Leibniz: Nature and Freedom
Donald Rutherford J. A. Cover, Editors
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
LEIBNIZ
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Leibniz: Nature and Freedom
Donald Rutherford J. A. Cover, Editors
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
LEIBNIZ
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LEIBNIZ Nature and Freedom
EDITED BY
Donald Rutherford and J. A. Cover
1
2005
1 Oxford University Press, Inc., publishes works that further Oxford University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education. Oxford New York Auckland Cape Town Dar es Salaam Hong Kong Karachi Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Nairobi New Delhi Shanghai Taipei Toronto With offices in Argentina Austria Brazil Chile Czech Republic France Greece Guatemala Hungary Italy Japan Poland Portugal Singapore South Korea Switzerland Thailand Turkey Ukraine Vietnam
Copyright # 2005 by Oxford University Press, Inc. Published by Oxford University Press, Inc. 198 Madison Avenue, New York, New York 10016 www.oup.com Oxford is a registered trademark of Oxford University Press All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission of Oxford University Press. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Leibniz : nature and freedom / edited by Donald Rutherford and J.A. Cover. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN-13 978-0-19-514374-4; 978-0-19-514375-1 (pbk.) ISBN 0-19-514374-4; 0-19-514375-2 (pbk.) 1. Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, Freiherr von, 1646–1716. 2. Free will and determinism. 3. Philosophy of nature. I. Rutherford, Donald, 1957– II. Cover, J. A. (Jan A.), 1958– B2599 .F7L45 2005 193—dc22 2004050094
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper
For R. C. Sleigh, Jr. Teacher, Colleague, Friend
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Preface
This volume of new essays is intended to provide a timely picture of the current state of scholarship on Leibniz’s metaphysics. We are grateful to the authors for contributing to the collection. We would also like to thank Daniel Garber and Robert M. Adams for their sound advice in the early stages of the project; Matthew Kisner, for his assistance in preparing the typescript for publication; and Peter Ohlin of Oxford University Press, for his enthusiasm and patience. Finally, we are especially thankful to Madeleine Picciotto and Karen Cover, for their inextinguishable good humor and support in the face of challenges to completing this project: overcommitment, physical injury, and stubbornness. The contributions of Robert C. Sleigh, Jr., to Leibniz scholarship have and continue to set a benchmark for a generation of students and researchers in the history of early modern philosophy. Those who read his work are fortunate to have him as a fellow philosopher; those who have studied with him are lucky to have him as a mentor; those who know him are blessed to have him as a friend. We dedicate this volume to Bob in fondness and gratitude.
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Contents
Contributors Abbreviations
xi xiii
Introduction 3 Donald Rutherford and J. A. Cover 1.
The One and the Many and Kinds of Distinctness: The Possibility of Monism or Pantheism in the Young Leibniz Mark Kulstad 20
2.
Leibniz and Sleigh on Substantial Unity Christia Mercer 44
3.
Leibniz on Precise Shapes and the Corporeal World Samuel Levey 69
4.
Leibniz and Idealism Daniel Garber 95
5.
Compossibility, Expression, Accommodation Catherine Wilson 108
6. Leibniz and Occasionalism Nicholas Jolley 121 7.
Leibniz’s Two Realms Jonathan Bennett 135
8.
Leibniz on Spontaneity Donald Rutherford 156
9. Moral Necessity Robert Merrihew Adams 10.
181
Spontaneity and Freedom in Leibniz Michael J. Murray 194
x Contents 11.
Leibniz Against Molinism: Freedom, Indifference, and the Nature of the Will Sean Greenberg 217
12. Video Meliora Proboque, Deteriora Sequor: Leibniz on the Intellectual Source of Sin Jack D. Davidson 234 Bibliography Index 263
255
Contributors
ROBERT MERRIHEW ADAMS is a senior member of the Faculty of Philosophy, Oxford University. JONATHAN BENNETT is retired and lives on an island near Vancouver, B.C. J. A. COVER is Professor of Philosophy at Purdue University. JACK D. DAVIDSON is Visiting Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Memphis. DANIEL GARBER is Professor of Philosophy at Princeton University. SEAN GREENBERG is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Johns Hopkins University. NICHOLAS JOLLEY is Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, Irvine. MARK KULSTAD is Professor of Philosophy at Rice University. SAMUEL LEVEY is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Dartmouth College. CHRISTIA MERCER is Professor of Philosophy at Columbia University. MICHAEL J. MURRAY is Professor of Philosophy at Franklin and Marshall College. DONALD RUTHERFORD is Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, San Diego. CATHERINE WILSON is Professor of Philosophy at the University of British Columbia.
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Abbreviations
(citations by page number unless otherwise indicated) A
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. Sa¨mtliche Schriften und Briefe. Ed. Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften. Darmstadt, Leipzig, Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1923–. Cited by series, volume, page.
AG
G. W. Leibniz. Philosophical Essays. Ed. and trans. Roger Ariew and Daniel Garber. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1989.
Ak
Immanuel Kant. Gesammelte Schriften. Ed. Akademie der Wissenshaften. Berlin: Reimer (later De Gruyter), 1910–. Cited by volume and page number.
AT
Oeuvres de Descartes. Ed. Charles Adam and Paul Tannery. Paris: J. Vrin, 1964–74. Cited by volume and page.
C
Opuscules et fragments ine´dits de Leibniz. Ed. Louis Couturat. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1903. Reprint, Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1966.
CSM
The Philosophical Writings of Descartes. Ed. and trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, Dugald Murdoch, and (vol. 3) Anthony Kenny. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984, 1985, 1991. Cited by volume and page.
CWS
The Collected Works of Spinoza. Vol. 1. Ed. and trans. Edwin Curley. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985.
DM
G. W. Leibniz. Discours de Me´taphysique. Cited by section as in G 4:427– 463. English trans. in AG, L, and WFPT.
DSR
G. W. Leibniz. De Summa Rerum. Metaphysical Papers, 1675–1676. Ed. and trans. G.H.R. Parkinson. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992.
xiv Abbreviations E
G. W. Leibniz. Opera Philosophicae quae exstant Latina, Gallica, Germanica omnia. Ed. J. E. Erdmann. Berlin: Eichler, 1839–40. Reprint, Aalen: Scientia Verlag, 1974.
Enquiry
David Hume. Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. Ed. L. A. SelbyBigge and P. H. Nidditch. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975.
Essay
John Locke. An Essay concerning Human Understanding. Ed. Peter H. Nidditch. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975. Cited by book, chapter, and section.
Ethics
Baruch Spinoza. Ethica. Roman numerals refer to parts; A: axiom; P: Proposition; D (following roman numeral): definition; Arabic numerals refer to axioms, propositions, definitions etc.; D (following P and arabic numeral): demonstration of a proposition; C, S, L: corollary, scholium, and lemma respectively; Post, Exp, Pref, and App: Postulate, Explanation, Preface, and Appendix. English trans. in CWS.
G
Die philosophischen Schriften von Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. Ed. C. I. Gerhardt. Berlin: Weidmann, 1875–90. Reprint, Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1978. Cited by volume and page.
GLW
Briefwechsel zwischen Leibniz und Christian Wolff. Ed. C. I. Gerhardt. Halle: Schmidt, 1860. Reprint, Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1963.
GM
Leibnizens Mathematische Schriften. Ed. C. I. Gerhardt. Berlin: A. Asher; and Halle: H. W. Schmidt, 1849–63. Reprint, Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1971. Cited by volume and page.
Grua
Textes ine´dits d’apre`s des manuscrits de la Bibliothe`que provinciale d’Hanovre. Ed. Gaston Grua. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1948. Reprint, New York: Garland, 1985.
H
G. W. Leibniz. Theodicy. Trans. E. M. Huggard. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1952. Reprint, LaSalle, Ill: Open Court, 1985.
L
G. W. Leibniz. Philosophical Papers and Letters. Ed. and trans. Leroy E. Loemker. 2nd ed. Dordrecht: Reidel, 1969.
LA
The Leibniz-Arnauld Correspondence. Ed. and trans. H. T. Mason. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1967. Reprint, New York: Garland, 1985.
LC
The Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence. Ed. H. G. Alexander. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1956, following Clarke’s 1717 English translation. Cited by letter and section.
LBr
¨ ffentliDer Briefwechsel des Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz in der Ko¨niglichen O chen Bibliothek zu Hannover. Ed. Eduard Bodemann. Hannover: Hahn, 1895. Reprint, Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1966. Cited by Bodemann’s numbering.
Abbreviations
xv
LH
¨ ffentlichen Bibliothek zu HannDie Leibniz-Handschriften der Ko¨niglichen O over. Ed. Eduard Bodemann. Hannover: Hahn, 1889. Reprint, Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1966. Cited by Bodemann’s numbering.
LOC
G. W. Leibniz. The Labyrinth of the Continuum: Writings on the Continuum Problem, 1672–1686. Ed. and trans. Richard T. W. Arthur. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001.
LR
G. W. Leibniz. Discours de me´taphysique et correspondance avec Arnauld. Ed. Georges Le Roy. Paris: Vrin, 1970.
Mon
G. W. Leibniz. Monadology. Cited by section as in G 6:607–623. English translation in AG, L, and WFPT.
MP
G. W. Leibniz. Philosophical Writings. Ed. and trans. Mary Morris and G.H.R. Parkinson. London: Dent, 1973.
NE
G. W. Leibniz. Nouveaux essais sur l’entendement humain. Cited by book, chapter, and section as in A, ser. 6, vol. 6. Translated in RB.
OM
Oeuvres completes de Malebranche. Edited by Andre Robinet. 20 vols., plus ‘‘Index des citations’’ and ‘‘Index general.’’ Paris: Vrin, 1958–84. Cited by volume and page.
PLP
G. W. Leibniz. Logical Papers. Ed. and trans. G.H.R. Parkinson. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966.
PNG
G. W. Leibniz. Principes de la Nature et de la Graˆce, Fonde´s en Raison. Cited by section as in G 6:598–606. English translation in AG, L, and WFPT.
Principles
Rene Descartes. Principia Philosophiae. Cited by part and article, as found in AT, vol. 8, and CSM, vol. 1.
RB
G. W. Leibniz. New Essays on Human Understanding. Ed. and trans. Peter Remnant and Jonathan Bennett. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981. Cited by page that corresponds to A, ser. 6, vol. 6.
S
G. W. Leibniz. Monadology and Other Essays. Ed. and trans. P and A. M. Schrecker. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965.
ST
St. Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologiae. Madrid: Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos 1955–1958. Cited by part, question, and article.
T
G. W. Leibniz. Essais de Theodice´e. Cited by section number as in G 6:21– 471; ‘‘a’’ refers to the ‘‘Abrege’’ and is cited by objection number; ‘‘pd,’’ ‘‘h,’’ ‘‘k,’’ and ‘‘cd’’ precede section numbers of the ‘‘Discours Pre´liminaire,’’ the ‘‘Reflexions’’ on Hobbes, ‘‘Remarques’’ on King’s volume The Origin of Evil, and ‘‘Causa Dei,’’ respectively. Translated (minus ‘‘Causa Dei’’) in H.
xvi Abbreviations Treatise
David Hume. A Treatise on Human Nature. Ed. David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.
WF
Leibniz’s ‘‘New System’’ and Associated Contemporary Texts. Ed. and trans. R. S. Woolhouse and Richard Francks. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997.
WFPT
G. W. Leibniz: Philosophical Texts. Ed. and trans. R. S. Woolhouse and Richard Francks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.
LEIBNIZ
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Introduction DONALD RUTHERFORD
AND
J. A. C O V E R
or much of the twentieth century the dominant interpretation of Leibniz’s
F philosophy was that framed in the pioneering studies of Bertrand Russell
(1900) and Louis Couturat (1901).1 Although differing in details, the accounts of Russell and Couturat both presented Leibniz’s philosophy as a development of his logic, in particular, his formulation of the principle of sufficient reason as a necessary and sufficient condition for truth: in every true proposition, necessary or contingent, the concept of the predicate is contained in the concept of the subject. From this principle, Couturat argued, follow all of the main theses of Leibniz’s metaphysics: the identity of indiscernibles, the complete concept theory of substance, the doctrine of expression, the hypothesis of preestablished harmony, the ideality of space and time.2 Russell expressed greater skepticism than Couturat about the success of Leibniz’s philosophical program. Where Couturat found in Leibniz’s writings a consistent expression of a rationalist metaphysics he labeled ‘‘panlogism’’ (Couturat 1901: xi), Russell stressed the way in which Leibniz’s rationalism led to a conclusion that Leibniz himself could not countenance: the necessary existence of all finite things (Russell 1900: 183). Despite regarding this conclusion as decisive grounds for rejecting Spinoza’s philosophy, Leibniz was—in Russell’s judgment—trapped by his own starting points into a similar form of necessitarianism. The Russell-Couturat interpretation spurred the investigations of several generations of scholars who endeavored to elaborate the details of Leibniz’s system and to respond to the difficulties that Russell had located in it. Foremost among these is the problem of contingency, which goes to the heart of Leibniz’s metaphysics and has decisive consequences for his moral philosophy and theology. The latter areas of Leibniz’s thought, however, received comparatively little attention from scholars during this period.3 For the most part their energies were devoted to analyzing metaphysical problems—concerning necessity and contingency, truth, identity, and substance—in isolation from the historical context in which they engaged Leibniz and their systematic connections to other parts of his philosophy. 3
4 Introduction
Representative is the comparative neglect of the topic of freedom, identified by Leibniz as one of the ‘‘two famous labyrinths’’ in which reason is prone to become entangled (G 6:29/H 53). Although the problem of contingency was primarily of interest to Leibniz because of its ramifications for divine and human freedom, the latter topics did not become a focus of English-language scholarship until the 1970s, and only recently have historians of philosophy begun to explore the complex theological landscape within which freedom was such a hotly contested issue during the seventeenth century.4 The past thirty years have witnessed a renaissance in Leibniz studies.5 With increasing regularity scholars have recognized the importance of adopting a synoptic approach to Leibniz’s philosophy, interpreting its various branches (logic, metaphysics, ethics) in relation to each other and to other areas of his thought (mathematics, physics, jurisprudence, theology). At the same time there has been a newfound sensitivity to developmental questions. Rejecting the assumption that Leibniz defends a single, unchanging set of philosophical views throughout his life, commentators have distinguished an early, middle, and late Leibniz, and have debated the consistency—synchronic and diachronic—of the positions he articulates within these periods.6 Finally, there has been a growing awareness of the need to interpret Leibniz’s views within the larger context of seventeenth-century intellectual life and to accommodate within such readings Leibniz’s own understanding of his relationship to the history of philosophy. To a degree unusual among seventeenth-century philosophers, Leibniz was eager to highlight the affinity between his views and those of his predecessors— ancient, medieval, and modern. Basic to his approach is the goal of establishing agreement between his positions and those of other philosophers, pursuing in this way a vein of truth that has been only slowly and incompletely extracted over millenia. Leibniz’s embrace of this goal has its roots in theology. He is convinced that there is a single source of truth, the divine intellect, to which all philosophers have had access, and he is committed to locating agreement among rival factions wherever possible. In a late letter to Nicolas Remond, he writes: I have tried to uncover and unite the truth buried and scattered under the opinions of all the different philosophical sects, and I believe I have added something of my own which takes a few steps forward. . . . I have found that most of the sects are right in a good part of what they propose, but not so much in what they deny. (G 3:605/L 654–655)7
Leibniz emphasizes that his own philosophy has been able to unite elements of truth from apparently irreconcilable alternatives (e.g., Aristotelianism and mechanism, or the Jansenist and Jesuit positions on freedom). Yet there are limits beyond which even he is not prepared to go. In the case of two prominent contemporaries, Hobbes and Spinoza, Leibniz finds their doctrines supported by principles that are objectionable at such a fundamental level that there can be no hope of accommodation, even if evidence suggests that in his youth Leibniz was strongly influenced by their writings. This anomaly offers an important clue to the deeper motivations of Leibniz’s philosophy, and a point around which to organize a historically informed account of his views.
Introduction
5
The Threat of Naturalism The philosophies of Hobbes and Spinoza exemplify a trend in modern philosophy that Leibniz labels ‘‘naturalism.’’ In a late commentary on Spinoza’s writings, he singles out Proposition 16 of Part 1 of the Ethics as a source for this doctrine: ‘‘From the necessity of the divine nature there must follow infinitely many things in infinitely many ways (that is, everything which can fall under infinite intellect).’’ ‘‘This view,’’ Leibniz argues, ‘‘is quite false, and makes the same mistake that Descartes insinuated, that matter successively accepts all shapes. Spinoza begins where Descartes leaves off: in naturalism’’ (AG 277).8 As Leibniz characterizes it, the fundamental error of naturalism is its conception of God as an infinite power whose effects are expressed necessarily, without the exercise of wisdom or choice. ‘‘As far as one can understand [Spinoza],’’ Leibniz writes in the Theodicy, ‘‘he acknowledges no goodness in God, properly speaking, and he teaches that all things exist through the necessity of the divine nature, without any act of choice by God’’ (T 173). Such a conception of God threatens the heart of Leibniz’s philosophical project, which seeks to comprehend the existence of all finite things in terms of their creation by a supremely wise and good God, whose justice is exhibited in his realization of the best of all possible worlds. The contingency of the world’s existence is an essential feature of Leibniz’s picture. If there were only one world that could exist, or if God’s power entailed the existence of all possible worlds, then the foundations of Leibniz’s theodicy would be undermined. There would be no way to defend God as a creator who exhibits justice in his actions, and who serves as a model for the agency of created rational beings. Furthermore, if the existence of the world and its constituents were necessitated by God’s action, then the claim of human beings to act freely would be compromised. The price to be paid by naturalism, therefore, is high: not only do we lose a conception of God as a fundamentally moral agent, but we also sacrifice the conditions for moral agency on the part of created rational beings. An early text by Leibniz fleshes out this picture of naturalism by linking it to the revival of the teachings of the two principal schools of Hellenistic philosophy: ‘‘There are two sects of naturalists fashionable today which have their source in antiquity; the one revives the opinions of Epicurus and the other is, in fact, composed of Stoics’’ (G 7:333/AG 281). Leibniz associates the revival of Epicureanism with the views of Hobbes: ‘‘Epicurus in times past, and Hobbes today, who hold all things to be corporeal, have given enough evidence to show that, on their view, there is no providence’’ (G 7:333/AG 282). According to Epicureans and their modern followers, any substance, including the soul and God himself, is composed of extended matter.9 If this is so, then God can be neither all-powerful nor allknowing; hence the case for God’s providence and justice cannot be made. The materialism of Hobbes and the Epicureans is one of the earliest targets of Leibniz’s criticism and a stimulus for his own efforts to preserve a place in nature for incorporeal, form-like principles. His objections to the teachings of what he calls ‘‘the sect of the new Stoics,’’ associated with Descartes and Spinoza, take a different tack. For these philosophers, he allows, there may be incorporeal
6 Introduction
substances, including God and human souls. Nevertheless, these ‘‘new Stoics’’ reduce God’s status to that of the soul of the world, or its ‘‘primary power,’’ which is determined to act by a blind necessity. Thus, in their case, too, divine justice is jeopardized. Against Spinoza, this charge is well founded.10 But how, one wonders, can Leibniz justify it in the case of Descartes, who goes to such lengths to defend the idea of God as a transcendent, supremely perfect being? Here Leibniz is certainly taking some liberty, but he reasons that the inner logic of Descartes’ philosophy leads him to a position that is—in its theological and moral consequences— indistinguishable from that of Spinoza. While Descartes affirms God’s omnipotence and supreme goodness, his understanding of the former precludes viewing God as a just creator. In support of this conclusion Leibniz cites Descartes’ doctrine of the creation of eternal truths, which he takes to imply the absence of objective standards against which to evaluate the justice of God’s action, and his pronouncement in Part 3 of the Principles of Philosophy that matter successively takes on all possible forms, which Leibniz takes to preclude the claim that nature always operates in the best, or ‘‘fittest,’’ manner.11 For these reasons, Leibniz concludes, Descartes’ God, or perfect being, is not a God like the one we imagine or hope for, that is, a God just and wise, doing everything possible for the good of creatures. Rather, Descartes’ God is something approaching the God of Spinoza, namely, the principle of things and a certain supreme power or primitive nature that puts everything into motion and does everything that can be done. (G 4:299/AG 242)
The fundamental threat of naturalism, as Leibniz sees it, lies in its rejection of an understanding of God as a wise and just creator, acting for the sake of intelligible ends. By reducing God’s role to that of an ultimate causal power, whose effects are expressed necessarily, naturalists reject the search for features of harmony and design in nature. Nature is as it is necessarily and not as a creator has intended it to be. Naturalism thus poses a direct challenge to traditional theological conceptions of the order of nature and of the place of human beings in nature. If God is not a wise and just creator in whose image human beings have been made, then there seems to be no special place reserved for human beings in nature, nor can human beings look to God for moral principles on which they may rely in governing their actions.
Nature and Natures These are conclusions that Spinoza openly embraces in the Ethics: human beings are to be understood as a part of nature, obeying the same necessary laws as other finite things. In the Preface to Part 3, Spinoza complains that ‘‘most of those who have written about the affects, and men’s way of living, seem to treat, not of natural things, which follow the common laws of nature, but of things which are outside nature. Indeed they seem to conceive man in nature as a dominion within a dominion’’ (CWS 491). The target of Spinoza’s criticism is the common view of human beings as both a part of nature and hence subject to natural laws, and at the same time superior to nature and capable of acting in ways that are not constrained
Introduction
7
by its laws. The view finds its sharpest expression in Descartes’ philosophy where human nature is cleanly dissected into the ontologically distinct essences of mind and body. Bodies act according to necessary laws of motion. Minds, which are present only in human beings, possess essential powers of reason and freedom on the basis of which it is concluded that ‘‘man disturbs, rather than follows, the order of nature, that he has absolute power over his actions, and that he is determined only by himself ’’ (CWS 491). Leibniz’s philosophy can be read as an attempt to find a middle way between the extremes of Spinoza’s naturalism, which limits human nature to the effects of necessary universal laws, and Descartes’ dualism, which preserves the uniqueness of human beings by positing within them a substance, res cogitans, whose actions ‘‘disturb, rather than follow, the order of nature.’’ In staking out this middle ground, Leibniz is led to defend his own version of a naturalistic theory of human beings, albeit one that is consistent with their creation by a wise and good God. According to Leibniz, divine wisdom requires creation of a world that is intrinsically intelligible, a condition that is met by ensuring that every being is endowed with a nature whose powers are sufficient to account for all of its effects. Leibniz’s naturalism is specifically intended to rule out the possibility that physical or psychological phenomena are in any way miraculous, that is, that they occur in a way that could be explained only by appeal to a direct intervention by God, or to ‘‘occult powers’’ that lie beyond the reach of reason. Instead, all natural phenomena can be explained in terms of the action of powers inherent in the natures of created substances. Like Spinoza, Leibniz finds Descartes’ dualism beset by conceptual problems, particularly Descartes’ failure to explain the mind’s ability to ‘‘disturb’’ the universal laws that govern the motion of matter. By virtue of what does mind have the power to move matter, and to do so in a way that routinely violates fundamental laws such as the conservation of momentum? Leibniz’s answer is that such problems can be avoided only if it is assumed from the start that mind and body do not stand in real causal relations to each other: mind cannot causally interact with matter, nor matter with mind. Up to this point Leibniz agrees with the conclusion drawn by Nicolas Malebranche, who develops Descartes’ philosophy in a system in which no finite thing operates as a true cause. As Malebranche would have it, causal power is exercised by God alone, who produces successive coordinated changes in the states of minds and bodies that leave the impression of direct causal interaction between them (both body-body and mind-body causation). Leibniz, however, rejects Malebranche’s occasionalism, seeking instead to preserve the identity of created substances as causal agents capable of bringing about changes in their own states. Against the thesis that God is responsible for all real change in the world, Leibniz defends what he calls the ‘‘system of concurrence,’’ or ‘‘preestablished harmony,’’ according to which God creates minds and bodies such that each, through the exercise of its own powers, in accordance with laws proper to its nature, brings about successive effects that are coordinated with one another. The impression that the mind is capable of directly causing changes in the body is, as Malebranche holds, an illusion; however, against Malebranche, Leibniz insists that subsequent changes in the states of
8 Introduction
both mind and body are the product of actions internal to each—actions that God, as a supremely wise creator, has chosen to harmonize with each other. As Leibniz makes clear in his 1695 essay New System of the Nature and Communication of Substances, it is basic to his theory that the agreement of soul and body and the changes internal to each can be explained naturally, in terms of the exercise of powers inherent in the substances themselves: [W]hy should God not be able to give a substance, from the beginning a nature or an internal force that can produce in it, in an orderly way (as would happen in a spiritual or formal automaton, but free in the case where it has a share of reason), everything that will happen to it, that is, all the appearances or expressions it will have, without the help of any created being? This is especially so since the nature of substance necessarily requires and essentially involves progress or change, without which it would not have the force to act. And since this nature that pertains to the soul is representative of the universe in a very exact manner (though more or less distinctly), the series of representations produced by the soul will correspond naturally to the series of changes in the universe itself, just as the body, in turn, has also been accommodated to the soul for the situations in which the soul is thought to act externally. (G 4:485/AG 144)
Leibniz’s efforts to distance himself from Descartes’ interactionism place him on a course parallel to that charted by Spinoza in the Ethics. Accepting that the fundamental difference between the properties of mind and body precludes their causal interaction, Spinoza defends a position that anticipates Leibniz’s preestablished harmony.12 Bodies and minds do not influence each other’s states causally. Modes of extension (bodies) interact causally with other modes of extension in accordance with laws of motion; modes of thought (ideas/ minds) interact causally with other modes of thought in accordance with psychological laws. Nevertheless, Spinoza insists that these two independent causal orders agree perfectly with each other: ‘‘The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things’’ (IIP7). His demonstration of this proposition, however, proceeds very differently from Leibniz’s defense of the superficially similar thesis of preestablished harmony. Where Leibniz regards preestablished harmony as the result of God’s intelligent design of a universe in which the autonomous causal powers of soul and body are providentially aligned, Spinoza’s doctrine of parallelism is a consequence of the necessary and unitary order of reality, in which God and nature are one in substance. The causal order of bodies is God’s own infinite power expressed through infinite modes of extension, and the causal order of ideas is that same power expressed through infinite modes of thought. For Spinoza, all causal power is ultimately the power of God, the one substance from whose necessary existence there necessarily follow ‘‘infinitely many things in infinitely many ways.’’ Malebranche’s insistence that God is the sole true cause of all that happens in the world brings him, in Leibniz’s opinion, perilously close to Spinoza’s position. Although Malebranche is adamant that God is a transcendent being, who creates and conserves a world of separate, finite substances, Leibniz questions whether Malebranche’s occasionalism allows him to uphold such a view. As Leibniz sees it, in denying to finite things an internal
Introduction
9
principle of action sufficient to explain their identity through change, Malebranche in effect undermines the claim of finite things to be separate substances. Thus, Malebranche’s occasionalism is one step away from Spinoza’s monism.13 Leibniz’s disagreements with Malebranche and Spinoza over the correct account of the mind-body relation are rooted in deeper issues about the metaphysics of causation. In the case of all three philosophers, their explanations of the apparent causal relation between the human mind and the human body—responses to the perceived failure of Descartes’ interactionism—emerge as special cases of general theories of the causal relations that unite finite things with God and with each other. Leibniz’s theory posits a complex array of harmonies linking the states and actions of finite things—harmonies that are ascribed to God’s choice of this as the best of all possible worlds.14 With this he advances his broader program of turning back Spinoza’s theological naturalism: the limitation of God to the substance of the world, or an infinite and necessary causal power. At the same time, Leibniz upholds—against Descartes and Malebranche—his own brand of philosophical naturalism, which insists on the intelligibility and causal autonomy of nature: whatever happens in nature can be explained in terms of the exercise of finite causal powers.
Harmony and the ‘‘Two Natural Kingdoms’’ The fundamental principles of Leibniz’s philosophy remained unchanged through most of his career. Until the end of his life, however, Leibniz continued to refine the system he constructed around these principles, often framing his views in response to the probing of insightful correspondents.15 One of the fullest summaries of Leibniz’s final philosophy is contained in the famous Monadology, composed two years before his death. Leibniz begins by positing a single basic entity, the monad: a simple, soul-like substance, endowed with essential properties of perception and appetition. Every monad, according to Leibniz, is confusedly omniscient: it represents the universe from the perspective of a living body, and is distinguished from other monads by the distinctness of its perceptions, or the adequacy of its knowledge (Mon 60). As ontologically independent substances, monads stand in no real relations to each other; there is no common external space in which they are located. Nevertheless, as a condition of their forming a single world, monads stand in ideal relations to each other. God creates each monad such that its states are coordinated with those of every other monad. Since each monad represents the same universe from a different perspective, the ‘‘interconnection or accommodation of all created things to each other, and to all the others, brings it about that each simple substance has relations that express all the others, and consequently, that each simple substance is a perpetual, living mirror of the universe’’ (Mon 56). This constitutes the first and most basic level of harmony in Leibniz’s system: a ‘‘universal harmony, which results in every substance expressing exactly all the others through the relations it has to them’’ (Mon 59). By coordinating infinitely many diverse perceptual representations of an infinitely complex universe, God is
10 Introduction
able to assure that individual monads are related to each other in a world and that together these monads make up the best of all possible worlds: ‘‘this is the way of obtaining as much variety as possible, but with the greatest order possible, that is, it is the way of obtaining as much perfection as possible’’ (Mon 58). In conceiving of the world’s harmony, however, Leibniz does not stop here. Every monad also is endowed with its own body, together with which it constitutes an organism, or living being, such as a plant or an animal. The body of each organism is infinitely complex, consisting of smaller organisms within smaller organisms to infinity (Mon 64). And Leibniz insists that nature as a whole consists of bodies organized in this fashion: [T]here is a world of creatures, of living beings, of animals, of entelechies, of souls in the least part of matter. Each portion of matter can be conceived as a garden full of plants, and as a pond full of fish. But each branch of a plant, each limb of an animal, each drop of its humors, is still another such garden or pond. (Mon 66–67)
Leibniz’s descriptions of the microstructure of matter rely heavily on metaphor, yet they support the basic point that over and above the minimal ontology of soul-like monads, he defends a second level of ontological commitment, which regards the world as consisting of an infinite envelopment of living beings: soul-like monads together with their organic bodies. Leibniz’s explanation of the operation of these living beings generalizes from his hypothesis of preestablished harmony. Advanced in the New System as a solution to the Cartesian problem of mind-body communication, the theory now is extended to Creation as a whole: nature everywhere consists of soul-like monads whose activities are harmonized with those of their individual organic bodies, and thereby with the states of all other monads. Leibniz characterizes this scheme as involving a ‘‘perfect harmony between two natural kingdoms, the one of efficient causes, the other of final causes’’ (Mon 87): Souls act according to the laws of final causes, through appetitions, ends, and means. Bodies act according to the laws of efficient causes or of motions. And these two kingdoms, that of efficient causes and that of final causes, are in harmony with each other. (Mon 79)
Leibniz maintains that the ‘‘two natural kingdoms’’ are causally autonomous and universal. Thus, for him, nature everywhere consists of souls (or soul-like monads) acting in accordance with laws of final causation and bodies acting in accordance with laws of efficient causation. The interpretation of Leibniz’s ‘‘two natural kingdoms’’ brings with it some of the most difficult and hotly contested issues in recent Leibniz scholarship. On the face of it, the view is consistent with two very different ontological positions. Most straightforwardly, it might be thought, Leibniz’s final ontology is one of ‘‘living beings,’’ specified as ‘‘corporeal’’ or ‘‘composite substances’’ (Mon 61), to which simple substances contribute as organizing forms. On this reading, to the extent that corporeal substances appear to interact with other corporeal substances, they do so as bodies in accordance with laws of efficient causation. To the extent that
Introduction
11
they act purposively, for the sake of specific ends, they do so as souls in accordance with laws of final causation. The attractions of this reading are many, and it is surely correct to think that it is Leibniz’s position at one level of analysis. It may even have been his preferred theory prior to the emergence of the doctrine of monads in the 1690s.16 What is less clear is whether it is his ultimate metaphysical theory—his bedrock account of reality, as created by God. Weighing against this conclusion are numerous texts in which Leibniz explicitly limits reality to monads alone. As he writes in a 1704 letter to Burcher de Volder: [C]onsidering the matter carefully, we must say that there is nothing in things but simple substances, and in them, perception and appetite. Moreover, matter and motion are not substances or things as much as they are the phenomena of perceivers, the reality of which is situated in the harmony of the perceivers with themselves (at different times) and with other perceivers. (G 2:270/AG 181)
On this reading of Leibniz’s position, soul-like monads alone are fully real, or entia per se. They alone are genuine substances, each requiring nothing for its existence except God’s creation and conservation. All other things, including composite corporeal substances, are only ‘‘entities by aggregation [Entia per aggregationem], and to that extent phenomena, existing, as Democritus put it, by convention and not by nature’’ (G 2:252/AG 177). With this account in place, Leibniz’s ‘‘two natural kingdoms’’ end up having very different statuses, with the kingdom of efficient causes subordinated, via relations of ontological dependency, to the kingdom of final causes. As it is in itself, reality (i.e., monads) operates according to laws of final causation. However, that same reality is represented by monads as a world of bodies, interacting through collisions in space and time. Thus, the laws of efficient causation—laws of the motion and collision of bodies—apply only at the phenomenal level, anticipating the claim of Kant’s transcendental idealism. It remains an open question whether an idealism that recognizes monads alone as substances is Leibniz’s ultimate position. The textual evidence in support of this view is not unambiguous, even in writings from the final decade of his life.17
The Kingdoms of Nature and Grace Leibniz regards human minds as a subclass of monads that are distinguished by their capacity for reflection and understanding. This brings with it significant epistemic, moral, and theological consequences. While ‘‘souls, in general, are living mirrors or images of the universe of creatures,’’ Leibniz writes, ‘‘minds are also images of the divinity itself, or of the author of nature, capable of knowing the system of the universe, and imitating something of it through their schematic representations of it, each mind being like a little divinity in its own realm’’ (Mon 83). Minds are characterized most basically by their capacity to comprehend intellectual truth: the eternal and necessary truths of reason and contingent truths concerning the order and harmony of the created world. In virtue of this knowledge, they are able to grasp reflectively the ends that have guided God in creation,
12 Introduction
and they are able to structure their own actions around the pursuit of these same ends. For this reason, minds stand in a unique relation to God: This is what makes minds capable of entering into a kind of society with God, and allows him to be, in relation to them, not only what an inventor is to his machine (as God is in relation to the other creatures) but also what a prince is to his subjects, and even what a father is to his children. (Mon 84)
Collectively, rational minds comprise what Leibniz calls ‘‘the city of God’’: ‘‘the most perfect possible state under the most perfect of monarchs’’ (Mon 85). This ‘‘truly universal monarchy,’’ he writes, ‘‘is a moral world within the natural world, and the highest and most divine of God’s works’’ (Mon 86).18 The designation of rational minds as ‘‘a moral world within the natural world’’ returns us to Spinoza’s complaint about those who ‘‘conceive man in nature as a dominion within a dominion.’’ In one sense, this is an apt description of Leibniz’s position: rational minds stand in a fundamentally different relation to God, through whom they are constituted as a ‘‘dominion within a dominion.’’ In Leibniz’s view, however, the ‘‘moral world’’ to which minds belong can be fully explained in naturalistic terms. In contrast to Kant, the capacity of minds for moral agency does not presuppose a ‘‘transcendental’’ freedom. Instead, freedom is conceived as a power that is exercised under the constraints of natural causation. As Leibniz understands it, the highest form of freedom is ‘‘freedom of mind,’’ wherein an agent acts in accordance with reason’s judgments concerning the greatest good. At the same time, understood metaphysically, that choice is a spontaneous action, caused by the operation of a power inherent in the agent’s soul or substance. The final harmony that Leibniz invokes in the Monadology relates ‘‘the physical kingdom of nature and the moral kingdom of grace,’’ or ‘‘God considered as the architect of the mechanism of the universe, and God considered as the monarch of the divine city of minds’’ (Mon 87). The harmony of the kingdoms of nature and grace addresses the primary topic of Leibniz’s theodicy: the enactment of God’s justice with respect to the merit and welfare of human beings. A just God, Leibniz believes, must ensure that virtue is properly rewarded with happiness, and vice punished with unhappiness. Yet our experience of our earthly existence suggests that this balance often is not achieved: the virtuous suffer unaccountably, and the wicked appear to profit from their wickedness. The orthodox Christian response to this paradox is that a proper reckoning will come only in another life, in which those justified through Christ’s grace will enjoy the bliss of eternal happiness, while the rest will suffer eternal damnation. While professing allegiance to the Christian doctrine of justification, Leibniz presents a different picture of the operation of divine justice in the Monadology—one consistent with the broader features of his naturalism. On this account, the balance between merit and happiness is preserved by natural means within the earthly existence of human beings: God the architect pleases in every respect God the legislator, and, as a result, sins must carry their penalty with them by the order of nature, and even in virtue of the mechanical structure of things. Similarly, noble actions will receive their rewards through mechanical means with regard to bodies, even though this cannot, and must not, always happen immediately. (Mon 89)
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In response to the objection that the balancing of merit and happiness often does not seem to occur within our earthly existence, Leibniz argues that this existence cannot be measured by what we take to be a natural lifetime. Living beings do not, properly speaking, die. What we take to be death is merely a stage in life, an enfolding and diminution of the body, which is followed by a later regeneration, development, and growth (Mon 73). Divine justice, Leibniz claims, is expressed with respect to this succession of life-stages, which are united in the experience of a single rational agent. And, crucially, he insists that all of this is encompassed within God’s plan for the best of all possible worlds, in which ‘‘harmony leads things to grace through the very paths of nature’’ (Mon 88).
Leibniz: Nature and Freedom Leibniz’s voluminous writings, spanning more than half a century, contain a heady mix of rigorous argument and imaginative speculation. The views they defend, a cross section of which we have outlined above, have occupied commentators for more than three centuries. The essays gathered in this book are important new contributions to the Leibniz literature. The book opens with two studies that tackle different aspects of one of the primary topics of Leibniz’s metaphysics—the relation of unity and multiplicity—as it is explored in his early writings. Mark Kulstad’s essay, ‘‘The One and the Many and Kinds of Distinctness,’’ offers a fresh take on an issue that has been the subject of much recent scholarship: Leibniz’s reputed brief embrace of monism and pantheism—doctrines associated with Spinoza—during his formative Paris period (1672–76). Commentators have been divided on whether Leibniz’s metaphysical inquiries ever led him to a position resembling Spinoza’s. Kulstad sharpens the debate by framing it in terms of the kinds of distinction that might be held to exist between the unity of God and the multiplicity of created things. On his reading, in at least one text from the period Leibniz advances the thesis that there is no ‘‘real distinction’’ between God and created things. Given this, Kulstad argues, there is a sense in which Leibniz can be understood to defend versions of monism and pantheism, although not ones that immediately license the charge of Spinozism. In ‘‘Leibniz and Sleigh on Substantial Unity,’’ Christia Mercer examines the basis of Leibniz’s views on the unity of corporeal substance. Mercer begins from the influential analysis of Robert Sleigh, who links the unity of Leibnizian substances to their possession of an identity through change. For Leibniz, Sleigh argues, this identity is guararanteed by the presence of a substantial form: an internal force or power by virtue of which any substance satisfies the condition of spontaneity: ‘‘each noninitial state of an individual has as its real cause some predecessor state of that individual’’ (Sleigh 1990: 131). Mercer acknowledges the significance of Sleigh’s analysis, yet she argues that important questions about unity remain unanswered by it, above all, the problem of how a substantial form—a self-sufficient active principle—produces a unity in its associated passive principle, or body, whose components are in constant flux. Mercer contends that the key to this problem lies in an historically informed account of Leibniz’s early writings, which reveal his
14
Introduction
underlying assumptions about unity. According to Mercer, these assumptions are broadly Platonist in character, and include the idea that a more perfect being (soul) has the power to ‘‘emanate’’ certain of its essential properties (unity, self-sufficiency, indestructibility) to a less perfect being (body). Mercer draws on this background in outlining the suggestive theory of the ‘‘hypostatic union’’ of mind and body, which Leibniz defends in an essay from 1669–70. The next two contributions, by Samuel Levey and Daniel Garber, focus on the vexed issue of the ontological status of body in Leibniz’s middle period (roughly 1680–1700). Commentators have long held that Leibniz’s commitment to an idealist metaphysics—one that restricts an independent existence to mind-like substances and relegates material things to mind-dependent phenomena—can be traced at least as far back as 1686. One of the central planks in their argument is Leibniz’s frequent denial that there is any precise shape in corporeal things, and his related claim that the properties of extension, shape, and motion involve something ‘‘imaginary.’’ In ‘‘Leibniz on Precise Shapes and the Corporeal World,’’ Samuel Levey takes issue with this conclusion. On Levey’s account, Leibniz’s denial is restricted to the ‘‘precise shapes’’ of traditional geometry, and thus is consistent with bodies possessing ‘‘fractal shapes’’ of infinite complexity. Levey shows that Leibniz’s views on the fine structure of matter and motion (developed in conjunction with his resolution of the ‘‘labyrinth of the continuum’’) support such a position, which parallels his reductive analysis of the property of motion. In both cases, Levey concludes, Leibniz’s analyses allow for ‘‘a nuanced realism about shape and motion as properties that belong to bodies as they are in themselves’’— and this is consistent with (though it does not entail) a realistic interpretation of corporeal substance. Daniel Garber is well known for his defense of Leibniz’s realism about corporeal substance during his middle period (Garber 1985). In ‘‘Leibniz and Idealism,’’ Garber revisits this reading, responding to criticisms raised by Sleigh (1990) and Adams (1994), and offering a broader perspective on Leibniz’s metaphysical outlook during the 1680s and 1690s. It is a mistake, Garber argues, to insist on a nascent idealism in Leibniz’s middle period based on views he will come to espouse later. Texts from the middle period offering prima facie support for an idealist interpretation can be reconciled, according to Garber, with Leibniz’s contemporaneous account of causal relations among animated bodies. At the same time, Garber allows that there is little evidence of Leibniz defining himself as a realist about corporeal substance during the period. In the course of a concerted attack on the Cartesian account of body, Leibniz relies implicitly on the supposition of corporeal substances, conceived as form-matter composites on analogy with living bodies. But he largely ignores the troubling metaphysical issues— central to his later thought—that such a supposition raises. The concept of harmony is fundamental to Leibniz’s understanding of the relations that unite a plurality of substances in a single world. Substances harmonize in their perceptions of a common universe, and changes in individual souls harmonize with changes in their respective bodies. The essays by Catherine Wilson and Nicholas Jolley both raise challenges to features of Leibniz’s hypothesis of preestablished harmony. Wilson’s ‘‘Compossibility, Expression, Accommodation’’
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15
responds to a puzzle Sleigh (1990) has posed about Leibniz’s account of the worldconstituting relations among substances. A number of texts suggest that Leibniz is inclined to regard the relations of compossibility, expression, and accommodation (or harmony) as entailing one another: any collection of compossible substances will be one in which each member of that collection both expresses and harmonizes with every other. But Sleigh objects that this is hardly obvious: compossibility is a necessary fact about the substances comprising a single world; by contrast, expression and harmony appear to add increasing degrees of perfection to a world. In Wilson’s words, they are ‘‘value-adding relations.’’ Wilson proposes a novel way of connecting these concepts. Universal expression is a feature of any Leibnizian possible world and is defined in terms of the correspondence among the contents of the perceptions of soul-like substances. Accommodation, on the other hand, is restricted to those worlds in which a set of more complex agreements obtains among the interacting, spatiotemporal bodies ‘‘projected’’ by those substances. In ‘‘Leibniz and Occasionalism,’’ Nicholas Jolley addresses another perennial topic of Leibniz scholarship: Leibniz’s defense of the system of preestablished harmony against Malebranche’s occasionalism. One line of criticism, going back to Arnauld, has challenged whether Leibniz succeeds in distinguishing preestablished harmony as a genuine alternative to occasionalism. Other critics have charged that Leibniz’s two main arguments against Malebranche—that occasionalism requires a God who ‘‘disturbs’’ the laws of nature, and that it presupposes the occurrence of ‘‘perpetual miracles’’—both miss the mark. According to Jolley, Malebranche has an easy response to the first of these arguments. The second, however, hinges on a much-discussed issue in recent philosophy of science: whether laws of nature constitute a ‘‘rock bottom’’ in scientific explanation, or whether such laws themselves require an explanation in terms of causal powers. Malebranche and Leibniz agree that God governs nature through general laws, and that miracles are to be understood as exceptions to these laws. Their disagreement turns on a further condition Leibniz imposes on laws of nature. Against Malebranche, Leibniz holds that a law-like principle is not truly a law of nature unless it is grounded in the causal powers of created substances. Since Malebranche denies the existence of finite causal powers, by Leibniz’s lights he is committed to a denial of the existence of laws of nature; hence the charge of perpetual miracles. Jolley goes on to show how Leibniz’s late metaphysics has the resources to overcome some of his disagreement with Malebranche, by restricting his grounding requirement to monads and settling for laws at the phenomenal level of bodies. However, the evidence suggests that Leibniz was unwilling to make this move, requiring that laws of impact be grounded in the physical forces of matter, which in turn are grounded in the primitive forces of monads. For Leibniz, the laws of nature include not only physical laws of efficient causation, governing the motions and collisions of bodies, but also laws of final causation, or appetite, which govern changes in the states of monads. In ‘‘Leibniz’s Two Realms,’’ Jonathan Bennett surveys the range of claims Leibniz makes on behalf of teleological concepts in the explanation of nature, and the harmony he posits between parallel orders of final causation and efficient causation. Bennett argues that in almost every case Leibniz’s assertions of the importance of teleology
16 Introduction
do not withstand scrutiny. The teleological nature of monadic appetitions is ‘‘dubious at best’’; and Leibniz fails to formulate the notion of a ‘‘teleological pattern of behavior’’ that is required to frame an informative thesis about the harmony between ‘‘teleological events in the mind and mechanistic ones in the body.’’ In the end, Bennett concludes that the ‘‘teleological load’’ in Leibniz’s philosophy is carried entirely by reason, to which Leibniz assigns both a cognitive and a conative function. Reason teaches human beings what the good is and disposes us to pursue it because it is good. Thus, there is at least one case in which Leibniz’s claims for teleology are borne out. Leibniz’s conception of rational action as action motivated by reason’s perception of the good is the starting point for the remaining essays, all of which are concerned with Leibniz’s treatment of the human will and its freedom. In ‘‘Leibniz on Spontaneity,’’ Donald Rutherford explores the conception of spontaneity, or self-determination, that is presupposed by Leibniz’s analysis of freedom. Traditionally, spontaneity has been understood to imply an absence of constraint or compulsion: a spontaneous act is one in which an agent moves herself as opposed to being moved by external causes. In the Theodicy, Leibniz makes it clear that by ‘spontaneity’ he means the power of self-determination that is the source of all the actions of every monad, whether rational or not. But if this so, then his account of spontaneity seems too broad to tell us anything informative about freedom; in particular, the notion of monadic spontaneity fails as a basis for distinguishing free acts from those in which an agent is physically constrained. Rutherford argues that Leibniz’s writings also offer support for a narrower notion of agent spontaneity, which characterizes cases in which an individual can be understood as acting for the sake of the greatest apparent good. Rutherford shows how the latter notion is defined within the framework of monadic spontaneity, and why Leibniz believes that both sorts of spontaneity are relevant to the understanding of freedom. The contributions by Robert Adams and Michael Murray target Leibniz’s doctrine of moral necessity, a species of determination that he takes to be consistent with the contingency of free acts. In ‘‘Moral Necessity,’’ Adams argues that the distinctive feature of this modality is that the notion of value—good or perfection— plays an essential role in the determination and explanation of choice. As such, Leibnizian moral necessity is opposed both to metaphysical necessity (that whose denial implies a contradiction) and to ‘‘any value-free mechanism determining choice.’’ Nevertheless, the concept of moral necessity is consistent with Leibniz’s efforts to interpret contingency as a species of hypothetical necessity, or determination in accordance with universal laws. On Adams’s account, ‘‘moral laws,’’ according to which ‘‘the value or apparent value of an end, or some analogue of apparent value, is sufficient of itself to determine the action of a substance,’’ ‘‘are strong enough to determine choice infallibly in advance.’’ The crucial point is that there is no deeper explanation of how such final causation operates—in particular, no explanation in terms of mechanical causes. Adams concludes by considering how this reading comports with the defense of contingency that Leibniz offers in connection with his conceptual containment theory of truth. That an agent in acting freely could have acted otherwise is supported by the thought that the agent’s
Introduction
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complete concept contains as primary constituents not the free choices themselves but ‘‘value-laden reasons’’ from which those choices follow by moral necessity, and that no finite analysis would suffice to derive the choices from their reasons. Adams expresses skepticism, however, as to whether any further mitigation of Leibniz’s determinism is possible. The topic of moral necessity is approached from a different direction by Michael Murray in ‘‘Spontaneity and Freedom in Leibniz.’’ Building on an interpretation defended in earlier writings, Murray argues that Leibniz’s conception of moral necessity is indebted to accounts of the notion developed by late-sixteenthcentury Spanish Jesuits, and that, according to such accounts, moral necessity entails the denial of psychological determinism, or the view that volitions are ‘‘causally necessitated by psychological antecedents.’’ Like Adams, Murray interprets moral necessity teleologically: in acting freely, an agent acts for the sake of a perceived good. In contrast to Adams, however, Murray does not see moral necessity as defined simply by the rejection of a ‘‘blind’’ or ‘‘value-free’’ mechanism determining choice. In Murray’s view, an assertion of moral necessity presupposes the denial that an act of choice is either physically or causally determined by antecedent conditions, although such conditions may nonetheless be sufficient for choice. In support of this reading, Murray appeals to texts in which Leibniz endeavors to defend the independence of human freedom from divine determination. In order for creatures to be held responsible for sin, God, through his willing, cannot be understood to be the cause of sin. For a free action to be genuinely a creature’s own, the creature must have ‘‘an active will, which is not psychologically determined.’’ Murray concludes that theological worries of this sort offer ‘‘powerful evidence of anti-compatibilist sympathies in Leibniz’s thought,’’ and that these sympathies favor the adoption of Jesuit moral necessity as a ‘‘buffer’’ between God and creatures. The final two essays, by Sean Greenberg and Jack Davidson, focus on the role of ‘‘intelligence’’ in Leibniz’s account of freedom. In ‘‘Leibniz against Molinism: Freedom, Indifference, and the Nature of the Will,’’ Greenberg analyzes Leibniz’s rejection of the doctrine of freedom promulgated by the sixteenth-century Jesuit Luis de Molina and elaborated by his successor Francisco Sua´rez. Central to the Molinist account is the notion of the will’s indifference: an agent is free if, with all the requisites for action posited, she is able to act or not act. It has been argued that Leibniz’s opposition to this conception of freedom hinges on its incompatibility with the principle of sufficient reason. For the Molinist, the will is capable of determining itself to one of a pair of alternatives, independent of antecedent grounds that represent one as better than the other. Arguably, this would be a choice for which there was no sufficient reason. Greenberg contends that Leibniz’s case against the Molinist goes beyond this, resting ultimately on their diverging conceptions of mind and will. According to Greenberg, in Leibniz’s account of freedom, as against that of the Molinist, the ‘‘will has no distinct functional role to play.’’ Rather than being an independent ‘‘self-determining power,’’ the will is a tendency or effort that depends entirely upon the mind’s representational states. Thus, for Leibniz, the issue of freedom turns not on what the will can or cannot do but on the distinctness of the mind’s perceptions. The highest ‘‘freedom of mind’’
18 Introduction
is the condition in which choice is determined by reason’s representations of the good (and not by the passions); hence Leibniz’s claim in the Theodicy that intelligence is the ‘‘soul’’ of freedom. Leibniz’s intellectualism is further explored by Jack Davidson in ‘‘Video Meliora Proboque, Deteriora Sequor: Leibniz on the Intellectual Source of Sin.’’ As Davidson defines it, intellectualism is the view that all volitional error (or sin) is preceded by cognitive error, or, conversely, that knowledge is sufficient for virtue. Davidson contends that Leibniz subscribes to an intellectualist position throughout his career. In later writings, however, Leibniz realizes that a potent form of intellectualism to which he had been attracted—one identifying volition with intellectual judgment—‘‘faces grave difficulties in explaining cases of incontinence and in assigning culpability for sin.’’ Davidson argues that Leibniz’s considered view is a ‘‘weak intellectualism,’’ which holds that sin always involves cognitive error but does not depend solely on cognitive error. The additional factor incorporated in Leibniz’s account is the influence of the passions: appetitive and aversive states that ‘‘unseat the rule of reason, without themselves being cognitive.’’ As Davidson explains it, the passions’ effectiveness in this regard depends upon the ‘‘essential temporality of practical reasoning.’’ Subsequent to the intellect’s judgment that a particular sinful act is to be avoided, the passions may ‘‘distract or misdirect’’ the intellect’s focus from the wrongness of the act to the pleasure anticipated in doing it. For Leibniz, the choice of the pleasurable over the virtuous presupposes a cognitive error—a judgment that the former promises a greater good than the latter. Davidson’s point, however, is that this can occur in a way that is outside the intellect’s control: an agent may retain the knowledge that a certain act is wrong and yet choose to perform the act, because of inattention and the nonrational force of the passions. Accordingly, Davidson concludes, Leibniz’s program of moral education depends as much on the habituation of virtue as it does on the acquisition of intellectual knowledge. In this introduction we have attempted to convey a sense of the breadth of Leibniz’s philosophical program and the diversity of topics and approaches that characterizes recent scholarship on it. It is hoped that the essays gathered here provide the inspiration for many more studies of Leibniz’s philosophy.
Notes 1. See also Cassirer 1902, which has had less influence on the literature. 2. Couturat (1901: x–xi) took Leibniz’s position to be expressed most clearly in the study known as Primae Veritates (‘‘First Truths’’), now dated to 1689 (A 6.4:1643–1649/AG 30–34). 3. This applies only to the English-language literature. On the Continent, there appeared inter alia the pioneering studies of Grua (1953, 1956) and Heinekamp (1969). 4. Parkinson 1970 was the first significant study of the topic in English. The other of Leibniz’s two labyrinths, that of the continuum, did not fare significantly better in the literature. See now, though, Levey 1998 and Richard Arthur’s introduction to LOC. 5. Adams (1994) links this renaissance to contemporary developments in modal logic and metaphysics, which have relied heavily on the notion of possible worlds. Against the Russell-Couturat interpretation, Adams argues that Leibniz’s view of problems concerning modality and identity ‘‘was
Introduction
19
largely shaped by his theology, and his use of logical doctrines in dealing with them cannot be understood apart from such metaphysical conceptions as that of substantial form’’ (4). 6. See, e.g., Garber 1985 and C. Wilson 1989. 7. For further texts and discussion, see Rutherford 1996 and Mercer 2001. 8. ‘‘Spinosa incepit ubi Cartesius desinit: In naturalismo’’ (Beeley 2002: 10). 9. In the main text of Leviathan Hobbes stops short of asserting the corporeal nature of God (see chap. 12.7). Such an assertion does appear, however, in chap. 3 (‘‘On certain objections against Leviathan’’) of the Appendix to the 1668 Latin edition, which Leibniz may have known. It is reproduced in Curley’s edition (Hobbes 1994: 540–542). 10. Arguably the charge fails in the case of the ancient Stoics, who uphold divine providence and, in one sense, divine justice. For further discussion, see Rutherford 2001, 2003. 11. For Descartes’ statement of the first view, see his letters to Mersenne of April 15, May 6, and May 27, 1630 (CSM 3:20–26), and his Replies to the Sixth Objections (CSM 2:291–292, 293–294); for the second, see Principles 3.47 (CSM 1:257–258). 12. See, in particular, paragraph 85 of the Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect, which Leibniz knew from Spinoza’s 1677 Opera posthuma: ‘‘[O]bjective effects proceed in the soul according to the formal nature of its object. This is the same as what the ancients said, i.e., that true knowledge proceeds from cause to effect—except that so far as I know they never conceived the soul (as we do here) as acting according to certain laws, like a spiritual automaton’’ (CWS 37). For Leibniz’s appropriation of the term ‘spiritual automaton,’ see the passage quoted earlier from the New System and T 52. 13. See On Nature Itself, sec. 15 (G 4:515/AG 165–166). 14. For an account of how the maximization of harmony underwrites this being the best of all possible worlds, see Rutherford 1995a. 15. See the articles collected in Lodge 2004. 16. For an influential account of Leibniz’s shifting views during the 1680s and 1690s, see Sleigh 1990, chaps. 5 and 6. 17. For arguments supporting an idealist reading, see Adams 1994 and Rutherford 1995a. For arguments against, see Hartz 1998. 18. Leibniz’s description of the ‘‘city of God’’ as a ‘‘truly universal monarchy’’ is at odds with Augustine’s limitation of its membership to the Christian elect. Leibniz’s city resembles more closely the Stoic cosmopolis: ‘‘a single city and state shared by humans and gods’’ (Cicero, De finibus 3.64).
1
The One and the Many and Kinds of Distinctness The Possibility of Monism or Pantheism in the Young Leibniz MARK KULSTAD
The One and the Many It would be no doubt an exaggeration to say that Leibniz was obsessed by the various forms of the one-many problem. But the issue certainly pervaded his philosophical thought. From universal harmony to perception, from corporeal substance to theology, from philosophy of science to nominalism, the problematic of the one and the many played an important role in his reflections throughout the course of his philosophical life. If many individual aspects of this emphasis are well known, their combined weight has perhaps been insufficiently appreciated. Consider, to begin, an issue currently being examined in great depth: (1) the issue of corporeal substance in the philosophy of Leibniz.1 Is a corporeal substance, somehow involving infinitely many substances, itself also strictly one substance, strictly an unum per se? And if so, exactly how do the many substances become one? Arnauld was one of those who pressed Leibniz on this (see, for example, LA 65–66, 108–109). Is the corporeal substance perhaps—as Hans Poser has suggested recently—something strictly less than an unum per se but also something more than simply an unum per aggregationem, some sort of derivative unity?2 If so, the exact sense of this unity or oneness would be of considerable interest. Commencing from the issue of corporeal substance, one might readily proceed in either of two opposite directions. (2) One might withdraw into the interior life of a single Leibnizian substance to consider the case of perception. Perception for Leibniz is simply the expression of the many in the one,3 thus providing as it were a psychological perspective on our problem.4 Bayle was one of those who pressed Leibniz for a clearer solution in the case of a simple substance, somehow 20
The One and the Many
21
one despite the multiplicity within it; Leibniz conceded to him that the issue was ‘‘one of those which are most in need of clarification’’ in his philosophy.5 (3) Alternatively, one might turn outward to the exterior complexity of the whole world to consider the case of Leibnizian universal harmony. This universal harmony is, for Leibniz—as of course for him all harmonies are—a unity in multiplicity, only in this case among all things (A 2.1:333). Both of these examples bring the issue of the one and the many into the spotlight, though at very different levels of analysis, the psychological and the cosmological—perhaps not surprising in a philosophy where the microcosm mirrors the macrocosm. With only a passing reference to (4) Leibniz’s nominalism, which of course provides the German philosopher with a response to one of the most historically familiar versions of the problem of the one and the many,6 let us turn to philosophical theology and its relation to the one and the many in Leibniz’s thought. Here we find, first, the question (5) how the one God gives rise to the infinitely many of this world (Kulstad 1999). Second, we find the complicating feature in Leibniz’s philosophical theology that (6) the one God is really triune, that is, a God that is one but somehow involves three persons—the God of the Trinity.7 (Note that this is, atypically for Leibniz, an example of the problem of the one and the finitely many.) Finally, in an issue that has recently gained prominence in connection with discussions of infinity in Leibniz, we find Leibniz subject to change on the question (7) whether God is the soul of the universe.8 Early in his life, at least briefly, Leibniz endorsed the view that God is the soul of the universe (A 6.3:474/DSR 25). In his maturity, he fought against the view with some passion (Carlin 1997). The topic is relevant to the current discussion in that such a relation between God and the world would be one way to bring unity, or oneness of some kind, to the multiplicity of God and the infinitely many items of this world. Although this is not the specific topic that will be taken up in this essay, there is some relation between it and the main issues I will discuss here. While one could provide further examples in this vein, issues (1)–(7) suffice to make it understandable why Heinrich Schepers has said recently that ‘‘one can view Leibniz’s metaphysics as the work of rationally explicating the different expressions of the polarity of the one and the many’’ (2000: 171).9 It is not, to be sure, the project of this essay to canvass this whole topic. Rather I shall aim to contribute something in connection with an intriguing and important aspect of it, not appearing in (1)–(7) just sketched. It is an issue highlighted by recent discussions of the question whether Leibniz ever adopted the monism (some would say pantheism) of Spinoza, that is, whether Leibniz ever seriously considered a philosophical solution of the problem of the one and the many, which made the multiplicity of the world so many different aspects or manifestations or modes of one single divine substance, or of a divinity uniting, and in some sense not really distinguished from, all existing things. In continuing this discussion, my ultimate purpose is to focus attention on issues important not only for the question of the one and the many but also for clarifying a number of critical concepts in Leibniz’s philosophy, early and late.10 Since ‘pantheism’ and ‘monism’ are both controversial and laden with multiple meanings, a preliminary discussion of the matter of terminology is in order.
22 Leibniz: Nature and Freedom
The monism we are interested in is, roughly speaking, the doctrine that there is only one substance. A relevant variant of this view is one in which the one substance is God. (Obviously, Spinoza’s system is a paradigm of monism in this sense.) Pantheism in its etymological sense is the view that all things are God. The basic idea here is quite frequently put in a pair of statements, as in ‘‘God is All and All is God,’’ and is often linked to, or equated with, the idea that God is identical to the world rather than distinct from it.11 It is typically held also that pantheism requires a special unity of all things. Obviously, more could and should be said about the identity and distinctness just mentioned—and it will be, later in this essay. But for the present, these preliminary definitions and remarks may serve as a reasonable basis for discussion. Turning from the definitions of these terms to the relation between them, we should note that, especially in connection with Spinoza, the terms ‘pantheism’ and ‘monism’ are sometimes used interchangeably. While this procedure is perhaps justifiable in some contexts, the associated concepts should in general be distinguished. I will here follow Michael Levine, the author of Pantheism and useful related articles,12 in saying that not all forms of pantheism are monistic, and not all forms of monism are pantheistic (1992: 95–98). The former point allows for pantheistic systems that are not based on a substance-metaphysics at all, and also for ones that are so based, but involve many substances rather than just one, substances nonetheless integrated into the pantheistic divine unity that Levine emphasizes. The latter point allows for a monism of one substance, but one in which ‘‘‘Unity’ in a relevant pantheistic sense is absent’’ (Levine 1992: 98). Such a system would not, for Levine, count as pantheistic. It is worth noting that in the end Levine endorses the idea of Spinoza as both a monist and a pantheist, thereby acknowledging that unity in a relevant pantheistic sense is present in Spinoza.13 Since Spinoza holds that the one substance, God, is indivisible,14 this suggests, what I shall in fact assume for purposes of this essay, that a monism in which the one substance is both divine and indivisible falls under the relevant pantheistic sense of ‘unity’ and hence counts as pantheistic. This still leaves some question as to the exact boundaries of unity in a ‘‘relevant pantheistic sense’’ in other contexts. But I shall not pursue this detail further here.15 With these terminological points addressed, and returning to the subject at hand, we note that a natural first response to one aspect of the topic proposed earlier is likely to be simply that since Leibniz is so obviously opposed to monism—a fortiori, to monistic pantheism—there is little point in examining any claimed Leibnizian endorsement of these two positions. Leibniz, some might insist, positively reveled in the multiplicity of the infinitely many individual substances, the world of monads, that he made famous. He clearly opposed himself to Spinoza on the point of monism versus monadism, indeed, so strongly that it is implausible that he ever took a supportive view. The following passage might serve as a basis for such a sentiment: [I]t is through these very monads that Spinozism is destroyed, for there are just as many true substances, as many living mirrors of the universe which subsist always, or as many concentrated universes, as there are monads; according to Spinoza, on the contrary, there is only one substance. He would be right if there were no
The One and the Many
23
monads; then everything except God would be of a passing nature and would vanish into simple accidents or modifications, since there would be no substantial foundation in things, such as consists in the existence of monads. (to Bourguet, December 1714; G 3:576)
Now I have no intention of opposing the view that the mature Leibniz was indeed a pluralist, that is, that he believed in his maturity that there are many substances rather than just one. But despite the forcefulness of passages such as this one, there is profit to be made by looking into passages that some (myself included) have taken to suggest that at certain points in his youth Leibniz was, or may have been, a monist and/or a pantheist.16 The payoff, again, is that it helps bring into sharper focus certain important issues for Leibniz’s philosophy, youthful and mature, that might not otherwise be sufficiently understood or appreciated.
Kinds of Identity and Distinctness in Relation to Monism and Pantheism Let us begin by picking up the thread of identity and distinctness in connection with some puzzling—some might even say mystifying—accounts of the doctrine of pantheism. What could it mean, for instance, to say that God is identical to the world, as opposed to distinct from it? Or what could it mean to say that God is all or is everything? Leibniz himself appeared to see serious difficulties here, for he expressed himself quite strongly to Eckhard as follows: ‘‘it seems impossible for there to be a Being that is everything; for it could be said of such a Being that it is you and it is me, which I think you will not admit’’ (28 April 1677; A 2.1:323, quoted in Adams 1994: 130–131). Conceivably, Leibniz had a simple argument in mind: if a Being were identical to everything, then it would be identical to you, and identical to me; in this case, by the transitivity of identity, you and I would be identical; but we are not identical; so the supposition is absurd.17 Clearly, conceptions of identity and distinctness are fundamental here, as they clearly were in our initial formulations of pantheism. But if the foregoing reconstruction of Leibniz’s thought correctly identifies the specific sense of identity that those who have claimed that God is all and all is God had in mind, then the claim is indeed puzzling. This suggests that we need to look harder at notions of identity and distinctness in connection with pantheism (and, as we shall see, in connection with monism as well). Some remarks of G.H.R. Parkinson will serve to motivate further this closer look. While in the end coming down on the side of those who see no pantheistic tendencies in the philosophy of Leibniz in 1675–76, Parkinson points out ‘‘a remarkable passage . . . which may be thought to be clearly pantheistic. Leibniz says, ‘Just as the form of the number three differs from all its parts, so do things differ from God. God is all things; creatures are some things.’ ’’18 Parkinson’s comment on this is that ‘‘Leibniz seems to be saying here that God is all things, and that creatures—i.e. what are normally called God’s creation—are parts of God. It is unlikely, however, that this really was Leibniz’s view’’ (Parkinson 1978: 88). I won’t take issue with the interpretation itself, here. Rather, I want to focus on the issue of identity and distinction that is imbedded in Parkinson’s formulation
24 Leibniz: Nature and Freedom
that God is all things and that things, or what are normally called creatures, are parts of God. It seems clear enough that Parkinson here offers a part-whole formulation of a proposed (pantheistic) God-world relationship: God is a whole in which the things of this world are parts, and in this sense God is the whole thing. But notice that the objection Leibniz raised in philosophizing with Eckhard does not seem to apply to this formulation. There, Leibniz to all appearances interpreted the idea of God being everything in terms of God being numerically identical with each thing. Via the transitivity of numerical identity, he would then be able to derive what he took to be the absurdity that one person would be numerically identical to another. Such an absurdity does not follow from a partwhole formulation of the God-world relationship of the sort just presented. On this formulation, it is not the case that God is numerically identical to each thing of this world. Rather, God is numerically identical to a whole, and each of the things of this world is a part of this whole. Since it is not the case that God is numerically identical to these parts taken individually, the inference Leibniz presented to Eckhard is blocked. So far, in discussing Parkinson’s ‘‘remarkable passage’’ and Parkinson’s commentary on it, we have focused on identity. But looking at the same issue with our focus turned instead toward distinctness is also worthwhile.19 Consider the following question: assuming the part-whole formulation of pantheism, is a thing of this world distinct from God? Neither yes nor no is a completely satisfying answer. Either answer seems to require further explanation. Yes, some will be tempted to say, any thing of this world is distinct from God given the part-whole formulation because no thing (e.g., Eckhard) simply is God. Eckhard, for instance, would indeed be a part of God on this formulation, but he would not be numerically identical to God. Others, however, may be tempted by a different answer. No, they might say, on the part-whole formulation a thing of this world is not truly distinct from God, for each such thing is a part of God, is within God. To be sure, no such thing is numerically identical to the whole, to God. But the thing is numerically identical to something that is a part of God. In this sense, it is not distinct from God. It is not something that exists over and above God, something that exists in addition to God. It is something that exists as part of God. What is suggested here is a sense of ‘distinctness’ different from the sense of ‘numerical distinctness.’ A proper part, we might say, is indeed numerically distinct from the whole of which it is a part, but it is not distinct from the whole in another sense, a sense that we can here specify as follows, under the label ‘mereological distinctness’: x and y are mereologically distinct iff (i) x and y are numerically distinct and (ii) neither x nor y is a part of the other.
While this modestly formal statement may seem foreign or strained, I submit that it captures a fairly standard aspect of ordinary human communication about things, about whether or not some thing a and some thing b are distinct from, other than, or separate from one another. But whether or not this point meets with agreement, I contend that in connection with issues of monism and pantheism a good argument that this sense of distinctness is valuable is that it affords a basis from which to
The One and the Many
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give a defense of Spinoza’s argument for monism (Kulstad 1996). This encourages the thought that the examination of this specific sense of distinctness, and, more generally, various specific senses of identity and/or distinctness involved in various forms of monism or pantheism, can be quite important in thinking clearly about these issues. Continuing in this vein, I would claim that another sort of distinction is significant in this connection, a sort well known to students of seventeenth-century philosophy. This is real distinction (as opposed to a modal distinction or a distinction of reason), the form of distinction crucial in Descartes’ argument for mind-body dualism and also taken up by Spinoza in his attempted defense (very much in opposition to Descartes) of the idea that the attributes of thought and extension might both be attributes of the same substance.20 It is here that we will find the main textual focus of this essay. In approaching the texts, the following senses of ‘monism’ are available to us.21 The list is not meant as exhaustive. (A) MonismND is true iff there exists an x such that x is substance and there exists no y such that y is substance and x is numerically distinct from y. (B) MonismMD is true iff there exists an x such that x is substance and there exists no substance y such that y is mereologically distinct from x.22 (C) MonismCD is true iff there exists an x such that x is substance and there exists no substance y such that y is constituentially distinct from x.23 (D) MonismRD is true iff substance exists and there exist no x and y such that x and y are substances and x is really distinct from y.24
A similar list of senses of ‘pantheism’ is available to us. Note that in all of these definitions, it is assumed that the God that is said to exist has unity in the relevant pantheistic sense, whatever that sense might be exactly. The definitions involve various ways of spelling out the rough idea that God is all, or that nothing is ‘‘distinct’’ from God. (A) PantheismND is true iff God exists and nothing is numerically distinct from God. (B) PantheismMD is true iff God exists and nothing is mereologically distinct from God. (C) PantheismCD is true iff God exists and nothing is constituentially distinct from God. (D) PantheismRD is true iff God exists and nothing is really distinct from God.
If not complete, the latter list captures a good bit of the logical and historical space occupied by discussions familiar to most of us. Pantheism of form (A) seems to be approximately what Leibniz had in mind as a target when he ridiculed a pantheism-like doctrine in discussions with Eckhard (see earlier). Assuming the truth of pantheism in the sense of formulation (A), that is, the truth of PantheismND, each thing—including Leibniz and Eckhard—would be numerically
26 Leibniz: Nature and Freedom
identical to God. The consequence that each human (along with each rock along the road, and each atom in the void, etc.) would count as the full (not partial) divinity has fascinated (and/or repulsed) thoughtful people for centuries. The consequence that Leibniz seems to have highlighted, however, was that in this case he and Eckhard would not be numerically distinct (as they had of course been assuming); rather they would be numerically identical. This was a consequence Leibniz did not think Eckhard would accept.25 Formulation (B) covers the sort of thing that many have in mind in more popular contemporary discussions of pantheism, namely, the vaguely scientificreligious idea that considers the whole universe of contemporary science (assume it as materialistic and finite, for present purposes) to be somehow ultimately unified and divine, with each material thing in the universe (including human life forms) being a part of the pantheistic whole, a pantheistic God. On this view, God is All (the universe, or Weltall, as the Germans would say), and individual material things are part of the All. Putting this a bit more technically, on this view nothing in the universe is mereologically distinct from the whole, which is God, even though each individual material thing in the universe is numerically distinct from the whole (a point that clearly separates this example from the previous one). Putting this in less formal terms, nothing in the universe is something over and above God, nothing is external to God.26 Formulation (C), with its emphasis on constituency rather than parts, would allow for a pantheism in which all things go to make up God in some sense, but not strictly in the sense of being parts of God—perhaps because (as in the case of Spinoza’s system) God would somehow not be taken to be divisible into parts.27 Of course, in terms of specific cases, the example just given would already count as an example of PantheismCD, since in it God exists and nothing is mereologically distinct from God. It follows from this that God exists and nothing is constituentially distinct from God,28 which is just PantheismCD. But if one wants at least the suggestion of a more concrete example of the latter type of pantheism that is not also an example of the former, consider, from a specific perspective, the example I have already mentioned, provided by Leibniz in a passage that Parkinson calls ‘‘remarkable’’: ‘‘God is all things; creatures are some things’’ (Parkinson 1978: 88).29 Now one could (and Parkinson himself does, as shown earlier) interpret this in terms of whole and parts. But such a reading is not forced by the passage.30 Leibniz, or someone else propounding a verbally similar view, might have in mind a doctrine in which the relation implied between God and things was not that of whole and parts, but rather something less strict, something nonetheless falling under some notion of constituency.31 Formulation (D) can also be related to a philosophically familiar sort of view, though one that is clearly quite different from the three views just considered. Simplifying a bit, we can discuss this on the model of Descartes’ idea that only two substances are really distinct, while a substance and its modes are not really distinct, but only modally distinct (Principles 1.60–61). Analogously, in a system in which all the things of this world were taken as modes of the one substance, God, one might say that the things of this world, that is, the modes, are not really distinct from God; rather each mode is only modally distinct from God. Nothing else in
The One and the Many 27
this system, we assume, would be really distinct from the existing God either; hence we would have a case of PantheismRD.32 I think it will be agreed that the various doctrines of monism and pantheism that have been considered through the ages (and not infrequently vilified) have often been obscure and confusing, difficult to understand and distinguish. I hardly claim that the modest approach offered here can cut through all the haze. But I do claim that focusing on identity and distinctness, in their various senses and manifestations—some of which have been put on display here—can help remove some of the mystification and confusion surrounding the doctrines of monism and pantheism.33 Hereafter I shall try to do just this sort of thing in a more limited way, in connection with recent discussions of the young Leibniz as a possible monist and/or pantheist.
Real Distinction and Leibniz’s Argument That All Things Are One With these preliminaries out of the way, let us turn directly to the young Leibniz, for a look at what appears to be—I will not here say definitely is—a youthful expression by Leibniz of monistic pantheism. The advantage of the previous discussion is that we can now put the hypothesis in a much more specific form: the present hypothesis is that the passage in question can be read as an expression of a monistic pantheism of the specific types, Monism RD and PantheismRD. Although the passage has been discussed by others as well, notably Adams and Mercer,34 my discussion is distinguished by its emphasis on the central role of the notion of real distinction in this text, as opposed to the other kinds of distinction on display in the second section herein. The quotation in question (which I shall refer to as the ‘‘all things are one’’ passage), is drawn from a paper dated by the Academy editors to November 1676(?), Quod Ens Perfectissimum Sit Possibile: It can easily be demonstrated that all things are distinguished, not as substances . . . but as modes. This can be demonstrated from the fact that, of those things which are radically distinct, one can be perfectly understood without another; that is, all the requisites of the one can be understood without all the requisites of the other being understood. But in the case of things, this is not so; for since the ultimate reason of things is unique, and contains by itself the aggregate of all requisites of all things, it is evident that the requisites of all things are the same. So also is their essence, given that an essence is the aggregate of all primary requisites. Therefore the essence of all things is the same, and things differ only modally. . . . If only those things are really different which can be separated, or, of which one can be perfectly understood without the other, it follows that no thing really differs from another, but that all things are one. (A 6.3:573/DSR 93, 95)35
This is, in my view, a fascinating passage, well worth the attention it has received in recent years. The argued thesis, that all things are one, is of interest in its own right, even if all mention of monism and pantheism were set aside. (I shall return to this specific question later.) But in fact the suggestion of monism36 and of pantheism37 has been a focal point for discussion to date. This examination will
28 Leibniz: Nature and Freedom
not be an exception to this, even if it goes beyond previous discussions (including my own) in a variety of ways. I cannot here deal with all the useful commentary that this passage has received. My more limited aim is to offer a reading of this passage that articulates the argument present in it and that makes clear how, and in just what sense of distinctness, one could see this passage as a statement of monism and/or pantheism. I shall be concerned as well to show the relation between Leibniz’s use of real distinction in this passage and Descartes’ important use of the same distinction. I argue that Leibniz’s use of the notion of real distinction (and related concepts, primarily modal distinction) is close enough to Cartesian uses38 to make it reasonable to look to material from Descartes as an occasional aid in interpreting Leibniz’s meaning in this passage. Let us examine things a bit more closely. In the ‘‘all things are one’’ passage, Leibniz uses the terms ‘really differ’ and ‘modally differ’ (realiter differunt, realiter . . . differe, and differunt . . . modo) at important places in his argument, and also suggests both real and modal distinctions in his opening statement of the thesis to be proved: ‘‘all things are distinguished, not as substances . . . but as modes [Res omnes non ut substantias sed modos distingui]’’ (A 6.3:573; emphasis added). He gives an account (perhaps only a partial account) of real distinction as well, namely, that ‘‘only those things are really different which can be separated, or, of which one can be perfectly understood without the other’’ (A 6.3:573). To all appearances this is the same account given in connection with things that are said to be ‘‘radically distinct’’ earlier in the passage. This use of the two terms ‘really’ and ‘radically’ in connection with distinction is a bit confusing, but in fact Leibniz at first wrote not radicaliter distincta but rather realiter distincta (really distinct) earlier in the passage. So it appears both from Leibniz’s terms and from content he assigned them that we have one concept at work in these two portions of the passage, but some uncertainty and inconsistency as to labeling.39 Certainly the label realiter distincta would have been more familiar to contemporaries, and in fact, the concept referred to would have been quite familiar as well: for key points from Descartes on real distinctness are quite similar to Leibniz’s points on real (or ‘‘radical’’) distinctness in the passage above. First, Descartes says, ‘‘Real distinction properly exists only between two or more substances’’ (Principles 1.60). This makes sense of Leibniz talking about things not being ‘‘distinguished as substances,’’ and then turning immediately to discussion of real/ radical distinction, without ever explaining what justifies the transition. For the transition was familiar enough to those who knew Descartes not to require explanation: the distinction that applies to substances is real distinction, not modal distinction. Second, Descartes says, ‘‘we perceive these to be really distinct from one another from the sole fact that we can clearly and distinctly understand one without the other’’ (Principles 1.60). Leibniz’s talk of perfectly understanding one without the other is certainly very close to this, and consequently Leibniz’s (admittedly wavering) choice of the term ‘really distinct’ to connect up with this would not have seemed out of place to contemporaries.40 Finally, although it will not play a central part in my discussion of real distinction, it is worth mentioning that Leibniz includes in this passage another idea about his real distinctness that is
The One and the Many 29
close to Descartes’ position. Late in the passage Leibniz gives two apparently equivalent clauses (seu is the connective): the first is the one I have just considered— one can be understood perfectly without the other; the other is, roughly, one can be separated (separari) from another. The latter is quite close to what Descartes gives in Definition 10 of his ‘‘synthetic’’ exposition of a part of his system in the Objections and Replies: ‘‘Def. X. Two substances are said to be really distinct when each of them can exist apart from the other’’ (AT 7:162/CSM 2:114). Leibniz talks about things that can exist in separation from one another; Descartes about things that can exist apart from one another.41 These seem to be terminological variants of the same basic idea.42 As for modal distinction, Leibniz does not provide us with much beyond the label in the ‘‘all things are one’’ passage. This makes things more difficult than they were in connection with real distinction, where he offered specific conditions of real distinction. Still, given the similarities to Descartes on real distinction—and certain textual clues that I will mention in a moment—it seems not implausible that Leibniz had in mind something similar to Descartes’ position when talking about modal distinction. For my purposes, the key point from Descartes is that modal distinction exists both ‘‘between a mode . . . and the substance of which it is a mode, and . . . between two modes of the same substance’’ (Principles 1.61). It is the first of these that might be unexpected. Although Leibniz uses different terminology in other passages in the same time period, he seems to have a similar twofold distinction involving nonsubstantial items clearly in mind, in a context not dissimilar from that of the ‘‘all things are one’’ passage: ‘‘So just as these properties differ from each other and from essence [by a modal difference?], so do things differ from each other and from God’’ (A 6.3:519/DSR 77; emphasis added). A final point before I consider the argument from the ‘‘all things are one’’ passage in greater depth: what does Leibniz mean by the key term ‘requisite’ (requisitum)? In a paper written at about the same time as the ‘‘all things are one’’ passage, he says, ‘‘A requisite is that without which a thing cannot exist’’ (December 1676?; A 6.3:587/DSR 113).43 Generally, in this time period the ultimate or primary requisites were taken by Leibniz to be the primary attributes, or the unanalyzable perfections or forms of God.44 Adams’s statement in this regard is helpful. He says that in the ‘‘all things are one’’ passage, ‘‘the ‘first requirements’ [primary requisites] of a thing are presumably the simplest, purest attributes occurring in the analysis of the thing. Leibniz is supposing that the conjunction of all the simplest, purest attributes constitutes the essence of God’’ (Adams 1994: 129). With these points better understood, let us turn to a reconstruction of Leibniz’s argument in the ‘‘all things are one’’ passage, one highlighting real and modal distinction: 1. Things are really distinct only if ‘‘one can be perfectly understood without another.’’ (text) 2. ‘‘[O]ne can be perfectly understood without another’’ just in case ‘‘all the requisites of the one can be understood without all the requisites of the other being understood.’’ (text) 3. ‘‘[T]he ultimate reason of things is unique’’ and it ‘‘contains by itself the aggregate of all requisites of all things.’’ (text)
30 Leibniz: Nature and Freedom 4. If ‘‘the ultimate reason of things is unique’’ and it ‘‘contains by itself the aggregate of all requisites of all things,’’ then ‘‘the requisites of all things are the same.’’ (text)45 5. ‘‘[T]he requisites of all things are the same.’’ (from 3, 4) 6. If the requisites of all things are the same, then to understand all the requisites of one thing is to understand all the requisites of another. (implicit)46 7. To understand all the requisites of one thing is to understand all the requisites of another. (from 5, 6)47 8. No thing can be perfectly understood without another. (from 2, 7) 9. ‘‘[N]o thing really differs from another.’’ (from 1, 8) 10. ‘‘[A]ll things are one’’ if ‘‘no thing really differs from another.’’ (implicit)48 11. ‘‘[A]ll things are one.’’ (from 9, 10) 12. ‘‘[A]n essence [of a thing] is the aggregate of all . . . requisites [of the thing].’’ (text) 13. If ‘‘the requisites of all things are the same,’’ and ‘‘an essence [of a thing] is the aggregate of all . . . requisites [of the thing],’’ then ‘‘the essence of all things is the same.’’ (text) 14. ‘‘[T]he essence of all things is the same.’’ (from 5, 12, 13) 15. If ‘‘the essence of all things is the same,’’ then ‘‘things differ only modally.’’ (text)49 16. ‘‘[T]hings differ only modally.’’ (text) 17. ‘‘[N]o thing really differs from another’’ and ‘‘things differ only modally.’’ (from 9, 16) 18. If ‘‘no thing really differs from another’’ and ‘‘things differ only modally,’’ then ‘‘all things are distinguished, not as substances . . . but as modes.’’ (implicit) 19. ‘‘[A]ll things are distinguished, not as substances . . . but as modes.’’ (from 17, 18; Q.E.D.)
A few comments on the reconstruction are in order here, not least because of possible questions concerning lines 12–19. First, with regard to lines 12–16: why have I changed the order of presentation, placing the points about essence, which in the passage earlier occur well before the conclusion that all things are one, after that conclusion? The reason for this is that, on my reading of the argument, the points about essence (along with the linked point about modal distinction) are not logically necessary for the conclusion that all things are one. Placing those points after that conclusion makes this feature of my reconstruction clearer, and it serves as well to emphasize the natural link between lines 12–16 and the final segment of the argument, lines 17–19. A second question in fact deals with just that final segment of the argument. It is connected with a curiosity of Leibniz’s argument that might be introduced via the following challenge: why are lines 17–19 even present in the reconstruction, given that in the formal demonstration portion of Leibniz’s ‘‘all things are one’’ passage, no such subargument appears explicitly? Strictly, the assumption here is correct, taking the ‘‘formal demonstration’’ to begin immediately after the initial statement of what can be ‘‘easily demonstrated.’’ But if we consider the challenge as a modest question, with a bit more flesh on the bones, a response suggests itself.
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Isn’t it curious, one might ask, that Leibniz says that a certain thesis ‘‘can be easily demonstrated,’’ and then, when proceeding to demonstrate it (starting with ‘‘This can be demonstrated from the fact that . . . ’’), he never again mentions the thesis in question, namely, that ‘‘all things are distinguished, not as substances . . . but as modes’’? Now an important element of my reconstruction—and the basis for my answer to the challenge just posed—is that Leibniz never lost sight of his aim to demonstrate this thesis; he simply thought that the connection between what he explicitly demonstrated and the initial thesis was obvious enough that it did not need to be spelled out. In a more formal reconstruction, of course, such economy and understatement are not permitted: one looks for the final ‘‘Q.E.D.’’ Lines 17–19 make possible that expected culmination—and not, it is hoped, in an implausible way. For the promised conclusion was that things are not distinguished as substances but as modes. Given what I have discussed about real and modal distinction, and given the interim conclusions of the foregoing reconstruction about real distinction and modal distinction (that is, lines 9 and 16, ones based firmly on what is explicitly in the demonstration), the final steps to the initially stated thesis should come as no surprise, even if they are not explicitly stated by Leibniz. Although a great many further comments would be in order in connection with this argument, concerning, for instance, possible rival reconstructions, or the critical evaluation of this reconstruction,50 I shall limit myself here rather strictly. I shall focus on the relation of this argument to monism and pantheism, or, more specifically, given the foregoing distinctions and hypothesis, to Monism RD and PantheismRD. To be sure, a first look at this argument may well suggest to some that, since no things are really distinct (distinct, that is, as multiple substances are), and since moreover all things have the same essence, the divine essence,51 and are only modally distinct (distinct, that is, as modes are), this means that for Leibniz, in this passage, at least, all things are taken as modes of the one substance God, which amounts to the position of Spinozistic monism, which, it is often held, is a form of monistic pantheism. But I am trying to be more careful here than going with a ‘‘first look’’ answer. For one thing, are we really sure we know what sense of ‘mode’ is being used here?52 More generally, now that we have seen some of the quite diverse forms monism and pantheism can take, can such an answer be taken seriously if it does not specify more exactly just what type of monism Spinozistic monism is? And even if that were done, would we have enough evidence from the few brief points mentioned in the last sentence to be confident that Leibniz’s text commits him to that same type of monism, whatever that should turn out to be? I suggest that we not try to encompass anything as grand as Spinoza’s system, and instead restrict ourselves to work with the definitions or types of monism and pantheism already laid out, and proceed in terms of them, even if the text does not always provide a completely definitive answer in terms of correspondence. Let us begin with PantheismRD, the doctrine that God exists and nothing is really distinct from God. Does Leibniz espouse this position in the ‘‘all things are one’’ passage? To be sure, the answer is not altogether obvious, in part because this passage does not include an argument for the existence of God, or even an explicit statement that God exists. But the context of the passage is a paper that argues that the most perfect being is possible and that proceeds from this to a proof that ‘‘a
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being of this kind . . . is necessary’’ (A 6.3:572/DSR 93). Accordingly, it seems that we can take the first clause as satisfied and turn to what in any case is the distinctive and controversial clause of the definition, the second clause having to do with the exact relationship of God and what other traditions call ‘‘creatures.’’ Does Leibniz in this passage endorse the view that nothing is really distinct from God? There is an easy, but perhaps not fully satisfying, answer to this question. It is that, yes, Leibniz does endorse this. In fact, he claims to demonstrate that no thing is really distinct from any other, and it follows immediately from this that, in particular, no thing (or nothing) is really distinct from God.53 And so, given our assumption, it follows that Leibniz endorses PantheismRD in the ‘‘all things are one’’ passage. What about the question whether the passage commits Leibniz to Monism RD, which is the doctrine that substance exists and there exist no x and y such that x and y are substances and x is really distinct from y? Here two things are not quite as obvious as they might at first seem. The ‘‘all things are one’’ passage is altogether silent, explicitly at least, on the matter of substance. But assuming for the moment that God’s existence is the existence of a substance, then the first clause would be satisfied, and we would again reduce things to the second clause of the definition in question, which this time is that ‘‘there exists no y such that y is a substance and y is really distinct from x.’’ Here line 9 of the foregoing reconstruction, Leibniz’s intermediate conclusion that ‘‘no thing really differs from another,’’ looms large. Given this point, it follows immediately that there are no substances S1 and S2 such that S1 is really distinct from S2. And so, given the assumption, it follows that Leibniz endorsed MonismRD in the ‘‘all things are one’’ passage. But it might be objected that, even if it is clear that the mature Leibniz took God as a substance, given that the ‘‘all things are one’’ passage seems in general to be quite at odds with the positions of the mature Leibniz, why must we assume that here? To mention just one point, it is typically granted that an individual substance is a paradigm case of a thing, but in the group of writings (the so-called De Summa Rerum) of which the ‘‘all things are one’’ passage is a part, Leibniz says: ‘‘I use the word ‘thing’ readily, for we are accustomed to say, ‘God is a being,’ but we are not accustomed to say, ‘God is a thing’ ’’ (A 6.3:519/DSR 77). If Leibniz were not taking God as a thing in the ‘‘all things are one’’ passage,54 then presumably he would not be taking God as an individual substance in that passage either, and so presumably the first clause of the definition of MonismRD would not be satisfied. To cover even this possibility, I note that Leibniz used the term ‘substance’ in two senses, for both an individual substance (as in the foregoing discussion) and for an essence.55 It is clear that in the ‘‘all things are one’’ passage Leibniz is talking about the divine essence, the essence of ‘‘the ultimate reason of things’’ (A 6.3:573/ DSR 93; see also Adams 1994: 129). And it is clear moreover that in that passage Leibniz contends that ‘‘the essence of all things is the same’’ (A 6.3:573/DSR 95). In this light, let us consider again the definition of Monism RD in connection with the ‘‘all things are one’’ passage. The definition is that substance exists and there are no substances S1 and S2 such that S1 is really distinct from S2. Let us read this now in terms of essences rather than individual substances. With respect to the first clause, I contend, as in the case of my discussion of Pantheism RD, that God, as the most perfect possible being, is said by Leibniz in the writing in question to be
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necessary, and hence to exist, and accordingly, the divine essence (substance, in this reading) exists. With respect to the second clause, if we again read in not individual substances but essences, we find that since the essences of all things are the same, one thing cannot be perfectly understood without another, and so no two essences (substances) are really distinct. To be sure, what would result would be a rather different Monism RD from the one in terms of individual substances. We would be left with the oneness of the divine essence rather than the oneness of the divine individual substance. But it would be a monism defined in terms of real distinction nonetheless.56
Comparative Testing: Adams and Mercer One way to test the usefulness of a new approach in the history of philosophy is to compare it with important prior treatments of the same issue. That is what I shall undertake in this final section. The two scholars who have most clearly devoted attention to the kinds of issues highlighted in this essay are Robert M. Adams and Christia Mercer. While I cannot on this occasion give their remarkable research the full and thorough attention it deserves, I can focus on a few key issues relevant to my reading of the ‘‘all things are one’’ passage and the delineation of different kinds of monism and pantheism, especially Monism RD and PantheismRD, with their emphasis on real distinction. Robert Adams’s views on monism, pantheism, and the ‘‘all things are one’’ passage are set out in section 3 of chapter 4 of his Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist. A challenging question is posed in the title of section 3: ‘‘Is Leibniz’s Conception of God Spinozistic?’’ (Adams 1994: 123). To be sure, the question is ultimately answered in the negative with respect to Leibniz’s mature philosophy, in the sense that, according to Adams, Leibniz’s root conception of God does not have ‘‘inescapably, Spinozistic implications’’ (Adams 1994: 134). However, what is most interesting and novel in Adams’s discussion is that the title’s question is answered in the affirmative with respect to one early period of Leibniz’s development. Specifically, Adams believes that at the time of the writing of the ‘‘all things are one’’ passage, Leibniz developed his conception of God in a way that did have Spinozistic implications. According to Adams, in that passage, ‘‘Leibniz flatly affirms the Spinozistic idea that finite things are only modes’’ (Adams 1994: 129). Moreover, although no specific definition is given, Adams refers to the conclusion of the argument of the passage as a ‘‘monistic conclusion’’ (Adams 1994: 129). For the moment I will pass over the intriguing mention of monism and the question of what specific sense of monism might be involved here. Instead I will focus on the question whether the Spinozistic conception of God Adams talks about is pantheistic. The answer is not perfectly clear, although Adams often uses the term ‘pantheism’ in the section and has certainly left the impression among some commentators57 that he ascribes a brief pantheistic phase to Leibniz, followed by a rejection of pantheism. Using Adams’s words as a suggestive guide, I will set out in brief the position I think Adams adopts on this question. At the time of Leibniz’s ‘‘all things are one’’ passage, finite things are taken by Leibniz as
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modes of the attributes of God. Accordingly, at ‘‘this time, ontological externality of the resulting entities [finite things] seems explicitly rejected’’ (Adams 1994: 130). To all appearances,58 this means that the ‘‘all things are one’’ passage is read by Adams as being pantheistic. But, according to Adams, by 1678 the treatment of finite things as modes of God is definitely rejected by Leibniz (Adams 1994: 130). A key to the rejection of this view is the developing Leibnizian position that ‘‘[t]he relation of the limited attributes of creatures to the absolute attributes of God is not the relation of mode to attribute, since they exclude each other from any one subject, by virtue of the negation involved in the creaturely attributes’’ (Adams 1994: 134). In line with this, Leibniz then believed that ‘‘creatures are not ‘in’ God because their limited attributes cannot be ‘in’ God’’ (Adams 1994: 133–134).59 Accordingly, although Adams does not say this in exactly these words, it seems clear that on his view Leibniz has, at the later stage, come to endorse the ‘ontological externality’ of finite things produced by God.60 Accordingly, at this later stage a pantheistic conception of God is not adopted by Leibniz.61 There is much that I agree with here, and, to repeat, I do not propose a fullscale treatment of Adams’s position, only a few remarks related to the main results of this essay. Consider how Adams initiates the section (‘‘Leibniz’s Later Years,’’ Adams 1994: 130) in which he examines the move away from the apparently Spinozistic position of the ‘‘all things are one’’ passage. Among other things, he quotes a passage from 1677 that I discussed earlier, the one in which Leibniz critiques the idea of ‘‘a Being that is everything.’’62 Adams presents this as a rejection of the pantheisticsounding Leibnizian quotation of 1676, ‘‘God . . . is everything. Creatures are some things’’ (A 6.3:512, as quoted in Adams 1994: 130),63 and seems to present it also as a more general turning away from the denial of ontological externality that Adams sees in the ‘‘all things are one’’ passage. But assuming the correctness of my earlier analysis of Leibniz’s critique of a Being that is everything, that critique presupposes a definition of pantheism along the lines of (A) earlier: PantheismND is true iff God exists and nothing is numerically distinct from God. Meanwhile, the Leibnizian quotation of 1676 has been interpreted by Parkinson, as we have seen, along the lines of PantheismMD. Now to offer a critique of PantheismND is not necessarily to offer a critique of PantheismMD. Nor would offering a critique of PantheismND necessarily be to offer a critique of PantheismRD, which on my interpretation earlier is precisely what Leibniz affirms in the ‘‘all things are one’’ passage. Please note that I am not saying here that Adams is doing either of these things. But I am saying that the distinctions I have drawn in the second section herein should be kept clearly in mind in attempting to chart Leibniz’s possibly shifting stances on pantheism (and, for that matter, monism). In fact, the point against ‘‘Being as everything’’ is not a main element in Adams’s account of the move away from the Spinozistic position of the ‘‘all things are one’’ passage. Other issues, such as those concerning subjects, powers, limited and absolute attributes, and being ‘‘in God,’’ play a more central role. But the points just discussed are nonetheless useful as a base from which to evaluate these other issues. As we have seen, Adams puts considerable emphasis on the idea that, in the more mature Leibniz, ‘‘[t]he relation of the limited attributes of creatures to the absolute attributes of God is not the relation of mode to attribute, since they
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exclude each other from any one subject, by virtue of the negation involved in the creaturely attributes’’ (Adams 1994: 134). Here, then, we have subjects, limited and unlimited attributes, nicely integrated. But is not the presupposition here that the younger Leibniz, the Leibniz of the 1676 ‘‘all things are one’’ passage, did not see some of these points, while the somewhat older Leibniz (correctly) did? And given the nature of the points, might not that be contrary to the principle of charity, and so (some might say) should not be adopted until other initially plausible alternatives have shown themselves to be implausible? I suggest an alternative, which I believe is plausible. Suppose that Leibniz never doubted (not even when he wrote the ‘‘all things are one’’ passage) that the possession of an absolute or unlimited attribute by some x, and the possession of a limited form of the same attribute by some y, means that x and y are distinct in some sense, in particular, are numerically distinct. In terms of Leibniz’s law, plausibly applied to the ‘‘all things are one’’ passage, God and a finite thing could not be numerically identical, since God has all attributes in unlimited or absolute form and a finite thing does not. But, the alternative reading continues, the main point of the ‘‘all things are one’’ passage concerns real distinction, not numerical distinction. For purposes of argument, let me put the alternative interpretation another way: the ‘‘all things are one’’ passage does not have to do with numerical distinction. If an argument is desired, here is a rough-and-ready one. Consider a Cartesian finite mental substance at a moment, a substance with one attribute and some modes of this attribute. Consider one of these modes. Is it numerically identical to the mental substance? No, it is numerically distinct. For the substance ‘‘can exist without other things, while needing only the ordinary concurrence of God’’ (Principles 1.51), while the mode cannot so exist. So the test of Leibniz’s law is not met. But what about real distinctness? Is the mode really distinct from the mental substance? The answer is clear. This sort of situation is a paradigm case of Descartes’ modal distinction, as opposed to real distinction. The mode and the substance are not really distinct, even though they are numerically distinct. Returning to the case of God and a finite thing, the question relevant to the ‘‘all things are one’’ passage is not whether God and the finite thing are distinct in some sense. They are. They are numerically distinct. The question is whether they are really distinct or only modally distinct.64 And the answer to this turns on the specific criterion of real distinctness, not on issues of numerical distinctness (and not necessarily, I would contend, on issues of subjects, powers, and being in God either—a connection here would need to be argued more thoroughly). Christia Mercer deserves much credit for her pathbreaking work on issues connected with the young Leibniz, including those connected with the topics of this essay.65 For example, in a recent article, ‘‘God as Both the Unity and Multiplicity in the World’’ (Mercer 2000: 71–95), she discusses texts thought by some to suggest pantheism in the young Leibniz, and she connects this with the problem of the one and the many—or, more exactly, with the issue of unity and multiplicity. Her ultimate view, however, is quite different from those who have claimed to see pantheistic leanings in the young Leibniz. As she puts it in a related article, ‘‘Leibniz was never a pantheist of any sort’’ (Mercer 1999: 273). Still, and interestingly, she not
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only strongly affirms that Leibniz did argue for a cosmological solution of the problem of the one and the many, at least under the heading of unity and multiplicity, but she also clearly endorses the view that it is God who is ‘‘both the Unity and Multiplicity in the World,’’66 going so far as to conclude her article with the statement: ‘‘That God is the unity and multiplicity in the world is a fact about Leibniz’s metaphysics that has gone unnoticed for too long’’ (Mercer 2000: 95). She takes pains, backed by serious philosophical and scholarly work, to (1) explain the sense in which she thinks Leibniz means this, (2) provide texts and historical analysis to support her reading, and (3) distinguish her reading from pantheistic readings. Both Adams’s text discussed earlier and my own work figure among the targets of Mercer’s critique in connection with pantheism and associated issues (Adams 1994: 123–130; Kulstad 1994: 424–428). Again, as was the case with Adams, I will only be able to take on a small portion of Mercer’s work. Again my focus will be on important points in her work that stand out when viewed from the perspective of the results of this essay. And the most important of these is the issue of distinction. Mercer is concerned to emphasize, and to document textually, Leibniz’s commitment in his early writings to the distinction that obtains between God and finite things. This has obvious relevance to my work earlier on the concepts of identity and distinction in the second section herein. At one point, for example, Mercer says, ‘‘there are a number of passages throughout the Paris period that imply a distinction between God and creatures’’ (Mercer 1999: 277). It is fairly clear from the context of this and similar statements that she introduces such Leibnizian passages to oppose pantheistic readings of the young Leibniz.67 But this point is particularly clear in the case of another passage, in which nonidentity and nonpantheism are immediately juxtaposed. She says, ‘‘each creature is an inferior image or expression of that essence [the essence of the supreme being, God] and is not identical to it. Leibniz was not a pantheist during the period of 1676–77 and what sounds like pantheism is seventeenth-century Platonism’’ (Mercer 2000: 93). Put simply, it appears that for Mercer, if creatures and God are distinct, then there cannot be that denial of ontological externality that she takes as the defining characteristic of pantheism.68 My own view on this, to anticipate a bit, is that distinctness comes in a number of different varieties, and that these need to be distinguished in relation to various sorts of pantheism before one comes to the conclusion that Leibniz was never a pantheist ‘‘of any sort.’’ To be sure, I think there is room for accommodation between Mercer’s reading and my own on the matter of distinctness—but not, I think, as much as Mercer might desire. For example, when Mercer is speaking about created things having their own power of acting, she says ‘‘they are in some obvious sense distinct from God’’ (Mercer 1999: 278). I agree, and in this there is room for accommodation. There is indeed ‘‘some obvious sense’’ in which Mercer and I can agree that even the ‘‘things’’ of the ‘‘all things are one’’ passage are distinct from God: they are at least modally distinct from God. And, given the discussion earlier, we can agree further that they are numerically distinct as well. Thus, we can agree that PantheismND can be ruled out as a Leibnizian position at this time. Where agreement breaks down is in relation to the question whether the
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things of this world are held by Leibniz to be distinct in some sense that makes it possible to say that ‘‘Leibniz was never a pantheist of any sort’’ (Mercer 1999: 273). On my view, the answer to this question is no, at least at the time of the ‘‘all things are one’’ passage, for in that passage, Leibniz argues that ‘‘no thing really differs from another’’ (A 6.3:573/DSR 95). Why does this not count as a denial of a specific sort of distinctness, and an affirmation of a specific sort of pantheism, namely, PantheismRD? (I have, of course, already presented my argument that it does.) In short, I think that one of the lines of argument in Mercer’s arsenal, that Leibniz would insist on a distinction between God and creatures throughout his youthful writings, would be enhanced by greater attention to the kinds of distinctness involved. Without such attention—and without a corresponding look at the kinds of distinctness claimed or denied in various sorts of pantheism—it would seem to be difficult to get a firm grip on which philosophers at which moments are not pantheists ‘‘of any sort.’’ Let’s look at one more passage in connection with distinctness, again linked with ontological externality. It provides another chance to argue how the perspective of my analysis of the ‘‘all things are one’’ passage in terms of real and modal distinction may change the way one sees passages near the center of the discussion of monism, pantheism, and the young Leibniz. Here is Mercer’s statement: As Robert Adams puts it in his recent book, Leibniz denied ‘the ontological externality’ of creatures.[69] But Leibniz is no more a pantheist than is Plotinus. That is, this is not pantheism, it is Platonism. He [Leibniz] writes, ‘‘It seems to me that the origin of things from God is of the same kind as the origin of properties from an essence. . . . So just as these properties differ from each other and from essence, so do things differ from each other and from God.’’ (Mercer 2000: 93, quoting from A 6.3:518–519/DSR 77; her emphasis)
A closer inspection of Mercer’s reading of Leibniz’s words sheds light on how two interpretational strains can diverge so markedly. Mercer’s target is Adams’s claim that Leibniz, in 1676, argued for pantheism in the sense of a denial of the ‘‘ontological externality’’ of creatures. Mercer clearly believes that the Leibnizian text she gives tells against a pantheistic interpretation, presumably on the grounds that (1) it asserts that ‘‘things differ . . . from God,’’ and (2) Adams’s interpretation of the denial of ontological externality rules out such difference between God and creatures. But viewed from the perspective of real and modal difference, Mercer’s choice of texts is problematic. For if the criterion of ontological externality is real difference (as it is in PantheismRD), so that creatures fail to be ontologically external to God if they are not really distinct from God, then the considerations adduced earlier suggest strongly that in this passage things are not said to be ontologically external to God. For those considerations pointed, as we saw, to the conclusion that the difference of the passage earlier is modal difference rather than real difference.70 An assertion of the modal difference of God and creatures would not prove that God and creatures are really different. And of course, a key point in the ‘‘all things are one’’ passage is precisely that ‘‘things differ only modally . . . [and] no thing really differs from another’’ (A 6.3:573/DSR 95).
38 Leibniz: Nature and Freedom
What, to conclude, are the results of our comparative testing? Having looked at important prior treatments of Leibniz on pantheism and monism, namely, those of Adams and Mercer, I hope one can see how the careful delineation of kinds of distinction—and most notably attention to the special cases of modal and real distinction highlighted in the ‘‘all things are one’’ passage—is essential in gaining full clarity on the subtle and difficult issues associated with unraveling Leibniz’s developing thought in this area. This essay has attempted to provide such distinctions and to provide an interpretation of Leibniz’s texts in light of them. The key interpretive claim is that in the ‘‘all things are one’’ passage of 1676, Leibniz endorsed and argued for the positions of Monism RD and PantheismRD.
Notes I thank Brenda Connor, a Ph.D. student in philosophy at Rice University, for her intelligence and hard work in carrying out the research assistance associated with this project. 1. Here I can mention only a few who have contributed to this discussion: Garber 1985; Sleigh 1990, especially chaps. 5 and 6; Adams 1994, especially pt. 3, ‘‘Idealism: Monads and Bodies’’; Rutherford 1995a, especially pt. 3, ‘‘Nature’’; Rozemond 1997; Hartz 1998; Phemister 1999; Woolhouse 2000; and Garber, chap. 4 herein. 2. Poser 2000: 274, discussing the correspondence with Des Bosses, especially G 2:457–458. The discussion of corporeal substance is Leibniz’s more complicated way of dealing with (among other things) the mind-body problem, understood in something like a Cartesian way. This problem can itself be viewed as a version of the one-many problem. Descartes’ mind-body problem involves, as he writes to Elizabeth, explaining how the two substances, mind and body (which may be taken as the many in this case), can constitute one human being. As he famously says to her: ‘‘It does not seem to me that the human mind is capable of conceiving very distinctly, and at the same time, both the distinction between mind and body, and their union. To do that, it is necessary to conceive them as a single thing and at the same time consider them as two things, which is self-contradictory’’ (to Elizabeth, June 28, 1643; AT 3:690/Wilson 1969: 379). 3. G 2:311. For similar statements of the definition of perception see G 2:112 and 121; G 3:581; G 6:608; G 7:566. For discussion, see Kulstad 1977, 1982. 4. As Leibniz says in section 13 of the Monadology, ‘‘[t]his diversity [in the changing perceptions of a monad] must involve a multitude in the unity or in the simple’’ (G 6:608/AG 214). At the same stage of his life, as I will show in a moment, this unity signaled the presence of what is one. 5. For their exchange on this, see Clarification of the Difficulties Which Mr. Bayle Has Found in the New System of the Union of Soul and Body (G 4:521–523/L 495–496). 6. For more on this, see Mates 1986, especially chap. 10. 7. Especially worthy of note in this connection is the recent book by Maria Rosa Antognazza (1999). 8. Among those discussing Leibniz’s early views on this topic are Carlin 1997: 1–24, and Mercer 1999: 278. Carlin also takes up Leibniz’s later opposition to the view of God as the world soul. Some of Leibniz’s arguments on this point, as discussed by Carlin, sparked a recent, serious discussion of the infinite in Leibniz. See Brown 1998; Arthur 1999a; Brown 2000; Arthur 2001. For more on the details of the mature Leibniz’s opposition to God as soul of the world, consult also Vailati 1997: 42–46, 153–156. 9. Schepers, who gives a longer, and somewhat different, list of examples in his important study of this topic, is one of the sources of inspiration for this study, along with R. C. Sleigh, Jr., who discussed closely related matters with me during my semester at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, in the fall of 1996. I owe him a debt of gratitude for making that research association possible, as well as for much more. 10. Perhaps the clearest examples of important related issues are the range of Leibniz’s uses of the concepts of identity and distinctness, his understanding of the doctrine of universal harmony, his theory of substance, and his views on the exact relation of God and the finite things of this world.
The One and the Many 39 11. See, for example, Owen 1971: 74; Angeles 1981: 111; Gentz 1986: 774. 12. The book is Levine 1994. For the articles, see Levine 1990, 1992. 13. Levine 1992: 98. Interestingly, as Jan Cover has reminded me in discussion, some view Spinoza as only a panentheist (one holding the view that whatever is, is in God), and not a pantheist. This emphasizes the point that there are different definitions of ‘pantheism,’ and associated distinctions, waiting in the wings. 14. See Ethics IP13, P14. 15. For more on the matter of the pantheistic sense of unity, see Levine 1990: 211–236. I do not claim that Levine would endorse my assumption for this essay about the pantheistic sense of unity. 16. See both Adams 1994: 123–134 and Kulstad 1994: 424–428. Christia Mercer has been a staunch opponent of a pantheistic reading of the young Leibniz, and she has done extensive research on many related issues. Among her works that should be carefully considered in this regard are Mercer 1999, 2000, 2001. The relations of Leibniz and Spinoza, particularly in connection with monism and/or pantheism, are hardly of recent interest only. Among the other studies that should be consulted in this area are: Stein 1890, especially chap. 5; Friedmann 1962; Parkinson 1978: 73–89. For further studies, the reader is referred to the succinct survey of almost three hundred years of reflection on the question whether Leibniz was a Spinozist provided by Morfino 1996 (who notes that as early as 1714 Bourguet had accused Leibniz of Spinozism [65]). 17. On another reading of the argument, the absurdity would lie simply in the idea that any human could be numerically identical to God. 18. Parkinson 1978: 88, quoting a passage from the paper of April 15, 1676, now available at A 6.3:512 and in Parkinson’s own newer English translation at DSR 67. 19. From this point onward, kinds of distinctness will take center stage in my discussion. But for each kind of distinctness I discuss, there will be a corresponding kind of identity. I will not typically emphasize or develop these, but it is worthwhile keeping the correlation in mind. 20. For Descartes, see the Sixth Meditation and Principles 1.51–56, 60–61. For Spinoza, see Ethics IP10S. 21. It is not built into any one of these that there exists a substance that is God. Thus, what is defined here is monism in a sense that is not necessarily theological. But if theological versions were desired, they could easily be supplied via small revisions of the definitions. 22. The definition of ‘mereological distinctness’ is given earlier, but for ease of application, here is a restatement of (B) with that definition applied to the present case: (B) Monism MD is true iff there exists an x such that x is substance and there exists no substance y such that y is numerically distinct from x and y is not a part of x. Note that this definition allows that there may exist a substance (or substances) numerically distinct from the one substance in terms of which monism is true. But such numerically distinct substances would be parts of the whole substance in virtue of which monism is true. That is, they would be numerically but not mereologically distinct from that substance. 23. The term ‘constituentially distinct’ has not yet been defined, but the basic idea is simple enough once one takes mereological distinctness as the model. Here is a reformulation of (C), with a clarification of ‘constituentially distinct’ built in: (C) MonismCD is true iff there exists an x such that x is substance and there exists no substance y such that y is numerically distinct from x and y is not a constituent of x. Although I will not define ‘constituent’ here, I can at least clarify it, thus: any part of a thing counts as a constituent of that thing, but one thing can be a constituent of another without being a part of that other. For an example of this notion at work in the context of a full discussion of one type of historical monism (Spinoza’s), see Kulstad 1996. 24. A formulation more exactly parallel to the others could have been chosen. Complexities in the ‘‘all things are one’’ passage that I will explain hereafter account for deviation. Recall that we are not trying to give all possible senses of ‘monism.’ To anticipate a bit, albeit cryptically, the present formulation handles both individual and nonindividual substances, and simplifies the treatment of other aspects of the ‘‘all things are one’’ passage at points where interpretive questions would otherwise significantly lengthen this essay. 25. One can link this to MonismND , although with no greater plausibility for the resulting doctrine than Leibniz allowed to the variant of PantheismND . If we assume that God in the system just sketched out is a substance, then the claim that nothing is numerically distinct from God implies that no
40 Leibniz: Nature and Freedom substance is numerically distinct from God. Thus, on this assumption, the present example of PantheismND would also be an example of MonismND . (If, on the other hand, God is assumed not to be a substance—for example, if the metaphysics of the case were taken to be somehow nonsubstantial generally—then this case would remain an example of PantheismND while not being an example of MonismND .) 26. As far as Monism MD is concerned, the present case provides a useful starting point. If we assume that the whole of the universe in this case counts as a single substance, then there would exist a substance and no substance would be mereologically distinct from it. That is, on this assumption, Monism MD would be true in this case. (If, on the other hand, the whole universe is assumed not to be a substance, then this case would remain an example of PantheismND but would not be an example of MonismND .) 27. Ethics IP13 in conjunction with ID6. 28. This is so because if something were constituentially distinct from God, then it could not be numerically identical to God or to a part of God (not a part, since a part is one kind of constituent). But since we are assuming an example in which PantheismMD is true, everything is either numerically identical to God or to a part of God. 29. Following his translation of what is now available in A 6.3:512, and also (in a slightly different English translation) in DSR 66–67. 30. To mention only one, confessedly strained, reading, one could let God be the set of all things and creatures be the members of this set. Since members of sets are not parts of the sets they are in, creatures would not, on this reading, be parts of God, although on some readings of ‘constituent’ they would still be constituents of God. 31. Such a system, which would count as a case of PantheismCD , would also count as a case of MonismCD , if certain assumptions about the case were made. We already have a case with God and constituents of God and nothing constituentially distinct from God. Assume that God counts as a substance here. Since there is nothing constituentially distinct from God, there is no substance constituentially distinct from God. But then MonismCD holds. Basically, this is the sort of monism that, on my view, is held by the historical Spinoza—although I limit myself to the claim that for Spinoza there is no substance constituentially distinct from God, that is, I do not ascribe to Spinoza the view that nothing is constituentially distinct from God, as was the case in the example just sketched out. See Kulstad 1996. (Of course, to return to my now familiar proviso, if we assume that God does not count as a substance here, then this case would remain an example of PantheismCD but it would not count as an example of MonismCD .) 32. This also counts as an example of MonismRD . It might be thought that the reasoning for this is straightforward, but it is not. A simplistic line of reasoning would go as follows: we have here the assertion that God is a substance, that God exists, and that nothing is really distinct from God; it follows that no substance is really distinct from God; so the case is an example of MonismRD . This is not strictly correct (although the reason why is a function of the somewhat unusual features of (D) in comparison with the other accounts of monism). What is required in the case of MonismRD is not simply that there be no substance that is not really distinct from the substance God, but also that there be no substances that are really distinct from each other. In the simplistic line of reasoning, this clause is not explicitly covered (although it might be argued that the resources are there to cover it, if the simplistic line of reasoning were made more sophisticated, with no new premises added). Fortunately, the further stipulation on the foregoing case, not included in the simplistic line—namely, that all the things of this world are modes—is sufficient to yield the result there are no substances other than God in the system described, a fortiori, no substances that are really distinct from one another. However, if, in the foregoing description of the system, it were assumed that we were dealing with a nonsubstantial metaphysical system, in which neither God nor anything else would be a substance, but it were nonetheless the case that God exists and that nothing is really distinct from God, then in this—admittedly abstractly described—case, PantheismRD would be true, but not Monism RD . 33. For another effort to clarify issues in a related vein, see Cover and O’Leary-Hawthorne 1999, chap. 7, ‘‘The threat of one substance.’’ They make clear that their main focus is a slightly different onesubstance threat from what might have been expected starting from the standpoint of this essay. What they emphasize is the question whether there is pressure in the system of the mature Leibniz away from
The One and the Many 41 his official position of ‘‘many created substances’’ and toward a position of ‘‘just one.’’ Still, the authors make clear that our problem, concerning monism with respect to all substance, not just created substance, is related: ‘‘the reader,’’ they say, ‘‘will see analogous pressures toward collapsing the distinction between God and the created world’’ (all three quotations from Cover and O’Leary-Hawthorne 1999: 255; the authors refer the reader also to n. 27 of chap. 7). 34. Adams 1994: 129–1230; Mercer 1999: 276. My first discussion of it in print was Kulstad 1994: 425–428. 35. Where I place the first set of ellipses, Parkinson’s translation adds an important phrase that in the Academy edition is in the footnotes, not in the main text. This is discussed in the text hereafter. 36. In a Spinozistic form, with the things of this world being modes of God rather than substances. 37. With all things being unified, indeed, one, and having as their single essence ‘‘all primary requisites,’’ which in turn appear, from comparison with other texts, to be simply the attributes or forms of God. See, for instance, De Formis Seu Attributis Dei (A 6.3:513–515), and A 6.3:520. (The latter suggests more simply that the collection of forms or attributes is the essence of God. A 6.3:514 brings in a subject as well.) Thus, we would seem to have a one or a unity which is all things and which is divine. 38. There is not space in this essay to document the point in a suitable way. However, I have attempted to document it in related essays. The fullest exposition appears in ‘‘Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz on Real Distinction, Pluralism, and Monism,’’ unfortunately not yet published. But a briefer statement is included in Kulstad 2001: 664–665. Occasionally, I have made use of bits of these essays in the present one. 39. This is not too surprising in a paper that was never prepared for publication. 40. Hans Burkhardt has reminded me, in discussion, that many would label this Descartes’ ‘‘epistemological criterion’’ of real distinctness. The corresponding ontological criterion is the one given in Definition 10 of the ‘‘Geometrical Exposition’’ in the Second Replies (AT 7:162/CSM 2:114). 41. One possible difference between Leibniz and Descartes is suggested by a strict reading of some of the earlier passages from both on real distinction. Whereas Definition 10 from Descartes is clearly meant to give a necessary and sufficient condition of real distinctness, a strict reading of, on the one hand, Descartes’ statement on clearly and distinctly understanding one thing without another and, on the other, of Leibniz’s statement on perfectly understanding one without another would seem to lead to the conclusion that the former offers a sufficient condition of real distinction; the latter a necessary condition. Of course, if both intended to be giving a necessary and a sufficient condition of real distinction (and Descartes’ definition certainly encourages the thought that he, at least, had in mind a necessary and sufficient condition of real distinction), then the difference would be only apparent. 42. In any case, Descartes uses the language of separation also: see the end of Principles 1.60. 43. From a paper entitled De Existentia. 44. Even in the one paper we are dealing with here, Quod Ens Perfectissimum Sit Possible, the talk of ‘‘all affirmative attributes’’ in ‘‘a most perfect being’’ (A 6.3:572/DSR 91) and of the ‘‘ultimate reason of things,’’ which ‘‘contains by itself the aggregate of all requisites of all things,’’ suggests that the requisites of the ‘‘all things are one’’ passage may be identified with the attributes of God. For more on requisites, see Rutherford 1995a: 112–115 (although he is dealing with a later time period and with a slightly different definition) and Adams 1994: 117–118 (who considers texts from Leibniz’s early years until the year of his death). 45. Leibniz’s term quia (because/since) provides key textual support for the claim that lines 3 and 4 are expressed in the ‘‘all things are one’’ passage. 46. This seems not only implicit in Leibniz’s reasoning but also true. 47. Although this precise conclusion may not seem obvious in Leibniz’s text, I think it is there. The specific passage I have in mind in support of this—‘‘in the case of things, this is not so’’—is a bit opaque when taken out of context. But I think reflection on the statement, in context, will make it clear that Leibniz affirms the proposition expressed in line 7 of the reconstruction. 48. Strictly, the text has the two clauses joined by conjunction rather than by any kind of definitional connection. Thus, line 10 must be taken as something implicit in Leibniz’s argument rather than explicit. But the suggestion is strong that Leibniz thinks there is such a connection between these two clauses.
42 Leibniz: Nature and Freedom 49. Strictly, Leibniz puts this as a conjunction rather than a conditional. The reconstruction gives my best guess as to what Leibniz intends here. This is one of the interesting points connected with this passage that unfortunately will not be taken up here for special discussion. 50. For more on this important matter, see Adams 1994: 129. 51. Leibniz doesn’t say this specifically in the paragraph in question, but ‘‘the aggregate of all requisites of all things’’ that he does specifically talk about there, as being contained in ‘‘the ultimate reason of things,’’ clearly suggests it. Adams (1994: 129) apparently reads it the same way. And elsewhere in writings of the same time period Leibniz confirms this. See, for example, A 6.3:519–20/DSR 79. 52. In an earlier version of this study, Mercer’s important research on this question (Mercer 1999: 283–295) had been presented and evaluated. Unfortunately, space limitations of this book precluded its inclusion in the final version. Very briefly put, my response to her suggestion that ‘mode’ is here used in a Platonistic sense is that the closeness of Leibniz’s language and concepts (especially real distinction, which is defined in this passage) to Descartes’ concepts of mode and of the real distinction of substances suggests at least a Cartesian substance-mode relationship, if not necessarily a Spinozistic substancemode relationship. 53. That is, it follows if we take it that Leibniz includes God in the class of things talked about in the ‘‘all things are one’’ passage. But this is not necessarily certain. See Kulstad 2001: 667–668. So, to cover all possibilities, assume for the moment that God is not to be counted as a thing in the sense of the ‘‘all things are one’’ passage. Then the inference just given, in the most obvious way of drawing the conclusion, via simple instantiation of the general principle that no things really differ, would be blocked. But there is another way to proceed. Given the specific account of real distinction given by Leibniz in the ‘‘all things are one’’ passage, one can still draw the conclusion that no things are really distinct from God, though not as directly. Taking God as ‘‘the ultimate reason of things,’’ which ‘‘contains by itself the aggregate of all requisites of all things’’ (A 6.3:573/DSR 93), (and perhaps adding a principle which both Adams and Mercer endorse, that for Leibniz at this time the analysis of all things involves all attributes that are in the divine essence [Adams 1994: 129; Mercer 1999: 282]) we may conclude, using lines 1 and 2 of the foregoing argument, that no thing is really distinct from God. For (perhaps oversimplifying a bit—adding the principle given a moment ago may be necessary), for any thing (excluding God) it is not the case that all the requisites of that thing can be understood without all the requisites of God being understood, taking these latter requisites to be all the attributes contained in the divine essence. So it is not the case that the thing can be perfectly understood without God (via line 2). So the thing and God are not really distinct (via line 1). Since the same argument applies for any thing, nothing is really distinct from God, which means that the second clause of the definition of PantheismRD is satisfied. 54. See the preceding note. 55. See A 1.7:248–249, drawn from Sleigh 1990: 97. 56. I shall return to something like this possibility in my discussion of Adams hereafter. 57. For example, see Mercer 1999: 273, 275–276, 279, and 293. 58. Mercer also reads Adams this way (Mercer 1999: 279). 59. Adams 1994: 133–134. Recall that Adams had suggested earlier that in the ‘‘all things are one’’ passage, Leibniz is saying, ‘‘finite things are in God as ‘modes’ of the divine attributes’’ (126, with a relation to 129). In Leibniz’s later position, as Adams sees it, things have changed: ‘‘creatures are not ‘in’ God’’ (133). This point is challenged in Mercer 1999: 279–90. 60. Adams 1994: 130 provides evidence for this. 61. He is quite clear, as we have seen, that a ‘‘Spinozistic’’ conception of God is not adopted by Leibniz at this later time. 62. A 2.1:323; translation from Adams 1994: 130. 63. A 6.3:512; translation from Adams 1994: 130. 64. Or, if you wish, return to a case of two finite minds. Are they really distinct or only modally distinct? 65. See Mercer 1999, 2000, and 2001. 66. Mercer 2000: 71 (the title) and 88–92. 67. In the case of the first passage, it appears in a paragraph that follows immediately after the laying out of a pantheistic ‘‘developmental story’’ of Leibniz’s youth, a paragraph that begins with the statement that this story ‘‘is false’’ (Mercer 1999: 277).
The One and the Many 43 68. Mercer 1999: 279. 69. She cites Adams 1994: 128, but the reference seems to be to 130. 70. In Descartes’ theory of modal distinction, as presented in Principles 1.61, two modes of the same substance differ modally, not really, from each other and from the substance. Although Leibniz’s case of properties of an essence does not fit this exactly, it is certainly related. And insofar as it does fit, the analogy points to things differing from each other and from God by a modal, not a real, distinction. This is just the sort of thing that would be involved in PantheismRD and is the sort of thing we found in the ‘‘all things are one’’ passage.
2
Leibniz and Sleigh on Substantial Unity CHRISTIA MERCER
obert C. Sleigh Jr.’s Leibniz and Arnauld: A Commentary on Their Correspon-
R dence is wonderfully Leibnizian. Sleigh creates a harmonized series of tightly
related components out of the complicated details that passed between Arnauld and Leibniz in their correspondence (April 1686 to March 1690). Because Sleigh’s book is a commentary on the letters that exchanged hands between Leibniz, Arnauld, and their intermediary, Ernst von Hessen-Rheinfels, Sleigh restricts his analysis of Leibniz’s metaphysics primarily to the philosophical material contained in the letters. There are virtually no serious philosophical questions raised in the correspondence that are left unexamined. There are, however, some questions left unanswered. The reason for this is not hard to identify: in the correspondence, Leibniz was neither clear nor explicit about some of his most important views and there are no related texts in which he offers neat answers to the relevant questions. In other words, there are some questions that Sleigh left unanswered about Leibniz’s views, and these are the questions to which Leibniz himself seemed either unable or unwilling to give answers to Arnauld. In this essay, I would like to turn to one of the most important—and surely one of the most intractable—of these difficulties, namely, the question of substantial unity. I do not pretend to have greater insight into the underlying notion of substance and unity as presented in the correspondence between Leibniz and Arnauld and the Discourse on Metaphysics than did Sleigh. In fact, I consider it a truth that if Sleigh works carefully through a text and does not make good sense of a topic, then there is no sense to be made of the topic as presented in that text. However, I would like to show here that once we place our topic within a wider textual scope, and once we position the relevant texts within a broader intellectual context, we can construct a satisfactory answer to some of the questions that arise about substantial unity. The cluster of problems surrounding the notion of unity have plagued Leibniz scholars for a very long time. Between the correspondence with Arnauld (1686–90) 44
Leibniz and Sleigh on Substantial Unity 45
and the Monadology of 1714, Leibniz is clear about the central role that unity plays in his metaphysics, but he is rarely more than suggestive about how we are supposed to explain this crucial feature of substance. As with many of his core tenets, however, Leibniz is much more explicit about his motivating assumptions in his early works. When we turn our attention to the early period (roughly, 1666 through 1676) in which he is developing his ideas and working out the details of his system, it is much easier to glimpse his underlying views about unity. In the first section that follows, I summarize the most important parts of Leibniz and Arnauld: A Commentary on Their Correspondence concerning substantial unity. Such a summary affords significant insights into Leibniz’s ideas about unity. But there are a few important questions left unanswered. Before turning to the early works for help with these, it will be useful to situate the early writings in their proper historical setting. The second section offers a brief outline of the relevant Platonist background, and the third section turns to an analysis of the most important early texts on the topic of substantial unity. More textual study needs to be done before a full account of Leibniz’s views is available, but the materials of these early works offer at least tentative answers to our questions about substantial unity.
Leibniz and Sleigh on Unity, Identity, and Substance According to Sleigh, it is in the correspondence with Arnauld that Leibniz ‘‘first worked out in detail his conception of an individual substance and what he took to be its philosophical consequences’’ (Sleigh 1990: 95). One of the assumptions that underlies this conception of substance is that a substance is what is a unity per se.1 Although in the correspondence with Arnauld and the related Discourse on Metaphysics, Leibniz says a great deal about substantial unity, some very important questions remain insufficiently answered. Let’s consider the most significant of these. As Sleigh makes clear, ‘‘the most stringent and exacting standards of substantial unity’’ include incorruptibility, ingenerability, and ‘‘most significantly’’ indivisibility (Sleigh 1990: 104). Leibniz writes to Arnauld in his letter of December 8, 1686: ‘‘Substantial unity requires a being that is complete, indivisible, and naturally indestructible,’’ and, moreover, this unity derives from ‘‘soul or substantial form. These are the only true complete beings’’ (LA 76). As Sleigh is right to note, for Leibniz, it is the soul or substantial form that confers the relevant sort of unity. Leibniz is however frustratingly unhelpful about the exact means by which a soul or substantial form produces a unity that is indivisible, ingenerable, and naturally indestructible. Nor does he explain precisely why such beings are ‘‘the only complete’’ ones, or even exactly why this is important. We have here a set of questions that concern both the nature and power of a substantial form: what is it about a soul or substantial form F in a substance S that confers unity on S; how does this unity guarantee the indivisibility, indestructibility, and ingenerability of S; in what sense is S a complete being and how is this completeness related to its other features (e.g., the indivisibility)?
46 Leibniz: Nature and Freedom
In his analysis of substantial forms in chapter 6, Sleigh offers important help with these questions. He explains: There are two central theses concerning the composition of corporeal substances— one negative, the other positive—to which Leibniz held fast in the Discourse and the correspondence. The negative thesis is that nothing whose essence is extension is an individual substance. The positive thesis is that each created individual substance, hence each corporeal substance, includes a substantial form. Leibniz saw these theses as connected. He often wrote as if establishing the negative thesis were tantamount to establishing the positive thesis. (Sleigh 1990: 116)
Since, for Leibniz, one of the main goals of the correspondence is to tempt ‘‘the great Arnauld’’ away from Cartesianism and toward the metaphysics of preestablished harmony, it is not surprising that Leibniz is keen to show Arnauld the various weaknesses of the Cartesian account of corporeal substance. As a means to this goal, Leibniz is very concerned to show that something whose entire essence is constituted by extensa is inadequate as a substance. Because Leibniz spends so much time on this topic, so does Sleigh. Although many of these details are enormously interesting, we can cut to the point most relevant to our topic, namely, that anything (whether extended or not) that is divisible is a being by aggregation, and that a being by aggregation is not a substance (Sleigh 1990: 119). Leibniz wants to convince Arnauld that, whereas beings by aggregation admit of degrees, substances or beings with substantial unity do not. The former are a matter of convention; the latter are not (Sleigh 1990: 121). The former change constantly; the latter remain the same unified thing throughout the course of their existence. That is, it is a fundamental view of Leibniz that, in Sleigh’s words, ‘‘[n]o substance is such that its unity and identity conditions are a matter of degree, a matter of convention.’’ As Sleigh nicely puts it: When [Leibniz] waxed most eloquent about substance, in contrast to various pretenders, it is this fundamental intuition that is generating the steam: ‘‘I maintain that one cannot find a better way of restoring the prestige of philosophy and transforming it into something precise than by distinguishing the only substances or complete entities, endowed with true unity . . . all the rest is merely phenomena, abstractions or relations.’’ (Sleigh 1990: 121; LA 101)
For Leibniz in the correspondence with Arnauld, therefore, there are fundamental individuals and there are nonfundamental individuals. The latter are aggregates, which are divisible, destructible, and temporary. They admit of degrees in the sense that they can be more or less unified and more or less divisible (e.g., a pile of rocks is more divisible than a piece of marble). Sleigh intends to articulate the difference between the fundamental individuals and the aggregates, and thereby to gain clarity on the nature of substantial unity. To this end, the question to which Sleigh turns is ‘‘what did Leibniz take to be the relation between an entity through aggregation and the entities that compose it, in virtue of which the entity through aggregation can be said to be ‘a state of being of those entities from which it is composed’?’’ In an attempt to answer this question, Sleigh cites an essay related to the correspondence entitled General Notations (Notationes
Leibniz and Sleigh on Substantial Unity
47
Generales), in which, as Leibniz explains, ‘‘[t]he chief point is this: an army accurately considered is not the same thing even for a moment, for it has nothing real in itself that does not result from the reality of the parts from which it is aggregated’’ (Sleigh 1990: 123; Grua 323). Sleigh’s gloss on this point is as follows: an aggregate is a state of being of those entities that compose it, in the sense that any truth about the aggregate can be expressed in propositions that ascribe modes and states to the composing entities without any need to refer to the aggregate itself. In other words, I take Leibniz to be claiming that aggregates are logical constructions from modes and states of the entities aggregated. Given this view of aggregates, it is easy enough to see why Leibniz would accept the grounding principle. (Sleigh 1990: 123–124)
The grounding principle claims: ‘‘For any x, if x is a being through aggregation, then there exists a decomposition D of x such that, for any y, if y is an element of D, then y is not a being through aggregation’’ (Sleigh 1990: 121). Leibniz explains to Arnauld part of the motivation behind the principle: ‘‘What constitutes the essence of an entity through aggregation is only a state of being of those entities from which it is composed; for example, what constitutes the essence of an army is only a state of being of the men who compose it’’ (LA 96–97). For Leibniz, then, a being that is divisible is one that is an aggregate, and an aggregate is something constituted of nonaggregates, that is, things with substantial unity. A nonaggregate or something with substantial unity is not divisible. To drive home this important point, Sleigh offers the following passage written by Leibniz in an essay entitled Definitions of Metaphysical and Logical Concepts: [N]o entity that is truly one [Ens vere unum] is composed of parts. Every substance is indivisible and whatever has parts is not an entity, but only a phenomenon. From these considerations the ancient philosophers correctly attributed substantial forms, such as minds, souls, or primary entelechies, to those things that they said made up an Unum per se. And they denied that matter by itself is a single entity [Unum Ens]. Certainly those things that lack these [substantial forms] are no more a single entity [Unum Ens] than a pile of sticks. . . . Certainly, these things do not remain the same more than a moment, whereas, by contrast, true substances remain through changes. (Sleigh 1990: 124)
There is, then, an intimate connection between entities that are divisible and entities through aggregation. As Sleigh explains: ‘‘An entity through aggregation is an entity whose existence depends upon those entities from which it is aggregated, in such fashion that a change in entities aggregated means a different entity through aggregation’’ (Sleigh 1990: 124). As Sleigh summarizes the point: ‘‘The feature common to divisible entities and entities through aggregation, to which Leibniz wished to draw our attention, is this: such entities are wholes composed in such a fashion that their identity conditions require a different whole for every change in composition’’ (Sleigh 1990: 125). Substances, however, are not like aggregates. They are truly one in the sense that they are indivisible and remain the same thing through time. Leibniz insists that each thing that is truly one has its own substantial form. An entity through aggregation does not have its own substantial form. The underlying assumption
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here is that a substantial form F of a substance S confers both unity and identity on S. The problem is that Leibniz does not explain how this is supposed to work. That is, nowhere in the Discourse or the correspondence with Arnauld does he explain exactly how substantial forms perform this double metaphysical task. So, the important question to address is: what exactly is it about substantial form F of a substance S such that F confers identity on S while it also confers unity? Sleigh is perturbed by the unity- and identity-making powers assigned to substantial forms, and for good reason. On the one hand, Leibniz endorses a notion of corporeal substance according to which a substantial form (somehow) constitutes a unity with its passive principle or body, which is itself constituted of other corporeal substances; on the other hand, he does not explain how this account is consistent with the indivisibility requirement. In his letters to Arnauld, Leibniz makes clear that substances are capable of remaining the same unified things although components of them come and go. Leibniz explains, for example, that ‘‘fire can transform an animal and reduce it in size,’’ although the animal retains its identity (LA 156). In an attempt to make sense of Leibniz’s position, Sleigh defines the term ‘composite entity’ as what refers to any individual, one proper component of which is another individual; and he distinguishes between what is divisible and what is deconstructible component-wise. While, for Leibniz, substances are not divisible, they are deconstructible component-wise. But this is all very odd. As Sleigh wonders: ‘‘What is the operative difference between being divisible and being deconstructible component-wise on which Leibniz wished to build so much metaphysics?’’ (Sleigh 1990: 126). It is in an attempt to answer this question that Sleigh turns his attention to Leibniz’s account of identity, which he considers to be the underlying issue. Sleigh justifies the transition from a discussion of unity and divisibility to one about identity in the following way: The real test is this: does the composite entity in question depend on each and every one of its components for its existence? If the answer is yes, then we have no substance; if the answer is no, we may have a substance. So divisibility is not really the vital matter here; the vital matter is whether the particular entity in question can remain the same entity over time while undergoing change of components. Leibniz’s claim amounts to this: given a substantial form suitably related to various components, we have a composite entity that can pass the test of remaining the same through change of components; absent the form, we do not. (Sleigh 1990: 126)
According to Sleigh, our ‘‘task’’ is to unearth ‘‘the explanation’’ behind the distinction between the sort of composite entity whose identity changes when its components do and the sort whose identity persists even through changes in its components. Sleigh’s point here is important. According to Leibniz in his correspondence with Arnauld, it is the substantial form of a substance that confers both the unity and identity on the substance. As noted earlier, one of the underlying questions here is: what exactly is it about mind-like or soul-like substantial form F of a substance S such that F confers identity on S while it also confers unity? In the light of Sleigh’s distinction between divisibility and component change, we might revise this question as follows: what exactly is it about mind-like or soul-like substantial form F of a substance S such that F confers identity and unity on S despite changes in the components of S?
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In his attempt to uncover Leibniz’s views about identity, Sleigh calls attention to some of the passages in which Leibniz seems to explain identity in terms of the causal autonomy of substances. For Leibniz, explains Sleigh, ‘‘remaining numerically identical over time is a basic condition that the metaphysically ultimate individuals of an acceptable substance ontology must satisfy’’ (Sleigh 1990: 128). Here the underlying assumption is that, in those cases when an entity persists despite component changes, the entity is one that ‘‘contains’’ all its predicates past, present, and future. In a letter of December 1686, Leibniz calls such entities ‘‘complete’’ and explains that they ‘‘express’’ all of their states, ‘‘as the concept of a substance must do’’ (Sleigh 1990: 126; LA 72). As Sleigh points out, Leibniz intends to convince Arnauld that ‘‘any alteration in the properties’’ of a person ‘‘would yield a different person’’ (Sleigh 1990: 128). One of my original questions concerned what it meant for a substance to be complete. As it turns out, Leibniz’s notion of completeness is more robust than one might first assume. He seems to identify completeness with causal autonomy where the idea is that F confers causal autonomy on S, along with unity and identity. The odd thing here is that F is supposed to confer unity, identity, and completeness on S despite changes in the components of S. Clearly, for Leibniz, substantial unity, identity, completeness, and causal autonomy are all closely related and are grounded in the substantial form. ‘‘Much is at stake here,’’ and so Sleigh sets about analyzing more thoroughly the notion of an individual substance that Leibniz presents to Arnauld (Sleigh 1990: 127–128). From Sleigh’s painstaking analysis, we can draw the following conclusions. First, in the correspondence with Arnauld and related Discourse on Metaphysics, Leibniz is prepared to embrace a view very like his later position, according to which each substance has a ‘‘law of order’’ that ‘‘constitutes’’ the substance. As Leibniz writes to Arnauld: ‘‘Each substance contains in its nature the law by which the series of its operations continues and all that has happened or will happen to it’’ (Sleigh 1990: 129; LA 136). The important point is that despite substantial changes, the substance remains numerically the same as long as those changes follow, in Leibniz’s words, ‘‘from its own nature’’ (Sleigh 1990: 129; Grua 323). According to Sleigh, this ‘‘account of substance’’ is ‘‘fresh in our period’’ (Sleigh 1990: 129) and was motivated by the rigorous conception of ‘‘what is involved in being an individual substance’’ (Sleigh 1990: 130). The second conclusion to draw from Sleigh’s analysis of Leibniz’s account of substantial identity is that the latter is consistent both with ‘‘the doctrine of spontaneity’’ and with (what Sleigh calls) ‘‘the doctrine of superintrinsicalness.’’ The doctrine of superintrinsicalness describes how a property or state is related to the individual substance that has it; the doctrine of spontaneity tells us how that property or state was produced. Sleigh considers Leibniz’s views about spontaneity to be helpful in explaining how the ‘‘law of order’’ is supposed to guarantee the identity of a substance S. According to the doctrine of superintrinsicalness, ‘‘every individual has all its properties intrinsically.’’ As Sleigh puts it: ‘‘Consider an individual x and a property f that x has; if f is such that, for any y, were y to lack f then y would not be x, then let us say that x has f intrinsically’’ (Sleigh 1990: 57). According to the doctrine of spontaneity, ‘‘the series of states, constituting the
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history of an individual substance, must be generated by a relation of causality, applied to its initial state’’ (Sleigh 1990: 129). It is important to Sleigh that ‘‘every property included in the concept of an individual substance is intrinsic to that substance’’ and ‘‘[t]hat an entity is an individual substance only if its series of states may be generated by a relation of real causality applied to its first state.’’ In the correspondence with Arnauld, Leibniz’s original formulation of the doctrine is: ‘‘Every present state of a substance occurs to it spontaneously and is only a consequence of its preceding state’’ (Sleigh 1990: 134; LA 47). Given all this, Sleigh then ‘‘speculates’’ that Leibniz regarded his doctrine of spontaneity as preserving intrinsicalness ‘‘so that whenever some state f of x is a real cause of state g of x, then if x has f intrinsically, x has g intrinsically’’ (Sleigh 1990: 130). For Sleigh, such claims are ‘‘a consequence’’ of Leibniz’s rigorous conception of ‘‘what is involved in being an individual substance’’ (Sleigh 1990: 130). Once we put these claims together with the plausible assumption that ‘‘Leibniz supposed that the initial state of any substance is intrinsic to it,’’ Sleigh proposes that we ‘‘attribute the following view to Leibniz: every noninitial state of a substance has as its real cause some preceding state of that substance; and, since every state of an individual substance thereby turns out to be intrinsic to that substance, every state of that substance (including its initial state) is included in, and in that sense a consequence of, its concept’’ (Sleigh 1990: 130). As we approach the climax of this part of Sleigh’s analysis, it is worth quoting him at length. He writes: Let us take stock of what ground has been covered and remains to be covered. Our first concern was how Leibniz differentiated between composites that are divisible and those that are not. Careful scrutiny of Leibniz’s arguments in the correspondence suggested that that distinction turned on another—the one between composite individuals that remain numerically the same through changes over time and those that do not. So our question became: What conditions must an entity satisfy according to Leibniz in order to remain numerically the same over time? Our answer is that this condition obtains, according to Leibniz, if each noninitial state of an individual has as its real cause some predecessor state of that individual. On this interpretation, the doctrine of spontaneity is built into the notion of an individual substance, according to Leibniz. Given the thesis that the relation of real causality preserves intrinsicalness and the thesis that the initial state of a substance is intrinsic to it, we reach the doctrine of superintrinsicalness. Attempting to derive so much of Leibniz’s doctrine concerning individual substances from his conception of what is required for real unity—unity consistent with remaining numerically identical through change—may seem excessive. But I take heart from a letter from Leibniz to l’Hospital, dated July 1695. After rehearsing the doctrines of spontaneity, world-apart, and marks and traces, Leibniz concluded, ‘‘The key to my doctrine on this subject consists in this consideration of what is properly a real unity, Monas.’’ (Sleigh 1990: 130–131)
Sleigh’s analysis of Leibniz’s correspondence with Arnauld shows that Leibniz’s demands about unity are closely related to other core tenets. We begin to see, for example, that identity and completeness are intimately related to one another, and to the law of the series, which itself may be seen to imply the doctrines of spontaneity
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and superintrinsicalness. I will return to the interrelations among these doctrines later. For now, it is noteworthy that on the basis of his thorough study of the correspondence with Arnauld and Discourse on Metaphysics, Sleigh is inclined to see the doctrines of superintrinsicalness and spontaneity as ‘‘built into the notion of an individual substance’’; and, moreover, he suggests that Leibniz’s understanding of that notion is itself grounded in his assumptions about ‘‘real unity.’’ Sleigh next turns to the question of ‘‘the internal generator, in virtue of which a substance produces its states in accord with its developmental law.’’ He identifies this internal generator with the substantial form of a substance, where the substantial form is ‘‘construed as a soul-like entity.’’ And he proposes that the ‘‘deep thesis’’ that underlies the developmental law is ‘‘the doctrine of marks and traces.’’ As Leibniz writes in a letter of 1686: ‘‘Every individual substance always contains traces of everything that has ever happened to it and indications of what will ever happen to it’’ (Sleigh 1990: 131–132; LA 39). Sleigh proposes that we understand the doctrine of marks and traces in terms of the intentions of a mind-like object: ‘‘Hence, only an entity that is a soul, or at least contains a soul, can satisfy the condition imposed by the doctrine of marks and traces, and hence, reach the level of an individual substance’’ (Sleigh 1990: 132). As Sleigh explains it: ‘‘Since past and future states of a substance (or anything else) do not literally exist in the present, they can be contained in the present state of a substance only intentionally, past states as the objects of memory, future states, as the objects of desire, or at least expectation’’ (Sleigh 1990: 132). Moreover, the intentionality of mind-like forms offers some help with their unity. As Leibniz writes in General Notations about the topic of how a composite can have true unity: ‘‘What makes these parts a unity in the case of man has attributes that cannot be made known without something that binds them together, namely, the faculty of perceiving and desiring’’ (Sleigh 1990: 132; Grua 323). On the basis of Sleigh’s discussion of the numerical identity of substance, we may conclude the following: for each individual substance S, there is a developmental law that itself is somehow generated by a soul-like substantial form F and that ultimately depends on the marks and traces of F; moreover, the doctrine of marks and traces is itself to be explained intentionally, that is, by the memories and desires of the mind-like F.2 In this section, I have summarized the discussion of substantial unity in Leibniz and Arnauld: A Commentary on Their Correspondence. Sleigh’s analysis of the notion as Leibniz discusses it in the correspondence with Arnauld and the related Discourse on Metaphysics makes genuine progress in uncovering the interconnections among Leibniz’s ideas about substantial unity, identity, and completeness. But despite this success in excavating Leibniz’s views about substantial unity, some fundamental questions remain unanswered. As noted, Sleigh’s account is based entirely on texts in which Leibniz avoids explicit acknowledgment of some of his underlying assumptions about unity. Therefore, the lack of resolution of some significant problems should not come as a surprise. But the unresolved problems do come as a disappointment. We yearn to learn more about the underlying nature of substance such that it produces its own unity, identity, and completeness. From Sleigh’s analysis, we have discovered a good deal about what substantial unities are not (they are not aggregates whose state of being is constituted of the
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entities from which it is composed), about what substantial unities do (they change components and yet remain the same), and about how their activities are directed (given the initial state of a substance S, S follows its ‘‘law’’). Perhaps most dramatically of all, Sleigh makes it perfectly clear that the substantial form is the real workhorse here: it is the mind-like substantial form that generates the completeness and causal autonomy, that confers unity and identity on its substance, and that contains the developmental law. Sleigh’s significant suggestion is that underlying all this is the mind-like substantial form with its memories and desires. This is all genuinely important. But we remain in the dark about the underlying nature of the mind-like substantial form such that it performs all these extraordinary tasks. That is, we want to know more about how the substantial form F in a substance S acts to accomplish so much. There are a number of related questions concerning both the underlying nature of F and the various metaphysical feats that it achieves. The most obvious of these are: by what means does F act and how does its activity guarantee the indestructibility and ingenerability of S; how exactly does F contain its developmental law and to what extent does the law constitute its nature; how exactly does F bind the components of S together so that component change does not affect the identity of S; can we clarify how the features of unity, self-sufficiency, and causal autonomy are related in F; can we understand more about how the features of completeness, self-sufficiency, and causal autonomy are related in F; and finally, is Sleigh right to attach so much importance to the intentionality of F? That the answers to some of these questions may significantly affect the coherence of Sleigh’s interpretation seems clear. Consider, for example, his explanation of identity. For each individual substance, says Sleigh, there is a developmental law that itself is somehow generated by a soul-like substantial form and that ultimately depends on the marks and traces of the individual; moreover, the doctrine of marks and traces is itself to be explained intentionally, that is, by the memories and desires of the soul-like substantial forms. While this helps to explain the identity of the substantial form over time, its contribution to the problem of unity is unclear if we take unity to be the relation that is supposed to exist between a substantial form and its body or passive principle. For a substance S that is constituted of a substantial form F and a passive principle P where P is a collection of corporeal substances, the unity formed between F and P remains mysterious. To use the example Leibniz offered Arnauld, an animal that is submitted to fire can decrease greatly in size while retaining its identity (LA 156). In such a case, Sleigh’s account explains how the soul of the animal remains the same, but it does not explain the unity between the soul and the body. Or to approach the problem in another way, Sleigh’s discussion of the relation among the doctrines of spontaneity, superintrinsicalness, and marks and traces is extremely helpful in revealing the subtleties and complexities of Leibniz’s thinking about substance, but his analysis also makes clear how intractable Leibniz’s views about unity are: as long as the substantial form is taken to be a soul-like entity whose thoughts and intentions arise entirely out of its own nature—that is, are intrinsic—it remains extremely difficult to see how such a self-sufficient object could create a unity with its passive principle. What exactly is the source of its metaphysical glue, and how are we to understand the constancy of it? Minds are supposed to be eternal and indestructible. There is
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little help here in understanding Leibniz’s assumptions about the apparent indefatigability of minds. In conclusion, despite Sleigh’s thoughtful analysis of Leibniz’s views as they are presented to Arnauld, we remain unenlightened about how the mind-like substantial form is supposed to perform some of its most fundamental metaphysical tasks. Nor do other scholars succeed where Sleigh has failed. Recent accounts of Leibniz’s views of substantial unity are no more enlightening.3 We therefore find ourselves sadly befuddled about this crucial part of Leibniz’s thought. But we need not despair. As I said in the introduction to this essay, if Sleigh works carefully through a text and does not make good sense of a topic, then there is no sense to be made of the topic as presented in that text. Because Sleigh has not been able to discern Leibniz’s underlying assumptions about unity in the Discourse on Metaphysics and correspondence with Arnauld, we are fully justified in looking to other texts for answers to our questions. I propose that we turn to some of Leibniz’s early writings in which he is working out his ideas about substantial unity, and that we situate these early texts in their rightful philosophical context.
Platonist Assumptions about Being and Unity In his discussion of some of Leibniz’s assumptions about unity, Sleigh identifies an idea that, as he puts it, ‘‘has had a remarkable hold on Western thought,’’ namely, that ‘‘the fundamental individuals of an acceptable metaphysical system must have unity and identity conditions independent of human convention; otherwise, our metaphysical analysis has not reached bedrock’’ (Sleigh 1990: 121). This observation about the fundamental significance attached to substantial unity in the history of philosophy is important, and worth pursuing in greater detail. Leibniz himself encourages us in this pursuit. As quoted by Sleigh, Leibniz points out in Definitions of Metaphysical and Logical Concepts that ‘‘the ancient philosophers correctly attributed substantial forms, such as minds, souls, or primary entelechies, to those things that they said made up a Unum per se’’ (Sleigh 1990: 124). As with so many other aspects of Leibniz’s thought, a survey of the right historical texts helps to identify some of the assumptions that underlie Leibniz’s own thinking about unity, identity, and substantial form. A few choice examples from the history of Platonism should be sufficient to situate the young man’s views about these matters.4 In Plato’s Phaedo, Socrates explains to some of his friends why he is eager to die. He argues, among other things, for the immortality of the soul. It is in this context that Socrates explains to Cebes ‘‘that the soul is most like the divine— deathless, intelligible, uniform, indissoluble, always the same as itself—whereas the body is most like that which is human—mortal, multiform, unintelligible, soluble and never consistently the same.’’5 Underlying Socrates’ argument is the view that the soul is like the divine in that it is ‘‘pure and invisible’’ (80e). Or as Socrates puts it later in the dialogue: ‘‘the soul must be proved to be indestructible and immortal . . . it has great vitality and a godlike nature’’ (95c). For my purposes, it is particularly important that the soul is divine-like, is indestructible, and remains ‘‘always the same as itself.’’
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At the end of the first section, I listed a number of questions about substantial unity that needed to be addressed. One of these concerned how the features of unity and self-sufficiency are supposed to be related in the mind-like substantial form; another asked how completeness, self-sufficiency, and causal autonomy are related in F. These passages from the Phaedo suggest that the divine-like nature of soul guarantees its self-sufficiency and constitutes its completeness in that that nature will never cease to be ‘‘the same as itself.’’ And it would seem to follow from this sort of self-sufficiency that the soul would be indissoluble and ‘‘deathless.’’ The idea that the soul—at least the human soul—stands between the mortal and the divine becomes standard fare in the history of Platonism. Many Platonists assumed that the soul’s divine-like status entailed its unity and vitality. Among the cluster of intuitions here is the striking idea that the soul is the kind of thing that always remains self-sufficiently itself. Its indestructibility and immortality are supposed to follow from this. Before turning to one of the leading proponents of this idea, it will be helpful to review some points about the relation between unity and selfsufficiency. For many ancient thinkers, ontological priority was to be explained mainly in terms of self-sufficiency. For Platonists, there was a hierarchy of self-sufficiency and being such that each of the lower strata in the hierarchy was supposed to depend on and be caused by the higher. In Plato’s Republic the sensible things depend on the Ideas, which themselves depend on the Good. For many of the philosophers who followed Plato, it was taken as obvious that unity and perfection were intimately related to self-sufficiency and being, so that the more reality something has, the more unified and perfect it would be. Both Christian and non-Christian Platonists assumed that there is a supremely perfect, wholly simple, and unified being on which all else depends. The implication was that only the highest being was wholly perfect, self-sufficient, simple, and real and that the beings in the lower strata had diminishing degrees of these features. What is less a unity, for instance, is less real and what is less real is constituted and explained by what is more unified and hence more real. For many Platonists, unity was the key metaphysical notion around which a number of beliefs clustered: that eternity and immutability are the marks of true being and perfection; that utter unity or simplicity excludes the possibility of parts and the possibility of change; that simplicity implies independence and self-sufficiency. From such assumptions it is supposed to follow that a wholly unified being is eternally, immutably, and independently itself, but also that whatever partakes of unity has an equal share of self-sufficiency.6 Even these brief comments7 about the proposals of Plato and other Platonists constitute significant help with the list of questions asked about substantial unity at the end of the first section. Within the Platonist tradition, we discern a cluster of assumptions about the souls or active principles in nature: they are fundamentally unified and self-sufficient; their self-sufficiency constitutes a kind of metaphysical completeness; this self-sufficiency and completeness entail indestructibility, indivisibility, and vitality; and they are somehow capable of sharing their unity and selfsufficiency with ‘‘lesser’’ beings. The great fifteenth-century Platonist Marsilio Ficino explains in his Platonic Theology how the soul ‘‘causes life to be diffused among bodies.’’ For Ficino, the
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soul, which is ‘‘always alive,’’ shares its unity and self-sufficiency with the body and thereby creates a harmony of components.8 In an attempt to explain the unifying powers of the soul, Ficino writes that the soul ‘‘diffuses its vivifying shadow through the division of body.’’ Although it remains ‘‘integral and simple,’’ the soul spreads ‘‘its indivisible power’’ to every single part of the body and thereby is ‘‘wholly’’ present to every part. It thereby gives its body its essence as an indivisible thing (43v). That is, according to Ficino, because the soul is a constantly active divinelike power, it is fundamentally unified, self-sufficient, and complete, and moreover it communicates its ‘‘vivifying’’ and ‘‘indivisible power’’ to anything it diffuses. But questions remain. The soul is supposed to be unextended (i.e., not in space) and yet it is supposed to diffuse its power to every part of its body. In order to explain the position of soul here, we need to turn briefly to the Platonist doctrine of emanation. Oversimplifying somewhat, we can say that: if A has an attribute f, then A can emanate f-ness to a being B. In the emanative relation, A loses nothing while B comes to instantiate f-ness. The emanative process is assumed to be continual so that B will participate in f-ness and have f if and only if A acts or emanates f-ness. It is important to emphasize the fact that, in the emanative causal relation, the f of A is greater and more perfect than that of B and yet the f in B resembles its cause. For early Platonists like Plotinus and Proclus, any act of production in the created world is a case of ‘‘imitating the One.’’9 These brief comments about emanative causation offer some assistance with one of the questions asked about substantial unity at the end of the first section, namely, how exactly does a mind-like substantial form F bind the components of a substance S together so that component change does not affect the identity of S? The answer suggested by Ficino is that S is constituted by F and the body over which F has emanative power, so that regardless of the changes in its body, S remains constantly itself. F binds together the components of S by emanating its power to them; and it follows that the changes in S are merely the result of F expanding or shrinking its emanative range. Although the soul effortlessly offers its powers to all the parts of its body, the range of its diffusion may be more or less expansive. It would be interesting to analyze the views of the Platonists in greater detail, but it remains my goal to discern Leibniz’s underlying assumptions about substantial unity. Despite the brevity of this historical material, we have made real headway with our questions. We are well prepared to discern Leibniz’s underlying ideas about unity and to construct more complete answers to our questions.
The Young Leibniz on Substantial Unity From the very beginning of his long philosophical career, Leibniz endorsed the Platonist assumptions just displayed. Although one of his main goals as a young philosopher was to construct an account of substance that was recognizably Aristotelian, Leibniz was perfectly happy to combine Platonist assumptions about God and the soul with Aristotelian ideas about substance. Briefly put, Leibniz intended to construct his theory of corporeal substance on the Aristotelian model, where a
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substantial form or active principle combined with a material or passive principle to constitute the fundamental entities of the created world.10 However, as so many medieval and early modern Aristotelians had done before, Leibniz borrowed heavily from the Platonist tradition for his views about God and the active principle in nature. For my purposes, it is particularly important to recognize that Leibniz assumed that the mind-like substantial form would possess the whole range of metaphysical powers described by Ficino. That is, for Leibniz—as for Plato, Proclus, Plotinus, Ficino, and many others—the active principle in nature is divine-like and therefore self-sufficient, complete, and unified. It is as unified and self-sufficient as anything other than God can be. From the outset of Leibniz’s philosophical career, we discern an intimate connection between unity, self-sufficiency, and completeness, and we find these features firmly rooted in the activity and vitality of the active principles in nature. Consider his first account of the nature and activities of substance. In On Transubstantiation of 1668, he defines substance as ‘‘a being that subsists per se’’ and then defines ‘‘a being that subsists per se’’ as ‘‘one that has a principle of action within itself [in se]’’ (A 6.1:508/L 115). That is, in On Transubstantiation, we find the following significant metaphysical commitment: the Principle of Substantial Activity assumes that a being S is a substance if and only if it subsists per se and S subsists per se if and only if it has a principle of activity within itself (in se). Also, in this essay, Leibniz equates mind and substantial form and implies that the principle of activity is in the latter (e.g., see A 6.1:509). It follows that both the mindlike substantial form and the corporeal substance that it activates are self-sufficient, and therefore that the substantial form is itself a substance. Thus, from the beginning of Leibniz’s philosophical reflections, it is a mind-like substantial form that is responsible for the activity and self-sufficiency of substances. In other essays of the late 1660s, Leibniz confirms this account of the activity and self-sufficiency of substance, and offers more details. Significantly, Leibniz’s belief in the essential connection between the activity of mind on the one hand and its unity, self-sufficiency, completeness, and indestructibility on the other dates from his early postgraduate days. For example, in a published text of 1664, he discusses the problem of the identity of individual things and considers a solution that assumes all of these features of the active principle in nature. He speculates in Specimen of Collected Philosophical Questions Concerning Law that the source of identity is the vivens unum, the living unity or one, which is indivisible and acts as ‘‘a fountain of life.’’ He notes that, ‘‘as the Rabbis maintain,’’ the soul is ‘‘like a little house in a certain part of the body, which no power can destroy.’’11 The implications of this early text are striking. First, the eighteen-year-old Leibniz suggests that vitality, selfsufficiency, and identity are all grounded in this living unity. Second, he commits himself to the connection between these features and indestructibility. That is, the assumption is that the vivens unum cannot be destroyed by any natural means. When we combine these assumptions with the Principle of Substantial Activity, the implication is that, for each individual substance S, there is a soul-like substantial form or vivens unum that guarantees the identity, self-sufficiency, indivisibility, and indestructibility of S. Finally, there is the provocative suggestion that this vivens unum somehow resides in a body, in which it is eternally based and to which it gives life.
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That Leibniz thinks of the human soul as an indefatigable and eternal fortress is confirmed in other texts of the period. Consider, for example, the second part of the Conspectus, entitled ‘‘Demonstration of the Immortality of the Soul, and of Incorporality.’’ In this text of 1668–69, Leibniz lists several topics that at first glance are not related to immortality. Of the six subjects listed, only the final one, a discussion of the immortality of the soul, explicitly mentions immortality. The other five topics concern the activity of mind where the assumption is that the immortality of the soul is supposed to follow from the fact that only God can destroy an active thing. Given the material of the second section, one of these is particularly interesting: Leibniz intends to argue for the immortality of the soul based ‘‘on self-motion, following Plato’’ (A 6.1:495). Or, as Leibniz further explains in some notes that he took on the Phaedo in 1676: whatever ‘‘participates in life is not able to be extinguished’’ (A 6.3:290). For the young Leibniz, therefore, only God can destroy the active principles in nature, and once created, such principles retain vitality. No natural thing can either corrupt or destroy them. It would be very helpful to know more about the nature of this vital activity that is somehow constant and indestructible. As noted earlier, Leibniz takes the active principles in nature to be mind-like, and he often claims that they act constantly.12 Although the young man makes few explicit comments about exactly what this activity is, the evidence strongly suggests that he models the activity and thinking of created minds on the activity and thinking of God, who acts by emanation. In brief, Leibniz follows his Platonist predecessors in modeling the nature and activity of created minds on God. For example, in a note of 1671, he explains: ‘‘Just as God thinks things . . . because they follow from his nature, so does Mind. . . . Mind and God do not differ except that one is finite and the other infinite.’’13 Although previous scholars have not paid adequate attention to this important aspect of Leibniz’s thought, throughout his long life, he conceives of the relation between God and creatures as emanative. Therefore, it should not come as a surprise that he follows Platonists like Ficino in thinking of the activity of divinelike minds as one of emanation. As Leibniz explains in section 14 of Discourse on Metaphysics: ‘‘it is evident that created substances depend on God, who preserves them and who even produces them continually by a kind of emanation, just as we produce our thoughts.’’14 Given that created minds act by emanation, it is not surprising that they are ‘‘never depleted.’’ Or, as Leibniz makes the point to Oldenburg, secretary of the Royal Society, in September 1670, the activity of mind is ‘‘perpetual’’ (A 2.1:64). It is this perpetual activity of mind-like substantial forms that guarantees the self-sufficiency and completeness of substances. In a text written in conjunction with On Transubstantiation and also of 1668, Leibniz articulates his original understanding of substantial self-sufficiency. Against mechanical philosophers like Gassendi and Descartes, who consider figure, motion, and magnitude to be the primary qualities of bodies, Leibniz asks in Confession of Nature against the Atheists: ‘‘[W]hat if I should demonstrate that the origin of these very primary qualities themselves cannot be found in the nature of body? Then, indeed, I hope that these naturalists will admit that body is not self-sufficient [sibi non sufficere] and cannot subsist without an incorporeal principle.’’15 In fact, Leibniz’s original
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rejection of the mechanical conception of body as res extensa rests on the assumption that extended stuff is insufficient and incomplete by itself to explain corporeal features. Leibniz argues that because ‘‘the same matter is indeterminate as to any definite figure . . . no complete reason [plena ratio] for the figure will ever be given’’ (A 6.1:490/L 110–111). The only way to avoid this unacceptable conclusion is to insist that there is ‘‘an incorporeal being’’ that acts to organize the matter of the body and thereby constitutes a ‘‘complete reason’’ for such corporeal features. For my purposes, Leibniz’s argument against the ‘‘naturalists’’ is less important than his promotion of his own views of self-sufficiency and completeness. We can extract the following two significant metaphysical commitments from the argument in the Confession of Nature. First, the Principle of Substantial Self-Sufficiency assumes that a being S is a substance if and only if S is self-sufficient and moreover S is selfsufficient if and only if the complete reason (ratio) for its features can be discovered in the nature of S. Second, the notion of a complete reason (ratio) assumed in these principles, may be put as follows: for some state or feature f, a complete reason (ratio) of f constitutes the necessary and sufficient condition for f. Among the questions left unanswered at the end of the first section were those that concerned the relation between the completeness, self-sufficiency, and causal autonomy of the substantial form F. The conjunction of the Principle of Substantial Self-Sufficiency and the Principle of Substantial Activity suggests a good deal about Leibniz’s original understanding of the relation between activity, selfsufficiency, completeness, and causal autonomy. The principles display the two separate tasks that the substantial form F in a substance S is supposed to perform. First, F has an internal source of activity or principle of activity, which keeps F constantly active and therefore self-sufficient. As we have seen, this self-sufficiency guarantees the indivisibility and (natural) indestructibility of F. Second, the substantial form seems to possess something that directs its activities. Whereas the principle of activity acts constantly, the directive device (as yet unspecified) instructs the principle on how to behave. It is important that the activities of F must somehow involve its body or passive principle and create a substantial nature with it. It is surely noteworthy that, from the beginning of Leibniz’s ruminations about metaphysical matters, he seems to assume that (1) substances are complete in the sense that they offer a complete reason or explanation for (at least) their (primary) features, and moreover that (2) this completeness is to be grounded in the nature of the substance, that is, in the unity formed by the active and passive principles. In his analysis of Leibniz’s notion of substantial unity, Sleigh worried about ‘‘[a]ttempting to derive so much of Leibniz’s doctrine concerning individual substances from his conception of what is required for real unity’’ (Sleigh 1990: 130–131). In particular, Sleigh’s analysis of identity and completeness led him to posit spontaneity and superintrinsicalness. As a confirmation and extension of Sleigh’s point, the early works show that the young Leibniz intended to construct a tightly unified substantial nature out of a mind-like substantial form and a passive principle, and by such means to offer a complete reason for every natural occurrence. In a work of 1669–70, Leibniz offers details about how this substantial nature is supposed to be formed. In On the Incarnation of God, or On Hypostatic Union,
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which is surely the most important text for my purposes, Leibniz presents an account of substantial unity. Although the explicit goal of the essay is to explain how the divine and human natures of Christ can form one substance, Leibniz displays a theory of substantial unity more generally. The text is worth quoting at length. According to Leibniz, the things that ‘‘are able to be unified hypostatically’’ are: 1) God and mind, 2) Mind and Body, 3) Body and Body through a common mind. Body and Body are not able to be unified in themselves hypostatically, because no Body subsists in itself. Mind and Mind are not able to be unified hypostatically, unless as perfect and imperfect because imperfect mind [i.e., created mind] does not act outside of itself unless through Body. . . . Moreover, created Mind . . . is not unified with every body, but just to the one in which it has been rooted and from which it cannot be separated. E.g. in the human body it should not be thought that the soul is unified hypostatically to all the little bodies which are in it, because they change perpetually, but [the soul] inheres in the center of the brain in a certain fixed and inseparable flower of substance, most subtly mobile at the center of the animal spirits, and [the soul] is unified substantially so that it may not be separated by death.16
Leibniz makes five claims in this passage that are especially relevant to my present concerns. They are: (1) if x and y are unified hypostatically, then either x or y subsists per se; (2) created mind cannot act outside itself except though body; (3) if x and y are unified hypostatically, then either x or y acts outside itself (through the other); (4) every created mind has a body to which it is unified hypostatically; (5) created mind is unified hypostatically with a body if and only if it is rooted in that body and cannot be separated from it.
Leibniz continues his essay by asserting the following: (6) ‘‘there is no hypostatical union except by means of the activity of the one on the other’’; i.e., if x and y are (presently) unified hypostatically, then one is (presently) acting on the other; (7) minds ‘‘have in themselves a principle of acting’’; (8) ‘‘every action [of God] on body is one of creation’’; (9) x and y are unified hypostatically if and only if (a) ‘‘one of them acts constantly by a special ratio of action [actus] on the other’’ and (b) ‘‘one of them is the other’s immediate instrument of acting’’ (A 6.1:533–534).
God is hypostatically unified with created minds in that the perfect mind acts constantly on the imperfect ones so that each of the latter is God’s ‘‘instrument.’’ God is not, however, hypostatically unified with bodies: although God constantly creates bodies, the divine mind is not the principle of the activity in an individual body nor is the body its immediate instrument of acting. Leibniz writes: ‘‘For truly the instrument of God is Mind, unified with God by means of which God acts on bodies other than by creating’’ (A 6.1:534). For my purposes, it is significant that, besides giving each mind its own principle of activity, Leibniz also suggests in this essay that God imposes on each mind ‘‘a ratio of action’’ so that the mind may act
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as ‘‘the instrument’’ of God.17 Leibniz offers the following summary of some of the claims made previously: ‘‘if A is [that which does] the unifying and B is that which is said to be unified, then (a) A is a thing subsisting per se, (b) A acts through B in C, (c) A acts immediately in B or [seu] not through another.’’18 Thus, according to Leibniz in On the Incarnation of God, for some mind-like substantial form F and some body or passive principle P, F and P are hypostatically unified just in case: F subsists per se (claim [1]), but only acts outside itself through the other; the passive principle need not subsist per se, but is the means by which F acts when it acts outside itself (claim [3]). Although God does not need a passive principle through which to act, F does (claim [2]). This means that all the activity in the natural world reduces to that of minds and bodies in hypostatic union. Moreover, it is not enough that the substantial form acts some of the time, it must act constantly on the passive principle. The idea seems to be that when the acting stops, so does the union (see claims [6] and [9]). Thus, Leibniz asserts in claim (9) that x and y are hypostatically unified if and only if the active principle acts constantly on the passive principle and that the latter is its ‘‘immediate instrument’’ of acting. By such means, we have arrived at two of Leibniz’s most basic assumptions about substantial form, namely, that it acts constantly and moreover that it only acts outside itself through its passive principle. In the remainder of the essay, Leibniz goes on to make an extraordinary claim, namely, that ‘‘there is no thought [cognitio] without a union because to render that which is thought [cognitum reddere] is itself an action of the one on the other.’’19 Thus, according to Leibniz: (10) created mind always thinks (cognoscere); (11) thought (cognitio) requires a union because to render the thing thought is itself an action of the one on the other (i.e., the formation of a thought requires an action of mind on body); (12) therefore, created mind must always be hypostatically unified with its body.
The main part of On the Incarnation of God offers a thorough account of the substantial unity forged by the mind and its body. Before mind will succeed at its assigned task, namely, to forge a unity with its body, four conditions must be met. First, according to Leibniz, each individual created mind has its own principle of activity (claim [7]) by which it acts constantly. Second, it has its own ‘‘special ratio’’ (claim [9a]). That is, the active principle or mind-like substantial form in a corporeal substance is fundamentally an active thing with its own set of instructions or ‘‘special ratio’’ in terms of which it acts. Third, when the mind acts, which it always does, it acts on its body. Finally, the result of each of these activities is a thought (although there may also be other results). It will be helpful to consider these features of mind and its relation to body in more detail. The mind-like substantial form has its own principle of activity by means of which it acts constantly and its constant activities are always on its body or passive principle. By combining mind and body in this way, Leibniz has cleverly managed to create a single unit out of active and passive principles. His strategy is straightforward: a real substantial union between the principles depends on the constant activity of the
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one on the other because the constancy of the union of the two depends on the constancy of the connection between them. Since the two principles will cease to be a union when they cease to be connected and since constant activity assures constant connection, Leibniz’s account of substantial union requires constant activity. Thus, the hypostatic union of the principles critically depends on two features of mind: that mind constantly acts and that each mind cannot act outside of itself except through the body in which it is rooted. A comparison to organic unities may be helpful at this point. If one understands an organic unity to be composed of substantial form and matter, then it is easy to see why unity requires constant activity: if the activity involved in maintaining the organic unity stops, so does the unity. We would generally agree that when the maintenance of the organization ceases (e.g., the heart stops, the liver no longer functions), the unity of the substantial form and matter does so as well (e.g., the entity dies, the formerly organized body becomes a heap of decaying flesh). The nature of organic unities also helps us to understand what Leibniz means when he says that the active principle cannot act outside itself except through the passive: in order to act externally, the source or cause of the organization has to act through the passive principle that it organizes. The mind-like substantial form, besides having a principle of activity by means of which it acts constantly, also has ‘‘a special ratio’’ that (somehow) directs its actions. Leibniz explains at least part of his motivation: ‘‘For truly the instrument of God is mind.’’ The suggestion is that God constructs individual substantial forms so that they act according to their divinely arranged instructions. The proposal here seems to be a more developed version of the idea found in Specimen of Collected Philosophical Questions Concerning Law. In that text of 1664, Leibniz intended to offer the vivens unum as the source of substantial identity. In On the Incarnation of God, he is prepared to give every mind-like substantial form a set of instructions by which it acts and maintains its identity. Among the questions left unanswered by Sleigh’s analysis of substantial unity, one concerned the matter of how the mind-like substantial form F was supposed to contain its developmental law and to what extent the law constituted the nature of F. On the Incarnation of God offers significant help with this topic. I said earlier that Leibniz has assigned F two tasks: to act constantly and to direct its activities. While the principle of activity easily fulfills the first task, we now see that it is the developmental law or ‘‘special ratio’’ that accomplishes the second. It would seem to follow then that each substantial form is the same insofar as it contains a divinelike vivens unum. What individuates one substantial form from another and what makes it complete in the relevant sense is its ‘‘special ratio.’’ That is, each substance will be (in Plato’s terms) ‘‘always the same as itself ’’ because of the law by which it acts. There are two more points to emphasize about the features of mind and its relation to body as presented in the main part of On the Incarnation of God. Both concern the nature of the unity of the substantial nature. In the Confession of Nature against the Atheists, we witnessed Leibniz’s demand that each substantial nature offer a complete reason or explanation for its features (at least the primary ones). The account of substantial union presented in On the Incarnation of God
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easily attains that goal. Leibniz has constructed the substantial union between the mind and body so that, for any feature f of the corporeal substance S, f results from the organization of the passive principle in S and moreover this organization occurs if and only if the mind acts through the passive principle. While the mind is the source of activity, the body is what mind organizes: each is necessary and both are sufficient for the corporeal feature f. By combining mind and body in this way, Leibniz has cleverly managed to create a single corporeal nature. Finally, the nature of the union forged between the active and passive principles in On the Incarnation of God is such that the result of the activities of this substantial unity are thoughts. That is, according to Leibniz in this essay, when minds act constantly on their bodies, what they produce are thoughts.20 This point brings us to another question raised at the end of the first section. We wondered there whether or not Sleigh is right to attach so much importance to the intentionality of the mind-like substantial form. It would appear that in Leibniz’s original attempt to work out the details of his views about substantial unity, he was already thinking about unity in intentional terms.21 The proposals in On the Incarnation of God are important and contain significant details about the young Leibniz’s views about substantial unity. The essay also makes some provocative remarks about the mind’s relation to its body. Among the questions left unanswered at the end of the first section, the one I have yet to consider concerns the thorny matter of component changes. As I asked the question there, how exactly does the substantial form F in a substance S bind the components of S together so that component change does not affect the identity of S? Or, to pose the more general question: what exactly is it about mind-like or soul-like substantial form F of a substance S such that F confers identity and unity on S despite changes in the components of S? As noted at the end of the first section, this is a serious problem and one that poses potential difficulties for Sleigh’s account. For each individual substance, says Sleigh, there is a developmental law that itself is somehow generated by a soul-like substantial form. While the developmental law helps to explain the identity of the substantial form over time, its contribution to the problem of unity is unclear if we take unity to be the relation that is supposed to exist between a substantial form and its body or passive principle. For a substance S that is constituted of a substantial form F and a passive principle P where P is a collection of corporeal substances, the unity formed between F and P remains mysterious. As Leibniz pointed out to Arnauld, an animal that is submitted to fire can decrease greatly in size while retaining its identity (LA 156). Sleigh’s account helps to explain how the soul of the animal remains the same, but it does not account for the unity between the soul and the body. Moreover, as long as the substantial form is taken to be a soul-like entity whose thoughts and intentions arise entirely out of its own nature—that is, are intrinsic—it remains extremely difficult to see how such a self-sufficient object could create a unity with its passive principle. In On the Incarnation of God, Leibniz offers some clues about how we might answer the question about component change. He writes in a passage already mentioned: ‘‘it should not be thought that the soul is unified hypostatically to all the little bodies which are in it, because they change perpetually, but [the soul]
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inheres in the center of the brain in a certain fixed and inseparable flower of substance . . . so that it may not be separated by death’’ (A 6.1:533). But what is this ‘‘flower of substance’’ and how is the soul permanently attached to it? According to Ficino, the soul is related to its body by means of emanation where the idea is that its power diffuses all the parts of that body. For Platonists like Ficino, God emanates the divine power to souls, which accordingly have that power (though in an inferior manner) and can then emanate it to their bodies. When the soul diffuses its body, it loses none of its emanative causal power and yet enlivens its body. For the young Leibniz, both the activity of mind and the relation between mind and body is to be understood along similar lines.22 Although previous scholars have not noticed this feature of the early texts, there is clear evidence that, for the young Leibniz, the activity of mind is one of emanation and moreover that minds diffuse bodies in much the same way that God diffuses creatures. That is, whether the mind in question is the infinite mind of God or the finite minds of nature, mind acts through emanation and ‘‘without being diminished.’’23 Fortunately, there is ample evidence of this account of substantial unity. Leibniz summarizes his position in a letter to Johann Friedrich of May 1671: ‘‘I am of the opinion that in a body, whether of a human being or animal, vegetable or mineral, there is a core [Kern] of its substance. . . . This core is so subtle that it remains also in the ashes of burned things and can, so to speak, draw itself into an invisible center’’ (A 2.1:108). In a fascinating essay that Leibniz attached to this letter, he offers crucial details about this ‘‘core’’ of substance. In this text, entitled On the Resurrection of the Body, Leibniz employs the same Latin verb used by Ficino (i.e., diffundere) to describe the relation between the soul and its body. He writes: ‘‘in everything there is a certain seminal center that is diffused throughout the thing.’’ This center is ‘‘the fountain of life’’ and that ‘‘in which the very soul is implanted.’’ The ‘‘subtle spirit or substance’’ cannot be destroyed but will survive through fire and other changes as ‘‘the flower of substance’’ (A 2.1:116). In the theological context of resurrection, it is not surprising that Leibniz should be concerned to show that the soul remains eternally attached to its body. Since the Christian doctrine demands that the human soul will be resurrected with its body, the believing Christian wants to rest assured that come Judgment Day, it will be her body (and not someone else’s) that accompanies her soul through the Pearly Gates. Leibniz has constructed the core of substance to satisfy exactly these demands. In fact, Leibniz is proud of his theory and insists that it has many benefits. Besides solving the problem of resurrection, it explains ‘‘the generation of plants from seeds,’’ the ‘‘development of the seed in the uterus,’’ and ‘‘the essences of chemicals’’ (A 2.1:116); it is also consistent with the radical theological demands of the doctrine of the Eucharist.24 Moreover, Leibniz is proud that his theory agrees with ‘‘the Jews.’’ He writes: ‘‘Indeed, the Jews maintain that, in a certain little bone, which they call Luz, the soul with this flower of substance remains unconquered by anything that happens’’ (A 2.1:117; see also A 6.1:91). For the young Leibniz, whether it is the development of a crystal, the generation of a plant, the movement of an object, or the resurrection of the body, the same process occurs: there is a core of substance that diffuses the thing.
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Leibniz’s notion of a core of substance is constructed so that each human substance will retain both its soul and its body from its birth to its death and for all eternity.25 Roughly speaking, the idea is that the soul remains eternally unified with a passive principle through which it acts. That is, for every substance S, there will be a substantial form F and a passive principle P. Although P can be more or less expansive, there will be some part of it, say, Pd, that remains invariably attached to F and through which F always acts. Following Leibniz’s use of the verb ‘to diffuse’ (diffundere), let’s call the relation between the active and passive principles one of diffusion. From Leibniz’s comments, we can interpret the relation as follows. For a substantial form F of a substance S, F diffuses its passive principle P just in case F has constant causal power over P. That is, like his Platonist predecessors, Leibniz intends the mind-like substantial form F in a substance S to diffuse the components of its passive principle. In the discussion of Ficino’s views about substantial unity in the second section, I showed that the soul is supposed to diffuse its unifying and vivifying powers to various parts of its body. For Ficino, the changes in the components of a substance S are merely the result of the substantial form F expanding or shrinking its emanative range. Leibniz’s view is strikingly similar except that he constructs a core of substance through which this emanation of unifying power must occur. That is, as Leibniz has constructed the core of substance, F remains eternally rooted in Pd and the diffusion of P by F will always occur through Pd. It is in this sense that the core is ‘‘the flower of substance.’’ In the letter to Johann Friedrich, Leibniz explains that the core is like ‘‘an embryo or seed of an animal [dem foetu oder frucht der Thiere],’’ which contains ‘‘the core of the whole body.’’ He insists that ‘‘this core of the substance of a human being neither increases nor decreases although its clothing and casing [Kleidt und Decke] are in constant flux.’’ These fluctuations can be extreme. Not only is ‘‘the core of the whole body’’ able to spread throughout the body, it is also able to ‘‘retract itself back to its source and fountain’’ where it is in a state of such subtlety that ‘‘no force . . . is able to damage it’’ (A 2.1:108–109). In the discussion of the resurrection of the body, it is not surprising that Leibniz is keen to explain some of the more dramatic changes that, as Christian doctrine insists, every human being will suffer in the eternity of existence. Leibniz’s theory of a core of substance is enormously clever: it explains how a substance is able to remain fundamentally the same and yet undergo the changes of natural growth and supernatural resurrection. And the diffusion relation constitutes a neat account of the unity formed between the active and passive principles, regardless of the changes in components. In every diffusion relation between a mind-like substantial form F and a body or passive principle P, each of the components of P contributes to the unity of the whole by acting according to the emanations of F through Pd. For example, in the case of an individual human substance, the person grows from infant to adult, then dramatically shrinks and expands between the moments of death and resurrection. Underneath these variations in the passive principle stands the core. Because the core of the substance is constituted by a self-sufficient soul and a passive principle through which the soul constantly acts, the core of the human is ripe for life, death, and even resurrection. For Leibniz in 1671, whether it is the generation of a plant, the growth of an adolescent, or the resurrection of the body, the same process occurs (A 2.1:116).
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Conclusion According to Sleigh, in Leibniz and Arnauld: A Commentary on Their Correspondence, it was in the correspondence with Arnauld and the Discourse on Metaphysics that Leibniz ‘‘first worked out in detail his conception of an individual substance and what he took to be its philosophical consequences’’ (Sleigh 1990: 95). The material of the third section herein suggests, however, that Leibniz had a conception of substance in his early period, and that the young man was keen to unpack the weighty metaphysical implications of Platonist ideas about mind, activity, completeness, self-sufficiency, and unity.26 It is not surprising therefore that the texts of Leibniz’s early period (roughly, 1666–76) offer significant help with questions left unanswered in the correspondence with Arnauld and the Discourse on Metaphysics. Once we place Leibniz’s early ruminations about substantial unity in their rightful philosophical context, we can begin to discern his underlying assumptions about the power of the active mind-like principles of nature to confer unity, self-sufficiency, and completeness on substances. A brief review of these assumptions is in order. One of the most difficult questions left unanswered by Sleigh’s analysis involved how the mind-like substantial form F in a substance S could confer unity. The conferral of unity on S was supposed to guarantee the indivisibility, indestructibility, and ingenerability of S, and to allow S to retain its identity despite changes of components. Following his Platonist predecessors, the young Leibniz assumes that the divine-like nature of the active principle constantly acts through emanation so that it remains (in Plato’s words) ‘‘constantly itself ’’ and thereby is incapable of division, generation, and destruction (by anything but God). Leibniz also takes it for granted that this mind-like form can act more or less expansively and that it is eternally rooted in a passive principle from which it cannot be severed. Although from my philosophical perspective, the divine-like nature of F remains (mostly) unfathomable, there may be some comfort in the fact that, for Leibniz and many of his contemporaries, the nature of mind was unfathomable exactly because it was divine-like (e.g., A 2.1:113; A 6.1:492–493). Despite the absence of an entirely plausible account of the activity of mind-like forms, the materials of Leibniz’s early period contribute significantly to our understanding of the indivisibility, ingenerability, indestructibility, and constancy of substantial unities. The early works have also helped with questions involving the interrelations among self-sufficiency, completeness, causal autonomy, and the developmental law. What we discovered was that each substantial form contains its own principle of activity by which it acts and a ‘‘special ratio’’ or set of instructions that directs its activities. The former guarantees the self-sufficiency of S; the latter constitutes the completeness of S because it directs the substantial form F as F creates and maintains a unity with its passive principle. By such means, S retains its identity and self-sufficiency. In conclusion, Sleigh’s analysis of substantial unity in the correspondence with Arnauld and the Discourse on Metaphysics contributes significantly to our understanding of many of the subtleties of Leibniz’s metaphysics. Once we place the
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questions that remain from that study in an appropriately broad textual and contextual scope, we begin to discern Leibniz’s underlying assumptions about the power of the active mind-like principles of nature to confer unity, self-sufficiency, and completeness on substances. Although more textual study needs to be done before a full account of Leibniz’s later views is available, the analysis presented here constitutes a first attempt to construct a thoroughgoing account of Leibniz’s theory of substantial unity.
Notes I thank Don Rutherford and Jan Cover for helpful comments on this essay, and the National Endowment for the Humanities for support during my research. 1. Among scholastic philosophers, there is a standard distinction between unity per se and unity per accidens. Although there is some disagreement about how to account for each, the Latin per se implies that the feature (in this case, unity) has its source in the nature of the substance and is essential. It was common for seventeenth-century German philosophers to define unity per se in terms of ens (being) where the assumption is that every substance has ens and everything that has ens has unity per se. As Leibniz puts it to Arnauld: ‘‘I cannot conceive of any reality without true unity’’ (LA 97). It is in this sense that a unity per se is a substantial unity. Unity per se is contrasted with unity per accidens because the latter does not arise from the being of the substance, but from something else (say, the coordination of parts). For Leibniz’s rough contemporaries on this topic, see, e.g., Weidling 1696: tab. 2; Stier 1641: cap. 3; Stahl 1655: tab. 14. In the correspondence with Arnauld, Leibniz insists that an accidental unity or a unity per accidens is ‘‘a phenomenal unity’’ and exists ‘‘by opinion, convention’’ (LA 101). See Sleigh 1990: 120–121. 2. At the end of his discussion, Sleigh poses a few questions that arise about his conclusions. One of these concerns how memory is supposed to work. Sleigh’s analysis of the doctrine of marks and traces requires that every substantial form ‘‘remember’’ its past states. A question arises about how nonconscious souls can do this. Sleigh’s answer to the question is based on a distinction that Leibniz sometimes makes between ‘‘the sheer reoccurrence of a previous perception, unaccompanied by consciousness of past perception’’ and a memory ‘‘which is remembrance accompanied by consciousness of past perception’’ (Sleigh 1990: 133). It would seem that memory of the former sort is available to nonconscious minds. 3. See, e.g., Adams 1994; Rutherford 1995a. In ‘‘Leibniz to Arnauld: Platonic and Aristotelian Themes on Matter and Corporeal Substance,’’ Martha Bolton raises the question that I have noted here about substantial form and substantial unity. I would like to thank Bolton for a prepublication copy of that article (Bolton 2004), which takes a different approach to the question from mine. 4. It