­ capable o f determining choice through its formal principle alone and must call in desire for an end to assist it, but rather" because, given the nature o f human action, choice determined to action b y the thought o f its universal vahdity must strive to produce the state o f affairs that pure practical reason requires. A formal maxim o f lawfulness, in other words, is not yet a m a x i m o f action, for the principle b y which w e determine choice must have a matter as well as a form. 3 7

From its analysis o f human action, Kant's argument concludes, all too abruptly, to the existence o f obligatory ends. T h e relation o f prin­ ciples o f pure practical reason to our sensuously affected nature, Kant argues, is a relation o f constraint, and that to w h i c h w e are constrained is a duty. Accordingly, the ends enjoined by pure practical reason are obligatory ends or ends w h i c h it is a duty for us to have. The c o n ­ clusion is hurried because, following immediately upon an argument which moves from the relation between action as such and ends to the relation between moral action and ends, it might g i v e the impression that in every morally g o o d action w e must have as the matter o f our choice one o f these obligatory ends (our o w n perfection and the happiness o f other men). Kant does, in fact, indicate that this is not the case by his assertion that 'among our ends' there must be some that are obligatory ones. B u t die last stages o f the argument are sketchy. 38

T o complete this argument, w e should return to Kant's assertion that every free determination o f choice is subject to the formal principle o f 37

M.d.S., 395.

3 8

Ibid., 385.

LAWS OF FREEDOM

oo

action. Since there can be no determination o f choice without an end, it is thereby subject also to the first principle o f ethical laws—act according to a maxim of ends w h i c h it can b e a universal law for every­ one to have. Just as every m a x i m o f action is subject to the formal principle o f action, so every adoption o f an end is subject to this principle prescribing the form o f the end. N o w our material maxims which w e submit to the formal principle o f action have as their ends certain elements in our happiness. B u t in so far as w e determine pur choice through the formal m a x i m o f lawfulness, w e must also adopt our ends on the basis o f their universal validity. This implies, first, that while our end is still our o w n happiness, the ultimate ground on which we will this end is no longer merely our natural desire for it but rather the thought that happiness is an objectively valid end for finite rational beings as such. One's o w n happiness, Kant maintains, cannot be an obligatory end because every man naturally and spontaneously wills his o w n happiness, so that the constraint that duty implies is not relevant here. But it is a morally permissible end, since it is rational for finite beings with needs and wants to will their satisfaction. Like the formal principle o f action, the first principle o f ethical law does not re­ quire us to give up our o w n happiness as an end; it requires only that w e will it under the formal aspect o f its rational necessity. A n d the submis­ sion o f our choice to the first principle o f ethics implies, secondly, that our ends cannot be hmited to our o w n happiness. If the basis on which w e adopt our ends is their objective necessity, then w e must also include among them the other ends o f pure practical reason—one's o w n per­ fection and the happiness o f other men. Needless to say, w e need not always be acting toward these specific obligatory ends; w e fulfil our duty in this regard b y having maxims o f promoting these ends— maxims which, as the circumstances arise, will be translated into action. But the fundamental direction given to the will b y the first principle of ethics means that w e shall pursue our o w n happiness, not in isolation, but as one element in the system o f ends o f pure practical reason and under the formal aspect o f its membership in this system. 39

40

41

3 9

A m o n g the elements in every free determination o f choice Kant distinguishes between the end, the object itself w h i c h is w i l l e d (das Materiale), and the purpose, that in the end w h i c h is the objective determining ground o f choice (das Formale,

the intentio animi). Cf. H.N.(2J), 389.

Just as, i n morally g o o d action, w e will

our material m a x i m through the formal m a x i m o f morality, so t o o w e w i l l our end (our happiness) through the formal aspect o f its rational validity. O n the pursuit o f one's o w n happiness as an indirect duty, cf. b e l o w , p p . 176-9. As Kant notes in MAS., 389, the first principle o f ethics requires us t o 4 0

4 1

PURE PRACTICAL REASON AND THE ENE>S OF ACTION OI This notion o f a system o f pure rational ends is seldom mentioned explicitly in the Tugendlehre. Y e t , as w e shall see, it is the implicit theme o f this w o r k and dominates Kant's derivation o f ethics as a system o f duties. Again, this concept is n o innovation on the part o f the Tugendlehre; the Grundlegung utilizes it, especially in its formula o f the kingdom o f ends, and the second Critique discusses at some length the w a y in which the duty o f promoting the highest good arises from the nature o f pure practical rekson itself. Kant's doctrine o f the summum bonum has, as a rule, been either overlooked or treated 'as a rritre appen­ dage to his moral philosophy. But just as the morality o f every free act o f choice depends o n our having the law as our motive, so the legality o f every free determination o f choice, Kant notes, depends o n 'the end which is also m y m o t i v e ' . A s w e have seen, the ethical legality o f an act o f choice means its conformity w i t h ethical law, that is', its having as the matter o f its maxim the ends o f pure practical reason. Hence the system o f these ends, the summum bonum, is to be the framework o f ethics o n its material side or as a system o f duties. T h e command to promote the highest g o o d is the comprehensive c o m ­ mand underlying specific ethical laws to promote particular obligatory ends, and it is our determination o f choice to the summum bonum that makes all our maxims, and not merely^ those o f promoting specific obligatory ends, ethically right or legal. 42

43

44

As soon as w e g o beyond the province o f outer legislation and regard pure practical reason, not merely as providing the norm for action,' but as itself legislative, it is as a power o f ends and o f a system o f ends that reason determines duties. Enough has been said o f pure practical reason as a p o w e r o f ends; w e should, however, recall briefly Kant's views on reason as a systematizing power. T h e Dialectic o f the Critique of Pure Reason examines at length the systematizing nature o f theoreti­ cal reason, but the relevance o f this to the question at hand lies only in

subordinate the ends w h i c h w e have (those that m a k e up o u r happiness) to those w h i c h w e o u g h t t o have, o r t o seek our happiness as a part o f the system o f pure rational ends. 4 2

" For this reason, ethics can also be defined as the s y s t e m o f the ends o f pure practical reason." M.d.S., 3 8 1 . 4 3

Cf. Gr., 433 ff. and K.d.p.V., n o . T h e relevant sections o f the second Critique

o n the content o f the summum bonum are those f r o m p a g e 107 t o page 113. 4 4

M.d.S., 398. A c c o r d i n g t o ibid., 3 9 6 - 7 , the end i n question could also be taken as " virtue " in the sense described b e l o w , pp.' 170-1, the steadfast " c o n ­ formity o f t h e w i l l w i t h e v e r y d u t y " (M.d.S., 3 9 s ) , i n c l u d i n g duty according t o ethical laws. This interpretation w o u l d also be suggested b y K.d.p.V., 57 ff.

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LAWS OF FREEDOM

its illustration o f the fundamental importance which Kant's metaphysics o f theoretical reason assigns to this characteristic o f reason. It is o f n o less importance to Kant's moral philosophy that reason in its practical function is a systematizing p o w e r and hence a p o w e r o f determining choice according to the Idea o f a system o f ends. B o t h in its pragmatic function, where it unites the ends o f our desires into the ideal o f happi­ ness, and in its moral function, where it projects an ideal o f systematic completeness among the necessary objects o f a finite rational will, pure practical reason is a power o f uniting our ends in a systematic whole. As the supreme moral principle expresses, in Professor Paton's terms, the necessary law o f pure practical reason's functioning, so the first principle of ethics expressesthe law o f its activity specifically as a p o w e r of ends; and this principle is, implicitly, a command to strive for the highest good, a system o f pure rational ends. Throughout his ethical writings Kant conceives a necessary connec­ tion bet.veen the disinterested rational will, the will acting in accord­ ance with universal law, and what he calls 'the essential ends o f reason'. As distinguished from arbitrary or contingent ends which the individual may or may not have, these are ends which everyone must have (in so far as he wills rationally) because they belong to the nature of pure practical reason itself. T h e first o f these ends is, o f course, the absolute and unconditioned g o o d , a g o o d w i l l ; and since w e are speak­ ing o f the practical reason o f an imperfectly rational being, the per­ fection of the moral will is virtue. B u t while virtue is the supreme good, it is not, Kant argues, the w h o l e and complete object o f pure practical reason. T o inquire after the highest g o o d is to ask what state o f affairs would satisfy completely the requirements o f pure practical reason, and this state o f affairs must include the happiness o f rational beings, subject to their worthiness to be happy. Happiness is not, like virtue, an absolute and unconditioned good. Impartial reason considers it to be good, not in itself and under all circumstances, but only in so far as the person possessing happiness is w o r t h y o f it. B u t the happiness o f rational beings, conditioned b y their virtue or worthiness to be happy, is the whole and complete object w h i c h pure practical reason w o u l d necessarily produce if it were in complete; control o f human action and 45

46

/

4 5

Cf. K.d.r.V. B 828, w h e r e K a n t notes that 'the w h o l e business o f reason' in its pragmatic function 'consists i n uniting all the ends w h i c h are prescribed t o us b y our desires into the o n e single end, happiness, and i n c o o r d i n a t i n g the m e a n s for attaining it'. This is true e v e n o f the pre-critical Fragment (c. 1775) and the early Vorlesung (c. 1781).' Cf. b e l o w , p . 203 ff. 4 6

PURE PRACTICAL REASON AND THE ENDS^OF ACTION

93

/if it were in control of nature, on whose co-operation happiness 1 depends. T h e highest good, it is clear, contains more^ than our specific obliga­ tory ends. First, w e can be under obligation td do only what it is within our p o w e r to do, and the realization o f the highest good is not c o m ­ pletely within our power. For example, the summum bonum contains the perfection o f all men, whereas, Kant holds, each man can promote only his o w n perfection. Moreover, our duty o f promoting the highest g o o d through those elements which are within our power is not so much a duty o f producing this state o f affairs as rather o f having a maxim o f striving for it. Secondly, our o w n happiness, as an object o f hope, is an important element in the summum bonum, although it is not directly relevant to a doctrine o f duties. Y e t , while the production o f the highest g o o d is beyond our power, ethics, as a doctrine of duties, is " t h e system o f the ends o f pure practical reason," and our obligatory ends are, in a sense, abstractions from this system. 47

48

N o w the fact that our o w n happiness is included in the highest good, to w h i c h the hrst principle o f etlhcs'clirects our will, seems to give added urgency to Kant's argument that the connection between the first principle o f duty as such and the first principle o f ethics is a synthetic one. His v i e w that the principle o f duty 4s a formal one is directly opposed to any system o f moral philosophy which w o u l d base the moral law on man's natural desire for happiness. A t the same time he holds that happiness is an end not only o f reason in its prudential function but also o f pure practical reason. T h e happiness o f rational beings as such, ourselves included, is an element in the system of ends which the first principle o f ethical law commands us to promote. It is, therefore, o f utmost importance for Kant to clarify the relation between the first principle o f duty and the highest good, lest it be thought that reason needs the hope o f happiness contained in the highest good in order to assist it in determining choice. Accordingly, he insists that pure practical reason takes the highest g o o d as its end and makes it our duty to strive ^or it in every action, not through any need or lack on the side o f the motive, but rather, so to speak, f r o m the fulness o f the morally determined will, which seeks to manifest its disposition in 49

4 7

Cf. KJ.p.V., n o : 'For t o n e e d happiness, t o be w o r t h y o f it, and n o t to par­ ticipate in it is inconsistent w i t h the perfect w i l l o f a rational being, i f this being at the same time has all power'. . •' R e g a r d i n g these limitations o n our obligatory ends, cf. b e l o w , p. 176 ff. and p . 186 ff. 0

4 8

4 9

Cf. KJ.p.V., 104 and 109.

LAWS OF FREEDOM

94

producing an object adequate-to itself. He suggests an analogy between the moral will and God, W h o may be thought to create not from any natural need but rather from a moral need to manifest His perfec­ tion. So too, the moral will seeks to produce the highest good, not in order to gain anything, but because it needs -an object to strive for in its actions. In so far as our happiness is an element in the highest good, our moral will's regard for our happiness is an unselfish one: it requires happiness because impartial reason determines this as an object and not merely because, as the private will o f a finite being, it seeks the satis­ faction o f our mclinations. T h e fundamental thesis o f Kant^s moral philosophy does not require him to ignore man's happiness. It requires him only to assign happiness, along w i t h the other objects o f a rational will, to a secondary and derivative position. A n d it cannot fairly be charged that, within these limits, he fails to give due regard to the natural element in man's being. 50

51

50 61

Uberden Gemeinspruch, 279 note. Cf. KJ.p.V., 129-30.

CHAPTER VTI \

PERFECT A N D IMPERFECT

DUTY

It is sometimes said that Kant's ethics is o f a 'legalistic' character or that his account o f the moral life is too closely modelled upon the legal structure o f the State. If this observation is to be valid, it must take into account that which, Kant holds, is the proper subject-matter o f ethics. M a n y o f our duties are juridical duties: their principles are established in L a w and they are only 'mdirectly ethical'. It is only after analysing Kant's doctrine o f imperfect duties that w e can justly esti­ mate the character o f his ethics, as distinguished from his philosophy o f L a w ; for imperfect duties are 'direcdy ethical', and. Kant's ethics is primarily a study o f these duties. Although this is not to be taken as the essential principle o f distinction between the t w o parts o f moral philosophy, it should at least warn us to suspend judgment regarding the 'juridical' character o f Kant's ethics until w e have examined the kind o f duty proper to Tugendlehre. T h e distinction between perfect and imperfect duty seems to be one that Kant w o r k e d out gradually. T h e complex doctrine o f the Meta­ physik der Sitten stands in sharp contrast w i t h the simple and clear-cut distinction w h i c h he draws in the Vorlesung, his early lectures on ethics based on Baumgarten's texts. Since L a w is the system-of duties to which w e can be externally compelled and ethics the system o f duties to which only self-constraint is possible, the simplest and, so to speak, most economical distinction between perfect and imperfect duty would be to equate the first with juridical duty and the second w i t h ethical duty. This is, in fact, the distinction proposed in the Vorlesung. There it is said that external obligation is necessitation through the will o f another, whereas interior obligation is necessitation through one's uown will. Interior obligations or duties are said to be imperfect because one can­ not be compelled b y other m e n to fulfil them, and external.obligations perfect because one can be so compelled. 1

B u t the simplest w a y m a y not be able to account for all the relevant facts, and in the Grundlegung Kant is led to reject this cListinetion through his recognition that there are perfect duties to oneself. Having made the 1

Vorlesung, 39. 95

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LAWS OF F R E E D O M

reservation that the division o f perfect and imperfect duties belongs properly to a metaphysic o f morals, he remarks that his understanding of perfect duty' is not that commonly adopted in the schools. 'Further, I understand here b y a perfect duty one w h i c h allows no exceptions in. the interests o f inclination, and so I recognise among perfect duties not only outer ones but also inner ones'. Since w e cannot be compelled by others to fulfil these perfect duties to ourselves, Kant's recognition of such duties clearly implies that his o w n principle o f division must differ from that put forward in the Vorksung; but as regards this prin­ ciple itself, the Grundlegung gives us little help. For a formal discussion of this division w e must, as he notes, await his metaphysic o f morals. The Metaphysik der Sitten, however, presents what may be yet an­ other concept o f imperfect duty. In the Grundlegung, as w e have seen, Kant discards the commonly accepted division between perfect and imperfect duty in favour o f a distinction according to which perfect duty permits no arbitrary exceptions or exceptions in favour o f the mclinations, and imperfect duty, presumably, permits such exceptions. In the Metaphysik der -Sitten Kant does not return to the traditional distinction in terms o f the possibility or impossibility o f external c o m ­ pulsion, but, it might be argued, neither does he w o r k out consistendy the implications o f the v i e w sketched in the Grundlegung. T h e Grundle­ gung and the Metaphysik der Sitten agree that imperfect duties consist in the adoption o f certain ends rather than in determinate actions and that they accordingly leave a 'latitude' between our aims and our ac­ tions in realization o f these aims—a latitude in which judgment must determine the action left unspecified b y the law. B u t whereas the Grundlegung implies that this latitude is a r o o m for arbitrary excep­ tions, the Metaphysik der Sitten argues, in such a w a y as to invite a rigoristic interpretation, that the latitude is only a permission to limit one maxim o f duty b y another. 2

But this difficult question o f whether the weight o f evidence in the later w o r k favours a rigoristic v i e w o f imperfect duty will be taken up in due course. Whatever the nature o f the latitude present in imperfect 2

Gr., 421 n. In the examples o f duties f o l l o w i n g the 'universal l a w o f nature' formula, w e find that m a x i m s contrary ,te~pirfect duties are such as cannot e v e n be conceived w i t h o u t contradiction as universal laws o f nature, whereas m a x i m s contrary to imperfect duties can b e conceived as laws o f nature but cannot b e so willed. Gr., 423. In applying the formula o f h u m a n i t y as an end-in-itself, w e find that treating persons as mere means t o our subjective ends involves violation o f perfect duty, whereas failure to adopt m a x i m s o f treating persons positively as ends violates imperfect duty. Gr., 430.

PERFECT AND IMPERFECT DUTY

97

duty may be, it is the nature o f the principles underlying juridical and ethical laws respectively that permits a latitude o f any sort in our observance o f ethical laws, and the nature o f these principles is, accord­ ingly, the more basic question. \ Since w e must examine separately the different aspects o f the pro­ blem, a distinction should be drawn between the matter and the form o f obligation, i.e. between the duty itself, that t o which w e are obli­ gated {Pflicht, ojflciutn) and^the moral necessitation to this duty (Verpflichtung, obligatio). A s for Kant's terminology, ' w i d e obligation' and 'imperfect obligation' are synonymous, as are the corresponding set o f terms, 'strict or narrow obligation' and 'perfect obligation'. E x ­ plaining his use o f the terms 'perfect and imperfect' with reference to the form o f obligation, Kant tells us that the laws are, respectively, stride and 'late* determining. His further usage o f Latin terms c o n ­ firms this identification. W h e n the obligation is perfect {obligatio perfecta) the law obliges stricdy (is stride obligatts): w h e n the obligation is imperfect the law is not o f narrow but only o f w i d e obligation (is late obligans). Less fiequendy, Kant uses 'non-essential or contingent' as synonymous with 'imperfect' duty, and 'necessary' as synonymous w i t h 'perfect' duty. Although he seems more often t o use the terms 'strict' and 'wide' with reference to the obligation and 'perfect' and 'imperfect' with reference to the duty, any term w h i c h can be used t o describe a duty can, apparendy, also be used to describe the correspond­ ing obligation. 1

3

4.

5

From Kant's recognition o f perfect duties t o oneself it is clear that strict obligation is not identical with legal obligation. T h e terms 'strict and w i d e ' obligation, o n the one hand, and 'legal and ethical' obligation, on the other hand, refer t o different things. T h e first pair o f terms refers to the type o f necessity itself: the second, t o the actively necessitating or constraining power. It is not the possible source o f constraint that distinguishes a perfect duty from a n imperfect d u t y , ' but rather the nature o f the l a w itself and the principle from which it is derived. Since, for the purposes o f this chapter, laws enjoining per- , 8

H.N.(23), 393. According t o this passage, s y n o n y m o u s terms for perfect and

imperfect duty are 'due* duty (schuldigePflicht) and 'meritorious' duty (verdienst-

liche Pflicht). Ibid., 394. 4 8

K.d.p.V., 159. This passage distinguishes b e t w e e n a l a w that is 'really o b l i g a ­ tory' and a l a w that furnishes, m e r e l y a principle o f obligation, i.e. a ground o f obligation, w h i c h is n o t always sufficient actually t o oblige. (Cf. M.d.S., 224.) O n the basis for asserting that 'necessary or essential' and 'contingent' correspond w i t h 'strict' and 'wide' respectively, cf. b e l o w , p . 102 ff.

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LAWS OF FREEDOM

feet duties to oneself can be considered as o f the same nature as juridical laws, w e can discuss the distinction between strict and wide obligation in terms o f the obligation accompanying juridical and ethical laws respectively, provided w e keep in mind the fact that the former prin­ ciples extend beyond juridical laws in the proper sense o f the term, to include the 'inner ius' comprising perfect duties to oneself. The fact that juridical laws are o f strict obligation and ethical laws of wide obligation follows, Kant tells us, from the fact that juridical laws are laws for actions whereas ethical laws are laws for the maxims of actions. If the law has to do in a determinate and immediate w a y with actions, specifying the manner and extent o f the action, then the law obliges strictly. If, on the other hand, the law commands immediately only that w e have certain maxims o f action, this is a sign that it leaves a latitude to judgment in our observance o f the l a w . A l a w carries with it strict obligation* Kant maintains, i f it commands precise actions and leaves us no choice regarding (a) making exceptions to the l a w or (b) determining the manner and extent o f our actions in fulfilment o f the law. Conversely, i f the l a w leaves the subject's judgment free to make exceptions to the l a w and to determine the w a y in which and the extent to which he will act, then the law is o f wide obligation. Ethical laws refer directly and immediately to our maxims and only indirectly and mediately to our actions 'in a general w a y ' , leaving it to o ur judgment to decide through what action w e shall observe the l a w . 6

7

8

f

9

The distinction which Kant has in mind is that between a law c o m ­ manding (or prohibiting) an action and a l a w prescribing the pursuit o f an end; and if w e g o back to the principle from which laws for actions are derived, w e can see at once w h y these laws cannot leave the subject free to decide when, h o w , and to w h a t extent he will observe the law. Laws for actions have to do only with the form o f our actions in ab­ straction from our ends. T h e y are applications o f the first principle o f all duty, which merely states the form o f lawfulness as such: so act that your maxim could become a universal law. Laws which determine precisely the action which is morally necessary or impossible do so * O n perfect duties toward oneself, VLTI. A l t h o u g h the separation o f strict from legal obligation is m o s t o b v i o u s in the case o f perfect duties to oneself, the t w o are sometimes separated in the case o f duties toward others. For example, obligation according to principles o f justice w h i c h cannot be e m b o d i e d in juridical laws (i.e. matters o f ' e q u i v o c a l right') s e e m t o be o f strict obligation. Cf. the

discussion o f equity (ius late dictum) in Vorlesung, 42. ''M.d.S., 390. H.N.(23), 394Ibid., 391, and M.d.S., 390. 8

9

PERFECT AND IMPERFECT DUTY

99

because just this action or omission is necessary in order to harmonize w i t h universal law. T h e l a w cannot, therefore, leave the subject free to determine what action he will perform or whether he will act at all; for in so doing it w o u l d leave h im free to do what is never morally permissible, i.e. to act on a maxim which could not serve as universal law. A s Kant puts it forcefully: since laws for actions express the mini­ m u m in an action that is necessary to make the action lawful, nothing can be subtracted from what they specify as duty—they 'cannot be 'indulgent' regarding their appHcation. T h e y can permit no latitude for choice because there is, here, no area o f the morally mdifferent in which choice might be allowed free play. 10

Preparing the ground for the a^tinction between strict and w i d e obligation, Kant argues that whereas i«s gives laws for actions, ethics gives laws only for the rnaxims o f actions. Since the formal principle o f action—whether it be regarded as the law o f our o w n will or as the law o f will as such—abstracts from our ends, the*laws obtained b y applying it cannot make it our duty to adopt maxims o f promoting certain ends. T h e formal principle o f action regards our material maxims as given and requires only that w e reject such o f them as could not become universal law. ' T h e maxims', K a n t explains, 'are here regarded as such subjective principles as merely qualify for giving universal law, which is only a negative principle, n o t to conflict with law as such'. ' T h e maxims o f action can be arbitrary and come only under the limiting condition o f their capacity for giving universal law, as the formal principle o f a c t i o n ' . A

11

O n the other hand, i f the duty in question is n o t a specific action but rather the adoption o f an end, the law has to d o w i t h the matter o f choice rather than w i t h the form o f the a c t i o n . It commands, not that w e reject given maxims o f action w h i c h are o f a form inconsistent with universal law, but rather that w e have a m a x i m o f promoting a 12

1 0

H.N.(2 ), 394M.d.S., 389. A l t h o u g h positive laws c o m m a n d , as w e l l as prohibit, certainactions, the principle o f all laws for actions is essentially a negative and restrictive principle. Hence, Kant notes, ethical laws should n o t be called 'laws' i n the strict sense, since they are 'not based only upon the formal condition o f all duty, namely freedom according t o universal laws w h i c h formal condition alone is necessary'. H.N.(23), 391. T h e lawfulness o f actions is determined i n abstraction from ends, and only principles relating t o actions and their form are unconditioned. (Ibid., 380.) Hence only such principles are properly called 'laws', i.e. 'principles o f the precise determination o f actions according to their quality and measure'. Principals w h i c h d o n o t necessitate strictly should, rather, be called 'admonitions'. Cf. also 3

1 1

1 2

?

Ibid.,2S9.

F

LAWS OF FREEDOM

100

certain end. Our actions, as means to this end, are o f course subject to the formal principle o f action. B u t it is not the ethical l a w that pre­ scribes this limiting condition. T h e ethical law prescribes, immediately, only the adoption of a maxim o f promoting a certain end. A n d because the ethical law is not merely the negative principle o f lawfulness as such, to make an exception to an ethical law (i.e. to do nothing, in given, circumstances, toward the obligatory end) is not eo ipso to act w r o n g l y . Since duty here consists in adopting a maxim, a violation o f duty must be on the same level, so to speak: it must also consist in adopting a maxim—a maxim of mdifferenc'e to the obligatory end. Many terms, such as 'duty o f virtue' and 'wide obligation', w h i c h seem precise and clear-cut in the abstract, become flexible in their appli­ cation. Hence it is not surprising to find that there are, so to speak, degrees o f wideness in w i d e obligation. ' T h e wider the duty', Kant asserts, 'the more imperfect, therefore, is the obligation o f m e n to the action.' O u r obligation to the action is a mediate one, through our obligation to have a maxim o f promoting an end. B u t i f the m a x i m in question is one o f benevolence to our parents, w e may have less latitude for exceptions and for determining the extent to w h i c h w e should satisfy their needs than w h e n the m a x i m is one o f benevolence to men in general. So long as the m a x i m is really one of benevolence— so long, that is to say, as the matter is not one o f right—our obligation is wide. But in some cases the obligation will approach more closely to' strict obligation than in others. W i d e obligation, then, results in the latitude which characterizes imperfect duties, and it is this latitude w h i c h essentially distinguishes them from imperfect duties. T o understand the nature o f the latitude which imperfect duty permits, w e should first consider the type o f excep­ tions permitted and excluded b y laws enjoining rterfect duties. So far as laws enjoining perfect duties are concerned, Kant is some­ times content to state that these laws admit o f no exceptions. In at least one instance he seems prepared to defend this unqualified state­ ment in its literal f o r m . B u t o n the w h o l e he intends it to be supple­ mented b y an explanation to the effect that such laws do not admit the moral possibility o f arbitrary exceptions^or exceptions made on merely subjective grounds. If a l a w determines an action precisely, he tells us, 'there remains to us no further choice, either for exceptions, if the law 13

)

14

18

MJ.S. 390. i.e. in his essay Uber ein vermeintes Recht aus Menschenliebe zu liigen, VIII, 423 ff. t

14

O n Kant's attitude toward lying, cf. b e l o w , p . 150 ff.

PERFECT AND IMPERFECT DU^Y

101

is valid in its universality', or for determining what and h o w much w c shall do in observing the l a w . This suggests that the l a w may admit certain necessary exceptions or that it may not be applicable under all conditions. Kant does not wish, in fact, to state his position in quite these terms. He criticizes the practice, c o m m o n in State law, of enacting a prohibition and then listing exceptions to it or conditions under which it does not apply. W h a t the legislator should do, he suggests, is to in­ clude a permissive law within the prohibitive law, as a limitation upon the prohibition. His objection to listing exceptions to a prohibition is that this practice indicates that the permissions are given haphazardly or added to the law as particular cases come up. T h e y ought, rather, to be determined according to a principle and so included within the law itself. For i f the legislator first enacts an unqualified prohibition and then permits exceptions to it, the prohibition was merely general and not truly universal, i.e. it was valid on the whole but not in every case. A n d mere generality is contrary to the nature o f l a w itself. T o take a crude example, the legislator ought not to formulate a l a w : thou shalt not kill, and then add that this law does not apply to soldiers in time o f war, public executioners, etc. He ought rather to formulate the l a w with quasi-mathematical precision as a prohibition against murder, defining murder in such a w a y as to make the concept inapplicable to morally permissible killing. In this w a y the prohibition will be valid for everyone, including soldiers in time o f war, executioners, etc. 1 5

16

Concrete examples o f this principle in operation will be found within the discussions o f specific ethical duties o f omission. O n e example, Kant's handling' o f suicide, will serve here to clarify the point and to show its significance regarding the exceptions w h i c h imperfect duty permits. In a metaphysic o f morals, it will be recalled, w e are dealing only with the duties o f 'men considered merely as men', and on this level w e find a general prohibition against suicide. Suicide is a vice, self-murder, because in abstraction from, the contingent ckcumstances and conditions in which men may find themselves w e can assume that the motive for suicide is one o f self-love. B u t w h e n w e descend into casuistry, admitting empirical knowledge o f these circumstances, w e 1 5

H.N.(23), 394. Italics m i n e . Cf. Zum ewigen Frieden, 347 n . A prohibitive a n d a permissive law, Kant explains, cannot have the same object regarded under the same aspect; if they did, they w o u l d contradict each other—-the o n e giving us a m o r a l tide t o d o w h a t the other makes morally impossible. But i f the prohibition is n o t universally valid, the permissive l a w included w i t h i n it does not have the same object as the prohibi­ tion. Cf. also H.N.(23), 384 and M.d.S., 223. 1 6

102

LAWS OF FREEDOM

find exceptions to the general prohibition, cases in which suicide would not be the vice o f self-murder. Under certain conditions a man may commit suicide because he thinks that his "ground o f obligation not to destroy himself is in conflict w i t h a stronger ground o f obligation (e.g. of benevolence to others). Such cases must be given casuistical treatment to determine which ground o f obligation is stronger and hence really obligatory. If the opposing ground o f obligation turns out to be stronger, then the man has a moral title to kill himself because he has an mdirect duty to do so. T h e prohibition against suicide permits no arbitrary exceptions, but w h e n w e descend into contingent circum­ stances it does admit morally necessary exceptions. 17

It is important, therefore, to distinguish between the formal principle ' of action and the specific laws derived from this principle. T h e formal principle o f duty permits absolutely n o exceptions. Specific laws de­ rived from the formal principle o f action, Kant argues, also permit no exceptions when once they have been properly formulated. But this is because they already contain all the necessary exceptions to the pro­ hibition against a certain type o f action, so that any further exceptions will be arbitrary ones. N o w if, in the case o f perfect duty, w e find necessary exceptions to the general prohibition when w e admit empirical knowledge o f men's circumstances and conditions, w e should expect that the latitude present in imperfect duty implies that, w h e n w e admit such empirical k n o w ­ ledge, the duty does permit arbitrary exceptions. In view o f Kant's treatment o f perfect duty w e should expect, in other words, that in order to distinguish perfect from imperfect duty it w o u l d not be sufficient to say that the latitude o f imperfect duty allows us to refuse, in given circumstances, to act on a m a x i m o f benevolence toward men in general on the ground that our duty here and n o w is, rather, to help our parents. Perfect duty, too, admits the possibility o f this sort o f exception. T o make the necessary distinction w e should have to say that w e can refuse, in given circumstances, to act on a maxim o f bene­ volence toward men in general in the absence o f any opposing claim and merely, as the Grundlegung indicates, on subjective grounds. A n early passage in the Metaphysik der Sitten, where Kant contrasts the precision at which Rechtslehre aimsj^ith the wide duties which are the proper subject-matter o f Tugendlehre, seems to imply such an arbitrary element in imperfect duty. Because o f the nature o f juridical laws, he points out, Rechtslehre aims at determining with a precision " Cf. below, p. 135 ff.

PERFECT AND IMPERFECT DUTY

103

Analogous to mathematical exactitude what is due to each subject of the /law. D u t y according to ethical law, on the other hand, consists only 'in the adoption o f ends or purposes. N o w the adoption o f an end is not merely an idle wish. It must manifest itself in action toward the end, and there is no great harm in referring to these actions as 'ethical duties', as Kant occasionally does. B u t it is important to remember that, stricdy speaking, duty according to ethical laws does not consist in these actions but rather in having maxims o f promoting certain ends. Hence Kant concludes that trie precision with which Rechtslehre deter­ mines our duties cannot be expected in Tugendlehre, 'which cannot deny a certain r o o m for exceptions (latitudinem)', 18

19

N o w although Rechtslehre may aim at determining exacdy what is due each subject o f the law, this aim is not achieved in the meta-* physical first principles o f L a w nor even in positive laws, but'rather in a court's decision o f right in particular cases. A n d in both the making o f positive l a w and its final appHcation Kant allows Hberal scope for the empirical conditions o f a given time and p l a c e . His denial that there is r o o m for casuistry in the appHcation of laws enjoining perfect duty is qualified b y his recognition'that this is true only w h e n the l a w has been so precisely formulated as to include within it all the neces­ sary exceptions to a general prohibition. In fact, each o f his discussions o f perfect duty toward oneself is followed by casuistical questions. Once the law has been properly formulated it remains for judgment only to subsume the action under the law, and from this there follows the 'verdict' that the act is contrary to duty. B u t there is room for casuistry between the loosely formulated general prohibition and the precisely formulated universal prohibition. In matters o f Law, the function which the j u d g e must at times fulfil is similar to this form o f casuistry: in applying the law he must interpret it and so formulate it with greater precision. ; 20

If it is not Rechtslehre that determines precisely the actions necessary according to juridical laws, the contrast between juridical and ethical laws should be drawn, not in terms o f the metaphysical first principles 18

Cf. M.d.S., 220.

1 9

Ibid., 233; cf. also 411. A t times, as in H.N.(23), 389,Kant speaks as ifjuridical laws left nothing whatsoever t o the subject's free choice, w h i c h is n o t strictly true. T h e l a w cannot extend t o every detail o f an action, nor is there a n y reason w h y it should, since m a n y aspects o f the action are quite irrelevant t o right. For'a brief summary o f s o m e points i n w h i c h Kant recognized the empirical limitations to w h i c h positive l a w is subject, cf.; H . J. P a t o n : The Categorical 2 0

Imperative, p. 194, n. 2.

LAWS OF FREEDOM

104

of Law and ethics, but rather in terms o f a court applying juridical laws and our o w n judgment applying ethical laws. The distinction asserted: that juridical duty consists in determinate actions whereas ethical duty consists only in having certain maxims o f action, must remain at this level. A n d it does not remain in full force if an arbitrary decision not to act, here and now, or to do less than one could is a v i o ­ lation o f duty according to ethical law. If ethics lacks the precision o f Law, it is because ethical laws leave r o o m , between the obligatory maxim and our action upon it, for a really arbitrary, subjective factor. So far Kant seems to be reasserting the v i e w o f the Grundlegung. B u t his formal discussion o f imperfect duty could be taken as a reversal o f this position. For while he there admits a latitude for free choice in the observance o f ethical laws, he adds that under a wide duty w e are not to understand a permission to make exceptions to the maxims o f actions but only a permission to limit one m a x i m o f duty by another, e.g. love o f mankind in general b y love o f one's parents. N o w i f w e i interpret 'exceptions to the maxims o f actions' as arbitrary decisions not to act, here and now, on a maxim o f benevolence, this assertion would deny an arbitrary element in the latitude, at least so far as the most important aspects of the latitude are concerned. T h e law w o u l d still, presumably, leave us free to decide what means w e should use to realize the e n d . But even though the ethical l a w could not specifyh o w much w e should do, it w o u l d not leave choice really free to decide whether to act or h o w much to do. T h e latitude w o u l d be present only because moral philosophy cannot admit sufficient empirical knowledge of the situation in. which w e find ourselves, and hence cannot k n o w 21

22

23

21 2 2

M.d.S., 390.

S o m e support for this rigoristic interpretation could be drawn from the confused passage in H.N. (23), 394. H a v i n g asserted that perfect duty admits n o exception if the l a w is valid in its universality (thereby seeming to i m p l y that imperfect duty does admit exceptions), Kant continues w i t h the statement that under ethical laws it is left to the subject's j u d g m e n t 'freely t o determine the w a y in which and the extent to w h i c h the c o m m a n d should b e carried out, and it is only necessary for us to d o as m u c h as is possible under the g i v e n circumstances'. Obviously, w e could n o t d o m o r e than is possible under the g i v e n circumstances; but the question is whether w e need always d o as m u c h as is possible. If so, h o w can j u d g m e n t 'freely' determine the extent t o w h i c h the c o m m a n d is to be carried out? Is this n o t already determined b y the l a w ^ m the sense that, o n c e the empirical factors are brought into relation w i t h the l a w , it is n o longer left ^ d e t e r m i n a t e h o w m u c h the the subject must do ? O u r choice o f means to the end is subject, n o t t o moral rules (except for the formal principle o f action), but rather to rules o f skill and prudence. Cf. M.d.S., 433 n. If the end can be promoted effectively b y t n o r e than o n e means w e are, presumably, free t o follow our inclinations in the matter. 2 3

PERFECT AND IMPERFECT DUTY

/

IOS

*

/ h o w much w e are capable o f doing toward the end and whether an [ opposing ground o f obligation is present which over-rides the necessity / o f acting; toward the end here and n o w or limits the extent to which w e must act. 5 Even this rigoristic v i e w does not deny that there is a place in the moral life for choice that is, in a sense, arbitrary. It must allow for Kant's principle that w e are free to pursue our o w n happiness, subject to the formal principle o f action, and this itself involves a latitude which is arbitrary in relation to morality. Since Kant's example is in terms o f benevolence, let us continue with this illustration. O u r moral title to pursue our o w n happiness, Kant argues, means that w e have no obli­ gation to sacrifice 'our true needs', those satisfactions which are essential to our happiness, in order to promote the well-being o f others; indeed, on the level o f men as such, a maxim o f self-sacrifice would contradict itself were it made universal l a w . A n d as for what constitutes our true needs, this depends largely on 'our o w n w a y of feeling'. Because happi­ ness is an ^determinate concept w h i c h the individu4 must fill with content on the basis o f his o w n inclinations, there must be an arbitrary element in our decision as to what subjective ends w e shall adopt. W h a t the rigoristic view does imply is that w h e n w e can, without prejudice to our true needs, afford help to> someone else, w e should be violating our duty b y arbitrarily deriding not to help this person or to do less for him than w e are capable o f d o i n g . T h e sphere from which this v i e w excludes arbitrary choice is precisely the sphere o f our i m ­ perfect duty o f benevolence, the field o f activity that remains after the satisfaction o f our o w n true needs. B u t it is not at allmecessary to interpret the passage in question in this rigoristic sense. W h e n Kant says that a wide duty is not 'a permission to make exceptions to the m a x i m o f actions', the 'exceptions' m a y mean a relmqmshing o f the maxims o f promoting obligatory ends, rather than a mere refusal to act, here and n o w , in pursuit o f such an end. Hence the text w o u l d mean simply that w e are not allowed to give up our maxim o f benevolence toward men in general; even though our special obligation o f supporting a sick or aged parent may curtail sharply our obligation to promote the well-being o f men in general, w e cannot use it as an excuse for never doing an act o f kindness toward ™ M.d.S., 3932 4

25

2 5

Ibid., 390. According to this text, the adoption o f a maximx o f indifference, i.e. a principle o f not observing the duty, w o u l d be a violation.of imperfect duty w h i c h is a vice. A minimal practice o f m e virtue w o u l d be a violation o f imperfect duty w h i c h is merely lack o f moral w o r t h or moral weakness.

106

LAWS OF FREEDOM

anyone else. In more general terms, the exception which constitutes a violation of imperfect duty w o u l d be, not an arbitrary refusal to act, here and now, in pursuit o f an obligatory end, but rather (i) the adop­ tion of a maxim of indifference toward that end or (2) a policy o f minimal and grudging action toward that end. As Kant points out, there is a hmitation on the latitude which imperfect duty permits. The necessitation present in every duty concerns, in imperfect duty, only our intentions or maxims, and a latitude is left for choice, 'pro­ vided only that it [the latitude] does not specifically change the inten­ tion and the principle o f this intention'. A n d this w o u l d seem to indicate that the exceptions which w e are not permitted to make are exceptions in the order o f our intentions rather than in our actions aimed at realizing these intentions. 26

j

The presence o f some hesitation and confusion in Kant's assertions regarding the latitude o f imperfect duty cannot be denied. This state­ ment, in the Nachlass, about its being necessary only to do the maxi­ mum possible in any given situation indicates that he at least entertained the rigoristic v i e w o f imperfect duty. B u t the Nachlass (which itself is not free from confusion on the subject) cannot be taken as Kant's definitive position, and in support o f the non-rigoristic v i e w w e find passages in the Metaphysik der Sitten which favour an arbitrary element in imperfect duty. Equally important, w e find, as I shall attempt to show, that the implications o f the rigoristic v i e w clash w i t h certain basic principles which Kant has adopted in his ethics. It might be thought that his actual handling o f our imperfect duties to promote our o w n perfection and the happiness o f other men w o u l d resolve the question. Unfortunately, it does not. T h e arbitrary element w o u l d show itself in judgment's final application o f ethical laws, while Kant's discussion remains on the most general level, explaining w h y our abstract notions o f perfection and happiness must be given their content on the basis o f our given capacities and mclinations. In v i e w o f all this, the basis for a decision as to w h i c h interpretation o f the latitude is, even if not assuredly Kant's view, more in keeping w i t h his principles can best be provided b y a clear exposition o f the alternatives and their implications. What is really at stake in this question o f latitude is whether the subjective element which prevents the l a w from deterinining actions escapes the law merely b y accident, as it were, or essentially and b y its very nature. T h e rigoristic v i e w w o u l d maintain that the reason w h y 2 8

H.N.(23), 391-.

PERFECT AND IMPERFECT DUTY

107

phics cannot give laws for actions is that the metaphysical first prin(ciples o f virtue cannot admit empirical knowledge o f the situation in which w e are deliberating about action in pursuit o f an obligatory end. The opposite view would maintain that, even gjiven unlimited empirical knowledge, w e could still not say that a man's duty consists in acting to a certain extent toward an obligatory end because there still remains a subjective factor which cannot be brought under an objective rule. Kant's assertion: 'Ethics does not give a law for actions (Jus does that), but only for the maxims o f actions' means, according to this view, that no matter h o w much empirical knowledge w e admit, w e still cannot say that a man's duty consists in a definite action, because he would not violate his duty in deciding not to act or to do less than he might do. It might be suggested that this non-rigoristic v i e w o f the latitude' is an invitation to laxity in our fulfilment o f imperfect duties'. B u t this suggestion seems to me to confuse t w o essentially different con­ siderations : that an imperfect duty may, o f its very nature, admit arbitrary exceptions, and that the more virtuous man will tend to make fewer exceptions and, on the whole, to do more rather than less. '. . . the closer man brings the maxim o f fulfilling this [imperfect] duty to narrow duty or to L a w (in his attitude o f will), so much the more perfect is his virtuous action'. O n e whose moral attitude of will is developed to only a slight degree will be content w i t h an occasional act o f e.g. benevolence; the more virtuous man will practice bene­ volence to a greater extent. B u t if an imperfect duty is o f such a nature as to permit arbitrary exceptions, the virtuous man can still, without prejudice to his virtue, refuse on merely subjective. grounds a parti­ cular claim upon his. benevolence. Such a refusal w o u l d not be moral weakness and a violation o f imperfect duty. O n the contrary, it w o u l d be a part o f his practice o f virtue, and his benevolent actions would be no less perfect because they proceed from an attitude o f will which does not regard choice as bound, on every occasion, to do the maximum which is morally possible. 1

27

O n the other hand, the rigoristic v i e w o f imperfect duty would seem to open the door to that attitude which Kant has condemned as 'fan-, tastic virtue'. This view regards us as bound to do the maximum pos­ sible under given circumstances toward the obligatory end and con­ siders a failure to do so, not indeed a vice, hut at least a lack o f moral worth and a violation o f imperfect duty. It regards choice-as bound on every side b y duty and reduces judgment's latitude, for the most part, n

M.d.S., 390.

LAWS OF FREEDOM

io8

to a weighing o f one ground o f obligation against another. N o w Kant himself warns us that our practice o f virtue is only an approximation to perfection, which remains an ideal, and that to regard ourselves as bound to realize this ideal here and n o w introduces a quality o f the 'fantastic' into our principles. The ideal o f perfection may, indeed, consist in doing the maximum possible to us on every occasion; but is not the man w h o holds himself bound to realize this ideal here and n o w one w h o , as Kant put it, 'strews all his steps w i t h duties, as with man traps'? 28

29

Whatever Kant's view on this fundamental issue m a y be, his in­ formal remarks concerning the virtues contrary to those vices which are violations o f perfect duties toward oneself throw important side­ lights on the latitude present in imperfect duty. W h i l e w e are under strict obligation to avoid the vices o f lying, intemperance, avarice, etc., cultivation o f the contrary virtues o f truthfulness, moderation and liberality belongs to the imperfect duty o f promoting our moral per­ fection, which consists in our possession o f all the virtues necessary to a morally g o o d life. Kant distinguishes three relations in w h i c h actions may stand to the moral l a w . Certain actions are morally impossible or forbidden b y the law; others are morally necessary or commanded b y the l a w ; and still others are morally permissible in so far as the law neither commands nor prohibits them. Morally impossible actions are violations o f right— either the rights o f other men or 'the right o f humanity in our o w n person'. Morally necessary actions are those which can be required by right: in other words such actions as, presupposing some juridical act on the part o f another, are necessary in order to maintain outer free­ dom. But apart from laws prohibiting morally impossible actions and prescribing morally necessary ones, there are only ethical laws en­ joining maxims o f promoting certain ends. T h e area o f morally per­ missible actions left over from juridical and quasi-juridical laws is, in a sense, not without its l a w ; for w e must do something toward the ends enjoined b y ethical laws. Y e t this area is really one o f morally ^differ­ ent actions, since no specific action is made necessary b y ethical l a w s . Between our m a x i m o f e.g. temperanc^pr truthfulness and our action upon this maxim, there is a latitude for prudential judgment to deter3 0

31

2 8

M.d.S., 453 n .

3 0

M.d.S., 223.

3 1

2 9

O n 'fantastic virtue' cf. above, p. 74.

W h e n Kant denies, in Religion, 23, that there are morally indifferent actions he is referring, n o t to the objective relation o f actions t o the law, but rather t o the moral attitude o f will o f the acting subject.

PERFECT AND IMPERFECT DUTY

109

mine what constitutes a temperate or truthful action for us under these circumstances. / T h e role w h i c h prudence plays in determining actions according to maxims o f virtue is brought out in Kant's attack o n the Aristotelian principle that virtue lies in the mean between t w o extremes. This prin­ ciple, Kant argues, does not serve to differentiate vice from virtue, as it is intended to do, since the distinction between vice and virtue is to be found in our maxims themselves and not in the degree to which w e act on our principles. T h e dictum: 'one ought not to do too much or too little' has its proper place in the deliberation w h i c h must take place w h e n a m a x i m o f virtue is to be embodied in action; for in the latitude between the m a x i m and the action one can do too much or too little. B u t here the dictum, while indeed true, is useless, since the mean must be determined b y prudential judgment and not b y moral laws. W h e n w e are trying to decide h o w to act on our m a x i m o f truthfulness w e must ask whether w e should, under the circumstances, say all that w e k n o w or believe about the subject. That w e should reveal neither too much nor too little is self-evident; but it is experience and not morality that will teach us the mean between excess and default. T h e moralist cannot determine b y a priori rules the mean between frankness and reticence, 'for both duties o f virtue have a latitude in the appH­ cation, and what is to be done can be discerned only by judgment according to rules o f prudence or pragmatic rules, not according to moraHty or moral rules'. 32

S3

T h e role assigned to prudential judgment in our observance o f ethical laws is one important aspect o f their latitude. Equally important are Kant's remarks regarding the free play which the mclinations may have in this type o f duty. A m o n g his problems in casuistry w e find the question: w h e n is the Hmitation o f a wide obHgation to be considered a 'purism' or 'pedantry' in our observance o f dirty, and a free play to be allowed our animal inclinations, even though w e thereby expose, ourselves to the risk o f transgressing, the moral l a w ? O u r perfect duty toward ourselves, Kant holds, excludes only that exercise p f the in­ clinations w h i c h is actually vice. O u r imperfect duty o f practising the contrary virtue consists in the adoption o f a. m a x i m o f virtue and leaves it to our j u d g m e n t to determine virtuous actions in accordance with this m a x i m . Generally speaking, Kant suggests, this virtuous maxim'restricts the play o f our mclinations more narrowly than docs the l a w prohibiting vice, and requires that the exercise o f the mclina3 4

& MAS., 404,

**Ibid., 433 n.

^ Ibid., 426.

LAWS

110

OF

FREEDOM

tions should not only not extend to vice but should also not occasion the danger o f vice. In other w o r d s , j u d g m e n t should be guided b y the general principle that w e ought to deny ourselves certain satisfactions which are in themselves innocent; for i f w e m a k e it our principle t o give free rein to the inclinations and check t h e m only at the brink o f vice, there is danger that at this point the inclinations will have gathered such impetus as to escape the control o f reason arid carry lis o h to a violation o f perfect duty. A s a rule, the practice o f virtue excludes not only vice but also a policy o f brinkmanship w i t h regard to vice. B u t , Kant suggests, there are times w h e n a rigid adherence to this principle o f containing the inclinations within safe limits w o u l d be m o r a l 'pedantry'. T h e r e are times w h e n the advantages to be gained b y allowing free play to the mclinations m a y counterbalance the danger that the mclinations, exercised to this extent, m a y lead o n to vice. W h e n brinkmanship in the exercise o f our inclinations is in question, it would seem that some opposing moral consideration is required t o release us from the obligation o f containing t h e m within safe limits. For example, in the question o f whether a use o f w i n e w h i c h borders on intoxication is permissible, or w h e t h e r w e have a moral title to attend a banquet w h i c h is likely to turn into an o r g y , K a n t points out that the dangers i n v o l v e d are to be w e i g h e d against considerations that the qualities p r o m o t e d b y the free use o f w i n e and b y the banquet— lively conversation, candour and sociability—are a m o n g the virtues o f social intercourse, w h i c h w e have an obligation to c u l t i v a t e . In a further casuistical question o f this t y p e he suggests that a too narrow restriction o f an animal impulse m a y itself b e the occasion o f v i c e . But, it should be noted, the question o f o u r m o r a l title to incur the danger o f vice is fundamentally different f r o m that o f our moral title not to do the m a x i m u m possible o n e v e r y occasion toward our obligatory ends. Kant's position that w e are morally entitled to expose ourselves to the risk o f vice only i f w e h a v e g o o d reason, o n moral grounds, for d o i n g so does n o t o f itself i m p l y that w e can refuse to d o the m a x i m u m possible t o w a r d p r o m o t i n g o u r obligatory ends o n l y w h e n some opposing ground o f obligation exists. 35

36

If the Grundlegung tends to neglectjhje role o f j u d g m e n t in moral action, the Metaphysik der Sitten clearly counteracts this tendency. E v e n w i t h regard to perfect duties j u d g m e n t has an essential function t o perform, w h e n these duties are n o t matters o f strict right. For although a l a w enjoining perfect duty, w h e n it is precisely formulated, admits MAS., 428. « Ibid., 426. 36

8

PERFECT A N D IMPERFECT

DUTY

III

o f n o exceptions, j u d g m e n t must determine whether or not this par­ ticular case falls under the prohibitive law. In the application o f ethical laws the role o f j u d g m e n t becomes, as it were, creative. M o r a l p h i l o ­ sophy tells us only to promote our obligatdry ends and to do so through actions w h i c h are not contrary to the formal principle o f action. From this point on it is for j u d g m e n t to deterarine w h e r e our duty lies and, w i t h the help o f principles o f skill and prudence, h o w to fulfil the d u t y . ^ 37

So far as the latitude. present in imperfect duty is concerned, the Metaphysik der Sitten seems, in summary, to be o p e n to t w o interpre­ tations : the rigoristic v i e w that w e violate an imperfect duty w h e n , in the absence o f any opposing ground o f obligation, w e do less than w e couJcTtoward the obligatory end, and the v i e w that imperfect duty o f ' its nature admits the possibility o f an arbitrary and subjective choice not to act t o w a r d the end in this particular situation or to do less than w e m i g h t do. Just because the first o f these v i e w s is rigoristic, it is likely to be considered the more 'Kantian'. B u t the second v i e w is in n o w a y inconsistent w i t h the high;standards o f Kant's moral p h i l o ­ sophy. A t the same time, it maintains the sharp and radical distinction between perfect and imperfect duty on w h i c h K a n t insists and allows full scope for the spontaneity w h i c h he regards as essential to a virtuous attitude o f w i l l and in recognition o f w h i c h he condemns 'fantastic virtue'. T h e virtuous man, K a n t insists, recognizes a field o f action w h i c h is neither c o m m a n d e d nor prohibited b y moral l a w s . T h e p r o b l e m o f the latitude in imperfect duty is the question o f whether this r o o m for arbitrary choice is, limited to the morally irrelevant details o f action and to actions w h i c h are excluded from the sphere, o f imperfect duty or whether it enters into our observance o f ethical laws themselves. N o determinate action is made necessary b y ethical l a w s . B u t is this o n l y because an ethical l a w m a y , in a concrete situation, c o m e into conflict w i t h another ground o f obligation? O r is it because these laws leaver o o m for a subjective, arbitrary element in moral action w h i c h , o f its nature, cannot be b r o u g h t under objective rules ? A c c o r d i n g to the first alternative Kant's stress o n the free play o f the mclinations in the field o f the morally permissible seems out o f proportion to its practical 38

x

3 7

A r o u g h parallel m i g h t b e suggested b e t w e e n the functions, o f j u d g m e n t in d e t e r m i n i n g perfect and i m p e r f e c t duties and 'determinant' and 'reflective' j u d g m e n t as described in K.d. 17., 179 ff. ' M . i . S . , 409. a8

112

LAWS

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consequences. T h e second alternative, o n the other hand, brings an element o f arbitrary choice into our fulfilment o f duty itself. W h e t h e r the charge o f 'legalism' is relevant to -Kant's ethics depends, in large part, on the w a y in w h i c h w e interpret the latitude o f imperfect duty.

CHAPTER V m

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^

OF P E R F E C T

DUTIES

ONESELF

W h i l e ethics on its formal side has to do w i t h our intention in fulfilling all our duties, as a system o f duties it is the doctrine o f duties oFvirtue. These are its proper subject-matter. 'Tugendlehre,' K a n t tells us, ' c o n ­ tains o n l y w i d e duties.' So far as w h a t is formal in our fulfilment o f duty is concerned, ethics treats o f all duties: but so far as duties t h e m ­ selves are concerned, 'ethics is the part o f moral philosophy w h i c h contains o n l y w i d e duties'. N o w this assertion is not a fortuitous one; it is, rather, the logical conclusion o f an argument that begins w i t h Kant's most fundamental and consistently maintained principle o f division between jurisprudence and ethics. Jurisprudenee, w e m a y re­ call, is the system o f duties according to laws w h i c h can be p r o ­ mulgated through outer legislation: ethics, the system o f duties for w h i c h o n l y inner legislation is possible. Hence the duties w h i c h c o m prise ethics must consist in obligatory ends,'since, K a n t argued, there is n o other determination o f choice w h i c h 'in its v e r y concept' excludes the possibility o f external constraint except determination t o an e n d . T h e adoption o f an end is an 'inner act o f the m i n d ' for which n o outer legislation is possible. F r o m this there f o l l o w e d the proposition that ethics gives laws only for the maxims o f actions, not for action? themselves; and f r o m this, in turn, the .conclusion that duties o f virtue are imperfect duties o f w i d e obligation. In v i e w o f all this w e m i g h t reasonably expect some explanation o f the fact that the greater part o f the Tugendlehre is devoted to perfect duties to oneself. Y e t Kant p r o ­ vides n o such explanation. 1

2

7

3

4

U p o n reflection, the presence o f perfect duties t o ourselves within ethics seems both natural and necessary. So far as our duties to others are concerned, ethics can begin straightway w i t h imperfect duties because jurisprudence has dealt w i t h perfect duties. A n d it seems natural, too, that there should be perfect duties to ourselves. As the , c o m m a n d o f benevolence presupposes the prohibitive laws o f justice, so too, in our relations w i t h ourselves, the c o m m a n d positively to p r o m o t e our perfection presupposes the prohibitibn against destroying H.N.(23), 389. Ibid., 384. M.d.S., 381., Ibid., 239. 1

2

3

113

4

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our nature. In general, the c o m m a n d to m a k e rational beings our end in the positive sense comes o v e r and a b o v e the prohibition against using them as mere means. B u t w h i l e w e m a y agree o n the necessity of mduding perfect duties to ourselves w i t h i n ethics, w e m a y w e l l ask h o w , in v i e w o f the principles b y w h i c h K a n t divides moral phil­ osophy, they can be located there. But even i f w e succeed, to some extent, in accounting for the pre­ sence o f perfect duties within Tugendlehre, a still more difficult p r o b l e m confronts us. From the preceding chapters it should be clear that 'duty of virtue' is a technical term for K a n t . A d u t y o f virtue, according to his definition, is a duty according t o a l a w w h i c h prescribes an end, object or matter to choice; and w e m a y recall that in the Introduction to the Tugendlehre he took pains t o preserve the precise, technical mean­ ing o f the term. For example, he distinguished carefully between duties o f virtue and the 'ethical d u t y ' o f determining choice through the motive o f duty, on the ground that the latter has to do merely w i t h what is formal in the determination o f choice whereas the former concern the matter o f choice. N o t e v e r y virtuous action, he argued, is the fulfilment o f a duty o f virtue: o n l y w h e n the l a w enjoining duty is an ethical l a w prescribing a m a x i m o f pursuing a certain end d o w e fulfil a duty o f virtue in observing the l a w . N o w f r o m the fact that an ethical l a w prescribes o n l y a m a x i m o f pursuing a certain end it follows that our duty according to ethical l a w is imperfect. A n d since duties o f virtue are, apparently, imperfect duties, Kant's reference to perfect duties to oneself as Tugendpjlichten or duties o f virtue comes as a surprise. 5

6

But the Metaphysik der Sitten s f e w references to the nature o f perfect duty to oneself, far from explaining h o w such duties can be called 'duties o f virtue', seem only to sharpen the contrast already implicit in the fact that they are perfect duties. Perfect duties to oneself first appear within the Rechtslehre, as 'inner juridical duties (innere Rechtspflichten)\ D i v i d i n g a metaphysic o f morals in general, K a n t proposes 5

Cf. above, p . 69. In H.N.fa), 395, K a n t d o e s n o t e that: ' S o far as duties o f

virtue are concerned, they w o u l d contain qfficiaxthices ethica as w e l l as officia ethices iuridica: that is t o say, duties o f virtue woulcTnocrude t h e observance o f all duties, whether o f perfect o r imperfect o b l i g a t i o n , f r o m a m o r a l attitude o f w i l l i n ful­ filling one's d u t y i n general'. This passage, h o w e v e r , represents a radical departure f r o m Kant's n o r m a l usage o f t h e t e r m ' d u t y o f virtue'. W h e n the Tugendlehre refers t o perfect duties t o w a r d o n e s e l f as Tugendpjlichten, it appears t o b e taking the term in a narrower sense than d o e s this passage, b u t n o t y e t i n the technical sense. • ,

'M.d.S., 390. .

'Ibid., 419.

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115

l 'the right o f humanity in our o w n person' and 'the rights o f other m e n ' as the basis for distmgmshing our perfect duties into 'inner' and 'outer' juridical duties. H e promises that 'in what follows' he will explain o u r 'inner juridical duties' as 'obligation from the right o f humanity in o u r o w n person'. T h e v a g u e reference to 'what follows' seems to indicate the opening chapters o f the Tugendlehre, w h i c h deal w i t h perfect d u t y to oneself; but the promised explanation is not forthcoming. Instead w e find that our inner juridical duties have n o w b e c o m e ' duties o f virtue. Kant's handling o f this subject is as g o o d a p r o o f as any that the Metaphysik der Sitten is a hurriedly written and, in fact, unfinished w o r k . A g a i n w e must turn for explanation to his prelinrinary notes t o this w o r k , w h i c h contain a more elaborate, i f still somewhat i n c o n ­ clusive, discussion o f the nature o f perfect duty to oneself. 8

9

Let us, then, begin w i t h the first p r o b l e m : i f ethics contains o n l y imperfect duties, h o w can perfect duties—even perfect duties t o o n e ­ self—be located witliin Tugendlehre ? Kant's reply is that perfect duties to oneself 'according to their content' do n o t b e l o n g to Tugendlehre: they belong, rather, to moral philosophy in general and so to Rechts­ lehre as the doctrine o f the highest limiting condition. 'In themselves,' h o w e v e r , they belong to Tugendlehre. T o consider duties 'according to their content' is to consider merely the nature o f w h a t is required b y the law, i.e. whether the duty consists in an action or in the adoption o f a m a x i m . T o consider them 'in themselves' is t o v i e w the l a w i n ' relation to the legislation in w h i c h it arises. W h a t K a n t means in this passage is that i f w e abstract from the legislation w h i c h promulgates the l a w and consider only the type o f l a w w h i c h enjoins perfect d u t y to oneself, w e find that it is a l a w only for actions and not for the maxims o f actions. T h e principle o f division, w h i c h gives us t w o mutually exclusive systems o f duties, L a w and ethics, is based o n the type o f legislation w h i c h can enact the l a w or the t y p e o f constraint w h i c h can accompany the l a w . F r o m this point o f v i e w , juridical duties are duties according to laws that can be promulgated externally,< and they can be only duties to other m e n . B u t i f w e adopt a different point o f v i e w , prescmding entirely from the legislation and considering10

1 1

8

M.d.S., p p . 236-7. Cf. also the diagram o n p . 240. T h e explanation o f the possibility o f d u t y t o w a r d o n e s e l f i n M.d.S., 4 1 7 - 8 , w i t h its distinction b e t w e e n t h e o b h g a t i n g subject, homo nohmenon, a n d t h e obligated subject, homo phaenomenon, m i g h t b e taken^as a n a c c o u n t o f 'the r i g h t o f h u m a n i t y i n one's o w n person'; If this is t h e passage t o w h i c h Kant is r e f e r r i n g , the e x p l a n a t i o n is an o b l i q u e o n e . 9

10

H.N.(23), 385.

1 1

Ibid., 379-

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only the nature o f the l a w ^ t h e n juridical laws are laws for actions, ethical laws, laws for the maxims o f actions; and i f there are laws p r o ­ hibiting certain uses o f our o w n person, w e can call our duties according to these laws juridical duties'. W h e n w e abstract from the legislation in which the duty arises and consider ' o n l y w h a t concerns legality', then, 'since it is a question only o f the c o n f o r m i t y o f actions w i t h the law, and the subjective determining g r o u n d m a y or m a y n o t ' b e the thought o f the law, our duties are either m e r e l y negative duties, i.e. duties which merely limit freedom in its inner or outer exercise and are called juridical duties in the general sense, of the term, o r they are positive and widening through the end they p r o v i d e ' . If, b y juridical duty', w e mean not so m u c h a duty w h i c h w e can be compelled b y others to perform as rather a duty w h i c h consists m e r e l y in an action, then w e can have juridical duties to ourselves as w e l l as to other men. Perfect iduties to o'irselves, Kant remarks, are officia iuris interni (erga seipsum) even as juridical duties i n the proper sense are officia iuris externi sive juridica. 12

13

W h a t led K a n t originally t o the n o t i o n o f 'inner juridical duty' was, apparently, the fact that there are prohibitions regarding our use o f our o w n person—prohibitions against self-murder, self-abuse, in­ temperance, l y i n g , avarice and servility—which leave us n o latitude in observing them. I f our principle for ckssifying our duties as juridical or ethical is ' o n l y the form o f obligation, w h e t h e r it be strict or w i d e ' , w e can say that there are inner, as w e l l as outer, juridical duties. A s w e saw in the preceding chapter, a l a w o f strict obligation is a l a w for actions, a negative and limiting principle w h i c h requires us o n l y to reject such o f our material m a x i m s as could n o t b e c o m e universal l a w ; and this, in turn, implies that laws enjoining perfect duty to oneself are applications o f the formal principle o f action. Perfect duties to oneself are not, even considered merely 'according t o their content', juridical duties properly speaking, because t h e y are n o t derived from the first principle o f Law. Neither are they ethical duties, because they are not derived from the special first principle o f ethics. T h e y are, rather, derived f r o m the first principle o f all d u t y prior to its differ­ entiation into the special first principle o f juridical d u t y and that o f ethical duty, and they therefore b e l o n ^ n e i t h e r to jurisprudence nor to ethics, but rather to 'moral philosophy in general'. 1 4

As soon as w e regard the formal principle o f duty as the principle o f laws which arise i n juridical legislation, w e H m i t its extension. Because n

HM(23),

268. Italics mine.

1 3

Ibid., 395.

1 4

Ibid.

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.

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^

' o f the hmited sphere witfiin w h i c h external compulsion is morally possible, the first principle o f juridical law is not the principle: so act that y o u r m a x i m could become, a universal law, but rather the narrower principle: act externally so that y o u r exercise o f freedom is consistent w i t h the freedom o f others under universal l a w . W h e n , on the other hand, w e regard the categorical imperative as the principle o f laws for w h i c h only inner legislation is possible, it is n o longer a principle for actions but rather for our ;intentions. Accordingly,, i f there are l a w s w h i c h prohibit actions because the maxims o f these actions "could n o t become universal law, w h i l e yet these actions are entirely consistent w i t h the freedom o f other men, such laws are derived neither from the first principle o f L a w nor from that o f ethical duty. T h e y must be applications o f the first principle o f duty as such. Considered 'according to their content', laws enjoining perfect duties to oneself have m o r e in c o m m o n w i t h juridical laws than w i t h ethical laws, since they merely prohibit actions o f a f o r m contrary to universal l a w . It is, therefore, appropriate to describe them as 'juridical duties'. B u t the universal law in question is not a l a w o f outer freedom. Hence, according to their content, perfect duties to oneself belong, n o t to jurisprudence, b u t rather to moral philosophy in general. B u t Kant's reason for referring to these duties as Rechtspjlichten is not merely that they bear a certain resemblance to juridical duties proper. It is the m o r e fundamental reason that moral philosophy in general is Rechtslehre, the doctrine o f ' R i g h t ' as the highest limiting condition u p o n our actions. Needless to say, i f Rechtslehre is here used as equivalent to-moral philosophy in general it cannot be Rechtslehre as the first division,of m o r a l philosophy. Rechtslehre in this wider sense is the doctrine o f perfect duties, w h e r e b y our freedom is limited i n either its external or its interior use, the doctrine o f laws based o n l y on 'personality and freedom'—more precisely, o n the Hmitation o f o u r freedom through personality. In our use o f our o w n person o u r choice stands under the Hmiting condition o f our personahty e v e n as, in our use o f other men, it is subject to the limiting condition imposed • by their status as persons or ends in themselves. I f the right o f an­ other person, in'the legal sense, is a limitation u p o n our tide to use w h a t is his, then, using the t e r m 'right' in a wider m o r a l sense, w e can say that the personality o f other m e n is the right o f humanity in thenperson and that our o w n ' p e r s o n a h t y is the right o f humanity in our o w n person. In other w o r d s , the personahty o f m e n as such is the H . N . ( 2 3 ) , 3 9 3 ; cf. also 3 9 2 . Ibid., 390. Ibid., 3 9 1 . N

15

16

17

S l 5

1 6

1 7

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first limitation upon our moral title t o m a k e use o f t h e m : w e cannot dispose o f persons as mere means to our subjective ends. Moreover, b y r e m o v i n g from the term ' R i g h t ' all that makes it properly juridical, w e can also speak o f the ' R i g h t o f humanity in our o w n person' as an 'inner ius'. B y analogy w i t h the definition o f L a w in the proper sense o f the term, this inner ius m i g h t be described as the limitation o f our inner exercise o f freedom to the condition o f its formal consistency w i t h itself. W h e n o n l y our use o f our o w n person is in question, the formal consistency o f freedom w i t h itself must have a quite different significance f r o m w h a t it has in our relations w i t h other men. A l t h o u g h the development o f this notion must await Kant's detailed analysis o f our specific duties, the passage in the Vork­ sung where he argues that freedom is in contradiction w i t h itself unless every exercise o f freedom is consistent w i t h the fullest use o f i t is relevant to the notion o f inner ius. I f w e m a k e use o f our non-deter­ mination b y immediate sensuous impulse in such a w a y as to destroy or weaken our natural and moral capacities for action, w e might be said to be using our freedom in such a w a y as to abrogate it. Perfect duties to ourselves are prohibitions against destroying our powers or hindering our use o f them, and inner ius comprises the laws w h i c h make our inner use o f freedom self-consistent. O u r exercise o f freedom in the use o f our o w n person, as in the use o f other men, is 'limited in its Idea'. In its outward exercise it can also be actively limited b y other men: in its inner exercise it cannot be so hrnited. B u t as soon as w e begin to discuss the active limitation o f our freedom b y other m e n or b y ourselves, i.e. the constraint w h i c h can a c c o m p a n y the law, w e have entered into either L a w or ethics. In moral philosophy in general, where perfect duties to ourselves b e l o n g according to their content, w e can discuss only the relation o f the l a w itself to choice, w i t h o u t reference to the possibility o f constraint. 18

T h e essential characteristics o f perfect duties t o ourselves b y virtue o f which they can be called officia iuris interni are implicit in the fact that their principle is merely the first principle o f duty as such, as it appears in 'moral philosophy in general'. Kant's further remarks about the R i g h t o f humanity in our o w n persoa-dr4w out the final implication o f this fact. R i g h t in the stricter sense requires o n l y actions, and not that w e make the principle o f L a w our m a x i m in performing these actions. So too, Kant argues, the R i g h t o f humanity in our o w n person does not require that w e refrain from violating the integrity o f our o w n 18

Vorksung, 151.

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119

(humanity from a motive o f duty, but only that w e refrain from such factions as w o u l d violate i t . T h e requirement that w e make the principle o f Flight itself our m a x i m is an ethical requirement pertaining to inner legislation, and the R i g h t o f humanity in our o w n person does not yet belong to ethics. B u t moral laws are practical principles, and although w e can c o n ­ sider them abstractly or 'according to their content', they must be accompanied b y moral constraint in order to fulfil their function as practical principles. N o w it is obvious, at least in a negative w a y , that all duties to ourselves must, as such, be situated within ethics rather than within jurisprudence. In so far as a violation o f duty to oneself does not affect the freedom o f other men, constraint b y others w o u l d be morally, impossible. A l l obligation to ourselves must be 'ethical obligation' in the*sense o f necessitation b y our o w n w i l l ; and the actions thus neces­ sitated 'ethical (not juridical) duties'; for ' i f the m o t i v e o f the action were not duty itself, w h a t w o u l d otherwise constrain us m o r a l l y . . . ? ' A l l duties to oneself must belong to ethics, the doctrine o f duties for w h i c h only inner legislation is possible. T h e y must, as Kant puts it, be a m o n g the 'special duties o f e t h i c s ' . B u t to say that the actions in question are not matters o f outer freedom and therefore fall outside the scope o f State legislation is to take only a negative v i e w o f the matter. It is to say, in effect, that since perfect duties to oneself cannot be the concern o f jurisprudence, they must be the concern o f ethics, the other division o f moral philosophy. W e also have to take into account Kant's positive v i e w o f the content o f ethics, the doctrine o f duties o f virtue. 19

2 0

21

F r o m Kant's analysis o f ethical prohibitions it follows that perfect duties to oneself cannot be duties o f virtue in the technical sense o f the term. If they are 'duties o f virtue' it is only in some wider sense; for the laws enjoining them are prohibitions against actions, not c o m ­ mands to adopt certain ends. A t the same time, it is clear that the c o n ­ nection between, these duties and inner legislation is not parallel to that between juridical duties and self-constraint through the motive o f duty. A l t h o u g h ethical prohibitions' merely limit our freedom in the use o f our o w n person even as juridical laws limit our freedom in the use o f other men, our freedom, in the sense o f our lawless freedom, is always limited w i t h a v i e w to some end; and this end is itself freedom in the normative sense. O u t e r freedom is the ratio essendi o£juridical k w s : it as in order to realize outer freedom that L a w restricts our actions. 19

H.N.(23), 390 and 381.

20

Ibid., 393.

21

M.d.S., 220.

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L A W S OF F R E E D O M

But in v i e w o f what does the ' R i g h t o f humanity in our o w n person' limit our actions affecting ourselves? T h e answer is, surely, in v i e w o f the inner freedom, and so o f the moral integrity, o f the subject. O u t e r freedom, as w e have seen, has in itself n o ethical significance. It is a condition that can be realized quite independently o f the subjects' motives, and in this sense the connection b e t w e e n juridical laws and ethical legislation is an extrinsic one. B u t 'inner freedom' is essentially an ethical concept. It refers to the subject's m o r a l attitude o f will, and ethical prohibitions, in so far as they are laws o f inner freedom, are intrinsically connected w i t h that legislation w h i c h includes the m o t i v e in the law. W e are not inwardly free i f w e refrain f r o m l y i n g f r o m a motive o f fear that our deception w i l l be discovered. W e cannot fulfil a duty o f inner freedom i f one m o t i v e o f sensuous origin checks the influence o f other motives o f sensuous origin, but o n l y i f motives o f sensuous origin as such are o v e r c o m e b y a m o t i v e o f reverence for the law. B o t h juridical laws and ethical prohibitions, according to w h a t they command, are indifferent to our motives. B u t the end o f the one can be achieved independently o f our attitude o f w i l l , whereas that o f the. other cannot. Other m e n can be o u t w a r d l y free although w e are mdifferent to or even hostile t o w a r d their freedom, but w e cannot be inwardly free and y e t mdifferent to our o w n freedom. W e are i n w a r d l y free only b y reason o f our attitude t o w a r d the l a w . T o put the matter in slightly different terms, it is clear that outer freedom can be disrupted merely b y an action. Because it is something fully external, its violation too is something external, an o u t w a r d action considered in abstraction f r o m the inner determination o f choice from which it proceeds. B u t this does n o t seem to be true in the case o f inner freedom. W h a t makes certain actions violations o f inner freedom is just the attitude o f w i l l manifested in these actions. Certain actions affecting one's o w n person are o f such a nature that to perform them necessarily implies a subjection o f one's attitude o f w i l l to the inclinations, and it is this that makes the action a violation o f duty t o oneself. T o take an example w i t h w h i c h w e are already farniliar: i f w e consider merely the bare act ofjielf-destruction, w e cannot say whether it is a violation o f duty to oneself; w e must also take into consideration the attitude o f w i l l f r o m w h i c h the action proceeds. Moreover, one class o f violations o f perfect duty to oneself consists not so much in particular external actions as rather in the adoption o f certain principles o f action. T h e v i c e o f avarice, for example, does n o t consist in refusing to spend one's m o n e y o n any g i v e n occasion: such

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an action in itself could not be distinguished from the practice o f the virtue o f thrift. Avarice consists, rather, in acting u p o n a principle w h i c h subjects one's attitude o f will to riches. If an action is a violation o f duty to oneself, it is, apparently, because the action manifests an attitude o f w i l l w h i c h is contrary to inner freedom. A n y l a w , whether it be a juridical law, an ethical prohibition, or an ethical l a w properly speaking, can be considered in abstraction from the legislation w h i c h enacts it, and w e can call the adoption o f our natural perfection as an end from a m o t i v e o f self-interest 'legal' just as our fulfilment o f a contract from fear o f the l a w ' s sanctions is legal. B u t i f w e v i e w laws concretely, as practical principles actively c o n ­ straining choice, juridical duties arise in legislation w h i c h is mdifferent to our motives, whereas perfect duties to ourselves and duties o f virtue arise in legislation w h i c h includes the m o t i v e o f duty in the l a w . Ethical prohibitions, like juridical laws, c o m m a n d o n l y actions; and they are thus distinguished from ethical laws, w h i c h prescribe m a x i m s o f pursuing certain ends. B u t like ethical laws, ethical prohibitions are intrinsically connected w i t h inner legislation, so that our ethical duties o f omission, considered 'in themselves' or as duties o f inner freedom, cannot be fulfilled independendy o f our^ attitude o f will. A n d this locates them, according to Kant's principle o f division, within ethics. T h e division between Rechtslehre and Tugendlehre, he explains, is based o n the fact that the concept o f freedom, w h i c h is c o m m o n to both, necessitates the division o f duties into those o f outer freedom and those o f inner freedom, ' o n l y the latter o f w h i c h are ethical'. 7

22

T o summarize Karit's s o m e w h a t complicated answer to the p r o b l e m raised b y the presence o f perfect duties within ethics, the doctrine o f imperfect duties: the manner in w h i c h w e describe perfect duties t o ourselves w i l l depend upon the point o f v i e w w h i c h w e adopt. A c c o r d ­ ing to the division o f duties w h i c h follows w h e n w e consider whether the l a w prescribes, o n the one hand, an object o f choice or, on the other hand, merely the form o f the action, perfect duties t o ourselves d o not belong within Tugendlehre. B u t from the point o f v i e w which lays d o w n the essential distinction between the t w o divisions o f m o r a l philosophy—the distinction o f duties o f outer freedom and duties o f inner freedom—perfect duties to ourselves d o b e l o n g to Tugendlehre. It is true that, in his treatment o f ethical prohibitions as such; K a n t presents the first point o f v i e w m o r e clearly than the second. In c o n ­ firmation o f the second, h o w e v e r , he does note that, from the v i e w 22

M.d.S., 406.

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point o f our obligation to the-duty, duties are distinguished according to whether 'the determining ground o f choice contains the principle': act according to a m a x i m w h i c h could b e c o m e universal l a w or, o n the other hand, 'make it y o u r m a x i m so to act as i f y o u w e r e g i v i n g universal l a w through that m a x i m , under the condition that in this legislation y o u can be consistent w i t h y o u r s e l f ' . W h e n the principle o f duty contained in the moral constraint says nothing about the subject's inner attitude o f will, he continues, duties w i l l consist merely in external actions or actions directed t o w a r d other people, and outer legislation can impose these duties. T h e doctrine o f these duties w i l l be Rechtslehre as the first division o f m o r a l philosophy. A c c o r d i n g t o the principle w h i c h commands us t o make it o u r m a x i m to act c o n ­ sistently w i t h universal law, our choice cannot be subject to the w i l l o f another person; and y e t this principle t o o , K a n t maintains, gives rise to perfect- duties (to ourselves) as w e l l as t o imperfect d u t i e s . Perfect duties t o ourselves, along w i t h duties o f virtue, are the proper subject-matter o f ethics, i f our principle o f division is based upon moral constraint according t o the l a w , a n d this n o t merely b y default o f external constraint; for they arise i n ethical legislation and belong intrinsically t o the doctrine o f duties f r o m self-constraint, the principle o f which has to d o w i t h our moral attitude o f will. 23

24

O n the basis o f this intrinsic connection b e t w e e n ethical prohibitions and inner legislation w e can g o o n t o the second, and m o r e difficult, problem regarding perfect duties t o oneself: the problem, namely, in what respect these duties can be called 'duties o f virtue'. It m i g h t be thought that w e are making the p r o b l e m unnecessarily difficult—that ethical duties o f omission are 'duties o f virtue' simply because the moral necessity o f making our perfection o u r end implies the necessity o f re­ fraining from certain actions w h i c h w o u l d frustrate this end. T h e l a w commanding us t o m a k e our perfection o u r end, it m i g h t be argued, implies a prohibition against transgressing this duty, and hence m a y be o f imperfect obligation i n w h a t it enjoins b u t o f perfect obligation in what it prohibits. This argument has m u c h t o r e c o m m e n d it, and, in fact, its essential point is v e r y close t o the conclusion w h i c h w e shall reach b y a m o r e devious path. B u t it_does n o t seem adequate to the complexities o f Kant's thought. T o b e g i n w i t h , it is not b y violating 2 3

T h e concluding phrase, 'under the c o n d i t i o n that i n this, legislation y o u c a n b e consistent w i t h yourself', a l t h o u g h its reference is m o r e general, seems t o b e particularly relevant t o duties t o oneself. H.N/(23), 380. 24

T H E N A T U R E OF P E R F E C T D U T I E S T O g N E S E L F

123

our ethical duties o f omission that w e transgress the l a w enjoining our /perfection as an end; it is, rather, b y failing to pursue our perfection, either from a m a x i m o f indifference to this end or from moral w e a k ­ ness in acting upon our m a x i m o f perfection) Perfect duties to oneself are, apparently, o f a different order from duties o f virtue. Further, since the principle o f ethical prohibitions is logically prior to the prin­ ciple o f duties o f virtue, it is difficult to see h o w the former could be derived from the latter. A l t h o u g h the end-result o f .the t w o lines o f thought m a y be the same, the order o f Kant's argument seems to re­ quire that w e begin w i t h the formal principle o f action as the principle o f certain 'duties o f inner freedom', rather than attempt to argue to ethical duties o f omission from the principle o f duties o f virtue. M o r e o v e r , it is quite possible that Kant conceives a closer relation between ethical duties o f omission and duties o f virtue than is s u g ­ gested b y this argument. A l t h o u g h the nature o f ethical prohibitions implies that duties enjoined b y them can be called 'duties o f virtue' only in a w i d e sense, it y e t seems probable that the analogy b e t w e e n the t w o is to be located in that w h i c h is the characteristic property o f duties o f virtue, namely, their reference to ends. T h i s is, at least, a hypothesis w o r t h considering. If it is correct, w e should begin w i t h the formal principle o f action as the principle o f certain duties intrinsically connected w i t h inner legislation and attempt to argue from this to the presence, in these duties, o f something that could be called an o b l i g a ­ tory end. T h e Metaphysik der Sitten gives us, so to speak, only the start­ ing point o f the argument—'the Plight o f humanity in our o w n person' —and its conclusion—the reference to these perfect duties as 'duties o f virtue'. A s for the^argument from the one to the other, what little guidance Kant provides in the cryptic notations o f the Nachlass suggests that w e can f o l l o w out the hypothesis mentioned, a b o v e . W e can, perhaps, best begin b y examining the text in w h i c h Kant's reference to these 'duties o f virtue' o c c u r s . O u r imperfect duties to ourselves, he asserts, are 'that w h i c h is material' in duty to oneself: they consist in making our natural and moral perfection,an end or matter o f choice; they have as their object our moral affluence and pertain to our melius esse or opulentia moralis; their principle is contained in the dictum, make yourself more perfect than mere nature made y o u . Perfect duties to oneself, o n the other hand, are 'that w h i c h is fprmal' in duty to oneself: they are prohibitions against acting 'contrary t o the ends o f our nature'; they pertain to our 'moral' health' or moral 'esse'; ^ MAS., 419. 25

!24

LAWS

OF

FREEDOM

their principle is contained in the Stoic dictum, live according to nature or preserve yourself in the perfection o f y o u r nature. In v i e w o f w h a t Kant has said regarding the nature o f ethical prohibitions, the m o r e obvious meaning o f his assertion that they are the formal element in duty to oneself is that these prohibitions are concerned w i t h the form o f our actions rather than w i t h the matter o f our choice. B u t the asser­ tion, taken in its context, seems also to mean\that the object o f these duties is the preservation o f ourselves as subjects o f duty. Strictly speaking, w e are, o f course, subjects o f duty merely b y the fact that w e are persons or subjects o f pure practical reason. B u t our actual moral condition is in conformity w i t h our nature as subjects o f duty only in so far as pure practical reason is in control o f our choice. N o w , as w e shall see, there are t w o w a y s in w h i c h w e can disturb moral reason's sovereignty over action and choice: b y arbitrarily depriving ourselves o f the physical, and hence o f the moral, use o f our p o w e r s ; and b y subjecting our attitude o f w i l l to the ends o f inclination. T a k e n together, these t w o classes o f vice are the destruction o f our moral esse, and in this sense the object o f ethical prohibitions is the preservation o f our prerogative as moral beings, our capacity to determine action b y pure practical reason. N o w , as the conclusion o f these remarks, K a n t adds the k e y phrase: b o t h our perfect and o u r imperfect duties to o u r ­ selves pertain to virtue'—the former as duties o f omission, the latter as duties o f commission, 'both, h o w e v e r , as duties o f virtue'. The t w o w a y s in w h i c h perfect duties t o ourselves can be called 'that which is formal' in duty t o w a r d oneself seem to be merely t w o facets o f the same principle; and this principle is, in turn, o n l y another w a y o f describing w h a t K a n t has previously called 'the R i g h t o f humanity in our o w n person'. Ethical prohibitions h m i t our use o f our o w n person to the condition o f lawfulness, and that w h i c h determines the lawfulness o f such actions is their consistency w i t h the 'ends o f our nature', i.e. w i t h the order w h i c h should exist a m o n g the components o f our being and w h i c h is dictated b y the fact that w e are beings capable o f moral action. T h e ' R i g h t o f humanity in our o w n person', w e m a y recall, was identified w i t h the hmitation imposed u p o n our choice b y the 'Idea o f our personality', and sinte^ciur personality consists in our capacity to g i v e the l a w t o ourselves, this restriction is, m o r e c o n ­ cretely, a prohibition against interfering w i t h our o w n capacity to determine choice autonomously. T h e importance o f the fact that ethical prohibitions comprise the inner ius w h i c h Kant describes in his 26

2 6

Cf. above, pp. 46-8,'and H . N . f o ) , 383.

I

THE N A T U R E OF PERFECT D U T I E S

TO

0*>£SELF

i 25

nptes to the Metaphysik der Sitten lies in the fact that the Tugendlehre ' reference to perfect duties to ourselves as 'duties o f virtue' can then be viewed in the light of the transition, made ir^ these notes, from the ' R i g h t o f humanity in our o w n person' to the 'end o f humanity in our o w n person'. If perfect duties to oneself are, in some sense, duties o f virtue, it must be b y reason o f the 'end o f humanity in one's o w n per­ son' w h i c h is their object. Despite the fragmentary and cryptic nature o f the evidence, it seems quite certain that Kant does, in fact, make this transition and that it is this transition w h i c h underlies the metamorphosis o f the Rechtslehre's 'inner juridical duties' into the Tugendlehre's 'duties o f virtue'. T h e 'ends o f humanity' are ends w h i c h belong to us as subjects o f pure practical reason, in distinction f r o m the 'ends o f men' w h i c h belong to ,us as natural beings, i.e. the ends w h i c h g « * o make up our happiness. W e r e it not for the problem o f perfect duties to oneself, w e should, o n the basis o f Kant's division o f duties, identify the.'ends o f humanity in our o w n person' w i t h the objects o f our imperfect duties to ourselves, i.e. w i t h our natural and moral perfection as objects o f c h o i c e . B u t K a n t tells us that s o m e o f the duties having to do w i t h our perfection, m o r e specifically w i t h our moral perfection, are merely negative duties or duties o f omission. ' T h e end o f humanity" in one's o w n person', he notes further, 'is either consistency w i t h the nature o f man or its cultivation according to laws o f f r e e d o m . ' N o w 'consistency w i t h the nature o f man' is a clear reference to the principle o f perfect duty t o w a r d oneself formulated in the Tugendlehre: 'live according t o nature' or ' d o not act contrary to the ends o f y o u r nature'. Accordingly, one aspect o f our perfection, the end o f humanity in our o w n person, is our 'moral self-preservation, health or esse'. M o r e o v e r , Kant indi­ cates that this is the g r o u n d o n w h i c h perfect duties to oneself are, in a wider sense, duties of virtue. ' O n e ' s o w n perfection as an end is either. stricte or late a duty o f virtue to oneself.' 27

28

29

30

Ethical prohibitions, then, enjoin duties o f virtue in a wide sense because they i n v o l v e the adoption o f our moral self-preservation as an end. B u t in w h a t sense is this an 'end' ? First, the integrity o f o u r : humanity is an end only in a negative sense. Speaking o f these p r o 27

Cf. the diagram on p. 240, with its distinction between 'the right of humanity in our own person' and 'the end of humanity in our own person'. According to the texts cited below, however, the 'end of humanity' seems to include the 'ends of our nature' which we ought not to act against, as well as the objects which ethrcai laws command us to take up as ends. H.N.(23), 398. Ibid., 387. Ibid., 3%%* 28

29

30

LAWS

126

OF

FREEDOM

bibitions, Kant notes that 'the end w h i c h w e should have w i t h regard to our o w n person is negative: humanity w i t h i n us wills that w e should not degrade man to a mere means'.' A l t h o u g h he has said that the object o f these duties can be called our 'moral perfection', it is o n l y the negative and formal aspect o f moral perfection that these duties i n ­ volve as our end in restricting our actions. A n d since duties correspond­ ing to this type o f end are essentially duties o f omission, the sharp distinction between ethical prohibitions and ethical laws enjoining duties o f virtue in the strict sense remains intact. This distinction lies in the fact that ethical prohibitions require us to reject certain m a x i m s o f self-love, whereas ethical laws require us to adopt maxims o f realiz­ ing certain ends or o f bringing certain states o f affairs into being. Y e t ethical duties o f omission can be called duties o f virtue in a wide sense, whereas juridical duties, e v e n w h e n accompanied b y ethical legislation, cannot be called duties o f virtue. Ethics requires us, Kant has said, to make the principle o f L a w our m a x i m in fulfilling juridical duties, and so to m a k e the right o f others our end; but he denied that this requirement changes the juridical character o f the duty. T h e essential difference here is that ethical prohibitions, c o n ­ sidered 'in themselves,' arise in inner legislation; and this implies that w e cannot fulfill these duties w i t h o u t directing our will to pure practical reason's system o f ends, according to the first principle o f ethical law. Juridical duties, o n the other hand, arise in outer legislation"; and though the ethical legislation that always accompanies t h e m brings our m a x i m under the categorical imperative o f ends, w h i c h prescribes the right o f others as our end, juridical duties can still be ftdfiled independently o f our motives and ends. Since external c o n ­ straint to these duties remains m o r a l l y possible, they are duties o f outer freedom, actions w h o s e m o r a l necessity is independent o f the agent's attitude o f will. Ethical prohibitions, o n the other hand, enjoin duties o f inner freedom, w h i c h w e cannot fulfill w i t h o u t g o i n g beyond the mere prohibition and adopting the 'integrity o f humanity in our person' as our end. 31

32

In the final analysis, our ethical duties o f omission remain something o f an anomaly, participating in cerjaijv: characteristics o f both juridical duties and duties o f virtue, y e t mclining, apparently, toward duties o f virtue. Because the principle o f these duties is a restrictive one, a p r o ­ hibition against certain actions, they can be called 'inner juridical 3 1

H.N.(23), 398.

.

3 2

Cf. a b o v e , p p .

84-5.

THE

/

NATURE

OF PERFECT D U T I E S

TO

ONESELF

*

127

\

duties folio w i n g from . the right o f humanity in our o w n person.' B u t because ethical prohibitions are laws o f inner freedom, the type o f constraint implied in these duties can be o n l y the self-constraint o f moral reason; and, given the purposive nature o f h u m a n action, w e cannot fulfil them w i t h o u t adopting the system o f ends enjoined b y the first principle o f ethical law. A n ethical duty o f omission is not a duty o f virtue in the full sense because the duty itself does not consist in adopting an end but only in^ omitting an action. Y e t it is a duty o f virtue in a w i d e r sense because w e cannot observe it, as a duty, w i t h o u t going b e y o n d the mere prohibition and taking as our end the formal aspect o f our moral perfection. T h e fact that ethical prohibitions prescribe duties o f virtue in this wider sense determines, in turn, the method b y w h i c h Kant, must derive specific ethical prohibitions. T h e principle o f these duties is that o f hunting our maxims to those o f such a f o r m that w e could give universal l a w through them. B u t because ethical prohibitions have as their object the preservation o f our m o r a l integrity, w e can discover w h a t maxims are lawful in their f o r m o n l y b y referring our maxims o f using ourselves in pursuit o f our subjective ends to the system o f objective ends that w e ought to w i l l , the ends that it is rational for us to will in v i e w o f both our physical and our m o r a l nature.

CHAPTER IX

PERFECT MORAL

DUTIES TO

BEING

WITH A N

ONESELF AS A ANIMAL

N A T U R E

Man is a being possessing the p o w e r o f pure practical reason. A t the same time, he has an animal nature. A n d because the t w o ' n a t u r e s , animal and moral, are united in the same being, m a n must treat his animal nature w i t h due regard for the fact that it belongs to the subject of pure practical reason. This is not m e r e l y another f o r m o f the prin­ ciple that any action o f a moral agent (and so also those directed t o ­ ward his o w n person) should be in accordance w i t h the commands o f pure practical reason. In order to deterrriine w h a t sort o f actions affecting other m e n conform w i t h principles o f legislative reason w e had to consider that our actions are directed t o w a r d beings w h o have the right to express their freedom o u t w a r d l y . Here w e are considering actions that affect our o w n person, a b e i n g capable o f rational and moral action and obligated n o t t o interfere w i t h these capacities. While our o w n humanity is the ultimate g r o u n d o f all our duties, it is also the proximate ground o f perfect duties t o ourselves. 1

These duties, Kant holds, are the most important o f all our duties since our observance o f them is the condition o f moral action, in w h i c h the absolute g o o d — a g o o d will—manifests itself. Y e t they are also the most difficult to establish; for in treating an action as a violation o f duty to ourselves w e must establish its i m m o r a l i t y in abstraction from its possible effects o n others, b y considering it merely in so far as it affects our o w n person. In the question o f perfect duties to ourselves, accordingly, Kant's general p r o b l e m is t o find criteria for determining what sort o f maxims fail, because o f their relation t o our o w n h u m ­ anity, to qualifyJior giving universal l a w . Certain maxims w i l l be dis­ qualified b e c a u s e j a e y disrupt the rational order a m o n g the ends o f man's composite animal,' rational, jaaaA m o r a l being, and the prohi2

1

Because a n y action is a use o f o u r o w n p e r s o n a n d affects it t o s o m e extent, Kant suggests that all-our duties are indirectly duties t o ourselves. For e x a m p l e , a duty o f f o r g i v i n g s o m e o n e w h o has injured us is indirectly a d u t y t o ourselves o f n o t degrading our soul w i t h hatred, a n d o u r d u t y o f b e n e v o l e n c e t o others is indirectly a d u t y t o ourselves o f m a k i n g ourselves the source o f others' happiness. C f . H . N . ( 2 ) , 403. 3

2

Cf. Vorksung, 14.6-7. 128

PERFECT DUTIES TO ONESELF ^

/ /

120

•

bitions against such actions will comprise perfect duties to oneself /as a moral being w i t h an animal nature. Other maxims will be dis­ qualified because, while the actions have nc\ adverse effects o n our animal nature, they are directly opposed to inner freedom and so to man's end as a moral b e i n g ; these prohibitions w i l l comprise perfect duties to oneself merely as a moral being. The first o f Kant's criteria,,, valid for both classes o f perfect duty to oneself, seems to be the formulation o f the categorical imperative w h i c h considers humanity, and more particularly humanity in one's o w n person, as an end in itself. From his general discussion o f perfect duties to oneself, it is clear that Kant intends this formula, so restricted, to indicate the immediate ground o f these duties. I have suggested' above that this principle is already an application o f the supreme'moral principle and indicated h o w it is derived' from the formula o f uni­ versal l a w . So i f K a n t can s h o w that certain maxims o f action i n v o l v e the use o f our o w n person as a mere means to our subjective ends—or, as he puts it here, i n v o l v e an 'abasement o f o u r personahty'—it w i l l follow that such maxims are inconsistent w i t h universal l a w . H i s p r o b ­ lem, then, reduces to finding criteria b y w h i c h w e can tell what sort o f maxims w o u l d i n v o l v e an abasement o f our personahty. Here, it must be admitted, Kant might have simplified matters for Iris reader. T h e most important o f his principles for bringing actions affecting our animal nature under the categorical imperative is c o n ­ tained in a remark, prelirriinary to his discussion o f these duties, w h i c h m i g h t w e l l be mistaken for a preliniinary definition o f suicide and o v e r ­ looked in favour o f his formal discussion o f that particular vice. B u t this definition o f ' a r b i t r a r y physical death' is, in fact, a definition o f all the vices o f this class qua vices; in other words, it points out the c h a r a c ­ teristic o f a m a x i m w h i c h makes our adoption o f it an abasement o f o u r personahty. Self-destruction, K a n t here explains, is either total or partial. T o t a l self-destruction is suicide; partial self-destruction consists in depriving oneself o f an organ or integral part o f the b o d y , or depriving oneself, permanently or temporarily, o f the physical and so indirecdy o f the moral use o f a p o w e r . T h a t suicide, along w i t h self-mutilation, comes 3

4

5

3

Cf. a b o v e , C h . VIII and M.d.S., 417-8-

4

Cf. a b o v e , p . 39 ff.

5

M.d.S., 421. In the Nachlass relating t o the Tugendlehre Kant suggests t h e formula mens sane in corpore sano^zs the principle o f d u t i e s t o oneself. B u t t h e ;

p r o b l e m , h e notes, is t o d e t e r m i n e w h a t constitutes 'health'. If this term is t a k e n in a w i d e e n o u g h sense, as the d u e order a m o n g the c o m p o n e n t s o f h u m a n nature, the formula w o u l d s u m m a r i z e Kant's argument. ' : 10'

JJO

LAWS

OF

FREEDOM

under this definition is sufficiently clear: B u t the principle extends beyond the usual meaning o f ' s u i c i d e ' . W e shall find that in discussing the t w i n vices o f intemperance, gluttony and drunkenness, Kant c o n ­ centrates o n the fact that through them w e deprive ourselves, for a time, o f our use o f reason or o f our capacity for skilful and reflective action. O n the basis o f the Tugendlehre alone it is not clear that the re­ maining vice o f self-abuse falls under this principle; but in the P'ddagogik Kant asserts that the practice o f this vice has harmful effects—that it results in sterility, early old age, etc., so that it t o o can be described as destroying or hindering the use o f one's p o w e r s . 6

W h i l e this definition is not y e t a formal argument, it is obvious what use can be made o f it. In estabhshing that certain actions affecting ourselves are vices w e are to s h o w that the m a x i m s o f these actions are not objectively valid, in other Words, that they are irrational. N o w practical reason in general is a p o w e r o f setting and realizing ends and, this being the case, it is irrational arbitrarily to deprive ourselves o f our powers o f setting and realizing ends. It is irrational arbitrarily to impair our use o f reason itself or to deprive reason o f its use o f the other p o w e r s in effecting its purposes. This criterion, it w o u l d seem, could easily bring the actions in question directly under the supreme moral principle itself. B u t it is also clear that a m a x i m o f arbitrary self-destruction is an 'abasement o f our personality' since it subordinates our ends as rational and moral beings to the ends o f mere inclination. A n d since the principle o f our o w n humanity as an end in itself indicates the immediate g r o u n d o f perfect duties to ourselves, it is appropriate that the maxims should, be brought under this principle. Despite the apparent completeness o f this argument, K a n t goes o n to offer further criteria: the Stoic principle 'five according t o nature' and, closely related to it, the teleological conception o f our animal instincts as 'natural purposes'. A n action w h i c h is contrary to 'nature' and to 'nature's purposes', he suggests, involves an abasement o f our personality. This superfluity o f criteria itself poses a serious problem, that o f their function in the argument. B u t first w e must consider the meaning and implication o f these printioles. 7

In accordance w i t h the dictum 'live according to nature, d o not act against the ends o f y o u r nature', K a n t divides these duties o n the basis o f our animal instincts for self-preservation, sex, and nourishment. His reason is that the object o f our instincts, taken as a w h o l e , is the pre­ servation o f our animal nature and its p o w e r s , so that actions in w h i c h 8

Padagogik, 497.

7

M.d.S., 419.

8

Ibid., 420.

'

PERFECT DUTIES

TO ONESELF

I3I

w e arbitrarily destroy or w e a k e n our powers coincide with the direc­ tion o f our instincts a w a y from the objects t o w a r d w h i c h , apart f r o m the intervention o f practical reason, they w^ould inevitably tend. In themselves the animal instincts do not require practical reason in order to produce their effects. T h e y pertain, in Kant's terms, to 'natural and mechanical self-love', and in the l o w e r animals, w h i c h belong w h o l l y to nature in the narrower sense (as opposed to freedom), they are n e c ­ essarily determined to these effects. In man, h o w e v e r , 'the instincts are released from their subjective necessity. T h r o u g h his practical reason man can set up arbitrary ends for the animal instincts or use them for mere pleasure in such a w a y as to prevent them from producing the results they w o u l d inevitably produce i f he w e r e a mere animal. K a n t insists that w h i l e vices can be built o n the. instincts, the instincts are n o t themselves the root o f these vices. It is, rather, the deviation o f the i n ­ stincts from their natural function that constitutes vice,.the root o f w h i c h is therefore to be found solely in man's freedom. \ x

9

Because in man, unlike the l o w e r animals, the exercise o f the animal instincts does not take place blindly but rather according to m a x i m s , man needs a rule to guide h i m in the free use o f his instincts. T h e m o r e obvious meaning o f this rule, live according to nature, is that w e o u g h t not to divert the instincts from their natural function. B u t the dictum, so understood, can serve as a moral principle only in so far as 'nature' also means ' h u m a n nature', the g r o u n d o f all our p o w e r s — ' animal, rational, and m o r a l . T h e animal instincts are only; o n e element within the nature o f m a n and their ends must be determined, w i t h regard for his nature as a w h o l e . T h e other element in h u m a n nature is practical reason, and the fact that reason can determine a c t i o n independently o f the mclinations indicates that the end o f reason is n o t merely to procure pleasure or even happiness for man. Hence i f w e use practical reason to pervert the animal instincts, to destroy or w e a k e n the animal substratum o f h u m a n action for the sake o f mere pleasure, w e are acting contrary, to the end o f practical reason itself and s o contrary to the nature o f m a n as a w h o l e . T h e mere fact that a certain use o f the instincts is 'unnatural' is itself w i t h o u t moral significance. It becomes morally relevant o n l y o n the assumption that the 'natural' effect o f the instincts is an object w h i c h a moral being necessarily wills in so far as he has an animal nature. A s moral beings w i t h an animal 1 0

9

1 0

Cf. Religion, 26-28; cf. also Voxlesung, 151-2. F o r this use o f the t e r m 'nature' and for a discussion o f the three e l e m e n t s i n

h u m a n nature, cf. Religion, 26 ff.

132

LAWS

OF

FREEDOM

nature w e necessarily will (in so far as w e w i l l rationally) the pre­ servation o f the animal m e d i u m for rational and moral action. T h u s it is our end as moral beings that ultimately determines w h a t ends w e must freely assign to our instincts and, in so far as the natural function o f the instincts coincides w i t h these ends, allows K a n t to use 'nature' in the narrower sense as an index o f moral action. Kant does not argue, simply, that w e o u g h t not to frustrate pur animal instincts; o n the contrary, he leaves it open to question whether it may not at times be obligatory, and so permissible, to act contrary to our instinct for e.g. self-preservation. T o act contrary to an instinct and to pervert it are t w o quite different things, and only the latter contains the note—all-important in Kant's procedure—that our end in acting is an arbitrary one. T h e mere frustration o f an instinct leaves it open what purpose w e m a y have in acting and whether our m a x i m o f action-toward-an-end is consistent w i t h the ends o f our being in its totality. T h e ends o f our animal nature m a y , in special cases, have to be sacrificed to the ends* o f the higher components in our being. B u t the perversion o f an instinct implies that w e sacrifice the welfare o f our animal nature to a merely subjective end and so subordinate the w i d e r ends o f our being to the ends o f mere inclination. B u t this does not y e t exhaust the implications o f 'nature' in Kant's argument. W h a t has been said so far about the instincts could be established merely b y empirical observation: it is e n o u g h t o k n o w that the instincts d o , in fact, produce actions w h i c h preserve our animal nature and its powers, and w e need n o t suppose that nature destines them to this end. B u t Kant's v i e w o f nature is a teleological o n e : through the ariimal instincts, he maintains, nature 'aims at' the pre­ servation o f the animal, o f the species, and o f the animal's p o w e r s . In the case o f each vice he argues, in effect, that an action w h i c h involves the use o f an instinct or p o w e r contrary to 'nature's purpose' for that p o w e r is a violation o f d u t y to oneself. W i t h the introduction o f these teleological considerations, the p r o b l e m o f determining the function o f 'nature' in Kant's argument becomes acute. For, according to his Critical principles, 'nature's purposes' cannot i n themselves be taken as manifestations o f (divine) reason f~the teleological v i e w o f nature has only a regulative function i n h u m a n k n o w l e d g e . T h e liberal use w h i c h K a n t makes o f natural teleology does n o t mean that he has t h r o w n his Critical caution to the w i n d s . It is in the discussion o f duties regarding the sexual instinct that the teleological aspect o f the argument is most pronounced, and it is here that K a n t refers us

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back to the Critique of Judgment and its explanation o f natural teleo­ l o g y . There are certain phenomena in nature—namely organisms— which, he there explains, w e cannot understand merely according to the principle o f mechanical causality. O u r progress in the study o f o r g a n ­ isms depends largely u p o n our conceiving t h e m as effects o f a cause w h i c h produces them in accordance w i t h its pre-existing Idea o f them. In other w o r d s , there comes'\ a point in our study o f .nature w h e n w e must turn to the notion o f final causality, not as an explanation for the existence o f organisms (for w e do not assert that organisms are, in fact, the products o f an intelligent cause), but only as a regulative or heuristic principle for our investigation o f organized matter. T h e structure o f the human mind is such that w e cannot conceive this connection other­ wise than as if it w e r e the Idea o f the effect^ or the end, that determined the cause to act. B u t the teleological principle is a subjective one in the sense that it tells us nothing about objects o f experience themselves. Accordingly, the Tugendlehre's assertion that the instjnets are 'natural purposes' is followed b y the definition o f a 'natural purpose' as such a connection o f cause and effect that, w i t h o u t attributing intelhgence to nature, w e must conceive this connection b y analogy w i t h an inten­ tional or purposive o n e . 1 1

12

Unless Kant w e r e to argue that nature's purposes are in themselves manifestations o f reason, the teleological principle cannot o f itself establish a violation o f duty. In recognition o f this, Kant distinguishes clearly b e t w e e n our v i e w that an action is 'unnatural' and the 'rational p r o o f that the action is i m m o r a l . In connection w i t h the principle 'live according to nature' I suggested that the unnatural character o f an action is itself morally irrelevant and that 'nature' becomes morally, significant only in so far as the natural use o f our instincts coincides w i t h a rational system o f ends. T h e same point is valid for the t e l e o ­ logical consideration o f nature. A n d i f this, is the case, the criteria re­ garding 'nature' are really n o t an essential and integral part o f the argument. T h e p r o o f in fact depends, not o n a n y special attribute o f nature, but o n the relation o f a m a x i m to the order which a fully rational being w o u l d necessarily institute a m o n g the ends o f h i s - c o m 13

11

Cf. K.d.U., 372 ff.

1 2

M.d.S., 424. A distinction should b e maintained b e t w e e n the terms ^Natur-

,

.

zweck and Zweck.der Natur. A Naturzweck (natural purpose, natural end, nature's purpose) is the t y p e o f c o n n e c t i o n w i t h i n nature described a b o v e . T h e e n d o f nature (Zweck der Natur), i.e. the final end t o w h i c h nature as a w h o l e is o r d e r e d , lies b e y o n d nature. Kant h i m s e l f is n o t always careful i n his use o f these t w o t e r m s . 13

M.d.S., 425.

LAWS

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posite being. If the subsequent appeal to nature' is possible o n l y because its function and supposed purposes can be seen to coincide w i t h this rational system o f ends, then the criteria d r a w n from nature' belong only to the exposition, not to the discovery, o f w h a t c o n ­ stitutes our duty. B u t these criteria m i g h t indeed prove useful in a 'popular' w o r k on moral philosophy, such as the Metaphysik der Sitten is supposed to b e . Given the popular Stoic ethics o f Kant's time and the eighteenth century's acceptance o f a teleological nature, K a n t might well hope to 'gain an entrance to the c o m m o n understanding' by connecting his ethics w i t h 'nature' and 'nature's purposes'. T o d a y , the value o f this connection w o u l d be considerably diminished. B u t if the role of'nature' is only that o f a convenient m e d i u m for e x p o u n d ­ ing a moral argument established independently o f it, n o serious o b ­ jection can be brought to its presence in the argument. It can simply be removed without affecting the 'rational p r o o f itself. . Kant seems originally to have intended this sort o f procedure and, for the most part, to have carried it out. B u t the general coincidence o f 'nature's purposes' w i t h our rational ends, together w i t h the personal belief in a teleological nature w h i c h he betrays w h e n he is not speaking Critically, m a y have led h i m occasionally to attribute some inde­ pendent significance to nature or at least to neglect the rational p r o o f in favour o f teleological considerations. In the case o f t w o vices, selfabuse and l y i n g , he speaks as i f the mere fact that the action is ' u n ­ natural' were p r o o f o f its immorahty. Here Kant's failure to s h o w that the actions are inconsistent w i t h the ends o f human nature as a w h o l e gives the impression that he needs natural teleology in order to estab­ lish the immorahty o f actions w h i c h are c o m m o n l y considered vices. Such a conclusion w o u l d , I thmk, be unjustified or at least unduly simplified. B u t these questions can best be handled within the dis­ cussion o f specific vices. 14

15

If the relation o f Kant's criteria is as I have suggested, his procedure meets his o w n requirement for a valid moral proof: namely, that for any one duty there can be o n l y one p r o o f . For the definition o f these vices as arbitrary self-destruction brings the actions under the cate­ gorical imperative, w h i l e the considerations regarding 'nature', far from being independent proofs, are merely devices useful in e x p o u n d 16

1 4

1 5

Gr., 391. Cf. b e l o w , p. 145 f t . For examples o f non-Critical statements regarding the purposiveness o f o u r

powers, cf. Gr., 423 and 395-6. 18

M . < £ S . , 403.

O n the contrast b e t w e e n m a t h e m a t i c s and p h i l o s o p h y m e n ­

tioned here, cf. K.d.r.V. B 741 f f

^

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135

i n g the proof. A t the-same time it answers the charge that Kant's derivation o f these duties is a haphazard affair that seizes on whatever comes to hand in order to establish the traditional duties. O n the c o n ­ trary, his procedure is a systematic one. A l t h o u g h the loss o f our powers m a y predominate in his exposition o f one duty and 'nature's purposes' in another, all the considerations discussed above are present at least imphcitly in each argument. T h e systematic unity o f Kant's. method is, in fact, not limited to this particular class, o f duties; the principles e m p l o y e d here will, w i t h appropriate modifications, be carried o v e r into the discussion o f all other classes o f duties to o u r ­ selves. First, h o w e v e r , let us see h o w the argument w o r k s out in the case o f perfect duties to ourselves as moral beings w i t h an animal nature; A. . S E L F - M U R D E R

K a n t reminds us first that suicide can be called self-murder only if w e can prove that it is a transgression o f duty and that, since w e are c o n ­ sidering suicide only as a possible violation o f duty°to ourselves, w e must not p r o v e that the action is a w r o n g b y arguing from its effects o n others. T h e action may, indeed, be a violation o f our duty to others. B u t w e can prove that it is a violation o f duty t o ourselves only if, abstracting from all effects o f the action on other men, w e can s h o w that our personality lays on us an obhgation to preserve our o w n l i f e . S o far as a metaphysic o f morals is concerned, suicide is equivalent to taking one's o w n life for the sake o f an arbitrary or merely sub­ jective end. In a metaphysic o f morals, it w i l l b e recalled, w e must re­ main on the level o f ' m e n considered merely as m e n ' : w e cannot des­ cend into the contingent circumstances in w h i c h individual men m a y find themselves. A n d it is only under contingent circumstances that there might occur a case o f suicide w h i c h w o u l d not be directed to a purely subjective end. U n d e r special conditions there could arise questions o f a collision between.grounds o f obhgation, in w h i c h we might allege a duty (and hence a right) to suicide o n the grounds that our continued existence w o u l d i m p l y violation o f another duty. Such 17

"M.d.S., 422. '

•;.

„

V

1 8

In Vorlesung, 193 ff., K a n t seems t o a d m i t o n l y o n e g r o u n d o n w h i c h it is m o r a l l y permissible t o take one's o w n life: n a m e l y , i n o r d e r t o prevent a v i o l a t i o n o f h u m a n i t y in one's o w n person. T h e casuistical questions i n M.d.S., 423-4 m a y indicate further g r o u n d s . In a n y case, the distinction b e t w e e n m e r e suicide arid self-murder t o be d r a w n in casuistry is indicated clearly i n H-N.fa), 400, w h e r e , listing the topics t o b e discussed under this h e a d i n g , K a n t n o t e s : 'Die Selbstent-

leibung nicht Selbstmord'. A parallel.distinction is i m p l i e d i n t h e subsidiary question, o f self-mutilation.

*

136

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questions are problems in casuistry, and the fact that Kant raises them as such is another refutation o f his alleged rigorism. In principle, as w e have seen, he is quite willing to admit the existence o f necessary exceptions to the sort o f moral laws discussed in the Metaphysik der Sitten. But o n the level o f ' m e n considered merely as men', only the inclinations can provide the m o t i v e for suicide; as in the Grundle­ gung's examples, the m a x i m o f suicide w h i c h w e are to consider is n o t simply 'I will destroy m y life', but rather 'I w i l l destroy m y life w h e n life promises more pain than satisfaction'. The argument to s h o w that arbitrary suicide is a vice—self-murder— is put forward briefly. ' T o destroy the subject o f morality in one's o w n person is to root out the existence o f morality itself from the w o r l d , so far as this is in one's p o w e r ; and y e t morality is an end in itself. Consequently, to dispose o f oneself as a mere means to an arbitrary end is to abase humanity in one's o w n person (homo noumenon), w h i c h was yet entrusted to man (homo phaenomenon) for its preservation'. In cornmitting suicide w e are destroying the natural substratum o f personality; and i f w e destroy it merely t o a v o i d an object o f aversion to the mclinations, w e are disposing o f the subject o f morality as a mere means to our subjective e n d s . 19

20

21

Self-murder is, then, the supreme e x a m p l e o f arbitrarily depriving ourselves o f our capacity for moral actions. In analysing the concept o f 'the right o f humanity in our o w n person', w e saw that our freedom in disposing o f our o w n person is limited t o the condition o f consis­ tency with itself, and the Vorlesung explains clearly h o w arbitrary suicide is opposed to the inner ius that comprises our perfect duties to ourselves. T h e act o f self-murder, K a n t notes, oversteps every h m i t a ­ tion on the exercise o f free choice, for the exercise o f free choice is possible only i f the subject e x i s t s . M o r e specifically, our exercise o f free choice must be consistent w i t h our nature as moral agents, and 22

1 9

Gr., 422. T h e nature o f a m a x i m requires that it specify certain c o n d i t i o n s or circumstances in w h i c h w e p r o p o s e t o act i n a g i v e n w a y . This statement (in M.d.S., 423) d o e s n o t b e l o n g t o natural t e l e o l o g y , w h i c h must remain w i t h i n 'nature' in the n a r r o w e r sense. T h e religious overtones o f this assertion are d e v e l o p e d at l e n g t h i n Vorlesung, ji93- W e are, Kant says, placed in the w o r l d for a certain p u r p o s e ; t h e seh^rrmrderer is i n o p p o s i t i o n t o the e n d o f his Creator and arrives before H i m as a soldier w h o has deserted his post. T h i s is also hinted at i n M.d.S., 422. C o m p a r e Vorlesung, 53, w h e r e K a n t locates t h e 'contradiction' in a m a x i m o f self-murder i n the fact that our i n t e n t i o n t o free ourselves f r o m pain and trouble b y destroying o u r life subordinates h u m a n nature t o animal nature. 2 0

2 1

22

Vorlesung, 187.

PERFECT DUTIES TO ONESELF

117

/ from this it follows that w e cannot destroy the subject o f duty unless w e have the moral title to do so. As the Tugendlehre puts it, 'man cannot 'renounce his personahty so long as he is a subject o f duty, hence so l o n g as he lives; and that he should have the W o r a l title to w i t h d r a w from all obhgation, i.e. freely to act as i f he needed no moral title for this action, is a contradiction'. T h e only ground on w h i c h w e could, consistently w i t h our status as subjects o f duty, destroy ourselves w o u l d be that duty requires it and s 6 gives us the moral title .to do it. B u t o n the level o f m e n as such, our first duty to ourselves as' moral beings with an animal nature is to preserve our animal nature. T h e teleological aspect o f Kant's argument against self-murder is not to be found w i t h i n his formal discussion o f this vice. That he v i e w s the matter in the light o f natural teleology is clear, h o w e v e r , both f r o m his previous classification o f the animal instincts and f r o m incidental remarks in his subsequent discussion o f self-abuse. Just as the natural function o f ' l o v e o f life' is to preserve the individual, he argues, so that o f sexual l o v e is to preserve the species. T h e v i e w that b o t h o f these instincts are 'natural purposes' takes us back t o the Grundlegung s discussion o f suicide: in committing arbitrary suicide w e are using our 'love o f life', our instinct for self-preservation, contrary to nature's purpose and so violating a duty to ourselves. F r o m Kant's 'rational p r o o f regarding self-murder, it is clear that the immorality o f arbitrary suicide can be established independendy o f teleological considerations and that these can serve only as a device for the popular exposition o f the proof. B u t the impact o f this device is weakened b y the fact that, at first glance, arbitrary suicide does n o t really l o o k like the use o f an instinct contrary to its natural end. I f we regard the instinct for self-preservation as directed t o the preservation o f the individual, it follows that in self-murder w e are acting c o n ­ trary to its natural end. B u t it is not clear that w e are using this same instinct contrary to its natural end, i.e. that it is the instinct for "selfpreservation that leads us to destroy ourselves. It w o u l d seem, rather, that w e are using ^another natural desire—our desire for happiness—to frustrate our ' l o v e o f life' and prevent it from fulfilling its function. I f the role o f natural teleology in the Tugendlehre is at all similar to its role in the Grundlegung (and I shall argue that it is), the question is o f s o m e importance. For in order to obtain the necessary contradiction in o u r maxini conceived as a l a w o f nature, it must be one and the same instinct that acts contrary to its'natural end. M.d.S., 422. Ibid., 424. 23

24

23

2 4

1

I38

LAWS

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The close connection that Kant conceives between the instinct for self-preservation and the natural desire for happiness found in rational beings with a sensuous nature seems to provide the link required. W h a t the Tugendlehre calls ' l o v e o f life' is described in the Grundlegung as 'self-love', a feeling whose fimction it is t o promote life. In c o m ­ mitting suicide o n the ' m a x i m o f self-love', that is, the m a x i m o f cutting short one's life w h e n its continued existence promises m o r e pain than enjoyment, one is destroying life t h r o u g h the same feeling whose function it is to promote l i f e . N o w K a n t identifies the rational prin­ ciple o f self-love w i t h that o f prudence, w h i c h prescribes the means for the agent to attain happiness. If self-love w e r e reduced to the level o f mere animal instinct it w o u l d b e c o m e an undifferentiated desire for well-being in general, and this is presumably w h a t Kant means b y ' l o v e o f life'. O n the level o f animal instinct n o distinction is made between life itself and a particular condition o f life: in other w o r d s , the animal's instinct for self-preservation is one w i t h its desire for well-being. T h e same instinct, K a n t seems to say, is present in man. B u t m a n does not act blindly upon this instinct. H e bases m a x i m s o n it, and in these he can distinguish between life itself and a state o f well-being or happiness. T h e ' p o i n t o f the argument seems to b e that nature's purpose in this instinct is not the happiness o f the individual but rather his self-preser­ vation, that his l o v e o f well-being is intended b y nature to lead h i m to avoid obstacles to his continued existence. A n d w h e n man uses his l o v e o f well-being, not to preserve his life, but to destroy it, he is using his love o f life contrary to its natural end. 26

26

There are several points o f interest in this discussion o f self-murder. O n e is that the teleological considerations add nothing to the argument itself and that K a n t indicates this b y the cursory w a y in w h i c h he introduces them. Another is that the use o f our instinct for self-preser­ vation contrary to its natural end coincides exactly w i t h the carefully defined act o f self-murder. If w e sacrifice our life on the grounds that it is our duty, w e are not using our instinct for self-preservation c o n ­ trary to its natural end (although w e are acting contrary to this instinct), and .neither are w e committing self-murder. O n l y the use o f this instinct contrary to its natural end enibodies all the conditions that make the act a violation o f duty, and it is because o f this coincidence that the teleological principle can be used to point out an abasement o f personality. Kant's discussion o f self-murder is a m o d e l one w i t h Gr., 422.

26

KJ.py.i36.

/

PERFECT DUTIES TO ONESELF

I39

regard to the relation o f the principles involved. B u t the following discussion o f self-abuse presents complications. B.

SELF-ABUSE

2 7

If Kant made only a perfunctory use o f the teleological principle in his discussion o f self-murder, he allows it to dominate his discussion o f self-abuse, to the extent o f obscuring the rational p r o o f itself. T h e moral argument here, as in all the vices o f this class, turns up6n the abasement o f personahty i n v o l v e d in subordinating the rational ends o f our being to mere inclination. B u t Kant fails to explain the precise meaning o f the objective, moral end in question. T h e Padagogik, w e have seen, discusses the vice in terms o f the p r e ­ servation o f the individual's powers and so brings it clearly under the definition o f all these vices as total or partial suicide. B u t this point is not mentioned in the Tugendlehre's formal discussion o f the vice. Referring back to his classification o f the instincts in terms o f nature's purposes, Kant stresses instead the deviation o f the instinct from its natural end, and nature's purpose in the sexual instinct is not the pre­ servation o f the agent but rather o f the species. Hence the rational proof here m a y be s o m e w h a t different f r o m that used in self-murder and intemperance, w h e r e K a n t is dealing w i t h the preservation o f the agent and his powers. Kant's emphasis o n natural teleology here makes his argument, implicitly, that o f the Vorlesung: that the preservation o f the species, the production o f moral agents, is one o f the 'ends o f humanity', one o f the objects o f man's rational w i l l . Accordingly, in using the sexual instinct for mere pleasure w h i l e preventing nature's purpose from being realized, one is subordinating the rational ends o f one's animal being to the ends o f mere mclination. , 2 8

Granting that K a n t can p r o v e the immorahty o f self-abuse indepen­ dently o f the teleological principle, o n the basis o f its opposition to man's system o f rational ends, it m a y seem strange that he should put such emphasis o n teleological considerations here w h e n he mentioned them only in passing w i t h regard to self-murder. T h e answer seems t o 2 7

Kant's title, ' O n Carnal S e l f - D e f i l e m e n t ' , a l o n g w i t h certain remarks i n b o t h the formal discussion a n d casuistical questions, m a y i n d i c a t e that h e intends these principles t o c o v e r unnatural v i c e in general, as a transgression o f d u t y t o oneself. Vorlesung, 212-4. K a n t also m e n t i o n s , i n Padagogik, 497, that the practice ofthis v i c e results i n a state o f m i n d inconsistent w i t h m o r a l i t y . H e is p r o b a b l y referring t o the loss o f respect for one's o w n person m e n t i o n e d i n the Tugend­ lehre. T o stress this p o i n t , h o w e v e r , w o u l d b e to treat the v i c e m o r e as a v i o l a t i o n o f d u t y t o o n e s e l f ' m e r e l y as a m o r a l being'. ' 2 8

P

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be that only the vice o f self-abuse provides Kant w i t h the opportunity to connect his moral argument clearly w i t h natural teleology and so to utilize the credentials to be gained b y such a connection. Apart from the preliminary classification o f the instincts in terms o f nature's pur­ poses, the connection between natural teleology and the vices o f selfmurder and intemperance can be made only b y a tour de force. In the case o f self-abuse, h o w e v e r , natural teleology is m o r e closely c o n ­ nected w i t h the moral proof, and this because o f our moral intuition o f the action. 'That such an unnatural use (and so misuse) o f one's sexual p o w e r is a violation o f duty to o n e s e l f . . . ,' K a n t asserts, 'occurs to everyone immediately, along w i t h the thought o f i t . . . ' A s soon as w e see w h a t the action involves, w e have an immediate insight into its moral character, w h i c h precedes our reasoning about duty. In fact, our i m ­ mediate recognition o f the action's i m m o r a h t y is based, not on the belief that it is unnatural, but on our obscure consciousness o f our d i g ­ nity as subjects o f morally legislative r e a s o n . B u t t o call the vice 'unnatural' is to arouse this feeling for our o w n humanity. In the order o f nature enjoyment accompanies the exercise o f the animal instincts, but this pleasure is not itself'nature's purpose'. T o carry out the per­ sonification o f nature i n v o l v e d in the teleological v i e w o f organisms, w e might conceive o f nature as adding this enjoyment as a means to assure that its end, the preservation o f the animal, w i l l be realized. In the unnatural use o f an instinct w e disregard the welfare o f our animal nature and take as our end merely the pleasure that accompanies the exercise o f the instinct. W e use w h a t is distinctively h u m a n in our actions (practical reason) in order to deny, practically speaking, our distinctively h u m a n end and so, in a sense, degrade ourselves b e l o w the level o f the brute animals. W h a t produces our m o r a l intuition o f an unnatural action is, then, our recognition o f the discrepancy between our dignity as subjects o f legislative reason and the use o f ourselves as mere means for gratifying the animal appetites. 2 9

30

N o w this discrepancy is present in self-murder and intemperance, as well as in self-abuse: it is w h a t constitutes the abasement o f person­ ality involved in ail o f them. Y e t o u r j s e r c e p t i o n o f the 'unnatural' character o f suicide produces n o such moral intuition; o n the contrary, Kant reminds us, the Stoics considered suicide the prerogative o f the Sage. T h e reason for this failure o f insight, he suggests, is that the attitude o f will required for suicide is quite different from that present 29

M.d.S., 425.

3 0

Ibid., 216.

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in self-abuse, w h i c h , as a mere 'feeble surrender' to the animal impulses, robs the agent o f all respect for his o w n person. T h o u g h our end in arbitrary suicide is an end o f inclination, the means for attaining this end requires courage, an attitude w h i c h is analogous, in some respects, to a moral attitude o f will and w h i c h is therefore compadble w i t h re­ spect for our o w n p e r s o n . In the discussion o f suicide, accordingly, Kant relegates the teleological v i e w o f the action t o the background. In the case o f intemperance, toQ, there are obstacles t o this v i e w : the teleological principle does not cover all the actions that Kant wants to include under intemperance; moreover, the irrationality o f the actions 'leaps to the e y e ' quite apart from their relation t o 'nature'. H a v i n g chosen natural teleology as the general m e d i u m for expounding the vices o f this category, K a n t does connect the moral arguments for suicide and intemperance w i t h 'nature's purposes', but in the most casual w a y . O n l y in the question o f self-abuse does he find a real opportunity for clairrung the advantages to be gained b y an appeal t o nature and its purposes. „ 31

T h e casuistical questions that f o l l o w Kant's formal discussion o f self-abuse are o f interest for t w o reasons: first, his suggestion that the rational end involved in the sexual iiLstinct is not limited to procreation, and second, his remarks o n the imperfect duty o f practising the virtues opposed t o vices w h i c h are violations o f perfect duty to oneself. Since Kant gives us only the problems and n o t the answers to them, there is undoubtedly some danger i n v o l v e d in d r a w i n g conclusions regarding his o w n position. Y e t certain general principles seem to be implicit in his discussion. Certain aspects o f the relation between the sexes have been treated in the Rechtslehre. Here K a n t is concerned only w i t h duty to oneself, so that the questions n o w raised apply even to relations within marriage. In brief, he suggests that, w h i l e the actual frustration o f 'nature's p u r ­ pose' is vice, the use o f the sexual p o w e r merely ' w i t h o u t regard for' that purpose—that is, at times w h e n the wife cannot conceive—is open to casuistical treatment. Is such action, like the unnatural use o f the p o w e r , a transgression o f duty? O r is there, in this case, 'a permissive l a w o f morally practical reason w h i c h , in the clash o f its determiriing grounds, makes permissible something that is in itself n o t allowed (as i f indulgently), in order to prevent a greater violation o f d u t y ? ' ^ 52

3

31

M.d.S., 425.

3 2

Cf. M.d.S., 276 ff. This is the discussion t o w h i c h K a n t is referring i n ibid., 424.

33

M.d.S., 426.

•

•: •

: ,,

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Although Kant's manner o f posing the question is not altogether free from confusion, he seems to suggest mat the action is not a violation o f perfect duty to oneself and that the exception w h i c h morally practical reason might permit in this case is an exception t o the imperfect d u t y o f practising the virtue opposed t o the v i c e o f impurity. N , o w the practice o f a virtue requires n o t merely that one refrain from vice but also that, as a general rule, one restrict the mclinations w i t h i n such limits that they w i l l not occasion the danger o f v i c e . B u t these limits are difficult to determine. A c c o r d i n g l y , K a n t n o w asks at w h a t point the hmitation o f the latitude present in w i d e duty becomes moral' purism or pedantry, and w h e n a certain free play should be permitted the inclinations, even considering the risk o f vice i n v o l v e d in it. I f s o m e good end is to be achieved b y the free play o f the inclinations, then it may be permissible to relax the restrictions that virtue generally i m ­ poses on them, even i f there is s o m e danger that the inclination, gather­ ing strength from its exercise, m i g h t tempt one to vice. A n d in the case at hand Kant seems to suggest that there are g o o d ends to be achieved: in the first place, the freedom permitted m a y prevent 'a greater v i o ­ lation o f duty' (although i f the freedom is really permitted, h o w can it be a transgression o f duty at all?); in the second place, he argues that while the sexual instinct in itself has nothing in c o m m o n w i t h 'moral love', w h i c h is an attitude o f w i l l , 'it can enter into close union w i t h moral love under the limiting conditions o f practical r e a s o n . ' A l ­ though these casuistical questions are problems for the individual's judgment, K a n t does seem to provide certain general principles for the guidance o f j u d g m e n t in applying the l a w . 3 4

35

C. I N T E M P E R A N C E

3 6

T h e keynote o f this discussion is set in Kant's definition o f intemper­ ance—a definition w h i c h is o n l y a m o r e specific f o r m o f that o f 'partial self-murder'. W e ought not, he explains, to consider drunkenness and gluttony in terms o f the painful effects or diseases they m a y produce, that is to say, in terms o f their relation t o our happiness; for such c o n ­ siderations w o u l d p r o v e only that t h e y a r e contrary to prudential rules. In defining these vices w e must rather indicate i n w h a t the transgression o f duty consists. Thus w e define intemperance in f o o d and drink as a misuse o f these b y w h i c h w e impair our ability to use our p o w e r s 8 4

3 5

Cf. above, p . 109 ff. M.d.S„ 426. Again, Kant's title is 'On Self-Stupefaction by Immoderation in the Use of Food and Drink'I The title indicates where the vice lies, i.e. in 'self-stupefaction'. 3 6

(

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37

pylrposively. T h r o u g h intemperance w e hinder first, our use o f reason itself and secondly, our capacity for carrying out actions in accordance w i t h reason. B y drunkenness, Kant explains, w e renounce for a time the use o f our rational powers and so reduce ourselves to the level o f animals. B y gluttony w e render ourselves incapable o f actions w h i c h w o u l d require adroitness and deliberation. W h a t makes in­ temperance a violation o f duty; to oneself is the fact that it involves impairing the rational use o f one's powers for an arbitrary end. That a transgression o f duty is i n v o l v e d in deliberately placing oneself in such a state, again, 'leaps to the e y e ' . A l t h o u g h Kant's argument stops at this point, it is obviously to be completed b y the assertion that such a use o f one's o w n person is an abasement o f one's personahty. A l t h o u g h the connection o f intemperance w i t h the teleological principle has been made in Kant's prehminary classification o f duties, the rational argument in this case is so clear that no reference to the un­ natural character o f the action is made in t h e formal discussion o f the vice. M o r e o v e r , the teleological principle does not serve to illustrate all the actions that K a n t wishes to consider under the vice o f intem­ perance. E v e n i f w e agree that gluttony comes under the notion o f using an instinct contrary to its natural end, it is difficult to believe that excess in the use o f alcoholic beverages is a perversion o f our instinct for nourishment. A n d in the discussion itself, as w e l l as in the casuistical questions, K a n t mentions actions w h i c h are related to intemperance in so far as they liinder our capacity for rational action, but w h i c h could hardly be regarded as perversions o f a natural instinct—for example, the use o f o p i u m and other drugs. T h e only principle invoked in the argument itself is the definition o f all these actions as arbitrary self-destruction, the impairment o f our rational p o w e r s merely for the sake o f pleasure. In w h a t w o u l d strictly be called intemperance w e can reasonably assume that the agent's end is mere enjoyment. In actions w h e r e this assumption cannot be made, Kant specifies that the vice consists in the action-toward-an-end considered as a w h o l e . H e notes, for example, t h a t t h e use o f narcotics for the sake o f the false sense o f , well-being they produce is w r o n g , whereas their medicinal use,, a l ­ though it too hinders our capacity for rational action, is permissible. 38

W e have noticed before Kant's v i e w that the vices o f this category are a renunciation, for the sake o f animal satisfaction, ofiwhat is dis­ tinctively h u m a n in our actions; and i f it is practical reason that dis­ tinguishes h u m a n action from animal behaviour, intemperance is per37

, M . d . S . , 420 and 427.

3 8

Ibid., 428.

^

*

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haps the clearest example o f reversing the hierarchy a m o n g the elements in our being. K a n t carries This argument so far as to assert that, o f the t w o forms o f intemperance, gluttony is the more degrading because it has to do only w i t h the passive p o w e r o f sense, whereas excess in drink at least stimulates the active p o w e r o f i m a g i n a t i o n . This remark is undoubtedly connected w i t h Kant's v i e w that the use o f w i n e has a moral end, b e y o n d mere physical enjoyment, since it stimulates the free exchange o f ideas and so promotes the virtues o f social inter­ course. B u t the contrast noted b e t w e e n sense and imagination ii also a contrast between the purely animal p o w e r s and the distinctively human powers. In so far as imagination is an active p o w e r it is closely associated w i t h the understanding, and excess in drink is the less degrad­ ing o f the t w o vices because, w h i l e it hinders full rational use o f the powers, it at least stimulates a p o w e r that is distinctively human rather than purely animal. 39

40

W i t h the discussion o f intemperance K a n t concludes his analysis o f perfect duties to oneself as a moral being w i t h an animal nature. I have suggested that Kant's criterion for deriving these duties is the notion that certain actions arbitrarily destroy or impair our natural p o w e r s and so our capacity for moral action. T h i s principle, along w i t h the prohibition against abasing our personality, w h i c h indicates the i m m e ­ diate ground o f perfect duties t o oneself, forms the moral p r o o f . Having established that certain actions are immoral, K a n t then turns to the notion o f a teleological nature in order to gain admittance for his conclusions t o the rninds o f his readers. Despite occasional lapses, the proper role o f nature's purposes is o n l y that o f bringing the moral laws in question 'closer to intuition'. T h e connection between the moral argument and the teleological principle m i g h t be left at this. B u t o n the other hand it seems likely that in appealing to nature's purposes K a n t is referring us back to his 'universal l a w o f nature' formulation o f the categorical imperative, or attempting to s h o w us that maxims o f action which are violations o f duty cannot be conceived as universal (teleo­ logical) laws o f nature. 41

39

4 1

MAS., 427.

4 0

Ibid., 428; cf. also Vorlesung, 200.

In Vorlesung, 151-4, Kant argues that i f o u r f r e e d o m o r n o n - d e t e r m i n a t i o n b y immediate .sensuous impulse is used .in such a w a y as t o b e inconsistent w i t h t h e greatest use o f f r e e d o m , w e are i n conflict w i t h 'the essential ends o f h u m a n i t y ' and so w i t h ourselves. T h i s passage s h o u l d b e read i n its entirety, since it is a m o r e abstract and general statement o f t h e principles implicit i n Kant's derivation o f duties to ourselves.

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/If this is the case, the role w h i c h natural teleology plays in the Tugendlehre is already foreshadowed in the Grundlegung. In his c o m ­ mentary o n the latter w o r k Professor Paton has s h o w n that the 'universal law o f nature' formula, particularly in questions o f duty to oneself, takes ' l a w o f nature' to be teleological l a w . In order to deterrnine whether our m a x i m can be conceived and willed as universal law, K a n t tells us, w e should ask whether w e can conceive and w i l l it as a l a w o f n a t u r e . For example, in order t o determine w h e t h e r a m a x i m o f ar­ bitrary suicide is objectively valid w e should ask w h e t h e r i t could b e a universal l a w o f nature that the instinct for self-preservation should function to the end o f destroying, rather than maintaining, life. W e cannot, he argues, conceive a system o f nature i n w h i c h end-directed powers w o u l d produce the contrary o f their natural ends; and w e can­ not, therefore, conceive such a m a x i m as a universal l a w o f nature. In the Tugendlehre Kant appears to extend'this procedure to all o u r animal instincts and natural powers. T h e possibility o f doing so m a y , in fact, have given him further reason for inaking the animal instincts the basis o f division in our duties regarding o u r animal nature. 4 2

43

T h e conclusions o f Professor R e i c h ' s study o n ' K a n t and G r e e k Ethics', especially w i t h regard to the status o f the ' l a w o f nature' for­ mula and its relation to the supreme moral principle, seem to confirm indirectly the v i e w that Kant's appeal to 'nature's purposes' is an i m ­ plicit use o f the l a w o f nature f o r m u l a . This study suggests that it w a s the popular Stoic formula convenienter naturae vivere w h i c h gave K a n t his clue that the notion o f a l a w o f nature could b e used to represent the moral l a w . W h i l e K a n t maintains that w e must n o t derive the supreme moral principle f r o m the constitution o f h u m a n nature, so that the conformity o f actions w i t h the l a w o f nature is n o t the p r i n - ' ciple o f morality itself, he can, b y interpreting 'nature' as an ideal o r w h a t w e can rationally w i l l t o be, take advantage 6f the effects w h i c h the notion o f a l a w o f nature will have. N o w if, in o u r use o f the animal instincts, w h a t w e can rationally will t o b e coincides w i t h the actually existing tendencies o f nature, the effect o f representing moral laws as teleological laws o f nature will be even greater. W h a t w e can rationally w i l l to be must b e determined independently, without refer­ ence to 'nature's purposes'. B u t i f w e then find.that the supposed teleo44

42

Cf. The Categorical Imperative, p . 146 ff.

4 3

O n the v a l u e o f using the l a w o f nature formula, cf. K.d.p.V., 69-70. * C f . Klaus R e i c h : 'Kant a n d Greek Ethics', Mind X L V I I I (1939), pp. 338-54 and 446-63. 4

11

>

I46

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l o g y o f nature is w o r k i n g t o w a r d moral ends, w e can refer t o the propensities and constitution o f h u m a n nature as concrete repre­ sentations o f moral law. The formula o f the l a w o f nature, so interpreted, is subject to Hmitations. As w e have seen, the moral principles m a y establish that actions which do not i n v o l v e the use o f an instinct contrary to its natural end are vices in relation to our animal nature. In the case o f these actipns it could still be argued, o f course, that w e cannot conceive the m a x i m as a law o f nature; but the argument w o u l d not have the full effect it has in the other cases. T h e m o r e serious hmitation o n the formula, h o w r ever, is revealed in Kant's discussion o f l y i n g , w h e r e the use o f our power o f speech contrary to its natural end is not necessarily the use o f it for our merely subjective ends. W e m a y n o t be able to conceive it as a teleological l a w o f nature that our p o w e r o f speech should be directed a w a y from its natural purposiveness, the communication o f bur thoughts, and yet w e m a y hesitate t o accept Kant's v i e w that e v e r y intentional untruth is a*violation o f duty. O n c e w e enter into duties to ourselves merely as moral beings, w h e r e v i c e consists not in the use o f specific powers or instincts contrary to the ends o f our natural being but rather in the adoption o f principles contrary to the end o f our moral being,, the l a w o f nature formula is less effective. Perhaps it is because o f these limitations that Kant's use o f the formula is not an explicit, thorough-going and methodical one. Y e t in spite o f them, he apparendy thinks its value is sufficient to justify its use w h e r e v e r possible. Before g o i n g o n to the next class o f duties, h o w e v e r , w e should take this occasion t o note the injustice w i t h w h i c h some o f Kant's critics attribute to h i m the v i e w that in determining our duties w e must ignore the consequences o f our actions. T h e point o f this criticism— that w e cannot j u d g e the m o r a l character o f an action in abstraction from its results—is w e l l made. B u t Kant's actual derivation o f duties makes it quite clear that nothing is further f r o m his mind. A l t h o u g h w e have not followed his derivation o f imperfect duties, it seems clear that this criticism cannot refer t o duties^vhich consist in h a v i n g m a x i m s o f promoting certain ends o r s t n v i n g t o effect certain results. T h e criticism must have to d o w i t h Kant's position regarding perfect duty, and it seems to arise f r o m his v i e w that the principle o f d u t y is a formal one. Kant's radical opposition t o ethical hedonism in any form and his stress on the a^riori source o f the moral l a w lead liim to insist repeatedly

/

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/that w e cannot regard an action as moral or i m m o r a l merely o n the grounds that w e like or dislike the results o f the action, nor even o n the grounds that the action w i l l contribute to\our happiness or be pre­ judicial to it. It is, rather, the form o f the maxim—its consistency o r inconsistency w i t h universal law—that determines its morality. B u t in order to decide w h a t f o r m our m a x i m has, w e must take into c o n ­ sideration the immediate results o f the action. In the case o f juridical duties, w e determine the legality o f actions b y reference to their effects o n outer freedom; i f an action has as its consequence interference w i t h another's pursuit o f his ends, the action is contrary to the principle o f L a w . B u t it is in perfect duties to ourselves regarding our animal nature that the relevance o f consequences is most striking. W h a t makes certain actions vices o f this type is precisely the fact that these actions have the consequence o f destroying our powers or hmdering us in the use o f them. C o u l d w e ask for a clearer refutation o f the charge b r o u g h t against K a n t than his definition o f these vices as 'total or partial selfmurder' ? It is arbitrary to d r a w a line between an action itself and its i m m e ­ diate consequences—between the action o f m u r d e r or theft and its effect o f depriving the v i c t i m o f his life or property, between the action o f suicide or intemperance and the total o r partial destruction o f our capacities for rational and moral action. A n d Kant has n e v e r suggested that w e can j u d g e the form o f an action in abstraction f r o m these consequences. H e insists that i f the action is, b y its form, a v i o ­ lation o f outer freedom or an abasement o f o u r personahty , then the m o r e remote consequences o f the action d o n o t justify us i n seeking them b y means o f the action. B u t in j u d g i n g the f o r m o f the m a x i m o f action w e cannot abstract from such consequences as are, in fact, a part o f the action itself. 4

CHAPTER X

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ONESELF BEING

All transgressions o f perfect duty to oneself consist o f maxims contrary, to the ends o f our nature; the principle 'live according to nature, do not act contrary to the ends o f y o u r nature' is the principle o f all perfect duties to oneself. T h e vices discussed in the preceding chapter were, w e found, actions contrary in the first place to the objective ends of our animal nature and so contrary to the ends o f human nature as. a whole. T h e special principle o f perfect duties to oneself merely as a moral being is the prohibition against acting contrary to the end o f our nature as moral beings, and Kant explains in w h a t this end c o n ­ sists. Such violations o f duty, he tells us, are directed against 'man's character as a moral being (according to its v e r y form)—that is, c o n ­ trary to inner freedom, the inherent dignity o f man'. Inner freedom is an attitude in w h i c h choice is free f r o m the influence o f the mclinations and open to that o f pure practical reason; and w h a t makes lying, avar­ ice, and servility vices is that the m a x i m o f each is a principle o f subordmating our p o w e r o f choice t o the ends o f mclination. T h e prin­ ciple o f this class o f duties is, accordingly, a 'prohibition against r o b b i n g oneself o f a moral being's prerogative—that o f acting according t o ' principles (i.e. inner freedom)—and so m a k i n g oneself a plaything o f mere mclination and hence a t h i n g ' . 1

A l l violations o f perfect duty to oneself are, admittedly, contrary to inner freedom. W h a t Kant wishes to point out b y defining the vices n o w in question in terms o f their direct opposition to inner freedom is that these vices consist not so m u c h in isolated actions as in the re­ flective adoption o f certain maxims. It is b y actions that w e destroy our animal nature, but it is b y attitudes o f w i l l that w e negate our moral being. In performing any action w e act u p o n a m a x i m ; but there can be, so to^speak, different levels o f m a x i m s or principles. There is a basic difference between the moral attitude o f a m a n w h o has adopted a virtuous principle but, under the influence o f some strong sensuous impulse, performs an action that deviates f r o m this principle, and that o f the man w h o has deliberately adopted a vice into his character. In the first case, assuming that the action is really a human action, the agent acts upon a m a x i m ; but w h e n the impulse subsides he rejects M.d.S., 420. 1

148

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tfhat m a x i m . Such actions Kant attributes to the 'frailty o f human hature', w h i c h means that w e are often hindered b y oUr mclinations 'when it comes to putting our virtuous resolutions into practice. B u t avarice, servility, and the kind o f decdtfufntss w i t h w h i c h Kant is particularly concerned are not isolated actions to w h i c h one is swept b y a sudden impulse. T h e y consist, rather, in reflectively adopted principles or (to use Professor Paton's term) 'policies o f action'. T h e y are directly opposed to inner freedom because in t h e m w e adopt a basic attitude o f disregard for our end as moral beings. In self-deceit w e refuse to regard ourselves as subject to an unconditioned imperative as such; in avarice w e subject our state o f mind to riches; in servility w e g i v e up our dignity as persons in order to obtain favour w i t h others. These vices are, practically speaking, a false valuation o f ourselves—the contrary virtue is iustum sui aestimium—because in them w e rnake\it our principle to g i v e o v e r the determination o f our choice to the mclinations. 2

3

T o consider the matter from a slightly different viewpoint, w e m i g h t ask whether a so-called impulsive.action, together w i t h its m o m e n t ­ arily adopted m a x i m , is a vice. In one sense, i f the action is a violation o f perfect duty it must be called a vice. T h e scheme w h i c h Kant p r o ­ poses is: let virtue equal 'a', absence o f virtue or moral weakness equal '0', and vice equal ' — a ' ; and any violation o f perfect duty is v i c e . B u t he also refers to a 'true vice' or 'qualified vice', describing this as a vice in the sense o f a basic principle. In the case o f a permanent p r o ­ pensity as distinguished f r o m a sudden and transient impulse, he tells us, w e have the opportunity to reflect upon the propensity, 'to Brood o n it, to get it rooted deeply, and so to take up the evil, as premeditated, into our m a x i m ; and it is then a qualified evil, i.e. a true v i c e ' . N o w the fact that an exercise o f the animal instincts tends to be accompanied or preceded b y sensuous impulse implies that such actions are likely t o occur under conditions in w h i c h they w o u l d n o t be 'true vices'. S u c h transgressions o f duty m i g h t , o f course, b e c o m e policies o f action; b u t the deliberate, reflective adoption o f a principle o f vice is not included in their concept. T h e frailty o f human nature, as K a n t points out, is quite compatible w i t h a. g o o d will. O n the other hand, violations o f 4

5

2

Cf. b e l o w , p. 157 and 172-6.

5

Ibid.,

.

3

M.d.S., 420.

4

Bid., 384.

408. In this passage Kant is distinguishing b e t w e e n Affekten and Leidenschaften, according t o the principles m e n t i o n e d a b o v e , p . 73. A l t h o u g h I d o n o t m e a n t o i m p l y that p r o p e n s i t i e s , t o self-deceit, avarice a n d servility are Leidenslhaften, t h e y s e e m t o share the reflective, premeditated character o f the vices w h i c h can be built o n these.

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perfect duty to oneself merely as a moral being arc, b y definition, settled and habitual attitudes o f disregard for our capacity for moral choice, based o n permanent propensities to self-deceit, hypocrisy, and avarice. A s such, they are directly Contrary to our end as moral beings because inner freedom, and hence virtue, cannot co-exist w i t h any one o f them. In the vices n o w under discussion, accordingly, it is the attitude from which our actions proceed, rather than the actions themselves, that constitutes vice. Since Kant treats avarice and servility in just this w a y , his discussions o f these vices are relatively simple and straightforward. In the case o f lying, h o w e v e r , the rigour o f his attitude on this subject leads him to depart from the definition o f vice in relation to our m o r a l end which he has just laid d o w n and to regard every deliberate untruth as a violation o f duty. His discussion o f l y i n g is, accordingly, in some respects the weak point in his derivation o f duties. A.

LYING

A t a casual reading, Kant's discussion o f l y i n g is, perhaps, one o f the most perlexing chapters in the Tugendlehre. O n the one hand K a n t makes it quite clear that he considers truthfulness a duty o f singular importance. L y i n g , he maintains, is the greatest violation o f man's duty to humanity in his o w n person; b y a he m a n 'throws a w a y and, as it were, annihilates his dignity as a m a n ' . O n the other hand w e search this chapter in vain for any real p r o o f that lying, as K a n t explicitly defines the term, is a violation o f d u t y to oneself. In defining the vice o f l y i n g as a violation o f duty to ourselves rather than to others, K a n t reminds us, w e must n o t take into consideration the harm that a He might d o to other m e n . If w e treat l y i n g as a violation o f duty t o others, then certain lies violate the rights o f others and b e l o n g to Rechtslehre, while other lies, w h i c h m a y h a r m others but w h i c h can­ not be brought under strict right, violate our duty o f benevolence to others. B u t i f w e treat l y i n g as a violation o f duty to ourselves, then every intentional untruth, and n o t merely those that are harmful t o others, must be considered a lie, that is, a violation o f duty. A he (in 6

7

6 7

MAS., 429. Cf. MAS., 238 and note, and 403. In4flVcssay On an Alleged Right to Lie from

Benevolence, K a n t treats l y i n g as a v i o l a t i o n o f d u t y t o others. H e r e h e argues that any intentional untruth, e v e n t h o u g h it h a r m s n o particular person, is a v i o l a t i o n o f 'the right o f h u m a n i t y ' and so a v i o l a t i o n o f d u t y t o others because it u n d e r m i n e s the basis o f contracts and civil s o c i e t y is f o u n d o n a contract. N e e d l e s s t o say, h e is here using 'right' in a sense w i d e r t h a n t h e juridical m e a n i n g .

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151

/the ethical rather than the legal sense) is any deliberate untruth, whether it be told maliciously Or in jest or even in order to achieve a 'really g o o d end', such as the welfare o f others. T o prove the i m m o r a l i t y o f any intentional untruth, even one told unselfishly to save the life o f an innocent person, seems a formidable task, and w e should expect an argument in proportion to it. B u t K a n t seems to regard any such p r o o f as almost superfluous. 'It is clear o f itself, he remarks, that in ethics every intentional untruth must be considered a violation o f duty, since 'dishonour . . . accompanies the liar like his s h a d o w ' . A s the discussion progresses, h o w e v e r , he does add t w o remarks—one d r a w n from the notion o f perfect duty as such, the other from natural t e l e o l o g y — w h i c h m a y be intended as proofs. In each case, though, there are serious objections to the argument implied. 8

9

H a v i n g asserted that it is morally impossible to he in any c i r c u m ­ stances, K a n t explains that a he, even as a'means to a really g o o d end, is ' b y its mere form a w r o n g to one's o w n p e r s o n ' . This statement he apparently considers a particular appHcation o f the principle under­ l y i n g perfect duty as such: namely, that the m a x i m o f an 'action, as a means to an end', comes under the limiting condition o f the formal principle o f action—so act that y o u r m a x i m could b e c o m e a universal l a w . It w i l l be noted, h o w e v e r , that in applying this principle t o lying, K a n t wishes, apparently, to consider the m a x i m o f lying i n a b ­ straction from its purposiveness or to make the end for w h i c h w e are acting irrelevant in j u d g i n g the moraHty o f the action, and in this w a y to m a k e the prohibition against deHberate untruth an absolutely u n ­ conditioned one. B u t i f his criterion for deriving perfect duties to o n e ­ self is the consistency o f our ends w i t h the ends o f h u m a n nature as a w h o l e , this manner o f j u d g i n g the form o f the m a x i m leaves us, i n effect, w i t h n o criterion for determining the moraHty or irnmoraHty o f telling a deHberate untruth. In general terms, his procedure w i t h regard to l y i n g is not consistent w i t h his n o t i o n o f perfect d u t y as such, w h i c h excludes o n l y arbitrary exceptions t o moral laws for ' m e n considered merely as m e n ' . A n d m o r e specifically, his procedure here excludes the criterion so far used in deriving perfect duties to oneself, while providing n o special criterion for this duty. 10

1 1

In the course o f the discussion K a n t remarks, firrther, that the m a n w h o deliberately tells an untruth 'has a purpose directly opposed to the natural purposiveness o f the p o w e r o f c o m m u n i c a t i n g one's thoughts 8

9

«• M.d.S., 430. Ibid., 4 2 9 . ' Ibid., 389. Cf. above, p . 81 ff. 11

1 0

Ibid., 430.

1^2

LAWS

OF

FREEDOM 1 2

and therefore renounces his, personality . . . ' N o w i f this assertion is intended as a p r o o f that every intentional untruth is a violation o f duty, it too is open to objections. In the preceding chapter w e saw that 'nature's purposes' can be used as illustrations o f the moral principles regarding our use o f the animal instincts because nature's purpose, the preservation o f our animal nature, is a necessary object o f our rational will, in so far as w e have an animal nature. So too, it could be argued, a moral being that is sociable b y nature rationally wills to communicate its thoughts to others: that is to say, nature's purpose in our p o w e r o f speech is at the same time a moral end. B u t f r o m this it follows o n l y that w e ought not, as a general rule, to use our p o w e r o f speech inorder to deceive. Kant did not argue that it is never permissible t o act contrary to the preservation o f our animal nature, but only that w e m a y not frustrate this end merely for the sake o f pleasure. In the case o f the animal instincts it so happens that to use them contrary to nature's purpose is to use therh merely for the ends o f inclination, w i t h o u t regard for their moral end; and it is for this reason that the unnatural use o f the instincts is an abasement o f our personality. B u t the connection between natural teleology and the moral principles i n v o l v e d seems to be only a contingent one, w h i c h breaks d o w n in the case o f lying. For here the use o f our p o w e r o f speech contrary to nature's purpose is not necessarily the use o f it for the ends o f mere inclination—our end can be a 'really g o o d end'. Here the essential link b e t w e e n natural tele­ ology and a violation o f duty, i.e. the subjection o f a m o r a l end to mere enjoyment, is wanting, and Kant seems to be m a k i n g an unwarranted extension o f teleology beyond the sphere o f the moral principles w h i c h , as a rule, it illustrates. W e must conclude, I think, that K a n t fails to establish w h a t he set out to p r o v e : that every intentional untruth is an abasement o f our per­ sonality. His assertion that a deliberate untruth, b y its form, is a w r o n g to our o w n humanity is not c o n v i n c i n g ; for unless w e include in the definition o f a He the qualification that it is told for the sake o f our subjective ends—and this Kant refuses t o do—the m a x i m o f the action does not necessarily e m b o d y the ascendancy o f inclination o v e r pure practical reason. K a n t m a y .have recognized that this argument cannot support his condemnation o f e v e r y deliberate untruth and added the argument f r o m natural teleology to p r o v e this assertion. B u t his use o f the teleological principle, unsupported b y the moral principles w h i c h it hitherto illustrated, again produces n o satisfactory result. " M i l , 429. .

PERFECT

DUTIES TO ONESELF

IS"?

/ T h e difficulty in this discussion o f l y i n g is that K a n t intends it to c o v e r three things: the action o f lying, lying as a reflectively adopted 'principle or policy o f action, and the attitude o f self-deceit. In the question o f self-deceit Kant's argument is a powerful one, though it requires to be supplemented by material outside the present discussion. As for the habitual attitude o f falsehood to others, K a n t indicates that this is an extension o f self-deceit and can be disposed o f by the same a r g u m e n t . In any case, heiis on stronger ground here, since he is thinJcing o f lying as a policy o f submission to the mclinations and so as an attitude opposed to inner freedom. W h a t he fails to account for is the exceptional he told o n moral grounds, e.g. to save the life o f an innocent person. B u t i f w e cannot accept Kant's position on the latter point, w e can at least understand h o w he came to adopt it. If the habit' o f falsehood has its ground in self-deceit, and i f self-deceit, according to Kant, destroys the condition o f moral action as such, then it is not difficult to see h o w he m i g h t have been led to extend his condemnation o f l y i n g to every intentional untruth and, for once,, to fall into the rigorism generally attributed to h i m . 13

1 4

T h e question o f the 'inner He' is raised early in the discussion, w h e n Kant tells us that his remarks about lying in general are intended to cover both lying to others and, what is worse, l y i n g to ourselves. T o resolve the paradox inherent in the notion o f dehberately deceiving oneself, Kant again, as in the question o f obhgation t o oneself as such, invokes his distinction between the noumenal T and the phenomenal T , between man as a moral being and man as a natural being. A n inner He is, essentiaHy, -using our natural being to conceal from our moral being (in the role of our conscience) our true attitude o f w i l l . W h a t is at issue in Kant's discussion o f l y i n g is primarily our relations w i t h . our pure practical reason, considered first as legislator and then as j u d g e , and the tentative explanation here is to be completed b y his discussion o f 'the first c o m m a n d o f all duties to oneself', i.e. ' k n o w thyself', and o f our duty to ourselves as 'our o w n innate j u d g e ' . M o r e o v e r , K a n t 15

16

r

1 7

13

M.d.S., 430-1; of. also Religion, 381

1 4

' -

T h e same rigorism is apparent i n Kant's attitude t o w a r d l y i n g as a v i o l a t i o n o f d u t y to others, at least so far as the general p e r i o d o f t h e Metaphysik der Sitten is concerned. For s o m e w h a t ' d i f f e r e n t v i e w s o n the essay m e n t i o n e d a b o v e , i n n o t e 7, cf. H . J. P a t o n : ' A n A l l e g e d R i g h t to Lie: A P r o b l e m i n Kantian Ethics', Kantstudien X L V (1953-54), PP- 1907203, and J. E b b i n g h a u s : 'Kant's A b l e i t u n g des Ver'botes der L u g e a u s d e m R e c h t s der M e n s c h h e i t ' , Revuetlntemationalede Philosophie N o . 30 (1954), Fasc. 4. Kant's treatment o f , l y i n g i n Vorlesung, 283 ff., is n o t rigoristic.

,

15

M.d.S., 429.

i« Ibid., 430.

1 7

Ibid., 441 ff. and 438 ff.

LAWS

154

OF F R E E D O M

concludes his discussion o f l y i n g w i t h a note, c o u c h e d in biblical terms, which identifies man's propensity to self-deceit o r hypocrisy w i t h the radical evil in human nature. W h e n w e have examined these three aspects o f the question, w e shall find that Kant's condemnation o f selfdeceit as an anrhhilation o f one's dignity as a m a n and the greatest possible w r o n g to one's o w n humanity is n o t mere rhetoric but literal truth. 18

-

Passing over the difficulties inherent i n the notion o f a 'radical propensity to moral evil', let us take f r o m this concept only w h a t is directly relevant to our problem; A s a radical propensity, this tendency must be inherent in human nature itself; a n d as a propensity t o moral evil, it must have its origin in man's freedom rather than in his natural being. A propensity to moral evil is 'the subjective g r o u n d o f the possi­ bility of the deviation o f maxims f r o m the m o r a l l a w ' : and this ground o f all particular maxims contrary t o the moral l a w must itself be a maxim e m b o d y i n g our fundamental attitude o f choice toward the moral l a w . M o r e specifically, K a n t means that the propensity t o moral evil cannot be located in the natural appetites belonging to man's sensuous nature. W e r e a m a n t o act merely o n sensuous impulse, w i t h ­ out reference t o the moral l a w , his actions w o u l d b e merely animal and not human actions, and so neither g o o d n o r evil b u t simply amoral. O n the other hand, were it n o t for the fact that man's mclinations provide h i m w i t h the basis for motives i n his conduct, there w o u l d b e ' no possibility o f his acting contrary t o the l a w ; for i n that case it w o u l d have to be reason, alone and o f itself, that determined action, and it is unthinkable that pure practical reason should determine action c o n ­ trary t o the l a w . T h e ground o f m o r a l evil lies i n our imperfectly rational nature; b u t the mere fact that w e h a v e sensuous inclinations does not account for our choosing t o a l l o w motives based o n them, rather than a pure rational m o t i v e , t o determine o u r actions. M o r a l l y evil maxims are those i n w h i c h w e freely a l l o w o u r choice t o be deter­ mined b y motives o f sensuous origin, and the source o f moral evil, as the w o r k o f freedom, must b e a fundamental attitude—a 'supreme m a x i m ' — o f f o l l o w i n g our mclinations rather than the l a w . 1 9

2 0

1 9

Cf. Religion 21 n . and 23-24; cf. ak&~-m.d.S., 431. T h i s implies that t h e

propensity t o m o r a l evil is unintelligible; f o r ' e x c e p t f o r a m a x i m n o d e t e r m i n i n g ground o f free c h o i c e c a n o r s h o u l d b e a d d u c e d ' , a n d w e c a n n o t explain, o r assign a cause t o , man's a d o p t i o n o f a certain m a x i m rather than its contrary. C £ Religion, 35. A s K a n t remarks, w h e n w e are l o o k i n g f o r t h e g r o u n d o f moral evil t h e sensuous appetites c o m p r i s e t o o little a n d a satanic reason, m a k i n g opposition t o t h e l a w itself the m o t i v e , c o m p r i s e s t o o m u c h . 2 0

PERFECT

DUTIES

1U U N t S h L f

153

(Because the inclinations and pure practical reason are both essential elements in human nature, w e cannot ignore either o f these rival claimants to the determination o f choice w h e n w e take up a funda­ mental attitude o f will. Consciousness o f the m o p d l a w and recognition o f its bmding p o w e r b e l o n g to our moral being even as our inclina­ tions belong to our natural being, and w e must adopt both into our supreme m a x i m . B u t these t w o motives cannot exist o n the same level. T h e one has its source in freeqjom, the other in nature; and since they spring from independent sources in our being, there is n o necessary concordance between them. T h e y m a y c o m e into conflict w i t h each other, and their relation in our m a x i m must, accordingly, be one o f subordination. W e must choose between a resolution to satisfy our mclinations only in so far as the moral l a w permits and a determination to o b e y the l a w only in so far as our mclinations agree w i t h w h a t it commands. O u r free choice o f the latter alternative is the propensity to moral evil in us, w h i c h can thus be defined as a reversal o f the m o r a l order o f our motives in our supreme m a x i m . 2 1

N o w Kant mamtains that this propensity to moral 6vil is inner fal­ sity, deceiving ourselves about the meaning o f the moral l a w to the prejudice o f the l a w . W h a t he means is that in adopting any morally evil m a x i m w e do not simply recognize the m o r a l l a w for the cate­ gorical imperative that it is and then, in the face o f it, adopt a contrary m a x i m . O u r moral consciousness w o u l d prevent such a forthright denial o f the claims o f morality. W e can adopt a m a x i m contrary t o the l a w only because in our supreme m a x i m w e have sophistically reduced the moral l a w to the status o f an imperative conditioned'by self-love. O n l y b y ' t h r o w i n g dust in our o w n eyes', deceiving ourselves about the meaning o f the moral law, can w e silence the moral element in our being sufficiently to let ourselves follow our mclinations. In so far as w e are moral beings the propensity to moral evil must be, at the same time, self-deceit regarding the categorical nature o f the m o r a l law and the relation o f our maxims to the l a w . 2 2

2 3

W e r e it not for this 'cunning o f the human heart' implicit in a m o r a l l y evil attitude o f w i l l , our 'natural predisposition for the g o o d ' w o u l d soon assert itself and shake us out o f this attitude. In our possession! o f pure practical reason and our emotional receptivity t o the n o t i o n 24

2 1

Religion, 36. T h e m a x i m o f the m o r a l l y g o o d m a n , K a n t explains, is displtig u i s h e d ^ o m that o f t h e e v i l m a n , n o t b y its substance (for the rnaxim i n e a c h case includes b o t h the inclinations and the l a w ) , but rather b y its f o r m , b y w h i c h o f these t w o is m a d e the c o n d i t i o n o f t h e other. •> 22

Religion, 42 n.

2 3

Ibid., 38 and 30.

2 4

Urn/., 38.

156

LAWS

OF

FREEDOM

of duty w e have, Kant maintains, a 'seed o f goodness' w h i c h , w e r e it not hindered b y inner falsity, w o u l d develop. There are on the emotional side o f our nature certain capacities for being affected b y moral concepts, w h i c h are powerful m o t i v e forces in our moral de­ v e l o p m e n t . A m o n g these the most important are the capacity to feel reverence for the l a w and the capacity to be emotionally affected b y reason's judgments o n the moral w o r t h o f our actions, or conscience. But these feelings are aroused, respectively, b y our recognition o f an unconditioned l a w in all its strictness and b y the comparison o f our actions w i t h the requirements o f this l a w . S o l o n g as w e regard the moral law as a conditioned principle and j u d g e our actions b y this false standard, neither reverence for the l a w nor conscience can c o m e effectively into play. For the m o m e n t , K a n t focuses his attention on the relation o f conscience to self-deceit. 25

26

Since a conscience belongs essentially t o our moral being, K a n t argues, w e cannot avoid comparing our actions w i t h the requirements o f the moral law. B u t i f W e have reduced the l a w to a mere conditioned principle, w e can confuse and disrupt the w h o l e matter o f moral i m ­ putation. T h e moral l a w commands not only that w e perform right actions but also that w e do this out o f reverence for the law. T h r o u g h self-deceit w e make the agreement o f our inclinations w i t h the l a w the condition under w h i c h w e propose to o b e y it, and in so doing r e m o v e from the l a w all reference t o our motives. S o l o n g as our actions are legal, w e can then regard t h e m as g o o d and even meritorious, al2 5

In the Tugendlehre Kant lists four 'prehminary concepts o f the mind's aes­ thetic capacity for b e i n g affected b y t h e c o n c e p t o f d u t y , ' that is t o say, four p r e ­ conditions, o n the side o f feeling, o f o u r responsiveness t o the claims o f m o r a l i t y . T h e y are moral feeling, conscience, self-esteem and l o v e . Cf. M.d.S., 398-403. W e can have n o d u t y t o acquire these dispositions, K a n t argues, since it is o n l y b y means o f t h e m that w e can r e c o g n i z e d u t y i n general; h o w e v e r , w e h a v e a d u t y to'cultivate and strengthen t h e m . F r o m t h e fact that h e includes l o v e a m o n g t h e m , it w o u l d s e e m that K a n t is speaking i n v e r y concrete terms a b o u t h o w w e are actually m o v e d t o fulfil the claims o f d u t y , rather than analyzing w h a t is required o n the part o f an imperfectly rational b e i n g i n order t o r e c o g n i z e the claims o f morality. 2 6

For Kant, the f u n c t i o n o f c o n s c i e n c e j s j j o t t o m a k e objective j u d g m e n t s about the tightness o r w r o n g n e s s o f actions, b u t rather t o j u d g e the subject's attitude i n - p e r f o r m i n g m o r a l actions. It is c o n c e r n e d w i t h w h e t h e r w e h a v e sincerely tried t o discover and fulfil o u r d u t y a n d w h e t h e r w e are striving t o act from the m o t i v e o f duty. A l t h o u g h I e m p h a s i z e t h e latter p o i n t in this discussion, it is clear that the m a n w h o has r e d u c e d the m o r a l l a w t o a c o n d i t i o n e d principle can a c c o m m o d a t e the matter o f the l a w t o his inclinations and d e c e i v e h i m s e l f regarding the c o n t e n t o f his duty. Professor P a t o n has discussed the f u n c t i o n o f conscience in an unpublished paper, 'Kant a n d C o n s c i e n c e ' .

I

PERFECT

DUTIES

TO ONESELF

**

157

though w e do them only from motives o f sensuous origin. As Kant points out, w h e n our attitude is morally evil, even the legality o f o u r actions is contingent since our attitude coulct equally well, under different circumstances, result in w r o n g or illegal actions. B u t his point is that even t h o u g h no w r o n g action should ever be performed, our attitude o f will, and so the actions proceedhig from it, are morally evil, and that so l o n g as this attitude persists w e are incapable o f any morally g o o d m a x i m or action and so a fortiori incapable o f virtue, because our moral attitude has been 'corrupted at its root'. Kant speaks o f a 'revolution' in our attitude o f will w h e n w e m a k e the moral l a w rather than mclination the first condition in our supreme maxim. This does not mean that there w i l l be n o further lapses f r o m the law in our actions—'for b e t w e e n the m a x i m and the action there is a great g a p ' . It does mean, h o w e v e r , that w e have a ' g o o d heart' and are in a position to acquire v i r t u e . B u t so l o n g as w e remain in the unwarranted state o f self-approbation possible through inner falsehood, --at peace w i t h our conscience because w e have disrupted our moral judgment, no such moral revolution can occur. 27

A c c o r d i n g l y Kant formulates the first c o m m a n d o f all duties to o n e ­ self as: ' K n o w (scrutinize, fathom) yourself . . . in terms o f your' moral attitude in relation to y o u r duty; k n o w y o u r heart—whether it be g o o d or evil, whether the spring o f y o u r actions be pure or i m ­ pure'. _ S i n c e r i t y _ w i t h ^ 28

29

(

virtue as rather 'the_formal condition o f all v i r t u e s ' . Neither is the contrary vice o f self-deceit merely one vice among~others and o n the same level w i t h them, It is the formal ground o f e v e r y 'true vice', o f every reflectively grounded principle subjecting our attitude o f will to the inclinations. Hence self-knowledge o f this sort is the beginning o f all human w i s d o m ; for i f w i s d o m is the h a r m o n y ' o f a finite being's will w i t h his final end, it presupposes, so far as m a n is concerned, the" removal o f the inner obstacle to his moral development, namely a bad will. U n t i l w e admit that our motives, as w e l l as our actions,,must be brought into conformity w i t h the l a w and try t o j u d g e ourselves accordingly, n o progress in the moral life is possible, and our inherent capacity for the g o o d must remain dormant. Because o f the impossi­ bility o f being certain o f our o w n motives, this c o m m a n d enjoins o n l y an imperfect duty. B u t it is "at least w i t h i n our p o w e r not.deliberately to deceive ourselves, and this prohibition—a specific f o r m o f the p r o hibition against lying as such—prescribes a perfect duty. "Religion, 47 and 38. MJ.S., 441. H.N.(23), 400. 2 8

2 9

158

LAWS

OF

FREEDOM

In discussing the vice o f l y i n g , K a n t remarks o n the worthlessness o f a man ' w h o himself does not believe w h a t he tells another (even a merely ideal Person) T . l / This hint o n the relation b e t w e e n sincerity and the duty o f religion is developed somewhat later, in his discussion o f conscience. For Kant, morality leads t o religion in the sense that it requires us to regard all our duties as divine commands. This is not to say that w e have a duty to believe in the existence o f G o d , or that, w e have special duties to G o d . B u t w e have a duty t o ourselves to v i e w moral laws as i f they w e r e divine commands, in order t o strengthen the moral motive proceeding f r o m our o w n legislative reason; and this duty, apart f r o m its general connection w i t h our striving for the summum bonutn, has a particular connection w i t h the vice o f self-deceit. As a counterbalance to our tendency t o w a r d inner falsehood, K a n t maintains, w e have a duty to conceive o f G o d as the j u d g e o f all our moral actions. 3 0

3 1

32

Kant represents the process b y w h i c h w e accuse, defend, and j u d g e ourselves in conscience h y analogy w i t h a court o f l a w . T h e j u d g e within us is, o f course, our o w n pure practical reason w h i c h first gives the law and then, after j u d g m e n t has subsumed an action under the l a w , announces the verdict that w e deserve either to be punished or to g o free. But it is b o t h natural and morally necessary to represent the judge as distinct from ourselves, the accused. It is natural to d o so b e ­ cause our imperfectly rational nature makes the judgments, as w e l l as the commands, o f pure practical reason appear as i f imposed o n us from without; conscience, as K a n t points out, is not something that w e freely make, nor can w e either dictate or silence its j u d g m e n t s . Moreover, it is morally necessary to conceive o f our conscience as a person distinct from ourselves, since otherwise 'the prosecutor w o u l d lose every c a s e ' . G i v e n our tendency t o self-deceit, it is o n l y b y c o n ­ ceiving the j u d g e w i t h i n us as a 'scrutinizer o f hearts' distinct from ourselves that w e can achieve, in cases o f conscience, the strictness and impartiahty o f a court o f l a w . For as self-deceit makes the w h o l e matter o f moral imputation uncertain, the notion that w e are respons­ ible for our actions to a being w h o knojws our motives and j u d g e s us 33

80

M.d.S., 429.

3 2

.

3 1

Cf. M.d.S., 440-1, 443-4 and 486 ff.

O u r duty o f striving t o realize t h e h i g h e s t g o o d leads us t o postulate t h e existence o f a m o r a l author o f nature as t h e c o n d i t i o n o f o u r pursuit o f this object, since the realization o f t h e h i g h e s t g o o d is, s o far as w e can see, possible o n l y through H i s existence a n d w e d o n o t strive t o bring a b o u t s o m e t h i n g w h i c h seems impossible. Cf. K-.d.p.V., 131 ff. 33

M.d.S., 438.-

\

PERFECT

DUTIES

TO

ONESELF

159

according t o them compels us, on our o w n part, to scrutinize our attitude o f w i l l and value our actions b y the rigour o f the law. T h e thought o f all our duties as 'public duties', that is, as duties enjoined b y the w i l l o f a divine legislator, enables us to fulfil the duty o f sin­ cerity. 34

Self-deceit is, then, the greatest w r o n g to ourselves merely as moral beings and an 'annihilation' o f our dignity as m e n because it strikes directly at the essence o f our humanity, namely, our capacity to' deter­ mine choice in accordance w i t h a categorical imperative. In so far as Kant's discussion o f l y i n g is essentially concerned w i t h self-deceit, w e can n o w better understand the importance he attaches to the sub­ ject. A n d w h i l e it is logically unjustifiable for hirri t o include every intentional untruth under this heading, w e can at least understand w h y he should have adopted such an uncompromising attitude toward l y i n g in general. His statement that every deHberate untruth is a violation o f duty to oneself is, in fact, out o f place in -a discussion o f vices w h i c h consist in adopting a basic principle contrary to inner freedom. It is essentially a p o h c y o f falsehood—toward others and especially t o w a r d oneself—that is a vice o f this category.

B.

AVARICE

T h e fact that K a n t is considering avarice as a violation o f duty to our­ selves rather than to others defines the type o f avarice w i t h w h i c h he is concerned. I f avarice in general is the hoarding o f m o n e y out o f all proportion to our needs, it is the intention w e h a v e that determines whether avarice is directly a violation o f duty t o ourselves or to others. • If w e refuse to share w h a t w e have o v e r and a b o v e our true needs because w e intend to spend the m o n e y o n ourselves', our attitude m i g h t be called 'self-seeking avarice', and it is primarily a violation o f our duty o f benevolence to others. T h e avarice that is a direct violation o f d u t y to ourselves is 'miserly avarice', a m a x i m o f acquiring m o n e y w i t h the intention o f merely possessing it rather than using it t o satisfy our true needs. W e violate our duty to ourselves w h e n , for the sake o f riches, w e leave our o w n needs unsatisfied. 35

T h e i m m o r a h t y o f miserly avarice Hes in the fact that its m a x i m 'is directly contrary t o duty t o oneself in relation t o the end'. It is contrary, first, to the end o f our moral being because it is a slavish subjection o f oneself to riches' and so a denial o f inner freedom, 'a »* H.N.(23), 401.

3 5

M.d.S., 432-3.

100

LAWS

OF

FREEDOM

fraud that the agent perpetrates on h i m s e l f . In this respect it is opposed to liberality, 'to the principle o f independence from everything except the l a w ' . Moreover, it is a violatidn o f duty in relation to the end because what w e adopt as our ultimate end, namely riches, is not really an end at all but only a means to the enjoyments that m o n e y can b u y . Through avarice w e make an end o f w h a t , in itself, has the value only o f a means. O u r happiness, o n the other hand, including the enjoyment o f material comforts w h i c h is an element in it, has. the value o f an end, although a conditioned end. A n d one o f the w a y s in which inner freedom manifests itself is in the pursuit o f our o w n happiness, in so far as this is included a m o n g the ends o f moral reason. Again, the principle operative here is that o f the integration o f the ends of our nature as a w h o l e . 36

37

C.

SERVJLITY

W h a t makes self-deceit, avarice, and servility vices is the fact that their maxims are directly opposed to inner freedom. A l l these vices i m p l y , in a practical w a y , a false valuation o f ourselves or a disregard for what constitutes our true w o r t h , n a m e l y our capacity to determine actions through maxims not based o n desire for an object. B u t the vice o f servility o r false humihty is, so t o speak, an explicit rejection o f our worth as persons, and K a n t accordingly takes this occasion to dis­ cuss the immediate ground o f perfect duties to ourselves merely as moral beings. In terms familiar f r o m the Grundlegung he distinguishes between man as a part o f nature and m a n as a person or subject o f pure practical reason. A s a natural being or 'rational animal', m a n has only the relative value o f a means t o an end. Because m a n possesses practical reason, this value in terms o f his usefulness is greater than that o f the other animals and, b y the same token, one m a n is m o r e valuable than another. Considered as a person, h o w e v e r , m a n is to be valued as an end in himself and possesses an 'absolute inner w o r t h or dignity'. A s the subject o f legislative reason, m a n has a value w h i c h is not merely that o f a means t o the ends o f others or to his o w n ends. And, since all m e n are conscious o f their o w n absolute w o r t h , to dis­ claim one's o w n dignity in relation tt5l5tners is false or l y i n g h u m i l i t y . 38

3 6

M.d.S., 434. O h the d u t y o f ' l i b e r a l i t y ' as h e r e defined, cf. H.N.fo), 400. O n Kant's criticism o f the Aristotelian distinction b e t w e e n t h e v i r t u e o f ' g o o d m a n a g e m e n t ' and the o p p o s i n g v i c e s o f avarice and p r o d i g a l i t y i n terms o f the degree t o w h i c h the agent acts o n his m a x i m , cf. a b o v e , p . 109 ff. 3 7

38

M.d.S., 434-5; cf. Grundlegung, 434-6.

PERFECT DUTIES TO ONESELF

/

.

l6l +

(

Subservience to others, K a n t notes, is always falsehood; 'for every men is conscious o f his inahenable right o f e q u a l i t y ' . ' If, in order to curry favour w i t h others, w e disclaim our right to the respect that others o w e us as men, w e are rrlaking ourselves a mere means to their self-esteem, and this because w e falsely value our o w n person as a mere means to our subjective ends. A l t h o u g h it is essentially an attitude o f w i l l that is in question, Kant mentions some specific actions that he considers manifestations o f a servile attitude. W e ought not, he asserts, to flatter others, to allow t h e m to tread o n our rights unpunished, to incur debts unless w e can g i v e full security for them, to m a k e ourselves dependent o n others' benevolence, to kneel d o w n or prostrate ourselves, not even before h o l y objects. A l l such actions, he mamtains, are contrary to the dignity o f humanity in our ' o w n person. A n d , w h i l e he includes courtesy a m o n g the virtues o f social intercourse, he questions the excessive concern w i t h formalities o f manner and address in his time; although these are trifles, he notes, they can lead to m o r e serious t h i n g s . W h i l e Kant's critics sometimes seize o n such questions as evidence ^of an excessive concern w i t h tri­ vialities—the ' m i c r o l o g y ' that Kant warns us against—they w o u f c L seem to be, rather, evidence o f his personal spirit o f independence and o f his strong feeling for the dignity o f the human being. 'Humility in c o m p a r i n g ourselves w i t h other m e n (and indeed w i t h any finite being, even a seraph)', Kant mamtains, 'is n o d u t y . ' T h e only humility to w h i c h w e are obligated is the humility w h i c h follows inevitably w h e n w e c o m p a r e ourselves frankly and sincerely w i t h the holiness and strictness o f the moral l a w . B u t this genuine humility is, at the same time, the,-highest valuation o f ourselves; for in recognizing our deficiencies in relation to the law, w e realize that it is w e ourselves' w h o g i v e the l a w , and the natural m a n in us feels compelled to rever­ ence humanity in his o w n p e r s o n . A spurious or false hurnility is 39

<

40

41

42

3 9 4 0

H.N.(23), 403. M.d.S., 436. •

4 1

Ibid., 435. T h i s , h o w e v e r , is t e m p e r e d b y the w a r n i n g that arrbgance i&a violation o f d u t y t o others. O n the p o s i t i v e side, K a n t anticipates difficulty h x a p p l y i n g our m a x i m o f self-esteem, since t h e balance b e t w e e n our d u t y t o ourselves in this regard a n d o u r duties o f l o v e and respect t o others is a delicate

one. Cf. M.d.S., 420, 435-6 and 465, and also Vorlesung, 237. 4 2

O n the universal d u t y o f respect for others w h i c h f o l l o w s f r o m their status as persons, cf. b e l o w , C h . X I I . T h e basis f o r t i u s d u t y is m a n ' s capacity for m o r a l action, n o t his actual a t t a i n m e n t o f virtue. H e n c e K a n t n o t e s that a criminal's personahty protects h i m f r o m certain types o f p u n i s h m e n t contrary t o his d i g n i t y

as a man, M.d.S., 463. 12

LAWS^ OF

i6i

FREEDOM

thus the direct opposite o f the genuine humility w h i c h it is our duty to cultivate b y self-knowledge. D.

DUTIBS

TO

SUPERSENSIBLE

OURSELVBS

WITH

REGARD

TO

NATURAL

AND

OBJECTS

Kant concludes his discussion o f perfect duties to oneself w i t h a note on 'the amphiboly o f the moral concepts o f reflection'. U n d e r a parallel heading in theoretical philosophy he explained h o w concepts w h i c h in fact have to d o w i t h the nature o f truth are readily mistaken for concepts about r e a l i t y . Here he is concerned w i t h duties w h i c h are really duties to m e n but w h i c h m i g h t easily b e mistaken for duties to other beings. In justifying the systematic completeness o f the Rechtslehre, K a n t argues that the redprocal relations o f right and duty w i t h w h i c h L a w is concerned can exist only b e t w e e n m e n . Here he raises the w i d e r question o f whether w e can have duties in general to beings other than men. His reply is that, at least so far as philosophy is concerned, m a n has duties only to men—himself or other m e n . In p r o o f o f this he asks us to consider w h a t is required o n the part o f an obligating subject. This being must, first, be a person, a subject o f pure practical reason. Secondly, this person must be an object o f experience since, according to the limitations o f human k n o w l e d g e , the o n l y objects w h o s e exist­ ence w e can k n o w are objects o f sensuous experience. A c c o r d i n g to the first requirement w e can have n o duties to natural objects (un­ organized matter, plants, and animals); according to the second, w e have n o duties, belonging t o moral philosophy, to G o d . B u t , K a n t maintains, w e have a duty t o ourselves (and other men) w i t h regard to both natural objects and G o d , and it is our failure to distinguish between duties to these objects and duties w i t h regard to them that gives rise t o the opinion that w e have duties to beings other than men. 43

4 4

45

T h e basis for duties to ourselves regarding natural objects is, in general terms, that our treatment o f t h e m affects our o w n feelings and, through these, our attitude o f w i l l . !nj£.e Tugendlehre, at least, K a n t is quite willing to recognize the use w h i c h morality can make o f certain natural feelings arid dispositions. T h e d u t y o f cultivating these feelings belongs to our imperfect duties t o ourselves and others. Here he is concerned w i t h the negative duty o f not w e a k e n i n g or destroying 46

« Cf. K.d.rV., B 316 4 8

ff.

4 4

MAS., 241 ff. Cf. also 488 ff.

C f b e l o w , p . 173 ff. and p. 197 ff.

«Ibid., 442.

/

PERFECT

DUTIES

TO

ONESELF

163

these feelings. A propensity to w a n t o n destruction o f the beautiful in nature, he explains, is a transgression o f duty to ourselves because it weakens or destroys a feeling which, though riot itself moral, is allied w i t h morality. In his study o f aesthetic j u d g m e n t K a n t explains h o w the beautiful arouses in us a feeling o f dehght in the object w h i c h has in it n o desire to m a k e use o f the object in furthering our subjective ends. W h i l e this feeling is not in itself moral, it has a certain kinship both w i t h specific moral attitudes such as moral l o v e , Wfhich is a dis­ interested satisfaction in the perfection and welfare o f others, and w i t h virtue in general, w h i c h implies freedom from domination b y our desires. Similarly, cruel treatment o f brute animals tends to blunt the feeling o f natural sympathy w i t h others' sufferings, w h i c h aids us in carrying out acts o f benevolence. E v e n gratitude to an old horse or dog^ he adds, is a duty to ourselves, because our natural feelings o f gratitude help us to perform the acts o f gratitude that are part o f our duties to others. 47

W i t h regard to our duty o f religion, Kant reaffirms that our duty to regard moral laws as divine commands is not a d u t y to G o d . O u r Idea o f G o d proceeds entirely from our o w n reason and proves n o t h i n g about the existence o f such a being. B u t in so far as it is formed b y reason in its practical function, w e have a duty to connect this Idea w i t h the moral law, because, as w e have seen, 'it is o f the greatest practical fruitfulness' in strengthening our moral m o t i v e s . 48

T h e note o n w h i c h Kant's discussion o f perfect duties to oneself ends in his treatment o f false humility is, in fact, the logical culmination o f his argument. T h e g r o u n d o f all perfect duties to ourselves is the fact that w e are persons and, as such, o u g h t to refrain from any action or attitude inconsistent w i t h our capacity to determine choice b y a pure rational m o t i v e and to carry out the actions so determined. T h e highest end o f our nature, under w h i c h and w i t h reference to w h i c h all our ends must be ordered, is our p o w e r to detenriine ourselves t o action independently o f our mclinations. A n y satisfaction o f inclinar tion or attitude t o w a r d the mclinations that is inconsistent w i t h this end is a subordination o f the highest end o f our nature, and so o f o u r nature itself, to some particular element in it. v

T h e principle o f perfect duties to oneself in general is, essentially, a prohibition against taking any component o f our nature out o f its 47

M.d.S., 443.

4 8

Ibid., 444-

104

LAWS

OF

FREEDOM

context, so to speak, and pursuing its end in isolation from, and to the detriment of, the w h o l e . T h e actions that comprised violations o f duty regarding our animal nature w e r e , in each case, the satisfaction o f some particular animal appetite in such a w a y as to destroy the integrity o f our animal nature. A n d because these actions w e r e immediately c o n ­ trary to our animal nature, they w e r e ultimately contrary t o our nature as persons, since our animal nature is itself one element in a larger w h o l e . A s for duties to ourselves merely as moral beings, the end o f our moral nature is freedom f r o m subservience t o the inclina­ tions and vice is, accordingly, a principle o f subordinating our attitude o f will to some propensity connected w i t h our sensuous nature. This, principle m a y be, at the same time, in conflict w i t h the legitimate needs o f our animal nature, as in the case o f avarice. Essentially, h o w ­ ever, it is contrary to our nature as a w h o l e because it elevates our inclinations a b o v e the end o f our m o r a l being. The principle o f perfect duties t o ourselves, K a n t notes, is the essentially negative c o m m a n d t o preserve ourselves 'in the perfection o f our nature'. B y the 'perfection o f o u r nature' he does n o t mean the state in w h i c h w e find ourselves w h e n , at some m o m e n t in time, w e determine to lead a morally g o o d life. His doctrine o n the radical evil in human nature implies that our w o r k is one o f restoring, rather than preserving, our integrity as moral beings. H e is referring, rather, to his v i e w that man's three classes o ^ a p p e t i t i v e powers—the animal appetites, practical reason, and pure practical reason—comprise his 'original' (as distinguished f r o m b o t h 'contingent' and 'acquired'), and in this sense 'natural' foundation for m o r a l a c t i o n . A l l three, he insists, are g o o d — n o t merely in the negative sense that they are not in themselves opposed t o the l a w , but i n the positive sense that they comprise our equipment for m o r a l action. M o r e o v e r , he c o n ­ tinues, the essential structure o f a being includes n o t o n l y the elements that g o to m a k e up that being but also their connection w i t h one another. T h e three elements that m a k e up the appetitive side o f human nature, in other w o r d s , stand i n a certain rational order, w h i c h is determined b y the fact that they are man's capacity for the g o o d . T h e original perfection o f our nature, them includes the subordination o f our animal appetites to reason and o f r e a s o n to pure practical reason. 49

50

49

6 0

MAS., 419.

' A c c o r d i n g t o Religion, 26 ff., 'natural' is contrasted w i t h ' c o n t i n g e n t ' ; according t o MAS., 441, it is contrasted w i t h 'acquired'. Cf. also the reference i n Religion, 26, to the ends o f these three classes o f appetitive p o w e r s .

PERFECT 1

DUTIES

TO

ONESELF

165

. . . W e destroy the original integrity o f human nature w h e n w e overturn the 'natural' hierarchy o f our powers. W e preserve it in so far as w e order our various appetites in a systematic unity o f ends in relation t o the ends o f pure practical reason. \

CHAPTER XI

IMPERFECT

DUTIES

TO

ONESELF

W h e r e a system o f ends in the relations o f m e n w i t h one another is concerned, fulfilment o f juridical duties provides the basic f r a m e w o r k of* non-interference with their lawful pursuit o f ends w i t h i n w h i c h a positive harmony o f ends can be instituted. A n a l o g o u s l y , fulfilment o f our perfect duties to ourselves is the negative side o f a systematic, coherence o f ends within our o w n will. O v e r and a b o v e the p r o ­ hibition against destroying our nature, w e are subject t o the c o m m a n d to make ourselves more perfect than mere nature made us, i.e. to m a k e our perfection an object o f c h o i c e . A l t h o u g h K a n t holds that i m ­ perfect duties are the proper subject-matter o f ethics, his account o f imperfect duties to ourselves is brief in comparison w i t h his analysis of perfect duties to ourselves. T h e reason seems to be that imperfect duties, as such, cannot be determined so fully and can therefore be treated under t w o general principles, the one h a v i n g to d o w i t h our perfection as natural beings, the other w i t h our moral perfection. 1

A.

THE D U T Y

OF N A T U R A L

PERFECTION

O u r natural perfection, as distinguished f r o m our moral perfection, consists in the development o f those powers w h i c h b e l o n g to us as rational animals. T h e l a w c o m m a n d i n g us to m a k e o u r natural per­ fection our end requires that w e strive to develop all the human p o w e r s within us except for our p o w e r o f moral choice itself, the cultivation o f w h i c h constitutes the separate duty o f p r o m o t i n g our moral per­ fection. W i t h i n our natural powers K a n t distinguishes three classes: powers o f mind (Geisteskrafte or Gemutskrdfte), w h i c h include under­ standing, j u d g m e n t and reason; p o w e r s o f soul (Seelenkrafte), a m o n g which Kant mentions m e m o r y and imagination; and finally p o w e r s o f body (Leibeskrafte). T h e p o w e r s o f m i n d are called 'understanding' (or also Reason') in the general sense o f the p o w e r o f thinking. B u t i f w e differentiate the functions o f t f c e ^ o w e r o f thinking, it can be divided into 'understanding' in the narrower sense o f the p o w e r o f 2

1

M.d.S., 419.

2

Ibid., 445. For a m o r e detailed discussion cf. Pddagogik, 475 rf. In t h e

Anthropologic Kant discusses, at s o m e l e n g t h , m a n ' s various p o w e r s , t o g e t h e r w i t h such matters as their diseases a n d disturbances, a n d t h e talents based u p o n t h e m .

166

IMPERFECT

DUTIES TO ONESEL£

167

/forming concepts, j u d g m e n t as the p o w e r o f applying general rules to / particular objects, and reason as the p o w e r o f inference. Understand­ ing, j u d g m e n t and reason are called the higher or superior p o w e r s because they provide the principles o f synthesis under w h i c h the sensuous manifold must be brought in order to give us k n o w l e d g e o f objects in Kant's technical sense o f the term. T h o u g h t , as the p o w e r o f the universal, is mstinguished from sensibility in general as the p o w e r o f representing the particular in objects. Because the sensuous cognitive powers, w h i c h include m e m o r y and imagination' as w e l l as the senses themselves, have to do only w i t h the particular, they are called the l o w e r or inferior powers. 1

T h e general principle regarding the development o f the h u m a n p o w e r s is that no one o f the l o w e r powers is to be developed b y itself or jfor its o w n sake, but only w i t h reference to the higher powers and the use they can make o f it. W h e n m e m o r y and imagination are cultivated w i t h reference to the powers o f mind, learning and taste are based upon their perfection. B u t 'the l o w e r powers have no value for themselves alone; for example, a man w i t h a v e r y g o o d m e m o r y but n o j u d g m e n t is a living encyclopedia'. K n o w l e d g e o f a great m a n y facts, w i t h o u t the ability to draw from these a general principle and apply it to further instances, is o f n o value; and an imagination d e ­ veloped without reference to the higher p o w e r s is, in fact, an i m ­ pediment to our use o f these. Finally, the powers o f the b o d y o u g h t to be mamtained and developed, for w i t h o u t these w e w o u l d lack the physical ability to realize the ends w h i c h w e set through, the practical activity o f the higher powers. A l t h o u g h in enumerating o u r natural powers Kant deals primarily w i t h their theoretical side, it is clear from his discussion o f both the ground o f our obhgation to this duty and its imperfect character as a duty that he is more concerned w i t h their practical functions. 3

4

T h e duty o f seeking natural perfection is imperfect because the law" cannot determine a priori the degree to w h i c h w e should develop o u r various powers in relation t o one another. T h e l a w requires that w e develop our p o w e r o f practical reason, our p o w e r o f setting ends in general, together w i t h the other p o w e r s w h i c h can be o f service in setting and realizing ends. B u t the relative degree to w h i c h our p o w e r s 3

Pddagogik, 472.

4

M.d.S., 445. Cf. the c o m p a r i s o n in KJ.p.V., 65, b e t w e e n the-categories o f t h e

^understanding, w h i c h bring the m a n i f o l d o f sensuous i n t u i t i o n under an a priori consciousness, and the categories o f f r e e d o m , w h i c h b r i n g the manifold o f o u r appetites under the u n i t y o f consciousness o f a p u r e w i l l .

LAWS

168

OF FREEDOM

should be developed depends-upon the ends w h i c h they w i l l be called upon to realize, and these ends w i l l differ w i t h different men. T h e y will be determined largely, Kant thirlks, b y our choice o f an occupa­ tion and this, in turn, w i l l depend u p o n our natural talents and in­ clinations. T h e natural perfection o f one m a n w i l l , accordingly, differ from that o f another. M o r e o v e r , even w h e n these ends have been determined and w e k n o w that certain p o w e r s should be developed to a greater extent than others, a latitude still remains for j u d g m e n t to decide upon the manner in w h i c h and the time at w h i c h our m a x i m o f cultivating these powers is to be translated into action. 5

So far as the ground o f our obligation to this duty is concerned, there is a possible source o f misunderstanding w h i c h must be avoided. It is clear, first, that w h e n Kant calls the development o f our natural powers a duty 'in a pragmatic regard' (as distinguished from our duty 'merely in a moral regard'), he does not mean that the ground o f obligation is to be found in the advantages w e shall gain b y having powers adequate to our ends. T o locate the basis o f obligation in our happiness and the relation o f our natural perfection to it w o u l d be to reduce the l a w enjoining our pursuit o f this end to a conditioned, pragmatic rule. T o obtain the g r o u n d o f obligation w e must again, as in the case o f perfect duties t o w a r d ourselves, abstract from such considerations and consider o n l y our relation to our o w n humanity. But Kant uses the term 'humanity' i n t w o different senses, and in this case it is o f some importance to distinguish these. W h e t h e r our pursuit o f natural perfection is a direct d u t y t o ourselves or only an indirect one—whether it is an obligatory end in its o w n right or merely instrumental t o our moral perfection—depends o n the w a y in which w e understand 'our relation to our o w n humanity'. 6

In Kant's usage the term 'humanity' usually refers to man's per­ sonality or his possession o f pure practical reason. B u t in certain c o n ­ texts it refers to man's possession o f reason in general. N o w pure practical reason is, o f course, the ultimate source o f all obligation: were it not for the presence o f legislative reason w i t h i n us w e should have no duties at all. B u t in mquiring after the g r o u n d o f obligation to any duty w e are seeking that o n ^account o f w h i c h moral reason imposes obligation, and in asking w h e t h e r this ground, in the case o f natural perfection, is our 'personahty' or our 'rationality' w e are asking 7

6

' M.d.S„ 445-6. 7

e

Ibid., 391-2.

Cf. ibid., 392: ' T h e p o w e r t o set a n y e n d w h a t s o e v e r for o n e s e l f is the charateristic o f h u m a n i t y (in distinction from arrimality)'.

IMPERFECT

DUTIES T O ONESELF,.

l60

/ whether our perfection as rational animals has value in itself or whether its value is only instrumental to our moral perfection. That natural perfection has the value o f a means to moral perfection—and, indeed, to the realization o f all our obligatory ends—is undeniable. K a n t holds, for example, that the development o f the arts and sciences has the effect o f weakening the p o w e r o f the animal impulses and, b y so doing, o f making us receptive to the legislation o f pure practical reason. It need hardly be added that in order to carry out our moral purposes effectively w e need certain theoretical k n o w l e d g e arid skills. B u t it w o u l d be a serious distortion o f Kant's doctrine to locate the g r o u n d o f this duty in the instrumental value w h i c h natural perfection has in relation to our other obligatory ends. O u r natural perfection, as a necessary object o f our rational will, has a value in itself (as w e l l .as a value as a means), and it is this intrinsic value o f natural perfection that is our ground o f obhgation to this duty. T h e g r o u n d o n w h i c h pure practical reason takes natural perfection as an end is simply that, as rational beings, w e necessarily will t o cultivate our capacity for rational action. M a n , 'as a being w h o is capable o f setting ends for himself, owes the use o f his powers not t o the instincts o f nature but to freedom', and the freedom in question is not necessarily absolute or transcendental freedom but rather the relative freedom manifested in the ability to set any end whatsoever— 'an arbitrary end in general'—and direct our actions t o w a r d that end. T h e natural state o f our powers m a y be adequate for satisfying o u r natural needs. It m a y even be the case, K a n t admits, that man can better attend to these needs i f his powers are n o t cultivated: instinct m a y be a m o r e reliable guide than reason w h e r e the satisfaction o f our animal needs and wants is concerned. Nevertheless m a n is indebted to himself as a rational being—a being capable o f setting ends—not to leave his powers in a state in w h i c h they are adequate only for obtaining the ends o f the instincts. H e ought, rather, to develop a n y o f his powers that practical reasort can use, to the degree prescribed; b y reason in v i e w p f the ends it m a y set for h i m . >- , 8

;

9

8

Cf. K.d.U., 429 ff. Kant's discussion o f o u r d u t y o f natural perfection s h o u l d be read against the b a c k g r o u n d o f .his p h i l o s o p h y o f h i s t o r y , as set forth i n ' t h e

appendix t o the Kritik der Urteilskraft and i n his t w o essays: MutmasslicherAtifang V/er Menschengeschichte and Idee zu einer allgemeitien Geschichte in weltburgerlich Ahficht. For a b r i e f s u m m a r y o f Kant's p h i l o s o p h y o f history, cf. E. F a c k e ^ e i m : 'Kant's C o n c e p t o f History', Kantstudien, v o l . 48 (1956-57),'pp. 381-98. 'Cf. M.d.S., 392 and especially 444-5. In the Grundlegung K a n t uses t h e t e l e ­ ological principle that nature takes the proper means t o its ends i n order to illustrate his p o i n t that practical reason m u s t h a v e an e n d other t h a n that w h i c h c o u l d - b e attained b y instinct. Cf. Gr,, 395-7 and also 423. ' . -> 9

LAWS B. T H E D U T Y

OF M O R A L

OF

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PERFECTION

W h i l e our nature as rational animals is the immediate ground for willing the cultivation o f our animal and rational powers, it is, again, our nature as moral beings that provides the highest principle o f order among the ends o f our being. In the duty o f moral perfection K a n t takes the final step in considering the hierarchy a m o n g the components o f human nature. A s beings capable n o t o n l y o f setting ends in general but o f settings ends in complete independence from nature as a w h o l e , w e necessarily w i l l the development o f our capacity for pure rational action as w e l l as o f our capacity for rational action as such. A s the end o f our animal nature is subordinated to our capacity for setting ends in general, so our rational nature is ordered to our capacity for moral action. T h e duty o f striving for moral perfection is, again, summarized in t w o general principles: 'be h o l y ' and ' b e perfect'. A c c o r d i n g to the first w e ought to strive for purity o f m o t i v e in our moral actions, and according to the second, t o strive t o fulfil all our d u t i e s . These t w o principles correspond to w h a t K a n t has called 'that w h i c h is formal in virtue', i.e. the resolution to m a k e reverence for the l a w our m o t i v e in every action, and 'that w h i c h is material in virtue', i.e. the extension o f virtue to all the objects o f a moral w i l l . O u r one virtuous attitude o f will, Kant has explained, manifests itself in striving to acquire supre­ macy over our various inclinations and propensities to e.g. intemper­ ance, avarice, lying, so that f r o m this point o f v i e w it is differentiated into the specific virtues o f moderation, hberahty, sincerity. Hence the command 'be perfect' prescribes that w e acquire all the virtues neces­ sary to fulfil every duty. 10

1 1

O u r duty o f moral perfection is, in short, the duty o f acquiring v i r ­ tue. But in Kant's discussions o f the ends o f moral action, 'virtue' appears as an end o n t w o different levels. O n the one hand, it is a specific object o f choice, along w i t h our natural perfection and the happiness o f others. O n the other hand, it is the end present in e v e r y moral determination o f choice, w h e t h e r to the fulfilment o f a juridical duty, to a merely permissible action, orjto the duty o f promoting, e.g. 10

1 1

M.d.S., 446.

Ibid., 395 and 406. Cf. also H.N.fa), 388: ' V i r t u e is the p o w e r o f ruling o v e r one's inclinations i n so,far as t h e y are obstacles t o practical reason; h e n c e . i t is self-mastery. F r o m this p o i n t o f v i e w there can b e n o distinctions w i t h i n v i r t u e except those o f degree. T h e distinction o f t h e inclinations as obstacles is w h a t makes the material distinction o f virtues, a n d f r o m this p o i n t o f v i e w there are m a n y virtues'.

7

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j.e happiness o f others. If, in order to strengthen our feeling o f reverlce for the law, w e deliberately reflect upon the presence o f pure practical reason within us, the end or matter, o f our m a x i m is,the strengthening o f our moral resolution. If, on trie other hand, w e help someone in need, our specific end is that person's welfare; yet, i f w e strive to do this from a m o t i v e o f duty our end, in a somewhat different sense, is virtue. T h e r e is only a limited field o f action in w h i c h virtue is the matter or content o f the morally g o o d man's maxims. B u t in every moral determination o f choice a will in conformity w i t h the l a w is the effect, the thought o f w h i c h determines choice to the action. In Kant's account o f the moral life, it is the cultivation o f virtue as an end in the latter sense that should be stressed. T h e self-conscious development o f character is essentially a preparation for the exercise o f virtue; but b y far the greater part o f man's moral development takes place implicitly in his actual exercise o f virtue in fulfilling his other duties. His moral perfection cannot be realized in abstraction from his moral life as a w h o l e . A t times, h o w e v e r , it w i l l be our duty to m a k e our moral perfection the matter or content o f our m a x i m s and to strive to develop our character, both through such positive measures as contemplating the moral l a w within us and cultivating our feelings o f natural sympathy and through the a ^ d p l i n a r y measures w h i c h Kant calls 'moral ascetic'. 12

Kant's primary concern in discussing 'moral ascetic' is to contrast the strength and gladness o f the truly virtuous m a n w i t h the servile fear o f what he calls the 'monastic ascetic'. Y e t the broad outlines o f his moral self-disripline can be discerned. It is, he tells us, 'a kind o f hygiene for man, in/order to preserve his moral health'. Apart f r o m the excesses w h i c h K a n t attributes to monastic asceticism, his o w n 'ethical gymnastic' seems to differ from this not so m u c h in content as in spirit and purpose. T o lay upon oneself a punishment (e.g. a fast) for a past violation o f duty is, he notes, a v e r y different thing f r o m denying oneself certain legitimate satisfactions in order t o strengthen oneself against futtire temptations to violate one's duty. Ethical selfdiscipline consists in struggling against the mclinations and curbing them, but only for the purpose o f being able to master them w h e n they threaten morality and o n l y to the extent necessary for this end. r e p e a t i n g his condemnation o f moral 'purism', K a n t adds that e x ­ cessive discipline o f the mclinations or ch^dpline o f t h e m in the w r o n g spirit w o u l d be contrary to virtue and w o u l d lead us secretly to hate 1 2

On m o r a l ascetic, cf. M.d.S., 484-5.

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virtue. W e ought not to try to exterminate the inclinations, but o n l y to curb them to the degree necessary t o safeguard ourselves against vice—a degree w h i c h cannot be determined a priori. T h e pursuit o f moral perfection requires, not the habit o f asceticism, but rather a maxim to be applied spontaneously as j u d g m e n t sees fit under the circumstances. Kant recognizes that the commands 'be h o l y ' and 'be perfect' i m p l y only wide obligation because virtue consists in approximation to an ideal which cannot be fully realized in this life. E v e n in its highest stages human morality remains virtue, and virtue is distinguished from holiness because it implies the presence o f mclinations w h i c h d o not o f themselves accord w i t h the l a w . W e o u g h t not to be satisfied w i t h an ideal l o w e r than that o f a w i l l completely in accordance w i t h the law. B u t w e fulfil our duty o f holiness, and perfection w h e n w e adopt a maxim o f striving after purity o f m o t i v e in the observance o f every duty. O u r duty o f moral perfection, K a n t tells us, is 'according to its quality strict and perfect, but according to its degree w i d e and i m ­ perfect, and this because o f the frailty o f h u m a n n a t u r e ' . In other words, the end w h i c h the l a w sets for us is perfectly definite: that w e be holy, and perfect. B u t the l a w requires, not the interior act itself o f deterrnining choice, in every instance, t h r o u g h a pure moral motive, but only the adoption o f a m a x i m o f striving t o w a r d this e n d . A little reflection, however, reveals the discrepancy between the notion o f imperfect duty and this account o f w h y our duty o f holiness is an imperfect one. For the characteristic feature o f an imperfect duty, as Kant previously defined the term, is the latitude w h i c h it permits between our virtuous m a x i m and our action u p o n this m a x i m ; and, no matter h o w the, 'latitude' is interpreted, there seems to be n o r o o m for it in the duty o f striving for holiness. In the case o f natural per­ fection and happiness the l a w determines our end only in an abstract and general w a y . It cannot determine these ends m o r e precisely because empirical ..elements enter in w h e n w e c o m e to decide w h a t specific ends comprise our natural perfection^arid the happiness o f others. Moreover, w h e n once the end is determined specifically, in an a posteriori w a y , it is still left t o j u d g m e n t to decide, in the given cir­ cumstances, whether w e shall realize that specific end and, i f so, t o what extent and b y w h a t means. B u t all this seems inapplicable t o our duty o f striving for holiness. Here the end is determinate and, w e r e it 13

14

18 14

1

M.4.S., 446. Ibid., 392-3.

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not for 'the frailty o f h u m a n nature', so too w o u l d be the action re­ quired b y the law. ' T o complicate the matter further, Kant seems t o offer yet another account o f w h y our duty o f striving for holiness is an imperfect one. O u r duty o f making reverence for the l a w our m o t i v e is an imperfect one, he tells us, because a m a d cannot so scrutinize his o w n motives as to be certain, in even a single instance, that he is acting from' duty. Even w h e n w e are conscious o f having this m o t i v e , w e cannot b e sure that it is our sufficient m o t i v e : there m a y be motives o f sensuous origin, present together w i t h the motive o f duty, w h i c h are in fact our determining motive. In the absence o f these the motive o f duty m i g h t not, b y itself, be strong e n o u g h to determine our choice. In order to k n o w that duty is our sufficient motive w e should have t o k n o w the non-existence o f some hidden determining motive, and this w e can never k n o w . This explanation, h o w e v e r , is open to the same difficulty as the preceding o n e : namely, that it locates the imperfect character o f the duty, not in a latitude w h i c h the l a w permits between our m a x i m and our action, but rather in something extrinsic to the notion o f imperfect duty as such. 1 5

B u t it is possible that neither o f these arguments i n itself is intended as a complete explanation o f w h y the duty is imperfect. I f w e take as our clues the fact that in the first argument 'the frailty o f human nature' is g i v e n as the reason w h y the duty is 'according to its degree w i d e and imperfect', and the fact that in the second argument Kant speaks o f duty as the sufficient, rather than as the sole, motive in moral action, w e m a y be able to supplement these explanations in such a w a y as to bind them together and, at the same time, bring the duty of holiness closer to 'imperfect duty' as such. W e shall argue that because o f ' t h e frailty o f h u m a n nature' it is permissible for m a n to allow other motives to co-operate w i t h duty in determining choice and that it is forNjridgrnent to decide, in any g i v e n case, whether this should be done, It should be added at once that Kant himself does not develop this position; yet, considering his attitude toward the inclinations at the time o f the Metaphysik der Sitten, it m a y w e l l be implied in his ex­ planations. A l t h o u g h Kant's manner o f speaking about the mclinatiohs and duty invites misinterpretation, it w o u l d be w r o n g to suppose that, even in his earlier writings, he adopts a completely negative attitude toward the inclinations. True, he there asserts that 'it must be the universal 16

M.d.S., 447 and 392-3: Uber den Gemeinspruch, 284-5.

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wish o f every rational being to be w h o l l y free f r o m ' inclinations— mcluding, so it seems, such inclinations as l o v e for our fellow men. B u t even this assertion is qualified b y its context, for K a n t is here arguing that w e ought not to let our inclinations s w a y us in determining where our duty lies. O n c e reason has determined w h a t constitutes our duty, he continues, an mclination t o w a r d w h a t is usually right (e.g. benevolence) can help us to carry out our moral purposes, even t h o u g h it cannot o f itself produce a moral m a x i m . In his later writings, this view that the inclinations can be put to g o o d use becomes even m o r e pronounced. 1 6

D u t y must, o f course, be the decisive m o t i v e in any morally g o o d action. B u t this leaves open the question o f whether duty should be the sole or only the sufficient motive—that is to say, a m o t i v e w h i c h could o f itself and without the co-operation o f other motives determine choice, but which does not exclude the help o f other motives. In favour o f the second alternative several passages could be cited. In the Tugend­ lehre Kant argues that since w e have a duty o f helping others w e h a v e an indirect duty to cultivate our feelings o f natural sympathy, 'because this is one o f the impulses w h i c h nature has placed in us to accomplish what the thought o f duty b y itself w o u l d not d o ' . A l o n g the same line, he argues that l o v e is a necessary element in human perfection: 'for what one does reluctantly, one does so sparingly and, indeed, with such sophistical evasions o f duty's c o m m a n d that from the latter [duty] as motive, without the accession o f the former [love], not t o o much m a y be e x p e c t e d ' . Similar considerations probably account for his including love, along w i t h moral feeling, conscience and selfesteem, a m o n g the 'preconceptions o f the mind's emotional receptivity for the concept o f duty'. In n o case does he i m p l y that the concept o f duty could not, b y itself, determine choice, but o n l y that, g i v e n h u m a n nature as it is, m a n needs the help o f his mclinations in order to lead a morally g o o d life. K a n t is here considering, not so m u c h the nature o f moral action in the abstract, as rather the conditions under w h i c h man is likely to exercise his p o w e r o f morally g o o d action. 1 7

18

Such statements s h o w that at the time^of the Metaphysik der Sitten, at least, Kant is willing freely to admit the importance o f our inclina­ tions and feelings in g i v i n g effect to our moral resolutions. N o r is this admission inconsistent w i t h his v i e w s o n inner freedom. W h a t he 1 8

KJ.p.V., 118. T h e animal inclinations, it w i l l b e recalled, are an e l e m e n t i n man's natural predisposition for the g o o d . 17

MAS., 456-7. Cf. b e l o w , p . 197 ff.

1 8

Das Ende alter Dinge, 338.

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says regarding mclinations that hinder our fulfilment o f duty—namely, that while w e are not responsible for our having mclinations, w e are responsible for the indulgence w h i c h allows them to influence c h o i c e —is true also o f those mclinations w h i c h facilitate our fulfilment o f duty. In so far as they have previously been cultivated w i t h a v i e w to this purpose they are, in part, the w o r k o f freedom. Y e t for all this it remains true that the mclinations have their source-in nature, as opposed to freedom, that they have no necessary connection "with morality, and that they m a y at any time g o out to something contrary to duty. Hence, in a l l o w i n g the mclinations to co-operate with the m o t i v e o f duty, pure practical reason must remain in control o f the situation, able to restrain the mclinations should circumstances require it. O u r supreme m a x i m must, o f course, be one o f f o l l o w i n g the l a w whatever our mclinations in the matter m a y be. B u t w h e n it comes to translating this m a x i m into action, it is open to K a n t to say that j u d g m e n t must decide whether certain mclinations w o u l d make our moral m a x i m m o r e effective or whether, on the contrary, these i n ­ clinations w o u l d , i f encouraged, endanger the self-sufiiciency o f d u t y as our motive. H e m a y w e l l have this in mind w h e n he attributes the imperfect character o f our duty o f holiness to 'the frailty o f human nature'. 19

B y this phrase Kant means, as w e have seen, our weakness in acting upon our moral resolutions;. and it is because o f this weakness that our duty o f moral perfection, w h i c h is objectively strict and perfect, becomes in relation to us w i d e and imperfect. Objectively speaking, a holy w i l l is superior to a virtuous w i l l , and a w i l l determined solely b y the thought o f duty is preferable to a w i l l determined b y the thought o f duty together w i t h motives o f sensuous origin. B u t , taking human nature as it is, w e should make use o f our inclinations to ensure that our moral resolutions will issue in g o o d actions. W e r e w e to take the c o m m a n d 'be h o l y ' literally, w e should have to try to exterminate the mclinations, and the, result, w o u l d , Kant suggests, be disastrous for h u m a n moral action. T h e reason w h y the duty is imperfect is n o t simply that w e cannot achieve holiness but rather that, in v i e w o f human nature, w e must take the path t o w a r d perfection that is open .to us. A n d this path is not that o f holiness or the absence o f all i n ­ clinations that m i g h t tend to something contrary to the law; but rather that "of using our potentially dangerous mclinations for our moral purposes. 2 0

1 9

Gr., 458.

2 0

M.d.S., 396-7 and 405.

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It is only w i t h this further explanation that the emphasis in Kant's first argument falls in the right place and that something resembling a latitude enters into the determination o f m o r a l choice itself. His further remarks about the diniculty o f scrutinizing our motives are, perhaps, merely comments upon the difficulties confronting j u d g m e n t w h i c h must, in deciding to encourage certain inclinations, see to it, that they are kept subordinate to duty as our sufficient m o t i v e . T h e imperfect character o f our duty o f holiness does differ f r o m that o f our other obligatory ends: it is essentially a concession to h u m a n weakness. Y e t this duty m a y have more ih c o m m o n w i t h our other imperfect duties than is apparent on the surface o f Kant's account.

C.

THE I N D I R E C T

OWN

DUTY

OF P R O M O T I N G

ONE'S

HAPPINESS

T h e first principle o f Tugendlehre commands, w e have seen, that w e direct all our moral actions t o w a r d the summum bonum, w h i c h consists o f the happiness o f finite-rational beings in proportion to their virtue. But when it comes to deriving f r o m the first principle o f ethics ethical laws enjoining the pursuit o f ends, K a n t holds that our duty is hmited to the pursuit o f our o w n perfection and the happiness o f other men. So far as the limitation o n our obligatory pursuit o f happiness is c o n ­ cerned, Kant's argument is that the concept o f d u t y implies necessi­ tation to a reluctantly adopted end', whereas 'their o w n happiness is an end which all m e n have (by reason o f the impulses o f their n a t u r e ) ' . Hence w e can have n o duty to adopt our o w n happiness as our end. In concluding this analysis o f imperfect duties to ourselves w e should examine more closely the moral relation b e t w e e n choice and the end o f our o w n happiness. 21

It should be quite clear, from all K a n t has said, that he has n o inten­ tion o f questioning the morality o f our pursuit o f our o w n happiness. He has always insisted that happiness is a necessary element in the end o f a finite rational being. Like natural and m o r a l perfection, it is a necessary object o f the rational w i l l o f a finite being. B u t Kant m a i n ­ tains that whereas all three o f these ends are objectively necessary, our happiness differs f r o m the other t w 6 m that it is also subjectively necessary. N o w it does not take m u c h observation t o convince ourselves that men are capable o f acting contrary t o their o w n happiness. A n d this 21

MJ.S., 385-6 and 388.

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learn to the question, w h e t h e r K a n t does not attribute greater prudence t o / m e n than they actually possess. I f happiness is an object o f our rational will, and i f w e can—and often do—act^ to the detriment o f our happiness, d o w e n o t have a duty to pursue our happiness even as w e have a duty to strive for perfection? Kant's position is, in fact, quite consistent w i t h his explicit recognition that m e n d o behave imprudendy and ruin their o w n chances o f happiness. A s finite beings w e spontaneously w i l l the ideal state o f satisfaction o f our needs and wants that w e call happiness. B u t like natural perfection and the happi­ ness o f other men, 'our o w n happiness' is an abstract concept. It d e ­ scribes only an ideal state, w i t h o u t telling us .what elements g o t o make up that state. A n d K a n t does not exclude the possibility o f c o n ­ straint to take as our ends certain things w h i c h , f r o m an objective point o f v i e w , pertain to our happiness. 1

W h e t h e r w e regard happiness as a m a x i m u m o f pleasure accompany­ ing our w h o l e existence or as an integration o f ends, a m o n g which, pleasure is only one, w e can g i v e n o precise definition o f happiness w h i c h w o u l d be valid for everyone. 'Happiness', K a n t holds, is o n l y an ideal w h i c h each m a n projects in his o w n w a y according to the relative strength o f his various mclinations, his background, education, etc. M o r e o v e r , as soon as w e speak o f happiness w e are speaking o f an end set b y practical reason. A brute animal does not seek happiness, b u t only the satisfaction o f the particular impulse o f the m o m e n t . If happi­ ness is a m a x i m u m o f pleasure, it is still for reason t o estimate h o w any particular satisfaction w i l l affect our contentment throughout the w h o l e o f our existence; and i f happiness is an integration o f ends, it is for reason to determine w h i c h o f our ends can b e combined into a w h o l e and w h i c h are incompatible w i t h one another. A n d reason, urilike instinct, can be m i s t a k e n . 8

22

W h a t is relevant to the question o f duty is not, h o w e v e r , a simple error o f j u d g m e n t . It is, rather, w h a t m i g h t be called a deHberate error, as w h e n some-strong inclination clouds our j u d g m e n t and w e act, in a sense, deliberately contrary to our o w n happiness. W e can choose to satisfy some pressing mclination even t h o u g h w e k n o w that this is contrary to the w i d e r state o f satisfaction w h i c h , i n our m o r e fully rational moments, w e call our happiness. T h e sick m a n can choose to satisfy his.desire for harmful f o o d and drink, convincing himself that health is not an essential c o m p o n e n t in his happiness. T h e miser can choose to indulge in the mere pleasure o f possession, thereby denying " Cf. KJ.U., 43o;KJ.p.V., 25-26; Gr., 417-8. 13

>

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himself the necessary comforts w h i c h his m o n e y could b u y and w h i c h the normal person w o u l d regard as an essential part o f happiness. In order to achieve a m a x i m u m satisfaction o f the inclinations w e must sacrifice certain present satisfactions. ' T h e precept o f happiness/ Kant notes, 'is often o f such a sort that it greatly interferes w i t h some in­ clinations, and y e t a man can form n o definite and certain concept o f the sum o f the satisfaction o f all o f them, w h i c h is called happiness.' T h e precepts o f prudence are imperatives, and this implies that the sulject o f these rules will not necessarily act in accordance w i t h them. T h e vagueness and mdeterminateness o f the concept o f happiness and the uncertainty o f attaining it even according to the counsels o f pru­ dence enable us, w h e n faced w i t h a strong inclination, to persuade ourselves that the satisfaction o f this inclination w i l l not decisively affect our prospects o f happiness, even t h o u g h , in the absence o f this mclination, our rational decision w o u l d b e t o the contrary. 33

In his examples o f the sick m a n and the miser K a n t indicates that, despite his insistence o n the vagueness o f the concept o f happiness and the lack o f consensus concerning it, he y e t conceives a certain objectivity in this notion. T h e r e are certain basic needs and wants arising from human nature, and the satisfaction o f these must b e reckoned, o n objective grounds, as pertaining t o e v e r y man's happiness. T h e ideal o f happiness w i l l be compounded in v a r y i n g w a y s , but there are certain satisfactions w h i c h , b y a consideration o f the nature c o m m o n to all men, must be included in the concept o f h u m a n happiness, whatever else m a y be super-added o n the basis o f individual differ­ ences. Kant implies this in noting that the m a n w h o risks his health for the pleasures o f food and drink m a y n o t r e c k o n health in his cal­ culations about happiness; nevertheless he is under obligation to preserve his health, and this comes under the duty o f pursuing w h a t pertains to his happiness. T h e miser, again, does n o t r e c k o n enjoyment o f the g o o d things o f life in his happiness. B u t , K a n t suggests, w e r e it not for the influence o f these temporary inclinations or permanent propensities u p o n one's j u d g m e n t , all w o u l d agree that e.g. health and pleasures are elements in happiness. T h e individuals in question have, in fact, c o m p o u n d e d their notions o f happiness differently f r o m 24

2 3

Gr., 399. In M.d.S., 451-2, Kant argues that w e can h a v e a d u t y t o b e b e n e ficient t o ourselves, i.e. t o p r o v i d e ourselves w i t h w h a t w e n e e d t o e n j o y life. T h e contrary o f this is t o deprive ourselves, ' t h r o u g h servile avarice, o f w h a t is necessary for the cheerful e n j o y m e n t o f life'. Cf. K.d.U., 430, w h e r e Kant speaks o f o u r 'true natural needs, a b o u t w h i c h our race is i n t h o r o u g h agreement.' 2 4

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t h e / w a y in w h i c h a fully rational agent w o u l d conceive happiness. A n d this is w h y their duty o f pursuing what, objectively speaking, pertains to their happiness is not a duty o f m a k i n g their happiness their end. ^ If our 'subjective' concept o f happiness is opposed to the 'objective' concept o f happiness, our duty to act contrary to our i n c l i n a t i o n t o ­ ward, e.g. avarice and provide ourselves w i t h w h a t w e need for 'a cheerful enjoyment o f life' is not a duty o f making our o w n happiness our end. For in so far as w e are mclined to avarice, w e do riot include this enjoyment in our notion o f happiness, since it cannot be integrated w i t h the essential element in our concept o f happiness—the satisfaction w e find in keeping our m o n e y . In other w o r d s , so far as something pertains to our notion o f happiness at any given m o m e n t , w e cannot be under obhgation to pursue it because w e necessarily desire it. A n d in so far as w e are under obhgation t o pursue" it, it does not pertain t o our present notion o f happiness and w e are not seeking it as an element in our happiness. W e are not, therefore, m a k i n g our happiness our end; for an object can b e c o m e an end only in so far as it is conceived by us, and our concept o f an ideal state o f satisfaction is not an i m ­ partial, rational one. 1

This seems to be the reasoning w h i c h underlies Kant's assertions, within the same paragraph, that w e cannot have a duty o f pursuing our o w n happiness and that w e can have a duty o f m a k i n g , e.g. health, prosperity and strength our ends. B u t in this case, he adds, our end is not our happiness but rather our moral integrity, and w e seek these things as means to moraHty, since their opposites are temptations t o vice. I f I seek prosperity for m y s e l f o n the g r o u n d that poverty is a temptation to vice, ' m y end is not m y happiness b u t rather the pre­ servation o f the integrity o f m y moraHty, w h i c h is at the same time m y duty'. T h e alleged duty o f p r o m o t i n g our o w n happiness, Kant c o n ­ cludes, is only an indirect duty o f pursuing these elements in happiness as a means to preserving our moral i n t e g r i t y . 25

Despite the distinctions w h i c h made this conclusion possible, it is difficult to avoid—bdth here and elsewhere—the impression that K a n t has d r a w n his division o f our o b h g a t o r y ends s o m e w h a t too sharply and then gone to considerable lengths to maintain the division, at least verbaHy. B u t this is a relatively m i n o r point. T h e m o r e important thing is that Kant recognizes, three types o f object o f a finite rational will—those w h i c h provide the content for our abstract notions o f M.d.S., 388. 26

i8o

LAWS

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happiness, natural perfection and moral perfection. O u r pursuit o f these ends, corning over and a b o v e the preservation o f our integrity as animal and moral beings, completes the system o f ends w i t h i n our o w n will w h i c h the first principle o f ethics, in part, requires us to promote.

CHAPTER XU

DUTIES

OF V I R T U E

TO

\

O T H E R

MEN

A l t h o u g h Kant's division o f obligatory ends left the impression that our duties o f virtue to others consist only in pursuing their happiness, he has already hinted that this is not the case. In connection w i t h the vice o f servility he explained that every man, b y virtue o f his person­ ahty, has a claim to respect from every other man. W e need only look at this relation from the v i e w p o i n t o f its other term to see that every man has a duty o f respect to every other m a n as such. B y mcluding duties o f respect a m o n g duties o f virtue to others K a n t makes provision for a class o f duties absolutely essential to men's moral relations, w h i c h are not adequately defined b y juridical duties and duties o f helping them to realize their subjective ends. W i t h i n the hmits o f the latter t w o types o f duty w e could, for example, help another person in such a w a y as to humiliate h i m and deprive h i m o f his self-respect. I f w e are under obhgation npt o n l y to help others out o f difficulties but also to do it in such a w a y as t o leave their selfrespect intact, it is because our moral i n a x i m o f l o v e always contains an admixture o f obhgation to respect. 1

But Kant's discussion o f our duties o f virtue to others repeats the pattern o f difficulties w h i c h w e found in perfect duties to ourselves. The problem is, again, to subsume the duties in question under the concept 'duty o f virtue'. A duty o f virtue, it w i l l b e recalled, consists only in a m a x i m o f striving to realize a certain end and hence leaves a latitude to j u d g m e n t in determining actions upon, this maxim. Y e t our duty o f respect shows such an analogy to j u r i d i c a l duty that Kant, at one point, can call it an 'ethische Rechtspflicht'. H o w , then, can these quasi-juridical duties be called duties o f virtue? F o r a m o r e precise formulation o f the p r o b l e m itself, as w e l l as for its possible solution, w e must consider carefully Kant's distinction between the t w o classes o f duty o f virtue t o others. 2

1

A l t h o u g h K a n t uses the t e r m Achtung t o describe b o t h one's feeling for t h e m o r a l l a w and for v i r t u o u s m e n ' o n the o n e hand, a n d t h e duties w h i c h o n e o w e s t o all m e n as such o n the o t h e r h a n d , h e translates t h e f o r m e r as reverentia and the :

latter as observantia aliis praestanda. Cf. M.d.S.-, 402, 462. I shall call the former 'reverence' and the latter 'respect'. 2

Cf. H.N.(23), 407. 181

LAWS

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^_ The first division o f these duties, he explains, can be made according .to whether or not, in fulfilling the duty, we-put the other person under / obligation. If, b y fulfilling it, w e p u t the other person under o b l i g a ­ tion to us, the duty is one o f l o v e ; i f not, it is one o f respect. A l t h o u g h Kant mentions that the duties are called duties o f l o v e and respect because o f the feelings w h i c h accompany our observance o f t h e m , he does not mean that our duty consists in having these feelings for other men. W h a t the l a w commands must always be w i t h i n our p o w e r , and w e cannot at will s u m m o n up a certain emotion. T h e l o v e and respect which it is our duty to extend to others are, rather, l o v e and respect 'in a practical sense', the adoption o f certain m a x i m s in our relations w i t h them. O u r duty o f l o v e consists in adopting a m a x i m o f making the subjective ends o f other m e n our o w n ends; our duty o f respect, in adopting a m a x i m o f restricting our actions in relation to others through our recognition o f their status as moral agents. 3

4

5

O u r observance o f a duty o f l o v e is, in relation to the person w h o receives our benevolence, meritorious: that is to say, it puts h i m under an obligation o f gratitude, w h i c h includes returning a like service to us in so far as he can. B u t our fulfdment o f a duty o f respect is not meritorious so far as the other person is concerned: the respect is merely what is due h i m . T h o u g h w e have an obligation o f benevolence to others, they have n o right to demand benevolence f r o m us, and in receiving it they get m o r e than their due. B u t in fulfilling a duty o f respect, as in a juridical duty, w e are merely rendering to others w h a t is rightfully theirs. It is clear, o f course, that 'due' and 'right', w h e n used with regard t o duties o f respect, d o not refer to legal obligation and strict right: since n o violation o f outer freedom is i n v o l v e d here, the other person cannot i n v o k e the p o w e r o f the State to c o m p e l us to fulfil our duty. M o r e o v e r , duties o f respect consist not merely in refraining from manifestations o f contempt but in refraining f r o m them through an attitude o f modesty, i.e. voluntarily hmiting our 6

7

8

MJ.S., 448, 450. Cf. also H.N.(23), 410. It is, o f course, the other person's pure practical reason that lays o b l i g a t i o n o n h i m , b u t our acts o f b e n e v o l e n c e provide the g r o u n d for his serf-imposition o f t h e d u t y o f gratitude. M-d.S., 448. T h e feelings o f l o v e a n d respect,for others can o c c u r separately, but practical l o v e and respect are a l w a y s uniterHri a d u t y o f v i r t u e t o others. 4

8

M.d.S., 449 and 450. Cf. also H.N.fa), 407.

e

Fulfilment o f a d u t y o f respect is a m e r i t o r i o u s act i n the sense that it g o e s b e y o n d that t o w h i c h w e can be externally c o m p e l l e d . It is n o t m e r i t o r i o u s in the sense o f establishing a claim, o n t h e o t h e r p e r s o n , t o gratitude. O n t h e first

sense o f ' m e r i t o r i o u s ' cf. M.d.S., 227: o n the second, ibid., 448.

Ibid., 448, 450, 462-4.

DUTIES

OF V I R T U E T O O T H E R

MEik

18}

/ claim to be esteemed b y others through our practical recognition in them o f the w o r t h w h i c h w e posit in ourselves. If, for prudential reasons, w e s h o w others all due respect w h i l e still inwardly c o n ­ temning them, w e are in fact violating our d u t y o f respect. But these points o f chstinction between duties o f respect and juridical duties d o not yet subsume the former under 'duty o f virtue' in a positive w a y , while the fact that w e must b o r r o w the t e r m i n o l o g y o f L a w to d e ­ scribe them indicates their analogy w i t h juridical duties. T h e different aspects o f this analogy are b r o u g h t out in several passages concerning duties o f respect. First, these duties are 'negative' duties or duties o f omission: the laws enjoining t h e m are limiting or restrictive principles, i.e. prohibitions against depriving another o f something due h i m . F r o m this it follows, secondly, that a violation o f a fluty o f respect is not merely lack o f moral w o r t h but vice, n o t merely failure to d o something meritorious but disregard for the hmitation w h i c h l a w places upon our f r e e d o m . Finally, duties o f respect, because they are negative duties o f h o t exalting ourselves at the expense o f others' self-esteem, are 'analogous' to the juridical duty o f 'not encroaclhng o n another's property'. Their principle is contained in the m a x i m : 'not to degrade another t o a mere means to m y end (not to demand that another abase' M m s e l f in order to sub­ serve m y e n d ) . ' D o e s not all this mean that the m a x i m o f respect involves the personahty o f others as an 'end' o n l y in a negative and hmiting sense, so that duties o f respect, like perfect duties to oneself, are duties o f virtue only in some w i d e r sense o f the term? : A l t h o u g h K a n t is not altogether clear o n this point, he seems to say that, despite certain shnilarities, duties o f respect differ in nature from perfect duties to oneself. I f w e compare the t w o classes o f duties o f virtue t o others, he notes, duties o f respect are to be considered strict in relation to duties o f love, w h i c h are w i d e . . B u t it w o u l d 8

9

10

1

11

;

12

• H.N.(2s), 407 and 411. T h e principle o f duties o f respect, K a n t notes,, is distinguished f r o m b o t h that o f juridical duties a n d that o f duties o f l o v e b y its b e i n g the principle o f consistency b e t w e e n o u r ends a n d t h e f r e e d o m o f others, . m o r e specifically, the,right t o equality w h i c h t h e y h a v e as m e n . B u t this 'right' t o > equality, h e adds, is n o t o b j e c t i v e r i g h t but rather the s u b j e c t i v e right o f another t o value h i m s e l f according t o h i s ' w o r t h as a p e r s o n . I n m a t t e r s o f strict or objective right o n l y the relation o f m y external actions t o those o f a n o t h e r is i n question. In • matters o f respect, it is rather the relation o f m y attitude o f w i l l t o the attitude o f others. D u t i e s o f respect e x t e n d the relations o f f r e e d o m a n d equality b e y o n d the sphere o f external c o m p u l s i o n i n t o that o f attitudes o f w i l l a n d l i m i t n o t m e r e l y external actions b u t also, in a sense, o u r ends t h e m s e l v e s . 9

M.d S., 449. T

1 0

Ibid., 464.

n

Ibid., 449.

,

1 2

Ibid., 449-50.

184

L A W S OF

FREEDOM

seem that 'strict' and ' w i d e ' are here used only as relative terms. Duties o f respect are in themselves 'mere duties o f virtue' and so, apparently, o f w i d e obligation. A n d this seems to i m p l y that the 'end' contained in the m a x i m o f respect is n o t a mere limiting condition oh our actions but rather the g r o u n d for a m a x i m o f striving to bring some state o f affairs into being. Hence w e cannot derive duties o f respect directly from the first principle o f all duty as such, as w e d e ­ rived perfect duties to oneself. Since the l a w enjoining duties o f respect prescribes only the adoption o f an end, w e must derive them f r o m the special first principle o f ethical duty. T o find this end, w e must consider that the m a x i m s o f both l o v e and respect are themselves abstractions f r o m the m o r e fundamental m a x i m o f realizing moral relations a m o n g men. M o r a l laws g o v e r n i n g the relations o f m e n to one another, K a n t explains, are the laws o f an 'intelhgible w o r l d ' sustained b y the forces o f l o v e and respect, w h i c h can' be compared w i t h the forces o f attraction and repulsion in the physical world. A s the laws o f attraction and repulsion are both essen­ tial to the existence o f nature, so the l a w o f l o v e , w h i c h bids m e n d r a w together, and the l a w o f respect, w h i c h commands them to keep a proper distance from one another, together provide the tension w i t h o u t which the moral w o r l d w o u l d collapse. A m a x i m o f l o v e w i t h o u t respect, or o f respect w i t h o u t l o v e , w o u l d not really be a moral relation at all. T h e m a x i m o f d u t y o f virtue to others is always a mixture o f l o v e and respect, and it is o n l y because at times the one and at times the other is the m o r e prominent aspect o f the relation that, for purposes o f analysis, w e speak o f duties o f l o v e and duties o f respect. 13

The end to be brought into existence, then, is the 'moral w o r l d ' , and between the m a x i m o f striving for this end and action u p o n this m a x i m w e find the latitude characteristic o f imperfect duty. M a x i m s of benevolence and beneficence, as w e shall see, can be abstracted from this basic moral relation and treated as duties o f l o v e ; but K a n t insists that the correct moral attitude t o w a r d other m e n is n o t that o f a philanthropist but rather that expressedm^the term 'a friend o f m a n ' . T h e philanthropist as such acts o n l y o n a m a x i m o f love, but the m a x i m o f friendship is one o f equal l o v e and respect. W h i l e Kant's later discussion o f friendship as a d u t y w i l l clarify these concepts, it is clear that a latitude remains for j u d g m e n t in, determining actions o n 14

u

M.d.S.', 448 and 449. Cf. also H . Z V . f o ) , 406,

14

M.d.S., 473. Cf. b e l o w , p . 199 ff.

410.

DUTIES

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MEN

I85

tfj/e m a x i m o f friendship. It is w r o n g , Kant points out, to reduce another to a mere means, even out o f l o v e for h i m , ancl it is for j u d g m e n t to decide, in any given case, h o w the respect necessary to preserve the other's independence is to be manifested and the relation o f equality maintained. It is true that the specific duties o f respect w h i c h Kant discusses— refraining from manifestations o f contempt, detraction "and ridicule— are, in a sense, duties o f omission. M o r e precisely, the duty o f respect 'is expressed only mchrectly (through the prohibition o f the o p p o ­ s i t e ) ' . T h e m a x i m o f respect w h i c h the l a w enjoins is that o f r e c o g ­ nizing an inherent w o r t h or dignity in other men, b y virtue o f w h i c h w e cannot use them as mere means to heightening our o w n ^elfesteem. Thus in c o m m a n d i n g immediately that w e adopt a m a x i m o f respect, the l a w prohibits, mdirectly and through the medium o f this m a x i m , such actions as w o u l d e m b o d y an attitude o f contempt for others. B u t the fact that the l a w implicitly prohibits certain kinds o f actions does n o t change the imperfect character o f the duty o f respect itself. Duties o f l o v e are clearly imperfect duties; y e t the l a w w h i c h enjoins the m a x i m o f love implicitly forbids a m a x i m o f hatred and hence such actions as w o u l d manifest hatred. For this reason Kant's discussions o f specific duties o f love—benevolence, gratitude and sympathy—are followed b y discussions o f the contrary vices o f hatred. In general, the m a x i m o f striving to realize the m o r a l w o r l d excludes the contrary m a x i m and hence such actions as w o u l d destroy moral relations a m o n g men. 15

Y e t , while the restrictive character o f duties o f respect must be thus qualified, it remains true that in duties o f respect, as distinguished f r o m duties o f love, the emphasis falls on the negative aspect o f the duty. This is inherent in the nature o f the respect w h i c h w e are bound t o s h o w others as m e n ; for, as K a n t points out, ' l a m n o t under obhgation to honour others (regarded merely as men), i.e., to s h o w them positive high e s t e e m ' ; and^a metaphysic o f morals cannot descend i n t o the relations o f respect proper to m e n under contingent conditions (age, sex, position, m o r a l character, etc.), w h e r e positive marks o f respect m i g h t be called for. O u r universal duty o f respect for others consists in adopting a m a x i m in consequence o f w h i c h w e d o nothing to d e ­ tract from the dignity w h i c h they, as subjects o f the l a w , °are entitled 16

15

1 8

M.d.S., 464-5.

Ibid., 467. Cf. also 468: ' O n t h e Ethical D u t i e s o f M e n t o O n e A n o t h e r with" R e g a r d t o T h e i r Circumstances'. *• '

186

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to posit in themselves. T h e end here, so far as actions are concerned, is to be realized b y negative means, and this accounts for the relative strictness o f duties o f respect in relation t o duties o f l o v e , the m a x i m o f which is to be embodied in positive pursuit o f others' subjective ends. Love and respect can be considered separately, but, as w e have seen, 'in their basis according to the law. they are always j o i n e d together in a duty, only in such a w a y that n o w the one, n o w the other, comprises the subject's principle, to w h i c h the other is j o i n e d in an accessory w a y ' . W e have noted, in general terms, h o w respect is j o i n e d as an accessory principle w i t h love. It remains to be seen h o w l o v e combines with the m a x i m o f respect w h e n the latter predorninates in a duty, and here w e must consider that aspect o f l o v e w h i c h K a n t treats under the heading 'the moral well-being o f others'. 17

T o Kant's division o f obligatory ends—our o w n perfection and the happiness o f others—it might be objected that the line is t o o sharply drawn. Against Kant's exclusion o f the perfection o f others from our obligatory ends it might be said that, w h i l e w e admittedly cannot perform a moral action for another person, w e can still p r o v i d e the conditions w h i c h w i l l help, or at least n o t hinder, others i n their selfimposition o f duty. In fact, K a n t does n o t fail to recognize that our actions and attitudes can influence the m o r a l development o f others: his discussion o f practical anthropology presupposes this, and w h e n he descends into the relations o f an adult t o a child or y o u t h , o r a teacher to his pupil, he discusses at some length w h a t the adult can d o to assist his charge in developing moral character and to prepare h i m for his adoption o f moral purposes. B u t the Metaphysik der Sitten has to d o only w i t h the relations w h i c h m e n as such h a v e t o w a r d one another, and in these relations K a n t is w a r y o f any attempt t o intrude u p o n an­ other's moral life. It is not merely the principle that w e cannot make the perfection o f others our end that leads K a n t t o exclude this from our obligatory ends; it is also his conviction that t o p r y into the moral state o f another and busy oneself with-^nT^roving his character w o u l d be a violation o f the respect due h i m . T h u s he limits our concern for the moral welfare o f other m e n t o the negative duty o f not tempting them to vice and, at the same time, subsumes this duty under the 18

17

1 8

MAS., 448. Discussions o f this kind are to b e f o u n d i n the Pddagogik and i n t h e Methoden-

lehre o f the Tugendlehre. M A S . , 466. 1 9

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MEN

187

obligatory end o f their happiness. W e have, Kant maintains, a duty o f avoiding scandal, i.e. anything w h i c h , the nature o f m e n being what it is, 'could be a seduction' to them to violate the m o r a l l a w ; and, since freedom from the pangs o f conscience pertains tQ happiness, this is a duty o f p r o m o t i n g other men's happiness, a duty o f l o v e . 2 0

(

W e have seen that one and the same action, regarded under different aspects, can constitute different vices. Thus any violation o f the law, if it is committed publicly, can be scandal in the general sense. T o give genuine scandal, 'an example o f lack o f reverence for the l a w , w h i c h m a y have harmful consequences', is contrary to duty in the highest degree. Y e t , in a sense, our duty o f not seducing others to,vice is a w i d e one, since 'our concern for another's m o r a l self-satisfaction does not permit determinate limits to be assigned i t ' . W h a t K a n t means is that it m a y be permissible and even morally necessary at times to perform actions w h i c h , because o f the ignorance or prejudice o f others, will have the same effect as scandal. I f others find scandal in conduct that is simply unconventional rather than immoral, w e must w e i g h the possible effect o f our action upon others w i t h our duty t o ourselves o f not being bound, b y the tyranny o f popular conduct, to a blind c o p y i n g o f the prevalent mores, w h i c h w o u l d destroy real v i r t u e . Hence our concern for the moral welfare o f others is, in. general terms, the g r o u n d o f only a w i d e obhgation. 21

22

B u t our duty o f concern for the moral well-being o f others takes o n more precise f o r m w h e n it combines w i t h the m a x i m s o f specific duties o f respect. T h e g r o u n d for duties o f respect is simply that other men, as moral agents, are entitled t o posit an absolute inner w o r t h in them­ selves. B u t at the basis o f this moral title is their; obhgation to selfesteem, and the vices o f contempt for others are such that, in practising them, w e m a y w e l l hinder others from fulfilling their duty to t h e m ­ selves. T h e nature o f respect is such that the m a x i m o f love w h i c h combines most readily w i t h it is one o f concern for others' moral w e l l being; and since the means available to us for p r o m o t i n g this aspect o f their happiness are, for the m o s t part, limited t o avoiding scandal, the accessory principle o f l o v e j o i n e d w i t h the m a x i m o f respect means that we,refrain f r o m contempt w i t h a v i e w to n o t detracting f r o m others' self-esteem. T o this extent, the m a x i m o f l o v e introduces a 4

-7

positive element into our fiilfilment o f duties o f respect. Man's predisposition for the g o o d consists i n the p o w e r o f pure reason to be practical, and as one condition necessary for m a n s deterM.d.S., 394. Ibid. Ibid., 464. 20

22

LAWSi)F

i88

FREEDOM

mination o f actions by pure practical reason K a n t mentioned certain capacities on the side o f feeling to be affected b y the thought o f duty. A m o n g these he mentioned 'self-esteem', w h i c h is a valuing o f oneself as die subject o f the moral l a w . Unless w e felt reverence for the l a w , and thereby reverence for ourselves as the subjects o f the moral l a w , w e | could not respond to the claims o f morality. N o w our predis­ position for the g o o d can never be lost entirely (unless, w e cease to be moral agents); but it can be hindered f r o m fulfilling itself in moral action, and one o f the w a y s in w h i c h it can be hindered is through the actions and attitudes o f other men. I f others s h o w contempt for a man, it will be more difficult for h i m t o feel the reverence for himself, as the subject o f the law, w h i c h belongs essentially to his capacity for moral action. K a n t seems to have this in m i n d w h e n he describes con­ tempt as a vice because it 'takes a w a y something that w o u l d otherwise be for the g o o d o f the subject'. A g a i n , in observing a duty o f respect w e contain ourselves vrithin certain limits 'in order t o detract nothing from the w o r t h w h i c h another person, as a man, is entitled t o posit in himself'. This line o f argument, h o w e v e r , becomes m o r e explicit and forceful w h e n K a n t turns t o the specific vices o f contempt. Since this introduction has been concerned primarily w i t h problems arising from duties o f respect, w e shall, reverse Kant's order and treat duties o f respect before duties o f l o v e . T h e m a x i m o f respect, it will be recalled, excludes a m a x i m o f contempt, w h i c h can manifest itself in several w a y s . Hence duties o f respect are t o be treated indirectly, through the prohibition o f these contrary vices. 2 3

24

25

A. PRIDE

While all violations o f duties o f respect manifest an attitude o f c o n ­ tempt for others, the m a x i m o f pride is the general expression o f contempt. Kant distinguishes b e t w e e n t w o attitudes: Hochmut {superbid), which m i g h t be called 'arrogance', and Stolz {animus elatus), w h i c h could be called 'self-respect' or 'a proper pride'. T h e first is described as a kind o f ambition, a striving always to be higher than others, b y reason o f w h i c h one demands o f others*~tnat they value themselves slightly in comparison w i t h oneself This is contrasted w i t h Stolz, which is qualified as 'noble' and described as anxiety to yield up none o f one's w o r t h as a m a n in comparison w i t h other m e n . T h e differ26

23 2 9

M.d.S., -402-3.

2 4

Ibid., 464.

25

Ibid., 450.

Ibid., 465. Stolz is identified here w i t h Ehrliebe, the external manifestation o f w h i c h is Ehrbarkheit (honestas externa). T h e fact that t h e latter is set forth as a

/

D U T I E S OF V I R T U E T O OTHER

MEN

l8Q

ence between these t w o attitudes is a fundamental one. Self-respect is . based o n one's consciousness o f one's dignity as^ a person and o f the rights flowing from personahty, and does not deny a similar recogni­ tion to others: arrogance is based o n contingent circumstances and violates the respect due others b y requiring that they sacrifice their dignity in order to heighten one's o w n self-esteem. T h e arrogant man, Kant points out, is really lacking in proper pride: he is always servile in the depths o f his soul, since he w o u l d not demand that others behave in a servile w a y to h i m unless he felt that, should his fortune change, it w o u l d not be difficult for liim to f a w n upon others and give up all claim to respect from them. W h i l e Kant notes that contemptuous treatment o f others is c o n ­ trary to principles o f both skill and prudence, i t is n o t these considera­ tions that make pride a vice. Its character as a vice lies simply in the fact that it is a denial o f the respect due others as m e n . ' T o contemn others is always contrary to duty, for they are men.' T h e fact that the ground for the respect due others as m e n is their capacity for moral action, not their actual attainment o f virtue, implies that the contempt w h i c h w e cannot help feeling for certain individual m e n w h o pay n o attention to the l a w cannot extend to a denial o f their inalienable w o r t h as subjects o f pure practical reason. B o t h the principle o f practical respect and its admixture o f practical love require us to conceal e v e n the contempt w e inevitably feel for immoral persons. Should w e find it necessary to censure their vice, Kant notes, it is unjust and e v e n incorrect in a theoretical w a y t o deny their inherent w o r t h as m e n ; for w e are then assuming that they can never improve, an assumption ' w h i c h is inconsistent w i t h the Idea o f a man, w h o as such (as a m o r a l being) can never lose;all predisposition to the g o o d ' . It is also contrary to practical l o v e , t o our. necessary concern for their moral w e l l - b e i n g , w h i c h requires that w e censure their vice in such a w a y as t o m a k e t h e m realize their capacity for i m ­ provement. In a characteristic aside, K a n t notes that o u r d u t y ofirespect extends even into our discussions w i t h others o n theoretical matters. In arguing a point w i t h s o m e o n e w e o u g h t not t o dismiss his errors as 'absurdities' or 'poor j u d g m e n t ' , but rather t o l o o k for the element :

2 7

principle o f the general division o f juridical duties i n M.d.S., 237, a g a i n s h o w s that perfect duties t o w a r d o n e s e l f a n d duties o f respect c o m p r i s e , m a sense, relations o f justice ( t o w a r d one's o w n ' h u m a n i t y and t o w a r d o t h e r m e n ) carried b e y o n d the sphere o f external c o m p u l s i o n . 1

27

M.d.S., 464.

190

LAWS

OE. F R E E D O M

o f truth in his argument and then explain to h i m h o w he c a m e to err, thus preserving his respect for his o w n understanding; for ' i f one denies him all understanding . . . , h o w can one m a k e h i m understand that he has erred?' 28

B. D E T R A C T I O N

Detraction is described as a propensity t o bring into the open s o m e • thing prejudicial t o another, w h i c h w i l l detract f r o m the respect due * him. Although Kant describes this propensity as h a v i n g n o particular end in view, he is probably speaking m o r e precisely w h e n he adds, later, that w e are actually striving to maintain o r heighten esteem for ourselves. B y discrediting others t h r o u g h evil gossip w e are trying to ensure an opinion that w e ourselves are as g o o d as, or at least n o w o r s e than, other m e a . Since duties o f respect are duties o f virtue, Kant distinguishes carefully between detraction and slander. T h e latter is a false statement, prejudicial to another's h o n o u r , w h i c h can be taken to court. That w h i c h comprises detraction cannot be taken to L a w . W h a t is said about the other m a y be true; nevertheless, K a n t m a i n ­ tains, t o say it is contrary t o our d u t y o f practical respect. 2 9

s

Here again, as in the case o f pride, the violation o f the respect due to others hardly requires elaboration. Instead, K a n t stresses the acces­ sory obligation o f striving to p r o m o t e the m o r a l w e l l - b e i n g o f others through the primarily negative means at o u r disposal. H e points out that men in general, as w e l l as the particular person w h o s e faults are made public, are harmed b y this vice, since the repeated direction o f their attention to men's failings weakens their respect for the human race as such and 'finally throws the s h a d o w o f worthlessness over our whole species', m a k i n g cynicism the dominant w a y o f thinking. D e ­ traction can eventually blunt and stultify m o r a l feeling itself, i.e. the feeling o f reverence for humanity as such and so for humanity vvithin one's o w n person. B u t in an interesting remark K a n t seems to suggest that our duty o f concern for the m o r a l w e l l - b e i n g o f others is not strictly limited'to refraining from w h a t m i g h t h a r m them. W e ought, he notes, to throw the veil o f b e n e v o l e n c e - ^ v e r the faults o f others, 'not merely b y softening our j u d g m e n t but also b y concealing these faults. For the example o f respect w h i c h w e g i v e another could arouse his striving to be w o r t h y o f this r e s p e c t ' . A l t h o u g h the available means for promoting the moral welfare o f others are primarily negat­ ive, this passage suggests that they are n o t strictly so. M.d.S., 463. ^ Ibid., 466. *> Ibid. 30

28

/ C.

DUTIES

OF V I R T U E

TO

OTHER

MEN

IQI

SCORN

Scorn is described as the propensity to ridicule others for their real or imagined faults. Here again K a n t suggests that it is the agent's attitude o f will, as w e l l as his external actions, that comprises the vice. T h e propensity w h i c h leads to the vice is a spiritus causticus, and the ridicule is aimed at depriving another person o f the respect due him. T h e vice is distinguished from the good-natured banter w h i c h is the prerogative o f friends, not merely b y the fact that the latter is directed at what is merely 'the appearance o f a fault' whereas ridicule singles out real faults (or at least w h a t the agent regards as real faults), but also b y the fact that the m o c k e r y contains n o scorn in it. W h a t makes ridicule a vice is, essentially, the fact that it is a denial o f the respect due another. But, Kant adds, the immediate delight in another's faults manifested here makes it so m u c h the m o r e contrary to duty because it contains something o f a fiendish j o y . 3 1

As contempt is the general attitude t o w a r d others prohibited b y the principle o f practical respect, so benevolence or weU-wishing is the general attitude t o w a r d m e n as such enjoined b y the principle o f practi­ cal love. This attitude, again, manifests itself in'specific duties o f l o v e : beneficence or active benevolence, gratitude and sympathy. A n d as the moral necessity o f an attitude o f benevolence excludes the possi­ bility o f hatred t o w a r d m e n as such, so the laws enjoining particular duties o f l o v e implicitly prohibit the contrary vices o f hatred: envy, ingratitude and dehght in others' misfortunes. Here again the love w h i c h w e are obliged t o extend others is not the e m o t i o n o f love. A l t h o u g h Kant holds that w i t h o u t the capacity for feeling l o v e w e should accomplish little in the w a y o f duty and that fulfilment o f our duties o f love leads us eventually to feel l o v e for other m e n , it remains true that w e cannot s u m m o n up a feeling merely because w e w i l l t o . T h e l o v e w h i c h it is our duty to have for other m e n is, rather, practical love, a m a x i m o f concern for their welfare. K a n t characterizes the basic m a x i m o f benevolence somewhat ' differently depending o n w h e t h e r he is stressing its distinction from a mere e m p t y wish or f r o m the activity o f helping others. O n the one hand, it is not a mere matter o f feeling, a natural k i n d l y disposition w h i c h m a y remain permanently ineffectual. It is, rather, a" practical benevolence, w h i c h 'concerns the maxims o f actions—a m a x i m o f benevolence (as practical) w h i c h has beneficence, as its consequence'. M.d.S., 467. Ibid., 401-2 and 449. Ibid., 449. 3 2

33

31

3 2

3 3

I

0

LAWS

2

OF

FREEDOM

O n the other hand, in contrasting it w i t h beneficence K a n t calls it 'a mere benevolence o f wish, w h i c h is really only a satisfaction in the well-being o f others without one's h a v i n g ' t o d o anything t o w a r d this' and which 'costs us n o t h i n g ' . These t w o descriptions, h o w e v e r , d o not really contradict each other. W e are under obligation to h a v e a maxim o f benevolence toward all men, and although as such, i.e. in its universality, is it only a wish, still it is a practical attitude w h i c h , in its relation to certain m e n within our field o f activity, has as its conse­ quence our making the welfare o f these m e n our end and acting t o promote this end. A l t h o u g h it is our duty to have an attitude o f b e n e ­ volence toward all men, w e cannot extend active benevolence t o t h e m all; and by this distinction the universality o f the m a x i m o f b e n e ­ volence is reconciled w i t h a distinction according to persons in m a k i n g their subjective ends our o w n . 'For in m y w i s h I can w i s h e v e r y o n e well equally, but in m y actions the measure can still be v e r y different . . . without violating the universality o f the m a x i m ' . Kant admits that, o f the several possible attitudes t o w a r d m e n as such, it is not immediately evident that w e are under obligation t o adopt that o f benevolence as our m a x i m . O n the contrary, the attitude o f indifference expressed in the saying ' e v e r y m a n for himself and G o d for us all' seems to be the most natural o n e . A n attitude o f concern for our O w n happiness and indifference t o that o f others must be c o n ­ sidered the natural and given situation in the relations o f m e n as such to one another because, w h i l e w e can presuppose one's o w n happiness as the subjectively necessary end o f e v e r y finite rational being, w h e t h e r one concerns oneself w i t h the happiness o f others is, apart f r o m moral laws, contingent upon one's having certain altruistic mclinations. B u t , Kant argues, this natural situation is morally impossible. O n e ' s o w n happiness is a necessary object o f a finite rational will, and if, as is morally necessary, one adopts this end o n the basis o f its rational valid­ ity, one cannot at the same time b e mdifferent to the happiness o f others. I f I adopt m y happiness as an end, n o t merely o n the basis o f m y natural desire for happiness but rather o n the g r o u n d that it is rational for any being w i t h needs and wants t o w i l l the satisfaction o f these, then m y w i l l is not a private w i l l b u t j a t h e r , i f the description is taken without metaphysical implications, a universal w i l l . A n d so M.d.S., 452. Ibid-. 34

3 5

36

3

34

3 6

**Ibid. Kant actually uses this expression t o e x e m p l i f y the contrary o f b e n e ­ ficence; but since the attitude o f b e n e v o l e n c e is itself practical, a m a x i m o f n o n indifference t o the welfare o f others, i t expresses e q u a l l y w e l l the c o n t r a r y o f benevolence i n general.

DUTIES

OF V I R T U E

TO

OTHER

MEN

^

193

m y attitude t o w a r d happiness is n o t an attitude merely toward m y happiness but rather t o w a r d the happiness o f men as such. T o will m y o w n happiness and, at the same time, be mdifferent t^o the happiness o f others w o u l d be morally w r o n g because m y m a x i m regarding happi­ ness w o u l d lack the universality o f a law. Kant puts this point forcefully. M y m a x i m regarding happiness, he argues, must have the universality o f a law, and hence I cannot be in­ different to the happiness o f other* men. 'Since, h o w e v e r ; all other m e n w i t h the exception o f m y s e l f do not comprise all men, and accordingly the m a x i m w o u l d not have in itself the universality o f a law, w h i c h is necessary for obhgation, so the l a w o f the duty o f bene­ volence includes m y s e l f within the c o m m a n d o f practical reason, as its object'. This does not mean that I a m under obhgation to l o v e my-, self, since I cannot have a duty t o d o w h a t I d o spontaneously and in­ evitably. It means, rather, that it is morally permissible for m e to be benevolent to m y s e l f (as I inevitably am) only under the condition that I also wish every other man well. For only w h e n m y m a x i m o f bene­ volence is one t o w a r d men as such can it qualify for g i v i n g universal law, 'on w h i c h principle every l a w o f duty is based'. 37

O u r obhgation to have a m a x i m o f benevolence t o w a r d mankind as such, Kant notes, is the greatest in extension a m o n g our duties o f love, and at the same time the least so far as the degree o f practical love is concerned. T o fulfil this duty to another it is o n l y necessary not to be mdifferent to him, and our obhgation to this minimal practical love is an obhgation to all m e n as such. B u t it is this attitude o f nonmdifference to the welfare o f m e n as such that leads us to adopt the subjective ends o f certain m e n as our ends and so to fulfil our duty o f beneficence. Certain men, K a n t explains, are 'closer t o m e in the relation o f duty' than are others, and accordingly I a m obliged to extend practical l o v e to t h e m in a greater degree. In discussing our indirect duty o f promoting our o w n happiness, w e noted Kant's v i e w that w h d e w e cannot have a duty o f benevolence t o ourselves w e can have a duty o f beneficence to ourselves., T a m closer to m y s e l f (even according to duty) than to any other', and I a m therefore under obhga­ tion to myself to provide for m y o w n true n e e d s . Here, however, w e are discussing duties o f virtue to other men, so that this ground o f obhgation enters into the discussion only as a limitation u p o n one's duty o f beneficence to others. 38

6

37 88

14

MAS., 451 Ibid.

LAWS

194 A.

OF

FREEDOM

BENEFICENCE

T h e proof o f our obligation to beneficence, again, turns o n the i m ­ possibility o f willing our m a x i m o f selfishness as universal l a w . A s in the Grundlegung, Kant argues that our m a x i m o f refusing to help others w h o are in need w o u l d contradict itself w e r e it made a universal law. For our m a x i m o f selfishness, made into a universal l a w , w o u l d be a universal permissive l a w entitling others to deny us help w h e n w e are in need, and in so far as w e w i l l our o w n happiness, w e w i s h for others to be prepared to assist us w h e n their help is essential to our happiness. In so far as moral laws, rather than pragmatic rules,'are in question, it need hardly be pointed out that the argument does not involve the assumption that m y refusal t o help others in need w i l l have the result o f making everyone deny m e help w h e n I need it. N o r is it necessary to assume that at some time I shall need help o r w a n t it from others: 1 m a y feel assured against ever needing help f r o m others, or I may be strong enough not to w a n t their help i f I a m in need. Such considerations w o u l d not change the force o f Kant's argument that w e are under obligation to adopt a m a x i m o f helping others w h o are in need and w h o d o w a n t our h e l p . It is o n l y necessary t o assume that I do will m y o w n happiness, and f r o m this it follows, according to Kant's argument, that I must also w i l l the happiness o f others and must, therefore, have a m a x i m o f helping t h e m w h e n they are in need and want m y help. 39

4 0

' W e have already noticed, in general terms, the reasons w h y our duty i o f beneficence is an imperfect one. E v e n apart from the question o f whether imperfect duty permits arbitrary exceptions, K a n t holds that empirical factors enter into j u d g m e n t ' s determination o f b o t h the extent to which w e should act and the sort o f thing w h i c h is to be done. T h e extent to w h i c h w e should practice beneficence depends, first, u p o n the extent o f our o w n true needs and the resources w h i c h w e have. H o w far, Kant asks in his casuistical questions, should one expend his resources in helping others? and replies: ' N o t to such an extent that he eventually brings himself to need another's b e n e f i c e n c e ' . T o d o so w o u l d be contrary t o one's d u t y o f self-esteem for oneself, w h i c h requires maintaining the status o f independence befitting a man, in MAS., 453, Cf. also Gr., 423. 41

89

4 0

Cf. J. Ebbinghaus: 'Interpretation a n d Misinterpretation o f the Categorical Imperative'; The Philosophical Quarterly, 1954. F o r Kant's v i e w that t h e m a n w h o is strong e n o u g h n o t t o seek help f r o m others still has a d u t y o f b e n e f i c e n c e t o " t h e m , cf. Gr., 398-9 a n d also 430, n . 1. «Af.rf.S.,454.

DUTIES

OF V I R T U E

TO

OTHER

MEN

IO<

so far as this is possible. M o r e o v e r , abstracting from any question o f a rightful claim in the strict sense, certain people stand in a closer relation to one than do others, and accordingly one's duty o f beneficence to them is greater. S o far as the extent o f our actions! is concerned, the l a w cannot determine them precisely because, in any g i v e n situation, it will depend o n the distinction o f persons (oneself and other men) involved and the closeness o f their relation in the duty o f love. Neither can the l a w determine precisely w h a t is to be done toward promoting the happiness o f other men. Kant recognizes that w e cannot make another person happy according to our o w n notion o f happiness, but only according to the other's conception o f it (except in the case o f children and the insane). W i t h i n the hmits imposed b y the lawful­ ness o f the other's ends, it is for h i m to decide w h a t constitutes his happiness. W e are obliged in a general w a y to help h i m achieve the subjective ends w h i c h , he believes, belong to his happiness. I f w e consider certain o f these ends to be foolish or contrary t o his happiness, w e need not help h i m to further them, so long as he has n o right to demand this particular thing. B u t the guiding principle here is that, within the hmits imposed b y the l a w and b y the m o r e obvious require­ ments o f g o o d j u d g m e n t , it is for the other's wishes to determine in w h a t w a y w e are to help h i m . W i t h regard to b o t h the extent and the kind o f action, it should be recalled that, according t o the n o n rigoristic v i e w o f Kant's theory o n imperfect duty, the l a w enjoining beneficence also leaves r o o m , b e t w e e n our m a x i m and o u r action, for an arbitrary, subjective factor in determining w h o m w e shall help, to w h a t extent, and b y w h a t means. 4 2

W i t h regard to the vice o f hatred contrary to beneficence, Kant draws a distinction between e n v y and jealousy w h i c h seems to parallel that between beneficence and benevolence. E n v y in general is an attitude o f displeasure in the welfare o f others, even t h o u g h the increase in their well-being has n o prejudicial effect o n our o w n . I f this attitude extends into actions aimed at diminishing their g o o d , the vice is true or 'qualified' e n v y ; otherwise it is mere jealousy. A l l the vices o f hatred, Kant remarks, are the m o r e degrading, and contrary to our d u t y to ourselves as w e l l as to others, because the hatred is secret and veiled. B u t to call these vices 'fiendish' w o u l d be an exaggeration. For none o f them is an immediate hatred o f others: all o f them are o n l y mediate hatred, w h i c h has "a basis in human nature. In the case o f e n v y , the ground o f the vice is really an unwillingness to see our o w n M.d.S* 388 and 454. 42

106

LAWS

OF

FREEDOM

good overshadowed b y that o f another person, a reluctance w h i c h arises from our valuing our o w n g o o d , o n l y b y comparison w i t h the good o f other m e n and not according to its intrinsic w o r t h . 4 3

B.

GRATITUDE

Gratitude is a duty o f all men t o one another, in the sense that'it is independent o f such circumstances as age, status, wealth, etc.; but it presupposes o n the part o f one person an act o f kindness t o w a r d an­ other. Kant describes the duty o f gratitude as that o f honouring another because o f a kindness received from h i m . T h e feeling w h i c h a c c o m ­ panies this recognition is respect for the benefactor. Y e t K a n t regards gratitude as a duty o f love, apparently because w e are under obligation to return a similar service o f l o v e t o o u r benefactor. I f he has s h o w n us a mere heart-felt wish for our welfare, w e o w e h i m at least r e c o g ­ nition o f the kindness and a similar w i s h ; i f he has s h o w n us active benevolence, w e o w e h i m a like service, i f he is still alive, and i f he is dead w e should pass o n to others the kindness w e have r e c e i v e d . Kant offers n o formal argument establisliing the duty o f gratitude, since this is already contained in his description o f duties o f l o v e as those in w h i c h one lays an obligation o n another. 4 4

45

Gratitude, Kant continues, involves a feeling o f respect for one's benefactor w h i c h disturbs our equality w i t h h i m i n the relation o f respect. W e feel ourselves 'a step l o w e r ' than our benefactor because w e o w e h i m a debt w h i c h , since he has taken the initiative i n love, w e can never fully discharge. This inequahty explains the possibility o f ingratitude, w h i c h m a y extend f r o m a mere lack o f appreciativeness to hatred o f our benefactor; for w e fear that, i n recognizing our debt o f gratitude, w e shall diminish our o w n dignity. B u t this fear, K a n t explains, arises f r o m a mistaken v i e w o f o u r d u t y t o ourselves. W e o w e it to our o w n humanity t o take all possible steps t o preserve our independence and to put up w i t h hardship rather than seek help f r o m others. B u t if, having fulfilled our d u t y t o ourselves, w e y e t b e c o m e the object o f another's beneficence, w e o u g h t n o t t o regard our debt o f gratitude as a burden o f w h i c h w e w o u l d gladly rid ourselves. W e ought, rather, t o l o o k upon it as n o t ' o h r y a material kindness but a 46

4 8

M A S . . 45? and 461.

4 4

Ibid., 454.

«Ibid., 456.

"Ibid., 459. K a n t h o l d s that o u r d u t y o f g r a t i t u d e e x t e n d s e v e n t o p e o p l e o f earlier times, w h o can b e considered o u r teachers. H e n o t e s that it is because w e incur this debt o f gratitude t o o u r forefathers i n e v i t a b l y that w e freely r e c o g n i z e o u r debt. In the case o f a d e b t o f gratitude w h i c h w e m i g h t h a v e a v o i d e d , w e are often reluctant t o a c k n o w l e d g e it.

i

DUTIES OF V I R T U E TO OTHER MEN ^

197

moral loudness as well, since it provides the opportunity for us to culti­ vate our love o f h u m a n i t y . A l t h o u g h Kant does not elaborate further on this statement, he seems to mean that our obhgation to gratitude gives us the opportunity to unite a m a x i m o f practical benevolence w i t h the feeling o f love in returning the act o f kindness, and so provides an occasion for culti­ vating our love for m e n in general, w h i c h belongs to our moral per­ fection. M o r e o v e r , the benefactor's experience o f receiving gratitude in return for his kindness w i l l encourage h i m to a greater exercise o f benevolence and strengthen his feeling o f l o v e as w e l l . A l t h o u g h Kant maintains that there is really n o conflict b e t w e e n the duty o f selfesteem and that o f gratitude, his conviction that it better befits the status o f a man to be the source o f others' welfare than the object o f their benevolence leads h i m to stress the active or practical side o f gratitude, i.e. the occasion w h i c h it provides for us to assume, on our o w n part, an active role in b e n e v o l e n c e . 47

48

C.

SYMPATHY

Since w e have a direct d u t y o f beneficence to others, w e have an indirect duty to cultivate our natural capacities for partidpating e m o ­ tionally in the j o y s and sorrows o f other m e n ; for these are feelings w h i c h can help us in carrying out our duties o f love. T h e duty o f c u l ­ tivating our feelings o f natural sympathy, K a n t explains^ is a duty w h i c h belongs to us, n o t merely as rational beings as such, but as animals e n d o w e d w i t h reason. It is a duty o f uniting humanitas practica, the will to share in another's j o y s and misfortunes, w i t h humanitas aesthetica, the emotional c a p a d t y to partidpate in another's feelings. A l t h o u g h Kant recognizes the aesthetic value o f l o v e and the emotions allied w i t h it, it is natural that in moral philosophy h e should stress the practical use to w h i c h such feelings can be put in m a k i n g our maxims o f beneficence m o r e effective. O f the t w o feelings w h i c h pertain t o moral sympathy, delight in another's j o y and s o r r o w in his misery, the latter is the m o r e useful in fulfilling our duties o f benevolence. Accordingly Kant, emphasizes the obhgation to strengthen this feeling b y e.g. visiting the sick, debtors' prisons, and the places where the p o o r are to be found. 49

47

MAS., 456. ^ ' . <2£. a b o v e , p . 128, n. 1. O u r d u t y o f b e n e v o l e n c e t o o t h e r s is, Kant holds, a n indirect d u t y t o ourselves o f m a k i n g ourselves the source o f o t h e r m e n ' s happiness. 4 9 MAS., 456. 4 8

108

LAWS

OF

FREEDOM

Although w e have had occasion before t o speak o f Kant's attitude toward the emotions and inclinations, the opinion that he is blind to, if not hostile toward, all such feelings is so ingrained as to warrant some further remarks o n the subject. W h i l e K a n t insists that m a n is not responsible for the inclinations w h i c h nature has implanted in him, he recognizes that w h a t man voluntarily does w i t h his mclinations can be imputed to h i m either as merit or as guilt. H e is responsible i f he allows his mclinations, through indulgence, to influence his m a x i m s to the prejudice o f the moral law. B u t , conversely, his natural mclinations which have been cultivated w i t h a v i e w to assisting h i m in carrying out his moral purposes can also be ascribed to his freedom. Nature, Kant tells us, implants a capacity for certain feelings in man, but this capacity can be actuated in t w o w a y s : 'unfreely', i.e. b y the mere interplay o f natural causes, or ' f r e e l y ' . In the latter case, the capacity for sympathetic participation in other men's feelings has been d e v e ­ loped according to principles o f reason and is, in part, the w o r k o f reason. For although, as Kant has said, w e cannot feel an e m o t i o n because w e will to, and it is still a natural cause that calls forth the emotion, reason has previously ensured that the natural cause (another's sorrow) will awaken this response b y c o m m a n d i n g us to perform certain actions w h i c h w i l l give rise to this response. In his discussion o f the emotion o f l o v e Kant notes that 50

Beneficence is a duty. H e w h o exercises it often and succeeds in his beneficent intention comes eventually really to l o v e the m a n w h o m he has helped. Hence the principle, y o u should l o v e y o u r neighbour as yourself, does not m e a n : y o u should immediately (first) l o v e him, and through the m e d i u m o f this l o v e do g o o d to him, but rather: d o g o o d to y o u r fellow-man, and this bene­ ficence will produce l o v e for m e n in y o u (as a facility o f the mclination to beneficence in g e n e r a l ) . 51

In this case, as in that o f 'moral sympathy', the emotion itself is, in part, the w o r k o f our freedom. T h e vice contrary t o the duty o f natural s y m p a t h y i s malicious j o y in the, misfortunes o f other men. T h e propensity to feel j o y in an­ other's misfortune, Kant explains, is agaifi^rounded in nature: accord­ ing to the laws o f imagination, m o r e specifically the l a w o f contrast, w e feel our o w n well-rbeing and e v e n our g o o d conduct the m o r e strongly b y contrast w i t h another's misfortune or scandalous behavi60

MAS., 456-7.

5 1

Ibid., 402.

DUTIES OF VIRTUE TO OTHER

MEN

IQQ

our/ B u t to encourage this feeling and, worse yet, to base on it a m a x i m o f bringing misfortune to others in order to delight in it is directly contrary to our duty o f sympathy, w h i c h is summarized in the saying: 'I am a man, and all that affects m a n concerns me t o o ' . 52

THE D U T Y OF F R I E N D S H I P

53

In order really to fulfil a d u t y o f love, i.e. to promote another person's welfare, our m a x i m o f l o v e must contain an admixture o f practical respect; but the duty is one o f l o v e because the m a x i m o f respect is joined w i t h it only as an accessory principle. A n d so top in our fulfil­ ment o f duties o f respect. T h e duty o f friendship must, accordingly, be treated separately f r o m duties o f l o v e and respect, because the m a x i m o f friendship combines l o v e and respect in equal measure. Kant has noted that our fulfilment o f a duty o f respect or love is accompanied b y emotional respect or love. This is true o f friendship also, w h i c h , in its perfection, is 'the union o f t w o persons through equal and mutual l o v e and respect'. T h e relation o f perfect friendship includes both the practical and emotional sides o f l o v e and respect (humanitas practica and humanitas aesthetica); and because it includes equal and mutual feelings o f l o v e and respect, friendship in its perfection remains only an ideal. It is our duty to strive to realize this relationship and to approximate to it, but not to realize it. A t t a c k i n g the ' h o b b y ­ horse' o f the romancers, K a n t lists some o f the obstacles w h i c h prevent us from achieving it in practice. 54

O n e obstacle is implicit in the definition o f perfect friendship, as a union o f t w o people t h r o u g h equal and mutual l o v e and respect: for it is difficult both to strike the balance o f emotional l o v e and respect toward another o n our o w n part and to return his l o v e and respect in equal measure. I f the measure o f our l o v e exceeds his, or vice-versa, his respect for us or our respect for h i m is likely to be chminished. Another difficulty lies in mamtaining the emotional side o f the relation­ ship while putting.into practice our maxims o f practical love and respect. If one o f the friends wants to draw too close in the relation o f l o v e and is checked b y the other's respect for h i m , he is likely to consider this a rebuff and a w a n t o f l o v e o n the other's part. Finally, it pertains to the l o v e o f friendship that each be prepared t o help the 62

M.d.S.\ 460.

6 3

'

a

V

Q n this subject cf. H . J . P a t o n : 'Kant o n Friendship'; Proceedings of the British Academy, V o l . XLII (1956), p p . 45-66.

"M.d.S., 469.

LAWS

200

OF

FREEDOM

other w h e n he is in need. B u t it is dangerous to the relation o f friend­ ship for either o f the partners to ask the other for help or to accept it from him; for, as w e have seen, the one w h o accepts the favour from the other feels a respect for h i m w h i c h he cannot expect to have re­ turned. Equal l o v e between the t w o m a y remain, but the equality o f respect w h i c h is essential to perfect friendship is disturbed. For these reasons, and others, Kant maintains that perfect friendship is only an ideal o f the m a x i m u m moral relations a m o n g men, w h i c h cannot be fully realized. But in 'moral' (as distinguished f r o m 'aesthetic') friendship, Kant singles out one special aspect o f the relationship w h i c h he describes as 'the complete confidence o f t w o persons in the mutual disclosure o f their secret thoughts and feelings, in so far as this is consistent w i t h mutual respect'. Freedom to open to another one's thoughts o n such subjects as one's associates, the g o v e r n m e n t , religion, etc., should be both the outcome o f friendship and a most important aspect o f it. But Kant is well aware o f the hmitations w h i c h the realities o f human affairs place upon the duty o f striving for this relationship. T o begin with, w e cannot achieve this relationship w i t h e v e r y o n e : a necessary prerequisite to it is a certain c o m m o n o u t l o o k shared b y t w o persons. A n d even w h e n w e find someone w i t h w h o m w e share this outlook, the other person m a y not be w o r t h y o f our complete confidence: he may make an unscrupulous use o f w h a t w e h a v e revealed to him, or he may, through mere indiscretion, be incapable o f chstmguishing between what is to be kept secret and w h a t can be passed o n t o others. M o r e ­ over, in disclosing our secret thoughts w e are likely to reveal our o w n deficiencies, and i f the other does n o t reciprocate, w e l o w e r ourselves in the relation o f respect. Y e t , K a n t feels, this aspect o f friendship, unlike perfect friendship, can actually be realized at times a m o n g m e n . W h i l e friendship in its perfection is o n l y an ideal, w e have noted Kant's v i e w that a m a x i m o f friendship, rather than o f philanthropy, is the correct moral attitude t o w a r d men. In a relation o f philanthropy the benefactor gives the other m o r e than his due and puts h i m under an obligation to gratitude. Hence the pliilandnropist is likely t o fall into pride and condescension and to forget t h a t h e is himself under obliga­ tion to benevolence. T h e attitude o f friendship, o n the other hand, contains the note o f equality a m o n g m e n , 'and consequently the idea o f being under obligation - b y this, at the same time that one puts another under obHgation through b e n e v o l e n c e ; as brothers, as it MJ.S., 471. . 55

6&

/

DUTIES

OF V I R T U E

TO OTHER

MEN

201 56

were, under one Father w h o wills the happiness o f a l l ' . The' man w h o is rich, Kant remarks, o u g h t not to regard his exercise o f benevolence as something meritorious, but only as the fulfilment o f his duty. In the first place, i f he makes the other person aware that the act is one o f beneficence, his act is not really a kindness at all, since he humiliates the other; and in the second place, his attitude m a y not even cor­ respond w i t h the realities o f the\ situation. Perhaps, K a n t suggests, it is incorrect to regard the rich man's gifts to the needy as 'beneficence' at all; since the distinction between rich and p o o r often results from the injustice o f the g o v e r n m e n t , his 'beneficence' m a y be only justice, restoring to others w h a t should rightfully be theirs. In any case, an honest appraisal o f the fact that his kindness costs h i m n o sacrifice and that he receives from it, besides, the satisfaction o f m o r a l feeling w i l l lead h i m to realize that the indebtedness is on his o w n side. T h e m a n whose beneficence involves self-sacrifice will, presumably, be suffi­ ciently aware o f his o w n needs to recognize that w e are all fellowmen, equal in the fact that w e all have needs and wants. A s 'rational beings w i t h needs, united b y nature in one d w e l l i n g place for the purpose o f helping one a n o t h e r ' , men should, in their attitude toward one another, reflect the equality o f love and respect implied in friend­ ship. v

57

58

THE

VIRTUES

OF S O C I A L

INTERCOURSE

Kant concludes his analysis o f duties o f virtue t o others w i t h a note on the 'homiletic virtues', i.e. the virtues o f social intercourse. Here w e are to consider l o v e and respect manifesting themselves in our ordinary intercourse w i t h m e n at large, w i t h a v i e w to promoting the attitude o f 'citizens o f the w o r l d ' a m o n g them. It is a duty to cultivate these virtues o f affability and propriety in so far as they are means w h i c h tend mdirectly t o promote the highest g o o d . Several positions w h i c h K a n t has previously adopted c o m e to bear on our obhgation to cultivate these virtues o f sociabihty and courtesy. W i t h i n the context o f his philosophy o f history, these w o u l d be virtues. For Kant, the ultimate end o f nature is man's culture, and the means w h i c h nature uses to free m e n from enslavement to their animal i m ­ pulses and enable them to set purposes, i f not in complete independence •from nature, at least in freedom from their purely animal instincts, include 'the refinement.of society' as well as the progress
68

M.d.S., 473.

6 7

Ibid., 453-4.

5 8

Ibid., 453-

" Cf. K.d.U., 429 ff. •

LAWS

202

OF

FREEDOM

buting to the refinement o f social intercourse w e are co-operating with the purposes o f nature in v i e w o f the final end, preparing m e n to do what they must themselves do in order t o achieve their final end. Although such considerations are m o r e relevant to man's historical development, they are, w h e n r e m o v e d f r o m their historical and teleo­ logical context, close to the reason w h i c h K a n t actually gives for regarding politeness and accessibility as virtues. Secondly, Kant has argued that it is a duty t o cultivate those feelings and mclinations w h i c h w i l l facilitate our fulfilment o f duty. I f w e cultivate such dispositions as accessibility, courtesy, hospitality, gentle­ ness, communicativeness, etc. from a motice o f duty, w e m a y thereby develop feelings w h i c h w i l l make our m a x i m s o f respect and l o v e more effective in practice. K a n t regards the social virtues as duties to ourselves as w e l l as to others, and the fact that the exercise o f these virtues will refine our o w n feelings seems to be, in part, the g r o u n d for regarding them as duties t o ourselves. But it is primarily as duties to others that K a n t treats the cultivation o f the social virtues. W h e n w e extend, e.g. courtesy t o another, w e bind him to a reciprocal s h o w o f courtesy, and i n this w a y there is brought about an appearance or illusion o f m o r a l relations o f l o v e and respect a m o n g men. Affability and propriety, w h i c h g i v e the appear­ ance o f love and respect, are only the ' o u t w o r k s ' or ' b y - p r o d u c t s ' o f virtue, and the illusion o f virtue w h i c h they g i v e 'deceives n o one, since everyone k n o w s w h a t they are w o r t h ' . Y e t they tend t o p r o m o t e virtue b y encouraging m e n to strive to bring this appearance as close as possible to the truth. K a n t has always maintained that a life o f virtue, far from being a morose and cheerless existence, involves so m a n y 'charms and satisfactions' that it w o u l d r e c o m m e n d itself e v e n o n aes­ thetic and prudential, grounds. T h e attractiveness o f a virtuous life should be used only as a counterpoise to the attractions o f vice. This prospect m a y be combined w i t h the t h o u g h t o f d u t y as a m o t i v e in order first to attract one to virtue since, after this beginning, the moral law can make its force felt, separate itself f r o m the other m o t i v e , and be sufficient o f itself. Hence 'to unite yjrtuje w i t h the graces' in one's o w n conduct and thereby bind others t o courtesy and affability is to present concretely the appearance o f virtuous relations a m o n g m e n and, b y the attractiveness o f this prospect, 'to m a k e virtue fashionable'. T h e exercise o f the social virtues is a duty because it tends indirectly to promote virtue itself. CCKJ.p.V., 88, «M.d.S.,473. 60

61

40

C O N C L U S I O N Even a cursory reading o f the Metaphysik der Sitten reveals that Kant's systematic appHcation o f the categorical imperative is a far different procedure from that usuahy attributed to him. Kant's supreme moral principle states that an action is w r o n g i f its m a x i m cannot, without contradiction, be regarded as universal law. A c c o r d i n g to a classical example o f Kantian criticism this means, concretely, that suicide is immoral because i f e v e r y o n e w e r e to act on a m a x i m o f suicide, the human race, and w i t h it the m a x i m o f suicicle itself, w o u l d become extinct. B u t Kant's o w n derivation o f duties shows clearly that he is not thinking o f logical consistency as the criterion o f moral action. T h e freedom from contradiction w h i c h he requires in a universalized m a x i m is, rather, a teleological consistency between our m a x i m and our objective, rational ends. T h u s in Kant's o w n account o f suicide it is not the self-defeating character o f the m a x i m that makes it i m ­ moral. It is rather the fact that, in acting o n a m a x i m o f arbitrarily destroying our capacity for free or moral action, w e are in contra­ diction w i t h our objective end as free or moral agents, and so in contra­ diction w i t h ourselves. This notion o f a teleological, as distinguished from a logical, contra­ diction is n o innovation o n the part o f the Metaphysik der Sitten. There is n o justification for speaking o f the ' n e w ethics' o f the Tugend­ lehre, as opposed to the 'old ethics' o f the Grundlegung. A s early as the pre-critical Fragment o f f . 1 7 7 5 , K a n t finds that I cannot oppose the moral l a w without 'controverting m y o w n reason' and willing ' w h a t is contrary to m y w i l l ' : conversely, b y conforming w i t h morahty's 'laws o f a thorough-going agreement w i t h oneself' I estabhsh h \ m y s e l f 'a practical unity o f the w i H ' . B u t for the content o f moral laws he refers us to 'the harmony o f the natural desires w i t h one's nature' and 'the harmony o f the . . . accidental desires w i t h nature and a m o n g themselves'. T h e consistency in question here is already a consistency between Our vohtions and ' o u r essential and highest purposes', w h i c h are d r a w n from the concept o f h u m a n nature as such, that is, from the concept o f a finite rational b e i n g e n d o w e d w i t h f r e e d o m . 1

1

The Fragment {Akademie e d i t i o n , V o l u m e X L X , p p . 276-82) is translated and.

203

204

LAWS

QF

FREEDOM

W h e n , about 1781, Kant delivered the course o f lectures w h i c h c o m ­ prise his Vorlesung, he was even more explicit about the 'contradiction' to be found in immoral maxims. In a m a x i m such as that o f arbitrary suicide, he explains, I contradict m y s e l f because I subordinate human nature to animal nature or bring practical reason under the control, o f the animal inclinations. Elaborating on his use o f 'human nature', K a n t explains that there are t w o grounds o f action in m a n : the inclinations, which belong to animal nature, and humanity, the cilstmgmshing characteristic o f w h i c h is freedom. Freedom is the condition o f the human use o f all our powers and the source o f all perfection: in it lies the worth o f humanity. Hence freedom's 'first rule is that in every action regarding oneself one ought so to behave that every use o f one's powers is consistent w i t h the fullest use o f t h e m ' . T h a t freedom, the highest order o f life, should annul itself and abrogate its o w n use is inconsistent w i t h the fullest use o f freedom. ' B u t it is only under certain conditions that freedom can be in h a r m o n y w i t h itself; otherwise it collides w i t h i t s e l f . . . ' A n d the condition under w h i c h freedom is selfconsistent is its agreement w i t h 'the essential ends o f h u m a n i t y ' . 2

3

So far as Kant's pre-critical w o r k s are concerned, it is clear that 'to contradict oneself' is to act contrary to the essential ends o f human nature, the highest o f w h i c h is freedom. It is hardly necessary to d w e l l on the recurrence o f this theme in the Metaphysik der Sitten. T h u s the 1 Grundlegung is embedded, as it w e r e , in a teleological context. Because the purpose o f the Grundlegung is only to isolate and investigate the supreme moral principle, and because this principle is a formal one, Kant there abstracts, for the m o m e n t , f r o m the question o f ends. It is only in the application o f the categorical imperative, not in the principle itself, that ends are relevant. So far as the Grundlegung's examples o f duties are concerned, it is clear that i n a w o r k thus limited in its purpose Kant cannot provide all the criteria necessary for deriving duties. Although, as Professor Paton has pointed o u t , these examples do make 4

commented o n in P. Schilpp's Kant's Pre-critical Ethics, pp. 127 ff. For a s o m e w h a t different v i e w o f the Fragment, cf. A . Hagerstrom, Kant's Ethik, p. 517 ff. I d o n o t w i s h to m i n i m i z e the radical difference b e t w e e n - t h ^ Fragment and Kant's critical ethics. M y point is o n l y that, f r o m t h e b e g i n n i n g , K a n t finds a close relation b e t w e e n the moral consistency o f t h e w i l l a n d m a n ' s 'essential a n d highest p u r ­ poses'. 2

..

3

Gf. P. Menzer, e d . : Eine Vorlesung Kants iiber Ethik, p . 152. Ibid. Although the Kritik der reinen Vemunft is n o t an ethical work, its Methoden-

lehre should also b e consulted for a discussion o f h o w t h e 'essential ends o f h u ­ manity' pertain t o t h e nature o f pure practical reason itself. 4

Cf. H . J. Paton: The Categorical Imperative, p . 149 ff.

/

CONCLUSION

205

use o f teleological criteria, they should not be used as the sole or even the primary source for Kant's applied moral philosophy. Since Kant himself has applied the categorical imperative, w e need not construct our o w n metaphysic o f morals, and, as the efforts o f Kant's critics prove, w e should not attempt to d o so. It is true that, b y taking 'contradiction' as logical contradiction, w e can save ourselves a g o o d deal of'effort. T o apply the categorical i m ­ perative w e need only try to conceive our maxims as universal k w s . In doing so, w e shall find that the maxims o f certain admittedly i m ­ moral actions, w h e n universalized, fail to give rise t o logical contra­ diction, w h i l e the maxims o f certain permissible and even obligatory actions contain contradictions. And^we can then dismiss the categorical imperative as the first principle o f duty. T h e essential difference between this procedure and Kant's is that Kant's method insists o n a systematic derivation o f duties and so o n the need for criteria. If the contradiction in an immoral m a x i m is a teleological one, then w e m u s t analyse the nature o f man as a composite animal, rational and m o r a l being, and compare the m a x i m in question w i t h the order w h i c h reason finds a m o n g these elements in his being. 5

T h e nature o f the categorical imperative itself tells us that the ulti­ mate end o f any moral l a w is to realize freedom. B y asking w h a t kind o f freedom can be realized through external compulsion, w e derive the first principle o f juridical laws, a principle w h i c h requires that our exercise o f outer freedom be consistent w i t h itself w h e n its m a x i m is conceived as a universal l a w . T h e 'consistency' in question here is a consistency between the means w e use in pursuing our ends and the possibility o f all others' acting in pursuit o f their ends. W i t h o u t these restricting laws, freedom collides w i t h or contradicts itself; that is, m y exercise o f freedom makes it impossible for others to express their freedom outwardly. A g a i n , the end o f laws w h i c h can be g i v e n only in ethical legislation is, freedom—inner freedom o f choice from the, domination o f the mclinations. A s juridical laws are conditions o f outer freedom, so ethical laws are conditions o f inner freedom, and to find these conditions, we must study the rational order a m o n g the elements o f our being. I f our pursuit o f our subjective ends makes it impossible for us to realize the rational ends o f our nature, then we are in contra­ diction w i t h the ends o f h u m a n nature and so i n contradictidn with. 6

In the second case, it is also necessary to accept the fallacy that, in testing the universal validity of our maxim, we must ignore the circumstances in which we arc acting and the results of our action.

206

LAWS

OF

FREEDOM

ourselves. A n d if w e fail to integrate our subjective ends into the system o f pure rational ends—if w e fail to adopt the obligatory ends o f reason— then w e are in contradiction w i t h ourselves because w e are choosing to live b y our inclinations rather than b y our reason, and so disrupting the rational order a m o n g the ends o f our b e i n g . The Metaphysik der Sitten is, in short, entirely consistent w i t h the Vorlesung $ principle: He w h o subjects his reason to the inclinations acts contrary to the essential ends o f humanity; for as a free agent he must not be subject to the inclinations but o u g h t rather to determine them through freedom. T h e end, therefore, to w h i c h m a n is directed is to achieve his fullest perfection through his freedom. 6

7

• Vorlesung, p. 53. - * Ibid., p . 154.

INDEX 35-6, 68, 75, 79 ff. obligatory, see d u t y o f virtue ethics formal and material aspects, 2p ff., 28-30, 69-71 pure and empirical, 3 ff., see anthropology, a priori k n o w ­ ledge feelings, importance of, 162-3, 7 3 5, 198 freedom, see also a u t o n o m y and moral laws, 4, 18-19, 21, 24-6, 67 inner, 27-8, 68, 82 ff., 119-22, 148 ff. k n o w l e d g e of, 2-3, 18, 25 outer, 27-8, 32, 35 ff, 50 ff, 66-7 relative, 27, 38, 67 friendship, 184-5, 199-201 G o d , 2-3 ^ 163, 196-7 gratitude, 163, 196-7 happiness and function o f State, 26, 36, 46 and supreme m o r a l principle, 5-6, 78-80 as obligatory e n d , 181-8, 191 ,ff. as rational e n d , 90-4, 160, 176180, 192-3 t w o concepts of, 78, 177 imperatives, 23-4, 86-7, 178, see also categorical imperative intemperance, 142-4 j u d g m e n t , 8, 14, 16-17, see also. latitude jurisprudence, see L a w latitude, 71, 96, 99, 100 ff., 167-8, 172-6, 194 ** L a w , see also right, f r e e d o m nature of, 22, 27, 35 ff. permissive, 57-8, 101, 141 positive a n d natural, 17, 34, 61-2 legislation, 23-4, 26, 115-16 ethical, 27, 28-33, 36-4°. ~ 3 » 64 ff., 82 ff., 119-21 juridical, 26, 31, 35-8, 42 ff., 61-3, 64 ff., 117 l o v e , see also feeling

acquired right, see right

Affekten, 73, 149 anthropology, practical, 7-9, 11 apathy, moral, 73

a priori k n o w l e d g e , 4-6 and metaphysics, 11 ff., 34 and moral laws, 5-6, 8, 11, 14-17 and natural l a w , 50-1, 61-3 and synthetic propositions, 2-3, 4, 55 note, 88-9 autonorny, moral, 4, 7, 18, 22, 25 ff., 32, 38, 46, 59-63, see also freedom avarice, 159-60 benevolence, 36, 104-6, 191-6 casuistry, 17, 101, 109-11, 141-2, 143 categorical imperative as principle o f ethics, 27-8, 31, 80 ff., 99-100, 116-17, 126-7, 183-6 as principle o f L a w , 26-7, 28, 30, 35 ff., 59, 80-2, 98-9, 115-19 as source o f all duties, 18 ff., 31-3, 76 ff. circumstances e x c l u d e d f r o m metaphysics, 15-17, 101-5, 107, 135-6" relevance of, 146-7 collective will, 51, 57, 60 ff. conscience, 156-9 constraint, see o b h g a t i o n c o n t e m p t , 188-91 detraction, 190 duty juridical, 26-9, 45-6, see also L a w ' right metaphysical system of, 3 , 1 1 ff., 19 m e t h o d o f deriving, 21, 33, 128 ff. o f virtue, 23, 27, 28, 30-2, 36, 39, 64-70, 89 ff., 123-7, 166 ff., 1 8 1 8 - perfect and imperfect, 21, 70, 95 ff. ends ancLaction, 28, 38 ff., 76 ff. and L a w , 27-8, 36, 38 ff., 64-8, 80, 98-9, 115-18 a n d supreme moral principle, 31,

I

6l

207

_

208

LAWS O'F FREEDOM

duty of, i8o-8, 191-9 lying, 100, 150-9 maxims, 22, 25 and ends, 28, 31, 38, 40-1, 86 ff., 99-100 formal and material, 80-1, 99 metaphysics as a priori knowledge, 11 ff. as pure knowledge, 5 ff. of morals, 13-17, see also circum­ stances of nature, 11-13 traditional and Kantian, 1-3 morally indifferent, 71, 99, 1 0 7 - n motives, see legislation and moral value, 22, 26 obligation, 20, 46-8, 62, 95, see also legislation ethical, 28-30, 45, 62-3, 82 ff, 119 ff. legal, 42-5, 48, 57 ff. strict and wide, 97-100, 116 perfection, 108, 166-76 practical reason, see maxim pride, 188-90

property, see right, acquired pure practical reason and ends, 85 ff., 131 ff. and system, 91-4 juridical function of, 34 ff. juridical postulate of, 51 ff. respect, 160-2, 181-191 right, 43 ff. acquired, 50 ff. inherent, 48-9, 52, 55 of humanity in one's own person, 46-8, 82, 114-19, 124-7 scorn, 191 self-abuse, 139-42 self-deceit, 153-9 servility, 160-2 suicide, 101-2, 135-9, 140-1 sympathy, 162-3, 197-9 summum bonum, 85, 91 ff. teleology, 130 ff., 163-5 universal practical philosophy, 19-20, 30 virtue, 27, 35, 64 ff. formal and material aspects, 69-71 misconceptions of, 7 1 - 5 , 107 virtues of social intercourse, 201-3